

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN TATARSTAN

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
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ABSTRACT

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY IN TATARSTAN

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This thesis analyzes the rise and decline of the intertwined concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in the case of Tatarstan. The rise and fall of the ethnic revival of the Tatars is examined within a micro perspective as a part of the ongoing concept of autonomous sovereignty. The post-Soviet sovereignty experience of Tatarstan is evaluated within a macro chronological perspective taking the concept of state capacity into account. Research findings of this study reveal that the ethno-national nomenklatura network under the leadership of Mintimer Shaimiev was always the determinant in shaping the content of the ethnic revival in Tatarstan compared with the other rival actors, TOTs and Democratic Opposition. The legacy of the Soviet nationality policies formed a solid ethnicity regime structure, which created and constrained the Tatar nomenklatura elites. Thanks to this historical legacy, the Tatar nomenklatura elites mobilized and instrumentalized nationalism for their elite survival

strategy and self-gain in the period of ethnic revival. During the 1990s, due to the expansion of the sovereignty of Tatarstan, the Tatar nomenklatura elites focused on obtaining as many concessions as possible from the federal center by putting forward the discourse of sovereignty. However, starting from the 2000s until today, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura exhibited a very submissive attitude against the overcentralization policies of Moscow. Having forgotten the sovereignty discourse of the 1990s, the Tatar elites currently chase federal subsidies and investments, which reveals how their pragmatic nationalist view easily adopts the new political conjectures

Keywords: Sovereignty, Ethnic Mobilization, Tatarstan, Elite Theory, Russian Politics

ÖZ

TATARİSTAN’DA ETNİK MOBİLİZASYON VE EGEMENLİĞİN YÜKSELİŞİ VE DÜŞÜŞÜ

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
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Bu tez içiçe geçmiş etnik mobilizasyon ve egemenlik kavramlarının yükselişi ve düşüşünü Tataristan olayında (örnekleminde) analiz eder. Tatarların etnik uyanışının yükselişi ve çöküşü, devam eden özerk egemenliğin bir parçası olarak mikro perspektifle incelenir. Tataristan’ın Sovyet sonrası egemenlik deneyimi makro tarihsel bir perspektifle devlet kapasitesi kavramı göz önüne alınarak değerlendirilir. Bu çalışmanın araştırma bulguları göstermiştir ki: Mintimer Şaymiyev’in altındaki etnik-milliyetçi nomenklatura ağı diğer rakip aktörler olan TOTs ve Demokratik Muhalefet’le karşılaştırıldığında Tataristan’da etnik uyanışın içeriğini şekillendirmekte her zaman belirleyiciydi. Sovyet ulus politikaları mirası Tatar nomenklatura elitlerini yaratan ve sınırlandıran sağlam bir etnisite rejimi oluşturmuştur. Bu tarihsel miras sayesinde Tatar nomenklatura elitleri kendi elit varlıklarını sürdürme stratejisi ve kişisel kazançları için milliyetçiliği mobilize edip

arařsallařtırdılar. 1990’lar boyunca, egemenlikteki geniřlemeden kaynaklı olarak, Tatar nomenklatura elitleri, federal merkezden alabildiđince ok taviz almaya, egemenlik sylemini ne ıkararak odaklandılar. Fakat, 2000’lerden bařlayarak gnmze kadar Tatar etnik-milliyeti nomenklaturası Moskova’nın ařırı merkezileřme politikalarına karřı ok itaatkar bir tavır gsterdi. 1990’ların egemenlik sylemini unutan Tatar elitleri federal destekler ve yatırımlar kovalıyorlar, ki bu da onların pragmatik milliyeti bakıřının yeni politik konjoktre kolayca uyum sađladıđını aıđa ıkartıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Egemenlik, Etnik Mobilizasyon, Tataristan, Elit Teorisi, Rusya Politikaları

To My Grandmothers, Emine Yılmaz and Hatice Dinç
Anneanne ve Babaanneme



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics
CC	Central Committee
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union
DPR	Democratic Party of Russia
FSB	Federal Security Service
GKChP	State Emergency Committee
IR	International Relations (Academic Discipline)
ITsNF	Initiative Center of the Popular Front
KADETS	Constitutional Democrats
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NEP	New Economic Policy
RF	Russian Federation
RSDP	Russian Social Democratic Party
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
RT	Republic of Tatarstan
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
TASSR	Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
TOTs	Tatar Public Center
UR	Union Republic
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, they do not...The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

Karl Marx¹

When Valery Tishkov saw the demands of the Tatar committee during the negotiations for the February Treaty, he asked me: "Will you leave Russia?" I replied to him: "Staying inside Russia was not our choice, so separating from it will not be our choice, either." Then, he asked me again to clarify the point: "As far as I understand you do not want to separate from Russia, but you do not want to be a part of Russia?" I replied to him "exactly".

Indus Tagirov²

Both universalism and particularism are two ineradicable dimensions in the making of political identities, but the articulation between them is far from being evident.

Ernesto Laclau³

There are more nations than states in modern era. The concepts of nation and state are considered as inextricable notions. In fact, a state is an apparatus of governance and nation is a political-cultural community. Some cautious estimates claim that now there are more than 3,000 nations in the world, while in the United Nations, 192 states are represented. Moreover, only 20 states out of 192 are ethnically homogenous. Some estimates also claim that only 3 percent of world's 6,000 national groups have achieved

¹ Karl Marx, (1937) *18th Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 5.

² My Interview with Indus Tagirov, Professor at History Department of Kazan Federal University, Kazan, 05.10.2016.

³ Ernesto Laclau, (2007) *Emancipation(s)*, London-New York, Verso, p. 29.

statehood.⁴ Although stateless nations constitute a significant amount of world population, they are omitted and marginalized by state centric international politics. The demands of recognition of minorities most of the time caused ethnic conflicts since majority nationality discourses of the nation-states consider the recognition demands of minorities as a security threat. The state centric officials are keen on conceiving diversity and multinationality as a form of instability. Hence, the nation-states oscillate from assimilating the diversity to accepting and accommodating them under several forms of autonomy. Federalism and regional autonomy are the highest stages of types of governance which aim to accommodate diversity. In fact, 39 percent of world population are living under a form of federalism or autonomy in today's world.⁵

Even under a form of federalism or high level autonomy, the central governments are reluctant to share the power with the autonomous units. Most of the governments of the multinational states are under the influence of the state-centric traditions. Naturally, they consider the relationship between state and ethnic groups as a zero-sum game, rather than a win-win situation.⁶ In fact, the national identity of the stateless nations are multilayered similar to the individual identity. The national identity of the minority nations involves nested identities, including the national identity of the majority. In other words, a Tatar or a Catalan is at the same time Russian and Spanish respectively. The minority-friendly liberal theory tends to approach stateless nations or minority nationalism in a positive manner. This paradigm highlights that minority nations have a significant potential to increase democratization of the nation-states. I appreciate minority-friendly approaches in the liberal theory and significant works of authors, such as Lord Acton, James Tully, Willy Kymlicka, Micheal Keating and Bhikku Parekh. It is obvious that stateless nations possess incomparable structural

⁴ Ephraim Nimni, (2013) "Stateless Nations in a World of Nation-States." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Karl Cordell, Stefan Wolf, pp. 55-67. London-New York, Routledge.

⁵ John Kincaid, (2010) "Federalism and Democracy: Comparative, Emprical and Theoretical Perspectives." In *Federal Democracies*, eds. Micheal Burgess, Alain M. Gagnon, pp. 299-325. New York, Routledge.

⁶ Renat Shaykhutdinov, (2007) *Give Peace a Chance: The Origings of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements in Multi Ethnic States*, Texas, PhD Dissertation at Texas A&M University, p. 22.

paths to enhance the equality and liberty principles in comparison with the majority nations in western democracies. In this thesis, I attempted to pursue the issue of minority nationalism and federalism in the context of Russia. However, in the context of Russian federalism, I cannot reach a similar result to the structural paths of the western forms of federalism. The Russian Federation has its own sui generis federation model, which is very distinct from the Western democracies. In the Russian federalism context, the legacy of Soviet nationality policies has a crucial place that forms a historical-institutional structure. The Soviet Union's ethnically codified legacy of the Soviet nationality policies created a high level of path dependency, which would have dramatically shaped the post-Soviet nationality policies of the Russian Federation. In other words, the structure of the ethnicity regime of the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly continuing in the post-Soviet Russia.

I believe that the Soviet Union implemented a sui generis nation building model, which can be revealed better by the distinction of cultural and political nationalism. Although hierarchically institutionalized, the Soviet state allowed for the cultural and linguistic flourishing of the minority nations. For example, mother tongue education and research on history of the minority nations/ethnic groups were legal and subsidized by the Soviet government. The central support on cultural nationalism was organized hierarchically depending on the institutional status of minority or titular nations. From top to bottom, the Soviet state was administratively organized as follows: Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), Autonomous Regions, Autonomous Provinces, and Autonomous Districts.⁷ At this point, Terry Martin emphasizes the cultural nationalism sphere of the early Soviet federalism under the title of 'affirmative action policies'. According to Martin, in the period of *Korenizatsiia* (Nativization) the Soviet state initiated a huge project in favor of non-Russian nations and ethnic groups. The Soviet Union even converted some ethnic groups which most probably would not achieve to develop as a nation in the

⁷ Dimitry P., Gorenburg, (2003) *Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation*, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, p. 47.

natural progress of history.⁸ In contrast to the cold war arguments of ‘Prison of Nations’, the Soviet Union not only allowed the usage of mother tongue, national education, and cultural rights but also in some cases invented and consolidated infant nations. However, preferential treatment to the non-Russians stabilized under the concept of ‘Russians as first among the equals’ in the Stalin era. The Stalinist regime ceased the affirmative action via remaining loyal to the Soviet template of ethnically codified nation building project. Nevertheless, the main template of the Soviet nationality regime had already been formed by the end of 1930s including fixing ethnicity in identity documents.⁹ Although coding ethnicity/nationality to the internal passports paved the way for the deportations of Stalin prior and during the Second World War.¹⁰ The stabilization of nationality policies of the Soviet Union continued up to the dissolution.¹¹

As for the political nationalism, Moscow strictly controlled the titular republics. The national ideologies which were articulated in different ideologies rather than the established order were harshly suppressed and punished by Moscow. Hence, the titular elites had to be loyal to the established order and Soviet communism in order to be in power in the titular republics and other types of Soviet autonomous units. The alternative national discourses were generally labeled as ‘nationalist deviation’ or ‘bourgeois nationalism’ by the Soviet authorities. Even national communism of Sultangaliev, which was influenced by the proto-dependency school ideas, was strictly suppressed and punished by the Soviet authorities.

By institutionalizing each ethnic group on a particular land, the Soviet government planted the seed of secessionist ethno-nationalism, which would wake up in the period

⁸ Terry Martin, (2001) *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, New York, Cornell University Press, p. 15-20.

⁹ Francine Hirsch, (1997) “The Soviet Union as Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses.” *Slavic Review* 56 (2), pp. 251-78.

¹⁰ Şener Aktürk, (2015) *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 197.

¹¹ Rogers Brubaker, (1994) “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account.” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 47-78.

of Glasnost and Perestroika and would facilitate the collapse of the Soviet state. The Tatar national movement and sovereignty mobilization similar to the other titular republics of the Soviet state had risen on this ground. However, the titular nationalisms and sovereignty projects were restricted under the framework of the legacy of Soviet nationality policies. Even though the concept of path dependency is generally implemented to understand the patterns of the economic issues, the concept fits much better to the issue of nationality regimes.¹² In other words, the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies had a crucial impact on the formation and future limitation of post-Soviet titular republics' sovereignty movements.

Another significant issue which is also related to the Soviet nationality policies is the role of titular elites in the period of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Soviet nationality legacy created and empowered the native state elites in the titular republics. The already created titular national elites in the early Soviet period found a place to strongly flourish in the period of Brezhnev. The long tenure of the native leaders in the era of Brezhnev, in particular, consolidated the positions of non-Russian state elites in the union and autonomous republics, which I prefer to name as 'ethno-national nomenklatura'. These ethno-national nomenklatura legacy marked the last years of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet politics with regard to the rapid transformation of the Soviet politics. In the union and autonomous republics ethno-national nomenklaturas skillfully instrumentalized nationalism, in order to secure their elite positions in power. The weakened state capacity of Moscow allowed these ethno-national nomenklaturas to play in their own islands safely for their private gains. The transformation into the market economy resulted in the intensive change of the state assets from the federal center to the titular republics. In addition, the privatization and control of the local state property provided the enrichment of the ethno-national nomenklaturas. Hence, the issues of minority nationalism, stateless nations and democracy in the Western context are so distinct to understand the reality in the Eurasian context. For example, minority elites of the stateless nations in the West challenge the majority nationalisms constantly to reveal their identities and take sovereignty concessions from the central

¹² Aktürk 2015: 41-42.

authorities. For example, the cases of Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland are the significant examples that examine the aforementioned point.¹³ However, in the Russian case, the ethno-national nomenklatura's of the autonomous republics were very submissive and they adopted the overcentralization policies of the Putin regime without any resistance. In other words, while the tiny conflicts can create big storms in the West in the Russian context the ethno-national nomenklaturas remained very submissive, even in some moments supportive of the federalism hostile policies of the federal center in Russia.

Following the paths of above-mentioned issues, this thesis focuses on the case of Tatarstan taking into account the sui generis character of Russian federalism. I will examine the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan, taking into account the reproduction of Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura. At the beginning of the research journey of this thesis, I was influenced by the idea that the Volga Tatars could enhance the democratization of Russia similar to the other stateless nations in the western countries. However, I encountered with an authoritarian regime, even on some occasions having similar or more authoritarian regional practices than that of the federal center, Moscow. When I questioned the autonomous authoritarian structure of Tatarstan, I witnessed the continuity of the nomenklatura structure. The ethno-national nomenklatura, which was also a product of the Soviet legacy, in fact, creates the barrier for democratization of Tatarstan similar to the authoritarian policies of the federal center which creates the barrier for democratization of Russia. Furthermore, I observed that the pragmatic self-interest based ethno-national nomenklatura was not so sincere for the demands of sovereignty. The local and federal state elites have very strong informal ties among themselves, which cause integration under the control of Moscow. In other words, the ethno-national nomenklatura and the central nomenklatura are the members of the same oligarchical club, which will always find a common ground even under the most conflict-ridden moments. Hence, in this dissertation, I argue that the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura

¹³ See for example, Micheal Keating, (2001) *Nations Against the State: the new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland*, New York, Palgrave. and Elçin Aktoprak, (2010) *Devletler ve Ulusları: Batı Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik ve Ulusal Azınlık Sorunları*, Ankara, Tan Kitabevi Yayınları.

instrumentalized nationalism for their self-gain and staying in power. For example, the state elites of Tatarstan retreat back when they do not need nationalism and they become very adoptive to the vertical power of the Russian state, which reveals how the Tatar regional elites instrumentalized nationalism and sovereignty discourses for their elite power. I pursued this argument in a micro and macro chronological perspective in the period of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty. As for micro research I examine the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization period in a compressed period of time. The issue of sovereignty, however, is examined approximately for two and a half decades (1990-2015). The quarter century long post-Soviet sovereignty experience of Tatarstan proved how the ethno-national nomenklatura is still active and determinant in the regional politics of Tatarstan and also how they are open to collaborate with Moscow even under the most disadvantageous moments. At this point, the question of why I choose the Tatarstan case among 21 autonomous republics in the Russian Federation lead us to examine the significance of the case of Tatarstan

1.1. Significance of the Tatarstan Case

In the Soviet period Tatarstan was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). The borders of Tatarstan did not change in the post-Soviet period. Tatarstan, located in the Volga region, neighboring the autonomous republics of Mordovia, Chuvashia, Mari-el, Udmurtia, Bashkortostan, and Kirov, Ulyanovsk, Samara and Orenburg Oblasts. Tatarstan is the most populated autonomous republic in the Russian Federation. As of the 2010 census the population of Tatarstan was 3,786,488. The ethnic distribution of the population according to the 2010 census is as follows: Tatar (Volga Tatar) 53.2, Russian 39.7, Chuvash 3.1 and others 4.1 percent. In fact, approximately one third of the Tatars are living in Tatarstan and majority of them dispersed through the other parts of the Russian Federation. In the 1989 census of the Soviet Union, the population of the Tatars are determined as 6,645,558, 5.5 million

living in the Russian Federation. Volga Tatars are Russia's largest ethnic minority constituting 3.8 per cent of the population of the Russian Federation.¹⁴ (See table 1.1)

Table 1.1. Ethnic Makeup and Density in Tatarstan, 1989

<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Population in Region (%)</i>	<i>Population Outside of region</i>	<i>Density (%) (Percentage Out of RT)</i>
Tatar	3,641,742 1,765,404 (49)	5,522,096	32
Russian	1,575,361 (43)	119,865,946	1
Chuvash	134,221 (4)	1,773,645	8
Bashkir	19,106 (0.5)	1,345,273	1
Other	147,650		

Source: George, Julia, A. *The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 59.

Historically Volga Tatars¹⁵ (Hereafter Tatars) were the most developed Muslim population in terms of early written culture and widespread literacy. They had early statehood experience such as Bulgar State and Kazan Khanate. Having possessed strong bourgeoisie, national press and intelligentsia, they were the leading Muslim nation of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century.¹⁶ The Tatars encountered with two significant ethnic mobilization periods roughly at the beginning

¹⁴ Goskomstat, (1996) *Itogi Vserossiiskoi Perepisi Naselenia 1989 Goda*. Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications.

¹⁵ In the historical contexts, “Volga Tatar” name is used. Both in the historical and modern contexts, the name of ‘Tatar’ is generally used.

¹⁶ Katherine Ellen Graney, (1999) *Projecting Sovereignty: Statehood and Nationness in Post-Soviet Russia*, PhD dissertation, Madison-Wisconsin, PhD Dissertation at University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999, p. 63-64.

and at the end of the 20th century. Concerning the first ethnic mobilization period, there was a global nationalist wave after the First World War, which affected on and formed the Tatar nationalism. As a result of the global nationalist wave, the multinational empires were replaced with nation states. The Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian Empires disintegrated. At the beginning of the 20th century, the minority ethnic mobilization affected many ethnic groups in Russia. The minority national discourses challenged the unity of the Tsarist Empire. However, the Bolshevik revolution dramatically changed the probable disintegrative destiny of the Russian Empire. Along with the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia managed to secure its territorial integrity and multinational structure. As a result of the implementation of the Soviet nationality policies, the minority ethnicities/nations of the USSR completed their Soviet type nation building. However, Glasnost and Perestroika policies of Gorbachev, triggered the ethnic-national mobilization which would disintegrate the Soviet Union, starting and disseminating through the whole Soviet space from the Baltic republics. Republics of the Soviet Union and other autonomous units which were similar to matryoshka nesting doll, were affected by this wave at various levels. For example, all of the union republics left the Soviet Union in the era of the turmoil at the end of 1980s. Concerning the autonomous republics, the process of ‘parade of sovereignties’, a process that simply aims to enlarge and deepen the demands of sovereignty, had already started. The Russian Federation was significantly affected by the aforementioned nationalist wave. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) of the Russian Federation began to be mobilized and sought to deepen their particular sovereignties. Among these autonomous states, Tatarstan was the most nationalist one.¹⁷ Tatarstan was very daring regarding the demands on sovereignty. In addition, the Tatars had a high level national consciousness which would necessitates from Moscow to act specifically and specially for Tatarstan.

The second mobilization period of the Tatar nationalism occurred at the end of 1980s, almost one century later than the previous one. This time mobilization movement was squeezed within a very short period of time. Between 1988-1994, the Tatars

¹⁷ Elise Giuliano, (2011) *Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics*, New York, Cornell University Press, p. 91.

experienced a social transformation which could not be imagined a few years before 1988. The Tatar nationalism extended their demands to the independent statehood. The demands of independence dramatically declined in the middle of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the asymmetrical federal status of Tatarstan consolidated with the signature of the federal treaty at the end of the bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Kazan in 1994. The issue of sovereignty of Tatarstan enjoyed its golden years during the 1990s. However, the sovereignty began to be constrained by Putin's centralist policies starting from the 2000s. In other words, while the rise and decline of the ethnic mobilization continued 4-6 years, the rise and decline of the sovereignty continued much longer, involving approximately a quarter century. One of the most significant reasons behind the achievements of the high level of autonomous sovereignty in the 1990s is the low state capacity of the Russian state. After the rise of Putin to the power, the state capacity of the Russian state was reestablished and improved. In the course of 2000s, Moscow gradually reduced and constrained sovereignties of the autonomous republics, as well as that of Tatarstan. I believe that the issue of ethnic mobilization can be studied in a micro perspective since the rise and decline of the ethnic mobilization lasts a very short period time, but the ethnic mobilization can reappear again in an optimum moment of time in the future. On the other hand, the issue of sovereignty of the autonomous units vis-à-vis the host states is a living process and it is better to study it in the long run to observe change in the sovereignty of the case studies. Accordingly, I prefer to approach the sovereignty issue in Tatarstan between the years of 1990 and 2015, which correspond to the presidency periods of Yeltsin and Putin (Medvedev/Putin)

During the 1990s, Tatarstan managed to get high level asymmetrical federative concessions from Moscow. Tatarstan's refusal of the federal treaty of 1992 and its enforcement of Moscow signing a separate treaty reveals the high level federative status of Tatarstan. Even under the fierce centralization attacks of Putin, Tatarstan symbolically secured its sui generis federative position in comparison with the other autonomous republics. For example, after 2013, the presidents of the autonomous republics had to consent using the title 'head' instead of 'president'. Currently only Tatarstan remains using the title 'President'. Even this symbolical particularity as well

as peaceful negotiations with the federal center during the turmoil years of 1990s makes Tatarstan a very interesting case regarding federalism and minority nationalism studies. Beyond this point, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura has always been the strongest regional actor in Russian politics. Their actions were imitated by the other autonomous republics. The already established ethno-national nomenklatura network of Tatarstan has survived under different political conditions of Yeltsin and Putin periods. Hence, continuity of the ethno-national nomenklatura can be explored better in the Tatarstan case rather than in the other autonomous republics since in some regions and republics the state elites were replaced with the new loyal actors by Moscow in the period of Medvedev.

The case of Tatarstan attracted the author of this dissertation since the Tatars were the most populous minority in the Russian Federation. In addition, Tatarstan was the most nationalist republic in the period of ethnic mobilization at the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The high level sovereignty demands of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation turned into an example in conflict resolution studies as an illustration of a peaceful negotiation under the title of 'Model of Tatarstan' in the post-Soviet period.¹⁸ In fact, the religious identity of the Volga-Tatars is an interesting case for the studies of Islam in Russia. In this thesis, the author omits the debates on religion in Tatarstan. Religion in Tatarstan can be a significant study per se or even for the ones who research non-systemic Tatar nationalism other than the sphere of ethno-national nomenklatura, The Tatar radical national movement articulated in Islamic discourses at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s as a result of the decline of the sovereignty project of Tatarstan. This makes 'Islam in Tatarstan' a hot topic of discussion. Unfortunately, this thesis will not focus on this research area.

¹⁸ See the discussion about Model of Tatarstan in Nicole Balkind (2009) *A Model Republic? Trust and Authoritarianism on Tatarstan's Road to Autonomy*, Chapel Hill, MA Thesis, University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, p. 5-11.

1.2. Main Argument and Methodology of the Thesis

This thesis mainly focuses on how the ethno-national nomenklatura in Tatarstan instrumentalized minority nationalism for their self-interest and the monopolization of power. I examined this process in a micro and macro perspective in the period of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty. The western literature which researches on Tatarstan generally omits the nomenklatura origins of the Tatar national elites. Most of the works in western literature consider that the autonomous republic status of Tatarstan can cause the democratization of Russia and Russian federalism similar to the other stateless nations in the West.¹⁹ As mentioned previously, I started my academic journey on Tatarstan with these western resources. I focused on the potentials of identity demands of the minority nations for creating a structural path that enhances democratization of the majority nations. Unfortunately, these minority-friendly works omit the internal regime characteristics of Tatarstan. Mintimer Shaimiev's nomenklatura network in Tatarstan created an authoritarian regime that takes its main political support from the rural Tatar population. Shaimiev was reputed for being one of the most authoritarian regional leaders in the Russian Federation.²⁰ The high level executive power of Shaimiev paralyzed the distinction of execution, legislation and judiciary, which are a sine qua non of a liberal representative democracy. The republican regional media and election processes are simply under the control of Shaimiev, which closes all the doors for alternative political choices in Tatarstan. In this sense, the regime of Shaimiev and its continuity under Minnikhanov is very similar to the other republics led by nomenklaturas, such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

With regard to the enrichment of the state elites, Shaimiev regime followed the same path of the other ethno-national elites of the former SSRs. Media reports estimates that Shaimiev network controls 70 percent of the economy of Tatarstan.²¹ Naturally,

¹⁹ See for example, the works of academics, such as: Katherine E. Graney, David Cashaback, and Helen Faller.

²⁰ Linda Roysi, (2004) *Russian Centre and Periphery: Explaining the Political Autonomy of Tatarstan*, Candidate Poiticarum Rerum, University of Bergen, p. 75.

²¹ Ibid., 74.

Shaimiev's two sons Radik and Airat are listed in the Forbes Dollar Billionaire list. The collapse of the Soviet Union and power gap resulted in the transformation of the state assets from Moscow to Kazan at the beginning of the 1990s. Hence, monopolization of power caused the consolidation of regional oligarchy which has high level connections with regional bureaucracy. There are some works which zoom on authoritarian and oligarchical character of the state elites of Tatarstan.²² However, these works omit the federal center's oligarchical, nomenklatura led regime character as well. Some of them even accuse the negotiations, which was a famous example named as model of Tatarstan in the conflict resolution literature, between Tatarstan and Russia in 1994 as it has been mentioned earlier. This kind of opposite minority hostile line simply uses the regional authoritarianism as excuse to attack federalism principle in general. Hence, this thesis is skeptical in terms of both Eurocentric and majority-nation influenced works, which I believe that they are not enough to understand the Tatarstan case as they omit significant points that constitute the Russian federalism. Although I have criticisms for their methodology these works have significant contributions to the Russian and Eurasian studies literature.

The reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura has political and economic aspects. In this thesis, I put forward the patterns of the political formation of ethno-national nomenklatura and its instrumentalization of nationalist discourses to form legitimacy for sustaining and consolidating their 'caste' or 'new class' located in high level bureaucracy both in the Soviet and post-Soviet period.²³ In this context, the informal ties between central and ethno-national nomenklatura form a crucial constitutional element that shapes the structure of the Russian federalism. The Soviet nomenklatura system, which emerged during the Stalinist regime, was mainly

²² See for example, Galina Yamelianova, (2000) "Shaimiev's Khannate on the Volga and Its Russian Subjects." *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol.1 no.1. pp. 37-52. and S. Sergeyev and E. Sergeeva, (2011) "Tatarskii Etnonatsionalizm v Respublike Tatarstan: Ot Raccaveta do Zakata." In *Novye Problemy i Protivorechia Sotsiokulturnogo Razvitiia Respubliki Tatarstan*, eds. A.L. Salagaev, S. Sergeev, L. V. Luchsheva, pp. 211-223, Kazan, KNITU.

²³ See for example, the nomenklatura formation in the USSR: Bohdan Harasymiw, (1969) "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Recruitment System." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2., No. 4., pp. 493-512.

dependent on the patron-client relationship. The patrons simply promoted the clients in return for political support, and since the clients were appointed to the bureaucracy by the patrons, they became very loyal to them. The enlargement of the patron-client relationship to all the levels of Soviet bureaucracy necessitated the informal ties among Soviet bureaucrats. In other words, the privileged nomenklatura via patron-client relationship and its natural result of consolidation of informal ties, made the elites feel that they were the members of the same club. These informal ties among nomenklatura members were enhanced starting from the Stalinist regime. Furthermore, the ethno-national nomenklaturas in the union and autonomous republics strengthened their informal ties with the federal center, particularly in the Brezhnev period, in which the titular elites found the long ruling opportunities.

The Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura was the product of the afore-mentioned bureaucratic structure of the Soviet state. In addition to the Soviet nomenklatura structure, the Volga Tatars were always well integrated to the Russian established order from the collapse of the Kazan Khanate to the end of the October Revolution. This historical background strengthened the nomenklatura informal ties between the Russians and the Tatars. Hence, the Tatar state elites indeed were always loyal to the Soviet Union. Shaimiev's support on coup attempt of the hardliner communists against Gorbachev with the aim of securing the Soviet Union can be understood in this context. Likewise, the Central Asian republics' ethno national-nomenklaturas were not enthusiastic to separate from the USSR, and most of them waited until the last moment to declare independence. For example, Kazakhstan was the last SSR which declared its official independence. I assume that from the beginning the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura under the leadership of Mintimer Shaimiev did not have a political agenda which would disintegrate Tatarstan from the Soviet-Russian established order. Hence, they simply instrumentalized the wave of ethnic mobilization and nationalism to get concession from the federal center to create an asymmetrical federalism, which would consolidate their reproduction of status of elite leadership.

Following the emphasis on the above-mentioned points, this thesis examines the patterns of reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura in the era of the rise and

decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan. The reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura can be analyzed under three main dimensions: the historical-institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, the national discourses of the state elites and the concept of state capacity. These three focal points are the main dimensions of my argument in this thesis. In other words, I will analyze the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan, taking into account the patterns of reproduction of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura.

The historical-institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policies is very significant due to seeding the flourishing grounds of the minority nationalisms that would be politicized at the end of the Soviet era. The Soviet state's institutional and hierarchical organization of titular region's administration can be evaluated as a sui generis nation building model. 'The socialist in content national in form' was the main characteristics of the Soviet type of nation building, which was similar to a communal apartment building.²⁴ According to the metaphor of Yuri Slezkine, in this communal apartment the common spaces were allocated to the Russians, and the numerous flats were allocated to the titular nations. The main template of the Soviet nationality policies was created in the era of Lenin and Stalin. This template continued until the collapse of the Soviet state.²⁵ The codification of ethnicity/nationality into internal passports facilitated sustaining national identity distinctions. The Soviet state with various forms institutionalized the ethnic identity and created titular national elites. Hence, the titular elites became part of the nomenklatura structure. The legacy of Soviet nationality policies resulted in consolidation of the ethnicities even in an established order in which Russian language and culture was dominant. It also led to the enhancement of titular elites, who were loyal to their patrons in Moscow. The emergence of ethno-national nomenklaturas and Soviet type of nation building was the main legacy of the historical and institutional heritage of the Soviet Union. In addition,

²⁴ Yuri Slezkine, (1994) "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism." *Slavic Review*, 53.2., pp. 414-452.

²⁵ Brubaker 1994: 47-78.

this legacy to a large extent determined the future of the various ethnic mobilizations, which started on the brink of the collapse of the Soviet state.

The Tatar ethnic mobilization and dominance of the Shaimiev network vis-à-vis the Tatar nationalists who were coming from out of the nomenklatura was the result of the Soviet nationality policies' strong path dependency. In other words, the ethnic mobilization and sovereignty game were played in the structural field of the Soviet nationality policies. This thesis focuses on this historical-institutional structural line in detail. However, only structure is not enough to understand the behaviors of the actors in the Tatarstan case. Despite the fact that from the beginning there were also alternative nationality discourses of Tatar nationalists and pro-unionist Democratic Opposition, Shaimiev had always a very advantageous and hegemonic position. From the beginning, Tatar nationalism was not a homogenous block or a deliberative democracy nodal. On the contrary, the Foucauldian conflict based discourse analysis can account for the competition and concession moments in the Tatar national imagination as well as the pro-federative challenging alternatives.²⁶ In addition, focusing on nationalism as an ideological discourse helps to account for the Tatar nationalism in a comprehensive manner, involving the competition and concession moments of various national discourses in the period of ethnic mobilization. To be concrete, in the case of Tatarstan, three main actors struggled against each other which were: The republican elites (Ethno-national nomenklatura), the Tatar nationalists, and Pro-unionist Democratic Opposition (Pro-Russian opposition).²⁷ At the end, the republican state elites' moderate nationalism and non-maximalist sovereignty project won the political war in Tatarstan. The nomenklatura network of Shaimiev skillfully created and administered national grievances and he managed to instrumentalize the already emerged Tatar national movement for his elite survival strategy in order to stay in power in the chaotic years during the end of the Soviet Union. At this point, as

²⁶ See for example, the antagonistic political theoretical lines between Foucault and Habermas in Steven Best, (1995) *The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, Habermas, Critical Perspectives*, the USA, Guilford Press.

²⁷ Sergei Kondrashov, (2000) *Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan 1988-1992: Origins and Development*, London, Macmillan Press LTD, pp. 73-81.

Brass points out, ethnic mobilization emerges generally in the period of intensive social transformation. Hence, the people of Tatarstan were simply very anxious for their future on the wake of the collapse of the Soviet state. They were very vulnerable to follow the manipulative nationalism of the ethno-national nomenklatura, emphasizing the interethnic inequalities between Russians and Tatars, which omits the long-term upward Tatar mobility as result of the 70 year-led Soviet modernization. The social turmoil and deteriorating economic conditions attracted most of the Tatars, causing the rise of ethnic mobilization. From 1988 to 1994, the regional government of Tatarstan was more prestigious than the central government in Moscow.²⁸

The last dimension of my argument is about sovereignty. Having explained the Tatar ethnic mobilization in a compressed period of time, I focus on the concept of sovereignty within a macro process, which covers the years between 1990 and 2015. In fact, the concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty are intertwined. The titular ethnic mobilization was a part of the period of the rise of sovereignty. Similar to national identity, the issue of sovereignty is an open-ended, malleable and a living process under structural limitations.²⁹ Most of the works in the literature partially cover the concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty. For example, some works focus on the issue of ethnic mobilization in detail by omitting the macro analysis of the sovereignty process.³⁰ On the other hand, some of the works in the literature focus on the sovereignty issues in a comparative perspective by omitting the details of the specific cases, such as Tatarstan.³¹ In this thesis, I jointly analyzed the intertwined concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty taking into account the reproduction of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura.

²⁸My interview with Dilyara Murzina, Associated Prof. at Sociat and Political Conflictology Department of Kazan National Research Technical University, Kazan, 03 October 2016.

²⁹See the discussions about identity in Bhikku Parekh, (2008) *A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 61.

³⁰ See for example, Sergei Kondrashov, (2002) and Rustam Gibadullin, (1998) *Tatarskoe Natsional'noe Dvizhenie: Politicheskaya Deiatel'nost' i Vliianie v Tatarstane (1988-1992)*, Kazan, Izdatel'stvo Kazanskogo Universiteta.

³¹ Mark R., Beissinger, (2002) *Nationalist mobilization and collapse of the Soviet state*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

The sovereignty issue as a part of my main analysis will be discussed taking state capacity into consideration. During the 1990s, the state capacity of the federal center was very weak. Hence, the centrifugal trend of the autonomous republics strengthened the asymmetrical federalism in the Russian federation. Although not democratic, the Russian federalism seemed similar to the western type of federations due to lack of central authority during the 1990s. The ethno-national nomenklaturas in the autonomous republics enriched and increased their authoritarian rules. Russia's weakened position, however, never turned into a claim of maximalist sovereignty in Tatarstan. Shaimiev regime was still loyal to Moscow and Yeltsin in the weakened condition of the federal state. After the agreement of the February Treaty in 1994, Shaimiev supported Yeltsin in the elections. Moscow also did not consider the rising autonomy of Tatarstan as a serious problem since it was an alternative model of peaceful negotiations instead of violent conflict which emerged in Chechnya. However, after the accession of Putin to the power, the vertical power of the federal center began to increase dramatically. Thanks to the increase of the oil prices, the federal center expanded its state capacity. The vertical power and authoritarianism in general gradually brought back the kind of Soviet type authoritarian established order. After the Beslan massacre, the federal center increased its attacks on the regions. Even the republican elections were replaced with the central appointment system, which turned the republics into de facto 'oblasts'. The ethno-national nomenklatura in Tatarstan did not resist sufficiently to the overcentralization policies of Moscow which started after 2000. Shaimiev was very submissive in that he even supported to the elimination of the presidential elections in the autonomous republics.³² At the end of the 2000s, the Tatar state elites' discourse of 'sovereignty, federalism, nation building' were already replaced by 'political rentierism'. The project and investment seeking policies of the Tatar state elites may also contribute to their self-interests and the regional economy. However, the issue of sovereignty had already vanished, which also proves how ethno-national nomenklatura of Tatarstan are loyal to Moscow. This situation also reveals the brotherhood of two oligarchies, namely Kazan and Moscow.

³² Roysi 2004: 75.

1.3. Notes on Area Study

This study attempts to go beyond the borders of positivism. As prominent Turcologist Zürcher points out, it is very difficult to write a research for a foreign country for outsiders. Outsiders do not have so many opportunities to immerse in the politics of a specific research country in comparison with the natives since they do not have enough knowledge about the culture, economy and society of the country which they study. However, sometimes being an outsider is advantageous in various contexts.³³ In the same way, like a person who cannot notice near objects, sometimes locals cannot notice the ongoing dynamics of the political structure of their own countries. In this research, I attempted to overcome these limitations of being an outsider in various ways. I lived one year in Kazan and learned Russian at Kazan Federal University so as to be familiar with the cultural habits of the Tatarstanani society. Unfortunately, I could not improve my Tatar language, which I started to learn at Kazan Islamic University. The dominance of Russian language in the public sphere does not inspire foreigners to learn Tatar language, for those who even speak Turkic languages. I have been in Kazan many times between 2013-2017. In my final trip to Kazan in September-October 2016, I conducted 15 interviews with the prominent academics and the actors of the Tatar national movement and pro-federative Democratic Opposition, including Prof. Rafael Khakimov, Prof. Indus Tagirov, Prof. Damir Ishakov, Prof. Ravil Gabdrakhmanovich Fakhretdinov, Prof. Vladimir Belyaev, Prof. Sergey Sergeyev, Prof. Tatiana Titova, Assoc. Prof. Vasil Sakaev, Assoc. Prof. Rustam Gibadullin, Assoc. Prof. Dilyara Murzina, Assoc. Prof. Dilyara Galiullina, and research assistant M.Z. Ilshat Amirovitch as well as some other officials. The in-depth interviews were conducted in Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny, second biggest city of Tatarstan and the former stronghold of the Tatar national movement. The in-depth interviews and long period staying in Kazan helped to constrain the positivistic tendency of the case study research. During my field research, I did not limit myself to one-dimensional ideological lines. On the contrary, I attempted to explore various

³³ Eric Von Zürcher, (2016) *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, p. 9-10.

conflicting ideological discourses from the Tatar national movement involving its statist and non-statist radical fractions to the pro-federative and ethnically Russian Oriented Democratic Opposition. I conducted research at the library of Kazan Federal University and National Library of Tatarstan. In this study, overwhelmingly English as well as Russian and Turkish resources are used.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

This dissertation is structured as follow:

In Chapter 2, I highlight the theoretical framework of the thesis. I examine the concept of ethnicity as political construction of elite discourses. Having followed the concept of ethnicity as elite discourse, I emphasize the advantages and drawbacks of the adopted approach. The main drawbacks of the structuring of ‘ethnicity within elite discourse’ is attempted to be surpassed by adopting the structural explanation of the Soviet nationality policies. Hence, I examine ethnic mobilization arguments in the Eurasian context in great detail by put forwarding the superiority of the historical-institutional arguments among several significant arguments and approaches which explain ethnic mobilization. In the second part of the chapter, I examine the issue of sovereignty and minority nationalism taking the Tatarstan case into account. I attempt to understand and conceptualize minority nationalism, autonomous sovereignty and state capacity concepts within the Eurasian studies perspective taking the patterns of reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura into account, which will frame the theoretical formation and argument of this research.

Chapter 3 attempts to examine the Tsarist and Soviet nationality policies, which will cause and constrain the emergence of the Tatar national movement at the end of the Soviet era. Chapter 3 emphasizes that the Bolsheviks totally reversed the Tsarist era nationality policies which were associated with assimilation and russification. The multiethnically and institutionally codified nationality policies of the Bolsheviks were shaped by Marx and Engels’ writings. The polemics with Austrian Marxists and Rosa Luxemburg helped to finalize the Bolsheviks’ views on nationalism and territorial

autonomy. The ideas of the Bolsheviks finally consolidated in the era of Lenin and Stalin and continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union to a large extent. Chapter 3 examines this aforementioned process in a chronological way. The Soviet nationality policies is very significant for understanding the rise and decline of Tatar ethnic mobilization and drive for sovereignty since they create a structural path dependency which is highly determinant for framing even the post-Soviet nationality policies.

In Chapter 4, I attempt to focus on the whole Tatar history from early history and pre-modern era to the beginning of Gorbachev period. The Tatar nationalists attach a lot of importance to the early statehood of the Tatars. The Tatars in fact had a bright medieval history including the statehood experiences of the Bulgar state and Kazan Khanate. The references to the past have become one of the significant constitutional parts of the Tatar historiography and nation building in the post-Soviet period. In chapter 4, I seek to explore the ‘golden era’ of the Tatar nation as well as the ‘dark era’ of suppression under the Tsarist rule. In addition, I focus on the emergence of modern Tatar nationalism and the consequences of Soviet modernization for Tatarstan.

Chapter 5 examines the dynamics of the emergence, rise and decline of the Tatar national mobilization in the period of collapse of the Soviet Union. The analysis is limited by the years between 1988 and 1994 since the ethnic mobilization period occurred and disappeared in a compressed period of time. Having explained three main actors namely, ethno-national nomenklatura of Shaimiev, Tatar nationalists and pro-unionist Democratic Opposition, Chapter 5 analyzes the reasons behind the ethnic mobilization and sovereignty claims in Tatarstan in a micro chronological perspective. In addition, Chapter 5 reveals the elite survival strategy and Tatar ethno-nomenklatura’s instrumentalization of the Tatar national movement for their strategy which aimed to stay in power in the post-Soviet era.

In Chapter 6, I examine the concept of sovereignty in the Tatarstan case taking the concept of state capacity into account. In a macro chronological perspective, I seek to explore the transition of the sovereignty claims of Tatarstan between 1990 and 2015. Having accepted the concept of sovereignty as an intertwined process with ethnic mobilization, I attempt to explain the rise of sovereignty in the decade-year rule of

Yeltsin. During the 1990s, Tatarstan managed to establish an asymmetrical federalism by taking lots of concessions from the federal center. However, Putin's accession to power totally reversed the situation. The change of the state capacity of the Russian state in the Putin/Medvedev period forced the autonomous republics to turn back to the Soviet type federalism structure. The Tatar state elites did not resist the centralization attack of the center. Hence, I attempt to reveal the transition of sovereignty focusing on the Tatarstan case as well as examining the reasons behind the submissiveness of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura against the ongoing overcentralization.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings and the research questions which guide the examination of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty within the Tatarstan case by focusing on the patterns of reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura. In addition, Chapter 7 seeks to highlight the sui generis Russian federalism and future prospects of federalism in Russia.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNICITY AND SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE EURASIAN CONTEXT

The Jacobin theory of one-nation one state was a recipe of tyranny and absolutism and the enemy of freedom.

*Lord Acton*³⁴

Shaimev's two sons Radik and Airat are shown in the Forbes Billionaire Lists. Both of them currently has 1.1-billion-dollar wealth, which put them in the list of ten richest families in Russia.

The Moscow Times, September 16, 2014

Political elites have a crucial role in determining the aspects of various nationality discourses. Undoubtedly, masses are not the passive followers of elites. People have to be convinced by the elite national discourses to mobilize. However, there is also the concept of structure, which constructs and restrains elite behaviors. Hence, structural analyses are the crucial for understanding ethnicity as well as poststructuralist discourse analyses in nationalism studies. In addition, there are clear differences between the majority and minority nationality discourses. Hence, it is better to analyze them contextually. In this chapter, I will mainly focus on minority nationalism in order

³⁴ Lord Acton, (1862) "Nationality.", *The Home and Foreign Review*, July 1862, pp. 1-16. Available at <https://direitasja.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/nationality.pdf>, (Last date accessed, June, 2017)

to conceptualize the issues of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in the Tatarstan context. The case of Tatarstan also reveals another distinction zone between the Western and Eurasian minority nationalisms and their demands on sovereignty. In this chapter, by focusing on the debates on ethnicity, I will attempt to present a comprehensive conceptual-theoretical framework. In the first part, I will explain my theoretical point of view on the concept of ‘ethnicity’. Secondly, I will focus on the ethnic mobilization approaches considering the Eurasian context. Thirdly, I will concentrate on the elite theory of ethnicity, which, I think, is the most efficient approach to comprehend the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization in the Tatarstan case. In the second part of the chapter, I will attempt to explain the concept of ‘sovereignty’, taking into account the perspectives of minority nationalism and stateless nations and finally, I will attempt to conceptualize the distinct character of Russian federalism by focusing on the Tatarstan case. I will highlight the nomenklatura system as a significant constitutional part of the formation of the ethno-national nomenklatura elites in Tatarstan. Lastly, I will attempt to explain the adoptive and submissive character of the Tatar nomenklatura in antagonistic political conditions by highlighting the concept of ‘state capacity’.

2.1. Theoretical Framework

The terms of ethnicity and nationalism are contested terms. In the nationalism literature, there are many significant works that attempt to theorize the origins of nationalism. Smith, Gellner and Anderson’s works are the pioneers of the debates on the origins of nationalism.³⁵ In this section, I will rather focus on the issues of ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and national elite discourses, which I consider significant to understand social reality in the Tatarstan case.

³⁵ For a further discussion about the origins of nationalism, See Umut Özkırımlı, (2010) *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.

2.1.1. Conceptualizing Ethnicity as a Political Resource (Political Social Construction)

The origins of the concept of ethnicity date back to the terms of *ethnos-ethnikos* in Greek civilization. Greeks used this term to describe non-Hellenic pagan societies. The modern definition of the ethnicity concept regarding sociology was coined by D. Riesman in 1953. The expanded usage of the term was started to be used during the 1960s and 1970s.³⁶ In fact, the concepts of ethnicity, race and nation have always been disputed. Anglo-Saxon tradition used the term to define minorities. On the other hand, European tradition used the term as a synonym for nationhood. The term became identical to conflict after the collapse of real socialism and Yugoslavian federalism. The term *ethnicity* degenerated into a synonym for tribal, primitive, barbaric and backward.³⁷ Until the works of Frederic Barth, ethnicity was conceptualized in an essentialist and fixed interpretation concerning cultural differences.

Before Barth, cultural difference was traditionally explained from the inside out-social groups possess different cultural characteristics which make them unique and distinct (common language, lifestyle, descent, religion, physical markers, history, eating habits etc.)³⁸

As Malisevic points out, Barth explained ethnicity from outside to inside. Barth defined ethnicity as social interaction. "It is not the possession of cultural characteristics that makes social groups distinct, but rather it is the social interaction with other groups that makes that difference possible, visible and socially meaningful."³⁹ Therefore, the identity, which creates a particular group, was determined by social interaction with another group. For example, an ethnicity study which is isolated from the relationship of a specific minority group with a specific majority or vice versa becomes obsolete. Among the classical sociologists, Weber highlighted

³⁶ N., Glazer and D. Moynihan, (1975) *Ethnicity; Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., cited in Sinisa Malesevic, (2004) *The Sociology of Ethnicity*, London, Sage Publications, p. 1.

³⁷ Malesevic 2004: 1.-2.

³⁸ Ibid., 2.

³⁹ Ibid., 3.

ethnicity on the grounds of social relation. Whereas Barth was explaining ethnic differences as social interaction, Weber was emphasizing the political aspects of interaction. As for Weber, the belief for ethnicity transformed into a group membership via political narrative. In this sense, “ethnicity is, can be defined, a politicized culture.”⁴⁰ To the extent that ethnicity is a political formation through the process of social action, it (re)creates the narratives of the common descent. As such, Weber’s contribution of defining ethnicity as status of privilege still involves crucial aspects to understand the concept of ethnicity.⁴¹

The definition of ethnicity as a political social relation situates the concept on the common grounds of various approaches. Among them, the most important ones are Neo-Marxism, Functionalism, Rational Choice, Elite Theory, Neo-Weberian Theory and Anti-Foundational approaches.⁴² Needless to say, all the approaches are valuable and explain some parts of social reality. However, as for the Tatarstan case, I believe that the modified elite theory with the structural analysis of the Soviet nationality policies legacy can be one of the best alternatives to understand most of the parts of social reality. In this thesis, I argue that the historical institutional ethnicity regime structure of the Soviet nationality policies engendered the formation of the Tatar nationalist elites, and when the Soviet State disintegrated and lost her state capacity, the Tatar national elites recreated a new nationalist narrative which combined the grievances of masses. In addition to the manipulation of the grievances, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura managed to instrumentalize non-nomenklatura national discourses in order to secure their elite positions in the turmoil years. The state elites had a decisive role in the destiny of the Tatarstan’s sovereignty project. This sovereignty project also gave them material benefits as the elite power continued in the post-Soviet period. Hence, the regional centrifugal sovereignty demands were framed under these conditions. Before elaborating on the elite theory of ethnicity

⁴⁰ Ibid., 141.

⁴¹For a further analysis of Weberian ethnicity, see, Ibid., 127-143.

⁴² For a detailed analysis about the sociological approaches of the concept of ethnicity see for example: Malesevic (2004).

considering the Tatarstan case, the issue of ethnic mobilization must be explained as the structural dimensional part of my argument, which frames the ethnic mobilization in the post-Soviet context. At this point, firstly, I will dwell on the ethnic mobilization approaches within the Soviet context. Then, I will put forward the argument of the historical-institutional approach within the Tatarstan context.

2.1.2. Theories of Ethnic Mobilization in the Eurasian Context

There were several approaches that attempted to explain post-Soviet separation and campaigns of sovereignty in the Eurasian Studies literature. Elise Giuliano categorized these approaches under four categories as: Historical Institutional, Demographic, Cultural, and Economic-Structural Arguments.⁴³ I will follow the categorization of Giuliano with some revisions. All these four arguments have potentials to explain social reality in the same way as the ethnicity approaches. Nevertheless, I believe that the historical-institutional approach, which was followed by the academics like Rogers Brubaker, Ronald Grigor Suny and Dimitry Gorenburg, explains the Tatarstan case better. First, I will describe the arguments in order to see the negative and positive aspects of them with a view to the Tatarstan case.

2.1.2.1. Historical-Institutional Arguments

According to this perspective, the roots of the rise of ethnic mobilization on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet State must be sought under the ethno-codified autonomy model of the Soviet State. The two main dimensions of the Soviet nationality policies were hierarchical ethno-territorial autonomy and the passport ethnicity model. The academics such as T. Martin, R. G. Suny, R. Brubaker and D. Gorenburg highlighted above-mentioned dimensions in line with the historical-institutional arguments.⁴⁴ As

⁴³ Giuliano 2011: 42.

⁴⁴ Terry Martin, (2001) *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, New York, Cornell University Press.; Ronald Grigor Suny, (1993) *Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford, Stanford University Press., Rogers Brubaker, (1996) *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ronald Grigor Suny points out, the Soviet nationality policies created the social and cultural base of the Republican minority elites, which would establish broad-based nationalist movements.⁴⁵ Likewise, Terry Martin puts forward that the Soviet nationality policies were an unprecedented multiculturalist project. Martin claims that the Soviet Union was an affirmative action empire in terms of allocating the group rights of the minority ethnic groups in the period of 1923-1941. With regard to the Soviet studies literature, the former nation-killing description of the Soviet state has been replaced with the Soviet type nation building arguments. The new argument, which was purified from the cold war clichés, mainly claims that the Soviet state, by creating national elites with the state resources, threw the seeds of secessionist minority nationalism. Dimintry Gorenburg partially revised the diversity focused positive discrimination or Soviet led nation-building arguments. He emphasized that the Eurasian Studies arguments, which are apart from the cold war era biased clichés, overemphasized the multiculturalist dimension of the Soviet state, and by doing so, has omitted the assimilationist policies of the Soviet nationality policies.⁴⁶ Yuri Slezkine's significant article, in which he likened the USSR to a communal apartment, concretized the Soviet nationality policies. As for Slezkine, the flats of the apartment were dedicated to the nations rather than the Russians, and the communal spaces of the apartment were under the hegemony of the Russian culture and language.⁴⁷ What is obvious is that the Soviet Union had an assimilationist and integrationist dimension under the dominance of Russian ethno-culture. Nevertheless, this assimilationist dimension was not powerful enough to save the country from the minority nationalism's waking up from the sleeping mode. In fact, minority nationalism was deliberately constructed by the state through the ethnically codified and diversified ethnicity regime of the Soviets.

⁴⁵ Suny 1993.

⁴⁶ Dimintry Gorenburg, (2006) "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation", *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*, eds. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble pp. 273-304, Washington D. C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

⁴⁷ Yuri Slezkine, (1994). "The USSR as a Communal Apartment or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism", *Slavic Review*, vol. 53, No. 2, pp.414-452

The Historical-Institutional approaches explained the rise of the nationalism in a positive framework. Nevertheless, the basic criticism against this approach contends that the approach could not explain the convincement of the masses that follow the nationalist programs. The Historical-Institutional approaches conceptualized masses as the passive followers of the nationalist elites. The nationalist mobilization waves on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union did not develop in every space at the same level. Among the SSRs, most of the Central Asian Republics were reluctant for independence and waited up to the last moment of the collapse of the USSR. The same situation occurred within Russia as well. Some ASSRs were very watchful for their sovereignty claims, and some of them were very daring to demand maximalist sovereignty. As Giuliano emphasizes, Dmitry Gorenburg provided a more comprehensive framework to explain nationalist mobilization inside Russia.⁴⁸ Gorenburg's work, which compared the four autonomous regions of Russian Federation, namely, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia and Khakassia, explained how state institutions variously penetrated into several republics at different levels. High ethnic mobilization was seen in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, whereas in Chuvashia and Khakassia, a lesser degree of ethnic mobilization was observed. Gorenburg argues that the institutions of native language education, academic institutions studying the local culture, ethnic preferences in government employment, and cultural institutions explain which ethnic masses mobilized behind nationalist movements.⁴⁹ Likewise, Mark R. Beissinger focused on the institutional backgrounds of the tide of the nationalism analysis of the SSRs, starting from the Baltic countries.⁵⁰

All these valuable analyses have some weak points to understand how masses approved and followed the nationalist discourses, which were created by the nationalist elites. In fact, this is the common deficiency of the elite-focused ethnicity approaches as well. Therefore, there is a need for more works which focus on the elite discourses

⁴⁸ Giuliano 2011: 44.

⁴⁹ Dmitry P., Gorenburg (2003).

⁵⁰ Mark R., Beissinger, (2002) *Nationalist mobilization and collapse of the Soviet state*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

and their hegemony by deconstructing nationalist elite discourses and understanding the consent of the masses that were mobilized by the state elites.

2.1.2.2. The Arguments of Demography and Settlement

These arguments overemphasize the role of population with regard to ethnic separatism. It is obvious that population matters. The larger and more concentrated minority ethnic groups have more chances to claim sovereignty. Likewise, central governments, which feel anxious by the widespread ethnic unrests are inclined to accommodate populously larger minority ethnic groups.⁵¹ Taking into account the issue of settlement, the minority ethnic groups, which were dispersed throughout the state, rarely seek or insist on sovereignty.⁵² At this point, Donald Horowitz claims that the power of the secessionist movement is inversely related with the heterogeneity of the population of specific regions.⁵³

Regarding the Russian case, however, these arguments cannot produce sufficient explanations. As Elise Giuliano points out, on the grounds of the data, nationalism is not correlated with the population of republics, in which titulars formed a majority, a plurality, or a minority population.⁵⁴ For instance, one of the most nationalist republics during the parade of the sovereignties of the era of glasnost, Yakutia and Bashkortostan, had a titular population of 33.4 and 22 percent, respectively. On the other hand, Autonomous republics of Dagestan, Chuvashia and North Ossetia had a strong titular population with 90, 69 and 53 percent, respectively. In these above-mentioned autonomous republics, no strong titular nationalist mobilization and sovereignty demands were observed. Hence, these autonomous republics were

⁵¹ Van Cott and Donna Lee, (2001) "Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35 (4): 30-58.

⁵² Renat 2007: 37.

⁵³ Donald L., Horowitz, (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 267.

⁵⁴ Giuliano 2011: 47.

identified as non-nationalist republics. In Tatarstan, titular population had a slight majority consisting of 48 percent of the population, and this was enough to make Tatarstan the most nationalist republic among the SSRs. Although Chechnya and Tuva had a clear majority of population with 71 and 64 percent respectively, the level of popular nationalist mobilization was behind that of Tatarstan.⁵⁵

In general, demography and settlement issues in some cases enhance minority ethnic nationalism as well. For instance, Kurds living in the Southeastern part of Turkey could resist the assimilative ethnicity regime of Turkey since they were the ethnic majority in the region. Moreover, they were surrounded by their co-ethnics from the neighbor countries of Syria, Iran and Iraq. Needless to say, titular demography and concentrated settlement provides the ground for the rise of minority ethnic nationalism. However, demographic arguments merely could not explain minority nationalisms and their politically discursively constitutional nature. With regard to the Russian case, demography-focused arguments failed to understand the rise of ethnic mobilization in titular republics.

2.1.2.3. The Arguments of Economic Interests

These arguments emphasize wealth as a catalyzer concerning the issue of ethnic separatism. Henry Hale points out that among former socialist states, the most separatist regions were often the richest ones.⁵⁶ Similarly, Treisman argues that economically advanced republics with rich natural resources and industry have high bargaining position vis-a-vis the center whether in the form of separation or the maximization of autonomy. Conversely, the poor republics have little bargaining power because of the dependence on the center.⁵⁷ From a similar point of view, Stoner-

⁵⁵ Population datas compiled from the 1989 USSR All-Union census cited in Giuliano 2011: 47-48.

⁵⁶ Henry E., Hale, (2000) "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting." *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000) pp. 31-56.

⁵⁷ Daniel Treisman, (1997) "The separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Post-Communist Order." *World Politics* 49 (January 1997) pp. 212-49.

Weiss emphasizes that resource rich republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Yakutia could demand to widen the economic control over the extraction and sale of oil, gas and diamonds.⁵⁸

In fact, the arguments of economic interest in terms of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty are partially explanatory to account the issue of ethnic mobilization in the Soviet Republics at the beginning of the 1990s. For example, the rich and developed Baltic republics sparked the wave of independence. Conversely, the less developed Central Asian republics among the union republics of the Soviet Union kept away from the independence up till the last moment when the collapse of the USSR was understood to be irreversible. Nevertheless, if the surface of these arguments is dug, the lack of correlation between economic arguments and ethnic mobilization can be observed as well. For example, among the union republics, the most nationalist ones were the Baltic republics and the least were the Central Asian republics. However, Moldova and Armenia were among the most nationalist republics similar to the Baltics. These countries, on the other hand, were not resource-rich or economically advanced republics either. Likewise, taking into account the ASSR level, Chechen-Ingush and Tuva were two of the less developed and rural dominant republics, but they had a high nationalist mobilization.⁵⁹ Among the ASSR republics, Yakutia, Komi and Karelia were the richest, but high level nationalist mobilization was only observed in Yakutia.⁶⁰ Gorenburg's comparison of Khakassia and Chuvashia was also challenged by the economic paradigms to explain ethnic mobilization. Gorenburg found that nationalist mobilization in Chuvashia was higher than that in Khakassia despite the fact that the former was economically more developed.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, (1997) "Federalism and Regionalism." In *Developments in Russian Politics* 4, eds. Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Y. Gitelman, pp. 229-250, Durham, Duke University Press, cited in Giuliano 2011: 55.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Gorenburg 2003: 200-233.

Briefly, the economic interest arguments are, to some extent, significant to understand the bargaining capabilities between regional and central governments. However, in the Soviet-Russian case, these arguments, to a large extent, fail to understand ethnic mobilization. Moreover, economic arguments presuppose that the elites are the major actors with regard to the issue of ethnic mobilization. Thus, they pacify and omit the role of masses who give the consent to the ethnic elites.

2.1.2.4. Cultural Arguments

Cultural arguments overemphasize cultural differences as the primary source of ethnic mobilization. Some of these arguments have primordialist view of ethnicity, which conceptualizes ethnicity as a fixed, frozen concept that would hold a fixed nature over time. Hence, cultural differences are thought to be sufficient to mobilize ethnic groups. In other words, the antagonisms and hostilities among ethnic groups were seeded via linguistic differences.⁶² The more modified forms of cultural arguments can be counted as versions of primordialism, ethno-symbolism. Ethno-symbolist arguments of Antony D. Smith basically highlight the endurance of group culture over time. The persistent nature of the cultural differences transmits from generations to generations in the form of memories and myths memories and myths, and thus, cultural differences are every time ready to be used by the ethnic mobilization discourses.⁶³

The realist international relations approaches, which approach minority ethnic nationalisms with doubt, have a tendency to conceptualize the issue of ethnic mobilization under a statist framework. These approaches tend to overemphasize the possibility of the emergence of ethnic mobilizations when the capacity of central states diminish to contain minority ethnic differences. Hence, within this perspective, the static nature of minority ethnic differences and nationalism are labelled as a security concern for the central governments.⁶⁴

⁶² See for an example of primordialist vision on ethnic mobilization, Helene Carrere d'Encausse, (1995) *The Nationality Question in the Soviet Union and Russia*, Oslo-Cambridge, Scandinavian University.

⁶³ Özkırımlı (2010).

⁶⁴ Giuliano 2011: 49.

Some of the cultural arguments have an ahistorical perspective, which seek the continuity of historical hostilities in the modern era. The oppressive legacy of the imperial states against their minorities and colonization are the catalyzers of the unforgotten hostilities among different ethno-cultural groups. With regard to the Soviet case, the religious oppression, regional economic inequalities, and linguistic assimilation were highlighted as the reason behind the rise of ethnic mobilization against Moscow. The Stalinist deportations and purges were the traumatic moments for the deported nations. However, the cultural arguments simply zoom on these tectonic faults, and very often exaggerate and distort oppressive memories under ahistorical specific nationalist discourses. By doing so, the historical hostilities were frozen and eternalized. Hence, the ethnic mobilization and separatist tendencies were overemphasized.⁶⁵

In practice, the cultural approaches to understand the issue of ethnic mobilization were falsified to a large extent concerning the Russian case. For example, as Elise Giuliano highlights if the autonomous republics of Chechnya, Ingushia, Dagestan were compared in the North Caucasia with regard to the Stalinist deportations, only in Chechnya a high level ethnic mobilization will be witnessed. Ingushians, Dagestanies together with Cherkessians, Karachais and Kalmiks did not dare to challenge the established order.⁶⁶ Likewise, the Volga Tatars were historically well integrated with Russians and the Russian state. Even at the end of the chaotic years of the Russian Tsardom, they demanded the cultural autonomy, which would be harshly criticized by the other Muslim nations, which would support territorial autonomy or independence. However, the highly integrated relationship between Russians and Tatars could not hinder Tatarstan's emergence as one of the most nationalist ASSR.

Briefly, the cultural approaches that attempt to explain the ethnic mobilization in the USSR and Russia are far from understanding the situation. Primordialism influenced

⁶⁵ Brown's work is one of the examples of this kind of works. See for example, Michael Brown, (1997) "The causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview." In *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Michael Brown&Owen R. Cote, Jr&Sean M. Lynn-Jones&Steven E. Miller, pp. 3-25, Cambridge-Mass., MIT Press.

⁶⁶ Giuliano 2011: 51.

the structural deficiencies of these arguments and conceptualized different cultural groups as hostile blocks against each other. Thus, these arguments omit the integrative success of Soviet modernization to combine various cultures under an ethnically diversified modern Soviet culture. Moreover, the national minority elites and masses were understood as combined blocks that always act under the same political behavior.

In my opinion, these four above mentioned arguments can explain some parts of the social reality of the ethnic separatism issue in the Soviet-Russian context. However, among all the approaches, the historical institutional approaches have the most explanatory resources. In this thesis, one of the dimensions of my argument regarding the case of Tatarstan will follow the path of the historical-institutional arguments. The second dimension of my argument to understand ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan is the discourses of elites, and the third one is the issue of the state capacity. All these dimensions explain the formation and survival of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura. I will attempt to elaborate on these issues in the following sections.

2.1.3. Understanding Ethnicity as the Political Construction of Elite Discourses

All the approaches adopted to conceptualize ethnicity are valuable since every approach sheds light on the layers of social reality. Nevertheless, I argue that in the Tatarstan case, the elite theory helps to understand more layers of ethnic mobilization and drives for sovereignty. Indeed, an inclusive elite theory of ethnicity which involves masses rather than focusing merely on the inter/intra relations among elites can be very useful for conceptualizing ethnicity in the Eurasian context. In this thesis, I will attempt to go beyond the borders of the elite theory of ethnicity. Before focusing on the pluses and minuses of the elite theory, I will first follow the origins of this theory.

The origins of the elite theory can be traced back to the works of Mosca, Pareto and Michel, who are the classical elite theorists who come from various disciplines such

as Social Anthropology, Social Psychology and Political Science.⁶⁷ The classical elite theory simply highlights how an organized minority can rule the masses. Their anachronistic conceptualization insists that even in the modern era, the distinction between the governor and the governed or the rulers and the masses did not change in content. Just as in the pre-Modern era, in the modern era, the domination of elites over masses continues.⁶⁸ The classical elite theorists rarely discussed ethnicity and nationalism. They focused on the power relations of the elites and on their capabilities of remaining in power. Hence, for the classical elite theorists, ethnicity was just an ideological mask, under which the political interests of the elites were hidden.

The contemporary elite theories regarding ethnicity put forward culture. Abner Cohen, Van Dijk, Paul Brass and Ted Gurr are the most prominent representatives of the contemporary elite theory approaches on the issue of ethnicity. Abner Cohen emphasizes symbols and their relationship with power. For Cohen, symbols are the integral part of power relations, and power represents the relations of domination and subordination. Hence, power is the constitutional aspect of social relations.⁶⁹ Indeed, symbols and rituals are very significant in Politics. People hate, love and kill each other because of symbols. Ernesto Laclau also highlighted the role of symbols and their articulation in right wing and left wing politics in his works.⁷⁰ As Malesevic points out, “Symbols possess indefinite and uncertain meanings but are, at the same time, indispensable for social action and communication. Collective action and, indeed, human societies more generally are inconceivable without the use of symbols.”⁷¹

Taking into account ethnicity, Cohen highlights the instrumental aspects of ethnicity which was used, distorted or (re)produced in several meanings that work for the benefit

⁶⁷ Malesevic 2009: 111.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Abner Cohen, (1979) “Political Symbolism”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 8, pp. 87-113.

⁷⁰ For a further discussion, see, Ernesto Laclau (1979), *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism and Populism*, London, Verso.

⁷¹ Malesevic 2004: 115.

of the elites. Cohen claims that ethnic symbols and nationalist discourses are instrumental for the elites. In other words, as Cohen claims, ethnic group leaders use cultural traditions and (re)formulate them as resources for the purpose of gaining power in the power struggles. As Malesevic quotes from Cohen:

Ethnicity in modern society is the outcome of intensive interaction between different culture groups, and not the result of a tendency to separatism. It is the result of intensive struggle between groups over new strategic positions of power within the structure of the new state: places of employment, taxation, funds for development, education, political positions and so on.⁷²

Another important figure, Teun Van Dijk, wrote many works about discourse analysis, ethnicity and race. Van Dijk highlights the connection between power and cultural reproduction. Van Dijk claims that cultural reproduction is always controlled by a mega elite discourse. Hence, the content of the symbols and their reproduction is always controlled by elites via state's ideological apparatus.⁷³

The elites' privileged position of controlling the symbolic resources of a specific state results in ethnic antagonism and its state-led legitimization. The state-led ethnicity discourses, which are articulated in ethnicity symbols, are crucial for the social cognition of the masses. Hence, the exclusive discourses are the basic reasons for minority domination and racism. Briefly, Van Dijk's focus on ideology and discourse is very significant with regard to domination via ethnic manipulation.⁷⁴

Paul Brass, who is working mainly on South East Asian politics, emphasizes the reinterpretation of the content of culture by the national elites in an instrumentalist way. In other words, cultural markers were bounded to the political interests of the elites. As Brass quotes about culture:

They are creations of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent, in order to

⁷² Ibid.,116.

⁷³ For a further discussion, see, T., A., Van Dijk, (1993) *Elite Discourse and Racism*, London, Sage Publication; T., A., Van Dijk, (2005) *Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America*, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publication.

⁷⁴ Van dijk 2005: 3-12.

protect their wellbeing or existence, or to gain political and economic advantage off their groups and for themselves.⁷⁵

According to Brass, ethnic mobilization generally occurs in the period of intense social transformation. Within these intensive social transformations, the politicization of culture is not inevitable, but rather it is determined by a set of social circumstances.⁷⁶ The political competition in Tatarstan at the end of the 1980s which included three actors, namely, ethno-national nomenklatura under the leadership of Shaimiev, Tatar nationalists, and pro-Russian Democratic elites, reminds us the Brass's claim of the need for intense social transformation for the emergence of ethnic group mobilization. Furthermore, the society in Tatarstan had means of symbol communication, the absence of immense class divisions, and socially mobilized population which is open to symbol communication. These three criteria are purported by Brass for successful ethnic group mobilization as well as intensive social mobilization.

Tedd Gurr's works focus on the violent forms of ethnic conflicts. He analyzed the role of elites in ethnic conflicts such as genocide and other forms of ethnic wars. His work on genocide was one of the examples of elites who mobilize popular support.⁷⁷ In fact, the case of Rwanda genocide fits the concepts of Gurr. The Hutu elites were controlling one of the most centralized states in the world. The genocide was activated by the top members of the government elites. The technical and ideological support was provided to the Hutu militia via the weapons of the army of Rwanda and the large scale state radio broadcasting of hatred speeches.

All in all, similar to the other approaches of ethnicity, the elite theory includes advantages and disadvantages to understand social reality. However, as I mentioned before, among various approaches, a modified elite theory explains the case of

⁷⁵ P. Brass, (1993) "Elite Competition and the Origins of Ethnic Nationalism." In *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, eds. J. G. beramendi, R. Maiz and X. Nunez, p. 111, Santiago de Compostela, University of Santiago de Compostela.

⁷⁶ Malesevic 2004: 118-119.

⁷⁷ T., R., Gurr, (1986) "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: a theoretical analysis." In *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, eds. M., Stohl and G., A., Lopez, New York, Greenwood Press.

Tatarstan more. One of the most disadvantageous points of the elite theory is the exclusion of the masses. The elite theory simply conceptualizes masses as the passive recipients that take whatever is given by the elites.

Both classical and contemporary elite theories treat not elites as passive creatures prone to easy manipulation. Unlike elites, who seem to be heterogeneous often in conflict with each other creative and skillful in their power struggle, the masses are largely viewed as homogenous, ignorant dependent conglomerates, with child-like qualities.⁷⁸

In this context, one of the significant points is the similarity between Marxism and the Elite theory. Malesevic claims that both approaches operate with the thesis of ‘false consciousness’. Most of the individuals internalize the ideologically distorted view of social reality. Hence, the ideological manipulation of the social reality is the common theoretical ground for the orthodox interpretations of Marxism and the Elite theory. Needless to say, in Marxism, false consciousness is structurally bounded to capitalist relations. According to the Elite theory, on the other hand, ideological manipulation of the elites is linked to human nature.⁷⁹ The Elite theory could not offer any structural linkages for its elite manipulation thesis. The issue of elite manipulation is perpetuated regardless of historical, social, economic and political conditions. For this reason, the elite theory could not offer a holistic approach in terms of ethnicity. Although the false consciousness thesis involves many problems, which put “Marxist revolutionaries” on the advocates of masses, the Marxist interpretations refer to the emancipatory paths by becoming conscious of class identity.

The above-mentioned points bring us to another problematic zone of the Elite theory. The Elite theory merely paralyzes the autonomy of culture and directly links it to an instrumental mentality, which operates in favor of the elites. The reduction of culture to politics stems from minority hostile position as well. Cohen, Van Dijk and Gurr define ethnicity as minority within the nation-states. However, Malesevic criticizes this majority friendly perspectives toward the minority ethnicity. As Malesevic states: “Minority ethnicity is possible only if there is an ‘invisible’ majority ethnicity. If

⁷⁸ Malesevic 2004: 125.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

‘minority groups’ emphasize their cultural distinctiveness it is only because there is a distinct dominant culture from which to differentiate themselves.’⁸⁰

Despite the fact that the elite theory of ethnicity involves the above-mentioned drawbacks, the elite approach is very crucial since the power holders have a decisive role to shape and construct the ethnicity regimes, official nationalist discourses and nation-building processes. In this thesis, I will attempt to fill the “structural” deficit of the elite theory with the historical institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policies. I assume that this modification can assist to understand the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization in general in Russia and in particular in the Republic of Tatarstan. In addition, this modification reveals the structural pattern which produced the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura.

2.1.4. Conceptualizing Sovereignty and Minority Nationalism

The state-centric international relations (IR) approaches assume that the international system emerged during the seventeenth century with the Peace of Westphalia.⁸¹ Before the late 1700s, sovereignty was thought to be residing in the body of Monarch. Bodin and Hobbes frequently described the ruler as the mortal God. From the beginning of the seventh century up until the nineteenth century, the divine oriented sovereignty transformed into modern concepts of “will of citizenry or people.”⁸² Hence, monarchical sovereignty turned into modern popular sovereignty. As Baudrillard contends, modern sovereignty began to be understood in terms of representation with its political and symbolic dimensions.⁸³ The modern understanding of sovereignty was generally described as “absolute authority a state holds over a territory and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by other sovereign states as a

⁸⁰ Ibid., 125.

⁸¹ Jens Bartelson, (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 137.

⁸² Cynthia Weber, (1995) *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 8.

⁸³ Baudrillard cited in Ibid.

sovereign state.”⁸⁴ In fact, the afore-mentioned description of sovereignty by the international relations scholars was rarely deconstructed. Instead, state-centric approaches fixed the meaning of sovereignty in an ahistorical way. Even in the modern sense, the concept of sovereignty represents different meanings in terms of space and time. Beyond this point, the conceptual relations of sovereignty in the Classical Age, Renaissance and Modernity represents a specific arrangement of knowledge and a specific mode of differentiation.⁸⁵

Before starting to explain the issue of power sharing in modern nation states, I contend that the concept of ‘nation-state’ has dramatically changed in the era of globalization. The evolution of the concept of sovereignty is generally omitted by the realist approaches of international relations (IR). The state-centric IR, while fixing temporarily and spatially the meaning of sovereignty within the Westphalian Nation-state context, failed to understand challenges posed by the minority to the nation states. Most of the essentialist concepts by the mainstream IR, such as sovereignty and nation-building are contentious concepts. For example, the issue of nation building is at the same time signifies nation killing for the minorities. Just as blindness to the historicity of sovereignty, the mainstream IR excludes and omits minority ethnic integration. Moreover, minority identity demands are considered within a security perspective, which is far from to notice the political, economic and cultural transformations for about three decades. At this point, I emphasize that the concepts of sovereignty, nation-state and nation-building are dynamic concepts and cannot be understood within the framework of the state-centric approaches.⁸⁶ I agree with the poststructuralist notion which claims that all these concepts are struggling in the arena of the political struggles of various discourses which cannot be fixed permanently.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Weber 1995: 1.

⁸⁵ For a detailed example, see, Bartelson (1995).

⁸⁶ See for example, the concept of nation building as political struggle of various discourses in Claire Sutherland, (2005) Nation-Building through discourse theory, *Nation and Nationalism* 11 (2), pp. 185-202.

⁸⁷ For a further political theory discussion about the roots of the deliberative versus agonistic democracy issues can be found in Steven Best (1995).

Although the term globalization is a contentious term, I agree to a large extent with the definition of it as increased global economic trade, the liberalization of economic markets, the advance of the multinational corporations, and capital mobility.⁸⁸ Taking into account the issue of sovereignty in the global era, what is significant is that nation-states are no longer the bosses of maximalist sovereignty even in their territories. They have to share some parts of their sovereignty with transnational economic rules and supranational organizations such as the EU, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. Some scholars even claim that the sovereignty of nation states has finished and a new form of global type sovereignty, what they called "Empire", has already emerged.⁸⁹ I partially agree with these arguments. There is a significant pressure to the nation states from top to bottom and from bottom to top. However, these pressures, namely recognition demands of minorities or sub-state regionalization demands from bottom, and supranational economic, political and institutional order from above, are not determinant enough to claim that nation-state sovereignty has vanished. After the Cold War ended, a unipolar world order emerged under the neo-liberal economic relations. Today, this post-Sovereignty era has uniqueness in itself; however, the nation-states are still the crucial actors in terms of the usage of sovereignty.⁹⁰

The era of globalization or post-Sovereignty period- if I use the term coined by Micheal Keating- turned into the scene of intra-state conflicts. Indeed, there have been increasing ethnic conflicts the since 1960s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ethnic conflicts peaked.⁹¹ On the other hand, globalization brought cultural homogenization with regard to the penetration of the American-influenced

⁸⁸ Margaret Moore, (2001) "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Minority Nationalism.", In *Minority Nationalism and Changing International Order*, eds. Micheal Keating and John McGarry, pp. 44-61., New York, Oxford University Press. pp. 44-61.

⁸⁹ Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri, (2000) *Empire*, Cambridge-Mass., Harvard University Press.

⁹⁰ Micheal Keating, (2001) *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in Post-Sovereignty Era*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press.

⁹¹ Thomas Benedikter, (2014) *Modern Özerklik Sistemleri: Dünya Özerklik Örnekleri*, İstanbul, Nika, p. 17.

western culture into the other parts of the world. Some of the proponents of globalization declared the end of nationalism or at least minority nationalisms. However, these claims seem to be failed and the individual and collective demands of the minorities continue with a rising trend. Hence, if minority ethnic mobilization continuous, there should be accommodation alternatives as well. Needless to say, devolution and accommodation were not coined in the era of globalization. The modern autonomy systems have almost been implemented for one century. Before I attempt to highlight the territorial approaches to ethnic accommodation, it is necessary to focus on minority nationalism and the reasons behind its durability against cultural homogeneity and linguistic assimilation.

2.1.4.1. Understanding Minority Nationalism

Stateless nations and other smaller minority ethnicities are generally considered within the framework of nation-states. State and nation seem to be understood as the indispensable integrated terms. Hence, the problematic conceptualization of minorities, in this sense, starts from this essential understanding. In fact, we are accustomed to living within this integrated duality. For example, in French, the term represents the nation-state. However, as Ephraim Nimni highlights, “A state is an apparatus of governance and a nation is a cultural community; these are two very different kinds of human groupings.”⁹² Indeed, most of the time, the match between nation and state does not create congruent units. For instance, as I mentioned earlier, there are approximately more than 3,000 nations. On the contrary, by adding Montenegro in 2006, there are 192 states represented in the United Nations. Fewer than 20 member states are conceived homogenous, which have minority population less than 5 percent of the whole state population.⁹³ Other estimates claim that there are 6000 national groups, only 3 percent of which achieved to reach independent

⁹² Ephraim Nimni, (2013) “Stateless Nations in a World of Nation-States.” In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolf, pp. 55-67., London-New York, Routledge.

⁹³ Micheal Brown, (1993) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 6., cited in Ibid.

statehood.⁹⁴ As I mentioned previously, the modern understanding of the state is a relatively new phenomenon. The Nation-State as a product of the advent of the modern society dated back to the 18th century. Before that, the states were different units in terms of sovereignty. These units from classical, middle and medieval times were referred to as “polis”, “civitas” and “regnum”.⁹⁵

The globalization process in this sense opened a new phase or dramatically revised the concept of the modern sovereignty. Hence, it created a lot of debates about the future of nation-states, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. Regarding the issue of minority nationalism, some skeptical arguments highlighted that nations are obsolete in the new order of globalization which depends on the intensification of interdependency and internationalism. Hobsbawm, for example, argues that nationalism was simply a product of modernism. Since modern sovereignty is evaporating, the supranational political institutions will be necessary within the paradigm of interdependency of the global economy. Minority nationalism, in this context, is a doomed attempt to copy the nation-state model, which is an outdated, archaic romanticism.⁹⁶

Needless to say, nation-states have, to a large extent, lost their sovereignties in the neo-liberal era. However, the violence apparatuses of the states such as police organization and army expenditures have been consolidated. In this context, the nation-states still, to a large extent, sustain their sovereignty in their particular territories. Regarding the issue of minority nationalism, on the other hand, we are witnessing the opposite of what Hobsbawm estimated. The new economic order of the free trade opened opportunities for minority nationalism concerning the increase in the importance of substate regionalism and supranational organisations such as the EU and NAFTA. The nation-state sovereignty vis-à-vis the free trade began to be contracted to the extent that regional economic blocks faded in. Another significant point is that supranational

⁹⁴ James Minahan, (2002) *Encyclopaedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*, Westport CT and London, Greenwood Press., cited in Ibid.

⁹⁵ Bereciartu Gurutz Jauregui, (1994) *Decline of the Nation-State*, Reno NV, University of Nevada Press, p.3., cited in Ibid.

⁹⁶ Moore 2001: 44-61.

organizations resolved the security dilemma of the minority nationalities, which makes them more defiant against their host states. Still another important point is that the small states are the new trend to govern and attract capital since they are advantageous over the bigger ones in terms of small bureaucracy and efficient administration.⁹⁷ Briefly, free trade capitalism provided new opportunities to the stateless nations. The arguments of the minority nationalism skeptics seemed to fail.

Taking culture into account, the skeptic minority nationalism arguments claim that the cultural homogenization will solve the 'problem' of minority nationalism.⁹⁸ These arguments highlight that globalization will be successful in eliminating the cultural distinctions among various nations. According to these arguments, nations were conceptualized as distinct cultures and languages. The weak aspect of these arguments is that first of all they specifically omit the multiple and nested identities of the stateless nations. The second point is that cultural differences are not the mere reason behind nationalist mobilization. Nations can, most of the time, be mobilized along other lines.⁹⁹

For example, in the case of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims shared a common culture, although they were divided among religious lines. Prior to the ethnic conflict, the religious distinctions were not significant among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Bosnian Muslims were one of the most highly secularized Muslim nations. The Yugoslavian society was highly integrated regarding common life, language, physical appearance and history. The most visible division was between the rural and urban communities. Likewise, Rwandan and Northern Ireland conflicts had a lot of similarities with the case of Yugoslavia. In these cases, cultural differences were very low within the societies. The antagonistic communities speak the same language and they have broadly similar cultural values. On the other hand, in the case of Canada and Switzerland, the competing communities speak different languages and

⁹⁷ Micheal Keating, (2001) *Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, New York, Palgrave, p.

⁹⁸ Moore 2001: 44-61.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

they have deeper cultural differences. Nevertheless, violent conflicts never emerged.¹⁰⁰

The above-mentioned points lead us to question the link between cultural difference and identity. The urbanization and globalization process can increase acculturation. However, the change in culture via acculturation does not mean losing the ethnic-national identity of minority nations. As Moore points out, “Acculturation can and does occur, perhaps even frequently, but what is much rarer is assimilation in the sense that the identity of the (as a distinct group) is given up and absorbed into the identity of a different group.”¹⁰¹ For example, in Turkey, most of the linguistically assimilated Kurds are one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Kurdish nationalism. Likewise, in Tatarstan, the urbanized Tatars, the most linguistically Russified portion, fervently began to support the nationalist discourses on the brink of the collapse of the Soviet State. Hence, the proponents of globalization disregard the unchanging character of identity. In other words, the powerful feeling or imagination as a different group continues even under the rain of linguistic assimilation and cultural acculturation. Most probably, the positioning of identity in relation with the “other” groups, generation by generation, reproduces self-identity with the burden of history and memories. The “good” represents integrative memories or the “bad” is associated with memories of assimilation through force. Hence, even the new generations born under very different social conditions could not go beyond the feelings belonging to a distinct group. The minority skeptics of globalization underestimate this essentialized feeling of “otherness” from the majority. As for the Tatarstan case, the afore-mentioned points can reveal the continuity of the Tatar national identity and Tatar nationalism. Some autonomy hostile advisors of Putin can hope that the increasing assimilation under Russian language would solve the nationality issue. However, as I highlighted above, the distinctiveness of belonging to a different national identity survives under the conditions of acculturation and assimilation. In an optimum moment, this potential can

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Moore 2001: 44-61.

be mobilized by a hegemonic political national discourse. Even the assimilationist and overcentralist policies of the federal center cannot stop this possibility.

2.1.4.1.1. Minority Nationalism and Democracy

The issue of democracy is a significant debate in terms of minority nationalism. The skeptics of the stateless nations generally argue that demands of the minority ethnic groups are archaic attempts, kind of pre-modernity reactions such as tribalism. Therefore, minority nationalism is not in accordance with modernity and democracy. On the other hand, counter arguments claim that the recognition demands of minorities promote democracy. If democracy means equality as Ranciere highlights, equality demands of the excluded ethnic groups can support the other equality demands of the democracy such as the equality between men and women, classes, genders and other marginalized groups within the society.

The debates on minority nationalism originally date back to the debate between John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton. As I mentioned, the skeptic arguments of globalization about the future of minority nationalism reveals that the long lasting argument of democracy with regard to minority nationalism still cannot draw a conclusion. John Stuart Mill was an ardent proponent of the nation-state model disregarding the ethnic differences. According to him, “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.”¹⁰² Mill’s nation-state paradigm implied that in contrast to the multinational empires, democracies must be uninational.¹⁰³ French Jacobin tradition was one of the ardent supporters of unitary nation-states as well. Habermas roughly positioned himself in line with the Mill’s thought. He points out that “While all nation-states have not been democracies, all democracies have been nation-states.”¹⁰⁴ At this point, Keating criticizes the “constitutional patriotism” concept of Habermas. For Keating, constitutional patriotism, which depends on the civic

¹⁰² Mill 1972: 392.

¹⁰³ Keating 2001: 8.

¹⁰⁴ Habermas (1998) cited in Ibid.

(good) version of nationalism against the ethnic (bad) version of nationalism, prefers big, consolidated states against the smaller states. The small states continued to be conceptualized as ethnic particularism against modernist universalism.¹⁰⁵

In practice, considerations of Habermas on consolidated bigger state vis-à-vis the smaller ones were falsified. Most of the stateless nations, for example, Catalans preferred inclusive civic nationalism concerning their sub-state nation-building model. On the other hand, the German nationality law still protects its ethnic and exclusionary content. Even the civic nationalism examples such as the United States and France can be conceived as ethnically inclusive but culturally not neutral.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, most of the examples of the stateless nations such as Catalans, Volga Tatars, Basques and Kurds reveal that stateless nations have a tendency to implement inclusive civic nationalism or nation-building models. For example, although Shaimiev had an authoritarian regime similar to Moscow, he achieved to highlight the civic nation building model in Tatarstan by giving references to the territorial bonds of the citizens that concretize itself under the title of “Tatarstani” citizenship. However, most of the post-Soviet republics followed the paths of the ethnicity-emphasized citizenship models.

Lord Acton, who can be associated with the pioneers of federalism in this context, composed pro-minority nationalist counter arguments. Acton emphasized that the modern theory of nationality is the greatest adversary of the rights of nationality.¹⁰⁷ Acton claimed that the multinational states are the better guarantors of democratic liberties and social progress. Acton harshly criticized the Jacobin conceptualization of unitary nation-state model. For him, “the Jacobin theory of one-nation-one state was a recipe for tyranny and absolutism and the enemy of freedom.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ For a detailed explosion of the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms see the works of Brubaker, Nairn and Kohn.

¹⁰⁶ Keating 2001: 9.

¹⁰⁷ Acton 1972: 268.

¹⁰⁸ Keating 2001: 9

Briefly, the above-mentioned debates show us that the conceptualization of minority nationalisms as a regressive tribalism or hindrance for universalized modernity is the biased discourses of majority nationalisms. In the post-sovereignty era, there are a lot of opportunities for the rise of stateless nations and minority nationalism. Furthermore, minority nationalism tends to approach the religious and ethnic differences in a friendlier manner than majority nationalism. However, if I argue that minority nationalism is progressive and liberal, and on the other hand, majority nationalism is regressive, authoritarian and fascist, I will fall into the essentialist trap. In nationalities and ethnic conflict studies, what is significant is to follow each case separately. In this context, the nationalist elites and the content of the nationalist discourses acquire decisive roles. If we conceptualize nationalism as an ideology, unlike other ideologies, nationalism has rarely been formulated through a coherent system of thought and precise program.¹⁰⁹ Nationalism is a flexible and thin ideology such as feminism and green thought. It can be incorporated into various fully-fledged ideologies such as liberalism and socialism.¹¹⁰ Taking the tendency into account, I generally agree with the pro-minority friendly arguments. However, in some cases, the ethnic elites of the minorities could adopt authoritarian and exclusive ideologies. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate all minority nationalities in a positive manner and to follow the Bolshevik distinction of the oppressed and oppressor nations. With regard to the Tatarstan case, which I will analyze in detail in the following chapters, I can say that among the various minority nationalist discourses, the civic nationalist content won the power struggle. Hence, the Tatar case should not be categorized under the category of exclusive nationalism considering the model of nation-building.

¹⁰⁹ Daniele Conversi, (2013) "Ideology and Nationalism." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, eds., Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolf, pp. 26-44., London-New York, Routledge.

¹¹⁰ Micheal Freeden, (1998) "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?." *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 748-765.

2.1.4.2. Understanding Autonomous Sovereignty

The issue of autonomy in the Western context has vertically three main levels. These are Federalism, Regional autonomy, and autonomy of local governments such as municipalities or devolution of the centralized authority from the strongest and the weakest. Among these levels, federalism has two dimensions, namely asymmetrical and symmetrical federalism. Asymmetrical federalism is a system in which the host state gives special and extensive governmental privileges to only one of the federal republics if they exist. For example, Tatarstan in Russia during the 1990s and Quebec in Canada are the examples of asymmetrical federalism since the autonomous states bilaterally negotiated the level of the autonomous sovereignty with the center. On the other hand, the United States is considered as an example of symmetrical federalism with regard to the limited privileges provided to her constituent states.¹¹¹ The level of autonomy in general is a disputed issue. Sometimes it is difficult to categorize various autonomous cases. At this point, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s investigation is one of the best works which systematized the territorial approaches to the ethnic conflict settlement. Therefore, I will touch upon the ambiguous concept of autonomy in line with the descriptions of McGarry and O’Leary.¹¹²

There are various strategies in the hands of governments that want to accommodate various recognition demands of the different national-ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. *Centripetalism* is one of the strategies of the incentives of the majority politicians taking into account the minority demands, particularly in unitary states. *Cultural Autonomy* (non-territorial cultural autonomy, corporate autonomy, extra-territorial autonomy) is a system that depends on group-based self-government, specifically for the dispersed ethnic groups living in a unitary state. *Consociation* is a system which accommodates plural communities and nations under a system of power sharing, and finally *territorial pluralism*, is a system that seeks accommodation through territorially based autonomy. Territorial pluralism can be divided into four

¹¹¹ Benedikter 2014: 47.

¹¹² For a detailed information about the issue of autonomy, see for example, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, (2013) “Territorial Approaches to Ethnic Conflict settlement.” In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolf, pp. 249-266., London-New York, Routledge.

levels of organizations as decentralization within a union or unitary state, federacy, cross-border territorial arrangements, and pluralist Federation.¹¹³

If I start with the issue of decentralization within a union or unitary state, I can say that this is a system in which central authorities can devolve some power to one or more regions asymmetrically without sharing judicial authority with the power devolved regions. In other words, this is a system which gives the authority to the center via the central judicial control unilaterally to decide on the level of decentralization with the regions.¹¹⁴ Some of the regional autonomies in Europe can be evaluated within this category. The United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are the most popular examples of decentralization via regional autonomy. North Ireland, Wales, and Scotland in the UK, Basque and Catalonia in Spain, South Tyrol in Italy can be analyzed under this category.

Beyond Europe, India is significant in that it is considered as a federation. Indeed, the unilateral power of the center to decide, share and decentralize sovereignty with the regions throws this ‘federation’ into the regional autonomy category. The regional units in India do not have any judicial power against the center. Hence, they have not a sine qua non power to be considered as pluralist federation.¹¹⁵

In a pluralist federation, on the other hand, sovereignty is divided between a federal government and its constituent units such as provinces, states, cantons, and republics. The division of power is entrenched in the constitution. Hence, unilaterally neither the federal government nor the constituent units are able to change the constitution. Ideal pluralist federations have to involve three dimensions. One of them is, as it was mentioned, constitutional guarantee concerning the sharing of power which includes, at least to some extent, control over the allocation of fiscal resources. The second dimension is that democratic relationship with the federal center must continue in the

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

intra-autonomous state. There should not be a majority oppression within the autonomous state. In other words, the administrative majority must be sensitive to the consensual and even consociate representation of the minorities within the autonomous unit. Finally, the multinational, or better to use plurinational character of the federations must be represented in order to involve nested identities within the autonomous unit taking into account the inclusive symbols and multilingualism. By doing so, the citizens of the majority nation and the minority ethnic groups living in the host, autonomous state will not feel alienated¹¹⁶.

Some pluralist federations allow their constituent parts to launch international relations on the condition that the international recognition and relation must not be contradictory to the federal law. The international recognition and representation of the substate unit can be considered as an example of the asymmetrical type of federalism. Tatarstan's international recognition on the grounds of trade and culture with the other states is one of the examples of this perspective, despite the fact that the sovereignty of Tatarstan is different from the western versions. Belgium and Canada allowed its constituent units to gain international character as well. French speaking populations of these countries can sit in the 'La Francophonie', the league of French-speaking states.¹¹⁷ Similarly, Russian Federation is represented as an observer member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation via Tatarstan and other Muslim populous autonomous units of Russia.¹¹⁸

Federacy is a kind of regional asymmetrical autonomy model, which obtains constitutionally guaranteed self-government from the host states. "When a nationality seeks guaranteed autonomy, but there is no general desire among the dominant nationality for a federation, the state can establish a federacy, that is, it can enter into

¹¹⁶ John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, (2005) "Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation and Federacy", In *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*, eds. B., O'Leary, J., McGarry and S., Khaled, pp. 47-91, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

¹¹⁷ McGarry-O'Leary 2013: 249-266.

¹¹⁸ See for example, Rustam Minnikhanov's visit on the OIC in February, 2017. http://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id=13130&ref=5752&lan=en.

a bilateral arrangement in which secured autonomy is offered to a part of the state only.”¹¹⁹ Puerto Rico’s relationship with the USA, and Northern Ireland’s 1998 treaty can be considered as the examples of federacy.¹²⁰

The final example of territorial autonomy is Cross-border territorial links. There are very few examples of such institutions since it requires high democratic capacity from the host state. Most of the time, national minorities have co-ethnics in the neighbor states beyond the borders. Even though national minorities obtain various autonomy levels, from federalism to the regional autonomy, still extra things should be done in order to satisfy national minorities. The most important thing is to open the channels of collaboration of the national minorities with their co-ethnics living in neighbor states. In this context, Northern Ireland and Ireland initiated joint policies over agriculture, food, safety, trade and business, and languages. Furthermore, North-South Ministerial Council was established to direct the joint policies with the Northern Ireland executives and the government of Ireland.¹²¹

With regard to the Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy or *Corporate Autonomy*, we can see the minority based self-government systems in cultural matters which entails public institutions that belongs to the minorities that are generally dispersed across the state. On religious base, Corporate Autonomy was implemented in the Ottoman Empire and Old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. *Millet* and *Kahal* were the names of the systems of the medieval corporate autonomy examples.¹²² Taking ethnicity into account, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer theorized the system from which Lenin would create counter-territorial arguments. Austrian Marxists’ proposal of non-territorial cultural autonomy aimed to save the Austria-Hungary Empire from the collapse of its dispersed minorities. A more complicated version of Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy occurred in inter-war Estonia. The system in Estonia gave the minorities

¹¹⁹ McGarry-O’leary 2013: 249-266.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

the right to control education, culture, libraries, theatres, museums and sport through cultural councils.¹²³ Furthermore, the Corporate Autonomy system has widely been implemented in most of the Western democracies and Eastern Europe.

Corporate Autonomy is significant in the context of Russia. “National Cultural Autonomy”, the definition of the corporate autonomy model in Russia, was presented in the second half of the 1990s. Due to the anxiety of the experienced centrifugal results of the Soviet ethnic federalism, Gavril Popov recommened first time the corporate autonomy model in Russia. He prepared a proposal for scrapping Russia’s system of territorial pluralism, and restoring the Tsarist system of ethnically neutral administrative regions.¹²⁴ In fact, as soon as the Russian State regained its state capacity in the Putin era, the Putin regime attempted to use the corporate autonomy to undermine Russia’s system of territorial pluralism. However, the already consolidated territorial ethnicity regime did not allow a shift from territorial to non-territorial autonomy in the federal center of Russia.

All these aforementioned autonomous examples mainly comply with the western autonomy models. Needless to say, the Russian case or the other territorial pluralities in authoritarian states have differences with the Western models. The formation and continuity of the nomenklatura system in the post-Soviet period is a significant feature of the sui generis Russian Federalism. Hence, in order to understand the issue of sovereignty and minority accommodation in Russia, I will attempt to frame the Tatarstan case taking the ethno-national nomenklatura aspect of the Russian federalism into consideration.

¹²³ John Coakley, (1994) “Approaches to The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict.” *International Political Science Review* 15 (3), pp. 298-314.

¹²⁴ Christiano Codagnone and Vasiily Filipov, (2000) “Equity, Exit and National Identity in a Multinational Federation: The ‘Multicultural Constitutional Patriotism’ Project in Russia.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 26 (2), pp. 263-288.

2.1.4.3. Understanding Sovereignty of Tatarstan under a Sham Pluralist Federation

I have mainly focused on the autonomous sovereignty taking the Western context into account until now. However, the structure of the Russian Federalism is very distinct from its Western counterparts. The legacy of the Soviet Union and its strong path dependency in the post-Soviet period necessitates the analysis of the Russian federalism separately. The Soviet Union was ostensibly a federation. The state structure was federated through ethno-national lines. However, the real power was tightly controlled by the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in Moscow. Although ‘the Soviets’, legislation bodies of the union republics and all forms of other autonomous units had to be elected by the local populations due to the constitution of the USSR, in reality the CPSU nominated all the bodies of legislation and executives, which paralyzed the notion of self-governance. Moreover, there was no judicial authority which would decide on the division of rights and functional spheres between the center and the republics.¹²⁵

This ultra-concentration of power in the hands of the CPSU augmented the bureaucratization of the Soviet state, which led to the emergence of patron-client relationships and other informal ties in bureaucracy. The degeneration of the Soviet state consolidated the nomenklatura ties and things got worse over time regarding the democracy and transparency of bureaucracy. Moreover, the titular elites joined the already created nomenklatura structure via the titular republics. The Soviet Union’s affirmative action policies for the titular nations created ethno-national nomenklaturas in the republics, which duplicated the patron-client relations of the center in their titular republics. The Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura emerged under these circumstances. Similar to the other titular elites, the Tatar titular elites consolidated their positions in the period of Brezhnev. In brief, the formation of ethno-national nomenklatura of Tatarstan had two main aspects: the nomenklatura system and the legacy of Soviet nationality policies. These two aspects created strong path-dependency patterns. Hence, the political culture of the Soviet era persistently continuous in the post-Soviet

¹²⁵ McGarry and O’Leary 2013: 249-266.

present. In the next chapter, I will analyze the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies in detail. In the next section, I will attempt to highlight the dynamics of the reproduction of the titular states' elites on the grounds of nomenklatura legacy.

2.1.4.4. The Nomenklatura System

The origins of the nomenklatura system date back to the pre-revolution period Bolshevik party model. The Bolshevik party structure operated illegally under the pressure of the Tsarist regime. Hence, structurally, the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks had limits concerning in-party democracy. The vanguard party model of the Bolsheviks, although organized hierarchically, adopted democratic centralism which allowed for free discussions and voting to determine the party policies. Lenin had prominent prestige, and the recruitment of the cadres to the high levels of the party administration was generally conducted by Lenin. Lenin highlighted this point at the 11th Congress of the Bolshevik party in 1922 as follows: "If the Central Committee is deprived of the right to direct the allocation of personnel, it will be unable to direct policy."¹²⁶ In other words, Lenin's stance for cadre nomination or recruitment was consistent with the structure of the Bolshevik party, which adopted a centralized, disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries, and the party also adopted a vanguard role vis-à-vis the working class and its organizations such as trade unions. All these features lay at the roots of rising bureaucratization and emergence of the nomenklatura system in the USSR. Nevertheless, Lenin took no direct part in the creation of the nomenklatura system.¹²⁷

The origins of the nomenklatura system began to emerge soon after revolution. Between 1919 and 1921, the infant forms of nomenklatura most probably emerged. In this period, the Soviets, the state apparatus, business firms, and trade unions were subordinated to the administrative authority of the Soviet state apparatus rather than the political leadership. Moreover, the party membership was subjected to the state

¹²⁶ Quotation of Lenin cited in T.H. Rigby, (1988) "Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura System." *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 40., NO. 4., pp. 523-537.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

apparatus, and the election process was converted into the appointment system in bureaucracy. The attempts of the workers to restore the autonomy of trade unions were defeated and labeled as anarcho-syndicalist deviation in 1921. The Kronstadt uprising was also harshly suppressed by the Bolshevik forces through the order of head of Petrograd Soviet, Grigori Zinoviev. Since 1921, under the authoritarian regime of Stalin with each successive year, independent-minded communists were liquidated and career-minded new pliable members were filled into the party, which caused the depolitization and overcentralization of the Soviet political culture. From 1921 onwards, the Communist Party penetrated into all layers of the society. The nomenklatura ties rapidly strengthened by the end of the collectivization-nationalization of all private properties in the Stalin period. Hence, the administrative authority of the party extended to most industrial, financial, transport, educational, cultural and media institutions in addition to the bureaucratization of the Soviets.¹²⁸

The nomenklatura system was hierarchically organized similar to a pyramid. With regard to the order of importance, at the top resides the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee. The other layers from top to bottom were as follows: nomenklatura of a republic central committee, nomenklatura of an oblast committee (obkom), nomenklatura of the city and urban raion committee (gorkom, gorraikom), and finally, nomenklatura of the rural raion committee.¹²⁹

The Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU was a huge bureaucratic machine functioning in more than twenty departments (otdely). The CC not only oversaw its corresponding otdely but also supervised the central ministries and governmental departments, which reveals that the CC was a de facto supreme executive organ in the USSR. The highest circle of the nomenklatura of the CC included the parties' highest bodies (Secretariat Auditing and Control Commissions) as well as the whole Presidium (Politburo) and Secretariat. The second part of the first layer consisted of the high

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ For a detailed information see for example, Bohdan Harasymiw (1969) "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Recruitment System." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2., No. 4., pp. 493-512.

officials of government, military, judiciary and press and KGB (Committee of State Security).¹³⁰ The second layer of nomenklatura was combined by the central committee of the union and autonomous republics. The nomenklatura system in this layer was the duplication of the central nomenklatura structure.

The nomenklatura system embraced all executive positions involving more than 3 million people. It extended from the party to the other leading posts, such as the military, the Soviets, the administrative apparatus, and public organizations, such as Komsomol, trade unions, women's groups and scientific intelligentsia.¹³¹

Undoubtedly, the nomenklatura system was a perfect tool for patronage and nepotism. The abolishment of the elections of the cadre recruitment in the Communist Party resulted in the enhancement of the informal ties. The informal ties replace the talent with the loyalty to the superior party members. Hence, the qualified cadres were replaced by poorly trained nomenklatura personnel in time. In fact, the informal ties that require loyalty and trust gradually created gerontocracy within the party. Women and youthful cadres found few opportunities to filtrate through the nomenklatura system. In the republics, the titular recruitment policies and the other affirmative action policies for the establishment of the cultural nationalism engendered the domination of ethno-national elites who are the significant parts of the nomenklatura system. These elites had to be loyal to their patrons whose power resides in the Politburo. The ethno-national elites' loyalty and trust for Moscow even continued on the brink of the collapse of the Soviet state.

The nomenklatura system began to dramatically change in the middle of the 1980s. Until that time, the nomenklatura system provided privilege to the Soviet elites politically. The material gains of the elites were limited. For example, the elites could live in good apartments located in the best places of the cities and could have best dachas for resting. They had privileges such as receiving gifts due to the patron-client relationship. In addition, their children could have high mobility to go abroad and

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid,

study. Other than these privileges provided by the political power, the gap between the life standards of the elites and those of the ordinary Soviet citizens were very little. However, Gorbachev's reforms, Glasnost and Perestroika, dramatically changed the elite structure of the Soviet nomenklatura.

The origin of early Russian capitalism dates back to the 'Komsomol Economy', which arose in the second half of the 1980s. Since then, the dynamics of the elite privilege shifted from power to property. As Kryshanskaya and White emphasize, the proposal adopted by the CPSU Central Committee in 25 July 1986 allowed Komsomols to function on commercial principles on the grounds of scientific and technical activity. It was due to this amendment that the first young Russian entrepreneurs took the stage at the beginning from 1987. The privileged commercial rights given to Komsomols resulted in state-led enrichment through middleman activities, such as buying and reselling video recorders, computers and other forms of technology products at exaggerated prices, and crude violations of the law.¹³²

The operating middleman service of Komsomol not only restricted with the scientific area. It also extended its scope to fashion shops, banking and import-export. By 1990, more than 17,000 youth cooperatives were functioning, employing about a million staff. Most of the early oligarchs had Komsomol origin, such as Igor Safaryan, Konstantin Borovoi, Konstantin Zatulin and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.¹³³ The research on the establishment of early Russian capitalism is beyond the scope of this study. However, I should highlight that the diversification of the Russian nomenklatura came from the privileged market economy rights of Perestroika which was monopolized by the state elites via isolating ordinary citizens. In other words, the state elites found the chance to improve their elite positions from bureaucracy to property by isolating the people of the USSR. The possession of private property via entering into market relations mainly occurred within six dimensions: the establishment of joint

¹³² Olga Kryshanskaya and Stephen White, (1996) "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite." *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 711-733.

¹³³ Ibid.

enterprises, the conversion of assets into cash, advantageous credits, property dealings, principles in import-export operations, and privatization of the state by state.¹³⁴

In brief, although diversified, the nomenklatura legacy continued in the post-Soviet era similar to the nationality regime of the Soviet state. The political dominance of the state elites diversified via economic dominance in the post-Soviet era. However, the oligarchical nature in essence continued from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period. In the federal center, the state elites' appropriation of the private property was a result of a more complex process than that of the periphery. In the regions and republics, the state elites' possession of private property generally occurred as the possession of regional-republican state assets via privatization during the 1990s. Hence, the autonomy and weakened state capacity of the Russian state caused the enrichment of ethno-national nomenklaturas via possession of state properties, particularly in the resource-rich republics. Undoubtedly, among the autonomous republics, the first one that comes to mind is Tatarstan due to its resource rich potentials.

2.1.4.5. Features of the Tatar Ethno-National Nomenklatura

The Tatar elites were historically well integrated to the Russian established order in the Tsarist era. When the expansion of the Tsarist Empire reached the Central Asian Muslim Nations, the Tatar elites played a mediatory role between the Russians and Muslims. This legacy continued even in the pre-revolution period at the beginning of the 20th century. The Tatar elites' insistence on extra-territorial cultural autonomy rather than territorial autonomy on the brink of the collapse of the Tsarist Empire proves the high degree integration of the Tatars under the Russian established order.

In the Soviet era, the integrative pattern between the Russians and Tatars continued. There were always grievances due to the low autonomous territorial status of Tatarstan. The Tatar elites from time to time expressed their disadvantageous territorial status; however, nothing changed due to the strict ethnicity regime of the Soviet state.

¹³⁴ For a detailed explanation of these six dimensions of the establishment of the early Russian capitalism, see for example, Ibid.

Nevertheless, good informal ties between the central nomenklatura and the ethno-national nomenklatura continued. In the Brezhnev era, the titular elites of the union republics enlarged their influence. Although the central nomenklatura was under the domination of Slavs, almost all the republics' first secretaries were appointed from the titular elites during the Brezhnev period.¹³⁵ The Tatars also benefited from the Brezhnev period in terms of titular appointment and economy. For example, Fikret Tabaev, the head of the TASSR, convinced Brezhnev to construct the giant track-machine factory, KamAZ in Tatarstan's city of Naberezhnye Chelny.¹³⁶

The escalation of ethnic mobilization, which could not be expected a year before 1988, dramatically changed the situation in Tatarstan similar to the other republics in the USSR. It was under the rule of Mintimer Shaimiev that the Tatars encountered the massive social transformation in the period of the collapse of the Soviet state. Tatarstan joined the wave of ethnic mobilization and drive for sovereignty which had begun to disseminate from the Baltic republics. However, the structural limitations due to low level autonomous republic status as well as good informal ties between the Tatar and Russian elites forced Shaimiev to pursue a reasonable path which did not aim a maximalist sovereignty project. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura was pressurizing Gorbachev to increase the status of the republic to the USSR level. However, after the collapse of the Soviet state, the strategy changed into getting as much concession from weakened Moscow as possible to form an asymmetrical status. The February treaty, signed in 1994, satisfied most of the demands of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura.

Without any doubt, Shaimiev was a nationalist person. However, he was at the same time a regional elite who wanted to remain in power. Hence, he skillfully managed to instrumentalize radical Tatar nationalism to show himself as a reasonable actor for Moscow. He established a nomenklatura network overwhelmingly from the rural

¹³⁵ Smith 2013: 217.

¹³⁶ My interview with Vasil' Sakaev, Associated Prof. of International Relations Department at Kazan Federal University, IR Department of KFU, Kazan, 30 September 2016.

Tatars. The periphery of Tatarsan became a support zone for Shaimiev since then. He coopted and integrated the urban Tatar intellectuals into his elite network, such as Rafael Khakimov, who would become his chief advisor. By doing so, he skillfully terminated the possible emergence of non-nomenklatura nationalism.

Shaimiev ruled more than two decades in Tatarstan. The transformation of the elite power to property in Tatarstan was a bit distinctive process than the situation which emerged in Moscow. Before anything else, Tatarstan was a resource rich country with high level of oil and gas resources. In addition, the country was highly industrialized. KamAZ truck factory and petrochemicals were always the backbone of the industry. In this context, the enrichment of the ethno-national nomenklatura dates back to the first years of the 1990s. Although Tatarstan implemented slow entrance into market strategy, the ethno-national nomenklatura found the possibility of the possession of republican property in two ways. Firstly, in Tatarstan, the state properties in the Soviet era belonged to the federal center. The weakened federal center and the turmoil in the period of the collapse of the Soviet state gave the possibility to the Tatar state elites to transfer the federal assets to the republics' possession and control. Hence, the republican economy simply remained under the direct control and influence of the titular elite network. Secondly, the control of republican autonomy by the state elites and privatization resulted in overenrichment of the Shaimiev network. Currently Tatarstan economy depends on ten large corporations such as Tatneft, Niznikamskieneftihim, Taif, Tatspritprom, Tayfondbanu, and KamAZ. Almost all of these large corporations are administered by a person of a titular ethnos, Tatar. Shaimiev's relatives and close friends control the key resource rich sectors. For example, currently Il'sat Fardiev is the Vice-Prime Minister of Energy; Azat Hamaev is the Minister of Land and Property, and Prime Minister Il'dar Khalikov is also a member of the Shaimiev family.¹³⁷ The current president, Rustam Minnikhanov, came to power in 2010. He was a close friend of one of Shaimiev's son. Furthermore, Shaimiev's two sons control the company of TAIF, and they had more than one-billion-dollar wealth thanks to the administration of TAIF. The sons of Shaimiev are

¹³⁷ Salagaev-Cergeev-Luchsheeva 2011: 226.

listed in the Forbes list of billionaires and Shaimiev's family is also listed in the list of top 10 richest families in the Russian Federation.¹³⁸

While the key businesses were dominated by the network of ethno-national nomenklatura, the discrimination against Russians based on ethnicity did not exist. The state elites of Tatarstan implemented a civic sub-state nation-building model. At the beginning of the 1990s, the union republics began to implement ethnic nation-building policies, which even currently continue in a soft form. Brubaker labelled these post-Soviet countries as 'Nationalizing States'. However, the Tatarstan case was distinct from the examples of the nationalizing states. The state elites always took care not to alienate the Russians in Tatarstan. When they implemented a cultural program for Tatars for example, they simultaneously implemented a symmetrical program for Russians. In other words, when they restored a mosque, they simultaneously restored a church. The same trend continued regarding the historical monuments. The restoration of old Tatar city Bulgar was done simultaneous with the restoration of Sviyazhsk, a Russian historical town in an island in which Ivan the Terrible stop over before the attack on Kazan Khanate. The emphasis on the discourse of 'Tatarstani people' reveals the multiethnic inclusive dimension of the ongoing sub-state nation-building. Nevertheless, the civic dimension of the nation-building process of Tatarstan was ongoing with the simultaneous ethnic nation building elements.¹³⁹

With regard to religion and national identity, Islam was always a constitutional part of the national identity of the Tatars. Hence, the Tatar national movement and ethno-national nomenklatura articulated the religious elements in national discourses. Non-ethno-national Tatar nationalism was the pioneer of this process. At the beginning of the 2000s, particularly the radical Tatar nationalism began to attempt to emphasize the religious discourses as a consequence of the fall of their radical nationalist maximalist sovereignty project. However, they were not successful to attract the Tatars because of the established secularist life style in the Tatar society. The Islamic discourses were

¹³⁸ Moscow Times, <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/forbes-names-russias-10-richest-families-39462>, accessed at April 2017.

¹³⁹ Graney 2009: 91.

generally attractive to the immigrants from the other republics of the USSR in Tatarstan.¹⁴⁰ The ethno-national nomenklatura had to deal with Islamic discourses in several moments. However, they have recently distanced themselves from the usage of the Islamic discourses due to the Islamization danger of the republic.

Another significant feature of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura is that the Tatar state elites had always strong informal ties with the federal center. This tradition continued in the post-Soviet period. Even in the highest moments of tensions, both Kazan and Moscow were aware that to a large extent they trusted each other. The state elites of Tatarstan were very vulnerable to the vertical power of the 2000s. One of the most important explanations for the submissiveness of the Tatar elites against Putin is that the Tatar elites did not want to lose the material benefits that depended on their elite status in the republic. The other significant reasons lie over the complex relationship between the concepts of particularism and universalism. The pragmatic minority nationalism of the Tatar elites was in general a particularistic discourse which could not present a political project for the other autonomous republics in the Russian Federation. Tatarstan turned its direction to the foreign countries rather than focusing on a strategy to improve the Russian federalism and to guide the other regions under a cohesive political project. Tatarstan managed to establish trade partnerships and cultural ties with foreign countries such as Turkey, the USA, Finland, Germany, Kuwait and Japan. However, focusing on the foreign relations and lacking an alternative project inside Russia gave the federal center the chance to reestablish the hegemony of the federal center when the state capacity of Russia enhanced. Andrey Makarychev claims that the insufficient particularistic discourse of the Tatar national elites against the federal center was a result of disjoined regional singularities.

In the context of disjoined regional singularities, the center could easily establish what Ernesto Laclau refers to as a 'hegemonic relation'. This is precisely what happened when Putin initiated a new project of state-building

¹⁴⁰ My interview with Mukhamet Zaripov, PhD in History, Researcher at Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan and Research Assistant in Kazan Federal University, Kazan, 11 October 2016.

and constructing the vertical of power that easily integrated regional elites within its structure.¹⁴¹

The focus on foreign relations of the Tatar ethno-cultural nomenklatura further enhanced the disjointed singularities character of Russian federalism, which reveals that in fact the particularized element is not totally particular and is influenced by the concept of universalism. Hence, in essence, the regionalizing and universalizing discourse intermingled and now constitutes the identity features of the regions and republics.

Briefly, the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies and the nomenklatura system formed the ethno-national nomenklatura-style administration in Tatarstan. The particularistic nationality discourses of the Tatar elites could not provide an alternative path of federalism in which the other autonomous units of the RT could go through. Undoubtedly, the Tatar elites were nationalist due to the decades of the legacy of the Soviet ethnicity regime. However, the elites were concerned with gaining resources for their network, which depended on the patronage politics. The Tatar elites were very skillful in adopting new political conditions. Hence, in order to understand the change in the behaviors of the Tatar elites, the concept of 'state capacity' is a good tool.

2.1.4.6. Understanding Sovereignty of Tatarstan in Relation with State Capacity

The issue of autonomy in Russia can be considered under a different pattern because of the historical legacy of the centralist, "vertical" governance. The sui generis ethno-territorial units of the Soviet State sustained its structure in the post-Soviet period. However, there has been a significant assimilationist tendency since the start of the Putin rule. During the 1990s, territorial autonomy in Russia was similar to the western counterparts. Hence, I will attempt to analyze the issue of sovereignty in Russia and Tatarstan under two periods: Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev. The term 'state capacity' is significant to understand the rising influence of Autonomous Republics during the

¹⁴¹ Andrey Makarychev, (2011) "Representation, identity and limits of centralization: Russian Regionalism through the lens of critical theory." *Vlaams Marxistisch Tijdschrift*, vol. 45, no. 4., pp. 142-150.

1990s and the centralization attack of the Russian state on the sovereignty of the autonomous republics, which started in 2000s with the accession of Putin to power.

There are various descriptions of state capacity regarding the power of the states. One of the definitions emphasizes that “the state capacity refers to a state’s ability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”¹⁴² After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its status of superpower. Moreover, neoliberal shock therapy economic policies eliminated the middle class and tied the hands of the Russian state regarding the ability to penetrate into society and regulate social relations. Under these worse economic conditions and lack of trust in the central government in Moscow, the autonomous republics were bold concerning the demands of self-government. Among the autonomous republics, Tatarstan was the most daring in terms of her regional wealth, demography and strong titular nationalist ideology. The strong regional state capacity of Tatarstan induced Yeltsin to constitute asymmetrical bilateral ties between Tatarstan and Russian Federation. The territorial autonomy of Tatarstan via peaceful negotiations became an example for the conflict-resolution literature. Tatarstan even managed to achieve international recognition and representation as noted before.

The informal networks between the elites of the central state and those of the regional states also affected the bargaining structure.¹⁴³ For example, in the Tatarstan case, there was a good relationship between the center and regional republic to negotiate. However, in the case of Chechnya, there were not entrenched networks between elites to tolerate each other. Accordingly, a violent conflict emerged.

The centrifugal structure of the federation during the 1990s was radically changed in the Putin era. The vertical centralist policies of Putin in tandem with the economic boom enabled the Russian state to reestablish its state capacity from the beginning of 2000s. Therefore, the bargaining power of the regions considerably decreased. The

¹⁴² Julie A. George, (2009) *The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 34.

¹⁴³ Ibid. 37-38.

territorial autonomy of the Russian republics was harshly damaged through the appointment system of the head of autonomous republics, which replaced the regional presidential elections with the central appointment system from Moscow. During the Putin era, Russian nationalism has been diligently underpinned. The discourse of 'Great power Russia' oppressed the visibility of the minorities. The non-territorial cultural autonomy was consciously put forward in order to dilute the territorial pluralism. Corporate (Cultural) autonomy even could not be implemented properly as a result of the prevalence of informal networks in bureaucracy.¹⁴⁴ The widening democratic deficit and restricting the devolution of powers have been transforming autonomous republics into "oblasts". As a result of negligence of Moscow, in order to protect minorities, assimilation of minorities accelerated in Russian Federation. In the autonomous republics, the number of vernacular medium educated schools dramatically decreased, just like the subjects with vernacular languages in the school curriculum.¹⁴⁵ What is obvious is that the ruling elites in Moscow consider the rights of minorities and the issue of sovereignty in the framework of security. Corporate Autonomy and negligence of minority rights have been used deliberately for restricting diversity and underpinning assimilation. Therefore, the change in the sovereignty dynamics in Tatarstan can be understood by focusing on Russian Federation's last two decades. The increasing gap of territorial federalism between Russia and the Western democracies on the grounds of self-governance is pushing Russia under the category of a 'sham federation', thanks to the reestablishment of the authoritarian central state capacity.

To sum up, in this chapter, I attempted to present a conceptual framework to explain the dynamics of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan taking the patterns of the reproduction of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura into account. The parade of sovereignties on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet State affected Tatarstan considerably. Especially, between 1988 and 1992,

¹⁴⁴ Federica Prina, (2016) *National Minorities in Putin's Russia: Diversity and Assimilation*, New York, Routledge, p. 3-6.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

the residents of Tatarstan witnessed incredibly fast social transformation. In the first part of the conceptual framework, I attempted to present the theoretical aspects to explain nationalist mobilization and drive for sovereignty in Tatarstan. I emphasized the concept of ethnicity and the approaches that claim to explain social reality with regard to ethnicity. Accordingly, I adopted the “elite theory” to understand the Tatarstan case. Nevertheless, there are some structural deficits of the elite theory regarding the issues of ethnicity and nationalist mobilization. I argue that the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies provides a strong ground to surpass the structural deficit of the approach of elite theory since the Soviet legacy had a decisive effect to constitute and constrain Tatar nationalist discourses. The modification of the elite theory underpinned by historical institutional legacy of the Soviet state opens more doors to explain the Tatar case. With regard to the issue of autonomous sovereignty, I highlighted minority-friendly approaches in the Western context and criticized the state centric discourses which are under the hegemony of majority nationalist discourses. With regard to the issue of sovereignty, in the second part of the chapter, I attempted to mark various faces of autonomous sovereignty. In this part, I focused on the Tatarstan case specifically. I consider the nomenklatura system an essential part of the sovereignty process in Tatarstan. Hence, I attempted to conceptualize the formation of the ethno-national Tatar nomenklatura and its main characteristics. Finally, the issue of state capacity is analyzed since it was an important structural determinant to shape the regional-republican elite behaviors. In brief, I attempted to highlight three main points to form the framework of this thesis. Elite nationality discourses, historical institutional legacy of the Soviet Nationality Policies and State capacity in relation with the autonomous sovereignty were analyzed regarding the sui generis Russian Federalism and its concretion with the provincial-ethnic nomenklatura characteristics in the case of Tatarstan. In the third chapter, I will analyze the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies taking into account historical institutional approaches.

CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY OF THE TSARIST AND SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES

Yuri Selezkine suggested that the Soviet regime suffered from 'ethnophilia;' it suppressed individual rights, but consistently promoted group rights by supporting national cadres, allowing education in non-Russian languages, and so on. In his view, the USSR institutionalized 'ethnoterritorial federalism' which can best be expressed by the phrase: 'If the USSR was a communal apartment, then every family that inhabited it was entitled a room of its own.

*Dovile Budryte*¹⁴⁶

The formation of Soviet Nationality policies is very significant in order to understand the post-Soviet national mobilization since patterns of the Soviet nationality policies have been continuing in the Post-Soviet era. The Soviet nationality policies were mainly outlined in the works of Lenin and Stalin. It was not an easy task for Lenin to convince the Bolshevik cadres about his nationality policy arguments. Finally, the Soviet ethnicity regime was established and consolidated in the era of Lenin and Stalin. The multiethnic inclusive nationality policy proposals of Lenin and Stalin became the official Soviet ethnicity regime. After Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev followed the same framework of the Soviet nationality policies if I neglect some small revisions. Hence, the initial two decades of the Soviet states to large extent determined even the fate of the Soviet Union. The Soviet institutions consolidated cultural nationalisms in the union and autonomous republics. Although the political aspect of the minority

¹⁴⁶ Davile Budryte, (2005) *Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building In The Post-Soviet Baltic States*, Burlington-USA, Ashgate, p. 18.

nationalisms was strictly suppressed, the Soviet state skillfully created the ethno-national minority (titular) elites in the union and autonomous republics. This institutional historical legacy of the Soviet nationality policies would create fatal impact during the Perestroika period. The nationalist mobilization throughout the Soviet state, in fact, was the revenge of the institutionally constructed and consolidated minority nationalisms by the Soviet state.

In this chapter, I will attempt to analyze the historical-institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, which was one of the most significant reasons behind the emergence of Tatar and other minority nationalisms in the Soviet Union. In the first part of the chapter, I will briefly focus on the Tsarist era nationality policies. The Tsarist heritage was significant for the formation of the Bolshevik nationality policies since the Tsarist past was associated with assimilation and russification. The revolutionary Bolsheviks, particularly Lenin, were motivated to diverge the Soviet state from the legacy of the Tsarist nationality policies very radically. In the second part of the chapter, I will explain the considerations on nationalism of Marx and Engels. Undoubtedly, the Bolsheviks paid much more attention to the works of Marx and Engels, and the philosophers' ideas always impressed them. In the third section of the chapter, I will focus on the formation of the Bolshevik nationality policies before the revolution. In this context, the debates of the Bolsheviks with the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg were significant in terms of the nationalism issue. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I will attempt to explain the formation and consolidation of the Soviet nationality policies as an official ethnicity regime of the Soviet state. The evaluation of the multinational and diversity based ethnicity regime of the Soviet Union will be evaluated chronologically. By doing so, I will attempt to explain the institutional framework of the Soviet ethnicity regime which would cause the rise and decline of Tatar nationalism in the Perestroika and post-Soviet period. In fact, this structural legacy significantly determined the rise and decline of Tatar ethnic mobilization. The Soviet legacy created titular elites and the nomenklatura system simultaneously. Hence, the elites inherited the nationalist and nomenklatura characteristics in the union and autonomous republics. The ethno-national nomenklaturas, which were a product of Soviet nationality policies, pursued their

independent strategies when the Soviet state went through an existential crisis in the period of Perestroika. The titular elites, in order to hold their power, instrumentalized nationality discourses for their personal or group drive. I will attempt to examine the historical-institutional path of the rise of ethno-national nomenklaturas in this chapter.

3.1. The Tsarist Russian Legacy: The Prison-House of Nations

In 1552, Ivan III invaded the Kazan Khanate. This event is to large extent considered as the opening of the imperial era of the Russian state. As Smith points out the invasion of Kazan heralded a Multiethnic empire that involves a large number of Muslims, Christians and Pagans. After the invasion of Astrakhan four years later, Ivan the Terrible focused on the north and occupied parts of Livonia and Lithuania until the defeat at the hands of the Swedes¹⁴⁷. Between 1579 and 1582 Cossack Ermak Timofeevich, with the support of the tsar, defeated the Khan of the Sibir and started the 300 years of Russian expansion across the Ural Mountains and over the vast and sparsely populated parts of Siberia.¹⁴⁸

The Russian Empire rapidly expanded after this point. During the 19th and 20th centuries, this expansion was equal to thousands of square miles daily. The western expansion was completed with the third partition of Poland in 1795. The Northwestern border stabilized with the acquisition of Finland from Poland in 1809. Expansion through Central Asia was accomplished in the 19th century. Among these excessive expansions, the most problematic and bloodiest one was the expansion through the South Caucasus. The local population of Chechens, Ingushes and Dagistanis managed to stop the Russian expansion temporarily from 1817 to 1864. This mighty resistance that seriously damaged the Russian troops became an important part of the national discourses of these people. The revolt hero Imam Shamil turned into a legendary figure in the memory of the local people. The Eastward expansion lasted longer but once it reached to the Pacific Ocean, it did not stay in East Asia. Alaska was colonized until

¹⁴⁷ Jeremy Smith, (2013) *Red Nations: The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR*, The UK, Cambridge University Press, p.1.

¹⁴⁸ Andreas Kappeler, (2001) *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, London, Longman, p. 79.

it was sold to the USA in 1867. The treaty of Peking in 1860 consolidated Russian territorial expansion near China and Korea. The harbor city Vladivostok's and Finland's annexation finalized the huge territorial size of the Russian Empire.¹⁴⁹

The expansion of the Russian Empire depended on the military conquest or military backed diplomacy. Just like most of the empires, I assume that in order to control the vast territory, the empire had to collaborate with the local elites. Ivan the Terrible, for example, after the invasion of Kazan, gave the chance to the Tatar nobility to join the Russian nobility, which provided the continuation of their former privileges and administrative capabilities. According to Smith, this was the main pattern for much of the colonial rule, which relied on the cooptation of local elites into the ruling class.¹⁵⁰ However, until Catherine the Great's reforms the ordinary Tatars faced brutal discrimination and they had to live in a segregated area.¹⁵¹ The freedom space was limited to the non-Russian nobility who accepted the conversion into Christianity. In the case of the Tatar nobility, the elites who refused the conversion into Christianity were expelled from the nobility, and they had to share the discriminative destiny of their ordinary co-ethnics.¹⁵² In other words, the discrimination based on religion was significant in the Russian Empire. As Rorlich highlights:

Throughout the centuries, the Russian state pursued a policy of national integration that meant conversion to Christianity and cultural assimilation. The new subjects of Muscovy were *inorodtsy* (non-Russian peoples): Muslim Tatars, animist Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis, Votiaks and others. The most urgent task confronting the Russian was the absorption of these new elements into the fabric of their own society. Religious, legal, educational, and economic policies were designed and enforced in a concerted effort to transform the *inorodtsy* into better Russian subjects by making them Christian first.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Smith 2013: 3.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ For a detailed explanation of the segregated Tatar quarter (Staraia Tatarskaia Sloboda) see for example: Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, (1986) *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience*, Stanford-California, Hoover Institution Press, p. 39.

¹⁵² Ibid., 38.

¹⁵³ Ibid., "Italics mine", English translation is added in parenthesis.

Modernization of Russia gave the opportunity to the Muslim population to express their customs, traditions and religious rituals more freely. Even though the missionary activities of the Orthodox church continued particularly in the Volga region.¹⁵⁴ The conversion success of the Orthodox church was overwhelmingly in the northern Russia and Siberia among the scattered non-Russian and non-Muslim population.¹⁵⁵

Emancipation of the peasantry in 1861 facilitated migration of the Russian population. Although the state dispatched its sources to stop this trend, most of the illegal migration routes were towards the captured lands of Central Asia. Initially friendly interethnic relations between Russians and non-Russians began to worsen at the end of the 19th century. Competition for land, insufficient water and concomitant illnesses escalated the inter-ethnic tension.¹⁵⁶

Taking into account the issue of nationalism, the second half of the 19th century was a significant period. Non-Russian national intellectuals emerged, but they could not achieve mass support from the overwhelmingly peasant local populations.¹⁵⁷ Georgians, Poles and Fins had the most powerful national identity in the empire. Thus, Poles and Fins managed to escape from the Russian rule in 1917.

Among Muslim societies in Russia Jadidism attracted important mass support. Once emerged in Crimea, Jadidism spread to Kazan. The aim of Jadid understanding was to modernize education and combine progressive European ideas with Islamic customs. In the 20th century the Jadid movement provided a base for the Muslim populations'

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 39-47.

¹⁵⁵ Smith 2013: 4.

¹⁵⁶ Jeff Shadeo, (2005) "Epidemic and Empire: Ethnicity, Class and Civilization in the 1892 Tashkent Cholera Riot." *Slavic Review*, Vol. 64, No. I, p. 123-124 cited in Smith (2013).

¹⁵⁷ Smith 2013: 7.

national demands. As a result of Jadidist legacy, Tatar national intelligentsia achieved to dominate the Russian Muslim movement.¹⁵⁸

3.1.1. Dilemmas of Russian National Identity in the Tsarist Russia

Two basic factors in the Imperial Russia shaped the Russian identity formation. Russia was an imperial power and hosted various non-Russian ethnic groups. However, the age of nationalism at the 19th century had begun to influence the Russian Tsardom. As an empire Russia had to involve national differences, but at the same time Russia had to create a modern nation state. In other words, on the one side there was an internationalist and inclusive approach, on the other side there was a nationalist hegemonic approach that materialize under Russian language and culture.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, this dilemma is still affecting the identity issue in the Post-Soviet Russia to some extent. The national identity concepts of *Ruskii* and *Rossisskii* was created under these circumstances. *Ruskii* was associated with the ethnic Russians. On the other hand, *Rossisskii* was associated with the people who lives in the territory of Russia. In other words, *Ruskii* can be categorized under the concept of ethnic nationalism, and *Rossisskii* can be categorized under the concept of civic nationalism.¹⁶⁰

The tension between the conservation of the empire and creating a modern nation state became visible in the 19th century. Concurrently the Russification and pan-Slavic policies took ground from the 19th century and Russian nationalism dramatically enhanced its influence at the beginning of the 20th century. The distinction between

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵⁹ Zeynep Dağı, (2002) *Rusya'nın Dönüşümü: Kimlik, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika*, İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, p. 69.

¹⁶⁰ For a further discussion about the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. See, Rogers Brubaker, (1994) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, the USA, Harvard University Press; Brubaker, (1996) *Nationalism Reframed Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press and Brubaker (2011) "Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1785-1814.

Westernizers and Slavophiles was another important tension of identity among Russian intelligentsia in the course of the 19th century.

The crisis of the Russian state and society against modernity came into surface after the defeat of the Crimean war. The Russian army was defeated by the alliance of the Ottomans, France, the United Kingdom and Kingdom of Sardinia. The defeat revealed that Russia was behind Europe in terms of technology. The overwhelmingly peasant society of Russia needed to be reformed in many aspects. Therefore, the Westernizers dramatically gained influence after the Crimean war. They thought that Russia had to adopt European institutions, bureaucracy and industrialization in order to get rid of a peasant society. Taking into account ideologically, the Westernizers believe that Russia was an indispensable part of the Western culture and that of the Western civilization, not an Asian state at all. As a matter of fact, European individualistic, liberal and rational values were supported by them.

The Slavophiles, on the other hand, believed that Russia was neither European nor Asian. Russia is a unique state, even the geography proved this uniqueness. Generally, they were skeptical against the western civilization. Moreover, they claimed that western civilization was a threat that sought to annihilate the Russian civilization. Hence, they had a conservative value system. The key emblems of Russian nationality, as for them, were such institutions as the family, the church and the village commune.¹⁶¹ Their adoration of the Russian people can be evaluated as a resistance against the modernity. They were skeptical about the western values. They believed that the western individualistic and rational ideas spoiled the purity of Russian nation. The slavophilia ideas can be articulated in various ideologies from anarchism to pan-Slavism.¹⁶² The criticism of individualism, for instance, can be articulated into the values of solidarity. In that respect, this articulation can be categorized as leftist. On

¹⁶¹ Evtunov-Goldfrank-Hughes-Stites, (2004) *A History of Russia: Peoples, Legends, Events, Forces*, Boston-New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, p. 362-363.

¹⁶² Ibid., 361-364.

the other hand, the exaltation and uniqueness of the Russian identity can be articulated in pan-Slavic ideas, so it can be easily associated with ethno-centric fascist ideologies.

In the course of the 19th century, the Russian state brought the ethnicity in the foreground. The rising influence of nationalism in the international system and nation-state model were significant, which pulled the Russian State into the ethno-centrist policies.¹⁶³ The last two tsars, Tsar Alexander III and Tsar Nicholas II encouraged the state nationalism and implemented Russification policies to achieve creating an ethnic national identity. These policies were realized in various areas. For example, the usage of all the other minority languages were forbidden in the schools forcing to use the Russian language. The non-Russian ethnic groups had to serve the compulsory military service, and relocation of Russians into the non-Russian regions were also intensified.¹⁶⁴ The ethnic Russian national mobilization was not only restricted in the state apparatus. The organizations such as the Union of the Russian People and the United Russian People found mass support from the public. As Sakharov points out these organisations had 350,000 and 60,000 members respectively, and they managed to reach around 9% of votes in the first Duma elections.¹⁶⁵ The mega narrative of Russian nationalism was shaped under the discourse, such as Russia is for Russians, Russia is under the siege of non-Russians, and the aim of protecting Russia from the foreigners. Without doubt, these nationalist segregatist mega discourses created minority reactionary nationalist discourses among the non-Russian ethnic groups. Furthermore, the rise of the leftist revolutionary movements, specifically, the discourse of the Bolsheviks turned the issues of identity and nationalism into a more complicated process.

Briefly, at the beginning of the 19th century the Russian Tsardom was under a significant identity crisis. The empire had a lack of capacity to respond to the effects

¹⁶³ N. Melvin, (1995) *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National identity*, London, Chantam House, p. 6-8.

¹⁶⁴ Dağı 2002: 77.

¹⁶⁵ A., N., Sakharov, “The main Phases of Distinctive Russian Nationalism.” In *Russian Nationalism Past and Present*, eds. Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, pp. 7-18, London, Macmillan.

of modernization. Moreover, the Russian ethno-centric national identity solutions for the national question increased the centrifugal tendencies of the non-Russian people of the periphery dramatically. The class contradictions of the industrialization and the Russian involvement in the First World War caused a mortal impact on the empire. The Bolsheviks took the power under these social conditions and national identity dilemmas.

3.2. The Legacy of Marxist Nationality Policies and Their Impact on the Bolsheviks

In our modern ages, both the nations and the revolutionary ideas against capitalism were born together. These newly born siblings of modernization, however, were shaped differently by time. There was a great tension between these two ideas. On the one hand, there is the nation in which happiness is available for a particular people and acknowledgement of the reality of the nation state system; on the other hand, there is the world which requires availability of change and happiness for all people.¹⁶⁶ In other words, particularistic ideas of nationalism were challenged by the universalistic ideas of socialism. In this context, the Bolsheviks had a tough task to conciliate nationalism and socialism. The Bolsheviks took a very vague legacy with regard to nationalism from Marx and Engels. Therefore, it is even controversial to claim that Marx and Engels created a Marxist Nationalism Theory.¹⁶⁷ The writings of Marx and Engels were mainly emphasizing the class struggle and the great transformations of mode of production. Hence, there was a reductionist and instrumentalist view concerning the issue of nationalism. Furthermore, both philosophers failed to produce a complicated state theory as well. The state is conceptualized as the tool of

¹⁶⁶ Antonis Liakos, (2008) *Dünyayı değiştirmek isteyenler ulusu nasıl tasavvur ettiler?*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, p. 18.

¹⁶⁷ Ephraim Nimni claims that Marx and Engels had a nationalism theory. In contrast, Georges, Haupt, Micheal Lowy, Claude Weill and Antonis Liakos believe that it is impossible to say that there is a Marxist nationalism theory. I also agree with the authors who claim that there is no Marxist nationalism theory.

bourgeoisie, and the nation is instrumentalized under the ascendancy of class struggle.¹⁶⁸

Initially, Marx and Engels adopted a Eurocentric optimistic view concerning the nationality issue. The philosophers merely considered that nationalism is a temporary phenomenon and soon would disappear with the expansion of capitalism. However, the failure of the 1848 revolutions forced the philosophers to revise their initial approach. The nationalist movements in Ireland and Poland complicated position of the philosophers in their later writings as well. The Irish case, would be a suitable reference to be used which by the Bolsheviks to verify their nationalism consideration based on the distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations. Hence, it would be better to focus on the classical Marxist approaches on the nationalism in two main periods.¹⁶⁹

3.2.1. Marx and Engels on National Question until 1848

The early writings of Marx and Engels can be traced by their famous work, *the Communist Manifest*. Marx and Engels praised the Bourgeoisie because of its revolutionary role that opens the doors for the proletarian revolution. The Bourgeoisie was evaluated as revolutionary to the extent that it unified the world market, and but also abolished local customs, traditions, and created a new world culture.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom

¹⁶⁸ For a detailed information of Marxist interpretations on ethnicity and nationalism, see for example: Sinisa Malesevic 2004: 30-44. Sinisa Malesevic highlights that the class reductionist perspectives of classical Marxism on ethnicity still cannot be bypassed by neo-Marxists. Most of Marxist approaches on ethnicity conceptualize ethnicity as a derivative phenomenon from the basic class phenomenon.

¹⁶⁹ For a three period distinction, see for example Deniz Dinç, (2010) *Nationality Policies in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan*, METU, MA thesis, Ankara

of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.¹⁷⁰

These free-trade ideas were very optimistic about the end of national differences, but it had some limitations. It can be derived from the ideas of philosophers that the proletariat must organize at the national level, however, as soon as they overthrow the bourgeoisie from the power they must expand the cosmopolitan ideas. In 1845, Engels challenged Kant's perpetual peace argument. He claimed that it is impossible to solve the problem of national contradiction within the framework of capitalist mode of production.

The fantasies about a European Republic, perpetual peace under political organization, have become just as ridiculous as the phrases about uniting the nations under the aegis of universal free trade...The bourgeoisie in each country has its own special interests, and ...can never transcend nationality...¹⁷¹

The progressive understanding of the history of the philosophers created notable polemics among Marxists, specifically, on Marx's ideas on Asiatic mode of production. For Marx, the main characteristics of Asian mode of production, was lack of private property in land. Due to the self-sustaining nature of the village economy, the labor was unable to become free from the closed community. Therefore, Asiatic mode of productions survive longer and stubbornly until with the contact with the dialectically superior capitalist mode of production introduced by the West.¹⁷² Although the encounter of the Asian and European mode of productions caused bloody massacres, the result can be tolerated since English invasion in India was evaluated as the unconscious tool of history by the philosophers.

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in India, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a

¹⁷⁰ Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, (1970) *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, p. 55.

¹⁷¹ Michael Löwy, (1988). *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question*, London, Pluto Press, p.6.

¹⁷² Lan Cummins, (2015) *Marx, Engels and National Movements*, UK, Routledge (RLE), p. 173.

fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.¹⁷³

In brief, the national question was neglected by the philosophers. The philosophers were not interested in the national antagonisms. They had a cosmopolitan understanding. They considered that the already started process of the vanishing of national differences would be finished in the era of proletarian revolutions.

3.2.2. Marx and Engels on the National Question after 1848

The failure of the 1848 revolutions led the philosophers to revise their optimistic point of view with regard to the temporality of the national question. The philosophers were displeased about the disunity of Germany and capabilities of the German bourgeoisie. Initially, the philosophers contended that Germany was on the eve of the revolution. However, the lack of centralization of Germany hindered the revolution.¹⁷⁴ The religious multiplicity of Germany together with the relatively late incomplete development of capitalist mode of production attracted harsh critiques by the philosophers. As Cummins quotes from the first volume of *Das Capital*: Germany was depicted as beset not only by modern evils but also by a whole series of inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social political anachronisms. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead.¹⁷⁵

The disillusionment of the failure of the centralization and revolution in Germany led to the revision of the nationality question. Engels divided nations into two categories: “Historic Nations” and “Historyless Nations”. By doing so, an instrumentalist point of view articulated in the initial conceptualization of nationality. The western developed

¹⁷³ *The New-York Herald Tribune*, column by Karl Marx, Online in: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm>, last accessed at May, 2017.

¹⁷⁴ Cummins 2015: 29.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 31.

capitalist countries such as England, France and Germany were defined as historic nations. The countries which are not connected to the capitalist mode of production were defined as historyless nations. At this point, the philosophers were very pessimistic about the Slavic nations in the Eastern Europe. Engels contended that Slavs were a historyless nation. Hence, Prussian unification and expansion in Eastern Europe should have involved the Slavic “backward” people. The distinction of the historic and historyless nations were not limited to Europe. As for the philosophers, the civilized historic nations must absorb the non-civilized historyless nations.

Or is it perhaps unfortunate that splendid California has been taken away from the lazy Mexicans who could not do anything with it? That the energetic Yankees by rapid exploitation of the Californian gold mines...for the first time really open the Pacific Ocean to civilization.¹⁷⁶

Likewise, the Philosophers had a say to the Bedouins as well with regard to the French invasion in Algeria.

The conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization. We may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed; we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers.¹⁷⁷

The late writings about the philosophers on the issue of the conflict between Ireland and England affected the Bolsheviks, particularly Lenin. By the year 1860, Marx had already started supporting Irish in the Irish-English conflict. Marx claim that the hatred between Irish and English would continue if they live together, so English proletariat would accuse Irish of decreasing the wages. Hence, Irish proletariat would become the reason of the poverty in the eyes of the English proletariat. According to Marx, a nation which suppresses the other one can never be evaluated as free.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ See the citation of Marx and Engels in Ronaldo Munck, (1986). *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, Avon, the Bath Press, p. 13.

¹⁷⁷ See the citation of Marx and Engels in Löwy 1988: 17-18.

¹⁷⁸ Umut Özkırımlı, (2008). *Milliyetçilik Kuramları: Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, Ankara, Doğu Batı Yayınları, p.50.

Munch and Löwy contend that the Irish issue was a total break of the philosophers in comparison to their initial approaches on nationalism. The new paradigm has the seeds of the distinction on oppressed and oppressor nation.¹⁷⁹ However, Nimni asserts that there was nothing new on the considerations of Ireland. For Nimni, Marx conceptualized Ireland and Poland as historic nations. That is why, his support for separation of Ireland was not deviation from the older paradigm.¹⁸⁰

With regard to the support of independence of Poland, Avineri puts forward another argument. Avineri claims that Marx supported the independence of Poland since he considered that Poland could play a buffer zone role against the “backward Russian Empire”.¹⁸¹ Certainly, Marx did not give consent to see Poland under Russian hegemony.

Briefly, Nimni highlighted the economic reductionist view point of Marx and Engels. On the other hand, the other researchers such as Cummins, Avineri, Munch, and Löwy highlighted tactical changes, and, concomitantly, the autonomy of political space in Marxist ideology.¹⁸² What can be deduced from all these arguments is that classical Marxism, initially had a Eurocentric, cosmopolitan and economic reductionist conceptualization of nationalism. Marx and Engels perceived nationalism as a temporary, provincialist, backward phenomenon that will be annihilated by the rise of Bourgeoisie and its antagonistic revolutionary subject, Proletariat. However, failure of the revolutionary upheavals forced the philosophers to make tactical changes which attempted to locate the nationality question on the side of revolutionary movements. At this point, the Irish case was prominent since Lenin found the seeds of his

¹⁷⁹ Löwy (1988).

¹⁸⁰ Ephraim Nimni, (1991). *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, Worcester, Pluto, p.26-37.

¹⁸¹ Shlomo Avineri, (1991). “Marxism and nationalism.” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4, pp. 637-657.

¹⁸² Dinç 2010: 13.

distinctive argument of nationalisms, such as the distinction of oppressor and oppressed nationalisms.

3.2.3. The Marxist Debate on Self-Determination before the Bolshevik Revolution

The issue of nationalism was vehemently debated among prominent Marxist thinkers after Marx and Engels, thus, four main approaches emerged. These are the right of nations to self-determination, an approach identified with Lenin; national nihilism which is associated by Rosa Luxemburg; extra-territorial national autonomy, a program developed by Austrian Marxists and Jewish party: Bund, and state federalism, which was supported by some socialists and nationalist parties in the Russian Federation.¹⁸³

Social Democratic Party of Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), the Marxist party of Rosa Luxemburg, had an anti-separatist program in contrast to the pro-independence oriented Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Rosa Luxemburg of SDKP claimed that the unifying political struggle of proletariat should not be supplanted by a series of fruitless national struggles. In her doctoral thesis, Luxemburg highlighted that the Russian and Polish market had already integrated, the Polish economy could not exist with isolation from the Russian economy. As for Luxemburg, the ones who support the self-determination right to Poland are feudal Polish nobility of the old order.¹⁸⁴ The national nihilist considerations of Luxemburg remained unrevised until her imprisonment by German authorities in 1915.

The economic centrist arguments of Luxemburg were universally pessimistic against the small nations. As for Luxemburg “The independence of small nations in general, and Poland in particular, is utopian from the economic point of view and condemned

¹⁸³ Jeremy Smith, (1999) *The Bolsheviks and The National Question, 1917-1923*, New York, Palgrave Macmilan p. 7.

¹⁸⁴ Löwy 1988 :31.

by the laws of history.”¹⁸⁵ The only exception among small nations were the Balkan nations of the Ottoman Empire. Having backed up her ideas from Engels' division of historic nations and non-historic nations, Luxemburg points out the cultural, social and economic development of the Balkan nations, which were superior to Turkey; thus, the independence movements in the region could be supported against the backward Turkish Empire. Rather than this exception, what was obvious is that Luxemburg was afraid that the small nations could play a role as pawns in the imperialist chessboard.¹⁸⁶ However, all these arguments of Luxemburg does not mean that she was not worried about the national oppressions. She was worried and wrote her recommendations regarding the solution of national problems. She, for example, encouraged the guarantee of cultural and educational rights of minorities in multiethnic states. However, she opposed to both territorial autonomy approach of Lenin and Stalin and non-territorial autonomy approach of Austrian Marxists, Bauer and Renner. Smith mentions that Luxemburg recommended a system of limited national-territorial autonomy, together with educational and linguistic guarantees for non-territorial national groups.¹⁸⁷ Luxemburg managed to attract attention of many Bolsheviks by her national nihilist ideas. However, Lenin with his high prestige could convince the cadres in his *self-determination right to the people* approach.¹⁸⁸

Another significant approach among Marxists before the Bolshevik revolution was the approach of Austrian Marxists' extra territorial cultural autonomy. As Özkırmılı points out Otto Bauer was the only person aimed to create a nationalism theory not only among Marxists but also among other philosophers in his era.¹⁸⁹ Bauer claimed that

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 32.

¹⁸⁶ Löwy 1988: 33.

¹⁸⁷ Smith 1999: 14.

¹⁸⁸ For a detailed information see for example, Richard Pipes, (1968). *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, p.277, and Yunus Emre Gürbüz, (2007) *Caught Between Nationalism and Socialism: Kazak Alash Orda Movement*, Ankara, METU PhD thesis.

¹⁸⁹ Özkırmılı 2008: 53.

one of the most of significant characteristics of a nation was “unity of fate”. Hence, territorial autonomy proposals for the national question was not enough to understand scattered nations, such as the Jewish community and Afro-Americans.¹⁹⁰

The Austrian Marxists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, unlike the Marxist orthodoxy, contemplated nation as a permanent and positive phenomenon.¹⁹¹ The Austrian Marxists highlighted not only the territorial autonomy, but also non-territorial cultural autonomy demands of the various nations in multiethnic/multinational states. Undoubtedly, the Austrian Marxists were heavily influenced by the ethnic structure of the Austrian Empire. The Austria-Hungary Empire was also a significant case for the arguments of Ernest Gellner taking into account the issue of nationalism. Gellner basically claims that it is industrialization which causes the nationalist mobilization. Hence, when people of the periphery immigrated to the city centers, they understood that they speak a different language from their bosses.¹⁹² The Austrian Marxists witnessing the industrialization of the Habsburg Empire constructed an elaborate blueprint for Austria. According to the plan, the state had to divide into eight multinational economic regions, but also into eight separate national councils administering cultural affairs, all united under the crown. For Smith, “the scheme of Personal Cultural Autonomy was the first serious effort by socialists to deal with the question of national groups living outside their own national territory.”¹⁹³

Briefly, the Austrian Marxists were aware that the issue of nationalism was not a temporary phenomenon and they strove for finding a solution to accommodate national differences. However, their arguments were harshly criticized by the Bolsheviks.

The third main approach among Marxists before the Bolshevik revolution was Lenin and Stalin's proposal of “the right of self-determination to the nations”. The articles of

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Smith 1999: 15-17.

¹⁹² For a further discussion, see, Ernest Gellner, (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, New York, Cornell University Press.

¹⁹³ Smith 1999: 15-17.

the program adopted by the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party at its second congress taking into account of national question was as follows:

1.(3) Broad local self-rule: regional self-rule for those localities which distinguish themselves by separate living conditions and the composition of the population.

2.(7) Destruction of social estates and full equality for all citizens, regardless of sex, religion, race and nationality.

3.(8) The right of the population to receive education in its native tongue, secured by the establishment of schools necessary for that purpose at the expense of the government and of organs of self-rule: the right of every citizen to use his native tongue at gatherings; the introduction of native languages on a basis of equality with the state language in all local social and government institutions.

4.(9) The right of all nations in the state to self-determination.¹⁹⁴

The party program mentioned above was shared both of the Bolshevik and Menshevik fractions. However, there was no reference for the federalism or national cultural autonomy in the program. The national minority parties such as Jewish Bund, Georgian Socialists Federalists, Armenian Dashnaktsutium, Belorussian Hromada together with Russian Socialist Revolutionaries opposed the program. They were simply demanding division of Russia into federal units. The Menshevik faction of the RSDLP came close to the national cultural autonomy approach of the Austrian Marxists by 1912. Moreover, there was strong support for Luxemburg's national nihilist arguments among Marxists.¹⁹⁵ Under these circumstances, Lenin encouraged Stalin to write a polemical work against Austrian Marxists in terms of the national question.

Stalin finished his work "Marxism and National Question" in 1913. Stalin defined the nation within four items: territory, language, economic life and psychological

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 14.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 15.

makeup.¹⁹⁶ According to Stalin, Bauer's approach on nationality encourages nationalism which was considered a Bourgeoisie phenomenon. Stalin was worried of the overshadowing impact of nationalism vis-a-vis proletarian revolution.¹⁹⁷

At this difficult time Social Democracy had a high mission-to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general 'epidemic'. For Social Democracy, and Social Democracy alone, could do this by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement¹⁹⁸

Stalin in his work vehemently criticized Otto Bauer's concept of nation, particularly the concept of "unity of fate". He claimed that the nation definition of Bauer is not enough to understand the Jewish communities who were separated into various areas and spoke different languages.

Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an indivisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?¹⁹⁹

Stalin, as a spokesman for the Bolshevik nationality policies both before and after the revolution generally followed the position of Lenin. However, some elements of

¹⁹⁶ Lenin, V., I. and Stalin, J., V., (2006) *Marksizm ve Ulusal Sorun*, İstanbul, Evrensel Basın Yayın, p.14.

¹⁹⁷ Dinç 2010: 18

¹⁹⁸ Joseph Stalin, (1954). *Marxism and the National Question*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, p. 312-313.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

Stalin's arguments were strictly disapproved by Lenin. For instance, Lenin highlighted that by defining nation as a historically constituted community of people, Stalin was under the influence of Bauer's concept of nation. Another point Lenin opposed Stalin was Stalin's overemphasis on territory. Stalin's arguments implied that there were no additional steps to be taken for the minorities which could not constitute the majority in a given area.²⁰⁰ Needless to say, Lenin had a position more tolerant and pro-minority oriented when he was compared to Stalin. These seeds of conflict would reveal after the revolution, when the Bolsheviks were challenged by the implementation of their nationality theories.

Lenin in 1914, finished his work, named “the right of nations to the self-determination”. Lenin emphasized the main lines of Bolshevik nationality policy. One of the important legacies which Lenin received from Marx and Engels was the distinction between oppressor and oppressed nation. Lenin built his nationality approach on this base. Marx's famous remark “a nation which suppresses another one cannot be free” was adopted by Lenin, who observed that minorities in Russia were suppressed by the monolithic Russification policies, which caused the start of minority ethnic mobilization under the Russian Tsardom. Therefore, there was a large political space to mobilize and articulate the minorities in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin's main aim was World socialist revolution, and the status of minorities of Russia would also become important in the post-revolutionary era, so Lenin was enthusiastic to give compromise for the minorities unlike the important cadres of the Bolshevik party. Lenin emphasized territorial autonomy and voluntarily secession rights of all nations in Russia. Although he was in favor of unity, he was very sensitive against great Russian chauvinist national suppression. Therefore, he had a pro-minority oriented nationality policies approach which led to polemics with Luxemburg concerning the issue of independence of Poland.²⁰¹ As for Lenin, the right of self-determination was

²⁰⁰ Smith: 1999: 18-19.

²⁰¹ Dinç 2010: 20

similar to the right of divorce of couples. However, as he pointed out “the right of divorce is not the invitation of all wives to leave their husbands”.²⁰²

In brief, the three main lines of nationality question were debated among Marxists together with the nationalist federation demands of national minority parties such as the Jewish Bund. To a large extent, Rosa Luxemburg had a strong influence on Bolshevik cadres. However, Lenin with the help of Stalin, achieved to impose his pro-minority nationalism approach with his high prestige.

3.3. Nationality Policies after the Revolution: Formation of the Ethno-Federal Soviet State

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks declared “the Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia”. Four principles were declared in accordance with the Bolshevik's principle of self-determination right to the nations. These principles were “Equality and Sovereignty of the People of the Russian Empire, the right of nations to self-determination, abolition of all privileges based on nationality or religion, freedom and cultural development of national minorities.”²⁰³ However, the Bolsheviks could not find the chance to implement their nationality principles properly before the Civil War. During the Civil War some parts of Russian Empire proclaimed independence. For example, *The republic of Estonia in Estonia; the Lithuanian Republic in Lithuania; The Latvian Republic in Latvia; The Ukrainian People's Republic, Skoropadskii's Government, and the Crimean Regional Government in Ukraine; Belarus People's Republic in Belarus; Moldovan Democratic Republic in Moldova; Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in Azerbaijan; Georgian Democratic Republic in Georgia; Republic of Armenia in Armenia; Alash-Orda in Kazakhstan; Transcaspian Provisional Government in Turkmenistan; Turkestan Autonomy in Central Asia; the Idel-Ural Project in Tatarstan; Bashkortostan in Bashkiria; Gorskaya-Mountain*

²⁰² See citation of Lenin in John Glenn, (1999) *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia*, New York, Palgrave, p.73.

²⁰³ Victoria Khiterer, (2004). “Nationalism in the Soviet Union.” In *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, ed. James R. Miller, p. 1000, New York, Macmillan.

*Republic in Dagestan; North Caucasian Emirate in Chechnya-Ingushia; The North Karelian Government, and the Olonets Government in Karelia; the Buryat-Mongol State in Buryatia; The Karakorum Altai District in the Altai Republic; the Provisional Yakut Regional People Government; and the Tyva People's Republic.*²⁰⁴

The anti-communist side of the Civil war, the whites, declared commitment to the idea of “united and inseparable” Russia. It is obvious that this was one of the main reasons of the defeat of the white movement.²⁰⁵ Some of the important non-Russian nationalities such as Bashkirs and Kazakhs changed their side when they were sure that the whites had no pledges rather than the option of “prison of nations”. Finally, the USSR was established as a union of equal nations and republics in 1922. A union treaty was agreed among the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia and the Soviet Federation of Transcaucasia. The twelfth party congress of the Bolsheviks organized the administrative structure of the USSR at three level. These are the authorities given to the Federal center from Moscow, the authorities given to the federal republics, but which are subjected to the control of the Federal center, and the authorities uniquely given to the union republics. Under the original constitution, the Soviet Union had 4 presidents loyal to the principle of the equal legislative rights of the Soviets of the union. The Central Executive Committee (CEC) was elected by a congress of Soviets, and each republic was governed through their own Supreme Soviets. The CEC had two level system: The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union or Federal Soviet was assigned to pass legislation, and the Upper house, the Soviet of Nationalities in which each republic was represented taking into account their hierarchical official status.

²⁰⁴ Andrey Shcherbak, (2013) “Nationalism in the USSR: A Historical and Comparative Perspective.”, National Research University Higher School of Economics *Research Paper*, Moscow, pp. 1-31.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

3.3.1. Affirmative Action Policies and Institutionalization of the Ethno-Federal Soviet State (1923-1939)

This period can be considered as the most important time which created the multiethnic-multinational Soviet ethnicity regime. The formation of the USSR was depended on the linkage between the territory and the ethnicity. Therefore, the federal structure of the USSR can be considered as an ethnic federalism. The multinationalist structure of the Soviet Union was also hierarchically institutionalized and fixed. The state-led enormous effort was implemented to support various non-Russian republics' nation building projects. Terry Martin labeled the early Soviet nationality policies as 'Affirmative Action Empire'.²⁰⁶ Before leaping into the details of the affirmative action, it is better to focus on the institutionalization of Soviet ethnicity from an administrative-institutional point of view.

The four-tier hierarchy of the administrative structure of the Soviet Union from top to down are: *union republics*, *autonomous republics*, *autonomous provinces and autonomous districts*. On the top of the hierarchy, there were union republics which were officially considered fully sovereign units. They have their own constitutions. The union republics have the right to secede from the Soviet Union. During the era of liberalization of the 1980s, the union republics achieved to control economic and budgetary decision making. The union republics had their own academy of sciences and greater representation in the federal legislative bodies. They had the right to engage in foreign policy relations.

The sub-unit of union republics was the autonomous republics which were subordinated to the union republics. These republics were partially sovereign and they had independent state-like administrative organs such as constitution and other governmental organs which were not need to be approved by the higher union republics. The autonomous republics had the right to initiate legislation proposals in the Union Republic Supreme Soviets. For the autonomous republics, one of the significant differences from a union republic was the disallowance to secede. They do

²⁰⁶ Terry Martin (2001).

not have their Academies of Science, but they have local branches of the Academy of the Science of the union republic, in which the particular autonomous republic's local culture can be studied and searched. Education in the universities was conducted in Russian language. However, the native language could be used through the end of the high schools or up to the upper classes in the high schools, which depended on the cultural development of the autonomous republics. The spending of budget in terms of cultural sphere was conducted by the autonomous republic, but most of the economic and budgetary decisions were conducted by the union republics.²⁰⁷

Autonomous provinces, on the other hand, were not sovereign. Provincial council existed which could recommend laws to the Supreme Soviet of the Union republics for the autonomous region.²⁰⁸ Education in native language was allowed up to the third or fourth grades of primary schools. Universities did not generally exist in these regions. Small ethnic institutions existed to promote local culture. Sometimes native ethnic groups could not achieve the majority in the provincial government, and the allocation of the budget was entirely determined by the Krai administration.²⁰⁹

The lowest unit in the administrative hierarchy was the autonomous districts. As Slezkine highlighted, these districts were created in order to provide ethnic homelands for the indigenous population of the Soviet far North.²¹⁰ Autonomous districts were part of Krai administration similar to Autonomous Provinces. One of the most significant distinctive features of them, however, was the lack of education in native language. Moreover, local governments were rarely controlled by the native population in autonomous districts.²¹¹

These four-level hierarchical administrative institutionalization of the ethnicity and nationness that was seeded in this period forged the cultural nationalism, which would

²⁰⁷ Gorenburg 2003: 31.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 31.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 32.

²¹⁰ Slezkine 1994: 414-452.

²¹¹ Ibid.

rise to the surface during the political and economic crisis in the 1980s. During the whole Soviet era the non-Russian nations which had no ethnically federal units were exposed to the strongest assimilation. Hence, ethnically federal system of the Soviet Union hindered the speed of assimilation of the non-Russian populations taking into account the particular national hierarchical positions. At this point, personal conception of ethnicity and its concomitant product “passport ethnicity” can be labeled as the second significant dimension of ethnically codified nationality policies of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime not only recognized various nations individually, but it also acknowledged them as a group and codified them into the internal passports. Therefore, the passport ethnicity regime can be considered the institutionalization of the multiculturalism. In the 1926 census, citizens were recorded taking ethnicity into account. The passport ascription of ethnicity was started in 1932.²¹² Since then, every citizen had to bear their national identity from birth to death except in some special cases. The children of the mix marriages had an alternative to choose the ethnicity of either of their parents at the age of sixteen. By the end of 1930s, the Soviet bureaucracy managed to collect data on ascribed ethnicity from the army documents, student files, and employment records.²¹³

3.3.1.1. Affirmative Action Policies or Soviet Type Nation Building

The administrative structure as explained in the previous section was only an important institutional part of a big effort of the Soviet type nation building process. As Terry Martin highlights, the Soviet Union systematically promoted the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and established many of the characteristic institutional forms of the modern nation state for them. Besides, the ethno-codified territorial administration, the Soviet State created and trained new national elites. In most of the various non-Russian territories, national languages were declared as the

²¹² Ibid., 30.

²¹³ Francine Hirsch, (1997) “The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses.” *Slavic Review* Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 251-78.

official language of the governments. The Soviet state financed the mass production of native language books, journals, newspapers, operas, movies, museums, folk music ensembles and the other cultural and historical outputs.²¹⁴

Without doubt, the Bolsheviks did not choose pro-minority oriented nation building model comfortably. The line of thought which was supported by Lenin and Stalin was seriously challenged by the counter lines which were already discussed in the initial part of this chapter. According to Martin, the logic of the affirmative action policies in the Stalin era was based on four main premises: The Marxist, The Modernization, the Colonial or Greatest Danger and the Piedmont Principle respectively.²¹⁵

Taking into account the Marxist premise, Martin points out that for the Bolsheviks, nationalism was a masking ideology which divided the power of the class struggle. However, Lenin was stunned by the power of nationalism which destroyed the multiethnic empires, such as the Habsburg and the Ottomans. Therefore, to cope with the bourgeois counter revolutionary ideology of nationalism, the Bolsheviks chose the tolerant way. Lenin's reaction against the independence of Finland summarizes the Bolshevik model. Lenin argued that Finnish independence intensified, not reduced, the class conflict.²¹⁶ In other words, Lenin implied that even if there was an attempt to invade Finland, Finnish nationalist discourse would spread out among Fins, and Finnish revolutionary movement would be damaged, causing the postponement of the class struggle in Finland.

The Bolshevik progressive understanding of history engendered the modernization promise. The Bolsheviks viewed nationalism as a product of bourgeois society. Lenin and Stalin insisted that nationalism would survive for a long period of time even under socialism.²¹⁷ Hence, Lenin supported the nation building processes of backward

²¹⁴ Martin 2001: 1-2.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ See the footnote at Ibid., 5.

Eastern nationalities in the Soviet Union.²¹⁸ Briefly, nationality was seen as an unavoidable and positive stage of modernization, and it was not comprehended as a security threat.²¹⁹

Martin classified the Leninist division of oppressor and oppressed nationality as the Colonial premise. Indeed, Lenin had a problem with all types of nationalism. As Lenin points out “Fight against all nationalisms and, first of all against Great Russian nationalism”.²²⁰ Lenin always thought that nationalism of the oppressed had a democratic content. Hence, he had a problem with great power Russian chauvinism which could have mobilized minority nationalisms that could divide the Soviet state into pieces. In the notorious Georgian case, Lenin even condemned Stalin, Dzerzhinskii and Ordzhonikidze as Great Russian Chauvinists. His word against these high level Bolshevik cadres was famous: “Russified natives were of the worst chauvinists.”²²¹

Another premise of Martin, namely the Piedmont principle is related to international relations. By implementing affirmative action policies, indeed, the Bolsheviks could play the minority card of the neighbor countries, particularly in the western borderlands. The Soviet Union had borders with Fins, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Rumanians. There were also a lot of scattered minorities in the newly born nation states. For instance, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, there were lots of Ukrainians living. Those Ukrainian co-nationals could be mobilized when they see the self-determination, nation building and autonomy in the Ukrainian SSR.²²²

The above mentioned principles concretized in 1923. The final shape of the Soviet Nationalities Policy was forged at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 and at a

²¹⁸ See for example Lenin's ideas on Bashkir nationalism in Gürbüz 2007: 23-24.

²¹⁹ Martin 2001: 6

²²⁰ Lenin "O prave natsii" cited in Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid., 7.

²²² Ibid., 9.

special conference of Central Committee (Tsk) in June 1923. After June 1923, the Bolsheviks did not organize special meetings with regard to the issue of nationality since the main line of the policies was already finalized.²²³ The resolutions of 1923 affirmed the Soviet Nation Building project. The Soviet Nation Building process or affirmative action policies, in this context, consisted several national forms such as national territories, national languages, national elites, national cultures, ethnic federation, economic equalization and migration.²²⁴

The issue of the territory was discussed earlier in detail in this chapter. The Bolsheviks hierarchically allocated territory taking into account ethnicity. What was significant as a nation building process was the promotion of national elites and national languages. In each territory, the Bolsheviks declared national languages as official languages. National elites were to be trained and promoted into high level bureaucratic positions such as leadership positions in the party, government, industry, schools and universities. These twin policies were called *Korenizatsiia* which can be translated as Nativization or Indigenization.²²⁵

Concerning the dimension of national culture of *Korenizatsiia* policies, we can witness excessive usage of symbolic national identity throughout the USSR in the era of affirmative action policies. Stalin legitimized these policies and national cultures as being “national in form, socialist in content”. At this point, Yuri Slezkine compared the Soviet Union to a communal apartment in which common spaces were filled by Russian identity, but the private apartments were dedicated to the particular non-Russian ethnic groups or nations.²²⁶ Therefore, the aggressive promotion of symbolic markers of national identity, national folklore, dress, food, costumes, opera, poets were implemented in each ethnically autonomous units. However, the politization of national culture was strictly forbidden. The content of the national culture had to be

²²³ See the footnote at Ibid., 9.

²²⁴ Ibid., 10.

²²⁵ For a further information of the root of the word *Korenizatsiia* See, Ibid.

²²⁶ Slezkine 1994: 414-452.

within the framework of Soviet socialist ideology. The articulation of the national culture in different ideologies were punished as bourgeois nationalism, so the repressive state apparatus came into play when the ideological limits of the state were exceeded.²²⁷

The high central ideological control of the state, indeed, did not open doors to the devolution of economic and political power to the periphery. Other than the cultural autonomy, it is hard to claim that in the USSR a genuine federation existed. “Although the 1922-1923 constitutional settlement was called a federation, it in fact concentrated all decision-making power in the center. National republics were granted no more power than Russian provinces”.²²⁸ Therefore, it is hard to say that Soviet *Korenizatsiia* policies had an impact on the central government.

Most of the Cold War oriented scholars are keen to label the Soviet state as an imperial colonialist power.²²⁹ However, the official archival documents proved the exact opposite with regard to economic equalization. For instance, the 1923 nationalities policy decrees called for measures to overcome the real economic and cultural inequality of the Soviet Union's nationalities. The relocation of factories from the Russian heartlands to the Eastern regions to overcome economic equalization were even considered.²³⁰ However, most of the planned sanctions with regard to economic equalization was never institutionalized, and the achievement was modest. Although there was a rift between discourse and implementation, the “backward republics” found chances to lobby for their benefits by distorting official documents and the Soviet political discourse in the era of *Korenizatsiia*. Loyal to the economic equalization and promotion of native regions, even the illegal Slavic migration was restricted for a temporary period.

²²⁷ For a detailed discussion about the link between state and ideology, see for example, Louis Althusser, (2014) *On the reproduction of capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus*, London, Verso.

²²⁸ Martin 2001: 13.

²²⁹ See as examples: The works of Oliver Roy, Richard Pipes, Roman Smal-Stocki, Helene d'Encausse are some of the examples of the cold war oriented scholarship.

²³⁰ See for instance Devenadtsatyi s'ezd, Tainy natsionalnoi politiki, cited in Martin 2001: 14.

In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, central authorities even sanctioned the expulsion of illegal Slavic agricultural settlers as a decolonization measure. In the early 1920s, the Soviet Union's eastern national territories were closed to agricultural colonization. However, by 1927 all-union economic interests had again prevailed over local national concerns and all restrictions on migration were removed.²³¹

The Soviet state's preferential treatment of its minorities most of the time created resentment among the Communist Party officials. The Soviet nationality policies, indeed, called for Russian sacrifice at the expense of supporting minorities. Majority of Russian territories was assigned to non-Russian republics. Russians had to approve the affirmative action policies. They were asked to learn minority languages. Moreover, their traditional culture was stigmatized as a culture of oppression. As a great power nation, Russians lacked their own communist party and they were not granted their own territory. What is obvious is that the Soviet state, contrary to the cold war era cliché arguments, did not even implement a neutral policy against their minorities.²³² They promoted and supported minority nation building processes. In other words, the central state took the leadership of Hroch's famous three-phase model, which explains the development of small state nationalism and nation building processes in Eastern Europe.²³³ Briefly, the party became the vanguard of non-Russian nationalism.

Just as party leadership was needed to lead the proletariat beyond trade-union consciousness to revolution, the party could also guide national movements beyond bourgeois primordial nationalism to Soviet international nationalism.²³⁴

During the NEP period (1923-1928) non-Russian citizens of the Soviet State enjoyed their golden times. However, throughout the 1930s the affirmative action policies of the Stalin era underwent a number of changes. From 1928 to 1932 forced

²³¹ Ibid., 15.

²³² See the debate between Bukharin and Stalin about the issue of neutrality in Ibid.

²³³ Terry Martin, (2001) "An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism" In *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, pp. 67-82, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

²³⁴ Ibid.

collectivization, abolition of the market and industrialization campaign enhanced the centralization of the Soviet state. Most probably the resistance to the forced collectivization from various non-Russian ethnic groups together with the rapid change atmosphere engendered the Bolshevik cadres to question the relevance of nationality. Some events of non-Russian minority mobilization such as Sultan Galiev affair and Ukrainian, Belorussian nationalist opposition to the center engendered a revision of affirmative action policies of Stalin. One of the most important revisions was the abolishment of thousands of tiny national territories which was established in 1920s. They were formally or informally abolished in the 1930s. Nevertheless, thirty-five larger national territories were empowered in 1936. Most of these territories still protect their ethno-territorial structure in the Post-Soviet space. Another significant event was the rehabilitation of the Russian national culture. In January 1934, Stalin declared the abolishment of Great Danger Principle or Great Power Nationality threat perception of Russian culture. By 1936, the Russian nation and culture was praised by Stalin. Russians were raised to the rank of first among the equals.²³⁵ As Stalin stated:

All the peoples of the USSR, participants in the great socialist construction, can take pride in the results of their work. All of them from the smallest to the largest are equal Soviet patriots. But the first among equal is the Russian people, the Russian workers, the Russian toilers, whose role in the entire Great Proletarian Revolution, from the first victory to today's brilliant period of its development, has been exclusively great.²³⁶

By the end of 1930s the Latin alphabets which were used in non-Russian territories were replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet. Initially, Latin alphabets were chosen to prove that the Soviet state was not a colonial power similar to the Russian Empire. In line with the revision of the affirmative action policies bilingualism and reengineering of non-Russian languages were officially supported. Therefore, the new policies were an attempt to bring closer non-Russian languages to Russian language. This new development heralded the dominance of cultural russification.²³⁷ Nevertheless, the

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Martin 2001: 452.

²³⁷ d'Encausse (1995).

affirmative action policies continued silently and reduced the large populous nations to the level of SSR and ASSR. The new official nationalist discourse transformed into friendship of people. As Martin points out the friendship of people was the imagined community of the Soviet state. Needless to say, the friendship of people would be damaged sooner with the deportations of Stalin.

3.4. The Great Purges, Great Power Russian Nationalism and Deportation of Nations (1940-1956)

During the Stalin era particularly in the 1930s the Soviet State turned into a mincing machine which suppressed all kinds of opposition out of the official Stalinist orthodoxy. Stalin's fiftieth birthday in 1929 revealed the massive inflation of his personality cult. In 1930, over 100,000 communists expelled from the party. The second attack between 1933 and 1934 resulted in the purge of over half a million party members. The new cadres which were loyal to the Stalinist orthodoxy were replaced by the purged ones. The idea of the purge extended to the rest of the society and cleansing of the party was no longer limited to the undesirable cadres. Moreover, the termination of the cadres was aimed via jailing or killing. The scale of purges was unprecedented. As Steven Rosefielde points out the average Gulag forced labor population in the years 1929-1953 was about 8.8 million, and the total adult losses attributable to forced labor, collectivization and the purges were over 20 million.²³⁸ Indeed, there is no an agreed data about the number of the victims of the purges. For example, Medvedev estimates that there were around 18 million victims 10 million of whom were killed.²³⁹

In 1937-1938 the military leadership was purged. The victims included Marshal Tukhachevskii, one of the most talented Soviet officers.²⁴⁰ Because of these purges

²³⁸ Steven Rosefielde cited in Richard Sakwa, (1998) *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, London and New York, Routledge. See for example Stephen Wheatcroft cited in Ibid., as an alternative result who thinks that Rosefielde's statistics were exaggerated owing to misinterpretation of the evidence.

²³⁹ See the citation in Sakwa 1988: 43.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

the Soviet Army was defeated against the Nazis at the beginning of the Second World War and the Nazi army was able to invade the western territories very fast and easily due to the lack of capable Soviet military officers. The purges also destroyed the majority of the old Bolshevik cadres. As Sakwa informs:

The police powers that had previously been employed against people outside the party were not turned against Bolsheviks themselves. Some 60 percent of the party activists of 1931 purged by 1937. The purges destroyed the majority of the Old Bolsheviks. Of the 139 members of the Central Committee elected by the seventeenth congress in 1934, 110 (79 per cent) had been arrested before the next congress in 1939; as had 1108 (56 per cent) of its 1966 delegates. Rank-and-file communists were members immune: members of previous oppositions were swept up together with thousands of ordinary party members. The leadership of the national republics were purged almost in their entirety, amid accusations of bourgeois nationalism and other crimes.²⁴¹

The purges led to the destruction of old managers and technicians as well. The new young vigorous skilled workers who were educated by the Soviet orthodoxy took over the technical jobs.

There are various perspectives that interpret the reasons of the purges. One of the perspectives highlights the individual role of Stalin. The supporting arguments of this perspective are such as: his paranoid mentality which could not tolerate opposition; his horrors of being put behind bars and his destruction of all Bolshevik cadres who had worked with Lenin. Another perspective that highlights the problem of authoritarian tendencies within the Bolshevik Party structure, which had been practiced since October 1917. Still another perspective highlights the developmental issues, namely; replacement of older elites by the new ones who were subordinated to the rule of Stalin. Taking into account the international dimension, some perspectives highlight the international threat which forces the rapid industrialization attempt of the Soviet State which would further create tension between center and the peripheries regarding harsh implementation of the collectivization campaign.²⁴² Obviously the truth stays under the combination of all these perspectives. I argue that, a combined perspective which does not exaggerate Stalin's individual megalomania seems better

²⁴¹ Ibid., 42-43.

²⁴² Ibid., 44.

to explain the situation. At this point, new leftist approaches which criticize the vanguard party model and its problematic relationship with socialist democracy seem more explanatory rather than the Trotskyist critics that exaggerate the deviation between Lenin and Stalin eras.

Soon after the great purges of Stalin, the deportations of nations were launched. This was the end of the affirmative action phase of the Soviet nationality policies. The institutionalized ethno-codified federal structure of the Soviet Union continued. However, the speed of pro-minority oriented nation building process slowed down. Thousands of non-Russian territories were already abolished at the end of the affirmative action policies. In this new phase of the nationality policies, the great danger of Russian nationalism principle of the former phase was totally abolished. Moreover, the former oppressor nation perception of the Russian culture was rehabilitated. The Russian culture, even Russian nationalism began to be seen as a glue which holds together various nations of the Soviet state. Due to the collectivization policies, the Bolshevik cadres began to consider that the issue of “backward nations” was finished. Thus, the demands for preferential treatment of the non-Russian nationalities began to be considered with a high suspicion and a security perspective. At the same time, Russians turned into a support base of the Soviet regime. If I return to the analogy of Slezkine, I can revise that the common space or corridors of the Soviet building were enlarging, and the doorman service for the non-Russian flats was being removed.

The deportations of Stalin implemented in two ways, namely *preventive* and *punitive* deportations. Stalin was anxious of the collaboration of some Soviet nations with the Nazis. Hence, in order to prevent the probability of the prospective collaboration the preventive deportations were implemented. The deportations of the Volga Germans and Meskhetians were the example of this kind of deportations. For example, the Volga Germans were the first people who were deported in 1941 at the beginning of World War II for the fear of the collaboration possibility with their co-ethnics. The deportations of Meskhetians were implemented under the fear of their collaboration

with a future possible enemy, Turkey.²⁴³ The Punitive deportations, on the other hand, had a logic of punishment of the particular Soviet nations who collaborated with the Nazi army. The deportations of Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechen, Ingush, Balkars and Crimean Tatars were the main examples of this kind of deportations.²⁴⁴ In fact, most of the people of the deported nations massively fought against the Nazi army. The percentage of non-loyal people to the Soviet State was indeed very little. However, all people related to above mentioned nations were forced to leave their homeland. were relocated in the Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Some of the elders and children of the deported nations died in the congested trains which were going non-stop until the relocation centers.²⁴⁵ The new comers did not welcome well, since the local people thought that they were traitors and deported to there. Hence, adaptation to the new lands were also problematic. The extent of deportations was very traumatic. For example, The Kalmyk Autonomous Socialist Republic simply vanished with its capital Elista. The punishment continued concerning cultural rights of the deported nations. Cultural institutions of the deported nations were destroyed. Their native language books were burned. State sponsored subsidies for the written native languages of the deported nations were abolished. Therefore, the languages of the deported nations converted into the primitive languages level.²⁴⁶ After Stalin's death via the help of Khrushchev's destalinization campaign these nations were mostly rehabilitated. Most of the deported nations found chance to return in the Khrushchev period. However, the trauma which was caused by the massive punishment of people without questioning whether they are innocent or guilty caused a serious trauma in the memory of history of these nations which would force the Soviet administration in the Perestroika period.

²⁴³ Kreindler, Isabelle (1986) "The Soviet Deported Nationalities: A summary and an Update." *Soviet Studies*, vol.38, No.3, pp.387-405.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Smith 2013: 155-157.

²⁴⁶ Kreindler 1986: 387-405.

3.5. Nativization and in Pursuit of a Soviet Supra Identity (1956-1994)

In the years of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Nationality policies followed institutional structure which was already established in the era of Lenin and Stalin. Since it is always not easy to change an ethnicity regime which is firmly established, the reform attempts were limited. The notable changes within the institutional limitations, from Stalin's death to the Perestroika, were such as: anti-Stalinist discourse and rehabilitation of the deported nations; influence of republican elites; educational reforms and slow-pace Russification. In this period there was an attempt to mobilize the citizens under the supra-national Soviet nation/people (*Sovyetskii narod*) discourse, which was far from success because of multinational institutional legacy of the Soviet ethnicity regime.

3.5.1. Khrushchev Period (1956-1964)

Khrushchev was a reformist leader and he attempted to rehabilitate Stalin's harsh nationality policies and authoritarian rule. He pursued a utopian program that included various reforms, aiming at improving the life conditions of Soviet citizens with regard to material and democratization sense. In 1956, Khrushchev condemned the Great Purge and attacked Stalin for his abuse of power during his reign. Furthermore, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for undermining the multiethnic character of the World War II success in his quest to emphasize Russian nationalism in the war. During Khrushchev era, in 1957, all deported nations were allowed the right to return back to their homelands.²⁴⁷ Indeed, the starting point of Khrushchev's reformist policies dated back to his Secret Speech in February 1956. The denunciation of deportations triggered the resurgence of ethnic nationalisms to some extent. For instance, between 2 and 11 March, 1956 Georgian youth furious with Khrushchev, who had banned the parades and poetry readings in honor of Stalin, took to the streets in various cities and protested

²⁴⁷ Shcherbak 2013: 1-31.

Khrushchev. Tensions escalated, and eventually, red army soldiers opened fire on demonstrators in Tbilisi, which killed 20 demonstrators.²⁴⁸

The bloody suppression of Hungarian uprising at the end of 1956 was the initial warnings of how nationalism could be articulated in an anti-Soviet discourse. The Hungarian case together with the secret speech of Khrushchev, in which he condemned Stalinist terror and deportations, caused grass-root movements mobilized by anti-Soviet discourse among satellite states and some SSR republics, including three Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Moldova.²⁴⁹ Among these, Lithuanian national unrest was the most powerful due to wide use of nationalist graffiti.²⁵⁰

With regard to economy, Khrushchev wanted to decentralize a large part of economic decision making and supervision to the regional councils.²⁵¹ This reform was called as *Sovnarkhoz* (Economic council). Having understood the limits of an overcentralized state economy, Khrushchev attempted to strengthen economic potentials of the union republics. However, the heritage of the command economy depending on the specialization among the Union republics prevented the decentralization reforms. For example, cotton from Central Asia and coal from Ukraine were sent to another place within the USSR to receive finished industrial products. This specialization was limiting *Sovnarkhoz*. Along with drawbacks of the specialization, *Sovnarkhoz* was also abused by the Union republics. The republican elites of the SSRs replace the idea of localism by nationalism via pursuing their own self interests. In some cases *Sovnarkhoz* clashed with *Gosplan* (*Gosuderstvenii Plan-State Plan*) as well.²⁵²

With regard to language policies, the education reform of 1958-1959 was a significant phase that strengthens the position of the Russian language at the expense of the native

²⁴⁸ Smith 2013: 199.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 200.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 205.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid., 207.

languages. The reform allowed the parents to choose the language of education for their children whether in Russian language or native languages. Russian language was already a lingua franca in the Soviet Union, so the permanence of the language decision in practical, means to enhance the position of the Russian Language. Article 19 of Khrushchev's thesis with regard to language reform is:

The question ought to be considered of giving parents the right to send their children to a school where the language of their choice is used. If a child attends a school where instruction is conducted in the language of one of the Union or autonomous republics, he may, if he wishes, take up the Russian language. And vice versa, if a child attends a Russian school, he may, if he so desires, study the language of one of the Union or autonomous republics.²⁵³

Not surprisingly, Baltic republics together with Georgia, Armenia, Belorussia and Ukraine opposed the language reform and they tried to defer and resist the implementation of the new language law which engendered small scale purges of high officials in some republics.

The nationality policies discourse under Khrushchev were to some extent revised in favor of a relative assimilationist tendency as well. For instance, *Rastvet* (Grow of nations) was the hegemonic nationalist discourse of the affirmative action policies. *Sliianie* (merge of nations) was already postponed on a far future, which initially requires the highest level of *Sblizhenie* (Converge of nations). Another concept of Soviet Nationality discourse, *Druzhba*, (Friendship) can be associated with the hegemonic discourse of the Stalin era. Concerning the era of Khrushchev, there was an intensification in the usage of *Sovetskii narod* (Soviet people/nation) concept. Khrushchev era was the starting period of the emphasis on the *Sovetskii narod* (Soviet nation) discourse.²⁵⁴ Although the term *Sovetskii narod* is a controversial term which is associated with people or nation in the literature. I agree with the authors who translate the term as nation. Likewise, I also agree with the translation of the Russian

²⁵³ Ibid., 210.

²⁵⁴ Aktürk 2012: 202.

term *Natsii* as an ethnic group in English.²⁵⁵ Soviet nation was conceptualized as a supra national identity which would cement the multinational structure of the country.

A new historic community of people was formed in our country from different ethnicities, having common characteristic traits the Soviet nation. They have a common socialist Motherland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a common economic base, socialist economy, a common social-class structure, a common world view Marxist Leninism, a common goal building of communism, many common traits in a common sacred character (*dukhovnom oblike*), and a (common) psychology.²⁵⁶

What can be deducted from this speech is that the lingua franca Russian language of inter-ethnic communication can be labeled as the primary state language of the Soviet Union. Although Khrushchev refrains from revealing his opinions directly regarding the language issues. At this point, what I need to say is that the Soviet state was always a multinational and ethnic diversity based state. When I mention the assimilative tendency in the era of Khrushchev it should be considered as the tendency under a multinational/ethnic umbrella.

3.5.2. Brezhnev and the Rise of the Union Republics

Brezhnev's tenure was a period of stagnation in many aspects. Very few new members were appointed to Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the union republic leaders remained in their places for a long period of time. Brezhnev created a tradition that the first secretaries of Union republics must come from the members of the titular nationalities. Therefore, the SSRs found opportunity to widen the autonomy in which they had already gained in several aspects. The long tenure of the titular leaders, however, caused widespread corruption and nepotism networks.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ See, Khrushchev's speech at XXII. Congress of CPSU in Ibid., 205.

²⁵⁷ Sakwa 1998: 252.

The discourse of, *Sovetskii narod* which was commenced by Khrushchev continued despite the fact that the rhetoric remained far from the expectations of the success as a unified common super identity. Between 1953 and 1982, the new intelligentsia which was appointed into high level posts could not fully adopt this new Soviet identity. As Sakwa points out, “many later went on to act as the proponents of independence”. What is significant is that the tenure of Brezhnev was in accordance with the titular nations, and he did not force to change the multinational structure of the ethnicity policy of the state into a more assimilationist one.

He himself claimed that Soviet culture was a culture socialist in content, in its main direction of development, multifaceted in its national forms, and international in its spirit and character. In other words, reflecting Stalin's slogan of national in form, socialist in content, Brezhnev repudiated the notion that the Soviet people would form a single nationality sharing a single language. At most, they would share a common culture expressed in different forms and different languages.²⁵⁸

All in all, the Bolsheviks had to deal with the issue of nationality since they were struggling against a multinational empire. The Marxist heritage which was adopted by the Bolsheviks was vague. Hence, the Bolsheviks had to find their own paths regarding the nationality issue. Most of the Bolsheviks, who came from an orthodox leftist tradition, were prone to national nihilistic approaches of Rosa Luxemburg. Furthermore, owing to the Tsarist imperial heritage and its legacy of late modernization, the Bolshevik cadres were under the influence of Russian nationalism as well. Concomitantly, they kept their distance from the sovereignty demands of minority nationalisms. However, Lenin's high prestige and the trust of the Bolshevik cadres in his mental capabilities were enough to convince them of the necessity to approach those minority nationalisms in a friendly way. Lenin's attempt of articulation of minority nationalism in Soviet socialism was embodied under the motto of Stalin, namely “Socialist in content, nationalist in form”. Ethnicity was institutionalized perfectly taking into account the multinationalist and multiculturalist logic. Contrary to the cold war era arguments, which emphasized the dimension of assimilationist

²⁵⁸ Isabelle Kreindler, (1982) “The Changing Status of Russian in the Soviet Union.” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 33, 17, pp. 7-39.

perspectives of the USSR as ‘nation killing’, the Soviet state, in fact, implemented a sui generis ‘nation building’ model. At the phase of affirmative action policies, the Soviet state even implemented “nation building” policies for its hundreds of tiny minority ethnic groups. The affirmative action policies ended at the end of 1930s. The forced collectivization, purges and deportations created a social trauma not only among minorities but also among majority Russian population. However, territorially institutionalized initial nation building model never deviated from its main road. Cultural nationalisms of minorities benefited from this path which was already established by the Soviet nationality policies by creating their own minority national intelligentsia.

The Soviet nationality discourse was aimed to follow the path of *Rastvet*, *Sblizhenie*, and *Sliianie*. The *Sliianie* (merging of nations) was always found to be a utopia from the beginning, so it was postponed to the era of world communist society. The initial two concepts of the Soviet nationality discourse were accomplished to a large extent. As Gorenburg points out, the new Soviet studies, which were far from the Cold War era prejudices, sometimes overemphasize the dimension of multiculturalism and *Rastvet*-nation building as a reaction to the Cold War era arguments. Hence, the scholars sometimes neglect the assimilative dimension of the Soviet nationality policies.²⁵⁹ Without any doubt, Stalin’s reduction of ethno-territorial administrative units for the small ethnic groups, Khrushchev’s educational reforms in 1958-1959 and rapid modernization with its several faces including economy, education gave the Russian language and culture de facto the status of interethnic communication that involves an assimilative dimension under Russian language and culture. Furthermore, this process worked at the expense of minorities, particularly those who live in the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. Even in the SSRs, this assimilative dimension was the main reason for the discourse of “nationalizing states”.²⁶⁰ However, the main line of the Soviet nationality policies followed the Multiethnic/cultural path. The ethno-

²⁵⁹ Dmitry Gorenburg, (2006) "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation", In *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*, eds. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble, pp. 273-304., Washington D. C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

²⁶⁰ For a further discussion of nationalizing states, see for example, Brubaker 2011: 1785-1814.

federal territorial structure and the passport inscription of the ethnicity dimensions of the Soviet multicultural ethnicity regime firmly restricted the assimilative tendencies and paralyzed the supra ethnic identity discourse of the “Soviet Man”. Furthermore, the cultural nationalism of the minorities, which was delicately established by the Soviet State, found the ground to reappear as a political nationalism from the period of Glasnost. At this point, the Brezhnev period was significant in that in this period, the titular elites found the opportunity to spread their nomenklatura network. The ethno-national nomenklatura system was deeply rooted in the period of Brezhnev due to Moscow’s titular friendly policies or condonation of the new local power areas. The native elites’ long rule in the titular republics heralded the rise of ethnic mobilization. However, in the Brezhnev period, even the titular elites were not aware of their detrimental powers for the Soviet-established order since the Soviet regime seemed imperishable even 2-3 years before of its disintegration. In the following chapters, I will examine the elite power of the ethno-national nomenklaturas, who were so decisive about the direction of ethnic mobilization, taking the case of Tatarstan into account.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE VOLGA TATARS: FROM THE MEDIEVAL AGES TO THE END OF SOVIET MODERNIZATION

The Tatar nationality was formed during the heyday of the Golden Horde's political and economic might and the prosperity of its culture in the 14th century resulted from its using of a common language, its territorial integrity, its economic strength and its cultural uniformity. This was the name when the Tatar nationality came into existence.

*R. G. Fakhretdinov*²⁶¹

The Volga Tatars, the most populous national minority of Russian Federation, had a strong tradition of statehood throughout history, which led to the formation and reproduction of modern Tatar nationalist discourses and the hegemony of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura. From the perspective of historiography as a political process which is produced, developed and changed by the articulation in national-political discourses, the issue of the origin of the Volga Tatars is a debated one. As Graney quoted from Hobsbawm, “Historians are to ethnonationalists as poppy growers are to heroin users.”²⁶² In other words, the writing of ethno history and its narratives of ethnogenesis are the politicized attempts.²⁶³ The Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura

²⁶¹ R., G., Fakhretdinov, (2013) *Istoriia Tatar*, Kazan', Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 126.

²⁶² See, citation of Hobsbawm in Graney Katherine E., (2009) *Of Khans and Kremlins: Tatarstan and the Future of Ethno-Federalism in Russia*, Lexington Books, New York, p.2.

²⁶³ Ibid.

and the Tatar national movement focused on the legacy of the Tatar statehood in the period of ethnic mobilization. For them, the Volga Tatars created independent states and in the modern era they deserve to have their independent statehood as well.²⁶⁴ That is why, the interpretation of history turned into a constituent part of the post-Soviet nationality and nation-building discourses of the Tatar elites. The medieval era states of Bulgar, Kazan Khanate and even the Mongol Empire began to be considered as the golden era of the Tatar nation and the Tatar national movement glorified with the victories of these states. When I visited the national museum of Tatarstan in Kazan, I witnessed how national discourses manipulated history for the sake of their national aims. In the national museum of Tatarstan in Kazan, the section allocated for the period when the Tatars were under the Russian Empire was very limited. However, the ancient and medieval periods of Tatars were allocated a wide space, almost reaching the 60-70 percent of the total exhibition area of the museum. The negligence of Tatars in the Russian Empire period indicates that the victories are always remembered by the national elites. However, the defeats and oppression are always aimed to be erased from the national consciousness by the national elites. In this chapter, I will attempt to highlight the political history of the Tatars briefly. Since the Tatar nationalists and the republican nomenklatura were influenced by the pre-Modern statehood of the Tatars, I will firstly focus on the early history of the Tatars. Secondly, I will try to explain the national resilience of the Tatars in the Tsarist Russia. Thirdly, I will highlight the modernization process of the Tatars at the end of the Russian Tsardom. Fourthly, I will explain the events and state projects of the Tatars prior to the Soviet Union and finally, I will focus on the modernization of the Tatar nation in the Soviet era taking into account inter/intra ethnic relations in Tatarstan. The political history of the Tatars will give significant tools to understand the Tatar national discourses which emerged in the Perestroika period. The hegemonic nationality discourses of the ethno-national nomenklatura frequently instrumentalized the national sentiments of the historical achievements for their personal or group drive to hold or acquire power.

²⁶⁴ My interview with Dilyara Murzina, Associated Prof. at Social and Political Conflictology Department at Kazan National Research Technological University, Kazan, 03.10.2016.

Before starting to explain the early history of the Volga Tatars, I will clarify a significant issue in the Tatar historiography. With regard to the historiography of the Volga Tatars, there are two conflicting lines which affect the discourses of Tatar nationalism; namely, the Bulgarist and Kypchak interpretation of history. The Bulgarist thesis, which was officially supported by the Soviet governments, highlighted the Bulgars and the Bulgar State as the origin of the Volga Tatars by de-emphasizing Mongolic influence on Tatar ethnicity. From the beginning of 1940s, Moscow dictated Bulgarist interpretation of Tatar history even though there were a lot of scholars on the side of Kypchak interpretation or modified Kypchak thesis via including Bulgarist elements.²⁶⁵ The Bulgar thesis simply traces the ancestors of Kazan Khanate to the Volga Bulgars, who are Turkic people pushed forward from Azov steppes to the Middle Volga and lower Kama region during the first half of the eighth century.

According to the Bulgar thesis, after the invasion of the Mongols, the Bulgar culture maintained its survival and provided a political Bulgar State legacy, which would provide the foundation for the emergence of the Kazan Tatars and the Kazan Khanate. The significant point of this thesis that must be stressed is that there was very limited acculturation between the Mongols and the Bulgars. Hence, the Bulgar thesis has a tendency to neglect Mongolic heritage of the Tatar history and to prefer absolute categories.²⁶⁶ The Kypchak thesis, on the other hand, contends that the Kazan Tatars are direct descendants of the Tatars of the Golden Horde.²⁶⁷ There are significant drawbacks of both of these theses. Both of the theses have tendency to argue in an absolutist and separated context which lacks the interaction and acculturation among societies. Undoubtedly, there were academics who defended the mixed lines before and after the Soviet Revolution. As I stated, the Bulgarist line was supported by the Soviet officials. However, after 1960s, a more inclusive Kypchak thesis with Bulgarist

²⁶⁵ Rorlich 1986: 6,

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

elements gained importance. The modified Kypchak thesis argues that the Volga Tatar ethnicity is constituted by interaction of three peoples; Volga Bulgars, Kypchak Speaking Turks, and Mongols. When the Mongols arrived in Middle Volga region, they mixed with the Kypchak speaking Turks who were already in the region, and these two groups caused gradual linguistic and political assimilation of the Bulgars. Hence, the Volga Tatars were born out of the interaction of Bulgar culture together with the Mongolic-Kypchak ruling elite legacy of the Golden Horde.²⁶⁸ At this point, modified Kypchak thesis seems more accountable regarding the unfinished debate on Tatar ethnogenesis. This inclusive Kypchak interpretation has been popular since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well. Without a doubt, the Soviet official support for the Bulgarist thesis involves an exaggerated perspective which aims to cut the Pan-Turkic elements of the Tatar ethnicity. Archeological findings and linguistic affinity of the Tatar language with Turkic languages, particularly with the Kypchak group affirm the accountability of the modified Kypchak thesis as well. If the Kypchak thesis is accepted, the history of the Volga Tatars becomes part of a Turkic history which extends to the Huns and the Turkic Khanate of Bumyn and Istemi Khans.²⁶⁹ However, although some post-Soviet official nationalist discourses accept the cultural-political legacy of the Bulgars, they pay much more attention to the Turkic-Mongolic heritage of the Tatar history.²⁷⁰

4.1. The Statehood of Volga Tatars in Medieval Era: The Bulgar State, Mongol Conquests and the Kazan Khanate

One of the main elements of Tatar ethnogenesis can be traced back to the Bulgars, and the Volga Bulgar State, which was emerged in the Middle Volga region on the

²⁶⁸ Fakhretdinov 2013: 172-197; Indus., R., Tagirov, (2008) *Istoriia Natsional'noy Gosdarstvennosti Tatarskogo Naroda i Tatarstana*, Kazan', Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, pp.5-10; Rorlich 1986: 6-9.

²⁶⁹ See for example, Fakhretdinov 2013: 147-161, Tagirov 2008: 10-50.

²⁷⁰ See Ibid.

confluence of Volga and Kama rivers. The first traces of Bulgars can be found in the Armanian History chronicles which were dated from the second centuries A.C. The Bulgars that were a Turkic tribe, were living around the Great Caucasian Mountains. The war with Alans rendered the Bulgars to penetrate Eastern Europe at the end of the fourth century.²⁷¹ The Great Bulgar State extended from the North Caucasian Mountains to the confluence of South and Middle Eastern Europe under the famous ruler Kubrat at the beginning of the seventh century. After the pressure of Avars, the Great Bulgar State disintegrated, and one of the heirs of Kubrat migrated into the Middle Volga region from Azov steppes under the rule of Khazars. The disintegration of the Great Bulgar meant the end of Turkic tradition on Bulgars.²⁷²

By the time the Volga Bulgar state was formed, its population had already been diverse including several Turkic and Finno-Ugric tribes. The Volga Bulgaria, the vassal state of Khazars, would soon be an important feudal medieval state in terms of agriculture, trade and craft. The confluence of Volga and Kama rivers was an important trade center stretching from Europe to Asia. The Volga Bulgars clearly benefitted from the transit location of their territories. The Bulgars converted into Islam under the ruler of Almush (Almas) in 922 A.D. Before changing their religion, in 921, Almush Khan sent an envoy to the caliph, asking for assistance to accept the religion of Islam. The Caliph Ja'far al-Muktedir as a response sent Ibn-Fadlan as the ambassador to the land of the Bulgars. Hence, the ruler of the North and his community joined into Islamic *umma* (community of believers).²⁷³ As for the economic activities, emancipation of the Bulgar state from Khazar vassalage increased the trade capacity of the Bulgar State dramatically. As Tagirov mentioned that Volga Bulgaria State was in the third place after Greece and Iran concerning trade in the world then.²⁷⁴ There were trade

²⁷¹ Tagirov 2008: 64.

²⁷² Ibid., 67.

²⁷³ Rorlich 1986: 11.

²⁷⁴ Tagirov 2008: 73.

agreements with Kiev, and the other Muslim societies together with the pilgrimage tourism to Mecca.

The rich black soil of the middle Volga provided fertile soil for agriculture. Ibn-Fadlan's chronicles were significant to inform the rich agricultural products of the Volga Bulgars. As Rorlich mentions via citing Fadlan, there were no taxes on the agriculture. However, there were 10 percent taxes on trade. "One tenth of the goods traded by both Bulgar and foreign merchants was relinquished to the treasury."²⁷⁵ Various crafts for buildings of houses, caravansaries and mosques, as well as metallurgy and weapon production were quite advanced in the Bulgar State. Furthermore, leather production such as producing clothes and boots via tanning of animal skins, pottery and jewelry production was also well developed and internationally famous in Volga Bulgaria.²⁷⁶

The foreign relations with Kievan Rus generally was peaceful and trade oriented. However, by the emergence of Northern Eastern Rus on the upper Volga region, the new hostile relations of the page of history opened. Only the imminent Mongol threat could force the two states to sign a peace treaty in 1229.²⁷⁷ Finally, Volga Bulgaria could not resist the Mongol campaigns and was defeated by the Mongols. The advanced feudal structure of the Bulgars as well as distinguished Northern Islamic Civilization would constitute an indispensable part of Tatar ethnogenesis soon.

The heritage of Mongols in terms of statehood and ethnogenesis was one of the turning points in the Tatar history. The Golden Horde under the rule of Batu Khan started a massive military campaign which would not stop with the invasion and destruction of the Volga Bulgar State in 1236. After Bulgar lands, Mongols continued to their massive invasions initially by conquering western lands of Moscow. In 1240, Mongols reached to Kiev. Nevertheless, the march of armies of Batu did not stop, and reached the lands of Eastern European territories. Batu had to return back as soon as he received

²⁷⁵ Rorlich 1986: 15.

²⁷⁶ Fakhretdinov 2013: 112.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 114.

the news of Great Khan's death at the end of 1241. Batu chose the city of Bulgar as temporary capital of the Golden Horde. Batu minted his coins as a symbol of sovereignty, and the rulers of the conquered lands began to come to Bulgar to receive their *yarlyks* (charters). Batu built himself a new capital on the lower Volga, namely, Saray, as soon as the new capital was fully constructed, Batu shifted the capital of the Golden Horde from Bulgar to Saray.²⁷⁸ The Golden Horde occupied a huge territory from the Irtush river in the East to the lower parts of Danube in the West, and from the Bulgar-Kazan borders in the North to the Caspian sea and Derbent canyon of Caucasia in the South.²⁷⁹

Khan Berke (1256-1266) adopted Islam, and the Golden Horde fully became independent from Karakorum in the period of Khan Mangu Temur (1267-1280). Under the rule of Ozbek Khan the position of Islam consolidated. Islam became official religion. Arabic became the language of politics and diplomacy.²⁸⁰ The Golden Horde was an empire type of state, so Mongolian medieval statecraft was never forced in the conquered lands. Some places were directly ruled and some other places were indirectly ruled. The Bulgar lands, in this context, ruled indirectly and had a great autonomy. Adaptation and consolidation of Islam had a beneficial and autonomist face for the conquered Muslim territories.²⁸¹

The Golden Horde was a symbiotic state which merged both nomadic and settled societies. There were around 25 significant cities under the rule of the Golden Horde. For example, Saray should not be considered as a tent city. By the time of Khan Ozbeks rule, it developed as an urban entity which had a sophisticated infrastructure such as water supply systems and Eastern physical city appearance with caravansaries, and mosques.²⁸²

²⁷⁸ Rorlich 1986: 18.

²⁷⁹ Fakretdinov 2013: 121.

²⁸⁰ Rorlich 1986: 20.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 20-23.

²⁸² Ibid., 20.

Social stratification was sharp in the Golden Horde. There was a strict tax collection system together with a broad network of bureaucracy to collect the taxes. The tax collection system was combined by central officials and local tax collectors selected among the local population, namely *Tamghachi* and *Souiurghal*. Only *Tarkhans* were exempt from the taxes. *Tarkhans* were a privileged nobility who had hereditary lands that was given to them as grants by the Great Khan, mostly with a condition to contribute on the state militarily such as raising soldiers.

Taking ethnicity into account, even the center of the horde cannot be labeled as purely Mongolic. The Mongol aristocracy which was mixed with the Turkic Kypchak tribes was a minority in the Golden Horde. As Fakhretdinov claims “a small Mongolian ethnos represented by empire's nobility quite quickly dissolved into the prevailing local Kypchak and newly-arrived Turkic speaking Tatar tribes.”²⁸³ Hence, by the fourteenth century, the Mongolian language of the minority elites soon would be vanished and assimilated under the Tatar-Kypchak language of the people. Fakhretdinov claims that along with the assimilation of Bulgars and Mongols under the Tatar-Kypchak super-ethnos, the formation of the Tatar nationality was emerged.

The Tatar nationality was formed during the heyday of the Golden Horde's political and economic might and the prosperity of its culture in the 14th century resulted from its using of a common language, its territorial integrity, its economic strength and its cultural uniformity. This was the name when the Tatar nationality came into existence.²⁸⁴

The Mongol rule was greatly weakened at the first half of the 15th century as a result of the plague. Drought and plague ravaged the Golden Horde. The attacks of Timurlane and neighboring Russian principalities facilitated the disintegration.²⁸⁵ The weakening of the center had a centrifugal effect on regional powers. Hence, the disintegration of the Golden Horde gave birth subsequent states which are overwhelmingly united under Tatar ethnos. The social and political heritage of the

²⁸³ Fakhretdinov 2013: 124.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 126.

²⁸⁵ Rorlich 1986: 23.

Golden Horde continued as Siberian Khanate (1429), The Nogai Horde (1420-1430s), the Big Horde (1433), The Crimean Khanate (1443), the Kazan Khanate (1445), the Kasimov Khanate (1452) and the Astrakhan Khanate (1459).²⁸⁶

Taking into account the impacts of Mongol rule on Volga Bulgars, it can be said that the Islamic identity of the Volga Bulgars were consolidated. The Golden Horde intensified the acculturation of various ethnic groups living in the middle Volga region. The Golden Horde as a melting pot center rendered the emergence of Tatar ethnicity as well.

Another turning point of the Tatar history was the formation of the Kazan Khanate. The Kazan Khanate located at the upper part of the confluence of Kama and Volga rivers, which was roughly similar with the current territories of Tatarstan Federal Republic in Middle Volga region. According to Fakhretdinov the territory occupied by the Kazan Khanate was vaster than today's Tatarstan reaching pre-Urals in the East and Saratov in the South.²⁸⁷ The capital city of the Khanate was Kazan, and there were more than 30 towns and fortresses which was belonged to the Khanate. 107 years of the rule of the Kazan Khanate to large extent continued as an independent state. However, there were foreign dominations from time to time. The relations with Moscow were never a constant hostile relation. There were significant periods of time of friendly relations which depended on intensive trade as well. For example, the period between 1484-1521 was the golden times between Kazan and Moscow. The rising influence of Crimean Tatar Khanate on Kazan, initially did not render hostile relations among three medieval powers. Indeed, Kazan, Moscow and Crimea forged an alliance against the successor powers of the Golden Horde. Hence, there was a beneficial market, which links Russian north to Crimea, Persia, Siberia and Central Asia under the authority of the alliance of Moscow, Crimea and Kazan. However,

²⁸⁶ Fakhretdinov 2013: 126.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 128.

when the alliance between Crimea and Moscow collapsed Moscow's policy suddenly turn to hostility towards Kazan in 1521.²⁸⁸

As for the reign of the Kazan Khanate, it can be said that the Khanate was an extension of the Mongol rule. The Kazan Khanate was founded in 1445 at the time of Makhmutek, the elder son of last Golden Horde ruler Ulug-Muhammed. Indeed, Ulug-Muhammed was also considered as the founder of the Kazan Khante as well from the period of 1437-1445. Ulu-Muhammed's other two sons, Yakub and Kasim went to Moscow and took refuge behind Vasilii II aftermath of the dynastic clashes for the Kazan Khanate.²⁸⁹ Moscow frequently intervened the domestic politics of the Kazan Khanate. Hence, in the case of Kasim, Russian tsar, Vasilii II endowed a small town of Meshchera on the Oka, which would thereafter be called as Kasimov. The non-Russian dominated population of Kasimov served as a puppet Khanate in service for Moscow.²⁹⁰

Almost three decades before the invasion of the Khanate by Ivan IV, the Kazan Khanate became a theater of game of thrones between Moscow and Crimea. Successor Khanates of pro-Crimean and pro-Moscow performed by turns. Finally, Moscow campaign against Kazan in 1552, resulted with the conquest of Kazan and destroyed the Kazan Khanate. The fall of Kazan opened a new phase in Tatar and Russian history. From that point, Russian imperial era started, and an important amount of non-Russian and Muslim population added into the Slavic and orthodox population of Russia which converted Russia into a multinational empire.

The Kazan Khanate was a typical medieval feudal monarchic state. The multiethnic structure of the state and the golden horde influenced on the administrative structure was evident. As Rorlich points out, within the boundaries of the Khanate were living not only Tatars but also Bashkirs, Cheremises, Chuvashes, and Votiaks (the ancestors

²⁸⁸ Rorlich 1986: 27.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 25.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

of Udmurts).²⁹¹ There were two assemblies in the administrative unit of the Khanate. For example, Karachi was a small royal council composed of the prominent members of a narrow aristocracy. There was also Mongolic-Turkic type of Kurultai which was bigger and composed of landed aristocracy, the military, and the ecclesiastical establishments.²⁹²

The economic structure of the Kazan Khanate was similar to the Bulgar State. Agriculture, crafts and trade were the most prominent features of the economy.²⁹³ Jewelry production was very developed thanks to the high level of stone-carving of craftsmen in Kazan.²⁹⁴ In the Khanate, slave trade was prevalent and Kazan was the one of the most important warehouses of slaves in the region.²⁹⁵ Apart from the slave trade, Kazan merchants sold leather, furs and fish as well. Taking architecture into account, there were impressive mosques and medresses in Kazan. Some of the monuments in the Kazan Kremlin have survived until the present-day. Famous among them was Nur-Ali mosque which was converted into church by the Russians after the conquest of the city. Kul Sherif, which was destroyed by the Russians were working as the primary mosque with its eight minarets. There are important evidences which support that Söyembikä Tower was constructed in the Khanate's period. The impressive 58-meter-tall tower's construction date is still enshrouded in mystery.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 28.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid, 30.

²⁹⁴ Fakhretdinov 2013: 131.

²⁹⁵ Kazan Khanate's slavery system reveals a significant comparison with Soviet and post-Soviet Tatar historiography. For example, prominent historian Indus Tagirov in his Soviet era writings highlighted that the collapse of the Kazan Khanate was a progressive event in Tatar history since the Kazan Khanate had a slavery system, which made the state more backward than the medieval Russian Empire in which a slavery system did not exist. However, Prof. Tagirov highlighted in the post-Soviet era that the collapse of the Kazan Khanate was a disastrous event for Tatar history. (During my interview with Rustam Gibadullin, the change of the ideas of Tagirov was emphasized.)

The collapse of the Kazan Khanate opened a new stage in Tatar history. In this stage, the intensive interaction with Russians and living under the rule of the Russians would become an indispensable part of the continuously shaped Tatar ethno-cultural identity.

4.2. The Tatars Under Russian Tsardom

The Conquest of Kazan Khanate initiated Imperial era of Russian Tsardom along with imperialistic unequal relationships between Moscow and the conquered territories. Indeed, the unequal political relationship between the subjects and objects and multinationality were the key determiners of empires.²⁹⁶ Not surprisingly, the medieval tsarist Russian ideology was heavily under the influence of orthodox religious ideology. Hence, antagonistic identity relations between Russians and Tatars were shaped under the orthodox religious dogma. The Russians were equalized with positive adjectives such as: “Believers, religious, pious, pure, peaceful and good.” On the other hand, the infidel Tatars were associated with negative adjectives, such as: “Nonbelievers, godless, pagans, impious, unclean, warlike, and bad.” Indeed, these kind of stereotypes against the Tatars have been continuing among Russian fascists contemporarily as well. Moreover, the discriminatory language codes against the Tatars were not only limited among racists, these codes can be found among ordinary life cycles of the whole society in the Soviet and Post-Soviet era as well.²⁹⁷ The abolition of these banal fascist nationalist language codes were not totally eliminated from the modern Russian society.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ Cohen Ariel, (1996) *Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis*, Westport, CT: Preager, p. 1.

²⁹⁷At this point, Sergei Einstein’s movie “Ivan Grozny”, which began to play in 1944, was an example of banal fascist language codes against the Tatars. In the movie, The Tatars of the Kazan Khanate was portrayed as Asian savages. However, Ivan the Terrible was portrayed with positive references. For a further explanation and deconstruction of the banal nationalist elements of the movie, see, Helen M. Faller, (2011) *Nation, Language and Islam: Tatarstan’s Sovereignty Movement*, Budapest-New York, CEU Press, p. 229-232.

²⁹⁸ For a further discussion on Banal Nationalism and Fascism, see for example Tanil Bora, <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/3290/fasizmin-halleri#.VwWaum70QrI>.

Ivan the terrible appointed Archbishop Gurii to initiate the massive conversions of Muslim Tatars in Christianity. Initially, the relative mild approaches were tried to convert Tatars, however, the mild approach did not bring the success. Afterwards, forceful conversion tactics were implemented, but the Tatars still refused the conversion in Christianity. The harsh pressure on conversion of the Tatars precipitated a massive revolt in 1556. The revolt was suppressed and the Tatars who refused to convert in Christianity expelled from the city and founded a new district, which was famously known as *Staraia Tatarskaia Sloboda* (the old Tatar quarter).²⁹⁹ However, gradual conversion to Christianity among Tatar nobility was gradually started in the tenure of Guriii. This moment was also the start of the mediatory role of the collaborated Tatar nobility in the Russian stardom. As Tanrisever highlights the imperial control of Moscow required the collaboration of Tatar nobility, hence Moscow coopted parts of noble Tatar elite into the Russian nobility. “It was the changing bargains of collaboration or mediation that had defined the actual working of imperial rule, and the political roles of the Tatar elites up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.”³⁰⁰

The Russian stardom used kinds of incentives and punishment measures to manage the spread of the conversion process into the whole of the Tatar society. However, neither punitive nor conciliatory measures did not increase the number of Tatar converts. For example, after the death of Gurii, most of baptized Tatars returned to Islam. This would be a chronic problem that would make the Tatars potential rebels. Not surprisingly, Tatars joined the great revolt of Stepan Razin in 1669 and 1670.³⁰¹ This participation led to the exodus of the Tatars towards Central Asia. Moreover, the decree of 1681 prohibited Moslem Tatar nobles the right to own serfs and facilitated the confiscation of their lands.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Rorlich 1986: 39.

³⁰⁰ Oktay Firat Tanrisever, (2002) *The Politics of Tatar Nationalism and Russian Federalism: 1992-1999*, London, PhD Theis at School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London,.

³⁰¹ Rorlich 1986:39.

³⁰² Tanrisever 2002: 49.

In the era of Peter, the Great, the missionary activity restarted in a modernist context. The emperor forced the conversion process of the Tatars via educational reforms and economic coercion against the Tatar nobility. The educational policy which attempted to create missionary Tatar priests to a large extent failed. However, economic reprisals that attacked the property of the Muslim Tatar nobility who still refused to be baptized were to a large extent successful. Peter ordered that the Tatar nobility should have to be converted in six months, otherwise their property would be confiscated. The laws of 1720 and 1721, which provided further advantages to the converts such as: exemption from military service and exemption from tax for three years facilitated the submission of the Tatar nobility. Accordingly, it was anticipated that some 40,000 Tatars had been baptized by 1725.³⁰³ The harsh anti-Muslim policies of the Peter the Great continued during the reigns of the empresses Anna Ivanovna and Elizaveta Petrovna.³⁰⁴ Empress Anna Ivanovna established *Kontora Novokreshchenskikh Del* (Department of the Affairs of Newly Baptized Peoples). In addition to the former economic and educational pressures on Islam, institutionalized conversion policies physically attacked on Islam through demolishing 418 out of 536 existing mosques between 1740 and 1743.³⁰⁵ Some of the Tatar nobilities deprived of lands and properties had to found their survival path in trade.³⁰⁶

The reign of Catherine II was the turning point in the Tatar history. During the reign of Catherine II, a lot of reforms were implemented in favor of the Tatars. Catherine II was under the influence of European enlightenment movement. Accordingly, she had a positive approach to Islam, since she thought it was an enlightened religion. In addition to ideology, she was well aware that Russian expansion through Central Asia could not continue with hostile relations against Tatars. Tatar merchants were the key players that could facilitate the penetration of Russian trade into Central Asia. Hence,

³⁰³ Rorlich 1986: 40.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., 41.

³⁰⁶ Gaiaz Iskhaki, (1992) *Idel'-Ural*, Chally, Kalkan, p. 25.

the laws issued in 1763 and 1776 allowed Tatars to engage in trade. Cathrine II's reforms on religion was also significant. In 1779 *Muftiat* (Muslim Ecclesiastical Council) was established. Hence, Islam was officially recognized as a separate religious entity first time in the Tsardom of Russia.³⁰⁷

The peaceful attitudes towards Muslims lasted in the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855). The nationalist ideas of the French revolution imposed the Russification policies on the Imperial nationality policies. The russification policies which were depended on both educational sphere and economic reward did not succeed again. However, a new Russian school system for non-Russians developed by Nikolai Il'minskii opened a lot of disputes among Russian policy makers. Il'minskii system was depended on Tatar native language education which required necessary Russian language courses in the curriculums of the native language schools. "The National in form, Orthodox in content" schools were aimed to export Russian cultural values to the Tatars.³⁰⁸ On the other hand, approval of the Tatars as a separated group reinforced the grow of cultural nationalism among Tatars. Furthermore, the schools contributed to the modernization attempts of the Tatars in the religious sphere.³⁰⁹ When Il'minskii died, there were 130 schools operating in this model in 1891. Il'minskii responded to the Russian critics that were afraid of being confronted by a strong united Tatar nation as follows:

This is dilemma: If from fear of separate nationalities, we do not allow the non-Russians to use their language in schools and churches, on a sufficient scale to ensure a solid, complete, convinced adoption of the Christian faith, then all non-Russians will be fused into a single race by language and by faith-the Tatar and Mohammedan. But if we allow the non-Russian languages, then, even if their individual nationalities are thus maintained, these will be diverse, small, ill-disposed to the Tatars, and united with the Russian people by the unity of their faith. Choose! But I believe that such diverse nationalities cannot have any solid existence, and in the end the very historical movement of life will cause them to fuse with the Russian people.³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ Rorlich 1986: 43.

³⁰⁸ Tanrisever 2002: 50.

³⁰⁹ Rorlich 1986: 86.

³¹⁰ See the citation of Il'minski in Tanrisever 2002: 50-51.

4.2.1. Jadidism

The Jadid movement beginning from the mid-nineteenth centuries reaching its peak at the last quarter of the 19th century, shook the Muslim World in general and the Tatar society in particular.³¹¹ Initially emerged as a new method for teaching Arabic alphabet the Jadid movement spread across the education sphere. Jadidism as a reformist ideology demanded to implement European modernized methods in mektebs and medresses. The traditional religious dogma of Islam could not reply to the new dynamics of the modernity. Hence, throughout the nineteenth century, the reformist Tatars who were under the influence of Russian modernization as well as Ottoman modernization found enough space to challenge the traditional religious thought of Islam.³¹²

The reevaluation of the religious thought started among Tatar intellectuals. The reformist Tatar movement can be traced on three main periods taking into account the key intellectual actors.³¹³ The reassessment of the religious thinking began at the beginning of the 19th century. G. Utiz Imani (1754-1815), Abu-Nasr al-Kursavi (1776-1813) and I. Khal'fin (1778-1829) were the key representatives of the first period, in which the Tatar reformist mullahs challenged the religious dogma. The second period turned toward cultural and educational reformism. In this context, the famous Tatar figures were Kayum Nasiri (1825-1902), Shihabetdin Merjani (1818-1889) and Rizaetdin Fakhretdin (1859-1936). Finally, the politicization of the Jadid movement started at the beginning of the 20th centuries. The political Jadid movement included various intellectuals such as Yosyf Akchura (1876-1935), Gayaz Ishakiy (1878-1954), Ismail Gasprinskii (1851-1914) and Galimjan Ibrahimov (1887-1938).

Initial stage of the Tatar reformist movement dated back to the publications of Sagit Halfin's Alphabet of Tatar Language (*Azbuka Tatarsgovo iazyka*) and Tatar dictionary

³¹¹ Davletshin Tamurbek, (2005) *Sovetskii Tatarstan*, Kazan, Izdatel'stvo Zhien, p. 63.

³¹² Rorlich 1986: 48.

³¹³ Ibid., 49.

(*Tatarskii Slovar*) in 1774 and 1775 respectively.³¹⁴ Abu Nasr al-Kursavi was the pioneer of the Jadid movement who challenged the religious dogma and traditional discourses of the *Kadimists*. The development of the Jadid movement continued with Kayum Nasiyri, famous enlightener of Tatars who published wide range of publications such as archaeology, history, ethnography and human anatomy. Accordingly, he was considered as Lomonosov of Tatars. He wrote over 40 masterpieces and introduced modern knowledge and sciences to the Tatar society.³¹⁵ Another significant figure among the initial stage of the Jadid movement was Shihabetdin Merjani. Merjani was an enlightened theologist, ethnographer and pedagogue, heavily influenced by Kursavi, proclaimed freedom of consciousness. Merjani called the Tatar people to learn from the other nations in the field of science and culture without limiting themselves within the national boundaries.³¹⁶ Furthermore, he urged the Tatars not to be ashamed of their national identity. He was the first person who used the name Tatar independent from the term Muslim. Accordingly, he influenced on the constitution of Modern Tatar identity. Gabdullah Tugay, the famous poet of the Tatar people, described him as: “Shihab Khezret shone like full moon, He was the first to take steps towards enlightenment, for the nation, he is invaluable khezret.”³¹⁷

The reaction of the Russian center to the reformist Tatar movement was in an aggressive way. The center of the empire simply supported the kadimists, traditional mullas vis-a-vis the reformist jadidists. The instructors of the center were teasing the activities of the reformists. The arrestments of the jadidist caused to underground continuity of their activities.³¹⁸ However, the imperial government backed resistance

³¹⁴ Tanrisever 2002: 52.

³¹⁵ Vsemirnaia Accotsiatsiia Pisatelei (Mezhdunarodnye Pen-Klub), (2013) *Kyryk Tatar, Corok Tatar, The Forth Tatars*, Kazan, Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, p. 233.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 210.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ravil' Amirhanov, (2005) *Tatarskii Narod i Tatarstan v Nachale XX Veka, Istroricheskie Zarisovki*, Kazan, Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo.

of the kadimist to jadid modernization was defeated at the beginning the 20th century. In the meantime, national consciousness of Tatars was growing simultaneously together with the other aspects of the secularization and modernization. At this point, the pan-Turkist intellectual Crimean Tatar Ismail Gaspirinskii constituted pan-Turkist thesis in his newspaper *Terjuman* (The Translator). The thesis of Gaspirinskii could be summarized in the motto of “Unity in language, work and spirit”. Accordingly, the Pan-Turkic ideology which demanded unity among Russia’s Turkic nationalities including the Volga Tatars, the Crimean Tatars, the Azeris, the Kazakhs, and the Uzbeks was advocated by the newspaper *Terjuman*.³¹⁹ The aim of creating pan-Turkic nation failed because of its problems in differentiating itself from pan-Islamism.³²⁰ Nevertheless, the politization of the Jadid movement had to wait until the February revolution in 1905. Until this moment, Jadidists were successful to modernize the Tatar society in the cultural and ideological sphere. There were rapid developments in education on the grounds of secularization and equality of men and women. Secular modern curriculums of westernized education and native language usage among Tatars covered enormous ground during the 20th century.

The revolution of 1905 was a turning point in terms of the politization of the Jadidist movement. The 1905 reforms recognized many rights taking modern citizenship rights into account. Tsar Nicholas II proclaimed all Russian and non-Russian citizenships equal, and introduced several reforms including the forthcoming elections of *Duma*. Russian Muslims attempted to express their political ideas in four Muslim congresses. However, it was hard to say that Russian-Muslims had a clear cut political agenda. Generally, there was a dominance of the Volga Tatars in these congresses. The first congress was hold in a boat, *Gustav Struve* in Oka river on 15 August 1905.³²¹ The adopted main goals of the congress were declared as follows:

³¹⁹ Tanrisever 2002: 53.

³²⁰ Sergey A., Zenkovky, (1960) *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 274.

³²¹ Tanrisever 2002: 53.

Unification of Russian Muslims for the purpose of carrying out political, economic, and social reforms.

Establishment of a democratic regime in which elected representatives of the people belonging to all nationalities would share in the legislative and executive power

Legal equality of Muslims and Russians

Freedom to develop Muslim schools, press, book publishing, and cultural life as a whole

Periodic reconvention of the congress.³²²

The most significant point concerning the first Muslim congress was the accomplishment of the religious union. The already established tension between Shiite Muslims of Caucasus and the Sunni Muslims from the Volga and Crimea evolved into reconciliation in the First All-Russian Muslim Congress. The Kazan group *Ittifak* was selected to organize the second congress.

In the fall of 1905, *Ittifak* was a political alliance which was seeking collaboration with Russian liberal parties in State Duma elections. The liberal tendency was vivid among Kazan Tatars. The Marxist-socialist ideas could not penetrate into the Tatar society. Husain Yamashev, one of the friends of A. Ishaki joined the Russian Social Democratic Party of Kazan and emerged one of the prominent active members of the party. Until the destruction of the Kazan Branch of the RSDP, Yamashev attracted few Tatars for the membership of the party. Yamashev continued his communist activities in Orenburg and published a newspaper, called as *Ural*, which lived a few months in 1907. *Ural* was critical of the Liberal and revolutionary-nationalist parties. *Ural*, as an orthodox Marxist revolutionary newspaper emphasized class based politics and class consciousness rather than that of national.

The failure of attracting Tatars of the RSDP and later the Bolsheviks can be understood within a context of debates of identity or class based politics among socialist parties. In the Tatarstan case, the Bolsheviks could not gain mass support because of the omission of the national identity issues. The Bolsheviks were not open to the

³²² Musa Bigi, (1917) *Islahat Esaslari*, Petrograd, n.a., pp. 175-177.

hybridization of their truths within other truths such as identity, religion and nationality.³²³ At this point, it is worth to refer a quotation from Rorlich that emphasizes the ideological limitations of the Bolsheviks.

The Tatar bourgeoisie may have been at fault in denying the existence of class differentiation among Muslims. Equally unperceptive, however, were the editors of Ural; to require their fellow Muslims to disregard or belittle an identity responsible for their survival as a people in order to join a brotherhood of the exploited was a colossal tactical error. The best evidence of the price Tatar Social Democrats had to pay for their political naïveté is the fact that, between 1905 and 1907, the liberal nationalist groups emerged almost unchallenged on the Russian political scene as the spokesmen for the Tatars, and at the time of the February Revolution, the membership of the Kazan Bolshevik organization was almost exclusively Russian. Those Tatars for whom ethnic and religious concerns took precedence over class issues chose to use the Muslim congresses as a means of identifying the priorities of the umma and articulating plans for action.³²⁴

The liberal ideological dominance among the Volga Tatar elites caused collaboration of the Tatar nationalist movement with Russian liberal-conservative parties. Kazan Tatars collaborated with Kadets (Constitutional Democrats). Kades leadership, in a gesture of goodwill, proposed the election of Yusuf Akchura to membership in Central Administrative Committee of Kadet party.³²⁵ The close association of the Kazan Tatars with the Kadets hindered to pursue an independent course of political

³²³ The debate of class versus identity is an unfinished, long-lasting issue in the left. The post-Marxist approaches, especially written by Ernesto Laclau criticizes class reductionism of the orthodox communist parties throughout the world. As for Laclau, the German communists were even responsible for the rise of the Nazis in Germany. For Laclau, the German communists simply were not successful to articulate populist discourses in their political socialist agenda. The Nazis filled the gap via appealing rightist-nationalist populist policies and finally managed to defeat the communists. For a further discussion on Populism, see the books, Ernesto Laclau, (2005) *On Populist Reason*, London&New York, Verso; and see the last chapter of Laclau in, Ernesto Laclau (1979), *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism and Populism*, London, Verso.

Furthermore, the distinction between SYRIZA and Greek Communist Party can be evaluated in the same context. For a further debate on class and identity in the context of Turkish left, see for example the article of Kazim Ates, supporting on hegemonic politics: Ne Sınıf Ekseni Ne Kimlik Ekseni: Hegemonik Siyaset, *Birikim*, 18th of February 2009, http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/266/ne-sinif-ekseni-ne-kimlik-ekseni-hegemonik-siyaset#.VxDa_W70QrI. Last time accessed at May, 2017.

³²⁴ Rorlich 1986: 107.

³²⁵ Ibid., 113.

action in the national level. Muslim members of the Duma elevated the demands of the Russian Muslims in line with the Kadet program. The Muslim deputies generally acted as a unified faction in Duma. However, their members declined from twenty-five in the first Duma to seven at fourth, since the change of the electoral system by the Russian nationalists. The experience of the parliament revealed the Russian Muslims. However, political achievements were limited due to turmoil of the revolutionary period and to the limited modest cultural autonomy demands. Taking into account of the Muslim Congress, the dominance of the Kazan Tatars and their limited demands caused dissatisfaction among other Russian Muslims.

4.3. The Foundation of Tatar ASSR

In May 1917, the first all-Russian Congress of Muslims held in Moscow. Indeed, the Volga Tatars were divided between the supporters of extraterritorial autonomy, namely *Turkchilar* and those who support territorial autonomy, *Tufrakchilar*.³²⁶ The side of the supporters of the territorial autonomy represented by prominent Bolsheviks such as Molla Nur Vakhitov. Without any doubt, supporters of the extraterritorial autonomy were dominant among the Volga Tatars. However, the delegates coming from Central Asia, Crimea and Azerbaijan supported the territorial autonomy, federalism. The federalist line defeated the extraterritorialists delegates of the Volga Tatars, who are implicitly pan-Turkist as well. The Tatar nationalists attempted to respond against the federalists by creating National Council, (Milli Shura) in Petrograd. Two months later, the Military Council (Harbi Shura) established in Kazan by Sadri Maksudi. Nonetheless, these organizations gained weak popular support. The Bolsheviks had to wait approximately one year to demolish the popular ground of the Tatar nationalist. On the winter of 1918, the Soviet of Kazan arrested the leaders of the Harbi Shura. The Bolsheviks managed to close all units of Tatar national organizations by 12 April 1918 without any serious resistance.³²⁷

³²⁶ Rorlich 1986: 132.

³²⁷ Tanrisever 2002: 54-55.

Meanwhile, In July 1917, the Bashkir activists angrily left the Second Muslim Conference in Kazan since they could not reconcile their territorial autonomy demands with the Tatars' demands of non-territorial autonomy in line with Russia's unity. However, by November 1917, the Bolshevik revolution, rapidly changed the Tatars' views on autonomy.³²⁸ A month after the October revolution a "National Assembly of the Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia was held in Ufa, the capital of current Bashkortostan. The Tatar activists also joined the assembly, and the assembly declared the formation of the Idel-Ural state which would become one of the constituent units of a renewed Russian Federal Republic. A commission was selected to implement the formation of Idel-Ural state.³²⁹

The idea of Idel-Ural state was endorsed by the Tatar communists of the Kazan Soviet led by Sultangaliev. In March 1918, the Idel-Ural state project was modified by the Bolshevik Commissariat for Nationalities Affairs (Narkomnats), headed by Stalin. Finally, the decision of formation of "Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic" declared, although the territorial scope and size of the proposed state was smaller than that of the Idel-Ural State project of the Tatars and Bashkirs.³³⁰ However, most of the Bashkir activists, including prominent nationalist Zaki Validi Togan regarded with skepticism. Togan was afraid of outnumbering by Tatars and Russians and living under domination of them. The project of Tatar-Bashkir republic collapsed when the outbreak of civil war started in May 1918. The Bashkir nationalists led by Togan, sided with White forces in order to gain an autonomous Bashkir republic. Togan was able to send 5,000 Bashkir troops to support the White army.³³¹

³²⁸ Rorlich 1986: 132.

³²⁹ For example, see the works: Daniel E. Schafer, (1995) *Building Nations and Building States: The Tatar-Bashkir Question in Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1920.*, PhD Thesis, Michigan, University of Michigan, pp. 71, 84-87; Katherine E. Graney, (1999) *Projecting Sovereignty: Statehood and Nationness in Post-Soviet Russia*, PhD Thesis, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin-Madison, p. 73; and Rorlich 1986: 132.

³³⁰ Graney 1999: 74.

³³¹ Schafer 1995: 290-292.

The Bashkir-White alliance was always fragile since the tsarist loyalists were always suspicious of the nationalist demands of the Bashkirs. The fragile alliance was collapsed when Togan foresee that the red army would defeat the whites. Hence, Bashkir nationalists changed side to gamble on the Bolshevik national-territorial autonomy promises.³³² Finally, on the 20th of March 1919, Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic declared, which would be temporally headed by a Bashkir Revolutionary Committee until a Congress of Soviets of Bashkiria. However, the alliance of nationalist Bashkirs and communist Bolsheviks deteriorated soon. The Soviet government issued a decree which aimed to rise the strict central control on the autonomous republic. By protesting the central control, Togan fled Ufa and joined the Basmachi rebellions. The newly created Bashkir obkom of the Communist party filled with Russian and Tatar communist.

Even though the Tatar communists such as Sultangaliev endeavored to create a unified Bashkir-Tatar state whether in the name of Idel-Ural or Tatar-Bashkir throughout the civil war from 1918 and 1919, the Bashkirs chose of a separated state caused the collapse of unified state projects. Although Vakhitov was killed on the 19th of August, 1918 by defending Kazan and sooner Kazan was invaded by the white forces, the Bolsheviks managed to recapture the city a few months later. Hence, the Bolshevik influence was always higher on the Tatars than on the Bashkirs during the turmoil of the civil war. Latterly, the Tatar communists debated creation of a separated state similar to the Bashkir ASSR. Eventually, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was declared by decree on May 27, 1920. Indeed, the new state was far away to fulfill the expectations of the Tatars. First of all, the territory covered an area of 68,000 square kilometers, which is very tiny in comparison of 220,000 square kilometers of the Idel-Ural project. Secondly, most of the ethnic Tatars in the Volga region remained to live out of the Tatar ASSR. “Only 1,459,000 of the 4,200,000 Tatars living in the Middle Volga area were included in the new republic.”³³³ The

³³² Ibid., 345.

³³³ Rorlich 1986: 123.

Tatars represented 51 percent of the population in comparison with the 39.2 percent of the Russians living in the TASSR. The borders of the autonomous republic excluded prominent cities such as Ufa, Belebeev, Birska, in which Tatars constituted majority of the population.³³⁴ As a comparison, only one-quarter of Tatars living in Russia included within the boundaries of the Tatar ASSR, while three quarters of Bashkir population was encompassed within the borders of Bashkir ASSR. Besides the significant population located in the Bashkortostan, there were large percentages of the Tatar population also excluded from the boundaries of TASSR. These cities were Orenburg, Perm, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk in addition to the Republic of Udmurtia.³³⁵

4.4. The Soviet Tatarstan

The Bolsheviks had to deal with the affair of Tatars in Bashkiria. With regard to the Tatar case, the Bolsheviks were challenged by a new form of a complicated opposition. This new type of opposition was a heterodox interpretation of Marxism via articulating in Islam and Nationalism. Without any doubt, the leading figure of the new opposition was Mirsaid Sultan Galiev. Sultan Galiev, a former Jadid teacher and journalist actively involved in Jadid secularist movement and advocated the transformation of *zemstvo* schools into national schools. Having taken part in Muslim congresses of 1917, he became one of the prominent figures of Muslim Socialist Community in Kazan. He joined the Bolsheviks in November 1917, and soon took many responsibilities in the administrative positions of various institutions. He was chairman of the Central Muskom, member of the Inner Collegium of Narkomnats, president of the Muslim Military Collegium, and member of the Central Executive Committee of the TASSR.³³⁶

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Graney 1999: 76.

³³⁶ Alexandre A. Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush, (1979) *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*, Chicago&London, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 207-8.

Sultan Galiev shifted the class antagonism of the Marxism into the national level. For Galiev, the class concept of classical Marxism could not account for the social structure of the peasant societies of the Eastern world. The Eastern world lagged behind the West as a result of western imperialist relations. Accordingly, the poor eastern nations must unite in order to break the chain of imperialism. According to Galiev, Islam would be a good cement to unify the eastern backward nations which are suffering under imperialism. Galiev emphasized the revolutionary potential of Islam. He attempted to articulate the egalitarian points of Islam in a communist discourse.

Sultangaliev also pointed out that what accounted for the strong commitment of Muslims to Islam were some of its intrinsic positive characteristics, such as collectivism; egalitarianism; emphasis on education (the thirst for knowledge from cradle to grave advocated in the prophetic tradition); industriousness; negation of private property for agricultural lands, water and forests, and existence of a progressive tax system in the form of the obligatory almsgiving. In addition, he stressed the desirability of a type of antireligious propaganda that would convince the Muslim believer that “Communists are not struggling against religion but merely using their right to be atheists. “Sultangaliev’s critics claimed that he was waging a propaganda war for Jadidism (i.e., secularism), not atheism, and criticized what they called his “vegetarian Communism, which did not have anything in common with the ideology of Marx, Engels, Lenin.³³⁷

To be brief, the heterodox interpretation of Sultangaliev’s Marxism was the combination of the egalitarian values of Islam, nationalism and communism as well as left populism. There are a lot of similarities between the heterodox Marxist interpretation of Galiev and the neo-Marxist Latin American dependency school. The proto-dependency school oriented thought of Sultangaliev was unique when the date of the emergence of the dependency school was considered after the Second World War. There were rumors that claim Sultangaliev had an influence on Latin American revolutionaries when they met one of the Bolshevik congresses. Accordingly, he exported the proto-dependency ideas to Latin America.

³³⁷ M. Kobetskii, (1930) “Sultangalievshchina kak apologia Islama.” *Antireligioznik* 1 (1930): 12-14; A. Arsharuni, (1930) “Ideologiia Sultangalievshchiny.” *Antireligioznik* 5, 22-25 cited in Rorlich 1986: 149.

The Bolsheviks, however, unwelcomed the “heretic” ideology of Tatar Muslim Communists under the leadership of Sultangaliev, Veli Iskhakov, and Mollanur Vakhitov. However, for tactical reasons the Bolsheviks initially approved the dominance of heretic communists in the Kazan Soviet. By 1920, Sultangaliev became the most influential Muslim Communist in the hierarchy of the Bolshevik Party. His proposal that conceptualized eastern nations as potentially revolutionary was rejected by the Bolsheviks in the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku, in September 1920. The Bolshevik leadership persisted that the East could be saved only through the victory of the western proletariat.³³⁸

The modus vivendi between the Bolsheviks and Muslim National Communists finally collapsed when Sultangaliev forced the limits of the Bolsheviks by attempting to organize Islamic millennium festivals in 1923, so Sultangaliev accused for national deviation and he was first time arrested.

Meanwhile the status of the TASSR in Russia was fixed as ASSR after the formation of the USSR on 30 December at the tenth All-Russian (first All-Union) Congress of Soviets. The ethnically codified hierarchical administrative system of the Soviet state did not grant a Union Republic status to Tatarstan because it lacked an external border. The Georgians, for example, were given a Union Republic Status although they were less numerous than the Tatars. Unlike the Tatars, the Georgians had an external border. When Sultangaliev became a member of the Tatar TsIK in 1923, he also criticized the second-class autonomous status of the party in his speech at the twelfth congress of the Russian Communist Party. Hence, the Sultangaliev’s opposition to the Tatarstan’s republic status was another reason of his arrestment in May 1923.³³⁹ Hence, as it was highlighted in the third chapter the new ethnicity regimes of the states take very durable roots in societies, which gave them a strong legacy that could be changed very hardly. The path dependency of the institutionalized ethnicity regimes of the states

³³⁸ Pervyi s’ezd narodov Vostoka. Baku, 1-8 sent. 1920. Stenograficheskie otchety (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 144-50 and 179-80, and G. Z. Sorokin, I s’ezd narodov Vostoka (Moscow, 1961), pp. 32-33.

³³⁹ Bulat F. Sultanbekov, (1990) “Mir Said Sultan-Galiev: His Character and Fate,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 9, no.2, pp 113-114 cited in Tanrisever 2002: 60.

continue very long time even without small revisions. Accordingly, the earlier debates on the republican status of Tatarstan revealed that the unwillingness of Moscow to tolerate even the discussion of the Union Republic status for the Tatars.³⁴⁰

The purges of Muslim National Communists, Sultangaliev and his close associates from the power did not hinder the Tatarisation of the republic. The *Korenizatsiia* policies resulted in the upper mobility of the Tatars through affirmative action policies. The Tatars dramatically raised their influence in the party, administrative structure and higher education. The lack of sufficient Bolshevik cadres necessitated the invitation of non-Bolshevik educated cadres to teach in schools. Accordingly, the Tatars raised their influence on the pro-Moscow government, established after the arrestment of Sultangaliev.³⁴¹

4.4.1. The Elimination of Tatar Nationalist Elites

The modus vivendi of the *Korenizatsiia* policies between the Tatar elites and Moscow ended up in 1928. By 1929, Sultangaliev second time arrested by the accusation of anti-Soviet activities and was sent to labor camp, in which he would die ten years later. In line with Stalin's orders, the party control commission arrested Tatar administrative elites accusing for being national communists in 1928. Among these Tatar elites there were Keshaf Mukhtarov (Chairperson of the TsIK of the TASSR), Rauf Sabirov (First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom), Kasym Mansurov (Commissar for Propaganda), M. Burundukov (Commisar for Education), V. Iskhakov (Vice President of the Tatar Gosplan), and M. Badaili (First Secretary of the Tatar Komsomol).³⁴²

Meanwhile, in the official discourse of Moscow the name Sultangaliev demonized and equalized into national deviation and ideology of the "enemy of the people". Sultangalievism or Sultangalievists became the synonym of the anti-Soviet

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Rorlich 1986: 153-154.

³⁴² Tanrisever 2002: 62.

elements.³⁴³ Indeed, when I visited the post-Soviet Tatarstan recently, I could not see his name in the public space although the other Tatar intellectuals or Bolsheviks were symbolized frequently in the public in Kazan, such as Vakhitov, Merjani. In 1930, the link with Sultangalievism became a reason of a massive purge of the Tatar party organization. 2,056 Tatar communists, from members to the high level administrative members, representing 13,4 percent of the total party membership were expelled from the party. Moreover, 2,273 Tatar communists were executed.³⁴⁴

The abolishment of NEP (New Economic Policy) in 1928, damaged the economic grounds of the Tatar nationalism. Kulaks were liquidated at the beginning of 1930s and the collectivization campaign enhanced the central control on TASSR. Taking into account the cultural sphere, the Society of Tatarology and the Oriental Institute were closed in 1930. Moreover, the attacks of Moscow against Tatar nationalism brought the Union of Tatar Proletarian Writers and Tatar State Publishing House into line. Finally, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic in 1939, which enhanced the assimilative dimension of the Russian language over the Tatar language.³⁴⁵

On the 5th of December in 1936, the USSR upgraded the status of various autonomous republics with that of Union republic. However, the demands of the Tatar elites rejected due to lack of external border of TASSR. Hence, the autonomous status of Tatarstan was consolidated and would shape the future of the Tatars even in the post-Soviet period. The new constitution of Tatarstan was adopted in 1937 and was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of RFSSR on 2 July 1940. Taking the constitution of TASSR into account, first of all, there were references to the socialist ideas. The article 2 of the constitution states that “The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tatarstan is the state of workers and peasants.” The article 12 of the constitution was influenced by Marx’s quotation of Critique of Gotha Program with a small revision. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his labor” was mentioned in the article.

³⁴³ Davletshin 2005: 236.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Tanrisever 2002: 62.

The articles 13-18 defined the autonomy of Tatarstan. According to the article 21, the Supreme Soviet was mentioned as the highest organ of power. The Supreme Soviet meets two times a year and it has an authority to select the president of the autonomous state. The Tatar and Russian languages were used in the gatherings of the Supreme Soviet. The speeches in Tatar language was translated into Russian language. However, there was no translation from Russian into Tatar language since every member was considered that they had good knowledge in Russian. As Davletshin points out, there were parliament members who had poor knowledge or no knowledge of Russian language in the Tatar parliament.³⁴⁶ The parliament members were elected for four years. Concerning the daily running of republican affairs, the Council of Ministers was the most important executive organ. The TASSR had 11 representatives at the USSR Supreme Soviet. Besides, one of the 12 Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the RSFSR was sent from Tatarstan.³⁴⁷ However, the Tatarstan Obkom of the CPSU was de facto the decision making unit of the republic. The Obkom was strictly controlled by the USSR Central Committee Politburo.³⁴⁸ Accordingly, it was hard to say that there was autonomy in Tatarstan in terms of the issue of sovereignty. Most of the state-like rights of the TASSR remained in paper such as the right of separation from the USSR.

4.5. The National Identity in Tatarstan after the Second World War

The Stalinist purges of the nationalities before and after the Second World War did not have an effect upon Tatarstan directly. However, the rising authoritarian structure of the Soviet State began to force the new Tatar national elites to collaborate with Moscow. The issue of national communism was already solved by the liquidation of the former national elites. Accordingly, the new elites remained in the line with Moscow. The new Tatar elites such as Said Shafaraev and Zinnat Muratov were

³⁴⁶ Davletshin 2005: 243.

³⁴⁷ Davletshin 2005: 243-246.

³⁴⁸ Tanrisever 2002: 64.

subservient to Moscow. The discovery of oil and escalation of the industrialization process resulted in immigration of Russian population into Tatarstan. The Tatar elites were personally benefiting from the industrialization process. Hence, they had a compliant attitude towards Moscow and Stalin.³⁴⁹

The tenure of Nikita Khrushchev and his de-Stalinisation campaign opened new doors for the Tatar elites. The policy of economic decentralization (*sovnarkhozy*) increased the Tatar elites' decision making capabilities in terms of tax revenues. The educational and language reforms in 1958 enhanced the assimilative tendencies of the Soviet state. Nevertheless, the institutional structure of the nationality policies continued to operate in its traditional multiethnicity inclusive pattern. The proposal of abolishment of the ethnic republics were denied not only by the Tatar elites but also the rest of minority elites of ethnic republics. The Tatar elites continued to demand union republic status in the Khrushchev period as well. However, they did not attempt to mobilize popular nationalist discourses against Moscow.

The tenure of Leonid Brezhnev was labelled as the accommodation with the leaders of union republics. The union republic elites found a substantial degree of local political and cultural autonomy in the period of Brezhnev. The Tatar elites consolidated local patronage networks in this period. "Fikret Tabeev, the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom, who ran the TASSR from 1960 to 1986, developed clientelistic relations with Moscow and local industrial managers."³⁵⁰ The accommodation of the Tatars elites with Moscow can be revealed in Kama Automobile Factory (KamAZ). The factory, constructed in Naberezhnye Chelny, in 1969 was a decision of Brezhnev to compensate the massive oil extraction in TASSR. The primary product of heavy trucks of the factory were significant for the Soviet military.³⁵¹ The factory triggered the Russian migration into the city. Accordingly, interethnic tension between Russians and Tatars increased. In the time of Perestroika, the city turned into the stronghold of Tatar

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 65.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 68.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

nationalism. Since the Tatar elites were benefitting from the rapid industrialization and of the state, they adopted conciliatory discourses in line with the multiculturalist structure of the Soviet State.

4.6. Modernization and Inter/Intra Ethnic Relations in Tatarstan

The impact of the Soviet modernization in Tatarstan was tremendous. Tatarstan became one of the most industrially advanced place of the Soviet Union. The industrialization process was started after the October revolution in 1917. In fact, in 1913, there could be found small soap factories, leather tanneries and fur-processing shops in Kazan. By 1920, the population of Tatarstan was 2,892,000 and the rural population was consisting of 2,639,000 village inhabitants.³⁵² The real industrialization started in Tatarstan in the late 1920 along with the industrialization campaign. Besides, the industrialization process can be divided into three stages. The first stage which covers the period of 1928-46 brought mechanical engineering, chemistry and power engineering. Almost all the factories were constructed in the industrial area of Kazan and Zelenodol'sk. The relocation of the industrial complexes during the Second World War increased industrialization process of Tatarstan. After the Second World War, the oil was discovered in the region. Hence, the second wave of the industrialization process continued between 1946 and 1965 around the oil industry and related products. Almetevsk and Bugulma industrial region, dominated mainly by the Tatar population in the southeastern part of Tatarstan raised during this period. The final wave of the industrialization that encompassed the period of 1966-91 brought the heavy truck manufacturing which was the largest truck factory in Russia. The location of the automobile-truck industry was located in the North-Eastern Tatar dominated region of Nizhnekamsk and Naberezhnye Chelny.³⁵³

³⁵² A. G. Galliamova, (2010) *Istoriia Tatarstana: Modernizatsiia po-sovetskii*, Kazan', Izdatel'stvo Magarif, p. 12.

³⁵³ Kondrashov 2000: 2-3.

At the beginning of the 1920s, most of the Russian population in Tatarstan was living in the cities. The average urbanized level of Russian population in the USSR was 21 percent. The Tatar population was one of the most urbanized population in the USSR, reaching the level of 14 percent at the beginning of 1920s. Hence, the Tatars were the most urbanized non-Russian ethnic group in the USSR. However, most of the urbanized Tatars were living in the cities out of Tatarstan. The urbanization level in Tatarstan was around 5 percent. Accordingly, the initial stage of industrialization in Tatarstan started with under a social stratification in which the more urbanized Russian population mainly inhabited in Kazan and the Tatar population mainly inhabited in rural areas.³⁵⁴

The Soviet modernization in Tatarstan provided the base for rapid industrialization of the Tatar population. Without any doubt, the Soviet state aimed to reach the abolishment of the class relations that causes economic disadvantages and inequalities. Hence, the pattern of social stratification in Tatarstan should be traced beyond the pattern of the class. The social stratification between Russians and Tatars should be considered within the antagonism of urban versus rural, and the identity tensions which were already created by the imperial established order which continue under the legacy of Russian ethno-cultural advancement and dominance of the public space in the Soviet era. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, Slezkine's metaphor of communal apartment accounts for the origins of the tension. Although the Soviet State initiated multiculturalist policies, particularly with the *Korenizatsiia* policies at the beginning of the 1920s, the progressive status of the Russian language and culture always dominated the public space. The non-Russian languages and cultures had to accept the inferior status of their cultural positions. Hence, the minority languages and cultures were mainly perceived under private domain and types of folk.

Although the 70 years of the Soviet modernization dramatically increased the urbanization level of the Tatars, there existed still gap between Tatars and Russians in terms of qualified jobs. As Kondrashov highlights, the Tatars were concentrated on

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 4.

blue-collared jobs vis-à-vis the Russians who were concentrated on white collar, administrative level jobs in the industrial complexes of Tatarstan.³⁵⁵ Accordingly, the urbanized social stratification in Tatarstan based on three levels. The bottom of the ladder consisted of overwhelmingly by the Tatars who were overwhelmingly skilled workers of the industrial complexes. The second stage of the ladder was consisted of overwhelmingly Russians who were recruited in high-skill jobs such as engineering, medicine, academy, and management. The top of the urbanized ladder was consisted by the republican nomenklatura who were consisted of mainly ethnic Tatars and to some extent Tatar intellectuals focusing on the social sciences of history and Tatar nationality.³⁵⁶ However, the urbanized social stratification was not so sharp in Tatarstan. There were virtually half of Tatars recruited in comparison with Russians in the second stage of high-skilled jobs of the urbanized career ladder.

With regard to the intra-ethnic relations among Tatars the tension between urban and rural Tatars were evident. In fact, the cultural and linguistic inferiority of the Tatars in comparison with the Russians were accepted by both of the urban and rural Tatars. However, the urban Tatars had a tendency to assimilate into the Russian dominated urban established order. The acceptance of acculturation of urban Tatars were criticized by the rural ones accusing of becoming *mankurt*.³⁵⁷ In other words, among urban Tatars there were identity crisis such as the feeling of neither Russian nor Tatar. The rural Tatars, on the other hand turned towards protection of their traditional culture accepting the inferiority of their culture and accusing the Russophonic established order to be in charge of unequal treatment against their nation. At this point, L. Sagitova claims that the inner conflict of both of the urban and rural Tatars was

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 14-17.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 19.

³⁵⁷ *Mankurt* (Renegade) is a term, used by Chinghiz Aitmatov in his famous book, *the day lasts more than one hundred years*, (1980). According to the author, *mankurt* is a prisoner who was captured by the hostile tribe. The prisoner turned into a soulless, unconscious slave as a result of a specific type of torture. Hence, the prisoner, in other words, *mankurt* becomes totally subordinate to his owner at the end. Due to the torture he could not remember anything about his previous life. In the novel of Aitmatov, the *mankurt* tragically killed his mother since he could not remember of her.

resolved by adopting three main strategies. One of them is the acculturation and assimilation into the Russophone established order. The second one is turning into the private life and seeking personal development to undermine the identity crisis, and the third one is the making hard efforts in self-development together with remolding the spiritual-make up towards elimination of the cultural inferiority.³⁵⁸ In other words, the third strategy can be reconsidered as challenging with the established order.

Taking the institutional legacy into account, the secondary place of the Tatars under an ASSR seems to increase the impact of acculturative and assimilative tendencies among the Tatar population throughout the Soviet modernization. According to the last census of the USSR in 1989, the major trend shows that there was an extensive bilingualism among the Tatar population even among the rural Tatar inhabitants. However, the urban Russians had almost no interest towards Tatar language. Even among the rural Russian population the knowledge ratio of the Tatar language was only 2 percent.³⁵⁹ Besides, the sociological research conducted in 1967 revealed that in the cities the urban Tatars predominantly spoke the Russian language at work. Even in the private sphere both Russian and Tatar languages were used. The 70 percent of the rural Tatars used their mother tongue at work. At this point, what is significant is that in 1989, two thirds of the rural Tatar population had knowledge of Russian language which was increased from 49,3 percent in 1979 to 63,4 in 1989. Beyond this point, among Tatars the inferiority of the Tatar language was accepted and there was almost no challenge from the population in the period beginning from the first purges of Tatar intelligentsia in the 1930s until the Glastnost and Perestroika policies. Indeed, the Tatars stays in the middle line with regard to the feeling of pride with the native language. During my interviews with Rustam Gibadullin and Vasil' Sakaev, I asked the question whether Tatars feel shame when they encounter with the Russian public domain. Both of them replied "no", but they added the other autonomous republics' people might feel shame with the inferiority of their culture against the Russian

³⁵⁸ Kondrashov 2000: 35.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 37.

culture.³⁶⁰ However, the feeling of pride with the vernacular language of the Tatars lagged behind the SSR nations. In fact, the usage of the vernacular language among SSRs of the Soviet state was never perceived as a shame. On the contrary, in most of the cases the titular languages were perceived proudly as a symbol of national dignity and pride. For example, Z. Agliullin, one of the leaders of Tatar national movement in Naberezhnye Chelny revealed above mentioned points with an event that he encountered while doing his military service in a battalion in which Lithuanians and Caucasians were also serving:

While we were educated in reverence of the Russians, they, the Lithuanians and Caucasians, respected primarily themselves, they did not have a bit of servility. Even if there were just two of them among ten Russians, they would talk among themselves only in their native language. At first this surprised me. But gradually I understood: this is a perfectly normal thing!³⁶¹

Another significant point that supports aforementioned example is the Russian perception of the accents of the non-Russians. The accent of Russian language which was spoken by the Baltic republics and Georgians were perceived in a positive manner such as nice and pleasant peculiarity. However, the accent of Russian language, spoken by the Tatars were regarded as deficiency in speech and sign of inadequate education.

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The aforementioned examples put forward the role of institutions regarding the mobilization of the ethnicity which was mentioned in the previous chapter. The secondary administrative hierarchy of the Tatars deprived the Tatars of the more developed institutions of the SSRs which had a crucial impact to forge and consolidate the titular nationality. This drawback of the Tatar nationality would determine the sovereignty demands of the various Tatar nationalist discourses during the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well.

³⁶⁰ My interview with Vasil' Sakaev; Rustam Gibadullin, Associated Prof. of History at University of Naberezhnye Chelny, Naberezhnye Chelny, 08.10.2016.

³⁶¹ See an interview with Z. Agliullin in: *Argamak*, 1992, no.3-4, p. 59.

³⁶² Respublika Tatarstan, 16 April 1994.

All in all, in this chapter, I attempted to touch upon the significant events and actors of the Volga Tatars in a historical perspective. The early statehood of the Volga Tatars, the Tsarist legacy, and finally the Soviet legacy and the modernization process in Tatarstan were analyzed respectively. The Volga Tatars have a gorgeous statehood legacy which continuously supports the Tatar nationalist discourses and reproduce the Tatar national identity. For example, the glory of medieval era's significant states such as the Bulgar Khanate, the Kazan Khanate as well as the association of Tatar ethnogenesis with the Mongol Conquests are perfect tools for the self-confidence of the Tatar nation. Accordingly, the 'slavery period' of the Tsarist heritage and the subordinate status of the Tatars to the Russian-dominated and Soviet-established order could be bypassed by focusing on the medieval era historiography. Furthermore, the adoption of Islam by the Khans of the Bulgar State was a significant turning point in the Tatar history as well. The Tatars owe great deal to Islam. Thanks to Islam, the Tatars could resist the religious conversion activities and assimilative aims of the Russians Tsardom. Hence, Islam turned into a constitutional element of the identity in the Tatar history. The Tatars were the pioneers of the religious modernization movement in Islam as well. The Jadidist movement influenced the secularization and modernization movements in the Muslim countries.

The national resilience of the Tatars continued in the Soviet era. The Soviet type of nation building and modernization to a large extent involved the Tatar national demands in the cultural domain by sustaining the reproduction of the Tatar identity. The issue of the autonomous sovereignty of the established Soviet order was challenged time to time. The example of The Sultangaliev affair and the Muslim Communist movement was a specific case, which forced the Soviet authority through proto-dependency school perspective. The Soviet type of nation building, which was seeded in the era of *Korenizatsiia*, opened the channel of consolidation of the Tatar nationality. However, the secondary autonomous republic of Tatarstan made the country vulnerable to assimilation under the Russian-dominant modern urban established order. The multiethnic institutionalist legacy of the Soviet nationality policies supplemented the national resilience and reproduction of the Tatar language and culture. On the other hand, the relatively uneven start of the modernization process

and the Russianness of the public space of Soviet modernization caused identity crisis among the Tatar population. The Tatars plunged into rapid changes due to the Gorbachev policies with the legacy of identity oscillations under these aforementioned conditions. In the next chapter, I will highlight how the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura and the Tatar national movement created grievances taking into account relatively backward position of Tatars vis-à-vis Russians. Furthermore, the danger of assimilation of Tatar language under Russian dominant public sphere became another grievance ground for the Tatar nationalists in the period of Perestroika. The Tatar nationalists' neglect of the successes of the Tatar nation in terms of urbanization, education and modernization in the Soviet era can be understood to some extent by the manipulative capacities of nationality discourses. The ethno-national nomenklatura was very successful in using grievances as a national discourse, which justify their elite survival strategy. Hence, even the minority nationalist discourses, particularly the discourses of state elites, are not free from the manipulative and exclusionary particularistic features of nationalism.

CHAPTER 5

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN TATARSTAN

Take as much sovereignty as you can handle.

Boris Yeltsin³⁶³ (during his visit to Kazan, 1990)

Shaimiev himself constructed his centrist position. Without the existence of the radical Tatar nationalists Shaimiev would become the most radical nationalist, so he needed a further radical nationalism to position himself as centrist and moderate.

Sergey Sergeev³⁶⁴

In this chapter I will attempt to understand the dynamics of national revival in Tatarstan. During the years 1988-1992, the Tatar national movement and the ethno-national nomenklatura found enormous chances to reshape the status of Tatars and to establish a relationship with the Russian Federation under the new circumstances. In order to understand the dynamics of the ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan, firstly, I will explain the background of the national revival by focusing on the political developments in the Soviet Union. Secondly, I will concentrate on the significant political events in the Tatarstan case during the years 1988-1994 chronologically. In this context, I will explain the rivalry among three actors, namely, the Republican elites (The ethno-national nomenklatura), the Tatar National Movement, and the pro-federalist Democratic Opposition in the period of the peak of ethnic mobilization. Thirdly, I will focus on the reasons behind the decline of ethnic mobilization. Finally,

³⁶³ See the quotation in Elena Chernobrovkina, “Reshat Vam Samim”, *Vechernaia Kazan*, 10 August 1990.

³⁶⁴ My interview with Sergey Sergeyev, Professor at Political Science Department in Kazan National Research Technological University, Kazan, 11.10.2016.

I will explain the nationality discourses of three main movements in Tatarstan and their competition to shape the direction of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period.

5.1. The Transformation of the Soviet Union: 1982-1991

By the early 1980s, the Soviet society came to the point of economic and moral stagnation.³⁶⁵ The Soviet Union was experiencing serious difficulties in terms of economy, social matters, and legitimization of the established order. The growth rate of the economy was steadily declining from 4.7 percent per year during the middle of 1960s to 2.0 percent per year in the early 1980s.³⁶⁶ Significant decelerations had been forcing the economy with regard to industrial production, agricultural output, labor productivity, capital formation, investment and per-capita income.³⁶⁷ The shortages of key consumer goods from the retail markets were also another problem, which directly affected the life quality of the Soviet citizens. Naturally, increasing economic stagnation was articulated in social problems. Bribery became the daily routine to bypass the consumer goods shortages or state control. The inefficiency of the unreformed command economy resulted in widespread corruption in bureaucracy.

Taking into account the legitimization of the established order, the Soviet citizens accepted the superiority of the Western countries and they were awaiting the initiation of a reform process of the Soviet socialism. The people of the Soviet Union were apathetic to the politics since the one party rule had already decreased the importance of the elections. The State Socialism long ago destroyed capitalist class structure. However, non-democratic structure of the command economy formed kind of a cast structure in bureaucracy. For example, the top of the caste was consisted of a small population of the state elites, who benefitted from status, perks and limited advantages

³⁶⁵ For a further discussion about Soviet transformation, see, Hosking H., A., Hosking, (1992) *The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within*, Boston.Mass: Harvard University Press.

³⁶⁶ Eric Shiraev, (2013) *Russian Government and Politics*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 65.

³⁶⁷ E., A, Hewett, (1988) *Reforming the Soviet Economy*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, p. 52.

as well as corrupt distribution of goods and services, particularly in retail sales.³⁶⁸ Apart from the privileged state elites, in other words *nomenklatura*, the majority of the Soviet citizens were living employed with little financial saving. Hence, the antagonism of the *bourgeois versus proletariat* seemed to be changed into that of *nomenklatura versus the people*. Throughout the 1980s, the antagonism of the latter was sharpening and it was obvious that the established order was losing its legitimacy. Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev came to power under these economic, social and ideological stagnation and partly crisis of the established order. However, the severity of the crisis of the system was not noticed by the western and local specialists other than few critics.

After Brezhnev had died, on November 10, 1982, Yuri Andropov (1914-84) became the leader of the Communist Party. Andropov was a reform-oriented figure who attempted to solve the political and economic stagnation of the Soviet State. In his very limited time of power, he struggled against corruption and attempted to improve labor discipline. Although he was a reformist, he remained loyal to the structural contours of the Soviet system. His reform implementation of the brigade system, which was issued by the law in 1983, aimed to give power to the laborers in villages and factories did not reach the planned targets. The central control on the production output continued. One of the most significant contributions of Andropov was his promotion of younger and vigorous party officials, such as Mikhail Gorbachev, instead of Brezhnev era's old party members. Andropov's insistence on Gorbachev, however, did not give fruits. Andropov died on February 9, 1984, at the age of 69. The gerontocracy of the Politburo elected the aged and not healthy Konstantin Chernenko (1911-85) as the general secretary of the party.³⁶⁹

Konstantin Chernenko, who was the last Soviet leader has been born before the revolution was loyal to Brezhnev policies, which made him the last representative of

³⁶⁸ Shiraev 2013: 62.

³⁶⁹ Ronald G., Suny, (1998) *The Soviet Experiment, Russia, the USSR and the Successor States*, New York&Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 449-450.

Stalinist centralist state structure. He remained in office from February 1984 to March 1985. His statuesque oriented rule expired on March 10, 1985 with his death.³⁷⁰ When the politburo decided to select Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union, no body was expecting the quick disintegration of the Soviet State because of his reformist policies.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev at the age of 54 became the leader of the Soviet Union. He was seen as a young vigorous survivor who would take the Soviet State from stagnation to acceleration. His radical reforms resulted in the collapse of the Soviet State. In fact, he did not want the collapse of the Soviet State. He was committed to the system, but he thought that he could humanize it. He realized that the centralized control of the economy and politics inevitably generated underground counter systems. He considered that he could reform the system within a limited framework that can restructure various problematic issues.³⁷¹

In the initial years of his rule Gorbachev was more conservative to implement his reformist agenda. Roughly from March 1985 to December 1986, he followed cautious Andropov-like reforms remaining loyal to the contours of the existing system. Meanwhile, the already stagnant Soviet economy was under pressure by the decreasing world oil prices. The Soviet economy, previously benefitted from the high world oil prices, had to seek more money from abroad. Moreover, the Soviet economy was pressured by the environmental disasters as well. The burden of cleaning up the aftermath of Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion forced the already weakened Soviet economy. Although there were signs of some slight improvements in industrial output and labor productivity in the initial years of Gorbachev, still these improvements were far below the expectations.³⁷²

³⁷⁰ Evtunov C., Goldfrank D., Hughes L., Stites R., (2004) *A history of Russia: Peoples, Legends, Events, Forces*, Boston&New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, p. 780.

³⁷¹ Evtuhov-Goldfrank-Hughes-Stites 2004: 783.

³⁷² Suny 1998: 453.

5.1.1. Glasnost and Perestroika

The nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl in 1986 revealed that the already started reform rhythm of Gorbachev was not enough to change the economic decline and heavy and non-transparent administrative structure of the Soviet bureaucracy. For example, in the Chernobyl incident, most of the lives could be saved if the officials had become transparent and had realized the seriousness of the situation. Hence, the Chernobyl events facilitated the radical reforms of Gorbachev, which were famously known under the title of Glasnost and Perestroika. In the Russian Language Glasnost means ‘openness’ and Perestroika means ‘Restructuring’. The reforms aim to restructure the Soviet Politics in the sphere of cultural expression, political participation, economic flexibility and détente.³⁷³ Gorbachev obviously envisioned a strong civil society inside a party state that depended on socialist democracy.

With regard to the freedom of expression Gorbachev declared various Glasnost reforms. Glasnost derived from the Russian word *golos* (voice) which was associated with the limited government sponsored reforms in tsarist times. As for Gorbachev it meant publicity, openness and freedom of expression.³⁷⁴ From 1987 onward, the Central control and censorship on press remarkably loosened. Forbidden books began to be published including Evgeny Zamyatin’s *We*, George Orwell’s *1984*, poems of Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak’s *Doctor Zhivago*, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*.³⁷⁵ The new journals began to seek data from once-closed archives. The curtain that hid the purges, deportations and atrocities of the Stalin era was torn apart and the prohibited films were released. Therefore, within a few years, starting from the liberal intelligentsia, the Soviet society began to focus on environmental issues. The censorship was released on religious, cultural and political issues as well. Gorbachev’s aim to create western type civil society to large extent

³⁷³ Evtuhov-Goldfrank-Hughes-Stites 2004: 783.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

seemed to be accomplished. However, the liberties of Glasnost soon began to mortally attack the legitimatization grounds of the established order of the Soviet Union.

Regarding international relations, Gorbachev initiated peaceful relations with the West. He withdrew the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, Moscow stopped to support pro-Socialist insurgencies around the world, and Gorbachev gave up on the Soviet influence and claims in Eastern Europe, which would cause the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and end of the Cold War. Gorbachev called his foreign policy approach as 'New Thinking'. New Thinking comprises three main approaches. Firstly, the ongoing confrontation between superpowers should stop immediately and without precondition. Secondly, international security needs all nuclear countries to reduce their nuclear arsenals to the minimum. Lastly, the Ideological competition must stop and international order must depend on universal values which contains peace and cooperation.³⁷⁶

Despite the contribution of Gorbachev to reform Soviet political structure and economy, his economic reforms were not successful. Moreover, it worsened the already stagnant economy. Gorbachev aimed partially open the Command economy to the private capital. He was influenced by the NEP policies and he often alluded the NEP era, giving credit to Lenin. The posters of Lenin and Gorbachev frequently could be seen in public. In addition, the government initially allowed limited forms of entrepreneurship in just the same way as NEP policies. Small scale enterprises passed into private hands. Many of the formerly forbidden black market economy became legal via the allowance of the partial market economy. On December 22, 1988, the federal monopoly on foreign trade was abolished, which opened the door ownership of foreign currency. However, the run of the people to the foreign currencies triggered the rise of inflation.³⁷⁷

In fact, Gorbachev refused his period's 'shock therapy' proposals of liberal economic advisers such as, that of Aganbegyan and Zaslavskaya. He believed an economic

³⁷⁶ Shiraev 2013: 74.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 73.

reform based on planning rather than consumer choice mentality of the radical liberal democrats. However, even the relatively smaller reforms resulted in fear and reluctance among the lower level party bureaucrats, which led to sabotage of even minor changes in economy. Likewise, the attempt of democratization in workplace via elections of managers resulted in high wages and without no increase in labor productivity.³⁷⁸ In other words, the reform of 1988, which combined democratization of the workplace and freedom to set prices and wages of the state enterprises, failed because of the resistance of older practices.

Most of the economic reforms of Gorbachev could not be properly implemented and the result was a much more worsened economy and destruction of bases of the Command Economy. For instance, shortages and inflation worsened and economic crime ran rampant. A new class of oligarchy emerged and poverty began to spread. Consequently, retired people and people living with fixed salaries became poor by the rapidly changing prices. The rising grievances occurred as waves of strikes in 1989. Crime and violence were skyrocketing. Most importantly regarding the nationalist mobilization in the USSR, “The growing gap between rich and poor generated anxiety that had been unknown to the general population for decades.”³⁷⁹

With respect to the political reforms of Gorbachev, the development of the political freedoms further improved. Gorbachev attempted to create multicandidate communist party which allowed dissent. Accordingly, in 1988, dissent was allowed. Competition and debate were the radical changes for one party rule party system, where members were accustomed to decide on policies behind closed doors. Gorbachev also attempted to increase the power of locally elected party members at the expense of the central party committees. In December, 1988, a new law, “Elections of People’s Deputies of the USSR”, was enacted. The new law provided opportunity of parliamentary elections free from the control of the communist party to a large extent. In March 1990, the communist party reluctantly agreed to revoke the article 6 of the Constitutions which

³⁷⁸ Evtuhov-Goldfrank-Hughes-Stites 2004: 787.

³⁷⁹ Shiraev 2013: 73.

claims that “the communist party as the leading and guiding force in Soviet life”. After the amendment, several new political parties emerged overnight. Within 6 months over 250 political parties were officially registered in Moscow³⁸⁰ These type of amendments, needless to say, created disappointment and fear among the hardliners of the communist party. At the end of 1980s, there were roughly three political lines which determined the policies of the Soviet state. The ‘left’ of Gorbachev was represented by democratic forces led by Boris Yeltsin. The ‘right’ of the Gorbachev was represented by traditional communists and nationalists, led by Ligachev. Gorbachev seemed to stay in the middle line who was periodically oscillating between “left and right”.³⁸¹ Most of the democrats were market capitalism oriented and they were already distanced themselves from socialist-communist ideas in mind. The most important figure among democrats, Boris Yeltsin, had moved up the party hierarchy, initially put forward by Gorbachev. Then, he adopted an anti-communist, anti-Marxist-Leninist and ideological “rightist” position. Yeltsin was liquidated by Gorbachev in 1987, but he managed to come back by winning the election to the Presidency of Russian Republic in 1991. Yeltsin began to attack constantly the unity of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, by adopting Russia based nationalist policy. Yeltsin constantly reflected the image that the Soviet Union was burden for Russia. Even in the sphere of autonomous republics, Yeltsin was encouraging the sovereignty movements of the autonomous republics. Once he visited to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan he advised the regional officials that “swallow as much as sovereignty as you could”. Accordingly, Yeltsin dramatically reduced the power of the federal center and damaged the unity of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, on the other hand, sheltered his belief in the possibility of reforming Marxist-Leninism. He positioned himself in the middle line and probably closer to the communist side. However, the reformation attempts of him

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 69-70.

³⁸¹ The conceptualization of the left and right is different from the class based distinctions in the context of Glasnost. The ‘left’ of Gorbachev were represented by the anticommunists: liberals, democrats, socialists, anarchists and populists. The ‘right’ of Gorbachev were represented by hardliner communists, nationalists, anti-Semites, and even monarchists, neo-Stalinists. For a further explanation, see for example, Evtuhov-Goldfrank-Hughes-Stites 2004: 790.

removed the shield of the Soviet State and left the state in a very vulnerable condition against the mortal attacks of nationalist mobilizations.

5.1.2. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the USSR

On the national question Gorbachev was very optimistic and hopelessly utopian. As for him, the Soviet State had already constituted the ‘Soviet People’ and ethnic relations within the USSR were already began to stabilized.³⁸² In fact, most of the Soviet Republics was led by the same leaders for a long period of time, dated back from the Brezhnev period. The nation building processes of the various republics were already finished. The ethnic tensions among Soviet citizens were dramatically decreased. It could be merely witnessed in a very low level and non-violent forms in the sport competitions, sometimes at bars, at mixed schools or just in queues.³⁸³

Gorbachev did not pay attention on nationality factor in his political reforms, which aimed to democratize the Communist party and Soviet bureaucracy. One of the most important problems were that when he attempted to draw the line the republican leaders and their corrupted web of bureaucracy, he underestimated reactions which could be articulated in the form of nationalist mobilization. The riots in Yakutia and Almaty were the first signs of these kind of reactions and heralded the forthcoming mortal wave of nationalist mobilization throughout the Soviet Union.

In May 1986, fighting broke out between Sakha and Russian students, in Yakutsk of Autonomous Republic of Yakutia. The police intervention was in favor of Russians. Hence, three day demonstrations appeared in order to protest the police intervention. The demonstrations also elevated the national issues and corruption in the Yakutia. The reply of the authorities to the riots worsened the situation. The authorities increased the number of Slavic students at the university which caused the continuity of interethnic tension in Yakutia. Similarly, in December 1986, Almaty riots, namely,

³⁸² Smith 213: 257.

³⁸³ Rasma Karklins, (1986) *Ethnic Relations in the USSR*, London, HarperCollins, p. 68-71.

Zheltoqsan broke out in Almaty, Kazakhstan.³⁸⁴ The issue of corruption was worse in the national republics than the Russian provinces. Hence, Gorbachev attempted to liquidate national elites in the ethnic republics. His testing ground was Kazakhstan. Dinmukhamed Kunaev was removed from the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. His 26 years of long tenure was replaced by Gennadi Kolbin, who was a Russian in ethnic origin. The day of the official declaration of Kunaev's replacement, supporters of Kunaev gathered around the streets of Almaty. Most of them were university students asking why a person who does not know Kazakhstan has been appointed to the office. There were ethnic slogans chanted throughout the protest such as "Kazakhstan is the country of Kazakhs, One rule Kazakhstan must be Kazakh, Kolbin go home, Stop dictatorship"³⁸⁵ Despite the fact that there were these kinds of ethnic mottos, indeed protests formed as "nepotistic in content and ethnic in form". The long tenure of Kunaev had already established a corrupted *ethnic nomenklatura* around him. The events were triggered in order to save the liquidation of the privileged ethnic elites of Kunaev. However, the significant point is that protests very quickly articulated in the nationalist discourse, which proved the fragility of the Soviet ethnicity regime. Hundreds of protesters were possibly killed in Almaty, which turned the protests into a myth in the post-Soviet nation building of Kazakhstan. Even Nazarbaev, who distanced himself from the Kunaev network during the protests, frequently gave reference to these events and emphasized his so called participation to the demonstrations.³⁸⁶

These first nationalist reactions were isolated and contents of the resistances aimed to save the national elites' bureaucratic network. However, nationalist grievances throughout the national republics emerged in the form of environmental concerns and spread throughout the Soviet Union. The democratic atmosphere of Glasnost allowed the emergence base of environmental activities, which would soon be articulated in

³⁸⁴ *Zheltoqsan* means "December" in Kazakh language and associated with the events of 17 December of 1986.

³⁸⁵ Dinç 2010: 55.

³⁸⁶ Dave 2007: 90.

the national discourses. It was obvious that heavy industrialization of the Soviet modernization created several environmental problems such as, pollution of Lake Swan in Armenia, gradual disappearance of the Aral Sea in Central Asia, Chernobyl Nuclear reactor explosion in Ukraine, pollution from phosphate plants, dams and several other factories, began to be discussed freely in the public sphere.³⁸⁷

There were several reasons that could explain why the environmental grievances emerged in national republics. As Smith highlights first of all polluting industry and some of the grand projects which were detrimental for the environment were located away from the central Russia, namely in the union republics. Secondly, the environmental issues were the safer zones to escape from the attack possibility of Moscow. Thirdly, in the West the environmental movements were already gaining influence and environmental activists of the Soviet Union inspired by them.³⁸⁸ Possibly another important reason was usurpation of the “class struggle” by the Soviet official ideology. Hence, the national opposition remained the only alternative zone of expression of grievances rather than that of class in order to oppose the established order and ideology.³⁸⁹

The foundation of the national fronts in Belorussia, Armenia and Baltic republics, especially in Lithuania, are one of the best examples of the articulation of national discourses in environmental concerns. The Chernobyl disasters dramatically increased the national activism level in Belorussia, which presented the lowest sense of national identity among the Soviet republics in the 1980s. First informal groups emerged in 1987 and in the course of Belorussian election campaign in February, 1990, nationalists organized meetings with 100,000 people demanding the revival of Belarussian language against assimilation.³⁹⁰ As to Lithuanian case, environmental complaints escalated against the plan of the largest nuclear plant station in Ignalina.

³⁸⁷ Smith 2013: 261.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 261-262.

³⁸⁹ Suny: 1993: 126.

³⁹⁰ Smith 2013: 265.

In late 1987, independent environmental organization *Zemyna Club* was founded. In February 1988, the colonization of Lithuania by the Soviet power discourse began to spread throughout the country. The Communist party of Lithuania also obliged to support the national discourse, which would more radicalize in the summer of 1988 by linking environmental and national causes and conceptualizing Soviet Union as a threat and assault for Lithuanian national identity. Soon after the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika was founded, merging with various national groups, and it began to be known as *Sajudis* whose goal was returning the independent status of Lithuania.³⁹¹ Likewise in Armenia, the Armenian national front was organized starting with condemnation of the Armenian Communist leadership over the pollutants of Chemical plants in Yerevan. The territorial disagreement over Karabakh issue and reactions against Soviet infrastructure and buildings after the earthquake disaster were articulated in environmental sensibility that fostered the nationality discourse in Armenia.

The environmental movements constituted the ‘articulation nodal’ between environmental concerns and nationalist grievances. Soon after, the movements transformed in national fronts among the union republics and some several autonomous republics, which have strong identity level such as Tatarstan, Chechenia-Ingushia, Bashkortostan, Yakutia. The Baltic national fronts were the pioneer of them. The other national fronts followed the path of the pioneers. Beissinger conceptualized the national mobilization at the end of Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991 as event based tide of nationalism.³⁹² Needless to say, there were a lot of problems in terms of political structure, economy and ideology in the Soviet state at that time. However, the nationalist mobilization was among the toughest and resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At this point, the significant thing keeping distance from deterministic unhistorical arguments, which explains the rise of ethnic mobilizations such as Pandora’s box theory. The tide of nationalism argument seems better to explain the situation since various mobilizations throughout the USSR reached very different

³⁹¹ Smith 2013: 264.

³⁹² Beissinger (2002).

results at the end. Some of them became very successful and created their independent states; some of them gained greater autonomy; some of them evaporated very rapidly; and still some of nations gained independence without prominent national mobilization. Beissinger highlights the point as follows:

The typical Pandora's box metaphor often used to describe the collapse of the USSR does not hold true, since in quite a number of cases the demons refused to leave the box or only did so under the influence of the actions of others. The variety of outcomes exhibited in the spread of nationalist frames and in the specific forms by which nationalist action manifested itself across this territory makes this an outstanding case (or set of cases) wherein to probe the interplay between structure and agency in the politics of nationalism.³⁹³

The nationalist mobilization also changed the political positions of the national elites as well. In some cases, demands of national movements were endorsed and adopted by the national elites. However, the official adaptation of the demands increased the flourishing of the national movements which stimulated more radical demands. Hence, the leaders of the national movements were pressured to choose either to join the national movements via adopting its radical demands or to stand against the national movements by taking to risk of being liquidated. The pragmatic Soviet nomenklatura most of time preferred the former position.³⁹⁴ Hence, even the most loyalists to the Soviet order, among the national nomenklatura, turned into fathers of their nations such as Heydar Aliyev, Leonid Kravchuk, Mintimer Shaimiev, and Saparmurad Niyazov.³⁹⁵

5.1.2.1. The Coup Attempt and the End of the USSR

After the independence of the three Baltic republics, Gorbachev attempted to keep the union within a framework of 15 decentralized Soviet republics. Gorbachev negotiated with the prime minister Boris Yeltsin and he agreed the liquidation of several senior

³⁹³ Beissinger 2002: 35-36.

³⁹⁴ Smith 2013: 262-263.

³⁹⁵ Beissinger 2002: 37.

officials in the government. The conservative senior officials thought that the new union treaty would be the end of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's reforms had already failed in almost every sphere. From foreign policy to economy and nationality issue, the country was in a turmoil. Hence, the conservatives aimed to liquidate the Democratic Opposition and Gorbachev, and they want to return to the codes of traditional Soviet structure. In August 1991, a group of senior government officials started a coup, initially removing Gorbachev and declaring state of emergency. Gorbachev was arrested in Crimea. The plotters announced that Gorbachev had resigned. However, political support of the coup was weak. Yeltsin and the government of the Russian Federation declared the army action illegal. Soon after anti-coup demonstrations started, the Soviet army could not use violence against the protesters. The strong resistance of Yeltsin and his supporters caused the failure of the coup, and finally, the military surrendered.³⁹⁶

Yeltsin used his popularity to accelerate the disintegration further. Gorbachev as a last attempt offered Yeltsin the presidency of the USSR in return for keeping the Soviet Union together. However, the head of Ukraine, Kravchuk was reluctant to stay in the union, so Yeltsin refused the offer. Finally, the Soviet Union officially disappeared at the end of 1991.

All in all, a lot of reasons can be counted regarding the collapse of the Soviet Union such as international factors, economic stagnation, closeness of the Soviet political system for any reformation. Moreover, the role of individuals was also significant such as the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. All of these explanations are valuable. However, what was impossible throughout 1986 if inevitable in 1991, it was the power of nationalist mobilization, which had the power to disintegrate the Soviet Union. The power of nationalist mobilization lied in the legacy of the history of the Soviet nationality policies. The Tatar nationalist movement emerged, developed, and gradually declined during and after the turmoil years of Glasnost and Perestroika. The ethnicity regime of the Soviet Union also played a decisive role to frame the future of the Tatar national movement. I will attempt to analyze Tatar national movement in

³⁹⁶ Shiraev 2013: 81.

general via focusing on its ethno-national nomenklatura dimension as a specific example under these macro structure of the rapid political changes.

5.2. Formation of the Tatar National Movement

Until the Perestroika period, the Tatars were well integrated to the Soviet established order. Throughout the Soviet history there was always dissatisfaction with regard to the 'low-level' autonomous status of the country, but in the length of time the elites and society were accustomed to it. For example, although the economic conditions of Tatarstan were lower than the rich Baltic Soviet Republics, the Tatars initially did not react as a dissident center to the Soviet system. The Baltic societies never perceived the Soviet State legitimate, but the majority of Tatar society and elites respected the established order.³⁹⁷ Hence, the nationalist movement in Tatarstan had some structural advantages and deficiencies. On the one hand, status of the republic was a significant deficiency to reach the Union level nationalist mobilization; on the other hand, as a late comer nationalist movement, the Tatar elites could walk through the path which was opened by some of the nationalist Union republics. Another dilemma was between location and national consciousness. From one side, the Tatars had a rich legacy of nationhood and statehood, which makes them one of the pioneers among the Muslim population. From the other side, Tatarstan remained inside the Russian Federation. With regard to location, the country was very disadvantageous in comparison with border republics. The Tatar society had to greet the Perestroika period under these structural oscillations.

In the Tatarstan case, the effects of the democratization, which was started around 1985, soon revealed the national problem in the public sphere. The Tatar elites began to question the impacts of the Soviet rule in the cultural and ecological sphere. The main problems clustered in the underdeveloped status of Tatar language, the quality of Tatar language education and ecological damage of the Soviet modernization in the

³⁹⁷ My Interview with Damir Ishakov, Professor at History Department of Kazan Federal University, Kazan, 04.10.2016.

territory of Tatarstan. The cultural-folkloric movements found the base to support the development of Tatar culture and language. The first ecological club was founded in Nizhnekamsk, 1987. On 5th of July 1987, the first ecological meeting was organized in Kazan. In the following years the environmental movement would focus its campaigns against the planned construction of biochemical factory and Nuclear-power station.³⁹⁸ Most of the future activists of the Tatar national movement actively involved in these cultural and ecological movements. For example, Fauriza Bayramova, the head of the radical wing of Tatar nationalist movement, *Ittifak*, took part in the protests against the construction of intended nuclear power plant.³⁹⁹ In the course of time, all these movements turned into a political character which supported national self-determination of Tatarstan.⁴⁰⁰

The politization of the country with various nationality discourses rose and declined in the compressed time of the years between 1988 and 1992. At the middle of 1990s, the ethno-national movements lost their grassroots and visibility, especially after the bilateral agreement between Russia and Tatarstan in 1994.⁴⁰¹ Hence, the rapid politization and nationalization of Tatarstan can be pursued chronologically better under four main periods: From Emergence of the National Movement to the Sovereignty Declaration of Tatarstan (Summer 1988-August 1990), From Sovereignty Declaration of Tatarstan to the collapse of the Soviet State (August 1990-Summer 1991), the struggle for Sovereignty in the period of political crisis (Summer 1991-1992) and finally, the decline of ethnic mobilization and the Tatar nationalist Movement (From 1992 to the middle of 1990s)

In 1988, two main significant events occurred with regard to the politization of the society. In May, some members of the teaching staff of Kazan State University and Kazan Aviation Institute signed a proposal where they declared that they organized a

³⁹⁸ Damir Ishakov, (1998) *Suverennii Tatarstan, Dokumenty, Materialy, Hronika*, Rossiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Moskva, p. 57.

³⁹⁹ My interview with Damir Ishakov.

⁴⁰⁰ Gibadullin 1998: 26.

⁴⁰¹ My interview with Sergey Sergeyev.

‘Popular Front’ under the guidance of CPSU. Both of the Tatar and Russian academics’ main aim was to attract the interest of the public by demanding the expansion of political and economic sovereignty of Tatarstan such as achieving the Union Republic status. The radical wing of the popular front adopted severe anti-establishment policies which left them without support from the regional elites, as well as popular support. The popular front attempt continued its activities under the branch of “Initiative Centre of the Popular Front”, ITsNF (Initsiativnyi Tsentr Narodnogo Fronta). Nevertheless, the impact zone of the movement remained narrow, consisting of only active members and 150-200 sympathizers.⁴⁰²

Main formal organization of the Tatar national movement was finally founded in the autumn of 1988, namely, Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii Obshechestvennyi Tsentr or TOTs). The Tatar intelligentsia from Kazan State University and Institute of Language, Literature and History were the main founders of TOTs.⁴⁰³ TOTs held first conference in October, 1988. There were around 800 people participated in the conference. Most of the participants were coming from Tatar humanitarian academics, Tatar writers, clergy and various non-formal cultural organizations.⁴⁰⁴ Regarding the organizational structure, TOTs was an umbrella organization binding almost all of the cultural-political fractions of the Tatar National Movement. The organizations of Tatar National Movement at the beginning of the 1990s can be divided into two main parts. Regarding cultural-educational sphere, there were Tatar national organizations such as *Tugan Yak, Vatan, Tovbe, Marzhani, Ana, Milli Yort, Fondy TYAK, Miras, Bulgar Komitety, Megarif, Kultura I Iskustvo, Informatsionnoe Agenstvo, Tatarinform, Kryashenskoe EKPO, Monogoobrozhnie Gorodskie Kulturnie Tsenty, Obedineniia, i Kluby*; the Social-political organizations were, namely, *TOTs, Soyuz Molededzhi Azatlyk, Komitety Suverennitet, Mizzgar, Bulgarskiy Natsional'nyi Kongres,*

⁴⁰² Kondrashov 2000: 116.

⁴⁰³ The name of the organization would also be called as BTOTs, “Vsesoyuznii, vse tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr”, an updated inclusive name that targets to involve Tatars outside of Tatarstan.

⁴⁰⁴ *Vechernaia Kazan*, 7 November 1988.

*Politieskii Partii Ittifak, Vatan, Idel-Ural, Firkai Nadzia, Islamskaia Demokraticeskaia Partiia Tatarstana, Respublikanskaia Partiia Tatarstana.*⁴⁰⁵

The first party conference revealed the strong connection between TOTs and regional republican elites.⁴⁰⁶ Tatarstan Obkom of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) promised TOTs to open a Tatar radio station and an all-Union Tatar newspaper.⁴⁰⁷ During my interview with Rustam Gibadullin, former prominent ideologue of the Naberezhnye Chelny branch of TOTs, stated that Marat Mulyukov, the first head of TOTs was under the control of Mintimer Shamiev.⁴⁰⁸ Likewise, Damir Ishakov, one of the prominent ideologues of TOTs, pointed out regional state elites, namely, Mintimer Shamiev initially had a pro-Tatar tendency which would last until early 1990s.⁴⁰⁹

The constitutional congress of TOTs was held in February, 1989. In this congress, TOTs declared its party program. The party program started with the title “Tatar Public Center, in support of Perestroika” (*Tatarskogo obsectvennovo Tsentra v Podderzku Perestroyki*). The party program was explained in detail under seven subtitles: “Common Position; Constitution and Real Rights of the Republic; National Statehood and the Rights of Tatar Nation; Democratic Society and Personal Rights; Economics and Ecology; Social Development of the Republic; Development spheres of Language, Education, Science and Cultures.”⁴¹⁰

The titles of the program reveal that TOTs adopted a nationalist-democratic ideology to achieve its goals. The Tatar cultural revival and increase of the republic to the status of Union Republic were some of the major aims of TOTs. The primary aims of TOTs

⁴⁰⁵ Rustam Gibadullin, (1998) *Tatarskoe Natsional'noe Dvizhenie: Politicheskaya Deiatel'nost' v Vliianie v Tatarstane (1988-1992)*, Kazan, Izdatel'stvo Kazanskogo Universiteta, p. 26.

⁴⁰⁶ During my interviews with prominent ideologues of the federalist Democratic Opposition, Sergey Sergeev and Vladimir Belyaev, the connection between TOTs and regional elites was also highlighted.

⁴⁰⁷ Kondrashov: 2000, 118.

⁴⁰⁸ My interview with Rustam Gibadullin.

⁴⁰⁹ My interview with Damir Ishakov.

⁴¹⁰ For a further information, see for example, Ishakov Damir 1998: 99-124.

had to be achieved under a democratic framework. The program revealed that TOTs' moderate nationalist ideology refrained from confrontation with the Russian population of Tatarstan. The TOTs program noticeably emphasized the moderate nationalist direction of the organization in the following manner:

Aims and Tasks of the Movement

The main aim of the movement is to realize the national, economic, political, and cultural rights of the republic, and comprehensive development Tatar population of the country including other places where it appears as minority. It also aims to support cultural, scientific and business contacts with Tatar national communities who are living abroad. Based on this, the movement puts forward special tasks:

- To activate social thinking and initiatives of citizens of the republic for solving nodal problems of Perestroika political system and national relationships.
- To obtain provision of Tataria Soviet Republic with the rights of sovereign state
- To contribute to the transition of the republic on the principles of self-financing
- To obtain constitutional consolidation of the status of Tatar and Russian languages
- To promote cultural-linguistic consolidation of the Tatar nation in all territories of the USSR.
- To develop political and spiritual culture of the population of Tatar Republic

Main Principles of the Movement

The members of the movement based their activities on the following principles:

- Humanism and protection of individual rights and national groups.
- Democracy and socialist pluralism
- Internationalism and priority of universal values
- Equality of all peoples
- Social justice
- Publicity (Transparency)
- Respect for the law
- Constructive cooperation with state and public organizations

- Autonomy and self-government
- Territoriality: representation of interests of all nations living in Tataria
- Extraterritoriality: Representation of interests of all Tatars irrespective of where they live.
- Liability⁴¹¹

The above written program of TOTs revealed the first disagreement between the Tatar nationalists and the regional republican elites. TOTs references on Tatar diaspora and self-sufficient economy had already annoyed the republican governmental elites. Hence, before the first congress they reacted to tame the ‘radical’ phases of the program. For example, they put the program of TOTs on the magazine of the Obkom of CPSU, an officially recognized propaganda medium, through censoring and distorting radical nationalist statements. The head of the organization community of TOTs, Marat Mulyukov, endeavored to water down the excitement and radical demands of the grassroots. He even declared that “the main task of our movement is to assist the party in the implementation of its course for restructuring Soviet society.”⁴¹² The rift between TOTs and regional republican elites or *regional nomenklatura* was distinguishable from the beginning.⁴¹³ However, throughout 1989, there was a strong alliance between TOTs and the regional elites. The regional nomenklatura was aware of the fact that the Soviet system was losing its legitimacy, but they did not want to lose their privileges. Hence, they were cautious about some demands that could annoy Moscow. Nevertheless, most of the demands of TOTs matched with the ambitions of the regional elites. Indeed, the demands would consolidate their elite privileges as long as they did not lose their powers. The regional nomenklatura would never allow the power to slip down to the hands of the new actors; therefore, they did not totally refuse the demands of the national movement. However, the regional nomenklatura had to tame the radical

⁴¹¹ Ishakov 1998: 124-125.

⁴¹² *Komsomolets Tatarii*, 19 February 1989, cited in Kondrashov 2000: 129.

⁴¹³ Henceforth, I will randomly use one of these titles: “regional elites, state elites, local elites, republican elites, ethno-national nomenklatura, ethno-nomeklatura, regional nomenklatura, Tatar nomenklatura” to refer the regional power represented by Mintimer Shaimiev.

elements that could cause a severe competition for power. From the second half of the 1989 and onwards, the collaboration between Republican elites and TOTs was strengthened. TOTs achieved to use print media opportunities provided by Tatar Obkom. Perhaps more importantly TOTs, gained the opportunity to access regional Radio and TV stations. Hence, Tatar nationalist discourses found important channels to reach the masses.⁴¹⁴ Before explaining the political events at the beginning of 1990s, it is better to understand basic features of the remaining political actors in Tatarstan.

5.3. The Competition Among Three Actors on the Way of Sovereignty Declaration

Throughout the 1990s declaring sovereignty marked the politics of Tatarstan. The already emergent division across ethno-political lines are sharpened. The legitimacy of Moscow was going worse and that caused the feeling anxiety about their future among the people. Under these conditions, the moderate nationalist-democratic structure of TOTs was challenged by newly-born radical nationalist elements such as party of *Ittifak* (Alliance) and radical nationalist youth organization *Azatlik* (freedom). With regard to the regional elites, Mintimer Shaimiev became the first secretary of the Tatar Obkom. From that time onwards, he would remain the most powerful decisive actor for decades in the politics of Tatarstan. Before plunging into the issue of the sovereignty declaration, the political characteristics of the remaining two actors, the Democratic Opposition and Shaimiev's nomenklatura network will be explained and finally the radical fractions of TOTs will be discussed shortly.

At the beginning of the 1990s, while the Tatar National Movement was getting organized under TOTs, Russian and Tatar pro-unionist, federalist elites were organizing under the name of 'Democratic Opposition or Federalist Electoral Bloc'. Democratic Opposition was mainly formed with democratic parliament members from

⁴¹⁴ Kondrashov 2000: 117.

the Regional Supreme Soviet.⁴¹⁵ The Democratic Opposition mainly comprised three political lines, such as Liberals, Social Democrats and the Right Defending Movement. Within the Right Defending Movement, there were three main divisions as well. These were: *Soglasie* (Accord), Citizens of Russian Federation and Slavic Club.⁴¹⁶

Within the Right Defending Movement, *Soglasie* was the strongest organization and Democratic Opposition which included these members was itself a multiethnic organization. For example, 1/3 of the members of *Soglasie* were ethnic Tatars.⁴¹⁷ The Regional Elites and the Tatar National Movement were generally keen to label them as pro-Russian Opposition. However, the leaders of Democratic Opposition insistently refused this label.⁴¹⁸ Pro-federalist-electoral bloc or Democratic Opposition basically supported democratization process initiated by Perestroika at the regional level. *Soglasie* attempted to appeal to the Tatar population apart from the regional elites/ethno-national nomenklatura and the Tatar National Movement. Democratic Opposition could not offer a clear economic program since they had various members who adopted rapid economic liberalization or slow pace transition. For example, Prof. Belyaev, the head of *Soglasie*, told the writer of this thesis that he was still a democratic socialist, but the organization could not adopt an ideology in the area of economy, if so the movement would break up.⁴¹⁹ The amalgam of *Soglasie* was deepening the democratization process and civil liberties in Tatarstan. In this context, *Soglasie* proposed three main ideas. One of them is the obligatory education both in Tatar and Russian languages for all students. The Other one is the offer of negotiations

⁴¹⁵ See the Tatar representatives of Naradovvlasi, (Regional Parliament group of the Democratic Opposition) in Chernobrovkina Elena, (2001) *Demokraticeskaja Oppozitsia Tatarstana: 10 let Puti*, Kazan, Izdatel' agnstvo REMARK.

⁴¹⁶ My interview with Prof. Vladimir Belyaev, Head of *Soglasie*, Kazan National Research Technical University (named after A.N. Tupoleva), Kazan, 11.10.2016.

⁴¹⁷ My interview with Vladimir Belyaev.

⁴¹⁸ During my interview with Sergey Sergeyev, he corrected me that they were multiethnic movement and he did not prefer to identify the movement as, Pro-Russian Opposition. On the other hand, Rustam Gibadullin highlighted that they were backed from Moscow.

⁴¹⁹ My interview with Vladimir Belyaev.

with Moscow to achieve a bilateral agreement, and still the other one was referendum for the status of Tatarstan.⁴²⁰

The basic difference between the democratic opposition and the Tatar nationalist movement initially occurred regarding different perspectives of group rights. The democratic opposition mainly interpreted the language issue as an important item among “basic individual liberties”. However, the Tatar National Movement interpreted it in context of “group rights of minorities”. Nevertheless, initially Tatar national democrats and Democratic Opposition supported both the democratization and rising sovereignty demands from Moscow together. The main contradiction between these two movements would come to surface on the brink of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

With regard to the republican elites, the nomenklatura background was very common among the members of high state bureaucracy. Most of the important figures of the regional elites were coming from Tataria Obkom of the CPSU. For example, formerly prominent ideologue of TOTs and advisor of Shaimiev, Rafael Khakimov, was a secretary for the Ideology of the Communist Party of the Tatar Obkom. Marat Mulyakov, the first leader of TOTs had good relations with the regional nomenklatura. He was an associated professor at the privileged department of History of the Communist Party. Similarly, other high level communist party elites gathered around Mintimer Shamiev who had already benefitted from the Soviet era affirmative action policies to climb the stairs in his career with his nomenklatura colleagues. At this point, looking at biography of Shaimiev helps to understand the ethno-national nomenklatura background trend of the regional elites.

Mintimer Shamiev was born in the village Anikovo on 20th January 1937. He graduated from the Agricultural Institute in Kazan in 1959 and joined the Communist Party in 1963. In 1967, he became an instructor and the deputy head of agricultural department at Tatar Obkom of the CPSU. In 1969, he was appointed to the position of Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources of the TASSR. Shamiev served as the

⁴²⁰ My interview with Vladimir Belyaev.

chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the TASSR between 1985-1989. Finally, Shaimev became the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom of the CPSU in September, 1989. Soon after, he also became the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, legislative organ of the Republic. In June, 1990 Shaimiev was elected the first President of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic. During the coup attempt in 1991, he supported the State Emergency Committee (*GKChP*). He worked as the president of Tatar Autonomous Republic until January, 2010. He recommended President Medvedev to appoint Rustam Minnikhanov as his successor. Currently, Shaimiev is helping Minnikhanov as his chief advisor.⁴²¹

Shaimiev played a crucial role throughout the 1990s, that shaped the regional politics not only of Tatarstan but also other ethnic republics, and in general he shaped the structure of the Russian federalism in the first half of the decade.⁴²² He skillfully used the rising ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan to consolidate his position and to gain concession from the center. During my interview with Damir Ishakov, I asked him whether Tatar nationalist movement was artificially constructed by Shaimiev or if it was independent in essence. He replied as follows:

Tatar Nationalist Movement was an independent movement. TOTs made an impact on Shaimiev. Shaimiev did not create or support TOTs. He used the national movement for his elitist power. Among TOTs members, there are not rich people. I know some TOTs members living in simplicity and poverty.⁴²³

During the times of ethnic mobilization in 1988-1992, Shaimiev's nomenklatura nationalist stance focused on political survival. That's why, his image has been described as more restrained and discreet than that of the leaders of other Russian regions. For instance, Luzhkov and Rossel, who attempted to follow on active policy challenging Moscow based national-regional policy were the other strong regional

⁴²¹ Nail M., Mukhiamov, (2000) "Politicheskaia elita Tatatastana: Biograficheskie svedeniia.", *In Regiony Rossii: Hronika i Rukovoditeli. Tom 7*, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato, p. 119., Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center-Hokkaido University.

⁴²² Kimitaka Matsuzato, (2006) "Authoritarian transformation of the Mid-Volga national republics: an attempt at macro-regionology." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.20, No.2, pp. 98-123.

⁴²³ My interview with Damir Ishakov.

leaders.⁴²⁴ Shamiev frequently remained at balanced position between the Democratic Opposition and Tatar National Movement.⁴²⁵ Shamiev's instrumentalization of Tatar National Movement for his elite survival was also emphasized by Sergey Sergeev, one of the prominent ideologues of the Democratic Opposition, during one of my interviews.

With regard to the Post-Soviet presidency of Shaimiev and Tatarstan leadership, the nomenklatura style patron-client relationship, corruption and abuse of public office for private gain was frequent witnessed. That's why, Shaimiev's nationalism in essence was national in form but personalistic in content. Patronage networks and informal political relations marked the post-Soviet politics of Tatarstan. Shaimiev and his entourage gained enormous financial benefits in the era of post-Soviet market economy transition.⁴²⁶ The national elites of Tatarstan grew rich under guidance of Shaimiev's. This issue will be discussed further in the part where the neoliberal economic transformation of Tatarstan is dealt with. After this brief introduction of the main characteristics of the remaining two actors, it is better to return to the politics of Tatarsan during 1990s.

5.4. The National Revival in Tatarstan on the Brink of the Sovereignty Declaration

The ethno-national revival in Tatarstan was triggered after the republican and regional elections in the spring of 1990. As a result of the first relatively free elections in Moscow, Gorbachev began to lose his legitimacy rapidly. Yeltsin returned to active politics as a Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the RFSRF. Furthermore, the Baltic national fronts had already begun to struggle for secession from the Soviet state. As a

⁴²⁴ Thomas Carter, (2015) *Networks and Regional Leadership in Yeltsin's Russia: the case of Eduard Rossel in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 1989-1999*, PhD dissertation at UCL.

⁴²⁵ My interview with Dilyara Murzina, Assoc. Prof. at Social and Political Confilictology Department in Kazan National Research Technological University, Kazan, 03.10.2016.

⁴²⁶ Mendras Marie "How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power." *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 15, no.4., 1999.

consequence of these events Tatar National Movement increased its activities throughout the 1990s. The Regional elites also paved the way for the intensification of the activities of TOTs. TOTs began to focus on the political issues, and radical Tatar nationalist branches began to emerge under the umbrella of TOTS.

In the March session of TOTs, the new radical nationalist party, *Ittifak* (Alliance) was endorsed by the Council of the representatives. Fauriza Bayramova and R. Mukhametdinov became the co-presidents of *Ittifak*. *Ittifak* proposed a strict party model which aims to establish an independent Tatar state. After the establishment of *Ittifak*, the liberal members of the TOTs acted under the group of *Grazhdanskoe Soglasie* (Civil Accord) to distance themselves from *Ittifak*. In the summer and spring of 1990, new radical nationalist Tatar organizations were added to *Ittifak* such as *STM* (Soyuz Tatarskoi Molodezhi), the Union of Tatar Youth and *Azatlik*, (Freedom).⁴²⁷

Both the Tatar nationalists and the democratic opposition created their parliament blocks. The democratic movement called themselves, peoples' power, *Naradovvlasti*. They had approximately two dozens of parliament members after the regional election in March, 1990. Similar to the Democratic Opposition, the Tatar nationalists also remained a minority bloc in 250 PM seated regional parliament. The regional elites won a clear victory in the election, winning 128 seats, 51 percent of the parliament. Moreover, the new election system provided disproportional representation of nomenklatura oriented Tatars in the parliament. The polling to decide the regional parliament speaker displayed the power of the Shaimiev network in the parliament. While Shaimiev took the 70.9 percent of votes, candidates of Tatar national movement F. Bayramova and Mulyakov only took 17.8 percent and 3.3 percent votes from the regional parliament, respectively.⁴²⁸

In the summer of 1990, society in Tatarstan politicized around the topic of sovereignty declaration. The rapid changes in Moscow encouraged TOTs to pursue more radical demands. Meanwhile, Yeltsin had already begun to undermine Gorbachev's position

⁴²⁷ Kondrashov 2000: 133-134.

⁴²⁸ Ibid. 136.

via supporting centrifugal tendencies all over the USSR. At the beginning of August 1990, Yeltsin made a trip to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to encourage the sovereignty demands of the autonomous republics. In Tatarstan, he said: “take all the sovereignty you can handle.” Regarding sovereignty declaration of Tatarstan he added: “We will welcome whatever independence the Tatar ASSR chooses for itself; I will say: If you want to govern yourselves completely, go ahead.”⁴²⁹

Rising suspicion to the center and worsening economic conditions motivated bold attempts taking into account the sovereignty declaration. On one extreme, TOTs modified its demands to support an almost independent statehood similar to the Baltic republics. On the other extreme, the democrats were supporting sovereignty more and more, but remaining as an Autonomous Republic under the Russian Federation. Shaimiev, at the end balanced the two poles and created a vague sovereignty declaration concerning the relationship between Tatarstan and Russia. In other words, the determination of legal status of both parties, Tatarstan and RSFSR was postponed and remained unclear. The act was symbolically important, Tatarstan removed the title ‘Autonomous’ and re-named itself as “Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic, the Republic of Tatarstan”. In addition, Tatarstan declared that its own laws and constitution gained priority on its territory.⁴³⁰ The first secretary of the Communist Party of Tatarstan Obkom, Shaimiev announced that Tatarstan was no longer part of RSFSR. Hence, he resigned from his position. Almost unanimously voted sovereignty declaration of Tatarstan, claimed full sovereignty on economy and natural resources, keeping the Russian language as state language with the Tatar. RT (Republic of Tatarstan) even symbolically seceded from RSFSR, but remained as a USSR republic. The sovereignty declaration, although approved among the three actors, namely, the ethno-national nomenklatura, the Tatar nationalists and Democratic Opposition heralded the prospective rising tensions among them in the following year.

⁴²⁹ Elena Chernobrovkina, “*Reshat’ vam samim*”, Vechernaia Kazan, August 10, 1990.

⁴³⁰ Elise Giuliano, (2000) *Paths to The Decline of Nationalism: Ethnic Politics in the Republics of Russia*, Chicago, Illinois, p. 42-43.

5.5. The Rise of Ethnic Mobilization: From Sovereignty Declaration to the Coup Attempt in the USSR (August 1990-Summer 1991)

After the sovereignty declaration, the Tatar National Movement gained a new momentum. The sovereignty declaration had a symbolic importance, but the Tatar National Movement was passionate to embody the symbolic act. Hence, TOTs organized a meeting on 10 September, 1990. More than 300 specialists discussed how to implement the already proclaimed sovereignty declaration. If Tatarstan had upgraded into the SSR status, there should have been adjustment of Laws in various spheres, such as economic independence, international relations, and most importantly, the relations with RSFSR. Tatar nationalists kept warm referring to the issue of sovereignty in the commemoration of the collapse of the Kazan Khanate throughout October as well.⁴³¹ On 5 October, 1990, in order to coordinate the sovereignty declaration and its path to the SSR status republic, a different branch of Tatar national movement was established, committee *Suverennitet* which became responsible to control and coordinate to the implementation of the sovereignty declaration. The committee *Suverennitet* highlighted the necessity of a new agreement with RSFSR as soon as possible to pass the transformative track regarding the issue of SSR status. Soon after, a meeting was organized by TOTs regarding the protection of the independence of Tatarstan. TOTs and Committee of *Suverennitet* insisted on urgently making a constitution in which the relationship between Tatarstan and Russian Federation would be clarified. They prompted to activate the regional parliament.⁴³²

While the Tatar national movement was increasing its influence, Democratic Opposition was also getting stronger. The strongest organization of the Democrats was the Tatarstan section of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). Similar to the Tatar National Movement, DPR was also consolidating its power in a period in which the influence of the Communist Party was diminishing. According to the Poll of the

⁴³¹ Gibadullin 1998: 40.

⁴³² Ibid. 41.

newspaper *Shahri Kazan*, DPR was shown as the most powerful party in Tatarstan by 23.7 percent public support.⁴³³ Meanwhile, in August 1990, *Soglasie* (Accord) Movement appeared for the first time. As I mentioned before, *Soglasie* was a multiethnic movement including many urban Tatars. The movement had an umbrella structure bonding various tiny organizations which were troubled with the Communist party nomenklatura both in the center and in the region. Hence, they had a reformist agenda similar to their ideological counterpart, DPR. *Soglasie* was anxious of the ethnic division of Tatarstan, and they attempted to prevent the emergence of national fronts in Tatarstan.⁴³⁴ The democratic opposition in general conceptualized the issue of ethnicity and nationalism with a non-ethnic liberal perspective under the framework of civil rights. With regard to the status of TSSR and its secession from Russia, *Soglasie* proposed the necessity of a referendum for the secession.⁴³⁵ Meanwhile, the regional parliamentary group of DPR, *Naradovvlasti*, pressurizing the regional government to adopt the legal foundations of a multi-party system and to increase the freedom of press in favor of the opposition.⁴³⁶

In this chaotic period before the collapse of the Soviet state, while the two actors positioned themselves as I highlighted above, the regional government supported Gorbachev's new union treaty proposal during 1991. The ethno-national nomenklatura hoped to enhance the status of the country to the SSR level. Therefore, they backed Gorbachev's new Union Treaty. In March 1991, Gorbachev's new Union Treaty was approved in Tatarstan by 88 percent. Similarly other middle Volga region republics voted in favor of the Union Treaty by more than 75 percent.⁴³⁷ However, Gorbachev's

⁴³³ Kondrashov 2000: 153.

⁴³⁴ Ibid. (interfront ne budet)

⁴³⁵ The pro-Unionist tendencies of the Democratic Opposition was evaluated by R. Gibadullin as follows: "The democratic Opposition was supported by Moscow. Indeed, they were not independent". My interview with Rustam Gibadullin.

⁴³⁶ Kondrashov 2000: 154.

⁴³⁷ Frank Allen and Ronald Wixman, (1997) "The Middle Volga Exploring the Limits of Sovereignty." In *New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, eds. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, pp. 140-189, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

published Union Treaty in May 1991, did not provide Tatarstan a union republic status. The disappointed Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan refused to sign the treaty until the UR status for Tatarstan is approved by the federal center.⁴³⁸

With regard to the political positions of the three actors in terms of the presidential elections of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federation, the views of the three actors were as follows: The second congress of TOTs was held in February, 1991. The moderate wing of the Tatar National Movement dominated the second congress as well. Only in the Naberezhnye Chelny Conference, radical wing of the Tatar national movement could find a chance to express their wish to finish the new constitution before 20 May 1991. The second significant demand from the regional authorities was to hold the Presidential Election of Tatarstan on 10th of June, 1991, which was two days earlier than date of the Presidential Election of the RFSSR, 12 June 1991. The Tatar national movement within both of its radical and moderate wings were harshly against participating in the Presidential election of the RFSSR. As for TOTs, the participation in the RFSSR election would be the obvious violation of the sovereignty declaration of Tatarstan. The members of TOTs considered that most of the political gains of the previous years would be at stake. Therefore, TOTs focused on the protection of Tatarstan's sovereignty declaration. TOTs constantly warned and pressurized the republican elites not to participate in the RFSSR elections.⁴³⁹

While TOTs was opposing the federal elections, Shaimiev proposed to elect President of Tatarstan and the RFSSR together. This proposal satisfied neither the Tatar national movement nor the pro-unionist Democratic Opposition. The balanced position of Shaimiev was criticized by sides. *Narodovlastie*, Democratic opposition's parliament fraction, emphasized the deepening risk of a confrontation between Moscow and Kazan. On the other hand, the radical nationalist fractions of TOTs harshly criticized Shaimiev because of the legitimization of a "foreign" state. Fauriza Bayramova, the

⁴³⁸ Giuliano 2000: 43.

⁴³⁹ Kondrashov 2000: 155-157.

head of Ittifak, staged a hunger strike in Freedom Square to protest the allowance of the Russian Presidential election in Tatarstan.

As a result, the final proposal of Shaimiev was reshaped in accordance with the nationalist movement. The regional elites allowed the RFSSR Presidential Elections, but they boycotted the election with TOTs. The Democratic Opposition decided to participate in the RFSSR election and vote for Yeltsin. Shaimiev was nominated as the only candidate for Presidency of Tatarstan with the full support of TOTs. Most of the voters chose to vote for Shaimiev (66%) rather than Yeltsin (37%) in the simultaneous elections of June 1991.⁴⁴⁰ The result consolidated the position of Shaimiev and caused a euphoria among Tatar national movement due to the lack of 50% of votes for Russian Presidency, which invalidated the election. In fact, the balanced strategy of Shaimiev refrained him from a direct confrontation with Moscow. Shaimiev's balanced position instrumentalized the national movement and enhanced his prominence. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union would give a crucial chance to the Tatar national movement to change the structure of the game vis-à-vis the ethno-national nomenklatura.

5.6. The Nationalist Mobilization in the Period of Political Crisis (From August 1991-Summer 1992)

The military coup d'état attempt of the conservative communists in Moscow altered the political situation in Tatarstan as well. Shaimiev assumed that the attempted coup would be successful. Hence, he gave an implicit support to the putsch. Most of the democrats and some part of the Tatar nationalists, for example F. Bayramova demonstrated on Freedom Square in support of democracy and Gorbachev, and protested the attempted coup. Riot police dispersed pro-democracy crowds by the order of Shaimiev. Shaimiev miscalculated the situation, so he attracted the harsh

⁴⁴⁰ Edward Walker, "The Dog that Didn't Bark: Tatarstan and Asymmetrical Federalism in Russia." *Harriman Review* 9, (Winter 1996), pp. 1-35.

disapprovals from the opposition. For example, *Soglasie* even made a public appeal to disband Tatarstan parliament.⁴⁴¹

Moscow attempted to liquidate Shaimiev. However, Shaimiev skillfully turned off the central attack with the help of the Tatar national movement. The Tatar National Movement considered that the leadership of Shaimiev was always better than being tied up to Moscow. Despite the fact that Shaimiev's popularity considerably decreased after the failed putsch he managed to survive. The National Movement could not create an alternative either. Nevertheless, the Tatar National Movement attempted to use relatively weak position of Shaimiev. Since they had already saved him they saw a right to pressure him to declare state independence in the turmoil period.⁴⁴² The apex of nationalist extremism finally emerged in October, 1991. When Tatar Nationalist commemorated the anniversary of the Collapse of the Kazan Khanate, they demanded from the Supreme Soviet to declare the republican independence. Nationalist demonstrators had rallied for four days in the Freedom Square of Kazan on which the regional parliament was located. However, when the demonstrators heard the non-willingness of the deputies for declaring independence they stormed the parliament and clashed with the police. Several security forces and demonstrators were seriously injured.⁴⁴³ When I lived in Kazan, I also witnessed from many Tatars that on the eve of the decision of the sovereignty declaration, the Russian army was already equipped to attack Kazan in case of an independence declaration..

During the events of storming parliament I was a child and one of our police officer relatives came to our house and said us that the Russian Army had encircled Kazan with numerous tanks and they were waiting to attack in case of a state independence declaration.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴¹ Kondrashov 2000: 172.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 173.

⁴⁴³ Giuliano 2000: 47.

⁴⁴⁴ My interview with Vasil' Sakaev, Assoc. Prof. at International Relations Department of Kazan Federal University, Kazan, 12.10.2016. Timur Valiakhmetov. told me a similar case, My interview with Timur Valiakhmetov., Postgraduate student in Social Sciences, Kazan, 05.10.2016.

The storming of Parliament further polarized the already divided society. The parliament members of the group *Narodovlasti* boycotted the parliament session. They stated that they would not attend the sessions until the Freedom Square is cleared by the extremist nationalist protesters. The boycott bore some fruits: Shamiev ordered prosecutors to investigate the occurred violence in the Freedom Square. Meanwhile, some radical nationalists of TOTs had already stated their wish to establish a national guard. Shamiev also banned this kind of paramilitary organizations.⁴⁴⁵ It was obvious that radical nationalists' hope of establishing an independent Tatar State reached its pinnacle during the turmoil year of 1991, but it remained to a large extent as a proposal. Radical Tatar nationalists never dared to initiate violence based on ethnic mobilization. Sakaev highlighted forming militia plans of radical nationalists as follows:

When I was a schoolboy at Naberezhnye Chelny, one member from the nationalist movement called Tatar students to Tatar language courses in the extra-school time. I participated in a few meetings of them. Then, they said us, they would teach Karate to every student. When I began not to go to the meetings the teacher warned me and said: Aren't you a Tatar? This is not good. You must come to the meeting like your friends.⁴⁴⁶

There are some alternative views explaining the nationalist street protests of 15-19th October, 1991. Vladimir Belyayev, head of *Soglasie* Movement, highlighted the link between extremist nationalists and Shamiev:

Most of the people who surrounded the parliament came from different cities by state buses and trucks. When I asked to Nikolay Ivanovic, the director of Kamaz, who provided the vehicles and organized coming of the people. He replied to me that it was ordered by the regional government.⁴⁴⁷

This comment shows that Shaimiev overcame his diminished prestige after the coup attempt via instrumentalizing the radical wings of the nationalist movement. He pretended to the Moscow elites that he was the only reasonable person who could be negotiated in the republic. Prof. Sergey Sergeyev comments on this issue as follows:

⁴⁴⁵ Kondrashov 2000: 177.

⁴⁴⁶ My Interview with Vasil' Sakaev.

⁴⁴⁷ My interview with Vladimir Belyaev.

Shaimiev himself constructed his centrist position. Without the existence of the radical Tatar nationalists Shaimiev would become the most radical nationalist, so he needed a further radical nationalism to position himself as centrist and moderate.⁴⁴⁸

Having rejected the independence declaration, Shaimiev approached the Democrat's former proposal of state-wide referendum in Tatarstan with regard to the issue of sovereignty. Shaimiev had already given a green light to Moscow that he would not declare independence from Russia. He also implied this in the session of the regional parliament.⁴⁴⁹ The Tatar national movement attempted to force the regional nomenklatura last time with the creation of a shadow national parliament, *Milli Meclis*.

At the beginning of 1992, radical wings of the nationalist movement organized all-Tatar Kurultay (Congress). In this congress, nationalists declared the independence of Tatarsan and foundation of *Milli Meclis* (Tatar National Assembly). *Milli Meclis* challenged the legitimacy of Tatarsan Supreme Soviet. Founders of the *Milli Meclis* were coming from the organizations of *Azatlik*, KS, Marjani Society, *STM* and *Ittifak*.⁴⁵⁰ They organized a parallel parliament and attempted to organize the Tatar National Front. Naturally, Shaimiev declared that *Milli Mejlis* is not legal and it is a coup attempt to overthrow the Supreme Soviet. Meanwhile, TOTs attempted to shift the activities of *Milli Mejlis* into a moderate cultural line of politics. On the other hand, *Milli Mejlis* was demanding election of a new president for independent Tatarstan.

The Dual Power attempt of the radical wings of the Nationalist Movement were soon to be rendered null and void by Shaimiev's new tactics. Shaimiev organized World-Tatar congress to break the legitimization of All-Tatar Congress of the *Milli Meclis* supporters. He invited to the World-Tatar Congress even diaspora Tatars outside the Soviet Union in June, 1992. Furthermore, he had already attracted the support of

⁴⁴⁸ My interview with Sergey Sergeyev.

⁴⁴⁹ Kondrashov 2000: 179.

⁴⁵⁰ Gibadullin 1998: 79.

moderate wing of TOTs and pro-Unionist Democratic Opposition in order to conduct a referendum and solve the sovereignty issue of in the republic in March.⁴⁵¹ Hence, the dreams of the radical nationalists to gain the legislative and political power remained a symbolic challenge to the republican elites and in the end evaporated.

The referendum in March 1992, became a disputed issue among three political actors. Moscow also interfered in the situation since it would determine the sovereignty division between Moscow and Kazan. TOTs demanded to vote constitution for Tatarstan in the referendum. The Democrats wanted to ask the issue of secession of RT from Russia. At the end, republican elites brought to some extent a vague question for the referendum. The referendum question was as follows:

Do you agree that Republic of Tatarstan a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the principle of equal treaties?

The Democrats strictly opposed the proposal. According to them, this referendum would increase the power of republican nomenklatura. Furthermore, the relation with Russia was not written clearly. On the other hand, TOTs was not fully satisfied as well. As for TOTs the issue of self-determination of the Tatar nation was not highlighted. At the end, the republican elites did not change the question and campaigned for “Yes” in the referendum. The Position of TOTs was “Not enough but Yes” and the Democrats campaigned for “No”.

The result of referendum was a clear victory for the republican elites. 81.6% of the eligible voters voted in the referendum. This was a very high participation for a post-Soviet entity. 61.4% of the voters voted for Tataristan’s Sovereignty, while 37.2% voted against it. The successor events of the referendum dissatisfied almost all the actors except republican leadership. Republican elites initiated bilateral negotiations with Moscow while they were consolidating nomenklatura ties without a strong rival.

⁴⁵¹ During my interview, when I asked Vladimir Belyaev that at the end Shaimiev implemented similar policies to the demands of the Democratic Opposition, such as: Ideas of two equal languages, negotiations that aims bilateral treaty with Russian Federation, and Referendum for status of Tatarstan. Belyaev replied to me: “Shaimiev realized and implemented these demands, but in a very strange and a distorted form”.

Although Shaimiev did an important mistake through implicitly supporting the putsch, he could secure his position with “Balance Based” tactics.

5.7. The Decline of Ethnic Mobilization and Tatar National Movement

From the summer of 1992, the ethnic tension in the country began to decrease considerably. The Soviet Union had already collapsed and the aim of Tatar nationalists to rise the status of the Tatarstan into the union level status had sunk. The ethno-national nomenklatura remained without any opponents. Furthermore, negotiations with Moscow concerning sovereignty of the country gave the chance to the regional nomenklatura to overshadow political discourses of the Tatar national movement and Democratic Opposition. In fact, during 1992 the relations of Kazan with Moscow were in tension. Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the federal treaty, offered in 1992. Then, Moscow retaliated by cutting the federal budget subsidies for Tatarstan. Shaimiev answered by refusing to send taxes to Moscow.

During 1993, Yeltsin was striving against the Duma opposition. However, Kazan did not intervene in the new political crisis in the center. Yeltsin organized a referendum to enhance his power. Kazan boycotted the referendum again. The rate of voters remained lower than 15% in whole Tatarstan. Tatarstan boycotted the federal election of 1993 via 14% participation as well. Finally, Yeltsin won the very critical political struggle against the Duma Opposition. He shielded the parliament and terminated the parliamentary alternative for Russia's future. Hence, authoritarian presidential regime has dominated the Russian politics since then. After the coup d'état of Yeltsin, the new constitution was voted in a referendum. Tatarstan again urged its citizens not to vote for the new constitution of the Russian Federation.

Most probably Yeltsin's victory cleared the political ambiguity in Russia and motivated the regional elites to reach an agreement with the federal center. In February 1994, Shaimiev declared that they reached an agreement with the federal center to sign the bilateral treaty which would determine the relationship between Tatarstan and

Russia. Actually, from this moment, seriously wounded Tatar national movement quickly marginalized and lost its already weakened public ties.

There are several reasons that I need to highlight regarding the fall of the Tatar nationalist movement. First of all, the ASSR status of the Tatarstan had already framed the future of the nationalist movement. In my opinion, this institutional structure almost closed the separatist alternatives from the Russian Federation. The Tatar national movement in general including the regional nomenklatura had to move under these structural limitations. Indeed, reaching the status of SSR was one alternative to gradually get rid of this structure. The Tatar nationalists and ethno-national nomenklatura pressurized to reach the status of SSR, but the Soviet Union collapsed. After this moment, for the Tatar nationalists only one alternative remained which was to achieve the independent statehood. Hence, ideologically they zoom on the grievances that basically focused on the inequalities between the Tatar and the Russian in terms of urbanization, and education, overrepresentation of the Russians in skillful jobs. The Tatar nationalists accused the Soviet state of Tatars relatively backwardness vis-à-vis Russians. In the era of the political and economic turmoil, this discourse was efficient prompting the ethnic mobilization. The regional nomenklatura implicitly supported this argument as well.

With regard to the decline of the movement, the Tatar nationalists always depended on the regional ethno-nomenklatura. There were few moments that the Tatar nationalist could bypass the ethno-national nomenklatura, but they did not even seriously attempt for it. Hence, the Tatar nationalists gave up the space to Shaimiev to instrumentalize them. I believe that Shaimiev did not constructed the Tatar nationalist movement and he periodically supported them to monopolize his power. In Kazan, he achieved to control the nationalist movement, but in Naberezhnye Chelny, the nationalist movement remained independent.⁴⁵² That's why, the Tatar nationalists were more active and interethnic tension was higher in Chelny. The Tatar nationalist movement's weak position against the ethno-national nomenklatura determined the

⁴⁵² My interview with Rustam Gibadullin.

fate of the non-nomenklatura Tatar nationalism. In the middle of the 1990s, the moderate members of TOTs had already left the organization to the radical nationalists and radical nationalists soon lost all of its public support resembling a discursive club lacking any grassroots. Shaimiev skillfully balanced the Democratic Opposition and Tatar nationalists. As Ishakov points out “Until the 1990s, Shaimiev had a pro-Tatar position. In 1990, he had a centric position and after 1991 he had a pro-Russian position.”⁴⁵³ The Tatar national movement’s weakness and the strength of the ethno-national nomenklatura actually lead us to the structural Soviet nationality policies arguments. The Soviet State’s nationality policy created ethno-national nomenklaturas in the union and autonomous republics. In this occasion, the ethno-national nomenklatura was holding the institutional base, which structurally limited non-nomenklatura national discourses.

Another significant reason for the fall of the Tatar nationalist movement was the neo-liberal transformation in Tatarstan. Although Tatarstan attempted to implement soft transformation to the market economy, the severity of poverty and social destruction seriously affected Tatarstan as well. In the times of severe poverty, people are not interested in politics. In other words, people struggle to survive and become apathetic to the politics.⁴⁵⁴ In the Tatarstan case, the privatization process changed the ownership of the properties. Most of the state firms as well as job alternatives were taken over by the private sector. As Giuliano highlights:

liberalizing economy introduced new trajectories off professional advancement and personal enrichment. With the collapse of Soviet central planning and the more toward a market economy, local labor markets underwent significant change. The number of state jobs dropped and people began to understand that better opportunities would increasingly appear outside of state control.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ My Interview with Damir Ishakov.

⁴⁵⁴ My Interview with Dilyara Murzina.

⁴⁵⁵ Giuliano 286-287 2000.

5.8. Nationality Discourses in the Period of Ethnic Mobilization

Until now, I have attempted to explain the political history in the ethnic mobilization period of 1988-1994. In this section, I will attempt to explain ideological positions of the actors. First of all, the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies formed a structural path for all the actors in the period of rapid transformation. The Soviet Union had already created Tatar ethnic elites and seeded the ethno-national mobilization. The ethnic mobilization level of Tatarstan was one of the highest among the ASSR republics, probably the highest. However, when we compare Tatarstan with Baltic, Caucasian republics and Moldova, the ethnic mobilization level considerably lagged behind. This example shows the importance of state institutions with regard to creating national elites and national consciousness. The union republics were always advantageous in terms of nation building opportunities. For example, the union republics had their separated national theaters, cinemas and opera branches, national sciences of academies, more intensive radio broadcastings in mother tongue, more representation in Moscow, more symbolic powers due to their SSR status. As a result of these conditions, once pioneer of the Russian Muslims, the Tatars, lagged behind Central Asian Muslim nations since the Central Asian SSRs had more opportunities to consolidate their nationhood. During my interviews, one of my questions was about the Tatar elites' national discourses which created grievances with regard to the Soviet past. During the 15 interviews I conducted, nobody considered the grievances created between 1988-1992 as a totally manipulative discourse. Almost everyone coming from three distinct discourses (Ethno-national nomenklatura, Tatar national movement, and Pro-Federalist Democratic Opposition) highlighted the negative effects of the Soviet Union on Tatarstan's development due to lower ASSR status. Hence, nobody thought that the grievances about the Soviet past was a total manipulation.

The radical wings of the Tatar national movement were keen on demonizing the Soviet past. However, moderate members of the Tatar Nationalist movement, ethno-national nomenklatura, and pro-federalist democratic opposition highlighted both the positive and negative dimensions of the Soviet past. Nevertheless, in the period of political turmoil, even the moderate members of the Tatar Nationalist movement and ethno-

national nomenklatura put forward these issues. The ethnic Tatars, anxious of their future and their declining life standard, were allured by the nationalist discourses of the ethno-national nomenklatura and Tatar national movement. The radical wings of TOTs, *Ittifak* and *Azatlik* frequently highlighted the Soviet past as colonization. For *Ittifak* and *Azatlik*, the relatively lower status of Tatars vis-à-vis Russians were due to the Soviet policies. It was this colonial structure that led to the assimilation of Tatar language and culture. Hence, in order to achieve the golden years of the middle ages in which the Tatars had a significant statehood legacy, the Tatars had to depart from the colonial center. In fact, the separation demands of the Tatar nationalists peaked from middle of 1990 to the beginning of 1992. Fauriza Bayramova played an active role in these years. Her ultra nationalist speeches reminded the people Russian ultranationalist Zhirinovsky's speeches. While Bayramova publicly stated that she was opposed to the mixed marriages between Tatars and Russian, Zhirinovsky offered to deport all Tatars to Mongolia. Indeed, Bayramova and Zhirinovsky's similar discourses revealed an important point regarding the evaluation of the minority nationalism. Even if minority national discourses have positive tendencies in terms of equality demands of the minorities, there is always a discriminatory core of minority nationalisms in which the superiority and particularity of a specific minority nation is highlighted and idealized similar to the majority nationalisms. In this context, this discriminatory core always created the danger of interethnic confrontation. In the Tatarstan case, the relationships between the Tatar national movement and ethno-national nomenklatura was always remained vague. Among different ideologies during my interviews I encountered with the comments that refer to the top down construction possibility of radical Tatar nationalism. In other words, the idea that "Shaimiev allowed the visibility of radical wings of the national movement himself" was a powerful argument shared by different ethnic backgrounds and political views.⁴⁵⁶ In my opinion, Shaimiev led an elite survival strategy and he skillfully instrumentalized Tatar nationalism in order to protect and consolidate his power position. That's why, he positioned himself as a reasonable actor who can balance the

⁴⁵⁶ My interviews with Sergey Sergeev, Vladimir Belyaev, Timur Valiahkmetov, Dilyara Murzina.

poles of Russian and Tatar nationalism. At this point, I can argue that the Tatar national movement was a product of structural paths of the Soviet nation building legacy, which wake up in the compressed transformative years of Perestroika. However, Shaimiev skillfully supported and held the Tatar national movement under his control. The visibility of radical nationalist *Ittifak* leader, F. Bayramova, for example could be supported by the arguments which claim that Shaimiev's creation of radical nationalism aimed to divide the Tatar national movement. The division of TOTs under two moderate and radical lines also gave Shaimiev the opportunity to delegitimize the moderate wings. Since a probable national elite would emerge from the moderate lines of the Tatar national movement, Shaimiev managed in advance to terminate the rival alternatives by skillfully using his ethno-national nomenklatura power. In fact, the ethno-national nomenklatura power was also a product of the Soviet nationality policies' creation of ethnic leaders in the republics which were particularly consolidated in the Brezhnev era.

Taking into account the grievances during Perestroika, the ethno-national nomenklatura and Tatar national movement manipulated this issue. Due to the lack of trust for their future people became more attracted to the demands of the Tatar national movement. Hence, the grievances were shaped along the lines of ethnic distribution of the workforce, underdeveloped status of Tatar language and the ongoing bad economic conditions. Simply, the Tatars were struggling with the difficulties of the Russian dominated established order. However, their focus on the negative impacts of the Soviet past overshadowed the positive impacts of the Soviet modernization, particularly in education, health, social security, urbanization levels, secularism, arts and sport. The Tatar nationalist movement and the ethno-national nomenklatura simply ignored the positive aspects of the Soviet legacy.

With regard to the popular support, Shaimiev's position was similar to the common public opinion in Tatarstan. The regional elites were closer to the society than the nationalist actors. During the 1990s, regional power was more legitimate and powerful than the Federal center.⁴⁵⁷ Hence, Shaimiev's strategy which aimed to take more power

⁴⁵⁷ My interview with Dilyara Murzina.

from the center and to create asymmetrical federalism seemed to be skillfully consolidated by the ethno-national nomenklatura network of Shaimiev.

The Federalist Democratic Opposition had a heterogeneous multi-ethnic movement as I have already mentioned. The Democratic Opposition initially supported the environmental concerns and the rearrangement of the status level of the republic together with Tatar nationalists. A significant portion of urban Tatars were supporting the movement which could hardly be named as a Russian movement. In this context, they were multiethnic, but they supported the rights of Tatars taking into account individual-liberal democratic principles. As for ideological considerations, the democrats in Russia were different from the federal center. As V. Belyaev points out, *Soglasie* had social democrat and socialist members in the organization. Various ideological views for the economic transformation existed among the democrats of Tatarstan as well. As Belyaev states:

The liberals in Tatarstan were different from the liberals of Moscow. Our liberals were social liberals, Shitanin and others. We had a proposal of redistribution of oil for social policy. We criticized economic policy of Yeltsin. We were critical. *Soglasie* complained about many policies of Yeltsin, but our movement did not aim to create a main model.⁴⁵⁸

The Democratic Opposition constructed an antagonistic discourse: Nomenklatura versus the People. The regional nomenklatura involves state elites, nationalists and (new) communists. According to this discourse, the democratic opposition was the representatives of the people.⁴⁵⁹ The democrats supported a democratic federalism and they were harshly opposing the separation possibility of Tatarstan from the RF. Since, they were pro-unionist with Russia during the period of ethnic mobilization, Democratic Opposition had some Russian nationalist wings such as, Slavic club. However, according to Belyaev, Slavic Club was a very moderate nationalist organization.

⁴⁵⁸ My interview with Vladimir Belyaev.

⁴⁵⁹ My interviews with V. Belyaev and S. Sergeyev, for a further discussion see, Salagaev-Sergeev-Luchsheva 2011: 211-224.

As for the ideology of Tatar nationalists, the moderate nationalist democratic position of TOTs should be evaluated. Initially, TOTs was not a radical nationalist organization. Moderate democratic nationalist views ideologically dominated TOTs. Up to the Coup attempt, the moderate nationalist democrats shaped the overwhelming tendency of TOTs. TOTs shared the ideas of the democratic opposition in terms of liberal principles. While Democratic Opposition was focusing only the liberal principles, TOTs was emphasizing affirmative action policies for Tatar culture and language. TOTs thought that individual libertarian perspectives were not enough to solve the nationality question. The Tatars were a nation and a group that demanded to protect and consolidate their culture and language. As for TOTs, the democratic liberties had to be conceived taking into account 'group rights' on behalf of Tatar nation. When the political turmoil deepened after the coup attempt in 1991 even the moderate nationalists dreamed to achieve an independent statehood. However, the weak position of TOTs against the ethno-national nomenklatura was destined to die. Soon after, the February Treaty, the moderate nationalists retreated from the political issues and focused on the cultural development of Tatar nation. Nevertheless, the radical wings continued functioning under the umbrella of TOTs. However, after the middle of 1990s, the radical nationalists were also highly marginalized and vaporized. With respect to the ideology, the Tatar nationalists focused on the issue of the statehood, together with creating grievances. The Tatars had a strong independent statehood tradition, such as Bulgar and Kazan Khanates, which were very influential states in the middle ages. Hence, they had a right to have an independent state in the modern era as well. In other words, construction of grievances and nostalgia of Tatar statehood were the main pillars of the Tatar nationalist discourse.

To conclude, in the middle of the 1980s the Soviet Union began to face various problems concerning economy, politics and international relations. The established order was ideologically in serious crisis. M. Gorbachev came to power under this stagnation period of the established order. His radical reforms to strengthen the Soviet State, Glasnost and Perestroika, backfired. Between 1988-1992, the crisis deepened and the Soviet Union collapsed. As I mentioned before, there were various reasons for the collapse of the Soviet State. Among these reasons, the ethno-national mobilization

had a significant place. The Soviet Union disintegrated along ethno-national lines. The national mobilization was a special event which delivered the final blow to the Soviet State. Tatar ethnic mobilization emerged within these turmoil years. Although the ethno-national mobilization level of Tatarstan was not among the highest if the union republics are taken into account, Tatarstan was considered the most nationalist republic among ASSRs in the RFSSR. The ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan remained under the patterns of the historical institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality policies. Initially, TOTs and ethno-national nomenklatura around Shaimiev followed the already opened ethnic mobilization path by the Baltic nations. However, the demands were different from them, such as achieving the SSR status. In fact, the infant elements of the pro-unionist multiethnic Democratic Opposition supported the demand to rise the status of Tatarstan together with regional elites and the Tatar nationalist movement. The environmental concerns were shared by the three actors as well. However, the deepening crisis in the federal center opened a new phase of rivalry among these three actors starting from the 1990s. The interethnic tension and polarization of the society increased on the wake of the collapse of the Soviet state. The Tatar nationalists' independent state demands skillfully instrumentalized by the ethno-national nomenklatura. By doing so, Shaimiev consolidated his elite rule and took concessions from the federal center to build post-soviet Tatarstan's asymmetrical federal status. After the relationship between Moscow and Kazan established through a bilateral treaty in 1994, the already declined Tatar national movement became extinct. Shaimiev did not need them at all in the middle of 1990s. The winner of the rise and decline of the ethnic mobilization period was the ethno-national nomenklatura. However, their construction of asymmetrical sovereignty throughout 1990s would be shrunk throughout 2000s. I will attempt to open up these issues concerning rise and decline of the sovereignty of post-Soviet Tatarstan in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN TATARSTAN

A prince should be a fox, to know the traps and snares; and a lion, to be able to frighten wolves.

*Machieveli*⁴⁶⁰

Russians are poor people living in a rich state.

*Vladimir Putin*⁴⁶¹

The concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty were intertwined starting from the end of the Soviet era. In the previous chapter, I focused on the dynamics of the rise and decline of the ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan between 1988 and 1994. With regard to the dynamics of the rise and decline of sovereignty concept regarding the Tatarstan case, I will follow a macro chronological perspective since the issues of sovereignty, regionalism and federalism are continuing and living processes that can be explained better focusing on the long term processes. Hence, I will take into account approximately the last 25 years of Russia and Tatarstan to understand the dynamics of the rise and decline of sovereignty of Tatarstan. As for the rise of sovereignty, I will initially focus on the Yeltsin period (1990-2000). The Yeltsin period was significant since the Russian state, due to its low power, could not intervene in the regions with its traditional centralist habits. During the 1990s, autonomous subjects of the Russian Federation found enough space to enhance their sovereignty claims. Among the autonomous subjects, Tatarstan was the pioneer due to its high regional state capacity. In the Yeltsin period, in fact, Russia was close to establishing a western type

⁴⁶⁰ Niccolo Machiavelli, (2005) *The Prince*, San Diego, Icon Classics, p. 91-92.

⁴⁶¹ Vladimir Putin, inaugural speech, May 6, 2000, RFE/RL (online edition).

democratic federal system. However, this opportunity was lost by the non-democratic nature of both the federal center and the ethno-national nomenklatura. Putin came to power in the millennium and his long tenure consolidated sui generis Russian federalism. Due to the positive economic developments, the Russian state regained its state capacity in the Putin era. Hence, 15 years of Putin regime (2000-2015) reversed the centrifugal tendencies of the Yeltsin period dramatically.

In this chapter, I will focus on the dynamics of the sovereignty in Tatarstan taking into account the policies of the state elites of both Moscow and Kazan in the period of Yeltsin and Putin. The “state capacity” concept will provide theoretical tools to pursue the dynamics of the rise and decline of sovereignty in Tatarstan. The republican state elites played an important role in the period of sovereignty similar to the compacted period of ethnic mobilization. Especially, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura instrumentalized nationality discourses and the concept of sovereignty to justify their nomenklatura style elite leadership. The ethno-national nomenklatura skillfully instrumentalized radical Tatar nationalism to present themselves as reasonable actors to Moscow. The weakened federal center gave the opportunity to transform the state assets from Moscow to the control of the Tatar nomenklatura at the beginning of the 1990s. In addition, the privatization process in Tatarstan, which was started in the middle of the 1990s, caused the oligarchical style enrichment of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura. In the Putin period, however, the resurgent Russia gradually took back the sovereignty concessions which were given in the Yeltsin period. However, the Tatar state elites quickly adopted the centralization policies and vertical power of Putin not to lose their self-interests and privileges. Hence, the popular motto of sovereignty began to be forgotten during the 2000s.

In this chapter, firstly, I will focus on the concept of state sovereignty. Then, I will explain the Russian case and Tatarstan’s autonomous position in the period of weakened Russia during the 1990s. As for the Putin period, I will examine the political change in the federal center in the period of enhanced state capacity. Finally, I will attempt to analyze Tatarstan’s reactions to the ongoing overcentralization policies of

the federal center taking into account the flexible, pragmatic behaviors of the Tatar state elites to hold their elite positions and power in the post-Soviet era.

6.1. The Concept of State Capacity to Understand Post-Soviet Federalism in Russia


The concept of ‘state capacity’ is a controversial concept. In fact, measuring the strength of states on its own is controversial, but some parameters such as Human Development Index, GDP per capita, Crime Index, Democracy Index, Bureaucracy and Corruption Index give significant clues about the capabilities of states. One-dimensional, reduced state capacity studies are not enough to account for the issue. For example, the hypothesis that democratic states are more powerful than the authoritarian ones can be falsified by the governance capacity of the authoritarian states, such as China, Russia and Iran. That is why, considering the degree of governance instead of regime types can be more reliable.⁴⁶² Taking into account ethnic conflicts, the concept of state capacity is frequently used particularly in the fields of theories of traditional international relations and security studies. Other than multi-thematic state capacity indices, the social scientific literature also highlights five distinct understandings of the strong-weak state dimension. These are centralization, wealth, professional and autonomous bureaucracy, relative lack of institutional constraints and quality and quantity of military assets.⁴⁶³ Furthermore, as Migdal argues, which I emphasized in the second chapter, state capacity refers to ability in penetrating society, regulating social relationships, extracting resources, and appropriating resources or using resources in determined ways.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶² Francis Fukuyama, (2013) “What is Governance?.” *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 347–368.

⁴⁶³ Mathew Adam Kocher, (2010) “State Capacity as a Conceptual Variable.” *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. Spring/Summer, pp. 137-145.

⁴⁶⁴ Joel S. Migdal, (1988) *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 4-5.

With regard to the state capacity of Russia, the period of Yeltsin and Putin should be distinguished. During the 1990s, Yeltsin had to face with the difficulties of state building in comparison with the state destruction as he did to destroy the Soviet state. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Human Development Index revealed that 33 percent of the citizens in the Russian federation were living in poverty, which was also supported by Putin's words as: "Russians are poor people living in a rich state"⁴⁶⁵ The transition of post-Soviet Russia, in this context, resulted in failure and vast poverty among Russian people. In the first year of the transition into market economy in 1992, the Russian GDP declined by 14.5 percent and the economy continued to contract until 1997, when a modest economic growth was finally achieved. However, Asian Economic Crisis hit the Russian economy again one year later. The steady economic growth could only be initiated in 1999.⁴⁶⁶ The rise of oil prices substantially financed the economic boom starting from 2000 until the economic crisis of 2014-2015. In Graph 6.1, the GDP per capita plot shows the periods of expansion and contraction of the Russian economy.



Graph 6.1. *The GDP Per Capita of the Russian Federation*

Source: UNDP Russian Report (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/RUS>)

⁴⁶⁵ Vladimir Putin, inaugural speech, May 6, 2000, RFE/RL (online edition)

⁴⁶⁶ Camilla Corr online opinion at <https://www.fundstrategy.co.uk/issues/online-december-2011/fools-russia-in/>

The change in the financial capabilities of the Russian state significantly influenced the relations of the center with the provinces. The weakened status of the central government encouraged regional powers and autonomous republics to take more concessions from the center, particularly from the oil rich strong republics. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha benefitted from the weakened position of Moscow. The weakened Russian state sought unity via asymmetrical federalist policies. In other words, the Russian state implemented treaty based politics with its subjects, which would cause hyper federalism or ultra-asymmetry, and this process is almost similar to confederation style relations between Moscow and the regions. Hence, the rule of law inside Russia began to be a disputed issue. In contrast to the USSR, the Russian state turned into a weak state regarding the penetration capabilities of state into society. At this point, as Polanyi argues, even a minimalist state needs to be strong enough in key aspects of markets such as keeping transaction costs low, ensuring the free flow of goods, enforcing contracts, and protecting property rights and preserving and protecting civil and political rights of its citizenry.⁴⁶⁷ Yeltsin's Russian was far behind the variables that Polanyi emphasized concerning the operational capabilities of the state apparatus. Concurrently, Yeltsin era treaty-based relations with the subjects created immense regional inequalities. In the judicial context, republican constitutions and bilateral agreements contained a lot of contradictions. Russia seemed to be moved away from the unified legal policy during the 1990s. Likewise, the autonomous republican leaders empowered themselves so much that it hindered the implementation of a unified and symmetrical economic policy in the federation scale. The republican leaders were highly enriched similar to their counterparts in the federal center thanks to entering into market economy. The continuity of the nomenklatura structure in the post-Soviet era caused the immense enrichment of the ethno-national nomenklaturas in the autonomous units of Russia.

⁴⁶⁷ Karl Polanyi, (1944) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, New York: Farrar and Rhinehart; cited in Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, (2006) *Resisting The State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia*, the USA, Cambridge University Press.

Starting from the initial years of the 2000s, Putin developed two discourses concerning the regional policy, namely, ‘Vertical Power’ and ‘Dictatorship of Law’. Economic development and enlargement of federal reserves provided resources for Putin to implement centralization policies. After the Beslan Massacre in 2004, overcentralization in Russia was strengthened. Hence, the problematic federalism in the Yeltsin era, which had potentials to be a western-type federalism per se disappeared. As Indus Tagirov points out, currently in Putin’s Russia, the federal structure of the Russian Federation has become similar to the structure of Soviet federalism.⁴⁶⁸ In other words, *politically Moscow’s strict control, but culturally autonomy of the republics* determine the features of Russian federalism pretty much the same as in the Soviet Union. At this point, if I refer to Michael Mann’s distinction of despotic and infrastructural powers of states in the Russian context, I can claim that the established order in the Russian state was constructed more on despotic power rather than infrastructural power which has many fragilities to control the civil society. Currently, the Russian state can curtain its lack of infrastructural power via informal networks with the state elites of the republics, which depends on mutual exploitation of federal and republican resources. This *artificial balance* can crumble if the federal center faces with problems related to economy and the level of allocation of the money to the republics from the federal budget.

In the following section, I will attempt to concretize the above-mentioned conceptual framework in the Tatarstan case. In other words, I will take into account the decrease in the Russian state capacity from the end of the Soviet state and throughout the 1990s to account for the rise of sovereignty in Tatarstan.

⁴⁶⁸My Interview with Indus Tagirov.

6.2. The Rise of Sovereignty in Tatarstan in the Era of ‘Parade of Sovereignties’

At the end of the Soviet Union, the national grievances began to challenge the ethnically organized Soviet federalism. The politically controlled centralized structure of Soviet federalism had already created “institutionalized monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity”.⁴⁶⁹ The liberal political atmosphere of Glasnost and Perestroika opened the path of the elevation of nationalist sentiment throughout the Soviet Union. As I already discussed, the institutionally ethno-codified federal structure of the Soviet State turned into the institutional vessels of nationalist mobilizations. The nationality issue and federal reform came to Gorbachev’s political agenda too late to secure the Soviet State. In 1989, Gorbachev admitted that the sovereignty of republics was symbolic and formal in nature. Gorbachev added that “Up to now, our state has existed a centralized and unitary state and none of us has yet the experience of living in a federation.”⁴⁷⁰ Meanwhile, national movements began to demand for greater economic and cultural autonomy. Outside the Politburo, discourses of nationalist movements such as *Suverennitet*, *Federalizatsiya* and *Pravovogo Gosudarstvo* (law-governed state) became very popular.⁴⁷¹

After Yeltsin had gained the chair of Russian Parliament (RSFSR) in April 1990, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was triggered. In June 1990, Russia made a declaration of sovereignty. The declaration basically proclaimed “full power of the RSFSR in decisions on all questions of state and public life...the priority of RSFSR’s Constitutions on Laws on the entire territory of the RSFSR, the exclusive right of the people to ownership, use and disposal of the national riches of Russia, and the right of free exit from the USSR.”⁴⁷² Yeltsin continued to undermine the Soviet Union and

⁴⁶⁹ Philip G. Roeder, (1991) “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization.” *World Politics*, 43/2 (1991), 205.

⁴⁷⁰ Gorbachev cited in Cameron Ross, (2002) *Federalism and democratization in Russia*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, p. 17.

⁴⁷¹ Jeff Kahn (2008) “What is the New Russian Federalism.” In *Contemporary Russian Politics: a reader*, Archie Brown, ed., pp. 374-384, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷² Ross 2002: 19.

Gorbachev by supporting the centrifugal demands of the autonomous republics. His famous statement “Take as much sovereignty as you could swallow” initiated a parade of sovereignties among ASSRs. As Yeltsin added further, “If this meant full independence from Russia your decision will be final”. Concurrently, ASSRs merited the invitation and unilaterally declared their sovereignties. By the end of 1990, almost all the ASSRs in the Soviet Union declared independence from their SSRs.⁴⁷³ Table 6.1 reveals the date of the declarations of sovereignty of all the autonomous units of the Soviet State.

Table 6.1. Republic Date of Declaration of Sovereignty

REPUBLIC	Date of Declaration of Sovereignty
North Osetiya-Alaniia	July 20, 1990
Kareliia	August 9, 1990
Khakassia	August 15, 1990
Komi	August 29, 1990
Tatarstan	August 30, 1990
Udmurtia	September 20, 1990
Sakha (Yakutiia)	September 27, 1990
Buriatiia	October 8, 1990
Bashkortostan	October 11, 1990
Kalmykiia	October 18, 1990
Marii El	October 22, 1990
Chuvashiia	October 24, 1990
Gorno-Altai	October 25, 1990
Tuva	November 1, 1990
Karachai-Cherkessia	November 17, 1990
Chechno-Ingushetiia	November 27, 1990
Mordova	December 8, 1990
Kabarno-Balkariia	January 31, 1991
Dagestan	May 15, 1991

⁴⁷³ Ibid. 21.

Table 6.1. (continued)

Adygeia	July 2, 1991
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Source: Jeff Kahn, 'The parade of sovereignties: establishing the vocabulary of the new Russian federalism', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 16:1 (2000), 62.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union opened the space to consider several recommendations about the federal structure of Russia. If I omit the ultra-nationalist unitary state proposals of Zhirinovskiy and other fascists, the draft constitution of 1991 envisaged a proper alternative for federal relations. The draft envisaged a federal structure with weak states. In this proposal, Russia would convert nationality-based republics into territorially-based lands (*Zemliia*), which would give the same status and rights to the national republics and territorial units. The autonomous republics harshly criticized and rejected this proposal since they would lose most of their ethnic privileges under this scheme.⁴⁷⁴

From October 1991 to October 1993, Russian presidency and government competed for power against the Russian parliament, which could be described as a civil war. For this reason, for two years, the federal center was paralyzed. The dual power was finally abolished by Yeltsin's coup against the parliament. In fact, the republics instrumentalized the weak state capacity of Russia very skillfully to their advantage. For example, in 1991, almost 80 percent of industrial output in Tatarstan was produced by enterprises under the command of central economic bodies, but by 1993, 70 percent of these enterprises had been transferred to Tatarstan's own jurisdiction.⁴⁷⁵

During this lowest state capacity period of Moscow, a federal treaty was signed with the republics in 1992. In 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation incorporated a slightly modified version of the Federal Treaty, 1992.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁴ Catherine Danks (2009) *Politics Russia*, the USA, Routledge, p. 175.

⁴⁷⁵ Ross 2002: 22.

⁴⁷⁶ Dansk 2009: 175.

6.2.1. The Federal Treaty and The Russian Constitution

The federal treaty, which was adopted in March 1992, created asymmetrical federalism in Russia. There were two main criticisms among public against the federal treaty. One of them was that the treaty granted many concessions to the autonomous republics. Concurrently, these concessions engendered grievances among non-ethnic regions. The second criticism was about the ultra-federative structure of the treaty. However, the proponents of the treaty perceived the treaty as an achievement as it unified Russia in the weak period of central state capacity. The federal treaty divided Russia into three federal administrative units in which different rights and powers were possessed. Taking into account the size of administrative capacity, the treaty envisaged three layers of administrative structure, namely, the national-state formation (sovereign republics), the administrative-territorial formations (krais, oblasts and autonomous cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg), and the national-territorial formations (autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs)⁴⁷⁷

The autonomous republics gained significant rights, which caused some criticisms that claim “Russian Federalism had turned into confederalism”. The autonomous republics were recognized as sovereign states with the right of national self-determination. They were granted the usage of natural resources and ownership of their land. The republics gained the right to elect their presidents and to impose their own citizenship jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Federal Treaty of 1992 gave the republics the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries bypassing Moscow to create bilateral economic relations. The regions, on the other hand, were not allowed to form bilateral relations with foreign countries and the ownership of local natural resources was not granted to them. Apart from Tatarstan and Chechnya, all the autonomous republics signed the federal treaty. Bashkortostan and Sakha signed the treaty with some reservations. Moscow granted them additional concessions with regard to federal tax and independent judicial system.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., 24-25.

The unfortunate regions, which demanded to have same rights with the ethnic republics, protested the asymmetrical concessions and they stopped or reduced paying taxes to Moscow. Some regions even attempted to create their regional republics to get the same federative rights with the ethnic republics. Among the daring regions, the most powerful one was Sverdlovsk Oblast. Oblast made a referendum for the creation of Ural Republic in April, 1993. 84 percent of the regional population supported the creation of Ural Republic. Similarly, there were regional republic proposals in Arkhangelsk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk and Saint Petersburg.⁴⁷⁹ Moscow, to some extent, revised the Federal treaty in the RT constitution of 1993. Nevertheless, the asymmetrical status of the regions and their wealthy provincial nomenklaturas remained to control their autonomous units economically and politically.

6.3. Tatarstan's Sovereignty Project Until the Bilateral Agreement in 1994

As I have discussed earlier, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the elites of Tatarstan pursued a path to increase the status of the republic to the Union Republic level. Hence, the elites of Tatarstan mimicked the model of Baltic sovereignty movements. However, the state elites never dared to claim maximalist sovereignty or independence from Moscow. This path of sovereignty conceptualization continued in the post-Soviet period as well. That is why, Tatarsan and Chechnya's refusal of the adoption of the Federal treaty and the draft constitution of RT in 1993 were different in essence. In the case of Chechnya, informal networks between the Chechen elites and the Federal elites almost did not exist. However, in the case of Tatarstan, there were strong informal and formal ties between Moscow and Kazan. The state elites of Tatarstan were always pragmatic and flexible to gain maximum concession from Moscow by never thinking of cutting the relations with Russia. The ambiguity of the demands of the Tatar elites can be accounted for with this framework. Tatar elites always attempted to push the center and when they passed red lines of the federal

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

center, they immediately retreated and showed the federal center that they were ready to compromise.

With regard to the sovereignty of Tatarstan, the referendum in March 1992 was an important step to reach high-level sovereignty. In this referendum, as I mentioned earlier, state elites won a clear victory, achieving 60 percent affirmative votes in a high turnout election of 81.5 percent. The citizens of Tatarstan approved the claim that “Tatarstan is a sovereign state and subject of international law”. Furthermore, as a sovereign state, Tatarstan should be considered “a subject of international law whose relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states should be formed on the basis of bilateral agreements”. In normal conditions, these statements can be understood as a declaration of independence, but the state elites of Tatarstan immediately specified that Tatarstan’s approval of statehood and bilateral treaty did not indicate secession from Russia. On the contrary, it was an indication of treaty-based autonomy relations with Russia.⁴⁸⁰ In fact, the maximum demands of the Tatar elites regarding sovereignty were influenced by the Porto Rico model. Rafael Khakimov coined this proposal. Similar to the relationship of Porto Rico with the USA, Tatarstan and Russian Federation were expected to organize an associate state partnership based on one of the significant ideologues of the Tatar national movement.⁴⁸¹

On November 6, 1992, Tatarstan Supreme Soviet adopted the Constitution of Republic of Tatarstan. The constitution was loyal to the ‘Sovereignty Referendum’ and the word Russia was only two times mentioned in the constitution, which prompted criticisms in the federal center. Article 1 and 61 of the constitution unambiguously stated that “The republic is a sovereign state and subject of the international law”. Article 61 also approved that Tatarstan is associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of treaty of mutually delegated authorities and powers. The constitution admitted that all the

⁴⁸⁰ Graney, 2009: 33-34.

⁴⁸¹ Rafael Khakimov, (1996) *Belaya Kniga: Put' k Suverenitetu, 1990-1995*, Kazan, Institut Istorii i Akademik Nauk Tatarstana, and My interview with administrative members of Tatar Youth Organization, Tatar Youth Center, Kazan, 04.10.2016.

citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan simultaneously possess citizenship of the Russian Federation.⁴⁸²

Having refused to sign the Federal treaty, Tatarstan boycotted RT constitution referendum in 1993. The Constitution proposal asserted the supremacy of the federal laws over republic's laws and contained the norms of privileged individual rights over minority rights, which contradicts with the sovereignty project of Tatarstan. The unofficial boycott of the republican elites dropped the constitution null and void in Tatarstan by 23 percent low turnout participation in the referendum. On the other hand, the constitution was adopted entirely in Russia, which was the sign of the end of the internal war in the federal center. Hence, both sides, the federal and especially the Tatar elites, came to be ready to end the uncertainties of the recent four years.

6.3.1. The Bilateral Agreements and the Treaty of February, 1994

After the failed constitutional referendum in February 1994, the federal center and Tatarstan agreed to sign a treaty which determines the relationship between Kazan and Moscow. In fact, the February Treaty was not the beginning of the negotiations. Both parties were in touch and progressing the negotiations and finally signed agreements (*soglasie*) in various fields.⁴⁸³ The February Treaty legalized, constitutionalized and shaped the de facto established ties between Kazan and Moscow. As Rafael Khakimov points out, “Since the 1993 constitution referendum of RF (Russian Federation) failed in Tatarstan there was not a constitutional relationship between Tatarstan and Russia. Hence, the treaty solved the constitutional problem between two parties. Tatarstan approved the constitution of the Russian Federation via the February Treaty.”⁴⁸⁴

The February Treaty, namely, “Treaty Between the Russian Federation and The Republic Of Tatarstan On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects And Mutual

⁴⁸² Graney 2009: 36.

⁴⁸³ See the agreements, (*soglasie*), between Kazan and Moscow during 1990-1994 in Khakimov (1996).

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

Delegation Of Powers Between The State Bodies Of The Russian Federation And The State Bodies Of The Republic Of Tatarstan,” covered mainly five issues between Moscow and Kazan. These issues were foreign trade; monetary, credit and foreign currency policy; budgetary interactions between the governments of Russia and Tatarstan; law enforcement, and the military sphere.⁴⁸⁵

The treaty was divided into three categories in terms of political and administrative authority. The first part was reserved solely for Republic of Tatarstan, The second part was reserved for the joint sphere of Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, and the last part described the authority sphere which solely gave the jurisdiction to the Russian Federation.⁴⁸⁶ In the treaty, Tatarstan was described as “associated state with Russian Federation according to the constitution of Russian federation, Republic of Tatarstan and this treaty”. Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the treaty gave substantial autonomy to Tatarstan regarding intra-state and inter-state economic and administrative relations. For example, article 11 proclaims that Tatarstan participates in international affairs; establishes relations with foreign states and concludes relevant agreements not contradicting with the Constitution and international obligations of RT, RT and Present Treaty; and participates in the activity of corresponding international organizations. Likewise, article 13 declares that Tatarstan conducts foreign economic activity independently.⁴⁸⁷ The issues of military, transportation and federal legal responsibilities were, to a large extent, given to the federal center. It was obvious that Tatarstan gained significant asymmetrical federal autonomy through this treaty. Taking into account the budgetary tax interaction, Tatarstan would pay 13 percent profit tax to the federal budget, 1 percent income tax from individuals, and VAT (Value added Tax) would be determined by yearly agreements between the ministries of finances of Tatarstan and Russian Federation.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁵ Shaykhutdinov 2007: 129.

⁴⁸⁶ See, the February Treaty in Appendix B.

⁴⁸⁷ See, Appendix B.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

The treaty and the other associated separated agreements (*soglasie*) between the federal center and Tatarstan attempted to cover most of the economic and administrative details. For example, the agreement on monetary, credit and foreign currency policy prescribed that the Central Bank of Russia would conduct the emission of cash money after consulting the Tatarstani cabinet; and the National Bank of Tatarstan could differentiate credit rates between certain commercial banks provided that on average it would agree with the accounting rate of the Russian Central Bank.⁴⁸⁹

The treaty of February, on the one hand, stabilized the amorphous relation between Russia and Tatarstan, while creating new constitutional contradictions. By the time of the February treaty, there were already four legal documents: Sovereignty Declaration of Tatarstan in 1990, the 1992 Federal Treaty, the 1992 Constitution of Tatarstan, and the 1993 Russian Constitution.⁴⁹⁰ The fifth one, the 1994 February treaty, was a result of a bilateral agreement, and in this sense, it was special. However, the February treaty had a contradictory nature per se. For instance, Article 2 of the treaty proclaims that Tatarstan is supposed to be solely responsible for all questions of jurisprudence on its territory, whilst Article 4 highlights that the Russian Federation is solely responsible for the judicial system. Likewise, determination of pricing policy, management and mobilization of military industrial complex, and administration of power, transport, communication and information systems are given both under the joint administration by two states and the sole administration of the Russian Federation.⁴⁹¹

The vagueness of the February Treaty and its associated special agreements turned into another constitutional contradictory issue. Implementation of the agreement revealed very dissimilar interpretations of the Federal Treaty and agreements between two parties. The federal center was interpreting the articles in favor of itself. Likewise, Tatarstan always had a tendency to enlarge the grey zones in favor of its sovereignty projection. That is why, the February treaty was fraught with contradictions. The most

⁴⁸⁹ Shaykhutdinov 2007: 129 translated and cited from Khakimov's *Belaya Kniga* for the details of the agreements, see Khakimov (1996).

⁴⁹⁰ Graney 2009: 39.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

significant contradictions between the federal constitution and the February treaty appeared in the sections of exclusive competences of Tatarstan and joint partnership sphere. The federal constitution lists some of the issues as joint, but the February treaty gives the authority merely to Tatarstan concerning these debated issues. The conflicted issues were generally on economic issues, intergovernmental agreements, independent foreign economic relations, conversion of state enterprises and the creation of a national bank.⁴⁹² Despite the fact that the federal constitution creates hierarchy between the federal and regional law in the joint action areas, the February treaty did not allow a hierarchy. In the case of the conflict, the treaty consults bilateral negotiations and agreements to solve the problematic issues.⁴⁹³

The treaty, which was signed in Tatar and Russian languages, was valid for a five-year period and it was renewed in 1999 as expected. The unilateral abolishment of the treaty was prohibited and no termination date was emphasized for the treaty. However, the Law on Division of Powers in 2003 rendered the treaty invalid similar to all other treaties between the center and regions which were null and void unless approved by both regional and federal parliaments by July 2005.⁴⁹⁴ In fact, yearly renewal of the exclusive budgetary issues of Tatarstan and the federal center were abolished when Putin came to power in 2000. Tatarstan had to accept the joint federal budgetary system and make a farewell to its exclusive autonomy in exchange for extra financial subsidies for Tatarstan's economic losses.⁴⁹⁵

The February Treaty in 1994 revealed significant debates on the concept of federalism in general and Russia's federal structure in particular. Academicians such as Kahn, Stoner-Weiss and Ross highlight the negative impacts of the February Treaty in terms of increasing constitutional contradictions and asymmetries in the Russian Federation. These academics have pessimistic viewpoints, and they argue that Tatarstan's

⁴⁹² Cashabak 2007: 53.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid. 58.

stubbornness consolidated contradictions and asymmetries and harmed the federal stability in Russia. On the other hand, optimistic academics, such as Graney and Cashaback, highlight the bilateral negotiations as a sine qua non precondition for a real democratic federalism. Furthermore, as Cashaback argues, by the year 1994, the relations between Moscow and Kazan were already vague and the sceptics of the treaty overlook the reasons behind the legal dissonance and significant potential of the accommodation role of the treaty. I agree with the argument of Cashaback that “dangerous precedent in Russia-Tatarstan relations is not the bilateral treaty per se, but the lack of correspondence between their constitutions.” I believe that the bilateral treaty accommodated most of the grey zones between Russia and Tatarstan, just like the creation of many contradictions. However, the main problem which was overlooked by the two sides was the non-democratic political traditions of Moscow and Kazan. In my opinion, asymmetrical federation or increasing asymmetry or even confederation is not a problem per se. On the contrary, they can better accommodate sharply distinct societies just like in the cases of asymmetries of Quebec, Northern Ireland, Basque, Catalonia and North Tyrol. However, in the case of Tatarstan, the increasing asymmetry consolidated enrichment of the regional state elites. In other words, regional nomenklatura did not distribute wealth and resources, which were gained as concessions from Moscow, to the people. On the contrary, they used this for their nomenklatura network consolidation and wealth. Hence, the asymmetry could not affect the life of ordinary people much since the same authoritarian nomenklatura continuity was shared by Moscow and Kazan. That is why, most of the potentials of the federal asymmetry for Tatarstan were wasted by the authoritarian tradition of the Shaimiev network, which acts in the same way as the authoritarian Moscow elites.

6.4. Sovereignty and Federalism in Tatarstan in the Period of ‘Parade of Treaties’

Yeltsin, in the first term of his tenure, signed 46 bilateral treaties with the regions. Hence, treaty-based constitution was the main federal strategy of Yeltsin on the wake of his second term. Yeltsin instrumentalized the bilateral treaties by buying loyalties of the regional elites. As Graney points out, his strategy was similar to his supportive

political agenda for regions at the end of the Soviet State. As soon as he achieved his goal he gave up the 'pro-regionalist policy' and attempted to strengthen the influence of the federal center. In his second term, he implemented the same instrumentalist elite survival strategy. From 1996 onwards, Yeltsin demanded harmonization of the bilateral treaties with the federal constitution.⁴⁹⁶ The Constitutional court of the RT, Duma and Yeltsin pressured the republics to revise their constitutions in line with the constitution of the RT.

Despite the pressure from the center, Tatarstan rejected revising its constitution. The defiance of Tatarstan was legitimized by the February Treaty. The February Treaty approved the transformation of exclusive rights of Tatarstan regarding internal affairs. Hence, Tatarstan considered the pressure as a unilateral act of the federal center. Due to the lack of sufficient state capacity of Russia, the disobedience of Tatarstan was not punished, which resulted in other regions' refusal of the demands of the center as well. Hence, by 1999, more than one third of 16,000 regional laws had become contradictory with the federal legislation.⁴⁹⁷

The asymmetrical federal autonomy of Tatarstan and nomenklatura continuity of the republic were established with Yeltsin and continued up to the end of the tenure of Yeltsin. At this point, there were two significant spheres of the sign of the rising sovereignty during the 1990s, namely the citizenship issue and the republican economy. I will attempt to touch upon these issues to show the enlarged sphere of influence and regional capacity of the autonomy of Tatarstan in the period of weakened federal center.

⁴⁹⁶ Graney 2009: 41.

⁴⁹⁷ RFE/RL Newslines, January 20, 1998.

6.4.1. The Issue of Republican Citizenship

Shaimiev stated that “citizenship is perhaps the most significant attribute to statehood.”⁴⁹⁸ Hence, Tatarstan paid too much attention to the issue of republican citizenship. Separate republican citizenship proposals were mentioned in the 1992 Republican Constitution and 1994 February Treaty. However, the federal constitution did not allow any separate republican constitutions. Therefore, the issue of citizenship became a part of power struggle between Moscow and Kazan. Having condemned the proposal of the federal center to remove ‘ethnicity section’ from the internal passports, president Shaimiev heated up the issue of separate citizenship, which was already forgotten. The retaliation of the elites of Tatarstan was so radical that in the republican parliament, Shaimiev recommended preparing a new draft for Tatarstani citizenship law that stipulated dual citizenship and separate passports for Tatarstani citizens. Moreover, the draft was allowing anyone whose grandparents had been born in Tatarstan to apply for citizenship in Tatarstan.⁴⁹⁹ Tatarstan’s parliament decision to allow republican exclusive passports rather than Russian ones provoked the federal center. The federal center utterly rejected this proposal. According to Moscow, since the Russian Federation is the subject of international law, another subject’s claim for its own passport is the violation of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. After the strict rejection of Moscow, Tatarstan retreated and sought conciliation with Moscow. Surprisingly, the negotiations for the representation of the citizenship of Tatarstan on passports were successful in Putin’s first year in power. In December 2000, Putin agreed with the renewed Tatarstani proposal which recommended that the federal passports issued in these two republics would include an additional four pages printed in the respective national languages of the republics and bearing the state symbols of the republics, indicating that the holder was a citizen of both Russian Federation and the indicated republic. Furthermore, the final demand of Tatarstan to sew the special insert of the republic into the passports was also accepted by Moscow.⁵⁰⁰ As Graney

⁴⁹⁸ Sovetskaia Tatariia, November 7, 1992.

⁴⁹⁹ Vechernaia Kazan, November 3, 1998.

⁵⁰⁰ RFE/RL cited in Graney 2009: 45.

highlights, Tatarstan, in the end, imposed its state sovereignty direction into the passports, namely, “Tatarstan is an integral, but distinct part of the federation.”⁵⁰¹

6.4.2. The issue of Economy: Alternative Economic Model of Tatarstan

During the 1990s, Russia implemented radical neoliberal reforms under the name of ‘Shock Therapy’. The fast transition from the command economy to the market created serious social traumas among the people. One of the main arguments that explains the high speed neoliberal reforms claims that by implementing a shock therapy, the Yeltsin regime attempted to abolish the possible alternatives of returning back to communism.⁵⁰² On the other hand, the neoliberal transition of Russia was backed up by most of the western countries. Hence, the federal elites might have hoped that it was the optimum solution for economic growth.

The western countries and Moscow put a pressure on the regional elites to implement the ‘Shock Therapy’ model. However, the state elites in Tatarstan chose to pursue alternative economic models.⁵⁰³ The alternative economic model of Tatarstan combined the strategies of soft entrance into the market with protecting social policies and social welfare in Tatarstan. Ideologically influenced by social liberalism, the elites of Tatarstan implemented alternative economic policies in four stages. The initial stage ‘Soft Entry into the Market’ was implemented from January 1992 until March 1994. The second stage labeled as ‘New Tatarstani Economic Model’ was implemented from April 1994 to April 1997. The third stage of the regional economy was entitled as ‘National Capitalism in Tatarstan’, which covered the period from April 1997 to

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., 46.

⁵⁰² Shiraev 2013.

⁵⁰³ As Rafael Khakimov points out excluding Austria, many western countries supported to impose ‘shock therapy’ in Tatarstan, but Tatarstan government refused them. My Interview with Rafael Khakimov, Kazan-Kremlin, 13.10.2016.

August 1998. After the 1998 economic crisis, Tatarstan implemented economic protectionism until the Putin period.⁵⁰⁴

The policy of ‘Soft Entrance into the Market’ (Miakhgovo Vhozheniia v Rinok) was initiated by President Shaimiev when he introduced this policy in the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan in February 1992. The basic aim of the program was to ease the pain of transition for the citizens through slow rate reforms and by maintaining social welfare privileges. In practice, the republican government controlled prices of foodstuffs and fuel. The subsidies of the regional government to consumers for housing and transport continued. Furthermore, the privatization process was partly implemented. In most of the strategic enterprises, the government remained to operate as the determinant shareholder. During my interview with Prof. Khakimov I asked him whether the “soft entrance into the market” strategy in general was successful during the 1990s. He replied as below:

Absolutely it was successful. Tatarstan protected her agriculture and constructed highways, bridges. Tatarstan provided alternative economic policy and special social policy. Tatarstan imposed special taxes for firms in exchange for reconstruction of Kazan, and Tatarstan implemented special programs to support the poor. We implemented alternative policies regarding privatization. For example, we stopped the privatization of TATNEFT, while Bashkirs had to sell BASHNEFT to the federal company ROSNEFT. KamAZ plant is also a very important enterprise. They wanted us to sell it. However, we supported it. KamAZ was rescued by the support of the regional government.⁵⁰⁵

Likewise, Shaimiev compared Tatarstan with Russia 6 months after the implementation of the soft entrance into capitalism strategy. Shaimiev criticized the shock therapy model that caused a decrease in the life standards of the Russian citizens. Shaimiev praised Tatarstan’s social policies such as lowering consumer prices, which protected the underprivileged citizens.⁵⁰⁶ When I compare the unemployment rates with the other regions of Russia, it was obvious that Tatarstan managed to decrease

⁵⁰⁴ Graney 1999: 253.

⁵⁰⁵ My interview with Rafael Khakimov.

⁵⁰⁶ Sovetskaia Tataria, September 30, 1992.

unemployment rates and in Tatarstan, salaries were relatively higher in comparison with other regions, which had to implement the shock therapy economic policies.

As for the second economic stage, the “soft entrance into the market” strategy inclined more to market orientation with the shift into the new economic model namely, ‘New Tatarstani Economic Model’. The regional government hired American Economy Expert Company, *Monitor*, to formulate an economic strategy for attracting foreign capital. Most of the privatization in Tatarstan as well as nomenklatura flourishing and appropriation of public resources started in this period between 1994 and 1997. Nevertheless, the special social policy of the unique Tatarstan model continued to operate.

The Monitor Company report, which was approved by the parliament of Tatarstan, recommended integrating the regional economy into the World Economy, attracting foreign investments, and economic competitiveness under the government’s regulatory role. Furthermore, the oil resources should have been distributed to create an investment and innovation driven economy.⁵⁰⁷

As for the third economic model, what I observe is that there was, to some extent, a tendency to revise the market oriented reforms. There was an emphasis on public good, but the previous model continued to operate to a large extent. The fourth and last stage was prepared for the economic crisis conditions of 1998. The government prohibited the export of crucial foodstuff to other regions in order to ease the pain of the crisis. Likewise, to make up for failing salaries, the Tatarstani government provided food support.

As I emphasized earlier, the spirit of all these four periods was influenced by social liberalism, but in the limits of the nomenklatura elite survival strategy. For this reason, social liberalism would be a very assertive claim that can overshadow the regional nomenklatura formation of Tatarstan.

⁵⁰⁷ Kabinet Ministrov Respubliki of Tatarstan cited in Graney 2009: 258.

6.4.3. The Consolidation of Nomenklatura Patronage in Tatarstan

During the 1990s, the chances to create a democratic federalism were lost due to the continuity of Soviet era authoritarian political traditions. Shaimiev managed to create a very established patronage politics in Tatarstan, which even hindered the intra-elite transformation. One-man rule under the cult of Shaimiev was formed in various ways. Firstly, the election system in Tatarstan was designed to get the results for the benefit of Shaimiev network. Territorial gerrymandering and overrepresentation of the rural districts in the elections allowed the republican elites to dominate election results.⁵⁰⁸ Secondly, the historical institutional legacy of the Soviet Union had already created a path dependency with regard to political culture. The domination of the public space by the authoritative state apparatus engendered people to obey the commands and wishes of the state elites and regional bureaucracy.⁵⁰⁹ Thirdly, the enrichment of the regional state elites through the instrumentalization of the public resources nourished the consolidation of the patronage politics. There are some academics who explain the local patronage network of Shaimiev under the terms of centralized *Caciquismo* and *Machine Politics*.⁵¹⁰

As Matsuzato highlights, “Caciquismo is a political regime in which caciques local bosses play the role of intermediary brokers between the central authorities and local communities. These bosses incorporate themselves into a hierarchy comprising a center, regions and localities, by way of political exchanges of patronage from above and mobilization of votes during elections. Caciquismo is not a Weberian hierarchy

⁵⁰⁸ Mithad Farukshin, (2000) Izbratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo I vybory v Tatarstane: Opyt regional'nogo pravovogo separatizma', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midhat Farukshin, Ulyanovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Provozashchitnoi Assamblei, pp. 11-14 cited in Tanrisever 2002: 121.

⁵⁰⁹ Henry E. Hale, (2000) “The Parade of Sovereignities: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting”, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, pp. 31-56.

⁵¹⁰ See for example, Kimitaka Matsuzato (2001) “From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo: Characteristics and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1900-2000”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol., 17, No. 4, pp. 47-77; and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova (2013) “Getting The ‘Dough’ And Saving The Machine: Lessons From Tatarstan”, *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol., 21, No., 4., pp. 507-529.

based on command and subordination, but a federal hierarchy built up with the common interests of upper and lower bosses.”⁵¹¹ The term *caciquismo* originally derived from Latin American Politics to explain the political machine structures and patronage networks of the political chiefs in Latin America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the Tatarstan case, Matsuzato argues that Shaimiev controlled the local chief executives through the appointment mechanism. Besides, local chiefs were encouraged to run in the republican parliamentary elections and awarded to be the deputies of Tatarstan. Hence, these meso-elites became loyal to their patron, Shaimiev. Similar to the central *caciquismo*, the local bureaucrats created their own mini-machines, which enabled them to dominate election results.⁵¹²

In a similar vein, Sharafutdinova puts forward ‘Machine Politics’ to explain the patron-client relationship in Tatarstan. Machine politics derived from the US politics associated with a party or political organization headed by a single boss or a small autocratic group, which commands enough votes to maintain political and administrative control of a city, country, or state.⁵¹³ Shaimiev managed to establish the machine by appointing bureaucrats in the periphery of Tatarstan. I believe that this was a serious drawback for the legitimization of the Tatarstan’s sovereignty project. If you distance yourself from the basic liberal democratic rights like electing the local leaders within Tatarstan, the demands for federalism and sovereignty from the federal center will not be legitimate. Hence, the authoritarian rule and machine politics of Shaimiev within Tatarstan played a self-destructive role to achieve a real federation inside Russia. Machine politics was very effective for the domination of regional *nomenklatura*. When Shaimiev boycotted the federal center elections, the semi-elites managed to infiltrate the decisions of the *nomenklatura* into the periphery. In the periphery, the rural citizens boycotted the elections in very high numbers, which revealed that the results of the boycotts were in line with the ethno-national

⁵¹¹ Matsuzato 2001: 47-77.

⁵¹² Sharafutdinova 2013: 507-529.

⁵¹³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Retrieved December 6, 2008.

nomenklatura's wishes and choices. Likewise, the support for Yeltsin by Shaimiev in the election of his second tenure can be understood within the same context. Yeltsin won the majority of the votes particularly in the rural parts of Tatarstan.⁵¹⁴

Shaimiev's building a patron-client network that was based on material interests consolidated authoritarianism in Tatarstan. The state elites of Tatarstan created monopoly on state institutions and regional media as well. In Tatarstan, with the exception of one of the significant newspapers, *Vecherniya Kazan*, most of the newspapers were monopolized by the ethno-national nomenklatura. Moreover, the regional televisions were under the control of regional elites. Lack of independent media, concurrently, created censorship in the regional media.⁵¹⁵

There are some critical arguments concerning Tatarstan's particular economic model on the grounds of political machine. These arguments basically argue that Tatarstan's model of "Soft Entry into the Market" and her particular strategy to delay the market oriented reforms served the domination of regional nomenklatura on public resources, which caused the enrichment of the republican state elites as well as the consolidation of political machine in the region. For instance, there was considerable doubt about the enrichment of Shaimiev network, his family and relatives. The nomenklatura regime of Shaimiev was accused for corruption and nepotism, similar to the nomenklatura network of the federal center.

Shaimiev's two sons, Radik and Airat, are shown in the Forbes Billionaire Lists. Both of them currently have 1.1 billion dollar wealth, which put them in the list of ten richest families in Russia.⁵¹⁶ The oil and chemical industry, and most importantly the regional public sources under the service engendered the family enrichment of the billionaire brothers, which reflects the oligarchical nature of Shaimiev's machine. In 1996, Airat and Radik brothers had a 5 percent share at Tatneft, the oil company of

⁵¹⁴ Matsuzato 2001: 47-77.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/forbes-names-russias-10-richest-families-39462>

Tatarstan. Shaimiev's nephew Ilshat Fadiev was the mayor of the oil-producing city Almetevsk. Airat and Radik brothers still co-own the TAIF group (Tatar-American Investments and Finances). As Farukshin emphasizes, the oil trade between Tatneft and the regional government was one of the significant factors behind the enrichment of the Shamiev family and his networks.⁵¹⁷

The above-mentioned oligarchical nature of the ethno-national nomenklatura of Tatarstan reveals the drawbacks of the sovereignty project of Tatarstan. Nevertheless, although they could not change the unbearable economic situations so much during the 1990s, Tatarstan's efforts to slow the entrance of the market and special social programs had a positive impact on Tatarstan's development, which put the country to a relatively better position among other regions and republics in the Russian Federation.

6.5. The Decline of Sovereignty with the Dictatorship of Law

Vladimir Putin came to power at the beginning of millennium, which heralded the change of the relationship between the federal center and regions dramatically. The regions and republics have already enjoyed the weakness of the Russian state. The centrifugal dimension of the Russian federalism during the 1990s created doubts about the unity of the Russian federation in Moscow. At this point, the improvement of the economy after the 1998 crisis and the growing oil revenues because of the increase in prices in the world market gave Putin the opportunity to reshape the regional affairs. The resurgence of Russia's central state capacity encouraged Putin to go further to establish Soviet reminiscent federalism, which can be embodied as "cultural autonomy, under strict central political control by Moscow."

⁵¹⁷ Midkhat Kh. Farukshin (1997) "Tatarstan's Oil Has Already Been Divided Up" *Russian Regional Report*, vol. 1., no. 38, 6 November.

Initially, Putin emphasized the judicial dissonance between the federal center and regions and republics.⁵¹⁸ The Yeltsin era federal policy of “parade of treaties” indeed created judicial asymmetries in Russia. As Putin stated in the federal assembly to criticize the point, “It is a scandalous thing when a fifth of the legal acts adopted in the regions contradict the country’s Basic Law, when republic constitutions and province charters are at odds with the Russian Constitution, and when trade barriers, or even worse, border demarcation posts are set up between Russia’s territories and provinces.”⁵¹⁹ As Putin mentioned, his primary federal reform objective was to create a unified economic, legal and security policy within the state by enhancing the central control over the regions. Hence, Putin’s assault on Yeltsin era federalism involves six major strands: the creation of seven federal super-districts/regions, the reform of the federation council, the creation of a new state council, the granting of new powers to the President to dismiss regional governors and dissolve regional assemblies, new rights for regional governors to dismiss municipal officials, and a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian Constitution.⁵²⁰ Among these centralization efforts, the creation of seven federal districts is one of the most significant reforms to control the regions, which I will attempt to explain in detail.

In May 2000, Putin’s presidential decree on regional politics put the control of 89 federal subjects under seven federal districts. The Yeltsin period’s 89 special presidential representatives structure was abolished. Instead, seven presidential envoys or plenipotentiaries (*polpredy*) were appointed on the posts of seven super-regions or federal districts. These federal districts were named as: Central (*Tsentralny*), Far Eastern (*Delnevostochny*), North Western (*Severo-Zapadny*), Volga (*Privolzhsky*), Siberian (*Sibirsky*), Southern (*Yuzhny*), and Urals (*Uralsky*). Plenipotentiaries of these

⁵¹⁸ When I explain the situation in general context with regard to the Russian Federalism, I prefer to use the word *region* as an inclusive term which encompasses both ethnic republics and non-ethnic federal regions.

⁵¹⁹ Rossiskaia Gazeta, May 19, 2000.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., 139.

federal regions were mostly selected by Putin's *siloviki* network. Among the appointees only Sergei Kriyenko and Leonid Drachevsky were civilians; the remaining ones had security backgrounds.⁵²¹ The main purpose of this new structure was to increase the ability of the center to coordinate the operations of the federal agencies in the regions through a framework which was totally controlled by Kremlin.⁵²² The federal districts did not aim to change the existing institutional federative structures of the Russian Federation. *Polpredy* were assigned to oversee the process of bringing republican and regional constitutions, charters and laws into conformity with the federal constitution and laws. Another aspect of the plenipotentiaires' aim was to ensure that federal agencies such as tax and security services uniformly operate throughout the federation, rather than in the interest of regional elites. Still another aim of the plenipotentiaires was to provide the rotation of the federal employees in order to hinder the creation of the local corruption ties between regional elites and federal employees.⁵²³

The new rights that enforce regional governors to dismiss the municipal officials were another implementation of the top-down control of the Putin regime. Putin's 2003 "Law on Principles of Organizing Local Self-Management" pushed the local mayors into vertical power at the expense of elected local officials. Step by step, municipal elections were pruned. The elected mayors began to be replaced by city managers, who were overwhelmingly chosen by governors and the ruling party of Putin. By 2011, more than half of the capital cities of the regions were appointed by city managers rather than the elected mayors. Moreover, in 2014, all the elections of the mayors of the large cities began to be de facto appointed through the governors and United Russia majority in the regional parliaments.⁵²⁴

⁵²¹ Danks 2009: 191.

⁵²² Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider, (2015) "Regional Politics" In *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Stephan K. Wegren, ed. London, Rowman&Littlefield, pp. 63-83.

⁵²³ Danks 2009: 191.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

Putin's centralization reforms were named as 'Power Vertical' (*Vertikal' Vylasti*). In accordance with the label of the reforms, Kremlin's influence on Federation council increased. The representation of the republican leaders in the federation council was abolished. Hence, the republican leaders lost the immunity in which they gained through the representation in the federation council. The new federal council, which had a mission to represent regional leaders, only had responsibilities like acting as an advisory board for the president of Russian Federation. At this point, one of the significant dimensions of the vertical power was a new law adopted in 2000, which gave Putin the right for dismissing popularly elected governors as well as dissolving regional assemblies. As Putin emphasizes, this legislation makes the intervention of the federal center possible "in situations in which government bodies at the local level have flouted the Russian Constitution and federal laws, violating the uniform rights and freedoms of Russian citizens."⁵²⁵

6.5.1. Institutional Expansion of the Vertical Power in the Regions

In line with the implementation of radical centralization policies of Putin, Moscow expanded the number and functions of the federal agencies in the regions. The aim was to coordinate and optimize federal policies from Moscow rather than allowing the federal agencies to autonomously operate. The number of federal officials increased from 348,000 to 616,000 between 2001 and 2006 on account of these parallel vertical power ambitions of Moscow. Likewise, centralized control of Moscow spread to the appointments of the heads of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and FSB (Federal Service of Security), and national anti-terror committee. The local right of veto was taken away from the local elites.⁵²⁶

In fact, every federal state has its national level agencies in the regions. For example, the FBI in the United States has offices in the regions. However, the regional agencies

⁵²⁵ Rossiskaia gazeteta cited in Ross 2002: 147.

⁵²⁶ Petrov-Slider 2015: 73.

of Putin's Russia are far from normal. First of all, the Russian federal agencies in the regions are operating in many fields and severely intimidating regional autonomy. They are acting not only for law enforcement, but also in many spheres just like a parallel state. Indeed, even the regions turn into shadow states concerning the source of power. A partial list of federal agencies in the regions is: the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (police), the FSB, the drug enforcement agency and the Investigative Committee, tax inspectors, anti-monopoly agency, the office for registering property, the youth affairs agency, conservation officials, the migration service, technical standards enforcers, emergency services and fire inspectors, the federal roads agency and many more.⁵²⁷

Overcentralization has increased the numbers of regionally based officials of federal agencies. Currently, there are 2.5 times as many federal administrative employees in the regions as regional government employees. These above-mentioned federal agencies are not subordinate to regional officials. The officials of the federal agencies are paid by Moscow and they have to report regional issues to the related headquarters in Moscow.⁵²⁸

This excessive centralization is far from solving the regional problems. The allocation of regional revenues from center to the regions has been operating not through regional governments, but through regional branches of ministries. According to Rafael Khakimov, the new system which requires the central distribution of budget is not transparent. Hence, the federal agencies and ministerial branches sank to corruption.⁵²⁹ Similar to Khakimov, Slider states that:

The pattern of numerous vertical channels of control and finance creates massive monitoring and coordination problems, which contributes to corruption and misallocation of resources. An obvious solution would be to roll

⁵²⁷ Darrer Slider, (2014) "A Federal State" In *Developments in Russian, Politics*, S., White, R., Sakwa, and H. ,E., Hale, eds. pp. 157-173, Durham, Durham University Press.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ My interview with Rafael Khakimov.

back the excessive centralization of the Putin years and give more decision-making authority to regional leaders.⁵³⁰

Besides the spread of federal agencies, the Putin regime paralyzed the regional parties by the law on political parties in 2001. The law imposed that regionally based parties are not allowed to register and compete in national elections. The change in regional legislation elections, which required half of the deputies to be elected by a party list, engendered the domination of 'United Russia' in the regions.⁵³¹ Hence by 2004, United Russia had rapidly spread to the regions as an ultra-hegemonic party which caused a run for the local branches of United Russia among regional elites including even the most stubborn republics such as Tatarstan.

6.5.2. Significant Events/Turning Points Towards the End of Russian Federalism

There were some critical moments with regard to the strengthening of the vertical power in Putin/Medvedev periods. Despite the fact that the centralization process after the millennium was an ongoing process, which is difficult to periodize, I believe that three events were significant with regard to the decline of the regional and republican sovereignty. These are: The Beslan massacre in September 2004, the removal of republican and regional leaders in the Medvedev period in 2009-2010, and Putin's attack on symbolic sovereignty of republics by replacing the title of "President" with that of "head" in 2013. The first two events were significant taking into account the contraction of operating dimensions of the sovereignty. However, the last one was significant to the extent that it was an attack on the last remaining strongholds of the sovereignty projections, symbolic sovereignty, of the autonomous republics.

On 1st of September, 2004, Islamic militants who had connections with Chechen leader Shaimil Basaev took over a school and children inside as hostages. Moscow's rescue operation of the hostages resulted in more than three hundred deaths, most of whom were school children. The tragic event in Beslan and the the confusion and disputes of

⁵³⁰ Slider 2014: 157-173.

⁵³¹ Petrov-Slider 2015: 73.

the authorities who were in charge in Beslan to stop the terrorist attack became an excuse for Putin to end the popular election of regional executives.⁵³² Although Putin allowed the continuity of the loyal regional leaders for a successive period, it was Medvedev, who removed the regional heavyweights starting from 2009.

In the Medvedev period (2008-2012), most of the governors and republican veterans were forced out. The victims included, Mintimir Shaimiev, the head of Tatarstan since 1989; Murtaza Rakhimov, the head of Bashkortostan since 1989; Yury Luzhkov, the governor of the Moscow city, and Yegor Stroev, the governor of the Orel Oblast. Medvedev presidency became a scene of the intensive replacement of Governors and Regional Police Chiefs (MVD). The old veterans of the regions acquiescently accepted the replacements and most of them ‘voluntarily’ resigned from their posts with the only exception of Yury Luzhkov.

Russia, during the presidency of Medvedev, seemed to solve the regional challenge in the center through the continuity of the massive centralization policies. A noteworthy residence against Moscow did not occur in the regional context. However, end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 witnessed massive protests in Moscow against the electoral falsification. Around 60 to 160 thousand people joined the peaceful rallies and demanded the repeal of the results of December Duma elections, an investigation into electoral fraud violations, and full transparency of new elections. The anti-establishment nature of the political mobilization caused anxiety in Kremlin.⁵³³ Most probably as a result of the effects of the 2011-12 mass protests, Putin brought back the regional election system in 2012. However, candidates of Kremlin won almost all the elections in the regions, which reveals the power of Kremlin in the regions. In fact, prior to the protests there were various channels to enhance the interaction between governors and the president. For example, every month a meeting with governors and the president is held in order to conduct a periodic evaluation of performance of the related region. The periodical meetings give the governors or republican presidents the

⁵³² Slider 2014: 160.

⁵³³ Grani.ru cited in Shiraev 2013: 209.

opportunity to lobby in favor of their regions for getting subsidies and approval for the new investment projects. In August 2012, Putin signed a degree and greatly simplified the evaluation indicators from 460 to 11.⁵³⁴ Nevertheless, the interaction of the governors and the president was always under the dominance of Moscow which hindered the democratic channels to solve the regional problems.

Another significant event occurred in the second term of Putin in 2013 with regard to the contraction of the republican sovereignty. Autonomous republics, naturally with their federal structure, had already named their heads as 'President'. This symbolic title seemed to be heavy for the established rule of Russia. Except for Tatarstan, all the titles of the republics were changed from 'President' to 'head' (*glava*).⁵³⁵ This situation reveals that even symbolically, the centralization of the Russian state targeted the autonomy and federal gains of the autonomous republics. Furthermore, it also reveals the supremacy of the sovereignty project of Tatarstan in comparison with that of other autonomous republics in the Russian Federation.

6.6. The Reactions of Tatarstan in the Period of Dictatorship of Law (2000-2004)

Putin's accession to power opened a new chapter concerning the issue of sovereignty in Tatarstan. Before the tragic Beslan events, Putin attacked the regions on the grounds of harmonization of regional and federal laws. The federal districts and presidential envoys, *polpredy*, were basically responsible for coordinating and observing the harmonization process in the regions. The Tatar state elites did not resist the new regional policies of Putin. They were surprisingly very acquiescent if I compare with the 'sovereignty' rhetoric during the 1990s. The established nomenklatura network, political machine or caciquismo of the Tatar elites decided that adopting the new centralization policies were more beneficial for them. The other option, that is, resisting the state would be riskier for the established regional order since the Tatar

⁵³⁴ Slider 2014: 167.

⁵³⁵ My Interview with Timur Valiakhmetov.

state elites enormously benefitted from the regional resources that caused enormous nomenklatura enrichment. That is why, they obeyed the new political structure and sought to take as much concession from the center in the new period as possible, which was also a familiar reaction in the period of ‘sovereignty’. Tatarstan’s acquiescent opposition could be seen from the very beginning. Shaimiev welcomed Putin’s efforts to harmonize the legal dissonance and contradictions. Shaimiev highlights this issue as follows:

We adopted a lot of different laws to reach some definite political and economic goals in a short period. We’ve done a lot, now it’s time to fix this mess. It’s necessary to make a clear division of competences, what belongs to the center and what to the subjects of the federation, without interfering with each other’s exclusive powers”⁵³⁶

The informal ties between the republican and federal elites, which were already established in the Yeltsin period, continued to operate in the Putin era as well. This was one of the reasons, which explains the soft reaction of the leadership of Tatarstan to the centralization policies. The informal personal relations between Moscow and Kazan created a win-win situation for both sides. In comparison with the other autonomous republics, Tatarstan retained its privileged status while softly entering into the structure of Putin’s “Power Vertical”. The construction of sovereignty occurred in the two main spheres. In the political sphere, Moscow immediately intervened to harmonize legal-constitutional dissonance. In the economic sphere, the economic autonomy of Tatarstan was seriously damaged by the new federal tax codes. I will explain these two main contraction areas of sovereignty respectively.

6.6.1. Legislative and Constitutional Harmonization Process in Tatarstan

On June 7, 2000, Russia’s Constitutional Court declared that the constitution of Altai Republic violates the federal constitution. The federal court cited three articles as problematic areas. One of them was the “Sovereignty Declaration of the Altai Republic”. Another one was the Altai Republic’s claim on full sovereignty on the

⁵³⁶ RFFE/RL cited in Cashaback 2006: 71.

natural resources which were located on its territory, and the last one was the ban on the storage of radioactive waste in its territory. The Federal Court decision was significant since it sets an example for the constitutional harmonization of other autonomous republics. Not surprisingly, Mikhail Mityukov, Vladimir Putin's representative to the court, highlighted that "More than a small number of the constitutions of subjects of the federation contain norms (violating the federal constitution) similar to the those of the Altai Republic and some have laws that go even further".⁵³⁷

The federal pressure to drive Tatarstan and other autonomous republics into a corner continued with the "harmonization commissions" of Putin. In the Volga region, the presidential envoy (*polpredy*), Sergey Krienko, organized a commission specifically aiming to put Tatarstan's legislation in line with the federal legislation. In the harmonization commissions, Tatarstan sidwas reluctant to conciliate. Hence, the conflicting issues were negotiated directly by Putin and Shaimiev. Tatarstan put forth the relevance of the bilateral agreement in 1994. However, the federal center was motivated to change the asymmetrical federalism into symmetrical federalism.⁵³⁸ Tatarstani State Council Speaker, Farid Mukhametshin, emphasizes that the bilateral treaty of 1994 was officially the only link between Moscow and Kazan since between the two parties neither the Federal treaty nor the constitution was valid. Hence, structurally there were very few options to discuss the conflicting political and juridical issues in the commissions.⁵³⁹

With regard to the official sphere to solve the judicial dissonance, the federal prosecutors severely confronted with the elites of Tatarstan. For example, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Volga Region, Alexander Zvyagintsev, protested 40 articles

⁵³⁷ <http://www.rferl.org/a/1344533.html>

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and A. Magemodev, (2004) "Volga Federal Okrug" In *Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Federal-Regional Reforms Volume I*. P. Reddaway and R. Orttung eds. p. 160., London, Rowman&Littlefield.

of the Republic Constitution as they were contradicting with the federal legislation.⁵⁴⁰ Tatarstan's ignorance of Zvyagintsev's protests moved the Russian Constitutional Court, which ordered the Tatarstan Constitutional Court to review and harmonize the Constitution of Tatarstan as soon as possible. Hence, the elites of Tatarstan did not resist further and throughout 2001, the republican parliament spent majority of its time to harmonize the legal dissonance. As Marsel Galimardanov reported, 89 out of 115 conflicting documents were harmonized with the federal law in 2001. Moreover, in 2001, federal prosecutors encounter problematic 73 laws, 31 of which were amended and 17 rescinded.⁵⁴¹ However, the efforts of the federal center did not fully pay off. The Federal Registry of normative acts still listed Tatarstan as the strongest offender among all the autonomous units in Russia. In 2004, 19 acts were found contradictory, which covered 20 percent of the total state-wide contradictory laws. Moreover, 92 laws contained provisions that violated the federal law in 2004.⁵⁴² Even in 2017, there are still some contradictory laws of Tatarstan waiting to be harmonized.⁵⁴³ Tatarstan's soft entrance into the Putin's legal order was mostly finalized with the Constitution of 2002. Hence, I will attempt to focus on the revisions in the Constitution of Tatarstan in 2002.

During the initial 2 years of the Putin period, Tatarstan's constitution was a harmonization issue per se. From May 2000, Moscow created a federal-regional expert group, which was responsible to harmonize the constitution of Tatarstan with the federal constitution. Meanwhile, Tatarstan's State Council formed a Constitutional Committee in September 2000 in order to implement federal-regional expert groups' recommendations. Approximately two year-long discussions resulted in the amended constitution of Tatarstan in April 2002. The new constitution was a pared down version of the 1992 Constitution. Whereas the 1992 Constitution contained 167 paragraphs,

⁵⁴⁰ <http://www.rferl.org/a/1345979.html> daily report by Gulnara Khasanova.

⁵⁴¹ Cashabak 2006: 75.

⁵⁴² Ibid., 76.

⁵⁴³ My interview with Dilyara Murzina.

the amended version contained 124 paragraphs.⁵⁴⁴ The disputed issues were the articles 61 and 62 of the 1992 constitution, which highlighted that Tatarstan is associated with the Russian Federation. The federal center pressured for replacing the term of ‘association’ with that of ‘united’. Hence, the new article in the constitution of 2002 defined Tatarstan as: “Tatarstan is a sovereign state and subject of international law *united with* the Russian Federation on the basis of a treaty on mutual delegation.”⁵⁴⁵

The second significant pressure of the federal center was former constitutions’ claim of international subjecthood of Tatarstan. The article which showed the country like an independent state was changed into: “Tatarstan independently participated in international and foreign economic ties (Article 1) and that it can conclude international agreements, exchange representatives, and participate in international organizations.” (Article 6).⁵⁴⁶

These above-mentioned changes of the constitution of Tatarstan reveal that the federal center did not have any tolerance on “confederalism” in its territory. Hence, the constitution of Tatarstan, which was similar to a confederal state, was pushed into the federal state area by the amended constitution of 2002. Nevertheless, Tatarstan was not defeated completely. The amended constitution still protected significant sovereignty areas of Tatarstan. Several clauses, which Moscow previously found objectionable, were retained. For example, Tatarstan protected its sovereignty on the issues of border change, official state languages of Russian and Tatar, provision for a separate republican citizenship, and most significantly the bilateral treaty of 1994, which had a legal constructive role between Moscow and Kazan.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ Graney 2009: 129.

⁵⁴⁵ Italics are mine.

⁵⁴⁶ The amended articles of 2002 Constitution cited in Graney 2009: 130.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

In fact, the amended constitution even did not solve the legal dispute between Moscow and Kazan. The new constitution still maintained ambiguous provisions on several competences of Tatarstan such as the citizenship issue, the 1994 bilateral treaty and the claim on sovereignty. Hence, Russian Deputy General Prosecutor Zvyaintseev issued protests against the 2002 constitution as well. The Federal prosecutors never gave up criticizing the amended constitution's remaining ambiguous areas. However, the state elites of Tatarstan refused the indictments of the federal prosecutors. Most of the Tatarstani elites believed that the Russian Constitutional Court was acting politically rather than acting only within the limits of legal criteria.⁵⁴⁸

The bilateral treaty of 1994 had its share from overcentralization as well. The treaty of 1994 had always a specific place for Tatarstan since the state elites supported the treaty-based federation model. The already renewed bilateral treaty in 1999 would face with attacks starting from 2000s. Putin charged Kozak working group to revise and identify all the problematic bilateral treaties. As a result, at the beginning of the 2000s, 28 out of 48 treaties were rescinded.⁵⁴⁹ Moscow seemed to respect Tatarstan's bilateral treaty more than the other autonomous units. However, at the end, the 2003 law on the side of state power set July 2005 as the deadline for bringing treaties in line with the federal law, which would practically make the bilateral treaty of Tatarstan an invalid and irrelevant legal document.⁵⁵⁰ In other words, from 2004 onwards, the treaty based federalism in Russia was totally abolished.

6.6.1.1. Change of the Federal Tax Codes and Decline of the Autonomous Economy

During the initial years of Putin, centralization policies were implemented in the economic sphere as well. The federal tax system was reformed in order to reach a

⁵⁴⁸ Cashaback 2006: 81.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 82.

⁵⁵⁰ See, Cashaback's interview with Mitdhat Farukshin, Ibid.

unified tax system. Hence, Tatarstan had to give up its privileges, which were gained via the bilateral treaty of 1994. Before Putin, regional tax revenues vis-à-vis the federal center were roughly about 60/40 percent in favor of Tatarstan. However, these pro-Tatarstani tax codes were reversed in the Putin period. Tatarstan had to send 60 percent of its tax revenues to the federal center.⁵⁵¹ The new tax code, which was approved by Duma and the federation council in July, 2000, introduced a flat income tax rate of 13 percent, established a minimum 5 percent unified social tax and raised excise taxes on a variety of goods such as alcohol and tobacco, and amended the law on value-added tax. Moreover, 100 percent of VAT (Value-added tax) must be turned over to Moscow.⁵⁵² At this point, not only Tatarstan but also many regional elites complained about the regulations of the new tax system. Some estimated that the new tax code would send 70 percent of revenue to Moscow, leaving only 30 percent of the tax revenues for the regions.⁵⁵³

Tatarstan obeyed the new tax codes and opened the branch of Russian Federal Treasury Board in spring 2001 as well as federal tax collection office in Kazan. In the following year, the loss revenue of Tatarstan reached approximately 3 billion rubles. Moreover, Putin announced some new taxes on oil extraction and refining in 2004.⁵⁵⁴ However, the increase in the federal economic revenues due to the rise of oil prices allowed the Putin regime to compensate for the loss of revenues of Tatarstan and other regions. For example, “while in 2002 the regions received just 200 billion rubles of federal assistance, the 2003 budget spared 700 billion rubles for similar purposes. The 2004 budget continued this line by offering some 813.97 billion rubles for similar purposes.”⁵⁵⁵ The federal center highly subsidized Tatarstan in return for the

⁵⁵¹ My interview with Rafael Khakimov.

⁵⁵² <http://www.rferl.org/a/1142199.html>.

⁵⁵³ Graney 2009: 122.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., 123.

⁵⁵⁵ Elena Chebankova, (2009) “Adaptive Federalism and Federation in Putin’s Russia” In *Power and Policy in Putin’s Russia*, Richard Sakwa, ed. Pp. 111-133, University of Glasgow-Glasgow, Routledge, pp. 111-133.

cooperation of the republican state elites with Moscow. For example, “in the 2002 Russian Federal Budget, Tatarstan received an equivalent of 408 million dollars in federal funds, while the rest of the 88 regions combined received only 176 million dollars.”⁵⁵⁶

Briefly, Moscow forced Kazan to enter the unified taxation system, which seriously damaged the republic’s economic sovereignty. Entering into the unified economic sphere of Moscow turned Kazan into a grant seeker republic similar to the other autonomous republics in the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, Moscow considered the substate state capacity of Tatarstan via highly supporting the republic through federal grants. The bilateral negotiations continued between Shaimiev and Putin under a new centralized federal structure. The high federal support to Tatarstan and concessions of the Tatarstani nomenklatura reveal that both sides adopted the new federal structure and attempted to find a midway concerning the implementation of the federal policies.⁵⁵⁷ However, the change in the regional policies of the federal center after Beslan accelerated the decline of the political and economic sovereignty of Tatarstan.

6.7. Tatarstan towards the End of Sovereignty:2004-2015

The Beslan massacre opened a new phase with regard to overcentralization. The removal of the abolishment of the election of regional and republican leaders consolidated the already started trend of the increase in centralization. However, Putin was flexible for the influenced regional leaders, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha. Putin reappointed the regional heavyweights for a new 4-year term again. By doing so, the federal center diminished the possibility of an emergence of opposition from the regions and republics against the removal of regional elections.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁷ See the adoptive federalism concept in Ibid.

The Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura understood that Putin is the boss and they acquiesced to the new political situations which were dictated by Moscow very quickly. In fact, throughout the 2000s, the elites of Tatarstan gave up the former discourse of ‘federalism’ and ‘sovereignty’. They focused on milking the federal center through local economic projects, which would be supported by the federal center. Hence, the Tatar elites adapted to highlighting the neo-liberal discourses of economic technocratization, innovation and attracting capital instead of the 1990s’ protectionist economic discourses. The only way to attract capital was going through the gates of Kremlin. Hence, the Tatar elites gave special importance to lobbying to convince Kremlin for the regional economic projects. Sharafutdinova called this new era of lobbying for regional projects as “politics of rentierism”.⁵⁵⁸ From Shaimiev to Minnikhanov, the Tatar nomenklatura flexibly adapted to the new conditions of the 2000s.

In the 2000s, as the federal budget swelled with oil revenues. Moscow had a much bigger pie to divide among the regions and even though some of the money was distributed based on a set formula and hard facts, considerable resources were disbursed for specific federal and even regional projects based on the lobbying capacities of the governors.⁵⁵⁹

In this period, there were two significant giant projects which Tatarstan hosted by the support of the federal center. The anniversary of the 1000th year of Kazan in 2005 and Universiad games in 2013 were the significant examples of the mega projects that were highly supported by Moscow.

Moscow’s 850th foundation anniversary was held in Moscow in 1998. Inspired by this event, Tatar historians under the guidance of Rafael Khakimov prepared a report that 2005 would be Kazan’s 1000th year of founding. As a result of the justification of historians and archeologists, president Putin issued a decree to celebrate Kazan’s 1000th year anniversary. The cost for the 1000th year anniversary of Kazan was

⁵⁵⁸ Sharafitdinova 2013: 507-529.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

estimated to be over 80 billion rubles, approximately 3 billion dollars.⁵⁶⁰ Kazan city benefited from this huge amount of money. During the Soviet time, Kazan lacked an underground transportation system. Thanks to the millennium celebrations, Kazan benefited from not only a new Kazan Metro (seventh in Russia) but also new roads, new hotels, restoration of historical buildings and an overall construction boom.⁵⁶¹

In the political context of Kazan Millennium, there were remarkable points such as Putin's attendance at the celebration and his pro-regional speeches. Putin surprisingly adopted re-federalizing rhetoric and policy initiatives. For instance, he stated "power vertical did not mean the unlimited consolidation of powers within the federal government".⁵⁶² Likewise, Shaimiev also found an opportunity to criticize Putin that power vertical is the negation of federalism and federalism is necessary for a huge and multinational state.⁵⁶³ However, Moscow's overcentralization policies did not stop after the Kazan millennium, which reveals that the above-mentioned speeches of Putin was empty and did not reflect the intentions of Moscow.

Similar to the Kazan Millennium, in 2013, Kazan held another mega event, Universiade Games (Olympics for Youth). The Tatar state elites skillfully convinced Moscow to represent and race for Russia in the Universiade. Kazan competed twice for the right to host the Summer Universiade. After losing the first attempt, Kazan won its second bid in 2008. The cost of the event increased ten-fold of the initial estimations. Totally around 228 billion rubles were spent for the 2013 Universiade Games. The federal center provided 61 billion and the republican budget put 81 billion and the remaining funds were provided by the private investors and federal loans. Naturally, Kazan and Tatarstan gained so much from the event. International outlook of the city and the presentation of Tatarstan and Tatar culture spiritually satisfied

⁵⁶⁰ The money spent for the reconstruction and development, 12 billion came from federal budget, over 38 billion rubles from the republican budget and over 35 billion rubles from private investors, Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.,

⁵⁶² Cited in Graney 2009: 142.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 143.

inhabitants of Kazan and the state elites. With regard to economy, Kazan gained many facilities including a reconstructed airport with a new rail line which provides transport from the city center to the airport, a 45,000 seat modern stadium (Kazan Arena), lots of sport complexes including one of the largest aquatic center, an entire village (campus) for the athletes which was converted to dormitories after the Universiade Games.⁵⁶⁴

Through the end of the 2000s, two significant events occurred concerning the sovereignty of Tatarstan. One of them was the renewal of the bilateral treaty between Moscow and Kazan in 2007 and the other was the Rustam Minnikhanov's coming to power in March 2010, after the two decade-long tenure of Shaimiev. Now, I will focus on these two events respectively.

The bilateral treaty of 1994 was renewed in 1999, but was not extended in 2004. Finally, Tatarstan's State Council approved the draft of the long awaited extension of the bilateral treaty. In fact, the reason for the long waiting was the federal center's intention to abolish the bilateral treaties in particular and asymmetrical federalism in general. Nevertheless, the special status of Tatarstan and lobby of the state elites worked pretty well to convince Moscow. Initially rejected by the federal council, the new bilateral treaty finally passed on 11th of July, 2007. In fact, on paper, Tatarstan seemed to protect most of its sovereignty status. For example, Tatar and Russian language as the two official state languages remained in the renewed 2007 bilateral treaty. Taking foreign relations into account, the new treaty endorsed the right of Tatarstan to carry out international and foreign economic relations. Furthermore, the new treaty implicitly recognized the March 1992 sovereignty referendum, which had declared "Tatarstan to be a sovereign state, a subject of international law, forming its relations with the Russian Federation, other republics and states on the basis of equal agreements."⁵⁶⁵ Despite the fact that the state elites of Tatarstan welcomed the renewed

⁵⁶⁴ Universiade Village (Derevnye Universiady) selected the best dormitory in Russia. For a detailed information, see for example: <http://ioi2016.ru/pages/village?locale=en>

⁵⁶⁵ Graney 2009: 146.

bilateral treaty, in practice, Moscow did not respect the initiatives of the republican elites in joint agreements in the realm of oil, tax, and educational policies. Hence, the bilateral treaty quickly turned into a symbolic gesture which was conceded by the federal center. The lack of renewal of the treaty in 2012 proved the merely symbolic notion of the bilateral treaty.

In the Medvedev period, Shaimiev was forced to resign similar to other regional and republican heavyweights. However, in the Tatarstan case, Shaimiev achieved his Prime minister Minnikhanov to be signed as the president by Moscow. The new successor president was from Shaimiev's nomenklatura network. That way, Shaimiev's influence and his machine network continued to work in the new era. In the other regions, on the other hand, the change of governors and presidents resulted in the crumble of nomenklatura network or local political machines. The scandals which erupted after post-Rossel Sverdlovsk, public clashes between the new and former presidents in Bashkortostan, and conflicts after Luzhkov in Moscow were some of the important examples of the change of regional leaderships.⁵⁶⁶ The story of the removal of Shaimiev in Tatarstan, on the other hand, did not cause the destruction of the former elite network. inclined to more cooperation rather than competition. The nomenklatura network or political machine in Tatarstan survived from the leadership change and even flourished. The political rentierism which was already established in the initial years of Putin period continued under the leadership of Minnikhanov.

Minnikhanov, in fact, fits the characteristics of the neo-liberal era. Although he was a long-serving prime minister, he did not come forward through politics. He focused on the economy and alternatives of economic diversification in the republican scale. Shaimiev became the advisor of the President and continued to stay at his office in the Presidential Palace, which shows that he still had a significant influence on Minnikhanov.⁵⁶⁷ Shaimiev never interfered in the work of the new President publicly.

⁵⁶⁶ Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, (2011) *Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism Inside Russia*. University of Notre Dame Press.

⁵⁶⁷ Sakaev described the relationship of former and new presidents as cooperation and competition together. My Interview with Vasil' Sakaev.

He focused on the restoration and protection of historical sites and the monuments of Sviyazhsk and Bolgar. Shaimiev's lobbies gave fruits. Historical Tatar city Bolgar was shown a World Heritage Site by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in 2014.

On 24th of November, 2015 the Russian Su-24 jet was shot down by Turkish warplanes near the Turkish border in Syria, which escalated the tension in the region. Vladimir Putin described the situation as “stab on back committed by accomplices of terrorists”. However, Turkish president Erdoğan insisted that “the actions were fully in line with Turkey's rules of engagement”.⁵⁶⁸ The escalated tension in the Syrian civil war between Turkey and Russia did not cause military confrontation between Turkey and Russia. However, Russia demanded an apology from Turkey and in the meantime imposed sanctions, including the export of Turkish products and ban of package holidays. Tatarstan tried to play a mediatory role during the conflict, whereas Chechen leader Kadirov was ready to declare jihad against Turkey. The Turkish investment particularly located in the Elabuga region had already reached around 1.5 billion dollars. That's why, Minnikhanov's speeches to solve the conflict were significant, which showed the economy-focused, investment seeker orientation of the country. Minnikhanov said: “I believe the conflict will find its political settlement and the projects that we have must be maintained through a joint effort.” He added that the republic hoped to retain economic ties with Turkey, and several major investment projects were negotiated between Tatarstan and Turkey.⁵⁶⁹

The above-mentioned reactions of Tatarstan to the plane crisis between Russia and Turkey show that the republic still has some influence with regard to foreign relations. However, the discourse of sovereignty seems to be only nostalgia recently in Tatarstan. Needless to say, Tatarstan still has more weight in comparison with other republics. Minnikhanov is the only president who continues to use the title of “President”. The other republican leaders accepted Putin's proposal which replaced their title from “President” to “head” (*glava*) in 2013. However, the current autonomy of Tatarstan

⁵⁶⁸ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34913173>.

⁵⁶⁹ https://in.rbth.com/news/2015/12/22/russias-tatarstan-hopes-turkish-investors-will-stay-leader_553499.

should not be exaggerated. The republican elites are so submissive that the possibility of “the battle of two presidents” in various circumstances will not be faced, at least for the near future.

All in all, in this chapter, I attempted to explore the dynamics of sovereignty in Tatarstan in a macro chronological perspective. In other words, I attempted to shed light on the last quarter-century of Tatarstan’s sovereignty project. During the 1990s, the political aims of Tatarstan were, to a large extent, accomplished. “Tatarstan was inside Russia, but distinct from Russia” in the period of Yeltsin. Without any doubt, the high regional state capacity of Tatarstan made it possible to take many concessions from the weakened federal center throughout the Yeltsin period. However, in this period, Tatarstan lost the chance to pressure the center to create a democratic federalism. The state elite’s nomenklatura network in Tatarstan did not have the vision to democratize both Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Hence, the state elites of Tatarstan could not resist the centralization policies of the Medvedev/Putin periods. The resurgent federal center brought back the Soviet type federalism in a few years during the 2000s. The republican discourse of “sovereignty, treaty, federalism” was replaced with political rentierism starting from the second half of the 2000s. Currently, only symbolic sovereignty seems to exist. However, I believe that the fragile established order in Moscow under an authoritarian and neoliberal political-economic structure cannot guarantee stability in the regional policies.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis examined the dynamics of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan. The Soviet nationality policies legacy and the nomenklatura system were discussed as the main constitutional elements that explain the reasons behind the rise and decline of ethnicity and drive for sovereignty in the Tatarstan case. The Soviet Union implemented a sui generis nation building model, which created ethnic elites in the union republics and the autonomous units. The Soviet multiethnic nationality regime in the short run created stability regarding the possible challenge by the minority nationalisms. However, in the long run, the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies initiated ethnic mobilization among titular nations, which emerged during the reforms of Gorbachev, Glasnost and Perestroika. The minority nationalist mobilization was one of the strongest reasons behind the collapse of the Soviet state. All the non-Russian (titular) union republics separated from the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. Although in the post-Soviet period Russia achieved to protect its Soviet era borders, strong minority nationalist mobilizations appeared inside Russia, particularly among the ASSRs, which generally attempted to widen autonomy through several sovereignty projects. The titular elites and their ethno-national nomenklatura nationality discourses prevailed over the other rival nationality discourses in most of the cases. Without any doubt, the titular elites were nationalist due to the Soviet nation building project. However, in the period of the weakened Moscow, the titular elites used the national issues as ideological legitimization for their elite survival and economic wealth strategies. In this thesis, one of my main findings is that the period of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan and other autonomous units in Russia was a process that was shaped under the domination of the elite leadership. The patterns of the elite formation of the Soviet period to a large extent continued in the post-Soviet era.

With regard to the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, at the end of his significant work, Dimitry Gorenburg stated that “Had the Soviet state followed the Turkish route and refused to admit the existence of ethnic minorities within Russia, it is likely that its subsequent efforts at Russification would have been even more successful than they were.”⁵⁷⁰ Undoubtedly, Gorenburg concerned himself with the matter of multiethnic character of the Soviet state and probably he accused the Soviet nationality policies of being highly minority ethnicity inclusive. However, his Turkey alternative had also created ethnic conflict in the opposite line. Turkish assimilative ethnicity regime has been challenged by Kurds, which put the country on the brink of a civil war. Therefore, assimilationist or multiethnic, both of which are the opposite lines, have specific problems. Nevertheless, in the Russian context, the ethno-codified nationality regime of the Soviet state consolidated minority nationalism which would hit the final blow to the federal center when the Soviet-established order went through mortal crisis in the Perestroika period. Taking Turkey and Russia’s two similar legacies of authoritarian modernization into account, an interesting further study can be conducted, which may contribute to the comparative politics literature in general by analyzing the two opposite nationality policies patterns.

In Chapter 3, I examined the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies. I elaborated on the formation of the Soviet nationality policies since I believe that historical and institutional legacy of the nationality policies created the structural dimension of the reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklatura in the titular republics. The historical-institutional legacy of the Soviet ethnicity regime created a durable path dependency, which formed and constrained the behaviors of agents and titular elites. The ethno-federal territorial structure of the Soviet federalism as well as the passport ethnicity model and all forms of preferential treatment policies for the titular nations reinforced the distinct aspects of the minority nations in the USSR. Also, these policies created titular elites who were coopted by the nomenklatura recruitment system. Hence, the sui generis Soviet nation building legacy and the nomenklatura system became the

⁵⁷⁰ Gorenburg 2003: 270.

constitutional-structural elements of the formation of the ethno-national nomenklatura or republican titular elites.

The rise of ethnic mobilization and drive for sovereignty in Tatarstan emerged under these afore-mentioned structural conditions. However, only structure is not adequate to explain the rise of ethnic mobilization. Hence, Chapter 5 examined the actors and their rival nationality discourses, which filled the content of the sovereignty projection of Tatarstan. The competition among the three actors, namely, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura, the Tatar nationalists and pro-federalist Democratic Opposition was an uneven process. From the beginning, the ethno-national nomenklatura had far more opportunities to make their nationality discourse hegemonic. Mintimer Shaimiev skillfully managed to show his political position balanced and reasonable in comparison with the two radical nationalist lines constituted by the Tatar nationalists and Democratic Opposition. In fact, the discourse of Shaimiev reduced the two alternative nationality discourses as radical pro-Tatar and radical pro-Russian to put forward his discourse which was characterized as ‘balanced’ and ‘peace keeper’ between the two hostile lines. Chapter 5 also highlighted how the national grievances in the Tatar society were constructed in the period of ethnic mobilization between 1988 and 1992(4). The construction of the national grievances by the ethno-national nomenklatura and the Tatar nationalists had, in fact, partially real and partially manipulative contents.

It is partially true that the low administrative status of Tatarstan created a lot of drawbacks for the development of Tatar language and culture. The Tatars, once the pioneer among the Muslim nations in Eurasia, found their language and culture relatively backward compared to the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Turkmen at the end of the Soviet modernization due to lack of the status of union republic. In fact, the Tatars had a rich early statehood experience dating back to the early Middle ages. In addition, the Tatars had a highly developed culture and language as well as the highest urbanization level among the Russian Muslims. Although the status of ASSR protected the Tatar culture and language, they lagged behind from the nations which were exposed to the nation building policies in the union level regarding the development level of

vernacular culture and language. In this context, in Chapter 3, I gave the focal points of the Tatar history beginning from the early medieval ages to the end of the Soviet modernization. The Mongol legacy, the Bulgar State and the Kazan Khanate were significant early statehood experiences in the Tatar historiography. The early Tatar history was articulated in the nationality discourses of the Tatar nationalists and the republican elites in order to legitimize the sovereignty campaign in the period of the ‘parade of sovereignties’.

With regard to the manipulative construction of nationalist grievances, the Tatar nationalists and the ethno-national nomenklatura highlighted that the Soviet heritage was in favor of Russians. Hence, the Tatars remained disadvantageous, subordinate and lagged behind the development of the Russian nation. In other words, at the end of the 70-year Soviet modernization, there was still a gap between the Tatars and Russians in terms of qualified job recruitment and urbanization levels. Concerning the ethnic distribution of the jobs, the Tatars concentrated on mostly blue colored jobs. However, the Russians concentrated on the white color qualified jobs. The top of the ladder, however, was dedicated to the ethno-national nomenklatura, who concentrated mainly on the administrative-governmental and academic positions in which research on vernacular culture and history was conducted. Ironically, the ethno-national nomenklatura concentrated on the relatively inferior status of the Tatars vis-à-vis the Russians on the grounds of levels of the ethnic distribution of jobs in order to organize nationalist grievances in the turmoil years of the Perestroika. This manipulative usage of the national sentiments omitted the significant achievements of the Tatars via Soviet modernization in terms of urbanization, education, and representation of the titulars in jobs that require skill. The ethno-national nomenklatura deconstructed the reality and articulated it in a nationalist discourse that legitimizes ethnic mobilization and drive for sovereignty, which would reinforce their elite power at the end.

Ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan rose and declined between 1988 and 1992. The last remnants of Tatar nationalism vanished in 1994 after the signing of the February Treaty of 1994. Hence, the compressed period of time which covered 4 to 6-year period did not break the continuity of the Tatar elite. Shaimiev managed to secure his position

as the president of Tatarstan. Even he bet on the wrong horse by supporting the communist hardliners, his position was so rooted that he got through the criticisms successfully, which emerged after the coup attempt of hardliner communists to overthrow Gorbachev. My research findings revealed that Shaimiev had a strong influence on the Tatar nationalist movement in Kazan. However, he was not able to control the Chelny branch of the TOTs. As Damir Ishakov highlighted, the Tatar national movement emerged independently, but Shaimiev instrumentalized it for his elite power. Shaimiev successfully co-opted the significant non-nomenklatura intellectuals of TOTs. By doing so, he closed the doors for possible emergence of alternative Tatar nationalists that could overthrow him from power. This pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism and member recruitment received support from the rural Tatars and urban Tatar intellectuals, which depended on the informal ties. These nomenklatura style informal networks were also significant in the relationship with the federal center.

Chapter 6, in this context, analyzed the federal relations between Kazan and Moscow taking long-term dynamics of the issue of sovereignty into consideration. The concept of 'state capacity' is used to examine the distinct features of the Yeltsin and Putin periods regarding sovereignty. In Chapter 2, I argue that the issue of sovereignty and ethnic mobilization are intertwined concepts which should be analyzed better within macro and micro perspectives. Hence, after I had analyzed the issue of ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan, I focused on the quarter-century long period of sovereignty issue between Kazan and Moscow. During the 1990s, the Russian central state capacity was considerably weakened by the Yeltsin's shock therapy market reforms. Hence, the ethno-national nomenklatura in Tatarstan used the weak state capacity of Russia to get more concessions from Moscow. Therefore, the 1990s witnessed the construction of asymmetrical federalisms across the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, Tatarstan was the most powerful autonomous republic due to its natural resources. However, in the Putin era, the centralization policies enhanced. Most of the concessions of the autonomous republics that were taken from the center had to be brought back. Overcentralization reached such a level that the autonomous republics even lost naming their leaders as 'president' with the only exception of Tatarstan. In this context,

my research findings highlight that the Tatar ethno-national nomenclature flexibly adopted ongoing excessive centralization and constructed good relationships with Moscow. The discourses of the Tatar elites, which put forward the issues of sovereignty and federalism during the 1990s, pragmatically changed into investment and rentierism-focused policies during the 2000s.

During the 1990s, the Tatar state elites found the opportunity to control the state resources. The Tatar state elites even implemented their own economic model, 'Soft Entrance into Market'. The soft entrance into market policies were relatively successful and relieved the trauma of the federal center's shock therapy program in favor of people. However, the privatization policies of 1994-1997 resulted in the excessive enrichment of the Shaimiev's nomenklatura network as the companies of the natural resources of oil and gas were managed and administered by the network of the republican nomenklatura. In addition to the control on the natural assets in Tatarstan, the government of Tatarstan was also ruled in an authoritarian manner by the ethno-national nomenklatura without any strong political rival. Three branches of government, legislative, judiciary and executive, were under the control of Shaimiev. In addition, the rich natural resources of Tatarstan, without the federal center influence, led to the enhancement of the provincial oligarchy led by Shaimiev and his family over time. Although Putin's accession to power tied the regional economy to the federal center by altering the tax revenues dramatically in favor of the federal center, the Tatar state elites still control their power thanks to the privatization process of the republican natural resources in the second half of the 1990s. The resurgent Russian state capacity, however, deteriorated the federalism alternative in the post-Soviet Russia. The particularistic vision of the ethno-national nomenklaturas in the autonomous units of Russia, who were merely focusing on their own nationalist agenda and self-material interests, could not create an alternative hegemonic policy against the federal center. The resurgent state capacity gave the opportunity to the federal center to abolish the influence of the disjointed autonomous republics. The vertical power of Putin easily abolished the asymmetrical federalism of the 1990s with the help of the nomenklatura legacy of the federal center and regions. In other words, the strong informal ties helped to integrate the regional and republican nomenklaturas into the vertical power.

As Indus Tagirov points out, currently the structure of federalism and sovereignty is the same as that of the Soviet Union.⁵⁷¹ Hence, a real federalism, which requires self-governance of the autonomous units in addition to the judicial authority that decides on the division of rights and functional spheres between the center and republics, still does not exist in the Russian Federation. The Soviet template ethno-national division of the autonomous units under the strong control of Moscow via vertical power continues under the Putin regime.

In the western context, there have been perspective changes in favor of minority nationalisms since the beginning of the 1980s. The reasons behind the optimistic views on minorities arise from the debates on nation-state sovereignty in the era of globalization. To the extent that globalization reveals the supra-national and sub-national economic bonds, the considerations on minority nationalism diversify from the state centric approaches. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, a real federalism strengthens democracy and at the same time it takes an active role to solve the tensions between the center and periphery, particularly by hindering ethnic conflicts. Hence, the demands of minorities have a pattern to develop and deepen the principles of equality and liberty. However, this pattern bears a discriminatory core to the extent that it articulates in the particularistic character of minority nationalism. Hence, this exclusionary dimension of minority nationalism damages inter-ethnic relations similar to the majority nationalism's deteriorations of inter-ethnic peace. Undoubtedly, all forms of demands of minorities have structural lines that support other forms of demands of equality and liberty. Likewise, all forms of autonomies, if they involve the participation of locals, have a tendency to democratize the host states or the federal center. This emancipatory tendency can be seen in the western autonomy models such as Quebec, Scotland, North Ireland, Catalonia and Basque. As I highlighted in Chapter 2, it is natural that if a majority nationalist discourse exists somewhere, a minority nationalist discourse is formed. In fact, these minority nationalisms have tendencies toward the leftist values. However, the particularistic exclusionary dimensions of the minority nationalisms contradict with the universalist values of the left. Hence, the role

⁵⁷¹ My interview with Indus Tagirov.

of national elites which shape the content of particular national movements is more significant than the structural democratic pattern of the minority nationalisms. Hence, I do not agree with the argument that “Every minority nationalism has leftist values”. The ideologies through which the elite discourses are articulated in nationalism determine the characteristics of the minority national movements in specific regions. In this sense, we encounter right wing minority nationalisms as well. For example, Nicaragua witnessed brutal clashes between Sandinistas and anti-communist indigenous leadership of the Atlantic regions until the establishment of the autonomy of the Atlantic lands.⁵⁷² Hence, I argue that the elite leadership is always more powerful and determinant in shaping the aspects of various minority national movements than the structural tendency of democracy of minority nationalisms. The decisive role of the elites necessitates investigating various cases of minority nationalisms in their own context.

Without any doubt, the case of Tatarstan is very different from the context of the Western autonomies. Russian and European politic culture, traditions and state systems have their own distinct dynamics. Before anything else, the issue of elite reproduction is operating highly differently in Russia compared to the western models due to the legacy of the nomenklatura system. In the Russian case, the nomenklatura structure and its privileged network of patron-client relationship and nepotism function under an authoritarian regime. Hence, the non-transparent structure of the ethno-national nomenklatura, which hinders the participation of the people in the administration, paralyzes the democratic content of autonomy demands. The minority nationalism is instrumentalized for self-interests by the ethno-national nomenklaturas in Tatarstan and in the other autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. For this reason, the titular nationalisms began to work as a curtain for the privileged positions of the elites and for their excessive enrichments through the control of republican assets and natural resources. Needless to say, every elite formation contains a privileged status and instrumentalization of ideologies for their elite reproduction. However, my research finding reveals that with regard to the Tatarstan case, this

⁵⁷² Benedikter 2014: 262-265.

instrumentalization of nationalism for personal interests through the elite rule intensively functions. This ethno-national structure in the regions and republics and the authoritarian rule of the federal center hinder the emergence of a real federalism in the Russian Federation. Tatarstan as an autonomous unit of a 'sham federation', hence, could not present a democratic project for Tatarstan and for the federal center. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the Western influence studies that expect a democratic project from Tatarstan similar to its Western counterparts. I believe that these works overexaggerate the structural democratic tendencies of the minority nationalism which remains under the influence of Western autonomous models.

In the same vein, I should point out that some pro-Moscow oriented works use regional authoritarianism to attack the federalism principle in general. I am very suspicious of this kind of studies. As I discussed in Chapter 6, I find the negotiation process and bilateral agreements between Kazan and Moscow during the 1990s very valuable, which opened the door for a real federalism alternative in Russia although they failed at the end. The republican or regional authoritarianism and the nomenklatura style governance are not a weakness which is peculiar to Tatarstan. Overall, the Russian Federation has a presidential system under the dominance of one-man rule. In this sense, the criticisms that neglect the authoritarianism of Moscow, the injustice of the income distribution, election frauds, imprisoned journalists, prohibitions on demonstrations, press-release and democratic gatherings seem to be very biased. Hence, it is not possible to approve the approaches which criticize Tatarstan for being a regional Khanate because these approaches attack on the federalism principle without questioning the authoritarian political aspects of the federal center. To finalize the point, it seems that Russia had to democratize from bottom to top. The regions and republics did not have democratization dynamic under the rule of ethno-national nomenklaturas similar to the state elites of the federal center.

Considering these afore-mentioned points, the asymmetrical federation model of Tatarstan was a peaceful model. The reason behind the peaceful model was also related to the informal elite networks between Moscow and Kazan. These good informal networks between elites date back to the nomenklatura system of the Soviet era. In

fact, they can be traced back to the middle ages until the collapse of the Kazan Khanate. There was always trust between the federal center and Tatarstan. Both of the sides were very reluctant to initiate violence during the 1990s. However, the Russian Federal center quickly applied violence in the Chechen case. Social dynamics in Chechnya was different from Tatarstan. For example, the Soviet-established order never became legitimate in Chechnya due to the late Tsarist period wars and Stalin's deportations. In addition, the informal networks between Chechen and federal elites were not strong to deal with the matters on the table.⁵⁷³ Although Dudayev attempted to solve the sovereignty issue of Chechnya through negotiations by declaring that he felt himself a citizen of Russian Federation, the last peaceful efforts of him were not enough. Yeltsin, convinced by the hawkish, pro-war supporters, attacked on Chechnya. The bloody conflict in Chechnya could only be finished at the beginning of the Putin period. After the killing of Dudayev, the Islamists took over the leadership of the Chechen nationalism. Hence, the region has overwhelmingly been Islamized as a result of the violence.

In the Tatarstan case, articulation of Islam in national discourses is also a significant issue that I omit to focus on in this thesis. The ethno-national nomenklatura used Islam as a form of Tatars' distinct identity. In this sense, Islam was/is an element of sub-state nation building. On the level of ethno-national nomenklatura, Islam could not find space to politicize. However, concerning non-nomenklatura Tatar nationalism, the Tatar national movement began to use Islamic discourses to restore their failure against the ethno-national nomenklatura. The process mainly enhanced at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s when the non-nomenklatura radical Tatar nationalism lost popularity and grassroots support. However, the articulation of the Islamic discourses in nationalism among radical nationalists, which basically support independent Tatarstan from Russia, was not successful. They could not gain support from the Tatar society. Only immigrants from Central Asia were, to some extent, attracted by this Islamized nationalism. As Amirovitch points out, Islamization of Tatarstan is an exaggeration due to the immigrants' appeal to these discourses rather than the natives'.

⁵⁷³ George 2009: 82.

From outside, it was believed that Islamization has been rising in Tatarstan. In fact, the Tatars have already secularized and been well integrated to live with Russians.⁵⁷⁴ However, these points are still debatable. Some of the researchers believe that the Islamization of Tatarstan can be noticed easily through the spread of Islamic life styles in Tatarstan such as men-women distinct sport clubs and Helal markets. Islam in Tatarstan was beyond the scope of this study. However, further studies, which focus on the non-nomenklatura Tatar nationalism, should focus on the nodal points of articulation between nationalism and religion.

In this research, the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura was my focal point rather than the nodal points of articulation between nationalism and religion. I analyzed the intertwined concepts of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in micro and macro perspectives. Within these two intertwined concepts, I found that the Tatar state elites were pragmatic and adoptive for their elite survival/continuity strategy. During the ethnic mobilization period, the discourse of ethno-national nomenklatura nationalism eliminated the other nationalism discourses of TOTs and Democratic Opposition. This victory resulted in the dominance of the Tatar elites in the spheres of economy and politics in Tatarstan. The two and a half decade long post-Soviet sovereignty experience at the end revealed that there has not been an antagonistic relationship between the Tatar and Russian state elites. On the contrary, at the final stage, in several difficult moments, they found dispute settlements. For this reason, the nomenklatura structure, inherited from the Soviet era, formed a trust-based relationship between the Tatar and Russian elites. Although there was always a competition between both elites, this competition had structural constraints that forced both camps to find a final settlement ground. The scope of this thesis, which analyzed the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty in Tatarstan, overlapped with the patterns of reproduction of the ethno-national nomenklaturas in the post-Soviet space. In this context, the three dimensions of the rise and decline of ethnic mobilization of sovereignty were the legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, the discourses of the elites and remaining actors, and the issue of state capacity. These three dimensions

⁵⁷⁴ My interview with Mukhamet Zaripov Ilshat Amirovitch.

which analyzed the issues of ethnic mobilization and sovereignty were always intersected under the determinant role of the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura. Hence, with the guidance of this research finding, I analyzed the issues of ethnicity and sovereignty taking into account the Tatar ethno-national nomenklatura which had pragmatic and adoptive character for their elite power in various political circumstances.

With regard to the future prospects, I assume that the authoritarian rule of the ruling elites is currently dominating the politics both in Russia and Tatarstan. However, the era of globalization has already activated new dynamics in politics. In 2012, thousands of people rallied against the election abuses, corruption and authoritarian rule of the Russian ruling elites. Although the over-centralization of Putin regime could have fastened up the assimilation of Tatar language, the issue of identity is not proportionally relevant with assimilation. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, people hardly forget their national identity. This point reveals that the prospective ethnic mobilization period is always on the agenda. Especially, in the deteriorated economic conditions, people can easily remember their national identity. In this context, although it seems that the Russian-established order stabilized the regional politics through nomenklatura legacy and the improvement of economic conditions, the new dynamics can create troubles against the established order. In other words, the new emancipatory and egalitarian dynamics of the social media and the Internet have been created as significant tools for mass mobilization. If the already declined economic conditions in Russia after 2014 continued, the regions and republics which seek investment and several subsidies from the federal budget would not be satisfied. Even if the ethno-national nomenklatura would not create a problem due to their elite positions and informal ties with Moscow, the Tatar people may problematize it with the new emancipatory dynamics of the social media. However, whether the mass mobilization will occur or not are only the options without any certainties. These challenging possibilities against the established order of Russia must not conceal the current reality of the Russian Federalism. For the near future, I do not expect that the dynamics of regional policies of Russia could change. The federal center's over-centralization policies integrated all the autonomous units into the vertical power. The provisional

elites submissively adopted the excessive centralization. I would like to highlight that even under these circumstances, that is, without any challenge to the vertical power, the established order in Russia may be vulnerable than it seems.



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
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APPENDICES


A: MAPS OF TATARSTAN AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A.1. TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS OF REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN



Source: <http://tat-map.ru/index/0-6>

A.2. RUSSIA'S ETHNIC REPUBLICS



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/russia_ethnic94.jpg

B: THE FEBRUARY TREATY

**TREATY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE REPUBLIC
OF
TATARSTAN “ON DELIMITATION OF JURISDICTIONAL SUBJECTS
AND
MUTUAL DELEGATION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE STATE BODIES
OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE STATE BODIES OF THE
REPUBLIC
OF TATARSTAN”**

Authorised representatives of the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan:

governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan;

proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples for self-determination, principles of equality, voluntariness and freedom of the will;

guaranteeing the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of economic space;

promoting the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures,

languages;

seeking for ensuring civil peace, inter-ethnic accord and security of peoples;

implementing the priority of the basic human rights and freedoms and citizen irrespective of

national origin, religion, residence and other differences;

taking into consideration the fact that the Republic of Tatarstan as a state is united with the

Russian Federation in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty on Demarcation of the Objects of

Management and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between State Bodies of the Russian Federation

and Bodies of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan, participates in international and foreign

economic relations,

hereby have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

Demarcation of the objects of management and mutual delegation of powers between the state

bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be

governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of

Tatarstan and the present Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation.

The state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power, and

shall:

- 1) ensure protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
- 2) form the budget of the Republic, define and impose the Republic's taxes;

- 3) decide the issues of the jurisprudence and notary public;
- 4) implement legal regulation of administrative, family, housing relations, as well as relations existing in the field of environmental protection and use of natural resources;
- 5) grant amnesty to individuals convicted by courts of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 6) decide issues relating to possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber and other natural resources, as well as state enterprises, organisations and other movable and immovable property, located in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan which is an exclusive property of the people of Tatarstan except for objects of Federal property.
- Demarcation of state property shall be regulated by the separate Agreement;
- 7) establish the system of state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as their organisational structure and functioning;
- 8) decide the issues of the Republic's citizenship;
- 9) establish the procedures for alternative civil service in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan for citizens having the right - in accordance with the Federal law - for substitution of military service;
- 10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with republics, regions, districts, autonomous regions and autonomous districts, cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg of the Russian Federation which shall not contradict the Constitutions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, the present Treaty and the other agreements between the state bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 11) participate in international affairs, establish relations with foreign states and conclude relevant agreements not contradicting the Constitution and international obligations of the

Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty,

participate in the activity of corresponding international organisations;

12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate agreement;

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13) conduct independently foreign economic activity.

Demarcation of powers in the field of foreign economic activity shall be settled by a special

agreement;

14) decide, according to the procedure fixed by separate agreement, the problems of conversion

for enterprises which are in possession of the Republic of Tatarstan;

15) establish the state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan.

ARTICLE III

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan

jointly are authorised to:

1) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms, the rights of national minorities;

2) protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity;

3) organise mobilisation of the national economy, direction of the development and production

of the weapons and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; matters

concerning the sale armaments, ammunition, military equipment and other military property, as well as the conversion of defence industry. The form and the share of Parties' participation shall be governed by a separate Agreements;

4) settle common and contradictory questions of citizenship;

5) co-ordinate international and foreign economic relationship;

6) co-ordinate pricing policy;

7) create funds for regional development;

8) pursue monetary policy;

9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or of the Republic of Tatarstan, that

can be transferred to the joint management, according to their interest based on voluntary and

mutual consent. The forms and the procedures for the joint management of the specific objects

shall be governed by a separate Agreement;

10) co-ordinate activity on questions of geodesy, meteorology , calendar system;

11) create joint funds for the aim of financing joint programmes, elimination of the consequences of natural calamities and disasters on the mutual agreement basis;

12) co-ordinate joint management of power system, road, railway, pipeline, air and water

transport, communications and information systems;

13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement of vehicles, cargoes and products

by air, sea, river, railway and motor roads, as well as by pipeline transport;

14) estimate the state of environment conditions in accordance with international standards and

take measures for its stabilisation and rehabilitation; ensure environmental safety, co-ordinate

actions concerning the use of land, water and other natural resources; prevent ecological

disasters; matters of specially guarded natural areas;

15) implement common policy in social sphere: population employment patterns, migration

processes, social protection, including social security;

16) co-ordinate the activities on the issues of health care, protection of family, maternity,

paternity, childhood, education, science, culture, physical culture and sport; train national

specialists for schools, educational, cultural institutions, mass media organisations and other

institutions and organisations; provide pre-school and school organisations with native language

literature; co-ordinate scientific research in the fields of history, culture of nations and their

languages;

17) deal with matters of personnel for judicial and law enforcement bodies;

18) settle litigation, arbitration and notary public matters;

19) co-ordinate the activity of law enforcement bodies, interaction of security services, creation

and use of the targeted programmes of crime control;

20) establish common principles for organisation of the state bodies and local administration

system;

21) establish administrative, administrative procedural, labour, family, housing, land, water,

forest, mineral wealth, environment protection legislations;

22) address the matters of joint use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources;

23) exercise other powers, established by mutual agreement;

ARTICLE IV

The following are within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies:

1) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws,

control over execution of laws; the implementation of federal structure and territory of the

Russian Federation;

2) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; matters of citizenship in the

Russian Federation; regulation and protection of national minorities' rights;

3) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial bodies and the

procedures for their organisation and activities; formation of federal bodies of state power;

4) federal state property and its management;

5) establishment of the basis for federal policy and federal programmes in the fields of governmental, economic, environmental, social, cultural and national development of the

Russian Federation.

6) establishment of the legal ground for common market; financial, foreign currency, credit and

customs regulations, money supply, principals of general pricing policy; federal economic

agencies including federal banks;

7) federal budget, federal taxes and duties; federal funds for regional development;

8) federal power systems, nuclear energy, fissile materials, federal transport, traffic, communication pathways, information and communication systems; space activities;

9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international agreements

of the Russian Federation; matters of war and peace;

10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;

11) defence and security; defence industry, the procedures for sale and purchase of armaments,

ammunition, military equipment and other military material; production of toxic substances,

narcotic drugs and the procedures for their use;

12) status and defence of state borders, territorial waters; air space, the exclusive economic zones

and continental shelf of the Russian Federation;

13) the judicial system, the Prosecutor's Office; penal legislation, penal procedural and penal

executive legislations; amnesty and clemency; civil, civil procedural and arbitration procedural

legislations;

- 14) federal collision law;
- 15) meteorological service, standards, gauges, metric system and time calculation; geodesy and cartography; names of geographical points; official statistics and book-keeping;
- 16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;
- 17) Federal State Service.

ARTICLE V

Legal documents issued by state bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be valid within the terms of reference for these bodies, institutions and officials.

ARTICLE VI

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation, as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of

Tatarstan, shall have no right to issue legal acts on the matters, which do not relate to their terms

of reference.

The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Federal State Bodies as well shall have the

right to protest against the laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan when

they violate the present Treaty.

Disputes on exercising the powers within the common terms of reference of the State Bodies of

the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled according to the procedures agreed upon between the Parties.

ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of implementation of the present Treaty the State Bodies of the Russian

Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude

additional agreements, establish joint structures and commissions on a parity basis.

ARTICLE VIII

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan

shall have plenipotentiary representative offices in the cities of Moscow and Kazan, respectively.

ARTICLE IX

No unilateral cancellation of, alteration of or amendment to the present Treaty or its provisions

shall become valid.

The Treaty shall come into force 7 days after its signing and shall be the subject to publication.

Made in Moscow on February 15, 1994 in two copies, each in the Tatar and the Russian languages, both texts having equal validity.

ON BE HALF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

BORIS YELTSIN

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

PRIME MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

ON BE HALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN

MINTIMER SHAIMIEV

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN

MUKHAMMAT SABIROV

PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN

C. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez çalışması Rusya'nın Volga bölgesindeki otonom cumhuriyetlerden birisi olan Tataristan örneği üzerinde etnik mobilizasyon (seferberlik) ve egemenlik kavramlarının yükselişi ve düşüşünü inceler. Volga Tatarları nüfus olarak Rusya Federasyonunu nüfusunun yaklaşık yüzde 3.8'ine tekabül ederek, Ruslar dışındaki en büyük etnik grup ve milliyeti oluşturmaktadır. Güçlü bir devlet geleneğine sahip olan Tatarlar, Kazan Hanlığı'nın 1552'de Rusya'ya ilhakından bu yana Ruslarla entegre yaşamaktadır. İmparatorluk Rusya'sı dinsel bağlamda Tatar halkına orta çağ boyunca ayrımcılık uygulasa da Tatar elitleri Rus müesses nizamına Kazan'ın işgalinden bu yana entegre olmuş durumdadır. Ancak, modern dönemle beraber Tatar ve Rusların entegrasyonu grift bir durum kazandı. Rusya içinde milliyetçilik ve sosyalizm gibi modern ideolojilerin yayılması, Rusya toplumunda ciddi bir sosyal dönüşüm yaşattı. Kökleri 19. yüzyıldan başlayan ve 20. yüzyılda şiddetlenen milliyetçilik meselesi bağlamında Rusya'nın çok etnikli ve kültürlü yapısı dağılma tehdidiyle karşı karşıya kalmıştı. Avusturya-Macaristan ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu gibi büyük, çok uluslu imparatorluklar milliyetçiliğin basıncına dayanamayarak dağıldılar. Rusya ise Bolşevik devrimi sonrası, milliyetçiliğin devlet tarafından sınırlandırılması ve yeniden inşa edilmesiyle, kendine has bir oluşum sayesinde birliğini korumayı başardı. Bu bağlamda Tatarların ilk etnik mobilizasyonu 20. Yüzyılın başına kadar gider. Bu tez çalışmasının konusunun önemli bir kısmı ise, yaklaşık bir asırlık aradan sonra Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasının arifesinde oluşan Tatarların ikinci etnik mobilizasyonu ile ilgilidir. Tatarlar, 1988-1992 yılları arasındaki kısa ve sıkıştırılmış bir zaman diliminde Rusya'dan ayrılıp bağımsız ulus devlet kurmaktan, Moskova'dan yoğun asimetrik özerklik elde etmeye kadar çeşitli ölçeklerdeki taleplerle Gorbaçov ve Yeltsin yönetimlerini baskı altına almışlardır. 1994'te imzalanan Şubat Antlaşması ile Tataristan Rusya içindeki asimetrik özerkliğini konsolide etmiştir. Ancak 1990'larda elde edilen yoğun özerklik hakları, Putin'in iktidara gelişi ve Rus devlet kapasitesinin yeniden güçlenmesiyle beraber büyük oranda budanmıştır. Dolayısıyla 1990'lardan günümüze kadar gelen yaklaşık çeyrek asırda Tataristan'ın egemenlik meselesi yükseliş ve düşüş dönemleri geçirmiştir. Aslında Tatar etnik mobilizasyonu,

egemenlik gibi hareket halinde olan ve makro olarak ele alınması gereken bir sürecin bir parçasını kapsamaktadır. Bu bağlamda etnik mobilizasyon ve egemenlik kavramları iç içe geçmiş kavramlardır. Bütün bu süreçlerde egemen aktör Tatar devlet elitleri olmuştur. Tatar devlet elitleri yerel nomenklatura geleneğini ve ağını Sovyetler'den günümüze kadar getirerek, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasıyla oluşan sosyal dönüşümden kazanan taraf olarak çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez çalışması Tataristan'daki etnik mobilizasyon ve egemenlik kavramlarının yükselişini ve düşüşünü Tatar etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturasının politik anlamda kendini yeniden üretmesini göze alarak analiz etmiştir. Tezin çalışma bulguları Tatar elitlerinin, elit nomenklatura tipi iktidarlarını sürdürmek için Tatar milliyetçi söylemini araçsallaştırdığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Yerel nomenklatura bağlamında ele alınan Tataristan'daki egemenliğin yükselişi ve düşüşü üç boyutta incelenmiştir. Bunlar: Sovyet ulus politikalarının tarihsel ve kurumsal mirası, yerel devlet elitlerinin milliyetçi söylemi ve devlet kapasitesi kavramlarıdır. Temel olarak Sovyet ulus politikalarının tarihsel ve kurumsal mirası azınlık milliyetçiliğinin Sovyet devleti tarafından kültürel düzeyde örgütlenmesi olmuştur. Yerel etnisite ve milliyetlerin (titular) Sovyet devleti tarafından kabulü, onların topraksal (territorial) ve kurumsal olarak ulus inşaları; Sovyet mirasının en önemli veçhelerindendir. Merkezi devlet tarafından sürekli beslenen azınlık kültürel milliyetçiliği Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılma döneminde politik milliyetçiliğin egemenlik taleplerine dönüşmüştür. Bu bağlamda temel olarak Sovyet ulus politikaları ayrılıkçı milliyetçiliğin tohumlarını bizatihi devlet olarak kendisi atmıştır. Bunun yanında diğer bir önemli Sovyet mirası veçhesi ise Sovyet bürokrasisinin oluşturduğu nomenklatura yapısıdır. Kökleri Bolşevik parti yapısına kadar giden, Sovyetler Birliği'nin ilk yıllarında ortaya çıkan, Stalin döneminde tüm Sovyet kurumuna egemen olan bu yapı Sovyetler Birliği'nin aşırı merkezileşmesini sağlamıştır. Aslında Sovyetler Birliği Komünist Partisi'nin bir personel alımı mekanizması olan nomenklatura sistemi, seçim yerine tepeden atama ilişkisine dayanır. Zamanla bu yapı parti içerisindeki informel (resmi olmayan) ilişkilerin gelişmesine ve batı terminolojisinde patron-müşteri ilişkisi (patron-client relationship) olarak geçen bir kariyer ağı meydana getirmiştir. Sovyet Komünist Partisi'ne özgün bu nomenklatura

geleneği zamanla bürokrasinin, Sovyet meclislerinin ve kamusal yaşamın her alanına sirayet ederek Sovyet Devleti ve toplumunun çürümesinde önemli bir işlev edinmiştir. Yerel (titular) elitler de nomenklatura mekanizmasının önemli bir parçası olmuşlardır. Özellikle Tatar devlet elitleri; Brezhnev döneminde yerel bölgesel nomenklatura ağlarını, tıpkı diğer ulusların elitleri gibi sağlamlaştırmışlardır. Sovyet ulus politikalarının kurumsallaşmış mirası ve nomenklatura yapısının yerel elitlerce kapsanması, Tatar ulusal hareketinin yapısal analizinin iki temel noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu tez çalışması bu yapısal analize, tezin üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerinde ayrıntılı olarak yer vermiştir.

Sadece yapısal analiz bir etnik hareketi ve mobilizasyonu açıklamakta yeterli değildir. Bu anlamda Tatar devlet elitlerinin milliyetçi söylemleri (discourse) başlı başına ele alınması gereken bir meseledir. Bu bağlamda tezin 5. Bölümü aktörlerin söylemlerine odaklanarak tezin söylem analizi kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Üç önemli aktör: Etnik-milliyetçi Nomenklatura, nomenklatura dışı Tatar milliyetçi hareketi ve Rusya ve federasyon yanlısı Demokratik Muhalefettir. Bu üç aktör, Tataristan’da milliyetçiliğin yükseliş ve düşüş dönemlerinde birbirleriyle mücadele içinde olan üç farklı söylemi temsil etmektedir.

Tezin ana argümanınının, yani Tatar etnik-nomenklaturasının pragmatik, araçsal ve adaptasyoncu (uyumsal) özellikleriyle milliyetçi söylemi kendi elit çıkarları ve iktidarı tekelleri altına almak için farklı politik momentlerde araçsallaştırmış olmasının, üçüncü boyutu “devlet kapasitesi” kavramına odaklanarak bu tez çalışmasında incelenmiştir. Devlet kapasitesi kavramı Tataristan’ın egemenlik ilişkilerini makro ölçekte incelemeye önemli olanaklar sağlamıştır. Tezin 6. Bölümü bu kavramsal analizden yola çıkarak 1990’lar ve 2000’ler sonrasının egemenlik ve özerklik ilişkilerindeki değişim ve dönüşümü 2015 yılına kadar, çeyrek asırlık bir dönemde ana dinamikleriyle incelemiştir. Yukarda bahsedilen üç argümansal boyutta analiz edilen Tatar etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturasının kendisini yeniden üretmesi ekonomik bağlamdan daha çok politik bir analiz hattı esas alınarak açıklanmıştır.

Tezin teorik bölümünü oluşturan İkinci Bölüm, etnisite ve egemenliği Avrasya bağlamında kavramsallaştırır. Etnisite kavramının incelenmesiyle başlayan 2. Bölümde Avrasya bağlamında etnik mobilizasyon teorileri ve son olarak azınlık milliyetçiliği ve özerklik ilişkileri sırasıyla incelenmiştir. Azınlık milliyetçiliği ve özerklik meseleleri Batılı örneklerle başlayıp Rusya Federasyonu’nun nev-i şahsına münhasır federalizm örneğinin Tataristan özelinde açılmasıyla ilerleyen bölüm tez çalışmasının kuramsal çerçevesini ortaya koymaktadır.

Etnisite kavramı modern anlamda sosyal bilimlere D. Treisman tarafından 1960’lar ve 1970’lerde taşınmıştır. Aslında etnisite, ırk, ulus kavramları sürekli tartışmalı kavramlar olarak günümüze kadar gelmiştir. Sinisa Malesevic’in belirttiği üzere Frederic Barth etnisitenin kavramsallaştırılmasında dönüm noktası olan bir tanım yapmıştır. Barth’tan önce etnisite özcü ve sabit bir kültürel farklılık olarak tanımlanıyordu. Barth’la beraber etnisitenin sosyal bir etkileşim olduğuna dair analizler ön plana çıkmıştır. Weber’in analizleri ise Barth’ın bahsettiği sosyal etkileşimi politikleştirmeyi başarmıştır. Weber’e göre etnisite politikleşmiş bir kültür olarak tanımlanıyordu. Bu tez çalışması Weber’in açtığı yoldan, ancak, elitlerin rolünü öne çıkararak etnisite kavramını elit teorisi çerçevesinde anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Aslında neo-Marksizm, İşlevselcilik (Functionalism), Rasyonel Seçim, Neo-Weberci teori, ve post-yapısalcı anti-temelci yaklaşımlar, bu çalışmanın benimsediği Elit Teorisi ile birlikte etnisiteyi sosyal gerçekliğin çeşitli boyutlarında anlamlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu tez çalışması yukarıda adı geçen etnisite yaklaşımlarından Elit teorisi yaklaşımını Tataristan örneğindeki yerel elitlerin oynadığı yoğun rolden dolayı Tataristan olayını (case) en iyi açıklayabilen bir yaklaşım olarak benimsemiştir. Elbette elit teorisin en önemli zaafı Malesevic’in de belirttiği gibi yapısal bir analizinin olmamasıdır. Bu tez çalışması elit teorisinin yapısal zaafını Sovyet ulus politikalarının tarihçi ve kurumsallaştırıcı mirasını ele alarak aşmaya çalışmıştır.

Sovyetler Birliği’nin yıkılışının arifesindeki etnik hareketleri ve ayrılıkçılık ilişkilerini tarihsel-kurumsal argümanın dışında başka argümanlar da açıklamak istemiştir. E. Giuliano’nun da belirttiği üzere dört temel argüman Sovyetler Birliği’ni yıkan etnik ayrılıkçılığı açıklamaya çalışır. Bunlar sırasıyla: tarihsel-kurumsal argüman,

demografi ve yerleşim argümanı, ekonomik çıkar argümanı ve kültürel argümanlardır. Bu tez çalışmasının da takip ettiği üzere tarihsel-kurumsal argümanlar, dört argüman içinde etnik mobilizasyonu açıklayan en güçlü argümandır. Bu argüman R. Brubaker, D. Gorenburg, R. G. Suny, T. Martin gibi akademisyenlerce desteklenmektedir. Bu tez çalışmasının da katıldığı bu argüman Sovyetlerin çöküşünün arifesinde yükselen etnik mobilizasyonları Sovyet ulus politikasının etnisite kodifiyeli özerklik modelinde bağlar. Etnisiteye dayanan topraksal (territorial) özerklik modeli ve pasaport etnisitesi modeli gibi etnisitenin kurumsallaştırılması yoluyla Sovyetler Birliği ayrılıkçı milliyetçiliğin temellerini kendine has ulus inşası modeliyle atmıştır. Tezin 3. Bölümünde bu argümana dayanan Sovyet ulus politikaları mirası, ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilmiştir.

Geriye kalan üç argümandan biri olan demografi ve yerleşime geldiğimizde, yüksek nüfuslu ve bir bölgede konsantre yaşamış milliyetlerin ayrılıkçıya daya yatkın olduğu temel olarak tartışılır. Ancak Sovyetler Birliği örneğinde Dağıstan, Çuvaşistan ve Kuzey Osetya örnekleri çok yoğun titular (yerel etnik) nüfusa sahip olmalarına rağmen bu cumhuriyetlerde çok düşük etnik mobilizasyon seviyelerine ulaşıldığı gözlemlenmektedir. Bu üç örnek demografi ve yerleşim argümanının sınırlarını göstermektedir. Yine aynı şekilde ekonomik güce dayalı, yani zengin otonom ve birlik cumhuriyetlerinin ayrılıkçılığa daha eğilimli olduğu yönündeki yaklaşımlar da Çeçenistan, Moldova ve Ermenistan gibi zengin olmayan Sovyet cumhuriyetlerinde yüksek seviyede ortaya çıkan etnik ayrılıkçılığı açıklayamamaktadır. Aynı bağlamda, kültürel farklılığı primordialist bir bağlamda ele alan özcü kültürcü yaklaşımlar da Kuzey Kafkasyadaki birçok Sovyet cumhuriyetindeki düşük milliyetçi talepleri, buna karşın Çeçenistan'daki yüksek ayrılıkçı etnik milliyetçiliği açıklayamamaktadır. Bu tez çalışması, Tataristan'daki etnik mobilizasyonun yükselişindeki tarihsel-kurumsal hattan gitmesine rağmen bu yapısalcı hattın da eksik yanlarına vurgu yapmıştır. Bu yapısalcı hattın en büyük eksik yanı kitlelerin elitler tarafından ikna edilmesine gerekli açıklamayı getirememesidir. Bu anlamda, bu sıkıntıyı aşmak için bu tez çalışması; postyapısalcı söylem analizi literatürüne de başvurur. Etnisiteyi elit söyleminin politik bir inşası olarak algılar ve bunu teorik bir bağlama oturtmaya çalışır.

Etnisiteyi elitlerin politik inşası olarak kavramsallaştıran elit teorisi Mosca, Pareto ve Michel'in eserlerine kadar uzanır. Aslında klasik elit teorisyenleri etnisite ve milliyetçilik meselelerini çok az tartışmışlardır. Modern elit teorisi literatüründe ise T. Gurr, A. Cohen, P. Brass, Van Dijk gibi düşünürler daha çok semboller ve onların iktidarla ilişkilerine dair eserler ortaya koymuşlardır. Modern elit teorisyenlerin çalışmalarında da, komplike bir formda dahi olsa, etnisite elitlerin kendi çıkarları ve iktidarda kalmaları için bir araç olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu tez daha önce de ifade ettiğim gibi etnisiteyi Tataristan bağlamında açıklamak için elit teorisini kabul etse de elit teorisinin özellikle yapısalcı boşluklarını Sovyet ulus politikalarının tarihsel-kurumsalcı değerlendirmesiyle modifiye etmeyi amaçlamıştır.

Tezin teorik çerçevesinin ikinci boyutu egemenlik meselesine ayrılmıştır. Egemenlik meselesi Tataristan ve Rusya bağlamında doğal olarak, küreselleşmeyle beraber ulus-devlet egemenliğindeki dönüşümü, azınlık milliyetçiliğinin kavramsallaştırılmasını, özerklik ve egemenlik ilişkisini, Rusya Federasyonu'nun kendine has federalizm modelinini kavramsallaştırma zorunluluğunu da beraberinde getirir. Bu çalışmada azınlık milliyetçiliğinin küreselleşmeyle beraber ömrünü doldurduğuna yönelik yaklaşımlar eleştirilmiştir. Azınlık grupları dilsel ve kültürel bağlamda asimilasyona maruz kalsalar da etnik kimliğe duydukları bağlılıklarını devam ettirmektedirler. Bir çok azınlık milliyetçi aktivist kendi yerel dillerini konuşmasalar dahi kendi etnisitelerine yoğun bir bağlılık duymaktadırlar. Tataristan örneğinde Tatar milliyetçiliğinin en ateşli savunucuları, Rus dili altında asimile olmuş kentli Tatarlardan gelmekteydi. Sanılanın aksine köylü Tatar nüfusu, Tatar etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturasına üye vermek dışında kendi özgünlüğünde bir köylü milliyetçi hareketi yaratamamıştı. Bu anlamda etnik kimliğin çok güçlü kökleri varsa, onunla kurulacak ilişkinin genişletilmiş ölçeği ulus-devlet ve özerklik tartışmalarını da gündeme getirmektedir.

Devlet merkezci uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarının azınlık milliyetçiliğine güvenlik perspektifinden bakması hiç şaşırtıcı değildir. Günümüz dünyasında 200'ün altında devlet varken 6000'in üzerinde ulusal grup bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu kadar çeşitli bir azınlık ulusu meselesini klasik realist güvenlikçi perspektifte açıklamaya çalışmak,

küreselleşmenin farklılıkları öne çıkaran konjonktürü altında gözden düşen bir yaklaşım halini almaktadır. Bu bakımdan bu tez azınlık milliyetçiliği ve otonomi meselelerine batı modellerini inceleyerek Rusya Federasyonu özelinde bir karşılaştırma olanağı da sunmaktadır. Batıda özerklik tartışmaları John Stuart Mill ve Lord Acton arasındaki liberal gelenek içindeki tartışmalara kadar gider. Federalizm yanlısı Lord Acton özerklik sistemlerinin farklı boyutlarının demokrasiyi de güçlendirdiğini vurgulamıştır. Micheal Keating'in de eserlerinde görülen bu azınlıklara olumlu bakan yaklaşım, özetle azınlıkların ve devletsiz ulusların çeşitli özerklik yoluyla uzlaşılarak (accommodate) çoğunluk ulusa entegrasyonu üzerinde durmaktadır. Keating; iç içe geçen kimlikler kavramıyla (nested identities) azınlıkların, aynı zamanda çoğunluğun kimliğini de taşıdığını göstermektedir. Bu anlamda, batılı modern özerklik sistemleri geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler kurumlarının aksine, iktidarı paylaştırıp demokrasiyi güçlendirerek merkezi devlet ve bölgeler arasında iki taraflı bir kazanma durumu yaratmaktadır. Qubec, Katalonya, Bask, İskoçya, Kuzey Tyrol, Kuzey İrlanda'da gözlemlenen çeşitli batılı özerklik örnekleri kültürel ve politik taleplerle şekillenmiş özerklik biçimleridir. Batılı örneklerde politik egemenliğin merkezi devletle paylaşımı, özerkliğin varoluşsal şartlarından biridir. McGarry ve O'leary'nin özerklik örnekleri modelini baz alan bu tez çalışması 2. Bölümde Merkezci politika (Centripetalism), Kültürel özerklik, topraksal çoğulculuk (territorial pluralism), Federalizm, Asimetrik Federalizm, Simetrik Federalizm, Kuzey İrlanda örneğinde görülen Federalimsi (Federacy), Bölgesel Özerklik gibi özerklik modellerini ve kavramlarını ayrıntılı olarak tartışır.

Rusya Federasyonu örneği ise batılı modellerden çok farklı bir dinamikte gelişmiştir. Sovyet döneminden kalma patika bağılılığı (path dependency) etnisite rejiminde ve federalizm meselesinde Rusya Federasyonu'na çok güçlü bir gelenek bırakmıştır. Temel olarak Sovyetler Birliği topraksal bir federalizm bağlamında etnik grupları baz olarak yönetim mekanizması geliştirse de özerkliğin politik kontrolünün Sovyetler Birliği Komünist Partisi'nin yoğun denetimi olmasından dolayı batılı anlamda gerçek bir federasyon olarak değerlendirilemez. Kültürel otonominin birlik cumhuriyetlere sağlanması, ancak politik otonominin eksikliği; Sovyet etnik-federasyonunu kendine özgü bir paradigmada değerlendirmeyi zaruri kılmaktadır. Aynı gelenek 2000'li

yıllarla beraber tekrar Rusya Federasyonu'nda canlanmıştır. Özerk cumhuriyetler egemenlik kullanımında ancak kültürel ve dilsel alanlarda yetkilidir. Politik ve ekonomik egemenlik Moskova'nın yoğun merkezîyetçi denetimi altında bulunmaktadır.

Etnik nomenklatura geleneği ise nev-i şahsına münhasır Sovyet Federalizmi'nin diğer bir önemli özelliğidir. Özellikle Tataristan örneğinde devlet başkanı Mintimer Shaimiev'in 90'ların sonundan günümüze kadar gelmesi nomenklatura geleneğinin ve onun Tataristan içi kırsal ağının ve de bunun yanında Moskova ile ilişkilerde kurulan informel ağların bir neticesinde ortaya çıkmıştır. Tataristan'daki egemenlik ve etnik mobilizasyonu anlamak için Sovyet mirası nomenklatura bürokratik geleneği ve onların yarattığı ahabap-çavuş ilişkileri, akrabacılık (nepotism), patron-müşteri (patron-client relationship) ilişkileri gibi kavramlar Tataristan'daki otonom egemenlik meselesini anlamakta kullanılması gereken olmazsa olmaz araçlardır.

Devlet kapasitesi kavramını da Sovyet sonrası dönemdeki Tatar elitlerinin politik tercihlerini anlamakta kilit kavramlardan birisidir. Tatar devlet elitleri Rusya'dan mümkün olduğunca çok taviz kopartmak, ancak Rusya'dan da ayrılmamak amacıyla oldukları için Moskova'nın sırasıyla zayıf ve güçlü olduğu 1990'lar ve 2000'lerde egemenlik meselesinde önemli dönüşümleri açığa çıkartmıştır. Yukarıda temel dinamiklerini ortaya koyduğum tez çalışmasının teorik çerçevesine şimdi tez bölümlerindeki içerikler üzerinden daha ayrıntılı bakıp Tataristan'daki etnik mobilizasyonu ve egemenliği anlamaya çalışabiliriz.

Üçüncü Bölüm, tez çalışmasının tarihsel-kurumsalcı yapısal yaklaşımına odaklanarak Tatar milliyetçiliğinin yükselişinin Sovyet ulus politikaları mirası temelinde tarihsel nedenlerini anlamaya adanmıştır. Sırasıyla Çarlık mirasından, Klasik Marksist milliyetçilik tartışmalarına ve bunların Bolşevik ulus politikalarına etkisinin tartışıldığı bu bölümde son olarak Sovyet ulus politikalarının oluşumu ve Glasnost ve Perestroyka'ya kadar uzanan zaman dilimindeki kısmi değişimleri incelenmiştir.

Çarlık ulus politikaları geleneği Bolşeviklere taşıdığı etki bakımından önemlidir. Aslında Bolşevikler Çarlık Rusya'sından radikal bir kopuşu her alanda uygulamaya

koyma hedefinde oldukları için, ulus politikasında da böyle bir hat izlemişlerdir. Kazan'ın Korkunç İvan tarafından 1552 yılında fethedilmesiyle beraber Rusya'nın imparatorluk dönemine geçtiği tarihçiler tarafından kabul edilmektedir. 20. Yüzyılın başına kadar olan genişlemeyle Rus imparatorluğu Alaska'dan Japon denizine kadar uzanan devasa bir toprak üzerinde hüküm sürmekteydi ve modernleşmenin etkisiyle ulusal kimlik meseleleri imparatorluk gündeminde sıcak tartışmalar yaratmaya başlamıştı. 19. Yüzyılda imparatorluğu korumak ve bir ulus devlet yaratmak arasındaki gerilim Rus politikasında görünür hale gelmişti. Rusya'nın yaşadığı kimlik krizine dair birçok model tartışılmış, Slavcılık ve Batıcılık tartışmaları Rus modernleşmesinin gideceği doğrultu üzerine iki farklı kutupta Rusya'nın kimlik ikilimlerine çözüm önermeye çalışmışlardır. Ulus meselelerinde ise Rusyalı (Rossiskii) ve Rus (Ruskii) yurttaşlık kavramları bu dönemlerde icat edilmiştir. Bu dönemde yine asimilasyondan, çok etnikliği kabule birçok ulus politikası tartışılmıştır. Geleneksel Çarlık refleksi ise Rus olmayan uluslar tarafından "Milletler Hapishanesi" olarak değerlendirilmekteydi. Bolşevikler bu kimlik krizinin ortasında iktidara gelmişlerdir. Şüphesiz bu kimlik tartışmalarının yanında Bolşevikleri daha yoğun olarak etkileyen Marks ve Engels'in ulus meselesinde yazdıkları olmuştur.

Marks ve Engels'ten aslında ulus meselesinde Bolşeviklere net bir miras kalmamıştır. Klasik Marksist tartışmalar ulus ve devlet kuramlarıyla ilgili tartışmalarda belirsizlikler içermektedir. Daha çok sınıf meselesi ve kapitalist üretim tarzında eserlere odaklanan filozoflar bir Marksist ulus kuramı geliştirememiştir. Varolan yazılar daha çok Avrupa merkezci ve evrenselci temelde kalmıştır. Sadece İrlanda meselesinde Lenin'ine ilham olan ezen ulus ezilen ulus milliyetçiliğinin nüvelerine rastlanabilmektedir.

Bolşevik Devrimi'nden önceki asıl hararetli tartışmalar ise Roza Luxemburg, Avusturya Marksistleri, Lenin ve Stalin tarafından temsil edilen 3 farklı milliyetçilik yorumu üzerinde dönmüştür. Luxemburg küçük milliyetler ve ayrılma talepleri üzerine pesimistik bir tutum takınmıştır. Avusturya Marksistleri Otto Bauer ve Karl Renner ise toprağa bağlı olmayan kültürel otonomi argümanını desteklemekteydiler. Lenin ve Stalin'inin ulus üzerine yazılarının büyük bir kısmı Avusturya Marksistleri

ile polemik şeklinde geçmekteydi. Çünkü Lenin ve Stalin toprağa dayanan etnik federal özerk birimleri ulus meselesinde çözüm olarak görmekteydiler. Aslında Bolşevik partisinin kadrolarının büyük bir kısmı Luxemburg'un azınlıklara daha kötümser çerçevede bakan fikirlerine daha yatkın durmaktaydı. Fakat Lenin yüksek prestiji sayesinde Bolşevik kadroları ezen ulus-ezilen ulus temelinde ayrıştırılan bir milliyetçik ve ulus politikası yorumuna ikna etmeyi başardı. Bu politika ki azınlık dostu olmanın ötesinde onlara kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkı (self-determination), federal özerklik ve dahası merkezi devlet tarafından desteklenen Rus olmayan milletlere ulus inşası olanakları sağlıyordu.

Sovyetler Birliği'nin Lenin ve Stalin tarafından oluşturulan ulus politikası hiyerarşik olarak düzenlenmiş bir etnik federasyon biçiminde kurgulanıp hayata geçirildi. Erken dönemde hayata geçen bu kalıp (pattern) Sovyet etnisite rejiminin ana gövdesini oluşturmaktaydı. Üstten alta Sovyet birlik cumhuriyetleri, otonom cumhuriyetler, otonom bölgeler (provinces) ve otonom mahalli alanlar (districts) biçiminde düzenlenmiş etnisiteye dayalı özerklik, kültürel haklar ve özyönetim alanlarında da hiyerarşik bir hak dağıtımı yapıyordu. Birlik cumhuriyetleri statüsündeki milletler hiyerarşinin tepesinde yer aldıkları için en şanslı olanlarıydı. Sovyetler Birliği'nden, kağıt üzerinde kalsa da, ayrılma hakkından tutun da ana dilde eğitim yapan üniversitelere, yine Moskova'dan bağımsız bilimler akademisine, yerel dilde sinema ve tiyatro gibi yoğun olanaklara sahiplerdi. İkinci halkadaki Tataristan'ın da içinde olduğu özerk cumhuriyetler daha düşük Sovyet ulus inşasından yararlanmışlardı. Örneğin, Tatarlar Tatarca eğitim yapan bir üniversiteye sahip değildi. Kazan Devlet Üniversitesi'nin bazı sözel bölümleri dışında yüksek eğitimde Rusça zorunluluğu vardı. Ama yine de anadilde eğitim istenildiği takdirde lise son sınıfa kadar alabilmenin olanakları vardı. Sovyet devleti T. Martin'in bahsettiği üzere titular milletlerin anadillerini ve kültürlerini geliştirmek ve titular elitler yaratmak için yoğun devlet kaynağı kullanmıştı. İronik bir şekilde azınlık milliyetçiliğinin diri tutulması Perestroyka döneminde Sovyetleri yıkan ölümcül vuruşa sebep olacaktı.

Martin'in tanımladığı üzere "pozitif ayrımcılık imparatorluğu" Sovyetler Birliği, Stalin döneminde merkezîyetçi bir politikanın yörüngesine girdi. Kültürel özerklik

sayısı küçük etnik gruplarda ortadan kaldırılrsa da etnik federalizm modeli devam etti. Pozitif ayrımcılık dönemi Rus etno kültürünün daha görünür hale gelmesiyle son buldu. Ancak etnisite rejiminin genel yapısı da korunmaya devam edildi. İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesi ve sonrası Stalin sürgünleri, sürgüne uğruyan milletlerde, Kırım Tatarları ve Çeçenler gibi, ciddi travmalara yol açtı. Bu travmalar ancak Kruşçev dönemi rehabilitasyon politikalarıyla biraz olsun unutturulmaya çalışıldı.

Stalin sonrası dönemde, Kruşçev ve Brejnev dönemlerinde bazı küçük revizyonlarla Sovyet etnisite rejiminin devamlılığı gözlemlendi. Ş. Aktürk'ün belirttiği üzere etnisite rejimleri ekonomik patika bağlılığından çok daha kalıcı bir patika bağlılığı yaratmaktadır. Bu anlamda Sovyet etnisite rejimi Sovyet sonrası dönemde de aynı yapısal hattan ilerlemektedir. Dolayısıyla Kruşçev ve Brejnev dönemleri içindeki değişim bu yapısal sınırın altında değerlendirilmelidir. Kruşçev döneminin ana karakteristiği Rusça'nın etkisini arttıran eğitim reformuyla ve Sovyet halkı üst kimliğini görünür hale getirmesiyle özetlenebilir. Yalnız Sovyet halkı üst kimliği çok etnikli etnisite rejiminin baskısı altında pek de başarı sağlayamamıştır. Brejnev döneminde ise titular elitler uzun dönem iktidarda kalma şansı buldular. Bu döneme ait en temel özellik, titular elitlerin nomenklatura yapısı içinde güçlerini pekiştirmesi olmuştur.

Tez çalışmasının **Dördüncü Bölümü** Tatar politik tarihinin genel hatlarına, orta çağdan Sovyet modernizasyonuna kadar tanımlayıcı bir şekilde ilerlemektedir. Yukarıda anlatılan teorik temel ve Sovyet ulus politikalarının yapısal sınırları çerçevesinde Tatar tarihi, Tatar etnik-nomenklaturasının ve Tatar milli hareketinin taleplerini meşrulaştırmak için birçok kez referansta bulunduğu alanlardan biridir. Aslında tarih yazımı başlı başına politikleşmiş bir çabadır. Bu anlamda Tatar milliyetçileri ve yerel nomenklatura, Tatarların orta çağdaki Bulgar Devleti ve Kazan Hanlığı gibi devlet geleneklerine sık sık göndermelerde bulunurlar. Mongol mirası ve Cengiz Han'ın torunları şeklinde anılmak da Kıpçak merkezli Tatar tarih yazımının önemli boyutlarından biridir. Aslında Bulgarci ve Kıpçak olmak üzere iki ana Tatar tarihi tezi mevcuttur. Bulgarci Tatar tarihi tezi basitçe Kazan Hanlığı'nın kökenlerini Volga Bulgarlarına dayandırmaktadır. Kıpçak tezi ise Kazan Hanlığını'nın kökenlerini

Altın Orda soyundan gelen Tatarlara kadar dayandırmaktadır. 1960'lara kadar Sovyetler Birliği tarih kitapları Tatar tarihinde daha çok Bulgarcı tezi benimsemişti. Fakat 1960'lardan sonra modifiye edilmiş Kıpçak tarihçiler arasında etkisini arttırdı. Bu teze göre Kazan Tatarlarının kökeni Volga Bulgarları, Kıpçak Türkleri ve Moğolların etkileşiminden oluşmaktadır. Moğollar Volga bölgesine geldiğinde bölgedeki Kıpçak Türkleriyle karıştılar. Altın Orda'da oluşan Mongol-Kıpçak yönetici tabakası bölgede yaşayan Finno-Ugrik Volga Bulgarlarını dilsel ve politik açıdan asimilasyona uğrattılar ve bu etkileşimden Tatar etnogenesisi meydana gelmiş oldu. Modifiyeli Kıpçak tezi günümüz Tataristan'ında da resmi olarak desteklenen tarih tezidir.

Bulgar Devleti zamanında Tatarlar İslamiyeti kabul etmiştir. Bu tarihten beri din Tatar kimliğinin önemli bir parçası olarak günümüze kadar gelmiştir. Kazan Hanlığı'na geldiğimizde ise Tatar tarihinin altın çağıyla karşılaşmaktayız. Tatar milliyetçi söyleminde Kazan Hanlığı'nın her zaman önemli bir yeri olmuştur. Kazan Hanlığı 1552'deki çöküşüne kadar önemli bölgesel politik ve ticari bir merkez konumundaydı. 107 yıllık Kazan Hanlığı'nın önemli bir kısmı bağımsız bir devlet olarak geçmiştir. Kazan Hanlığı'nın Rus hakimiyetine girmesiyle beraber Ruslar tarafından seçilen elitler dışında sıradan Tatarlar, dini orta çağ segregasyonu ile karşı karşıya kaldılar. Tatarlara yönelik bu ayrımcılık II. Katerina dönemine kadar devam etti. II. Katerina'nın İslama pozitif yaklaşımı Çarlığın resmi dinlerinden birisi kabul etmesiyle beraber Tatar arasında yayılan dinsel rahatlama aynı zamanda Ceditçi dinde yenilik hareketinin de tohumlarını oluşturmuştur.

Ceditçilik 19. Yüzyılın ikinci yarısından 20. Yüzyılın başlarına kadarki bölümde Arap alfabesinde bir yeni metod olarak başlayıp, eğitim alanında modernist bir metod halini almıştır. Medrese ve mekteplerde Avrupalı modern metodların öğretilmeye başlaması, dini dogmaya karşı Tatar entellektüelleri arasında yeni bir modernleştirici dinamik yaratmıştır. Utiz İmani, Kursavi gibi düşünürlerce başlayan ilk nesil Ceditçi akım, 20. Yüzyılın başında politikleşmiştir. Yusuf Akçura, İsmail Gaspiralı, Galiman İbrahimov, Ayaz İshaki gibi Tatar entellektüelleri politikleşmiş Ceditçi akımın temsilcilerindendir. Tatar entellektüellerinin Ceditçilikten liberalizm ve milliyetçiliğe

eklemlenen düşünceleri 20. Yüzyılın başında popüler hale geldi. Bolşeviklerin kimlik politikasına eklemlenen bir sınıf politikası söylemini oluşturamaması, Tatar entellektüelleri arasında sosyalizm fikriyatının yaygınlaşmasını sağlayamamıştır. Bu yüzden birçok Tatar entellektüeli liberalizmin etkisi altında kaldı.

Bolşeviklerin iç savaşı kazanıp bölgede nüfuzlarını sağlamlaştırmalarıyla beraber İdil-Ural Devleti ve Tatar-Başkir Devleti gibi milliyetçi projeler uygulanma şansı bulamadı. Hiç şüphesiz Tatarlar ve Başkirler arasında olan rekabet birlikte oluşacak bir devletin doğmasına yapısal olarak da pek olanak tanımıyordu. Tataristan'ın Özerk Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti statüsüne alınması Tatar elitlerinde ciddi hayal kırıklıkları yaratmıştı. Bolşevikler Tataristan'a görece az bir toprak parçası vermiş, bunların ötesinde büyük oranda bir Tatar nüfusu komşu Başkurdistan'ın topraklarına bırakılmıştı. Elbette, Tataristan'ın Rusya içinde kalışı daha çok sınırlarda kümelenmiş milliyetlere verilen birlik cumhuriyeti statüsünden de mahrum kalmasında önemli bir nedendi. Bunun haricinde güçlü Tatar milliyetçiliğini dizginlemek de Bolşevik liderliğinin gizli bir ajandası olabilir. Bu tezin yazarı Sovyetlerin sınırlarının çizimindeki böl ve yönet tezinin ana belirleyici yöntem olduğuna karşı çıksa da, Bolşevik liderliğinin kafasında böyle bir şeyin hiç geçmediğine dayanan diğer karşıt kutup argümanlara da şüpheyile yaklaşmaktadır.

Sovyet dönemi Tataristan politikasıyla ilgili olarak, 1920'lerin sonlarına kadar uzanan yerleştirme (Koronizatsia) politikaları, Tatar devlet elitleri ve Moskova arasında uyumlu bir dönemin geçmesini sağlamıştı. Özerk otonomi statüsünün verdiği rahatsızlık ve küçük topraklı sınırlar meselesi çabuk unutulmuşa benziyordu. Zaten Tatar devlet elitleri Moskova tarafından atanması ve pozitif ayrımcılık politikaları sayesinde artan Tatar nüfuzu yönetimde ve lokal komünist partide uyumlu bir hat yaratmıştı. Sadece tek sıkıntıyı Sultangaliyev'in başını çektiği Marksizmin heterodoks bir yorumuna dayanan muhalefet oluşturuyordu. Sultan Galiyev, Latin Amerikan Bağımlılık Okulu örneğine benzeyen İslam, milliyetçilik ve sosyalizmin bir sentezine dayanan ve dahası emperyalizmin merkez-çevre ilişkisi üzerinden yarattığı ulusal bağlamdaki artı değer sömürsünü eleştiren bir hatta özgün bir eleştirel sosyalist düşünce yaratmıştı. Stalin yönetimi, Korenizatsia döneminin sonunda 1928 yılından

başlayarak Müslüman Komünistlere daha fazla hareket imkanı tanımayacak ve hepsini tasfiye edecekti. Bu tarihlerden Perestroyka dönemine kadar Tataristan ve Rusya ilişkilerinde herhangi bir dalgalanma olmadığını söylemek güç olmayacaktır. Sovyet müesses nizamı meşruluğuna meydan okumayacak şekilde Tataristan politikasını istikrarlı bir hatta tutmayı başardı.

Tez çalışmasının bu bölümünün son kısmı ise bölüm başında özet olarak verilen politik tarihin ardından, sosyolojik açıdan modernleşmenin Tataristan'daki etnisite arası ve etnisite içi ilişkilerine ve etkilerine ayrılmaktadır. Sovyet modernleşmesi sayesinde Tataristan hızla saniyeleşmiş ve Tatarlar arasındaki eğitim ve şehirleşme oranı hızla artmıştır. Ama yine Rusların, Tatarlara göre sosyal statü olarak bir adım önde olmaları devam etmiştir. Sergei Kondrashov'un belirttiği üzere sosyal tabaka modern Tataristan'da üç bölmede gerçekleşmekteydi. En alt tabakada mavi yakalı endüstriyel işçiler arasında yoğunlaşan bir Tatar nüfusu vardı. Ruslar ise beyaz yakalı, daha kalifiyeli işlerde istihdam edilmişlerdir. En üst kısımda ise Tatar etnik-nomenklaturası ve Tatar akademisyen ve entellektüelleri bulunmaktaydı. Yönetici katman içinde Tatarların Ruslara göre ciddi bir ağırlıkta bulunmaktaydı. Akademide doğa bilimi merkezli bölümlerde yine Ruslar ağırlıklıyken, sosyal bilimlerde ise Tatar entellektüellerinin ağırlığı hissediliyordu. Şehirli Tatar nüfusu arasında özel alanda bile Rusça'nın kullanımı çok yaygındı. Tatarca ancak kırsal alanda etkisini hissettirebiliyordu. Bu anlamda Şehirli ve kırsal Tatarlar arasında bir kimlik gerilimi her zaman vardı. Ruslar arasında Tatarca bilme oranının kırsal Rus nüfusunda bile yüzde 2'den fazla değildi. Bu anlamda Tatarlar birlik cumhuriyetlerinin gerisinde kamusal alanda yerel dil kullanımına sahiptiler. Bütün bu şehirli Tatar nüfusunun dilsel ve kültürel açıdan Rus kültürü içinde asimilasyonu ve de kır-şehir gerilimi Perestroyka döneminde yükselecek etnik hareketliliğin şekline de çeşitli düzeylerde yön verecekti.

Beşinci Bölüm, yukarda sırasıyla belirtilen teorik çerçeve, Sovyet ulus politikalarının yapısal mirası, Tatar tarih yazımı ve modernleşmenin etkilerini göz önüne alarak 1988-1994 dönemleri arasındaki etnik mobilizasyonunun yükselişi ve düşüşünü anlamlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Arka plan olarak Sovyetler Birliği'nin Gorbaçov dönemindeki son politik gelişmelere ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasına odaklanan

bölüm, daha sonra Tatar ulusal hareketinin kuruluşuna ve yükselişine odaklanır. Tatar etnik-nomenklaturası, Tatar ulusal hareketi ve Demokratik Muhalefet arasındaki geçen rekabet ve aktörler arası ilişkiler bu bölümde kronolojik olarak analiz edilmiştir. Daha sonra etnik mobilizasyonun düşüşünün nedenlerine yer veren bölüm, son olarak yukarıda adı geçen üç hareketin ulus söylemlerini açıklamaktadır.

1980'lerin başlarından itibaren Sovyet ekonomisi ciddi bir durağanlıkla karşı karşıya kalmıştı. Batı bloğunun üstünlüğü Sovyet kurulu düzeni tarafından kabul edilmişti. Ekonomide ve politikada bir dizi reformun gerekliliği can alıcı bir hal almıştı. Gorbaçov'un 1985 yılında Sovyetler Birliği liderliğine gelişi ile bu reform süreci ekonomik, politik, kültürel ve uluslararası ilişkiler alanlarında başlatıldı. Uluslararası ilişkilerde, ABD ile büyük bir yumuşama ve Sovyetlerin Doğu Avrupa'daki nüfuz alanının terkedilmesi politikaları izlendi. Politik ve kültürel anlamda Glasnot (Açıklık) politikalarıyla Sovyet sansürü büyük oranda kültürel alandan çekildi. Demokratikleşme meselesinde de bir dizi politik reform gözlemlendi. Bütün bunlardan daha önemlisi ise hiç şüphesiz ekonomik anlamda atılan NEP politikalarının modern bir versiyonu şeklinde kamuoyuna tanıtılan ekonomiyi devletçi ekonomiden sınırlı düzeyde piyasaya ve küçük işletmelere açma adımları ortaya çıktı. İlginç bir şekilde Gorbaçov ulus meselesiyle pek ilgilenmemişti. Ona göre ulus meselesi çoktan çözülmüştü. Ulus meselesinin Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışında kilit rol oynayacağı birkaç sene içinde açığa çıkmıştır. 1987'de imkansız olarak görülen Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışı 1990'da kesinleşmiş gibiydi.

Öncelikle çevresel sorunlar üzerinde örgütlenen ulusal hareketler Sovyet ekonomik reformunun, Perestroyka'nın (Yeniden İnşa) başarısız olmasıyla kısa bir zaman diliminde politikleşmeye başlamıştır. Hiç şüphesiz politik açıklık ve sansürün ortadan kalkması Sovyet kurulu düzenine muhalefet etmek için muhaliflere büyük cesaret kaynağı olmuştur. Sovyetler Birliği, ortodoks komünistlerin Gorbaçov'a darbe girişiminin başarısız olması ve Yeltsin'in Sovyet liderliğinde rakipsiz kalmasıyla çöküşü kesinleşmişti. Baltık Devletlerinden gelen milliyetçi dalga da bu çöküşte diğer birlik cumhuriyetlerini de bu dalgada sürükleyerek son öldürücü darbeyi vurmuştu. İşte Tatar ulusal hareketi ve etnik-milliyetçi nomenklatura liderliği Tataristan'da bu

milliyetçi dalgasının ve merkezi otoritenin dağılmasının yaptığı koşullarda ortaya çıkmıştı.

Tatar ulusal hareketinin Tataristan'ın özerk cumhuriyet statüsünden dolayı milliyetçi dalgada birlik cumhuriyetlerine göre yapısal olarak dezavantajlı bir konumu vardı. Ancak, milliyetçi dalgada buz kırıcı Baltık ulusal hareketlerinin gittiği yoldan ilerlemeleri, onları takip etmeleri açısından ise avantajlı bir pozisyona da sahiptiler. Tatar elitleri, milliyetçi dalga'nın başlamasıyla Sovyet egemenliğini kültürel ve ekolojik alanda çok geçmeden sorgulamaya başladılar. Ana şikayet alanları ekolojik tahribat, Tatar dilinin az gelişmişliği ve Tatarca'nın eğitim dili olarak kalitesizliğine odaklanmıştı. Nizhnekamsk şehrinde ekolojik topluluk 1987 yılında açıldı. Kazan'da 1987 yazında ilk ekolojik miting gösterisi yapıldı. Ekolojik muhalefet Tataristan'da planlanan biyokimyasal fabrikaya ve nükleer santrale karşı kampanyalar düzenledi. Geleceğin bir çok Tatar milliyetçi aktivistleri bu kampanyalarda boy göstermişlerdi. Faruze Bayramova, geleceğin *İttifak* hareketinin lideri, bunlardan başlıcalarıydı.

1988 yılında çevre hareketlerinin politikleşmesi açısından iki olay yaşandı. Birincisi, kurulan Halk Cephesi idi. Halk Cephesi Tataristan'ın politik ve ekonomik egemenliğini yükseltmek için birlik cumhuriyeti statüsü talep ediyordu. Ancak hareket, Tatar devlet elitleriyle sorunlu bir ilişki içinde olduğundan kitleselleşmeden sönmüldü. 1988 güzünde ise, Tatar ulusal hareketin ana resmi organizasyonu Tatar Halk Merkezi (TOTs) (Tatar Public Center) kuruldu. Kazan Devlet Üniversitesi'nin Dil, Edebiyat ve Tarih enstitülerinden gelen akademisyenler TOTs'un ana kurucularını oluşturuyordu. TOTs'un tüzük kongresi 1989 şubatında yapıldı. Milliyetçi ama aynı zamanda liberal ve demokratik bir hat, program ve tüzük olarak kabul edildi. Mintimer Shaimiev (Şaymiyev) liderliğindeki Tatar devlet elitleri kuruluş yıllarında TOTs'a yakın bir çizgide duruyor ve hatta TOTs kamu kurumlarını rahatlıkla kullanıyor ve Shaimiev tarafından destekleniyordu. Hatta Rustam Gibadullin, TOTs'un Naberezhnye Chelny (Yarçalı) liderlerinden, Rustam Gibadullin TOTs'un Genel Başkanı Marat Mulatov'un Shaimiev'in adamı olduğunu kendisiyle yaptığım mülakatta belirtmiştir. Bu anlamda, etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturanın Kazan'da TOTs üzerinde yoğun bir etkisi olduğu söylenebilir. Örneğin TOTs'un ideologlarından

Rafael Khakimov çok geçmeden Shaimiev'in danışmanı olacaktı. TOTs'un ana amacı Tatarların milli, ekonomik, politik ve kültürel haklarını geliştirmek olarak tanımlanıyordu. Birlik cumhuriyeti olarak Tatar Sovyet Cumhuriyeti seviyesine yükselmek; Tatarca'nın ve Rusça'nın anayasal gelişimini sağlamak; Tatar milletinin tüm Sovyet toprakaları içerisinde kültürel ve dilsel gelişiminin kaydedilmesi; TOTs programının önemli başlıklarından birkaçıydı.

1990 yazına gelindiğinde Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki gelişmelerden kaynaklı olarak Tataristan'da politik tansiyon giderek artmaya başlıyordu. Tataristan'ın egemenlik ilanı meselesi Tataristan'daki üç aktör arasındaki kutuplaşmayı arttırdı. Etnik-milliyetçi nomenklatura Moskova'yla köprüleri atmamak için özerk cumhuriyetten birlik cumhuriyetine geçiş konseptinde bir egemenlik deklarasyonu tasarlıyordu. TOTs'un radikal milliyetçi kanadı egemenliğin bağımsız devlete kadar uzatılmasını istiyordu. Etnik olarak Rus ağırlık Demokratik Muhalefet ise Rusya'dan ayrılma meselesine sertçe karşıydı. Bu arada Yeltsin de Gorbaçov'u zayıflatmak için Tataristan'ın egemenlik taleplerini destekliyordu. Sonunda 1990 ağustosunda Tataristan, sembolik olarak kalsa da Tataristan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti olduğunu ilan etti.

1990 yazından 1991 yazındaki darbe teşebbüsüne kadar geçen zamanda etnik mobilizasyon yükselmeye devam ediyordu. TOTs sembolik egemenliği gerçek egemenliğe çevirmek için tutkuluydu. Tatar ulusal hareketinin radikal kanadından bir kesim egemenliği hayata geçirmek için Egemenlik Komitesi (Committee of Suvernitet) adında bir organizasyon altında örgütlenmeye başladılar. Aynı şekilde Demokratik Muhalefet de güçleniyordu. Yerel parlamentoda Naradovvlasi (Halkın Gücü) adında bir meclis grubu oluşturuyorlardı. Vlademir Belyaev'in liderliğindeki Soglasie (Uzlaşma) hareketi ise Demokratik Muhalefet içinde etkisini hızla arttırmıştı. Belyaev'in şemsiye hareketi liberal-demokratik bireyci bir politik hat izlemekteydi. Tataristan'ın Rusya'dan ayrılmasının kesinlikle halka bir referandumla sorulması gerektiğini savunuyordu. Soglasie, yerel nomenklatura ile ise ciddi bir gerilim içindeydi. Şubat 1991'de TOTs'un ikinci kongresi yapıldı. İlimli akım radikal milliyetçilere karşı tekrar bir üstünlük elde etmişti. Rusya Federal Sovyet Sosyalist

Cumhuriyeti başkanlık seçimi ise yeni tartışmaları Tataristan politikasında beraberinde getirdi. TOTs seçimlere katılamamak gerektiğini savunuyordu. Demokratik Muhalefet seçimlere katılıp Yeltsin'i desteklemeyi planlıyordu. Etnik-milliyetçi nomenklatura ise sonunda Rusya başkanlık seçiminin Tataristan'da yapılmasını kabul etti, ancak seçimi boykot etmekte karar kıldı ve aynı güne Tataristan başkanlık seçimlerini de koydu. Shaimiev yüzde 66 oy alarak başkan seçildi. Yeltsin ise boykotun etkisinde yüzde 37 oy alabildi. Böylece Rusya başkanlık seçimi Tataristan'da kadük kaldı.

Ağustos 1991'den 1992 yazına kadar geçen süre ise Shaimiev iktidarda en kırılgan dönemini atlattı. Shaimiev Moskova'daki ortodoks komünistlerin organize ettiği darbe girişimini destekledi. Darbenin başarısız olmasıyla beraber de Tataristan'da eleştiri oklarını kendine çekti. Demokratik Muhalefet Shaimiev'in istifasını talep ediyordu. Tatar milliyetçileri ise Shaimiev'i desteklemekle beraber onu kaotik zamanlarda radikal hamlelere itebilmenin hesaplarını yapıyordu. Kazan'ın Korkunç Ivan tarafından alınmasının yıldönümünde Tatar milliyetçileri parlamentonun bağımsızlık ilan etmesi için Tataristan Parlementosu'nu kuşattı. Vladimir Belyaev'e göre kuşatmanın organize edilmesinde Shaimiev'in parmağı da vardı. Shaimiev Moskova ve Yeltsin karşısında darbe olayından dolayı düşen prestijini Tatar ulusal hareketinin radikal kanadını mobilize ederek, Moskova'ya kendisi giderse gelecek olanların ayrılıkçı milliyetçiler olacağı mesajını vermek istiyordu. Tatar ulusal hareketi ise alternatif Milli Meclis gibi hareketlenmelere girişse de Shaimiev'in karşında dişe dokunur bir alternatif sunamayarak, aslında kendileri için kritik bir yılı boşa geçirmiş oldular. Aslında yapısal sınırlamalardan dolayı alternatif yaratmaya ne bir güçleri ne de bir motivasyonları vardı. 1992'nin yazına gelindiğinde Shaimiev'in etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturası transformasyon yıllarını başarıyla geçmişti ve iktidarını korumuştı. Artık Tatar ulusal hareketine de ihtiyacı kalmamıştı. Rusya içinde kalma ama yoğun asimetrik özerklik elde etme, etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturanın temel hedefi haline geldi. Bu andan itibaren de Tatar milliyetçilerine verilen kamusal destek çekildi. TOTs'un liberal ılımlı kanadının da politikaya ilgisizleşerek TOTs'dan ayrılmasıyla TOTs içinde sadece kitle desteği çok sınırlı olan radikal milliyetçiler kaldı ve onlar da giderek marjinalleşmeye başladı. 1994'teki Şubat antlaşmasıyla Tataristan'ın fiili

özerkliği resmileşince Tatar milliyetçilerin son kalıntıları da siyaset sahnesini terketti. Bir anda düşen bu etnik mobilizasyona hiç şüphesiz neo-liberal şok terapinin yarattığı kamudan beklentinin kalmaması ve yoğun yoksulluk hali de etken olmuştu.

Altıncı Bölüm egemenliğin yükselişi ve düşüşü sürecini Tataristan örneğinde incelemektedir. Egemenlik meselesi aslında etnik mobilizasyonla iç içe geçmiş bir süreçtir. Bu anlamda durağan değil dinamik bir kavramdır. Bu çalışmada egemenlik meselesine makro bir perspektifle yer verildi. Tataristan'ın yaklaşık son 25 yıllık Sovyet sonrası dönüşümü geniş bir zaman diliminde anlamlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Egemenlik yükselişi ve düşüşü mevzusu Yeltsin dönemi 1990'lar ve Putinli 2000-2015 yılları arası dönemde incelendi. Yeltsin dönemi Rus devlet kapasitesinin düşmesi ve Tataristan'ın asimetrik federalizminin güçlenip kökleşmesi bakımından, bu tez çalışmasında Tataristan egemenliğinin yükselişi olarak değerlendirildi. Putin dönemi ise Rus devletinin tekrar güçlenen devlet kapasitesi ve buna eşgüdümlü olarak dikey güç politikasının hayata geçmesiyle otonom cumhuriyetlerin hepsinde ve Tataristan'da egemenliğin budanması yılları oldu. Sovyetler Birliği dönemindekine çok benzeyen bir sahte federasyon yapısı tekrar Rus federalizminin varoluşsal özelliği haline geldi. Bu noktada ilginç bir şekilde Tatar etnik-nomenklaturası yeni dikey güç rejimine adapte oldu. 1990'ların egemenlik söylemi yerini Moskova'dan yatırım peşinde koşan Tatar devlet elitlerine bıraktı. Elbette egemenlik talebinden politik rantiyeciliğe uzanan süreçte etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturanın kendi elit güçlerini ve zenginliklerini koruma ve geliştirme gelenekleri belirleyici oldu.

Devlet kapasitesi kavramı aslında tarihsel sosyolojinin ve uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinlerinin çalışma alanlarını kesen kompleks bir kavramdır. Bu tezde kavramın zenginliğinin gösterilmesiyle beraber daha çok kavram, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında ele alındı. Migdal ve George'nin aktardığı üzere devlet kapasitesi bir devletin topluma girme, sosyal ilişkileri düzenleme, kaynakları çıkarma ve bunları belirli şekillerde ölçme tanımıdır. Bu anlamda Kişi başına düşen milli gelir (GDP per capita), suç indeksi, demokrasi indeksi gibi ölçümlerin devlet kapasitesini göstermedeki istatistiki olanaklar da tez çalışmasında belirtilmiştir.

1990'lar boyunca Rusya büyük bir ekonomik durgunlukla ve sosyal moral çöküntüyle karşı karşıya gelmişti. Bu durumdan da yararlanan bölgeler ve otonom cumhuriyetler özerklik alanlarını genişletmeyi başarmışlardı. 1994 Şubat antlaşmasıyla Tataristan, Rusya'dan sadece kendisine özgü önemli özerklik ayrıcalıkları elde etti. İkili antlaşmalarla federal ilişkileri düzenleme politikası Yeltsin döneminde bölgelerle 46 ikili antlaşma yapılmasına neden oldu. Bölgelerin ve otonom cumhuriyetlerin yerel devlet kapasitelerinin pazarlık payının da etkili olduğu bu antlaşmalarla beraber federal anayasanın yetki alanı ve meşruluğu noktasında ciddi karmaşalar yaşanmaya başlamıştı. Otonom cumhuriyetler ve bölgeler ise merkezden kazandıkları tavizleri kendi nomenklatura ağları içinde elit güçlerinin konsolidasyonu ve bireysel zenginleşme için harcıyordu. Dolayısıyla yerelde demokratik katılım eksikliğinden dolayı bölgesel derebeylikler olarak tabir edilen bir sistem meydana geliyordu. Tataristan bu sistem içinde en güçlü örneklerden biri haline gelmişti.

1990'lar boyunca Tataristan kendine özgü bir dizi ekonomik program izledi. Bunlardan en başarılısı Şok Terapi'nin etkilerini de bir nebze azaltabilen, Pazara Yumuşak Giriş ekonomi modeliydi (Soft entrance into market). Tatar elitleri birçok federal mülkiyeti özerk mülkiyete geçirdikten sonra bunları özelleştirilmesinde ayak diredi. Bu anlamda birçok kamu kurumu Tatar nomenklaturasının kontrolü altında kaldı. İlk yıllarda Tatar halkı bu durumdan az da olsa pay alıp, refah düzeyleri Rusya'nın geri kalanından 90'ların ilk yarısında iyi olsa da 90'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren yoğunlaşan özelleştirme etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturayı inanılmaz derecede zenginleştirdi. Kuşkusuz Tataristan'ın zengin petrol ve gaz kaynakları ve Tatneft'in Shaimiev ailesi tarafından özelleştirme yoluyla kontrolü Tataristan'da nomenklatura patronajının yayılıp güçlenmesine yol açtı. 90'ların sonunda Roysi'nin de belirttiği üzere Tataristan ekonomisinin yüzde 70'i Shaimiev nomenklatura ağı tarafından kontrol ediliyordu. Putin'in iktidara gelişi elit zenginleşmesinin önünü kesme de 90'ların söylenen feodalizmini başka bir uçta, aşırı merkezileşmeyle çözmüş olacaktı.

Putin'in 2000 yılında iktidara gelişi federal merkez ve bölgeler arası ilişkileri yoğun bir şekilde değiştirdi. Putin'in ilk hamlesi federal anayasa ve Rus yasalarıyla çelişen bölgesel yasalara eğilmek oldu. Federal merkezle, bölgeler ve otonom cumhuriyetler

arasındaki çelişme yüzde 20 dolaylarında devasa bir hukuksal karmaşa yaratmıştı. Dolayısıyla Moskova'nın bölgeleri yasal düzeyde hizaya çekmesi “Kanunun Diktatörlüğü” şeklinde de literatürde tanımlandı. Putin'in bir diğer merkeziyetçi hamlesi ise Rusya'yı 7 bölgeye ayırmak oldu. Böylece bu yerlere atanan süper valiler, bölgeler ve otonom cumhuriyetler üzerinde Moskova'nın kontrolünü sıkılaştırdı. Moskova'nın merkezileştirici müdahalesi 2000'ler boyunca öyle bir hal aldı ki, bölgelerde doğrudan Moskova'ya bağlı yönetim bürokrasisi o bölgenin veya otonom cumhuriyetin sayıca kendi bürokratik üyelerini bile geride bıraktı.

Beslan katliamını da bölgelerdeki aşırı merkezileşme politikasına fırsat bilen Putin rejimi, otonom cumhuriyetlerde başkanların seçimle gelme mekanizmasını da kaldırdı. Ama yine de bölgesel dengeleri gözeterik görevine devam eden başkanları tekrar atadı. Medvedev döneminde bölgesel ve özerk cumhuriyetlerin yönetilerinin tasfiyesi gerçekleştirildi. Tataristan'da Mintimer Shaimev devlet başkanlığı görevini Rustam Minnikhanov'a bıraktı. Bu noktada, kritik olan mesele diğer bölge ve cumhuriyetlerin elitlerinin yerine yeni elitlerin atanmış olmasıdır. Tataristan'da ise Minnikhanov, Shamiev'in etnik-milliyetçi nomenklatura ağının bir parçasıydı. Bu anlamda Tataristan'da eski elit ağı darbe yememiş oldu. Putin döneminde başlayan aşırı merkeziyetçi politikalara Rus yöneticiler tarafından bir başka verilen isim ise ‘Dikey İktidar’dır (Vertical Power). Dikey iktidarın bölgelerde ve cumhuriyetlerde kurumsal genişlemesinin yanında ekonomik ilişkiler de özerkliğini yitirdi. Vergi yasaları değiştirilerek, bölgelerden merkeze aktarılan vergilerde Moskova lehine düzenlemeler getirildi. Moskova'nın düzenlediği birleşik vergi sistemi Tataristan'ın ekonomik egemenliğine ağır darbe vurdu. Moskova yeni vergi sistemini ve ekonomik özerkliğe vurduğu darbeyi federal ödeneklerle telafi etti, ki bu federal ödenekler Rus ekonomisinin petrol fiyatlarının yükselmesiyle bağlı olarak güçlenen ekonomisinden ayrılan önemli meblağlara tekabül ediyordu. Ama yine de Tataristan, Moskova'nın federal ödeneklerine bağlı hale gelmiş oluyordu.

Tatar etnik-milliyetçi elitleri aşırı merkezileşmeye ekonomik egemenliğin son bulmasına, yeterli tepki göstermemekle beraber, bilakis yeni koşullara hızla adapte oldu. Moskova'dan federal ödenek ve yatırım arayışları yeni dönemde Tatar elitlerinin

eski egemenlik, federalizm söylemlerini bir kenara bırakmalarına sebep olacaktı. Bu dönemde Kazan'ın 1000. Kuruluş yılı etkinlikleri, Universiad gibi etkinlikler Tataristan'ın Moskova'dan federal ödenek bulması ve bu ödeneklerin bir bölümünü altyapı hizmetlerine ayırmalarına vesile oldu. Kazan'ın uluslararası görünürlüğü ve turizm gelirleri 2000'li yılların ortasından itibaren sürekli arttı. Ama bir bütün olarak 90'larda yaklaşılan batılı anlamda bir federalizm ihtimali Putin rejiminin aşırı merkeziyetçi müdahaleleri ve Tatar etnik-milliyetçi elitinin sürece pragmatik uyumu sebebiyle ortadan kalktı. Geline son aşamada, Tataristan'daki egemenlik yoğun bir düşme kaydetmiştir. Hatta politik egemenlik nosyonu çökmüştür. Sovyet federalizminin bir tür devamı olan kültürel otonomi tandanslı bir tür özerk yönetim devam etmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez çalışması etnik mobilizasyon ve egemenlik kavramlarının yükselişi ve düşüşünü Tataristan ve Rus federalizmi örnekleminde incelemiştir. Rusya-Avrasya çalışmaları literatüründe 1988-1992 arası etnik mobilizasyon meselesine odaklanan çalışmalar vardır: S. Kondrashov, R. Gibadullin, E. Giuliano'nun çalışmaları bunların önemli örneklerindendir. Ayrıca etnik mobilizasyonu da bazı çalışmalarda kapsayarak egemenlik meselesine karşılaştırmalı çerçevede odaklanan önemli çalışmalar da mevcuttur: D. Gorenburg, M. Beissinger ve J. George gibi. Ancak bu çalışma egemenlik ve etnik mobilizasyon kavramlarının ikisine de Tataristan örneğinde odaklanan literatürdeki ilk çalışmadır. Bunun yanında, hem batı merkezci kavramlarla Rusya Federalizmini anlamaya çalışan bu anlamda da Tataristan içsel otoriter dinamiklerini göremeyen çalışmalara da bir eleştiri niteliğindedir. Aynı şekilde bazı Rus yazarların Tataristan'daki yerel otoriterleşmeyi eleştirirken bir bütün olarak çoğunluk ulus yanlısı tavır alıp federalizm ve özerklik prensiplerinin sorun olduğunu düşünen argümanlarla da mesafelidir. Bu anlamda, yukarıda bahsedilen iki zıt kutba karşı da aynı zamanda alternatif, literatürde üçüncü bir pozisyon yaratma çabasındadır. Tez çalışmasının araştırma bulguları göstermiştir ki: Tatar etnik-milliyetçi nomenklaturası gerek Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının arifesinde olsun ve gerek Sovyet sonrası dönemde olsun elit çıkarını ön plana almışlardır. Putin'in aşırı merkeziyetçi politikalarına çok hızlı bir şekilde adaptasyon bu pragmatizmin en önemli göstergelerinden biridir. Rusya federalizminin genel

durumu ise, dikey güçle istikrarını sağlamış, informal ilişkilerle yerel elitlerin Moskova'ya bağlılığı üzerinden bölgesel ilişkilerde bir istikrar sağlamış gibi gözükse de bu Rusya'da ulusal azınlık meselesinin bittiği anlamına gelmemelidir. Unutulmamalıdır ki azınlık etnik kimliğine bağlılık ve azınlık milliyetçiliği, merkezi devlet kapasitesinin zayıfladığı ve yerel tatminsizliğin arttığı durumlarda yeniden hatırlanabilir. Rusya'nın kırılgan ekonomisi ve otoriter politik rejimi şu an etnik meselede kontrolü tamamen elinde tutuyor gözükse bile gelecekte doğabilecek böyle bir ihtimalden tamamen kurtulmuş gibi görünmemektedir.



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TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

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