PRECARIOUS NECESSITY: DELEUZE AND THE THEORY OF THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT

PRECARIOUS NECESSITY: DELEUZE AND THE THEORY OF THOUGHT

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This thesis aims to give an elaborate exposition of Deleuze's philosophy of thinking by discussing particularly its relationship to his metaphysics. The first chapter provides a detailed presentation of Deleuze's understanding of thinking by distinguishing it from two other salient conceptions of thought. The second chapter focuses on Deleuze's criticisms of the Kantian model of thinking and a brief introduction of his proposed solution to those problems, which amounts to his theory of Ideas. The following three chapters focus on a crucial problem within the theory of thought, i.e., thinking's relationship with the real and its capacity for reaching an absolute. To this end, these chapters discuss the relationship between Deleuze's philosophy of thinking, his philosophy of time and metaphysics. My argument in these last three chapters is that Deleuze, as a "pure metaphysician," propounds a non-dogmatic speculative position which I call speculative temporalism. According to this position, thought can reach an absolute, i.e., an unconditional truth, which is that time as the pure and empty form of change is the condition of any occurrence, including contingent human thinking and experience. However, what is original in Deleuze's theory of thought is that any necessity and truth thought can reach remains a precarious necessity, meaning that they, all truths, including the necessity of the pure form of time, are open to being destroyed by the disintegrating powers of time itself.

Keywords: Deleuze, Philosophy of thinking, Kant, Absolute, Pure form of time.

ÖZ

GÜVENCESİZ ZORUNLULUK: DELEUZE VE DÜŞÜNCE KURAMI

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Bu tez Deleuze'ün düşünme felsefesinin özellikle onun metafizik ile olan ilişkisini tartışarak ayrıntılı bir incelemesini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk bölüm, Deleuze'ün düşünme anlayışını Batı felsefe geleneğindeki diğer iki önde gelen düşünce kavrayışından ayırmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Deleuze'ün Kantçı düşünme modeline yönelik eleştirilerine odaklanmakta ve bu sorunlara önerdiği çözümü kısaca sunmaktadır. Sonraki üç bölüm, düşünce kuramı içindeki çok önemli bir soruna, yani düşünmenin gerçekle ilişkisine ve onun bir mutlağa ulaşma kapasitesine odaklanmaktadır. Bu amaçla, bu bölümler Deleuze'ün düşünme felsefesi, zaman felsefesi ve metafiziğ. arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışmaktadır. Bu son üç bölümdeki argümanım, Deleuze'ün "saf bir metafizikçi" olarak, düşüncenin bir mutlağa ulaima konusunda benim spekülatif zamansalcılık adını verdiğim dogmatik olmayan spekülatif bir pozisyon ileri sürdüğüdür. Bu pozisyona göre, düşünce mutlak yani koşulsuz bir gerçeğe ulaşabilir; bu, değişimin saf ve boş biçimi olarak zamanın, olumsal insan düşüncesi ve deneyimi de dahil olmak üzere herhangi bir oluşumun koşulu olmasıdır. Bununla birlikte, Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisinde orijinal olan şey, herhangi bir gerekliliğin ve düşüncenin ulaşabileceği gerçeğin güvencesi ve kırılgan

bir zorunluluk olarak kalmasıdır, yani zamanın saf formunun gerekliliği de dahil olmak üzere tüm gerçeklerin, zamanın yıkıcı ve dönüştürücü güçleri tarafından yok edilmeye ve dönüştürülmeye açık olmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Deleuze, Düşünce felsefesi, Kant, Mutlak, Zamanın saf formu.

To my brother, for his unconditional support

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Gilles Deleuze are cited by the following abbreviations:

ATP *A Thousand Plateaus*

DR *Difference and Repetition*

LS *Logic of Sense*

WP *What is Philosophy*

M *Masochism: Coldness and Cruality*

DI *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*

TRM *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*

PS *Proust and Signs*

CC *Essays Critical and Clinical*

NP *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

KCP *Kant's Critical Philosophy*

ES *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*

B *Bergsonism*

D II *Dialogues II*

N *Negotiations*

TI *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*

F *Foucault*

Works by Martin Heidegger are cited by the following abbreviations:

CP *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*

BT *Being and Time*

WCT *What is Called Thinking*

Works by Immanuel Kant are cited by the following abbreviations:

CPR *Critique of Pure Reason*

INTRODUCTION

DELEUZE: A PHILOSOPHY OF THINKING?

> "*A new image of thought – a new conception of what thinking means is the task of philosophy today. This is where philosophy, no less than the sciences and the arts, can demonstrate its capacity for mutations and new 'spaces'*." (DI 93)[1]

When the questions regarding thinking are raised in philosophy, viz. its whatness, its basic elements, its relationship to sensation and memory, and its fundamental capacities etc., they are generally regarded as belonging to the domains of the philosophy of mind, epistemology, or rational psychology. Can we conceive an autonomous field of study focusing particularly on the nature of thinking and thought, albeit interlinked with the philosophy of mind and epistemology? I will assume that the theory of thought, theory of knowledge, and theory of mind indicate three distinct fields of study, which, roughly speaking, take their primary subject matter respectively as thought, knowledge, and mind. Without doubt, in their course of study, each of these fields deals with the other two subject matters in so far as they are relevant to their primary matter of inquiry. A rough list of the questions that would concern the theory of thought could be as follows: What is that which we call thinking? What is a thought? Do only human beings think, or can we consider some other beings also as thinkers? What are the essential and accidental elements of thought? What is a concept? What is the relationship between reasoning and thinking, sensation and thinking, perception and thinking, affects and thinking, anticipation and thinking? Can thought reach something unconditional, an absolute and a-subjective truth by remaining within its finite boundaries? When we define the philosophy of thinking with reference to these questions, it becomes conspicuous that although the term "philosophy of thinking" is largely absent in the philosophical literature, the field is at least as old as philosophy

[1] All the block quotations are italicized in the text. The normal font indicates emphasis in those quotations.

itself.[2] From the ancient theories of the soul through the early modern theories on the nature of the mind and the Kantian subject of synthesis to the contemporary neo-materialisms, philosophical thinking has doubtless found itself dealing with the issue of thought and the questions listed above in various ways.

One of the originalities of Gilles Deleuze within this long history of inquiry on the nature of thinking is his provoking idea that the history of the theory of thought is dominated by engrained presuppositions in a way that the true philosophical investigation regarding the above fundamental questions is immediately smothered by a shared intuition which, though taking very different guises, ends up by providing another variation on a rooted idea viewing thought as a natural and universal capacity of the human. This view of thinking as the exercise of a determinate natural capacity constitutes one of the core tenets of what Deleuze calls *the dogmatic or orthodox image of thought*, which is built on the presupposition that "everybody is supposed to know implicitly what it means to think" (DR 131). By isolating this concept of the dogmatic image of thought, Deleuze extracts a major problem in the history of philosophy, which is that an entrenched notion of thinking, which is neither self-evident nor tenable, had determined the course of not only our theoretical understanding of thinking, mind, knowledge but also our practices that are shaped by this theoretical understanding. The meaning of thinking has already been decided before the question concerning thinking has even been raised: Thinking is a determinate and natural capacity endowed with a natural knack for truth. Thought errs when its natural flow is intruded by external deviators, i.e., by passions, when it becomes a patient rather than an agent. Deleuze summarizes the other features of the dogmatic image of thought as follows (DR 167): In the dogmatic image of thought, the *model* or *form* of thinking is recognition, understood as the harmonious co-functioning of different faculties, viz. perception, imagination, memory, and understanding, on one identical object. The *ideal* of thinking is common sense, that is, the communicability of the object that is recognized, both on the level of different faculties and on the level of different subjects. The *elements* of thought are representations. The *logical form* of thought is the relation of designation, which is analyzed through propositions. Lastly, the *end* of thinking is knowledge.

[2] In the Deleuze scholarship, to the best of my knowledge, the term "philosophy of thinking" is first used by Shores (2021, 67–77).

Deleuze argues that though in different distributions and under diverse determinations, these eight features constituting the dogmatic image of thought dominate the conception of thinking from Plato to Heidegger with only a few exceptions, such as Nietzsche and Hume (DR 134, NP 103-110). As I will analyze more in detail in the first chapter, Deleuze's critique of the dogmatic image of thought discerns at least two main traditions, one starting with Plato's *Theaetetus* and going up to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the other is mainly the phenomenological tradition (DR 134, 320n6). Though Deleuze's comments on phenomenology are scarce, when it comes to the issue of the nature of thinking, it is clear that he considers phenomenology as a relative advancement upon the tradition starting from Plato and coming at least up to Kant. He thinks that, with phenomenology, in particular with Heidegger, some postulates of the dogmatic image of thought (thought as a determinate natural capacity, model of recognition) dissipates (DR 144). This, however, does not obstruct Heidegger and other phenomenologists like Husserl (WP 85) and Merleau Ponty (DR 320n6) from putting a subjective or implicit presupposition that takes the form "everybody knows ..." at the center of their philosophy (DR 129-130). For instance, by arguing that there is a pre-ontological understanding of Being, "an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself" (BT 35, 102), Heidegger presumes a fundamental homology between thought and that which is to be thought, and thus, transposes the dogmatic image at a more profound level (WP 209-210).

My aim in this thesis is to give an elaborate exposition of Deleuze's philosophy of thinking by discussing particularly its relationship to his metaphysics. The first chapter provides a detailed presentation of Deleuze's understanding of thinking by distinguishing it from two other salient conceptions of thought. The second chapter focuses on Deleuze's criticisms of the Kantian model of thinking and a brief introduction of his proposed solution to those problems, which amounts to his theory of Ideas. The following three chapters focus on a crucial problem within the theory of thought, i.e., thinking's relationship with the real and its capacity for reaching an absolute. To this end, these chapters discuss the relationship between Deleuze's philosophy of thinking, his philosophy of time and metaphysics. My argument in these last three chapters is that Deleuze, as a "pure metaphysician," propounds a non-

dogmatic speculative position which I call speculative temporalism.[3] According to this position, thought can reach an absolute, i.e., an unconditional truth, which is that time as the pure and empty form of change is the condition of any occurrence, including contingent human thinking and experience. However, what is original in Deleuze's theory of thought is that any necessity and truth thought can reach remains a precarious necessity, meaning that they, all truths, including the necessity of the pure form of time, are open to being destroyed by the disintegrating powers of time itself. Before going into the main body of the thesis, let me briefly go over each of the chapters.

In the first chapter, I exhibit two dominant conceptions of thinking in the Western philosophical tradition as it is analyzed in Deleuze's critique of the dogmatic image of thought. I call them *representational* and *homological* notions and present Deleuze's criticisms against these two conceptions. The representational notion of thinking, which plays a central role in Deleuze's conceptualization of the dogmatic image of thought, characterizes thought essentially as one's capacity to transcend the bounds of the perception through concepts as representational tools and, thus, views thought as fundamentally representational. The homological conception of thinking opposes the representational conception on the ground that representations are preceded by a more primordial ontological category, which is events. However, they understand events essentially with reference to homology or a deeper attunement between thought and the world. Thus, they maintain the understanding of thinking as a determinate capacity. Lastly, I argue that though Deleuze's notion of thinking also gives ontological primacy to events rather than things, his conception is sharply distinguished from the homological understanding of thinking in that it does not construe thinking as a determinate capacity but a contingent process engendered by problems. Deleuze's problematical notion of thinking views thinking as fundamentally a contingent and open process of *creation* or *becoming*, a becoming that rests on nothing but contingent encounters rather than a determinate and innate capacity. We do not know what thinking can do because we have before our eyes only its past, which is eminently contingent, a past that cannot be taken as an absolute point of reference.

[3] By "speculative," I understand any position which has something to say about reality, which has a claim on a form of absolute. By "dogmatic," I understand a position that does not take into account the conditions and bounds that thought and knowledge are subject to. Thus, a position that takes account of those limits and conditions can be seen as "critical."

In the second chapter, I take a closer look at Deleuze's criticisms against the dogmatic image of thought by analyzing the transcendental model of recognition propounded by Kant constituting one of the core constituents of the dogmatic image of thought (DR 13). I first explain how Deleuze understands the term recognition and why he thinks that it is not an adequate model to explain the nature of thinking. To this end, I expound on Deleuze's three criticisms of the Kantian transcendental model of recognition. Following this, I lay out Deleuze's theory of Ideas which aims to overcome the problems of the Kantian model of recognition.

In the third chapter, I discuss a fundamental problem that any theory of thought must confront, which is thought's relationship with necessity and truth. The question is whether thought can reach something necessary and unconditional, either a principle or an entity, and if it can, by what right. We will see that what is at stake in this question is no less than the philosophical value of Deleuze's own theory of thought itself. If thinking as an absolutely contingent process cannot guarantee the necessity of its own productions, it remains a moot question why we should hold Deleuze's theory of thought rather than some other theories. After laying out this problem, I will present three main strategies that are appealed to by the commentators in the literature in confronting this problem. These strategies also amount to three different ways of interpreting Deleuze's philosophy (at least his metaphysics). I will dub these approaches rationalist, irrationalist, and non-dogmatic speculative readings and argue that a non-dogmatic speculative position characterizes Deleuze's position the best. However, I will argue that the current scholarship on Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative position fails to combine his metaphysics with his philosophy of time. This lack shall determine the task of the next two chapters. Studying this aspect of Deleuze's theory of thought will not only help us reconcile seemingly incongruous aspects of Deleuze's philosophy foregrounded by different lines of interpretations which, in the secondary literature, gave rise to conflicting interpretations of Deleuze's philosophy, but it will also navigate us into new paths in the contemporary debates on thought's capacity to reach an absolute.

In order to complete our treatise on Deleuze's theory of thinking, finally, I explain the essential link between time and thinking. Studying this aspect of Deleuze's theory of thought will help us reconcile seemingly incongruous aspects of Deleuze's philosophy

which, in the secondary literature, gave rise to conflicting interpretations of Deleuze's philosophy. Time has at least two central roles in Deleuze's theory of thought, which I examine in detail in chapter four and chapter five, respectively. First, time, with its distinct dimensions, is the pure transcendental condition of the occurrence of any event, including the event of thinking. Being as such, time plays the role of the ground of things, events, and facts. Secondly, time indicates the process of "universal ungrounding" (DR 91) and the unbounded power of destruction, metamorphosis, and novelty; as such, time plays the role of the "falsifier," having the power to radically overturn everything and reduce all the things, events, and facts to the level of mere contingent occurrences waiting for their metamorphosis and destruction. When we bring together those two aspects of time, we reach the conclusion that thought can give us necessary productions, necessary not in the sense of eternal but in the sense of well-grounded. In fact, as we will see, they are well-grounded upon the pure form of time, precisely the immutable form of what is not eternal. However, these well-grounded productions remain precarious, meaning that they remain open to being disrupted or destroyed in the future.

CHAPTER 1

THINKING: REPRESENTATIONAL, HOMOLOGICAL, PROBLEMATICAL

Overview

In this chapter, I exhibit three conceptions of thinking, which I dub representational, homological, and problematical notions, the first two of which are that are critical in Deleuze's construal of the dogmatic image of thought. The representational notion of thinking, which constitutes the main target of Deleuze's criticisms, characterizes thought essentially as the capacity to transcend the bounds of the sense perception through concepts as representational tools. The homological conception of thinking opposes the representational conception on the ground that representations are preceded by a more primordial ontological category, which is events. However, the homological conception of thinking understands events primarily on the ground of an original attunement or homology between thinking and what is being thought or events. Lastly, I argue that though Deleuze also regards events as ontologically primary over things and their representations, his conception is distinguished from the homological, since it does not construe thinking as a determinate capacity, but a contingent process engendered by problems.

1. The Representational Notion of Thinking

It is of little controversy that what I will call the representational conception of thinking has been the most dominant understanding of thought in the occidental philosophical tradition. The gist of this conception can be put as follows: Thinking is, first and above all, a natural capacity for forming representational ideas rendered possible by a capacity for the spontaneous employment of concepts. In contrast to sense-perception, which is bound to the presence of external stimuli here and now, thinking enables one to re-present to oneself an entity that is not actually here and now by virtue of concepts as representational tools. To put it simply, to perceive a stone, I must be exposed to the stone here and now. However, in order to think of the stone, it is sufficient to bring to

mind the concept of stone and relate it to other concepts.[4] In this sense, thought frees one from the limited world of sensory states and opens the autonomous realm of rationality through those representational tools called concepts. The reason why I name this view as *representational* is it characterizes thinking fundamentally as an innate capacity to transcend the bounds of the sense perception and limited imagination through concepts as representational tools. It would be helpful to visit some cornerstones of this tradition and expose the continuities between them to understand its main characteristics. But the reader should keep in mind my presentation will be limited to just a rough outline because of the impossibility of providing a faithful presentation of these quite complex and detailed views in such a limited space.

Keeping in mind the significant points of divergence in the details and main direction of their analysis of the nature of concepts, we can say that from Plato to Kant, the understanding of thought as a unique capacity for rationality (in contradistinction to perception) and the status of the concept as a representative tool and as the mediator of thought hardly becomes the subject of transformative questioning. Aristotle (2016, 33 / ii 5, 417b23), for instance, puts forwards a representational model of thought by arguing that thinking is of universals, whereas sensation is of particulars. In *Metaphysics*, for instance, he (1924 / 999a24-30) underscores this difference by maintaining that "For all things that we come to know, we come to know insofar as they have some unity and identity, and insofar as some attribute belongs to them universally." Hence, concepts, for Aristotle, are above all *identities*. They designate what is common, what is "identical" in a group of entities. Only by means of these identities do we come to know differences. The difference here is conceived as the limit between two identities. What explains the foundation of concepts is the idea of *similarity* among the individual instances that a concept gathers in unity (Salmieri 2008, 48–49). What is philosophically at stake in the problem of concepts or universals, both in Aristotle and in the debates to follow concerning universals, is precisely the relationship between thinking and reality, whence follows the shattering problems of philosophy, such as the existence of the external world, the mind-body

[4] For a succinct exposition of the differences between thinking and perceiving in this view, see (Bayne 2013, 4–8). He lists three necessary conditions of an ideal act of thinking, which comprises the capacity for representing objects (1) in a stimulus-independent manner (in contrast to perception), (2) in a manner that enables the thinker to move swiftly among different representations and create new representations out of the present ones (imagination), and (3) by representing in a structured way (categories).

problem, and the problem of other minds.[5] For the question that directly proceeds when concepts are marked as the main constituents of thinking is how to construe the relationship between concepts and what they represent, their origin and the rules of their creation.

Concerning the origin of concepts, a large extent of the philosophers who hold the representational notion maintains that they are products of the intellect. That is, intellect furnishes concepts through its capacity for abstraction and reflection. Thomas Aquinas (1954, ll, 6, ad 1), for instance, argues that "Therefore, it is clear that abstraction, which is common to all intellects, makes a form universal." A similar idea is held by Locke. He characterizes the ability for "abstraction whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become representatives of all of the same kind" as excluding contingent differences in a set of entities and generalizing a similarity or a common feature found in them (Locke 1997, 155 / II.11.9-10). Though Kant (1992, 351) follows the tradition by conceding that "I compare things and attend to that which they have in common, and I abstract from all other things; thus this is a concept, through which all these things can be thought," he also transforms the theory of concepts by distinguishing empirical concepts, concepts of understanding and Ideas of reason.

Thinking understood as the capacity to use concepts, is also what distinguishes humans from animals. All the philosophers I mentioned above, concede a certain capacity for judgment to animals. However, their point is that they do not have the capacity for rational judgment, which requires the use of concepts proper. For instance, though Aristotle is clear that it is rationality that distinguishes humans from other animals, he also thinks that humans have a variety of capacities (above all, sensory capacities) shared by other animals (Davin 2018). Following Avicenna's theory of internal senses, Aquinas also concedes that animals have a certain capacity for judgment in a way that they are able to distinguish what is beneficial for them and what is not, or what is dangerous and what is not. But what distinguishes humans from other animals is their capacity for "rational judgment" which enables them to reflect upon and determine their own judgments, which distinguishes it from the "natural judgment" of animals that is bound to the external determination (Aquinas 1954, 24.2). In a very similar

[5] Salmieri (2008, 10) demonstrates that what is later called the problem of universals can be safely regarded as either the problem of concepts itself, or else a part of that problem.

fashion to Aquinas, Locke (1997, 154) also argues that the ability to furnish "universal ideas" through abstraction is precisely what distinguishes humans from other animals, though they have some capacity for compounding and comparing the simple ideas that get from their senses and arrive at more general ones. This idea of rational judgment's independence and freedom from external determination is sustained by Kant, as he argues that the will "can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses. . . Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses" (Kant 1991, 42/6:213–14, cf. CPR A534/B562).

One of Deleuze's principal dissatisfactions with this view is that it does not take the problem of the production of concepts seriously enough. Despite all their differences, there seems nonetheless an insistence among the advocates of the representational conception of thinking on the idea that concepts are identities, i.e., abstracted similarities a set of entities have.[6] Explaining concepts through similarity among a set of entities, Deleuze argues, is possible either by presuming the empirical givenness of those individual things (as it is done by pre-Kantian philosophies) or the empirical givenness of the experience in which the diversity of things is given (Kant's strategy). While the first leads us into a dogmatic metaphysical stance with regard to the reality of things, Deleuze argues, as I will show in detail in the second chapter, that the second is built upon the fallacious strategy of modeling the transcendental upon the empirical. Viewing difference as the limit between two given identities already assumes what is to be explained, i.e., how and why the given is given as such. What is supposed to be explained, i.e., concepts, are implicitly presupposed by posing a field of individuated beings. In the representational conception, concepts are taken as the explanation of what we think. Deleuze argues that this approach must be reversed in such a way that concepts are not *explanans* of thought but are *explanandum*. He argues, "The first principle of philosophy is that universals explain nothing, but must themselves be explained" (WP 7).[7] That which was the explanation now becomes that which is to be explained. For instance, the categories in Kant, i.e., the *explanans*, becomes what should be explained.[8]

[6] For now, I ignore Kant's distinction between empirical concepts and the concepts of understanding.
[7] Somewhere else, he maintains, "Abstractions explain nothing, they themselves have to be explained" (N 145).
[8] "We require a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories" (NP 91).

2. The Homological Notion of Thinking

Though he does not assert it explicitly, Deleuze seems to think that a break occurs with the representational conception of thought with the advent of phenomenological conceptions of thinking, which I will conceptualize as a sort of homological conception of thinking. The reason why I call this notion of thinking *homological* is that with it, representation and the transcendental stability of concepts considered as the fundamental and most primordial conditions of thinking are replaced by a still more primordial occurrence of events and the homology or pre-given harmony between thought and events which are given to thought. Events, traditionally understood, stand in opposition to the things, essences and entities.[9] In the representational notion of thinking, for instance, concepts are used to determine what something *is*, that is, its essence (from *esse*, which means "to be" in Latin). When one seeks the essence of X through the question "What is X," the other questions such as when, in which case, where, or who become merely *accidental*. If we consider Plato's aporetic dialogues, for instance, who or what is beautiful becomes inessential compared to the question what is beauty. Here, I will distinguish two approaches that gives an ontological primacy to events over things and substances in their account of thinking. The one is homological, which according to Deleuze, is mostly defended by the phenomenological tradition, and the other is problematical, which indicates Deleuze's own position. Considering the scarcity of Deleuze' remarks on other phenomenologists, here I will focus merely on Heidegger and his criticisms against the transcendental conception, and show why Deleuze thinks that Heidegger's evental conception remains tethered to the dogmatic image of thought.

According to Heidegger, the guiding question of Western thought had been the question of "What is X?" This form of the question, which is already present in Plato's aporetic dialogues,[10] takes its most general form with Aristotle when the latter determines the question "What are beings?" (τι το ον) as the primary subject matter of metaphysics (CP 60). The basic and profound move that lies at the heart of Heidegger's critique of this view is the problematization of the "is" as it figures in the question

[9] As Rovelli (2018, 96) concisely puts it, "We can think the world either as made up of things, of substances, of entities, of something that is, or as made up of events, happenings, of processes, of something that occurs."

[10] Among the aporetic dialogues, see for instance, *Meno,* which is guided by the question "What is virtue?" and *Euthyphro,* which is shaped around the question "what is piety?"

"What is X?" When we treat the question of "What is X?" as primary, we simply discard the question of the Being of beings (expressed in the "is") as trivial, and thus, the Being of beings goes unnoticed in the question. Whence, the principal form of philosophical questioning becomes "What are beings as beings?" in which the ground that makes the understanding of beings as beings, which is their Being, is overlooked. Heidegger argues that from the Greeks to Kant, thinking understood in terms of representational capacity (the forms of judgment and categories) plays a decisive role in establishing the understanding of beings as such (CP 200).[11] He argues that "'thinking', in the ordinary determination that has been usual for a long time, is the representing of something in its ἰδέα as the κοινόν ["common"], the representing of something in its generality" (CP 51). In other words, the beingness of being is derived by examining beings for a common feature shared by them, by abstracting what is identical in a set of particulars, which can be carried out by various a priori and a posteriori methods. Understood this way, concepts and thinking are taken as the ground for the beingness of beings, "identity becomes the essential determinations of beings" (CP 156). Hence, when the question of Being is subordinated to the question of beings, that is, when the question of "what are beings as beings?" is taken as primordial, philosophy finds itself in the swamp of the problem of representation, trying to bridge the distance between the concept we have of something and the thing it is a concept of.

Heidegger argues, very much like Deleuze, the chief defect of this form of questioning, which later leads it to unsolvable problems, is that it is unable to explain how it is itself possible, that is, what makes the identity of concepts possible in the first place. Heidegger contends that conceptual thinking is possible only on the ground of one's originary openness to the difference between Being and beings (BT 35, 227; CP 234, 300).[12] He contends that identity derives from the essential ontological difference between Being and beings, Being's disclosedness to Dasein.[13] Hence, conditioning the

[11] With regard to Aristotle, Heidegger maintains that "Despite [Aristotle's] denial that being has the character of a genus, nevertheless being (as beingness) is always and only meant as the κοινόν, the common and thus what is common to every being'" (CP 60). With regard to the German idealism, he contends, "Yet 'idealism', precisely in its modern guise, is indeed Platonism, inasmuch as modern idealism also maintains that beingness must be grasped in terms of "representing" (νοεῖν), i.e., (under Aristotelian influences) in terms of λόγος as διανοεῖσθαι ['thinking through'], i.e., in terms of thinking, which according to Kant is the representing of something in general (categories and the table of judgments; categories and the self-knowledge of the reason for Hegel)" (CP168).

[12] In his later works, Heidegger expresses the idea of "the primal occurrence of Being as the event"

[13] Heidegger uses the term Dasein to designate specifically the human existence.

representational understanding of thinking is the disclosedness or openness of being as the essential occurrence, as the event.[14]

According to Heidegger, the original meaning of thinking (*Legein*, verb form of *logos*) as an openness to the Being of beings as we find in the Greeks (according to Heidegger, mostly in Parmenides [WCT 172-86]) has nothing to do with the concept understood in the representational terms. He maintains that "Thinking is not grasping or prehending. In the high youth of its unfolding essence, thinking knows nothing of the grasping concept" (WCT 211).[15] It is not one's thinking through concepts that make one's relation to Being possible. Instead, it is by virtue of one's pre-theoretical understanding of Being (or as he later designates under such terms as "disposition" and "presentiment" [CP 19]) and involvement in the world that concepts are operative.[16] What foremost and essentially calls for thinking, what grounds human's capacity for the employment of concepts, is Dasein's exposure to the Being of beings, its pre-given disposition for Being, a pre-established harmony between thinking and what gives itself to thought. Hence, concepts are operative and meaningful only through Dasein's primordial openness to Being. Questioning understood as one's exposedness to the Being of beings is the fundamental motive of thinking through which "problematic [of Being] alone is accepted as the unique habitat and *locus* of thinking" (WCT 185, original italic). Hence, *thinking is nothing but the expression of the essential occurrence of Being, being as the event*; that is, pre-given attunement between Being and thought.[17]

For Deleuze, what is fundamentally problematical in the Heideggerian homological conception of thinking is that the latter puts a "pre-ontological understanding of Being," or fundamental "disposition" at the basis of its account of thinking. Heidegger reproduces the traditional idea of adequation between thinking and what is being thought in a more profound level, between the event of thought and the event of the giving of the given. Thus, Heidegger's homological conception of thinking is built upon a subjective or implicit presupposition. That is, the justification of the pre-

[14] "This is the essential occurrence of beyng itself; we call this essential occurrence the *event*" (CP 8).
[15] On this point, see also (Heidegger 2013, 33–37).
[16] He maintains, "The basic disposition disposes Da-sein and thereby disposes thinking as a projection of the truth of beyng in word and concept" (CP 19).
[17] In his arcane way of putting it, "Inceptually, *thinking* is the anticipatory ap-prehension and gathering of the unconcealedness of what emerges and is constantly present as such" (CP 155, original italic).

ontological understanding of Being, according to Deleuze, is mainly a presupposition that takes the form "everybody knows ..." (DR 129-130): Everybody knows in a pre-philosophical and pre-conceptual manner what the pre-ontological understanding of Being means. The meaning of this implicit presupposition is that Heidegger sees a fundamental homology between thought and that which is to be thought. For this reason, Deleuze thinks that Heidegger's philosophy, in the end, retains the primacy of identity in the form of attunement between the event of thought and the event of Being (DR 321; WP 209-210).[18] With the *Heideggerian homological conception of thinking, although thinking is no longer treated as a natural capacity, it is still construed as a determinate capacity*, i.e., *a capacity to engage in the event of Being*. Thus, with Heidegger, the old conception of the human capacity for thought is replaced by a deeper attunement between the human and thinking on the level of Dasein's openness to Being. The latter is explained by Heidegger with reference to the pre-established affinity or homology between Dasein and Being, between the event of thought and the event of the giving of the given. We think the Being that we are pre-disposed to think. But what explains this pre-disposition or pre-established harmony between Dasein and Being? Is this not merely a re-production of the idea of traditional harmony between thought and what is being thought on a more profound level? At this point, Deleuze argues that, due to this presupposition of the attunement between thinking and Being, Heidegger's conception of thinking remains bound to the dogmatic image of thought that construes thinking principally as a natural and determinate capacity (DR 134, WP 210). Instead of replacing the question of "what is X?" with "what is Being?" or more properly, "Through *whom* is the Being of beings revealed?" (Dasein), Deleuze argues that in each case, the important questions are always "How?" "how much?" "in which cases?" "who?" "where?" "when?" "from what point of view?" which allows us to account for the event of thinking as a contingent occurrence among other occurrences rather than taking it as a pre-given determinate capacity (DR 188).[19]

[18] However, one might oppose this criticism by pointing out that Heidegger, in his later work, left this vein of thinking and terminology in favor of an account in which Being makes itself open to human beings, and Da-sein finds itself in the openness of Being. Bahoh's reading of the late Heidegger, for instance, aims at how later Heidegger can evade Deleuzian critique. He (2020, 216) argues that "Deleuze… did not have access to *Beiträge* [Contributions to Philosophy] or the related private manuscripts. The concept of difference they contain moves beyond that accounted for in *Différence et répétition*'s critique of Heidegger and shows that his ontology is more similar to Deleuze's than the latter recognized."

[19] "Not that it is sufficient, however, to repeat a single question which would remain intact at the end, even if this question is 'What is being?'" (DR 200). "[T]ruth is never the product of a prior disposition but the result of a violence in thought" (PS 16). Also see (Colebrook 2015, 218–19).

3. The Problematical Notion of Thinking

Deleuze's account of thinking hinges on a notion of thinking understood more as an open-ended and creative process rather than a determinate natural capacity.[20] He argues that thinking happens not by virtue of a mysterious congruence between the structure of thought as a determinate capacity and the sensible content, but by way of affectivity which hangs not on the idea of congruence of the event of thinking and the event of the giving of the given but on the idea of violence that thought constantly undergoes in the face of that which itself is to be thought. In other words, thought must be understood not as a determinate and innate capacity but as an open process of *production or creation,* a becoming that rests on nothing but contingent encounters, on "sudden jolts that beat like arteries" (WP 201). Hence, thinking proceeds not from "*recognizable* objects, but things that do violence, *encountered* signs" (PS 101, original italic).[21] The act of thinking proceeds from a contingent and forceful encounter with signs, that is, from affectivity.[22] I will dub those views that consider thinking not as a determinate capacity but as a contingent process that is engendered by problems the problematical conception of thinking.[23] In Deleuze, just as beings are understood as *beings-in-making* rather than predetermined entities that precede their relations, thinking is viewed as *event-in-making* or *becoming*, which happens in-between different fields of problems and individuations. But what does Deleuze precisely understand by a problem and a sign?

According to Deleuze, thinking is possible only on the basis of problems.[24] However, problems manifest themselves as "signs," which are the bearers of problems.[25] A sign, in this context, is that which has the capacity to generate certain affect in an

[20] "The act of thinking does not proceed from a simple natural possibility; on the contrary, it is the only true creation" (PS 97).
[21] Also see (PS 27).
[22] "Thought is in a fundamental relation with affect. We do not think without being sensitive to something, to signs" (Zourabichvili 2012, 71).
[23] The British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, in his article "The Psychoanalytical Study of Thinking. A theory of thinking" (1962) also defends a problematical notion of thinking. Bion (2013, 302) stresses that thinking is not a determinate innate capacity but "has to be called into existence to cope with thoughts." Like Deleuze's idea that "thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought" through an encounter (DR 147), Bion argues that "thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the pressure of thoughts and not the other way round" (Bion 2013, 308). He argues that thoughts contain or express a problem in a way that they should be dealt with (Ibid).
[24] "… thought thinks only on the basis of an unconscious" (DR 199). Also see (DR 14, 108, 165).
[25] The term sign has different uses in Deleuze's work. Here, I focus on the meaning of the term in *Proust and Signs* and *Difference and Repetition*. Also, see (Smith 2012, 92) for the term "sign" as it appears in *Difference and Repetition*.

individual.[26] The ultimate characteristic of being affected is that it puts the individual in a problem, "as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem – as though it were a problem" (DR 140). Deleuze argues, "Problems and their symbolic fields stand in a relationship with signs. It is the signs which 'cause problems' and are developed in a symbolic field" (DR 164). Being always gives itself to us under a problematic form, as a set of problematizations. We have intimations of sense preceding the constitution of well-defined concepts. But these intimations of sense express themselves through problems, not through a determinate capacity for truth. But how exactly are problems incorporated in signs? The genesis of the act of thinking starts from an encounter with a sign, i.e., through affection. Thus, according to Deleuze, thinking is not a pre-determinate ability of an individual but happens through a forceful and contingent encounter with signs. Thus, thinking means, above all, to experiment and to problematize, which proceeds from a contingent and forceful encounter with signs, that is, from affectivity.[27] As Deleuze puts it, "The act of thinking does not proceed from a simple natural possibility; on the contrary, it is the only true creation. Creation is the genesis of the act of thinking within thought itself. … To think is always to interpret—to explicate, to develop, to decipher, to translate a sign" (PS 97). To be affected necessitates neither concepts understood as rational structures belonging to a transcendental subject nor a peculiar openness to the Being of beings.

One natural consequence of not viewing thought as a natural determinate capacity is that there can be no thinking proper but only different events of thinking. We cannot point to the essence of thinking but only to the events of thinking. These events, however, are grounded neither on the essential occurrence of Being as it is in Heidegger nor on another form of a deeper attunement between human existence and thought. Rather, an event of encountering a sign, in so far as it refers to a system of problems and confronting the pure form of time (as we will see in the final chapter),

[26] In one of his essays on Spinoza, Deleuze uses the affections and signs synonymously (CC 138): "… Signs or affects… A sign … is always an *effect*." The understanding of signs in terms of *effects* or affections is also dominant in *Proust and Signs* and *Difference and Repetition*. "One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. Vocation is always predestination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs" (PS 4) "There is always the violence of a sign that forces us into
the search, that robs us of peace" (PS 15).

[27] "To think means to experiment and to problematize" (F 116).

amounts to the genesis of a form of thinking, however simple it is. Explaining thinking on the basis of a fortuitous encounter with signs brings forth the conception of thinking as not a determinate or natural capacity, either as a capacity for the free employment of concepts or a more profound capacity for meaning. The act of thinking does not depend on a simple natural ability. Instead, it is a creation that amounts to the genesis of the act of thinking.[28] Thought refers to this creative process. But we can distinguish different forms of thought or creation, as Deleuze does with regard to art, science, and philosophy in *What Is Philosophy* (WP 208). Following Zourabichvili's (2012, 53) characterization of philosophy, we must say of thinking that "We do not know what thought can do" because we have before our eyes only its past which is eminently contingent, a past that cannot be taken as an absolute point of reference. Hence, it is inadequate to absolutize what we find in our contingent experience as the essence of thinking rather than seeking the conditions of the production of this contingent structure.

To sum up, for Deleuze, thinking is not *a determinate capacity*, be it a natural capacity for abstraction or rationality, or a capacity to engage in the event of Being. Instead, it is a *contingent production of dynamic arrangements of heterogeneous elements shaped according to problems.* I will dub those views that consider thinking not as a determinate capacity but as an open process-in-the-making engendered by problems the problematical conception of thinking.[29] Deleuze's conception of thinking is distinguished from the homological notion in so far as it does not take thinking as *a determinate capacity* but *an event in the making*. In tandem with this, Deleuze does not explain difference through the identity of a concept or a more primordial occurrence of Being and seeks an explanation of the real genesis of concepts and the origin of thinking. If we are to compare Deleuze to Heidegger, we can say in Deleuze, the disclosure of Being as corresponding to the question of Being is grounded on the being of problems; that is, the ontology of the question leaves its place to a metaphysics

[28] "The act of thinking does not proceed from a simple natural possibility; on the contrary, it is the only true creation. Creation is the genesis of the act of thinking within thought itself" (PS 97).

[29] The British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, in his article "The Psychoanalytical Study of Thinking. A theory of thinking" (1962) also defends a problematical notion of thinking. Bion (2013, 302) stresses that thinking is not a determinate innate capacity but "has to be called into existence to cope with thoughts." Thoughts in some form contain or express a problem in a way that they should be dealt with (Bion 2013, 308). Like Deleuze's idea that "thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought" through an encounter (DR 147), Bion argues that "thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the pressure of thoughts and not the other way round" (*Ibid*).

of problems.[30] In keeping with this, the idea of thinking as a friendly or attuned exchange of giving with Being is replaced by the idea of violent genesis of thought via a shocking encounter.

[30] See (DR 195-197). We can safely maintain that Badiou's (2000, 20) claim that Deleuze's "work is concerned with thinking thought (its act, its movement) on the basis of an ontological pre-comprehension of Being as One" is completely foreign to the Deleuzian notion of thought. Being unable to appreciate this crucial difference between Heideggerian homological and Deleuzian problematical notion of thinking, Badiou (2000, 21) also claims that "Deleuze is, on a number of critical points (difference, the open, time…), less distant from Heidegger than is usually believed and than he no doubt believed himself to be."

CHAPTER 2

FROM RECOGNITION TO THE CONTINGENT GENESIS OF THOUGHT

"*Thought is a matron who has not always existed.*" (Antonin Artoud, quoted in DR 148)

Overview:

From Plato to Kant, the model of recognition determines the orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think (DR 134). However, Deleuze argues that an account of thinking based on the model of recognition we find in the representational conception is inappropriate for several reasons. In this chapter, I will first explain what Deleuze understands by the term recognition and why he thinks that the model of recognition is not an adequate one to explain the nature of thinking. To this end, I expound on Deleuze's three criticisms of the Kantian model of recognition. Following this, I lay out Deleuze's theory of Ideas which aims to overcome the problems of the Kantian model of recognition through an onto-genetic account of thought.

1. Recognition as the Fundamental Structure of Thinking

It is obvious that our daily lives are brimmed with acts of recognition: This is a computer, it is raining outside, this is a piece of wax, here is a virtuous man, and so on. The acts of recognition give us identities. The difference is meaningful only with reference to the primal identity of the objects of recognition. The table and computer are different because the table *is* a table, and the computer *is* a computer. These two separate primal identity statements are the ground of other statements about the table's difference from other things. However, as he frequently puts it with regard to Plato's distinction between two sorts of sensation, Deleuze thinks that there is nothing that stirs thinking, nothing new or striking that would force one to think in most of the ordinary events of recognition.[31] He proclaims that "Of all the finite movements of

[31] See (DR 138–42, 236; NP 108, 210 n33; PS 100–1).

thought, the form of recognition is certainly the one that goes the least far and is the most impoverished and puerile" (WP 139).[32] When a thought engendering thing becomes tethered to the structure of recognition, it no longer indicates thinking but a mere habit. In this respect, Deleuze often qualifies the object of recognition with the Greek term *doxa* (opinion).[33] Opinions are not genuine creations because creations are always singular while opinions are always general.[34] Opinions may come out of genuine creations just as recognitions may be the recognition of novel things. But so far as creations become generalities, they become opinions. In this "transcendental model of recognition" which defines thinking as the natural exercise of a universal thinking subject, "doxa is universalized by being elevated to the rational level" (DR 134).[35]

At this point, this criticism might seem, to say the least, too generic. Can we really shelve the model of recognition due to the stupor that some everyday acts of recognition put our thinking in? How adequate is such a unified and sterile concept of recognition? Do not new discoveries arise when people *recognize new things*; in other words, do not the inventors and creators first *glimpse* the novelty in a fleeting moment and then bring it to light by anchoring it through the structures of recognition, that is, by making it communicable, by rendering it an object of *common sense*? Does not Deleuze, with his partly intimidating rhetorical language, draw a strawman argument against the model of recognition?[36] These questions are completely legitimate at this

[32] Also see (DR 135). "But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognize, we are thinking?"

[33] "Opinion is a thought that is closely molded on the form of recognition" (WP 146). Also, see (WP 80). However, note that Deleuze's use of the term "opinion" might be confusing partly because Deleuze uses this term in divergent contexts ranging from the analysis of artworks to metaphysics and partly because, in many places, Deleuze eschews from giving a positive definition of it and suffice to say what it is not. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there is no thorough study of this term in the secondary literature. For a good concise analysis of the term, see (Colebrook 2002, 16–17, 23–24). Olkowski's (2021, 33–34, 43) discussion of the term "opinion" in terms of empirical judgments or judgments based on the lived experience bearing on the given empirical content of experience is also insightful.

[34] In that regard, "If philosophy is paradoxical by nature, this is not because it sides with the least plausible opinion or because it maintains contradictory opinions but rather because it uses sentences of a standard language to express something that does not belong to the order of opinion or even of the proposition" (WP 80).

[35] See note 56.

[36] Deleuze's argumentation seems so hasty and rhetorical in some cases. For instance, take this passage: "Who says 'Good morning Theodorus' when Theaetetus passes, 'It is three o'clock' when it is three-thirty, and that 7 + 5 = 13 ? Answer: the myopic, the distracted and the young child at school. These are effective examples of errors, but examples which, like the majority of such 'facts', refer to thoroughly artificial or puerile situations… Error acquires a sense only once the play of thought ceases to be speculative and becomes a kind of radio quiz" (DR 150).

point. However, Deleuze's criticism of recognition as based on its essential affinity with opinion does not stem from a mere personal distaste for opinions or generality. Rather, Deleuze's critique of the pervasiveness of opinion stems from some more fundamental philosophical flaws that he finds in the model of recognition. There are at least three fundamental problems with the model of recognition put forward by Kant that should lead us to reserve any quick adherence to its claim for fundamentality and coherency. These problems are the following: (1) we cannot establish the unity of a transcendental subject, which is supposed to ground the identity of the object communicated among faculties, (2) the Kantian model of recognition fallaciously universalize or make transcendental what is truly empirical and contingent as it simply presupposes the *fact* of experience and build the transcendental upon this contingent fact, and (3) the harmonious co-functioning of faculties is possible only on the ground of a "discordant harmony" of faculties. Before exposing each of these problems individually, first it would be helpful to explain what Deleuze understands by the term "recognition." Deleuze defines recognition as "the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or conceived" (DR 133). Each faculty – sensibility, understanding, imagination, memory, and reason – has its own particular given and way of relating to it. The faculty of perception, for instance, is bound to the present. It can relate to its object (the sensible beings) only insofar as the latter is here and now. However, memory does not require this. Instead, it requires its object (temporally structured representations) to be self-identical through time. As for imagination, it needs none of these two but rather requires its object (representations insofar as they can be associated with other representations according to certain rules) to be able to be associated with other representations. Understanding, on the other hand, requires its object (representations in so far as they are determinable by categories) to be determinable by various categories (quality, quantity, modality etc.). Recognition, however, indicates harmonious cooperation of all these faculties on a supposed identical object.[37] In other words, one of the indispensable conditions for the recognition of an object is that all the faculties can potentially take the object of another faculty as its object in a free and spontaneous manner. Recognition in so far as it

[37] "An object is recognized … when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate to their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object" (DR 133).

indicates the harmonious collaboration of all faculties assures the communicability of sense by founding the ground of *common* sense.[38] If we recognize an apple, in principle and ideally, we can recall it at a later time, we can imagine using it in a cake; we can discern its qualities by using certain concepts and so on. In all these cases, it is the *identical* apple we think of. In this case, the recognition of the apple is grounded on (1) different faculties' potentiality for functioning in agreement and (2) the identity of the object communicated among faculties. In the Kantian picture, as we will see, the (1) is presupposed since experience would be impossible without the harmonious co-functioning of different faculties, while the (2) is guaranteed by *the "I think" structure*. Before undertaking a thorough inquiry concerning these central pillars of the model of recognition, let me also note that Deleuze's point here is not that we must do away with the concept of recognition or representation or that we must discard it from our philosophical explanation of thought. Instead, his arguments are leveled against the philosophical positions which take recognition and representation as a primordial principle through which what there is to be understood about thinking can be brought into the light. It is not that Deleuze denies the actuality of recognition or that objects and subjects have identities. It is simply that these are secondary; they are the effect of a more profound nexus of relations.

2. First Problem: The "I think" as a Grounding Principle of Recognition

In the Kantian model of recognition, the form of the "I think" serves as a grounding principle (following Michael Rohlf (2020), we can call it Kant's principle of apperception) for the model of recognition in so far as it enables the congruent co-working of faculties. As Kant famously puts it, "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me" (CPR B132).[39] This means that indeterminate intuitions become determinate representations when the manifold of

[38] See KCP 21-24. Deleuze notes, "'Common sense' is a dangerous phrase, strongly tinged with empiricism. It must not therefore be defined as a special 'sense' (a particular empirical faculty). It designates, on the contrary, an *a priori* accord of faculties, or more precisely the 'result' of such an accord. … Knowledge implies a common sense, without which it would not be communicable and could not claim universality." We should also note three different common senses according to the interest of the legislating faculty: speculative common sense when the legislative faculty is understanding, moral common sense when the legislative faculty is reason, and aesthetic common sense when there is no particular legislative faculty but free and undetermined harmony of faculties (DI 57, 60).
[39] Cf. (CPR B137).

intuition is combined and determined as the transcendental subject links it to "I think." Thus, "I think," as the form of spontaneity of the transcendental subject, is the condition of production of any representation (Deleuze 1978). In that regard, the "I think," insofar as it guarantees the unity of all representations and their synthesis, can be considered as the condition of any thought. Hence, it is the "I think" that grounds the concert of all faculties and their consensus on the identity of the object they communicate to each other.[40]

According to Deleuze, "when Kant puts rational theology into question, *in the same stroke* he introduces a kind of disequilibrium, a fissure or crack in the pure self of the 'I think'" (DR 58, original italic). The fissure Deleuze talks about pertains to the impossibility of an immediate relation between the self and the act of synthesis. The self cannot have immediate knowledge of itself but only as it appears or is given to itself (CPR B158). In other words, "I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of determination" (CPR158n; cf B407, B155-56). As Lord (2012, 92, original italic) aptly puts it, in the case of the self's intuition of itself, determination is "a matter of *producing* my being by internally differentiating it from my thinking. … the 'I think' generates itself from its own differential relation to itself." This means that the self cannot be its own spontaneity. It cannot have an immediate relationship with itself. Instead, it can only represent itself as being so, as spontaneous. According to Kant, this self-intuition is bound to happen within time; that is, *the self can determine its existence only as it is given in time*. He contends,

> *The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required, which is* grounded in an a priori given form, *i.e.*, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable. (CPR B157, emphasis is mine)

This essential split between the empirical ego (intuiting self) and the transcendental subject indicates that the transcendental subject is itself a passive subject produced within time. In other words, the transcendental subject has to intuit itself in time, thus, it can discover itself only thanks to its effects produced in time, through auto-affection happening within time. Hence, it would be inadequate to treat the transcendental

[40] "Namely, this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis [through I think]" (CPR B133).

subject as a locus of sheer activity or undisturbed spontaneity that can even determine its own existence. As Deleuze puts it, "The activity of thought applies to … a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, … which lives it like an Other within itself" (DR 86). The transcendental subject's activity of externally applying the categories to the content given in intuition, according to Deleuze, is derivative when we consider its passive constitution in time. For this reason, the transcendental subject must be characterized as a fractured I, rather than an actor of unmediated spontaneity. Thus, the transcendental cogito that grounds the harmonious cooperation of faculties must be seen as a process of the generation of an Other in time, a self-differing before being a locus of sheer identity. Hence, as we will see in chapter five, what Deleuze marks as one of the great discoveries of Kant's transcendental philosophy is that the being of thought itself attests to thought's differing from itself as it is bound to occur within time. According to Deleuze, this movement of self-differing that traverses all acts of intuiting is an inherent characteristic of thought, which amounts to difference in itself, a difference which precedes and escapes all the mediation coming with concepts and representations. Hence, the Kantian "I think," which is supposed to guarantee the unity of the transcendental subject, is fundamentally a fractured I, an I split through the pure line of time. Deleuze's point in the analysis of the fractured I is that when we push Kant's philosophy to its logical consequences, it carries within itself the seeds for its own transformation. Time as the empty form of difference undercuts the ideal of the identity of the transcendental subject that is supposed to ground it.[41]

3. Second Problem: Modelling the Transcendental After the Empirical

The model of recognition, at least as Kant delineates it, is tainted by a more serious problem that occupies a central place in Deleuze's opposition to it. Two central questions Deleuze poses to the Kantian model of recognition are these: What are the transcendental conditions of the givenness of the given? That is, what makes something determinable or sensible in the first place? How can thought come to determine what is totally different from it? Secondly, when Kant argues that experience

[41] According to Deleuze, it is precisely the introduction of the form of time by Kant into thought as such that marks "the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy" that constitutes the transcendental dimension of his philosophical stance, i.e., "transcendental empiricism" (DR 87). I will return to this point in chapter five.

would be impossible without the a priori structures of the transcendental subject, does he not presuppose the *fact* of experience and build the transcendental upon this contingent fact? What entitles us to extract a universality and necessity from a given, i.e., contingent, and actual experience, viz., the necessity regarding not only what thought *is right now* but what thought *can be at all* (a leap from *de facto* to *de jure*)? These questions, to a large extent, are inspired by one of the early critics of Kant's transcendental philosophy, a shrewd Spinozist and one of Deleuze's central sources, Salomon Maimon.[42]

In chapter two of his *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy*, Maimon (2010) levels two main criticisms against Kant's transcendental philosophy. The first criticism concerns the relationship between sensibility and concepts. The question Maimon (2010, 37–38) asks is, "How can the understanding submit something (the given object) to its power (to its rules) that is not in its power"? That is, how can intuitions and concepts, having completely heterogeneous natures, come to an agreement? How are pure a priori concepts to be applied to the matter of sense? The second criticism Maimon levels against Kant concerns the transcendental conditions of transcendental idealism itself. Namely, the question Maimon poses is what are the transcendental conditions of transcendental idealism itself (Lord 2011, 108)? Kant proves the objective validity of categories on the ground that *experience would be impossible without them* (Maimon 2010, 100). Hence, the main concern of Kant is this: We have before us an actual experience, so how can we account for the conditions that make this *experience* possible? This way, the validity and necessity of categories are predicated on the actuality of experience, which is merely a contingent fact. In other words, Kant presupposes *the fact of experience* simply because of the actuality of experience. Whence the necessity of the transcendental is fallaciously grounded on a contingent

[42] Kant seems to show great respect to Maimon. In one of his letters, he (1999, 311–12) says, "not only none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Herr Maimon does, but also very few men possess so much acumen for such deep investigations as he." For a useful exposition of the key ideas of Maimon, see the section on Maimon in (Lord 2011). On the relationship between Deleuze and Maimon, see (Jones 2009; Smith 2012, 65–69). It also bears noting that much of Deleuze's knowledge of Maimon comes from Martial Gueroult's book *La Philosophie transcendantale de Salomon Maïmon* dating 1929.

empirical ground. Thus, Maimon accuses Kant for presupposing the *fact* of experience without establishing it.[43]

Following Maimon's first critique, Deleuze argues that by viewing sensibility and understanding as having totally different natures and linking them only externally, Kant simply reproduces the old idea of pre-established harmony between the object and subject on the transcendental level of faculties differing in nature. In other words, though Kant rebukes the idea of a pre-established accord between subject and object by demonstrating how the object is constituted through *a priori* structures of understanding, he seems to transpose the idea of harmony to the register of faculties which differ in nature (KCP 22). Deleuze maintains,

> *[I]n order to explain how passive sensibility accords with active understanding, Kant invokes the synthesis and the schematism of the imagination which is applicable a priori to the forms of sensibility in conformity with concepts. But in this way the problem is merely shifted: for the imagination and the understanding themselves differ in nature, and the accord between these two active faculties is no less 'mysterious' (likewise the accord between understanding and reason)* (KCP 22).

Kant's transcendental system requires an account of the immanent genesis of faculties in order to solve this problem and become properly transcendental. In other words, we need to determine the condition under which intuition or sensibility is itself possible.

For Deleuze, the second critique of Maimon leads us to shift our focus from the question of the conditions of the possibility of the given to the question of how the given is given. Kant traces the transcendental after the empirical by assuming the empirical and contingent fact of experience and finding the transcendental conditions of experience in this contingent and empirical domain. In this picture, what is necessary and transcendental depend upon what is contingent and empirical. What is supposed to condition is itself conditioned upon what it is supposed to condition. According to Deleuze, the "vicious circle which makes the condition refer to the conditioned" causes Kant's transcendental project to remain in the bounds of empiricism (LS 105). Deleuze, instead, argues that in order to liberate the

[43] In a letter to Marcus Herz (Kant 1999, 313–14), who sent a copy of Maimon's *Essay* to Kant in order to request from him a recommendation for the book, Kant summarizes the criticisms Maimon leveled against his philosophy and replies to them. However, it is hard to decide whether Kant really responds to Maimon's criticisms in this letter. He seems to simply reiterate the main arguments of *Critique of Pure Reason* in a way that suggest Kant regarded the track followed by Maimon as impertinent to his own transcendental project. Lord (2011, 109) and Deleuze (KCP 23) maintain that it is possible that Kant felt the exigency of Maimon's criticisms and tried to answer them in the *Critique of Judgement*.

transcendental from its unjustified empirical hinges, we need to explain how the given is given, conditions under which sensibility itself is possible. Thus, we can say that with Deleuze, the Kantian transcendental question of how the given can be given to a subject is transformed into a more profound transcendental question, that is, how can the given be given as such?[44] As a consequence, one of the fatal problems tainting the account of thinking based on the Kantian model of recognition is it is based on a fallacious model of making the condition itself depend on what is to be conditioned.

4. Third Problem: The Limit-Objects and the Harmony of Faculties

How is the spontaneous accord of the heterogeneous faculties possible? In the Kantian picture, an agreement obtains among the faculties according to the interest of particular legislating faculty; that is, the faculties take on determined tasks under the direction of one determining faculty (DI 57). For instance, the faculty of sensibility and understanding enter into harmonious accord under the legislation of understanding according to the speculative interest. In the practical interest, faculties of understanding and reason enter into an accord under the legislation of reason. But in these two, the agreement among faculties is a determinate one. The accord is made possible by one determining faculty's binding the others in a determinate relation. However, as I have pointed out above, *in order not to reproduce a presupposed harmony between the subject and the object on the transcendental level of faculties*, the harmony of faculties must presuppose, at a deeper level, that faculties are capable of *free* and *indeterminate* accord (KCP 24). As Deleuze puts it, "The faculties would never enter into an agreement that is fixed or determined by one of themselves, if to begin with, they were not in themselves and spontaneously capable of an indeterminate agreement, a free harmony…" (DI 58). In the letter to Marcus Herz in which Kant responds to Maimon's criticisms, Kant (1999, 314) appeals to the idea of "divine creator" when it comes to explain the question of the origin and the accord between different faculties. He maintains,

> *If we wanted to make judgements about their origin [the origin of understanding and sensibility] – an investigation that of course lies wholly beyond the limits of human*

[44] "And, in fact, Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis. We require a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories: what are the forces of reason and of the understanding?" (NP 91).

> *reason – we could name nothing beyond our divine creator; once they are given, however, we are fully able to explain their power of making a priori judgments (that is, the quid juris)*.

However, Deleuze maintains that Kant's philosophy shows us a path to such a genetic account of the faculties, but this path is not pursued by Kant himself. Here I will not go into the details of Deleuze's interpretation. Instead, what I aim to do here will be to explain the essential idea Deleuze obtains from his reading of Kant and the reason why he thinks that it undercuts the model of recognition.

What is significant in the Kantian genetic account of the faculties – to the extent that leads Deleuze to frequently make use of it – is the idea of *excess* or *limit*.[45] According to Deleuze, in the *Critique of Judgment*, we find an account of how each faculty encounters that which surpasses it from the standpoint of its empirical use, i.e., its "limit object" (DR 146): the imperceptible in sensibility, the unimaginable in imagination, the unthought in thought. In the analytic of the sublime, for instance, the imagination encounters what is unimaginable and calls for reason to grasp it. It is this idea of being carried to the *limit* that is crucial for Deleuze. In his interpretation of the relationship between other faculties, the guiding insight remains the same: Thought encounters *a limit-object, which it cannot properly think of, but has to think it as a limit*. Thought finds within itself something that it cannot think of. But it must think it in so far as it is unthinkable. "There is something here in thought which testifies to a limit of thought, but on the basis of which it thinks" (DR 184). The faculties are faced with an absolute limit, to which they can do nothing but relate.

Deleuze thinks that "Kant was the first to provide the example of such a discordant harmony" (DR 146). However, in Kant's philosophy, the discordant harmony among

[45] Deleuze frequently makes use of the idea of discordant harmony among faculties in his early work (DR 140,146, 193; PS 98-99; D 24). It also bears noting that this idea of excess, non-relationality, and productive singularity is one of the central themes of the second half of 20th-century French philosophy. Hallward (2003) meticulously traces the continuity of these themes in the work of Michael Henry, Levinas, Deleuze, Badiou, Laruelle, and other French philosophers of the 20th century. He propounds that all these philosophers, in one way or another, share a tendency for a radical refusal of representation and mediation. That which exceeds one's power of grasping attests to an original or primordial truth subversive of representational structures which are totalizing and hierarchizing. This ungraspable or singular truth generally gives rise to a rejection of relationality in favor of a non-relational conception of thought and the real. Likewise, Gary Gutting (2011), in his substantial work on the history of French philosophy after the 60s, also argues thinking the impossible or thinking the limit has been the main concern and ultimate horizon of French philosophy since the 1960s. Though Hallward's tracing of these continuities is very helpful for contextualizing Deleuze's thought, as I will argue in chapters four and five, his treatment of Deleuze is far from being acceptable.

faculties serves for the solidification of the primacy of representation (DR 87). Hence, Deleuze's strategy can be seen as taking up the Kantian initiative and giving it new direction alien to the Kantian use of it. As it will be also evident in chapter five, this idea of *limit-object* plays a central role in Deleuze's metaphysics and his construction of a non-dogmatic speculative philosophy. The limit-object is not given as an object of thought, but rather it is given as a problem, or as an Idea. He argues, "… for reason to experience a problem, in its own domain, there must be a domain that escapes reason, putting it initially into question" (ES 33). Each faculty experiences a problem in so far as it is exposed to that which escapes it. The discovery of thought's internal differing within *time* and thought's exposure to a limit-object under the form of an Idea plays a central role in Deleuze's attempt to thematize the idea of the difference in itself in particular and construct his metaphysical position in general without appealing to a dogmatic footing. Explaining the term Idea will occupy our next task in this chapter, which, as we will see in chapter five, will play a core role in Deleuze's understanding of thinking and his construction of a non-dogmatic speculative philosophy.

5. Theory of Ideas and Tripartite Ontology

By the term Idea, Deleuze does not simply mean an opinion or any form of mental representation, be it in the form of words or images that stand for some entities that the mind relates to. Instead, what he has in mind is the original meaning of this word, as we find it in the works of Plato, Kant, and Hegel. In order to understand Deleuze's theory of Ideas, we need to have a brief look at Kant's theory of Ideas, from which Deleuze benefits greatly. According to Kant, an Idea of reason is a fabricated totality furnished by reason which can never be given in experience, such as "pure earth, pure water, pure air" (CPR A645–6/B673–4). There can be no literal object corresponding to those Ideas. But Ideas are no mere illusions or hypothetical creations of reason. Instead, they have an indispensable regulative role, for "we interrogate nature in accordance with these Ideas, and consider our knowledge defective as long as it is not adequate to them" (*Ibid*). In this respect, for Kant, an Idea is "*a problem without any solution*" (CPR B384, emphasis is mine). For "An object outside experience can be represented only in problematic form" (DR 169). The objects of Ideas can neither be given in experience nor be known through the employment of the concepts of understanding. But nonetheless, reason represents them without being able to

determine them. In other words, we can never have an intuition of the World as a totality, but what reveals itself in the Idea of the World is causality as a problematic, the fact that reason can causally link different objects of experience to infinity. In this respect, it is this problem that is the true object of the Idea of the World. Deleuze follows this Kantian claim that the real object of Ideas are problems qua problems; thus, he gives us *the first definition of Ideas: Ideas are problems*.[46]

Though Deleuze's theory of Ideas follows Kant's theory of Ideas in its outline, as Daniel Smith (2012, 123) rightly notes, Deleuze thinks that "Kant had not pushed to the limit the 'immanent' ambitions of his own theory of Ideas." He accuses Kant of leaving different dimensions of the Idea external to each other; that is, instead of seeing the undetermined, the determinable, and the determined as different moments of the same structure, he separates and leaves them external to each other. In Kant, while Ideas themselves are undetermined, they become "determinable only in relation to objects of experience, and bear the ideal of determination only in relation to the concepts of understanding" (DR 170). However, as I have pointed out above, in so far as the relationship between sensibility and understanding remains an external linkage, different dimensions of an Idea, i.e., the undetermined (sensible matter) and the determined (representations) remain external to each other as well. Precisely for leaving the undetermined, the determinable, and the determined external to each other, Deleuze accuses Kant's project of the critique of involving too much empiricism and not being transcendental enough (DR 170). As for Deleuze, he defines an Idea as "an internal problematic objective unity of the undetermined, the determinable and determination" (DR 170). That is, an Idea involves three distinct but inseparable dimensions, i.e., the undetermined, the determinable, and the determined in an immanent fashion. Deleuze's theory of Ideas aims to solve the problem of the relationship between heterogeneous spheres, viz. sensibility and understanding, by giving an account of the Idea as an immanent inclusion of the undetermined, determinable and the determined. Hence, we can say that Deleuze seeks an account of a purely immanent determination of Ideas in contrast to the Kantian theory of Ideas that defines two of the three dimensions of Ideas extrinsically. When viewed as an immanent structure involving these three moments together, the Idea becomes truly genetic. As it will be clear in chapter four and five, the immanent inclusion of the

[46] ".. problems are Ideas" (DR 168). Also see (DR 162, 169).

undetermined, determinable and the determined means that undetermined (sensible) becomes determined (representations) within *time* as the pure form of the determinable. That is, it is the pure form of time as the form of the determinable that allows Deleuze to bridge the gap between the sensible and the understanding, the undetermined and the determined. The relationship between the undetermined and the determined becomes *an immanent movement occurring within time* rather than an external linkage.

Deleuze tags the undetermined as pre-individual singularities or pure differences. They are pre-individual because they designate that which gives rise to individuals. What makes them singularities is that they are not yet related to individuated entities, i.e., not yet determined.[47] They are pure differences because they do not have a prior identity that makes their relationship to other elements possible. With this terminological choice, Deleuze does not imply that pre-individual singularities are existents in themselves, but that without reciprocal relationship with other elements, they are mere singularities. It is merely unmeaningful to stake them out as individual existents. It is the reciprocal relationship between pre-individual singularities that makes them *determinable*. In other words, the undetermined pre-individual singularities become determinable when they enter into reciprocal relationships. What makes them determined, in turn, is the relationship between different domains or groups of singularities. Thus, the Idea is composed of the complex relationships among those pre-individual singularities. This brings us to the *second definition of the Idea*: *Ideas are complexes of relations or multiplicities*.[48] The pre-individual singularities and their reciprocal relationships have a virtual state of existence, meaning that they are real but not actual, where the actual state of existence refers to empirical diversity of things. In this sense, the virtual liaisons or complexes of relations are genetic elements, out of which the register of actual events comes to be.

To explain the immanent involvement of the undetermined, the determinable and the determinate, Deleuze also appeals to the mathematical model of calculus. It bears noting that the mathematical model of calculus is just a tool to demonstrate one way

[47] "Singularity should not be understood as something opposing the universal but any element that can be extended to the proximity of another such that it may obtain a connection" (TRM 350).
[48] "Problematic Ideas are not simple essences, but multiplicities or complexes of relations and corresponding singularities" (DR 163).

of conceiving and making sense of the problematic unity of the undetermined, determinable and the determined.[49] As we will see in chapter four and five, the differential model allows Deleuze to create a truly immanent conception of temporality such that Ideas are nothing but one's exposure to time itself. Thus, when Deleuze says that "dx is the Idea" (DR 171), he does not mean that all Ideas are mathematical. Instead, the mathematical model of calculus gives us one appropriate way of understanding the Idea structure. Thus, calculus is neither the only mathematical expression of problems (DR 179), nor the ground of other Ideas. As we will see, the Ideas, in so far as they are the structure of the real, can be biological, social, physical Ideas, and so on.

To begin with, what is important for Deleuze in calculus is that it enables us to conceive how the undetermined magnitudes (dx, dy) become determinable as they enter into a reciprocal relationship (dx/dy), and become completely determined when we consider the elements in a neighboring field (the values of dx/dy). For instance, let the differential symbol of dx define the instantaneous change in a continuous magnitude, such as the change of acceleration (the rate of change in the velocity over a period of time) of a car. When it is understood this way, the value of dx cannot be determined. That is, it is *undetermined* (also note that dx does not have to exist for all points). In order for dx to be determinable, at least two things, the instantaneous change in velocity (let's symbolize it by dy) and time (let's symbolize it by dt) must be put into reciprocal determination. Only by virtue of this *reciprocal determination* (DR 172), dx becomes *determinable*. And when we take a certain period of time and the change of velocity during that time, the dx becomes completely determined. What is essential for Deleuze in this mathematical model is that in it, terms (dx, dy, dt etc.) do not exist independently of each other, but relations between them exists independently of the terms (dx/dy). Each term that is needed to determine the instantaneous change in the acceleration exists only in relation to another. These elements (dx, dy taken individually) have no independent existence or prior identity but are only in a

[49] See (DR 179, 183-4). We can discern Ideas of different registers and milieus, such as biological Ideas, social Ideas, or biological Ideas. (DR 184-186, 193): "The same could be said for other Ideas or multiplicities: the psychic multiplicities of imagination and phantasy, the biological multiplicities of vitality and 'monstrosity', the physical multiplicities of sensibility and sign." (DR 193). James Williams (2003, 145) also rightly warns that Deleuze's example of calculus does not intend to show that all problems are mathematical and are solvable given certain mathematical calculations. It is quite the reverse, it is problems that constitute the mathematical Ideas.

reciprocal relationship with other elements. Smith (2012, 83) gives an excellent summary of these points:

> *In the calculus, the differential relation can be said to be a pure relation; it is a relation that persists even when its terms disappear, and it thus provides Deleuze with an example of what he calls the concept of* difference-in-itself. *Normally, we think of difference as a relation between two things that have a prior identity ("x is different from y"). With the notion of the differential relation, Deleuze takes the concept of difference to a properly transcendental level; the differential relation is not only* external *to its terms (Bertrand Russell's empiricist dictum), but it also* determines *its terms.*

At this point, the theory of Ideas, with all the terminology concerning pre-individual singularities and genetic elements, might seem arcane and quite obscure. In order to make sense of these ideas and to see the real significance of the theory of Ideas, we need to expound on the relationship between Ideas and time, which will occupy us in chapter five. The notion of differential relations will also be at the core of Deleuze's understanding of time. But, before doing this, we need to first look at a central problem that concerns any theory of thought, and Deleuze's theory in particular.

CHAPTER 3

THOUGHT AND NECESSITY: THREE READINGS OF DELEUZE

Overview

In this chapter, I discuss a fundamental problem that any theory of thought must confront, which is thought's relationship with necessity. The question is whether thinking can give us something necessary and unconditional, either a principle or an entity, and if it can, by what right? What is at stake in this question is no less than the philosophical value of Deleuze's own theory of thought itself. If thinking as an absolutely contingent process cannot guarantee the necessity of its own productions, it remains an open question why we need to hold Deleuze's theory of thought rather than some other theories. After laying out this problem, I will present three main strategies used by the commentators in the literature in responding to this question. These strategies also amount to three different ways of interpreting Deleuze's philosophy (at least his metaphysics). I will dub these approaches rationalist, irrationalist, and critical speculative readings and argue that a non-dogmatic speculative position which, roughly, means that Deleuze makes claims regarding the real while at the same time taking into account limiting conditions of knowledge, characterizes his position best. However, current scholarship on Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative position fails to combine his metaphysics with his philosophy of time. This lack shall determine the task of the next two chapters.

1. The Problem of Thinking and Necessity

As Smith (2012, 72) rightly points out, one of the crucial problems any theory of thought must confront is the question concerning thought's potentiality for reaching the domain of the real or thought's relation with the real. The question is, "How can thought leave [its] meager sphere of the possible in order to think the real: that is, to think existence itself, to think existing things?" Can thought have anything to say about reality beyond its givenness to sentient subjects? How can thought get out of its concepts and logical principles and access the real? In other words, by what right can

thought productions be necessary? Here, by the term necessary, I understand what is unconditional, that is, what pertains to the real in itself as it is not dependent upon a subject. Besides their far-reaching significance for the philosophy of thinking in general, it should also be clear that these questions are of key importance for Deleuze's theory of thought in particular: If the productions of thinking rely on a contingent process of becoming, does not Deleuze's own philosophy become a mere useful fiction? In other words, when Deleuze argues that all thoughts arise from contingent encounters, he gives this particular claim a status that makes it apply universally and necessarily to all thoughts. Thus, this particular thought production or claim seems to be no more contingent but necessary claim. But by what right Deleuze can argue this, while his position allows us even to have a contingent encounter where we are led to think "no thoughts arise from contingent encounters."[50] In Deleuze's theory of thought, how can thinking, as an absolutely contingent process, provide us with something necessary? If thinking itself is a contingent process in the making, what authorizes Deleuze to assert something real and necessary about the nature of thinking? Why should we believe Deleuze's claims rather than take his claim as mere fiction?

Besides this problem, remember Deleuze (2007, 41–42) blatantly regards himself as a "pure metaphysician." This description seems accurate as Deleuze's theory of thought can also be regarded as an adamant reprise of some traditional metaphysical questions concerning the ultimate nature of reality, the foundation of knowledge and representation, and the relationship between subject and object. But how are we to make sense of Deleuze the metaphysician who has something to say about ultimate reality, if all that thought can furnish us remains within the boundaries of its exiguous contingent creations? If thinking does not have a natural affinity for truth, and its productions cannot be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity, what kind of reasons can we have to endorse Deleuze's own claims on thought? In this respect, it is not an exaggeration to say that what is at stake in the relationship between the real and thought is not only Deleuze's theory of thought but also the whole metaphysical aspect of Deleuze's philosophy. If we take a broad survey of the many ways that scholars have addressed this contentious problem in Deleuze's philosophy, I think we can discern at least three general approaches that are often taken, which can be correlated to three basic ways of understanding Deleuze's metaphysics. A cluster of interpretations, which

[50] I am grateful to Corry Shores for helping me to better formulate this point.

I will dub rationalist readings, align Deleuze with the pre-Kantian dogmatist metaphysical tradition and argue that the question of thought's capacity for producing necessary creations is, at best, an impertinent issue to Deleuze's overall philosophy. These interpretations generally view Deleuze as a vulgar metaphysician talking unreservedly and dogmatically about the fundamental structure of reality by rejuvenating scholastic philosophical concepts. However, as my exposition of Deleuze's theory of thought up to this point shows, the rationalist readings are detrimentally flawed since Deleuze is far from being negligent of the exigencies of the Kantian critique of metaphysics. Thus, we cannot take him as a traditional metaphysician. Another line of interpretations, which I call irrationalist readings, holds that Deleuze's philosophy is non-absolutist and anti-metaphysical. These readings, which have strong textual support, mainly argue that Deleuze is an anti-metaphysician; that is, he subverts the traditional image of philosophy as a path to absolute truths. Though the irrationalist readings are more adequate to the spirit of Deleuze's philosophy compared to the rationalist readings, they remain incapable of satisfactorily explaining the metaphysical aspect of Deleuze's philosophy, which doubtless constitutes a nonnegligible dimension of his thinking. More recently, a middle-way reading between these two, which I shall call non-dogmatic speculative readings, is proposed. By "speculative," I understand any position which has something to say about reality, which has a claim on a form of the absolute. By "dogmatic," I understand a position that does not take into account the conditions and bounds that thought and knowledge are subject to. Thus, a position that takes account of those limits and conditions can be seen as "critical." The critical speculative interpretations suggest that Deleuze, as an all-too-critical philosopher of the post-Kantian era, creates a non-dogmatic speculative philosophy while fully embracing the Kantian rejection of the dogmatic metaphysical absolute based on intellectual intuition. Deleuze's philosophy is speculative in so far as it has something to say about the real. But it is at the same time non-dogmatic since it is sensitive to the exigencies of critical philosophy; that is, it takes into consideration the limitations of the subject and thinking. Hence, non-dogmatic speculative readings maintain that Deleuze does metaphysics, but in a very particular way.

I will argue that the critical speculative readings provide us with the most satisfactory account of Deleuze's metaphysical position. My task in the next two chapters will be

to reconstruct Deleuze's critical speculative metaphysical position by taking into consideration one of the dire shortcomings of the interpretations present in the literature, which is the relationship between time and Deleuze's speculative philosophy. In other words, I will bring together the idea of the disruptive forces of the future and the notion of the Idea as the structure of the real through an analysis of the concept of time as it figures in Deleuze's speculative philosophy. In order to bring these two seemingly incongruous aspects of Deleuze's philosophy together, we need to explain the central role of time in Deleuze's critical speculative philosophy itself. This will also allow us to see that it is precisely the simultaneity of those two seemingly conflicting aspects that constitute the very originality of Deleuze's speculative philosophy and philosophy of thinking.

2. Rationalist Readings

One of the salient themes of the rationalist readings is the image of Deleuze as a pre-Kantian philosopher and a traditional metaphysical materialist; that is, a follower of Spinozian or Leibnizian thinking on such themes as causality, substance, and matter. Voiced vehemently by both some of his fervent critics (Badiou 2000; Hallward 2006) and his most ardent readers (Hardt 1993), this claim is used both to attack and defend Deleuze's philosophical project. Badiou's (2000, 45) presentation of Deleuze as a pre-critical or classical thinker obviously plays a central role in his critique of the latter for propagating a vulgar vitalism and a philosophy of the One.[51] By relying on Deleuze's persistent use of pre-Kantian philosophers such as Leibniz and Spinoza, his constant critique of Kant, and his belief in the "self-evident legitimacy of immediate intellectual intuition," Hallward (2006, 73–74) also claims that Deleuze "consistently presents himself as a non- or even pre- rather than neo-Kantian thinker," thus, "Deleuze's work is best read as a renewal or radicalization of the affirmative naturalism he celebrates in the work of Spinoza and Leibniz in particular" (*Ibid*, 12).

[51] "[W]e can state that Deleuze's philosophy, like my own, moreover, is resolutely classical. And, in this context, classicism is relatively easy to define. Namely: may be qualified as classical any philosophy that does not
submit to the critical injunctions of Kant" (Badiou 2000, 45). In another place, Badiou argues "Deleuze's idea of the event would have had to convince him to follow Spinoza to the end … and convince him to name 'God' the unique Event in which becomings are diffracted" (Badiou 2007, 41). It is true that Deleuze once calls himself a "classical philosopher" (TRM 361). However, given the context, this description is far from being a support for Hallward's claim.

A similar strategy also animates Michael Hardt's reading of Deleuze in his *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, but this time, his aim is not to criticize but to make sense of Deleuze's metaphysical position. Hardt (1993, xix) argues that "Deleuze does not announce the end of metaphysics, but on the contrary, seeks to rediscover the most coherent and lucid plane of metaphysical thought." Though this much goes without doubt, to support his interpretation, Hardt unreservedly aligns Deleuze's philosophy with the scholastic thinking on being. He believes that Deleuze's idea of the productivity of being is best understood through the scholastic manner of ontological reasoning and the criteria this philosophy establishes for such reflection (*Ibid*, 125). This attempt at understanding Deleuze as a kind of continuation of the scholastic terminology is maintained throughout Hardt's book through discussions on, for instance, causality (*Ibid*, 8, 17), and the substance-mode distinction (*Ibid*, 15).

3. Irrationalist Readings

In contrast to the image of Deleuze as a pre-Kantian neo-Spinozist, another image in the literature portrays him as a ruthless anti-metaphysician. According to this image, it is an error to think that Deleuze's philosophy aims to provide us with unchangeable, ultimate, and eternal truths about the real. Instead, the whole point of his philosophy is to show that such an explanation can never be attained, since Deleuze's philosophy is ultimately a philosophy of groundlessness. Namely, its main point is to show that we cannot arrive at a metaphysical ground to explain things, since reality in itself is chaotic, unruly, and always disruptive of orders. We cannot give necessary explanations for what happens as they come out of pure chance, as the future is completely independent of our conceptions and understanding of the world. The earth is "permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles" (ATP 40). In this picture, there is no point in trying to evaluate the outputs of thinking according to criteria such as truth or falsity. The criteria to be used to evaluate the thought productions are whether they are remarkable, significant, or whether they are life affirming or not.[52] In Deleuze, thus, the idea of unchanging truth is replaced by the idea of the genuineness and effectiveness of creation. If the products of thought cannot

[52] As Deleuze puts it, "Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure" (WP 55, see TRM 238).

have a claim on necessity and some form of truth, and if the sole criteria to select among them is their significance, remarkability, or whether they are life affirming or not, then we can say that thought, in its highest potentiality, is a creative interpretation. And what should make us hold Deleuze's conception of thinking rather than the representational or homological conception of thinking is that the former is more life affirming, or gives us a more remarkable and "thought provoking" account of thinking. Two of the emblematic examples of irrationalist readings are François Zourabichvili (2012) and David Lapoujade (2017).

The term occupying the central place in Lapoujade's reading can also be seen as one of the core themes of irrationalist reading: aberrant movements. An aberrant movement is a movement that disrupts a given order. We encounter this idea under different conceptual guises in Deleuze's oeuvre: deterritorialization, becoming-other, powers of the false, the falsifier, demonic forces of the future, and so on.[53] Lapoujade argues that Deleuze does away with the model of recognition and judgment taken as the primary point of reference and beginning for a philosophical investigation, since judgment and recognition creates illusionary hierarchies, which Deleuze replaces with the non-illusionary reality of chaotic forces (Lapoujade 2017, 73). In this reading, the new "image of thought is the 'schizophrenia in principle'" (*Ibid*, 74). Lapoujade (2017, 27, original emphasis) even gives "a preliminary definition of Deleuze's philosophy": "*An irrational logic of aberrant movements.*"

Lapoujade's interpretation follows Zourabichvili's classical work *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event* in a very central problem. Zourabichvili makes a distinction between irrationalism and illogicism. He (2012, 57, 170) argues that even though Deleuze is an irrationalist (we cannot give any *reason* for what will come about), he is not an illogicist.[54] One of the principal features distinguishing illogicism from the irrationalism is that the latter does not imply that everything is possible. In other words, the advocates of irrationalism, in contrast to illogicism, hold that what can happen is limited by certain logical rules. However, "Logic doesn't mean rational. We could even say that for Deleuze, a movement is all the more logical, the more it escapes rationality. The more irrational, the more aberrant, and yet the more logical. It is like

[53] I expound on these ideas in chapter five.
[54] Lapoujade also emphasizes this point. He believes that "Deleuze is above all a logician and all his books are 'Logics'" (Lapoujade 2017, 26).

Dostoyevsky's and Melville's characters: they can offer no reasons although they obey a commanding logic" (Lapoujade 2017, 27). Hence, this logic is "necessarily irrational, that challenges us to affirm chance" (Zourabichvili 2012, 57), a logic that "escapes all reason" (Lapoujade 2017, 27).

However, there is a crucial problem that not only Zourabichvili's and Lapoujade's readings but also any irrationalist reading must confront. This essential problem concerns the conditions of aberrant movements themselves. If what accounts for aberrant movements is the irrationalist *logic of forces* (Zourabichvili 2012, 69) or the logic of aberrant movements, what exactly is this logic? What are the rules of it, if it has any? Where does it get its intelligibility, logicality, and necessity? This problem of intelligibility and necessity gives a hard time to irrationalist readings. Lapoujade affirms that aberrant movements are not contingent. But by themselves, they cannot explain the necessity that they are subjected to. The question to be answered, hence, is "What logic do aberrant movements obey?" (Lapoujade 2017, 25, 27). But it is highly suspicious whether Lapoujade and Zourabichvili or any other advocate of irrationalist readings succeeds at providing a satisfactory or decisive answer to this essential question, which would require the transformation of some of the essential theses of the irrationalist reading.[55] As it will be clear in the next two chapters, in order to solve this problem, we must give a thorough analysis of the idiosyncratic relationship between truth and time, which will show us that Deleuze's metaphysics, in fact, affirms at once an intelligible speculative absolute and essential destructiveness of this speculative absolute. Paradoxically, this fundamental shortcoming in explaining the core idea of their interpretation cause the irrationalist readings of the kind Lapoujade foregrounds to remain in a dogmatic position. For, though it presents itself as anti-metaphysical, we can discern a dogmatic metaphysical claim lying on the basis of Lapoujade's irrationalist reading, as aberrant movements seem to play the role of a principle governing reality while not being accounted for but merely assumed.

[55] Corry Shores (2021), for instance, does this by providing a more nuanced reading of Deleuze's allegedly "irrational" logic. He argues that though "there is something more to Deleuze's philosophy that is not properly expressed using our available logical notions," that does not imply that we should totally give up any attempt at searching for a rational basis for Deleuze's logic from the start (*Ibid*, 12). In that respect, Shores propounds that many of the important basic principles of Deleuze's logic are "in fact entirely logical and rational, but only non-classically so" (*Ibid*, 4). Among non-classical logics, Shores argues that a many-valued logic is the best fit for Deleuze's logic.

4. Critical Speculative Readings

In rejecting Zourabichvili's (2012, 36) claim that Deleuze has no ontology either in the vulgar sense (saying something about the ultimate reality of the world) or in a more profound sense (the primacy of being over our knowledge of it, as in Heidegger), Constantin Boundas (2006, 27) gives a stark expression to what is at risk in irrationalist readings: if we do not hold that Deleuze has something to say about the real itself, we would have to reduce his ideas to the status of mere "useful fiction." However, Boundas's appeal to considering Deleuze as a metaphysician who has something to say about an ultimate reality does not necessarily mean reading him along with a pre-Kantian rationalist tradition, as rationalist readings do. In other words, it is possible that Deleuze propounds a speculative view without being dogmatic. Recently, some interpreters (Kerslake 2004; Bell 2006; Bryant 2008; Welchman 2009; Smith 2012, 72–88) have pursued this line of reading and argued that Deleuze's metaphysics consists in the idea of a non-dogmatic speculative absolute. A distinguishing feature of this group of interpreters is their shared effort to explain the unique place Deleuze occupies in post-Kantian European philosophy by focusing particularly on his convoluted relationship with Kant's critical philosophy. Those interpreters insist that it is a mistake to regard Deleuze's philosophy as a simple return to pre-critical metaphysics or as mere irrationalism. They maintain that Deleuze is a resolutely critical philosopher who was not only well aware of the advancement that the Kantian critique brought upon the dogmatic philosophical thinking but also that he sought to overcome the limitations that the latter brought about by not returning to dogmatic thinking.

All of these interpreters, each in their own way, argue that Deleuze propounds a non-dogmatic speculative position. As I will also propose a critical speculative reading in the next two chapters, my strategy here will not be to expose each of these brilliant analyses but instead incorporate them into my reconstruction of Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative position. However, my reconstruction will be shaped around an essential shortcoming in all of these works, which concerns the fundamental relationship between Deleuze's philosophy of time and his metaphysics. None of the above authors gives an exhaustive account of the crucial role of the problem of time in Deleuze's speculative philosophy. Even Bryant (2008), who is the one who takes

the issue of time most seriously in his interpretation of Deleuze's speculative philosophy, does not attempt to include a crucial aspect of Deleuze's philosophy of time that is advanced in the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition* and in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, that is, the disruptive powers of time, which are heavily used by irrationalist readings to support the idea that Deleuze is against any absolute. The approach I will advance in the next two chapters will show that these two aspects of Deleuze's philosophy, i.e., its speculative side and so-called irrationalist side, are not irreconcilable. In fact, they constitute the very originality of Deleuze's speculative position. Thus, the aim of what follows is to demonstrate that a close study of Deleuze's philosophy of time and its relationship with his metaphysics and philosophy of thinking reveals that Deleuze's metaphysics put forwards a unique idea of absolute, an absolute which is not eternal, a necessity which is open to the possibility of being destroyed, as I will call it, a *precarious necessity*.

Thus, in order to complete our treatise on Deleuze's theory of thinking, we need to show lastly the essential link between time and thinking. Studying this aspect of Deleuze's theory of thought will help us reconcile seemingly incongruous aspects of Deleuze's philosophy which, in the secondary literature, gave rise to conflicting interpretations of Deleuze's philosophy. As we will see in the next two chapters, time has two central roles in Deleuze's theory of thought. First, time, with its distinct dimensions, is the pure transcendental condition of the occurrence of any event, including the event of thinking, events of "subjectivation" and "objectivation." Being as such, time plays the role of the ground of things, events, and facts. Secondly, time indicates the process of "universal ungrounding" and the unbounded power of destruction, metamorphosis, and novelty; as such, time plays the role of the "falsifier," having the power to radically overturn everything and reduce all the things, events, and facts to the level of mere contingent occurrences waiting for their metamorphosis and destruction. When we bring together those two aspects of time, we reach the conclusion that thought can furnish us with necessary productions, necessary not in the sense of eternal but in the sense of well-grounded. In fact, as we will see, they are well-grounded upon the pure form of time, precisely the immutable form of what is not eternal. However, these well-grounded productions remain precarious, meaning that they remain open to being disrupted or destroyed in the future.

CHAPTER 4

THINKING OF TIME: DELEUZE'S SPECULATIVE TEMPORALISM

Overview

In this chapter, I reconstruct Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative metaphysics. Deleuze builds his speculative philosophy upon the "greatest initiative" of the Kantian critical philosophy, which is the introduction of the form of time into thought (DR 87). In that respect, Deleuze's speculative philosophy can be seen as an attempt at taking this Kantian initiative to its conclusions. Just as Kant redirects the term "synthetic" from its propositional philosophical origins to the metaphysical process of the real production of reality, Deleuze redirects the Kantian notion of time understood as "inner sense" to a pure transcendental condition of the real. Namely, in Deleuze, time, with its distinct dimensions, is raised to the status of a pure transcendental condition of all occurrences. In that regard, I will argue that Deleuze's metaphysical position can be characterized as speculative temporalism.

1. Deleuze and the Idea of Critique

Welchman's (2009, 31) characterization of Deleuze's general strategy in building his speculative philosophy is a particularly helpful one and deserves to be quoted fully:

> *Deleuze starts out from [the] Kantian insight into the possibility of a transcendental account of object production distinct from and presupposed by empirical (causal) production. But rather than taking this as an opportunity to redeploy the epistemic constraints that surround the transcendent onto the transcendental itself – a move characteristic of phenomenology – Deleuze takes it as an opportunity to offer a speculative metaphysical account of the production of objects of experience that rejects the categories of representation.*

But how does Deleuze do this? There are at least two fundamental difficulties that any such speculative philosophy is bound to confront: Given the finitude of the subject, by what right one can assert anything about reality in itself, which seems to require infinite intuition? And how can one remain critical while essentially disengaging the

real from the subject? That is, how can one remain critical while rejecting the primacy of the categories of representation?

As I have shown in chapter two, Deleuze criticizes Kant for tracing the transcendental from the empirical. When Kant presupposes the *fact* of experience and determines the conditions of possible experience according to this presumed fact, he makes the conditions depend on what they are supposed to account for, i.e., the conditioned. In that regard, Deleuze argues that the Kantian critique still includes too much empiricism. Phenomenology, according to Deleuze, goes no further in that regard. It uses the method of transcendental-phenomenological reduction and aims to bracket all the empirical and naturalistic assumptions to reach the originary self-givenness of experience, which amounts to reaching originary opinions, or *Urdoxa*. What is problematical in this method is that what is pertaining to the contingent structures of experience, viz., the empirical, is being raised into the transcendental level. In that respect, Deleuze's struggle to save philosophy from the realm of opinions can be regarded as an effort to not universalize or make transcendental what is truly empirical and contingent, i.e., an effort not to trace the transcendental from the empirical. [56] In order not to track the transcendental from the empirical, we should ask not the conditions of possible experience where we take experience as a given fact without establishing it, but the *conditions of possibility* of a possible experience, which amount to asking the real conditions of experience (B 23). Thus, when we ask the question of the conditions of possibility of the possible experience, we ask about the real conditions of the contingent occurrence of human experience and thinking. By changing the question this way, we cease to treat the experience of a subject that is bound to be contingent in so far as it is given in the empirical domain as primary and take it as a contingent event just like any other events. We stop treating it as primary only because we ask if there is any necessary condition for this contingent event itself.

[56] With this, we are in a position to understand Deleuze's critique of opinion that I mentioned at the beginning of the second chapter. A critique of doxa means the rejection of universalizing contingent empirical content as unchanging transcendental structures. Deleuze's explanation deserves to be quoted fully: "The image of thought is only the figure in which doxa is universalised by being elevated to the rational level. However, so long as one only abstracts from the empirical content of doxa, while maintaining the operation of the faculties which corresponds to it and implicitly retains the essential aspect of the content, one remains imprisoned by it. We may well discover a supra-temporal form or even a sub-temporal primary matter, an underground or Ur-doxa: we have not advanced a single step, but remain imprisoned by the same cave or ideas of the times which we only flatter ourselves with having 'rediscovered', by blessing them with the sign of philosophy" (DR 134).

Deleuze's general strategy for building a non-dogmatic speculative philosophy is to radicalize and rectify the Kantian critical philosophy by being "concerned with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism" (DR 58). This furtive and explosive moment within Kantianism, according to Deleuze, is nothing but the discovery of the pure and empty form of time. Not only can Deleuze's speculative philosophy be seen as carrying this Kantian initiative to its conclusion, but also Deleuze's entire philosophy can be seen as an elaboration of this idea of a pure and empty form of time (Smith 2023, 60). Just as Kant redirects the term "synthetic" from its propositional philosophical origins to the metaphysical process of the transcendental production of reality, Deleuze redirects the Kantian notion of time as "inner sense" to a pure transcendental condition of the real production of things and entities. With Deleuze, time is raised to the status of a necessary condition for any occurrence, including human experience and thinking. However, this new notion of time does not designate the phenomenal time of a subject or kinetic time objects. Instead, it is time as the pure and empty form of change. But what does the pure and empty form of change mean?

2. Deleuze on the Kantian Revolution: The Pure and Empty Form of Time

Deleuze argues that the Kantian transcendental philosophy brought about a new conception of time in which the movement-time relation is reversed (Deleuze 1984, DR 86); that is, with Kant, the traditional notion of time as the measure of movement undergoes a radical transformation in favor of a conception of time as the condition of movement. Deleuze celebrates this transformation in the notion of time as "the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy" (DR 87). But he further argues that Kant did not pursue this initiative into its necessary conclusions, since he subjugates the consequences this new understanding of time to the transcendental unity of the subject. To understand this point, let me reiterate how Deleuze understands the revolution in the notion of time that is brought by Kantian critical philosophy and why he thinks Kant fails in taking this conception of time to its conclusions.

Before Kant, time is generally understood as the measure of movement. By defining time in terms of quantity of motion, as the "number of movement in respect of before and after," Aristotle (1941, 4.11.219b24) provides the paradigmatic example of this understanding of time. The movement, however, is understood traditionally under two

forms, the intensive movement in the soul, which indicates the simultaneity of different movements, and the extensive movement in the world, which indicates the succession of movements.[57] In tandem with this definition, one of the main concerns of the classical philosophers was to find something outside of movement through which all other movements can be measured, an unchanging substance which is eternal or non-temporal. In this framework, finding something unchanging would amount to the discovery of a universal and eternal truth *necessary* in all times and all places. However, with Kant, time is no more conceived as the measure of movement; instead, every movement, be it intensive or extensive, finds its condition in the essential unfolding of time itself; thus, time assumes an autonomy of its own in a way that it depends on nothing but itself.[58] In this picture, the Self (the soul), the World (the cosmos), or God (the eternal) can no longer serve as non-temporal grounds of what is temporal, as ultimate truths to be discovered, since their eternity collapses under the form of time that grounds the sensible intuition. In addition to this, Kant reverses the understanding of time principally in terms of succession by arguing that time cannot be defined by succession; instead, the succession, simultaneity, and permanence must be construed as different relations or modes of time itself.[59] To put it another way, according to Kant, succession, simultaneity, and permanence are determined within time (CPR A182/B225, Deleuze 1984, CC 28). But if time is not defined by succession, simultaneity, or permanence, what is it? What is the *pure* and *empty* form of time which cannot be reduced to relations of succession, simultaneity or permanence?

Kant conceived time as the form in which the undetermined becomes determinable; that is, time is the pure form in which all determinations, viz. becoming, alteration, and change happen. But, as he frequently stresses, though time is the form of what alters, it does not change itself.[60] He argues, "The time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not change; since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as determinations of it" (CPR A182/B225). However, what is crucial at this point is that the immutable form of time

[57] In the lecture of 17 April 1984, Deleuze (1984a) gives a detailed analysis of this history. My brief exposition here follows Deleuze's seminar and Smith's (2023) useful summary of this lecture.
[58] "[T]he concept of alteration and, with it, the concept of motion (as alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time" (CPR A32/B48).
[59] Leibniz, for instance, defines space in terms of simultaneity and coexistence while defining time essentially in terms of succession: "'I hold it [space] to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions.'" quoted in (Smith 2023, 68).
[60] See (CPR A41/B58; A83; A144/B183; A182/B224–5).

itself cannot be said to be permanent or eternal since what is permanent, just as what is successive or simultaneous, is perceived *within* time, whereas the immutable form of time cannot be perceived. In other words, *the immutability of time does not imply that time is eternal*. Instead, it is the form of what is not eternal. Deleuze puts this as follows:

> *Everything that moves and changes is in time, but time itself does not change or move, any more than it is eternal. It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable form that does not change – not an eternal form, but precisely the form of what is not eternal, the immutable form of change and movement.* (CC 29, See DR 89, KCP viii)

Time as the empty form of change is not an event or fact (also not an arche-fact) happening within another time (CC 28, CPR A183/B226). Thus, time as the empty form of change is not an event or a fact (also not an arche-fact). Instead, it is the form of any event or fact; that is, it is a *pure transcendental condition* that is *not grounded on any given fact* but must be thought of as the condition of any givenness itself. This point is crucial in understanding Deleuze's speculative position, since the consequences of contending that time itself cannot be said to permanent or eternal is enormous. As we will see in the next chapter, in Deleuze's theory of time, in principle, time can abolish itself in the future.[61] In other words, the necessity of time does not also signify eternity and universality.[62]

However, in Kant, as it is well known, the pure form of time remains the "pure form of sensible intuition" (CPR A32). Thus, the a priori concept of time is operational only with regard to the three active syntheses of time since "time cannot be perceived in itself" (CPR A183/B226; B233) and "the a priori concepts (space and time) [are] possible only through the relation of the intuitions to it" (CPR A107). Thus, in Kant, the pure form of time remains shackled to the active syntheses of time carried out by the transcendental subject. Roughly put, these active syntheses are the synthesis of apprehension by which one comprehends two successive impressions as contained in

[61] Badiou (2000, 63), for instance, depending on the intemporality of time in Deleuze, argues that "if time is truth, then the being of time, as the being of truth, has to be able to be thought under a concept from which all temporal dimension has been eliminated." As we will see in the next chapter, in Deleuze, time is intemporal in the sense of being non-temporal or eternal, but it is immanent only to itself. Besides, for Deleuze, it is also possible that the immutable form of time can abolish itself in the future.

[62] Being negligent of these differences, Badiou (2007, 41) claims that "Like all philosophers of vital continuity, Deleuze cannot abide any division between sense, the transcendental law of appearance, and truths, eternal exceptions. He even seems sometimes to identify the two." My argument in the next chapter will prove that Badiou's reading has essentially nothing to do with the Deleuzian notion of truth.

one moment, the synthesis of reproduction by which one retains the recollection of the past presents and reproduces them in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition by which one relates the apprehended present and the reproduced former presents to a permanent object.[63] According to Kant, if the active syntheses of time carried out by the mind were not primordial, that is, if the mind could not think the identity of itself and its action before the givenness of its content within time as difference, it could not have access to the a priori concept of time in the first place.[64] In other words, the unity of the transcendental apperception is what makes the pure concept of time possible in the first place, not the reverse.

According to Deleuze, with this strategy, Kant again traces the transcendental from the empirical. By presuming the fact of experience and explaining time as that which makes experience possible, Kant makes the transcendental conception of time reliant upon an empirical fact.[65] In other words, Deleuze argues that Kant "has essentially taken a psychological account of what it is for the temporal world of objects to emerge for us and reiterated it at a transcendental level" (Somers-Hall 2013, 61). In this respect, Deleuze contends that the three active syntheses of time cannot bear on time itself. The subject "performs a synthesis not of time itself, but of what is *in* time and of the *parts* of time" (Deleuze 1984a, original emphasis). Certain forms of determinations of time can be dependent on the subject, but their determination is bound to happen within time. Obviously, our acts of consciousness exercise a synthesis of what appears in time and of the parts of time. But these acts of consciousness themselves happen within time, in a way that even the self itself cannot have an immediate relationship with its existence but must intuit it within time itself. Thus, Deleuze thinks that the Kantian understanding of time opens the prodigious realm of the transcendental, but Kant botches the possibility of a properly transcendental philosophy by illegitimately re-shackling the pure form of time to the transcendental

[63] See (CPR A98-111). Three syntheses also correspond to three modes of time, i.e., succession, simultaneity, and permanence.

[64] "The mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their connection in accordance with a priori rules" (CPR A108).

[65] "It is clear that … Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension is directly induced from an empirical apprehension, and so on. In order to hide this all too obvious procedure, Kant suppressed this text in the second edition. Although it is better hidden, the tracing method, with all its 'psychologism', nevertheless subsists" (DR 135, see LS 98).

structure of subject. Therefore, in so far as the acts of syntheses are bound to happen *within* time, we can tell of the pure form of time that it is essentially *independent* of what pertains to the subject, or *autonomous* with regard to the subject. That is, the pure form of time is not an imposition on the part of the subject. Instead, the subject is an imposition of time in so far as the self can discover its existence only through auto-affections within time. This was the main idea of Deleuze's analysis of fractured I as I presented in chapter two: the self can discover itself only thanks to its effects produced in time, through an auto-affection happening within time.[66] But how can we say anything about time in itself, except that it *is* independent of the events happening within it if it remains unperceivable? How can thought get out of its own element (identity and representation) and reach time itself? This question is of utmost importance since it not only allows us to see how Deleuze's philosophy remains critical while moving away from the bounds of representation and subject but also enables us to construe the crucial relationship between his theory of Ideas and philosophy of time.

3. How Do We Think of Time in Itself: Time as an Idea

With the question of access, we are forced into a false dilemma: Either we can know something and thus make it an object of representation, or we cannot know it and thus cannot make it an object of representation. However, there is a third way: we can *know something positive* about that which we cannot make an object of representation. This is the main point of Deleuze's theory of Ideas and its contribution to the Kantian understanding of Idea. As I have shown in detail in chapter two, that which exceeds the powers of representing is thought of as a limit-object under the problematic form, i.e., in the form of an Idea.[67] However, neither an Idea is an entity, nor a problem is a given. In that regard, even if time itself remains *unperceivable*, it remains *thinkable*. It is thinkable as an Idea. Thought does not conceive time as the very form of formlessness by making it an object of its own.[68] Instead, it thinks it under a problematic form, as that which cannot be thought but must be thought. Deleuze puts this point succinctly as follows:

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[66] Daniela Voss (2013, 197) rightly emphasizes that this necessary auto-affection in time amounts to the interiorization of the difference between thought and being, which, according to Deleuze, marks the "discovery of the transcendental" (DR 86).

[67] See (Smith 2023, 54–55) for a formulation of this point.

[68] "What, however, is the content of this third time, this formlessness at the end of the form of time?" (DR 299).

> *An object outside experience can be represented only in problematic form; this does not mean that Ideas have no real object, but that problems qua problems are the real objects of Ideas. The object of an Idea, Kant reminds us, is neither fiction nor hypothesis nor object of reason: it is an object which can be neither given nor known, but must be represented without being able to be directly determined* (DR 169).

Understanding Ideas as problems enables Deleuze to argue that in order to think the real, we do not have to have an infinite intuition. Though we are bound by the limits of finite intuition, we can think of the real under a problematic form, as we think about infinity in various fields of mathematics such as differential calculus, mathematical theory of dynamical systems, and high dimensional topology.[69] Thus, we can say that Deleuze's approach to the problem of the real is not guided by classical logic that take the principle of identity as its primary principle but by mathematics which allows him to conceptualize a notion of difference in itself.[70] This is what Deleuze thinks when he claims thought finds "*within itself* something which it *cannot* think, something which is both unthinkable and that which must be thought." (DR 192, the first emphasis added). This strategy is thoroughly critical since thought finds *within itself* that which cannot be thought but must be thought. This is like we are exposed to thinking infinity. We cannot conceive it empirically, but it forces itself to be thought in a problematic form. Hence, it is not that thought attempts to think existence through its logical principles; instead, existence forces itself to be thought in the form of an intelligible problem or Idea (Smith 2012, 85). Thus, thought grasps the real in an Idea, not in a concept.[71]

Just as we do not think of infinity as a determinate given but as an intelligible problem, we conceive the pure form of time not as a determinate given but as a problem or an Idea. We can even say that in so far as the pure form of time is the *form* of formlessness, Ideas are nothing but one's relation to the pure form of time. In this respect, it comes as no surprise that in one of his articles on Kant, Deleuze argues that the "source of time" is the discordant accord of faculties (CC 35). As I have shown in chapter two, Deleuze thinks that in face of something sublime, the faculties (understanding and imagination) are brought to their limit in a way that the sublime disintegrates the

[69] DeLanda (2002), in his classic work, provides a brilliant reading of Deleuze's metaphysics through the dynamical system theory and chaos theory. See (Burchill 2007) for Deleuze's topological conception of space and Smith (2012, 287–311) for Deleuze's general approach toward mathematics.
[70] Smith (2012, 85) also makes a similar point but he emphasizes particularly the role of differential calculus in Deleuze's understanding of Ideas.
[71] "What remains outside the concept refers more profoundly to what is inside the Idea" (DR 220).

synthesis and schemata. In other words, the activities of synthesizing breakdown in such a way that something formless emerges.[72] This something formless is nothing but time itself as an Idea. For this reason, as Smith (2023, 55) rightly points out, Deleuzian Ideas can be seen as pure forms of time, "and conversely, the pure form of time is itself an Idea."[73] Thus, with the theory of Ideas, "Deleuze effects a speculative reconstruction of reality that is not relative to specifically human interests…, a reconstruction driven by the transcendental and critical thought that *the real processes of production of empirical objects cannot themselves be objects*" but only Ideas or problems (Welchman 32, emphasis added). Ideas are not the objects of thought. They bear on the real production of things themselves as the actualization of things out of the virtual infinite variability of time. Thus, the theory of Ideas becomes a critical speculative metaphysics concerning the real production of empirical objects. The real production of things, that is, their constant actualization is conditioned upon the pure and empty form of time.

4. Deleuze's Speculative Temporalism

His theory of Ideas allows Deleuze to strip the question of the real from the transcendental structure of experience and the subject and to locate it to the question of time.[74] What justifies this move is nothing but the fact that the transcendental structures of the subject making experience possible are preceded by a still more primordial transcendental condition, which is the pure and empty form of time. The pure and empty form of time is a condition of givenness itself. In Kant, thinking, with all its transcendental structure, is bound to find itself happening within time as it is shown by the idea of fractured I. The self can discover itself only by means of its auto-

[72] As Bryant (2008, 215) puts this point, "Such an approach is said to be critical insofar as it bases itself on the ability of a faculty to be taken to its limit, to encounter its limit such that it belongs to it alone, rather than shackling the faculties to one another under the form of recognition."

[73] "In so far as the Cogito refers to a fractured I, an I split from end to end by the form of time which runs through it, it must be said that Ideas swarm in the fracture" (DR 169). If we remember from chapter two that Ideas are given through signs as the bearer of problems, we can also say that signs are "seeds of time," or pure presentations or internal relations of time: "The direct time-image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal; and hyalosigns, and crystalline signs, should therefore be called mirrors or seeds of time" (TI 274).

[74] Unlike Welchman (2009, 39), who argues that Deleuze gradually disengages his speculative position from the problem of temporality as he saw that the latter leads him to a kind of transcendental idealism, I argue that it is the issue of temporality that lies at the heart of Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative philosophy. In that respect, in contradistinction to Welchman, I agree with Bryant (2008, 176) that in fact, it is in his later work postdating his collaboration with Guattari that Deleuze seems unrestrainedly dogmatic.

affections produced within time. In other words, thinking discovers itself as something undergoing actualization in time, that is, it is bound to find itself mediated in time. In that sense, time ontologically precedes the identity of the subject. But if so, time is a more primordial transcendental condition than any structure belonging to the subject, since, with this understanding of time, it is no longer the subject that imposes time but rather it is the subject that is an imposition of time (Bryant 2008, 184).

The consequences of this new understanding of time are momentous. As Deleuze hints, the post-Kantians like Hegel and Fichte seem ignorant of this furtive moment within Kantianism in a way that they tend to focus primarily on "I think" and the unity of apperception instead of the pure form of time that created a crack in the "I think" (DR 58). To understand the consequences of Deleuze's strategy of foregrounding the passive self and the pure form of time instead of focusing on the unity of apperception, it would be helpful to briefly visit the Hegelian version of "I think" and compare it with the Deleuzian speculative positioning of time.

At the very beginning of *The Science of Logic*, Hegel (2010, 57/21.55) famously maintains that when thought is "*withdrawn* into this *unity*, has sublated every reference to an other and to mediation… what we have before us is only simple immediacy" of thinking itself (original emphasis). In other words, when thought leaves all its presuppositions with regard to itself, whether it has any particular structure, functions with certain concepts, or is governed by some particular rules, what remains is the pure being of thought, thinking in its immediacy, or thought of thought – *not the being of anything in particular but the be-ing as such*. Thus, "free, self-critical thought that suspends all its presuppositions about itself is left with nothing to think but itself, its own simple *being*" (Houlgate 2006, 31). Hegel (2010, 48/21.57) contends the pure being of thought in its simplicity as such is the self-necessitating ground or "the first truth" out of which other necessary categories of thinking have to be derived. In other words, Hegel contends that thought, by merely looking at itself, can find a self-grounding and self-necessitating basis, which is that if *thinking*, then *is*; or "thinking, therefore *is*" (Houlgate 2006, 32).

This Hegelian idea of simple immediacy of thought gives us a useful model to understand Deleuze's idea of the pure and empty form of time as the pure transcendental condition of not only thinking but also all occurrences. First of all,

Deleuze argues that it is impossible for thought to withdraw from all the mediation and intuit itself in its immediate activity. In so far as intuition must happen in time, thought cannot have before itself its simple immediacy. Even if we suppose the Hegelian formula "thinking, therefore is" does not require the self's intuiting itself, we must at least grant that what thought has before itself, when it suspends all the determinate content it has, is the *occurrence* of thought which is bound to happen *within time*. In other words, even when thinking sublate every reference to an other and to mediation, what remains, the simple *be*-ing of thought, presumes the *happening* of thought. Thus, "if thinking, then is" can be true, but only on the condition that thinking *occurs* within time. The empty form of time is self-grounding in so far as it is the condition of the *occurrence of thinking*. And it is this idea of time that allows Deleuze to remain *critical* while rejecting the primacy of the subject and representation.

This much is fair. But what entitles Deleuze to raise time to the status of the transcendental condition of not only the event of thinking but of *any event* at all? As I emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, one of the crucial aspects of Deleuze's critical speculative philosophy, which is also one of his central criticisms against the Kantian model of critique, is that it does not take the experience as a fact and determine its conditions of possibility. Deleuze *takes experience as mere contingent occurrence and asks about the real conditions of this contingent occurrence.* That is, Deleuze's strategy for avoiding the fallacy of tracking the transcendental from the empirical is to seek not the conditions of possible experience but the *conditions of possibility* of the possible experience, conditions of the occurrence of experience which amount to determining the real conditions of experience as a contingent happening. What is transcendental must be completely foreign to this contingent occurrence and must ground it in the first place. However, when we ask the question this way, we ask the condition of the possibility of any occurrence at all, since we seek the real conditions of *a* contingent occurrence by taking the human experience simply as an occurrence among other occurrences. The Hegelian version of the "I think" is also illustrative in that regard. In the Hegelian picture, thinking as sublated to all mediation can be considered as a *simple event*. In other words, in the Hegelian case, we do not presuppose anything about the nature of thinking, whether it has any particular structures, whether it functions with certain categories, or is governed by some particular rules. Thus, in the end, we obtain a *simple* event with no particular

determination. But we discovered that this simple event is conditioned on the pure and empty form of time. Then, we can say time is not the condition of only some events requiring the structure of the subject but any event at all. It is not merely a condition of the contemporaneity of subject and object, but it is a condition of any occurrence, including processes of subjectivations and objectivations.

Thus, the question concerning the real conditions of experience can give us the pure transcendental condition or the real conditions of the possibility of all contingent events at all, including human experience and thinking. In contrast to Kant, then, Deleuze does not build the transcendental upon the empirical givenness of experience and hypostasize its conditions in immutable and transcendental structures since he thinks that the form of experience can radically change in the course of time. With Deleuze, the idea of synthesis and the transcendental production of objects of experience leaves its place to the idea of time as the pure transcendental condition of *any* synthesis, the real production of things within time. It is in this sense time gives us "a transcendental ground more fundamental than that of mind" (Bryant 2008, 178). The process of ideal synthesis of difference described in chapter four of *Difference and Repetition* indicates nothing but the synthesis of the temporal sections, that is, the actualizations of entities out of the virtual relationships designates an arrangement of an individual's relationship to time. Deleuze shows that the pure form of time does not pertain to the world-constituting activity of the subject. Instead, it bears on reality itself, as it is not relative to specifically human interests. In that regard, raising the empty form of time to the pure transcendental condition of any event, Deleuze propounds a speculative position that we can call *speculative temporalism*. Pure form of time is not immanent to anything, but everything is immanent to it. In that sense, *time is immanent to itself*. Everything is within time, but time itself is not within another time (Deleuze 1984a, KCP vii). As I will show in the next chapter, the virtual and the actual, as two dimensions of the real, are nothing but two dimensions of immanent temporality.

CHAPTER 5

TIME, TRUTH, AND THINKING

Overview

What is the relationship between the pure form of time which is unperceivable, and the phenomenal time that is structured around different modalities of time, viz. past present and future? If we understand the modalities of time as dependent upon the thinking subject, the only thing we know about the real is the pure and empty form of time as the pure transcendental condition of all occurrences. Deleuze first shows that different modalities of time are, in fact, originary positions of the time; that is, they are not constructions of the mind but belong to the pure and empty form of time itself in an a priori manner. Thus, they designate the a priori structure of time. What allows Deleuze to make this claim is the idea of *passive synthesis of time*, which implies that *the syntheses of time follow a priori from the pure and empty form of time itself* rather than being a result of the activity of a subject.

1. Problem of the Modalities of Time

How do the different modalities of time, viz. past, present, and future, come into existence? And what is their relationship with the pure form of time? If different modalities of time are mere constructions on the part of the living individual, then we do not get too far in terms of thought's capacities for thinking the real. The main point of Kant's three syntheses of time is to show how the operations of the mind connect and synthesize different moments within time. Without the operations of the mind, we do not have the modalities of time but merely time as the infinite variability and chaos. In the case of Deleuze, if we understand the modalities of time as dependent upon the thinking subject, the only thing we know about the real is the pure and empty form of time as the pure transcendental condition of all occurrences. But this does not say too much. In order to be able to talk about the real productions of things within time, viz. their actualizations, we need to show the relationship between the pure form of time and the actualizations of things in the empirical domain. In order to do this, Deleuze

first shows that different modalities of time are, in fact, originary positions of time; that is, they are not constructions of the mind but belong to the pure and empty form of time itself in an a priori manner. Thus, they designate the a priori structure of time. What allows Deleuze to make this claim is the idea of *passive synthesis of time*, which implies that *the syntheses of time follow a priori from the pure and empty form of time itself* rather than being a result of the activity of a subject. To put it another way, the pure and empty form of time requires an a priori, not empirical, ordering of time as past, present, and future.

Kant seeks to determine the conditions of possibility of the temporal appearances and finds them in the syntheses of time carried out by the transcendental subject. In other words, for Kant, the three syntheses of time are required for the unity of apperception. But, as we saw, in this strategy, Kant models the transcendental after the empirical by taking experience as a fact. In this respect, the main question for Deleuze is whether we can discern an ordering of time that follows from the pure and empty form of time, not from the fact of experience. Deleuze's answer will be that we can conceive something like succession, simultaneity and permanence only on the basis of an ordinal concept of time in which past, present, and future designate transcendental determinations of time. As Bryant (2008, 187) aptly puts it, "It is only insofar as time is ordinal, that it is composed of these three originary dimensions in their own right, that instants can manifest themselves in a succession as one instant coming after another and being preceded by another." In that sense, succession, simultaneity, and permanence are given, but their givenness is possible only because of the originary order of time as three distinct temporal domains. Therefore, according to Deleuze, phenomenal time finds its real conditions in the pure form of time and the passive syntheses of time. But how are present, past, and future constituted within the pure form of time?

2. Deleuze and the A Priori Constitution of Time

2.1. The first Synthesis of Time: Present

The pure and *empty* form of time does not presuppose a content, that is, an event or thing that unfolds and, thus, gives rise to time. But even if we do not presuppose the occurrence of an event ontologically preceding time, in order to be able to speak of time, we need to grant an *elementary connection* between diverse parts of time.

Imagine two pure instants within the empty form of time, instants with no duration and extension in themselves. There must be an *elementary connection* between these two different instants in order to talk about a pure and empty form of time. Without this elementary connection, there would be only one or the other moment, and thus, only a single moment that contains no before or no after. But if there is no before or after, there is also no *time*.[75] Thus, the pure and empty form of time is possible only if time differentiates in the sequence of instants by building minimal relations between preceding and succeeding instants.[76] Notice that instants in this case do not refer to the lived time of an individual, but purely ideal instants indicating infinitely small temporal sections. Deleuze calls this minimum requirement needed for the pure and empty form of time "contraction" and understands it with reference to the idea of approximation found in the mathematical model of calculus. He thinks that it is only on the basis of a "contraction" of pure instants that time is possible. In that regard, Deleuze calls present the "foundation of time" (DR 79). This minimum connection or synthesis cannot be subordinated to the activity of the mind or the identity of the subject that carries out the synthesis. The idea is that this elementary connection between pure instants must *be* in so far as time *is*. In that regard, this elementary synthesis of time is a passive synthesis of time independent of a subject in such a way that the subject itself *is* nothing but a dynamic arrangement of contractions happening at different material levels. He maintains, "Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, retention, expectations" (DR 73). There are contractions and rhythms that are present within an organism at the level of organs, cells, organelles etc., in a way that we "are" these contractions before we "have" them (DR 73). Thus, the coexisting contractions within an individual determine the *duration* of the lived present in an individual. Hence, it is not that pure form of time is founded on the lived present of an individual, but instead,

[75] My formulation of this point is greatly indebted to Bergson (1965, 48). Smith (2023, 55–56) also quotes the same passage.

[76] Kant also starts with the same idea in his philosophy of time. But for him, these elementary connections between different instants are primarily constituted by the mind. In that regard, Kant's first synthesis of apprehension can be seen as an acute critique of the instant since its main idea is that in so far as intuition contains a manifold in itself, its temporal condition cannot be a mere instant. For "as contained in a single moment, no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity." (CPR A99). In other words, if the representation of a manifold is limited to an instant, this instantaneous representation of the manifold would be an absolute unity, and thus, it would lack manifoldness. Thus, it is necessary that the mind differentiate time in the sequence of appearances one after the other. Kant calls this necessary activity the synthesis of apprehension.

contractions account for the duration of the lived present of an individual.[77] Thus, the first synthesis of time produces a *variable present*, that is, a present whose *duration varies* according to different individuals, but *whose existence* does not depend on them.[78]

2.2. The Second Synthesis of Time: Past

Although the present is the foundation of time, it remains within time; that is, the first synthesis of time "constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes" (DR 79). But what is the condition of this passage? When a pure instant passes, does it not become past? If so, in order for the pure instant to crease to be present, it must have a relationship with the past. But how are we to construe the relationship between present and past? One obvious answer goes as follows: the past is simply a former present. Hence, the passage of the present designates a relationship between a former present and a present present. Nonetheless, Deleuze thinks that this way of construing the relationship between past and the present is problematic, since this model cannot make sense of what he calls "the paradox of pure becoming." At the very beginning of *Logic of Sense*, to explain what he means by the paradox of pure becoming or pure event,

[77] This is crucial in understanding Deleuze's theory of time. Brassier's (2007) criticism of Deleuze for propounding a full-blown idealism by hypothesizing the lived present to the level of truth of time stems from his confusion concerning the primacy of the pure form of time and the present. Deleuze's method in his account of the constitution of temporality is not to start from what is given and to work backward to its transcendental conditions. In other words, he does not start with the present and finds its transcendental condition in the pure element of the past. The present and the past are themselves conditioned upon the pure form of time. If this were to be the case, Deleuze's account would be another form of tracing the transcendental from the empirical, and as Brassier (2007, 191) trenchantly argues, would end up with a full-blown-idealism.

[78] The duration of a present "varies according to the species, the individuals, the organisms and the parts of organisms under consideration" since "The duration of an organism's present, or of its various presents, varies according to the natural contractile range" (DR 77). We can make sense of this point through some recent research in biology. A recent study shows that animals with higher metabolic rates tend to perceive time slower than those with lesser metabolic rates. For instance, the lived present of a golden-mantled ground squirrel comprises about two times more "instants" than the lived present of a human (Healy et al. 2013, 687). The reason for this is that the duration of a present moment is dependent upon the perception of temporal information. For instance, the temporal resolution of a squirrel's sensory system is dependent on the factors such as the sensitivity of its light-perceiving parts and the speed of information-processing processes in those parts. But both of these factors are dependent on the temporal cycles of elements composing the information processing procedures. Neurons and sensory receptors, for instance, play a crucial role in these information-processing procedures. But neurons and sensory receptors do not have the same temporal cycles in every animal. That is, the speed of response of those cells varies according to the individual. But why and how? In animals, neurons and sensory receptors economize energy to the minimum required to get the job "done just right-enough" (Laughlin 2001, 476–77). But the "job" that is required to be done varies according to the needs of the individual. Thus, as the energy consumption rate affects information processing performance, i.e., the contractile range of neurons and receptor cells in those cells, the duration of the present varies in those individuals.

Deleuze refers us to scenes in Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* when Alice's size increases. As Alice becomes larger, she becomes larger than the size she was. But in the same stroke, she becomes smaller than the size she is becoming at the moment. But it is logically impossible that she be larger and smaller than herself at the same time. Then, why do we not simply say Alice is larger than she was, and she is smaller than what she will be? But when we do this, we simply relinquish from explaining what we want to explain, i.e., Alice's *becoming larger and smaller* at the same moment. That is, Alice undergoes an "instantaneous becoming," not a passage from one state to another (Shores 2014, 200). Deleuze maintains this point as follows:

> *When I say "Alice becomes larger," I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time*. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. *This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present.* (LS 1, emphasis added)

What is essential in the event of becoming is that it "does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after" (LS 1). Thus, in order to explain the event of becoming, we need to find a way to make sense of the before and after as *simultaneous* but *different* instants. Deleuze finds solution for this problem through a differential understanding of time in which an instant is construed as the linear approximation of the preceding moment. In this way, before and after are construed as two moments brought infinitely close to each other such that though there is no moment extending between two moments, there is still an intensive degree of variation differentiating them. Mathematically speaking, this means that when we take a moment in the process of Alice's growing, at this moment, the limit is same from the left and the right side. For instance, suppose t_1 stands for the present moment and t_0 stands for the moment preceding t_1. When we think of those two moments as infinitely close to each other, there is no temporal gap extending between them. However, though there is no temporal gap extending between them, t_1 and t_0 are still two different moments such that there is a passage from t_0 to t_1 in the sense that there is an intensive degree of change between these two moments.[79] To put it another way, two moments are different moments, but they are *continuously connected to each other* in such a way


[79] Deleuze (1981) puts the same point as follows " A', A, A"; A is the instantaneous affection, of the present moment, A' is that of a little while ago, A" is what is going to come. have brought them together as closely as possible, there is always something which separates them, namely the phenomenon of passage."

that extensively speaking, they are simultaneous. When we take the limit from the side of $t_{0,}$ the result is the same with the one that we get when we take the limit from the right side. In other words, *extensively* speaking, t_1 and t_0 temporally coincide. But t_1 excludes the t_0 with a certain degree of intensity. In a word, t_1 and t_0 are *extensively simultaneous* but *intensively distinct*. But notice that the moment we talk about is nothing but an infinitely short moment, or a pure instant, just as the pure differences symbolized by *dx* in the second chapter. If the moment is not infinitely small but a determinate metric unit, however small, the "becomes" of the "becomes larger and smaller" turns into the "is" of "is larger and smaller" (Shores 2014, 205). This understanding of the passage of time has three main consequences with regard to the past.[80]

First, the paradox of pure becoming shows that the past cannot be conceived simply as a former present moment, an instant which is past. Instead, given that past and present synthesize each moment in a simultaneity of "before" and "after," then the past is a pre-requisite of the passage of the present. The present *presupposes* the past since it is a condition of the passing of the present. In so far as the present presupposes the past, the past is the *ground* of the lived present. That is, if the present is the foundation of time, then the past is the ground of time (DR 79). We can also express this point as follows: Strictly speaking, the present instant *is not* (in a way that dx is not). It exists only in relation to the past (dx exists only in relation to dy). What *is* is nothing but these relations which are in the past. But these relationships signify the relationship within the past. Thus, we should say what *is* is past, while the present is merely a pure

[80] Deleuze, by working on Bergson's philosophy of time, arrives at these same three conclusions by referring to three paradoxes about the relationship between the present and the past. He calls these the paradox of contemporaneity, the paradox of co-existence, and the paradox of pre-existence. The question giving rise to the first paradox is a very basic one: how does a present moment become a past moment? First of all, in order for a present moment to pass, it must cease to be present. But how can a present moment cease to be present? In order for it to be able to cease to be present, it must already be constituted as past in some way. Otherwise, when a new present comes, the present present and the new present would constitute a sequence of a present without any of them being passed. Thus, "No present would ever pass were it not past 'at the same time' as it is present" (DR 81). Deleuze solves this paradox by endorsing a differential understanding of time, i.e., time as being composed of infinitesimal instants, which, when they are brought together, indicate one and the same moment. The second paradox is that "if each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then *all* of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is past now" (DR 81-82, original emphasis). But if we say that the past is contemporaneous with the present moment that it was, then we must say that the past, in some sense, past must pre-exist the passing present since there must be a past that was never present. In other words, there must be a past that was not formed after merging with the present but has an existence in itself (DR 82).


becoming, and the future simply does not exist. Deleuze summarizes these points succinctly as follows: "The present *is not;* rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It *is* not, but it acts. … The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act … But it has not ceased to be…. it IS in the full sense of the word: It is identical with being in itself. … of the present, we must say at every instant that it 'was,' and of the past, that it 'is,'" (B 55).




Graph 0

Second, the paradox of pure becoming demonstrates that the present instant and the moment just preceding it must be contemporaneous with each other in each moment. But if this is so, that means there must be *a perfect continuity* between each moment constituting the time. By perfect continuity, I understand that in each part of time, when we take two instants, we must be able to bring them infinitely closer. In the mathematical formulation, for each point within time, the limit from the left side and the right side must be the same. For instance, the station shown in Graph 1 and Graph 2 is not possible within the Deleuzian framework,[81] since in Graph 1 we cannot bring moment 4 and the moment just coming after it infinitely close to each other, and in the graph 2, we cannot bring the moment preceding or coming after the moment 4 infinitely close to the moment 4. Thus, from the Deleuzian perspective, time cannot make jumps but can only be continuous. I will call this requirement *the continuity principle*.

[81] In all of the graphs, X-axis represents time while the Y-axis represents a time-dependent arbitrary property of an entity, such as speed, distance relative to a certain point, or size, as in the case of Alice, etc.





Graph 1 **Graph 2**

Third, if the past is coexistent with the present in a way that a pure event has a dual dimension of both being past and present at the same time, then we should construe a present moment as co-existent with *all* the preceding moments. In other words, if there is a *perfect continuity* between before and after in each part of the past such that there is no instant extending between a present moment and the moment just preceding it, we can continue following each moment's past without halting. Thus, we can say that *the present moment is coextensive with all the past moments preceding it*. If a present moment requires a perfect continuity between *all* the past moments preceding the present moment, then the present is *simultaneous with all the past*. As Deleuze puts it, "If each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then *all* of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past" (DR 81-82, original emphasis).

2.3. The Third Synthesis of Time: Future

Just as the first synthesis, the second synthesis is also intratemporal, that is, it cannot express the pure and empty form of time itself but rather must be constituted within it (DR 88). For, the past can *be* only by means of the emergence of a new moment that was not past, even though this moment *immediately becomes* past as it emerges. Then, what does the third synthesis which bears on the future consists in? What we need to do is to apply the differential model to the relationship between a present moment and a moment to come: we are to think of a future moment as an infinitely close moment to the present moment. But this future moment is possible only on the condition that it is an extensively simultaneous but intensively different moment. To exemplify,

suppose t_1 is a present moment and t_2 is a future moment. In order for t_2 to be different than t_1, the former must be distinguishable from the latter. Namely, a future moment can come only as a difference, as *completely new moment* neighboring all the past moments. What is produced in the new moment is nothing but the past itself in a completely new moment (DR 90). If the past is the whole of relations (TI 10), then in each moment, the whole, meaning the universe including all existents, changes. With the coming of a future instant, the past is repeated, but it is also transformed and becomes something new. Thus, future is a repetition of the past that "'makes' a difference" (DR 292). It is the new or difference that constitutes the reality of time as the pure and empty form of everything that changes. For this reason, Deleuze sometimes equates the third synthesis of time with the pure form of time.[82] Thus, in so far as the third synthesis is what makes the first and second synthesis possible, we can say that the coming of the new, or difference is the essence of time.

In *Cinema 2: Time-Image*, Deleuze discusses the third synthesis of time with regard to the question of truth in a chapter entitled "The Powers of the False." Just as the discovery of the originary time amounts to the discovery of true, discovery of the pure form of time amounts to the discovery of an autonomous and immanent concept of the false. He argues that the liberation of time from the grip of the eternal puts the concept of truth into crises, since if the discovery of originary time amounts to the discovery of true, in a picture where there is no originary time, the true always remain on a bed of nails. But what does the form of the true mean and how does the form of time put it into crises? And what does an autonomous concept of the false mean?

Deleuze argues that philosophers tended to keep the true away from the realm of contingent existents, in the eternal (TI 130). When the criterion for truth is universality and eternity, meaning that a truth must be true in all times and in all places, falsity becomes a mere error, a diversion from truth. For instance, in the past, people believed that earth was flat, but right now, we know that it is round and *has always been* round. However, with the understanding of time as the pure and empty form of change, this concept of truth is no more valid. For, if the future is autonomous with regard to present and past, then there is nothing guaranteeing that something that *is* and *has always been true* will be true in the future. What defines future is its potentiality for overthrowing

[82] "[T]he empty form of time or third synthesis" (DR 88).

what is true, that is, its falsifying or disruptive powers, meaning the metamorphosis and creation that the future can bring. As Deleuze maintains, "It is a power of the false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts" (TI 131). But how can it become false that the world is not round in the future? If it is *possible* to conceive a world which is not round, then there is nothing *necessary* that prohibits this event to happen. The world's roundness is a contingent situation which, in principle, can change in the future. Thus, in the Deleuzian picture, the temporal status of truths are undecidable, since we simply do not know what future will bring, and future has the potential to change the past.[83] This understanding of the future and time has drastic consequences. I will summarize these consequences in three groups.

First, the future remains always "unforeseen and non-preexistent," and thus, principally always uncertain (CC 1). There cannot be a relation of determination between future and past. In this picture, there can be no causal relationship between past and future in the traditional sense since future effects cannot pre-exist in their causes. In principle, the future can bring anything. In so far as future is unforeseen and non-preexistent, it liberates time from both present and the past. Thus, if the present is the foundation of time, and if past is the ground of this foundation, the future is the groundlessness that supersedes the ground (DR 91). Deleuze contends, "The form of time is there only for the revelation of the formless… The extreme formality is there

[83] The problematic relationship between time and the form of truth, Deleuze argues, has "burst out" in the paradox of contingent futures, which first formulated by the ancient philosopher Diodorus Cronus. The paradox goes as follows: If it is *possible* that a naval battle *may* take place tomorrow, there seems to follow two logical paradoxes. If it is *possible* that a naval battle takes place tomorrow, it is equally *possible* that a navel battle does not take place tomorrow. However, if a naval battle *actually* takes place tomorrow, it is *no longer possible* that the naval battle does not take place. In other words, the second possibility turns out to be impossible, while the first possibility becomes a necessity. This conclusion constitutes *the first paradox*: an impossibility follows from a possibility. What about the other case, that is, what do we get if a naval battle does not take place tomorrow? If the naval battle does not take place tomorrow, it is no longer *true* that a naval battle may take place tomorrow, since if the battle *actually does not take place*, then it is no longer *possible* that a naval battle take place tomorrow. Thus, we have *the second paradox*: what is true in the past is not necessarily so. It was true that a battle may take place tomorrow. But If the battle does not take place tomorrow, then it is no longer true that a battle may take place tomorrow. According to Deleuze, the paradox of contingent futures puts the conception of truth in terms of eternal essences into crises. But Deleuze happily embraces both of the conclusions and include them in his theory of truth or falsity. Thus, for Deleuze, *the past is not necessarily true* and *impossible can follow from the possible*. He argues that time can pass "through incompossible presents, returning to not-necessarily true pasts." (TI 131). Also see (Shores 2021, 201–2).

only for an excessive formlessness" (Ibid), which amounts to the absolute contingency of the future.

Second, if the future can bring *anything*, the form of the true is no more eternity, since a truth of past remains open to be disrupted by the novelty of the future. With this new understanding of time, *the idea of necessary truth does not disappear but is radically transformed.* Given that everything is immanent to the pure form of time, time can bring anything, even its own annihilation. This understanding of time enables us to conceive *well-grounded truths which are not eternal*. In so far as everything is subject to the disruptive forces of future, anything that is *necessary now with regard to the order of ordinary events* has a *precarious necessity,* which remains open to be disrupted in the future. Every truth remains at best a precarious truth. This is not a truthlessness, but the precarity of all truths. However, this possibility does not indicate a constant re-creation such that we cannot talk any *enduring* truth. Though the pure form of time as groundlessness supersedes past as the ground, the supersession does not mean abolition.[84] The future supersedes the past in each moment, but it does not abolish it. Because of the continuity principle, the continuity with the past remains a condition for the future as well. Though, future is autonomous with respect to this condition in so far as it has the power of transforming it, this condition also determines the limits of the contingency of future.

Third, if the pure and empty form of time requires the absolute novelty of the future and the total involvement of past as contracted in the present which is blending into the future, then we have three different temporal modalities which indicate the a priori structure of pure and empty form of time: the past, the present, and the future. The order of time is not distributed according to an empirical criterion; instead they are "formal and fixed characteristics which follow *a priori* from" the pure and empty form of time (DR 89). The reason why they are not distributed according to an empirical criterion is that, as I have shown, this transcendental structure of time is a necessary condition for the pure and empty form of time itself. Thus, this structure of time does not pertain to the phenomenal time, but to the time itself, and thus, it is a priori.


[84] Bryant (194) argues that "the condition is the past, the agent is the present, while the future is the product abolishing both condition and agent." However, this characterization of supersession as abolition is not adequate to Deleuze model for the reasons I will explain in the subsequent sections.

3. Limits of the Contingency of the Future


Up to this point, we have seen that time as the pure form of change is immutable, and thus, it is absolute. The immutable form of time has three formal and fixed characteristics which follow a priori from the order of time. In this picture, future events remain indeterminate and unprecalculable. However, this indeterminacy is not boundless.[85] There is only one condition to limit the range of possibilities of what is to come, which is the only absolute condition we have, i.e., the pure and empty form of time itself. Thus, what will happen cannot go against the structure of the pure and empty form of time. But what can go against this condition? We can delineate at least two groups of events that go against it. First, given the continuity principle, a future event cannot bring about *jumps* in the continuous line of becoming. In other words, anything is possible for a future event except that which creates discontinuity in the pure form of time. Jump here does not simply mean *radical change happening extremely fast*. It means a change which happens *non-temporally*; thus, not a becoming but an emergence from *ex nihilo*.[86] It is a non-temporal change because there is no *temporal passage* between a moment of jump and the moment preceding it. In the case of Alice's growing larger and smaller at the same time, the criterion for the temporality of this change is that when two instants following each other can be brought infinitely close two each other, they express the same moment. Mathematically speaking, this means that when we take a moment in the process of Alice's growing, at this moment, the limit function is same from the left and the right side. Mathematically, this kind of change amounts to a *jump* that creates discontinuity in a curve. Second, if what will happen create a full gap, meaning that if it abolishes the pure form of time, then it cannot create itself again. Time cannot miss an instant. In other words, anything is possible except that which does not bring about any change, which amounts to time's *continual* abolishing itself or temporal absence of time itself. In order to make sense of these claims, let us take the following graphs:

[85] Recently, Quentin Meillassoux (2014) argued for a limitless contingency of the future. Given the analysis I will provide here, it is a debatable question whether Meillassoux's model allows for the abolition and recreation of time.


[86] This is also one of the central differences between Deleuze's conception of event in terms of becoming and Badiou's understanding of event coming out of void or and Meillassouxian idea of "irruption *ex nihilo*" or "chaotic becoming" (Meillassoux 2007, 59). In the former, events are understood in terms of the instantaneous becoming, while in the latter, they are understood primarily in terms of abrupt emergence. Meillassoux (2007, 80) argues, for instance, "irruption *ex nihilo* becomes thinkable within the very framework of an immanent temporality."




Graph 3



Graph 4



Graph 5



Graph 6

If we think t_1 as a present moment, the Deleuzian understanding of the contingency of the future allows for the Graph 3 and 6. Graph 3 shows that anything can happen in the moment just coming after t_1, given that these two moments are continuous. Thus,

the only condition for the future of the curve is that the event occurring between t_1 and t_2 must be explainable in terms of continuous instants. This condition is not satisfied, for instance, in Graph 4 and 5. The graph 4 shows a break happening at t_1. The reason why this is impossible in the Deleuzian picture is that in this case the moment just following t_1, (let's call it t_2) is not simultaneous with t_1, which is a situation going against the continuity principle. In other words, t_0 and t_1 cannot be brought infinitely close to each other. However, the continuity principle says that when two moments are brought infinitely close to each other, they imply extensive simultaneity. At t_0 and t_1, what happens is not a pure becoming and an abrupt or non-temporal emergence.

However, graph 6 is also possible in the Deleuzian picture. At t_1, time may abolish itself, since we said that time is not eternal, but it is the immutable form of what is not eternal. In tandem with this, we can think time abolishing itself in a future moment. In that case, we would still have a coherent picture. Time is not the *eternal* becoming of everything. In other words, becoming is necessary but it is not necessarily eternal. It is necessary only in so far as time *is*. However, its abolishing itself simply implies the non-existence of everything. Nonetheless, in this case, it is impossible for time to recreate itself after the moment of t_1, as it is exemplified in Graph 5, even though this creation amounts the creation of the world as it was at the moment of annihilation. The reason why time cannot re-create itself once it becomes abolished is that it requires again the discontinuity of the time. In Deleuze's vocabulary, it would require that time as the immutable form of change itself changing, since times abolishing and recreating itself amounts to a change in the immutable form of time, which is impossible.[87]

4. Truth and Contingency: The Principle of Contingent Reason

In order to complete our inquiry, we need to lastly confront an essential criticism that might be levelled against Deleuze's non-dogmatic speculative position. By proposing an ultimate ground what would explain everything, i.e., the pure form of time, Deleuze seems to be committed to the principle of sufficient reason. Traditionally, the principle of sufficient reason is regarded as one of the elementary requirements, or presuppositions of metaphysical study understood as having a claim on the ultimate

[87] "Why is time, as a form of what changes, necessarily an immutable form? Because if the form of what changes itself changes, it would have to change in another time. There would be a nesting of times" (Deleuze 1984a). Also, "If time were succession, it would need to succeed in another time, and so on to infinity" (KCP vii)

reality or the ground of things. However, obviously, the principle of sufficient reason and the understanding of time as the pure and empty form of change exclude each other. If the principle of sufficient reason tells us there *must* be a *reason* for that which happens, the *empty* form of time tells that just the reverse: there can be no reason or ground for what happens. Thus, the problem is, how can Deleuze propound a speculative position while at the same time not holding the principle of sufficient reason? Is not this contradictory?

Deleuze is well aware of this problem. His strategy to overcome this problem is twofold. On the one hand, past is the ground of time, thus it is the ground of any event. On the other hand, this ground is *superseded* by the future. The future is groundlessness itself (DR 91). With the future or the pure form of time, the ground is "twisted" and joined to that which is truly groundless. Traditionally, the sufficient reason consists in relating something to a ground. But in Deleuze, sufficient reason "relates *what it grounds* to that which is *truly groundless*" (DR 154, emphasis is mine). Thus, there is twofold processes of *grounding* and *ungrounding*. A future event is grounded on the past, but in itself, the future has the power to overthrow this ground in a way that the future supersedes the past. For instance, let us suppose that the world has been round up to this point. If we could freeze time at this point, this contingent fact would be a necessary truth. However, we cannot freeze time at this point, and it is conceivable that the world ceases to be round in the future, either by changing shape or becoming no more. If that is so, any assertion concerning the shape of the world can, at best, be precariously true or necessary.

In this picture, what we have is no more the *principle of sufficient reason* but *principle of contingent reason*. There must be a reason for what happens, a ground. But this reason is never necessary, but rather it is contingent. This means that there can be no *general rule* or ground to explain what happens, but only particular reasons, which remain contingent. Hence, the ground is not necessary, rather it is necessarily contingent. Deleuze maintains,

> *philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and contingent principle, an encounter, a conjunction. It is not insufficient by itself but contingent in itself. Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could have been different, with different neighborhoods.* The principle of reason such as it appears in philosophy is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good

> reason but contingent reason*; there is no universal history except of contingency*. (WP 93, emphasis added)

The reason why we cannot give necessary reasons is because the future can overthrow anything. The principle of contingent reason also designates the power of the false, or aberrant movements in contradistinction to the power of the universal and necessary truth. It makes every kind of truth a precarious truth, a truth which is not eternal and open to be disrupted by the distruptive powers of future. Deleuze's idea that we need to replace possible-real opposition with the virtual-actual couple should be understood in this context. For when we think in terms of the possible-real opposition, what can come about is already determined beforehand as what is possible. Here, everything is already given *as possible*. A possibility becomes realized when existence is added to it. What renders the principle of sufficient reason possible is the possible-real couple, since if the real is already conceived in the possible, then we can give a reason for why a certain possibility becomes real. However, in the virtual/actual couple, the virtual does not designate an already given set of possibilities, rather it brings forth something which did not pre-exist in anyway. Thus, when Deleuze argues that the virtual events are the sufficient reason of actual events, this must be also understood in terms of principle of *contingent reason*.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THINKING PRECARIOUSLY

Our inquiry up to this point can be seen as a demonstration of the precarity of thought, at least on two levels.

Thinking is nothing but creating a territory in chaos, an open-ended plane in chaos, a dynamic memory in the infinite speed of time. In so far as it is a "struggle against chaos" or the infinite speed of time (WP 203), it always stands under the risk of the disintegrating powers of the future. In *What Is Philosophy*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy, science, and art as "different forms of thought" (WP 208) differ from each other by virtue of their specific mode of relationship to the chaos or the pure form of time. In the same book, Deleuze and Guattari propose the concept of chaos to characterize the pure form of time (Smith 2023, 55). Their definition goes as follows:

> *Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a* virtual, *containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately,* without consistency or reference*, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance*. (WP 118, second emphasis is mine)

At each moment, as the empty form of change, time designates an infinite variability. When Deleuze defines thinking as a struggle against chaos, this must be understood as a struggle against the disintegrating powers of time.[88] According to Deleuze, thinking consist in confronting this *infinite variability* and creating out of it an open-ended and dynamic arrangement of heterogeneous elements that were extracted from that chaos, or what Deleuze calls a "chaosmos." It is never a static order because it remains open to being disrupted in the future, and it is under continuous creation. In other words, thinking consists in creating a dynamic territory within infinite variability, a memory that would save one from the infinite speed and variability of time. Principally, the work of science consists in slowing down the infinite variability of time by cutting through the infinite variability through a plane of reference and extracting variables

[88] "[T]hinking does not occur in the categories of subject and object, but in a variable relation to territory and to the earth" (TRM 379, my italic; WP 85). Here the earth used synonymously with the chaos, and thus, with the pure form of time.

that enter into determinable relationships in a function. As for philosophy, it cuts the infinite variability of time through a plane of consistency and keeps the infinite speed of time by extracting variations that converge as the component of a concept. And the work of art consists in cutting through the infinite variability through a plane of composition and extracting varieties out of it (WP 202). Thus, thinking itself, in the face of time, has a precarious existence in a way that the future designates the constant hazard of loss of integrity, unity, and coherence. In other words, thinking is constantly under the threat of a "properly chaotic world without identity" (DR 57, original emphasis). In this sense, when thinking discovers itself necessarily happening within time and discovers the autonomy of the latter with regard to its own occurrence, or any event of subjectivation and objectivation happening within it, it confronts nothing but the pure fact of the possibility of disintegration and death at each instant of time. Thinking as a struggle against the becoming-terror of time indicates nothing but its hazardous game with death. Of this terror of the possible death that thinking constantly confronts and struggles against, Deleuze says:

> *Nothing is more distressing than a thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off, that disappear hardly formed, already eroded by forgetfulness or precipitated into others that we no longer master. These are infinite variabilities, the appearing and disappearing of which coincide. They are infinite speeds that blend into the immobility of the colorless and silent nothingness they traverse, without nature or thought. This is the instant of which we do not know whether it is too long or too short for time. We receive sudden jolts that beat like arteries. We constantly lose our ideas. That is why we want to hang on to fixed opinions so much*. (WP 201)

Besides the precarity of the being of thought itself, thought productions also remain precarious in the face of the disintegrating and disruptive powers of the future. Though it is itself is constantly under the danger of destruction, disruption, or metamorphosis, thought, in so far as it creates a dynamic plane within chaos, gives us a *ground* for life, a precarious ground. Though thinking can think of an absolute, viz., the pure and empty form of time, this absolute does not provide us with unchanging, eternal, and universal truths. Instead, it is the truth of the precarity of the best models and concepts we have that would lead us to be suspicious and critical of our own positions. Hence, Deleuzian theory of thought shows us that thinking is bound to remain in the gray area, away from the tempting tranquility of white and black. The highest point thought productions could reach in terms of truth is a precarious truth, a truth that is open to be destroyed or metamorphosed.

To the twofold precarity of thinking, there accompanies thought's vacillation between ground and groundlessness. On the one hand, thought discovers an absolute: The pure form of time *is*, independent of what happens within it. It is a necessary condition of all contingent occurrences. In so far as there can be nothing determining the pure form of time, there can be no necessary occurrences but only contingent occurrences. Time, as a necessary condition of occurrences, is not itself an occurrence. On the other hand, this absolute leaves us with uncertainty since, as a necessary condition, nothing necessitates time's own necessity. Thus, in principle, it is possible that time abolishes itself in the future. In other words, its necessity as a condition of what happens does not guarantee its eternity. It is necessary without being eternal. The consequences of this new conception of time are extreme: Anything can change, the form of experience, the form of thinking, and even the stability of change itself.

But the disruptive powers of the future are not too restrictive on thought's capacity for creating well-grounded productions. Time's power of metamorphosis does not mean that nothing can be said to be *true*, though we can say nothing can be true eternally. This is the reason why I prefer the term precarious truth over the Nietzschean term false to designate the truth status of the thought productions. The falsity that truth finds itself always in danger of is a falsity *on the horizon*. All truths are potentially subject to the disintegrating powers of the pure form of time. Thus, the idea of the metamorphosis of truth in Deleuze has nothing to do with truth's being merely fiction or illusion. "Necessity does not suppress or abolish chance" (NP 26), just as chance and contingency do not abolish necessity. Though the disruptive forces of the future potentially prohibit postulating anything eternal, it does not obstruct us from creating well-grounded constructions which, though they remain open to change, can have a truth that is on the way to being re-produced. To reiterate, no form of thinking can produce a necessary production having a universal and eternal truth. But this does not eschew thought from having a necessity, a *precarious necessity* that always remains open to be destroyed or changed. However, in order to determine if it will be destroyed or changed, we need to be vigilant. We cannot assume from the start that it is false, or it will change. It must demonstrate its changeability by changing itself. If we take a thought production as if it will *necessarily change* in the future, we already approach it from the side of necessity rather than contingency. This way, we do not affirm the chance. But the pure form of time forces us to remain in the precarity of the chance.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez Deleuze'ün düşünme felsefesinin özellikle onun metafizik ile olan ilişkisini tartışarak ayrıntılı bir incelemesini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk bölüm, Deleuze'ün düşünme anlayışını Batı felsefe geleneğindeki diğer iki önde gelen düşünce kavrayışından ayırmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Deleuze'ün Kantçı düşünme modeline yönelik eleştirilerine odaklanmakta ve bu sorunlara önerdiği çözümü kısaca sunmaktadır. Sonraki üç bölüm, düşünce kuramı içindeki çok önemli bir soruna, yani düşünmenin gerçekle ilişkisine ve onun bir mutlağa ulaşma kapasitesine odaklanmaktadır. Bu amaçla, bu bölümler Deleuze'ün düşünme felsefesi, zaman felsefesi ve metafiziğ. arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışmaktadır. Bu son üç bölümdeki argümanım, Deleuze'ün "saf bir metafizikçi" olarak, düşüncenin bir mutlağa ulaima konusunda benim spekülatif zamansalcılık adını verdiğim dogmatik olmayan spekülatif bir pozisyon ileri sürdüğüdür. Bu pozisyona göre, düşünce mutlak yani koşulsuz bir gerçeğe ulaşabilir; bu, değişimin saf ve boş biçimi olarak zamanın, olumsal insan düşüncesi ve deneyimi de dahil olmak üzere herhangi bir oluşumun koşulu olmasıdır. Bununla birlikte, Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisinde orijinal olan şey, herhangi bir gerekliliğin ve düşüncenin ulaşabileceği gerçeğin güvencesi ve kırılgan bir zorunluluk olarak kalmasıdır, yani zamanın saf formunun gerekliliği de dahil olmak üzere tüm gerçeklerin, zamanın yıkıcı ve dönüştürücü güçleri tarafından yok edilmeye ve dönüştürülmeye açık olmasıdır.

Felsefede düşünmeye ilişkin sorular, yani düşüncenin neliği, onun temel öğeleri, duyum ve bellekle ilişkisi ve temel kapasitelerine ilişkin sorular ortaya atıldığında, bu soruların genellikle zihin felsefesi, epistemoloji veya rasyonel psikoloji alanına ait olduğu düşünülür. Peki her ne kadar zihin felsefesi ve epistemoloji ile ilişkili olsa bile özellikle düşünmenin ve düşüncenin doğasına odaklanan özerk bir çalışma alanının varolabileceğini söyleyebilir miyiz? Bu tezde düşünce, bilgi ve zihin felsefelerinin üç ayrı çalışma alanını imlediğini ve kabaca ifade edersek, birincil çalışma konularının sırasıyla düşünce, bilgi ve zihin olduğunu varsayacağım. Kuşkusuz, bu alanların her

biri, öğrenimleri sırasında, birincil araştırma konularıyla ilgili olduğu ölçüde diğer iki konuyla iletişim halinde kalır. Fakat özel olarak düşünce kuramını ilgilendiren soruların kabaca bir listesi şöyle olabilir: Düşünme dediğimiz şey nedir? Sadece insanlar mı düşünür, yoksa başka varlıkların da düşündüğünü söyleyebilir miyiz? Eğer söyleyebilirsek neden? Düşüncenin asli ve arızi öğeleri nelerdir? Bir kavram nedir? Düşünmenin akıl yürütme, duyumsama, algılama, duygulanımlar ile ilişkisi nedir? Düşünce, sonlu sınırları içinde kalarak koşulsuz bir şeye, mutlak ve öznel olmayan bir hakikate ulaşabilir mi? Düşünme felsefesini bu sorulardan hareketle tanımladığımızda, felsefi literatürdeki "düşünme felsefesi" teriminin yokluğuna karşın bu alanın en az felsefe kadar eski olduğunu düşünmek abartı olmayacaktır. Kadim ruh teorilerinden, zihnin doğasına ilişkin erken modern teoriler ve Kantçı sentez fikri ve çağdaş neo-materyalizmlere kadar, felsefi düşünce kendisini yüzyıllarca şüphesiz düşünce meselesiyle ve yukarıda sıralanan sorularla farklı şekillerde uğraşırken bulmuştur.

Gilles Deleuze'ün düşünmenin doğasına ilişkin bu uzun araştırma tarihi içindeki özgünlüklerinden biri, düşünce kuramı tarihine kökleşmiş varsayımların hakim olduğu ve düşünceye ilişkin yukarıdaki temel sorular odağında gelişecek ciddi bir felsefi incelemenin, düşünceyi insanın doğal ve evrensel bir kapasitesi olarak gören köklü bir düşünce tarafından anında boğulduğunu iddia eden kışkırtıcı fikridir. Düşünmeyi en temelde belirli bir doğal kapasitenin hayata geçirilmesi olarak görmek, Deleuze'ün "herkesin düşünmenin ne anlama geldiğini üstü kapalı olarak bilmesi gerektiği" (DR 131) varsayımı üzerine inşa edilen dogmatik veya ortodoks düşünce imgesi olarak adlandırdığı şeyin temel ilkelerinden birini oluşturur. Deleuze, bu dogmatik düşünce imgesi kavramını yalıtarak, felsefe tarihindeki önemli bir sorunu ortaya çıkarır; o da, ne apaçık ne de savunulabilir olan yerleşik bir düşünme kavramının, yalnızca teorik düşünme, zihin, bilgi anlayışımızın değil, aynı zamanda bu teorik anlayışla şekillenen uygulamalarımızın da rotasını belirlemiş olmasıdır. Düşünmenin anlamı, düşünmeyle ilgili soru sorulmadan önce karara bağlanmıştır: Düşünme, doğal bir hakikat becerisiyle donatılmış, belirli ve doğal bir kapasitedir. Düşüncenin hakikat yolundan sapması ancak onun doğal akışına dışsal saptırıcılar, yani tutkular tarafından yönlendirildiğinde, yani bir fail olmaktan çok bir münfail haline geldiğinde olur. Deleuze, dogmatik düşünce imgesinin diğer özelliklerini şu şekilde özetler (DR 167): Dogmatik düşünce imgesinde, düşünme modeli ya da biçimi, farklı yetilerin yan algı, hayal gücü, hafıza ve anlama gibi yetilerin aynı nesne üzerinde uyumlu birlikte-işleyişi

olarak anlaşılan tanımadır (recognition). Düşünmenin ideali ortak-duyu (common sense), yani hem farklı yetiler düzeyinde hem de farklı özneler düzeyinde tanınan nesnenin iletilebilirliğidir. Düşüncenin öğeleri temsillerdir. Düşüncenin mantıksal biçimi, önermeler aracılığıyla çözümlenen adlandırma ilişkisidir. Düşüncenin ereği ise bilgidir.

Deleuze, farklı dağılımlarda ve farklı belirlenimlerde olsa da, düşüncenin dogmatik imgesini oluşturan bu sekiz özelliğin, Nietzsche ve Hume (DR 134, NP 103-110) gibi birkaç istisna dışında, Platon'dan Heidegger'e kadar düşünme anlayışına hakim olduğunu savunur. Tezin ilk bölümde detaylı bir şekilde incelediğim gibi, Deleuze dogmatik düşünce imgesini eleştirirken karşısına aldığını iki temel geleneği bir birinden ayırır. Bu geleneklerden biri Platon'un *Theaetetus*'undan başlayıp Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'ne kadar uzanır. Diğeri ise esasen fenomenolojik gelenektir (DR 134, 320n6). Deleuze'ün fenomenoloji üzerine yorumları az olsa da düşünmenin doğası meselesi söz konusu olduğunda fenomenolojiyi Platon'dan başlayıp en azından Kant'a kadar uzanan gelenek üzerinde görece bir "ilerleme" olarak gördüğü açıktır. Fenomenolojiyle, özellikle Heidegger'le, düşüncenin dogmatik imgesinin bazı koyutlarının (tanıma modeli) yok olduğunu düşünür (DR 144). Ancak bu, Heidegger, Husserl (WP 85) ve Merleau Ponty'yi (DR 320n6) felsefelerinin merkezine (DR 129-130) "herkes bilir..." biçimini alan öznel veya örtük bir varsayım yerleştirmekten alıkoymaz. Örneğin Heidegger, Ontoloji-öncesi bir Varlık anlayışının, yani "Dasein'ın kendisine ait temel bir Varlık eğilimi"nin (BT 35, 102) olduğunu ileri sürerek, düşünce ile düşünülmesi gereken arasında temel bir homoloji varsayar ve böylece dogmatik imgeyi daha derin bir düzeye aktarır (WP 209-210).

İlk bölümde, Deleuze'ün dogmatik düşünce imgesine yönelik eleştirisinde analiz edildiği şekliyle Batı felsefi geleneğinde iki baskın düşünme anlayışını sergiliyorum. Bunları düşünmenin temsili ve homolojik kavramsallaştırmaları olarak adlandırıyorum ve Deleuze'ün bu iki kavrama yönelik eleştirilerini sunuyorum. Deleuze'ün dogmatik düşünce imgesini kavramsallaştırmasında merkezi bir rol oynayan düşüncenin temsili kavramsallaştırması, düşünceyi temel olarak kişinin temsili araçlar olarak kavramlar aracılığıyla algının sınırlarını aşma kapasitesi olarak karakterize eder. Homolojik düşünme anlayışı, temsillerin daha ilksel bir ontolojik kategori olan olaylar tarafından önceliğini savunarak temsili kavrayışa karşı çıkar.

Bununla birlikte, hoolojik düşünce kavrayışını savunan filozoflar olayları esas olarak homolojiye veya düşünce ile dünya arasındaki daha derin bir uyumlamaya atıfta bulunarak anlarlar. Böylece, belirli bir kapasite olarak düşünme anlayışını sürdürürler. Son olarak, Deleuze'ün düşünme mefhumunun şeylerden ziyade olaylara ontolojik bir öncelik vermesine rağmen, düşünmeyi belirli bir kapasite olarak değil, problemlerden kaynaklanan olumsal bir süreç olarak yorumlaması bakımından, onun anlayışının homolojik düşünme anlayışından keskin bir şekilde ayrıldığını ileri sürüyorum. Deleuze'ün düşünme kavrayışı düşünmeyi temelde olumsal ve açık uçlu bir yaratma ya da oluş süreci, belirli ve doğuştan gelen bir kapasiteden ziyade olumsal karşılaşmalardan başka hiçbir şeye dayanmayan bir oluş olarak görür. Bu kavrayışa göre düşünmenin neler yapabileceğini bilemeyiz çünkü gözlerimizin önünde yalnızca onun fazlasıyla olumsal olan ve düşüncenin geleceğine dair mutlak bir referans noktası olarak alınamayacak geçmişi vardır.

İkinci bölümde, dogmatik düşünce imgesinin (DR 13) temel bileşenlerinden birini oluşturan Kant'ın öne sürdüğü transendental tanıma modelini inceleyerek, Deleuze'ün dogmatik düşünce imgesine yönelik eleştirilerine daha yakından bakıyorum. İlk önce Deleuze'ün tanıma terimini nasıl anladığını ve bunun düşünmenin doğasını açıklamak için neden yeterli bir model olmadığını düşündüğünü açıklayacağım. Bu amaçla, Deleuze'ün Kant'ın aşkınsal tanıma modeline yönelik üç eleştirisini açıklıyorum. Bunu takiben, Kant'ın tanıma modelinin sorunlarını aşmayı amaçlayan Deleuze'ün Fikirler teorisini ortaya koyuyorum.

Üçüncü bölümde, herhangi bir düşünce kuramının yüzleşmesi gereken temel bir sorunu, yani düşüncenin gereklilik ve hakikatle olan ilişkisini tartışacağım. Soru, düşüncenin gerekli ve koşulsuz bir şeye, bir ilkeye veya bir varlığa ulaşıp ulaşamayacağı ve ulaşabiliyorsa hangi hakla ulaşabileceğidir. Bu soruda söz konusu olanın, Deleuze'ün kendi düşünce teorisinin felsefi değerinden daha az olmadığını göreceğiz. Mutlak olarak olumsal bir süreç olarak düşünme, kendi üretimlerinin gerekliliğini garanti edemiyorsa, diğer bazı teoriler yerine neden Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisini tutmamız gerektiği tartışmalı bir soru olarak kalır. Bu sorunu ortaya koyduktan sonra, bu sorunla yüzleşmek için literatürdeki yorumcular tarafından başvurulan üç ana stratejiyi sunacağım. Bu stratejiler ayrıca Deleuze'ün felsefesini (en azından onun metafiziğini) yorumlamanın üç farklı yolu anlamına gelir. Bu

yaklaşımları rasyonalist, irrasyonalist ve dogmatik olmayan spekülatif okumalar olarak adlandıracağım ve dogmatik olmayan spekülatif bir pozisyonun Deleuze'ün pozisyonunu en iyi karakterize ettiğini iddia edeceğim. Bununla birlikte, Deleuze'ün dogmatik olmayan spekülatif konumu hakkındaki mevcut bilimin, onun metafiziğini zaman felsefesiyle birleştirmekte başarısız olduğunu öne süreceğim. Bu eksiklik, bundan sonraki iki bölümün görevini belirleyecektir. Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisinin bu yönünü incelemek, yalnızca, ikincil literatürde Deleuze'ün felsefesinin çelişkili yorumlarına yol açan farklı yorum çizgileri tarafından ön plana çıkarılan Deleuze felsefesinin görünüşte uyumsuz yönlerini uzlaştırmamıza yardımcı olmayacak, aynı zamanda bizi düşüncenin bir mutlağa ulaşma kapasitesi hakkındaki çağdaş tartışmalarda yeni yollara yönlendirecektir.

Son olarak, Deleuze'ün düşünme kuramı üzerine incelememizi tamamlamak için, zaman ve düşünme arasındaki temel bağı açıklıyorum. Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisinin bu yönünü incelemek, ikincil literatürde Deleuze felsefesinin çelişkili yorumlarına yol açan, Deleuze felsefesinin görünüşte uyumsuz yönlerini uzlaştırmamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Sırasıyla dördüncü ve beşinci bölümde ayrıntılı olarak incelediğim Deleuze'ün düşünce kuramında zamanın en az iki merkezi rolü vardır. Birincisi, farklı boyutlarıyla zaman, düşünme olayı da dahil olmak üzere herhangi bir olayın meydana gelişinin saf aşkın koşuludur. Bu haliyle zaman, şeylerin, olayların ve olguların zemini rolünü oynar. İkinci olarak, zaman "evrensel temelsizleşme" sürecini (DR 91) ve sınırsız yıkım, başkalaşım ve yenilik gücünü gösterir; bu haliyle zaman, her şeyi kökten alt üst etme ve her şeyi, olayı ve olguyu başkalaşımını ve yok oluşunu bekleyen olumsal oluşumlar düzeyine indirgeme gücüne sahip «yanlışçı» rolünü oynar. Zamanın bu iki yönünü bir araya getirdiğimizde, düşüncenin bize ebedi anlamında değil, sağlam temellere dayalı olarak gerekli olan gerekli üretimleri sağlayabileceği sonucuna varıyoruz. Aslında, göreceğimiz gibi, zamanın saf biçimine, tam da ebedi olmayanın değişmez biçimine iyi temellendirilmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte, bu sağlam temellere dayanan yapımlar istikrarsız olmaya devam ediyor, yani gelecekte kesintiye uğramaya veya yok edilmeye açık durumdalar.

Smith'in (2012, 72) haklı olarak işaret ettiği gibi, herhangi bir düşünce kuramının yüzleşmesi gereken en önemli sorunlardan biri, düşüncenin gerçek alanına ulaşma potansiyeline veya düşüncenin gerçekle ilişkisine ilişkin sorudur. Soru şudur:

“Düşünce, gerçeği düşünmek için, yani varoluşun kendisini düşünmek, var olan şeyleri düşünmek için [kendi] yetersiz olanak alanını nasıl terk edebilir?” Düşüncenin, duyarlı öznelere verili olmasının ötesinde gerçeklik hakkında söyleyecek bir şeyi olabilir mi? Düşünce, kavramlarından ve mantıksal ilkelerinden nasıl çıkıp gerçeğe ulaşabilir? Başka bir deyişle, düşünce ürünleri hangi hakla gerekli olabilir? Burada zorunlu teriminden koşulsuz olanı, yani bir özneye bağlı olmadığı için kendinde gerçeğe ait olanı anlıyorum. Genel olarak düşünme felsefesi için geniş kapsamlı önemlerinin yanı sıra, bu soruların özellikle Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisi için kilit öneme sahip olduğu da açık olmalıdır: Eğer düşünme ürünleri olumsal bir oluş sürecine dayanıyorsa, Deleuze'ün kendi felsefen sadece faydalı bir kurguya mı dönüşecek? Başka bir deyişle, Deleuze tüm düşüncelerin olumsal karşılaşmalardan doğduğunu öne sürerken, bu özel iddiaya evrensel ve zorunlu olarak tüm düşüncelere uygulanmasını sağlayan bir statü verir. Dolayısıyla, bu özel düşünce üretimi veya iddiası artık olumsal değil, zorunlu bir iddia gibi görünüyor. Ama Deleuze hangi hakla bunu tartışabilir, halbuki onun konumu bizim "olumsal karşılaşmalardan hiçbir düşünce doğmaz" diye düşünmeye sevk edildiğimiz bir olumsal karşılaşmaya sahip olmamıza bile izin verir. Deleuze'ün düşünce kuramında, tamamen olumsal bir süreç olarak düşünme bize gerekli bir şeyi nasıl sağlayabilir? Düşünmenin kendisi olumsal bir süreçse, Deleuze'e düşünmenin doğası hakkında gerçek ve gerekli bir şey ileri sürme yetkisini veren nedir? Deleuze'ün iddiasını sadece bir kurgu olarak kabul etmek yerine neden onun iddialarına inanalım?

Bu sorunun yanı sıra, Deleuze'ün (2007, 41–42) kendisini bariz bir şekilde “saf metafizikçi” olarak gördüğünü hatırlayın. Deleuze'ün düşünce kuramı, gerçekliğin nihai doğası, bilgi ve temsilin temeli ve özne ile nesne arasındaki ilişkiyle ilgili bazı geleneksel metafizik soruların katı bir tekrarı olarak görülebileceğinden, bu tanım doğru görünmektedir. Ama nihai gerçeklik hakkında söyleyecek bir şeyleri olan metafizikçi Deleuze’ü nasıl anlamlandıracağız, eğer düşüncenin bize sağlayabileceği her şey onun dar olumsal yaratımlarının sınırları içinde kalıyorsa? Düşünmenin hakikate doğal bir yakınlığı yoksa ve ürettikleri hakikat ya da yanlış açısından değerlendirilemiyorsa, Deleuze'ün düşünce üzerine kendi iddialarını desteklemek için ne tür gerekçelerimiz olabilir? Bu bakımdan gerçek ile düşünce arasındaki ilişkide söz konusu olanın sadece Deleuze'ün düşünce kuramı değil, Deleuze felsefesinin tüm metafizik yönü olduğunu söylemek abartı olmaz.

Bilim adamlarının Deleuze'ün felsefesindeki bu tartışmalı sorunu ele aldığı birçok yolu geniş bir şekilde incelersek, sanırım Deleuze'ün metafiziğini anlamanın üç temel yolu ile ilişkilendirilebilecek, sıklıkla benimsenen en az üç genel yaklaşımı ayırt edebiliriz. Rasyonalist okumalar olarak adlandıracağım bir dizi yorum, Deleuze'ü Kant öncesi dogmatik metafizik gelenekle aynı hizaya getiriyor ve düşüncenin gerekli yaratımları üretme kapasitesi sorununun, en iyi ihtimalle, Deleuze'ün genel felsefesine aykırı bir konu olduğunu öne sürüyor. Bu yorumlar genellikle Deleuze'ü skolastik felsefi kavramları canlandırarak gerçekliğin temel yapısı hakkında kayıtsız şartsız ve dogmatik bir şekilde konuşan kaba bir metafizikçi olarak görür. Bununla birlikte, Deleuze'ün düşünce teorisini bu noktaya kadar açıklamamın da gösterdiği gibi, rasyonalist okumalar zararlı bir şekilde kusurludur çünkü Deleuze, Kantçı metafizik eleştirisinin gerekliliklerini ihmal etmekten uzaktır. Dolayısıyla onu geleneksel bir metafizikçi olarak kabul edemeyiz. Benim irrasyonalist okumalar olarak adlandırdığım başka bir yorum dizisi, Deleuze'ün felsefesinin mutlakiyetçi olmadığını ve metafizik karşıtı olduğunu savunur. Güçlü bir metin desteğine sahip olan bu okumalar, esas olarak Deleuze'ün bir metafizik karşıtı olduğunu iddia eder; yani, mutlak gerçeklere giden bir yol olarak felsefenin geleneksel imajını alt üst eder. Akılcı olmayan okumalar, akılcı okumalara kıyasla Deleuze'ün felsefesinin ruhuna daha uygun olsa da, Deleuze'ün felsefesinin, kuşkusuz onun düşüncesinin göz ardı edilemez bir boyutunu oluşturan metafizik yönünü tatmin edici bir şekilde açıklamaktan aciz kalırlar. Daha yakın zamanlarda, bu ikisi arasında, benim dogmatik olmayan spekülatif okumalar olarak adlandıracağım bir orta yol okuması önerildi. "Spekülatif" derken, gerçeklik hakkında söyleyecek bir şeyi olan, bir mutlak form üzerinde iddiası olan herhangi bir pozisyonu anlıyorum. Dogmatik derken, düşüncenin ve bilginin tabi olduğu şartları ve sınırları dikkate almayan bir duruşu anlıyorum. Dolayısıyla, bu sınırları ve koşulları dikkate alan bir pozisyon "kritik" olarak görülebilir. Eleştirel spekülatif yorumlar, Kant sonrası dönemin fazlasıyla eleştirel bir filozofu olarak Deleuze'ün, entelektüel sezgiye dayalı dogmatik metafizik mutlaklığın Kantçı reddini tamamen benimserken, dogmatik olmayan bir spekülatif felsefe yarattığını ileri sürer. Deleuze'ün felsefesi, gerçek hakkında söyleyecek bir şeyi olduğu sürece spekülatiftir. Ama aynı zamanda eleştirel felsefenin gerekliliklerine duyarlı olduğu için dogmatik değildir; yani konunun ve düşüncenin sınırlarını dikkate alır. Bu nedenle, dogmatik olmayan spekülatif okumalar, Deleuze'ün metafiziği çok özel bir şekilde yaptığını iddia eder.

Eleştirel spekülatif okumaların bize Deleuze'ün metafizik konumunun en tatmin edici açıklamasını sağladığını öne süreceğim. Sonraki iki bölümdeki görevim, literatürde mevcut yorumların korkunç eksikliklerinden biri olan zaman ile Deleuze'ün spekülatif felsefesi arasındaki ilişkiyi dikkate alarak Deleuze'ün eleştirel spekülatif metafizik konumunu yeniden inşa etmek olacak. Başka bir deyişle, geleceğin yıkıcı güçleri fikri ile gerçeğin yapısı olarak İdea mefhumunu, Deleuze'ün spekülatif felsefesinde yer alan zaman kavramının analizi yoluyla bir araya getireceğim. Deleuze felsefesinin görünüşte uyumsuz olan bu iki yönünü bir araya getirmek için, zamanın Deleuze'ün eleştirel spekülatif felsefesindeki merkezi rolünü açıklamamız gerekir. Bu aynı zamanda, Deleuze'ün spekülatif felsefesinin ve düşünme felsefesinin özgünlüğünü oluşturan şeyin tam da görünüşte çelişen bu iki yönün eşzamanlılığı olduğunu görmemizi sağlayacaktır.

Bu noktaya kadarki araştırmamız, en azından iki düzeyde, düşüncenin güvencesizliğinin bir kanıtı olarak görülebilir.

Düşünmek, kaos içinde bir alan, kaos içinde açık uçlu bir düzlem, zamanın sonsuz hızında dinamik bir hafıza yaratmaktan başka bir şey değildir. Düşünce zamanın sonsuz hızı (WP 203) ya da "Kaosa karşı bir mücadele" olduğu sürece, her zaman geleceğin parçalayıcı güçlerinin riski altındadır. Felsefe Nedir'de Deleuze ve Guattari, "farklı düşünce biçimleri" (WP 208) olarak felsefe, bilim ve sanatın, kaosla veya zamanın saf biçimiyle olan özel ilişki tarzları nedeniyle birbirlerinden farklı olduklarını tartışırlar. Aynı kitapta Deleuze ve Guattari, zamanın saf biçimini karakterize etmek için kaos kavramını önermektedir (Smith 2023, 55). Tanımları şu şekildedir:

> Kaos, düzensizlikten çok, içinde şekillenen her biçimin yok olduğu sonsuz hızla tanımlanır. Bu bir hiçlik değil, virtüel bir boşluktur, tüm olası parçacıkları içerir ve tüm olası biçimleri çizer, bunlar aniden ortadan kaybolmak için, tutarlılık veya referans olmaksızın, sonuçsuz bir şekilde ortaya çıkar. Kaos, sonsuz bir doğum ve yok oluş hızıdır." (WP118)

Değişimin boş biçimi olarak zaman her an sonsuz bir değişkenliği belirtir. Deleuze, düşünmeyi kaosa karşı bir mücadele olarak tanımladığında, bu, zamanın parçalayıcı güçlerine karşı bir mücadele olarak anlaşılmalıdır. Deleuze'e göre düşünme, bu sonsuz değişkenlikle yüzleşmekten ve ondan, bu kaostan çıkarılan heterojen öğelerin açık

uçlu ve dinamik bir düzenlemesini veya Deleuze'ün "kaozmos" dediği şeyi yaratmaktan ibarettir. Asla durağan bir düzen değildir çünkü bu düzen gelecekte bozulmaya açık kalır ve sürekli yaratım halindedir. Başka bir deyişle, düşünme, sonsuz değişkenlik içinde dinamik bir bölge, kişiyi zamanın sonsuz hızından ve değişkenliğinden kurtaracak bir hafıza yaratmaktan ibarettir. Prensip olarak, bilimin işi, zamanın sonsuz değişkenliğini, bir referans düzlemi yoluyla sonsuz değişkenliği keserek ve bir fonksiyonda belirlenebilir ilişkilere giren değişkenleri çıkararak yavaşlatmaktan ibarettir. Felsefeye gelince, zamanın sonsuz değişkenliğini bir tutarlılık düzleminden keser ve bir kavramın bileşeni olarak birleşen varyasyonları çıkararak zamanın sonsuz hızını korur. Ve sanat eseri, bir kompozisyon düzlemi boyunca sonsuz değişkenliği kesmek ve ondan çeşitleri çıkarmaktan ibarettir (WP 202). Bu nedenle, düşünmenin kendisi, zamanın karşısında istikrarsız bir varoluşa sahiptir; öyle ki, gelecek sürekli bütünlük, birlik ve tutarlılık kaybı tehlikesini belirtir. Başka bir deyişle, düşünme sürekli olarak "kimliğin olmadığı tam anlamıyla kaotik bir dünyanın" tehdidi altındadır (DR 57). Bu anlamda düşünme, zaman içinde zorunlu olarak gerçekleştiğini keşfettiğinde ve kendi oluşumuna ya da onda meydana gelen herhangi bir özneleşme ve nesnelleşme olayına göre ikincinin özerkliğini keşfettiğinde, karşısına parçalanma ve nesnelleşme olasılığının saf gerçeğinden başka bir şey çıkmaz. Zamanın dehşet-oluşuna karşı bir mücadele olarak düşünmek, onun ölümle oynadığı tehlikeli oyundan başka bir şey ifade etmez. Deleuze, düşünmenin sürekli olarak yüzleştiği ve mücadele ettiği bu olası ölüm dehşeti hakkında şunları söyler:

> *Kendinden kaçan bir düşünceden, uçup giden, zar zor kaybolan, unutkanlıkla çoktan aşınmış veya artık hakim olmadığımız başka fikirlere dönüşmüş fikirlerden daha üzücü bir şey yoktur. Bunlar, ortaya çıkmaları ve kaybolmaları çakışan sonsuz değişkenliklerdir. Doğasız ve düşüncesiz, içinden geçtikleri renksiz ve sessiz hiçliğin hareketsizliğine karışan sonsuz hızlardır. Bu, zaman açısından çok uzun mu yoksa çok kısa mı olduğunu bilmediğimiz andır. Damar gibi atan ani sarsıntılar alıyoruz. Fikirlerimizi sürekli kaybediyoruz. Bu yüzden sabit görüşlere başlanmak bu kadar istiyoruz*. (WP 201)

Düşüncenin varlığının belirsizliğinin yanı sıra, düşünce üretimleri de geleceğin parçalayıcı ve yıkıcı güçleri karşısında güvencesiz kalır. Düşünce, kendisi sürekli olarak yok olma, bozulma ya da başkalaşım tehlikesi altında olmasına rağmen, kaos içinde dinamik bir düzlem yarattığı ölçüde, bize yaşam için bir zemin, istikrarsız bir

zemin verir. Düşünme mutlak, yani zamanın saf ve boş biçimini düşünebilse de, bu mutlak bize değişmez, ebedi ve evrensel hakikatler sağlamaz. Bunun yerine, sahip olduğumuz en iyi modellerin ve kavramların güvencesizliği gerçeği bizi kendi konumlarımızdan şüphe duymaya ve eleştirmeye yöneltecektir. Dolayısıyla Deleuzecü düşünce kuramı bize, düşünmenin beyaz ve siyahın cezbedici dinginliğinden uzakta, gri alanda kalmaya mahkûm olduğunu gösterir. Düşünce üretimlerinin gerçeklik açısından ulaşabilecekleri en yüksek nokta, istikrarsız, yok edilmeye veya başkalaşıma açık bir gerçektir.

Düşünmenin iki yönlü kararsızlığına, düşüncenin temel ile temelsizlik arasındaki yalpalaması eşlik eder. Bir yandan düşünce bir mutlağı keşfeder: Zamanın saf biçimi, içinde olup bitenlerden bağımsızdır. Tüm olumsal olayların gerekli bir koşuludur. Zamanın saf biçimini belirleyen hiçbir şey olamayacağına göre, zorunlu olaylar olamaz, sadece olumsal olaylar olabilir. Olayların zorunlu koşulu olarak zamanın kendisi bir olay değildir. Öte yandan bu mutlak, zorunlu bir koşul olarak zamanın kendi zorunluluğunu gerektirmeyen hiçbir şey olmadığı için bizi bir belirsizlik içinde bırakır. Böylece, ilke olarak, zamanın gelecekte kendini ortadan kaldırması mümkündür. Başka bir deyişle, olanın bir koşulu olarak gerekliliği, onun ebediliğini garanti etmez. Ebedi olmadan gereklidir. Bu yeni zaman anlayışının sonuçları aşırıdır: Her şey değişebilir, deneyimin biçimi, düşünme biçimi ve hatta değişimin istikrarı bile.

Ancak geleceğin yıkıcı güçleri, düşüncenin sağlam temelli üretimler yaratma kapasitesini çok kısıtlayıcı değildir. Zamanın başkalaşım gücü, hiçbir şeyin doğru olamayacağı anlamına gelmez, ancak hiçbir şeyin ebediyen doğru olamayacağını söyleyebiliriz. Düşünce üretimlerinin doğruluk statüsünü belirtmek için Nietzscheci "yanlış" terimi yerine güvencesiz hakikat terimini tercih etmemin nedeni budur. Gerçeğin kendisini her zaman tehlikede bulduğu yanlışlık, ufukta beliren bir yanlışlıktır. Tüm gerçekler potansiyel olarak zamanın saf biçiminin parçalayıcı güçlerine tabidir. Bu nedenle, Deleuze'deki hakikatin başkalaşımı fikrinin, hakikatin sadece kurgu ya da yanılsama olmasıyla hiçbir ilgisi yoktur. "Zorunluluk şansı bastırmaz veya ortadan kaldırmaz" (NP 26), tıpkı şans ve olumsallığın zorunluluğu ortadan kaldırmaması gibi. Geleceğin yıkıcı güçleri potansiyel olarak ebedi herhangi bir şeyi varsaymayı yasaklasa da, bu bizi değişime açık olsalar da yeniden üretilmek üzere olan bir hakikate sahip sağlam temellere dayalı yapılar yaratmaktan alıkoymaz.

Yinelemek gerekirse, hiçbir düşünce biçimi, evrensel ve ebedi bir doğruluğa sahip gerekli bir üretimi üretemez. Ancak bu, düşünceyi bir zorunluluğa, her zaman yok edilmeye veya değiştirilmeye açık kalan belirsiz bir zorunluluğa sahip olmaktan kurtarmaz. Ancak, yok edilip edilmeyeceğini veya değiştirilip değiştirilmeyeceğini belirlemek için uyanık olmamız gerekiyor. Baştan bunun yanlış olduğunu yoksa değişeceğini varsayamayız. Değişebilirliğini kendini değiştirerek göstermelidir. Bir düşünce üretimini gelecekte zorunlu olarak değişecekmiş gibi ele alırsak, ona zaten olumsallıktan çok zorunluluk açısından yaklaşıyoruz demektir. Bu ise, şansı ve olumsallığı olumlamıyoruz demektir. Ancak zamanın saf biçimi bizi şansın kararsızlığında kalmaya zorlar.

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