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Mustafa Türkeş

A PATRIOTIC LEFTIST DEVELOPMENT-STRATEGY PROPOSAL IN TURKEY IN THE 1930s: THE CASE OF THE KADRO (CADRE) MOVEMENT

This article attempts to make a contribution to the intellectual history of the early Turkish Republic through an examination of *Kadro*, a monthly journal of political, economic, and social ideas, which was published in Turkey between 1932 and 1934.[1] The Kadro movement took its name from the journal *Kadro*; the journal aspired to fulfill two self-appointed tasks: to develop an ideological framework in which to interpret the Turkish revolution that had created the republican regime led by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,[2] and to suggest economic policies that, in accordance with this ideological framework, the regime should pursue in the future. Although *Kadro* clearly identified itself with the republican regime, and although its publication was sanctioned and encouraged by leaders of the Kemalist regime (the same political leadership that eventually forced *Kadro* to cease publication), it was not a simple emanation of the government or of the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP). Most of the journal's regular writers had "leftist" backgrounds that had, on occasion, brought them into collision with the republican authorities. *Kadro*'s political loyalty to the regime was never in question, but within these limits, it exhibited a striking degree of intellectual independence.

There is ample evidence to suggest that *Kadro*'s publication took place at a time when the republican regime was engaged in a partial re-examination and re-orientation of its policies. From 1923 to 1929, the ruling RPP pursued "liberal" economic policies, which then followed protectionist economic policies when the Great Economic Depression of 1929 started to bite the Turkish economy. The 1929 Great Economic Depression forced the Turkish government to re-examine its economic policies; thus, the RPP tended to search for a new orientation in economic spheres.

In addition to the RPP's search for new economic policies, Atatürk, president and the leader of the RPP, ordered his close friend Fethi Okyar to set up an opposition party. Okyar set up the Free Republican Party (FRP) in August 1930, which planned to pursue economic liberalism if the FRP came to power. However, it is difficult to

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judge to what extent this party would advocate economic liberalism, because it did not survive long. Okyar himself decided to abolish the party in November 1930, perhaps fearing that it would cause collisions between himself and President Atatürk, who was, at the same time, the leader of the RPP. Given the fact that the Great Depression of 1929 had already made itself felt, the FRP could not, in any case, have advocated economic liberalism if it had survived longer.

In July 1932, the ruling RPP decided to implement an import-substituting industrialization policy and launched the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan in 1933. The RPP's economic policies, known as etatism, would last until the outbreak of World War II; thereafter, it was modified. Politically, too, the RPP was in search of a new orientation. It was not until the third congress of the ruling RPP, in 1931, that the party produced a proper written program. From its formation in 1923 to its second congress in 1927, the party had been governed by regulations adopted on 9 September 1923; from 1927 to the third congress, it was governed by the new regulations adopted at the second congress.[3] The second congress formally adopted the principles of republicanism, nationalism, and populism; the third congress added the principles of secularism, revolutionism, and etatism. These six principles became the RPP's "Six Arrows," which, in 1937, were inserted to the Turkish Republic's constitution.

These principles, as formulated in 1931 and as expanded in 1935, were adopted with no lengthy public discussions. There is no need to go through the meaning of each of the six principles; for present purposes, it suffices to note that the meanings of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, and revolutionism reflected the establishment of a republican, secular Turkish nation-state and do not appear to have provoked much discussion within the ruling Kemalist regime. However, the meaning of etatism did provoke much discussion in the RPP and among intellectuals of the time, in particular between the third (1931) and the fourth (1935) RPP congresses. Thereafter, discussion died down until after World War II.[4]

The third congress of the RPP in 1931 defined etatism as follows:

> Although considering private activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.

At the fourth congress of the RPP in 1935, however, the following paragraph was added:

> The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to encourage private enterprise, and also to regulate and control the work that is being done. The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interests of the nation. If the enterprise, which the State itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the enactment of a law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify the loss sustained by the private enterprise as a result of this appropriation. In estimation of the loss, the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration.[5]

Although in July 1932 the RPP started to implement etatist economic policies, it is clear that there were differing views within the ruling party. From the third to the

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fourth RPP congresses, differing views became clear within the political leadership over the meaning of etatism, in particular, between two factions of RPP, conventionally known as the İş Bank (Business Bank group), an interest group led by Celal Bayar, and the bureaucratic group led by İsmet Inönü, Prime Minister. It would be appropriate to go through the differing views within the ruling RPP. It is clear that the two groups agreed on the two broad principles: that private enterprises should continue to be a fundamental part of Turkey's economy, and that the state should take an active part in industrial investment. However, the two groups gave differing emphases to each of these principles. The İsmet Inönü group argued that in order to lead the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible, in addition to encouraging private initiatives, the state should take an active part in its economic life, and the government should have necessary rights to regulate private enterprises.[6]

The İş Bank group, on the other hand, argued that there should be a limit to the state's role in the economy. This group criticized the state for neglecting private enterprise and the etatist hierarchy for being inefficient and bureaucratic. The İş Bank group's interpretation of etatism was somewhat peculiar: "etatism begins where private enterprise stops."[7] Although the İş Bank group identified itself as an advocate of economic liberalism, its argument evidently did not have much to do with liberalism in the strict sense of the concept, because it favored the heavy protection of local manufacturing and strongly supported the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry, which had granted extensive privileges to the private sector.

It is significant that aside from the tax exemptions and privileges granted to private enterprise by the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry, banking appears to have been the main source of capital for the private sector.[8] Some twenty-eight private banks had been established in the 1920s, but only the İş Bank, which had been initiated by President Atatürk in 1924 and had Celal Bayar as its general director, had nationwide branches. In the 1930s, the İş Bank played a major role in the railway system; the lumber industry; coal production; the sugar, textile, and glass industries; and insurance companies. In the sugar industry, the İş Bank acted as the representative of the private sector, together with the state banks. In the 1930s, the İş Bank also cooperated with the Sümerbank in the exploitation of the Keçiborlu sulfur mines. In addition to supplying credit for trade and industry, the İş Bank played an important role in imports and exports.[9]

The extent of the political influence of the İş Bank group became clear in September 1932. Earlier that year, the "July Laws" had been introduced, preparing a foundation for etatist policies and reducing the privileges previously enjoyed by private enterprise.[10] The outstanding feature of the July Laws of 1932 was that the activities and authorities of the Bank for Industry and Mining, which had been set up in 1925, were divided in two: the State Office for Industry was granted responsibility for the organization and planning of state and private industry, and the Industrial Credit Bank was granted responsibility for financing state industry. This caused considerable resentment among the İş Bank group, because, according to the new law, the State Office for Industry was to have almost absolute control over the direction of state enterprises and was given extensive rights in deciding whether private companies should enter any field of industrial activity. The State Office for Industry was also given the right to supervise existing private enterprises. Finally, this law granted the

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State Office for Industry the right to decide forms of partnership between state and private enterprise, and the State Office for Industry furthermore had the right to transfer profitable private enterprises to state ownership.[11] In sum, the established partnership between the İş Bank group and state enterprises was in danger. In the same month that the July Laws were enacted, the İş Bank group put forward a project to establish a paper factory and asked the Ministry of Economy for credit. Mustafa Şeref Özkan, the minister of economy, refused, after consulting with Prime Minister İsmet Inönü, on the grounds that a paper industry should remain within the framework of state entrepreneurship. All these discussions were referred to President Atatürk, who confirmed that the İş Bank group should not be granted the right to set up a paper factory, but who also dismissed Minister of Economy Mustafa Şeref Özkan, replacing him with Celal Bayar on 9 September 1932. In Turkish historiography, this is called the "Yalova operation."[12] Until this appointment, Celal Bayar had served as general director of the İş Bank. The İş Bank group quickly found Bayar's ministerial attitude sympathetic. He favored amending the July Laws, and in June 1933, the State Office for Industry and the Industrial Credit Bank were abolished and replaced by the Sümerbank, freeing the private sector once more to establish partnerships with state enterprises.[13] In 1937, Bayar was appointed prime minister, replacing Inönü—seemingly, a further victory for the İş Bank group and its views on etatism, though one that did not prove lasting: following Atatürk's death in November 1938, Inönü became president, and Bayar was soon removed from the premiership.[14] In 1946, Bayar, who so far had served as an RPP member of Parliament, would form the main opposition party, the Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950. Bayar became president and held that position until the party was removed from office by the 1960 coup d'etat.

The fact that most important discussion on the meaning of etatism occurred between 1931 and 1935 is of some significance, because it was during this period—from 1932 to 1934—that the journal *Kadro* was published by a group of patriotic leftist intellectuals. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,[15] the ideologue of the *Kadro* movement; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu,[16] the legal licensee; Vedat Nedim Tör,[17] editor; and Ismail Hüsrev Tökin[18] and Burhan Asaf Belge,[19] regular contributers, set out to promote serious discussions on ideology and economic-development strategy. It was not simply that *Kadro* participated in these discussions, but, more important, that *Kadro* appointed itself to undertake the task of developing a theoretical framework to interpret the Turkish revolution and to propose a development strategy. The Kadro movement has already been the subject of a number of scholarly studies, which are reviewed in detail in my article, "A Critique of Studies of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement."[20] As I argue there, the previous studies do not exhaust the subject. For one thing, they present widely differing assessments of *Kadro*, which, in the case of some authors, appear to reflect widely differing political prejudices. For another, several of the studies are under-researched, relying on a limited range of secondary sources and memoirs. Few appear to have been based on a thorough examination of the contents of *Kadro* throughout its publication. As a result, several of *Kadro*'s more important arguments and proposals have been overlooked or misinterpreted, particularly on the subjects of ideology and development strategy.

The importance of *Kadro* lay in part in its intellectual originality, which derived in

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part from the journal's attempt, though not convincing, to elaborate a "third way" between capitalism and socialism. At least as important, however, was the originality of *Kadro*'s sources of intellectual inspiration, many of which were previously unknown to intellectual discussion and debate in Turkey. These included a variety of strands of socialist thought, some derived directly from the Soviet Union, as well as from the teachings of certain German economic and social thinkers. In another article, "The Ideology of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey,"[21] I examine *Kadro*'s five possible sources of inspiration; its critiques of capitalism, socialism, and fascism; its analyses of international systems, historical materialism, pre-capitalist classes in Turkey, national liberation movements, nationalism in general, and social nationalism in particular; and the cadre, concluding that the ideology of the Kadro movement was patriotic leftism. Thus, the ideology of the Kadro movement is deliberately not included in this article.

This article is devoted to analyzing *Kadro*'s development-strategy proposal. Here, the study attempts to outline and analyze *Kadro*'s proposals for economic development with references to the Great Depression, foreign-trade policy, capital accumulation, planned industrialization, rural development in general and land reform in particular, and the role of the state. As the question of economic development was also considered by two other leading intellectuals of the time, Ahmet Ağaoğlu,[22] an advocate of "economic liberalism," and Ahmet Hamdi Başar,[23] the advocate of "economic etatism," and as *Kadro* is hastily identified with Inönü,[24] the prime minister, and Recep Peker,[25] the secretary-general of the RPP, it is useful to begin by discussing Ağaoğlu, Başar, Inönü, Peker, and *Kadro*. This will draw a picture, first, to discern characteristics of the main considerations of the time; second, to indicate differences and similarities among them; third, to see their arguments on economic development as a whole; and fourth, to analyze and comment on *Kadro*'s proposals as a whole.

The first figure to be considered is Ağaoğlu, an RPP MP who in 1930 transferred his allegiance to the short-lived FRP (11 August 1930–16 November 1930). After the FRP episode, he became a professor at the University of Istanbul. During his FRP phase, Ağaoğlu advocated multi-party parliamentary democracy and a "liberal" economic policy.[26] In his book *Devlet ve Fert* (The State and the Individual), a collection of articles that had appeared in daily newspapers in 1932 and 1933, Ağaoğlu stated that he could identify himself completely with "Etatism," "Kemalizm," and "Revolutionism."[27] However, Ağaoğlu unequivocally stated that his interpretation of etatism was different from that of *Kadro*. He argued as follows:

> The objective of the Kemalist state is to protect, encourage and ensure individual initiatives' progress. In addition to this, I accept the fact as far as Kadro does that the state should undertake the task of establishing infrastructure and some industries, which individual entrepreneurs are unable to do.[28]

Ağaoğlu and *Kadro* agreed that the private sector was too weak to undertake the task of industrialization, and both advocated that the state should intervene in the economy. In their objectives, however, Ağaoğlu and *Kadro* differed radically from each other: while Ağaoğlu strove to protect and encourage the private sector, as will be seen later, *Kadro* opposed this, arguing that the state should not allocate its resources to encouraging or protecting the private sector, but should invest in industry on behalf of the

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whole nation and keep the larger part of industry in state ownership. In other words, it may be suggested that while Ağaoğlu advocated the state's helping to create a national bourgeoisie by protecting and encouraging private enterprise, *Kadro* argued that the state should leave to the private sector neither the task of industrialization nor the ownership of the larger part of industry.

Ağaoğlu was a faithful believer in the assumption that a liberal economy was self-regulating, and although he was in favor of protectionist policies and advocated state intervention in the economy, he nevertheless argued that state intervention in the economy should be kept to a minimum[29]—without, however, specifying where this minimum line should be drawn. Regardless of its theoretical merits, the case for a fully liberalized economy was difficult to argue in Turkey, where the private sector remained anxious for protection and assistance by the state.

Within these limits, however, Ağaoğlu pressed the liberal case, placing particular emphasis on the inefficiency of state enterprises. He asserted that "the private sector does better than the state sector," because bureaucrats were incompetent in dealing with economic matters.[30] However, he failed to explain how the private sector could generate capital for investment, and whether it was possible to find technical personnel to run enterprises without bureaucrats. The fact was that the private sector was largely dependent on the state's protection in raising capital, and the state was the main provider of technical assistance through the state schools.

Ağaoğlu emphasized that desirable economic development could be achieved only in an environment in which individual enterprises were allowed to use their free initiative. To prove his point, he gave Henry Ford as an example, arguing that Ford had started from nothing and worked hard, using his individual initiative to establish the strongest car company in the United States. Here, Ağaoğlu claimed, lay the main cause of economic backwardness in Turkey, as well as in Eastern societies in general: the state had an absolute and commanding power over individuals and society. This, he argued, repressed individual initiative and frustrated the development of private entrepreneurship. In his view, European economic progress was directly linked to European institutions, and the key to achieving the desired economic development in Turkey was internal restructuring. By internal restructuring, he meant parliamentary democracy and the freedom of individual initiative.[31]

Ağaoğlu conceded that parliamentary democracy in Europe had been damaged by the emergence of Hitler and Mussolini, but he believed that parliamentary democracy sooner or later would restore itself, because it was the only workable method that governments in European states could follow. He suggested that parliamentary democracy and individual freedom were, and should be, major goals for Turkey, at least in the long run.[32]

Ağaoğlu accepted that *Kadro* was not an advocate of socialism or fascism, but he condemned *Kadro* for advocating totalitarian and authoritarian notions similar to those of socialism in Soviet Russia, Pilsudski's regime in Poland, Nazism in Germany, and fascism in Italy.[33] Though doubtless sincere, this criticism of *Kadro* was in a sense odd: Ağaoğlu was happy to identify himself with the Kemalist regime, which had a clearly authoritarian character.

In its replies to Ağaoğlu, *Kadro* argued that the economic backwardness of Turkey and the Eastern countries was caused by European imperialism; the colonies remained

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enslaved by their industrial retardation and by their dependence on the importing of industrial goods. The development of capitalism in Europe, *Kadro* argued, rendered underdevelopment inevitable in the colonies and semi-colonies of Asia and Africa.[34] As to the domestic reasons for economic backwardness, *Kadro* argued that the existing socio-political structure, which *Kadro* often labeled "liberalism," and the socio-economic structure, which *Kadro* identified as "*zati iktisat*" (home production–consumption economy) was to blame. In opposition to Ağaoğlu, *Kadro* argued that in an economy in which the private sector lacked sufficient capital for economic development, individual initiative could not achieve the desired economic development, and that the state should take up this task and keep industry under its own control.[35]

Kadro somewhat contemptuously referred to Ağaoğlu, and to lecturers at the University of Istanbul such as İbrahim Fazıl (Pelin) Bey, as supporters of "Cavid Bey Liberalism."[36] As finance minister in some of the cabinets during the second constitutional period (1908–18), Mehmed Cavid Bey had advocated a free-market economic policy and the Ottoman Empire's specialization in agriculture in accordance with the doctrine of comparative advantage. *Kadro* rejected this international division of labor and put emphasis on Turkey's urgent need for industrialization. The lecturers at the University of Istanbul did not enter into direct controversy with *Kadro*, and in any case, the 1933 "University Reform" removed a majority of the staff, including Fazıl Bey, from the university.[37] The views of the sacked lecturers remain unclear, but it can be speculated that they did not defend etatism with the same vigor as *Kadro*.

Another figure who expressed himself publicly on the subject of etatism was Ahmet Hamdi Başar, the director of the Istanbul Port company and editor of a monthly journal, *Kooperatif* (Co-operative), from 1932 to 1933. Başar also contributed to *Kadro* a few times.[38] Başar described himself as an advocate of "economic etatism," thereby distinguishing himself from what he called "extremist etatists,"[39] apparently a reference to *Kadro*. Başar argued that some extremist etatists advocated an autarkic economic policy, which he defined as an attempt to make Turkey economically self-sufficient and independent of other countries.[40] Başar rejected this on the ground that autarky was an impossible goal, given the realities of the 20th-century international setting. Instead, he suggested that the aim should be economic self-reliance, in the sense of a self-sustaining economy.[41] Başar, like *Kadro*, advocated a planned economy, arguing that only in a planned economy could the government identify social needs and, at the same time, balance supply and demand. For him, a planned economy was the only way to avoid the devastating effects of the world economic depression, which Turkey and other countries were currently going through. Başar was convinced that in a planned economy, economic depressions could be avoided, and if they did occur, the planning or the implementation of the plan would be at fault—not the principle of the planned economy.[42] Başar's attitude toward industrialization appears to be different from that of *Kadro*: while for *Kadro*, heavy industry, in particular, was a necessary component of economic development and one of its main objectives,[43] in Başar's view, it appears, heavy industry was not a necessary element of economic progress, though he failed to explain why.[44] Nor was Başar as hostile as *Kadro* to the private sector's involvement in the economy. Başar argued that the state sector should be replaced by the private sector as soon as the private sector was able to function efficiently and contribute to social goals, though for the time being, he accepted that this

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might be a long-term objective.[45] Like *Kadro*, however, Başar was opposed to the development of a national bourgeoisie through protectionist measures. He was critical of the government's high tariffs, which provided important privileges to a number of infant industries, and argued that the policy of encouraging and protecting the private sector was conducive to social injustice.[46]

In view of the facts that capitalism had not developed in Turkey and there was no national bourgeoisie capable of carrying out a development program, Başar argued the state should play a major role in development, in spite of all the problems associated with state enterprises.[47] Başar also argued that the state should secure conditions for sustained economic development and should not pit private or state sectors against each other. He argued that, under "economic etatism," the government could, in principle, use the instruments of state power to counter-balance the economic power of capital and to prevent the bureaucratization of the state.[48] The crux of his argument, however, was that the state should not arrogate unto itself all the responsibilities and powers needed to organize economic matters; rather, it should distribute its authority and responsibility to new institutions.[49] He suggested that consumers' and producers' co-operatives should be established and given the power to exercise direct control over the activities of state enterprises. He also attempted to elaborate a control mechanism that would prevent political favoritism from influencing economic activities undertaken by the government. For Başar, the state might serve as the instrument for transition to "economic etatism," which, according to him, aimed to satisfy socially defined needs, as well as to achieve self-reliance and sustained economic development.[50] Eventually, he argued, the state should withdraw from economic affairs.[51] Başar concluded that Turkey's economy should be restructured in accordance with social needs and objectives. The rule, he suggested, should be the satisfaction of social need, not specialization according to comparative advantage.[52]

There were some parallels between *Kadro* and Başar: like *Kadro*, Başar argued that economic backwardness in Turkey, as in other Eastern countries, was caused by European imperialism, and that international economic relations in their existing form damaged underdeveloped countries.[53] On one occasion, *Kadro* called Başar "brother."[54] However, they differed from each other in three important aspects. First, while *Kadro* rejected capitalism as the inevitable source of class struggle and the main cause of underdevelopment in colonies and semi-colonies in Asia and Africa, Başar rejected capitalism on the basis of the impossibility of establishing this system in Turkey. Başar argued that it was a historical reality that capitalism had not developed in Turkey,[55] though he failed to explain why it would be impossible in the future. Second, while Başar did not rule out the private sector's participation in the economy in a major way,[56] *Kadro* argued that priority should be given to state entrepreneurship and advocated that the state should control the private sector.[57] Third, while Başar hoped to disperse the state's power and eventually to secure the state's withdrawal from economic activities,[58] *Kadro* advocated the opposite.

Although Prime Minister Inönü had publicly committed the RPP to "moderate etatism" in August 1930, and although the July Laws of 1932 together with other decrees prepared a ground for the implementation of etatist policies, it appears that following Bayar's appointment as minister of the economy in September 1932, he refrained from commenting at any length in public on the principle or the implementation of

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etatism. Not until October 1933, when he published an article entitled "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı" ("The Etatist Character of Our Party") in *Kadro*, did Inönü articulate his interpretation of etatism. In this article, as pointed by Korkut Boratav, Inönü spelled out his interpretation of etatism as if he were the leader of an opposition party rather than the prime minister.[59] The article made several important points. First, Inönü argued that whereas seven or eight years earlier discussions had centered on the question of whether etatism provided the means for economic development, such polemics had since become null and void, because wealthier states had also tried to protect and save their economies by these means, which would have been unthinkable in the past. Second, he argued that etatism meant not only the protection and preservation of the economy from the effects of the Great Depression, but also the provision of means for economic progress. Third, he argued that it would be naive to think that industrialization could be achieved without direct investment by the state in industry. Fourth, he rejected the argument that "the private sector does better than the state sector." Fifth, he suggested that the argument that the state should invest only where the private sector was unable to do so should be viewed cautiously, whereas he, too, would have been delighted if the private sector had invested in a broad range of fields, freeing the state to invest its resources elsewhere, the fact was that the private sector in Turkey was too weak. He added that the case for etatist policies rested not on the question of ownership, but on the questions of ability and utility.[60] Although Inönü published this article in *Kadro*, this did not mean that *Kadro*'s and Inönü's interpretations of etatism were identical. Inönü and *Kadro* both rejected the assumption that "the private sector does better than the state sector" and argued that the state should take up a leading role in the industrialization of Turkey. However, while Inönü's reason for giving priority to state investment in industry was the inability of the private sector to take up a leading role in Turkey's industrialization, *Kadro*'s reasoning, in addition to this, was that one way or another, the private sector put its interests before the interests of the nation and could not be trusted to deliver the desired economic development. It followed, in *Kadro*'s view, that the state should not only take up a leading role in industrialization, but that it should also control the private sector.

At this juncture, it is worth looking at the views of Recep Peker, secretary-general of the RPP (1931–36). During the academic year 1934–35, Peker delivered a series of lectures at the University of Istanbul and at the Law Faculty of Ankara, which were published in 1935 as a book, *İnkilap Dersleri* (Lectures on Revolution). Although he attempted to outline his views concerning economic policy in this work, it is difficult to discern a coherent conception of etatism, except for advocacy of authoritarianism to achieve desired economic development, and the book looks like a collection of superficially written propaganda pamphlets.[61]

It remains to consider *Kadro*'s own views on etatism. Writing in *Kadro* in 1932, Tökin argued that there were three kinds of etatism: "fiscal etatism" (*Fiskal Devletçilik*), "socialist etatism" (*Sosyalist Devletçilik*), and "nationalist etatism" (*Nasyonalist Devletçilik*). "Fiscal etatism," as Tökin defined it, was the notion that the state should assume a direct role in the economy, as an entrepreneur, as a means of earning revenue for the state budget. In this version of etatism, Tökin argued, economic activities were conducted in accordance with the rules of "liberal economy." Tökin placed Turkey's

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etatism in this category, an indirect admission that *Kadro* was not happy with the government's interpretation of etatism. In "socialist etatism," the goal, Tökin argued, was the establishment of a socialist society, with the state acting on behalf of the proletariat for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In "nationalist etatism," in contrast, Tökin—and *Kadro* in general—argued, the state did not belong to any particular class or act on behalf of any particular class. Rather, the state was composed of a conscious cadre who would act on behalf of the nation and in the best interest of the whole nation. *Kadro* argued that the principles of "nationalist etatism" were the defense of national interests against foreign powers and ensuring that the national economy functioned for the good of the whole nation. *Kadro* claimed that although "nationalist etatism" did not oppose private enterprise, the private sector could be allowed to work only within the framework of a planned economy in which the state enterprises occupied the leading positions. *Kadro* urged that private enterprise be allowed only insofar as its activity did not influence the process of decision-making in the state apparatus.[62] In 1932—and, to a lesser extent, in 1933—*Kadro* used the term *autarkic economic policy* to refer to a mixture of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. However, by 1934, the terminology had changed, with *autarky* being abandoned in favor of self-reliance and self-sustained economic development. It may be suggested that Başar's criticisms of autarky might have influenced *Kadro* on this score: as noted earlier, Başar rejected autarky as an impossible goal, given the realities of the 20th-century international setting.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION AS AN OPPORTUNITY

Kadro took a radical view of the Great Depression: it argued that the catastrophic collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929 heralded the breakdown of the economic order established after World War I. For *Kadro*, the Great Depression was more than a cyclical crisis, and the problem was not confined to over-production, under-consumption, and competition among the Imperialist Powers for markets for their industrial goods and agricultural produce.[63] Rather, the Great Depression reflected a structural crisis in capitalism.[64]

Kadro pointed to the negative effects of the Great Depression on Turkey's economy, noting that the prices of agricultural produce and raw materials had fallen further than those of industrial products; as a result, countries that exported agricultural produce and raw materials had lost much purchasing power. This, in turn, had resulted in a sharp decrease in their imports of industrial goods.[65] At the same time, however, *Kadro* foresaw certain positive consequences of the Great Depression, in the political as well as the economic fields. *Kadro* argued, first, that the Great Depression would end the Western powers' monopoly on industrial production; second, that the Great Depression would accelerate the process, already manifest since World War I, of the emergence of new financial centers, such as the United States and Japan—not to mention the USSR, which was emerging as a new political and economic power. Third, *Kadro* foresaw major political implications behind these economic changes: the European powers would begin to lose their political hegemony over their colonies, and this process would accelerate.[66] *Kadro* argued that since World War I, and particularly since the onset of the Great Depression, the world was dividing into three distinct

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groups of countries: the imperialist countries; the countries that had rebelled against imperialism; and the socialist USSR.[67]

Kadro noted that the Great Depression had forced European countries to sell their industrial products at lower prices than previously and that, in addition, these countries had started to export factories to hitherto non-industrialized countries.[68] This, Aydemir noted, was "Super Capitalism" because European countries could not sell industrial goods to their colonies, they had to sell factories, and the period of the Great Depression was witnessing an influx of machines from Europe to non-industrialized countries.[69] As Haldun Gülalp has noted,[70] *Kadro* interestingly predicted that the Great Depression would have an impact on the character of industrialization on a world scale: non-industrialized countries and colonies would acquire basic industries, and the already industrialized metropoles would move on to higher industries.[71]

From the first to the last issue, *Kadro* insisted that the Great Depression would continue for some time[72] and argued that the Turkish government should not only take measures against the short-term negative effects of the Great Depression, but that it should also develop a framework within which long-term economic development could be achieved. *Kadro* saw the Great Depression as an opportunity that the Turkish government could make great use of, in particular by helping to establish light as well as heavy industry in Turkey.[73] As will be seen, *Kadro* believed that the means to this end would be a protectionist foreign-trade policy; acceleration of national production; disciplined, rationalized, modernized, and state-controlled industry; and substantial land reform.

FOREIGN-TRADE POLICY

Kadro noted that from 1923 to 1930, Turkey's foreign-trade balance had been negative, but that from 1930 to 1934, the government had succeeded in balancing foreign trade—and even in producing a small surplus. For *Kadro*, this last was no more than a partial success, because it had been achieved through a reduction in imports. In other words, the overall volume of Turkey's foreign trade had declined as a result of the negative impact of the Great Depression.[74]

Kadro also noted that the Great Depression had undermined free trade on a world scale and that a new foreign-trade pattern, based on protectionism, had started to emerge across the world: not only had small states introduced protectionist elements into their foreign-trade policies, but those formerly staunch advocates of free international trade, the United States and Britain, were also retreating into economic isolationism or protectionism. In particular, *Kadro* interpreted the British-convened Ottawa Conference of 1932 as an attempt to pursue a protectionist, autarkic foreign-trade policy within the British Commonwealth.[75]

Kadro applauded the Turkish government's decision to introduce import quotas in 1930 and its subsequent attempts to control foreign trade through bilateral barter-clearing agreements. Indeed, *Kadro* went on to urge that any future foreign-trade agreements should be based on the principle, first established in the 1932 trade agreement between Turkey and the Soviet Union, of exchanging goods for goods without the use of money.[76] When the government concluded a clearing agreement with Germany in 1933, *Kadro* expressed satisfaction, pointing out that the agreement helped

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the government avoid world market prices and that it necessitated active governmental support for exports.[77] The clearing agreements did help the government balance foreign trade, but, at the same time, they rendered Turkey's foreign trade increasingly dependent on Germany, the only country prepared to trade with Turkey on the basis of clearing agreements. *Kadro* does not appear to have foreseen this problem, which became apparent only toward the end of the 1930s; *Kadro* was forced to cease publication in late 1934.

A second suggestion made by *Kadro* was that the government should seek to control the composition of imports as well as their quantity: although the foreign-trade agreements mentioned earlier provided the government with a means of balancing Turkey's foreign trade, *Kadro* argued that they would be meaningless unless the government controlled the character of imported goods. Otherwise, the private sector would import chocolate and processed foods. Instead, *Kadro* suggested that the state should set up state-owned "foreign-trade offices," which should import intermediate and capital goods in conformance with the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan.[78]

CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

The 1930s saw the steady, though not total, displacement of foreign-owned banks in Turkey by national banking houses, both state-owned and private. *Kadro* refrained from criticizing Turkish-owned private banks directly, probably because the largest of them, the İş Bank, had been set up through the direct initiative of President Atatürk. However, *Kadro* continued to argue, in general terms, that banking houses should be under state ownership.

Kadro not only argued that the private sector was too weak to play a major role in accumulating capital required for industrial investment; it also consistently argued that a capitalist accumulation strategy would be harmful, because the capitalist system contained within itself the seeds of its own decay. Above all, capitalism, *Kadro* argued, created problems of class struggle and internal anarchy, whereas the Turkish revolution, because it had begun with a national structure not divided into antagonistic "social classes," would reject and take measures to make impossible such divisions. *Kadro*'s conclusion was that the Turkish revolution should develop a non-capitalist capital-accumulation strategy. Specifically, it pressed for a state-controlled banking system and, at the same time, made suggestions as to how the state might assist capital accumulation through fiscal and budgetary measures. The possibilities for promoting capital accumulation through banks were limited on a practical level, however, because household savings were small and the Great Depression had reduced them further. *Kadro* preferred to concentrate its attention on other ways to generate capital. The most important of these were various fiscal and monetary measures, which were the key to *Kadro*'s proposal for a "non-capitalist" accumulation strategy. According to *Kadro*, the state should undertake and control all resource mobilization—and should retain the surplus of its own activities and a substantial portion of private-sector profits—to finance its own investments. *Kadro* called this the "non-capitalist development strategy."[79] The profits of state-owned enterprises, *Kadro* suggested, could help establish new industrial investment, but the problem was how to generate the initial capital to finance the state-owned enterprises. Foreign loans were too limited

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to be effective, and *Kadro* was ideologically opposed to the entry of foreign capital into Turkey, regarding all foreign investors as self-seeking. In any case, foreign capital did not enter Turkey in a major way during the period under question. One alternative, *Kadro* suggested, was internal borrowing through the issuing of state bonds. When the government issued bonds to finance the railways in 1933, *Kadro* expressed approval and suggested that similar internal borrowing be employed to finance the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan.[80]

Kadro also urged that the state budget be expanded. In 1932, *Kadro* proposed that the state budget should be increased from 160 million to 500 million Turkish lira[81] and repeated this suggestion in the following years.[82] *Kadro* also suggested that more currency be issued and argued that financing an increased budget by this means would not necessarily lead to inflation, provided that the increased amount of money was invested directly in industry.[83]

There are indications that Prime Minister Inönü may similarly have favored an increase in the state budget during this period; in any event, however, the government stuck to its established policy of having a small and balanced budget as a precaution against inflation.

Equally radical were *Kadro*'s views on taxation. It applauded the government's 1925 decision to abolish the *Aşar* (the tithe), arguing that this would stimulate an increase in capital accumulation in the agricultural sector. *Kadro* urged that this approach be generalized: if, as *Kadro* advocated, the state undertook the complete mobilization of all economic resources and used the surplus of the state-run enterprises and a substantial portion of private-sector profits to finance expansion of its own economic activities, there would be no need to increase taxes—or, indeed, to collect taxes at all, because state-sector earnings would be sufficient to finance industry. Once this policy was implemented, the state would dominate all aspects of resource allocation and would be able to control industrial investment, once and for all.[84] Evidently, there was some confusion in *Kadro*'s views on taxation, for its proposal to sequester a proportion of private-sector profits amounted to taxation under another name. So, arguably, was its advocacy of reliance on the profits of state enterprises, insofar as those profits were increased by monopoly prices (a disguised form of consumption tax) and by depressing the wages and salaries of state-sector employees (a disguised form of income tax).

KADRO'S PROPOSAL FOR PLANNED INDUSTRIALIZATION

As the government prepared the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan in 1932 and 1933, and put it into practice in 1934, *Kadro* sought to interpret the notion of a planned economy in a broad context and to suggest ways in which the government's industrialization plan might be improved. However, one should keep in mind that *Kadro*'s writers were not officially involved in decision-making bodies.

Kadro emphasized that state planning was not an entirely new idea: there was an increasing tendency toward state planning in Europe, and certainly in the Soviet Union. State planning in Europe, *Kadro* argued, specifically sought solutions to the problem of overproduction, while in the Soviet Union, it sought to envisage socially defined needs. However, *Kadro* argued, Soviet planning had failed to anticipate the

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problem of underproduction. Thus, *Kadro* implicitly argued that the Turkish government should not repeat the Soviet Union's mistake: the failure to envisage how much production was needed. *Kadro* argued that if the plan were not prepared carefully and not put into practice properly, the planned economy might not deliver what had been envisaged. For *Kadro*, the planned economy meant that the state would be responsible for production and distribution. *Kadro* argued that the state should decide on the allocation of resources for production and that the state, rather than consumers' demand, should determine what would be produced and how much of it would be produced.[85]

While the government's first Five-Year Industrialization Plan envisaged the development of textile, chemical, earthernware, iron, pulp and paper, sulfur, sponge, worsted, and hemp industries, *Kadro* argued that there was also a strong need to invest in heavy industry. *Kadro* suggested that electrification, housing, aviation, petroleum, alcohol and alcoholic drinks, mining, cement, and sugar should be included in the plan.[86] *Kadro* added that it was not against seeking technical assistance from foreign countries, but stressed that the best way to solve technical problems would be to learn by doing.[87]

Kadro's approach to the government's version of planning was implicitly critical. It consistently argued that a planned economy meant that the state, and not consumers' demand, must decide what should be produced and how much of it should be produced; it also insisted that the state, not the private sector, must own industry, though the private sector might be allowed to invest in fields designated by the state. *Kadro* repeatedly emphasized that the private sector must not be allowed to acquire an influential position in the state apparatus.[88]

KADRO'S PROPOSAL FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Concerning rural development, it can be suggested that İsmail Hüsrev Tökin was *Kadro*'s most important writer. Tökin had begun his research into rural problems in 1926 and had made several visits to various places in Turkey to make observations for his research. He systematized his findings in articles in *Kadro*, which served as a basis for his book *Türkiye'de Köy İktisadiyatı* (Rural Economy in Turkey), published in 1934. In rural matters, *Kadro* generally followed Tökin's lead.

Kadro saw the prospect of rural development in Turkey as dependent on three highly inter-related issues: the structure of landownership, problems identified with the ownership structure, and the need for substantial land reform.

In eastern Anatolia, *Kadro* noted, big landownership (*Ağalık-Derebeylik*) was prevalent. Big landowners had local political and religious power. Although *Kadro* did not comment on whether big landowners had influential positions in the Grand National Assembly, it did emphasize their local power.[80] It may be added that *Kadro* never suggested that big landowners had an influential position with regard to the formation of the government's economic-development policy. The problems identified with this big landownership, *Kadro* argued, might be divided into two: first, because big landowners had local political–religious powers, the state had been unsuccessful in penetrating society. *Kadro* called this the socio-political problem of the landownership structure. With respect to the socio-economic problem, *Kadro* argued, although big

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landowners generated capital, this capital was never transferred into agricultural investment, let alone into industrial investment. Rather, the big landowners enjoyed their prestigious positions and happily spent their money on gambling and womanizing. As a result, there had been no structural change in agricultural production for centuries: peasants produced only for their own needs. *Kadro* concluded that the structure of landownership itself was a major obstacle to rural economic development.[90]

In western Anatolia, in contrast, *Kadro* noted that sharecropping was prevalent: sharecroppers gave part of their crops as rent to the owner of the land. The owners of such land were mainly shopkeepers, who lived in cities or towns and had acquired the land mainly as a result of the inability of small land-holding peasants to pay off their debts to creditors and usurers. Under sharecropping, the land was fragmented, *Kadro* argued, and the capital generated under this system was invested neither in agriculture nor in industry. Under sharecropping, too, *Kadro* concluded, the structure of landownership constituted a major obstacle to rural development.[91]

Kadro identified six rural classes: (1) big landowners; (2) rural entrepreneurs; (3) small land-owning farmers; (4) sharecroppers; (5) farm workers; and (6) landless peasants and slaves. One of the problems with this social structure, *Kadro* argued, was that small land-owning farmers were heavily indebted to usurers, and when these small landholders were unable to pay their debts, their lands had to be taken by the moneylenders. Thus, *Kadro* argued that the urban shopkeepers who lent money to small landholders acquired these lands. With regard to landless peasants, *Kadro* argued that they might well be regarded as slaves, because they had no land of their own and had to obey orders given by big landowners.[92]

Kadro acknowledged that the structure of landownership was not the only problem: the inadequacy of railways and roads hampered the transportation of agricultural produce from the rural areas to the cities. But *Kadro* did not consider this an insurmountable problem, because the government had already started to construct rail lines and had made substantial progress. *Kadro* suggested that this endeavor could be taken further: in addition to the government's railway-construction program, freight charges for agricultural produce should be kept low—or, if possible, be free, which *Kadro* hoped would stimulate the flow of agricultural produce from the rural areas to the cities and encourage the peasants to produce for the market rather than simply for their personal needs.[93]

Kadro also noted that mechanized farming had failed to spread, except on a limited scale, in western Anatolia. One of the reasons, *Kadro* argued, was that agricultural labor remained cheap.[94] The introduction to agriculture of advanced technology, according to *Kadro*, could come only from above, through the intervention of the state.[95]

Kadro argued that in rural areas, the character and quantity of agricultural produce and clothing were determined by personal needs—which, as noted earlier, *Kadro* called subsistence economy (*Zati İktisat*). In addition, the existing pattern of landownership prevented differentiation and specialization in production and production for the market. *Kadro* suggested that the state intervene and change the existing rural structures.[96]

Specifically, *Kadro* favored substantial land reform, explaining that this, in theory, might be accomplished by socialist or populist methods. Under the socialist method, all private landownership might be abolished, and land might be collectivized, as had

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happened in Soviet Russia. Under the populist method, which *Kadro* preferred, every peasant would be given some private land.[97]

Kadro did not specify the amount of the land to be distributed to the peasants, although it stressed that the government should take into account the quality of land when implementing land reform. *Kadro* was aware of problems associated with land reform, such as the fragmentation of holdings, leading to a decrease in agricultural production. *Kadro* argued that this problem could be avoided, provided that the state took a series of measures. First, *Kadro* argued that a national agricultural plan should be prepared, adding that in preparing such a plan, the government should take into account the production as well as the marketing problems of cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts, figs, opium, and raisins, Turkey's main agricultural exports.[98] Second, following the substantial land reform, the state should establish "Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives" and ensure that the peasants produced crops in accordance with a national agricultural plan. The Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives, *Kadro* argued, could generate some capital from their members, and this could be coordinated with the state-owned Agricultural Bank. Third, *Kadro* maintained that the lands of the big landowners should be nationalized without compensation, because any compensation paid to the big landowners would enable them, in following years, to buy land back from small land-owning peasants. Fourth, following land reform, *Kadro* argued, a law forbidding the selling of land should be enacted, for without it land reform might fail, and the rural structure might return to the condition in which it was before land reform came into force.[99]

Kadro argued that private landownership would encourage the peasants to work efficiently, because the lands were their private property. As long as production was coordinated by an agricultural plan, the reform would achieve a socio-economic transformation, a rapid increase in agricultural produce, a possible expansion in exports, and capital accumulation in rural areas.[100] In addition, reform would achieve certain socio-political objectives. In the first place, it would break down big landowners' local political powers and enable the state to penetrate rural areas. In the second place, land reform would free landless peasants from their dependence on big landowners, and a more egalitarian rural society would be established. It appears that *Kadro* hoped that by means of substantial land reform, the state could ensure that the peasants would side with it in opposition to the big landowners.[101]

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

In order to achieve its proposals for economic development, *Kadro* argued, a strong centralized state was needed. This, according to *Kadro*, would be achieved by giving the state economic and political powers. The state must be entitled to regulate resource allocation and decide income distribution, as well as to prevent the private sector from gaining an influential position in decision-making. However, such political powers would not mean much without accompanying economic power. *Kadro* specifically argued that the state must own the larger part of industry and control the existing private enterprises, for only such a combination of economic and political powers could provide the state with an autonomous position within society. *Kadro* held that the state must be the representative of the nation, organizing economic and social life

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on behalf and in the best interests of the whole nation, not the representative of any particular class. However, there was some confusion in *Kadro*'s argument. In discussing the origin of the state, *Kadro* often referred to Marxist views, arguing that, in precapitalist society, the state had been the representative of the landowning stratum, and that currently, in capitalist society in Europe, it was the representative of the bourgeoisie. In Turkey, however, *Kadro* argued that the state could and should be the representative of the whole nation, without clearly explaining how this would be achieved.[102]

Kadro's faith in the state had a more specific focus: the journal spoke of a conscious minority, the cadre, which would ensure the implementation of economic-development proposals that it put forward. *Kadro* assigned a strong positive role to the state, guided by an enlightened cadre, arguing that the state must possess the political authority and economic power to decide the way in which capital accumulation and income distribution would occur, and that the state must also be free from the influence of particular interest groups or classes.

It may well be stated that *Kadro*'s main dilemma lay in its attribution to the state: *Kadro* assigned the state an autonomous position above society and social classes, whereas the Kemalist state was not free from the penetration of particular interest groups. Indeed, it was the interest groups—in particular, the İş Bank group—that did not tolerate even the survival of *Kadro*, and in December 1934, the journal was forced to cease publication when its franchise holder, Karaosmanoğlu, an RPP MP was sent abroad as ambassador.

CONCLUSION

Evidently, the discussions among Turkish bureaucrat–intellectuals of the 1930s on the subject of economic development were fruitful. Ağaoğlu, Başar, and *Kadro* were all concerned with the lack of sufficient capital in Turkey to give momentum to economic development, and in the face of the Great Depression, all three searched for ways to achieve the desired economic development. Among them, only *Kadro* saw positive sides in the political and economic effects of the Great Depression, and only *Kadro* suggested land reform. For all three, the desired economic development meant a self-sustaining, industrialized national economy. All three advocated the state's intervention in the economy, although each differed on the question of the extent of the state's intervention, as well as in their objectives. All three advocated "etatism," but each put the emphasis on different aspects.

Ağaoğlu's interpretation of etatism called for the state to offer practical encouragement to the private sector, in the hope that development of the private sector would, over time, become self-sustaining. He remained faithful to the assumption that a liberal economy was self-regulating. Başar's argument was based on the claim that capitalism had not developed historically in Turkey, and that in the face of the Great Depression, the state had to intervene in the economy. Başar's approach was critical of the views of "liberals" and of *Kadro.*

While Ağaoğlu was not attracted by a centrally planned economy and, in general, did not comment on planning, Başar, like *Kadro*, showed enthusiasm for a planned economy, believing that it might serve to avert economic depressions. However, Başar

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seemed less enthusiastic about the establishment of heavy industry in Turkey, thereby distancing himself from *Kadro.*

On the question of the extent of the state's intervention in the economy, Ağaoğlu, in theory, argued for minimal intervention—without, however, specifying and making persuasive arguments as to where this minimum line should be drawn. Başar favored dispersing the state's economic powers to new institutions and hoped for total withdrawal of the state from economic affairs in the long run. In contrast to both Ağaoğlu and Başar, *Kadro* argued for the expansion of the state's intervention in the economy in every possible way. Finally, while Ağaoğlu clearly believed that Turkey ought to follow the Western countries' path of economic development, Başar and *Kadro* opposed this path, and *Kadro* searched for a non-capitalist economic-development strategy.

Kadro warned that Turkey's achievement of economic independence was yet to be completed and would depend on the careful implementation of a new set of economic policies. These new economic policies, *Kadro* urged, must include an expanded state-controlled industry, a protectionist foreign-trade policy, and substantial land reform. Except for land reform—which was originally and solely *Kadro*'s suggestion until 1945—the remainder of the journal's proposals, it can be suggested, complemented the Kemalist government's own economic policy. However, it should be stressed that *Kadro*'s proposals were more radical than the Kemalist government's, and, besides, they had an openly ideological dimension: *Kadro* emphasized that the private sector should not be permitted to occupy influential positions in decision-making and that the private sector's participation in the implementation of the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan should be kept to a minimum, for otherwise the private sector's economic power would develop into political influence. *Kadro*'s suggestions appear to have made little impression on the Kemalist leadership—not even on the Inönü group, whose skepticism about the private sector appears to have been based on pragmatic rather than ideological considerations. Thus, it must be stressed that *Kadro*'s proposed development strategy was not identical to the Kemalists' practices. *Kadro*'s proposals for economic development rested on the following assumptions: first, *Kadro* saw the Great Depression as an opportunity for Turkey's industrialization, insisting that the depression would continue for some time, and suggested that the Turkish government should not only take measures against the short-term negative effects of the depression, but that it should also develop a framework within which long-term economic development could be achieved. Second, *Kadro* predicted that the Great Depression would have an impact on the character of industrialization on a world scale: non-industrialized countries and colonies would acquire basic industries, and the already industrialized metropole would move on to higher industries. These assumptions persuaded the *Kadro* writers to elaborate a program of industrialization. *Kadro* urged the Turkish government to prepare a comprehensive industrialization plan and made practical suggestions as to ways to generate the capital needed for industrialization. The most important of these suggestions were various fiscal and monetary measures, which were the key to *Kadro*'s proposal for a "non-capitalist" accumulation strategy. According to *Kadro*, the state should undertake and control all resource mobilization, and it should retain the surplus of its own activities and a substantial portion of private-sector profits, to finance its own investments. *Kadro* called this a "non-capital-

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ist development strategy." *Kadro*'s argument for a non-capitalist development strategy reflected the way the journal's writers conceived current economic and political development; it was not an argument about whether *Kadro*'s proposals made up a "third way." Taking their political, economic, and ideological considerations as a whole, one can see that the *Kadro* writers were convinced that Turkey could not follow the path that European countries had been traveling. Thus, they searched for an alternative development strategy. In the final analysis, it can be suggested that *Kadro* did not produce a non-capitalist economic-development strategy, but it did put forward a carefully prepared development strategy within the context of capitalism, and its development strategy was patriotic–leftist in the 1930s.

NOTES

[1]Thirty-six issues appeared, and the average number of pages in each issue was fifty. A facsimile edition of *Kadro* was published by Cem Alpar, 3 vols. (İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1978, 1979, and 1980).

[2]Surnames were adopted in 1934. For the sake of convenience, however, surnames are used throughout this article.

[3]Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (Istanbul, 1969), 60.

[4]Sarc's article outlines and, at the same time, reflects discussions on etatism after World War II: Ömer Celal Sarc, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," *Middle East Journal* (1948).

[5]For the RPP program at the third congress, see Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde TEK PARTİ YÖNETİMİ'nin Kurulması (1923–1931)* (Ankara, 1981), 448–49; for the fourth congress, see the official translation in Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939), 308–309.

[6]Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, 2. Baskı, (Ankara, 1982), *passim*; William Hale, "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930–1945," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin* 7 (1980): 100–17.

[7]Sarc, "Economic Policy," 432; Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, *passim*; Hale, "Ideology," 100–17.

[8]Yahya S. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923–1950)*, 2. Baskı, (Ankara, 1986), 113.

[9]Z. Y. Hershlag, *Turkey, The Challenge of Growth*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1968), 90–91; Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin*, 1999.

[10]Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, 181–224.

[11]Ilhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, *Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye'de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu* (Ankara, 1982), 145–58.

[12]Mahmut Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931–1938)*, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1974), 2:41–50.

[13]Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, 121–32.

[14]Mahmut Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi 1939–1945* (Ankara, 1974).

[15]Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976), the son of a landless peasant family from Edirne, trained to be a teacher, served on the Caucasian front during World War I, and worked as a schoolteacher in Nuha, Azerbaijan, from late 1919 to late 1921. While in Nuha he abandoned his earlier Pan-Turanist beliefs in favor of socialism. He attended the Bolshevik-organized Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920 as a representative of the teachers of Nuha, and subsequently joined the Turkish Communist Party. In late 1921, Aydemir went to Moscow to study at the Communist University of the Workers of the East (KUTV). He attended meetings of the Comintern as a representative of the students of the KUTV and was in touch with the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Socialist Party (TWPSP). In late 1923, Aydemir returned to Istanbul, where he became an influential figure in the TWPSP and contributed to *Aydınlık* (Light) magazine. The TWPSP split in 1925, and in May of that year, Aydemir and other TWPSP activists were arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of five to fifteen years. In October 1926, Aydemir was released from prison; in 1927, he was rearrested on a subversion charge, but was soon set free. By 1927, Aydemir had relinquished his link with the TWPSP and began to question his "communist" beliefs, which he renounced in favor of the Turkish national liberation movement. Soon after he was released from his second arrest, Aydemir was given a post in the Ministry of Education, dealing with professional educational mat-

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ters, and became headmaster of the Ankara Trade Lycee. In 1929, he began to give talks at the Turkish Hearths Society (Türk Ocakları), on ideological matters. In 1931, he combined his talks in a draft book *İnkilap ve Kadro* (The Revolution and the Cadre), in which he outlined his initial views on national liberation movements. From 1932 to 1934, Aydemir, together with İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge, and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, published *Kadro*. From 1929 to 1937, Aydemir continued to teach at the Ankara Trade Lycee and kept in touch with the Milli Iktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti (National Economy and Thrift Society). From 1937 to 1939, he served as director of economics of Ankara (Ankara Iktisat Müdürü), then as chairman of the Department of Industrial Research at the Ministry of Economy (İktisat Vekaleti Sanayi Tetkik Heyeti Başkanı). In 1946, Aydemir and Tökin drafted an industrialization plan, which later came to be known as the "Kadroist Plan," though it was never implemented. From 1947 to 1951, Aydemir served as an inspector in the Directorate of Transportation, but the victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 election led to his forced retirement. In retirement, he continued to write for the newspapers, and in 1959, he published his autobiography, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (The Man in Search of Water). From 1961 onward, he also contributed to the magazine *Yön* (Direction), which in many respects echoed *Kadro*'s arguments. He died in 1976. Aydemir's major publications include "Lenin ve Leninizm" (Lenin and Leninism; 1924), a study on Lenin's role in the Bolshevik revolution, which he wrote with Sadrettin Celal Antel; *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye* (Turkey in the World Economy; 1931), a study of Turkey's economy, including statistical information on European and Balkan countries; *İnkilap ve Kadro* (The Revolution and the Cadre; 1932), an outline of his initial views on the Turkish revolution and the role of a revolutionary cadre; *İktisat Mücadelesinde Köy Muallimi* (Village Teachers in the Economic Struggle; 1933), a brief outline of roles for village teachers in the economic struggle; *Halk İçin İktisat Bilgisi* (Textbook of Economics for the People; 1938), a brief introduction to Turkey's economy; *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (Turkey's Economy; 1940), a textbook for secondary schools; *Suyu Arayan Adam* (The Man in Search of Water; 1959), his autobiography from World War I to the late 1950s; *Tek Adam* (The Leader; 1963–65), a biography of the national leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 3 vols.; *Toprak Uyanırsa* (A Novel; 1963); *İkinci Adam* (The Second Man; 1966–68), a biography of İsmet Inönü, 3 vols.; *Menderes'in Dramı* (Menderes's Ordeal; 1969), a biography of Adnan Menderes and a brief history of the Democratic Party; *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa* (Enver Paşa, from Macedonia to Central Asia; 1970–72), a biography of the celebrated Unionist leader, 3 vols.; *İhtilalin Mantığı* (The Logic of Revolution; 1973); *Kahramanlar Doğmalıydı* (A Novel; 1974); *Kırmızı Mektuplar ve Son Yazıları* (Red Letters and Late Writings [of Aydemir]; 1979), Aydemir's private correspondence with two friends from the KUTV: Pavel, a Russian, and Liu Shao-chi, a Chinese. The book also includes further memoirs.

[16]Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889–1974), a son of the aristocratic family of Karaosmanoğulları, received his secondary schooling in Cairo, and in 1908 enrolled at the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. He abandoned law for literature, and by the end of World War I he had published a number of short stories. In late 1919, Karaosmanoğlu joined the war of liberation and worked for the Ankara government. In 1923, 1927, and 1931, he was elected to Parliament, and served as a member of the legislature's Foreign Affairs Commission. From 1932 until he was appointed ambassador to Albania in late 1934, he was the franchise holder of *Kadro*. From 1934 to 1955, Karaosmanoğlu served successively as ambassador to Albania, Prague, the Hague, Bern, Tehran, and again Bern. He retired in 1955 and, from 1957 onward, worked for the daily newspaper *Ulus* (Nation), which supported the RPP. After the military coup of 1960, he was elected to serve on the commission that drafted a new constitution. In 1961, he was elected as an MP of the RPP, but he resigned in 1962, accusing the RPP of violating Atatürk's principles. From 1965 until his death in 1974, he worked as director of the Anatolian News Agency. He contributed numerous articles to daily newspapers. Karaosmanoğlu's major publications include the plays *Nirvana* (1909); *Bir Serencem* (An Event; 1913); and *Erenlerin Bağından* (Chats of Dervishes; 1922); the novels *Kiralık Konak* (Hired Estate; 1922); *Nur Baba* (1922); *Rahmet* (Rain; 1923); *Hüküm Gecesi* (The Judgment Night; 1927); *Sodom ve Gomore* (1928); *Yaban* (Stranger; 1932); *Ankara* (1934), an indirect criticism of the lifestyles of Kemalist bureaucrats; *Milli Savaş Hikayeleri* (Stories from the National War; 1947); *Okun Ucundan* (From the Edge of Arrow; 1940); and *Gençlik ve Edebiyat Hatıraları* (Memoirs of Youth and Literature; 1969), a brief history of the development of literature in Turkey; and memoirs, including *Bir Sürgün* (Exile; 1937), which recounts his period as ambassador to Albania; *Atatürk* (1946), concerning Atatürk and the republican period; *Zoraki Diplomat* (Enforced Diplomat; 1955), memoirs of his career in Turkey's foreign service; *Hep O Şarkı* (The Same Song; 1956); *Vatan Yolunda* (In Serving My Country; 1957); and *Politikada 45 Yıl* (45 Years in Politics; 1968).

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[17]Vedat Nedim Tör (1897–1985), the son of Edip Bey (the first secretary to the chief of staff of the army during the CUP regime), graduated in 1916 from the Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul, and studied economics at the University of Berlin, where in 1922 he completed his doctoral thesis, "How Turkey Became a Subject of Imperialism." Tör was involved in a left-wing student group during his stay in Germany and was elected to represent the TWPSP at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, in November–December 1922. Returning to Turkey in late 1922, Tökin became a contributor to *Aydınlık* (Light) magazine. In 1925, the TWPSP split, and in the same year, Tör, along with Aydemir and other TWPSP activists, was arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Released in 1926, Tör was rearrested on a subversion charge in 1927. During the subsequent trial, Tör handed over secret TWPSP documents to the police, and soon after, he was set free. By then, Tör had relinquished his link with the TWPSP, as well as his communist beliefs. From 1929 to 1933 Tör worked as chairman of the Milli Iktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti (National Economy and Thrift Society), and from 1933 to 1938 as director of the Department of Press and Printing. In the 1930s, Tör edited *Turquie Kémaliste*, a bimonthly journal in French that sought to spread knowledge of Turkey abroad. From 1938 to 1944, he served as director of tourism and radio Ankara. In the years between 1943 and 1945, he also published a magazine, *Hep Bu Topraktan* (Always from This Land). In 1944, he was offered a post as cultural adviser to the Yapı Kredi Bankası (Housing and Credit Bank) and worked there until 1970. In that year, he started to work as cultural adviser to another financial institution, the Akbank. He died in 1985. From the 1940s to the early 1980s, Tör was preoccupied with artistic and cultural matters and edited children's magazines. Tör's major publications include his autobiography *Yıllar Böyle Geçti, Anılar* (Passing Years, Memoirs; 1976), and *Kemalizmin Dramı* (Ordeal of Kemalism; 1983), a collection of his articles on Kemalism.

[18]İsmail Hüsrev Tökin (1902–94), the son of a middle-class family, graduated from the Austrian Lycee in Istanbul, and in summer 1922, having received a scholarship from the Soviet embassy in Turkey to study in Moscow, enrolled in the KUTV along with Aydemir, Vala Nurettin, and Nazım Hikmet. After one year at the KUTV, Tökin studied economics at the University of Moscow until 1926. He is said to have been involved in the Anatolia-based Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (Peoples' Communist Party), but though Tökin has subsequently denied this, it is known that he was one of the representatives of this party at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (1922). It seems likely that he also had links with the TWPSP. Having returned to Turkey in 1926, Tökin initially worked for a German company; from 1927, he was employed at the Directorate of Railways; and in 1929, he was appointed to the credit department of the Agricultural Bank and taught at the Ankara Trade Lycee, whose headmaster was Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. From 1933 to 1939, Tökin worked for the state-owned Sümerbank. From 1939 to 1941, he taught at the Gazi Educational Institute and the Trade Lycee, and from 1941 to 1942, he worked in the Ministry of Trade. From 1942 to 1950, he was employed in the Ministry of Economy, where, together with Aydemir, he drafted the abortive 1946 industrialization plan. Meanwhile, Tökin also contributed to the magazines *Doğuş* (Birth; 1944–46) and *Sohbet* (Chat; 1950). When the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, Tökin was dismissed from his post in the Ministry of Economy, but in the same year, he was offered a post in the Directorate of Railways, where he worked until 1953. In 1953, he resigned from his post and moved to Istanbul, where he was offered a post as economic adviser to the privately owned Yapı ve Kredi Bankası (Housing and Credit Bank); he worked there until 1963. From 1963 to 1973, he held a post as secretary in the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. He retired in 1973 and died in 1994 in Istanbul. Tökin's major publications include *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı* (Turkey's Rural Economy; 1934), a detailed study of the rural structure of Turkey; *Ekonomik Coğrafya* (Economic Geography; 1940), a textbook for secondary schools that provides a brief introduction to Turkey's natural resources and to economics; and *İktisadi ve İçtimai Türkiye, Rakamlarla: Türkiye'de Sanayi* (Statistical Indicators of Socio-Economic Turkey: Turkey's Industry; 1946), a survey of Turkey's industrialization, including statistical information.

[19]Burhan Asaf Belge (1899–1967), the son of an Ottoman Mutasarrıf (governor of a sub-province), completed his primary-school education in Beirut and graduated from the Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul. He studied civil engineering in Berlin during World War I and, after graduating in 1922, worked until 1924 as a correspondent for the Anatolian News Agency in Bucharest. While studying in Germany, Belge became involved in left-wing politics. In 1925, Belge began to contribute to *Aydınlık* magazine and joined the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Socialist Party. In May 1925, like Aydemir and Tör, he was jailed but was released in October 1926. By then, Belge had relinquished his link with the TWPSP, as well as his communist beliefs. In the late 1920s, he worked at the Turkish Foreign Office, and from 1933 to 1943 he served as adviser to the Directorate of Press and Printing, whose director was Tör. During these years, Belge made

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radio programs. When the Democratic Party was set up in opposition to the RPP in 1946, Belge gave his support and contributed to the party's daily newspaper *Demokrat İzmir* (Democrat Izmir). After the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, Belge continued to support it in the daily newspaper *Zafer* (Victory). Belge was elected as an MP of the Democratic Party in 1957; he also made news programs for Radio Ankara. After the 1960 coup d'état, Belge was jailed for life, but was given amnesty in 1963. He then went to Germany and worked for German Radio until he died in 1967. Belge's major works include *Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Nasıl Oldu?* (From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey: How Did It Happen?; 1933), a brief history of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey; a translation of *Ankara, Türkiye'deki Yeni Oluşumun Bir İzahı* (Ankara, An Explanation of Modern Turkey; 1936), a brief history of Anatolia from the Hittites to republican Turkey by Nobert Von Bischoff, former secretary of the Austrian Embassy in Turkey; and *Radyo Konferansları* (Radio Talks; 1940–41), 14 vols., a collection of his news programs from 1940 to 1941.

[20]Mustafa Türkeş, "A Critique of Studies of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement," *METU Studies in Development* 25 (1998).

[21]Idem, "The Ideology of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (1998): 92–119.

[22]Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) emigrated from Azerbaijan to Istanbul in 1909, was detained in Malta from 1920 to 1921, and joined the war of liberation and became MP and director of Press and Publishing for a short period until joining the FRP. His major works include *Devlet ve Fert* (Istanbul, 1933) and *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, 2. Baskı, (Istanbul, 1969); *Şii Mezhebi ve Membaları*, published in French (France); *Ahunt ve İslamiyet*, published in Russian; *Türk Hukuk Tarihi* (Istanbul); *Türk Medeniyet Tarihi* (Istanbul); *Hukuku Esasiye* (Istanbul); *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde* (Istanbul); *Üç Medeniyet* (Istanbul); and *İngiltere ve Hindistan* (Istanbul).

[23]Başar (1897–1971) trained to be a teacher and was involved in Ahali Fırkası, published *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası* (1925). From 1925 to 1934, he worked as the director of the Istanbul Port company and edited the monthly magazine *Kooperatif* (1932–33) and *Barış Dünyası* (1944). In 1946, he joined the Democratic Party, and became an MP in 1950; however, he resigned in 1953, and after the 1960 coup d'état he was elected to the commission that prepared the 1961 constitution. His major works include *İktisadi Devletçilik*, 1, 2 (Istanbul, 1931, 1933), and *Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye*, 2. Baskı (Ankara, 1981).

[24]Inönü (1884–1973) graduated from the Military Academy and fought in the Balkan wars, Yemen, and World War I. He joined the war of liberation in 1920, became commander of the Western front, and participated in the Lausanne negotiations as the chief of the Turkish delegation in 1923. Except in 1924, he was prime minister from 1923 to 1937. When Atatürk died in 1938, Inönü became president and remained in office until 1950. He is known to have been the "second man" after Atatürk. The victory of the Democratic Party removed him from the presidency; thereafter, he served as the leader of the RPP until he was defeated by his secretary-genaral, Bülent Ecevit, in 1972. Inönü then resigned from the RPP. He formed several coalition governments between 1961 to 1965: see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1966, 1967, and 1968).

[25]Peker (1888–1950) graduated from the Military Academy in 1907; fought in Yemen, Tripolitana, and World War I; joined the war of liberation in 1920; and became secretary-general of the National Assembly. He several times served as secretary-general of the RPP and held many ministership during the period from 1923 to 1946. In 1946, he became prime minister, although he had to resign in 1947 because of the strong opposition from the newly formed opposition Democratic Party and from his own party, the RPP. He taught at the Military Academy and at the Istanbul and Ankara university law schools. He was a staunch supporter of one-party rule. He was one of the founders of the RPP's *Ülkü* (Ideal) magazine and published a book, *Inkilap Dersleri* (Lectures on Revolution) in 1935, showing his clear tilt toward one-party rule. He asserted himself as an ideologue of the RPP, with some success. His major publication is *Inkilap Dersleri*, 4th ed. (Istanbul: 1984), a collection of his lectures on revolution.

[26]See Ağaoğlu's books *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* and *Devlet ve Fert*, 56–57.

[27]Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 56.

[28]Ibid., 76.

[29]Ibid., passim.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., 64–67.

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[32]Ibid., 73–76.

[33]Ibid., 52–55.

[34]In 1932 and 1933, Aydemir replied to Ağaoğlu in the pages of the daily *Cumhuriyet*: see *Cumhuriyet* 13 October 1932; 12, 13, 17, and 20 December 1932; and 21, 22, 23, 26, and 27 January 1933. The other *Kadro* writers also replied to Ağaoğlu in the pages of *Kadro*.

[35]*Kadro*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933), 17; ibid., vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 25–36; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 23–31.

[36]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 12 (1932), 38–43; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 5–11.

[37]*Kadro* supported the 1933 university reform: see ibid., vol. 1, no. 8 (1932), 547–48; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 5–11; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 37–40; ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (1933), 24–28; ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 45–51; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 5–10.

[38]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 43–49; ibid., vol. 2, no. 21 (1933), 47–50; ibid., vol. 2, no. 22 (1933), 42–46.

[39]Ahmet Hamdi (Başar), *İktisadi Devletçilik*, 2 (Istanbul, 1933), 138.

[40]Ibid., 108.

[41]Ibid., 112.

[42]Ibid., 143–54.

[43]*Kadro*, vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 20–25; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 26–30.

[44]Başar, *İktisadi Devletçilik*, 2:135–219.

[45]Ibid., 142.

[46]Ibid., 84.

[47]Ibid., 137.

[48]Ibid., 139–40.

[49]Ibid., 138.

[50]Ibid., 137–40.

[51]Ibid., 142.

[52]Ibid., 135–43.

[53]Ibid., 38; *Kadro*, vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 43–49.

[54]*Kadro*, vol. 3, no. 28 (1934), 42–43.

[55]Başar, *İktisadi Devletçilik*, 2:136.

[56]Ibid., 136–219.

[57]*Kadro*, vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 20–25; ibid., vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 25–36; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 23–31; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 26–30.

[58]Başar, *İktisadi Devletçilik*, 2:142.

[59]Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, 108.

[60]*Kadro*, vol. 2, no. 22 (1933), 4–6.

[61]Recep Peker, *İnkilap Dersleri*, 4. Baskı (Istanbul, 1984).

[62]*Kadro*, vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 20–25; ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 9–14.

[63]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 15 (1933), 20–24; ibid., vol. 3, no. 32 (1934), 33–36; ibid., vol. 3, no. 33 (1934), 4–10.

[64]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 1 (1932), 21–27; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 28–39.

[65]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 15 (1933), 20–24; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 18–24; ibid., vol. 3, no. 30 (1934), 20–31.

[66]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 9–14; ibid., vol. 3, no. 32 (1934), 33–36.

[67]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 15 (1933), 20.

[68]Ibid., vol. 3, no. 33 (1934), 4–10.

[69]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 6–11.

[70]Haldun Gülalp, "Statism and the Turkish Revolution: An Early 'Dependency' Theory," *Review of Middle East Studies* 4 (1985): 78.

[71]*Kadro*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1932), 21–27; ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 6–11.

[72]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 17–20; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 28–39; ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933) 22–28; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 51–52; ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (1933), 20–23; ibid., vol. 3, no. 34 (1934), 19–23.

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[73]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933), 22–28.
[74]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 13–18.
[75]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 43–44; ibid., vol. 2, no. 17 (1933), 32–36; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 32–36.
[76]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 13–18, 25–28.
[77]Ibid., vol. 3, no. 28 (1934), 27–34.
[78]Ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 11–15; ibid., vol. 3, no. 28 (1934), 27–34.
[79]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 20–25.
[80]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 17 (1933), 50–55; ibid., vol. 3, no. 29 (1934), 15–18, 19–27.
[81]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 9 (1932), 4–10; ibid., vol. 1, no. 12 (1932), 5–11.
[82]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 24 (1933), 47–49.
[83]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 9 (1932), 4–10; ibid., vol. 1, no. 12 (1932), 5–11; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 28–38; ibid., vol. 2, no. 16 (1933), 23–28; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 6.
[84]Ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 6–18.
[85]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 26–30.
[86]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 24 (1933), 5–16; ibid., vol. 3, no. 30 (1934), 41–48; ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933), 35–41; ibid., vol. 2, no. 14 (1933), 45–50; ibid., vol. 2, no. 15 (1933), 40–46; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 41–44; ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (1933), 37–42; ibid., vol. 2, no. 21 (1933), 33–38; ibid., vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 88–90; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 55–57; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 13–20; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 19–26; ibid., vol. 3, no. 29 (1934), 33–36; ibid., vol. 3, no. 30 (1934), 35–40; ibid., vol. 3, no. 33 (1934), 33–36; ibid., vol. 3, no. 35–36 (1934), 50–54.
[87]Ibid., vol. 3, no. 31 (1934), 29–34.
[88]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 5 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 20–25; ibid., vol. 3, no. 27 (1934), 26–30.
[89]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 1, no. 6 (1932), 41–45; ibid., vol. 1, no. 7 (1932), 16–24; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 34–37; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 20–26.
[90]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 34–37; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 20–26; ibid., vol. 1, no. 6 (1932), 41–45; ibid., vol. 1, no. 7 (1932), 16–24.
[91]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 15–21; ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 34–37; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 20–26.
[92]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 4 (1932), 10–14; ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 34–37; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 20–26.
[93]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 15–21; ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 34–37; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 20–26.
[94]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 15–21.
[95]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 7 (1932), 11–16.
[96]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 5–12; ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933), 17; ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34.
[97]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 21 (1933), 21–24; ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 33–39.
[98]Ibid., vol. 1 no. 2 (1932), 41–45; ibid., vol. 3, no. 28 (1934), 44–47; ibid., vol. 1, no. 4 (1932), 18–25; ibid., vol. 1, no. 8 (1932), 44–46; ibid., vol. 2, no. 16 (1933), 15–22; ibid., vol. 3, no. 26 (1934), 43–46; ibid., vol. 3, no. 30 (1934), 16–19; ibid., vol. 3, no. 31 (1934), 16–21.
[99]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 16 (1933), 15–22; ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (1933), 12–19; ibid., vol. 2, no. 21 (1933), 15–20, 21–24; ibid., vol. 2, no. 22 (1933), 19–22; ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 33–39.
[100]Ibid., vol. 2, no. 21 (1933), 21–24; ibid., vol. 2, no. 22 (1933), 19–22; ibid., vol. 2, no. 23 (1933), 33–39.
[101]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 3 (1932), 25–34; ibid., vol. 1, no. 4 (1932), 10–14; ibid., vol. 1, no. 6 (1932), 41–45; ibid., vol. 1, no. 7 (1932), 16–24; ibid., vol. 2, no. 22 (1933), 19–22.
[102]Ibid., vol. 1, no. 2 (1932), 9–14; ibid., vol. 1, no. 10 (1932), 13–19; ibid., vol. 2, no. 13 (1933), 10–16; ibid., vol. 2, no. 18 (1933), 25–36; ibid., vol. 2, no. 19 (1933), 25–36; ibid., vol. 2, no. 20 (1933), 5–14; ibid., vol. 3, no. 25 (1934), 5–12.

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