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PIERRE BOURDIEU'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATES CONCERNING IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

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ABSTRACT

PIERRE BOURDIEU'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATES CONCERNING IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

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The debates concerning ideology and discourse have a rich and complicated history. Moving from this history, this thesis aims to investigate how Pierre Bourdieu, one of the most important sociologists in Europe, can be read on the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Although the term ideology is not particularly central to Bourdieu's work, we assert that his conceptual world tell us a story which is pertinent to the ones in ideology and discourse debates. Moving from this axis, we shed light upon Bourdieu's concepts such as habitus, doxa, field, symbolic power and symbolic violence. We examine both the anatomy of the concepts mentioned and their relationships with each other. We show that how these concepts can be operational from the angle of the debates on ideology and discourse. In our study, we argue that Bourdieu's conceptual framework extend the sociological dimension of the debates concerning ideology and discourse and Pierre Bourdieu can be read with the other monumental names, from Marx to Foucault, in the history of the debates.

Key Words: Ideology, discourse, habitus, practice, doxa, symbolic power, symbolic violence.

ÖZ

PIERRE BOURDIEU'NUN İDEOLOJİ VE SÖYLEM TARTIŞMALARINA KATKISI

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İdeoloji ve söylem tartışmaları oldukça zengin ve karmaşık bir tarihe sahiptir. Bu tarihten hareketle biz bu çalışmamızda Avrupa'nın en önemli sosyologlarından birisi olan Pierre Bourdieu'nun ideoloji ve söylem tartışmaları üzerinden nasıl okunabileceğini ortaya koymaya çalışıyoruz. İdeoloji kavramı Bourdieu'nun çalışmalarında merkezi bir konumda bulunmasa da, onun kavramsal dünyasının ideoloji ve söylem tartışmalarında mevcut bulunan temel argümanları anımsatan bir çerçeve çizdiğini iddia ediyoruz. Bu eksenden hareketle Bourdieu'nun habitus, pratik, doxa, sembolik iktidar ve sembolik şiddet gibi kavramlarını inceliyor ve söz konusu kavramların hem anatomisine hem de birbirleriyle ilişkilerine bakıyoruz. Bu kavramların ideoloji ve söylem tartışmaları açısından nasıl operasyonel olabileceğini gösteriyoruz. Çalışmamızda Bourdieu'nun kavramsal çerçevesinin ideoloji ve söylem tartışmalarının sosyolojik veçhesini genişlettiğini ve Pierre Bourdieu'nun ideoloji ve söylem tartışmalarının tarihindeki, Marx'tan Foucault'ya, birçok anıtsal isimle birlikte okunabileceğini savunuyoruz.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İdeoloji, söylem, habitus, pratik, doxa, sembolik iktidar, sembolik şiddet.

In Loving Memory of My Grandmother, Ş.K.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It is evident that ideology as a term is one of the most disputable and difficult concepts in social sciences. This can also be claimed for the term discourse. From the perception of ideology as an inversion of truth to the perception of ideology as false consciousness; from the concept of hegemony as a non-reductionist insight in Marxist theory of ideology and ideology as the interpellation of the subject to Saussurian revolution and Marxist philosophical standpoints in the theory of language and also from the relationship between discourse and power to the discursiveness of the "Social"; the debates concerning ideology and discourse have a rich and complicated history. Therefore, as a result of this rich and complicated history, there are too many studies on ideology and discourse which are original approaches with monumental names such as Marx, Althusser, Lukacs, Gramsci, Saussure and Foucault who focus on main themes such as "state apparatuses", "hegemony", "false consciousness" and "articulation".

In the existing literature and common conceptions and current approaches, what must be questioned is whether the philosophical and sociological contributions made by relatively new scholars are examined enough. It seems that in the literature there is a belief as if "everything was said" on ideology and debates on the meaning of what is called discourse. It goes without saying that such a view narrows the scope of the debates. At this point, Pierre Bourdieu and his contributions to the theories of ideology and discourse are crucial for verifying the claim mentioned above. Perhaps,

the debate on ideology and discourse is not over and there are things we may learn from Bourdieu. Moving from this point, this study aims to investigate how Pierre Bourdieu can be read on the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

Pierre Bourdieu, whose ideas have influenced so many scholars in various fields of study from nationalism to feminism, is one of the most significant intellectuals in our century. What makes Bourdieu interesting for us is not only his succesful attempts in building new concepts such as habitus, doxa, field, symbolic power and symbolic violence, but also his contributions to the debates concerning the examination of middle class culture in a new sociological perspective. Hence, Bourdieu's fruitful sociological perspective may contribute to reading the higly complex debates on ideology and discourse from a different angle.

Born in Denguin, a small town in south-eastern France, on 1 April 1930, Pierre Bourdieu was "undoubtedly the most important sociologist of the post-war period in Europe." when he died on 23 January 2002 (McRobbie, www. opendemocracy.net/themes/ article-10-292.jsp). In the last years before his death, "he had become increasingly prominent, not just as an intellectual but for his participation on the wider political stage" (McRobbie, 2002: 129) and maybe for this reason, in the eye of his "enemies", Bourdieu was a "militant sociologist" (Duran, 2002: 325).

Pierre Bourdieu, whose "central plank in his sociological platform is his attempt to transcend the 'compulsory' and 'ritual' choice between subjectivism and objectivism" (Jenkins, 1994: 66), held the chair of the sociology at the College de France, the highest instance of independent French research, where he had been teaching since 1982. "Author of some 25 books, he also founded the leading

sociological journal, 'Actes de la recherce scientifique' in 1975." (Madarasz, www.counterpunch.org/bourdieu1.htm).

Although the term ideology is not particularly central to Bourdieu's work, because its conceptual framework is rather driven by the power of the concepts like habitus, doxa, field, symbolic power and symbolic violence, it can be asserted that these concepts mentioned above tell us a story which is pertinent to the ones in ideology and discourse debates.

Given that we have mentioned some concepts of Bourdieu such as habitus, doxa, field, symbolic power and symbolic violance; understanding what these concepts "mean" in Bourdieu may be essantial. In Bourdieu's works; habitus is an objective basis for regular modes of behaviour, doxa is the point of view of the dominant presenting itself as a universal point of view, field is a competitive system of social relations which functions according to its own logic, symbolic power is a power of constructing reality and of transforming the vision of the world, and symbolic violence is the gentle; invisible form of violence.

Needless to say, we are aware of the fact that these notions which we have mentioned above have much more complex meanings in Bourdieu's conceptual universe. However, here we only try to draw the framework of the main context which we shall depend on throughout the study.

Daring to simplify, in this study our main context which is determined by Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual tools shall be as follows: In social world, there are many "field"s from art to education which have their own rules and in these "field"s there are countless sets of dispositons, that is, "habitus"es which both shape and is shaped by "Practice"s that have a vital relationship with both "field"s and "habitus"es.

Needless to say, social world and thus “field”s, "habitus"es and “Practice”s are subject to a continuous struggle for power. Groups having different kinds of “capital”s struggle with each other by using a specific and “symbolic” form of power and violence that is difficult to perceive in modern life. By means of “symbolic power” and “symbolic violence”, groups try to establish a doxic order, that is an order which is established according to the dominant's worldview, on social world. This study shall attempt to shed light upon this process and its ties with the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

Therefore, in second chapter we shall take a look at the history of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. In the third chapter of the study, the terms of practice, habitus and field and in the fourth chapter, the terms of symbolic power, symbolic violence and doxa are examined. In doing this, we shall try to indicate the anatomy of the terms and their relationship with each other and additionally, their relation to some main themes in the debates. Throughout the chapters, we shall be concerned how these terms can be read on the debates concerning ideology and discourse. In the end of the each chapter, the terms that we have mentioned shall be discussed on the axis of the “field”s of language and education which are at same time very crucial for the history and the content of the debates. Discussing the terms on the axis of education and language, which has to do with the compulsory of taking account of the power relations having prominent production and reproduction mechanisms, shall also be useful for making sense of the operation of the terms from habitus to doxa. In the end of our study, we hope that we shall be able to show clearly how Pierre Bourdieu and his conceptual map can be read on the debates that we have mentioned.

For instance, in our study we shall ask: "To what extent can reading Bourdieu extend the debates concerning ideology and discourse? In what degree can reading Bourdieu enrich the conceptual map of the debates?" In this way, we shall also ask: "Does he achieve to escape from the traps of the classical dichotomies between the structure and the subject which were prevalent in previous approaches?''.

"How does Bourdieu constitute the meaning and the subject?" shall be our another question owing to the fact that the constitution of subject and meaning is crucial in ideology and discourse debates. Our other questions which shall be minor ones are: "Why does Bourdieu avoid using the term ideology although he has to do with main questions and main fields of ideology and discourse debates such as education and language?" and "How can we classify Bourdieu's arguments within ideology and discourse debates?". As an another question, it shall be meaningful to ask: "What are the similarities and differences between Bourdieu on the one hand and the other scholars such as Althusser, Gramsci, Foucault and Sausure?". On the axis of our questions which we have asked above, our major question will be : How can be Pierre Bourdieu read on the debates concerning ideology and discourse? If we can answer our major question and relevant questions on a brief characterization of ideology and discourse debates, we think, we shall achieve to highlight the matter: "Pierre Bourdieu's conribution to the debates concerning ideology and discourse".

We shall benefit from many texts to answer these questions in our study. But at this point we would like to state that in the literature, we have not come across with a publication that directly coincides with our topic to be examined in our study. However, a very concise interview between T. Eagleton and P. Bourdieu may be accepted as an exception: *Doxa and Common Life: An Interview (1997).*

Language and Symbolic Power (1991) is another source to be mentioned here. This book which is written by Pierre Bourdieu is about both linguistic theory of Bourdieu and interactions among the concepts such as habitus, symbolic power and symbolic violence operating on the field of language. We can underline another book which we shall use partly in our study. Pierre Bourdieu's *In Other Words* (1990) is significant with respect to its contribution to drawing the conceptual map to be articulated in main debates concerning ideology and discourse.

Having presented these two primary sources, we shall now point out some certain secondary texts that will help us in outlining the debates made around our topic. From this respect, in addition to Jenkins's *Pierre Bourdieu* and Swartz's *Culture and Power*, some very fruitful and instructive articles which we shall use are: Purvis and Hunt's "Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology...", Eagleton's "Ideology and Its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism", Zizek's "The Spectre of Ideology" and "Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach".

Undoubtedly, we shall also benefit from some classical texts in the literature by just summarizing briefly their arguments about ideology and discourse such as Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", Marx's "Fetishism of Commodities" and Marx and Engels's "German Ideology", Gramsci's "Prison Notebooks" and Foucault's "The Archeology of Knowledge".

The method which will be pursued in our study is interpretative-textual method. In using this method, at the same time, we shall wield critical reflection. In this context, the conceptual framework of our study shall be drawn by analyzing and interpreting Bourdieu's concepts such as habitus, doxa, field, symbolic power and symbolic violence.

On this ground, in our study we aim to shed some light on how Bourdieu's conceptual tools may be used in the debates and how these conceptual tools may contribute to the debates. This attempt seems crucial to us owing to the fact in the existing and enormous literature on ideology and discourse debates, despite some analysis about the position of Bourdieu's conceptual tools in the debates, there are no sufficent attempts to clarify this position. For this reason, we shall concentrate on the relationship between the existing debates concerning ideology and discourse and Bourdieu's conceptual tools.

Supposing that Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual map extends and enriches the debates and gives new opportunities for "Reading" the debates on different scholars from Marx to Foucault, in our study, we shall attempt to show how Bourdieu can be read on the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Throughout the chapters, we shall try to argue that whether Bourdieu's concepts are useful instruments to grasp the effects of the relations of power "in and behind discourse" and the position of the subjects in ideological and discursive practices. In our study, we shall also attempt to underline the fact that Bourdieu's emphasis on the multi-dimensionality and complexity of meaning and subject provide an opportunity to make sense of the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

Despite the fact that it is difficult to read Bourdieu on the debates since Pierre Bourdieu tends to avoid the term ideology, which "has very often been misused or used in a very vague manner" (Bourdieu, 1997: 266), we nevertheless hold that if Bourdieu's concepts are thought in the parellellism with the debates concerning ideology and discourse, most of the main themes in the debates could gain deeper sociological dimensions and therefore, Pierre Bourdieu and his conceptual world are

worthy of reflection and examination for any attempt for reconsidering the phenomena of ideology and discourse.

CHAPTER TWO

A GLANCE AT THE HISTORY OF THE DEBATES CONCERNING IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

As we have emphasized before, ideology as a term is one of the most disputable and difficult concepts in social sciences. As Teun Van Dijk stressed ironically, "this sentence you read is almost a routine. Studies of ideologies begin with a remark about the vagueness of the notion and the resulting theoretical confusion of its analysis"(Van Dijk, 1998:1). In addition to Van Dijk, Terry Eagleton points out that "nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology" (Eagleton, 1991: 1). Hence we come across with a huge variety of meanings concerning the term ideology. "The process of production meanings, signs and values in social life", "systematically distorted communication", "socially necessary illusion", "a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class" or " forms of thought motivated by social interests" can be listed to indicate the "fuzzy life" of the term ideology (Eagleton, 1991: 1-2).

Moving from this axis, maybe we should take a look at the historical dimension of the term ideology. Before giving a brief characterization of the debates, we should underline that, ideology as a term was intended to be a philosophical term for the "science of ideas" when it was first used in the late eighteenth century by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy (Mardin, 2000: 22, Barth, 1976: 1, O'Sullivan, 1989: 7, Freeden, 1996: 14, Williams, 1977: 56). It can be said that when the term ideology was first used, the meaning of the notion is too far from its everyday life use which is generally pejorative in our time. In the beginning, as Barth emphasized, "ideology had a practical and not just a theoretical significance because in the view of its

proponents it alone provided an adequate foundation for the political, moral and educational sciences" (Barth, 1976: 3).

But now, before debating de Tracy who wanted to "construct a practical project for the purification of the thought" (Minogue, 1989:27) and the other Enlightenment scholars, our attention should be paid to the arguments put forward by Bacon, Helvetius and Holbach since it is compulsory to grasp the philosophical background of the term.

It is generally known that in Bacon's point of view, there are some obstacles to human understanding which he calls them idols. "These idols, the idols of the Tribe, the idols of the Cave, the idols of the Market-place and the idols of Theatre, prevent human understanding from reaching the truth" (Larrain, 1978: 19, Barth, 1976: 23). In a sense, these idols create obstacles for objective grasp of reality. In fact this is very crucial point for making sense of the nature of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. As David McLennan stated, the idols of the Tribe are common to the human species and these idols are used to indicate the tendency of believing the traditions. The second has to do with the own limits of the individuals. The third derives from the social life of man and is about the language. The fourth has to do with the dogmatic attitude, fables and doctrines in the old times (McLennan, 1999: 15). The first core of the *representation question* shows itself here, in the pages of *Novum Organum (1620).* We, needless to say, see the traces of the perception of ideology as distortion here. Such a perception and the *representation question* in Bacon's thought have critical assumptions about the role of the Reason and the relationship between the object and subject. The argument which Bacon put forward, that is to say "it is possible to reach the truth by demolishing the idols", assumes an

independent relationship between the object and subject. Here both objectivity and subjectivity is seen in the same existence mode.

While some idols (obstacles to human understanding) are innate in Bacon's theory, when it comes to the era of the French Enlightenment, we see that the obstacles, the "idols" are external. The scholars of the Enlightenment devote their writings to the external obstacles which mask the truth. In their point of view, the one and only obstacle which prevents human understanding from reaching the true knowledge of life is religion.

In the era of the French Enlightenment, there is a common idea amongst the intellectuals: "Religion is the source of all superstitions, false notions and preconceptions" (Larrain, 1978: 29, Barth, 1976: 36). For instance, Helvetius and Holbach put forward this version in their theories about "priestly deceit" which is a theory about priests using religion to maintain their power. In their view, priests are interested in keeping people in ignorance so that they can maintain their riches. "There is a sort of conspiracy against the people which are led by priests and which can only be destroyed by education" (Larrain, 1979: 24). Religion, as Helvetius and Holbach emphasized, creates an imaginary world where men could satisfy their need for happiness which the social conditions and legal-political order of the real world denies them (Barth, 1976: 36-7). The theory of priestly deceit wanted to make it clear that behind religious representations, "power interests" were hidden (Larrain, 1979: 25). The main question for these French thinkers is discovering the source of the happiness. They think that people can be happy if only they use their rational capacities. Therefore, the Reason is instrumentalized to make people happy. According to these scholars, by means of education the reason shall be improved and

"sharpened" in a way. As Hans Barth put it, in fact, these philosophers have "principally the same epistemological position as Bacon" (Barth, 1976. 31).

From Helvetius to Holbach, the scholars of the French Enlightenment keep a deep trust in the supremacy of the Reason. *The question of representation* in the arguments put forward by these French philosophers assumes that the knowledge of the nature can be grasped correctly and the natural and social reality can be reflected on human mind. This trust on the supremacy of the Reason shall also be seen in the positivist era and the role of science, education, "order and progress". But, in this point, a crucial transformation appears in the "fuzzy life" of the term ideology.

Despite the fact that ideology has a positive meaning in the beginning, following the transformation of France from a democratic republic into a despotic autocracy; a pejorative meaning was attached to the concepts of ideology and to the figure of ideologue by Napoleon Bonaparte. In the nineteenth century, the convergence between the term ideology and its negative content was completed (Larrain, 1979: 30). For instance; in positivism, which was born in France in the epoch of ideologies (Timur, 1993: 129), science is fetishized and byproduct of this, ideology is seen as an imaginary and irrational cognitive structure.

To take a concise look at the emergence of ideology, we can assert that from Bacon via Holbach, Helvetius, de Tracy and Napoleon to Nietzsche; the phenomenon analysed under the name of idol, prejudice, religion or ideology, was always considered as a psychological distortion, as a problem that operates at the level of cognition. Here when we take a look at the historical debates from Bacon to positivist era, we run into the embodiment of the main questions in the background of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. First of all, we see that a distinction between "positive" and "negative" ideology is made. Then we realize

another distinction between "subjectivity" and "objectivity" is also made behind these assumptions which are based on the idea of distortion. Nevertheless we can say that on this main axis, the distortions, which were related to passions and superstructural institutions such as religion, were never related to historical and social contradictions until Karl Marx.

Marx's contribution, at this point, is really very crucial for showing the connection between ideology and social contradictions in society. It goes without saying that it is very difficult to summarize Marx's thoughts concerning the question of ideology owing to the fact that he uses the concept of ideology as a broad category (Barrett, 1996:11) and he also explains this concept by using terms about consciousness together with social contradictions. Nevertheless, some prominent features in Marx's approach to ideology can be pointed out. But before debating Karl Marx's ideas concerning the debates, we would like to mention a significant philosopher to grasp the Marxist insight: Ludwig Feurbach.

It is crucial that Ludwig Feurbach's critique of religion goes much deeper than the theory of priestly deceit that we have discussed before. Feurbach puts a different and more complex theory of religion against the existing theories of religion. Feurbach asserts that the institution of religion has to do with "the essence" of the human. It is a kind of alienation (Belge, 2000a: 8). Religion for Feurbach is not an external entity, but it is a social entity. Religion is an institution about social reality. As Larrain pointed out, in Feurbach "religion is no longer conceived as an arbitrary and independent phenomenon which could explain people's ignorance and unhappiness" (Larrain, 1979: 32).

Karl Marx is very aware of what Ludwig Feurbach attempted to do. According to Marx, Feurbach should be acclaimed owing to the fact that he makes critical

contributions to the emergence of real materialism and understanding of the alienation of human essence (Marx, 2000: 158). By moving from this point, Marx does not approach the question of (mis)representation only in the parallelism with consciousness. However, Marx and Engels regard ideologies as systems of misleading or illusory ideas. They use, in the *German Ideology*, the metaphor of "camera obscura". "If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects in the retina does from their physical life-process." (Marx-Engels, 1999: 67). In fact, Marx and Engels here try to indicate that we cannot get away from ideology easily as we did in the situation of "priestly deceit". Both of them emphasize that "the real processes of life". Now the questions concerning ideology are not only about consciousness. In a way Marx and Engels remind Ludwig Feurbach by stressing that we should grasp "ideological reflections" by only means of "the real processes of life". Here we run into a pejorative usage of the term ideology. It is so since ideology-like "ethics, religion and metaphysics"- has no history. They are not autonomous institutions any more; they are deeply rooted in the real physical life-processes (Marx-Engels, 1999: 68). In addition to this, the term ideology here is used in a negative sense owing to the fact that "ideology" and "ideologists" are used as pejorative in Marx. Marx and Engels mention young Hegelists as "conservative ideologists" and claim that "the first form of ideologists is the religious" (Marx- Engels, 1999: 64-75).

Secondly, "ideology" in Marx can be seen as a way of thinking without considering material and social dynamics. For instance, Marx puts forward that the commodities has social and material basis which cannot be ignored and writes about the fetishism of commodities that "a commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial

thing, and easily understood. His analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." (Marx, 1974: 76). Here Marx benefits from a negative conception of ideology to see the functional dynamics of modern capitalist society. Marx's analysis about commodity fetishism signifies an idea of distortion like in the German Ideology, but with a significant difference. In this text, distortion is not a simply (mis)representation in the domain of consciousness. In this point we see the traces of distortion mechanisms functioning on external or social reality and here ideologies have a history even it is secondary. In this text, Marx analyses the fact that fetishism lies not in our perception but in the real social life (Zizek, 2004: 80).

Lastly, it can be pointed out that for Marx and Engels, ideology is a superstructural institution which has to do with the domain of consciousness. This feature indicates itself in Marx's classical phrases: "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness." (Marx, 1984: 84). Additionally, Marx sees "legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic" forms, "in short" as "ideological forms" (Marx, 1984: 85). Here again we run into a conception of ideology which has no history. Because, ideology is seen as omnipresent category.

Until now, we have mentioned rigid distinctions made between the object and the subject, the reason and the nature. We have witnessed the arguments concerning the reflections, the echoes of material life and besides the obstacles preventing human understanding from reaching the truth. Marx even is a scholar influenced by the Enlightenment, attempted to break the circle based on clear distinctions about

grasping reality. Marx gives us some clues about complex dynamics of material life as we have especially seen in *Commodity Fetishism*. But when it comes to Lukacs, Gramsci and Althusser, we see that central attention is paid to social and material basis, and the transmission of ideology through various sets of institutions and practices are taken into account.

Gyorgy Lukacs is significant especially for the reason that he examined Hegelian effects upon Marx and the relationship between history and consciousness. In Lukacs, the essence of scientific Marxism consists in the realisation that the real forces of history are independent of men's consciousness of them. "Men do indeed make history, but in false consciousness, and in order therefore to understand history, we have to understand false consciousness." Here, it is significant that dialectical materialism requires us to investigate this false consciousness as an aspect of the historical process, and as a stage in the historical process, rather than simply proclaim its falsehood. (McDonough, 1978: 36).

Lukacs emphasizes that the role of the false consciousness and its "moral and the other forms" are determinant together with "various ideologies and religions in the class struggles in the past."(Lukacs, 1971: 224). Lukacs underlines the ideologies in respect to their relationships with their classes and he points out that the actions of the class are determined by class consciousness. Besides, he mentions that the positions of the classes are significant in a way reminding Lenin. Class consciousness is determined by the position of the classes. He, in a way reminding Lenin again, makes a distinction between the ideologies of bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These ideologies of these classes are different from each other since their consciousness is different. Bourgeoisie cannot have the consciousness of the proletariat owing to the fact that it means a "self-annihilation" for the bourgeoisie. In

fact, here we also run into the traces of the question of representation since standing in the "correct position" has to do with the "correct perception" of the world. It is also crucial that all these distinctions made by Lukacs have to do with another distinction made between science and ideology. To summarise, we can point out that "science are no longer to be strictly counterposed to ideology" (Eagleton, 1997:181). Science in the thought of Lukacs is the expression of a particular class ideology and the supremacy of the class position of the proletariat makes the world-view of this class more scientific. Besides, one of the key elements in the thought of Lukacs is "reification" which plays a crucial role in the distinction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. "Reification", which carries prominent traces from Marx's "commodity fetishism", signifies a process that people are dominated by things in general. One of the major consequences of this process is the demolition of total images (Lukacs, 1971: 103-4).

Even though the term of false consciousness and the name of Lukacs are generally used together, the question of false consciousness in Lukacs can be seemed problematic. As Eagleton pointed out, "Lukacs takes over from aspects of the Second International, the positive, non-pejorative sense of the word ideology, writing unembarrassedly for Marxism as "the ideological expression of the proleteriat. And this is at least one reason why the widespread view that ideology for him is synonymous with false consciousness is simply mistaken." (Eagleton, 1994: 180). Whatever the situation is, separated from Lenin's positive conception of ideology, Lukacs is undoubtedly one of the key thinkers in the historical background of the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

We nevertheless can put forward that Gramsci and Althusser are more successful than Lukacs to take account of the transmission of ideology through countless sets of

institutions and practices each with their own specifity and internal contradictions. The key category in the writing of Antonio Gramsci, in fact, is not ideology but hegemony. Extending and enriching the notion and the theory of ideology, Gramsci's concept of hegemony is broader category than ideology. It is worth pondering the distinction between these two terms. As Eagleton pointed out, Gramsci, who wants to find out how the proletariat falls into the trap of fascism, normally uses the word hegemony to mean the ways in which a governing power wins consent to its rule from those it subjugates- though it is true that he occasionally uses the term to cover both consent and coercion together. There is thus an immediate difference from the concept of ideology, since it is clear that ideologies may be forcibly imposed. Therefore, "hegemony includes ideology but not reducible to it" (Eagleton, 1994: 195-96).

The distinction between hegemony and ideology has to do with the struggle of Gramsci against the economist and reductionist conception of ideology. Gramsci states that one must distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure; and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or "willed". "To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological'; they organise human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary, they only create individual movements, polemics and so on." (Gramsci, 1971: 376-7).

The notion of hegemonic class should also be emphasized here. Hegemonic class is a class which has been able to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own by means of an ideological struggle (Mouffe, 1979: 181). It is crucial that Gramsci also insists on the material and institutional structure for the elaboration and

spreading of ideology. This is made up of different hegemonic apparatuses: Schools, churches, the entire media and even architecture and the name of the streets. The ensemble of apparatuses is termed the ideological structure of a dominant class by Gramsci, and the level of the superstructure where ideology is produced and diffused is called "civil society" (Mouffe, 1979: 187). The idea of hegemonic apparatuses provides a good opportunity to examine the thesis of Louis Althusser.

As McLennan pointed out, Althusser confronts and resolves two problems. First, the classic base/superstructure metaphor has theoretical limits which must be surpassed. The only way to think the existence and the nature of the superstructure is from the point of view of reproduction. Second, the classic Marxist theory of the State also remains descriptive and must be expanded. The state involves not only the classic repressive state apparatus (RSA) but also other kinds of apparatuses with their own specifity: The ideological state apparatus (ISA). The distinction between the RSAs and the ISAs is at the centre of Althusser's conception of ideology. The ISAs are different from RSAs precisely in their functioning: "They function massively and predominantly by ideology". This functioning is also what unifies the diversity of institutions because the ideology by which they function is already unified beneath the ruling ideology (McLennan, 1978:93, Althusser, 1971:138, Belge, 2000b: 10). Besides the distinction between the RSAs and ISAs, there are three main thesis in which Althusser explains the nature of ideology and its general mechanism.

The first one is that ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. This thesis implies a definite break with all conceptualisations of ideology as false consciousness. For Althusser, ideology is not a representation of reality. It is a very different thing: A representation of an (individual) relationship to reality. Briefly, ideology is not a

representation of the real conditions of existence but a representation of an (imaginary) relationship of individuals to these real conditions of existence (Althusser, 1971: 150, McLennan, 1978: 95, Kazancı, 2002: 57). This point can remind us the arguments that Lukacs put forward. When we have mentioned the name of Lukacs, let us underline that the distinction made between science and ideology by Althusser is different than that of Lukacs'. In Althusser, a sharp division between science and ideology is made and science criticizes the ideology and functions differently than ideologies.

The second is that ideology has a material existence. According to Althusser, it is so because ideology always exists within an apparatus and apparatus and its practices (Althusser, 1971: 150, McLennan, 1978: 96, Kazancı, 2002: 57).

The third thesis is that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects. This particular functioning of ideology implies that it is addressed to individuals. The practico-social function specific to ideology is to constitute concrete individuals as subjects, to transform individuals into subjects. Every individual recognizes himself as a subject. This recognition of being a subject, this recognition of what appears to be an obvious and natural fact, is in fact an ideological recognition of an obviousness imposed by ideology. One recognizes oneself as a subject only in the practice of concrete ideological rituals inscribed in ideological apparatuses (Althusser, 1971:160-1, McLennan, 1978:96, Kazancı, 2002: 58). This feature and the second thesis we have pointed out above can remind us that old Pascalian formula: "Get on your knees, open your hands, move your lips...Faith shall come then". We shall return to this point later in debating Pierre Bourdieu.

"False consciousness" of Lukacs, "hegemony" of Gramsci and "ideological state apparatuses" (ISA) of Althusser, who revises Marxist conceptions concerning

ideology, are at the same time significant break points both within Marxist tradition and within ideology and discourse debates. Especially, Althusser's theory of ideology, despite all attacks, may be read "as coming close to the distinction that has come to be designated by ideology-discourse couplet". According to Purvis and Hunt, there is a direct link between Althusser's *interpellation*, the mechanism through which ideology constitutes people as subjects, and the concept of discourse that is too striking to be ignored (Purvis-Hunt, 1993: 483).

To define the term discourse, we can use Purvis and Hunt's definition. "Discourse refers to the individual social networks of communication through the medium of language or non-verbal sign-systems." (Purvis-Hunt, 1993: 485). Even though the authors emphasize that discourse can be non-verbal; for instance "practices in which males open doors for females", it must be underlined that linguistic theories are crucial to reach the realm of discourse. Hence our focus must be on the scholars such as Saussure and Volosinov.

From the angle of the debates, Saussure's definition of language as "a system of signs" (Saussure, 1974: 14) seems critical. To make sense of what Saussure exactly says is possible by pondering the distinction between "language" and "speaking", since in separating language from speaking, we are at the same time separating: "(1) What is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental." (Saussure, 1966:14). In *Course in General Linguistics*, Saussure writes that language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is therefore comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc.

Based on structuralist logic, the theory of Saussure examines language as a closed system and "language has no outside" but nevertheless it is a social institution. In this

system, the sign is embodied within the concept, "signified" and the sound image, "signifier" (Saussure, 1966: 15-16; Üşür, 1997: 74-75). In Saussure, the system of language is not an evolutionary; rather it is like a chaotic, rhisomatic chain. What make the individuals speak is the language system itself. In this system meaning emerges on a relative "fixity and nonfixity". The relationship between the signifier and the signified is contingent. The signifiers, besides, have no positive value. The value of the signifiers and the meaning itself are determined by a relationalist logic in the system. As Laclau stressed, in Saussurian linguistic theory there are two basic principles around which linguistics is organized. "The first is that in language there are no positive terms, only differences. The second principle is that language is form and not substance" (Laclau, 1993: 432).

After Saussurian revolution, the most significant contribution to the studies of ideologies and philosophy of language was made by Valentin N. Volosinov. Volosinov's approach showing itself in his classical phrase: "Without signs, there is no ideology. "(Volosinov, 1973: 9) is very useful key point to grasp the debates. In Volosinov, everything ideological possesses a meaning: "it represents, depicts or stand for something lying outside itself." (Volosinov, 1973:9) and the meaning has a key role. A tool or any consumer good may gain a meaning and convert into an ideological sign. For instance, "think of the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Union and bread and wine for Christians". It is crucial that every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow of reality, but is also itself a material segment of that very reality in Volosinov's interpretation (Volosinov, 1973: 10-11).

Ideology, according to Volosinov, cannot be derived from consciousness, as is the practice of idealism and psychologistic positivism. He criticizes those who localize ideology in the realm of consciousness and states that "by doing this, they transform

the study of ideologies into a study of consciousness and its laws." (Volosinov, 1973: 12-3). Reminding Gramsci, Volosinov formulates the relationship between language and power by saying this: "The ruling class strives to impart a supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgements which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccentual." (Volosinov, 1973: 23). As is seen, in contrast to Saussure, Volosinov takes account of the role of the individuals and social groups.

In addition to Sausure and Volosinov, the role of the individuals and social groups in the language system is examined by another significant scholar, Michel Pecheux. Michel Pecheux is a key figure representing "an Althusserian standpoint in discourse analysis". According to Pecheux, discursive formation determines "what to say" in a social formation and signify a meaning matrix. This matrix is determined by ideological structure and practices. The ideological structure and practices here at the same time shape the meanings and the interpretations. The meanings, the interpretations and the explanations change and these interchanges and transformations among the linguistic elements define the discursive processes. In this process, meanings are not fixed and in contrast to Saussure's parole, discursive processes are "relatively autonomous" (Pecheux, 1982: 58-62).

Michel Pecheux writes that "language is the common base of all discursive processes". For Pecheux, a discursive formation is occurred by many discursive processes and discursive formations are determined what Pecheux called as ideological formation. Influenced by Althusser, Michel Pecheux assumes that there are linguistic activities which give reference to the linguistic elements in discursive formation based on ideological formation. These activities are named as discursive semantic. On this axis, the subjects cannot perceive the complex structure that is

embodied in the ideological formations having discursive and interdiscursive formations. This complex structure in a way determines the consciousness and practices of the subjects in together with the meanings (Zizek, 2002b: 58). In other words, ideologies turn the individuals into the subjects. In this process, "class struggles" are very crucial determinants and each word, in a way reminding the arguments that Valentin Volosinov put forward, converts into a weapon or a symbol for any struggle (Pecheux, 1982: 98-111).

With the transformation of language from a system of signs to the domain of power struggle and criticisms about modernity, there is seen a tendency aiming to understand the new structure of power and its affects upon the formation of ideology and discourse. Michel Foucault and also Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe make significant contributions to debates in this respect. While power is being built from "below" in modern society, Foucault's emphasis was getting close to "the contextuality of the discourse" and he was trying to find the original forms of discourses which are not distorted by power relations through *genealogy and archaeology of knowledge.*

Foucault's rejection of theoretical humanism and his rejection of the truth/falsity dichotomy place him in unambiguous opposition to any notion of critical ideology. "On the other hand, his view of discourse as the medium of struggle mirrors the central thrust of that feature of Marx's concept of ideology as the terrain in which people become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. In this respect, Foucault's conception of discourse is very similar to the "sociological" version of ideology." (Purvis-Hunt, 1993: 489).

In the model of Foucault, what should be emphasized from the angle of the debates is that the social institutions affect the individuals and serve to the power in

shaping the characteristic of individuals and producing the "truth". In this process, according to Foucault, the contextual meaning is determined by enunciative functions. And discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but on the contrary, a totality in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined (Foucault, 1989: 55). It is also a critical reflection point that there is a significant distinction made by Foucault between discursive and non-discursive practices: "The latter being conceived as 'primary relations' existing independently of all discourse or all objects of discourse (that) may be described between institutions, techniques and social forms, etc." (Foucault, 1989: 45). For Purvis and Hunt, it is not that he thinks that there is somewhere a realm outside discourse, because all practices and institutions function through the medium of discourse. Rather social practices and institutions are not reducible to discourses; they have their conditions of possibility that are not provided by discourse alone (Purvis-Hunt, 1993: 490).

When it comes to Laclau and Mouffe, if we dare to simplify, they contribute to the debates by developing a new concept of ideology which is constructed within the conception of hegemony and showing the determinacy of discursivity and the articulation of social differences by discursive practice. By means of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe attempted to build up a fruitful conceptualization of power. On this axis, discourse is a "meaningful totality which transcends the distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic" and in their point of view, discursive struggles about the ways of fixing the meaning of a signifier are central to explain the political semantics of our contemporary political world. This partial fixing of the relation between signifier and signified is what the scholars called "hegemony". Laclau and Mouffe, who present a history of Marxism "from the Second International to

Gramsci", in their works, use the term hegemony to theorize the decisions taken in an undecidible terrain and the conclusion is that "as unddecidability operates at the very ground of the social, objectivity and power become indistinguishable. It is in these terms that it has been asserted that power is the trace of contingency within the structure." (Laclau, 1993: 435).

Laclau and Mouffe refuse Foucault's distinction between the discursive and non-discursive; rather they view all objects of inquiry or knowledge as discursive. But they insist that the discursivity of all objects of knowledge has no necessary connection with the perennial philosophical debate about whether there is an external reality that exists independent of consciousness (Purvis-Hunt, 1993: 492). In their words; "a discursive structure is not a merely cognitive or contemplative entity; it is an 'articulatory practice' which constitutes and organizes social relations." (Laclau-Mouffe, 1985:96). Attempting to go beyond the dichotomies like subject and object and thought and reality, their analysis affirms that "every object is constituted as an object of discourse and that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioral aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities." (Laclau-Mouffe, 1985: 107).

As Laclau emphasized, there has recently also been an important attempt by Slavoj Zizek to extend discourse theory to the field of political analysis through an approach which brings together Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian philosophy, especially Saul Kripke's anti-descriptivism (Laclau, 1993: 436). Zizek, born in Lyublyana in 1949, used this approach, which Ernesto Laclau underlined, with a special emphasis to popular culture and -especially movies. On this axis Zizek

benefits from Lacanian reading strategy which can be called "reading with..." By moving from Lacanian suggestion about "reading Kant with Sade", he attempts to read "Hegel with Lacan" and "Hitchcock with Lacan". As Somay pointed out, this reading strategies benefited by Zizek remind us Marx's Hegel readings "with Feurbach" or Hegel "with Adam Smith" (Somay, 2002: 10).

Slavoj Zizek wields these names and their theoretical universes to shed light upon the power relationships hidden in contemporary society. Therefore Zizek's one of the major intellectual interests is concerning the debates on ideology and discourse. By moving from this point, we can point out that Slavoj Zizek describes contemporary approaches by distrubuting the existing theories of ideology. Zizek emphasizes the necessity of thinking the term ideology out of the question of representation. For Zizek, "ideology has nothing to do with illusions or misrepresentations". What is ideological is a social reality in which participants should not know anything about it essence (Zizek, 2002a: 36). If a political point of view, according to Zizek, stands in a correct point about the objective content of itself, it could be totally ideological. In the thought of Zizek *vice versa* of this assumption is true too (Zizek, 2002b: 52). In addition to this fact, Slavoj Zizek warns us about the ideologies that are dominant and the ideologies that seem like dominant. Therefore for Zizek, the investigation of the position of the dominant ideology should be a compulsory task (Zizek, 2004a: 9).

Saying that if ideologies shall be effective, "their logic of legitimization of dominance relationships should be hidden", Zizek shifts the old classical Marxist formula-"they do not know, but they do"- and puts it as-"they know what they do well, but neverthless they do" (Zizek, 2002b: 53-54). In the parallelism with this fact, Slavoj Zizek benefits from the Hegelian triplet concerning religion: Doctrine, belief

and ritual. The nature of ideology in this triplet is compatible with: "Ideology as a complex of ideas (theories, convictions, beliefs, argumentative procedures); ideology in its externality, that is the materiality of ideology, Ideological State Apparatus; and finally, the most elusive domain, the 'spontaneous' ideology at the heart of social reality itself". Here Zizek writes that liberalism, on this axis, is a doctrine that is developed by various scholars from Locke to Hayek, it is materialized in rituals and apparatuses (free press, elections, markets, etc.) and active in the spontaneous (self) experience of subjects as "free individuals"(Zizek, 2002b: 55-56).

As Laclau mentioned, "in three cases Zizek finds an essential symmetry of development: at some stage the frontier dividing the ideological from the non-ideological is blurred and, as a result, there is an inflation of the concept of ideology which loses, in that way, all analytical precision" (Laclau, 1996:2). These three cases at the same time indicates the operation ideology "in itself", "for itself" and "in and for itself". Moving from this fact Slavoj Zizek asserts that the function of ideology is not to present us a point to run away from reality, rather it is to present social reality itself as a getaway from a traumatic, real core (Zizek, 2002a: 61).

In this context, the individuals reflect their beliefs to *the big Other* which is "virtual symbolic order that constitute the reality for us" (Zizek, 2003: 284), so the individuals can keep their distance against *the big Other* (Zizek, 2004a: 79). In this context drawn by Slavoj Zizek, the truth cannot be found out by only "looking strictly". On the contrary, a blurred object or reality can be seen by "looking awry" as we have seen in Holbein's painting (Zizek, 2004b: 26). As he pointed out, in other words, the truth at the same time emerges by misrecognition (Zizek, 2002a: 72). Moving from this fact Slavoj Zizek suggests that the Lacanian concept *le synthome* can be benefited as fruitful instrument for the relationships between ideology and

discourse. Zizek gives reference to the explanations based on the practices of hegemonic articulation which fix "the floating signifiers" by using "points de capiton", a Lacanian concept used to symbolize the instruments to fix the meanings, and assumes that it is useful but insufficient method. By means of *sinthome* Zizek aims to show "the ultimate stupidity of sinthome" by getting out its context that discursive and ideological practices have power to mystify (Zizek, 2004b: 174-175). Even though there are some intellectual obstacles (like Hegel and Lacan), Slavoj Zizek's thought is very vital for the debates concerning the ideology and discourse and for reading Bourdieu on the debates as we shall try to indicate following pages of this study.

To summarise, on this brief characterization of the debates which, at the same time, shows our general historical framework that we shall wield in reading Bourdieu, we hope to show how Pierre Bourdieu can be read on the debates by means of the concepts and the main themes discussed above. In doing this, we shall try to find some answers to the questions which seem compulsory to ask from the angle of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Now let us begin to go into the conceptual world of Pierre Bourdieu with habitus and practice.

CHAPTER THREE

PRACTICE, HABITUS AND FIELD

In this chapter, three of Bourdieu's most important "thinking tools", the concepts of practice, habitus and field, shall be discussed. Here we shall attempt to provide an insight to make sense of the conceptual ground that Bourdieu's theoretical world is built upon. Hence, first of all, our aim is to shed light upon how Pierre Bourdieu localizes the agents' position in social world, the social networks that are established by the agents and the social arenas in which the agents take their positions and struggle with each other. On this axis, we shall attempt to grasp the nature of what Pierre Bourdieu calls "field". Secondly, this chapter is concerned with the role of the dispositions, which determines the shapes of "practice"s and at the same time is determined in a way by these "practice"s, of the agents living in the "field"s. The fact that we have to examine the process of the production of sets of dispositions in various fields shall take us to the notion of "habitus". Thirdly, in the end of the chapter, we shall take a look at the "field"s of education and language, which are the very arenas to observe power struggles between different groups and process of the genesis of some main dispositions and practices that affect the agents. These two fields shall, at the same time, provide us a useful context which we can see the operation of the concepts that we have mentioned above. Besides, we shall see how these fields are portrayed in Bourdieu's world and gain a suitable reflection ground for the debate which we shall make in the fourth chapter with special emphasis upon the question of power in Bourdieu.

Before debating the term "field" and "habitus", to take a concise look at the term practice of Bourdieu may be essential owing to the fact that practice is the key term for both Bourdieu's sociological perspective that is product of the attempt to find a middle way between structuralism and objectivism and "the logic of operation" of the other concepts. Keeping in mind what the central plank in Bourdieu's sociological platform is, now we can begin with the distinctive features of Bourdieu's practice.

I. Practice: Between Structures and Dispositions

First of all, practice which is "the result of the interaction between a given habitus and a given field'" (Vann, 2000: 171) is located in space, and more significantly in time. Interaction takes time and it occurs in space. Time and space are both capable of being modelled in different ways, and they are equally social constructs, but movement in space always involves movement in time. Practice as a visible, "objective", social phenomenon cannot be understood outside of time and space. "Any adequate analysis of practice must, therefore, treat temporality as a central feature of its very nature." (Jenkins, 1992: 69).

Second, practice "which has a logic that cannot be reduced to an economic logic" (Wacquant-Bourdieu, 2003: 109), according to Bourdieu, is not consciously-or not wholly consciously-organised and orchestrated. As Jenkins pointed out, "nothing is random or purely accidental but, as one thing follows on from another, practice happens. Practice manifests itself through the combination of structures and habitus and has the potential of generating new habitus." (Jenkins, 1992: 70). Through practice, the social world and its reflections are internalized and reproduced. The internalization of the social world and its reflections, needless to say, is a good

beginning for reading Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse. But now, such attempt without taking into account of the other notions, habitus and field, shall be weak. Therefore, after drawing our conceptual framework, we shall attempt to read Bourdieu on this ground that we have underlined.

Practice, like the other concepts of Bourdieu, carries prominent features of his sociological perspective and his interactionist approach to the question between the structure and subject. In the parallelism with this point, Pierre Bourdieu argues that "practices are constitutive of structures as well as determined by them." (Swartz, 1997: 58). He emphasizes that the structures are themselves socially constructed through everyday practices of agents. This is a crucial point for discussing the logic of practices, the relationship between the structure and the subjects. After discussing these reflection points, it goes without saying that it shall be a compulsory to examine the notion of habitus.

In fact, what Pierre Bourdieu is trying to get at here, in building the term practice, may be best summed up in his notions of *practical sense* or *practical logic* "which leads the subjects in the social world" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003: 29). In Bourdieu's thought, "practice has a logic which is not that of logic and thus to apply practical logic to logical logic is to run the risk of destroying the logic one wants to describe with the instrument used to describe it." (Jenkins 1992: 82). "Subjects" are active and knowing agents endowed with a *practical sense*, that is, "an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division (what is usually called taste) and also a system of durable cognitive structures (which are essentially the product of the internalization of objective structures) and of schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate sense" (Bourdieu, 1998:25).

As it is seen, for Bourdieu "social agents are not automata regulated like clocks, in accordance with laws which they do not understand. They put into action the incorporated principles of a generative habitus, system of dispositions acquired through experience variable from place to place and time to time." (Bourdieu, 1995: 53). In such a model, according to Pierre Bourdieu, the agents have freedom to move far from the established order or rules.

As is known, the relationship between the structure and the subject brings so many problems difficult to solve. Here the notion of habitus is invented by Bourdieu to cope with these problems. In fact, the operation and function of practices are best understood through the concept of habitus since practices are, at the same time, are produced in fields by means of countless habituses. Thus, we need to take a closer look at the structure of the notion of habitus in order to make sense of what the term practice expresses.

II. Habitus: Set of Dispositions

In fact habitus is an old Aristotelian and Thomist concept (Jenkins, 1992: 77). Habitus has been variously defined in Bourdieu's intellectual world but, it can be put most simply as "the system of schemes of perception, thought, appreciation and action which are durable and transposable". Moving from this definition, Bridget Fowler is right in saying that "Given that this [habitus] implies that the subjective world constituted in a stable pattern, Bourdieu then goes on to link habitus to a material or structural position, not unlike the Lukacsian notion of worldview." (Fowler, 1997: 18).

The habitus is a kind of practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation- what is called in sport a "feel" for the game, that is, the art of *anticipating* the future of the game, which is inscribed in the present state of play. To take an example from the realm of education which we shall discuss below, the "feel" for the game becomes increasingly necessary as the educational tracks become diversified and confused (Bourdieu, 1998: 25).

Bourdieu rethinks this concept in order to get away from classical dichotomies between the subject and the structure:

> Since the habitus, the virtue made of necessity, is a product the incorporation of objective necessity, it produces strategies which, even if they are not produced by consciously aiming at explicitly formulated goals on the basis of an adequate knowledge of objective conditions, nor by the mechanical determination exercised by causes, turn out to be objectively adjusted to a situation. (...) Constructing the notion of habitus as a system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level as categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles of action meant constituting the social agent in his true role as the practical operator of the construction of objects (Bourdieu, 1990: 11-13).

Habitus, as the system of dispositions to a certain practice, is an objective basis of regular modes of behaviour and thus for the regularity of modes of practice, and if practices can be predicted, this is because of the effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain way in certain circumstances (Bourdieu, 1990: 77-8). Habitus which is a "socialized subjectivity" (Wacquant-Bourdieu, 2003: 117) cannot be examined as if it were a "computer programme" and this concept has to do with what is called 'hexis' that is used to signify department, the manner and style in which actors carry themselves: stance, gait, gesture, etc" (Bourdieu, 1990: 24). This means that the modes of behaviour created by the habitus do not have the fine regularity of the modes of behaviour deduced from a legislative

principle (Bourdieu, 1990: 78). The habitus goes hand in glove with vagueness and indeterminacy. We can therefore assume that habitus obeys a practical logic.

The habitus, which is the generative principle of responses more or less well adapted to the demands of the certain field , "is the product of an individual history, but also, through the formative experiences of earliest infancy, of the whole collective history of family and class; through, in particular, experiences in which the slope of the trajectory of a whole lineage is expressed, and which may take the visible and brutal form of a failure, or on the contrary, may show itself merely as so many imperceptible regressions." (Bourdieu, 1990: 91).

According to Bourdieu, all the antinomies that the notion of habitus aims at eliminating are: "Finalism/mechanism, explanations by reasons/causes, conscious/unconscious, rational and strategic calculation/mechanical submission to mechanical constraints, etc. and the relation which obtains between habitus and the field to which it is objectively adjusted is a sort of ontological complicity, a subconscious and pre-reflexive fit." (www.ac.wwu.edu/-curth/papers/bourdieu.html.). This complicity manifests itself in what Bourdieu calls as the sense of the game or 'feel for the game' (or *sens pratique*, practical sense). In his words, it is intentionality without intention which functions as the principle of the strategies devoid of strategic design, without rational computation and without the conscious positing of ends." (Bourdieu: 1990: 108).

Now let us try to shed some light upon the main features of the notion of habitus. For Bourdieu, first of all, habitus realizes itself, become active only in the relation to a field, and the same habitus can lead to very different practices and stances depending on the state of the field.

Secondly, habitus, as the product of social conditionings, and thus of a history (unlike character), is endlessly transformed, either in a direction that reinforces it, when embodied structures of expectation encounter structures of objective chances in harmony with these expectations, or in a direction that transforms it and, for instance, raises or lowers the level of expectations and aspirations. Habitus, in certain instances, is built upon contradiction, upon tension, even upon instability (Bourdieu, 1990: 117).

Thirdly, not only can habitus be practically transformed (always within definite boundaries) by the effect of a social trajectory leading to conditions of living different from initial ones, it can also be controlled through awakening of consciousness and socio-analysis and habitus is a concept which, indeed, has to do with different approaches to culture. As David Swartz pointed out:

> Bourdieu theorizes culture as more than a 'common code' as in structuralism, more than an ideological system of ideas, beliefs, or values, as in Marxism, or more than a general world view posited by Mannheim's *Weltanschauung.* All of these images of culture, despite their quite different theoretical origins, convey little sense of agency. While the concept of habitus includes all of these features, it privileges the basic idea that action is governed by a 'practical sense' of how to move in the social world. Culture is a practical tool used for getting along in the social world (Swartz, 1997: 115).

Habitus is both a system of schemata of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices. And, in both of these dimensions, its operation expresses the social position in which it was elaborated.

Consequently, habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; however, they are immediately perceived as such only by those agents who possess the code, the classificatory schemes necessary to understand their social meaning. "Habitus thus implies a 'sense

of one's place' but also a 'sense of the place of others'. For example, we say of a piece of clothing, a piece of furniture, or a book: "That looks petty-bourgeois" or "that's intellectual". What are the social conditions of possibility of such a judgement? (...) Thus through habitus, we have a world of common sense, a world that seems self-evident" (Bourdieu, 1990: 131).

One of the functions of the notion of habitus is to account for the unity of style, which unites the practices and goods of a single agent or a class of agents. In Bourdieu's words:

> The habitus is a generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary "lifestyle"[1], that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods and practices. Like the positions of which they are the product, habitus are differentiated, but they are also differentiating. (...) Habitus are generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices-what the worker eats, and especially the way he eats it, the sport he practices and the way he practices it, his political opinions and the way he expresses them are systematically different from the industrial owner's corresponding activities. But habitus are also classificatory schemes, principles of classification, principles of vision and division, different tastes. They make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar, and so forth, but the distinctions are not identical (Bourdieu, 1998: 8).

As is seen, the term habitus, which signifies classifications that are at the same time an object for class struggle and practices, has to do with micro-worlds which Bourdieu calls as fields.

III. Field: Site for Struggle

The concept of field emerged from the encounter between research into the sociology of art that Bourdieu was starting to undertake in his seminar at the Ecole

[1] Here the term "lifestyle" can be read as "set of different behavioural practices has to do with the consumption habits". See David Chaney's. 1999. **Yaşam Tarzları**, Ankara: Dost, pp.13-34

Normale, around 1960, and the beginning of the chapter devoted to religious sociology in Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft (Bourdieu, 1990: 22). Constructed the notion of field both against and with Weber, by thinking about the analysis he proposes of the relations between priest, prophet and sorcerer (Bourdieu, 1990: 45), Bourdieu assumes that field has specific logic determined by countless social practices and emphasizes the relationship between habitus and field as follows:

> I oppose the relationship of ontological complicity between the habitus and the field. Between agents and the social world there is a relationship of infraconscious, infralinguistic complicity: in their practice agents constantly engage in theses which are not posed as such. The habitus fulfills a function which another philosophy consigns to a transcendental conscience: it is a socialized body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world- a field - and which structures *the perception of that world as well as action in that world [emphasis mine]*.. (...) Every field, in producing itself, produces a form of interest which, from the point of view of another field, may seem like disinterestedness (or absurdity, lack of realism, folly, etc.). One thus sees the difficulty in applying the principle of the theory of sociological knowledge (Bourdieu, 1998: 179-81).

Bourdieu characterizes social relations in the context of the field. Field is defined in Bourdieu as a competitive system of social relations functioning according to its own rules. The field is the site of struggle for power, which we shall discuss in the fourth chapter especially on the axis of symbolic power and symbolic violence, between the dominant and subordinate classes. As Lawley indicated, "these fields vary from family patterns to artistic practices." (Lawley, www. itcs.com/elawley/bourdieu.html.).

The idea of field suggests the existence of partially independent regions of social activity, such as artistic practice, structured according to a relational set of struggles that take place over currencies or resources particular to that field. According to Prior, the concept of field has an almost chameleon- like quality in that it can mean

all things to all people: determined and determining, structured and structuring, strong and weak, modern and postmodern, promoting reproduction and change, Marxist and Weberian (Prior, 2000: 142-4). As Robert Vann puts it, "field is a structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of the different kinds of resources or "capital" (Vann, 2000: 171). "Field", Moi writes, "is a competitive system of social relations." (Moi, 2000: 317). To these comments, we may add that Pierre Bourdieu's field can be seen related to the idea of an autonomy which is embodied by a set of dispositions and practical sense. Therefore, we may put forward that according to the positions that agents occupy in the fields located in a social space; contexts, contents, agents and processes have an area of operating to its own logic. In this respect, at first sight, Bourdieu's "field"s find a similarity with Nicos Poulantzas's "domain"s. As it is known, Poulantzas proposes to turn Marx's original conception of class-in- itself and class-for-itself on its head, by postulating class as a social relation which is constituted in three domains of activity: The economic, the political and the ideological domains. (Wilkes, 1990: 111).[2] Here, it should be put forward that both fields and domains have a specific logic that has interaction with different classes.

IV. Distinctions and Position-takings:

On the basis of the concepts we have outlined, now we might take a closer look at the interaction between these concepts and the operation of these concepts on the fields of language and education. Summarizing the concepts so far, we may assume

[2] See also Nicos Poulantzas. 1973. **Political Power and Social Classes**, London: New Left Books, Simon Clarke. 1991. "Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas's Theory of State" in **TheStateDebate**(ed.) S. Clarke, New York: St. Martin Press, pp.70-106 and R. Miliband, N. Poulantzas, E. Laclau. 1977. **Kapitalist Devlet Sorunu**, İstanbul: Birikim.

that practice, habitus and field have to do with the position-takings in social life. We may also assert that the highly complex process of position-takings give us significant opportunities for reading Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

According to Bourdieu, "at every moment of each society, one has to deal with a set of social positions which is bound by a relation of homology to a set of activities (the practice of golf or piano) or of goods (a second home or an old master painting) that are themselves characterized rationally." (Bourdieu, 1998: 4-5). As Pierre Bourdieu indicated in Distinction (1994), the "'choices" made by social agents in the most diverse domains of practice, in food or sport, music or politics, and so forth are compatible with the position-takings that we have mentioned above.

Social space for Bourdieu is constructed in such a way that agents or groups are distributed in it according to their position in statistical distributions based on the two principles of differentiation: Economic capital and cultural capital. In *Distinction* in which Pierre Bourdieu attempted to represent social space, agents are distributed in the first dimension according to the different kinds of capital they possess, and in the second dimension according to the structure of their capital, that is, "according to relative weight of the different kinds of capital, economic and cultural, in the total volume of their capital." (Bourdieu, 1998: 6-7).

In a more general sense, the space of social positions is retranslated into a space of position-takings through the mediation of the space of dispositions, that is to say, habitus. As Bourdieu underlined, "to each class of positions there corresponds a class of habitus (or tastes) produced by the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition and, through the mediation of the habitus and its generative

capability, a systematic sets of goods and properties, which are united by an affinity of style." (Bourdieu, 1998: 8).[3] In addition to this process, different position-takings lead to different worldviews. Here the notion of "difference" associated with different positions, that is, goods, practices, and especially manners, function in each society, in the same way as differences which constitute symbolic systems, "such as the set of phonemes of a language or the distinctive features, (...), that constitute a mythical system, that is, as *distinctive signs*." (Bourdieu, 1998: 9).

Therefore, symbolic systems in Bourdieu, in a sense, can be seen as "field"s which have many "habitus"es and "practice"s in itself and these "habitus"es and "practice"s are characterized by sets of distinctions and differences. This feature indicates that in Bourdieu there is not "one and only" structure that determines the agents's worldview, but there are too many "structure"s which can be changed by time and space. It should be also added that in Bourdieu's thought, as another point to be understood better in examining symbolic power and symbolic violence, the stress on differences and distinctions can give us a an opportunity for reading Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse from a performative perspective that has clear connections with structuralists. That is to say, Bourdieu's conceptual approach can provide us an insight to see the "ideological dimension" of everyday life practices, which we can see in Slavoj Zizek's approach which indicates the fact that the shaving styles of women's genital organs and/or the shapes of toilets carry prominent traces from "ideology" (Zizek, 2002c: 145-6).

[3] On this axis Pierre Bourdieu writes in *Distinction* that "Habitus is embodied class (including biological properties that are socially shaped, such as sex or age) and, in all cases of inter-or intra-generational mobility, it is distinguished (in effects) from class as objectified at a given moment (in the form of property, titles etc.), in as much as it perpetuates a different state of the material conditions of existence- those which produced it and which in this case differ to some extent from the conditions of its operation." (Bourdieu, 1994: 437).

In addition to the relationship between practices of the agents, from eating to sport, in social world and the distinctions that we have mentioned above, for Bourdieu, there is at the same time a relationship between the agents' body and distinctions made. In Bourdieu's thought, tastes have to do with the position-takings in social life and therefore the worldviews of the agents. As a result of this, the tastes about food can be seen as related to the perception about body of the agents. According to Pierre Bourdieu, "tastes in food (also) depend on the idea each class has of the body and of the effects of food on the body, that is, on its strength, health and beauty; and on the categories it uses to evaluate these effects, some of which may be important for one class and ignored by another, and which the different classes may rank in very different ways (Bourdieu, 1994: 190). For instance "The working class prefers both cheap and nutritious foods for the reason that they are interested in the strength of their body more than its shape while the privileged classes are interested in the shape of their bodies." (Işık, 1998: 140, Bourdieu, 1994: 190). Therefore, as Işık argued, it can be said that for Bourdieu, "body is the materialized form of the tastes." (Işık, 1998: 141).[4]

To sum up, the main idea is that to exist within a social space, to occupy a point or to be an individual within a social space is to differ, to be different and this fact is based on the idea that through social categories of perception are differentiated in practices. Bourdieu sheds light upon this idea as follows:

> Difference becomes a sign and a sign of distinction (or vulgarity) only if a principle of vision and division is applied to it which, being the product of the incorporation of the structure of objective differences present among all their agents, piano owners or accordion lovers, and structures the perceptions of owners or lovers of pianos or accordions (there was a need to spell out this analysis of the logic-that of symbolic

[4] For an example on this axis see Diana Crane. 2003. **Moda ve Gündemleri**. İstanbul: Ayrıntı. Here Diana Crane writes that "Bourdieu's theory of cultural tastes and reproduction is very useful for the reason that it helps to grasp the different classes' reaction against cultural goods and material culture and its products." (p. 19)

> violence-according to which dominated lifestyles are almost always perceived, even by those who live them, from the destructive and reductive point of view of the dominant aesthetic). (...) Denying the existence of classes, as the conservative tradition has persisted in doing for reasons not all of which are absurd, means in the final analysis denying the existence of differences and of principles of differentiation. (Bourdieu, 1998: 12)

As is understood, in social world, agents living on the fields that depend on a set of dispositions and practices have some sort of capitals such as economic, cultural or symbolic which we shall especially discuss in the fourth chapter of this study. Having these capitals at the same time requires having some distinctive properties and manners. That is to say, VW or Volvo, golf or soccer, red wine or champagne may be the distinctive features of different worldviews. Different capitals in Pierre Bourdieu's thought, at the same time, function as the vital part of the reproduction process. This reproduction process is, needless to say, highly complicated and there is a continuous struggle on the distribution of the capitals used in this reproduction process.

In this struggle, on the one hand, the dominants try to make their rule permanent by reproducing the given power relations and its reflections in everyday life, on the other hand, the subordinate groups resist against their rule. The most known strategy used by the dominants to win this struggle is to produce the belief in the legitimacy of currently dominant power. Therefore, one of the main aims of the dominants is to reproduce this belief. Reproduction of belief, as we shall see in the fourth chapter, has to do with a field in which the dominants can employ an "invisible and gentile form of violence". Thus, education is the very field of the reproduction of power relations and mechanisms. But it should be also noted that education is not the only field that is used by the dominants for reproduction of power relations. Besides the field of education, as we shall discuss below, there is also the field of language which

is an arena for determination of the uses and the meanings of the words. Both fields serve the dominants as ideological tools to sustain their rule. But their function in Bourdieu cannot only be reduced to this assumption. These fields in Bourdieu's thought have different faces to be discussed. We shall outline some prominent features of the fields of education and language in Bourdieu's thought below and give a theoretical background to go on to discuss the nature of the fields on the ground of the question of power in the fourth chapter. Let us begin with the field of education.

V. Bourdieu on Education and Language:

Perhaps one of the most significant attempts to formalize the role of education in the reproduction of class relations, which we shall assert that this reproduction process is ideological, has been carried out by Bourdieu and Passeron. As Bernstein puts it, "they are concerned with the analysis of the legitimatization of structures of culture, principles of transmission, communicative practices, and their systems of meanings, together with an analysis of how their arbitrary features disguise the power relations which they transmit." (Bernstein, 1990:167).

Bourdieu argues that it is the culture of the dominant group/groups that control the economic, social and political resources which is embodied in the schools, and that is this 'embodiment' that works as a reproduction strategy for the dominant group. As Harker and Moi pointed out, just as our dominant economic institutions are structured to favour those who already possess economic capital, so our dominant cultural institutions are structured to favour those who already possess cultural capital, in the form of the habitus of the dominant cultural fraction. (Harker, 1990: 87, Moi, 2000: 321). On the ground of this fact the schools take the habitus of the

dominant group as the natural and only proper sort of habitus and treat all children *as if* they had equal access to it. Here, in this assertion, attention should be paid to the statement of "as *if*" owing to the fact that this statement reminds the idea of illusion which is very central to the debates concerning ideology and discourse. At this point, Bourdieu's arguments concerning ideology remind that of Louis Althusser's and Antonio Gramsci's.[5]

The dominant habitus is transformed into a form of cultural capital that the schools take for granted, and which acts as a most effective filter in the reproductive processes of a hierarchical society (Harker, 1990: 87, Bernstein, 1990: 46). The habitus of the dominant social and cultural fraction acts as "a multiplier of educational capital, not just in the field of education but also in the related fields of jobs, community work and cultural consumption." (Harker, 1990: 97). For Bourdieu, educational system is an institutionalized classifier which is itself an objectified system of classification reproduction the hierarchies of the social world in a transformed form. It should be mentioned that in the educational mechanism tests or competitive examinations serve to turn the differences between classes into the "absolute truth". As Bourdieu pointed out, "tests or competitive examinations *justify* in reason divisions that do not necessarily stem from reason, and the titles which sanction their results prescent *certificates* of social competence, not unlike titles of nobility, as guarantees of technical competence" (Bourdieu: 1998: 22).

[5] It can be pointed out that the schools as "hegemonic" or "ideological state apparatus" is accepted in Gramsci and Althusser as one of the main effective realms that the ruling class wield to make their "worldview's" permanent and dominant. The schools are seen as the institutional structures for the elaboration and spreading of ideology of the ruling class. In Bourdieu, this function is described in much more details, especially with special emphasis on the key role of the distinctions made on the ground of the terms "doxa", "symbolic power" and "symbolic violence" and the role of the resistance mechanisms are underlined which we shall discuss in the fourth chapter.

The reproduction of the structure of the distribution of cultural capital is achieved in the relation between familial strategies and the specific logic of the school institution (Bourdieu, 1998: 19). The distribution of cultural capitals by means of school institution is at the same time an attempt to sustain the existing power relations in any given field and generally in social world. Therefore, Bourdieu's arguments concerning the distribution of cultural capitals and the struggle on this axis can be read as a reproduction theory. But the hallmark of Bourdieu's arguments lies in his specifity of his sociological perspective that indicates itself in Bourdieu's attempt to find a middle ground between structuralism and subjectivism. For this reason, emphasizing the role of the primacy of practices, Bourdieu, rejects objectivist explanations and models in explaining the reproduction process.

Here, Bourdieu uses a useful notion, habitus that we have examined above, to cope with the problems of this kind of models and attempt to mediate the objectivist and subjectivist traditions by using the concept of habitus. Thus, at this point, a new model which Harker called as "minimal Bourdieu model" is suggested to make sense of the logic of Bourdeiusian reproduction analysis. In this model, habitus is constituted as a "negotiator tool" between the structure and the practices (Harker, 1990: 101).

According to Bourdieu, the educational system acts like Maxwell's demon, "at the cost of the energy which is necessary for carrying out the sorting operation, it maintains the preexisting order, that is, the gap between pupils endowed with unequal amounts of cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1998: 20). By a series of complex operations, the system separates the holders' cultural capital from those who lack it. The system thus tends to maintain preexisting social differences. In this system, "the

school institution performs a truly magical operation, the paradigm of which is the separation between the sacred and the profane according to Durkheim's analysis. (...) The act of scholastic classification is always (...) an act of *ordination*. It institutes a social difference of rank, a *permanent relation of order*." (Bourdieu, 1998: 21).

The school institution institutes *social borders* analogous to those which formerly separated nobility from gentry and gentry from common people. According to Bourdieu:

> This separation is marked, first of all, in the very conditions of life, in the opposition between the reclusive life of boarding schools, on the one hand, and the free life of the regular university student, on the other; then in the contents and especially the organization of the course of preparatory study toward the competitive examinations, with, on the one hand, very strict supervision and highly scholastic forms of apprenticeship, especially a high-pressure, competitive atmosphere which inspires submissiveness and presents a conspicuous analogue to the business world, and on the other hand, "student life," closely related to the tradition of bohemian life and requiring much less in the way of discipline and constraint, even during the time devoted to work (Bourdieu, 1998: 23).

At this point, on the axis of education, Bourdieu's concept of habitus bears some relation to Basil Bernstein's code.[6] The concept of habitus, however, is a more general concept, more extensive and exhaustive in its regulation. "It is essentially a cultural grammar specialized by class position and fields of practice. (...) Codes are culturally determined positioning devices. More specifically, class-regulated codes position subjects with respect to dominant and dominated forms of communication and to the relationships between them." (Bernstein, 1990: 13). Here it should be stressed that ideology is constituted through and in such positioning. From this

[6] Codes of Basil Bernstein are positioning devices which is regulative principle selecting and integrating: "relevant meanings, forms of their realization, evoking contexts" (Bernstein, 1990: 14).

perspective, ideology inheres in and regulates modes of relation. Ideology is not so much content as a mode of relation for the realizing of contents.

According to Bernstein, "code modalities establish and reproduce the practices specific to a field and create the specifity of a habitus" (Bernstein, 1990: 45). At the same process, ideologies regulate the means, contexts and forms of cultural production and reproduction.

To grasp what Pierre Bourdieu exactly says about the role of the school and the education system in which ideology of the dominants try to determine and regulate the contexts of cultural (re)production as mentioned above, we can utilize Richard Harker's summarization of Bourdieu's arguments concerning the levels of the education system. For Harker, at the first level, "for under-privileged children there is a lower success rate-expectations are adjusted accordingly, and become part of the habitus." (Harker, 1990: 89) The remaining levels of the process may be summarized as follows:

> Level 2: Where some success is attained, under-privileged children (and their families) tend to make the 'wrong' option choices.
> Level 3: Learned ignorance of the schools and selection agents-recognizing only those who recognize them.
> Level 4: Denigration of the academic-style over content.
> Level 5: Devaluation of certificates-in favor of habitus. Where selection now turns on habitus (style, presentation, language, etc.), these things then become a form of symbolic capital, which acts as a multiplier of the productivity of educational capital (Harker, 1990: 89).

Here what Pierre Bourdieu asserts about the role of the education system can remind Althusser's explanations concerning the ISA's (Ideological State Apparatuses) again. But it should be kept in mind that Bourdieu makes a fundamental distinction between a "field" and "apparatus". According to him, "the idea of apparatus reintroduces a pessimistic functionalism and it is an infernal engine, programmed to

bring about certain ends. In a field agents and institutions are engaged in struggle, with unequal strengths, in accordance with the rules constituting that field of play, to appropriate the specific profits in that game" (Bourdieu, 1995: 88). That is to say, in a field, those who want to dominate the field are advantageous but they nevertheless have to break the resistance of the subordinate class. In Bourdieu's words, "a field becomes an apparatus when the dominant agents have the means of nullify the resistance and the reactions of the dominated." (Bourdieu, 1995: 88). Pierre Bourdieu therefore examines the school, the church, the State, the parties as not apparatuses but as fields.

One of the vital fields which can be added to the list above is the field of language owing to the fact that language is an area in which ideology of the dominants try to regulate the means, contexts and forms of cultural production and reproduction and additionally, the uses of the words and the determination of meanings are one of *sine qua non* conditions of an ideological struggle.

Thus, keeping in mind that the main connection points between Bourdieu's arguments concerning language and the debates on ideology and discourse shall indicate themselves in the fourth chapter since the power mechanisms shall be discussed there, we can point out that it is compulsory to take a look at the arguments which Pierre Bourdieu put forward about language. Here our aim is only try to look at the ground that we shall walk in the fourth chapter. Now we can begin to sum up some main features of the field of language in Bourdieu's thought below.

First of all, Bourdieu holds that "language is a part of the way of life of a social group and serves essentially practical ends." (Snook, 1990: 160). We may argue that Bourdieu's attempt to find a middle way between structuralism and objectivism is

also seen in his thoughts concerning language. Bourdieu criticizes of both structural (Saussure) and formal (Chomsky) approaches to language and reject all dichotomies such as "langue" and "parole" and "competence" and "performance". For Bourdieu, "language includes both the words and the actions with which they are woven." (Snook, 1990: 168). On this ground, at least at first glance, we can put forward that Bourdieu is much closer to Volosinov who takes account of the role of the social agents than Saussure who examines the language as a "closed system".

It goes without saying that Bourdieu's reflections on language are much more complex than presented above. We shall therefore attempt to go into only the relevant arguments which have to do with the terms we discussed above and the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Let us begin with saying that, in Bourdieu to make sense of language, it is very crucial to keep in mind that linguistic utterances are the product of the relation between a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market. In other words, linguistic expression, speech is the sum of linguistic habitus and linguistic market (Bourdieu, 1995: 78).

It is also worth keeping in mind here that in developing his approach to language and linguistic exchange, Bourdieu applies and elaborates the ideas that make up the theory of practice which is discussed above.

Linguistic habitus is "that subset of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular contexts. (The family, the peer group and school etc.) (Thompson, 1991: 17). As Vann pointed out, " these dispositions reflect the social conditions present during their acquisition. These dispositions affect both an individual's linguistic practices and his or her anticipation of their symbolic value in

various fields. One's linguistic habitus, as all forms of habitus, is the product of experience and inculcation." (Vann, 2000: 171).

When it comes to linguistic market, it signifies the contexts or fields those linguistic utterances or expressions are always produced. "The properties of linguistic markets endow linguistic products within a certain ""value". On a given linguistic market, some products are valued more highly than others; and part of the practical competence of speakers is to know how; and to be able, to produce expressions which are highly valued on the markets concerned." (Thompson, 1991: 18).

In Bourdieu's words: "There is a linguistic market whenever someone produces an utterance for receivers capable of assessing it, evaluating it and setting a price on it. Knowledge of linguistic competence alone does not enable one to predict what the value of a linguistic performance will be on a market." (Bourdieu, 1995: 79).

As Pariola underlined, "the variations in the relations of power in this market, [linguistic market] determine the variations in the value of our utterances in different contexts." (Pariola, 2000: 296) and 1utterances receive their value and their sense only in their relation to a market." (Bourdieu, 1991: 67). In addition to this, "the relations of power that obtain in the linguistic market are manifested and realized in the fact that certain agents are incapable of applying to the linguistic products" (Bourdieu, 1991: 69).

Undoubtedly, if there is a market, if there is a product, there must also be a "capital". At this point, we come across with the concept of linguistic capital. Linguistic capital may be seen as a power over the mechanisms of linguistic price formation which structure the process of the emergence of the utterances and "a

power to make the laws of price formation operate to one's advantage and to extract the specific surplus value." (Bourdieu, 1995: 80). And it should also be noted that "the laws of the transmission of linguistic capital are a particular case of the laws of the legitimate transmission of cultural capital between the generations." (Bourdieu, 1991: 61). The linguistic capitals are used in a conservative way by the dominant groups to sustain the existing order, the doxic order that we shall examine in the fourth chapter. In doing this, the dominant groups wield the existing "distinctions" in the social world that we have mentioned above and additionally make critical distinctions in the field of language that are compatible with the other distinctions in the other fields. For instance; "'the popular speech' is one of the products of the application of dualistic taxonomies which structure the social world according to the categories of high and low, distinguished and vulgar, refined and coarse or rude, rare and common, well mannered and sloppy: in short, categories of culture and nature"(Bourdieu, 1991: 93).

When we look at the notions mentioned above and think language through these notions, we see that in Bourdieu there is a strong idea based on the fact that language is a social entity. According to Pariola, Bourdieu's analysis of the relationship of language to social life indicates some significant features. "First of all, language is not simply a means of communication, but also a medium of power. Secondly, individual choices are conditioned by the demands of the target social field/market (audience) and consequently, every linguistic interaction displays "the social structure that it both expresses and helps to create" (Pariola, 2000: 298).

We have so far attempted to indicate what the terms practice, habitus and field mean and also how they are embodied in the "fields" of language and education. In

doing this, we have also tried to establish a ground to read Bourdieu "with and against" Volosinov, Gramsci, Althusser and Foucault in the fourth chapter. At this point, to make sense of these concepts mentioned and Bourdieu's theoretical world, it is compulsory to take a look at the relationship between the concepts discussed above and power mechanisms. We thus, in the next chapter, examine the concepts of Bourdieu's symbolic power and symbolic violence.

CHAPTER FOUR

SYMBOLIC POWER AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

As is known, one of the most significant dimensions of the debates concerning ideology and discourse is the question of power. Both in classical definitions of ideology and in its modern versions which encompass the term discourse, we see the faces of power which are hidden in these debates. We thus, in this chapter, shall attempt to shed some light upon the relationship between the question of power in the debates concerning ideology and discourse and Bourdieu's conceptions of symbolic power and symbolic violence. In doing this, we shall firstly draw a conceptual framework and then take a look at the fields of language and education which are crucial for both recalling the history of ideology and discourse debates and understanding the operation of Bourdieu's concepts on this axis. For this reason, it seems sensible to begin with what Bourdieu means by using these concepts.

As Pierre Bourdieu mentioned, "the field of power is not a field like the others. It is the space of the relations of force between the different kinds of capital" (Bourdieu, 1998: 34). It is therefore the space of a struggle between different groups having different kinds of capital who want to possess domination against each other. Therefore, in this struggle process, especially in modern everyday life, power gains new dimensions based on logic of the determination of "symbolic". Moving from this fact, Bourdieu tries to underline the importance of this new version of power and, needless to say, violence.

For Bourdieu, in modern everyday life, there are significant effects of power and violence which are "gentile" and more difficult to perceive and to him, it seems compulsory to examine these effects in a new conceptual framework which is compatible with the other necessary concepts to make sense of new faces of power and violence, such as habitus, practice, field and doxa. At this point, in Bourdieu's conceptual world, we firstly come across with symbolic power and its very effective instrument, symbolic violence as concepts to be described.

I. Symbolic Power: "A transformed form of power"

Symbolic power in Bourdieu is "a power of constructing reality." (Bourdieu, 1991: 166). In this point, it should be emphasized that the relationship between symbolic power and reality is crucial. In this relationship, we see the traces of the perception of ideology as false consciousness and Habermas's use of ideology: "ideology as systematically distorted communication". In Bourdieu's words, symbolic power -as a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of conforming or transforming the vision of the world itself- is an almost "a magical power" (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). According to Bourdieu, this power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force, by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization- is "a power that can be exercised only if it recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary." (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). Bourdieu emphasizes that "this means that symbolic power does not reside in "symbolic systems" in the form of an "illocutionary force" but that is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and who submit to it, in the very

structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced." (Bourdieu, 1991: 171).

To make sense of the nature of symbolic power, it is very significant to keep in mind that symbolic power, as John Thompson mentioned, presupposes a kind of active complicity on the part of those subjected to it (Thompson, 1991: 22). Here, it should be added that dominated individuals for Bourdieu are not passive bodies to which symbolic power is applied, as it were, like a scalpel to a corpse. Rather, symbolic power requires, "as a condition of its success that those subjected to it believe in the legitimacy of power and the legitimacy of those who wield it." (Bourdieu, 1991: 23).

According to Bourdieu, in fact, there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the legitimate divisions, symbolic power, in this sense, is a power of "world making" (Bourdieu, 1990:137). Pierre Bourdieu thinks of symbolic power as "worldmaking power" owing to the fact that it involves the capacity to impose the "legitimate vision of the social world" and of its divisions. Because, symbolic power legitimizes existing economic and political relations but does not reduce to them. As David Swartz put it, "this marks the difference between Bourdieu's view of culture and the orthodox Marxist view of superstructure." (Swartz, 1997: 89).

Symbolic power contributes to the intergenerational reproduction of inegaliterian social arrangements. World making consists of so many classifications and these classifications themselves are objects of domination struggle. As Bourdieu emphasized, "the struggle over classifications is a fundamental dimension of class struggle." (Bourdieu, 1990: 138). For Bourdieu, to change the world, one has to

change the ways of world making, that is, the vision of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced. Symbolic power, whose form par excellence is the power to make groups, rests on two conditions:

> Firstly, as any form of performative discourse, symbolic power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital. The power to impose upon other minds a vision; old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles. (...) Secondly, symbolic efficacy depends on the degree to which the vision proposed is founded in reality. Symbolic power is the power to make things with words. (...) Symbolic power is a power of consecration or revelation, the power to consecrate or to reveal thing that are already there (Bourdieu, 1990: 139).

At this point, it is very crucial to see the connection between the exercise of symbolic power and "misrecognition". It goes without saying that misrecognition is one of the key terms in the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Approaching the issue from this angle, we can point out that misrecognition, which is a result of the exercise of symbolic power and its need to legitimize itself, "denotes 'denial' of the economic and political interests present in a set of practices." (Swartz, 1997: 89). Misrecognition in Bourdieu's thought, which is also akin to the "false consciousness" in the Marxist tradition, is tied to Bourdieu's strong claim that all actions are interested. "The logic of self-interest underlying all practices- particularly those in the cultural domain- is misrecognized as a logic of disinterest". According to Swartz :

> Symbolic practices deflect attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested pursuits. This misperception legitimizes these practices and thereby contributes to the reproduction of the social order in which they are embedded. Activities and resources gain in symbolic power, or legitimacy, to the extent that they become separated from underlying material interests and hence go misrecognized as representing disinterested forms of activities and resources (Swartz, 1997: 90).

As it is easily seen, Pierre Bourdieu uses the term "symbolic power" to refer not only to a specific type of power, but also to an aspect of most forms of power as they

are routinely deployed in social life. Undoubtedly, in this process, the instrument of symbolic power which wants to sustain and legitimize itself is symbolic violence. The term symbolic violence is worth pondering owing to the fact that the process of constructing reality and the "world making" is controlled by the groups who wants to sustain the domination on the fields by means of symbolic violence mechanisms. These mechanisms are used especially when there is a resistance against the ruling groups. This feature of symbolic violence is compatible with the nature of violence in classical sense.[1] Yet, symbolic violence has some features which are different from the violence in classical sense. Therefore, to grasp these features, we shall examine the "unperceived form of everyday violence", that is, symbolic violence.

II. Symbolic Violence: "Unperceived form of everyday violence"

Anthony Giddens appears to be right to stress that "With Pierre Bourdieu's idea of symbolic violence, the point is to apply the concept of violence to a wide variety of forms of oppression which people might suffer and thereby, to relate it to general criteria of social justice" (Giddens, 1994: 231).

In Bourdieu's conceptual world, symbolic violence is the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety (Eagleton, 1994: 224).

As Richard Jenkins pointed out, symbolic violence is the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate. (Jenkins, 1992: 104) Here we come across with a critical

[1] Hannah Arendt writes in "On Violence" that "violence is, naturally, is charecterized as a "medium" and when power is in jeopardy, violence indispensably is used by the rulers" (Arendt, 1997: 96).

question: What is the function of this legitimacy? Jenkins gives, in this context, a meaningful answer to this question:

> This legitimacy obscures the power relations which permit that imposition to be successful. Insofar as it is accepted as legitimate, culture adds its own force to those power relations, contributing to their systematic reproduction. This is achieved through a process of misrecognition: the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder (quoted in Bourdieu-Passeron, Reproduction In Education, Society and Culture, London: Sage, 1977, p.5, Jenkins, 1992: 104).

Symbolic violence is the violence which exerts submission, which is not perceived as such, based on "collective expectations" or socially inculcated beliefs. (Bourdieu, 1998:103) Symbolic violence rests on the adjustment between the structures constitutive of the habitus of the dominated and the structure of the relation of domination to which they apply: the dominated perceive the dominant through the categories that the relation of domination has produced and which are thus identical to the interests of the dominant (Bourdieu, 1998: 121). In Pierre Bourdieu's words:

> Like the theory of magic, the theory of symbolic violence rests on a theory of belief or, more precisely, on a theory of the production of belief, of the work of socialization necessary to produce agents endowed with the schemes of perception and appreciation that will permit them to perceive and obey the injunctions inscribed in a situation or discourse. The belief I am describing is not an explicit belief, possessed explicitly as such in relation to a possibility of nonbelief, but rather an immediate adherence, a doxical submission to the injunctions of the world which is achieved when the mental structures of the one to whom the injunction is addressed are in accordance with the structures inscribed in the injunction addressed to him (Bourdieu, 1998: 103).

In such a context, it must be underlined that "one of the effects of symbolic violence is the transfiguration of relations of domination and submission into affective relations, the transformation of power into charisma or into the charm suited to evoke affective enchantment" (Bourdieu 1998: 102). In this transfiguration

process, different fields are unified by the dominant class and it should be added that the genesis of the state is inseparable from the process of unification of the different social, economic, cultural (or educational), and political fields which goes hand in hand with the progressive constitution of the state monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1998: 33).

It goes without saying that, while different fields are unified and power is transformed, domination tends to be differentiated. According to Pierre Bourdieu, in this level, domination is not the direct and simple action exercised by a set of agents (the dominant class) invested with powers of coercion. "Rather, it is the indirect effect of a complex set of actions engendered within the network of intersecting constraints which each of the dominants, thus dominated by the structure of the field through which domination is exerted, endures on behalf of all the others." (Bourdieu, 1998: 34). That is to say, there is a symbolic dominance used against the subordinate groups and this "symbolic domination rests on misrecognition, and therefore on the recognition of the principles in whose name it is exerted." (Bourdieu, 1998: 100).

Bourdieu claims that, if the state is able to exert symbolic violence, "it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought" (Bourdieu, 1998: 40).

We therefore may point out that, this operational logic of the state has to do with the process of concentration of different species of capital from economic capital to symbolic capital. Bourdieu sums up this process as follows:

> It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of metacapital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders. Concentration of the different species of capital

> (which proceeds hand in hand with the construction of the corresponding fields) leads indeed to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital (capital etatique) which enables the state to exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital and especially over the rates of conversion between them (Bourdieu, 1998: 41-2).

III. Symbolic Capital: The Source of Symbolic Power

Here we must take a glance at the term symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is an ordinary property (physical strength, wealth, warlike valor, etc.) which, perceived by social agents endowed with the categories of perception and appreciation permitting them to perceive, know and recognize it, becomes symbolically efficient, like a veritable *magical power* (Bourdieu, 1998: 102). For Bourdieu, symbolic capital is any property (any form of capital whether physical economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value. In his words:

> I call symbolic capital any kind of capital (economic, cultural, academic or social) when it is perceived according to the categories of perception, the principles of vision and division, the systems of classification, the classificatory schemes, the cognitive schema, which are, at leat in part, the product of the embodiment of the objective structures of the field in consideration, that is, of the structure of the distribution of capital in the field being considered. Symbolic capital is capital with a cognitive base, which rests on cognition and recognition (Bourdieu, 1998: 85).

Owing to the fact that symbolic capital is nothing other than economic or cultural capital when it is known and recognized, when it is known through the categories of perception that it imposes, symbolic relations of power tend to reproduce and to reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space (Bourdieu, 1990: 135). Here what should be underlined is that the forms of classifications are at

the same time the forms of domination especially employed by symbolic power. As Bourdieu puts it:

> More precisely, symbolic capital is the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species capital of capital (strong/weak, large/small, rich/poor, cultured/uncultured). It follows that the state, which possesses the means of imposition and inculculation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1998: 47).

Symbolic capital is common to all members of a group. Since it is a being-perceived, which exists in the relations between properties held by agents and categories of perception (high/low, masculine/feminine, large/small, etc.) which constitute and construct social categories (those above/those below, men/women, large/small) based on union (alliance, companionship, marriage) and separation (the taboo of contact, of misalliance, etc.), symbolic capital is attached to groups -or to the names of groups, families, clans, tribes...(Bourdieu, 1998:103-4) This is true especially of symbolic capital and social capital which can only be reproduced through the reproduction of the primary social unit which is "the family" (Bourdieu, 1998: 107).

In the fields, which are the arenas of the struggle for power, there is a significant competition for shaping the process of symbolic production. Different groups having different kinds of symbolic capital want to dominate the field by ruling the symbolic production and reproduction processes of these capitals. Each field has its own realms for symbolic production and reproduction and these realms can be seen as "the field(s) of symbolic (re)production". As Bourdieu puts it, "the field of symbolic production is a microcosm of the symbolic struggle between classes; it is by serving

their own interests in the struggle within the field of production that producers serve the interests of groups outside the field of production" (Bourdieu, 1991: 168). Here we come across with one of the versions of the notion of ideology in Marxist theory: *a mystification employed by a particular class to hide its own interests* (Barrett, 1996:12, Marx-Engels, 1999: 67).

In the struggle that we have mentioned above, since symbolic capitals have a vital role for gaining the power, distinctions, as we showed in the third chapter, are very crucial. In the struggle for the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents wield a power which is proportional to their symbolic capital, that is, to the recognition they receive from a group. Distinctions, which are seen in the use of language, in the hobbies, in the educational rituals and so forth, are effective tools for cultural domination which has very complex mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion.

Through distinctions, which are "the difference written into the very structure of the social space when it is perceived and the symbolic transformations of de facto differences" (Bourdieu, 1991: 238), the groups struggling with each other for the rule of the field(s) attempt to determine the perception of the social world for the subordinate groups. Here it should be noted that "the perception of the social world implies an act of construction" (Bourdieu, 1991: 235) and as Bourdieu put forward, "the authority which underlines the performative effectiveness of discourse about the social world, the symbolic force of visions and previsions aimed at imposing the principles of vision and division of this world" (Bourdieu, 1991: 239).

The degree of "mystification" of the dominant groups that is based on the logic of distinctions varies according to the symbolic capitals that the groups possess and the

forms of them. At the same time, this feature has to do with the question of the use of legitimate symbolic violence employed by symbolic power. As Bourdieu puts it:

> In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate *naming* as the official imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles, in particular all the power that they possess over the instituted taxonomies, those inscribed in people's minds or in the objective world, such as qualifications. Thus, all the symbolic strategies through which agents aim to impose their vision of the divisions of the social world and of their position in that world can be located between two extremes: the insult, that idios logos through which an ordinary individual attempts to impose his point of view by taking the risk that a reciprocal insult may insue, and the official naming, a symbolic act of imposition which has on its side all the strength of the collective, of the consensus, of common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the state, that is, the holder of the *monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence* (Bourdieu, 1991: 239).

For the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, each of the groups in different fields struggle with each other. In this struggle, the structuring principles of the world view are subject to multi-dimensional domination strategies. These structuring principles in Bourdieu rooted in the objective structures of the social world and the relations of power are also present in people's minds in the form of categories of perception of those relations. But as Bourdieu emphasized, "the degree of indeterminacy and vagueness characteristic of the objects of the social world is, together with the practical, prereflexive and implicit character of the patterns of perceptional evaluation which are applied to them." (Bourdieu, 1991: 236).

Every field thus is the site of a more or less openly declared struggle for the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field. "The question of legitimacy arises from the very possibility of this questioning from this break with the doxa which takes the ordinary order for granted" (Bourdieu, 1991: 242).

IV. Doxa: The Worldview of the Dominants

At this point, it seems as a compulsory to explain what doxa means. Doxa, in Bourdieu's words, "is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for- granted of the world that flows from practical sense." (Bourdieu, 1990: 68). Doxa thus implies a practical knowledge and by using doxa "we accept many things without knowing them and that is what is called ideology" (Bourdieu, 1997: 268).

Doxa is a particular point of view, "the point of view of the dominant which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view -the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the State and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the State." (Bourdieu, 1998: 57). As Eagleton argued, "doxa belongs to a tradition-bound social order in which power is fully naturalized and unquestionable, so that no social arrangement different from the present could even be imagined. Here, subject and object merge indistinguishably into each other." (Eagleton, 1994: 223). As Krars pointed out, "every mode of domination, even if it uses physical violence, presupposes a doxic order shared by the dominated and the dominants." (Krars, 1990: 169).

"Allodoxia" is another term that should be emphasized in considering the term doxa. "Allodoxia" which is an error of identification, a form of false recognition" (Marliere, 2000: 212) is a useful conceptual tool to think Bourdieu together with the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Thus it can be said that in Bourdieu's thought, it is assumed that there is a lack between the representation and reality of the beings. At first glance, it reminds the classic debates made by the scholars of the Enlightenment such as Helvetius and d'Holbach. But in fact this idea of "lack"

between the representation and reality in Bourdieu is very complicated since there are so many "lack"s in many fields and thus habituses that are arena of the struggle for power. This feature leads to think this "lack" in a multi-dimensional way.

Turning back to the notion of doxa which carries the antagonism between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, we can assume that doxa is very significant for reading the debates concerning ideology and discourse on Pierre Bourdieu. We shall discuss whether the notion of doxa can be challenged to the notion of ideology or discourse at the end of this study. But now, let us emphasize that doxa has to do with the distribution of symbolic capital and the question of legitimacy about this distribution.

As Swartz showed, "symbolic capital represents for Bourdieu a way of talking about the legitimation of power relations through symbolic forms. It is a form of legitimate accumulation, through which the dominant groups secure a capital of credit which seems to owe nothing to the logic of exploitation". Tied to his stratification analysis of relations between dominant and dominated groups, Bourdieu understands symbolic capital as "a sort of advance" extended by the dominated to the dominant as long as the dominated find it is within their interest to accord recognition and legitimation to the dominant. It is a "collective belief", "a capital of trust" that stems from social esteem as well as material wealth (Swartz, 1997: 92).

The arguments that David Swartz put forward here may be understood clearly by taking a look at the operation of symbolic power in the field of language.

V. Bourdieu on Education and Language

The process of the distribution of symbolic capitals, which is at the same time related to the distribution of the other forms of capital, is determined by the forms of

symbolic imposition employed by symbolic power. As Pierre Bourdieu mentioned, "the relations of communication *par excellence*- are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized." (Bourdieu, 1991: 37) The use of the language, the choice of the particular words, the pronunciation of them and the determination of meanings, signifies a complex struggle for power that is seen in linguistic markets. These markets play a key role in shaping not only the symbolic value of utterances but also "the meaning of discourse".

As Bourdieu pointed out, "the different meanings of a word are defined in the relation between the invariant core and the specific logic of the different markets" (Bourdieu, 1991: 39). It is therefore needless to say that different "discursive formations" emerges in different linguistic markets. Undoubtedly, this feature has to do with the genesis of different linguistic habituses. For Bourdieu; "it is true that the definition of the symbolic relation of power which is constitutive of the market can be the subject of *negotiation* and that the market can be manipulated, within certain limits, by a metadiscourse concerning the conditions of use of discourse." (Bourdieu, 1991: 71) As Bourdieu mentioned:

> This includes, for example, the expressions which are used to introduce or excuse speech which is too free or shocking ("with your permission", "if I may say so", "if you'll pardon the expression", "with all due respect", etc.) or those which reinforce, through explicit articulation, the candour enjoyed on a particular market ("off the record", "strictly between ourselves", etc.). But it goes without saying that the capacity to manipulate is greater the more capital one possesses, (...), it is also true that the unification of the market is never so complete as to prevent dominated individuals from finding, in the space provided by private life, among friends, markets where the laws of price formation which apply to more formal markets are suspended" (Bourdieu, 1991: 71).

Turning back to the term symbolic violence, we can assert that besides the field of language, the field of education is very typical realm to observe how symbolic violence operates. First of all, as Bourdieu puts it, "the educational system no doubt directly helps to devalue popular modes of expression, dismissing them as "slang" and "gibberish" and to impose recognition of the legitimate language." There is a dialectical relation between the school system and the production of the legitimate language employed by the dominants of the political field who want to establish new hierarchies based on linguistic practices. This attempt is at the same time a very vital part for the establishments of a hegemonic project by the class enjoy the will to rule the social world.

Since linguistic practices, as we discussed, are determined by a complex interaction between the linguistic market(s) and linguistic habitus(es), the political will to unificate the linguistic practices are turned towards the linguistic market(s) and therefore linguistic habitus(es) and establishes a symbolic domination. Here "the distinctiveness of the symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint." (Bourdieu, 1991: 51). It should be also noted that "the political unification and the accompanying imposition of an official language which differ fundamentally from the theoretical relations between different languages, spoken by politically and economically independent groups and thus all linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate practices." (Bourdieu, 1991: 53).

These legitimate practices are based on two critical principles: "Distinction and correctness". "Correct usage" of the language is determined and controlled by the educational system and in this system; the distinctions are internalized in people's

minds and become a "doxic experience". In fact, as Richard Jenkins also pointed out, "the mainstay of the exercise of symbolic violence is 'pedagogic action', the imposition of a cultural arbitrary, of which there are three modes: "*diffuse education*", which occurs in the course of interaction with competent members of the social formation in question, "*family education*", which speaks for itself, and "*institutionalised education.*" Jenkins gives some more details about the function of the "pedagogic action":

> The symbolic strength of any pedagogic agency is a function of its 'weight' in the structure of power relations. Pedagogic actions reflect the interests of dominant groups or classes, tending to reproduce the uneven distribution of cultural capital among the groups or classes which inhabit the social space in question, hence reproducing social structure. Pedagogic action involves the exclusion of ideas as unthinkable, as well as their positive inculcation. Exclusion or censorship may in fact be the most effective mode of pedagogic action (Jenkins, 1992: 105).

Pedagogic agencies, in such a context, are of longer duration and greater stability than other agencies of symbolic violence. "Pedagogic work and its results are a substitute for physical constraint and coercion: it is produced by pedagogic authority and subsequently reinforces it. Bourdieu argues that the experience -as a pupil- of pedagogic work is the objective condition which generates the misrecognition of culture as arbitrary and bestows upon it the taken for granted." (Jenkins, 1992: 107). The more pedagogic work is done, the more it tends to obscure "the objective truth of the habitus as the internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary", an internalization which proceeds apace with the process of inculcation. Pedagogic work which is bestowed, not earned (Bourdieu, 1998: 106) has the function of "keeping order" by this means, through linked processes of self-limitation and self-censorship. (Bourdieu, 1998: 107) Therefore, through pedagogic agencies, a structure is founded that operates against the subordinate groups.

Pedagogic agencies wield "pedagogic authority" which is a necessary condition of successful pedagogic action. It is an arbitrary power to act, misrecognised by its practitioners and recipients as legitimate. This legitimacy makes it possible for pedagogic action to work. The pedagogic authority of the school is the source of illusion that the symbolic exercised by the educational system is unrelated to the overall structure of power relations, as much as it fosters a view of schooling as a legitimate or neutral process.

Schools for Bourdieu constitute a *field* which, more than any other, tends to reproduce itself because of the fact that, among other reasons, "agents have control over their own reproduction. That being said the educational field is in the thrall of external forces." (Bourdieu, 1998: 43). In Bourdieu's thought, schools contribute to the reproduction of the domination and "legitimate the dominant social order by naturalizing social differences" (Poupeau, 2000: 71).

The educational system in Bourdieu is very effective instrument to sustain the existing inequalities for the owners of the political field and so this system can be seen as a vital part of the political field which "is the site of a competition for power." (Bourdieu, 1991: 190), that is, the educational system itself is an arena for the struggles for power. Here from the angle of the debates concerning ideology and discourse, maybe a special attention should be paid to the nature of what is called as "the political field".

In the political field, it goes without saying that there is an official point of view, which is the point of view of the "officials" and which is expressed in the official discourse (administrative discourse). According to Pierre Bourdieu, this discourse fulfills three distinct functions:

> First of all, it performs a diagnostic, that is, an act of knowledge or cognition which begets recognition and which, quite often, tends to assert what a person or a thing is and what it is universally, for every possible person, thus objectively. In the second place, administrative discourse says, through directives, orders, prescriptions etc. what people have to do, given what they are. Thirdly, it says what people have actually done, as in authorized accounts such as police records (Bourdieu, 1990: 136).

Here we can conclude that the critical function of the official discourse, the discourse of the dominants, is to make distinctions concerning the social space which tends to function as a symbolic space, "a space of life styles" (Bourdieu, 1990: 132), based on "is and ought to". Inside of this discourse a special effect is hidden. Bourdieu calls this effect as: "The oracle effect". Bourdieu writes that "thanks to which the spokesperson gives voice to the group in whose name he speaks, thereby speaking with all the authority of that elusive, absent phenomenon, that the function of priestly humility can best be seen: it is in abolishing himself completely in favour of God or the People that the priest turns himself into God or the People." (Bourdieu, 1991: 211).

Speaking in Saussurian terms, we can point out that the signifier becomes the signified through the oracle effect and the oracle effect, "a limiting form of performativity, is what enables the authorized spokesperson to take his authority from the group which authorizes him in order to exercise recognized constraint, symbolic violence, on each of the isolated members of the group." (Bourdieu, 1991: 212).

This discourse of the dominants, which contains "the oracle effect", at the same time, has a tendency to construct political fetishes. Political fetishes are people, things, beings, which seem to owe to themselves alone an existence that social agents have given to them. As Bourdieu mentioned, "political idolatry consists precisely in

the fact that the value which resides in the political personality, that product of men's brains, appears as a mysterious objective property of the person, a charm, charisma: the ministerium appears as a mysterium." (Bourdieu, 1991: 205).

The official discourse employed by the dominants is one of the symbolic instruments to rule the social life, an instrument for domination and therefore a specific contribution to make the political violence (domination) and symbolic violence (the existing doxic order: orthodoxy) last.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Reading Pierre Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse in fact may seem ironical, as we underlined in introduction, owing to the fact that "Bourdieu firmly rejects ideology as a primary concept in favour of the concepts of doxa and symbolic power" (Orr, 2000: 126). What should be discussed here is then whether the terms of doxa and symbolic power can be challenged to the term ideology/discourse and if it is so, to what extent?

Moving from the fact that "concepts sometimes should be refurbished-first, to be more precise and second, to make them more alive" (Bourdieu, 1997: 266), Bourdieu's challenge to the debates concerning ideology and discourse can be seen as a reaction to the Cartesian philosophy and particularly to the Marxist tradition emphasizing the role of (false) consciousness and (mis) representation. In his words, "as long as you think in terms of consciousness, false consciousness, unconsciousness, and so on, you cannot grasp the main ideological effects, which most of the time are transmitted through the body." (Bourdieu, 1997: 269). Here, Bourdieu reminds Valentin N. Volosinov who states that "ideology cannot be derived from consciousness" (Volosinov, 1973: 13).

In Bourdieu's view, among those concepts, that we have outlined throughout the study, "doxa is more useful to perceive many things that are called ideology since the term ideology operates in a very obscure manner" (Bourdieu, 1997: 267), because of the Cartesian philosophy inherited in Marxist approach in theory of ideology. The

fact that Bourdieu emphasizes the sociological grasp of the practices, which are operated within habituses and fields, indicates that to grasp the main ideological effects in the field of social practices and mechanisms is only possible with moving away from the classical arguments concerning consciousness and representation. Byproduct of this, in Bourdieu's thought, the process of the constitution of the meaning and subject, which has very complex logic, is determined by countless practices in social world. Thus it can be argued that for Bourdieu, both the constitution of meaning and subject and the "logic of the ideological practices" depend on an "invisible, multi-dimensional interaction network." In this context, it is meaningful that Zizek gives a reference to Bourdieu for a "hidden" ideological functioning in this network (Zizek, 2002b: 63-64).

Here to make sense of the nature of this "network", we can sum up what Pierre Bourdieu means by using the concepts of habitus, practice, field, symbolic power, symbolic violence and doxa. If we dare to simplify, in social world there are fields which have their own specific logics and rules. In these fields there are different habituses, set of dispositions, embodied in practices "which makes the subjectivity socialised"(Scahill,www.ed.uuic.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/93_docs/SCAHILL.HTM). On these habituses and fields, which both determine the agents and are determined by the agents, there are continuous struggles among the groups having different kinds of capital. These groups struggling with each other for the domination of the fields wield symbolic power, "a transformed, misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form of the other forms of power." (Bourdieu, 1991: 170), and its inseparable tool symbolic violence that is "unperceived form of everyday violence." (Bourdieu, 1997: 266). The general inclination is that the powerful possessors of symbolic capital

become the wielders of symbolic power, and thus of symbolic violence. Through symbolic power and symbolic violence, these groups try to make their worldviews dominant on the fields and thus in social world.

Having very summarily evoked the picture that is drawn by Pierre Bourdieu by means of the concepts mentioned, we can now make sense of the function of ideology and discourse in Bourdieu's thought easier. First of all, it is evident that in Bourdieu's theoretical universe, ideology and discourse play a key role in the production and reproduction process of the power relations. As is known, it is one of the main and mostly accepted features of ideology and discourse and this feature is compatible with some definitions currently in circulation such as; "ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power", "a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class" or generally "the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life." (Eagleton, 1991: 1).

Approaching the issue by both keeping these definitions of ideology and the definition of discourse that "refers to the individual social networks of communication through the medium of language and non- verbal sign- systems." (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485), we can see that the production of the existing power relations and therefore, the structure of domination in society are ensured by a complex process in which, as Garnham pointed out, "agents internalize social structures in the habitus as cognitive structures or classificatory schema that operate below the level of consciousness and discourse" (Garnham, 1993: 179).

Secondly, we thus come across with a vital dimension of ideology and discourse in Bourdieu's thought. Especially, when it is thought on the axis of habitus, practice and field. The fact that there are tastes which "classify and classify the classifier"

(Bourdieu, 1984: 411) and distinctions in social world which can be "represented in the form of multi-dimensional space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe." (Bourdieu: 1991: 231) shows us that ideology and "discourse" of the dominant classes serve the internalization and naturalization process of the distinctions in the social world by dominated classes. We hold that this function of ideology and discourse, which strictly reminds Marxist tradition, in Bourdieu's thought is very critical.

Ironically, in reading Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse, one should also bear in mind that not only Bourdieu's approach to the role of ideology (and discourse) is doubly determined but also, in his point of view, ideology itself is doubly determined too. As Bourdieu emphasized, "we must remember that ideologies are always *doubly determined,* that they owe their most specific characteristics not only interests of the classes or class fractions they express of, but also to the specific interests of those who produce them and to the specific logic of the field of production" (Bourdieu, 1991: 169).

Ideologies owe their structure and their most specific functions to the social conditions of their production and circulation in Bourdieu's thought, that is, "first, to the functions they perform for specialists competing for a monopoly over the competence under consideration (religious, artistic, etc.); and second, and as a by product of this, to the functions they perform for non-specialists." (Bourdieu, 1991: 169). Moving from this point, Pierre Bourdieu thinks that it could be possible to

avoid from the reductionist insight in classical Marxist theory of ideology that overemphasizes the role of representation and false consciousness.

In Bourdieu's thought, the struggles for power on different fields have to do with the will to determinate the knowledge of the social world. And "knowledge of the social world, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stakes *par excellence* of the political struggle, a struggle which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world." (Bourdieu, 1991: 236). Therefore, the fact that the will of the groups to shape the knowledge of the social world leads us to think that in Bourdieu there is an idea of power exercised and enacted "in discourse" and at the same time "behind discourse". In both cases, "power is won, held and lost in social struggles" (Fairclough, 1989: 73-4).

Thus in Bourdieu, to think ideology and discourse on the axis of power is a compulsory. Here Bourdieu's emphasis on the knowledge of social life is crucial. It seems that Bourdieu is not very successful at getting away classical dichotomies between subject and object. Reminding the scholars of Enlightenment and Marx, Bourdieu's thought has still some gaps about the question of misrepresentation and is far from his main aim which is to avoid from the reductionist insight in classical Marxist theory of ideology that overemphasizes the role of representation and false consciousness.

Under the light of the compulsory that we have mentioned above, in reading Bourdieu on the debates, there appears another significant point to be stressed: *The question of legitimation.* We have seen that in Bourdieu's world, the role of ideology and discourse has to do with the relations of power. Thus, at this point, the ways used

by the dominant power to legitimate itself gain importance. As Terry Eagleton mentioned in *Ideology*, "a dominant power may legitimate itself by *promoting* beliefs and values congenial to it; *naturalizing* and *universalizing* such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; *denigrating* ideas which might challenge it; *excluding* rival forms of thought, *obscuring* social reality in ways convenient to itself." (Eagleton, 1991: 5). When the operation of habitus, practice, field, symbolic power, symbolic violence and doxa on the fields of education and language is remembered, it shall be seen that in Bourdieu the dominant power wields all the ways mentioned above to legitimate itself.

The monopolization, the exclusion, the naturalization, the universalization, the denigration, the obscuration and the promotion of (collective) truth are seen "as the source of every effect of symbolic imposition" (Bourdieu, 1991: 212) in Bourdieu's thought. But here a critical hallmark can be realized. Approaching the question of legitimacy from the angle of symbolic power and symbolic violence that are difficult to be aware of, since they are "something we absorb like an air" (Bourdieu, 1997: 270), it should be underlined that if there is no consensus on the legitimacy of symbolic power and the legitimacy who wield it, it is not possible that symbolic power and symbolic violence can be effectual. It is at the same time one of the weak points in Bourdieu's thought. For instance; Thompson asks, in the parallelism with this assumption, a critical and meaningful question: "If it is difficult to be aware of symbolic power and symbolic violence, how can there be a consensus on their legitimacy?" (Thompson, 1984: 61). Moving from this question, we can mention that there are some attacks upon Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic power and symbolic violence on the axis of the question of legitimacy (Üşür, 1997: 116).

Reading Bourdieu on the debates, we have to emphasize the position of the subjects against the dominant ideology and discourse. What should be underlined here is that in Bourdieu's thought, there is a certain and powerful belief that the subjects can resist against the dominance upon themselves and "change the structure". For instance; the subjects can challenge to orthodoxy by heterodoxy. Thus it is evident that, Bourdieu does not fall into the traps of passivism and pessimism. Nevertheless, he accepts that it is difficult to resist against the mechanisms of symbolic power and symbolic violence which are "everywhere and nowhere." (Bourdieu, 1997: 270).

In fact, as we have tried to emphasize throughout the study, the idea of "struggle" in Bourdieu is very significant from the angle of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. At this point, we can remember the arguments that Pierre Bourdieu put forward about the "field"s of language and education. As we showed in this study, language and education are the very fields of the struggle between the dominant and the subordinate groups. These both fields can be seen as "institutionalised classifier" of the inequalities existing in the social world. The uses of the words or the mechanisms of examinations as "ideological tools" are used in this process and generally serve the interests of the dominants.

What should be underlined here is the fact that the subordinate groups have potential to resist the "power" and "violence" upon them. The struggle of the subordinate groups versus the dominant groups is compatible with the struggle in political field which is dominated by an *official discourse* that puts clear and certain limits between "is" and "ought to" in social world. The official discourse for Bourdieu, which tends to create political fetishes and "mystical" effects called as *the*

oracle effect, is pondered on the axis of the other ideological mechanisms in the fields of language and education. Here we run into, even Bourdieu's intention is very different, a structuralist logic that carries prominent traces from Althusser and Pecheux. The position of the subordinate groups and their relationships with official discourse are compatible with the approaches in the structuralist tradition.

We can put that the operation of the ideological and discursive practices in Bourdieu can be read in the parallelism with the materialization of the set of dispositions on the bodies. That is to say, from a Bourdieusian perspective, bodies can be seen as materialized forms of our social positions and inclinations in social world. In other words, bodies are the signifiers of ideological and discursive practices. Bodies are the same time sites for struggle for the perception of the social world. Therefore, when we look at the picture drawn by Bourdieu's concepts so far, we can maintain that David Swartz is right in saying that "Bourdieu understands ideology as the capacity to impose the means for comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised, taken-for-granted forms" (Swartz, 1997: 89).

We can agree that, as Swartz also assumed, "Bourdieu is able to extend and reformulate with particular insight both Weber's idea of legitimation and the Marxist concept of ideology when he analyses how cultural practices assume symbolic value and obscure their role in justifying social inequality". However, Bourdieu's emphasis on the legitimating expects of power, particularly their indirect and hidden effects, makes his theoretical explanations weakened about economic power and physical coercion in some modern societies. It can be seen as another weak point in his

thought in together with his thought's weak points in front of the structuralist tradition.

A glance at the concepual world of Bourdieu shows that Bourdieu's notions can be read on the axis of the debates concerning ideology and discourse especially if we approach the issue in the parallelism with the question of power. This point we have tried to underline is really crucial for pondering the debates concerning ideology and discourse on Pierre Bourdieu. By moving from the explanations we have made before, it can be put forward that the theory of Bourdieu's symbolic power and symbolic violence, as Bridget Fowler also argued, can be seen as "a theory of ideology" (Fowler, 1997: 22). Through the concepts of symbolic power and symbolic violence, it is possible to mention "a process of the reproduction of the dominant ideology" in Bourdieu. As Tom Bottomore emphasized, "for Pierre Bourdieu education and language are two critical "fields" of the struggle on this reproduction process." (Bottomore, 1993: 71). On this axis, keeping in mind the points we mentioned before about Althusser, we can point out that there are indeed some quite striking parallels between Bourdieu's "conception of ideology" as both theory and material practice and that of his teacher, Althusser.

Although Bourdieu criticized the structuralist tradition, we can put forward that he nevertheless enjoy some prominent features reminding Althusser. First of all, comparing with Althusser, it is evident that Bourdieu developed and revised his theory by trying to escape from the traps of the structuralism. Thus, as Bridget Fowler emphasized, "where Althusser was vulnerable to a powerful critique of his essentially functionalist and idealist conception of ideological domination, Bourdieu cannot be criticized in the same way". The virtue of Bourdieu is that "he combines a

theory of class interest and misrecognition of such interest with a theory of stable structures and social relations." (Fowler, 1997: 23). Yet, it should be kept in mind that Bourdieu's conceptual world which we used to read the debates concerning ideology and discourse from a different perspective is akin to Althusser's thesis about ideology: "Ideology has a material existence." According to Althusser, as we emphasized in introduction, it is so because ideology always exists within an apparatus and its practices (Althusser, 1971: 150, McLennan, 1978: 96, Kazancı, 2002: 57).

Bourdieu's emphasis on social practices and their visions as set of dispositions in various fields which are used to indicate the operation of doxic order, to some extent, can remind both Althusser and Zizek, who argues that even "the shapes of toilets are materialized forms of different ideologies and traditions" (Zizek, 2002c: 145-146). If we approach the issue from the angle of the field of education, material practices and existences in the field of education in Bourdieu's thought, such as exam papers, are seen as arenas for struggle for power and legitimation. For instance; exam papers for Pierre Bourdieu can be seen as materialized form of dominant "middle class culture" and the inequalities that are sustained by means of schools. Hence, these are the very clear examples of the operation of symbolic power and symbolic violence.

Secondly, as is known, the process of the emergence of meaning and subject in Althusser is determined by structure. The subjects have no capacity to resist against the structure. When it comes to Bourdieu, if we especially think of the difference between the concept of field and the concept of apparatus, the fact that Bourdieu's conceptualization of the "Subject" has the ability to resist is a very significant hallmark that should be kept in mind. The ability we have underlined here, at the

same time, causes a struggle on the determination of the meaning in each field. This feature has to do with the Bourdieu's emphasis on the relative autonomy of the different fields in the social world. This is, thus, a fruitful reflection point to think Bourdieu "with and against" Michel Foucault.

According to Fowler, "Bourdieu's conception of relative autonomy attributes more importance to material and political struggles than Foucault does." (Fowler, 1997: 92). It is true that, Bourdieu's criticism of authorship, his analysis of practice and position-takings within a set of possibilities of a prominent cultural field and the explanations about "body" have a resemblance to the thought of Michel Foucault. As Fowler mentioned:

> Both have started from the assumption that the Enlightenment conception of ideological mystification obscures the taken-for-granted representations through which humans apprehend the world, which are overwhelmingly collective in character and the product of socialization. Such elementary classifications structure the universe by means of categories of time, space, law, nature, etc: when internalized, they produce what Michel Foucault calls the "never-said" and Bourdieu calls "doxa" (Fowler, 1997: 93).

When Foucault introduces his conception of "episteme" or the "field" of discourses, he says that his archeological project is to "depresentify thing" so as: "To conjure up their rich, heavy immediate plenitude, which we usually regard as the *primitive law of a discourse* [emphasis mine] that has become divorced from it through error, oblivion, illusion." (Foucault, 1989:48).

Bourdieu shares many of these assumptions when he approaches the areas of both gender and aesthetic discourses that Foucault underlined. That is, he is principally interested in doxic attitudes towards high and low and the invention of the artist. Whereas Bourdieu perceives such taken-for-granted doxa leaving their effects on

incorporated and refined history, Foucault had hauntingly described discursive formation as "one great text". (Fowler, 1997: 98, Tekelioğlu, 1999: 21).

Both also attack a mystical, or atomistic, view of individuality which depends on the philosophy of consciousness (Fowler, 1997: 99, Howarth, 2002: 115, Üşür, 1997: 96). "It is also strikingly evident that the structuralist concept of "reverse discourse", produced under the pressure points of different relations to power, is also present in Bourdieu's thought." (Fowler, 1997: 99).

These points of alignment do not mean that there are no differences between Foucault and Bourdieu. First of all, we can put forward that it is difficult to see how Foucault's power microcosms are mapped on to more causally effective social structures, in terms of the concentrated power of the State or dominant class. Moving from this point, Bridget Fowler sheds light upon the matter as follows:

> Bourdieu's break with structuralism was premised on seeing individual agents as actively struggling with their conditions of life in capitalist agriculture or domestic production, and it is in the context of the direct experiences of nature, labour and property that Kabylians, and others, make and transmit meanings. Foucault's order, by contrast, delineates incompatible epistemes but proposes no clear material realities within social structures to which these correspond (Fowler, 1997: 98).

Despite the differences that Bridget Fowler underlined, Foucault's approach to the question of power and his emphasis on the logic of interaction instead of the logic of determination (Üşür, 1997:97) and his explanations about the position of the dominant institutions can be pondered in the parallelism with Bourdieu's thesis on *doxic order*. That Foucault's *never-said's* is compatible with Bourdieu's *doxa* indicates itself in their emphasis on the production of truth and the classifications made by the dominants. It goes without saying that their explanations about their role

of the classifications made in social world gives us a fruitful framework for reading the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

In fact reading the debates on ideology "with and against" Foucault and Bourdieu seems ironic for both of the scholars owing to the fact that they criticize the notion of ideology for at least three reasons. Firstly, ideology is invariably used "in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth" (Foucault, 1980: 118, Bourdieu, 1997: 233). Secondly, the concept of ideology presupposes transparent and unified conception of human subjectivity "that is either deceived by the operation of ideology" (Foucault, 1980: 118, Bourdieu, 1991: 164). Thirdly, as a rejection to the notion which is especially seen in Foucault's writing but is compatible with Bourdieu's main thesis, ideology is usually placed in a secondary position relative to something "which functions as infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant" (Foucault, 1980: 118).

Although, both Foucault and Bourdieu criticize the notion of ideology, they nevertheless are concerned with questions inherited in debates concerning ideology which are ranging from the question of legitimacy to the constitution of meaning and subject. Especially, they can be thought together with one of their main aims: "To unmask the operation of power".

We can therefore conclude, even it seems that Bourdieu has more resemblance to the thought of Foucault than that of Althusser's, "Specters of Althusser" have deeply rooted in Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical universe too. We should also add that thinking Bourdieu "with and against" both Althusser and Foucault is meaningful in reading the debates concerning ideology and discourse especially from the angle of the constitution of the meaning and subject.

Until now, we have mentioned the historical background of the debates briefly and take a look at the conceptual world of Pierre Bourdieu. Now here, it is time to ask again what kind of theoretical feature makes Pierre Bourdieu different from the other scholars in the history of the debates concerning ideology and discourse. Here, in contrast to our deep hopes, we should confess that we cannot find clear and brand new differences in Bourdieu's theoretical world in order to put forward certain arguments and "original" themes concerning the debates on ideology and discourse. However, we assume that Pierre Bourdieu is significant to make sense of the "hidden" power dynamics and "spectres of ideology" in contemporary societies. His conceptual universe is not maybe very far from the structuralist tradition that he criticized, but nevertheless we can hold that Bourdieusian concepts can be instrumentalized to examine ideological effects in everyday life on the axis of the debates. Reading Bourdieu's concepts with another scholar, for instance Zizek, can give us some significant opportunities to make sense of the debates concerning ideology and discourse.

Another concluding remark which should be stressed here again is that, even though Bourdieu criticizes the structuralist tradition, his thoughts carries traces from this tradition as we have mentioned before. Despite the good will of Bourdieu about staying far from the structuralist thought and his several attacks upon this tradition, it is difficult to say Bourdieu is totally far from the ideas of Saussure, Althusser or Pecheux. The position of the linguistic markets, the process of the emergence of doxa, the nature of the habitus which are sets of dispositions or the dynamics of symbolic power and violence used against the subordinate groups have connections with the path that is walked by structuralist scholars. Nevertheless, these concepts of

Bourdieu can be benefited in reading the debates concerning ideology and discourse, if we use a Lacanian reading strategy, "reading with..." as Slavoj Zizek did.

To conclude our study, we would like to state once more the fact that although the themes which we see in Bourdieu's world, such as the role of ideology and discourse in the legitimation of the power of a dominant class or the relationships between ideology and practices or the position of the subjects are undoubtedly not new themes for the debates concerning ideology and discourse, Bourdieu's concepts such as habitus, practice, field, symbolic power, symbolic violence and doxa can nevertheless provide us a "sociological gaze" for reading the debates.

To underline again, it is true that reading Bourdieu on the debates concerning ideology and discourse, we cannot put forward that Pierre Bourdieu bring brand new themes to the debates. But nevertheless, Bourdieu's emphasis on the multi-dimensionality and complexity of meaning and subject reminding Zizek (even Zizek's attempt is more powerful) can extend the sociological dimension of the debates on ideology and discourse owing to the fact that at least Bourdieu's sociology provide a deep and fresh gaze to make sense of the debates about the nature and dynamics of power, classes, cultural struggles and social interactions.

Here we also would like to emphasize that, Bourdieu's concepts should be read together. Unlike the assessments of Fowler (1997) and Orr (2000), we do not think that doxa and symbolic power are the very concepts which are compatible with Pierre Bourdieu's approach to the notion of ideology. We hold that, from habitus to doxa, from field to symbolic power, Bourdieu's concepts are meaningful as long as they are thought together. In concluding our study, we lastly would like to mention that Pierre Bourdieu, who "believes that the critical thrust of social science can help the

subordinate groups in their struggle against elites" (Swartz, 1997: 294) and states that "sociology is a martial art" (Öztürk-Aymaz, 2002: 61), can be read on some scholars from Volosinov to Foucault and from Laclau and Mouffe to Zizek on the axis of the ideology and discourse debates and may highlight our way to see the faces of power and "the spectres of ideology and discourse" in modern life.

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