

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT: FROM ARCHAEOLOGY TO
GENEALOGY, FROM STRUCTURALISM TO POSTSTRUCTURALISM

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ABSTRACT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT: FROM ARCHAEOLOGY TO GENEALOGY, FROM STRUCTURALISM TO POSTSTRUCTURALISM

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The question of whether Foucault can be considered a structuralist or a poststructuralist philosopher has led to various interpretations among Foucault scholars. On the one hand, the Foucault scholars reading his archaeological method from a poststructuralist perspective argue that Foucault aimed to diagnose the *present* from the beginning of his archaeological period in order to understand what the present day is. On the other hand, some argue that Foucault cannot be called a structuralist because he is concerned with specific discursive formations whose truth value is relative to a particular historical period and culture. Furthermore, the Foucauldian methodological change from archaeology to genealogy has been an ongoing debate based on such explanations of from *discursivity* to *nondiscursivity*, from *knowledge* to *power and knowledge*, or an *isolable* domain of knowledge to *non-isolable* domains

of knowledge and power. This study aims to ascertain the accuracy of scholars' interpretations as to whether Foucault can be called a structuralist or a poststructuralist. In the end, this thesis has significance in contributing a new interpretation to the discussion among Foucault scholars; it also serves the purpose of a better understanding of Michel Foucault's philosophy by treating the Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical methods in their terms.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, structuralism, poststructuralism, archaeology, genealogy



ÖZ

MICHEL FOUCAULT FELSEFESİ: ARKEOLOJİ'DEN JENEOLOJİ'YE, YAPISALCILIK'TAN POSTYAPISALCILI'ĞA

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Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı bir filozof olarak kabul edilip edilemeyeceği sorusu, Foucault akademisyenleri arasında çeşitli yorumlara yol açmıştır. Bir yandan Foucault'nun arkeolojik yöntemini postyapısalcı bir bakış açısıyla okuyan Foucault akademisyenleri, Foucault'nun arkeolojik döneminin başından itibaren bugünü teşhis etmeyi, şimdiki zamanın hangi koşullar örüntüsüne dayalı olduğunu göstermeyi amaçladığını, en azından böyle bir niyeti olduğunu iddia ederler. Öte yandan bazıları Foucault doğruluk değeri belirli bir tarihsel dönem ve kültüre bağlı olan belirli söylemsel oluşumlarla ilgilendiği için onun yapısalcı olarak adlandırılmayacağını öne sürüyor. Dahası arkeolojiden jeneolojiye Foucault'nun

yöntemsel deęiřimi, *söylemsel* olandan *söylemsel olmayana*, *bilgiden iktidar* ve *bilgiye* veya izole edilebilir bir bilgi alanından izole edilemez bilgi ve iktidar alanlarına yönelik bu tür açıklamalara dayanan süregelen bir tartışma konusu olmuřtur. Bu çalışma Foucault akademisyenlerinin Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı mı olarak adlandırılabileceęine dair yorumlarının doğruluęunu tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, Foucault arařtırmacıları arasındaki tartışmaya yeni bir yorum getirme açısından önem taşımaktadır; Foucault'nun arkeolojik ve jeneolojik yöntemlerini kendi terimleriyle ele alarak Michel Foucault felsefesini daha iyi anlama amacına da hizmet etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Michel Foucault, yapısalcılık, postyapısalcılık, arkeoloji, jeneoloji

To my grumpy cat



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Michel Foucault was an influential French philosopher in the 20th century who was generally associated with the movements of structuralism and poststructuralism. However, among Foucault scholars, whether he is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker is still debated. This is because Foucault avoids giving clear-cut definitions about himself regarding whether he is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker. *Prima facie*, this dispute is very understandable, considering that his writings can be interpreted in both ways.

Structuralism as a new way of looking at human beings had gained its venerated prominence with the rise of social sciences in France in the 1950s. However, due to its excessive claims, structuralism later began to be devalued by academicians in France. Poststructuralism, however, started to take its place as a counter-response in the 1970s.

Generally speaking, what is striking in Foucault's philosophy is the conclusion that human knowledge and human beings are historical. It is evident that to reach such a conclusion, Foucault had to go through a long process.

Foucault's entire philosophy is generally differentiated in terms of three periods: archaeological, genealogical, and ethical. However, for this thesis, I intend to focus on his first two periods, namely, archaeology and genealogy. I will especially focus on his *The Order of Things*, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, *Discipline and Punish*, and

History of Sexuality Volume I. The first two books can be categorized as belonging to the archaeological period, stressing the historical structures responsible for the formation of particular *discourses*; his last two books, on the other hand, can be considered as belonging to the genealogical period, working on the complex relationship between *knowledge* and *power*.

Considering the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism, Foucault's turn from archaeology to genealogy has an undeniable effect on formulating my thesis. This thesis aims to present that the transformation of the Foucauldian archaeological method into the genealogical one can be interpreted as a shift from structuralism to poststructuralism. For this purpose, this thesis is divided into three chapters. First, I will describe structuralism and poststructuralism. Correspondingly, I will define the Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical methods. Second, I will depict how some Foucault scholars discuss whether Foucault is a structuralist or a post-structuralist. Last, I will investigate how accurate these scholars' interpretations are. In light of the order of these chapters, I hope the manner in which I read Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods will support the thesis statement that the methodological change from the Foucauldian archaeological method to the genealogical one can be interpreted as a shift from structuralism to poststructuralism. Reading the Foucauldian archaeological method from a structuralist perspective and his genealogical method from a poststructuralist perspective will help us better understand Michel Foucault's philosophy. More specifically, in his *The Order of Things*, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, *Discipline and Punish*, and *History of Sexuality Volume I*, the problems that are raised, the questions that are addressed, the strategies that are developed, and the concerns and purposes that are voiced and served are different. For this reason, I prefer to read each one in its own right, considering not only the contents of these books but also the external factors that may have affected them. By dividing his entire philosophical achievements into two main streams, structuralism and poststructuralism, the different concepts he used in his studies can be much better understood.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I will try to give a general account of the claims of structuralism and poststructuralism. Correspondingly, I will explain the Foucauldian

archaeological and genealogical methods. This section will be divided into four sections.

In the first section, I will give a general account of structuralism. As a popular movement among French intellectuals, structuralism is regarded as a way to understand and conceptualize social reality by adapting some principles and approaches. Specifically, structuralism takes an object of study as a whole, no matter the subject; it can be a language, a human psyche, a literary text, or a slice of a historical moment.

Generally speaking, structuralist thinkers try to create a self-enclosed system in which its elements are interrelated with one another. They aim to formularize the originative rules allegedly responsible for the construction of systems. In their accounts, they embrace the idea that social reality can be read like a textbook whose blind spots are deciphered by intellectual effort. This movement assumes that human reality is subject to a set of rules, which are abstract, static in themselves, and closed to human consciousness. Therefore, structuralist thinkers try to uncover these rules, the inner logic underlying the relations among the elements of a system. In other words, they disclose what is unspoken in what is spoken and what is unapparent in what is apparent. Uncovering the hidden network of the structures embedded in a society is the general purpose of structuralism. Hence, they prioritize the principles of the *unconscious level of knowledge*, *synchronicity*, *atemporality*, and *universality*.

In the second section of the chapter, I will describe the movement of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism becomes popular in the beginning of the 1970s. Poststructuralist thinkers are concerned with analyzing such themes as *power relations*, the social construction of human subjects, writing and textuality, political judgments, sexual differences, and gender studies. Moreover, poststructuralism gives up on any sort of totalizing tendency toward social reality because it focuses on how complex daily life is. In other words, poststructuralist thinkers emphasize the complexity of human experiences in their specificity. That is, they reject the idea that any single theory can account for everything social.

Additionally, they are most interested in social practices and situations in which people become subjects. Poststructuralist thinkers consider that human subjects are socially constructed. Further, poststructuralist accounts are critical in showing that what seems apolitical is indeed bound up with several political processes; what seems necessary could have been formulated otherwise, and what appears to be natural is, in fact, socially constructed. Furthermore, thanks to these poststructuralist conclusions, the deterministic inclination of structuralism toward social facts began to be rejected.

In the third section of the first chapter, I will explain the Foucauldian archaeological method. What Foucault does in this period is the archaeology of historical discourses. He investigates how specific discursive formations have an originary role in determining particular discourses within a given historical period. What is the most intriguing aspect of his archaeological studies is the fact that discourses in a discipline share undeniable structural patterns linking them within a given historical period. Therefore, he creates such a notion, i.e., *episteme*, in order to define the historical periods. He treats each period as self-enclosed domains whose boundaries are defined according to the similarities among the rules responsible for the formation of discourses. These rules are what Foucault calls *historical a priori*. These rules are embedded in culture; people are not aware of these rules. In that regard, similar to structuralists, Foucault is concerned with excavating the unconscious rules buried in each episteme.

However, by the end of the 1960s, especially in his interviews, Foucault admits that he felt incapable of explaining the transition between different historical periods. This is because the system that he projects consists of a history based on an atemporal temporality. That is to say, while he initially intended to study the notions of breaks, paradigms, thresholds, and anomalies to map out an order in a given culture, he disregarded the notion of *change*. In short, his archaeology was incapable of giving an account of why, how, and through which mechanisms one set of historical a priori rules led to another and, thus, why, how, and through which mechanisms one discursive formation was replaced by another. In the 1970s, Foucault realized that new discourses do not come into existence ex-nihilo. However, his archaeological method

did not have the toolbox to give an account of the mechanism of change effectively. Thus, he was unsatisfied with his archaeological account as it was based on a holistic and strictly *discursive* point of view. Accordingly, in his genealogical period, he is much more concerned with *nondiscursive* practices in order to give a complete account of the notion of *change*.

In the last section of this chapter, I will describe the Foucauldian genealogical method. With this method, Foucault enters the realm of *power relations*. He applies his genealogical method to study such nondiscursive elements of knowledge-formation as institutional structure, social and familial authority, gender norms, etc., to give a complete account of the mechanisms of change. To do this, he needs to show the connection of the present to the past, given that new discourses do not come into existence *ex-nihilo*. Since the archaeological method is only interested in the discursive field of knowledge and renders the historical periods in a totalistic manner, it is insufficient to show the mechanism of *transformation* between discourses. Foucault, thereby, turns to genealogical analyses to give an account of the notion of change. What he aims with the method is to display how the traces of contemporary practices emerged out of particular struggles, strategies, and exercises of power. Each practice has its own history and specific course of events. Therefore, Foucault studies the temporalized forms of knowledge and power by tracing the processes out of which contemporary practices emerged.

In the second chapter of the thesis, I will describe some Foucault scholars' interpretations regarding whether Foucault is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker. We will see that such scholars as Diaz-Bone, Sturrock, Rabate, and Lundy read Foucault as a structuralist. On the other hand, names like Gordon, Monod, and Olssen read Foucault from a non-structuralist perspective. The third interpretation comes from Koopman, who read Foucault from neither a structuralist nor a poststructuralist perspective. Last, we will see that such names, like Gutting, Descombes, Besley, and Flynn, read Foucault from a poststructuralist perspective.

In the last chapter of the thesis, I will critically evaluate the accuracy of the accounts of these Foucault scholars. I will argue that the main fallacy in these accounts can be described as follows: They retrospectively look at the Foucauldian archaeological method and assume some sort of *continuity* between his two different periods. Moreover, they take Foucault's own but late interpretation of his life-long purpose, which is supposedly to give an account of the *present*, for granted by arguing that the archaeological method of the 1960s and the genealogical method of the 1970s are complementary with each other or correspond to the expansion of one another. They also disregard the social and political background at the time when Foucault goes on to a methodological change as if Foucault had not been influenced by his time. To be more specific, the reliance upon structuralist accounts was on the wane between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. And the time when the shift from structuralism to post-structuralism occurred was simultaneous with the time when Foucault turned his attention from archaeology to genealogy. In my reading, I will take the Foucauldian archaeological method in its own terms. And I will treat the methodological change as a shift from structuralism to post-structuralism. While this thesis has significance in contributing a new interpretation to the discussion among Foucault scholars, it also serves the purpose of a better understanding of Michel Foucault's philosophy.

CHAPTER 2

SYNOPSIS

2.1. Structuralism

Structuralism, preeminently popular among French intellectuals in the mid-20th century, was a way to theorize social disciplines in order to understand social phenomena in connection with linguistic theories. These disciplines included anthropology, history of ideas, literature, and psychoanalysis. Some of the prominent figures of this movement were Claude Levi-Strauss the anthropologist, Roland Barthes the literary critic, and Jacques Lacan the psychoanalyst. Each of them influenced contemporary thought in France. Additionally, the role of Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic account was decisive in the background of French structuralism. This was because structuralist philosophers saw something valuable in the theory of language, namely a way of classifying and theorizing *differences* that one finds in reality.

Generally speaking, the main motive behind this orientation can be described in terms of creating a system in which everything, even “change,” can be understood by the interplay of each element within a structural system. Strictly speaking, as Olssen notes, according to de Saussure's view, a structure referred to the structure of a system in which the “parts were dependent upon the whole, and where the parts could only be understood in relation to the structure” (2003, p.190). In this sense, the parts and their reciprocal and interacting relations to one another in a particular system can give an exact overall picture of the system. Indeed, these relations are social, e.g., economic, ideological, political, and scientific. Therefore, for Olssen, the adoption of this sort of approach entails some important philosophical implications, namely the rejection of

the “correspondence theory of language or truth... [which is] representing reality as a transparent reflection of the real, as well as the rejection of taking the concept of the subject as an intrinsically rational being” (pp.190-1). As a consequence, the Cartesian conception of the subject, which is characterized as an intrinsically rational being representing reality as what it is, has been rejected by the development of linguistic theories. In other words, the transparency between human consciousness and reality begins to decline due to the idea that *thought* is bound up with the rules in language. Studying the rules inherent in language has started to be the key to giving an account of human reality for structuralist thinkers. Structuralism, in this sense, is a movement that begins with a question that is concerned with the nature of *meaning*. Hence, various social disciplines like anthropology, psychoanalysis and literature in the movement elevate a linguistic question. Structuralist accounts are based upon the idea that thought is something learned by human beings through coming to understand the cultural meaning of things. Olssen explains the intricate relation of structuralist accounts with linguistic theories by writing,

If thinking requires language, and language is learned, then the investigation of thought, truth and consciousness implicates the human sciences. This was the legacy of structural linguistics that influenced the increasing popularity of structuralism throughout the disciplines from the middle of the 20th century. (*Ibid.*, p.191)

In that regard, linguistic rules are inherent in human reality and culture. This is the common idea within the development of modern human sciences, which are concerned with determining the way to understand the codes of a culture that are immanent and can be disclosed through the study of language. Thereby, studying the rules embedded in a language amounts to saying that it is the way to conceptualize human reality. That is, what we think, explains Sturrock, is conditioned by the “structure of the language...no communicable thought is possible independently of language” (2003, p.25). For him, language is central to any society, and a “preponderance of the ideas with which structuralists in various fields have worked are to be found most clearly formulated in structural linguistics” (*Ibid.*). As Pettit puts it, the assumption behind structuralist linguistic theories can be defined as follows: “where there is a meaning – in a word [i.e., a sign] or a sentence [i.e., a collection of signs] – there is structure, the

word being restricted by the rules to a set of uses, the sentence to a particular set of interpretations” (1975, p.3). He also points out that for Saussure, these signs refer to “psychologically our thought,” claiming that “there are no ideas before words” (pp. 5-6).

In that movement, human subjects should no longer be seen as *agents* who constitute the world and give meaning to things or order them. Structures depicted by structuralism provide a ground for the possibility of human thought, meaning that human beings’ languages, such as English, Turkish, French, etc., and their *unconscious* are governed by the rules of structures. In other words, speaking subjects are subject to impersonal laws of structures. In short, structuralism claims that there is no transparent correspondence between things and the human mind and that everything that happens in the social realm possesses a structure whose elements can be defined within the mappable relations with other elements. In that regard, structuralism, by definition, requires a holistic point of view. That is also to say that it implies a rejection of atomistic causal explanations or linear-way of looking at things. This way of approaching systems requires a *synchronic* or ahistorical perspective. Therefore, structuralism takes culture as the object of study as a whole, no matter what the subject matter is; it can be a language, a human psyche, a literary text, or a slice of a historical period.

Since structuralism draws its verification from the abstract structures of language, conceived as universally applicable to different systems, it demonstrates an underlying unity beneath all existing forms, including actual and possible conditions of existence. In other words, anthropology and literature, for example, may have a standard method and be regulated by a common set of principles. In this context, Rabate points out that structuralists have aimed at unifying all these different structuralist disciplines by “taking the simplest and the strongest as a model – structural linguistics” (2003, p.11). As Kronenfeld and Decker put it, “Saussure’s influence on structuralism is not only direct -via linguistics- but also indirect via the notions...about the role of language as the social phenomenon par excellence and about the special nature of such social phenomena” (1979, p.505). To understand the intricate relation of linguistics with

structuralism, Saussure's contribution to that movement should be explicated. It is obvious that there is no one-to-one correspondence of the application of his theory to various structuralist accounts since there may be different nuances regarding the ways of the different thinkers' reading of Saussure. As they (p.507) say, a difference would be, for example, that Saussure never claims that language creates reality; yet, this idea permeates in structuralism. Lacan, for instance, renders the Saussurean linguistic theory as his model by treating it as the grammar of the *unconscious*. As Evan puts it, "Lacan takes up the Saussurean concept of the sign in his 'linguistic turn' in psychoanalysis during the 1950s" (2006, p.186). Similar to other structuralist social scientists, Lacan modifies the theory of sign according to his studies by treating the role of "signifier" as the unconscious and "signified" as the conscious. Evan points out that, for Lacan, "signifiers exist prior to signifieds; this order of purely logical structure is the unconscious" (*Ibid.*). This is because, as Günday and Kaçar write, in Lacan's terminology, the unconscious is structured like a language" (2022, p.101). Similarly, Levi-Strauss treats cultural practices as *signs*, just as are in Saussure's linguistics, and translates linguistic analyses into his anthropological terms. As Pace holds it, he suggests that "cultural systems of all kinds could be viewed as languages" (1978, p.286). Levi-Strauss proposes that every part of a culture has a sign value, "which can be juxtaposed to other signs to construct complex systems of communication" (*Ibid.*).

For the purpose of this thesis, it will suffice to understand the influence of the Saussurean linguistic theory on the development of the fundamental features of structuralism in general.

The role of language in structuralism can be explained as follows: First, language has a central point in any society. Therefore, language-system can be applicable to understanding social reality. Second, different accounts unique to various structuralist disciplines can be formulated in structuralist linguistics. It is important to note that, with Sturrock's term, language as a "universal faculty" and a particular language, e.g., French, is entirely different (*Ibid.*, p.26). I do not intend to go further about linguistic theories concerning this difference, but in order to understand structuralism's general characteristics in relation to linguistics, suffice it to say that language taken by

structuralists as a faculty is abstract. To be more specific, language conceived as a universal mode of thought gives ground for various actual languages as a precondition. In principle, it has been stated that everyone who has spoken and thought in different languages has the same structures that are universally applicable to all differentiated languages. These structures are considered embedded in spoken languages. Third, structuralism is not concerned with the notion of change, the evolution of language in time, and the origins of particular languages; instead, structuralist linguistics intends to uncover the permanent structure or the constants of language. For this reason, a structuralist linguist searches for them by setting the alterations of language aside. However, this does not mean that linguistic theories renounce diachronic or historical explanations of structures by claiming that those structures will last forever and are closed to external factors. In fact, they admit that structures evolve in time. Nonetheless, a synchronic approach toward structure is necessary for a structuralist study because it aims to show the static structure at a particular moment. In other words, the notion of change is considered as being diffused in the historical fabric and would be defined in terms of evolution, progress, and continuity. It is assumed that the system becomes pure and straightforward as it evolves in time. That is, the structure becomes what it is in time, or what it was intended to be in the first place. The change, here, is not understood in terms of breaks, ruptures, transformations, discontinuity, and paradigmatic shift. For Sturrock (p.28), Saussure points out that studying a language can be conducted along two axes, namely *spatial* and *temporal*: A diachronic linguist focuses on the change of language and the sequence of distinct events that have happened through time without a concern to constitute a permanent system, whereas a synchronic linguist is concerned with the connections between coexisting items that are responsible for constituting a system, “as perceived by the same collective consciousness” (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1983, as cited in Sturrock, 2003, p.28). Similarly, Dosse proposes that structures are perceived as “a common language of all the social sciences,” and social scientists (structuralists) are concerned with the “hidden meaning in unconscious collective practices” (1997, p.228). In this sense, as Sturrock puts it, language is the totality that is “stored in the collective consciousness,”

meaning that studying language allows mapping the structures already established by a given society (p.30).

Fourth, for Saussure, language consists of a collection of signs, which are the basic elements of a linguistic system and can be written and spoken. From this collection, particular series of signs can be formed as a sentence or as a proposition, depending on whether they conform to the rules of grammar and logic. They can also be sounds, images, and gestures. Additionally, since there is no transparent correspondence between the words and the world, a sign consists of two components: *signifier* and *signified*. As Sturrock puts it, they are taken together to understand the process of *signification* and to “distinguish readily between the manifest and the abstract faces of the sign” (p.35). The former denotes the physical form of a sign-thing, whereas the latter refers to a concept with a certain meaning. Further, these signs are entirely arbitrary, meaning that their forms are not determined by what they refer to in the material world, and they are diversified in particular languages. However, saying that they are arbitrary is not to say that human beings are free to change them because they become fixed over time in a linguistic community. This entails such a conclusion that individuals cannot constitute and order the world, but language creates reality by itself. It is true that language is spoken by human beings; however, the forms of their enunciations are determined by the rules of language. In other words, the correspondence between signs and their referent is bound up with the context of a body of knowledge.

Furthermore, the signs should not merely be understood as the ones strengthening the relationship between language and reality because they are also forms determined by the interrelations among the elements of a system. That is, signs can be analyzed with two orientations in language, namely language-event and language-system. Signs might be responsible for the meaning of things or reality insofar as they are applied to the world as it happens in language-event. Nevertheless, here, signs are also taken as forms like other elements of the language-system. More precisely, the place that signs occupy in the system determines the forms of signs and their *values*. The value of signs is determined by the interrelations of the elements within the system. In short, the

analysis of signs aims to show the condition of the possibility of meaning within a language.

Fifth, language is conceived as a system of *differences*. The signs are what they are by virtue of what they are not within a system. This is because signs are forms, having neither stability nor identity. In this vein, change that occurs in one sign entails the change in other signs within the system. Here, change does not constitute a problem for a structuralist as long as it is analyzed holistically within the system. In that regard, Sturrock points out that changes in a language do not “affect the systematic nature of language itself; synchronic point of view of Structuralism does not at all deny the influence of outside factors..., it only insists that these changes themselves be seen as ‘structure dependent’” (p.40). Within the system, change can be defined in terms of *structure* and *unconscious*. As Sturrock puts it, the change that happens within a particular language is “conditioned by the structure of language” and determined by the “unconscious selection...of its speakers” (*Ibid.*). The change in question requires a cumulative process to have the status it has. Just like a change is determined by the structures, enunciations of speaking subjects are subject to structures. In addition to that explanation, change in a system does not happen straight away; there must be a period or process “when new and old forms coexist and compete until one or other gives way, or until both are preserved...during this period of coexistence linguistic change becomes a synchronic study” (*Ibid.*). Last, as Sturrock writes, each sign invokes all the other signs with which it is in relation. Saussure calls this the “associative dimension of language” (p.42). This dimension of language is not only interested in what is written or spoken but also what is unwritten or unspoken. In that regard, one can say that language holds the memory of a culture.

2.2. Poststructuralism

Structuralism, a popular movement in the human sciences in France between the 1950s and the late 1960s, was gradually overthrown by poststructuralist critics. There is no exact date showing where structuralism ends and poststructuralism starts. Although we cannot say that there is a single reason that led to this change, some internal and external causes could have made that shift possible. Generally speaking, some structuralist thinkers like Barthes, Foucault, Althusser, and Derrida began to depart from the descriptive tendency of traditional structuralism to a more critical point of view of poststructuralism regarding the social and political circumstances of France at that time (see Lundy, 2013, pp.76-84). Strictly speaking, poststructuralism is regarded as a movement that begins with a shift from an interest in human sciences to philosophical analyses of the themes such as *power relations*, *discourse*, *the construction of the subject*, *writing and textuality*, *political judgments*, and *sexual differences* and *gender constructions*. Poststructuralism starts with a series of critiques regarding extreme structuralist outcomes stemming from its would-be scientific projects. Many thinkers state that poststructuralism can be considered an internal transformation of structuralism by rejecting, extending, refuting, and modifying some structuralist conclusions. However, generally speaking, as Lundy (2013, p.84) puts it, poststructuralism was especially popular by the end of the 1960s thanks to the works of some prominent names like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Kristeva, Irigaray, and Lyotard.

How poststructuralism differs from structuralism can be described as follows: First and foremost, poststructuralists criticize the totalizing tendency of structuralism that ignores how complex a daily life is. In that regard, from the perspective of poststructuralism, structuralist disciplines reduced concrete reality to an abstract theory. However, for poststructuralists, relying on a single theory is unrealistic because human reality is so complex that no theory can account for everything. In that regard, poststructuralism stands against the universal and deterministic implications of structuralism. Moreover, the approach toward taking society as a readable text may

not always increase the reliability of structuralist accounts. As a matter of fact, the uprising of May'68 can be seen as an example of the decline of that movement. This event was social and political but unforeseen. The possible implications of its inexplicable nature were not predicted by political structuralists who had assumed that if there were a rebellion, the revolutionary subject would have to be the working class, not white and middle-class Sorbonne students. Therefore, as Lundy says, "the spirit of '68 was not structuralist," the uprising was not in line with the established political theories produced by the alliances of the French Left (*Ibid.*, p.81). With this untimely rupture, structuralist accounts aiming at diagnosing the present in its own social dynamics, rigorously adapted to unitary and self-enclosed systems, began to be seen unreliable.

Second, contrary to structuralism, poststructuralism rejects the idea that there is a deep and final truth about human reality that is waiting to be uncovered and can be established by some methods. It adopts a skeptical attitude against such truth claims. Like structuralists, poststructuralist thinkers are uncomfortable with subject-centered rhetoric; they do not take human beings as the source of meaning and truth. However, unlike structuralism, which does not examine the notion of the "death of man" by focusing on concrete human relations, poststructuralism indicates that it is noteworthy to study the human subject within its social reality. For this reason, poststructuralism is concerned with how the human being is socially constructed. More precisely, the subject is historically created, meaning that human beings become subjects in time in specific ways. Poststructuralist thinkers attempt to analyze these ways. Bapty and Yates hold that "the subject cannot be self-present and that its identity is a social and cultural production" (1990, p.20). Similarly, Foucault, who rejects the idea of a subject as the source of rational thinking, engages in searching for these ways in which individuals become subjects; precisely, in his case, human beings are transformed into subjects as products of a complex relationship between *power* and *knowledge*. Additionally, poststructuralist thinkers argue that scientifically-oriented structuralism that tries to subsume almost every social fact under universalizable theories is not the way to understand human reality. Structuralism disregards multi-factors that could have an influence on concrete reality and elevates the structures that are immanent in

culture in order to conceptualize social facts as if they could be isolated for the purposes of the study at hand. Poststructuralism, by contrast, is concerned with almost every single detail that is overlooked by structuralists, such as power, force-relations, institutional structure, social and familial authority, gender norms, etc. Thereby, poststructuralism deals with human practices in their specificity. In that regard, one could say that poststructuralist accounts are more critical in showing that what is presented as apolitical, natural, and necessary are indeed bound to numerous complex political processes. As Bapty and Yates point out, the aim of poststructuralism is “always to articulate...ideas within their existing traditions in order to address any particular problem of the subject and its socio-cultural identity” (*Ibid.*, p.3). In that regard, Williams (2005, pp.2-3) writes that it puts the traditional forms of knowledge and definitions into question, and it opens up their cores and changes our sense of their roles as stable. Therefore, poststructuralists are regarded as critics who re-interpret and re-evaluate traditional philosophical notions such as “history” and “temporality” and re-adapt them to contemporary philosophical thinking.

Third, poststructuralism prioritizes diachronic or historical explanations over a synchronic viewpoint. Poststructuralism mainly analyzes concepts of *temporality*, *transformation*, *history*, and *change* to understand social reality. What structuralism conceptualizes as extra-temporal phenomena, such as social systems, psychic life, economic systems, or literature, are studied within their historical unfolding by poststructuralists. There may not be one reason behind this insistence on diachronic explanations. In any case, one reason is that they emphasize the relationship between the past and the present or the historical dimension of the present. As Schrift puts it, human “experience is historicized” (2018, p. 179). For that reason, poststructuralist analyses return to history to rethink the dynamic structures between the past and the present. Similarly, Bapty and Yates state that poststructuralism focuses on “the diachronic within the synchronic...by reopening of time and history” (*Ibid.*, p.5). As Williams (*Ibid*, p.106) puts it, poststructuralism provides a new form of historical analysis that stresses the relationship of us in the present within the past. It asks how and through which historical mechanisms “we” become who we are in the present. Similarly, inquiries into how the past transformed into the present and how the present

differs from the past. In short, what is marked by poststructuralism is thinking historically.

Fourth and lastly, the way in which structuralism holds the notion of *difference* is different from that of poststructuralism. In principle, structuralism focuses on the simultaneous presence of the elements of a system and the ways in which these elements differ from each other, highlighting that a thing is what it is by virtue of what it is not within the system. However, the attention to the concept of difference is particularly different in poststructuralism. It does not insist on giving explanations based on identity. Poststructuralism treats the notion of difference as a derivative term because the meaning of things is no longer determined by the play of signifier and signified, as is the case in linguistic theories. As Schrift puts it, “the attention to difference – rather than a focus on identity – is particularly central to the [poststructuralist] projects” (2018, p.182) Signification, here, is determined by power relations and, therefore, necessarily context-dependent. In that regard, Olssen is right in writing that “meaning is not produced through the free play of signifiers alone, but signification is affected by power” (2003, p.194). Therefore, from a poststructuralist perspective, structuralist accounts cannot limit themselves to self-enclosed systems and claim to explain everything, because social facts are shaped by historically unique power relations and, therefore, are context-dependent. More precisely, poststructuralism recognizes the particularity and singularity of events in favor of contingency and openness. Unlike structuralist emphasis on identity and non-identity, which refers to a self-contained and closed system, poststructuralism is more concerned with the notions of change, mobility, and transformation. This kind of analysis also enables poststructuralists to avoid the totalizing tendency of structuralism by giving much more attention to micro-practices.

I will argue that the transition of the Foucauldian methodological change from archaeology to genealogy can be interpreted in parallel with the transition from structuralism to poststructuralism. For this reason, in the following parts of this section, the Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical methods will be explained. In chapter three, I will show that the archaeological method can be read from a

structuralist perspective while the genealogical one from a poststructuralist perspective.

2.3. The Foucauldian Archaeological Method

Foucault developed the archaeological method in his early books in the 1960s: *History of Madness*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, *The Order of Things*, and *Archaeology of Knowledge*. However, according to the purposes of this thesis, only the last two books are to be considered, because the nature of these books is much more concerned with “discursive formations” than the other two. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault conducts a particular form of history, that is, “archaeological” history of thought as different from “history of ideas” or “systems of ideas.” *Archaeology of Knowledge*, on the other hand, supplements *The Order of Things* as a methodological handbook. In this handbook, Foucault gives a more detailed and nuanced account of archaeology and unravels some unsolved problems regarding the methodology he employed in *The Order of Things*. In other words, as many Foucault scholars put it, the archaeological method operated in these two books has slightly different nuances. Nevertheless, the archaeological method applied in these two books gives us detailed information about what Foucault had in mind in his early writings. Precisely, unlike traditional forms of history that are operated at a subject-centred level, archaeological history of thought puts the status of the *man* or the subject’s position into question. It displaces the *subject* from its privileged position, precisely its originative role. For this reason, Foucault aims to go much deeper to reveal the conditions of apparent forms of knowledge that are beyond individuals’ awareness. Thus, he is not interested in the deliberate activities of individuals who are the authors of texts, which he calls *subjective unities*, guaranteeing *continuity* in history. He writes,

I wish to restrict myself to the singular relationship that holds between an author and a text, the manner in which a text apparently points to this figure who is outside and precedes it. (*What is an Author?* (1969), 2010, p.300)

Instead, he tries to undermine the long-standing notions of continuity and *gradual change* derived from such histories – which see the subject as a principle of transmitting ideas from one mind to another – by embracing the notions of *discontinuity, breaks, ruptures, dislocations*, and so on (see the Introduction to *Archaeology of Knowledge*). In this sense, Foucault undertakes to formulate an archaeological method for a non-subject-centered approach to the history of thought and provides a critique of the claims of traditional history. To conduct his research, Foucault begins with investigating what he calls *documents*, which are collections of *statements*. He takes documents as an object of study and treats them as *monuments*. That is, they are intended to be analyzed in their own right without an effort to revive authors' thoughts, intentions, or beliefs.

For Foucault, statements are subject to a set of historical rules unapparent to individuals, each of which belongs to a discursive formation. For him, there is no confinement in the choice of fields in which statements occur; they can be derived from scientific, literary, political, philosophical, or institutional texts. In short, they refer to an extensive workload for Foucault in drawing a general picture of a specific historical period. Specifically, he aims to find the hidden rules responsible for the emergence of statements. According to Foucault's formulation of statements, they are diffused in a discursive realm. This realm is regulated by a set of *rules*. Foucault aims to detect the unique and complex set of *relations* among these rules, which are responsible for the construction of discourses in particular historical periods. Statements of such discourses, for Foucault, do not have to be *sentences* or *propositions* as collections of linguistic signs that strictly conform to grammatical and logical rules. Instead, Foucault treats them as having an enunciative function, meaning that they become meaningful only when they are related to one another according to certain rules in a discursive formation. Statements are operated at the *speech-act* level. That is, they are connected to other series of signs and produce their *associated fields*. Foucault declares that he is not interested in formal structures of discourses but in the *relations* among the rules that define the positions of statements. The reason for this is the fact that he does not give a general account of the rules of a discursive formation that may be universally applicable to each and every discursive formation in different

social systems. These rules are specific to time and place. Furthermore, it is these historical rules of discourse formation that are responsible for the unity of discourses. Foucault writes,

We sought the unity of discourse in the objects themselves, in their distribution, in the interplay of their differences, in their proximity or distance – in short, in what is given to the speaking subject; and, in the end, we are sent back to a setting-up of relations that characterizes discursive practice itself; and what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of *rules* that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity. (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, p.51)

These rules govern the following: *objects*, *enunciative modalities*, *conceptual frameworks* or *theoretical viewpoints*, and the formation of *strategies* (see part two of *Archaeology of Knowledge*). First, there are rules for the construction of “objects.” These rules are associated with “social norms.” For instance, a child whose behavior seems “abnormal” can be an object of “psychopathology.” Here, “familial norms” play an effective role in determining the objects of a scientific discourse. Therefore, thanks to these rules that determine what is normal and what is not, an object of observation, medical judgement, and treatment comes into existence. Second, statements in a discourse have a certain mode of speech, namely “enunciative modality.” They work as a function within a determinate context, meaning that they acquire a particular meaning according to the position they take in a specific discourse. In other words, even when the rules of a discursive formation can exactly be the same as another, they may not have the same meaning on people’s thinking because they operate at different *enunciative* levels. While a statement of a specific discourse, for instance, may have a particular meaning based on a given episteme, the same statement may refer to an entirely different meaning in another of a specific discipline. Foucault explicitly treats statements as functions by pointing out,

The statement is...a function of existence...One should not be surprised, then, if one has failed to find structural criteria of unity for the statement; this is because it is not in itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space. It is this function that we must now describe as such, that is, in its actual practice, its conditions, the rules that govern it, and the field in which it operates. (*Ibid.*, pp.97-98)

Third, these rules are also responsible for the formation of “concepts.” The rules specify acceptable ways of formulating and ordering concepts. Last, the rules are concerned with “strategies,” which refer to the range of possible theories located in a discursive formation. Strategies give rise to a specific theory or idea to be more acceptable than others in a given discipline. Choosing one theory among logically possible theories does not mean that the decision was made by an individual purposefully. This is because thematic choices are specified by the strategic possibilities embedded in a given period in which people live, as well as in a specific discursive formation. For Foucault, the set of possible theories in a discursive formation is enabled by the rules that underlie and implicitly control the thoughts of individuals.

The studies that Foucault conducts and renders as discursive formations in *The Order of Things* are the empirical sciences of natural history, analysis of wealth, and general grammar in the Classical period, as well as biology, economics, and philology in the Modern era. Each discipline is subject to a particular set of rules, so the rules construct a common ground of different disciplines prevalent in a specific time and place. In this sense, the sharp break between the Classical and Modern eras that Foucault calls *epistemes* – each of which is subject to a particular set of rules – acknowledges the fact that modern sciences are distinct discursive formations with respect to Classical empirical sciences. Therefore, the “change” that occurred between historical periods is explained through “discontinuity” regarding the complex and originary relations among the rules of a discursive formation. Foucault calls such relations *discursive relations*. However, these relations are not available to individuals’ reflections. The purpose of the Foucauldian archaeological analyses is to describe these relations between statements that define the domain in which various statements perform their functions and thus have various meanings. Hence, the analysis of statements is made without a reference to speaking subjects. It is certain that statements are made by speakers, but an individual takes up a position that is defined by the rules of a discursive formation to make those statements. Additionally, Foucault states that to describe “systems of dispersion,” there must be a *regularity* between objects, concepts, and thematic choices in a discursive formation (2002, p.41). He writes:

The regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation itself. The fact of its [i.e. a statement's] belonging to a discursive formation and the laws [i.e. the rules] that govern it are one and the same thing...[Thus] discourse, in this sense, is not an ideal, timeless form that also possesses a history...it is, from beginning to end, historical. (*Ibid*, p.131)

Dreyfus and Rabinow are right in finding the regularities in a system important in the sense that they are not “simply accidental orderings,” but indicate “some underlying systematic regulation;” that is, *historical a priori* rules (1983, p.84). As Foucault points out, these rules are not transcendental, meaning that they are not considered a priori or prior to experience or should not be understood as the conditions giving the possibility of experience independently from time and place, which Foucault calls “formal a priori” (*Ibid.*, p.144). Instead, they are historical in the sense that they can be characterized as the historical conditions of existing statements. Thus, the archaeological method interrogates the rules of a system that would account for these statements’ historical conditions of existence. Foucault states that “the rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance)” of utterances (*Ibid.*, p.42). In this sense, one would say that these rules refer to the reality of statements. The Foucauldian archaeological analyses treat statements as historical events, each of which is subject to rules that are stored in the unconscious of human beings. The rules are what draw up the contours of the realm of thought in a given historical period and culture. Thus, Foucault aims to identify them specific to discursive formations by introducing the term “historical a priori.” The rules are historical a priori; that is, they are defined as “the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice” (*Ibid.*, p.144). In Han’s terms, Foucault uses the notion of the historical a priori to map “not the conditions for the possibility of experience, but rather the historical conditions for the possibility of knowledge” (2002, p.93). For similar concerns, Foucault introduces the term “archive” to point out the rules that govern the appearance of statements.

Against this background, we can understand why we can call the Foucault of the 1960s a structuralist. In my view, there is no necessity to use the term “structure” to become a structuralist; in fact, in addition to archive and historical a priori, Foucault also uses the term “system,” which is interchangeably used with the former. Moreover, like

structuralists, Foucault is interested in mapping the relations among statements and groups of statements in a system. Hacking points out that the Foucauldian archaeology does not “interpret the texts, but to display the relationships between sentences that explain why just these were uttered and those were not” (1979, p.45). In this context, we could say that Foucault is a structuralist. These structures are present in a discursive realm, meaning that they appear only when they are uttered or written in “the network of spoken formulations that make up a conversation” (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, p.110). However, as Foucault admits in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, there are also *nondiscursive practices* that should be explained for a better understanding of discursive formations, such as institutional structures, social forms, economic practices, and political events, even though Foucault largely omits these practices in his archaeological period. Thus, Dreyfus and Rabinow are right in saying that “there is no place in archaeology for a discourse with social significance” (1983, p.89). Without adding the analysis of non-discursive practices going along with discourses, the structure of discursive formations is doomed to be considered self-contained systems as if they are closed to external causal factors. Moreover, *change* between and within discursive formations can never be totally understood. Furthermore, without it, the archaeological analyses would have to work *synchronically*; that is, the set of rules would be conceptualized as remaining the same for long periods by disregarding their temporality. In other words, although Foucault’s archaeological analyses are intended to reveal the temporal dimension of changes, the change would be explained holistically within the boundaries of a discursive formation, as is the case in *The Order of Things*. Thus, Foucault does not have an apparatus to show the transition between epochs and to explain the mechanisms of change that leads to the transformation of discourses. Therefore, he falls into certain “staticism.” As Macey points out, it is difficult to understand “how the shift from one episteme to another occurs” (2004, p.79). This may be because, for him, Foucault denies the “very possibility of historical change” (*Ibid.*). In my opinion, Foucault’s inability to account for a historical change is not rooted in his denial of change; by contrast, he is obsessed with the notion of change. However, the failure comes from the inefficient toolbox of his archaeological method. He tries to explain why he did not give an account of change by writing,

Archaeology, however, seems to treat history only to freeze it. On the one hand, by describing discursive formations, it ignores the temporal relations that may be manifested in them; it seeks general rules that will be uniformly valid, in the same way, and at every point in time... on the other hand, when it does have recourse to chronology, it is only, it seems, in order to fix, at the limits of the positivities, two pinpoints: the moment at which they are born and the moment at which they disappear. (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp.183-4)

Nonetheless, Foucault could not be more of a structuralist because he was struck by synchronic analyses. Needless to say, the story that he wrote at the end was a self-enclosed system in which there was no change or transformation. Everything in this system became obedient to strict determinations. While he initially intended to reject the modern conception of the human subject, the result of his archaeological analyses made human beings become puppets in this system and strangled with static structures. Yet, Foucault is unsatisfied with the inefficacy of the archaeological method because he is a philosopher who is obsessed with the notions of change and temporality. He sincerely writes,

It seemed to me that it would not be prudent for the moment to force a solution I felt incapable, I admit, of offering: the traditional explanations – spirit of the time, technological or social changes, influences of various kinds – struck me for the most part as being more magical than effective...I chose instead to confine myself to describing the transformations themselves, thinking that this would be an indispensable step if, one day, a theory of scientific change and epistemological causality was to be constructed. (*The Order of Things*, pp.xiii-iv)

As a result, he needed to have a tool in his toolbox for the account of the notion of transformation. That is why, in the 1970s, he changed his position from archaeology to genealogy. By conducting the genealogical method, he started to analyze *power relations* in order to better understand the notions of *change* and *heterogeneity*. In his *genealogical* studies from *Discipline and Punish* to the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, Foucault focuses on the question of change and transformation, especially the mechanisms of change, i.e., investigating through which contemporary social practices gain the status that they have at the present-day by studying the temporalized forms of *knowledge* and *power*. Thereby, with the aid of genealogical analyses, he aims to reveal our practical involvement with the world by showing the historical dimension of the present.

2.4. The Foucauldian Genealogical Method

The starting point of Foucault's methodological shift from archaeology to genealogy can be related to his compelling question, "what is the present?" Whereas his archaeological method is concerned with the realm of discursive formations of knowledge, his genealogical method is exercised in the realm of nondiscursive relations between *power* and *knowledge*. The Foucauldian genealogical analyses operate at the level of mutual relations between knowledge and power. Specifically, Foucault projects a realm where discursive and nondiscursive relations are inextricably connected. Discursive formations include systems of "truth," whereas nondiscursive relations refer to modalities of "power." By this method, Foucault pursues the origin of specific claims, objects, and concepts of truth, especially in human sciences. However, genealogy is not a method that tries to find a static or monolithic origin or foundation; instead, its intriguing aspect is to undermine what is assumed to be homogenous and necessary by showing their heterogeneous, contingent structures and alternative beginnings.

What is disclosed by genealogy is that there is no essence or unity to be discovered. The idea that everything that seems unified today could have been constructed differently makes a ground for Foucault's pursuit of genealogical analysis of the present. For him, what is at stake in conducting genealogical investigations is to find multiple origins and the forms that they take. Furthermore, his genealogical method tries to show that the origin of what is considered rational and the bearer of truth is rooted in the relationship of forces, namely, *power relations*. Foucault explains the purpose of his genealogical studies by writing,

[H]istorical sense...become a privileged instrument of genealogy if it refuses the certainty of absolutes. Given this, it corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses, that is capable of liberating divergence and marginalized elements...capable of shattering the unity of man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past...it ceaselessly multiplies the risks, creates danger in every area...it dissolves the unity of the subject. (Nietzsche, *Genealogy, History*, 1977, pp.152-3, 163)

The concept of power occupies the central place in Foucault's genealogical problematization of "the certainty of absolutes. By power, Foucault does not understand an entity that an individual possesses. Instead, power refers to the unity of relations that also make human beings become individuals. In principle, power should not be considered negative, merely as a form of subjugation and prohibition. He, by contrast, regards this notion as positive, meaning that power produces subjects. How it produces subjects can be defined in terms of *force relations* (see *The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction*, 1978, pp.92-102). Force relations cannot be separated from each other. They are always in an antagonistic play of forces, acting upon or reacting to each other within the network of strategies and counter-strategies, or alliances and counter-alliances. So, each move produces the opposite version of itself in this play. In this sense, multiple force relations can explain everything in the system. In that regard, power has a relational character instead of referring to a static structure. Putting it differently, nothing is ever the same where there is power because everything is produced insofar as forces and counter-forces encounter. By studying power relations alongside their counter-effects produced by the encounter of opposite forces, Foucault focuses on their specificity, namely *micro-practices*. For him, they should not be considered consequences derived from specific legislative and social structure processes. Instead, he suggests that each practice has its own history, course of events, techniques and tactics. Taylor states that Foucault is concerned with "individuals' behaviors and interactions ('local relations' like academic transcripts, or choices what to wear), to see how larger patterns, and eventually national norms or regulations, grow out of them" (2011, p.19).

Foucault asks in what forms mechanisms of power have been manifested, transformed, dislocated, and extended, and how they operate at the level of continuous processes which govern our bodies, gestures, and behaviors. For Foucault, thanks to these ongoing processes, human beings become subjects. In short, Foucault takes power with its modalities to add a new dimension to understanding social structures. Consequently, the procedures that the archaeological and genealogical methods take would be different when both are concerned with the same object. In focusing on "sexuality," for example, archaeology begins to show how the rules of a discursive

formation in the mid-nineteenth century enable us to speak about sexuality. These rules also make it possible to bring diseases of sexuality into discourse, allowing authorities such as doctors to isolate these diseases as entities and thus let them speak on “perversion.” The Foucauldian genealogy, by contrast, defines “sexuality” as a product of complex power relations, meaning that “sexuality” has been produced by power rather than being repressed (see part three of *The History of Sexuality Volume One*). As Hoy puts it, infantile sexuality, for instance, was not a natural phenomenon that ought to be repressed; rather, it was invited and “incited by techniques of surveillance and examination” (1986, p.227). These techniques may include “hints in medical manuals for parents on how they might examine their children’s bedsheets for evidence of their solitary nocturnal activity” (*Ibid.*). Therefore, one can say that the archaeological method insists on isolating discursive practices from external factors and formulating the rules responsible for the production of statements. The genealogical method, on the other hand, is concerned with nondiscursive relations that are connected to discursive relations by the exercise of power relations. Moreover, by studying these relations, Foucault the genealogist conducts the history of the present; that is, he investigates which force relations are responsible for those historical transformations that have made us who we are now.

When we look at the historical significance of this Foucauldian shift of interest, one can say that the internal transformation of structuralism into poststructuralism parallels Foucault’s methodological evolution to genealogy and his definition of himself as a poststructuralist at that time. Similar to the critiques of poststructuralists against structuralists for their lack of philosophical efficacy and political stance, Foucault criticized his archaeological analyses in favor of a broader methodology, namely genealogy, by writing:

[The]different regimes that I tried to identify and describe in *The Order of Things*, all the while making it clear that I wasn't trying for the moment to explain them, and that it would be necessary to try and do this in a subsequent work. But what was lacking here was this problem of the ‘discursive regime’, of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements. I confused this too much with systematicity, theoretical form, or something like a paradigm. (*Power/Knowledge*, 1980, p.113)

As Koopman puts it, a lack of internal philosophical efficacy in the archaeological period whose task is to “diagnose the present,” or what we may term as a causal explanation, such as “explaining the contingent genesis of the present,” and as well as external political critique, such as “a critical relevance to the present,” is compensated by his genealogical method (2008, p.345-6). Studying the present is important for Foucault because it is understood to be the locus of temporal and historical processes in which subjects are constituted. Studying the present situations in which one finds oneself is also significant because these situations are historically and temporally located within the ongoing process of change; therefore, we are subject to temporality and change. In other words, by studying power, Foucault turns to diachronic (historical) explanations of who, where, and what we are. For this reason, this kind of characterization of the present in terms of temporality and change enables Foucault to escape the *totalizing* tendency of structuralist archaeology, that is, escape the necessity of explaining things by their relations with other things in a closed system. Genealogy, as an analytic inquiry of the conditions of the possibility of the present, permits us to understand our situatedness in history with all its dimensions; where we have come from, who we are, and where we may go. This is because Foucault claims that the present is conditioned by the relations between specific forms of power and specific forms of knowledge. And the history of the present is conditioned by temporalized relations between these modalities of power and knowledge. However, archaeology is insufficient to engage with the history of the present because, by its very nature, it isolates momentary slices of the “archive” and investigates them in a closed domain. What is lacking in this method – one that genealogy does have – can be defined in terms of *temporal multiplicity* and *dynamic relations* between *power* and *knowledge*. Archaeology is intended to focus on one type of temporality, namely *discontinuity*, and one domain of practice, namely knowledge. In contrast, genealogy is concerned with multiple temporalities and multiple relations of domains such as power and knowledge. This new object of conceptualization enables Foucault to make philosophical causal explanations for historical changes and have a political critique of the present. More precisely, through his genealogical analyses, Foucault paves the way for liberating the subject of the present from the things that present themselves as

“natural,” “necessary,” and “apolitical.” This method exposes the fact that these things are products of multiple power relations and are socially constructed. Furthermore, by studying power, Foucault now can give an account of *change*. Finally, for Foucault the genealogist, power and knowledge are not categorized as identical or completely distinct and independent atoms, but formulated as in constant interaction with each other. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault says that “power produces knowledge...that power and knowledge imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p.27).



CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter addresses some interpretations of Foucault scholars, discussing whether he is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker. For this purpose, it is divided into four parts: First, those who read the Foucauldian archaeological method from a structuralist perspective, such as Diaz-Bone et al., Sturrock, and Lundy; second, those commentators who argue that although his archaeological method has undeniable similarities with structuralism, Foucault is not a structuralist, such as Gordon, Monod, and Olssen; third, such Foucault scholars as Koopman who are against such categorizations about him, claiming that Foucault is neither a structuralist nor a poststructuralist; last, those such as Gutting, Descombes, Besley, and Flynn, who claim that Foucault is a poststructuralist even in his archaeological period.

Diaz-Bone et al. state that Foucault combined his understanding of discourse in his archaeological period with a structuralist view in the sense that discourse functions as a “super-individual reality as a kind of practice that belongs to collectives rather than individuals” (2008, p.10). Contrary to his archaeological method that wrestles with giving a general account of governing rules entrenched in a given culture, Foucault, in his genealogical period, gives up on the collectivist reading of discourses. More precisely, as we can see in his *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault operates specific modalities of power at a micro-level such as *disciplinary power*, to understand the dynamic relations of power and knowledge and their productions by investigating the economy of penitentiary systems. In that regard, subjects are constructed, constituted, socialized, and affected under the impact of *power relations*. Therefore, investigating power and knowledge relations enables Foucault to escape from the totalizing tendency of structuralism or a sort of universal determinism. Additionally, according

to these writers (p.11), the Foucauldian concept of discourse is characterized as a “self-contained order” in which the rules of the formation of statements are discursively combined. In *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault draws a general outline of four complexes understood as the formation of discourses. In this book, presented as a methodological handbook to his *The Order of Things*, Foucault studies the sum of all written and spoken effective statements insofar as they are constructed according to the same rules of discursive formation. Therefore, as they write, discourses consist of statements, which are produced in a discursive realm by conforming to a set of rules “inherent in...[the] preceding statements” in order to gain a status of being “accepted” and “recognized” (*Ibid.*). In this sense, as they put it, identifying discourses means treating systems of statements as “bearers of their rules of formation; the rules that made statements possible and that simultaneously already reside in the statements” (pp.11-2). That is, there is nothing outside discourses and external to statements. In this context, they claim that the Foucauldian archaeological method can be interpreted from a structuralist perspective.

Similarly, but for different reasons, Sturrock argues that Foucault’s earlier works, especially his studies in *The Order of Things* and *Archeology of Knowledge*, can be considered structuralist. Structuralism, for Sturrock’s definition (2003, pp.11-12), can be conceived in terms of some specific notions, namely *universality*, *internal laws*, *objectivity*, *scientificity*, and *unconscious* level of knowledge. He concludes that the Foucauldian archaeological method has most of these structuralist qualities. He writes:

Once we admit that structures are unconscious, as even Foucault granted it after he had abjured his earlier affiliation, once we glimpse how these structures provide a deeper rationality to familial, linguistic, literary, economic or epistemic systems, then we all have become Structuralists, whether we want it or not. (*Ibid.*, p.16)

For Sturrock, it is clear that searching for an unconscious level of knowledge or the regulating rules implicit in systems corresponds entirely to a structuralist analysis, even though Foucault states that “this kind of analysis is not specifically used” (2002, p.17).

In that vein, another Foucault scholar, Craig Lundy, argues that Foucault does not reject structuralism, yet he transforms the movement by broadening its scope with a historical dimension. Structuralism had gained its prominence in the intellectual world of France between the 1950s and the 1970s with the rise of social sciences such as linguistics, semiology, psychoanalysis and sociology. That movement was considered a break-off from the traditional approaches to society by recasting the terms of the understanding of human existence. For him (2013, p.70), one of the main characteristics of structuralism is the quest for *scientificity*, meaning that not only do the natural sciences such as mathematics, physics, or biology give an objective account but also are the human sciences responsible for theorizing objective truth. Objectivity and scientificity were the qualities needed to be reached to have theories respected in the social domain. However, that purpose was never reached, says Lundy (p.71), and the validity of structuralism's scientificity was criticized and abandoned by poststructuralists. Another characteristic of structuralism is *synchronicity* or ahistoricity. Everything in a system is dependent on the relations of the elements, which are simultaneously present. A synchronic approach toward systems, thus, implies the *inner logic* of a system, which is waiting to be revealed. He explicates that the structural and inter-structural relations in a system need to be "simultaneously considered in order to 'see' what was hidden from view and 'hear' what was unspoken" (p.72). The synchronic tendency towards systems to produce scientific theories and to reveal their inner logic relies upon the idea that these structures are indeed universally applicable. He considers that Foucault is a structuralist in his *History of Madness*, which seeks to "elicit the vital role that the unapparent (in this case madness) played in the operation of apparent forms (in this case reason) through a consideration of their structural relations and systematic consistencies" (p.76). In this sense, Foucault is willing to reveal the dynamic structural relationship between the "unapparent" and the "apparent," whereby, writes Lundy, he does not completely have the scientific concern of structuralism and does not make historical "totalization" (*Ibid.*). He rather concentrates on micro-practices specific to different eras. However, Foucault departs from classical structuralism as the main point of this book is "derived through historical contextualization, historical interpretation, and more specifically,

the historicization of structures” (*Ibid.*). In other words, for him (*Ibid.*), Foucault strengthens structuralism in a way that he subjects that movement to transformation in its early stage. In this sense, Foucault has not left that movement but modifies it by conjugating it with history. He says, “Foucault’s work had the added effect of reconciling history (a particular form of history) with the structuralist movement” (*Ibid.*). More precisely, Foucault was seen as the leading figurehead of structuralism, writes Lundy (p.82), at the time he wrote his book *The Order of Things* with the subtitle, *An Archaeology of Structuralism*, which was regarded extraordinarily successful within the structuralist paradigm.

There are also accounts arguing that similarities between structuralism and the Foucauldian archaeological method do not make Foucault a structuralist. Peter Gordon (2016, p.3), for example, points out a strong affinity between the Foucauldian archaeological method, operated especially in *The Order of Things*, and structuralist theories. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault applies that method in order to split the “diachronic past” into “discontinuous strata,” namely the Renaissance, the Classical, and the Modern, each period ordered by unique structures, or, in Foucault’s words, *epistemes* (*Ibid.*). Foucault uses the notion of the *historical a priori* to show the “hidden network that served a paradoxical function, as both a transcendental yet also contingent grid for the possibility of knowledge within any epoch” (*Ibid.*). Each of these periods is governed by a unique set of rules implicit in epistemes. Furthermore, Gordon claims that in the last pages of *The Order of Things*, we see that Foucault articulates a paradigmatic change in his time, in which the paradigm of the “humanist episteme of the modern age” was closed, and a new paradigm began (*Ibid.*). In that regard, he adds that that book was a “provocative and paradigmatic work” in its appearance at the time (p.5). This ambition, he adds, has a deep affinity with other “intellectual currents of the 1960s,” especially with “structuralism” (p.3).

The adoption of the idea of history “as an open terrain for the continuous unfolding of the human spirit” embedded in the modern episteme began to be disregarded (*Ibid.*). In other words, the approach toward history in the contemporary period casts a doubt on historical or diachronic explanations. Similarly, for Gordon, because of the very

nature of the notion of “the historical a priori,” Foucault disregards “the idea of the progress... [by splitting] the diachronic past into discontinuous strata” (*Ibid.*). In that vein, he points out the ambiguity of Foucault’s *historical a priori* in being both “a transcendental yet also contingent grid for the possibility of knowledge within” any episteme (*Ibid.*).

Furthermore, Foucault changed his position in his later genealogical studies. Gordon identifies the methodological shift as “volte-face” in such a way that the author of *The Order of Things* is “no longer familiar to us today” (p.4). He adds, “the principles of archaeology were different from the tactics of genealogy:” *synchrony*, for example, as a principle for the archaeological method was abandoned in the genealogical period (pp.4-5). However, Gordon interprets this shift in terms of the transition from “the analytic of knowledge under the sign of a discontinuous past” to “an analytic of power that restored past of practices – of punishment and confession – as material for the history of the present” (p.4.). For this reason, one could say that Foucault abandons a structuralist approach by giving his attention more to diachronic explanations in his genealogical studies. Nonetheless, Gordon (p.5) prefers to read *The Order of Things* to such a degree that its essential point is to radicalize the stability of knowledge by showing its instability and temporalization. In that regard, for him, what Foucault did in that book was to reveal the “historicity of transcendental,” concerning the temporality of the “historical a priori rules” governing the space in which particular sorts of knowledge emerge (*Ibid.*). According to Gordon’s reading of *The Order of Things*, although in his book, Foucault seems to be concerned with the atemporal rules embedded in historical epistemes and mapping out the homogeneity of each episteme, the motive behind this effort is to demonstrate “the heteronomy of the present with respect to the past” (*Ibid.*). Therefore, according to Gordon, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault emphasizes *temporality* even though that book has shared methodological similarities with structuralism. For this reason, Gordon does not read Foucault from a structuralist perspective.

Jean-Claude Monod defines the complex relationship of Foucault’s *The Order of Things* with structuralism with respect to the “dissolution of the idea of ‘man’” (2016,

p.23). He states that the Foucauldian archaeological method, “the diagnosis of the present,” and the “death of man” are held together within the structuralist paradigm (*Ibid.*). First, he (*Ibid.*) questions the extent to which the purpose of the archaeological method, namely the diagnosis of the present, has been achieved by arguing whether the Foucauldian archaeological method can give a proper account of the present, i.e., the episteme in which we stand. Then, he analyzes the Foucauldian conception of the “death of man” within the structuralist paradigm. He concludes that the Foucauldian archaeological method should not be considered from a structuralist perspective while there are affinities between Foucault’s archaeology and structuralism.

The Order of Things, for Monod, is a book in which Foucault situates himself as an archaeologist who investigates the hidden rules embedded in historical epistemes in order to map out an *order* responsible for the discursive formation of discourses. Epistemes are purported to be self-enclosed domains whose boundaries are determined according to the combinations of asserted rules particular to given historical periods, such as the Renaissance, Classical, and Modern. Foucault’s characterization of the concept of *episteme* is based on his articulation of *unconscious* sets of rules underlying historical periods that appeared to be a “condition of any episteme” (p.24). However, this characterization causes trouble when we consider Foucault’s aim in his archaeology period, which is for Monod, is to objectify her time, “reading the signs of the passage to a future new space” (*Ibid.*). Here, what Foucault has in mind is to question the possibility, even for the archaeologist, of being fully aware of the unconscious conditions of the current episteme to transcend them.

According to Monod, the manner in which archaeology treats historical epistemes as self-enclosed domains poses a difficult problem when one searches for the conditions of the present time, given the fact that the regulating rules are not open to human consciousness (*Ibid.*). If the concept of the present is something that is unknown to consciousness, especially what lies behind the present forms of knowledge-formation, it is not easy to “objectify one’s own epistemological situation” (*Ibid.*). Monod argues that it can be made possible only by “historical distance that allows us to grasp the general system of knowledge of a past time” (*Ibid.*). In that regard, a retrospective look

is in need of the diagnosis of the present in order to detect and reveal the sets of unconscious conditions of the possibility of knowledge. However, the Foucauldian archaeological method is not well enough to give an account of the present, given that the present is not and cannot be formulated in the same manner as the historical periods are schematized within the archaeological rhetoric. This is because the present is located along the way of the ongoing process of change.

With the archaeological method, Foucault projects a history fraught with discontinuous successions in which there is no *progress*. However, this leads to a sort of anomaly when it comes to the present. This problem is evident for Foucault, as well, saying that the archaeological method remains insufficient to show a transition from the past to the present. Therefore, he asks the same question about the diagnosis of the present at the time he would go through with a change from archaeology to genealogy by rereading the Kantian question: *What is Enlightenment?* This question can be regarded as a turning point throughout Foucault's works.

Monod explains the inadequacy of the archaeological method by the image, "Vignola's Due Regole Della prospettiva;" meaning that "giving a *perspective* to *our own vision* while showing the (historical) limits of our angle of vision" (pp.31-34.). In that regard, realizing the purpose of the archaeological method, i.e., the diagnosis of the present, necessitates the "genealogy of history" (p.34). That is why for him, Foucault goes on to a methodological change to give an account of the present. Moreover, Foucault's approach toward the historical epistemes in terms of unconscious conditions of knowledge formation and the notion of the human subject, which is unaware of these conditions, leads to an important philosophical implication, namely the "death of man." According to Monod, this may cause us to misconceive that Foucault is a structuralist, given the fact that the idea of the dissolution of the notion of "man" has already been brought forward by structuralist human sciences.

In an interview, Foucault says, "structuralism enables us to diagnose what is 'the present,'" and Monod writes, "structuralism was not only a method, but it was also a sign and a symptom...that enabled a diagnosis of the present" (p.28). He points out

some structuralist human sciences used in *The Order of Things*, each of which challenges the “ethnocentric view of history” with the objects of “contemporary ethnology,” a “transparent view of subjectivity” with that of “psychoanalysis,” and so on (p.29). Thus, as Monod writes, “man loses his absolute singularity” (p.31). As a result, Monod’s understanding of the Foucauldian archaeological method practiced in *The Order of Things* and its relation to structuralism can be wrapped up as such: “Foucault’s diagnosis [of the death of man] was situated in that precise moment, the structuralist moment” (*Ibid.*).

What kind of the view of “man” was dissolved with the help of structural social sciences is the discourse about the nature of “man” that had been preeminently rooted in the 19th century; namely, a figure of the *homo dialecticus*, a man “who loses and finds himself again through history, who loses his ‘essence’ through a historical ‘alienation’ and ‘saves’ himself from that fall through *work, history, revolution*, and so on” (p.29). With the rise of the human sciences, such as “sociology, economics, ethnology, psychoanalysis, history,” the moment was beginning to dissolve the notion of the “man” (p.27). Each social discipline elaborates on different aspects of human reality by offering various accounts. Having shown a particular part of human reality, they reduced the concept of “man” from its transcendental and origivative position to a realm in which it is subject to a social or cultural reality beyond them. Therefore, human life becomes an object of study that can be formulated within a social context. According to Monod, in the same way that structuralist disciplines give rise to the dissolution of “man,” the Foucauldian archaeological analyses of history give rise to a “radical philosophical conclusion for the present... [that is] the ‘death of man’... is heralded by the triumph of the ‘human sciences’” (p.24).

Consequently, for Monod, using the term “unconscious conditions” for the emergence of particular discourses and the relevance of his understanding of the notion of the “death of man” to structuralism may lead the reader to see Foucault as a structuralist. However, diagnosing the present has been aimed from the beginning of Foucault’s archaeology. This purpose, for Monod, is not in line with structuralism, even though the archaeological method is not well enough to realize Foucault’s purpose. Therefore,

Foucault applies the genealogical method to his studies to establish his essential purpose. This is why, for Monod, although there are strong similarities between Foucault and structuralism, the former cannot be called a structuralist.

Mark Olssen (2003, p.191) states that Foucault is influenced by structural linguistics in his studies in the 1960s and relinquishes this approach for genealogical studies in the 1970s. The reason behind seeing Foucault as a structuralist philosopher may be his close relationship with those thinkers such as Cavailles, Bachelard, Canguilhem and Althusser, who are mostly concerned with giving an account of systems, concepts and structures. However, for Olssen, Foucault is not a structuralist, even though there are strong affinities between his archaeology and structuralism. The relevance of the Foucauldian archaeological method to that movement can be explained as follows: With a complete reliance upon systems based on some unique structures of language, the traditional tendency toward the sovereign subject as intrinsically rational and responsible for representing reality as what it is is abolished by structuralists. For Olssen (*Ibid.*), Foucault shares the same concern with structuralist thinkers. Specifically, his “synchronic method of archaeology” aims to enunciate the “rules for the formation of discourse, as materially embodied in the statement,” not in an individual’s psychic life (p.191). Therefore, for Olssen (p.191-2), Foucault was influenced by some structuralist approaches in several ways; yet his archaeological methodology does not share all structuralist principles. On the one hand, he adopts the structuralist approach toward the understanding of the concept of *causality*, which is non-linear unlike the traditional rationality of *analytic reason*; rather, the main concern is “revealing multiple relations,” which led Foucault to take “social reality as a structure, or set of relations among elements, whereby the *change* is analyzed holistically, and also enabled him to avoid methodological *individualism*” (*Ibid.*). On the other hand, Foucault is not concerned with the notion of *universalism* central to structuralism. Olssen affirms that this is the notion that is clearly related to structuralists such as Saussure, Barthes, and Levi-Strauss, whose theories are grounded on one original structure that is both “universal and ahistorical” (p.192). That is, Foucault differs from structuralism in that he shares the main concern of

poststructuralism, which is to define multiple regularities proper to specific times and places.

As Olssen (*Ibid.*) puts it, poststructuralism assumes that each period and culture has its own regularities, which are not the same in all historical periods and in all cultures. In this sense, he interprets Foucault as a poststructuralist. In addition, in structuralism, theories are constructed once the regulating laws defining structures are revealed, and only then the related parts are established. For him (p.193), Foucault stands against this structuralist tendency that is “prioritizing the structure over the parts, whereby the units can be explained once the essence of the structure is uncovered.” Furthermore, there is a lack of historicity of structures, says Olssen, so the priority of “synchrony” over “diachrony” is apparent in structuralism (*Ibid.*). Yet, Foucault does not have an interest in synchronic analyses. In short, for Olssen, it would be wrong to read the early Foucault as a structuralist, even though there are some undeniable effects of structuralism on Foucault’s archaeological period. Therefore, he writes,

One can see that even when Foucault’s methodological focus privileged archaeology, it was within the context of historically constituted epistemes and the difference of his position to structuralism was already manifest in relation to several key dimensions. The dissociation became more apparent after Foucault’s turn to genealogy...at the close of the 1960s, which... led him to play down the importance of archaeology and its concern with the purely formal (and more structuralist) analysis of discourse. With the turn towards genealogy, Foucault became more concerned with power and history, and the historical constitution of knowledge. In this process, there is, however, no integrative principle and no essence. (*Ibid.*)

In addition to these explanations, there is an interpretation that sees Foucault as neither a structuralist nor a poststructuralist. For instance, Colin Koopman (2008, p.339) does not think of the shift from the Foucauldian archaeological method to the genealogical one as a shift between two incompatible methodologies. Rather, they need to be considered in such a way that enables Foucault to expand his critical apparatus to transit from the field of *knowledge* to the area of *power/knowledge*. His stance is against such given interpretations on this methodological change that is partially characterized as the change from *discursive* to *non-discursive* or from *isolable* objects to *non-isolable* things, and that genealogy enables him to work on *power*, but

archaeology does not (pp.342, 344). Instead, what is at stake, for him (pp.342-3), in this shift can be explained as follows: First, genealogy is required for studying not only power but also knowledge enforced with power, especially their complex dynamic relations. This is not to say that archaeology does not adequately give a political ground, says Koopman, “it [archaeology] can also be used to analyze ‘political status’ and being ‘in power’” (p.342). In that regard, he tries to refute such interpretations that the archaeological method can only be concerned with epistemic concerns, such as searching for the conditions of the possibility of knowledge or the formations of discourses. For him, archaeology should not be regarded as a method restricted only to epistemology because it might also be used to give a political account if necessary.

Second, it is not only the notion of “power” that leads Foucault to go to a methodological change from archaeology to genealogy but also “the move from an analysis of an isolable domain of human activity to the analysis of the interaction between two or more non-isolable domains” (*Ibid.*). In other words, archaeology is insufficient to give “causal explanations” as to show “why the rules and regularities have in fact assumed the form that they have” since the reasons could stem from any sort of objects from non-isolable domains, i.e., from power relations (p.344). That is why Foucault needs an extra apparatus linked to archaeology to surpass these constraints (*Ibid.*). Furthermore, according to Koopman (p.345), “a lack of philosophical explanation and a lack of political critique is supplied by Foucault’s idea of ‘a history of the present.’” Thus, the analysis of the *history of the present* needs to be established to surpass these shortcomings. Koopman characterizes the Foucauldian understanding of the present, especially the *present situations*, in terms of *temporality* and *historicity* or *process*; to analyze the present situations we need to hold them as “historically and temporarily amidst ongoing process of *change*” (p.347). As Koopman (*Ibid.*) says, this also helps Foucault escape from the totalizing tendency of archaeology.

However, according to his reading of this methodological shift, this does not mean that archaeology is put aside when it comes to terms with the present situations. And thanks to the genealogical method, the archaeological analyses acquire a new dimension

through the notions of *temporal multiplicity* and *power and knowledge*. Thus, Foucault can sufficiently conceptualize a *history of the present* with tools provided by the genealogical method. He explains that these elements are not found in archaeology and are provided by genealogy that Koopman characterizes as the expansion of archaeology. He writes,

These two elements help us recognize genealogy as an expansion of archaeology: archaeology was informed by a singular conception of temporality (discontinuity) and a singular focus on one domain of practice (knowledge) whilst genealogy expanded the view so as to wrestle with multiple temporalities and multiple practical domains in their relation to one another. (*Ibid.*, p.348)

He describes this shift from knowledge to the variable relations between power and knowledge as the transition from a “narrow archaeology to a broader analytic employing both archaeology and genealogy” (p.353). Thanks to the genealogical method used to investigate “the temporal relations between variable elements of power and knowledge”, he adds, Foucault recuperates the “philosophically and politically viable concepts of historicity, temporality, and the historical present” (*Ibid.*). Therefore, Koopman thinks that the integration of genealogy into archaeology makes room for philosophical and political advances, which is made possible by studying the history of the present. For Koopman, studying the relations between power and knowledge is an analytic endeavor, meaning that the present is “conditioned by certain forms of power and certain forms of knowledge;” therefore, the history of the present is “conditioned by the temporalized interactions between these powers and knowledges” (*Ibid.*). Hence, studying the history of the present requires the genealogical method. Genealogy, according to Koopman (pp.353-4), enables Foucault to re-conceptualize “history” as a history that undergoes change, but, in his early period, Foucault regarded history as full of discontinuity, ruptures, transformations etc.; the tendency of it was more concerned with describing specific historical *moments* of the *archive*. Henceforth, the approach toward history is now modified with the idea that “continuity and discontinuity are essential axes or elements” (p.353). More precisely, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault takes the momentary facts from an *ahistorical* perspective, meaning that he reduced the “dynamic change” into “static

moments” (p.355). This approach to historiography will be insufficient to examine the concept of the history of the present alone, which requires the application of the essential tools of historical analysis such as *temporality*, *process*, and *change*.

Finally, the number of Foucault scholars who view Foucault as a poststructuralist is relatively high, although they occasionally refer to some structuralist echoes in his archaeological method. Nevertheless, they focus on poststructuralist themes that are most visible in Foucault’s works, even in his archaeological period. For example, Gary Gutting (2005, p.3) states that in the archaeological period, Foucault did not propose a general theory or conceptualizable methodology because his main interest was to provide a way out of concepts and practices that seem inevitable; therefore, he conducted historical research, which enabled him to offer “liberating alternatives.” He argues that Foucault was a philosopher who, even in his archaeological period, was always concerned with the problem of the present rather than forming a permanent methodological account that applies to all his studies.

He accepts the idea offered by Dreyfus and Rabinow in *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* that Foucault developed a “new method,” (both historical and philosophical) whereby he ‘goes beyond’ structuralism and hermeneutics,” called “interpretative analytics” (p.2). That is, the method is analytic in the sense that it has a critical concern with the use of concepts; and it is interpretative in the sense that it seeks to find how to read the coherent practices in which “the concepts are expressed” (*Ibid.*). In this sense, according to Gutting (p.7), archaeology and genealogy aim to find similar patterns between different disciplines, such as language, biology, and economics in the Modern age, compared to their followers with different names and orderings in the Classical age. These disciplines, which are in the same era, have much more common similarities with regard to their formations than their successors in the following and preceding periods. This leads Foucault to construct his notion of *episteme*, a system of concepts describing knowledge for a given period. Thus, Foucault tries to map out *historical a priori* rules that determine the conditions for the possibility of knowledge appropriate to a given intellectual field.

However, according to Gutting's explanation (p.10), the real motive behind this endeavor can be explained by understanding the present rather than understanding the past. Foucault's histories, for him (*Ibid.*), serve such a purpose in dissolving the necessity that is asserted as insurmountable in the present-day by showing the contingent structure of things; it follows that these things are not really inevitable. Further, Gutting argues that *The Order of Things* can be read as a "historical critique of the modern concept of man" (p.12). He says (1989, p.266) that it is possible to argue that archaeology can be tied to contemporary counter sciences such as psychoanalysis and anthropology that decentralize the concept of "man," and that this archaeology seems to be compatible with structuralism. He goes on to say that structuralist analyses are considered to have a scientific status and ability to give an "objective theoretical understanding of human beings," and that archaeology can be regarded as the "historical counterpart of structuralism" (*Ibid.*). According to Gutting, at first glance, to view the Foucauldian archaeological method from a structuralist perspective is understandable as long as it is assumed to give a kind of general theoretical understanding of human beings and to present a specific and historically limited perspective and to engage with an "absolute, ahistorical body of theoretical truth" (pp.266-7). Additionally, here one can consider that the concluding chapter of *The Order of Things* gives a response to the efforts of contemporary social scientists or structuralists to establish a "theoretical understanding of human beings" (*Ibid.*). Similarly, the archaeological method decentralizes the modern conception of human beings in the same way that "structuralists had achieved in other domains" (p.266). It would be reasonable to conceive the archaeological method as a structuralist effort within this context. However, Gutting (p.267) argues that this ahistorical approach has been weakened by his later studies, supported by Foucault's genealogical method. In addition, he (p.268) says that Foucault does not accept the structuralist disciplines as belonging to a branch of genuine science, holding scientific objectivity, such as mathematics and geometry. Thereby, it is possible to consider that "Foucault's archaeology succumbs to the structuralist temptation," given that the method gives a "general theoretical understanding of human beings" (p.267). He states that this way of approaching the Foucauldian archaeology can seem inevitable insofar as we admit

the idea that the archaeological method aims to give a general theoretical account of human beings. Besides all these interpretations, Gutting holds that Foucault never “entirely succumbs to it [i.e., the structuralist temptation]” (*Ibid.*). This is because the Foucauldian archaeological method is a “method of concrete historical analysis, not of general social scientific or philosophical theorizing” (*Ibid.*). More precisely, the claims generated by that method are subject to a given time and culture. This, explains Gutting, makes it impossible to “present it [i.e., the archaeological method] as a neutral, universally valid body of theoretical knowledge” (p.268). For this reason, Gutting (2005, p.14) says that, unlike structuralist thinkers, Foucault was not a philosopher who insisted on inventing new and permanent methods, but what distinguishes him may be the flexibility to use the methods required by his particular subject.

All in all, in Gutting’s view, Foucault applies his archaeological method to particular historical periods or epistemes to reveal their “historical a priori rules” of discursive formations, which should not be conceived as a general theoretical account of human beings and as universally applicable rules. Gutting also claims that from the beginning, the archaeological method is an “instrument of a critical history that accords with... [the purpose] laid down in the essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’” (1989, p.270). For this reason, he asserts that the Foucauldian archaeological method does not conform to the “structuralist temptation of pure [and] ahistorical theory” (*Ibid.*). And he (*Ibid.*) holds that archaeology still plays an essential role in Foucault’s genealogical period. For Gutting (*Ibid.*), the reason why Foucault goes to a methodological change can be explained in terms of interest from *discursive practices* to *nondiscursive practices*. Adding archaeology to genealogy leads Foucault to analyze a systematic relationship between “*power* and *knowledge*” (p.271). Thanks to that connection, Foucault can sufficiently explain the “cause of changes in discursive formations...bracketed in *The Order of Things*” (*Ibid.*). The archaeological method is not able to give an account of the mechanisms of changes between and within epistemes. Unlike traditional historical approaches to these changes, they “cannot be fit into any simple unified teleological scheme (e.g., the rise of the bourgeoisie)” because they can be related to various unrelated factors of “economic, social, political, and ideological causes” (*Ibid.*).

According to Gutting's explanation, this kind of analysis requires studying the notion of *power*, especially the "micro-physics of power" (*Ibid.*). For this reason, Foucault changes his method from archaeology to genealogy in order to realize his purpose, namely, to give a philosophical account of the present in terms of the notion of change, which Foucault calls "history of the present." For Gutting (*Ibid.*), this transition can be explained by Foucault's way of reconciling nondiscursive practices with discursive practices and can be thought of as a link between *knowledge* and *power* to provide a causal explanation of the *change*.

Additionally, by this methodological change, Foucault's interest could turn from a descriptive account of knowledge based on searching for regulating discursive rules in an episteme to a much more critical account of the things that present themselves as normal, natural, or necessary today. In light of these interpretations, Gutting reads the Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical methods from a poststructuralist perspective, even though he accepts that there are similarities between Foucault's archaeology and structuralism. In other words, although its ahistorical, static, and non-subject-centered results are in accordance with structuralism in general, archaeology serves the genealogy of the present as a "complementary" method (*Ibid.*). For this reason, for Gutting, Foucault is a poststructuralist even in his archaeological period.

Similarly, Descombes prefers to read the Foucauldian archaeological method in terms of the "archaeology of ourselves," which is based on what Foucault calls the "return of language" (2016, p.66). Descombes considers that *The Order of Things* is best described as poststructuralist even though that book was received in Paris "as a kind of structuralist manifesto and its achievement was seen in successfully displacing the "dominant philosophy of consciousness" (p.67). The philosophy of consciousness was dominant in developing theories in philosophy until that time. With the rise of social sciences and the triumph of structuralist contributions to human sciences, it is understandable that *The Order of Things* was seen as the change for the fate of philosophy. The relation between Foucault's archaeology in *The Order of Things* with poststructuralism, for Descombes, can be described as follows: First, an exact definition of the archaeological method needs to be given, then in what ways the

archaeology of ourselves relates to “the return of language” may be provided (*Ibid.*). Descombes says that archaeology is a “historical science of *monuments*” (*Ibid.*). It is a kind of “historiography in which you have to pay attention to the *discontinuities* between cultural formations” (*Ibid.*). In Foucault’s archaeology, there are different *epistemes*, or “systems of thought;” each of them has its particular intellectual *order*. However, it is highly challenging or even impossible to have an objective sense of a specific era by giving reference to the terms of another era. If everything in epistemes can be considered within self-enclosed systems, and if the systems of thought are indeed discontinuous, then the possibility of understanding the classical episteme from the perspective of modern episteme, for instance, is impossible. Descombes argues that it can be impossible for us but not for the archaeologist who always finds a “way to explain in a language that we understand the terms used by the inhabitants of the classical age...as a philosophy of sign” by giving reference to Canguilhem’s views at this point (p.76). More precisely, Descombes explains that putting a specific age in a definite bunch of terms or conceptualizing it is only made possible by “looking at the seventeenth century from our point of view with a question in mind that the classical thinkers did not raise” (*Ibid.*). And, he adds, Foucault is aware that thinkers in the 20th century are concerned with “questioning language” while thinkers in the 19th century, for instance, are more interested in “life and work” (*Ibid.*). Accordingly, language plays a significant role in the background of thinkers living in the 20th century. In that regard, “the return of language” is a phenomenon that denotes a kind of general pattern showing people’s ways of thinking in the modern period. This amounts to saying that, for Descombes, “the justification of the book *The Order of Things*, ‘words and things,’ is *semantics*,” a book full of intellectual detections theorized on the ground of the present linguistic concerns (*Ibid.*). That book, therefore, for him, “gets seriousness from being an archaeology of ourselves” (*Ibid.*). For this reason, Descombes (p.77) reads the Foucauldian archaeological method as a “radical reflection” on the present since it endeavors to give an account of our position in history.

The problem of structuralism, in his view, for Foucault, stems from its inability to give a “unified view of language” though it takes the lead in a linguistic paradigm in several human sciences; “language matters for the linguist, for the logician, for the modernist

writer, but not in the same way and for the same reasons” (*Ibid.*). In addition to that, where there is discontinuity, transformations, rupture, break, etc., archaeology comes to give a diagnosis of the problem and starts digging into it by conducting historical investigations. As a result, as an archaeologist, Foucault carries out a general theory of discourse “claiming to achieve radical reflection without leaving the world of historicity and cultural relativity” (*Ibid.*, p.80.). This method is, for Descombes, worth having the qualification of being radical since it “would provide us with a way to describe ourselves in our situation with respect to other possible systems of thought” (*Ibid.*, p.77). In other words, Foucault analyzes a plethora of discourses in *The Order of Things* to show their particularity within their historical and cultural context, as if they were schematized to be indifferent to the present discourses. However, according to Descombes’ reading of Foucault’s archaeology, they, in fact, intuitively serve us to understand our historical situatedness by pointing out alternative systems of thought. For him, this is where Foucault differs from structuralism. Here, he concludes by writing,

The speakers of a language are not really speaking...the linguistic system is speaking through them. Hence the great pronouncements about the *death of man* and the *disappearance of the author*. These are the already poststructuralist conclusions. (*Ibid.*, p.81)

All in all, Descombes holds the Foucauldian archaeological method as a poststructuralist since this method aims at understanding the turning points of transformations in the past from the present point of view by naming it “the archaeology of ourselves” (pp.75-81). The terms such as “the death of man” and “the disappearance of the author” can be understood by studying the theory of *discourse*, which is not considered apart from the notions of *history* and *cultural relativity* and are completely poststructuralist themes.

In a similar position, Tina Besley (2015, p.1440) explicitly puts Foucault’s archaeological method within the framework of poststructuralism. For her, poststructuralism accentuates a critical history as an ongoing process by laying emphasis on “diachronic analyses, the mutation, transformation, and discontinuity of structures, serialization, repetition, ‘archaeology,’ and perhaps, most importantly,

what Foucault...calls genealogy” (*Ibid.*). In addition, the Foucauldian archaeological method should be considered a critical history, analyzing the supposedly necessary truth claims to show their contingent structures. Similarly, poststructuralism provides a critique of such claims by showing their contingent structures in that they are socially constructed. Besley (*Ibid.*) argues that the Foucauldian archaeological method holds the same purpose. Furthermore, she holds that Foucault admits that the problem of his archaeological period is the “individualization of discourses” (*Ibid.*). This inclination, for her, might stem from the well-known criterion based on the “isolation of the linguistic systems”, which had an immense effect on the ways in which theories were constructed at the time that Foucault applied archaeology as a method. This inclination is then abandoned by Foucault in his later studies with the aid of multiple analyses of *power relations*.

His archaeological method was strictly limited within the boundaries of discourses. In each episteme, there are several distinct discourses, each of which has its own different objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and effective strategies. Discourses are also taken to be analyzed at different discursive levels in an archaeological area to reveal “the fundamental codes of a culture” (*The Order of Things*, p.xxii). To do this, Foucault is concerned with mapping out the conditions responsible for the formation of discourses. By detecting the *historical a priori rules* underlying each episteme, it is thus possible to give an account of “a possible experience for a period of time, an area and for given individuals” (Besley, 2015, p.1442). However, for Besley, the reason why the Foucauldian archaeological method should be considered from a poststructuralist perspective is that Foucault is deep down not interested in formulating “structural laws of their construction;” instead, his main concern is to reveal their contingent structures by searching for the conditions of the existing discourses that would be “related to the practical field in which [they are] deployed” (*Ibid.*, p.1441).

Lastly, Thomas Flynn (2005, p.24) argues that Foucault is explicitly a poststructuralist, both in his archaeological and genealogical studies. These studies share the same concern in their own way. The Foucauldian archaeology is the method that concentrates on the study of *discourse*, whereas genealogy focuses on *relations of*

power (*Ibid.*). According to Flynn, the reason why Foucault used archaeology in his early studies can be explained by his distinctive approach to historiography. Particularly, Foucault distinguishes himself from traditional history, which is characterized by “continuity,” “totalizing tendencies,” “evolution toward a normative stage,” and “neglect of the nonstandard” (pp.6-8). Rather than being devoted to the “history of ideas,” explains Flynn (p.5), Foucault insisted on conducting historical analyses that he calls the “history of thought.” What Foucault means by the “history of thought” is to search for a domain that is not intolerant to “anomalies, marginalities, exceptions” because Foucault is sensitive to “fractures and breaks in [alleged] historical continuity through which the new, the irregular, and the unexpected can emerge” (p.8). Additionally, for Flynn, unlike traditional approaches to the term discourse based on “narratives,” Foucault understands that discourse is the “series of statements that follow a set of rules constituting a certain communicative domain,” meaning that these statements are not considered products of the self-transparent subjects (p.11). Indeed, Foucault tries to correct the ambiguity stemming from the asserted continuity in the history of ideas by coming to engage with what he calls “discursive practices” (p.12). Flynn explains that, by *discursive practices*, Foucault endeavors to get rid of the narrative approach, which is defined as “series of discontinuities described in the mode of continuity,” and reverses this traditional approach with the new one that “describes continuities in the mode discontinuity” (p.14). This gives rise to some critical philosophical implications for history, such as undermining the force of “humanism” that denotes a “meaning-giving subject,” the disappearance of “totalizing tendency,” and the appearance of “multiple forms of rationalities” rather than a “unique form of rationality” (pp.10, 20). Thus, Flynn states that Foucault uses archaeology to map a “space of multiple dissensions” or “discursive formations” that can be seen in various forms of “technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioral schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, and in pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them” (pp.12, 18).

However, Flynn concludes that archaeology is limited for this large-scale investigation because it is nothing but the “descriptive analysis” of a set of effective statements that are collected in discourses; but statements are also linked to *nondiscursive* situations

that archaeology fails to explain (p.21). However, Flynn points out that the Foucauldian archaeological analysis should not be confused with the “formalist approach of structuralism” because structuralism is “essentialist in character, basing social intelligibility on atemporal structures that define in advance the nature of empirical relations” (*Ibid.*). He goes on to say that the archaeological method “historicizes the structuralist forms into rules of transformation and displacement” (*Ibid.*). Furthermore, Flynn (p.23) relates the Foucauldian genealogy to the study of *nondiscursive practices*. Generally speaking, he explains that his genealogy is “anti-foundationalist,” meaning that Foucault conducts “the analysis of descent” to search for “numberless beginnings” (p.24). The project of Foucault’s genealogy can be clarified as showing the “one” through “many;” that is, to put it in Flynn’s words, “seeking to fragment traditional unities and reveal the ‘numberless beginnings’ without end that cover our historical landscape” (*Ibid.*). Thus, he thinks that Foucault is a poststructuralist because his entire philosophy has the same concern as that of poststructuralism. Correspondingly, roughly speaking, he regards the methodological shift from archaeology to genealogy as the transition from the analysis of discursive practices to that of non-discursive practices; in other words, the “archaeological accent is on discourse” whereas “the genealogical is on relations of power” (*Ibid.*).

CHAPTER 4

DIAGNOSIS

This chapter is devoted to evaluating the accuracy of the accounts of the Foucault scholars concerning whether or not Foucault can be called a structuralist or a poststructuralist. Regarding Foucault's turn away from the archaeological method to the genealogical one and his relation to two mainstream movements, namely structuralism and poststructuralism, some of the commentators' interpretations perfectly match with how I read Foucault, though some have failed to read him properly. To avoid the pitfalls of misreading the method, I will take Foucault's archaeological method in its own terms, tracing the development of his conception of the method. The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain how accurate the scholars' interpretations are as to whether Foucault can be called a structuralist or a poststructuralist; and, eventually, to conclude that his methodological change from archaeology to genealogy can be interpreted as a shift from structuralism to poststructuralism. It is through this reading style, I suggest, that Michel Foucault's philosophy, particularly his use of certain concepts and terms in both the archaeological and genealogical periods, can be best understood. And I hope that the manner of the discussion that I will conduct will support my suggestion at the end of this chapter that Foucault was a structuralist in his archaeological period and a poststructuralist in his genealogical period.

Before I start analyzing the accuracy of the scholars' interpretations regarding the issue at hand, it is important to point out the diversity of Foucault's self-definition as to whether he is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker.

In 1967, Foucault explains his relation to structuralism in an interview with a Tunisian inquirer when he is asked whether he is a structuralist, and he answers by distinguishing two sorts of structuralism,

As defined by the method structural analysis, structuralism was not a philosophy, but the way some human sciences studied their objects. To be a structuralist in that methodological sense would imply being engaged in one of the sciences of man, like linguistics, ethnology, or history of religions. But there was...another kind of structuralism...“generalized structuralism,” meaning that the study to be performed would not be confined to a particular domain, but would take as its object the various aspects of our whole culture...a study could be described as “structuralist philosophy...” defined as “the activity that allows us to offer a diagnosis of what is today.” ([Foucault, *Dits et Écrits I*, 1954-1975, p.608] in Descombes, 2016, p.76)

In 1970, Foucault tries to refute such ideas claiming that he was a structuralist in his early period by re-writing a new *Foreword* to the English edition of *The Order of Things*:

In France, certain half-witted ‘commentators’ persist in labelling me a ‘structuralist’. I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis. (*The Order of Things*, 2005, p.xv)

Nevertheless, he acknowledges that there are certain similarities between his archaeological analyses and structuralism, namely the focus on the “unconscious,” “the dissolution of the idea of man” by putting,

There may well be certain similarities between the works of the structuralists and my own work. It would hardly behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware. (*Ibid.*, p. xv)

However, in the Introduction to *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault insists that although what he did in his archaeological studies was similar to structuralist accounts, the concern that he had was entirely different from that of structuralists. He explains,

My aim is not to transfer to...a structuralist method that has proved valuable in other fields. My aim is to uncover the principles and consequences of an autochthonous transformation that is taking place in the field of historical knowledge. It may well be that this transformation, the problems that it raises, the tools that it uses, the concepts that emerge

from it, and the results that it obtains are not entirely foreign to what is called structural analysis. But this kind of analysis is not specifically used. (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, 2002, pp.16-7)

In 1983, in an interview with Gerard Raulet, Foucault announces that he is neither a structuralist nor a poststructuralist thinker, and says, “I have never been a Freudian, I have never been a Marxist, and I have never been a structuralist” (*The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume II*, 1998, p.437).

It is the dilemma that we have seen in his writings and speeches leading to different versions of Foucault regarding whether he is a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker. However, putting aside his inconsistent self-descriptions, I will argue that Foucault is a structuralist in his archaeological period and a poststructuralist in his genealogical period. Correspondingly, I will conclude that his methodological change from archaeology to genealogy can be interpreted as the change from structuralism to poststructuralism.

I begin by explaining the notion of “the history of the present” and its relation to the Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical methods. It is clear that Foucault does not fall into anachronism when he conducts historical research. He does not try to explain or give meaning to a historical social phenomenon from the perspective of his time. In *The Order of Things*, for example, he tries to give an account of the transformations of discourses in different disciplines such as natural history, analysis of wealth, and general grammar within the Classical period. Having completed his archival explorations, he realizes that these three disciplines shared more commonness than their successors, namely biology, political economy, and philology in the modern era. For this reason, Foucault tries to conceptualize the rules that are embedded in a given culture and responsible for the formation of each discourse in a particular era in order to map out the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, on which statements are based. His archaeological method aims to analyze these rules in order to find an order between and within statements or groups of statements. These rules are what Foucault calls historical *a priori*. In that sense, they function as the conditions for the formation of knowledge. They are also historically contingent. Through this

archaeological analysis, Foucault tries to place himself at a distance and gazes at them from the outside.

However, later on in his studies, he comes to the conclusion that what he has done so far was to write a history of ourselves, which he calls “archaeology of ourselves.” This is because, when he tries to examine autochthonous transformation taking place in the realm of historical knowledge, he admits that he has a question in mind: What is the *present*? However, this question gets its seriousness when Foucault turns his attention from the past to the present by asking the question: What is happening today?

What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here it is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves. (*The Government of Self and Others*, 2010, p.20-1)

Foucault gives an account of the ontology of the present by studying specific human experiences, such as the discourse on penitentiary systems and the discourse on sexuality, by seeking the descents of these experiences in the course of history. The aim is to show that the present has been shaped by the temporalized modalities of power relations.

Descombes is right in saying that a twentieth-century thinker raises a question that a nineteenth-century thinker, for instance, did not. For example, a twentieth-century thinker is much more concerned with the use of language, whereas a nineteenth-century thinker is much more situated among the currents of work and life. According to Descombes’ reading of the book, since Foucault is a philosopher from the twentieth century, the theories and notions in *The Order of Things* have already been written and explained in accordance with the order of that era par excellence. In that sense, Foucault uses the same language of his time without an effort to revive an obsolete sense of the language used by the inhabitants from a different historical age, in order to give an account of his time. Therefore, for him, the “justification of the book *The Order of Things*, ‘words and things,’ is *semantics*” (p.76). Thereby, Descombes reaches a conclusion that the Foucauldian archaeological method could be characterized as a “radical reflection” on the present since it endeavors to give an

account of our position in history (p.77). However, Descombes is wrong to say that Foucault tries to show our historical situatedness within his archaeological paradigm. I am not even sure that Foucault had such a purpose then. In my view, Foucault would have to wait to give an account of our historical situatedness in the present time until he developed his genealogical method. This is because the toolbox of the archaeological method is insufficient for this purpose, i.e., giving an account for the question: What is the present-day? Precisely, he, first, needs to explain the transformation of discourses or the notion of change in order to realize his purpose. That is why he goes to study *power relations* in his genealogical period.

Nonetheless, it is true that, in his genealogical period, Foucault explains that his purpose has been to conduct an “analysis of the relation between forms of reflexivity – a relation of self to self – and, hence, of relations between forms of reflexivity and the discourse of truth, forms of rationality and effects of knowledge” (*Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume III*, 2002, p.444). Similarly, Gutting argues that this has been the purpose of Foucault from the beginning of his archaeological period, which is to find “liberating alternatives” as a way out of supposedly necessary and ahistorical norms. That is why, for him, a history of the present has been Foucault’s main purpose even in the archaeological period. However, in my opinion, the accounts that Descombes and Gutting propose are misleading to the degree that the Foucauldian archaeological method does not have the toolbox for giving an account of the relationship between the past and the present.

In my reading of *The Order of Things*, Foucault does not and cannot aim to write a history of ourselves, connecting the present to the past. This is also because Foucault operates one form of temporality, that is, “discontinuity,” by putting the “continuity” aside in his archaeological period; each period has been purported to be self-contained as if there is no continuity between them. However, here lies a real difficulty if we take the purpose of the archaeological method for granted, which is writing a history of the present. Discursive formations in different periods are enacted to be entirely different from each other; that is, they are schematized in a discontinuous or atemporal realm of history. However, the question arises: Where is the mechanism that enables the

transformation of one discourse to another? It is evident that new discourses do not come into existence at all *ex-nihilo*, given that they follow their previous ones by undergoing a process of transformation. As a matter of fact, if one assumes that Foucault has aimed to write a history of the present since the beginning of his archaeology period, where is continuity in Foucault's archaeology then?

In other words, similar to structuralists, he assumes that the *change* between discourses and within historical periods is diffused in the fabric of history; that is, as Olssen (pp.191-2) writes, change is explained holistically within the system or the boundaries of a delimited discursive formation of a historical period. That is why he pursues a synchronic approach toward his archaeological studies. Thus, he puts the question of temporality in a bracket. Moreover, he could not explain the problem of change within the archaeological rhetoric. Indeed, as Koopman (2008, p.344) puts it, he needs an extra apparatus to give a philosophical account of the notion of change, i.e., power, which would be supplied by his genealogical method that accepts history as an ongoing process of change.

Some Foucault scholars, such as Flynn, argue that the Foucauldian archaeological method should not be confused with structuralism due to the formality of structures in the structuralist paradigm and due to the fact that Foucault is not a formalist. Furthermore, Foucault is not a structuralist because he “historizes the structuralist forms” (Flynn, 2005, p.21). It is true that Foucault focuses on the historical forms of structures. However, although it is not clear what it means exactly the “historicization of structures” – whether the validity of structures is unique to a particular time and given culture – an analysis of the present must first be conducted to give an account of discursive and nondiscursive practices in the process that makes us what we are today. Without giving an account of the present, this objection is not in line with a proper reading of the Foucauldian archaeological method. For his archaeology is disinterested in diachronic (historical) explanations. Foucault writes,

Discourse is snatched from the law of development and established in a discontinuous atemporality. It is immobilized in fragments: precarious splinters of eternity. But there is nothing one can do about it: several eternities succeeding one another, a play of fixed images disappearing in

turn, do not constitute either movement, time, or history (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, 2002, p.184).

In that regard, Foucault freezes historical moments in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Things* as if they were the historical slices of a period. I am content with Gordon's explanation regarding the issue; Foucault radicalizes the "stability of knowledge by showing its instability and temporalization" (2016, p.5). Similar, but from a different point of view, I also agree with Lundy's interpretation of the Foucauldian archaeological method concerning its relation to structuralism. That is, Foucault does not abandon this movement; by contrast, he broadens the scope of the movement by conjugating it with a historical dimension. In that regard, Foucault strengthens the structuralist movement by subjecting it to a transformation in its initial stage. Consequently, in order to understand better the concepts and theories that he developed in his archaeological period, I suggest that we should act within the framework of Foucault's own characterization of the method. Therefore, the Foucauldian conception of the archaeological method shows a strong parallel with the movement of structuralism; the archaeological method has shared the feature of structuralism, namely atemporality or synchronicity. In other words, Sturrock (2003, p.16) is right in saying that once we admit that the Foucauldian archaeological method bears the quality of synchronicity, Foucault becomes a structuralist whether we want it or not.

Similarly, the interpretation of Foucault's methodological shift from archaeology to genealogy has led to a diversity of interpretations among Foucault scholars. Gutting, for instance, reads it as a transition from Foucault's study of discursive practices to the study of non-discursive practices. For him, Foucault changes his method in order to realize his original purpose, which is to give an account of a history of the present. As a matter of fact, for Gutting, archaeology is insufficient to give a full account of the notion of change that would be characterized in terms of temporality. Additionally, he explains this methodological turn by arguing that archaeology is used to study the realm of knowledge, whereas genealogy is for the relationship between power and knowledge. Hence, he suggests that archaeology can be seen as a complementary method of genealogy, given that Foucault has aimed to give an account of the present

from the beginning. Similar but from a different point of view, Koopman asserts that Foucault changed his position from archaeology to genealogy to give a causal explanation of the transformation between discourses and the transition between historical periods. Thanks to his genealogical analyses, Foucault can show the temporality of dynamic relations between the forms of power and knowledge, i.e., the forms of things that they have. Thereby, with the help of his genealogical analyses of the present, Foucault recuperates the lack of a philosophical causal explanation of the change and political inefficacy of the archaeological method. That is, the change is no longer explained holistically within the boundaries of a limited historical period in terms of ruptures and paradigms; instead, it is defined in terms of both *continuity* and *discontinuity*. His archaeology also gains a political standpoint in showing that the things that seem necessary and apolitical have indeed been subject to political processes and have a contingent structure. Koopman is right in saying that we are situated in the present that is conditioned by the temporalized modalities of *power* and *knowledge*. And the present begins to be characterized as an ongoing process of change. Therefore, Foucault returns to history to conduct genealogical analyses in order to reveal the contingent structure of the claims that seem necessary today. Hence, for Koopman (p.348), the Foucauldian genealogical method should be regarded as the expansion of the archaeological method in broadening the singular type of temporality – discontinuity – with continuity, and in broadening the singular type of practical domain – knowledge – with multiple practical domains, power and knowledge. For this reason, Koopman concludes that Foucault's genealogy is the extended version of his archaeology.

Prima facie, it is reasonable to interpret the Foucauldian methodological change in this fashion to the extent that archaeology cannot account for the notion of change and the history of the present. These explanations seem to be fairly enough when considering the insufficiency of the archaeological method. However, they are based on the assumption that there is continuity in both methods. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that archaeology served genealogy as a complementary method, or the latter can be characterized as an expansion of the former. In that case, a question can be raised: If Foucault aimed to diagnose the present from the beginning, why would he

have conceptualized such a history in which there is no continuity or progress? Without giving an account of the notion of change and transformation between discourses, these interpretations would have to be an over-generalization of Foucault's methodological change, thereby misreading his archaeological method. It is obvious that these sorts of interpretations remain at the surface level when it comes to understanding the Foucauldian archaeological method.

These commentators miss the following: Foucault is not the same philosopher in his archaeological period as we see him in his genealogical period. I think we need to give our attention to what he says regarding the issue,

I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? (*Foucault (1982), Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, 1988, p.9*)

In the archaeological period, he conducted his historical analyses within the structuralist paradigm by reducing temporality into atemporality by replacing diachronic explanations with synchronic ones. He projects an archaeological realm in which he tries to find hidden – *unconscious* – historical a priori rules or the codes of a culture that give rise to the formation of discourses. In that regard, he falls into the totalizing tendency of structuralism. While he analyzes the systems of statements or groups of statements in a discursive realm, as well as the relations among the rules responsible for giving an order to discourses, he disregards giving an account of the transformation of each discourse as if they were “autochthonous” specific to their historical period. It is true that the truth value of each discourse is particular to its historical time. However, new discourses did not come into existence ex-nihilo. This fallacy becomes apparent when he changes his direction to diagnose the present-day. Contrary to the commentators' suggestion, Foucault cannot give an account of the present even though it is believed that he had such a purpose in his archaeological period.

It is true that Foucault has never reached a conclusion that these rules are universal, meaning that they are independent of time and place. By contrast, they are relative to

a given historical era and culture. His aim is not to give a universal account. And, Foucault explicitly says, “I would not want what I may have said or written to be seen as laying any claims to totality. I do not try to universalize what I say” (*Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume III*, 2002, p.223). For this reason, those who regard Foucault as a non-structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker make their arguments by referring to his emphasis on cultural relativity. Olssen (2003, p.192), for example, holds that Foucault differs from structuralism in the way that he regards certain forms of knowledge particular to time and place. Foucault does not treat them as universal structures independent of time and place. In a similar vein, Gordon argues that Foucault’s obsession with temporality does not make him a structuralist because the account that he proposes is relative to a particular time and culture. Similarly, for Descombes (2016, p.80), the themes of history and cultural relativity have been dominant in Foucault’s terminology throughout his life. That is why Foucault should not be called a structuralist. Likewise, Besley (2015, p.1442) points out Foucault’s cultural relativity, which allows him to escape structuralism. Deep down, for her, the Foucauldian archaeology aims at revealing contingent structures of forms of knowledge, which do not bear a universal truth claim. Along the same line, according to Flynn (2005, p.24), Foucault’s entire philosophy seeks ways to fragment traditional unities and unveil the contingent structures of supposedly necessary structures. Thus, he thinks that Foucault is a poststructuralist because he shares the same concerns with poststructuralists.

However, as we can see in his *The Order of Things*, these rules are characterized like an *arche* as if they were universally applicable for their time and place. It is certain that the account that Foucault gives is relative to a particular time and place; however, the manner in which he constructs his system necessitates imagining that the system is self-enclosed. This is because Foucault treats historical periods as paradigms whose borders are determined according to the regularities among the similarities between historical discourses. I agree with Diaz-Bone in saying that the rules of the discursive formations are explained in a self-enclosed system as if there were no continuity between historical periods and nothing outside the given time and culture. This is not to say that Foucault is concerned with giving a universalistic account that is

independent of temporal and cultural conditions. However, to be more specific, I do not feel the capability to consider his account as completely relative to time and place when I analyze his archaeological studies in their own terms. As Foucault accepts it, a genealogy of history must first be conducted to have such a claim.

Moreover, reading the Foucauldian archaeological method in that fashion can seem to be taking it in a narrow sense, given that we should read it from a broader perspective by integrating ourselves in a retrospective glance. Additionally, one can point out that the reason why Foucault conducts the archaeological analyses that enabled him to construct an order between epistemes in a given historical period can be explained by the fact that he tries to understand his present. As a matter of fact, some Foucault scholars interpret his archaeology in that way. However, as mentioned before, this would be an overlooking of his archaeological method.

Studying historical epistemes is not and cannot be used to understand the present dynamic circumstances unless an account of the history of the present is given. As Monod puts it, in Foucault's archaeology, a specific theory, such as Marx's theory or Ricardo's political economy, which had been as ones that were recognized as having a "scientific value" in the nineteenth century, conforms to the epistemic conditions of its time (2016, p.25). Monod is right to say that from the standpoint of the archaeological method, it would not be appropriate to treat Ricardo's political economy – a theory whose scientific value is no longer valid for the present day – as a clue to understanding our present. That is why Foucault needs to give an account of the present first in order to make such an interpretation.

The question must first be addressed if we assume continuity in Foucault's entire philosophy. It is true that Foucault has implied that there is continuity in his writings and speeches in the late 1970s. However, he had not made such a statement until then. Nonetheless, if I needed to say the continuity between the archaeological and genealogical methods, I would say that Foucault is still an archaeologist in orientation in his genealogical period to such an extent that he still tries to find the invisibility behind the visibility. That is, in his early period, through conducting his archaeological

studies, he attempted to unearth the hidden or unconscious principles that would give rise to the possibility of knowledge in specific epistemes. Likewise, in his later period, he studies the unapparent conditions that govern the ways in which human beings experience their social reality. That is why he goes on to study the exercise of power and its relation to knowledge, given that everything is within the grid of these two distinct but interrelated realms. Ironically, this continuity can be equated with the role of structuralism in post-structuralism. That is, looking for the unapparent conditions within the apparent is still a structuralist tendency that we can still see in post-*structuralism*. Therefore, if we recall the scholars' interpretations regarding whether Foucault can be called a structuralist or a poststructuralist philosopher, assuming continuity in Foucault's entire philosophy, especially between his archaeological and genealogical methods, we would have to conclude that Foucault is still a structuralist in orientation in his genealogical period. However, this structuralism is different from what we are familiar with structuralism in his archaeological period. This is due to the fact that this structuralism is affected by the dynamic relations of *power* and *knowledge*. It is through this kind of analysis that Foucault eludes the synchronic approach and the totalizing tendency, which leads to important philosophical conclusions. These conclusions can be attributed to the "post" of *post-structuralism*. Therefore, the Foucauldian methodological change from archaeology to genealogy should be read as a transition from structuralism to post-structuralism.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we saw that features of structuralism, namely synchronicity, the totalizing tendency, the dissolution of the idea of “man,” and seeking the unconscious conditions of the apparent forms of knowledge are present in Foucault’s archaeology. Synchronicity or atemporality allows for the inter-relations among the structures in a particular system to be revealed in toto without studying the diachronic or temporal development of their elements. And the reliance upon the Cartesian subject that is taken as an intrinsically rational being who has the power to determine her reality begins to be eliminated. This is because language plays an important role in determining human reality. Moreover, searching for the rules that are not open to human consciousness is the common tendency shared by structuralist thinkers that we can see in different structuralist disciplines ranging from psychoanalysis to anthropology.

As opposed to structuralism, poststructuralism welcomes both continuity and discontinuity by emphasizing the temporality or contingency of supposedly necessary and natural things. And poststructuralist thinkers are concerned with the specificity of human practices by arguing that any singular theory is not and cannot explain human reality at all. They discern themselves from the totalizing tendency of structuralism by arguing that nothing is ever the same where there is power. It is evident that Foucault has the overtones of these features of poststructuralism in his genealogical period.

We also saw that Foucault aims to unearth the unconscious conditions of the possibility of knowledge – the *historical a priori* rules – upon which discourses are based in his archaeology period. Foucault opens up an archaeological space in which he conducts historical analyses in order to uncover an *order* among statements or groups of statements. In each historical era, Foucault claims that there is a distinctive structure,

i.e., *episteme*, which governs how a particular set of enunciations were formed and marks off what was thinkable and unthinkable. In short, Foucault treats archaeology as a method of research in the history of thought he had developed, revealing the discursive traces of clear-cut historical periods, each presenting its own distinct ordered patterns of statements.

Foucault stressed the notions of historical discontinuities and paradigmatic shifts that would characterize his archaeological analyses. The remarkable finding in his *The Order of Things* can be described as follows: the disciplines of general grammar, natural history, and analysis of wealth in the Classical period have more in common than their successors and predecessors in the following and preceding periods. The discourses of life, language, and labor in the nineteenth century give eventually rise to the development of the disciplines of biology, philology, and economics in the twentieth century, respectively. However, what is most striking for Foucault is to discover the fact that the structural patterns that link different discourses within the same period are much more apparent than the internal transformations of their successors or predecessors or the continuity between them. The synchronic similarities or the patterned regularities between different disciplines within the same period are much more apparent than their diachronic development over the course of time. However, this leads to a problem that would solely be resolved by his genealogical method.

Correspondingly, we also saw that Foucault applies his genealogical method to understand the dynamic relationship between the past and the present. The insufficiency of the archaeological method, i.e., a lack of philosophical explanation of the mechanisms of changes and the political or social significance of the human experience, is supplied by his genealogical method. Thanks to the genealogical analyses, Foucault conceptualizes the *descents* of the present conditions by showing the temporality and contingency of the supposedly necessary claims. By the studies of the temporalized forms of *power* and *knowledge*, Foucault has given an account of the *present* and the notion of *change* that he had felt incapability during the archaeological period.

In short, the Foucauldian archaeological method was used to unveil the structural order and discontinuities that separate the present from the past. By contrast, through conducting historical analyses, the Foucauldian genealogical method was used to search for the descent and continuities of the processes that shape the present and show how contemporary human experiences emerge from the network of strategies and counter-strategies, alliances, and counter-alliances of power and knowledge.

Further, we witnessed the diversity of interpretations among the Foucault scholars concerning as to whether Foucault was a structuralist or a poststructuralist thinker. It is not easy to read Foucault from either perspective, given that Foucault is such a figure who is very suspicious of categorizations. Regarding him from a structuralist or a poststructuralist perspective is still a thorny issue among the commentators. This is because, in my view, the effort that the scholars put into their studies is to understand Foucault's philosophy better, given that the accounts that Foucault gives are believed to differ from the versions of his time. In that regard, I bear the same concern as the scholars, except that I think Foucault was influenced by the currents of his time.

Last, we saw a discussion concerning how accurate the scholars' interpretations are as to whether Foucault can be called a structuralist or a poststructuralist. The common mistake that I saw among them can be articulated as follows: They assume that there is continuity in Foucault's entire life as if Foucault had the purpose of diagnosing the present from the beginning. There is no wrongness in making such a statement only when we consider Foucault's intentions or beliefs. However, there is no instantiation proving that Foucault realized the purpose of his archaeological period within the archaeological rhetoric. As the scholars put it, the failure is due to the insufficiency of the archaeological method. Therefore, Foucault goes on to a methodological change from archaeology to genealogy in order to fulfill his desire, that is, giving an account of the present. I agree with the scholars' characterizations about the insufficiency of the archaeological method and the efficiency of the genealogical method. However, they did not realize that the Foucauldian methodological shift from archaeology to genealogy should be interpreted as a transition from structuralism to post-structuralism.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Michel Foucault, 20. yzyılda genellikle yapısalcılık ve postyapısalcılık hareketleriyle ilişkilendirilen bir Fransız filozofudur. Ancak, Foucault akademisyenleri arasında onun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı bir düşünr olduđu hâlâ tartışılmaktadır. Bunun bir nedeni, Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı mı düşünr olduđu konusunda net tanımlamalar yapmaktan kaçınmasıdır. Onun bu tr sınıflandırmalara şphe duyan bir figr olduđu göz nne alındığında, bu anlaşılabilir bir durumdur. Diğer bir nedeni ise çalışmalarının her iki şekilde de yorumlanabildiğı gerçeğidir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın amacı bu çtrefilli tartışmaya yeni bir boyut kazandırmaktır: Foucault arkeoloji dnemi çalışmalarında yapısalcı izler taşıırken jeneoloji dneminde postyapısalcı izler taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu tez Foucault'nun metodolojik değışimine – arkeolojiden jeneolojiye – yapısalcılıktan postyapısalcılığa geiş olarak değıerlendirilebileceğini göstermeyi hedeflemektedir. Nihayetinde bu çalışma, Foucault akademisyenleri arasındaki tartışmaya yeni bir yorum getirme açısından nem taşıırken, aynı zamanda Michel Foucault felsefesinin daha iyi anlaşılması amacına da hizmet etmektedir.

İnsanı ve içinde bulunduđu sosyal gerekliğı anlamayı hedefleyen ve yeni bir bakış açısı olarak ortaya çıkan yapısalcılık, 1950'lerde Fransa'da sosyal bilimlerin yükselmesiyle kayda değıer bir poplarite kazandı. Ancak yapısalcılık, aşırı iddiaları nedeniyle daha sonra 1970'lerde, yine Fransa'daki akademisyenler tarafından

eleştirilmeye başlandı. Postyapısalcılık ise bu tartışmalara bir karşı tepki olarak yerini almaya başladı.

Foucault felsefesi genel olarak arkeoloji, jeneoloji ve etik olmak üzere üç döneme ayrılır. Ancak bu çalışma amacı doğrultusunda onun ilk iki dönemi olan arkeoloji ve jeneoloji üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Özellikle Foucault'nun 1960 ve 1970 yıllarında bu iki metodu uyguladığı *Kelimeler ve Şeyler* [*The Order of Things*], *Bilginin Arkeolojisi* [*Archaeology of Knowledge*], *Hapishanenin Doğuşu* [*Discipline and Punish*] ve *Cinselliğin Tarihi* [*History of Sexuality Volume One*] çalışmaları incelenmektedir. İlk iki kitap, belirli söylemlerin [discourses] oluşumundan sorumlu tarihsel yapıları [structures] vurgulayarak, arkeolojik döneme ait olarak kategorize edilebilir; son iki kitabı ise *iktidar* [power] ve *bilgi* [knowledge] arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiyi işleyen jeneoloji dönemine ait sayılabilir.

Bu tez, Foucault'nun arkeolojik yönteminden jeneolojik yönetime geçişinin yapısalcılıktan postyapısalcılığa geçiş olarak yorumlanabileceğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamadığından, çalışmanın kendisi argümanlarını üç bölümde ortaya koyacaktır. Birinci bölüm yapısalcılık ve postyapısalcılığını tanımını vermektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, Foucault'cu arkeolojik ve jeneolojik yöntemleri tanımlanmaktadır. İkinci bölüm Foucault akademisyenlerinin Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı mı olduğu hususundaki farklı yorumlarını ortaya koymaktadır. Üçüncü ve son bölümde ise, bu akademisyenlerin yorumlarının ne ölçüde doğru olduğunun kritiği yapılmaktadır. Bu bölümlerin sıralaması ışığında, tezin hedefi (1) Foucault'cu arkeoloji yöntemin yapısalcı bir bakış açısıyla ve jeneoloji yöntemin postyapısalcı bir bakış açısıyla okunması sayesinde Michel Foucault felsefesinin daha iyi anlaşılması ve (2) bu yöntem değişiminin bu iki ana akımla ilişkilendirilebilmesi ile Foucault akademisyenleri arasındaki tartışmaya yeni bir yorum katmaktır. Daha spesifik olarak söz konusu kitaplarda ortaya atılan sorunlar, ele alınan konular, geliştirilen stratejiler ve ortaya çıkan kaygılar ve amaçlar birbirinden farklıdır. Bu nedenle bu kitapların sadece içerikleri değil, onları etkilemiş olabilecek dış faktörleri de göz önünde bulundurarak her birini kendi içinde okumayı tercih ediyorum. Foucault'nun bu iki dönemdeki tüm felsefi kazanımlarını yapısalcılık ve postyapısalcılık olmak üzere iki

ana kola ayırarak, onun çalışmalarında kullandığı farklı kavramların çok daha iyi anlaşılabilirliğini savunuyorum.

Foucault'cu yöntem değişiminin iddia edildiği gibi gösterilebilmesi için öncelikle bu tezin ilk bölümünde, yapısalcılık ve postyapısalcılık iddialarının genel bir açıklamasını yapıyorum. Buna bağlı olarak, Foucaultcu arkeolojik ve jeneolojik yöntemlerini açıklıyorum. Bu bölüm dört ayrı alt başlıktan oluşmaktadır.

Birinci kısımda, yapısalcılık hakkında genel bir açıklama yapıyorum. Fransız entelektüelleri arasında popüler bir hareket olan yapısalcılık, bazı ilke ve yaklaşımları benimseyerek toplumsal gerçekliği anlamanın ve kavramsallaştırmanın bir yolu olarak görülmektedir. Spesifik olarak yapısalcılık, konusu ne olursa olsun, çalışma nesnesini bir bütün olarak alır; ele alınan konu spesifik bir dil [language], insan aklı/ruhu [a human psyche], bir edebi metin [a literary text] veya tarihsel bir anın bir parçası olabilir [a historical moment].

Genel olarak konuşursak, yapısalcı düşünürler, öğelerinin birbiriyle ilişkili olduğu, kendi içine kapalı bir sistem yaratmaya çalışırlar. Sistemlerin yapımından sorumlu olduğu iddia edilen orijinal/yaratıcı kuralları formüle etmeyi amaçlarlar. Açıklamalarında toplumsal gerçekliğin kör noktalarını entelektüel çabayla deşifre edilen bir ders kitabı gibi okunabileceği fikrini benimserler. Bu akım, insan gerçekliğinin soyut, kendi içinde durağan ve insan bilincine kapalı bir dizi kurala tabi olduğunu varsayar. Bu nedenle, yapısalcı düşünürler bu kuralları, bir sistemin öğeleri arasındaki ilişkilerin altında yatan içsel ve sosyal gerçekliğe gömülü olduğu varsayılan mantığı [inner logic] ortaya çıkarmaya çalışırlar. Başka bir deyişle, söylenende söylenmeyeni, görünende görünmeyeni açığa vururlar. Yapısalcılığın genel amacı, bir toplumda gömülü olan yapıların gizli ağını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu nedenle, çalışmalarında bilinçdışı bilgi düzeyi [unconscious level of knowledge], eşzamanlılık [synchronicity], zamansızlık [atemporality] ve evrensellik [universality] ilkelerini takip eder.

Yapısalcı disiplinlerin gelişiminde Saussure'ün dil anlayışı yadsınamaz bir etkiye sahiptir. İnsan hayatını ve sosyal gerçekliği anlamaya ve bunu kavramsallaştırmayı

hedefleyen yapısalcı düşünürler kendi disiplinlerini geliştirirken Saussure'ün dil teorisinden etkilenmişlerdir. Bunun nedeni şu şekilde özetlenebilir: Dilsel kurallar insan gerçekliğinin ve kültürünün doğasında vardır. Bu, bir kültüre içkin olan ve dilin incelenmesi yoluyla ifşa edilebilecek kodları anlamının yolunu belirlemekle ilgilenen modern beşerî bilimlerin gelişimi içindeki ortak fikirdir. Dolayısıyla bir dilin içine gömülü olan kuralları incelemek, bunun insan gerçekliğini kavramsallaştırmanın bir yolu olduğunu söylemek anlamına gelir. Yani, düşündüğümüz şey, diye açıklıyor Sturrock, “dilnin yapısı tarafından şartlandırılmış... dilden bağımsız olarak iletilebilir hiçbir düşünce mümkün değildir” (2003, s.25). Bu bakımdan dilsel kurallar insan gerçekliğinin ve kültürünün doğasında vardır.

Bu yönelimin arkasındaki ana güdü, her şeyin, hatta “değişimin” [change] bile yapısal bir sistem içindeki her bir unsurun etkileşimi ile anlaşılabilceği bir sistem yaratmak olarak tanımlanabilir. Olssen'in de belirttiği gibi, Saussure'ün görüşüne göre, “parçaların bütüne bağlı olduğu ve parçaların ancak yapıyla ilişkili olarak anlaşılabilceği” bir sistemin yapısına gönderme yapan bir yapıdır (2003, s.190). Bu anlamda, belirli bir sistemdeki parçalar ve bunların karşılıklı ve etkileşimli ilişkileri, sistemin tam bir genel resmini verebilir. Aslında, bu ilişkiler sosyal ilişkilerdir, örneğin ekonomik, ideolojik, politik ve bilimseldir. Bu nedenle, Olssen'e göre, bu tür bir yaklaşımın benimsenmesi, bazı önemli felsefî çıkarımlar gerektirir, yani, gerçekliği gerçeğin şeffaf bir yansıması olarak temsil eden “dil veya hakikatin tekabül teorisinin” [correspondence theory of language and truth] reddi ve “özne kavramını özünde rasyonel bir varlık olarak alma” [Cartesian subject] fikrinin reddi gibi (s.190-1). Sonuç olarak, gerçekliği olduğu gibi temsil eden, özünde rasyonel bir varlık olarak karakterize edilen Kartezyen özne kavramı, dilbilimsel teorilerin gelişimi tarafından reddedilmiştir. Bu anlayış, bu tarzla ele alınan öznenin ölümü [death of man] sonucuna yol açmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, düşüncenin dildeki kurallara bağlı olduğu fikriyle insan bilinci ile gerçeklik arasındaki şeffaflık kanısı önemini yitirmeye başlar. Dilin doğasında var olan kuralları incelemek, yapısalcı düşünürler için insan gerçekliğinin hesabını vermenin anahtarı olmaya başlamıştır. Yapısalcılık, bu anlamda, anlamın doğasıyla ilgili bir soruyla başlayan bir harekettir. Bu nedenle, hareket içindeki

antropoloji, psikanaliz ve edebiyat gibi çeşitli sosyal disiplinler dilbilimsel bir soruyu gündeme getirerek faaliyet gösterir.

Bu bölümün ikinci kısmında, postyapısalcılık hareketini anlatıyorum. Postyapısalcılık 1970'lerin ilk yıllarında popüler hale gelmeye başladı. Postyapısalcı düşünürler, güç ilişkileri [*power relations*], insan öznelerin sosyal inşası, yazı ve metinsellik, politik yargılar, cinsel farklılıklar ve toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmaları gibi temaları analiz etmekle ilgilenir. Dahası, postyapısalcılık, günlük hayatın ne kadar karmaşık olduğuna odaklandığı için toplumsal gerçekliğe yönelik her türlü bütünleştirici eğilimden vazgeçer. Başka bir deyişle, postyapısalcı düşünürler, çalışmalarında özgüllükleri içinde insan deneyimlerinin karmaşıklığını vurgularlar. Yani postyapısalcılık, yapısalcılıkta olduğu gibi belirlenmiş herhangi bir teorinin beşerî gerçekliği olan her şeyi açıklayabileceği fikrini reddeder. Buna ek olarak, postyapısalcı düşünürler apolitikmiş gibi görünen, zaruri ve doğal olan buymuş gibi dayatılan görünürdeki tüm homojen yapıların aslında hepsinin birer politik kaygılarla inşa edilmiş, tarihsel çözümlemelerle olumsuzlukları ve dolayısıyla heterojen yapılar olduğunu göstermeyi hedefler. Bu bağlamda postyapısalcılık eleştirel düşünme tarzını benimser.

Yapısalcılığın aksine postyapısalcılık, insan gerçekliğine dair ortaya çıkarılmayı bekleyen ve bazı yöntemlerle kurulabilecek derin ve nihai bir hakikat olduğu fikrini reddeder. Bu tür hakikat iddialarına karşı şüpheci bir tavır takınır. Fakat yapısalcılar gibi, postyapısalcı düşünürler de *özne-merkezli* retorikten rahatsızdırlar; anlam ve hakikatin kaynağı olarak insanı ele almazlar. Ancak, “insanın ölümü” [*death of man*] kavramını somut insan ilişkilerine odaklanarak incelemeyen yapısalcılıktan farklı olarak postyapısalcılık, insan öznesinin toplumsal gerçekliği içinde incelenmesinin dikkate değer olduğunu belirtir. Bu nedenle postyapısalcılık, insanın sosyal olarak nasıl inşa edildiğiyle ilgilenir. Daha doğrusu öznenin tarihsel olarak nasıl kurulduğu, yani insanın zaman içinde belirli koşullarda özne haline nasıl geldiği fikrini incelemek adına bu koşulları araştırır.

Postyapısalcılık çalışmalarda eşzamanlı [*synchronic*] bir bakış açısı yerine artzamanlı [*diachronic*] veya tarihsel açıklamalara öncelik verilir. Postyapısalcılık, sosyal

gerçekliği anlamak için temel olarak zamansallık, dönüşüm, tarih ve değişim kavramlarını analiz eder. Yapısalcılığın sosyal sistemler, psişik yaşam [psychic life], ekonomik sistemler veya edebiyat gibi zaman dışı fenomenler olarak kavramsallaştırdığı şeyler, postyapısalcılar tarafından tarihsel açılımları içinde incelenir. Artzamanlı açıklamalardaki bu ısrarın tek bir nedeni olmayabilir. Her halükârda asıl sebebi geçmişle bugün arasındaki ilişkiyi veya bugünün tarihsel boyutunu vurgulamalarıdır. Schrift'in dediği gibi, bu akımla birlikte “insan deneyimi tarihselleştirilir” (2018, s. 179). Bu nedenle postyapısalcı analizler, geçmiş ile bugün arasındaki dinamik yapıları yeniden düşünmek için tarihe geri döner.

Birinci bölümün üçüncü kısmında Foucault'nun arkeoloji yöntemini anlatıyorum. Foucault'nun bu dönemde yaptığı aslında tarihsel söylemlerin arkeolojisidir, yani belirli söylemsel oluşumların/pratiklerin, belli bir tarihsel dönem içindeki spesifik söylemlerin oluşumunda nasıl yaratıcı bir role sahip olduğunu araştırır. Arkeolojik çalışmalarının en ilgi çekici yönü, bir disiplindeki söylemlerin belirli bir tarihsel dönem içinde onları birbirine bağlayan yadsınamaz yapısal kalıpları paylaşması gerçeğidir. Dolayısıyla tarihsel dönemleri tanımlamak, kendi içindeki dinamiğin yapısını anlamak için *episteme* kavramını oluşturur. Her dönemi, söylemlerin oluşumundan sorumlu kurallar arasındaki benzerliklere göre sınırları tanımlanmış, kendi içine kapalı alanlar olarak ele alır. Bu kurallar, Foucault'nun *historical a priori* dediği şeydir. Bu kurallar bir kültürde içe gömülü şekilde saklıdır ve o kültürde ve zamanda yaşamış insanlar bu kuralların bilinç düzeyinde farkında değillerdir. Bu bakımdan, yapısalcılara benzer şekilde Foucault, her epistemedeki gömülü olan bilinçdışı kuralları ortaya çıkarmakla ilgilenir.

Ancak Foucault, arkeolojik dönemde tarihsel çözümlemelerini yapısalcı paradigma çerçevesinde, “artzamanlı” açıklamaların yerine “eşzamanlı” açıklamaları getirerek zamansallığı zaman-dışılığa indirgeyerek yürütmüştür. Söylemlerin oluşumuna yol açan bir kültürün gizli - bilinçsiz – “tarihsel a priori” kurallarını veya kodlarını bulmaya çalıştığı bir arkeolojik alan tasarlar. Bu bakımdan yapısalcılığın bütüncülleştirici eğilimine düşer. Söylemsel bir alandaki ifade sistemlerini veya ifade gruplarını ve söylemleri düzenlemekten sorumlu kurallar arasındaki ilişkileri

incelerken, her bir söylemin dönüşümünü sanki kendi tarihsel dönemlerine özgü birer “otokton” [*autochthonous*] yapılmış gibi göz ardı eder. Her söylemin doğruluk değerinin [truth-value] tarihsel zamanına özgü olduğu doğrudur. Ancak şu bilinmelidir ki, yeni söylemler yoktan var olmadı. Bu yanılgı ancak Foucault, temelde bugünün hesabını [*diagnosis of the present*] vermek için yönünü arkeolojiden jeneolojiye değiştirdiğinde belirginleşir. Yorumcuların iddialarının aksine Foucault, arkeolojik dönemde böyle bir amacı olduğuna inanılsa da bugünün hesabını veremez.

Ancak 1960’ların sonunda, özellikle röportajlarında Foucault, farklı tarihsel dönemler arasındaki geçişi açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığını kabul eder. Çünkü tasarladığı sistem, zaman-dışı bir zamansallığa dayalı bir tarihten oluşmaktadır. Yani, başlangıçta belirli bir kültürde bir düzenin haritasını çıkarmak için “kırılmalar,” “paradigmalar,” “eşikler” [*thresholds*] ve “anormallikler” kavramlarını incelemeyi amaçlasa da değişim [*change*] kavramını göz ardı etti. Kısacası, onun arkeolojisi, bir dizi tarihsel apriori kuralın neden, nasıl ve hangi mekanizmalar aracılığıyla bir diğerine yol açtığını ve dolayısıyla bir söylemsel oluşumun yerini neden, nasıl ve hangi mekanizmalar aracılığıyla bir diğerinin aldığını açıklamaktan acizdi. 1970’lerde Foucault, yeni söylemlerin yoktan var olmadığını fark eder ve takip eden çalışmalarında değişim mekanizmalarının [*mechanisms of change*] jeneolojik açıklamalarına yönelir. Bununla birlikte, arkeolojik yöntemi, değişim mekanizmasını etkili bir şekilde açıklayacak teçhizata sahip değildi. Arkeolojik yöntem bütüncül ve söylemsel [*discursive*] bir bakış açısına dayandığı için tarihsel dönemler arasındaki geçişin ve aynı zamanda söylemlerin dönüşüm meselesini açıklamakta yetersizdir. Nitekim Foucault jeneoloji döneminde değişim mefhumunun tam bir açıklamasını verebilmek için söylemsel olmayan [*nondiscursive*] pratiklerin tarihsel incelemelerine yönelir. Bu aynı zamanda, geçmiş ile şimdinin [*the present*] arasındaki bağlantıyı gösterebildiği için felsefi anlamda bugünün hesabını verebilmenin bir yolu olacaktır. Bu sebeple, Foucault jeneoloji döneminde iktidar [*power*] ve bilginin [*knowledge*] zamansallaştırılmış formlarını çalışır.

Bu bölümün son kısmında, Foucault’nun jeneoloji yöntemini anlatıyorum. Bu yöntemle Foucault, iktidar ilişkileri [*power relations*] alanına girer. Değişim

mekanizmalarının tam bir açıklamasını vermek için kurumsal yapı, sosyal ve ailevi otorite, cinsiyet normları vb. gibi bilgi oluşumunun söylemsel olmayan unsurlarını incelemek için jeneoloji yöntemini uygular. Bunu yapmak için, yeni söylemlerin yoktan var olmadığı gerçeğini dikkate aldığımızda, bugünün geçmişle bağlantısını göstermesi gerekiyor. Arkeolojik yöntem sadece söylemsel bilgi alanıyla ilgilendiğinden ve tarihsel dönemleri bütüncül bir şekilde ele aldığından, söylemler arasındaki değişim mekanizmasını göstermekte yetersiz kalmaktadır. Böylece Foucault, değişim mefhumunun bir açıklamasını vermek için jeneolojik analizlere yönelir. Yöntemle amaçladığı şey, belirli mücadeleler, stratejiler ve iktidar uygulamalarından nasıl çağdaş pratiklerin izlerinin ortaya çıktığını göstermektir. Her uygulamanın kendi tarihi ve belirli olay akışı vardır. Bu nedenle Foucault, çağdaş pratiklerin ortaya çıktığı süreçlerin izini sürerek zamansallaştırılmış bilgi ve iktidar biçimlerini inceler.

Foucault, geçmiş ile bugün arasındaki dinamik ilişkiyi anlamak için jeneolojik yöntemini uygular. Arkeolojik yöntemin yetersizliği, yani değişim mekanizmalarının nedenlerini ve insan deneyiminin siyasi ve toplumsal önemini felsefi olarak açıklayamaması, onun jeneoloji yöntemiyle sağlanır. Jeneolojik analizler sayesinde Foucault, sözde gerekli iddiaların zamansallığını ve olumsuzluğunu göstererek mevcut koşulların inişlerini [*descents*] araştırır. Foucault, iktidar ve bilginin zamansallaştırılmış biçimlerine ilişkin incelemeleriyle, arkeolojik dönemde yetersiz hissettiği şimdiki zamana ve değişim kavramına dair bir açıklama yapabilmektedir.

Kısacası, geçmişin yapısal düzeni ve süreksizlikleri ortaya çıkarmak için Foucault arkeolojik yöntem kullanır. Buna karşılık, jeneolojik yöntem sayesinde Foucault iktidar ve bilgi formlarının tarihsel analizler yürüterek bugünü şekillendiren süreçlerin kökenini ve sürekliliklerinin oluşumunun ardındaki koşulları araştırmak ve çağdaş insan deneyimlerinin stratejiler ve karşı stratejiler, ittifaklar ve karşı ittifakları vb. süreçlerine tabi olduğu gerçeğinin hesabını verir. Bu sayede Foucault geçmiş ile bugünün arasındaki bağlantıyı kurabilmesi için, değişim mekanizmalarının yeni söylemsel oluşumlarındaki etkisi, yani arkeoloji döneminde reddettiği sürekliliği açıklayabilmek için iktidar çalışmalarına yönelir. Nihayetinde Foucault, yalnızca

zamansallığın tek formu olan süreksizlikle ilgilenmez, aynı zamanda sürekliliği de işin içine katarak tarihsel analizlerin hakkını verebilmektedir.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı mı olduğuna dair bazı Foucault akademisyenlerinin yorumlarını ele alıyorum. Diaz-Bone, Sturrock, Rabate ve Lundy gibi akademisyenlerin Foucault'yu yapısalcı olarak okuyor. Öte yandan Gordon, Monod ve Olssen gibi isimler Foucault'yu yapısalcı olmayan bir bakış açısıyla okuyor. Üçüncü yorum, Foucault'yu ne yapısalcı ne de postyapısalcı bir bakış açısıyla okuyan Koopman'dan geliyor. Son olarak, Gutting, Descombes, Besley ve Flynn gibi isimlerin Foucault'yu postyapısalcı bir bakış açısıyla okuduklarını görüyoruz.

Diaz-Bone'a göre, Foucault'nun arkeolojisinde söylemsel oluşumların kuralları – söylemlerin dışında hiçbir şeyin olmadığı – kendi içine kapalı bir sistem içinde açıklandığından Foucault'yu yapısalcı olarak okumayı tercih ediyor. Benzer şekilde Sturrock ve Rabate Foucault'nun arkeolojik yönteminde mevcut olan sistemlerde örtük iç yasalar, nesnellik, bilinçdışı bilgi gibi yapısalcı nosyonlara odaklanır. Onlara göre bu kavramları bir kez kullandığımızda, istesek de istemesek de Foucault'nun yapısalcı olduğunu kabul etmemiz gerektiğini öne sürüyorlar. Lundy için ise Foucault yapısalcılık hareketini tarihsel bir boyut ekleyerek hareketin kapsamını genişlettiğini ve ilk aşamasından itibaren onu dönüştürdüğünü savunuyor.

Gordon Foucault'nun her biri bilgi olanağı veren bir dizi kurala tabi olan tarihsel dönemleri kavramsallaştırmasının yapısalcılığa benzediğini söyler. Bununla birlikte, zamansallık üzerindeki vurgusu, Foucault'yu yapısalcı yapmaz çünkü bu kurallar belirli bir zamana ve mekana görecelidir. Benzer şekilde Monod, belirli söylemlerin ortaya çıkması için *bilinçdışı* [unconscious] koşullar terimini kullanmanın Foucault'yu yapısalcı olarak algılamamıza sebebiyet verebilir, ancak Foucault'nun başından beri bugünün tarihini amaçladığını ve arkeolojinin bu amaç için yeterince iyi olmadığını savunur. Ona göre bu amaç, yapısalcılıkla bağdaşmaz. Bu nedenle, bu amacı tesis etmek için yeni bir yöntem olan jeneolojiye geçiş yapar. Olssen ise Foucault'nun bazı unsurlar arasındaki çoklu ilişkileri ortaya çıkarmak için nedensellik kavramının

“atomistik” olmayan veya doğrusal olmayan yapısalci versiyonunu benimsediğini açıklıyor. Ancak bu, Foucault’nun yapısalci olduğu anlamına gelmez, çünkü Olssen’e göre belirli bilgi biçimlerinin belirli bir zaman ve mekana bağlı olduğunu düşünmesi bakımından Foucault yapısalci düşünürlerden ayrışır. Foucault bunları zamandan ve mekandan bağımsız uygulanabilir *evrensel* yapılar olarak genellemez. Foucault’ya yapısalci diyemememizin bir başka nedeni de başından beri “değişim” kavramına takıntılı olmasıyla açıklanabilir. Arkeolojik yöntemde değişim topyekûn anlatılır, ancak Foucault bu tür açıklamalarla yetinmez. Bu nedenle Foucault yöntemini arkeolojiden jeneolojiye değiştirir.

Koopman Foucault’nun jeneoloji metoduna yönelmesini arkeolojinin genişlemesi olarak okur. Daha doğrusu arkeolojik yöntemin felsefi anlamda nedensel açıklama bakımından eksikliği ve siyasi eleştiri noksanlığı jeneoloji yöntemiyle sağlanır. Koopman Foucault’yu bu tür yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde asla kategorize etmez çünkü Foucault bu tür sınıflandırmalara şüpheyile yaklaşan bir figürdür. Ve ona göre Foucault, spesifik bir yöntem geliştirme kaygısı taşıyan bir filozof değildir. Bu yüzden Koopman’a göre Foucault ne yapısalcıdır ne de postyapısalcıdır.

Gutting’e göre Foucault arkeolojik dönemdeki tarihsel çalışmalarıyla yapmaya çalıştığı şey, geçmişi anlamaktan çok bugünü anlama niteliği taşır. Nitekim Foucault’nun içinde bulunduğumuz zamandaki gerekli, apolitik, ve doğal görünen şeylere eleştirel bakış açısına işaret ediyor. Dolayısıyla ona göre Foucault, tarihsel çalışmaları sayesinde bu iddiaların aslında olumsal, sentetik ve politik süreçlere bağlı olduğunu gösterir. Nitekim Gutting, arkeoloji metodunun jeneoloji metoduna “tamamlayıcı” bir yöntem olarak hizmet ettiğini savunur. Bu nedenle Foucault başından beri postyapısalcıdır. Bu tür açıklamalara benzer şekilde, Descombes için tarih ve kültürel görelilik [*cultural relativity*] terimleri başından beri Foucault’nun terminolojisinde mevcuttur. Bu nedenle ona göre Foucault’ya postyapısalci diyemeyiz. Benzer bir konumda Besley, Foucault’nun kültürel göreliliğine vurgu yapar, yani arkeolojik döneminde yaptığı şeyin “evrensel” bir hakikat iddiası taşımayan “olumsal” yapıları ortaya çıkarmak olduğu anlamına gelir. Son olarak, Flynn’e göre, sosyal gerçekliği “zaman dışı” [*extra-temporal*] yapılara dayandıran

yapısalcılık, özcü bir karaktere sahiptir. Ancak bu gelenekten farklı olarak Foucault'nun arkeolojisi, yapısalcı biçimleri tarihselleştirir. Dolayısıyla Flynn'e göre Foucault'nun tüm felsefesi, geleneksel birlikleri dekonstrüksiyon etmenin ve görünüşte gerekli olan yapıların olumsal çözümlemelerini ortaya çıkarmanın yollarını arar. Bu nedenle postyapısalcılarla aynı kaygıları paylaştığı için Foucault'nun bir postyapısalcı filozof olduğunu düşünür. Ayrıca Foucault, söylemleri arkeolojik dönemde belirli bir “söylemsel” alandaki bir dizi kurala aitmiş gibi ele alır. Ancak bu söylemler, arkeolojinin açıklayamadığı “söylemsel olmayan” durumlarla da ilişkilidir. Bu nedenle, arkeolojiden jeneolojiye metodolojik değişimini söylemsel olandan söylemsel olmayana geçiş olarak yorumlar.

Tezin son bölümünde, ikinci bölümde ele aldığım Foucault akademisyenlerinin açıklamalarının doğruluğunu eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendiriyorum. Bu anlatımlardaki esas yanlış şu şekilde tanımlanabilir: Foucault'nun arkeolojik yöntemini retrospektif olarak ele alıyorlar ve onun iki farklı dönemi arasında bir tür “süreklilik” varsayıyorlar. Dahası, 1960'ların arkeoloji yöntemi ile 1970'lerin jeneoloji yönteminin birbirini “tamamladığını” veya birbirinin “genişlemesi” olarak kavramsallaştırılmasını ileri sürerek, Foucault'nun en başından beri amacının bugünün [*the present*] felsefi hesabını vermek olduğunu kabul ederler. Ek olarak Foucault metodolojik bir değişikliğe gittiğinde, dönemin toplumsal ve politik arka planını da hiçe sayarlar.

Benim *The Order of Things*'i okumama göre Foucault, geçmişle bugünün arasındaki değişimi ve sürekliliği göstererek şimdiye dair bir tarih yazmayı amaçlamamıştır. Bunun nedeni, Foucault'nun arkeolojik döneminde “sürekliliği” bir kenara bırakarak bir tür zamansallığı, yani “süreksizliği” işlemesidir; her dönem, sanki aralarında bir süreklilik yokmuş gibi kendi içinde kapalı bir “episteme” şeklinde ifade edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, yorumcuların yaptığı gibi bugünün tarihini yazma amacını arkeolojik yöntem paradigmasında sorgusuz sualsiz kabul edersek, burada yatan zorlu bir probleme işaret etmek gerekir. Farklı tarihsel dönemlerdeki söylemsel oluşumlar birbirinden tamamen farklı olacak şekilde açıklanır; yani, bu oluşumlar Foucault'nun arkeolojisinde süreksiz veya zamansız bir tarih alanında şematize edilirler. Ancak

burada, akademisyenlerin gözden kaçırdığı ya da gerekli önemi vermedikleri düşünülmesi gereken bir sorun vardır : Foucault'nun arkeolojisinde bir söylemin diğerine dönüşmesini sağlayan mekanizma nerede? Yeni söylemlerin bir “dönüşüm” sürecinden geçerek öncekilerini takip ettikleri düşünülürse, yoktan var olmadıkları açıktır. Aslında Foucault'nun arkeoloji döneminin başından beri “bugünün tarihini” yazmayı hedeflediği varsayılırsa, o zaman Foucault'nun arkeolojisinde “süreklilik” nerededir?

Foucault'nun arkeolojiden jeneoloji metodolojik değişiminin yorumu, Foucault akademisyenleri arasında çeşitli yorumlara yol açmıştır. Bir kısmı onu Foucault'nun “söylemsel pratikler” çalışmasından “söylemsel olmayan pratikler” çalışmasına bir geçiş olarak okur veya arkeolojinin “bilgi” alanını incelemek için kullanıldığını, jeneolojinin ise “iktidar” ve “bilgi” arasındaki ilişki için kullanıldığını savunarak bu metodolojik eğişimi açıklar. Diğerleri ise benzer şekilde Foucault'nun söylemler arasındaki dönüşüme ve tarihsel dönemler arasındaki geçişe “nedensel” bir açıklama getirmek için konumunu arkeolojiden jeneolojiye değiştirdiğini ileri sürer. Bu bağlamda Foucault'nun jeneolojik metodunu onun arkeolojisinin genişletilmiş versiyonu olduğunu veya jeneoloji metodunun arkeolojinin tamamlayıcı niteliği taşıdığı sonucuna varır.

İlk bakışta Foucault'cu metodolojik değişimi bu şekilde yorumlamak, arkeolojinin “değişim” kavramını ve “bugünün tarihini” açıklayamadığı ölçüde mantıklıdır. Arkeolojik yöntemin yetersizliği düşünüldüğünde bu açıklamalar oldukça yeterli görünmektedir. Ancak Foucault'nun yöntemsel değişimi hakkında yapılan bu tür açıklamalar iki yöntem arasında “süreklilik” olduğu varsayımına dayanmaktadırlar. Arkeolojinin jeneolojiye tamamlayıcı bir yöntem olarak hizmet ettiğini varsayalım ya da ikincisi, birincisinin bir uzantısı olarak nitelendirilebilir olduğunu söyleyelim. Bu durumda şu soru sorulabilir: Foucault şimdiki zamanı baştan teşhis etmeyi amaçladıysa, neden arkeoloji döneminde sürekliliğin ve ilerlemenin olmadığı böyle bir tarih anlayışını kavramlaştırdı? Söylemler arasındaki değişim ve dönüşüm kavramına bir açıklama getirmeden, bu tarz yorumlar Foucault'nun metodolojik değişiminin aşırı genelleştirilmesi, dolayısıyla onun arkeolojik yöntemini yanlış

okumak anlamına gelecektir. Foucault'nun arkeolojik yöntemini anlamak söz konusu olduğunda bu tür yorumların yüzeysel düzeyde kaldığı açıktır.

Foucault'nun tüm felsefesinde süreklilik olduğunu varsayarsak, öncelikle ifade ettiğim bu sorunun çözülmesi gerekiyor. Foucault'nun 1970'lerin sonlarında yazılarında ve konuşmalarında süreklilik olduğunu ima ettiği doğrudur. Ancak o zamana kadar böyle bir açıklama yapmamıştır. Bununla birlikte, arkeolojik ve jeneolojik yöntemler arasındaki sürekliliği söylememiz gerekirse, Foucault'nun jeneoloji döneminde, hâlâ “görünürlüğün” ardındaki “görünmezliği” bulmaya çalışacak kadar bir arkeolog olduğunu söyleyebilirim. Yani erken döneminde, arkeolojik çalışmalarını yürüterek, belirli *epistemelerde* bilginin imkânını doğuracak gizli veya bilinçsiz ilkeleri ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmıştır. Aynı şekilde, daha sonraki döneminde, insanların toplumsal gerçekliklerini deneyimleme biçimlerini yöneten, görünmeyen koşulları inceler. Bu nedenle, Foucault spesifik “iktidar” ve “bilgi” formlarını çalışır. İronik bir şekilde bu süreklilik yapısalcılığın postyapısalcılıktaki rolüyle eş tutulabilir. Yani, görünmeyen koşulları görünenin içinde aramak, *post-yapısalcılıkta* hala karşılaştığımız yapısalcı bir eğilimdir. Bu nedenle, akademisyenlerin Foucault'nun yapısalcı mı yoksa postyapısalcı bir filozof olarak adlandırılabilceğine ilişkin yorumlarını hatırlarsak, Foucault'nun tüm felsefesinde, özellikle arkeolojik ve jeneolojik yöntemleri arasında süreklilik olduğunu varsayarsak, Foucault'nun yönelim açısından jeneoloji döneminde hala yapısalcı olduğu sonucuna varmamız gerekir. Ancak bu yapısalcılık, onun arkeolojik döneminde aşına olduğumuz yapısalcılıktan farklıdır. Bunun nedeni, bu yapısalcılığın “iktidar” ve “bilginin” dinamik ilişkilerinden etkilenmesidir. Foucault, önemli felsefi sonuçlara götüren yapısalcılığın eşzamanlı yaklaşımdan ve bütünleyici eğilimden bu tür bir analiz yoluyla kurtulur. Bu sonuçlar, post-yapısalcılığın “post” ekine atfedilebilir. Bu nedenle, arkeolojiden jeneolojiye Foucault'cu metodolojik değişim yapısalcılıktan post-yapısalcılığa geçiş olarak okunmalıdır.

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