(IN)SECURITIZATION OF MIGRANTS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF SYRIANS IN GAZIANTEP

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submitted by **EBRU VURAL** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA
Head of Department
Department of International Relations _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN
Supervisor
Department of International Relations _____

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Işık KUŞÇU BONNENFANT (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şerif Onur BAHÇECİK
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem KAYGUSUZ
Ankara University
Department of International Relations _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Kadir Onur UNUTULMAZ
Social Sciences University of Ankara
Department of International Relations _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Ebru VURAL

Signature:

ABSTRACT

(IN)SECURITIZATION OF MIGRANTS IN TURKEY:
THE CASE OF SYRIANS IN GAZIANTEP

VURAL, Ebru
Ph.D., The Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN

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Since 2011, Turkey has been one of the leading refugee-hosting countries worldwide, accommodating millions of displaced Syrians through its reliance on the temporary protection regime, which has become a significant subject of academic debate. While much research has focused on legal frameworks, integration processes, and foreign policy aspects, little attention has been paid to how everyday migration governance practices shape the (in)security dynamics. Within this context, the aim of this study is to understand and interpret the everyday practices and mechanisms of migration governance as experienced by displaced Syrians in Gaziantep, and to uncover how these practices contribute to (in)securitization processes as conceptualized by the Paris School of security studies. Drawing on in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in Gaziantep with 42 displaced Syrians and various stakeholders, the study investigates how ordinary procedures, such as ID checks, mobile migration vehicles, and profiling mechanisms, contribute to the normalization of surveillance and unease. The central argument is that Turkey's migration governance does not reflect a coherent securitizing discourse, but rather a dispersed logic of governmentality, where ordinary administrative procedures normalize

surveillance and produce a continuous sense of deportability for displaced Syrians. Many displaced people adopt self-regulatory behaviors and internalize surveillance logics, indicating that migration governance tools within borders, such as mobile migration points, function as “borders” within state’s borders. These mechanisms operate through ordinary routines, rather than exceptional politics, supporting the Paris School’s emphasis on “the governmentality of unease.” Therefore, this highlights the value of focusing on everyday lived experiences to monitor (in)security dynamics.

Keywords: displaced Syrians, (in)securitization, mass migration, Paris School, Turkey’s immigration regime

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE GÖÇMENLERİN GÜVENLİK(SİZ)LEŞTİRİLMESİ:
GAZİANTEP'TEKİ SURİYELİLER ÖRNEĞİ

VURAL, Ebru
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Zerrin TORUN

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2011'den bu yana Türkiye, geçici koruma rejimine dayanarak milyonlarca yerinden edilmiş Suriyeliyi kabul etmiş ve bu yönüyle dünya çapında en önde gelen mülteci barındıran ülkelerden biri olmuştur. Bu rejim, önemli bir akademik tartışma konusu haline gelmiştir. Araştırmaların büyük bir kısmı hukuki çerçeveler, entegrasyon süreçleri ve dış politika boyutlarına odaklanırken, gündelik göç yönetişimi pratiklerinin güvenlik(siz)lik dinamiklerini nasıl şekillendirdiğine görece daha az dikkat edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın amacı, Gaziantep'te yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin deneyimlediği gündelik göç yönetimi pratiklerini ve mekanizmalarını anlamak ve yorumlamak; bu pratiklerin Paris Okulu güvenlik çalışmaları literatüründe kavramsallaştırıldığı şekliyle güvenlik(siz)leşme süreçlerine nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Çalışma, Gaziantep'te 42 yerinden edilmiş Suriyeli ve çeşitli paydaşlarla gerçekleştirilen derinlemesine yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan yararlanarak, kimlik kontrolleri, mobil göç araçları ve profil oluşturma mekanizmaları gibi olağan prosedürlerin gözetim ve tedirginlik halini nasıl normalleştirdiğini incelemektedir. Temel argüman, Türkiye'nin göç yönetiminin tutarlı bir güvenlikleştirme söylemini yansıtmaktan ziyade, sıradan idari

prosedürlerin gözetimi ve yerinden edilmiş Suriyeliler için sürekli bir sınırdışı edilme hissini normalleştirdiği dağınık bir yönetimsellik mantığını yansıttığıdır. Birçok yerinden edilmiş kişi öz-denetim davranışlarını benimsemekte ve gözetim mantıklarını içselleştirmektedir. Bu durum, mobil göç noktaları gibi sınır içi göç yönetimi araçlarının, devlet sınırları içinde 'sınırlar' gibi işlev gördüğünü de göstermektedir. Bu mekanizmalar olağan gündelik rutinler aracılığıyla işlev görmekte, istisnai politikalardan ziyade gündelik bürokratik uygulamalara dayanmakta ve Paris Okulu'nun 'tedirginlik yönetimselliği' vurgusunu desteklemektedir. Dolayısıyla, gündelik yaşantıların merceğe alınmasının güvenlik(siz)lik dinamiklerini izlemek açısından önemini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: güvenlik(siz)leştirme, kitlesel göç, Paris Okulu, Türkiye'nin göç rejimi, yerinden edilmiş Suriyeliler

To my mom and dad

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Of course, I am fully aware that this dissertation has its shortcomings, for which I alone bear responsibility.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
HDP	People's Democratic Party
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MONE	Ministry of National Education
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPAA	National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis
PKK	The Kurdistan Workers' Party
PMM	Presidency of Migration Management
PYD	The Democratic Union Party
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
TOKİ	Housing Development Administration of the Republic of Turkey
TPR	Temporary Protection Regulation
TPS	Temporary Protection Status
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
YPG	People's Protection Units

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of the Study

By the end of the Cold War, the relationship between security and migration had become one of the central themes in international relations and security studies, as states increasingly framed immigration as a security challenge. The 9/11 events gave impetus to studies on the securitization of migration, which intensified in 2015 with the Syrian displacement, which is widely constructed and framed as a "refugee crisis." Although how European countries and the West securitized migration has been studied frequently, studies on the securitization of migration in Turkey were few in number until recent years. Nevertheless, in recent times, especially after the mass influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey after the Syrian Civil War erupted, studying Turkey's immigration policies and policies towards refugees within the context of securitization theory has become stimulating and meaningful. In this context, this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's policies and management of mass migration, using mass migration from Syria to Turkey after 2011 as a case study and focusing on the experiences of Syrians who are living in Gaziantep.

The response and involvement of Turkey in the Syrian crisis, which soon turned into a Syrian refugee crisis in the international arena, put Turkey under the spotlight of global and regional actors and humanitarian organizations. Turkey employed policies outside the core legal instruments of the international refugee regime, namely the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (Refugee Convention) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 (New York Protocol). In fact, because Turkey maintains the geographical limitation of the 1951 Refugee

Convention, Syrians could not be recognized as refugees in legal terms. Instead of employing the category of "asylum seekers" under the 1994 Regulation, Turkish authorities initially adopted ad hoc policies framed in humanitarian narratives and labelled Syrians as "guests." As "guest" has no legal connotation to guide the policies and administrative practices to be applied to displaced Syrians who entered Turkey in large numbers, Turkey enacted the temporary protection regime for displaced Syrians. As a result, Syrians in Turkey fell into a unique legal and administrative category to be managed. Refugees are subjects with rights and responsibilities under international law. However, in cases of mass influx, the refugee status determination process has not been applied, and the temporary protection regime has become an instrument applied not only in Turkey but also in European and North American countries in practice.

At the beginning of the events that displaced Syrians, there was no overarching law in the legal structure of Turkey for people who were displaced by the Syrian Civil War and arrived in Turkey, but preparations for such a law were underway. Before that, ad hoc policies were generally employed to deal with such issues, and Turkey was not ready for such a massive influx yet. It can be argued that Turkey remained "a country envisioned without foreigners"[1] for a very long time, but even before the arrival of Syrians, this was being challenged by the pressures of neoliberalism and regional and global politics. In addition, institutional structuring was also established after the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).[2] Nevertheless, the law and the institutional structure have evolved, changed, and developed over time, and we can say that this process is still ongoing.

Regardless of the legal status of Syrians in Turkey, Turkey consistently hosted one of the highest refugee[3] populations globally, which unsurprisingly made the country and its response a central case of academic interest in forced migration and refugee

[1] Sema Erder, "Yabancısız Kurgulanan Ülkenin 'Yabancıları,'" in *Türkiye'de Yabancı İşçiler: Uluslararası Göç, İşgücü ve Nüfus Hareketleri*, ed. Aylan Arı (Derin, 2007).

[2] Republic of Turkey, *The Law on Foreigners and International Protection*, No. 2013/6458. Accessed May 10, 2025.https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6458.pdf

[3] The term 'refugee' is used here in reference to its definition in international law.

studies. There is a growing literature on Syrians in Turkey. These studies generally emphasize the legal status of Syrians in Turkey, the vulnerabilities created by the temporary protection regime, the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey, and the conditions required for Syrian migrants to participate in working life. Other studies have mostly questioned the significance of the issue for regional and international politics. These have included studies analyzing Turkey's foreign policy in the face of migration movements. In addition to these, the number of studies drawing the link between migration and security is also considerable. However, it is important to keep in mind that securitization should not be treated as a phenomenon that has already happened or a static or eternal phenomenon within the Turkish context. It is more accurate to consider it a process that needs to be traced. Another point that should be emphasized in this context is the differences in the understanding of securitization between the Copenhagen School and the Paris School of Security Studies approaches, as stated in this dissertation. Taking the existing literature into account, this study aims to contribute to this literature by evaluating Turkey's response to mass migration flows from Syria through a securitization lens. Within this context, this thesis analyzes how Turkey's practices related to the reception, stay, and return of displaced Syrians have been experienced and interpreted by the displaced people themselves after the eruption of the Syrian Civil War. The aim is to explore whether and how migration and displaced Syrians have been securitized through a fieldwork-based analysis of local practices, within the framework of the Paris School's approach to (in)securitization.

1.2. Research Questions

In light of the framework outlined above, there are a number of questions this thesis aims to answer. As stated above, the main aim of this thesis is to use Syrians living in Gaziantep as a case study and investigate the traces of securitization/(in)securitization at the micro level[4] and how it is experienced by the people who have come from the Syrian territories. The main research question of this

[4] Here, the term "micro level" does not refer to the "levels of analysis" debate in International Relations theory. Rather, it denotes the everyday and practice-based dimension of migration governance as experienced by displaced Syrians in Gaziantep.

thesis is: How do displaced people from Syria in Gaziantep experience and interpret the local and everyday practices of migration governance and what do these experiences reveal about processes of (in)securitization within the framework of the Paris School of Security Studies' approach?

In this context, micro and macro-level[5] analyses offer a multidimensional perspective that channels individual experiences with structural frameworks. By combining these levels, this thesis offers a multilayered perspective that starts from the daily experiences of Syrians living in Gaziantep and extends to Turkey's migration management policies. While focusing on displaced people from Syria's encounters with practices and their interactions with bureaucratic structures at the micro level, it examines the legal, institutional and international contexts of Turkey's migration policies at the macro level. Thus, this study aims to reveal how individual experiences intersect with the macro level, thereby providing a comprehensive assessment of the situation within the framework of the Paris School of Security Studies' understanding of routine securitization.

1.3. Literature Review

The mass flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War has led to a surge in academic studies on this issue. While scholarly attention to Turkey's immigration policy precedes the Syrian crisis, the volume and scope of research have expanded significantly since the influx. These studies extend to multiple dimensions, including factual information about the influx that sets the ground for further studies, political parties' discourses, interplay of migration and foreign policy, and Europeanization of Turkey's asylum regime. This literature review groups these studies thematically, highlights their key arguments, and identifies critical gaps relevant to my research question: How do displaced people from Syria in Gaziantep experience and interpret the local and everyday practices of migration governance and what do these experiences reveal about processes of (in)securitization within the framework of the Paris School of Security Studies'

[5] The term "level" here does not refer to the "levels of analysis" debate in International Relations theory. Rather, it is used in the sense of analytical dimensions, distinguishing between the micro (everyday/lived) and macro (structural/institutional) layers.

approach? However, it is not possible to cover all the existing studies in this literature review. Therefore, the focus will be on representative works that capture the key debates s in the field.

Studies such as those by Çağaptay and Menekşe[6] and Orhan and Senyücel Gündoğar[7] provide valuable empirical insights into the demographic, social, and economic impact of the refugee influx in Turkish border cities. Çağaptay and Menekşe's work shows how the ethnic and sectarian composition of cities like Kilis and Hatay shifted due to the arrival of Syrians, while Orhan and Senyücel Gündoğar's report further investigates the social integration challenges and economic consequences for host communities. Kirişçi and Ferris[8] similarly acknowledge the protracted nature of Syrian displacement and explore possible integration scenarios. These studies focus primarily on the impact of the Syrian refugee influx and provide foundational factual data rather than framing them within a security or (in)security lens.

Çağaptay and Menekşe analyze the impact of the Syrian refugees in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin and Şanlıurfa. This research study concluded that ethnic and sectarian balance in those cities changed after the Syrian refugees arrived. As an illustration, Arab population in Kilis increased 59 percent, while it had been less than 1 percent previously. In Hatay, for instance, while Alawites' percentage was one third of Hatay's population and was dominant in the Arab community of Hatay, this shifted towards Sunnis after the influx. Regarding the economic dimension of the crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees, after the border was closed to trade with Syria in 2012, Turkey lost Syrian markets.[9] Çağaptay and Menekşe's study present

[6] Soner Çağaptay and Bilge Menekşe, *The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Southern Turkey*, Policy Focus 130 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014), 33, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus130_Cagaptay_Revised3s.pdf.

[7] Oytun Orhan and Sabiha Şenyücel Gündoğar, *Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey*, 195 (Orsam and TESEV, 2015), 40, https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Effects_Of_The_Syrian_Refugees_On_Turkey.pdf.

[8] Kemal Kirişçi and Elizabeth Ferris, *Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey and the International Community*, Policy Paper 7, Turkey Project (Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, 2015), 24, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-Policy-Paper-web.pdf.

[9] Çağaptay and Menekşe, *The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Southern Turkey*, 3.

factual information about the consequences of the Syrian exodus to Turkey, how it changed the balance in the cities that border Syria. On the other hand, Orhan and Şenyücel Gündoğar provide factual information on the effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey based on the report published in cooperation between ORSAM (Center for Middle Eastern Studies) and TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation). According to the report, the effects of the Syrians on Turkey are manifold: social, economic, political, in terms of security and the effects on public policy. Orhan and Şenyücel Gündoğar put forth that most of the Syrians live outside of the camps, approximately 15% living in the camps. This means that Syrians would adopt Turkish culture and lifestyle, yet social integration is more problematic when cultures, languages and lifestyles are diverse. Kirişçi and Ferris in their paper titled "Not likely to go home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey and the International Community" postulate that Syrians are likely to stay in Turkey and discuss integration scenarios of Syrians. They also provide information about the effects of the Syrians on the politics, economy and society. Nevertheless, they do not handle these issues in terms of security.[10] Orhan and Şenyücel Gündoğar also assert that even in the year the report was written, atmosphere was conducive to ethnic and sectarian polarization. Moreover, demography has been changed by the refugee influx and high fertility rates. Despite that, there are both positive and negative effects in economic terms, and they are interrelated. Local Turkish firms benefited from the distribution of humanitarian aid material to the Syrian refugees by supplying these materials.[11] The report also emphasizes that problems arise because of the different languages, cultures, and lifestyles among the local population and Syrians in the border provinces where Syrians densely live.

Turkey's evolving legal and policy framework of migration governance has also sparked academic interest. The report prepared by Respond project team is crucial to mention in this regard. The report investigates the contrasting treatment of European and non-European asylum seekers, focusing on how their cases were evaluated and the practices they encountered. The report puts forward that the Syrian exodus,

[10] Kirişçi and Ferris, *Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey and the International Community*.

[11] Orhan and Şenyücel Gündoğar, *Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey*, 7–8.

which started in 2011, "is a unique experience in Turkey's immigration history due to the sheer numbers and protracted stay". This may render the immigration issue in Turkey "a politically salient issue for political parties", which previously had not divided political parties.[12]

CHP (Republican People's Party)'s report, "Between Borders: From Humanitarian Tragedy to Humanitarian Test," analyzes refugees' living conditions and proposes rights-based policy recommendations.[13] Ilgıt and Memişoğlu examine the systematic stances of CHP, MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), and HDP (People's Democratic Party) from 2011 to 2016, highlighting how refugees are increasingly perceived as burdens or security threats.[14] Karakaya Polat focuses on the ruling party AKP's (Justice and Development Party) framing of the crisis through religious solidarity and moral superiority, using humanitarian discourse to legitimize domestic and foreign policy stances.[15] In a more recent contribution, Saylan and Aknur examine the discourses of the CHP, İYİ Party, HDP, and Victory Party to show how securitization tendencies have strengthened as evidenced by debates on deportation and how the Victory Party has emerged as an openly anti-immigrant actor.[16] Similarly, Kurtoğlu Eskisar and Durmuşlar examine the attitude of Turkey's far-right MHP toward refugees. This study focuses on explaining the inconsistent behaviors of the MHP. It reveals that the MHP initially defined refugees as an economic and security threat, but later, after its alliance with the AKP, MHP avoided directly

[12] Elif Çetin et al., *Turkey – Legal And Policy Framework Of Migration Governance*, Working Paper Series Paper 2018/11, RESPOND Multilevel Governance of Migration and Beyond (Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul, 2018), 648, https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.1418590.

[13] Veli Ağbaba, *Sınırlar Arasında: İnsanlık Dramından, İnsanlık Sınavına*, 1st ed. (Tekin Yayınevi, 2016).

[14] Aslı Ilgıt and Fulya Memişoğlu, "Contesting Refugees in Turkey: Political Parties & the Syrian Refugees," in *Turkey's Syrians: Today and Tomorrow*, ed. Deniz Eroğlu Utku et al. (Transnational Press, 2017).

[15] Rabia Karakaya Polat, "Religious Solidarity, Historical Mission and Moral Superiority: Construction of External and Internal 'Others' in AKP's Discourses on Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *Critical Discourse Studies* 15, no. 5 (2018): 500–516, https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2018.1500925.

[16] İbrahim Saylan and Müge Aknur, "Discourses of Turkish Opposition Parties towards Syrian Refugees: Securitization and Repatriation," *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 24, no. 2 (2023): 259–83, https://doi.org/10.17494/ogusbd.1255254.

targeting this issue and shifted its rhetoric to the Syrian War, border security, and anti-Western sentiment.[17] These works emphasize the political instrumentalization of migration, but they largely adopt a discourse-oriented approach rather than practice or experience-based analysis.

CHP's research study reveals the situation from the standpoint of refugees and asylum seekers. It describes the main problematic areas with regard to rights in detail. What is more, the research study importantly addresses the security dimension of the problem as human smuggling and terrorism. Apart from providing information regarding Syrians' living conditions, it also offers policy recommendations to policymakers.[18] This body of research is important for other researchers to understand the main opposition party's position with regard to the official stance of the Turkish government. This study is also in line with recent academic works that offer a rights-based approach to refugee matters. However, we should also keep in mind that CHP deputies' discourses ironically differ from the wording used in this study. This report is also significant to understand how political party positions have changed over time and how these shifts have been influenced by the evolving political atmosphere.

Besides, the work of Ilgıt and Memişoğlu also provides a vision of how opposition parties stand regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. Although the stance of the Turkish government and how its stance transformed can easily be traced since the beginning of the crisis, the position of the opposition parties is also important to examine. Ilgıt and Memişoğlu, whose study covers 2011 to 2016, aim to give a systematic understanding of the stance of three opposition parties, CHP, MHP and HDP on the Syrian refugee issue in their study.

Ilgıt and Memişoğlu argue that domestic political debates are essential to study because they reflect what they call "refugee-hosting fatigue." Turkey's initial

[17] Gül M. Kurtoğlu Eskisar and Tuğcan Durmuşlar, "Responses of Far Right Parties to Refugees in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of MHP in Turkey," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 49, no. 5 (2023): 1229–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2021.2005557.

[18] Ağbaba, *Sınırlar Arasında*.

response to the people who fled from Syria because of the Syrian Civil War was hospitable. Accordingly, Turkey followed an open-door policy. However, as the conflict protracted, domestic tensions emerged on the stay of Syrian refugees in Turkey since it was perceived as "a threat to social order and security."[19] The authors put forth that refugees are politicized in Turkish domestic political debates. Syrian refugees are perceived as a societal security threat in three ways: "rival victim group," "voter and demographic threat," "has unfair access to public services." CHP, as the main opposition party, represents Syrians as a "burden"[20] and favors their return to Syria once the conditions in Syria improve. MHP is also argued to securitize the Syrians. MHP places territorial integrity, national unity and Kurdish issue at the core in its Syrian refugee discourse. MHP, like the main opposition party, views Syrians as a burden. MHP is also concerned about the Syrians' future in Turkey as their stay will lead to new questions based on "ethnic identity, collective rights and the Hatay question." The open-door policy is also criticized as terrorists could easily enter Turkey, using the borders. On the other hand, HDP's stance is somewhat different from the other two opposition parties. HDP is in favor of granting citizenship rights to Syrians, lifting the geographical limitation of the Geneva Convention. Moreover, HDP expressed the need for a rights-based refugee policy. Nonetheless, HDP's discourse is criticized by Ilgıt and Memişoğlu as it is thought to present "selective solidarity" towards some of the refugee groups.[21]

Unlike the work of Ilgıt and Memişoğlu, who examined the opposition parties' discourses, Karakaya Polat provides an analysis of the ruling party's, the AKP's, discursive stance on the issue. Karakaya Polat argues that AKP emphasized religious solidarity and humanitarian values in its discourse about the Syrian refugees. Turkey's ruling party also frames its discourse in its foreign policy by presenting itself as the "defender of all oppressed people." AKP's discourse on Syrian refugees is also pursuant to its "attempts to reconstruct the Turkish nation along more Islamic lines." In accordance with these, Karakaya Polat argues that the refugee issue is used

[19] Ilgıt and Memişoğlu, "Contesting Refugees in Turkey: Political Parties & the Syrian Refugees," 1.

[20] Ilgıt and Memişoğlu, "Contesting Refugees in Turkey: Political Parties & the Syrian Refugees," 6.

[21] Ilgıt and Memişoğlu, "Contesting Refugees in Turkey: Political Parties & the Syrian Refugees," 7–8.

by the AKP as a tool to claim "moral superiority" over domestic and foreign opponents. This enabled AKP "to reconstruct the nation along more Islamic lines."[22]

Aknur and Saylan, presenting a more recent study on the issue, focus particularly on the repatriation debates and the discourses of opposition parties. Their analysis reveals that CHP and the İYİ Party have increasingly emphasized securitizing frames through references to economic burden, security concerns, and demographic threat, while the HDP continues to adopt a more rights-based discourse. The newly established Victory Party, on the other hand, has placed the issue of repatriation at the center of its agenda, positioning itself as Turkey's first explicitly anti-immigrant party and further polarizing politics through its "silent invasion" rhetoric.[23] Kurtoğlu Eskisar and Durmuşlar, on the other hand, focus on the discourse of the far-right MHP and reveal its contradictory stance. In this context, while the party first described refugees as an economic and security threat, it later moved closer to the ruling AKP and shifted its discourse toward the Syrian war, border security, and anti-Western rhetoric, prioritizing ideological influence over electoral considerations.[24]

A third group investigates how foreign policy considerations shape asylum and migration governance. Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek,[25] Devlet Karapınar,[26] and Ihlamur Öner[27] argue that Turkey's migration policy has been influenced by humanitarian diplomacy and security concerns. Genç, Heck, and Hess[28] underscore

[22] Polat, "Religious Solidarity, Historical Mission and Moral Superiority," 500.

[23] Saylan and Aknur, "Discourses of Turkish Opposition Parties towards Syrian Refugees."

[24] Kurtoğlu Eskisar and Durmuşlar, "Responses of Far Right Parties to Refugees in Hybrid Regimes."

[25] N. Ela Gökalp Aras and Zeynep Şahin Mencütek, "The International Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus: The Case of Syrian Refugee Crisis and Turkey," *Migration Letters* 12, no. 3 (2015): 3, https://doi.org/10.59670/ml.v12i3.274.

[26] Yelda Devlet Karapınar, "The Contemporary Lens in International Relations: Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus in Turkey," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2017): 103–34.

[27] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur Öner, "Turkish Migration and Asylum Regime in the Light of Humanitarian Diplomacy," *Akademik Orta Doğu* 9, no. 1 (2014): 119–42.

[28] Fırat Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey: Contested Regionalization, Deceleration and Legal Precarization," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 34, no. 4 (2019): 489–508, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1344562.

the tension between humanitarian and securitarian approaches, suggesting that Turkish practices are driven by functional concerns alongside geopolitical imperatives. Memişoğlu and Ilgıt[29] also note the central role of security and control in shaping public perceptions of Syrians, while Tayfur emphasizes the shift in Turkey's stance that once viewed migration as a hard security issue though it is now considered a soft security problem.[30]

Another group of studies on asylum and refugee issues is also closely related with foreign policy. These can be called studies focusing on the migration and foreign policy nexus. Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek argue in their article that foreign policy orientations have an impact on immigration and asylum policies of the countries. However, studies on this issue are rare in the literature, especially in the refugee crisis.

They examine the interrelation between foreign and asylum policies and question how it created divergences in dealing with the mass refugee influxes. Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek use Turkey's policy responses to Syrian refugee crisis as their case study. Turkey's self-representation in foreign policy made Turkey follow a policy based on humanitarianism and open-door policy towards the Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, this was in the beginning of the crisis. In the following years, Turkey reconsidered its policies and started to follow policies such as "non-arrival" and "security." Turkey also, started to use terms such as "temporary protection," "voluntary return" and "burden share" when handling the Syrian refugee issue.[31]

Devlet Karapınar sheds light on the migration foreign policy nexus in her article. She reveals that securitization is "one of the core pillars of Turkish immigration policy alongside human rights and mutual interests." Turkey's efforts in border

[29] Fulya Memişoğlu and Aslı Ilgıt, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Multifaceted Challenges, Diverse Players and Ambiguous Policies," *Mediterranean Politics* 22, no. 3 (2017): 317–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1189479.

[30] Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of Security and Migrations," in *Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean*, ed. Mendo Castro Henriques and Mohamed Khachani (IOS Press, 2006).

[31] Aras and Mencütek, "The International Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus."

management issues imply a securitized dimension. Migrant smuggling and human trafficking also call for a security-oriented approach to the immigration issues.[32]

Another group of studies, though they can be analyzed within the literature on the migration-foreign policy nexus, attempt to examine the Turkish response and Turkish immigration regime through humanitarian or securitized lenses. They also provide insights into whether Turkey's perception of immigration is driven by security. Ihlamur Öner places Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy approach in Turkish foreign policy at the center of her analysis. Ihlamur Öner identifies humanitarian pillars as follows: "improving the lives of Turkish nationals, kin and related communities living abroad, active involvement in crisis regions, and cultivating and emphasizing humanitarian sensibilities within the UN system." Yet, she argues that Turkey's response to the regular and irregular migrants does not fit its humanitarian diplomacy approach, which places human beings and values at the center. She suggests Turkey revisit its immigration and asylum policy to better align with this approach.[33]

Unlike the work of Ihlamur Öner, Genç, Heck and Hess argue that Turkish migration and asylum regime is intertwined with humanitarian and securitarian approaches. They assert that Turkish migration regime is not just affected by the EU, but its transformation is shaped by the combination of the EU and Turkey's foreign and national policy interests. As a result, Turkish migration regime is multilayered, resulting in "ambiguous legal, social and political limitations for migrants and refugees."[34] Turkish migration and asylum regime and its application are said to be entwined with humanitarian and securitarian approaches. What is more, Genç, Heck and Hess put forth that much of the Turkish government's efforts in the field of migration are driven by functional concerns together with "geostrategic priorities" and "regional developments."[35]

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[32] Devlet Karapınar, "The Contemporary Lens in International Relations: Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus in Turkey," 127.

[33] Ihlamur Öner, "Turkish Migration and Asylum Regime in the Light of Humanitarian Diplomacy," 119.

[34] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 489.

[35] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 500.

Tayfur sets forth Turkish perceptions of security and migration. While Turkey traditionally gave importance to hard security issues, as a country of both transit and destination, it now perceives migration as a soft security issue. Tayfur believes that this is due to repercussions that Turkey faced from uncontrolled "illegal" migration. Further, he refers to the negotiations between Turkey and the EU on migration management, which implies the EU leverage on the Turkish migration regime.[36] Tayfur's study is important in the sense that it was written in 2006 and outlined the pre-2011 migration scene. In the book titled "Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East," Şahin Mencütek considers Turkey one of the case studies together with Lebanon and Jordan. In cases of mass migration flows, securitization is a common phenomenon in the region, which has contradictory effects on the "safety, protection, human rights and citizenship". Such population movements are also perceived as a threat to political demography.[37] Regarding the refugee governance in Turkey, Şahin Mencütek contends that it is structured and stable, but rather dynamic and evolving, which she defines as a multi-stage and multi-pattern governance model.[38]

Seyhan proposes after his narrative inquiry that Turkey developed a humanitarian approach in the field of legislation and administration. In other words, irregular migration is not seen as just a national security threat or a threat in terms of welfare.[39] He further argues that Turkish migration and asylum policy was perceived as a security issue previously. Main issues regarding migration and asylum were dealt with by the National Police Organization in Turkey before the establishment of civil authority, DGMM (Directorate General of Migration Management). Nevertheless, this securitized approach has changed according to Seyhan.[40]

[36] Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of Security and Migrations."

[37] Zeynep Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, Routledge Global Cooperation Series (Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2019), 34.

[38] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 73.

[39] Osman Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey: A Narrative Inquiry," *Journal of Organisational Transformation & Social Change* 11, no. 3 (2014): 185, https://doi.org/10.1179/1477963314Z.00000000029.

[40] Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," 195.

Memişoğlu and Ilgıt examine divergent views of actors in Turkish asylum debate such as the Turkish state, NGOs, and international organizations on the Syrian refugee issue. They argue that "security/control dimension" is a dominant factor in the Turkish asylum debate along with the legal status of the Syrian refugees. Discourse and public perceptions about the refugees are mainly shaped by the Turkish state.[41]

While analyzing Turkish response to immigration, Toğral Koca argues that it is needed to focus on practices to understand whether securitization is present. She argues that humanitarian discourse is evident in Turkey's official discourse. However, when we look at the refugee governance, control and containment are dominant, which point to the security framework. Therefore, she adopts the sociological approach to securitization rather than the Copenhagen School's conceptualization, which focuses on speech acts. Accordingly, she emphasizes practices above discourses. She focuses on the securitization of non-camp Syrian refugees in the Turkish labor market and argues that securitization is used to disguise structural and political problems. In this respect, Toğral Koca sees the handling of the Syrian refugee issue as a securitized process.[42] Toğral Koca also indicates that it is necessary to critically examine Turkey's open-door policy towards refugees from Syria. She says that "refugees fleeing Syria have been administered in a security framework embedding exclusionary, militarized and technologized border practices." In this regard, Turkish practices are highly securitized and the principle of non-refoulement and human rights is violated as a result of securitized practices.[43]

A significant strand of literature examines how EU migration governance frameworks have influenced Turkey's policies, which are often termed Europeanization or externalization. Studies by İçduygu[44], Özgür Baklacıoğlu[45], and

[41] Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," 332.

[42] Burcu Toğral Koca, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From 'Guests' to 'Enemies'?," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 54 (May 2016): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2016.4.

[43] Burcu Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," *Migration Letters* 13, no. 3 (2015): 209.

[44] Ahmet İçduygu, "EU-Ization Matters: Changes in Immigration and Asylum Practices in Turkey," in *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the*

Yıldız[46] demonstrate how EU enlargement policies and readmission agreements have shaped Turkish asylum practices. Toğral[47] and Yüksel[48] critically analyze how the EU's securitizing discourse is transferred to Turkey, leading to exclusionary practices that conflict with human rights principles. Tolay adds a critical perspective, arguing for a more humanitarian approach to migration governance in Turkey, beyond the EU's security-driven lens.[49]

İçduygu, even before the Syrian refugee crisis, discussed Turkey's immigration and asylum policy practice within the context of 'EU-ization'.[50] The article of Özgür Baklacıoğlu draws attention to the "ongoing" Europeanization of Turkish asylum policy, which she defines "as a process twisted between discourse of public order and national security." Europeanization of Turkey's asylum policy has two dimensions according to Özgür Baklacıoğlu: one is the EU's role as a driver of institutional reform in migration management and the modernization of border security, and the other dimension is the erosion of a rights-based approach in migration management.[51]

Yıldız's study is exemplary of EU's efforts to externalize its migration policy as it explores EU's efforts to externalize its migration policy to Turkey as a candidate

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European Union, ed. Andreas Ette and Thomas Faist, Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship (Palgrave, 2007).

[45] Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu, "Building 'Fortress Europe': Europeanization of Asylum Policy in Turkey," *The Romanian Journal of European Studies* 7, no. 8 (2009): 103–18.

[46] Ayselin Gözde Yıldız, "Implications of the External Dimension of European Immigration Policy for Turkey," in *The European Union's Immigration Policy*, by Ayselin Gözde Yıldız (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58699-5_4.

[47] Burcu Toğral, "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2012): 65–77.

[48] Sinem Yüksel, "Securitization of Migration: The Case of Turkey-EU Relations," *Marmara Journal of European Studies* 22, no. 1 (2014): 169–87.

[49] Juliette Tolay, "Turkey's 'Critical Europeanization': Evidence from Turkey's Immigration Policies," in *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar (Hamburg University Press, 2012).

[50] İçduygu, "EU-Ization Matters: Changes in Immigration and Asylum Practices in Turkey."

[51] Özgür Baklacıoğlu, "Building 'Fortress Europe': Europeanization of Asylum Policy in Turkey," 103.

country. Yıldız also analyzes how transit migration has been managed under the European Union's enlargement policy and its repercussions for Turkey. Yıldız further analyses Europeanization of Turkey's immigration policy in many aspects, such as visa and asylum policy, legislative adaptation, border management and readmission agreement.[52] Besides, Özçürümez and Şenses focus on the irregular migration policy of Turkey within the context of Europeanization of Turkey.[53] Likewise, Kaiser and Kaya evaluate the change in migration and asylum policies of Turkey as part of Turkey's Europeanization process.[54]

Tolay approaches Turkey's Europeanization of immigration policy process in a critical manner and argues that the supposed securitization of migration in Europe led to policies that are unjust to migrants. She criticizes some Turkish actors for accepting this securitized understanding. However, some other Turkish actors are critical of Europeans, arguing that they approach the immigration issue in a materialist way that dehumanizes migrants and contradicts Turkish norms of empathy. Therefore, it is argued that it is not suitable for Turkey to apply migration policy in a securitized understanding.[55] It can be seen that Tolay proposes that Turkey's immigration policies should be formed in a humanitarian manner, and refugees should be welcomed in this way. Yüksel evaluates the EU leverage on Turkey's policy transformation as the securitization of migration and applies the securitization concept of Copenhagen School to her analysis. She argues that EU is the actor that securitizes migration in its relations with Turkey for political purposes rather than in response to real existential threats. Yüksel studies the securitization of migration issue in Turkey-EU relations by focusing on internal security, cultural identity and welfare state.[56] Toğral focuses on practices rather than speech acts in her

[52] Yıldız, "Implications of the External Dimension of European Immigration Policy for Turkey."

[53] Saime Özçürümez and Nazlı Şenses, "Europeanization and Turkey: Studying Irregular Migration Policy," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 13, no. 2 (2011): 233–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2011.578867.

[54] Bianca Kaiser and Ayhan Kaya, "Transformation of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," in *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Scorecard*, ed. Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin (Routledge, 2016).

[55] Tolay, "Turkey's 'Critical Europeanization': Evidence from Turkey's Immigration Policies," 53.

[56] Yüksel, "Securitization of Migration: The Case of Turkey-EU Relations."

securitization of migration analysis, thereby adopting the Paris School framework rather than the Copenhagen School. She evaluates how securitization of migration in the EU affects third countries by using Turkish migration practices, visa issue, border controls, asylum policies and the readmission agreement as a case study. She shows how the EU transfers its migration practices to a candidate country, securitizing migration issue beyond its borders. The need for a critical assessment of discourses, such as democracy and human rights in EU-Turkey relations, remains necessary since both the EU and Turkey prioritize their state-centric interests over the rights and 'dignity' of migrants.[57]

Another set of studies focuses on the evolution of Turkey's legal and institutional framework. Sarı and Dinçer describe Turkey's asylum regime as a fragmented configuration shaped by the EU requirements, while still marked by ambiguities and security concerns.[58] Şahin Mencütek provides a periodization of Turkey's refugee governance, noting its transition from ad hoc responses to a security-oriented approach, especially after 2015.[59] Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel explore how Syrians navigate this precarious legal and social status, experiencing "differential inclusion" within the temporary protection regime.[60] Özer highlights how xenophobia reinforces exclusionary practices in Turkey,[61] while Toğral Koca argues that security concerns often overshadow humanitarian discourse in Turkey's migration regime.[62]

Sarı and Dinçer define Turkey's asylum regime as a "fragmented configuration" for the reason that Turkey only grants refugee status to the individuals that come from

[57] Toğral, "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices," 65.

[58] Elif Sarı and Cemile Gizem Dinçer, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?," *Movements* 3, no. 2 (2017): 59–79.

[59] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*.

[60] Feyzi Baban et al., "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to Precarity, Differential Inclusion, and Negotiated Citizenship Rights," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 41–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1192996.

[61] Yeşim Özer, *International Migration and Xenophobia: Examples of Turkey and France* (Derin, 2015).

[62] Toğral Koca, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From 'Guests' to 'Enemies'?"

European countries although it signed the 1951 Geneva Convention. Non-Europeans can only be granted "temporary asylum." In practice, this is problematic as multiple authorities are involved, and the procedures for evaluating asylum claims are complex. Sarı and Dinçer, while questioning whether Turkey's asylum regime can be considered "new" one, argue that there are continuities with the old regime. The authors contend that while Turkey's migration and asylum regime is reconstructed as a result of EU requirements, uncertainty persists in the regime, and the securitized understanding of migration in Turkey takes precedence over guaranteeing the rights of refugees.[63] The 1994 Regulation established a dual asylum seeking procedure. To illustrate, refugee applications had to be submitted to both to UNHCR and to Turkish authorities.[64] Sarı and Dinçer see the establishment of DGMM as an important step towards standardizing and civilianizing the Turkish asylum regime. The DGMM, established under the Ministry of Interior "has taken over the responsibility of overseeing all matters related to asylum and migration from the Foreigners' Police;"[65] however, even this did not eliminate the dual asylum-seeking procedures.

Referring to Syrians in Turkey was also a problematic issue, highlighting the precarious situation of Syrians in Turkey. Syrians were referred to as "guests" in the initial phase of the Syrian Civil War when they were expected to return to their country shortly. For example, the report that AFAD prepared in 2013 was titled "Circular on Health and Other Services of Syrian Guests." Government officials, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, also referred to Syrians in Turkey as guests. It is also pointed out in the report prepared by Dinçer, Federici, Ferris, Karaca, Kirişçi, and Özmenek Çarmıklı that Turkish officials refer to Syrians as refugees, persons under temporary protection, or guests.[66]

Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel's study examines precarity, differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The Turkish government

[63] Sarı and Dinçer, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?," 59.

[64] Sarı and Dinçer, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?," 63.

[65] Sarı and Dinçer, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?," 64.

[66] Osman Bahadır Dinçer et al., *Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality* (International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)&Brookings, 2013), 38.

provides Syrians with some citizenship rights, but the way it regulates their status places Syrians in "a position of limbo as 'neither refugee nor guest'".[67] Syrian refugees in Turkey are said to be in a precarious state in the sense that "citizenship, employment, housing, education, health, mobility, social protection, social rights" are not certain and predictable. This is partly because of the temporary protection regime's nature. As the name suggests, it provides temporary rather than permanent protection. As a consequence, their situation is not stable in the long term, and feelings of insecurity and instability concerning their status is widespread among Syrians.[68]

In the book "International Migration and Xenophobia: Examples of Turkey and France," Özer examines France and Turkey's international migration policies in the 2000s and 2010s within the context of xenophobia. She argues that the main driver behind the change in migration policies is xenophobia. Xenophobia is fostered by the deepening divide between citizen and non-citizens/immigrants across political, economic and societal spheres in both Turkey and France.[69] One important factor contributing to negative attitudes towards Syrians in Turkey was the perception that they constitute a large group benefiting from services provided by the Turkish state. She further argues that in Turkey, the Syrian refugee issue was framed as a demonstration of hospitality of Turkey, which led to the neglect of the rights.[70]

Despite the rich body of literature, several gaps persist that my research aims to address. First, most studies focus on political discourses, policy frameworks, or macro-level debates, with limited attention to the everyday practices of migration governance and how these practices are experienced by Syrians at the micro level on the ground. Second, while some works acknowledge the securitization of migration, they often conceptualize it abstractly, without applying practice-oriented theoretical frameworks such as the Paris School's focus on routinized practices and micro-level

[67] Baban et al., "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," 41.

[68] Baban et al., "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," 45.

[69] Özer, *International Migration and Xenophobia: Examples of Turkey and France*, 129.

[70] Özer, *International Migration and Xenophobia: Examples of Turkey and France*, 130–32.

security governance. In this context, this research aims to fill these gaps by applying the Paris School of Security Studies to analyze practices and interactions in Gaziantep, as experienced by displaced Syrians. Thus, this research study moves beyond discursive analyses to reveal how securitizing logics are operationalized in daily governance encounters.

1.4. Methodology and Research Design

While writing this thesis, I have not only relied on primary and secondary sources. First, I examined Turkey's past and current migration regime through legal documents, official papers, journal articles, books and reports of various actors in the field. In addition, I aimed to understand how the events were presented to the public by scanning newspaper and academic articles. My review of the general literature on the subject provided me with a perspective on how to place Syrian migration within Turkey's overall immigration history. Moreover, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with a total of 25 Syrians living in Gaziantep (Please see Appendices C.) and 17 other actors working in this field, two of whom were interviewed as both Syrian refugee and civil society worker (Please see Appendices D.). I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews due to their flexibility, which allowed me to understand participants' narrative on the topic and explore additional details as needed.[71] Furthermore, in forced migration research, narratives play a crucial role in understanding the experiences of refugees. I believe that through semi-structured interviews, participants' experiences and expressions can be effectively captured and analyzed.[72]

Although I had planned to conduct semi-structured interviews with the public institutions employees, my application to the Presidency of Migration Management was rejected after several months (Please see Appendices B.). Although the absence of this component of interviews presents a limitation of this thesis, I was able to

[71] Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, *InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*, 3rd ed. (Sage Publications, 2015), 31–32.

[72] M. Eastmond, "Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 2 (2007): 249, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem007.

conduct completely informal interviews with two employees working at the Provincial Organization of the Presidency of Migration Management. The ethics committee approval required for this thesis was obtained from METU Human Research Ethics Committee with protocol number 0236-ODTUİAEK-2024 (Please see Appendices A.).

This thesis uses Gaziantep as a field study area and attempts to understand whether, and in what ways, Turkey's international migration regime towards Syrians is securitized through the experiences of Syrians living in Gaziantep. In this respect, a field study to understand micro level experiences was conducted. There are many reasons why Gaziantep was chosen as the fieldwork site. The first reason is that Gaziantep has the second-largest Syrian population under Temporary Protection, after Istanbul:




Figure 1. Distribution of Syrians under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces[73]

[73] Presidency of Migration Management, "Statistics," accessed December 25, 2024, https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27.




Figure 2. Distribution of Syrians under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces[74]

As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, although returns from Turkey to Syria accelerated following the new developments in Syria in December 2024, Gaziantep's ranking in the distribution of Syrians under temporary protection has not changed.

Gaziantep has had strong ties with Aleppo since the Ottoman Empire period, and a notable portion of the Syrian population in Turkey is originally from Aleppo.[75] Another point I would like to add is that I have been living and working in Gaziantep since November 2017. This gave me the chance to witness firsthand the lives of Syrians living in Gaziantep for more than 6 years. However, I should point out that this is still not enough to qualify me as an "assigned insider"[76] because I was born and raised mostly in Ankara. According to Irgil's definition, the "assigned insider"

[74] Presidency of Migration Management, "Statistics," accessed August 25, 2025, https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27.

[75] *Anadolu Agency*, "İçişleri Bakanı Yerlikaya: Son 15 Günde Suriye'ye Dönenlerin Sayısı 25 Bini Geçti," December 25, 2024, accessed December 25, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/icisleri-bakani-yerlikaya-son-15-gunde-suriyeye-donenlerin-sayisi-25-bini-gecti/3432689.

[76] Ezgi Irgıl, "Broadening the Positionality in Migration Studies: Assigned Insider Category," *Migration Studies* 9, no. 2 (2021): 1215–29.

position requires the researcher to share the same local origin with the host community members, which is not the case for me.[77]

I started collecting my field data after the so-called "Kayseri events" that took place in the summer of 2024. This was a period marked by an explosion of tensions between the host society and the Syrian population, which we had already been observing in recent years. The unrest in Kayseri was not restricted to this city; similar tensions were reported in Gaziantep as well.[78] This situation inevitably affected my communication with my possible interviewees as potential research participants. In fact, what I encountered was generally a "challenging context." In such an environment, reaching "key informants" was a problem that I had to overcome before starting the field research.[79] What I witnessed and felt was the state of great anxiety among displaced Syrians as a result of the Kayseri events. Many were worried that I might be a "spy," and there were Syrians who sincerely told me that "spies" had infiltrated among Syrians and that there were various spies working for both the Assad regime and the Turkish government. As they had nowhere else to go, they were very suspicious of every communication attempt outside their close circles. There were also prospective participants who were particularly sensitive about the content of my questions, and some of them chose not to take part in the research after seeing my interview questions. Later, during my interviews with Syrian opinion leaders, I learned that Syrians are often advised not to comment on the political situation in Turkey or make any other political comments (Interviewee Civil Society Number 12).

Another point I would like to point out is that the population generally referred to as Syrians is, in fact, highly diverse in terms of ethnic backgrounds. In addition, there are significant differences among "Syrians," such as education level and social and economic capital. Displaced people from Syria have quite different economic

[77] Irgıl, "Broadening the Positionality in Migration Studies: Assigned Insider Category."

[78] *BBC Türkçe*, "Kayseri Olayları: Türkiye Genelinde Gözaltına Alınan 1065 Kişiden 28'i Tutuklandı," July 5, 2024, accessed July 5, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/crgmzv9p2y3o.

[79] Carla Alberti and Nicole Jenne, "Getting Prepared to Be Prepared: How Interpersonal Skills Aid Fieldwork in Challenging Contexts," *Qualitative Sociology Review* 15, no. 3 (2019): 47–48, 3, https://doi.org/10.18778/1733-8077.15.3.03.

profiles. In my interviews with Syrians, contrary to the general belief that they are all in need of assistance and aid-dependent, I found that their economic situation varies considerably. While there are many aid-dependent families, there are also those who have established businesses in Turkey with their own capital and even created employment opportunities. In this regard, I had the chance to speak with many displaced people from Syria from diverse economic backgrounds. This perspective underscores the importance of acknowledging the diversity of experiences of Syrians, meaning that these experiences cannot be reduced to a monolithic narrative. This also shows that statistical information should be supported by qualitative data, such as semi-structured interviews. For this reason, I aim to interpret micro-level experiences through a qualitative approach. In order to understand the complex nature of social phenomena, qualitative research methods are especially valuable as researchers can explore interviewees' experiences and perceptions.[80]

When we look specifically at Turkey, we see the existence of a recurring humanitarian discourse of the ruling political elites. But is this the situation as perceived in practice? In this sense, rather than "speech acts," which are used to securitize the issue by presenting it as such, "practices" in the field of displaced Syrians' management will be given analytical prominence. The analytical framework that the Paris School of securitization/(in)securitization offers a more nuanced understanding of securitization that helps trace the process of securitization/(in)securization through practices of the bureaucrats in the field as experts. By combining qualitative interviews with theoretical insights from the Paris School of Security Studies, this thesis provides a rich and contextualized analysis of securitization/(in)securitization processes in forced migration governance. Thus, this thesis contributes to the analyses of securitization via practices by exploring the experience of these practices by the target population in the case of Gaziantep.

1.5. Organization of Chapters

This thesis is designed in six chapters, including Introduction and Conclusion parts. Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, sets the groundwork by outlining the study's

[80] Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 380–81.

aim, main research question, and methodology. It reviews the literature on migration and security in Turkey, highlights the gaps this thesis seeks to fill, and explains why Gaziantep was selected as the field site. The chapter also presents the qualitative research design and fieldwork experiences that frame the later analysis. The introductory part aims to set out the scope and limitations of the thesis.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework of the thesis. It explains how the idea of security has changed from a narrow, state-focused view to broader and more critical approaches. The chapter presents the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, which is based on speech acts, and compares it to the Paris School's sociological and practice-oriented view. Drawing on Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, it emphasizes how everyday bureaucratic practices, surveillance, and governmentality contribute to processes of (in)securitization, meaning it shows how daily bureaucratic routines, surveillance, and government practices shape processes of (in)securitization. By combining these insights with phenomenological approaches that highlight lived experiences, it sets the analytical lens for the empirical study.

Chapter 3 looks at the international, regional, and domestic contexts of Turkey's reception of Syrians. It briefly explains that migration has always been important in Ottoman and Republican history. The chapter then discusses neoliberal globalization and explains how economic restructuring since the 1980s transformed Turkey's migration regime. It shows how liberalization, privatization, and the rise of informal labor markets created the conditions for immigrant labor and in which displaced Syrians were received after 2011. The chapter also highlights how Syrians became part of precarious and low-paid work. Finally, it examines Turkey–Syria relations and regional politics, tracing the ups and downs of bilateral ties and showing how the Syrian crisis and Turkey's foreign policy shaped the admission and later management of Syrians. It explores the regional and political dimensions of Turkey-Syria relations. It traces the history of disputes between Syria and Turkey, such as Hatay, water sharing, the PKK, the normalization after the Adana Accord, and the later deterioration of relations during the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War. It explains how Turkey's foreign policy choices, security concerns, and shifting

regional alliances influenced its open-door policy and the longer-term management of Syrians in the country.

Chapter 4 examines Turkey's legal and institutional framework of migration management and how it has shaped the reception of displaced Syrians. It provides an overview of the background developments preceding the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). The chapter then reviews the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013, which also led to the creation of the Directorate General of Migration Management (later Presidency of Migration Management). It then explains the Temporary Protection Regime introduced in 2014, showing how Syrians were placed under this status, which provided certain rights but maintained temporariness and legal uncertainty.

It further discusses policies on health and education for Syrians under temporary protection as well as border management measures that shifted from an open-door policy to stricter control and the building of a security wall. The chapter also explores the interaction between humanitarian rhetoric, such as discourses of "brotherhood" and "guests," and security-oriented practices like inspections and deportation procedures. This dual approach highlights how Syrians are included in Turkey's labor force while being exposed to insecurity and vulnerability at the same time.

Chapter 5 presents the fieldwork findings from Gaziantep. It draws on 25 interviews with displaced Syrians and 17 with various stakeholders. The chapter begins by describing the difficulties of accessing participants and the atmosphere of fear and uneasiness among Syrians, especially after recent events. It notes the diversity of interviewees in terms of ethnicity, gender, and legal status, and underlines that even naturalized citizens do not feel fully secure. The chapter then analyzes the main themes that emerged in the interviews. It highlights the impact of internal and external control mechanisms, such as restrictions on mobility, address checks, and the use of Mobile Migration Point Vehicles, which bring border practices inside the country. Finally, it shows how the fear of deportation and the uncertainty of legal status shape everyday life, producing a constant state of unease for displaced Syrians.

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by bringing together the micro-level experiences of displaced Syrians in Gaziantep and the macro-level analysis of Turkey's migration governance. It emphasizes how everyday practices, bureaucratic routines, and control mechanisms such as mobile migration vehicles and restriction codes assigned to ID cards of Syrians under the temporary protection regime shape Syrians' lives, leading to insecurity and fear. The chapter also underlines the tension between humanitarian rhetoric and security-oriented practices, showing that protection is often combined with control. Finally, it highlights the contribution of the Paris School's practice-based approach in explaining how (in)securitization is produced through daily routines and points to the different effects these processes have on diverse groups of Syrians.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

During the Cold War years, the concept of security was typically understood within relatively clear and narrow boundaries, often limited to military threats and state-centric concerns. After the Cold War, however, security understanding underwent a significant transformation: it broadened and deepened, and the boundary of the concept became increasingly blurred. As a result, today, when we read the academic studies on security, we encounter terms such as securitization, desecuritization, resecuritization, criminalization, or riskification. This conceptual expansion has provided scholars of international security with diverse analytical tools and frameworks, allowing for more nuanced understandings of threats, actors, and practices. This has also placed security studies on a more interdisciplinary ground. However, it has raised concerns about "securitizing everything," which means perceiving or interpreting every issue in the social world as a security matter. At the same time, this issue has posed an analytical challenge for security studies. Nevertheless, the main theoretical perspective underlying this thesis is the need to understand how security/(in)security is constructed through everyday practices, discourses and power relations.

As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to unfold how on-the-ground bureaucratic and surveillance practices of migration governance targeting displaced Syrians in Turkey, particularly in the city of Gaziantep, are received, experienced, and interpreted by Syrians themselves and how these interactions can be related to the processes of (in)securitization. In this study, rather than a fixed and objective reality, security is understood as a concept shaped by social and political processes

that also embed power relations. In this sense, it clearly departs from classical/traditional security studies and adopts a more critical and practice-oriented approach. To better explain the theoretical positioning of the thesis, this chapter first aims to discuss what security is and how it has evolved over time, how security is understood in traditional and critical strand of thoughts in the international relations discipline. What does securitization/insecuritization designate in the Copenhagen and Paris schools of security studies? And how can practices fit into the Paris School of security studies? With this aim, first, the concept of security will be addressed.

2.2. The Concept of Security

The evolution of the concept of security has evolved over a long history, and, as narrated by Arends, can be examined in two main stages. The first stage relates to the Roman use of the term *securitas*, which carried religious connotations. In the Middle Ages, this understanding gradually shifted towards *certitudo*, referring to a sense of certainty or unwavering faith in God.[81] *Securitas* originally referred to "being free from danger, safety, and security." In its absence, however, terms such as "carelessness, recklessness, and negligence" could emerge. It was closely associated with emotions such as "fear"—particularly "the fear of death"—which could be alleviated by a sense of "trust." Since religion often engages with such emotions, *securitas* also acquired a spiritual connotation.[82] The second phase in the conceptual evolution of security emerged with the works of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes associated security with the role of the Leviathan in preventing civil war and ensuring internal order. His conceptualization was also influenced by Thucydides' reflections on war and political conflict.[83] In Hobbes' understanding, security became one of the foundational concepts of the modern state.[84] The modern understanding of security can thus be viewed as a synthesis, combining the Athenians' efforts to preserve

[81] J. Frederik M. Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," in *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Çatışmadan Güvenliğe Seçme Makaleler*, ed. Mustafa Aydın et al. (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012), 199.

[82] Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," 200.

[83] Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," 199.

[84] Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," 213.

imperial stability in ancient times, the Roman notion of *securitas*, and Hobbes's emphasis on avoiding civil wars.[85]

Building on this historical evolution, security today stands as one of the core concepts of the contemporary state system and global political order.[86] This prominence is even reflected in standard dictionary definitions of the term. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, security is defined as "the quality or state of being secure such as freedom from danger, freedom from fear or anxiety and freedom from the prospect of being laid off."[87] Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "freedom from danger or threat. The state or condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety."[88] In the same vein, the concept of security is one of the central concepts in International Relations theory and discipline. Yet, the definition of the term is still not clear-cut. It does not mean that scholars did not provide a definition of the term. On the contrary, many of them coined their own definitions. In International Relations literature, while McSweeney considers security "a slippery term"[89] Buzan argues that it is "an essentially contested concept."[90] Baldwin questions the contested nature of the concept of security[91] and comes to the conclusion that it is a murky and poorly explained term.[92] Despite many studies on security during the Cold War, Buzan still considers concept of security "an underdeveloped concept" in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.[93]

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[85] Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," 199.

[86] Arends, "Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: Avrupa Geleneğinde 'Güvenlik' Kavramı," 199.

[87] *Merriam-Webster*, "Definition of Security," September 27, 2024, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/security.

[88] *Oxford English Dictionary*, "Security," accessed October 6, 2024, https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=security.

[89] Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 69 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.

[90] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 7.

[91] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): 10–12.

[92] Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," 12.

[93] Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 3.

Apart from review articles on the notion of security, every scholar has their own understanding of security based on the lens they adopt. Accordingly, the traditional notion of security in International Relations focuses on military issues and takes the state as the only referent object. Security in International Relations discipline is mostly thought of as a matter of "power." However, it is usually understood in more specific terms, such as military or police power and tangible materials like defense equipment and troop capabilities, or the quality of intelligence services.[94] In the traditional security approach, sovereignty and territory are important referent objects to be secured, and security is mainly based on military power. It is within this context that Security Studies emerged as a distinct subfield in the aftermath of World War II.[95] This traditional focus on military power significantly shaped how the field was initially defined. Walt, who is a defensive realist, sees security studies as a field tightly bounded by research on the potential risks of power in the form of military strength and its management and oversight.[96] Accordingly, what is important to study in security studies is to understand under which circumstances the possibility of the aggression of states is higher and how violence or war affects macro, meso and micro levels. What can be done to prevent war or to participate in warfare is another area of research in this type of security studies.[97]

Wolfers, in the early Cold War years, distinguishes between objective and subjective sense of security (and largely ignores the intersubjective sense of security which constructivism later introduced to security studies). Objectively, if one's acquired values are not in danger, then security is ensured; otherwise, it can be measured by the extent to which it exists or does not exist. Subjectively, if one does not need to worry about the undermining of their acquired values, then security is ensured.[98]

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[94] Jason Ackleson, "Constructing Security on the U.S.–Mexico Border," *Political Geography* 24, no. 2 (2005): 165, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.09.017.

[95] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.

[96] Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 221–22.

[97] Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 212.

[98] Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 485, https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138.

Booth follows this definition and correlates security with "the conditions of being and feeling safe."[99] In this sense, it is a situation in which a person is not in danger and is safeguarded.[100] Baldwin argues that security can be defined by answering some questions, such as which values and whose security should be prioritized.[101] Nevertheless, Booth points out that there is no definitive meaning of security in international relations.[102]

The traditional conception of security was challenged heavily by the 1980s, especially by the end of the Cold War. For instance, in his book "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations," first published in 1983, Barry Buzan argues that security is not solely a military issue, and in this regard, the traditional understanding of security was too narrow. He also asserts that security is shaped not only by objective threats but also by perceived ones. Although the state was considered the central actor in security, it is not the only one. In this sense, the work challenged the dominant realist, state-based understanding of security that prevailed during the Cold War period. The challenge in security studies arose from a "puzzlement," as named by McSweeney, regarding international security issues and the answers provided by the International Relations discipline. The traditional understanding of security was not adequate to explain the events that occurred immediately after the Cold War.[103] In other words, the conventional definitions and understanding of security were not found adequate in the post-Cold War era as they were found narrow and insufficient to shed light on security situations in the world.

As new insecurities became salient in the post-Cold War era, new or critical security studies argued that security should be considered again with a broader and deeper

[99] Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 105 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 107.

[100] James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzche, and Baudrillard," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Columbia University Press, 1995), 24–25.

[101] Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," 5.

[102] Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Critical Security Studies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 13.

[103] McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 1.

perspective.[104] The complicated nature of world politics challenged the mainstream conceptualizations of security of the Cold War, and alternative conceptualizations of security were needed, which denoted a security understanding that encapsulated individuals and the world community in addition to the state. The new security concept also needed to appreciate change rather than *status quo,* making it "future oriented."

Besides, the security concept of the new era should not just consider military problems. Instead, the concept should be broadened to include other types of threats, such as economic, environmental, and other threats to human life.[105] In this vein, the 1993 study named "Identity, migration, and the new security agenda in Europe" incorporated societal security into the field of security studies, linking it to identity and migration.[106]

In the same way, as Rothschild argues, the 1990s brought about new principles to security studies. Security was thereby extended in many forms. First, it extended downward: from nations to groups and individuals. Second, it extended upward: from nations to the international system or "supranational physical environment." Third, the concept of security was extended horizontally, which meant from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or human security. Fourth, the responsibility to guarantee security was also stretched from nation states to international institutions, local or regional governments, non-governmental institutions, media and public opinion, or other abstractions, such as the unique features of the market.[107] Importantly, rather than reducing the concept of security to a single domain, Buzan proposes dividing it into five distinct sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Thus, he recognizes different referent objects of security.

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[104] Pınar Bilgin et al., "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," *Naçao e Defesa* 84, no. 2 (1998): 154.

[105] Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Contending Philosophies about Security in Europe," in *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, ed. Colin McInnes (Routledge, 1992), 4.

[106] Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (St. Martin's Press, 1993).

[107] Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?," *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): 5.

2.2.1. Security as a Social Construct

There are various perceptions and diverse ways of analyzing the concept of security. How should it be studied methodologically? What should it encompass? However, the answers depend on the reacher's perspective. According to Bilgin, Booth, and Wyn Jones, security is a construct. Security is not a fixed concept; rather it depends on divergent worldviews and political standpoints.[108] At this point, it is important to highlight the constructivist understanding of security, as new security studies largely adopt a social constructivist perspective, viewing security as a social construction. This perspective offers a profound understanding of how security issues emerge and dissolve over time.[109]

Social constructivism sees security as a socially constructed phenomenon through the interaction of actors. Therefore, its meaning can change over time and place. Security, in this sense, is context-specific. In social constructivism, security threats are not objectively given facts; they are created through intersubjective interaction between groups and individuals.[110] In constructivist thought, threats emerge as a result of processes and intersubjective interaction of actors. Namely, they do not exist outside of a specific context. In this sense, it challenges the traditional view where security issues are confined to military power rather than being context-dependent.[111]

As reiterated above, according to social constructivism, security is "socially constructed." Namely, there is not a list of standardized principles to name or consider an issue as a security issue. Instead, threats are created, produced, or shaped by the actors involved.[112] The reality in which we live is shaped by our perceptions,

[108] Bilgin et al., "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," 154.

[109] Ralf Emmers, "Securitization," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, 3rd ed., Alan Collins (Oxford University Press, 2013), 132.

[110] For a detailed account on social constructivism see: Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[111] Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2014), 5–6.

[112] Matt McDonald, "Constructivism," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (Routledge, 2008), 63.

values, understanding…etc. Intersubjectivity and ideas are central in social constructivism, since -according to constructivists- the international system does not exist independently of our perceptions, unlike natural phenomena studied in the biological sciences. Therefore, it does not stand on its own for objective study. Instead, it requires intersubjectivity. Thoughts and ideas are important in this line of thought, not solely bodily or tangible forces.[113]

The role of language is central in the social constructivist approach to security. Social constructivism posits that security is not an objective condition, but a social construction shaped through discourses and produced and maintained by various actors.[114] Accordingly, the role and use of language is also fundamental to the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of security. Notably, one of the school's key contributions to security studies, the concept of securitization, is grounded in the theory of speech acts. The following subsections will explore different approaches to securitization and the varying logics underpinning it. First, the Copenhagen School's contributions to the field of security studies will be briefly examined.

2.3. The Copenhagen School

As it is widely known, the Copenhagen School takes its name from the institute "Conflict and Peace Research Institute" (abbreviated as COPRI), which was based in Copenhagen. Key academicians of this school are Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. The main works of the Copenhagen School scholars introduce central concepts of the Copenhagen School to security studies. While the seeds of the sectoral approach to security were already present in the 1983 edition of the book "People, States and Fear," it was more explicitly developed and systematically articulated in the revised 1991 edition. Building on the formulation of the sectoral approach to security, "Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe"[115] further developed the framework with a particular focus on societal

[113] Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 162.

[114] McDonald, "Constructivism," 63.

[115] Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (St. Martin's Press, 1993).

security. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis"[116] elaborated "securitization," and "Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security"[117] offered a regional approach to international security and introduced "regional security complex theory." Within the scope of this thesis, securitization is specifically important. Sectoral approach, however, also deserves attention since migration is mostly seen as a threat to societal security, which was integrated into security studies by the Copenhagen School. Alongside this development, by broadening the security agenda, international migration, like many other issues, attracted scholarly attention to be studied within security framework.

Barry Buzan put forward that security studies should not just focus on the military sector, but encompass other sectors such as political, economic, environmental and societal.[118] Thereby, issues that could be evaluated as new insecurities of the post-Cold War era were embraced by new security studies, such as the environment, poverty, and human trafficking. Sectoral approach also provided analytical convenience to the studies of security. Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde proposed the sectoral approach as an analytical method and lens through which the same issue could be seen through different perspectives.[119] In this regard, the different sectors of security provided analytical means to disentangle the whole into pieces in which "distinctive patterns of interaction exist."[120]

From the perspective of the sectoral approach to security, most notably, securitization of migration can be seen in the societal sector, which is strongly related to identity. Societies' core values, culture, and language which are the

[116] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner publishers, 1998).

[117] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[118] Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*.

[119] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 23; Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 168.

[120] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 8.

elements of a society's identity, are the referent objects.[121] In this sense, it is demonstrated by Weiner that immigration is a subjective threat and depends on how the receiving state defines itself.[122] He further argues that ethnic and cultural affinities are socially constructed and, in this context, securitizing an ethnic immigrant group can be a choice for the securitizing actors and may change over time.[123]

2.4. Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School introduced "securitization" to security studies, which is a process through which security threats are socially constructed by securitizing actors. At the end of securitization, certain issues are transformed into security matters through the use of language, discourse, and narration. In its simplistic understanding, "when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics," we have a case of securitization."[124] Although the Copenhagen School's securitization approach resulted in a fruitful arena to study security in the post-Cold War era, it was criticized by some other studies, such as that of Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans. This line of studies is named the Paris School of security studies or sociological approach to securitization. These are two different logics as described by Phillippe Bourbeau, namely the logic of exception and the logic of routine.[125] This specifically constitutes the main difference between the Copenhagen and Paris school of security studies. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is based on speech acts and discourses, which are successful in the sense that the audience accepts the declaration of an issue as a "security issue." When the audience is convinced of the existence of a threat or an enemy, adoption of extraordinary measures is justified.

[121] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

[122] Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 110.

[123] Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," 105.

[124] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, 491.

[125] Philippe Bourbeau, "Securitization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., ed. James D. Wright (Elsevier, 2015).

This type of securitization process reflects Carl Schmitt's conceptualization of the "state of exception." In such cases, those in the positions of authority define what constitutes a threat, thereby responding to it not through normal political procedures but through extraordinary measures. Thus, at the end of the securitization process, repressive policies are legitimized, and authoritarian tendencies are strengthened. However, the Paris School argues that the process of securitization, for which Bigo prefers the term (in)securitization over securitization, is not only about speech acts and discourses but also "mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics" and "with Weberian routines of rationalization."[126] Within this context, first, the securitization approach of the Copenhagen School and speech acts, and then the Paris School and sociological approach to security will be examined.

2.4.1. The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

In securitization theory, precedence is given to the ways in which security threats are constructed politically and socially, rather than focusing on the objective existence of different kinds of security threats.[127] This means that the existence of an existential threat is not indispensable for an issue to be a security issue. Namely, an issue may become a security matter if it is presented as such.[128]

Securitization studies originally aim to find answers to the questions of who securitizes, which issues are securitized, who the referent objects that need to be protected are, why and to which ends the possible conditions under which securitization processes occur.[129] On the research agenda of securitization theory, Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka put forward three domains of research: "securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting

[126] Didier Bigo, "International Political Sociology," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 1st ed., ed. Paul D. Williams (Routledge, 2008), 126.

[127] Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory," *Security Dialogue* 42, nos. 4–5 (2011): 427.

[128] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 24.

[129] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 32.

from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created."[130]

Securitization was first coined by Ole Wæver in the field of International Relations in 1995. The key concept in securitization theory is "discourse". For Copenhagen School scholars, issues such as the environment and migration can become security issues through discourses. Specific matters are presented as existential threats to a certain referent object, and, if this process succeeds, these issues become security issues.[131] In that regard, Wæver challenges the traditional conception of security, which considers only states as the matter of security and treats security as given.[132] He argues that security is a "speech act," and it is not given, unlike the traditional approach suggested, but constructed through a discursive process.

The core question to study security, according to Wæver, is to find out what makes an issue a "security problem,"[133] and his answer is that if elites declare something as a security problem, an issue may become one.[134] In Wæver's words:

> with the help of [Austin's] language theory, we can regard security as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as betting, giving promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security' a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use a whatever means are necessary to block it.[135]

However, it should also be noted that while utterance itself is important in the Copenhagen School's securitization approach, it is also criticized by many other scholars working on securitization.

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[130] Thierry Balzacq, "Securitization Theory: Past, Present, and Future," *Polity* 51, no. 2 (2019): 494, https://doi.org/10.1086/701884.

[131] Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 578, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108097553.

[132] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Columbia University Press, 1995), 48.

[133] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 52.

[134] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 52.

[135] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

Security is described by Wæver as a speech act and a certain method of presenting an issue as a problem[136] in a particular context, at the end of which the specific issue constitutes security.[137] Speech acts do not inherently define a situation as a security situation. Instead, they create it as a security problem through "successful representation."[138] This means that the act of expression itself is the action.[139] The above-mentioned situation represents the Copenhagen School's contribution to security studies and its challenge to the traditional understanding of security, which takes security to be an objectively given fact. This means that security is discursive, intersubjective, and constituted socially in the Copenhagen School's security approach.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, in their book "Security: A New Framework for Analysis," aimed to contribute to the analysis of security through "a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization."[140] Security, according to Buzan, Wæver, and de Vilde, is "an intersubjective establishment" and "a discursive process" through which issues are moved out of the political realm. Moreover, emergency measures could be taken to deal with those issues.[141] Securitization is defined by Buzan and Wæver as "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat."[142] Their definition of securitized is to present an issue "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."[143]

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[136] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55.

[137] McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," 568.

[138] Christopher Baker-Beall, "The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other,' Securitization and Control," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5, no. 2 (2009): 191.

[139] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 26.

[140] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, vii.

[141] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 24–25.

[142] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 491.

[143] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 24.

Securitization theory provides an analytical framework to study security, which, as the Copenhagen School argues, is a social construction. Copenhagen School provided a model to study security. In this sense, it can be argued that the Copenhagen School's security conceptualization challenges the traditional understanding of security, which sees security as an objective fact, by proposing intersubjectivity. Their framework is based on the construction of security, which considers security a social construction.

Securitization is a process in which a certain issue is transformed into a matter of security by an actor with the acceptance of the audience. The situation is then transformed into a problem. Acceptance of the audience is important since the issue cannot be securitized if audience stays indifferent to the issue that is presented as an existential threat to a referent object by the elites. In this case, it is just a "securitizing move." Thus, audience should be receptive in order for the securitizing move to be successful.[144]

As mentioned previously, securitization is a process, and successful securitization needs a securitizing actor, a referent object, and an audience. Referent objects are the "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival."[145] The referent object of security can be different depending on the sectors of security. To illustrate, it can be the state, individual, nation, political authority, identity or a social group. While a society's identity can be threatened, a state may be threatened by losing its sovereignty. Yet, the Copenhagen School appreciates the importance of the state as a referent object. Within the scope of this thesis, however, societal security is significantly important, which can be defined as "the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolutions, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom."[146] As migration and societal security have close connections in European immigration experience, many academic works deal with migration-security nexus (especially

[144] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 25.

[145] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 36.

[146] Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 23.

taking European identity as the referent object), since migration is increasingly seen as a threat to identities and cultural homogeneity of European countries.

The securitizing actor is also important in a successful securitization process. The actor securitizes issues by announcing that a specific referent object is existentially threatened.[147] The securitizing actor can be a political party, elites, or a state representative who claims to speak on behalf of the audience. In other terms, they have the potential power to use securitization as a tool on a specific matter, allowing them to gain control related with that matter.[148]

As mentioned beforehand, not all securitizing moves are successful. Successful securitization needs the audience to be convinced. It is an intersubjective process where security is socially constructed through discourses. In order for a securitization move to be successful, it should be received by the "audience" as well. Namely, not all securitization moves are successful, and securitization is not a unilateral process. Through discourses, a "referent object" is constituted as being under threat and framed as under an existential danger. An issue is securitized only if the audience is persuaded that the referent object faces an existential threat.[149]

Clarification on the acceptance of the audience is also important here since in many academic works, the consent and acceptance of the audience is said to be necessary. However, creation of consent does not always occur without the reflection of power relations and in a democratic discussion environment. In this sense, coercion and consent go hand in hand in that matter.[150] Nevertheless, it can be said that success in the securitization process is not determined by the securitizing actor but by the audience, and it is an inter-subjective process.[151] To sum up, for a successful

[147] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 36.

[148] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Columbia University Press, 1995), 54.

[149] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 25.

[150] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 25.

[151] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 31.

securitization process, "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules"[152] are needed.

As we can understand from the definitions provided above, a securitizing actor speaks out about a particular object, which is called "referent object," that is existentially threatened. Therefore, measures under ordinary politics are not enough to deal with that particular "problem," and extraordinary measures are needed to be taken for the survival of the referent object. If the audience is convinced about this, then the issue can be removed from the boundaries of the ordinary politics, and extraordinary measures can be employed to tackle the claimed problem. Emergency politics is not opposed by the audience as a result of the securitization process, which would otherwise not have been tolerated.[153]

As not all securitizing moves are successful and the use of language is important in successful securitization, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde reveal the facilitating conditions for successful securitization/securitizing move. The facilitating conditions, named by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde as internal and external conditions, determine whether the speech acts work and are accepted by the audience as a threat to the relevant referent object. For securitization to be successful, there are basically two facilitating conditions that must be met. The first is internal and the second is external. The internal condition requires linguistically correct articulation of the action. In other words, the action must follow linguistic rules. The second is external, that is, contextual. The actor who will carry out the action must be in a position to do so socially and politically.[154] Regarding external conditions, social capital of the securitizing actor is also important since it describes the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience. In this sense, social capital of the securitizing actor determines whether the audience approves that the referent object is threatened.[155] In short, people and conditions should be ready for the securitization

[152] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 26.

[153] Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 1 (2006): 55, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072.

[154] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 32.

[155] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 33.

process.[156] It is reiterated by Balzacq that, according to the Copenhagen School scholars, these are the rules that actors should follow. Otherwise, securitization cannot be achieved.[157]

As repeatedly mentioned before, securitization is a process, and the Copenhagen School scholars interrogate how a certain issue is removed from the political agenda and placed into the security agenda. In Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde's words:

> security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Security can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized.[158]

When an issue is non-politicized, then the state is not involved in that issue, and it is not subject to public debate or decision. If the issue is politicized, then it becomes a part of public policy and requires government decision and allocation of resources. However, the issue is still managed within the standard political system. When an issue is securitized, then it is accepted as an existential threat that requires emergency measures, and actions are taken outside the scope of normal politics. If an issue is dealt with like a technical issue then it means that it is not politicized, however, after an issue is politicized, then securitizing actors can convey it as a threat to a specific referent object.[159] It can be understood from these definitions that securitization can be considered as an extreme version of politicization. Namely, the scale ranges from non-politicized to politicized and securitized, forming the levels.[160]

This being said, it is important to point out that the Copenhagen School scholars are not in favor of securitization. For instance, Wæver criticizes the construction of

[156] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 32.

[157] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 172, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960.

[158] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 23.

[159] Jonna Nyman, "Securitization Theory," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, 1st ed., ed. Laura J. Shepherd (Routledge, 2013), 54.

[160] Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 214.

issues as security matters and proposes that most of the time de-securitization is better.[161] Wæver thinks negatively of securitization because any measures that are considered proper by the state elites could be used under those circumstances. In those grounds, positive change would be impossible. De-securitization means taking issues out of the security framework of existential threats and bringing them back into normal political debate in the "ordinary public sphere."[162] Issues may also go back and forth from securitization to de-securitization.

2.5. Paris School of Security Studies

2.5.1. Introduction

As explained in the previous subsection, the Copenhagen School gives utmost importance to the use of language, namely discourses. The point of departure of the Paris School lies in its critique of the Copenhagen School's overemphasis on the importance of discourses to construct an issue as security. Although Paris School admits the constructed nature of security/(in)security, it does not view it as an exceptional discourse. Rather, it adopts a more sociological approach, emphasizing routine practices of bureaucracy in categorizing, defining, and thereby securitizing issues.[163] The Paris School is referred to as "the (in)securitization theoretical framework" by some scholars.[164] The Paris School draws on disciplines other than International Relations too, such as political sociology, criminology, and law.[165]

On the difference among securitization approaches, Bourbeau makes a differentiation between "logic of exception and logic of routine."[166] As discussed in the previous

[161] Ole Wæver, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery," March 17, 2004, 13–14.

[162] Ole Wæver, as cited in Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 29.

[163] Rens Van Munster, "Review Essay: Security on a Shoestring: A Hitchhiker's Guide to Critical Schools of Security in Europe," *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 2 (2007): 236, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836707076694.

[164] Dimitris Skleparis, "(In)Securitization and Illiberal Practices on the Fringe of the EU," *European Security* 25, no. 1 (2016): 92, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1080160.

[165] C.A.S.E Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 4 (2006): 449, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606073085.

[166] Philippe Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process," *Millennium* 43, no. 1 (2014): 187, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814541504.

subsection, the Copenhagen School rests on the logic of exception, whereas the Paris School mostly relies on the logic of routine. In this sense, securitization derives from practices that are mundane and patterned.[167] While Carl Schmitt is influential in the logic of exception,[168] Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are influential figures in the logic of routine through their thoughts on governmentality and practices respectively.[169] The other main difference between the Copenhagen School and Paris School is the securitizing actors. While it is mostly political elites in the former, bureaucrats and security professionals are significant in the latter's understanding of securitization. All in all, Copenhagen school has has little to say about technology use, yet it is vitally important in the Paris School.[170]

In the Paris School's imagination of securitization, it is "a dispersed social process."[171] However, it should also be noted that the Paris School scholars share a much looser common research and intellectual ground than the Copenhagen School scholars. Even so, this school was referred to as the Paris School by Wæver in 2004,[172] and it was widely accepted afterwards.[173]

The Paris School of security studies has been shaped by an understanding of security at the European level and has mostly focused on practices of border security. This has inevitably led the school to emphasize the relationship between migration/migrants and security. In other words, the Paris school of security studies inherently problematizes the migration-security relationship that is formed through practices. The Paris School of security studies uses philosophical underpinnings of

[167] Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together," 188.

[168] Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together," 189.

[169] Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together," 190.

[170] Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together," 188.

[171] Stephan Scheel, "Reconfiguring Desecuritization: Contesting Expert Knowledge in the Securitization of Migration," *Geopolitics* 27, no. 4 (2022): 1043, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1774749.

[172] Wæver, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery."

[173] C.A.S.E Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe."

Foucault, such as governmentality and panopticon, and Bourdieu's conceptual tools, involving field, habitus, practice to comprehend securitization/insecurization, hence adopting a sociological approach to security.[174] In the next part, field, habitus, and practice will be unpacked, since they affect practices within a social context to a certain extent.

2.5.2. Fields and Capital

Fields are "social subsystems." Actors in a specific field follow the rules and roles that constitute the rules of the game. This generates a set of practices with a pattern. Fields are spaces in which actors are involved in the game in order to achieve a better position in that specific field by deploying their capital in various forms, such as social, economic, cultural, or symbolic capital they have. Thus, actors aim to improve their position in the field.[175]

Fields are not ahistorical entities and may change over time.[176] When the place of an actor changes in the field, it affects the position of other actors. So, the position of an actor is linked to other actors' position, reflecting the power relations in the field. Practices occur in various fields within a society.[177]

In fields, power struggles exist based on capitals of agents. Capital helps actors to enter the field and compete for a position in a hierarchical domain, ensuring they are

[174] Examples include but are not limited to: Didier Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 225–58, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00132.x; Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives* 27, no. Special Issue (2002): 63–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105; Didier Bigo, "Globalized (in)Security The Field and the Ban-Opticon," in *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, ed. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, Routledge Studies in Liberty and Security (Routledge, 2008); Jef Huysmans, "A Foucaultian View on Spill-over: Freedom and Security in the EU," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 3 (2004): 294–318, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800018; Trine Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security: Rethinking Theory and Practice*, New International Relations (Routledge, 2016).

[175] Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000): 165, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066100006002001.

[176] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 165.

[177] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*: *Rethinking Theory and Practice, New International Relations* (Routledge, 2016), 28.

recognized in the game. However, capital in the field is relative to others' position[178] and must be recognized in order to gain authority in the field. Villumsen Berling puts forth how capital operates in the field in three ways. First, if capital is valid, it helps the actor to enter into the field. Second, capital is decisive for the position of the actor in the field. However, a specific kind of capital should be respected in that exact field. She lastly introduces doxic battles to the literature in the belief that this notion better captures change.[179]

Field is not an institution but a structured social space in which conflict and struggle are centripetal. These spaces are always structured and contain power relations and struggles. Hierarchy in the field is important as it is based on varying capitals and fundamental differences of the agents involved in the field. The hierarchy within the field is indeed based on different capitals, such as economic, social, cultural, symbolic, that actors possess. These capitals determine the position of individuals in the field and influence the strategies they use.[180] Agents' capital may not give them the same power in different fields; this means that it is not always as valuable as in other fields.[181] Agents within the field come together or diverge depending on if they have common or competing goals. This determines the nature of competition and struggle within the field.[182]

What is more, the field exerts influence on everyone that enters into it and has a directive function. The field influences and guides those that come into it. Agents entering the field adopt the rules and norms of the field without always realizing it and act accordingly. This is also related to Bourdieu's concept of "habitus," which will be explained below.[183] In each field a particular field of interest, or in

[178] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 22.

[179] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 23.

[180] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 27.

[181] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 165.

[182] Didier Bigo and R.B.J. Walker, "Political Sociology and the Problem of the International," *Millennium* 35, no. 3 (2007): 732, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070350030401.

[183] Loïc Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (Polity Press, 1992), 17.

Bourdieu's words, *illusio,* is produced and shaped. Agents that enter the field understand implicitly how to play according to the rules. Divergent fields produce their own *"illusio*," which the agents partaking in the field value. Agents learn how to act in the field by observing these *illusio* and agree to play according to the rules of the game. Bourdieu refrains from using the word interest and prefers *illusio*, because the former sounds like the calculations of a rational actor, which Bourdieu does not approve of.[184] Agents' practices gain meaning within fields. As agents act according to the rules of the game in the fields, they also reproduce the rules.[185] Borrowing from the practice turn in International Relations and following Pouliot, practices are not unidirectional. It is conducted by the actor, but it also shapes the actor's identity, and, in this context, it forms social contexts.[186]

Authority is important in fields, and this may be achieved through technical expertise or the capacity to talk through statistics. Professionals of the field, through mundane practices of data collection and classification, gain statistical knowledge that ordinary people do not possess. Through this data, they can define what constitutes risk or unease in the real sense. However, as stated above, fields are also spaces for competition and conflict for divergent players that try to exist in the field. This issue drives them to strive for dominance in real knowledge of what constitutes genuine risk or unease.[187] The process of securitization has moved out of the narrow sphere of political actors and spread more widely among security professionals and technological advances in control and surveillance. Securitization is thus the result of a field effect, that is, not a conscious choice of a single or limited actor.[188]

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[184] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, "The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Chicago Workshop)," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (Polity Press, 1992), 117.

[185] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 166.

[186] Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

[187] Bigo, "Globalized (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon," in *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, ed. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, Routledge Studies in Liberty and Security (Routledge, 2008), 12.

[188] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 75–76.

Field is "a patterned system of objective forces…, a relational configuration endowed with a specific gravity."[189] Fields are relational configurations within a specific societal context from politics to art in which individuals and groups compete. Within the field, the rules, norms and power dynamics are objective forces which affect the acts, the boundaries of behavior, or the strategy of agents/individuals. The field has a gravity within itself. The relations within the field occur according to a hierarchical configuration. Because of the gravitational force, powerful actors in the field can affect the position of others in the field who are less powerful. Field, in this sense, determines the power relations between the actors and reproduces them.

Fields have their own dynamics. They are not fully apart from the outer world or other fields, yet function to a certain extent autonomously. It is not possible to immediately transfer power or authority from one field to another.[190] Villumsen Berling, in her study, aims to demonstrate how the authority to define security at the European level keeps the European security field cohesive. In each field, there is a specific game to play and having power to define is important, such as defining what counts as a security issue, so that one can gain control within that specific security field. In Villumsen Berling's case, this is the field of European security, and authority to define what is included in the European security field keeps the field operating.[191]

2.5.3. The Field Effect and Daily Practices

As noted in the previous subsection, the Copenhagen School relates securitization process to existential threat to a referent object and involves persuasion of the audience to use exceptional methods to tackle the problem. However, this problem is not a daily threat. Conversely, in the Copenhagen School, it is presented as a threat to survival so that the audience does not oppose moving that issue beyond normal politics. On the other hand, the Paris School brings us closer to tackling the issue on a daily basis even without explicitly naming it as an existential threat or as part of

[189] Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 17.

[190] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 29.

[191] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 29.

following a grand plan.[192] As a matter of fact, most of the actors involved in the practices of insecuritization are not aware of the major consequences of their actions and do not actually intend to act towards this goal. The consequences of these actions stem from the field effect in which actors, who act within the field, struggle for power and contest over whose security is important.[193]

Illiberal practices in the Western context stem from the field effect of numerous security professionals who also have transnational ties. This challenges the Copenhagen School's restriction of securitizing actors to a large extent to political elites. The Paris School of securitization widens the securitizing actors in securitization processes. Paris School does not see securitization as a grand plan of elites, through which step-by-step securitization occurs. The Paris School treats securitization neutrally, without assigning a positive or negative connotation.[194]

Bigo appreciates the Copenhagen School's innovation of the importance of the use of language in securitization of immigration. However, he argues that securitization does not occur only as a result of the speech acts of the political elites but together with the security professionals' acts and as a field effect in the European context. The field effect is important, and the security field is formed by the police, gendarmerie, military, and intelligence service, those who provide surveillance technology, and risk assessment experts.[195] While military power was the key determining feature of European security during the Cold War, it had changed by the post-Cold War period, in the 1990s. Old security analysis framework became insufficient in the new era, and new actors with divergent practices entered the security field. Villumsen Berling, therefore finds, Bourdieu's concepts, such as fields and capital, useful to understand the European security in the new era.[196]

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[192] Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, Routledge Studies in Liberty and Security (Routledge, 2008), 5.

[193] Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty*, 5.

[194] Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty*, 4.

[195] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 65.

[196] Villumsen Berling, *The International Political Sociology of Security*, 27.

2.5.4. Habitus and Practices

"Administrative practices" are significant in the Paris School's understanding of security, and, hence, securitization. These practices can be enacted through "population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation."[197] The habitus of professionals of security should also be considered, including their strict adherence to the principle of confidentiality and their alertness to governing unease or fear.[198] The Paris School does not adopt survival logic and exceptionality. Routine practices are significant in forming the feeling of unease, insecurity, danger, and fear. Day-to-day practices of bureaucrats and police are vital to capture securitization/insecuritization.[199]

Habitus in Bourdieu's sociology denotes sets of dispositions, which have a tendency to last and transpose.[200] Habitus does not only integrate past experiences but also acts as a set of perceptions, tastes, and actions so that numerous different missions and duties are achieved.[201] Habitus acts as a constituting device. It is not totally distinctive or it does not perfectly determine the behavior, but it still acts within agents.[202] Prior experiences shape habitus, and habitus affects the practices of agents, concomitantly shaping their experiences and history.[203] Habitus, the field's internal dynamics, rules, and norms influence practices of agents acting in that specific field. Understanding the field is important, since "identity (agency), interests, strategies" are bound to that exact field.[204] Habitus also reflects the collective memory of the

[197] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 65.

[198] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 66.

[199] Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order*, 1st ed., Security and Governance Series (Routledge, 2011), 38.

[200] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 28th, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 82.

[201] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 83.

[202] Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 18.

[203] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 166.

[204] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 166.

community. How one behaves or tends to behave does not only depend on the person themselves. Instead, it is an outcome of the community in which they live. Moreover, it does not only depend on the present but on the past experiences.[205]

However, Bourdieu's concept of habitus has not been free from criticism. For example, Bigo, in his article analyzing insecuritization practices in the European security field across three areas, criticizes Bourdieu's concept of habitus as it overemphasizes the legacy of the past on agents, and he argues that in some cases Bruno Lahire's concept of "patrimony of dispositions" is more explanatory. In general terms, "patrimony of dispositions" means that skills and dispositions are formed over time and can change as well. Dispositions may become active or suppressed in different social settings. They are not fixed and unchangeable.[206]

According to Huysmans, following Bourdieu (1982), discourses are embedded in specific social practices. We need to understand whether "political" or "technocratic" discourses are important in the construction of threat, security, or risk that cause unease. Regarding technocratic discourses, Huysmans gives the example of lobbyists in the professional sense, customs and liaison officers among others.[207]

Within the context of this thesis, I can add migration administration bureaucrats and officers to this list for their potential to frame Syrians as risky bodies through their ordinary practices. Although discourse is still powerful in the construction of a specific language, we need to understand the power relations in which this discourse is embedded. However, focusing on political discourses under the spotlight has the risk of ignoring the technique of performing practices and its constructed nature.[208]

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[205] Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," 166.

[206] Didier Bigo, "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 3 (2014): 210, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614530459.

[207] Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2006), 91, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203008690.

[208] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 92.

2.5.5. Governmentality and Ban-opticon

The form of governmentality constituted by security measures that pervade every aspect of life is important and largely derived from Foucault's philosophy. Governmentality in Foucault's definition refers to:

> The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means: apparatuses of security.[209]

With this statement, Foucault explains how power operates within society. Power does not just operate through legal and coercive methods but also through "institutions, procedures, analyses…calculations and tactics." This form of power is directed towards the target population and instrumentalizes political economy to govern. Security apparatuses like surveillance, police, or security institutions serve as technical means of this form of power. All in all, Foucault aims to explain how power creates a constant security and control mechanism in the everyday life of people and argues that this is achieved by a complex yet efficient tool. Bigo puts forth that the monitoring of population and employment of surveillance technologies have become "routines of everyday life, rather than exceptional practices."[210]

Bigo argues that the securitization of migration, the tightening of border controls, and the weakening of the welfare state are indicative of a transformation in governmentality or "the art of government." The state is now developing a different form of governance, based on insecurity and unrest. Rather than being protective and supportive, the understanding of the state has evolved into one that constantly takes precautionary steps against insecurity and threats. The increase in internal security measures is actually part of the process of redefining the state's control over the population.[211]

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[209] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell et al. (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 102.

[210] Didier Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," in *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, ed. David Lyon (Willan Publishing, 2006), 46.

[211] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 81–82.

This new art of government is not pan-opticon, as Bigo argues.[212] Pan-opticon is used by Foucault to show how society is formed, like in the novel 1984, and how it is transformed "to a society of management and monitoring the life of populations" within a territorially fixed state.[213] Pan-opticon monitors everyone, everywhere, all the time. Bigo uses the term ban-opticon instead. In ban-opticon, not everyone but those who are categorized as risky are monitored. Who is going to be monitored is decided with the help of surveillance technologies. Surveillance profiles a person as risky or not risky. As a result, depending on the profile of the person, they may or may not be under surveillance. The aforementioned "political technology is based on proactive, anticipative, and morphing techniques." The aim here is to manage future through surveillance and the control of the risky groups.[214]

Ban-opticon is derived from explaining the post-9/11 world, which was created by the US at the global level to meet global insecurities like terrorism or organized crime, which produced "the field of unease management" in the end. This not only includes exceptionalist practices, containment and profiling of aliens but also mobility of people.[215] "The ban attempts to show how the role of routines and acceptance of everyday life protects some over others, or how the protection of these others against themselves as the profound structure which explains the 'moment' of the declaration of exception."[216]

The ban-opticon has now replaced the pan-opticon. While the pan-opticon monitors people by keeping them in a fixed place, the ban-opticon quickly identifies their profile as risky or not risky and removes them if they do not match the expected. In the ban-opticon, movements are monitored. It is not even limited to the present as information technologies and virtual reality tools are used to predict future

[212] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 82.

[213] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 46.

[214] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 82.

[215] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 47.

[216] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 47.

movements. Thus, behavior that may pose a threat now and in the future is identified.[217]

Professionals dealing with unease in society also identify what constitutes a threat or risk with the help of their professional identity. Even if those who are not professionals in the field try to have a say in this determination, it is not possible for this challenge to be successful because they lack professional status in the field. Professionals have an institutional and technological advantage in the field because others do not have the capital that the former possesses.[218]

Professionals in the field have some confidential information and therefore have a more competent image of what is a threat and what is not. This secrecy gives them power to make generalizations about threats. Sometimes this is based on a single incident. They have "legitimate" knowledge derived from technical and statistical data, that is to say, capital, over other players in the game.[219] Bigo gives the examples of Echelon, Europol, or Interpol as holders of technical knowledge since they have a vast amount of information on a specific issue. Through data and statistical knowledge, insecurity management thus becomes more about risk management than the use of force.[220] Security professionals, rather than politicians, with their capital, have been at the top of the hierarchy of what security is and how to provide it.[221]

Mobility within and between the borders of states is controlled to the extent technological and bureaucratic abilities allow. States conduct surveillance to control movements using wired walls, fingerprints, visualization systems, or they close borders to keep the "risky" outside. In addition, states control movements through technological tools of border control, some of which even start from outside of the

[217] Bigo, "Globalized (in)Security The Field and the Ban-Opticon," 37.

[218] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 74.

[219] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 74.

[220] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 75.

[221] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 75.

borders, such as issuing biometric passports and visas, which may take the form of electronic fences at the borders and registration and work permits within the borders. All these are technical and bureaucratic processes that depend on technical expertise. They are also instruments used to control mobility, and they create controlled zones for the entry of approved individuals into state borders.[222] With employment of technological procedures, technocratic and bureaucratic routines and practices gained significance. Inspired by Foucault's techniques of government,[223] professionalism and technical expertise give power to knowledgeable/expert practices and help to create a language of security outside the discourse of political elites.[224] And, in this sense, securitizing practices may become more significant than securitizing speech acts in understanding securitization processes. Huysmans focuses on the European context and finds the Foucauldian lens useful. If problematic, movement is externalized through a "territorial-judicial technology" and internalized through a "biopolitical and statistical technology" that coexist at the same time.[225] So to speak, border control practices go hand in hand with monitoring and profiling practices of the population at the European level.[226]

The development of technologies that can be used for the security of populations in fact increases securitization. It also leads to a shift towards the private sector for ensuring security through surveillance, transforming the relationship between private and public sectors. Individual security, which is actually within the private sphere, moves into the political sphere due to the intermingling of private and public domains, and in a sense, turns into the management of individuals' feelings of security and insecurity.[227]

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[222] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 92.

[223] Foucault, "Governmentality."

[224] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 86.

[225] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 86.

[226] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 87.

[227] Didier Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. Mathias Albert et al., Borderlines, vol. 18 (University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 104.

2.5.6. Intermingling of Inside and Outside Security

Intertwining and coexistence are conceptualized by Bigo through Möbius ribbon analogy. Möbius ribbon of security, in Bigo's words, is "the merging of internal and external security".[228] Möbius ribbon metaphor to understand security is based on Rob Walker's study, where he problematizes inside and outside.[229] This metaphor of blurring borders between inside and outside paves the way for us to comprehend intertwinedness of boundaries.[230] This may also allow us to think within national, international or global ex-realities and imagine beyond those borders, helping us to capture the transversal lines of power struggles.[231] Iconic concepts of the modern state system in this line of thinking: security, sovereignty, territoriality are shaking.[232]

Westphalian vision of states is challenged, whose borders were demarcated between anarchy and hierarchy through transnationalization and globalist forces, and the distinction between inside and outside is intertwined, changing the roles of security agencies.[233] In this sense, security is "an attempt at securitization of daily life by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police potential for action."[234] In a sense, this also means that the ends of security and insecurity are connected to each other like a Möbius strip. This way of thinking also helps to open up new avenues of thought, envisioning the "plurality of boundaries and by introducing the discussion on its limits and transgressions."[235] In the meantime, we

[228] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 100.

[229] R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 24 (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[230] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 97.

[231] Bigo and Walker, "Political Sociology and the Problem of the International," 732.

[232] Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe," in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, 1st ed., ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (Routledge, 2000), 171.

[233] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 101.

[234] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 111.

[235] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 96–97.

can question the issue of belonging and other, since, in today's world, the boundaries separating inside and outside "no longer separate human realities."[236] It is the understanding of the sociological approach that security practices are also practices of insecurity. Security and insecurity are considered to be intertwined in a single process. As in the Möbius strip in Bigo's analogy, there is no front or back surface. Instead, a structure in which security and insecurity are constantly intertwined exists. Namely, practices like border controls and technologies do not eradicate insecurity. On the contrary, they disseminate fear and anxiety about mobility in everyday practices. In other words, these security practices turn into a process that reproduces insecurity, and these two coexist dynamically, meaning that a decrease in one does not mean an increase in the other. Bigo explains that the practices that used to secure borders with the help of technological devices do not end the insecurity of borders. On the contrary, daily life mobilities become more insecure.[237]

The fact that the fields of internal and external security have entered a relationship analogous to a Möbius strip is not due to an increase in threats, but rather to the problematization of the relationship between self and others. While the practices of security professionals in daily life are expected to make life more secure, they may inadvertently increase insecurity in daily life. Since security is not an end in itself, one's security may result in others' insecurity. Thus, the police presence and intervention in daily life are actually increasing.[238]

Transnational threats are one of the issues that lead to the intertwining of internal and external security spheres. This is because issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, or organized crime cannot be solved within the borders of modern states. This paves the way for more transnational formations in the security understanding. However, it is open to debate whether this increases security or insecurity or leads to the restriction of freedom in the name of security.[239]

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[236] Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens* (New Press : Distributed by W.W. Norton, 1999), 6.

[237] Bigo, "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control," 221.

[238] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 111; 113.

[239] Bigo, "The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)," 94.

Against this backdrop, it becomes necessary to explore how securitization may take shape through practices and routines, not merely through language. Focusing only on language may result in missing essential aspects in securitization process, such as "gestures, maneuvers, the rituals of demonstration of force."[240] Bigo further argues that securitization may occur for certain issues even without discourse and use of speech act, which is very well known by the forces responsible for internal and external security, including the military and police. Namely, "practical work, discipline and expertise" are as important as discourses and the use of language of political elites regarding securitization,[241] if not more important.

According to Bigo, since "administrative knowledge" is so important and it transforms into administrative power, administrative bodies prevail over debates and discussions on a certain issue.[242] Furthermore, technocratic practices, most of the time, performed in secrecy and through discreet methods.[243] It should also be noted that secrecy also gives the power to that specific entity.[244]

Van Munster, following Bigo, assigns significance to bureaucratic regimes. Bureaucracies are more effective than political elites in making security decisions because of their expert knowledge. Security decisions are taken by the system in which bureaucrats are situated. Thus, if we focus on the discourse of actors active in the political field, we may miss the more important everyday acts which led to the securitization process through routine and mundane practices.[245] Van Munster, nevertheless, warns that focusing solely on bureaucratic practices would not help to

[240] Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe," 194.

[241] Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe," 194.

[242] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 83.

[243] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 92.

[244] Not sure whether derived from technical knowledge or incapacity, Turkish migration administration agency is "powered by secrecy". Please see: Sibel Karadağ and Doruk Tatar, "Powered by Secrecy: Contesting Imaginaries of Migration Governance in Turkey," *Geopolitics* 0, no. 0 (2024): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2024.2347278.

[245] Rens van Munster, *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU*, 1st ed., Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series (Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 5.

catch up the securitization, rather in his view political and bureaucratic fields are "mutually constitutive" fields.[246]

The abovementioned issue is also raised by Bourbeau, who asks whether considering the practices or framings of security professionals is enough to securitize an issue. A constructivist account's answer would be no, since the social world could not be captured in this case, and intersubjective formation of structure and agent would be overlooked.[247] Likewise, Bourbeau criticizes the Paris School's overemphasis on security professionals' role in securitization. He recognizes the importance of social power in Bourdieusian sense in securitization process. However, he contends that it is just derived from the security field and gives the example of the role of environmentalists in securitization of environmental issues, such asdegradation.[248]

2.6. Phenomenological and Experience-Based Approaches to Security and Securitization

Much of the securitization literature tends to concentrate on elite-driven discourses and the discursive construction of security, often adopting the Copenhagen School as its primary analytical framework. At the same time, there is also a growing body of literature that investigates the lived experiences of individuals, everyday aspects of security, and embodied experiences. For example, Crawford and Hutchinson note that although a lot has been written about security policies and tools, we know much less about how people actually live with and deal with these measures daily.[249]

To address this gap, in her work, Evranos describes how Islam has become a security issue in the daily lives of Muslims in France. This securitization is not limited to measures taken in extraordinary circumstances. It has also become a daily practice

[246] Munster, *Securitizing Immigration*, 6.

[247] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 38.

[248] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 39.

[249] Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson, "Mapping the Contours of 'Everyday Security': Time, Space and Emotion," *British Journal of Criminology* 56, no. 6 (2016): 1185, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv121.

that determines how Muslims are accepted in society. The study reveals the real-life traces of securitization theory by showing how people experience these processes. Thus, it helps us to understand how security practices spread into daily life and how they are felt in the lives of Muslims.[250] Another study focuses on how Arab-American and British Arab activists feel about security measures in their daily lives. Staeheli and Nagel state that border checks and surveillance make people feel watched and unsafe. These controls do not just limit movement but also reinforce fear and stop people from feeling like they belong to the society and country they are live in.[251] They argue that real security means being able to live daily life without fear of detention, threats, or limits for many Arabs, but government policies and constant watch actually make them feel less secure.[252] They also show that citizenship rights are important because they help people feel more secure and a part of the community.[253]

This also has a common ground with the Paris School approach to in/securitization, which takes into account the banal, routinized and dispersed practices of in/securitization in addition to political speeches and elite discourses. However, Crawford and Hutchinson argue that real-life security measures like airport checks, city cameras (CCTVs), and police patrols always have different effects on people. So, to really understand how security is managed, we must analyze how people feel and experience these security measures daily.[254]

The shift toward examining the mundane and embodied dimensions of security is utilized in the works of scholars such as Amoore[255] and Liu and Yuan[256], who

[250] Birsen Aybüke Evranos, "Securitization of Islam in France: Everyday Lives of French Muslims," *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences* 32, no. 2 (2023): 259.

[251] Lynn A. Staeheli and Caroline R. Nagel, "Rethinking Security: Perspectives from Arab–American and British Arab Activists," *Antipode* 40, no. 5 (2008): 780, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00637.x.

[252] Staeheli and Nagel, "Rethinking Security," 796.

[253] Staeheli and Nagel, "Rethinking Security," 780.

[254] Crawford and Hutchinson, "Mapping the Contours of 'Everyday Security,'" 1186.

[255] Louise Amoore, "Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror," *Antipode* 41, no. 1 (2009): 49–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00655.x.

illustrate how everyday practices and emotions become vital to understanding the processes of securitization. Amoore contends that data-based, probabilistic evaluations derived from the mundane patterns of everyday life can serve as a basis for processes of securitization.[257] Amoore suggests that such knowledge serves as the foundation for everyday securitization within the context of the war on terror,[258] while she also highlights how the use of algorithms plays a key role in these routine security practices.[259] Liu and Yuan, on the other hand, emphasize that the emotional dimension of fear is crucial to understanding how securitization unfolds within the everyday spaces of politics.[260]

Focus on the everyday and the experiences of marginalized people are also explored by Jonna Nyman. In her work, Jonna Nyman states that while the perspectives of powerful actors (states, leaders, large institutions) are traditionally central to the discipline of International Relations (IR), the experiences of powerless or marginalized groups are not given sufficient attention. She argues that it is ethically important to understand and make visible how less powerful groups, such as refugees, migrants, or marginalized groups, experience security in their daily lives. According to her, security is not something that only arises in extraordinary circumstances (war, terrorism, etc.). On the contrary, "insecuritization" can also be produced through ordinary and everyday practices. In other words, factors such as borders, citizenship, and the distinction between "us" and "them" are rebuilt through everyday bureaucratic or routine practices. It requires the recognizition of how the everyday is neglected and how this shapes our understanding of security. Therefore, understanding how security operates in everyday life across time and space, how people feel, experience, and reproduce it is crucial for the politics of security.[261]

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[256] Tianyang Liu and Zhenjie Yuan, "Making a Safer Space? Rethinking Space and Securitization in the Old Town Redevelopment Project of Kashgar, China," *Political Geography* 69 (March 2019): 30–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.12.001.

[257] Amoore, "Algorithmic War," 52.

[258] Amoore, "Algorithmic War," 52.

[259] Amoore, "Algorithmic War," 54.

[260] Liu and Yuan, "Making a Safer Space?" 40.

[261] Jonna Nyman, "The Everyday Life of Security: Capturing Space, Practice, and Affect," *International Political Sociology* 15, no. 3 (2021): 322, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olab005.

Along with this, borders and the perception of boundaries are also important. In today's world, a border is no longer just a line on a map. It is a system that decides who belongs and who does not, and it stretches far beyond the physical edges of a country.[262] While most studies focus on how security is managed at borders, researchers such as Loong investigate how security practices are part of everyday life inside a country. For example, in her study, she shows how Bangladeshi workers in Singapore face daily checks by police and cameras in places like Little India. The government considers these workers a problem and treats them as if they are a risk, even though they are legal workers needed for the economy. That is, security is not only about stopping people at borders. It also involves how migrants feel and live with these controls in their daily lives, even when they are "legal" workers.[263] In Singapore, temporary Bangladeshi workers are legally allowed to stay, but they are always watched by police and city cameras (CCTVs). They are seen as a threat, yet they are needed for the (capitalist) economy. But still, these workers do not simply accept this as they find small ways to move, hide, and use the system for their own goals. Nonetheless, they cannot fully escape because they live in "permanent temporariness."[264]

Studying these experiences is so important because it reveals how security really works in people's daily lives. This approach not only broadens our understanding of securitization but also underscores the ethical and political importance of paying attention to the lived experiences of marginalized communities in the production of security/(in)security. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that, as Eastmond states, narratives serve not just for expressing experiences in daily life but also function as a mechanism for negotiation. Stories provide researchers with a space to examine the meanings people attach to experiences. The narrator/storyteller, in this case, a forced migrant, does not merely state facts; rather, the truth is reconstructed through the

[262] Daniel Trilling, *Lights in the Distance: Exile and Refuge at the Borders of Europe*, 1st ed. (Verso Books, 2018), x–xi.

[263] Shona Loong, "'This Country, Law Very Strong': Securitization beyond the Border in the Everyday Lives of Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in Singapore," *Geoforum* 90 (March 2018): 11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.01.012.

[264] Loong, "'This Country, Law Very Strong,'" 18.

interplay of experience and narrative.. In this context, researchers need to question their own role in conveying lived experiences and generating "narrative data."[265]

2.7. Conclusion

Uncovering the relation between migration and security in and out of the states and society is not a new academic phenomenon. Different theoretical perspectives draw diverse links between migration and security in International Relations. The nexus between migration and security that has been drawn in International Relations literature is summarized by Bourbeau under five headings, adopting different theoretical perspectives. The first one comes from realism, which can be divided into two streams. The first stream of studies focus on "disorder produced by migration" while second stream of studies consider migration only if it risks triggering international crises and war. Neoliberalism forms a connection between migration and security through state responses to external threats, which are subsequently followed by policies. Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes ideational factors in constructing external threats, in this case this is transnational migration.[266] The fourth strand of thought is securitization theory, which instrumentalized the speech acts to analyze security, which is widely associated with the Copenhagen School.[267]

The last line of studies followed Michel Foucault's and Pierre Bourdieu's thoughts, focusing on the "governmentality of unease" rather than on security as a matter of survival, which is commonly referred to as the Paris School.[268] Exceptionality becomes routinized and banal through "governmentality of unease."[269] In this line of studies, security is mainly understood as a management practice through which involved agents try to enhance their role as security and protection providers. Agents

[265] Eastmond, "Stories as Lived Experience," 248.

[266] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 36–38.

[267] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 39.

[268] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 38.

[269] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 47.

do this through handling people's anxieties or fear and, if it does not exist, even by creating them.[270]

Within the Paris School framework, the securitization of migration is the result of the practices and processes of many different actors, and Huysmans argues that its effects are structural. Securitization does not originate only from political elites or a single source, nor does it rely on processes such as audience persuasion. However, this does not mean that this field is free from power struggles. Instead, actors engage in power relations through their practices framed by their capital and habitus.[271] In this process, technocracy is significant due to its webs of relations and technocratic knowledge.[272] Even, inspired from Alexander Wendt's famous dictum "security is what the professionals of unease management make of it."[273]

[270] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 66.

[271] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 69.

[272] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, 121.

[273] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 85.

CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS OF SYRIANS' RECEPTION TO TURKEY

3.1. Introduction

Responses of states to mass refugee flows differ according to many factors, such as domestic and foreign policy considerations and regional and global systemic dynamics. While some refugee groups are welcomed in specific time periods, some "undesired" others are excluded and kept outside the borders of that state. Yet, this tendency may change in other time periods. Migrations were an important part both for the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. The Ottoman Empire's establishment and collapse were accompanied by migrations,[274] and modern Turkey was established as a nation-state through migrations.[275] In other words, migrations were an important phenomena in transforming the geography that the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic once encompassed.[276] The Ottoman Empire, for the most part of its long history, implemented a lenient approach towards immigration, primarily driven by the ethno-religious composition of the population and the overarching territorial principles of empires.[277] Additionally, economic considerations influenced this policy.[278] Amidst the decline of the Ottoman Empire, a

[274] Kemal H. Karpat, "Önsöz," in *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler*, ed. M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2015), xxvi.

[275] Karpat, "Önsöz," xxxix.

[276] Ayhan Kaya and M. Murat Erdoğan, "Giriş," in *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler*, ed. M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2015), 3.

[277] Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 50.

[278] Başak Kale, "Transforming an Empire: The Ottoman Empire's Immigration and Settlement Policies in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 2 (2014): 252, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.870894; Başak Kale, "Zorunlu Göçün 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerindeki Etkileri," in *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler*, ed. M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2015), 157; 159.

new approach emerged, which aimed to halt the disintegration and maintain the unity of the Ottoman state.[279] The Republic of Turkey adopted a restrictive stance towards migration and formalized this through the implementation of the 1934 Settlement Law.[280] Within the context of "us" and "other," "us" referred to individuals of Turkish descent and culture (yet, in practice it was interpreted mainly as Sunni-Hanafi Muslims).[281] The categorization of the "other" in migration policies was established based on the concept of temporariness. The admission of Syrians to the country differs from Turkey's past practices in this regard but it is similar in that it is temporary, at least as envisaged.

3.2. Neoliberal Globalization and Turkish Immigration Regime

Turkey's socio-economic structure plays a critical role in shaping the country's reception and (non)management of displaced Syrians. These dynamics cannot be fully grasped without situating them within the broader context of neoliberal globalization. The reason is that it has increasingly influenced the design and implementation of migration governance in Turkey. Whereas the global context is important in determining the direction and type of migrations, the domestic context and states' position in the global order are essential in the reception and response conditions of the arrivals as well as living conditions and the inclusionary or exclusionary tendencies of host states. From this point of view, this section of the chapter will briefly summarize the transformation of Turkey's domestic scene under neoliberal globalization and Turkey's integration into the global neoliberal economic order, mainly because global division of labor has changed with neoliberal globalization. This also affected the characteristics of the migration towards Turkey starting from the 1980s to the 2000s. As it will be discussed below, while Turkey's

[279] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Sultan's Advisers and the Integration of Arabs and Immigrants," in *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (Oxford University Press, 2001), 185.

[280] *The Law on Settlement* (*İskan Kanunu*), Law No. 2510, Official Gazette No. 2733 (June 25, 1934), art. 2.

[281] Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (2000): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200008701316; Kemal Kirişçi, "Migration and Turkey: the dynamics of state, society and politics," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4:178.

market-oriented economy got integrated deeply into the global economy, migratory patterns and migrants' characteristics have transformed. This also has repercussions regarding Turkey's reception of displaced Syrians and their living conditions and experiences. This part of the chapter will briefly explain how Turkey engaged with the neoliberal global economy and put Turkey's migration history within the context of this neoliberal transformation of Turkey's socio-economic scene. This section traces how neoliberal restructuring has influenced the evolution of Turkey's migration regime and its current modes of managing displacement.

The economic system and international political orientation known as "embedded liberalism," which began to be implemented in the post-World War II period, started to be shaken by the end of the 1960s. In the 1970s, unemployment, inflation, and fiscal crises hit countries hard, and capital accumulation turned into a serious crisis. This brought the end of Keynesian policies, which were replaced by neoliberal ones and increasingly promoted through the "Washington Consensus" in the 1990s.[282] Neoliberalism restructured the economic and financial organization of states through a series of measures, such as "…privatization, reorganization of the financial system in ways more consistent with foreign interests, the opening of internal markets to foreign capital, lowering tariff barriers, and the construction of more flexible labor markets."[283] All this has been characterized as the state's retreat from welfare programs, privatization, and deregulation.[284] What is expected from the states in neoliberalism is to ensure the effective operation of the markets.[285] However, this does not mean that states are no longer needed. On the contrary, in neoliberalism, the engagements of states is deeply needed for the endurance of market forces. Therefore, the connection between the state and the capital is likely to remain.[286]

[282] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 9–13.

[283] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 99–100.

[284] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 3.

[285] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 2.

[286] Danièle Bélanger and Cenk Saraçoğlu, "The Governance of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The State-Capital Nexus and Its Discontents," *Mediterranean Politics* 25, no. 4 (2020): 413, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1549785; Wendy Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics*, by Wendy Brown (Princeton University Press, 2005), 41.

One of the important reasons why neoliberalism triumphed and found a way to spread geographically was the capital accumulation crisis of the 1970s, which found its place in the everyday life of ordinary people through rocketed inflation and high rates of unemployment.[287] However, in practice, neoliberal policies did not help to restore capital accumulation on a global scale but restored, and in some cases, even created "the power of an economic elite."[288] The proponents of neoliberal globalization believed that it would accelerate economic development and reduce poverty so that developing and developed countries would converge in terms of development. Today, however, we are witnessing that this has not happened. On the contrary, global inequality has widened.[289] According to Yükseker, neoliberal globalization provides opportunities for certain groups to accumulate capital by accessing new markets. However, it also results in the dispossession and social exclusion of other already disadvantaged groups.[290] In fact, neoliberalism served as a political project directed to deepen and systematize the domination of capital over political and social relations.[291] In this sense, it is compatible with the argument that as a state apparatus the neoliberal state's main aim is to create a favorable environment for accumulation of capital in favor of domestic and international capital.[292] Regarding this aspect, neoliberal policies serve the interests not of ordinary people but of "…private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital."[293] The neoliberal restructuring of economies resulted in subcontracting, temporary work and casualization in employment,

[287] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 14.

[288] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 19.

[289] Stephen Castles et al., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 253–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26846-7.

[290] Deniz Yükseker, "Neoliberal Restructuring and Social Exclusion in Turkey," in *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era*, 1st ed., ed. Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (Routledge, 2009), 262.

[291] Merih Angın and Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "AKP Döneminde Türkiye'de Büyük Ölçekli Özelleştirmeler ve Devletin Dönüşümü," *Praksis* 30–31 (2013): 75; Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," 39–40.

[292] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 7.

[293] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 7.

increase of migrant women workers in labor force, expansion of informal economy, and precarity.[294]

In the case of Turkey, the process of neoliberalization started in 1980 with the neoliberal programme known as the 24th January Decisions, which was a set of economic reforms including provisions such as devaluation, abolition of price controls, and restructuring and downsizing of state-owned enterprises.[295] In addition to this, it also aimed at market liberalization and the empowerment of capital (both national and international) over labor through structural adjustment policies.[296] What was aimed by the structural adjustment policies was the transformation of import-substitution industrialization model into an export-oriented one.[297] However, it was impossible in the face of strong opposition to such a neoliberal transition. A conducive environment for implementing that kind of "anti-labor" programme was ensured by the military rule, which lasted until 1983.[298] The military rule paved the way for Turkey to liberalize its financial markets and integrate into global neoliberalism as opposition could not raise its voice under military rule, and the implementation of market-oriented policies was eased.[299] Furthermore, the leaders of the military coup utilized Islamic values and institutions as a means of legitimization.[300] Rising identity-based movements filled the void left by the Marxist left and accelerated the decline of class-based movements. Consequently, the working class started to become divided along cultural lines.[301]

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[294] Castles et al., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 256–60.

[295] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2005*, 10th ed. (İmge Kitabevi, 2006), 147.

[296] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 148.

[297] Gülay Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," in *Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge of Europe*, 1st ed., ed. Erik Berggren et al. (Shaker Publishing, 2007), 191.

[298] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 148.

[299] Maral Erol et al., "The Making of Neoliberal Turkey: An Introduction," in *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey*, ed. Cenk Özbay et al. (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2016), 5.

[300] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 1 (1997): 67.

[301] Mustafa Kemal Coşkun, *Sınıf Kültür ve Bilinç: Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı Kültürü, Sınıf Bilinci ve Gündelik Hayat* (2013), 201–2.

Another factor necessary to understand neoliberalism in Turkey is the transformation of Turkish social structure. In this regard, it needs to be mentioned that urbanization that started years ago resulted in the urban population exceeding rural population in the beginning of the 1980s.[302] The developments in the 1980s served as the "building blocks of neoliberalization" in Turkey,[303] if not the complete transformation. In this era, while class-based politics were coming to an end, the labor force lost its position against the economic elite, with the exception of the period between 1989-1993.[304] In return, layoffs, deunionization, subcontracting and privatization increased step by step whereas the informalization of labor market gained structural persistence.[305] In the new era, major capital holders avoided investing in industry. Instead, they either leaned towards lending, because of high interest rates, or towards investing in sectors such as construction and tourism.[306] As a result, the Turkish economy was shaped in this way, necessitating mainly low-skilled employment and labor-intensive production. In the new accumulation regime envisioned by the neoliberal transformation, particularly in the Turkish context, producers in low value-added sectors, led by the textile industry, have been integrated into international markets as subcontractors. This has contributed to the spread of flexible production and resulted in the erosion of organized labor.[307] In this context, the increasing number of small enterprises has been able to evade inspections more easily, allowing them to disregard workers' rights.[308]

With the increase in informal employment, the labor force without rights became increasingly precarious. In short, with the neoliberal transformation, capital-labor

[302] Erol et al., "The Making of Neoliberal Turkey: An Introduction," 5.

[303] Erol et al., "The Making of Neoliberal Turkey: An Introduction," 6.

[304] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 176–77.

[305] Taner Akpınar, "Türkiye'ye Yönelik Kaçak İşgücü Göçü," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 65, no. 3 (2010): 6–7, https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000002171.

[306] Faruk Ataay, "Türkiye Kapitalizminin Mekansal Dönüşümü," *Praksis* 2, no. Spring (2001): 67–68; Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 191.

[307] Ahmet Bekmen, "State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era," in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça et al. (Pluto Press, 2014), 53.

[308] Coşkun, *Sınıf Kültür ve Bilinç: Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı Kültürü, Sınıf Bilinci ve Gündelik Hayat*, 221.

relations and the structure of the labor market transformed. This produced conditions conducive for irregular migrant workers to come to Turkey. It should be noted here that the increase in informalization has created a demand for irregular migrant workers in the Turkish labor market. Akpınar draws a connection between the rise of informality and the increasing numbers of irregular migrant workers coming to Turkey rather than the opportunities offered by the Turkish labor market. This is due to the fact that structural adjustment policies did not create enough growth in employment prospects, and many other studies even showed that privatizations led to increasing unemployment. In this sense, starting from the late 1980s, the rise of the informal sector became a pull factor for irregular migrant workers to come to Turkey to take part in the informal economy as a "reserve army of labor" to lower labor costs in the period between 1989-1993, when wages of native workers increased.[309] Namely, it is the rise of informality that paved the way for the inclusion of irregular migrant workers into the Turkish informal economy.

Apart from that, the Turkish visa regime, which is "flexible,"[310] is vital as it caused the informal employment of foreign migrants to increase. This is also in line with Castles et al.'s[311] argument that states either employ migrant workers legally or turn a blind eye to the employment of irregular migrants with silent approval or employing these two strategies together. Though Castles et al. based their argument on advanced capitalist countries, considering Turkey's silent approval of irregular migrant workers in the informal economy, the argument is partly valid for Turkey as well. Although it is punishable to employ foreigners without proper registration, this does not deter employers from employing foreigners without the necessary permits since scrutiny is not effective in Turkey.[312]

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[309] Akpınar, "Türkiye'ye Yönelik Kaçak İşgücü Göçü," 5–8.

[310] Gülay Toksöz et al., *Irregular Labour Migration in Turkey and Situation of Migrant Workers in the Labour Market* (International Organization of Migration, 2012), 21; Akpınar, "Türkiye'ye Yönelik Kaçak İşgücü Göçü," 7; Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 196.

[311] Castles et al., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 241.

[312] Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 197.

Turkey's domestic transformation and the developments in the near neighborhood of Turkey and at the global level resulted in new migratory patterns as a challenge and changes in Turkey's reception conditions towards different migrant groups. In many studies, different types of migrants since the 1980s are grouped under four main headings: transit migrants, irregular labor migrants, refugees (under the definition of the 1951 Convention) and asylum seekers, and regular migrants who enter Turkey with valid documents and do not breach the rules to stay in the country.[313] In the 1990s, migrations to Turkey were diversified as migrants with varying aims, occupational skills, ethnicity, country of origin, and gender came to Turkey.[314] Erder and Kaşka specify groups of incoming people as follows: Eastern European countries became a source of circular migration by shuttle trade, and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sub-Saharan African countries became a source of asylum seekers and transit migrants.[315] However, most of the time, they were stuck in Turkey.

The increase in the informal labor market in Turkey has led to a dramatic increase in temporary and circular migration with the aim of informal trade,[316] exacerbated by regional and global developments. Turkish capital's search for lowering wages could easily be met following the dissolution of the Soviet Union as people in search of work, trade, and income headed to Turkey from the ex-Soviet and Eastern European countries.[317] In addition to that, the idea of a "Fortress Europe" became increasingly widespread, in Europe and the borders became more and more difficult to cross,

[313] Examples include: Ahmet İçduygu and E. Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey," *Global Governance* 6, no. 3 (2000): 383–98; Ahmet İçduygu, "The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows in Turkey," *International Social Science Journal* 52, no. 165 (2000): 357–67, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00265; Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B. Aksel, *Irregular Migration in Turkey*, IOM Migration Research Series (IOM, 2012), https://doi.org/10.18356/113240e5-en.

[314] Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," in *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar (Hamburg University Press, 2012), 123.

[315] Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 116.

[316] Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 127.

[317] Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 127.

which caused the migrants who were aiming for Europe to be stuck in Turkey. As a result, their temporariness turned into de facto permanent settlement in the country.

As mentioned before, Turkey's visa system was also suitable for these kinds of migration flows. Accordingly, suitcase traders could conduct their business in a semi-regular way since they entered Turkey legally with visas though their baggage often exceeded legal limits.[318] Turkey's liberal visa regime is important in the sense that it made the Turkish case unique, allowing "suitcase trade" to flourish between Turkey and its source countries.[319] Yet, in contrast to the relatively liberal visa policy, it is highly restrictive concerning long-term stays and work permits for foreigners.[320] Regarding migrants with economic incentives, neoliberal globalization did not result in enhanced transparency or inclusivity, or it did not improve gender standards. On the contrary, it caused vulnerability, fluctuations in the economy, and "violence of uncertainty" on the part of the migrants and make them constantly shift between regularity and irregularity.[321]

At this point, it would be useful to analyze where Turkey stands in the global division of labor under globalization. Since the 1970s, some sectoral activities such as manufacturing, which can be run mainly by low-skilled, low-paid labor, outsourced from the Western countries to developing countries. Nevertheless, jobs that required higher payment remained in industrial countries for the time being.[322] Various manufacturing activities shifted from developed Western countries to developing countries where labor is cheap and taxes are low. Namely, production

[318] Mine Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," in *Social Transformation and Migration: National and Local Experiences in South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia*, ed. Stephen Castles et al., Migration, Diasporas, and Citizenship (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 136.

[319] Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 128.

[320] Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 118.

[321] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 133.

[322] Castles et al., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 241.

activities were outsourced to these countries in accordance with the "new international division of labor."[323] Large enterprises also outsourced the labor-intensive production processes to small and medium size enterprises to be able to remain globally competitive.[324] Even in developing countries, labor-intensive production took place either in small or medium-sized companies or through the informal employment of home-based workers. Flexibility in production helped to decrease the cost of production even more for large-scale employers through informal employment.[325]

Domestic workers caring for children and the elderly or performing household chores, construction, services, manufacturing and textiles-garment sector, informal trade, agriculture, and sex work constitute the main sectors where immigrant workers are employed in the informal economy.[326] Danış discusses in her study that the garment sector, which is labor-intensive and necessitates relatively low capital, requires low-paid, low-skilled, and flexible labor to adapt to heavy working conditions due to intense global competition. It is mainly the urban poor and migrants (internal and foreign) who work under these conditions. It should also be noted that migrant workers without legal work permits encounter even greater precarity and vulnerability to exploitation.[327] When we consider the extent to which the informal economy/labor in Turkey has reached due to neoliberalization,[328] it is not surprising that those willing to work in such informal sectors are mostly migrants

[323] Didem Danış, "Konfeksiyon Sektöründe Küresel Bağlantılar: Göçmen İşçiler, Sendikalar ve Küresel Çalışma Örgütleri (Global Dealings in Apparel Manufacturing: Migrant Workers, Trade Unions And Global Labor Initiatives)," *Alternatif Politika* 8, no. 3 (2016): 566.

[324] Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 192.

[325] Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 183.

[326] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 136; Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 125.

[327] Danış, "Konfeksiyon Sektöründe Küresel Bağlantılar: Göçmen İşçiler, Sendikalar ve Küresel Çalışma Örgütleri (Global Dealings in Apparel Manufacturing: Migrant Workers, Trade Unions And Global Labor Initiatives)," 564–65.

[328] For example, in 2004, the share of informal employment in total employment was about 53 percent (Toksöz 2007: 192)

and the urban poor's more vulnerable groups, such as children and women living in precarious conditions. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, in these sectors, harsh working conditions are coupled with low wages.[329] One must also take into account that there is no unionization due to the inherent informality of these sectors.

It should be noted that informality is also existent in specific sectors for Turkish workers.[330] This means that both Turkish and foreign workers may compete for these informal jobs. There are mainly two ways in which irregular migrants are incorporated into the informal economy. They can either be employed in jobs that host community members are unwilling to take thereby making a net positive contribution to the economy.[331] As Castles, de Haas and Miller note, immigrant labor increases the effectiveness of the labor market by filling 3D jobs (dirty, difficult/demeaning, dangerous) or low-paid, low-skilled, and seasonal jobs that members of the host community are reluctant to take,[332] or immigrants may compete for jobs that natives or migrants with work permits already seek.[333] This creates a divergence between the interests of big business owners and those of workers. On the contrary, business owners tend to favor an increased supply of migrant workers (without the protective shield of social security scheme) in the overall workforce, while domestic workers oppose this, since they would then have to compete for jobs under worse conditions.

Turkey's transformation since the 1980s has resulted in a total paradigm shift from the earlier era, accompanied by individualization and the erosion of strong familial

[329] Danış, "Konfeksiyon Sektöründe Küresel Bağlantılar: Göçmen İşçiler, Sendikalar ve Küresel Çalışma Örgütleri (Global Dealings in Apparel Manufacturing: Migrant Workers, Trade Unions And Global Labor Initiatives)," 567.

[330] Ahmet İçduygu, *The Labour Dimensions of Irregular Migration in Turkey.*, CARIM Research Reports, Research Reports 2006/05 (European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2006), 13; Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 125.

[331] Reyhan Atasü Topçuoğlu, "Düzensiz Göç: Küreselleşmede Kısıtlanan İnsan Hareketliliği," in *Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar* (İletişim, 2012), 508; Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 125.

[332] Castles et al., The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 241, citing Rainer Münz et al., 2007, 7.

[333] Atasü Topçuoğlu, "Düzensiz Göç: Küreselleşmede Kısıtlanan İnsan Hareketliliği," 508; Erder and Kaşka, "Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity," 125.

ties that had played a role in alleviating poverty and an increase in aging population. This has increased the demand for informal domestic workers along with increasing poverty in the country,[334] since a strong need for the care of children and elderly people appeared. The immigrants filled this gap while the informal labor market offered only "precarious and uncertain" conditions for them.[335]

This social transformation occurred in parallel with liberalization steps in the economic and financial spheres. In the post-1980 period, both the weakening of social welfare networks and the impact of neoliberal economic policies deepened vulnerabilities both in the labor market and in everyday life. For example, capital movements were liberalized in 1989. The realization of the Customs Union in 1995 with the EU was another step in the liberalization of foreign trade.[336] However, liberalization of capital movements also led to an uncontrolled growth of external debt.[337] While the global economy was increasingly dependent on financial activities, excessive debt became unmanageable, borrowing ratios of public sector rose steadily, and high inflation marked the 1990s in Turkey. These led to two devastating financial crises: 1994 and 2000/2001. It can even be argued that the last crisis played a significant role in the AKP's coming to power alone in the 2002 elections.[338] Through a series of economic crises and subsequent agreements with the IMF, the management of the Turkish economy was increasingly subject to the influence of external economic actors like the IMF and the World Bank.[339] In addition to that, Turkey's candidacy for the European Union has initiated the process of harmonizing Turkish legislation with the EU *acquis*.[340] Şenses puts forth that these processes have

[334] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 137.

[335] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 147.

[336] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 172.

[337] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 185.

[338] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 139.

[339] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Yarihi*, 172–73.

[340] For a brief information of Turkey-EU relations, see: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for EU Affairs, "History of Turkey-EU Relations," August 9, 2024, https://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html.

undermined the capacity to formulate economic policy at the domestic level.[341] Consequently, Turkey increasingly integrated into global markets, experiencing significant negative repercussions as a result of international financial institutions' prescriptions.

With the AKP coming to power in 2002 and the rigorous implementation of the IMF programme, neoliberalism deepened further in Turkey. Eder examines the detrimental consequences of Turkey's neoliberal transformation across three distinct dimensions. Firstly, rural poverty increased while employment in agriculture decreased mainly because of liberalization in the agricultural sector. As a result, subsidies for agricultural products were reduced, while large agricultural firms entered the agricultural sector.[342] Secondly, strong "commodification of land" in the urban space reduced opportunities for upward mobility through unofficial housing. The last one is the social welfare system, which is increasingly privatized.[343] In such an environment in Turkey, migrants in the informal economy became part of other poor groups. In such a setting, people became "dispossessed"of their earlier rights, and this facilitated the markets to spread further. Dispossession of rights included the rights that people had gained within the process of capitalist expansion, such as labor unions and social protection systems.[344]

In this context, the admission of Syrians to Turkey after 2011 can be considered a part of Turkey's neoliberal restructuring process. As previously noted, the retreat of the state from welfare provision, the flexibilization of labor markets, and the growth of informal employment during this period collectively contributed to a rising demand for cheap and precarious labor across various sectors. In this context, displaced Syrians were mostly employed in low-paid and precarious jobs and thereby played an important role in the labor market shaped by neoliberal economic policies.

[341] Fikret Şenses, "Turkey's Experience with Neoliberal Policies since 1980 in Retrospect and Prospect," in *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey*, 1st ed., ed. Cenk Özbay et al. (Routledge, 2016), 17.

[342] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 139.

[343] Eder, "Turkey's Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers," 140.

[344] Yükseker, "Neoliberal Restructuring and Social Exclusion in Turkey," 263.

As a result, the arrival of Syrians has coincided with the socioeconomic structures shaped by neoliberal transformation, leading to an increase in informal, precarious employment.[345] This is also supported by the discourses mentioned below.

Syrians who came to Turkey in 2011 and were later allowed to leave the tent cities joined the growing urban and rural poor populations. In statements made mostly by AKP officials, it is emphasized that the participation of Syrians in the unregistered labor force is vital. They work in all sectors in significant numbers. For example, at the time, Deputy Chairman and Head of Local Governments, Mehmet Özhaseki, said:

> They keep the industry alive in some cities. If you go to Gaziantep industry, hundreds of thousands of people work in the heaviest and most difficult jobs. It is the same in Kayseri industry. They cannot find workers, these people are working.[346]

Accordingly, former AKP Deputy Chairman Prof. Dr. Yasin Aktay said, "Employers, investors and industrialists are very happy with Syrians. If you withdraw Syrians in some very important places, the economy of this country will collapse."[347] Mehmet Güzgülü, Deputy Mayor of Manisa Metropolitan Municipality in 2017, said:

> We have very few people coming from the bottom, and that is why those who come to Turkey from outside, namely from Syria, the shoemaking sector was very strong in Syria, especially around Aleppo. Some of them work in Istanbul and Izmir. I know that about ten thousand Syrians are working in the shoe industry in Istanbul. I don't know the exact number in Izmir, but I heard that it is between three thousand and five thousand. So, it is a very big number. Now, if it were not for them, I would like to say what a shoemaker in Gaziantep said in the infrastructure of the shoe

[345] As a detailed study of this issue, please see: Danièle Bélanger and Cenk Saraçoğlu, "Processes of Wage Theft: The Neoliberal Labor Market and Syrian Refugees in Turkey," in *Refugees on the Move: Crisis and Response in Turkey and Europe*, 1st ed., ed. Erol Balkan and Zümray Kutlu Tonak (Berghahn Books, 2022), https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800733848.

[346] Orhan Bursalı, "'Suriyeliler Giderse Ekonomi Çöker': Köle Emeği Sömürüsü," *Cumhuriyet,* July 29, 2021, accessed April 1, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20210729050616/https:/www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan-bursali/suriyeliler-giderse-ekonomi-coker-kole-emegi-somurusu-1856152.

[347] " *Sözcü,* "AKP'li Aktay: Suriyeliler Giderse Bu Ülkenin Ekonomisi Çöker," July 26, 2021, accessed April 4, 2024, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/akpli-aktay-suriyeliler-giderse-bu-ulkenin-ekonomisi-coker-wp6558430.

> industry, 'All our personnel working in our infrastructure are Syrian. If the Syrians leave today, we will have to close our shoe industry.[348]

Employment of foreign migrants in agriculture and in rural areas is also important to mention. It is discussed above that informal employment is widespread in the Turkish economy both for domestic and migrant workers, who compete for jobs, often for lower wages and longer hours. However, there is an exception in the agriculture sector: Syrians under temporary protection can work there even without work permits. According to "Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection" Article 5 (4),

> Foreigners under temporary protection who will work in seasonal agriculture or livestock farming are covered by work permit exemption. Applications for work permit exemption shall be made to the governorship of the province where temporary protection is granted. These applications shall be notified to the Ministry by the relevant governorship.[349]

To summarize what has been said so far, with neoliberal globalization and migration to Turkey, types of migrants and reception conditions have diversified. In other words, Turkey's articulation with the global economy, which started in the 1980s, has had a vital impact on Turkey's migration history.

This process has also affected the processes and reception conditions of Syrians after they were admitted to Turkey and began leaving the camps in 2014. While a large number of Syrians started to live in cities as urban poor, they are "sharpening the race to the bottom,"[350] and some of them also take part in the agricultural sector, which was facilitated by legal regulations. Turkey's acceptance of Syrians was closely linked to its regional relations. The next subsection will deal with this issue.

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[348] " *Milliyet*, Ayakkabı Sektörünü Suriyeliler Ayakta Tutuyor," February 2, 2017, accessed April 1, 2024, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/manisa/ayakkabi-sektorunu-suriyeliler-ayakta-tutuyor-11817097.

[349] " Council of Ministers Decision, Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection." January 11, 2016, No. 2016/8375, *Official Gazette* (January 15, 2016).

[350] In the original usage of Toksöz, it implied domestic workers vs irregular foreign workers. Syrians were added to this "race" later. Toksöz, "Informal Labour Markets and the Need for Migrant Workers: The Case of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective," 197.

3.3. Evolving Turkey-Syria Relations, Regional Politics and the Syrian Crisis

Turkey-Syria relations were never easy, the relations between the two countries were highly security-oriented and marked by many conflicts from the water problem to Syria's support for PKK. However, before the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the relations were generally positive. Relations deteriorated rapidly after the spread of the Arab Spring to Syria. As stated, the relationships between Turkey and Syria have experienced ups and downs throughout the history of both states since World War I. While Turkey took its place in the international system as a sovereign state following the War of Independence, Syria would have to wait much longer. Both countries emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, sharing similar histories and cultures among border communities. People in these regions shared closer relations, which is also supported by the collected interview data regarding Aleppo and Gaziantep. During the interviews, the participants stressed the shared history, kinship relations, and cultural ties between Gaziantep and Aleppo from the Ottoman Empire to the present. Yet this did not result in friendly relations between Turkey and Syria. The border demarcation following World War I contributed to mutual suspicion, driven largely by the ideological tensions between Arab and Turkish nationalism,[351] exacerbated by disagreements over many issues throughout the republican history of Turkey.

The contention between the two countries regarding Hatay province is one of the earliest disputes. The Sanjak of Alexandretta (the name of the province at that time), with its diverse ethnic composition, was part of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. While Syria, under French mandate, claimed the province as part of its territory, a local referendum (plebiscite) in 1939 the Sanjak of Alexandretta resulted in its unification with Turkey. However, Syria perceived the annexation as illegitimate and never officially recognized it. Thus, the Hatay dispute remained a significant factor straining bilateral relations well into the 20th century.[352]

[351] Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, "Conclusion," in *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*," ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Routledge, 2016), 205.

[352] Sarah D. Shields, *Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 234–40.

During the Cold War era, Turkey and Syria were aligned with the opposing blocs of East-West rivalry. While Turkey allied with the US-led Western bloc and joined NATO in 1952, Syria aligned with the Soviet Union, especially from the late 1950s onward. Nevertheless, the ideological rivalry between their blocs did not play as significant role in the deterioration of their relations as the Kurdish issue.[353]

Turkey gained control over the Euphrates River through the construction of the Keban, Karakaya, and Atatürk dams under the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). Given that the Euphrates also flows through Syria and Iraq, this led to water-sharing disputes at the international level. Syria demanded a fixed and binding water-sharing agreement, but Turkey limited itself to providing only temporary assurances. With the advantage of its upstream location, Turkey was in a superior position in this dispute. On the other hand, Syria used the PKK issue to put pressure on Turkey, linking the water issue with the PKK problem. While this situation strained bilateral relations, it also paved the way for Turkey to adopt a more conciliatory stance on the water issue.[354]

The key point of the tension regarding the PKK was that its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, took refuge in Syria while directing terrorist activities against Turkey.[355] One of the steps Turkey took in this regard was to align with Israel against Syria.[356] However, this strategy failed to significantly alter Syria's policy towards the PKK. Turkey finally mobilized troops on the Syrian border, and in response to this military threat, Syria expelled Öcalan,[357] which culminated in the signing of the Adana Accord in 1998. Alongside Turkey's pressure, Hafez al-Assad's internal goal of securing his

[353] Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (Pinter Publishers, 1991); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (Routledge, 2012).

[354] Hinnebusch and Tür, "Conclusion," 206.

[355] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Introduction: The Study of Turkey-Syria Relations," in *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Routledge, 2016), 2.

[356] Jonathan Ghariani, "Turkish-Israeli Relations: 'The Golden Years,' 1991–2000," *Israel Affairs* 30, no. 1 (2024): 5–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2023.2295602.

[357] Yasemin Akbaba and Özgür Özdamar, "Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy: Turkish-Syrian Relations since the 1980s," in *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Routledge, 2016), 129.

son Bashar al-Assad's succession also played a role in the Syrian government's decision to sign the Accord.[358] Nevertheless, the Accord ushered in a new era of normalized relations, facilitated by various dynamics.

Regarding relations with Israel, the pragmatic relationship between Turkey and Israel was short-lived and soon deteriorated when Israel and the US sought deeper ties with Iraq's Kurds, following the US-led invasion of Iraq.[359] Additionally, the Palestinian issue remained a significant factor in the deterioration of Turkey–Israel relations in the long run.

The 2000s marked a turning point in bilateral relations, initiating a gradual process of normalization. A few symbolic events demonstrated the determination of both sides to pursue reconciliation, which aimed to lead both sides toward amity. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attendance at the funeral of Hafez al-Assad was a significant step in consolidating the normalization of relations. Additionally, President Sezer's visit to Damascus, despite pressure from the US and France on Turkey to isolate Syria, marked another pivotal moment.[360]

Addressing the issue of Abdullah Öcalan's refuge in Syria represented just one dimension of the new era in relations between the two countries. Realpolitik and internal factors also played a significant role in shaping the trajectory of the new relationship. For instance, the US invasion of Iraq pushed both countries to cooperate in opposing the partition of Iraq and the potential Kurdish threat to their territorial integrity.[361] Turkey's refusal to grant the US acces to its airspace to invade Iraq positively influenced the Syrian public opinion on Turkey.[362]

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[358] Sezgin Yüksel, "The October 1998 Crisis in Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Prospect Theory Approach," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (2002): 58.

[359] Hinnebusch and Tür, "Conclusion," 208.

[360] Hinnebusch, "Introduction: The Study of Turkey-Syria Relations," 2.

[361] Akbaba and Özdamar, "Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy: Turkish-Syrian Relations since the 1980s," 129.

[362] Hinnebusch and Tür, "Conclusion," 222.

Ideological shifts in Turkey's foreign policy and diplomacy, particularly after the 1980s, played a significant role in shaping its bilateral relations. While Kemalist foreign policy sought to maintain distance from Arab-populated countries, the "neo-Ottoman" identity that underlined under the leadership of Turgut Özal and was further strengthened during the AKP era, aimed to foster greater engagement with the former Ottoman territories.[363] The AKP government also sought to leverage its neo-Ottoman policies as a means to address domestic political challenges, to gain legitimacy, and to expand its ideological base.

AKP had its roots in the National Outlook movement, representing political Islam in Turkey. However, AKP had significant differences with the former National Outlook parties and emphasized these differences at every opportunity to establish its legitimacy.[364] AKP embraced the neoliberal paradigm and sought to gain the support of the US and EU as a safeguard against potential Kemalist threats, particularly from the military. This can be considered a strategic move by the AKP, especially during a period of strong military oversight in political affairs. The ongoing EU negotiations helped AKP to secure international support, as it successfully presented itself as a pioneer of democracy. These changes and narratives do not prove AKP's break with its roots, but the party evolved to the point that it could collaborate with the West.[365]

However, this can be interpreted more as a tactical alignment, rather than an ideological rupture. This image formed the substantial core of the AKP model, demonstrating that moderate Islam could accommodate democratic principles and align with the neoliberal economic policies of the West.

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[363] Edward Wastnidge, "Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-Assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics," *Middle East Critique* 28, no. 1 (2019): 13, https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1549232; Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Back to Enmity : Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Uprising, '" *Orient, Journal of German Orient Institute* 56, no. 1 (2015): 14. ; Meliha Benli Altunışık, *Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: The AKP Model*, CMI Brief no. 2019: 08 (Michelsen Institute, 2019), 3, https://www.cmi.no/publications/6973-turkeyshumanitarian-diplomacy-the-akp-model.

[364] Ahmet Çiğdem, "İslamcılık ve Türkiye Üzerine Bazı Notlar," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 6: İslâmcılık*, 2nd ed., ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İletişim, 2005), 6:27–28.

[365] Sungur Savran, "İslamcılık, AKP Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı," in *Neoliberalizm, İslamcı Sermayenin Yükselişi ve AKP*, ed. Ahmet Öncü et al. (Yordam Kitap, 2013), 131.

The newly emerging image of the AKP had also benefited from the ongoing EU negotiations that helped democratize Turkey and affected the party's public image positively.[366] The democratizing effect of the EU process is not limited to the Turkish case, it is observed in all candidate countries.[367] Thus, Western support for the AKP model in Middle Eastern countries, along with democratization and neoliberal reforms that were supported by Islamism, helped AKP to become stronger and also shaped its foreign policy, which aligned with Ahmet Davutoğlu's "zero-problems with neighbors" policy. He claimed that the historical and cultural inheritance of the Ottoman era imposed Turkey a sense of responsibility towards the former Ottoman territories.[368] Under this neo-Ottoman approach, AKP sought to establish deeper relations with the Sunni-Muslim majority countries, projecting an image of promoting moderate Islam.[369]

A similar dynamic occurred in Turkey-Syria relations as well. Following the Adana Agreement, both countries began collaborating on various fields, such as the economy and security. This process was mutually beneficial: while it helped Turkey to expand its influence in the Arab and Gulf regions through Syria, Turkey served as a channel for Syria to engage with the West.[370] Building on these positive developments, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria signed an agreement allowing visa-free travel between these countries, which also aimed at enhancing economic

[366] Selcen Öner, "Internal Factors in the EU's Transformative Power over Turkey: The Role of Turkish Civil Society," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 14, no. 1 (2014): 38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.882089.

[367] Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg, "Introduction: The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe," in *Beyond NGO-Ization: The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg, Mobilization Series on Social Movements, Protest, and Culture (Routledge, 2016), 21–24, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315569246.

[368] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey as an 'Emerging Donor' and the Arab Uprisings," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no. 3 (2014): 336, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2014.959761.

[369] Sertif Demir and Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey's Politic-Military, Social and Economic Security," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 13, no. 26 (2020): 4–5.

[370] Samir al-Taqi and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "As Seen From Damascus: The Transformation in Syrian-Turkish Relations," in *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Routledge, 2016), 108–9.

cooperation.[371] At the same time, under its new foreign policy vision, Turkey assumed the role of a regional power in conflicts during the AKP era. One of the most important of them was Turkey's efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel over the conflict on Golan Heights in 2008.[372] However, these mutual benefits proved insufficient to prevent Turkey and Syria from entering a new period of strained relations with the rise of the Arab Spring in December 2010.

The Arab Spring revealed the AKP's sectarian tendencies in foreign policy. A similar trend could be observed when the party became more authoritarian in domestic politics over time. As the EU negotiation process faded and the AKP eliminated potential threats through judicial investigations, such as Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, the Islamist orientation of the party became more evident. While Islamism provided an opportunity to mobilize a wide segment of society, it also served as a means to address the Kurdish problem and expand its sphere of influence in the Middle East. However, it is important to note that although Islamism was initially used as a tool to solve the Kurdish problem, in reality, it proved largely ineffective and remained at the rhetorical level. To legitimize its stance, AKP even claimed that nation-state borders had been imposed by European imperialists.[373] However, Islamist politics, which placed a strong emphasis on the Sunni interpretation of Islam, harmed the AKP's image. This deterioration in its image coincided with the party's move toward a more authoritarian stance in domestic politics. The suppression of protests, such as the Gezi Park demonstrations, further highlighted the AKP's increasing undemocratic tendencies. Consequently, AKP

[371] Ahmet T. Kuru, "Turkey's Failed Policy toward the Arab Spring: Three Levels of Analysis," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2015): 97, https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-3145779. ; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon," June 10, 2010, accessed July 5, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-political-declaration-on-the-esthablishement-of-the-high-level-cooperation-council-among-turkey_-syria_-jordan-and-lebanon.en.mfa.

[372] *France 24*, "Syria, Israel Confirm Indirect Peace Talks via Turkey," May 21, 2008, accessed July 5, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/20080521-syria-israel-confirm-indirect-peace-talks-via-turkey-syria-israel.

[373] Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (2015): 310, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.947152.

could no longer serve as a model for Middle Eastern countries in the eyes of the West.[374]

In response to the Arab Spring protests that began in December 2010, the Syrian government took harsh and repressive measures against demonstrators. This resulted in a wider crisis that quickly escalated into a civil war. As mentioned earlier, while relations between Turkey and Syria followed a positive course in the early 2000s, the relations deteriorated rapidly with the onset of unrest in Syria. Turkey initially called on the Syrian government to reform, but when the repressive policies of the Assad regime continued, Turkey started to support the Syrian opposition. This was one of the main reasons for the intensified tension between the two countries.[375]

While the Arab Spring challenged dictatorial regimes, Syria witnessed one of the most violent clashes between government forces and rebel groups, marked by ethnic and religious divisions.[376] The sectarian and brutal response of the Syrian government to the uprising drew the attention of global public opinion in favor of the demonstrators. Turkey similarly opposed the Assad regime and supported anti-government and anti-regime groups, a stance that eventually evolved into a sectarian policy. However, Turkey's position on the Syrian government did not change suddenly. Initially, Turkey attempted to convince the Syrian government to implement democratic reforms and hold free elections to address the legitimacy crisis. Unfortunately, these efforts failed to persuade the Syrian government.[377] Turkey soon declared its support for the opposition groups.[378] In Teitelbaum's often-referenced study written in 1984, when the East-West division was still existent, it is stated that the relationship between migration and foreign policy can be analyzed at

[374] Cihan Tuğal, *Türk Modelinin Çöküşü: Arap Ayaklanmaları İslami Liberalizmi Nasıl Yıktı ?* (Agora Kitaplığı, 2016), 2–3; 21–24.

[375] Akbaba and Özdamar, "Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy: Turkish-Syrian Relations since the 1980s," 125.

[376] Demir and Yılmaz, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey's Politic-Military, Social and Economic Security," 1–2.

[377] Akbaba and Özdamar, "Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy: Turkish-Syrian Relations since the 1980s," 130–31.

[378] Benli Altunışık, "Turkey as an 'Emerging Donor' and the Arab Uprisings," 337.

four levels, one of which is the granting of asylum to people coming from "hostile regimes."[379] In this context, refugees are not only subjects of international humanitarian law but also objects instrumentalized in foreign policies. Although the humanitarian discourse is dominant in Turkey's refugee reception policy, this issue also warrants careful consideration.

Despite this brief hesitation, Turkey welcomed the changes brought by the Arab Spring, following the replacement of dictatorial regimes by Islamic movements and parties, several of which were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Turkey sought to use the Arab Spring as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East.[380] As Assad demonized the Sunni opposition and employed violent measures against them, the AKP positioned itself as a defender of Sunni Islam,[381] a stance aligned with its domestic politics. The AKP also sought to legitimize its position through the concept of humanitarian diplomacy.[382] However, Turkey's deep involvement in the Arab revolutions ultimately undermined its image as a benign regional power.[383]

Turkey expected the Syrian government to be easily replaced by the opposition, but the government proved more resilient, as it had greater control over society and the advantage of secret police and an extensive intelligence network. Moreover, the Syrian army remained loyal to the government,[384] along with external support for the Assad regime. Following the violent clashes, Turkey opened its borders to refugees from Syrian territories, andTurkey began supporting the formation of the Free Syrian

[379] Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," *International Organization* 38, no. 3 (1984): 34–40, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300026801.

[380] Demir and Yılmaz, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey's Politic-Military, Social and Economic Security," 5.

[381] Hinnebusch, "Back to Enmity : Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Uprising ,'" 16.

[382] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 8.

[383] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no. 2 (2014): 203, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.868392.

[384] Demir and Yılmaz, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey's Politic-Military, Social and Economic Security," 5.

Army in June 2011. In response, the Syrian government allowed the PYD to take control of the Kurdish region along the Turkey-Syria border.[385] This indicates that the Syrian government once again employed the Kurds as leverage against Turkey.

Turkey's involvement in the Syrian conflict was criticized for its sectarian approach and support to the Free Syrian Army. As Hinnebusch notes, these policies undermined Turkey's regional image and fed accusations that it indirectly enabled radical groups, although such claims remain controversial and are strongly rejected by Turkish officials.[386] These accusations diminished Turkey's ability to mobilize the US and other Western countries against the Assad regime. Over time, increasingly vocal critiques from Turkish society emerged. Both the large number of refugees and the PYD's presence played a significant role in reshaping Turkey's experience of the Arab Spring. In particular, the increase in security risks for Turkish citizens, such as missiles falling on border cities like Hatay and terrorist attacks carried out by individuals crossing the borders, led to growing criticism of the AKP's foreign policy.[387]

The rising number of refugees has become a significant issue for a wide segment of society. This has even led to the formation of a single-issue party, The Victory Party (Zafer Partisi), which capitalizes on and promotes anti-immigrant discourse. Nevertheless, critiques did not come solely from nationalist parties and groups. Kemalists were another group that criticized the AKP's foreign policy since the early years of its governance. Their historical tendency has been to maintain distance from Arab countries, and they now view the presence of refugees as a potential threat. While the Kemalists' reaction stems from nationalist sentiments, concerns about secularism also played a major role.[388] This unrest related to the AKP's foreign

[385] Demir and Yılmaz, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey's Politic-Military, Social and Economic Security," 6; Hinnebusch, "Back to Enmity : Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Uprising ,'" 15.

[386] Hinnebusch, "Back to Enmity : Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Uprising ,'" 18.

[387] Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions," 214–15.

[388] Çetin Çelik and Holly White, "Forced Migration and Protection: Turkey's Domestic Responses to the Syrian Refugees," *European Review* 30, no. 3 (2022): 359, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798721000028.

policy grew in parallel with the economic crisis, which affected broad segments of society, leading to increased electoral volatility. While the AKP formed an alliance with the nationalist MHP, it became more vulnerable to nationalist or xenophobic critiques regarding the refugee issue. Discourses rooted in Islamism could facilitate the integration of refugees by framing them as brothers within the broader Islamic ummah. However, narratives centered on Turkish identity and nationalism were incompatible with the open-border policy. Considering that Turkey became the host country for the largest number of refugees in the world,[389] the AKP had to reconsider its stance on the Syrian government, at least as a response to the growing societal backlash.

For a long time, Turkey's relationship with Syria remained largely limited to the regions controlled by Turkey along the border. Turkey pursued a policy of humanitarian diplomacy in these regions and toward Syrian refugees.[390] Relations with Kurdish-controlled regions were more tense. Turkey attempted to prevent the expansion of Kurdish territory, but it was not an easy task as the power dynamics involved complex relations and multiple actors in the region. After ISIS gained strength and was recognized as a threat by Western countries, the US shifted its priority to combating terrorism, and the YPG began to play a prominent role in the fight against ISIS.[391] The YPG's growing role placed Turkey in a more difficult position regarding its efforts against both the PKK and the YPG. Turkey's ability to act was further constrained by the diplomatic crisis that followed the downing of a Russian fighter jet. The diplomatic crisis led Turkey to recalibrate its approach to Russia, resulting in concessions not previously made. The agreement on Turkey's purchase of S-400 air-defence missiles can also be considered a significant concession.[392] However, this decision had repercussions for Turkey-US relations,

[389] Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy, 1.

[390] Benli Altunışık, "Turkey as an 'Emerging Donor' and the Arab Uprisings," 343–44.

[391] *Reuters*, "What Is the Syrian Kurdish YPG?,", October 5, 2023, accessed October 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-syrian-kurdish-ypg-2023-10-05/.

[392] Mühdan Sağlam, "Prof. Dr. Gencer Özcan: Turkey Suriye'den Çekilmek Durumunda Kalacak, Çekilmesi de Gerekiyor," *Gazete Duvar*, July 15, 2024, accessed July 20, 2024, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/prof-dr-gencer-ozcan-turkiye-suriyeden-cekilmek-durumunda-kalacak-cekilmesi-de-gerekiyor-makale-1705754#google_vignette.

resulting in Turkey's removal from the F-35 joint strike fighter program[393] due to its deployment of S-400 air-defence systems from Russia. Furthermore, Turkey became increasingly dependent on US support, as evidenced in 2020, when 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an attack by Russian and Syrian regime forces.[394]

After 2022, rapprochement efforts were initiated between the two countries. In December 2022, a pivotal meeting was held in Moscow at the level of defense ministers, owing to Turkey's efforts to normalize relations.[395] Another meeting was held in May 2023.[396] The underlying reasons for these rapprochement efforts differed for each country. For Turkey, public unrest regarding refugees increasingly influenced electoral behavior. This issue, combined with economic problems, began to undermine the AKP's electoral prospects.[397] Another key factor driving Turkey's move to normalize relations is the security concern posed by the presence of the YPG. The Assad regime had its own agenda for potential rapprochement with Turkey. First, the war in Ukraine diverted Russia's focus away from Syria, consequently reducing its assistance to the Assad government in reclaiming lost territories.[398] As a result, the Assad regime became more reliant on collaboration with Turkey. The territories controlled by the YPG, in particular, constitute one of the most significant issues for Turkey. However, Assad's demands are not limited to those regions. They also include areas jointly controlled by Turkey and the Free

[393] Jonathan Marcus, "US Removes Turkey from F-35 Fighter Jet Programme," *BBC News*, July 17, 2019, accessed October 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49023115.

[394] Ertan Erol, "The Decline of Turkey as a Subimperialist Power: Political Economy of the Turkish Foreign Policy under AKP Rule," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 26, no. 6 (2024): 928–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2024.2311953.

[395] *Bianet*,"Defence Ministers of Turkey, Syria, Russia Meet in Moscow," December 29, 2022, accessed October 20, 2024, https://bianet.org/haber/defense-ministers-of-turkiye-syria-russia-meet-in-moscow-272111.

[396] *Al Jazeera*, "Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran Hold High-Level Talks in Moscow," May 10, 2023, accessed October 20, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/10/russia-syria-turkey-and-iran-hold-high-level-talks-in-moscow.

[397] *Ahval News*, "Erdoğan Would Lack Majority Support in Presidential Election - Poll." July 8, 2022. Accessed October 5, 2024. https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-elections/erdogan-would-lack-majority-support-presidential-election-poll.

[398] Armenak Tokmajyan and Anais al-Wahibi, *The Long Road to Rapprochement between Syria and Turkey* (The Century Foundation, August 15, 2023), accessed July 15, 2024, https://tcf.org/content/report/the-long-road-to-rapprochement-between-syria-and-turkey/.

Syrian Army. Another key factor driving the Assad government's move toward normalizing relations is the ongoing economic crisis. For Syria, having relations with Turkey, particularly based on economic cooperation, is of vital importance. Turkey also serves as a gateway to Western markets and can act as a mediator against Western sanctions. Similarly, Turkey stands to benefit from these relations, as it can access the Gulf via Syria and expand its sphere of influence.[399] Turkey's access to the Gulf countries through Syria in order to become a key regional power and thus expand its influence more easily is another factor to be considered. These rapprochement efforts involved economic, domestic, and geopolitical concerns for both sides. However, the Assad regime fell in December 2024, and these rapprochement prospects did not materialize. All in all, Turkey's response to the influx of people to its territories from Syria cannot be considered by ignoring the geopolitical factors and foreign policy aspirations of Turkey.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, the international, regional, and domestic contexts that shaped Turkey's reception of displaced Syrians have been examined. Domestically, the neoliberal transformation that began in the 1980s fundamentally reshaped Turkey's economy, labor market, and social structure. As a result of informality, subcontracting, and precarious employment characteristics, Syrians found themselves in the low-paid, unregistered, and insecure labor force. This neoliberal restructuring was reinforced by Turkey's integration into the global markets, the influence of international financial institutions, and Turkey's pursuit of export-oriented growth. As a result, a large number of displaced Syrians were added to the urban and rural poor, which also produced new forms of dependency on migrant labor.

At the regional and geopolitical level, Turkey-Syria relations faced many ups and downs, alternating between tension and cooperation. Although relations between the two countries normalized and improved in the 2000s, this ended in 2011 with the Syrian Civil War and shifting alliances in the region. Turkey aligned itself with the

[399] Tokmajyan and al-Wahibi, *The Long Road to Rapprochement.*

opposition groups and adopted humanitarian rhetoric intertwined with sectarian and strategic considerations. The refugee issue thus became entangled with Turkey's foreign policy choices, regional rivalries, and domestic political transformations.

As a result, Turkey's reception of Syrians cannot be understood in isolation from these intertwined dynamics. The neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish economy, the informalization of the labor market, and the evolving geopolitical environment of Turkey -Syria relations set the ground for Syrians' reception by Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM SYRIA AND MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN TURKEY

4.1. Legal and Institutional Framework and Related Bureaucratic Practices Pertaining to Displaced Syrians

4.1.1. The Formation and Evolution of Legal Framework of Turkey's Mass Migration Management

This part of the chapter aims to shed light on Turkey's immigration regime and how it has changed over time due to several factors. Many may argue that Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which was approved in 2013, aimed to address the challenges Turkey faced after the Syrian mass influx. Yet, it can be argued that the law emerged from both Turkey's need to comply with the EU acquis and its quest to be a part of the global immigration regime. It is important to understand the legal framework since it guides the government institutions and other actors regarding how to govern immigration and immigrants. Hence, in this part, legal framework of Turkish immigration regime will be examined.

Migration management is defined in the online booklet of Presidency of Migration Management as:

> a concept defining the management constituted from several state institutions within the national system for managing foreigner's entry and stay within the borders of the state as well as managing the protection provided for refugees and other persons requiring international protection in an orderly and humanitarian manner.[400]

[400] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration* (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 2014), 18:42, https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/Yayinlar/Kitaplar/turkiyevegoc_en.pdf.

It covers all types of migrants including economic migrants or refugees who flee because of a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country. Immigration is defined, in the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, as "the movement of people from their home state to another state, usually to seek employment, to improve wages, to join family member or to escape from adverse living conditions."[401] However, as the focus of this dissertation is forced migration, it will not focus on migrants with economic interests or who left their country based on willingness. Instead, the focus will be on people who are "forced to move from his or her country of origin or of residence" and who are seen as "an anomaly in state-centred international law."[402] Castles, de Haas, and Miller acknowledge the fact that different types of migrations are interwoven, and one cannot delineate clear boundaries between them.[403] In today's world, dichotomies like voluntary or forced migration are not useful to explain migration and immigrant realities.[404] Although these categories are now intertwined, one should keep in mind that the corresponding laws, regulations, and practices are different. Therefore, while analysing the legal structure, these "false" dichotomies will be kept in mind.

4.1.1.1. At the International Level

In the introductory note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it is stated that "Grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948…the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, is the centrepiece of international refugee protection today."[405] The legal and moral foundation of this protection is laid out in

[401] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, 1st ed., Penguin Reference Books (Penguin Books, 1998), 242.

[402] Evans and Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, 470.

[403] Castles et al., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 100.

[404] David Leblang and Benjamin Helms, *The Ties That Bind: Immigration and the Global Political Economy*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2023), 12, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009233248.

[405] UNHCR,"Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 60 Years UNHCR, Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees," December 2010, 2.

Article 14 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries for asylum from persecution."[406]

Building on this principle, the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or Geneva Convention (1951), Article 1 (2) defines a refugee as any person who:

> as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.[407]

However, this definition was later amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, known as the 1967 New York Protocol Article 1 (2), which states that:

> For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events Occurring before 1 January 1951 and..." and the words "... as a result of such events", in article 1 A (2) were omitted.[408]

Thereby, the geographical and time limitations were lifted by 1967 New York Protocol. These remain the most important documents regarding refugees in international law. Apart from these, there are other international agreements regarding immigration and immigrants. However, the abovementioned Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol form the core of the international legal framework for refugees. Three fundamental principles of the legal framework for refugees are "non-discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulement."[409] It

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[406] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, Article 14(1), https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

[407] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, United Nations, Article 1(2), https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.

[408] Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, United Nations, Article 1(2), https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.

[409] Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 60 Years, UNHCR, Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3, https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.

should also be noted that economic migrants and refugees are covered by different agreements in international law. Some examples of legal regulations for economic migrants in international law are the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 and the Migrant Workers Convention of 1975.[410]

Turkey is a signatory of both the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol. In this sense, Turkey is part of the international refugee governance framework. However, Turkey still maintains geographical limitation under the Geneva Convention and does not give refugee status to people coming from countries which are not members of the Council of Europe. This makes the Turkish asylum system complicated, since Turkey borders conflictual areas of the Middle East but does not grant full refugee status to people from those countries, including those from Syria after 2011.

4.1.1.2. At the National Level

Regarding Turkish national legal framework for asylum and migration management in the Turkish Republic, the first text that aims to govern migration and migrants is the Settlement Law of 1934. Settlement Law aimed to control the settlement of the people that crossed the Turkish borders with the aim of migration or asylum. This law had "a kin-based focus."[411] This law promoted the settlement of people who belong to "Turkish descent and culture."[412] Since Turkey, unlike the Ottoman Empire, was founded as a "nation state," it developed immigration policies accordingly.[413] Settlement Law reflected the need of the Turkish Republic to create a homogeneous national identity through population exchange agreements with Balkan countries and by resettling Turkish and Muslim populations in Turkey. Other regulations on this subject that fell outside the scope of Settlement Law were enacted

[410] Evans and Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, 57.

[411] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:11.

[412] Ahmet İçduygu, "Türkiye'ye Yönelen Düzensiz Göç Dalgaları İçinde 'Transit Göç,'" in *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler*, ed. M. Murat Erdoğan and Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2015), 4.

[413] Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," 188.

under various laws, such as the Passport Law No. 5682 and the Residence and Travel of Foreigners No. 5683.[414]

International protection area or the area of asylum remained unregulated at the national level until the 1994 Regulation, whose official name is "The Regulation on the Procedures and Principles related to Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey, either as Individuals or in Groups, Seeking Asylum either in Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits in order to Seek Asylum in another Country." The 1994 Regulation was a response to the developments at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s after the Gulf War, which resulted in the mass flow of people from Iraq to the Turkish border. Before that, the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol were the only sources of international protection. In addition to these, administrative practices guided the governance of migration issues.[415]

Article 8 of the 1994 Regulation shows Turkey's intention of stopping the mass influxes at the Turkish borders. This article states that:

> As long as there are no political decisions taken to the contrary, and provided that Turkey's obligations under international law are maintained, and taking into account its territorial interests, it is essential that population movements be stopped at the border, and that asylum seekers be prevented from crossing over into Turkey. Necessary and effective measures shall be taken by the relevant bodies on this matter.[416]

From this wording, we can say that mass influx situations are viewed from a security perspective and that there is no reference to humanitarian concerns. In addition, with the adoption of the 1994 Regulation, a "dual asylum system"[417] (or may be referred to as dual track procedures[418]) occurred in Turkey. This has stemmed from the fact

[414] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:11.

[415] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:11.

[416] Republic of Turkey, *Regulation on the Procedures and Principles Related to Possible Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey Either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum Either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in Order to Seek Asylum from Another Country*, No. 1994/6169 (January 19, 1994).

[417] Sarı and Dinçer, "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?"

[418] M. Zieck, "UNHCR and Turkey, and Beyond: Of Parallel Tracks and Symptomatic Cracks," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 22, no. 4 (2010): 593; 602, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeq033.

that both the Turkish authorities and the UNHCR started to evaluate refugee claims after the adoption of the 1994 Regulation, and Turkey gave temporary asylum to people coming from non-European countries until the UNHCR could resettle them in a third country. This situation, arising from geographical limitation and the fact that Turkish authorities are now also in charge of asylum claims previously under the

UNHCR's sole authority has been criticized for creating a duality in the asylum system of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish migration regime was criticized in some ways, such as the absence of regulation at the level of law, and Turkey's maintenance of the geographical limitation clause at the 1951 Geneva Convention.[419] It is pointed out by Canefe that if a state is a signatory of an international convention, clauses such as geographical limitation are considered "anomaly" in legal terms.[420] At this point, however, it is worth remembering that this is a right granted to Turkey by the Convention. In addition to that, Turkey, by ratifying the Geneva Convention, is still bound up with the principle of non-refoulement regardless of where the refugee came from.[421] This is also appreciated by Turkey at the NPAA 2003, Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs. Although Turkey's reservation on lifting the geographical limitation remains, it is stated in this text with reference to humanitarian concerns that Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement. It is stated that this applies to both those who have been granted refugee status and those who have been granted temporary asylum. Thus, it was emphasized that Turkey did not violate Article 33 of the Convention.[422] Article 33 (1) of the Convention regulates the prohibition of expulsion or return, widely known as "refoulement" and states that:

[419] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 5; Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?," in *Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar (Hamburg University Press, 2012), 75.

[420] Nergis Canefe, "Management of Irregular Migration: Syrians in Turkey as Paradigm Shifters for Forced Migration Studies," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 54 (May 2016): 22, https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2016.6.

[421] Canefe, "Management of Irregular Migration," 22.

[422] Republic of Turkey, Council of Ministers, *Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (2003 NPAA)*, Official Gazette No. 25178 (July 24, 2003): 655.

> No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.[423]

During their stay in Turkey, persons coming from outside Europe who qualify to be a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention are not granted refugee status but are recognized as conditional refugees. This status allows them to stay in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled in a third country. Hence, constitutes a form of temporary asylum in Turkey. Asylum seekers stay in Turkey until the refugee determination process concludes, which is run by the UNHCR Turkey office, and then they are resettled in a third country that accepts them as refugees.[424] The refugee status determination process is an international protection system based on individual application. If found legitimate, the UNHCR in Turkey assists the asylum seeker "to find resettlement countries willing to host refugees."[425] But here too, countries are under no obligation to accept them, which is perhaps one source of criticism of "burden-sharing."

It should also be noted that, as mentioned above, although the dual asylum system and dual track procedures existed in Turkey regarding international protection, the UNHCR ceased its "registration and refugee status determination" activities in Turkey as of 10 September 2018, following the development of Turkey's national capacity in asylum management. Since then, the full authority has been transferred to Turkish institutions. Now, Directorate General of Migration Management / Presidency of Migration Management (DGMM/PMM) "is the sole authority responsible for processing asylum applications and refugee registrations in Turkey, as well as the only institution mandated to conduct refugee status determination."[426]

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[423] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, United Nations, Article 1 (2).

[424] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 210.

[425] Ahmet İçduygu and Eleni Diker, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, October 25, 2017, 17, https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195389678-0256.

[426] *UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency*, "Turkey: Registration and RSD with UNHCR," accessed October 26, 2024, https://help.unhcr.org/turkiye/information-for-non-syrians/registration-rsd-with-unhcr/.

Nevertheless, because the geographical limitation under the 1951 Refugee Convention still exists, different procedures are applied to the applicants.

Before the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) No.6458 that was adopted on 4 April 2013 and came into effect on April 12 2014, there was not a law at the national level dealing solely with international protection and foreigners, nor a civilian body focusing on migration management. Therefore, LFIP is a milestone regarding Turkish migration management and the asylum system. According to the official website of the Directorate General of Migration Management (from 2022, Presidency of Migration Management – PMM), LFIP was required for two main reasons: legal factors and the European Union harmonization process.[427] Given that the Temporary Protection Regulation, which is the primary legal instrument concerning Syrians, is derived from and dependent on Turkey's national legal framework, analyzing this national legislation is essential for the purposes of this dissertation. However, before that, the effect of the EU accession process and Turkey's relations with the EU will be dealt with.

4.1.1.3. The Effect of the EU Accession Process and Relations with the EU

Turkey, after gaining candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, entered a process of Europeanization in many policy areas by the 2000s, including migration and asylum issues. However, the EU accession prospect was not the only reason for changes in the Turkish migration management and asylum system. It is stated by İçduygu that the EU accession process and international developments that turned Turkey into a country of immigration necessitated changes in the Turkish asylum system.[428] In addition, Canefe points out that Turkey's national and regional interests, and especially its "domestic economic priorities" had a significant impact on the transformation of the Turkish migration system. Canefe attracts attention to these points because many experts only focus onthe EU-related changes in the

[427] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:13.

[428] İçduygu, "EU-Ization Matters: Changes in Immigration and Asylum Practices in Turkey," 201.

Turkish migration system.[429] Keeping all these in mind, the mass influx of Syrian refugees accelerated the enactment of the LFIP.[430]

After December 2004, when Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU, migration-related issues became one of the main issues in negotiations. Since Turkey has lengthy territorial borders with states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria,[431] EU membership would extend the EU's external borders to these countries. In this sense, it can be argued that Turkey's adoption of the EU acquis regarding migration is a tool for the EU to externalize its migration and border regime. Management and security of the borders, as well as practices and policies regarding migration and asylum, are expected to align with the EU *acquis*.[432] Asylum and migration issues are dealt with under Chapter 24 "Justice, Freedom and Security," and it has "a significant position" in negotiations with the EU. Asylum and Migration Action Plan of Turkey entered into force on 25 March 2005.[433] It was prepared in line with the 2003 "National Program of Turkey for Undertaking European Union Acquis."

Geographical limitation and burden sharing are seen as concerns as reflected in the wording of Turkish officials in the National Action Plan, and these sensitive issues are left open. Turkey may become a target for refugee influxes from the neighbouring regions, especially the Middle East, which would impose both political and economic burdens on Turkey. In the NPAA 2003 Chapter 24, it is stated that:

> The geographic limitation will be lifted in the accession process, on the condition that it should not encourage large scale refugee inflows to Turkey from the East, upon the completion of the necessary legislative and infra-structural measures and in line with the sensitivity of the EU Member States on the issue of burden-sharing.[434]

From this statement, Turkey's concerns regarding mass influxes, primarily expected from the Middle East and North Africa, become clear. When it comes to burden

[429] Canefe, "Management of Irregular Migration," 10.

[430] İçduygu and Diker, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, 12.

[431] Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," 191.

[432] Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," 188.

[433] İçduygu and Aksel, *Irregular Migration in Turkey*, 43.

[434] Republic of Turkey, *2003 NPAA*, Official Gazette No. 25178 (July 24, 2003): 655.

sharing, Turkey was concerned about the stricter practices and policies of the EU regarding asylum and migration, the absence of a common European system, and the enduring discussions on safe third countries. In that kind of environment, possible conflicts in the Middle East and the Caucasus may result in a mass influx of people to the Turkish borders, making the need for burden-sharing inevitable.[435]

Expectations under Chapter 24 regarding migration, asylum, and border management are high. Those include alignment with the EU *acquis*, capacity building in the field of asylum, border management, preparation for implementation of the Schengen *acquis*, alignment of the visa legislation, implementation of the EU acquis, and adoption of best practices in combating illegal migration.[436] Turkey is expected to confront illegal employment, cooperate on joint guards and surveillance, strengthen its external borders, combat human trafficking, and conclude readmission agreements.[437] Border management is also an important concern, since Turkey is an important route for undocumented migrants seeking entry into EU countries. Therefore, Turkey is expected to align with the EU standards in managing external borders.[438]

In accordance with expectations, Turkey has made significant changes in asylum, migration, and border management areas. Work permit and naturalization laws were changed and deportation capacities were increased with financial assistance of the EU. Additionally, Turkey took steps regarding human trafficking by adopting Palermo Protocols, and visa regulations were reformed. Moreover, the Turkish borders were strengthened as part of Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy. The Directorate of Project Implementation on Integrated Border Management was established under the Ministry of Interior in 2004, which later

[435] Republic of Turkey, *National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration (2005 NAP)*, March 25, 2005, https://en.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/files/turkiye_ulusal_eylem_plani(1).pdf.

[436] Republic of Turkey, Council of Ministers, *Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (2003 NPAA)*, Official Gazette No. 25178 (July 24, 2003), chap. 24.

[437] Canefe, "Management of Irregular Migration," 23.

[438] Seyhan, "Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey," 193.

became the Bureau for Border Management in 2012. This bureau aimed to plan, prepare, and administer the EU projects on Integrated Border Management.[439]

Even though many changes were being made in Turkey, the lack of national legal framework was frequently criticized by the EU. Turkey was in the process of preparing a comprehensive law regarding migration and asylum issues. In 2008, the Asylum and Migration Bureau was established under the Ministry of Interior to draft the Foreigners and International Protection Law. "Consultative Board" was composed of academicians working on asylum and migration, input was sought from public institutions and civil society, and technical support from the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) was accepted during the preparation period.[440]

From a "community of practice" perspective, IOM has a key role to play in building Turkey's migration management capacity by providing technical expertise, counselling, and fostering social learning competencies. At this point, Fine argues, based on her research, that Turkey's national migration legislation has not been shaped solely by internal dynamics. Rather, it has been shaped by the influence of actors such as the IOM and what she describes as "bordercratic" communities, which means technocrats specialized in migration and border management. In building Turkey's national migration capacity, the IOM produced categories based on its technical know-how, provided professional socialization, and turned Turkey into an extension of the EU's external border management.[441]

In this context, it would be useful to refer to the EU-Turkey Migration Agreement, known as the EU-Turkey Statement or EU-Turkey Deal of 18 March 2016. Turkey had been a transit country before also becaming a destination country. Although Turkey has become a destination country, it remains a transit country for migrants

[439] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 4.

[440] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:14.

[441] Shoshana Fine, "Liaisons, Labelling and Laws: International Organization for Migration Bordercratic Interventions in Turkey," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 10 (2018): 1743–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354073.

from the Middle East and North Africa.[442] The events of summer 2015, referred to as the 2015 European refugee crisis or refugee protection crisis,[443] prompted the European Union to engage in greater cooperation with Turkey on migration issues. In the summer of 2015, more than a million people seeking refuge crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe.[444] In October 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed on a Joint Action Plan,[445] followed by a more comprehensive agreement in 2016, widely known as the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016.[446] Turkey agreed to improve border security and accept the retun of irregular migrants who crossed into Greece from Turkey. In return, the EU proposed that for every migrant returned, one Syrian asylum seeker would be resettled from Turkey to the EU. Turkey would receive a total of €6 billion in grants earmarked for Syrian refugees. In addition, Turkey's EU accession process and visa-free travel rights for Turkish citizens would be under consideration. Article 8 of the statement commits to "re-energize the accession process."[447]

Under the EU-Turkey Agreement, approximately 41,000 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey to the EU between April 2016 and January 2024. During this

[442] European Commission, *Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey*, COM(2024) 593 final, accessed 19 December 2024, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/aebf392d-0c6b-4841-8234-f9661d1cb4ec_en?filename=COM_2024_593_F1_COMMUNICATION_FROM_COMMISSION_TO_INST_EN_V3_P1_3789868.PDF.

[443] Başak Kale, "The Limits of an International Burden-Sharing Approach: The Syrian Refugee Protection Crisis and Its Consequences on Turkey's Refugee Policy", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 22, no 4 (2017): 55-84; Maissaa Almustafa, "Reframing refugee crisis: A 'European crisis of migration' or a 'crisis of protection'?" *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 40, no 5 (August 1, 2022): 1064-82, https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654421989705.

[444] Hereward Holland, "Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015," *UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, December 30, 2015*, accessed March 10, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/over-one-million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015

[445] European Commission, "EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan," fact sheet, October 15, 2015, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/15_october_2015_eu_turkey_joint_action_plan.pdf.

[446] European Commission, "EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016," press release, no. 144/16, 18 March 2016, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/18_march_2016_turkey_eu_statement.pdf.

[447] European Commission, "EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016." ; please see: Kemal Kirişçi, "As EU-Turkey Migration Agreement Reaches the Five-Year Mark, Add a Job Creation Element," *Brookings*, March 17, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/as-eu-turkey-migration-agreement-reaches-the-five-year-mark-add-a-job-creation-element/.

period, from 2016 onward, a total of 2,140 migrants were returned from the Greek islands to Turkey. However, Turkey suspended return operations in March 2020 due to COVID-19, and this decision remains in effect. Despite requests from the European Commission and Greece to resume return operations, no new returns have been carried out since that date.[448]

Moreover, in recent years, the refugee issue has been at the forefront of relations with the European Union. In fact, political leaders have even been using the threat of "sending refugees to Europe" as a political lever. For example, in 2016, in response to the European Parliament's recommendation decision to temporarily suspend negotiations with Turkey,[449] President Erdoğan stated: "You cried out when 50,000 refugees gathered at Kapıkule. Let me tell you this: if you go any further, these border gates will also be opened, so take note of that. Neither I nor this nation pays heed to empty threats, and take note of that too."[450] In another meeting, he expressed the situation as follows:

> They panic whenever we say 'we will open the gates.' Don't panic... When the time comes, those gates will be opened. Let's see how you handle hundreds of thousands of people. When just 100 people arrive in Greece by sea, you call us on the phone, but you say nothing about the 4 million here.[451]

Indeed, at the end of February 2020, Turkey opened its borders. Erdoğan later stated that:

> At the beginning of February, a process started. Around 4 million refugees are in our country, and they have been with us for nine years. Now, by pushing another 1.5 million refugees to our borders, they wanted to burden us further. Months ago, I made a statement: "If the West does not share the burden, we will open the gates,"

[448] European Commission, *Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey*, 3.

[449] European Parliament, "Freeze EU accession talks with Turkey until it halts repression, urge MEPs," November 17, 2016, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161117IPR51549/freeze-eu-accession-talks-with-turkey-until-it-halts-repression-urge-meps.

[450] *BBC News Türkçe*, "Erdoğan'dan AB'ye: Daha ileri giderseniz, sınır kapıları açılır," November 25, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-38103319.

[451] *Euronews Türkçe*, "Erdoğan: 'Kapıları açarız' dediğimiz zaman tutuşuyorlar," October 24, 2019, https://tr.euronews.com/2019/10/24/erdogan-kapilari-acariz-dedigimiz-zaman-tutusuyorlar-abd-li-sentaorler-kurt-militanlar.

> but they took it lightly. They thought, "He must be bluffing." Now that we have opened the gates, the phones have been ringing non-stop: "Close the gates." We said, "That's over; the gates have now been opened. Now, you will bear your share of this burden.[452]

In sum, migration and refugee issues and the political leverage they created have become central components of the relationship between Turkey and the EU, influencing both migration management and broader geopolitical dynamics.

4.1.2. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the establishment of Directorate General of Migration Management

Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), Law No. 6458 was adopted in 2013 and came into effect in 2014. Article 103 of the LFIP envisaged the establishment of a civilian authority dealing solely with migration management.[453] Accordingly, in 2014, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established. These two developments are considered "revolutionary changes" in Turkey's migration management field.[454]

The establishment of DGMM is seen as a sign of leaving the nation-state approach, thus considering migrants no longer primarily as a security threat, since the powers of General Directorate of Security were transferred to a civilian authority responsible for migration. LFIP is expected to protect migrants better, and the integration of the migrants is also directly given attention to.[455] Turkey's asylum system has substantially changed under the LFIP after 2014.[456] Regarding the developments in the Turkish law on asylum, António Guterres, the High Commissioner for Refugees,

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[452] Mehmet Tosun, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Artık kapılar açılmıştır," *Anadolu Agency*, March 6, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/bahar-kalkani-harekati/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-artik-kapilar-acilmistir/1751538#.

[453] Republic of Turkey, *The Law on Foreigners and International Protection*, No. 2013/6458, Official Gazette No. 28615 (April 11, 2013).

[454] İçduygu and Diker, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, 16.

[455] İçduygu and Diker, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, 16.

[456] Yeşeren Eliçin, "The Role and Capacity of Local Government in Managing Migration in Istanbul," *Hrvatska i Komparativna Javna Uprava* 19, no. 3 (2019): 432, https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.19.3.4.

stated that the adoption of the law is "a reflection of Turkey's strong commitment to humanitarian values and principles."[457]

The legislation first aims to control the rules and practices relating to foreigners' entry, stay, and departure from Turkey, as well as to regulate the scope and application of the protection provided to foreigners seeking security from Turkey. The topics that are covered by the LFIP are extensive, such as the rights of stateless persons, rules on reception, accommodation and removal centers, types of international protection, harmonization, temporary protection, and the non-refoulement principle. LFIP also envisages "humanitarian residence permit," which aims to give individuals the right to legally stay in Turkey, for humanitarian reasons.[458]

LFIP has three parts: foreigners, international protection, establishment, and duties of DGMM. The roles, functions, and responsibilities of DGMM are regulated by LFIP. Article 103 (1) of the LFIP states that:

> The Directorate General for Migration Management has been established under the Ministry of Interior with a view to implement policies and strategies related to migration; ensure coordination between the related agencies and organizations in these matters; carry out the tasks and procedures related to foreigners' entry into, stay in, exit and removal from Turkey, international protection, temporary protection and protection of victims of human trafficking.[459]

With the establishment of the DGMM, it became the main state institution whose main duty is governing every aspect of migration. It has the authority in policymaking and management of migration. It has the authority to register, protect, detain, and deport legal and illegal migrants. DGMM had a "highly centralized authority."[460] The LFIP envisaged central and provincial organization of the DGMM, as well as a Migration Policy Board (it is now defunct, yet replaced by Presidential

[457] UNHCR, "UNHCR Welcomes Turkey's New Law on Asylum," April 12, 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-welcomes-turkeys-new-law-asylum.

[458] Republic of Turkey, *The Law on Foreigners and International Protection*, No. 2013/6458.

[459] Republic of Turkey, *The Law on Foreigners and International Protection*, No. 2013/6458.

[460] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 5.

Migration Board, which is "responsible for determining Turkey's migration strategies related to foreigners and following the coordination and implementation…"[461] permanent boards and commissions, and an overseas organization. However, as a result of the elections held in 2018, the Presidential Government System was introduced in Turkey. As a result of the subsequent changes in the migration administration system, migration administration and policy-making became more centralized.[462] DGMM is also in charge of policymaking and management of international protection. Three types of international protection are acknowledged in LFIP: refugee, conditional refugee, and subsidiary protection.[463] The term "refugee" in the LFIP is defined in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. Conditional refugees are applicants coming from countries except for those in Europe. Before this law, they were referred to as "asylum seekers." Conditional refugees are allowed to stay in Turkey temporarily before they are resettled to a third country.[464] Subsidiary protection is granted to a person who cannot be given refugee or conditional refugee status, but "he/she would have the risk of being sentenced to death; face torture or serious threat to himself or herself by reason or indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict."[465] Subsidiary protection is regulated under Article 63 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).[466]

As mentioned earlier, UNHCR, initially as the sole competent body and later jointly with Turkish authorities, assessed the applications of persons seeking international

[461] Presidency of Migration Management, "Migration Board," accessed 10 March, 2025, https://en.goc.gov.tr/migration-policies-board41.

[462] Ilgın Barut, *Türkiye'de göç politikaları: değişim, kurumsallaşma ve sorunlar*, 1st ed., (Kriter, 2022), 180–88.

[463] Law on Foreigners and International Protection, LFIP, Article 3(r), accessed May 10, 2025, https://en.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/en.goc/Ingilizce-kanun/Law-on-Foreigners-and-International-Protection.pdf.

[464] Law on Foreigners and International Protection, LFIP, Article 61(1), accessed May 10, 2025, https://en.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/en.goc/Ingilizce-kanun/Law-on-Foreigners-and-International-Protection.pdf.

[465] Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, 18:22.

[466] Law on Foreigners and International Protection, LFIP, Article 63, accessed May 10, 2025, https://en.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/en.goc/Ingilizce-kanun/Law-on-Foreigners-and-International-Protection.pdf.

protection. However, as of 10 September 2018, it withdrew from the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process completely. After that date, the Presidency of Migration Management (then named DGMM) became the sole authority in the country regarding registration, processing and RSD.[467] In addition, as of 8 January 2018, the powers and associated duties of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) in the areas where it was previously authorized to deal with Syrians were transferred to the Presidency of Migration Management.[468]

4.1.3. Establishment of Temporary Protection Regime

As already stated, when the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, Turkey was in the process of preparing its national asylum law. Although many factors have influenced Turkey's new asylum and migration law and institutional structuring, as Genç, Heck, and Hess argue, the consequences of the Syrian Civil War had an enormous impact on Turkey's new asylum and border regime. In the Turkish law, as mentioned above, there are three types of international protection. However, individual refugee status determination was not conducted for displaced Syrians. Instead, displaced Syrians were placed under a separate temporary protection regime.[469] Nonetheless, it is worth noting that temporary protection was not created specifically for Syrians who fled to Turkey *en masse* after the eruption of the Syrian Civil War. In fact, temporary protection was even dealt at NPAA, 2008. Temporary protection is based on the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001. It is also known as the EU Temporary Protection Directive.[470] In cases of probable mass population movements, temporary protection is foreseen. Even in NPAA 2008, the strengthening of the capacity of the "Asylum and Immigration Unit" is mentioned in cases of mass influxes.[471] In addition, Turkey has been able to provide temporary asylum in cases

[467] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Registration & Refugee Status Determination (RSD) with UNHCR," September 10, 2018, accessed October 25, 2024, https://help.unhcr.org/turkiye/information-for-non-syrians/registration-rsd-with-unhcr.

[468] Barut, *Türkiye'de göç politikaları*, 188.

[469] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 5.

[470] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 210.

[471] Republic of Turkey, *National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis 2008*. 269.

of mass influx under the provisions of the 1994 Regulation. However, this framework has gained a more solid legal basis with the introduction of the Temporary Protection Directive.

At first Syrians were referred to as "guests" by the Turkish officials and public speeches of politicians. This also indicated the belief that Syrian people would stay temporarily in Turkey. By referring to them as guests, the hospitality of Turkish society was also highlighted. Yet, Syrians did not return to Syria as the conflict prolonged, and many more Syrians came to Turkey or wanted to transit through Turkey to Europe. The word "guest" had no legal equivalent. As Syrians continued to stay in Turkey, a legal status had to be given to them. They were excluded from above-mentioned international protection types and given a "temporary protection status" (TPS) based on Temporary Protection Regulation.

However, there are two points I would like to highlight about the temporary protection regime. First, as Övünç Öztürk also points out, although temporary protection is not explicitly defined in any legally binding international document, it has evolved and taken shape over time through practical applications in situations of mass influx. In particular, the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo during the 1990s marked a significant turning point in the development of this practice within the European and the EU context.[472] Second, temporary protection is not only Turkey's way of managing displaced people from Syria outside the scope of international refugee law, but it has also been criticized as "legally unsound and politically unconvincing," with its inherent feature being "ambiguity."[473]

Article 91 of the LFIP authorizes the government to declare temporary protection in the event of mass influxes. Temporary Protection, which is based on Article 91 of the LFIP, states that:

[472] Öztürk Neva Övünç, "Geçici korumanın uluslararası koruma rejimine uyumu üzerine bir inceleme," *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 66, no. 1 (2017): 201, https://doi.org/10.1501/Hukfak_0000001891.

[473] Jean-François Durieux, "Temporary Protection: Hovering at the Edges of Refugee Law," in *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2014*, ed. Mónika Ambrus and Ramses A. Wessel, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2015), 45:221, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-060-2_9.

> (1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.
> (2) The actions to be carried out for the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey; measures to be taken to prevent mass influxes; cooperation and coordination among national and international institutions and organisations; determination of the duties and mandate of the central and provincial institutions and organisations shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Council of Ministers.[474]

The LFIP first introduced the legal basis for temporary protection in Article 91. Subsequently, on 22 October 2014, the Council of Ministers issued the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), which laid down detailed rules and procedures for the implementation of this status for displaced people coming from Syria. The Regulation was later updated following the adoption of the presidential system in Turkey.[475] It should also be noted that even before the adoption of the LFIP, Syrians were put under temporary protection starting from October 2011, in accordance with Article 10 of the 1994 Regulation. Since, as stated above, "guest" does not have any legal connotation, it may cause arbitrary practices.[476] After the 1994 Regulation, non-Europeans could benefit from temporary asylum, meaning that while they were undergoing refugee status determination process by the UNHCR, they were granted protection in Turkey.[477] Following this, the "Directive on Reception and Accommodation of Syrian Arab Republic Nationals and Stateless Persons Residing in the Syrian Arab Republic Who Arrive at Turkish Borders in Mass Influx to Seek Asylum" adopted on March 30, 2012 marked the formal introduction of temporary protection status for Syrians in Turkey.[478] The Reception Directive was not shared with the public as only relevant state officers were able to access it.[479]

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[474] Republic of Turkey, *Temporary Protection Regulation*, No. 2014/6883 (October 22, 2014), Official Gazette No. 29153.

[475] *UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency*, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Frequently Asked Questions," accessed 10 March, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/sites/tr/files/legacy-pdf/frequently_asked_questions.pdf.

[476] Center for Middle Eastern Studies-ORSAM, *Suriye'ye Komşu Ülkelerde Suriye'li Mültecilerin Durumu: Bulgular, Sonuçlar ve Öneriler*, 189 (2014), 11.

[477] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 210.

[478] *Suriye'ye Komşu Ülkelerde Suriye'li Mültecilerin Durumu: Bulgular, Sonuçlar ve Öneriler*, 11.

[479] İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği-MAZLUMDER, *Türkiye'de Suriyeli Mülteciler, İstanbul Örneği-Tespitler, İhtiyaçlar ve Öneriler* (2013), 8.

On October 22, 2014, the Temporary Protection Regulation was adopted. This regulation laid out the details of the temporary protection. The conditions and framework of protection, rights, duties, and procedures are detailed in Temporary Protection Regulation.[480] Before that, rules, rights, and duties for people under temporary protection were not clear. As pointed out by Özden, the three main principles of the Temporary Protection Regime are: adherence to the non-refoulement principle, an open-door policy, and "registration with the Turkish authorities along with support within the borders of the camps."[481] Although the uncertainty regarding the legal status of Syrians in Turkey may be considered alleviated, temporary protection status is criticized by Mülteci-Der for its obscurity in terms of legal, political, and social dimensions and its temporality and ambiguity regarding naturalization.[482] Although a legal framework for naturalization had already existed, the issue became a matter of government policy in 2016. On July 2, 2016, President Erdoğan publicly announced the possibility of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrian nationals for the first time, stating, "We will give citizenship to our Syrian brothers and sisters."[483]

The legal framework regarding Syrians is mainly drawn by LFIP at the level of law and Temporary Protection Directive. By 2024, people coming from Syria are the only group that are granted Temporary Protection Status. This provides the main basis for displaced people coming from Syria's right to stay in Turkey. However, Temporary Protection Directive did not eliminate the temporariness within the Turkish asylum system. As the name of the Directive designates, Syrians' status is temporary, which can be terminated by presidential decree. This means that although Temporary Protection Status gives Syrians the right to stay in Turkey, it does not give permanent legal protection to stay within the borders of Turkey. Temporary

[480] Eliçin, "The Role and Capacity of Local Government in Managing Migration in Istanbul," 432.

[481] Şenay Özden, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, MPC Research Reports 2013/05 (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2013), 3.

[482] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 6.

[483] *Anadolu Agency*, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: 'Suriyeli Kardeşlerimize Vatandaşlık İmkânı Vereceğiz,'" July 2, 2016, accessed October 26, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gunun-bAslıklari/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-suriyeli-kardeslerimize-vatandaslik-imkani-verecegiz/601836.

protection status does not fall into the durable solution that is offered by the UNHCR either. The UNHCR considers voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and integration durable solutions for refugee situations.[484] As also discussed in the previous sections, Syrians are not refugees according to the Turkish national law. Displaced people from Syria were not envisioned to have local integration as part of a durable solution. The possibility that Syrians could eventually gain citizenship was first mentioned five years after 2011, when they initially entered the country. Reiterating the emphasis on brotherhood/sisterhood, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on 2 July 2016, stated in Kilis that:

> I believe that among our brothers and sisters, there are those who want to become citizens of the Republic of Turkey. There are steps taken by our Ministry of Interior in this regard. By following up what they can through an office established by our ministry, we will provide this assistance, this support to these brothers and sisters, and we will give them the opportunity to become citizens.[485]

Such developments can be interpreted as legal developments that serve the local integration of Syrians in Turkey. Although people from Syria were not included in the RSD process by the UNHCR, they arrived *en masse* and were collectively placed under temporary protection. Article 16 of the Temporary Protection Regulation states that "individual international protection applications filed by foreigners under this regulation shall not be processed in order to ensure the effective implementation of temporary protection measures during the period of the implementation of temporary protection."[486] That is to say, Syrians are prevented from going through the refugee determination process of the UNHCR by temporary protection measures, with the aim of settling them in safe third countries as "recognized refugees."[487] Çorabatır, the President of İGAM (The Research Centre on Asylum and Migration), points out that when Syrians started to come to Turkey in 2011, UNHCR decided not to register

[484] *UNHCR*, "Solutions." accessed October 26, 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/build-better-futures/solutions.

[485] *Anadolu Agency*, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: 'Suriyeli Kardeşlerimize Vatandaşlık İmkânı Vereceğiz,'" July 2, 2016, accessed October 26, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gunun-basliklari/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-suriyeli-kardeslerimize-vatandaslik-imkani-verecegiz/601836.

[486] Republic of Turkey, *Temporary Protection Regulation*, No. 2014/6883, art. 16.

[487] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 210.

their asylum applications because the Turkish government was concerned about the UNHCR's refugee determination process, which could harm Turkey's encampment policy.[488] Turkey initially assumed that the Assad regime would not last long and that Syrians, after temporary encampment, would return to Syria.[489] The only exception to this is the Syrians who can be categorized as "vulnerable."[490]

According to the recent legal framework, the rights of immigrants have increased in terms of access to the labor market, public education system, and social health care services. Moreover, harmonization measures applied to them.[491] However, "the rights given to the migrants and asylum seekers show variation based on the regions that those people came to Turkey."[492]

In the Turkish legal system, Europeans and non-Europeans are treated under separate legal frameworks. This distinction is also reflected in the differing legal frameworks for Syrians and non-Syrians. As a result, divergent administrative and legal systems exist for them, and their lives take a different shape in practice.[493]

However, the vast majority of Syrians in Turkey live under the Temporary Protection Status, and the number of people who have been granted exceptional citizenship remains limited relative to the total Syrian population. Temporariness and uncertainty are inherent to Temporary Protection Status, making Syrians vulnerable to changes in domestic politics in Turkey or regional policy changes.

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[488] Metin Çorabatır, *The Evolving Response to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs* (Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 2016), 8, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-Dev-Corabatir-FINALWEB.pdf.

[489] Kemal Kirişçi, *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going beyond Hospitality* (Brookings, 2014), 1, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Syrian-Refugees-and-Turkeys-Challenges-May-14-2014.pdf; Çorabatır, *The Evolving Response to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs*, 8.

[490] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 10.

[491] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 11, 13.

[492] Canefe, "Management of Irregular Migration," 17–18.

[493] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 6.

4.2. Main Characteristics of Turkey's International Migration Policy with Regard to Displaced People from Syria

4.2.1. Health and Education Policies under the TPS

Temporary Protection Regulation outlines the services provided to foreigners under temporary protection. Article 26 (1) of the TPR states that: "Foreigners under the scope of this Regulation may be provided with healthcare, education, access to the labor market, social services and assistance, as well as interpretation and similar services." In this context, the services provided to those under the Temporary Protection Regulation will be addressed below.

Yıldırım, Komşuoğlu, Özekmekçi explain Turkey's health policy toward displaced Syrians in three stages. First, existing health facilities were used temporarily; second, migrant health centers were established in cooperation with NGOs; and third, starting in 2016, Syrian health professionals were employed with EU support, accompanied by a reduction in the role of NGOs.[494] Turkey initially perceived the Syrian crisis and the resulting influx as a short-term situation and offered temporary solutions with existing health system resources. However, over time, it became clear that this was a long-term situation. Partnerships were formed with NGOs, and migrant health centers were established, particularly to support primary health care services for displaced Syrians. Starting in 2016, with the help of EU funding, more permanent health services began to be provided to Syrians.[495] These services were supported by EU-funded projects like SIHHAT "Improving the Health Status of the Syrian Population under Temporary Protection and Related Services Provided by Turkish Authorities" (SIHHAT 1 and SIHHAT 2).[496] However, such projects can create perceptions of inequality due to the advantages they provide to migrants compared to local residents. According to the results of a study conducted in Adana, Turkish

[494] Ceren Ark Yıldırım et al., "The Transformation of the Primary Health Care System for Syrian Refuge Es in Turkey," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 28, no. 1 (2019): 75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196819832721.

[495] Yıldırım et al., "The Transformation of the Primary Health Care System for Syrian Refuge Es in Turkey," 92–94.

[496] Please see: SIHHAT Project, https://www.sihhatproject.org/

citizens feel a sense of injustice. They believe it is unfair that Syrians could benefit from services free of charge while they themselves had to pay insurance premiums and co-payments. This perception of inequality reinforces social boundaries towards Syrians.[497]

As already stated in the official website of the UNHCR Turkey, children in Turkey, regardless of whether Turkish citizens or foreigners, have the right to receive primary and secondary education that is free of charge.[498] Unutulmaz divides Turkey's education policy towards Syrian children into three stages. The first stage covers the years 2011-2014, during which the government did not interfere in the education of the Syrians' own "community-based" education approach. This stage coincided with the belief that Syrians would only stay temporarily in Turkey. During this stage, education was in Arabic. Second stage was characterized by the realization that Syrians were likely to stay longer than initially expected. During this stage, a "mixed-model" was adopted, including both NGOs and the control of the state. After 2016, efforts focused on integrating Syrian children into the Turkish education system. This period coincided with the realization that a significant number of Syrians would permanently stay in Turkey. Yet it is important to notice that these periods also overlap.[499] This shows that the changes in education policies for Syrian children have evolved in parallel with the realization that the significant number of Syrian population in Turkey is likely to be permanent. There was initially no legal education policy for the Syrians who were granted temporary protection in 2011. In the first years of the influx, Syrians organized their own education initiatives with the support of NGOs. In 2014, the Ministry of National Education (MONE), with the support of AFAD, opened temporary education centers to provide education in Arabic based on the Syrian curriculum. Syrian teachers also took part in

[497] Selin Siviş, "Who Is (Un)Deserving? Differential Healthcare Access and the Interplay between Social and Symbolic Boundary-Drawing towards Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48, no. 17 (2022): 4029–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2058470.

[498] *UNHCR UN Refugee Agency*, "Education FAQs," accessed May 8, 2025, https://help.unhcr.org/turkiye/faqs/education-faqs/.

[499] Onur K. Unutulmaz, "Turkey's Education Policies towards Syrian Refugees: A Macro-Level Analysis," *International Migration* 57, no. 2 (2019): 238–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12476.

these centers.[500] At this point, possibly also influenced by the perception that Syrians would only stay temporarily, there were no efforts to provide Turkish language education. It should also be noted that transitioning to the second stage involved serious security concerns as there was no strong government involvement during the first stage, which raised concerns about potential security vulnerabilities as the number of Syrian children increased.[501]

In fact, when consider Turkey's dominant policy towards education in ethnic groups' languages, tolerance of the use of Arabic as the language of education in the initial years of the influx is important to note. McCarthy relates this to the "political objectives" of the AKP government.[502] It is argued by McCarthy that Turkey's education policies for Syrian refugee children are shaped by ideological and political concerns rather than the needs of Syrian school-aged children.[503] Although "the transformation of the perception of Turkey's Syrians" played a significant role in the change of education policies toward Syrians,[504] the figures announced by the MONE in 2021 still show that a substantial number of school-aged Syrian children remain outside of the education system. The numbers provided by the Ministry of National Education in 2021 present that a significant number of Syrian children are at school age. The data provided show that "35,707 students were enrolled in kindergarten, 442,817 in elementary school, 348,638 in middle school, and 110,976 in high school. In total, 771 thousand 428 children continue their educational life. There are 432,956 children of educational age who do not attend school,"[505] indicating that, despite

[500] Mehmet Fansa and Mehmet Sayıcı, "Education and Integration in Countries with Syrian Children: Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Germany and Turkey," *Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies* 12, no. 2 (2025): 82, https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/2123.

[501] Unutulmaz, "Turkey's Education Policies towards Syrian Refugees," 240.

[502] Aslıhan Tezel McCarthy, "Politics of Refugee Education: Educational Administration of the Syria n Refugee Crisis in Turkey," *Journal of Educational Administration and History* 50, no. 3 (2018): 224, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220620.2018.1440541.

[503] McCarthy, "Politics of Refugee Education: Educational Administration of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey," 236.

[504] Unutulmaz, "Turkey's Education Policies towards Syrian Refugees," 245.

[505] *Refugees Association*, "Number of Syrians in Turkey July 2023," (August 22, 2023), accessed May 8, 2025, https://multeciler.org.tr/eng/number-of-syrians-in-turkey/.

these enrollment figures, there is still a considerable number of Syrian children who are not participating in the education system.

4.2.2. Border and Mobility Management

When the repercussions of the Arab Spring turned into a civil war in Syria in April 2011, Turkey's declared policy towards the Syrians who fled to Turkey was the "open-door" and "non-refoulement".[506] It was a political decision[507] to act in this way since the 1994 Regulation clearly stated that Turkey would stop mass influxes at its border unless a political decision to the contrary was made. However, as an EU candidate, Turkey took steps to align its border control regime with that of the EU, which meant tighter border checks for Turkey and strengthening the borders to stop irregular and unwanted migrants. Nevertheless, border control was expected to be handled by a civilian authority under the Ministry of Interior rather than Turkish Armed Forces as a necessity for EU accession. It is put forth by Toğral Koca that this practice still reflects a militarization approach.[508]

Before the Syrian civil war, starting from September 2009, Turkish and Syrian people enjoyed visa-free travel.[509] Thus, Syrians who had passports and valid documents were able to enter Turkey as usual, and those who did not have valid documents were sheltered at temporary refugee camps.[510] At first, Syrian refugees were called "guests"[511] with no legal rights. Syrians received services mostly in the form of aid. The number of Syrians fleeing to Turkey increased day by day. At first, some of them had the chance to go back and forth between Turkey and Syria.

[506] Eliçin, "The Role and Capacity of Local Government in Managing Migration in Istanbul," 432; Çorabatır, *The Evolving Response to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs*, 11.

[507] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 76.

[508] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 215.

[509] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 18, no. 3 (2013): 202.

[510] Dinçer et al., *Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality*, 5.

[511] Kirişçi, *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going beyond Hospitality*, 1.

However, as the conflict soured, the numbers continually escalated. When their settlement areas were bombed, or any armed clashes occurred, they crossed the Turkish borders. When the conflict subsided, they returned to their homes.[512]

Since April 2011, Turkey has closely monitored the developments in Syria, and five temporary tent cities were initially established in Hatay's Yayladağı and surrounding districts. In 2012, the first container city was opened in Kilis to provide more durable accommodation for the growing number of displaced Syrians.[513] It was claimed that Turkey would create a "buffer zone" at the border if the numbers increased rapidly. In response to these claims, in May 2011, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs then, declared that Turkey would not close its borders to its "Syrian brothers" in any way, even if their number exceeded 10.000. Turkey declared that no Syrians would be rejected, and Turkey would continue to implement the open-door policy.[514]

In the first instance, Turkey insisted on the temporary nature of their stay, and policies were mainly "ad hoc," as stated by Şahin Mencütek.[515] Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said that "Syria is our domestic affair,"[516] and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu emphasized Turkey's humanitarian responsibilities.[517] Genç, Heck, and Hess argue that Turkey's response in the first phase of the Syrian conflict was different from Turkey's reaction to the refugees coming from the Iraqi border in the 1990s, which also resulted in the adoption of the 1994 Regulation, which is considered a document prepared by a "securitized perspective" by the authors.[518]

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[512] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 78.

[513] *Turkish Red Crescent*, "Suriye İnsani Yardım Operasyonu Üçüncü Yılında," March 14, 2014, accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Haber/HaberArsiviDetay/1196.

[514] *Deutsche Welle*, "Türkiye: Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Kapımız Açık," June 15, 2011, accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.dw.com/tr/Turkiye-suriyeli-sığınmacılara-kapımız-açık/a-15155526.

[515] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 73.

[516] *Birgün*, "Erdoğan: Suriye Bizim İç Meselemiz," August 8, 2011, accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.birgun.net/haber/erdogan-suriye-bizim-ic-meselemiz-59465.

[517] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 78.

[518] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 6.

While responding to the Syrian civil war and the consequent mass influx, Turkish officials based their arguments on humanitarianism and Turkey's quest to be a regional power and mediator in regional conflicts. Turkey responded to the mass influx as an emergency case. Turkish Red Crescent, which is a semi-state foundation, various municipalities close to Syrian borders, and the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) participated in the acceptance of people coming from Syria and treated themin the first instance.[519] IHH was also the only NGO that could enter into the camps for a while.

As a result of the emergency situation, registration of the Syrians while entering Turkey was not systematic in the beginning. It is pointed out by Çorabatır that Gendarmerie took notes regarding the IDs of the people coming from Syria.[520] As time passed, Turkey's policies changed as the situation in Syria worsened, and that it became clear that the conflict would last longer than anticipated by the Turkish authorities.

In practice, the open-door policy of Turkey was not implemented uninterruptedly throughout the conflict. For example, by the summer of 2012, when the conflict in Syria intensified, especially in Aleppo and its neighbourhood provinces, the crossing of Syrians was kept limited.[521] NGOs working in that region stated that Turkey refused thousands of people trapped in unsafe border zones.[522]

Turkey's open-door policy was also interrupted because of the Islamic State militants' attacks. As Islamic State militants in Kobane advanced in September 2014, local people left the town and poured into Turkish borders. Turkey let the people in from a 30-kilometer section of the Turkey-Syria border, who were waiting at the Turkish border. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

[519] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 79.

[520] Metin Çorabatır's (President of İGAM) statement at "The Global Refugee and Migration Congress," Session "Immigration-in Immigration-out" October 15, 2019, Gaziantep in response to the question: Who kept the records of the Syrians entering to Turkey in April 2011?

[521] Dinçer et al., *Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality*, 5.

[522] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 81.

stated that only two of the nine crossing points were left open by Turkey after opening the border for a short time.[523] Crossings from the Turkish border were closely scrutinized. Borders were kept open only for commerce and humanitarian aid and were opened and closed depending on the circumstances.[524]

By 2014, Turkey had started to register Syrians more systematically, and the open-door policy was turned into a selective open-border policy. However, by the autumn of 2015, Turkey cancelled the open-door policy, it was no longer easy for anyone to cross the Turkish borders.[525] Unlike previous policies, especially after 2015, Turkey allowed the reception of Syrians only under the condition of "specific humanitarian circumstances and the availability of places within the camps," and new camps were established in Syrian territories.[526] The dynamics of the Syrian civil war affected Turkey's response to the conflict.[527] After that, the people living in the camps tried to reach Europe through the Aegean Sea, and some of them paid human smugglers to cross Turkish borders.[528]

Regarding Turkey's policies, there are different views. Toğral Koca considers the developments regarding Turkish border controls as securitarian developments. On the other hand, Tolay argues that Turkey adopted a humanitarian approach over security interests even in the case of mass influx. She further argues that there are "some dark spots" even in practice. The Turkish case is an example of how "a change of mindset can be translated into different policy practices."[529] "Some dark

[523] *BBC*, "Türkiye Suriye Sınırını Kısmen Kapattı," September 22, 2014, accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/09/140922_turkiye_kobani.

[524] Kılıç Buğra Kanat and Kadir Üstün, *Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Toward Integration* (SETA - Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2015), 12.

[525] Genç et al., "The Multilayered Migration Regime in Turkey," 6.

[526] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 81.

[527] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 84–85.

[528] İlker Ataç et al., "Contested B/Orders. Turkey's Changing Migration Regime," *Movements Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies* 3, no. 2 (2017): 13.

[529] Juliette Tolay, *The EU and Turkey's Asylum Policy in Light of the Syrian Crisis*, Global Turkey in Europe II (Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2014), 136, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09868.13.

spots" in practice are important to dwell on a little more. Toğral Koca highlights that border control activities are not open to "public scrutiny and civil society as well as intergovernmental organizations have limited access to the responsible authorities."[530] Turkish practices of admission of people from Syria and their return are problematic areas. Monitoring at the borders is not adequate, there are transparency problems, and steps are taken secretly in practice. Toğral Koca further argues that the right to seek asylum and principle of non-refoulement is obstructed after the mass influx.[531]

Turkey's practices to control and confront mass influxes were materialized in the construction of a "Security Wall" along its borders, which was announced in 2015, with the aim of increasing border security, combating all types of smuggling, and confronting illegal border crossings. Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) started to build the Security Wall along Turkey's border with Syria. TOKİ completed 564 kilometers of it, whereas the governorates of the border provinces completed 200 kilometers of the wall in 2018. The Security Wall project has physical, electronic, and advanced technological layers. The wall is envisaged to be equipped with new technologies such as drones, advanced surveillance systems active 24 hours, thermal cameras, remote-controlled weapons systems, seismic and acoustic sensors, and modular concrete walls.[532] In this sense, when the Syrian Civil War started, Turkey accepted Syrians as guests with the expectation that the conflict would not last long and the Assad regime would end. As the conflict prolonged, Turkey's border controls tightened. Eventually, Turkey built the Security Wall along its southeastern borders to ensure security.

4.3. The Securitization of Migration of Syrians in Turkey? : Interaction of Discourses, Practices, and Perceptions

Following the civil war that began in Syria in 2011, Turkey became the world's largest host country for refugees, hosting about 3.2 million refugees, including

[530] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 216.

[531] Toğral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," 216.

[532] *Anadolu Agency*, "Turkey Installs 764 km Security Wall on Syria Border," June 9, 2018, accessed March 10, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-installs-764-km-security-wall-on-syria-border/1170257.

displaced people from Syria.[533] The ruling party AKP declared the "open door" policy and welcomed people from Syria with hospitality rhetoric, including "ensar-muhacir" discourses, and emphasized neo-Ottoman narratives, highlighting the historical responsibility imposed by the Ottoman legacy, referring to Syrians as "brothers."[534] This rhetoric continued for a while without significant public discontent. Turkey thereby sought international credibility and prestige by admitting Syrians under a humanitarian obligation.[535] This approach was shaped by a sense of humanitarian responsibility rooted in religious and cultural ties.[536] However, as the conflict continued and economic hardship deepened in Turkey,[537] Syrians have gradually become the focal point of economic debates, social tensions, and political disputes.[538] Over time, the increasing number of refugees, economic hardship, and social tensions have intertwined migration with security and politics.[539] During this process, migration has increasingly been framed as a security issue. However, this situation has not been the result of a conscious securitization policy by the government.[540] Rather, it has been shaped by the rhetoric of opposition actors,[541]

[533] *UNHCR*, "UNHCR Turkey Stats," accessed October 26, 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/hakkimizda/unhcr-tuerkiye-stats

[534] İbrahim Saylan ve üuge Aknur, "Discourses of Turkish Opposition Parties towards Syrian Refugees: Securitization and Repatriation," *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 24, no 2 (August 10, 2023): 266, https://doi.org/10.17494/ogusbd.1255254.

[535] Senem Çevik ve Efe Sevin, "A Quest for Soft Power: Turkey and the Syrian Refugee Crisis," *Journal of Communication Management* 21, no 4 (November 6, 2017): 400, https://doi.org/10.1108/JCOM-04-2017-0042.

[536] Please see: Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects," *Nationalities Papers* 41, no 6 (November 2013): 865-70, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.857299.

[537] Fulya Memişoğlu ve Aslı Ilgıt, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Multifaceted Challenges, Diverse Players and Ambiguous Policies," *Mediterranean Politics* 22, no 3 (July 3, 2017): 318, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1189479.

[538] Zeynep Yanaşmayan, Ayşen Üstübici, ve Zeynep Kaşlı, "Under the Shadow of Civilizationist Populist Discourses: Political Debates on Refugees in Turkey," *New Diversities* 21, no 2 (2019): 41.

[539] Yanaşmayan, Üstübici, ve Kaşlı, 41-44.

[540] M. Murat Erdoğan, "'Securitization from Society' and 'Social Acceptance': Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 17, no 68 (2020): 76, https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.883022.

[541] Yanaşmayan, Üstübici, ve Kaşlı, "Under the Shadow of Civilizationist Populist Discourses: Political Debates on Refugees in Turkey," 44.

particularly groups such as the Victory Party,[542] and public opinion.[543] The use of refugees as cheap and precarious labor, rising unemployment rates, and rhetoric such as "Syrians are taking our jobs" have intensified public reaction against Syrians.[544] Public perception in Turkey has increasingly been shaped by concerns about cultural incompatibility and social anxiety, as well as discourses such as "Syrians commit crimes and pose a "security" threat."[545]

As stated in the theoretical framework of the thesis, according to the Copenhagen School's securitization approach, securitization occurs through the discourse of political elites. Accordingly, states or political actors present a particular issue as an "existential threat" and take "exceptional measures" to deal with this threat, legitimizing these measures through successful securitization processes. However, in Turkey, there is no evident tendency toward conscious securitization in the discourse of the AKP elite. With the exception of some instances where Erdoğan has used this issue as a "card" against Europe (and even here, the presence of Syrians in Turkey is not presented as a security threat), the AKP elites generally adopt a discourse that supports Syrians, emphasizing their contribution to the Turkish labor market[546], their low crime rates[547], and they use brotherhood-themed expressions[548].

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[542] The following books written by Ümit Özdağ, Leader of the Victory Party, which emerged during this process based its arguments mainly on immigrants: Ümit Özdağ, *Stratejik Göç Mühendisliği: İç Savaşa Sürüklenmek İstenen Türkiye*, (Ankara: Kripto, 2020); Ümit Özdağ, *Demografik İşgal* (İstanbul: Destek, 2023).

[543] Erdoğan, "'Securitization from Society' and 'Social Acceptance'", 76.

[544] M. Murat Erdoğan, "Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi (SB 2023)"August 2024, 108-9, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/sites/tr/files/2025-04/suriyeliler_barometresi_2023_1.pdf.; Selen Girit, "Suriyeli mülteciler dosyası: İstihdamda 'en alttakiler'" *BBC News*, 7 October 2015, accessed 10 May, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151007_suriyeliler

[545] Erdoğan, 152.

[546] *Cumhuriyet*, "AKP'li Özhaseki'den 'mülteci' açıklaması: Sanayiyi onlar ayakta tutuyor; gönderemezsiniz," July 27, 2021, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/akpli-ozhasekiden-multeci-aciklamasi-sanayiyi-onlar-ayakta-tutuyor-gonderemezsiniz-1855656

[547] Muhammed Boztepe, "'Suriyelilerin suç işleme oranı yüzde 20 azaldı'," *Anadolu Agency*, August 28, 2018, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/suriyelilerin-suc-isleme-orani-yuzde-20-azaldi/1240687

[548] Yıldızalp Merve, Mümin Altaş, İsa Toprak, Yasemin Kalyoncuoğlu, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Ne biz ne milletimiz ne de Suriyeli kardeşlerimiz bu sinsi tuzağa düşmeyecek," *Anadolu Agency*, July 7,

In this sense, when we evaluate the situation in the Turkish context of securitization, we see that the process is more complex. While the government tries not to portray Syrians as a threat in its rhetoric, the opposition and general public opinion frame the Syrian presence in terms of various security concerns. Thus, the triadic relationship between forced migrants, politics, and security is intertwined at both the rhetorical and practical levels. This also feeds the experience of "insecurity" that Syrians feel in their daily lives. For example, in the summer of 2024, Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya announced that 729,000 Syrians were not found at their addresses, and this data was shared with the public for the first time.[549] However, field data obtained from Syrians suggests a different narrative regarding absence from the address, creating a serious sense of insecurity among Syrians. The government's efforts to insist on the brotherhood and humanitarian rhetoric while tightening border controls and promoting rhetoric of return,[550] coupled with the opposition[551] and society's coding of Syrians as threats in many aspects,[552] indicate that the relationship between migration and (in)security in Turkey is evolving in a complex manner.

4.3.1. The Government's Discourse and Practice Strategy as a Dual Approach

As mentioned earlier, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has expressed a humanitarian approach by referring to Syrians as "guests," "brothers," and "muhacir" in its official discourse. However, this discourse also reflects a neo-

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2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ne-biz-ne-milletimiz-ne-de-suriyeli-kardeslerimiz-bu-sinsi-tuzaga-dusmeyecek/3264087

[549] Fundanur Öztürk, "Kayıtlı olduğu adreste bulunamayan 729 bin Suriyeli, kaydını güncellemezse ne olacak?" *BBC News*, August 4, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cvgxwjqxl9go

[550] For example, in an opinion letter published in 2022, Burhanettin Duran examines the rhetorical shift in Erdoğan's discourse between return and the idea of not handing over "our brothers" to their killers. Burhanettin Duran, "Erdoğan'ın Suriyeli Söylemi Ne Diyor?" *SETA*, May 10 2022, https://www.setav.org/yorum/erdoganin-suriyeli-soylemi-ne-diyor.

[551] Victory Party, "Zafer Partisi örtülü istilayı Anadolu kalesi ile sona erdirecektir," accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.zaferpartisi.org.tr/Haberler/zafer-partisi-ortulu-istilayi-anadolu-kalesi-ile-sona-erdirecektir/ ; Hande Karacasu, "Sessiz İstila," YouTube video, May 3, 2022, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EpPo5vjC2bE

[552] Mustafa Aydın, ed., "Kantitatif Araştırma Raporu: Türkiye Siyasal Sosyal Eğilimler Araştırması 2021" (İstanbul: Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye Çalışmaları Grubu, Akademetre ve Global Akademi, January 4, 2022), 97.

Ottoman approach in foreign policy. This points to Turkey's regional leadership role and historical responsibility.[553] When the civil war broke out in Syria, the rhetoric and foreign policy line of then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu aligned with this approach.[554] These emphases continued after he left office.[555] Nonetheless, as emphasized in previous sections, the literature has not examined the relationship between the forced migration of Syrians, capital owners, and the state as extensively as it has other dimensions. It is important to underline that Syrians have also become part of the urban poor as "urban refugees" and have been part of the labor force as cheap and precarious labor, serving the interests of capital owners. These conditions also illustrate Turkey's incorporation into the neoliberal economic system. Consequently, both the AKP and capital owners adopt a more accommodating stance regarding the presence of Syrians as a cheap and precarious labor force.[556]

However, in the face of growing public pressure and social unease, the government has sought to alleviate these concerns through security measures targeting irregular migration and migrant smuggling, rather than Syrians themselves. For example, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya has made statements about strategies to combat irregular migration, emphasizing that control rests with the state.[557] While initiatives such as Mobile Migration Points and strict inspections are presented in the official

[553] Nermin Aydemir, "Framing Syrian Refugees in Turkish Politics: A Qualitative Analysis on Party Group Speeches," *Territory, Politics, Governance* 11, no 4 (May 19, 2023): 666, https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.2012247.

[554] Çevik ve Sevin, "A Quest for Soft Power", 402.

[555] Aydemir, "Framing Syrian Refugees in Turkish Politics," 666.

[556] Danièle Bélanger and Cenk Saraçoğlu, "Processes of Wage Theft: The Neoliberal Labor Market and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", In *Refugees on the Move: Crisis and Response in Turkey and Europe*, ed. Erol Balkan and Zümray Kutlu Tonak, 1st ed. (Berghahn Books, 2022), https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800733848; Cenk Saraçoğlu and Danièle Bélanger, "Suriyeli Mülteciler ve Geçici Koruma Rejimi: Sermaye için Mekansal Ayar", In *Marx 202: Bugünü Karl Marx ile Düşünmek*, ed. Esengül Ayyıldız, Yasemin Ahi, ve Muharrem Açıkgöz (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2020), 303-33; Taner Akpınar, *Sermaye'nin Hafif Piyadeleri: "Kaçak" Göçmen İşçiler* (İstanbul: Kor, 2020).

[557] Presidency of Migration Management, "İçişleri Bakanımız Sn. Ali Yerlikaya, Düzensiz Göçle Mücadelede 4 Strateji Uygulandığını İfade Etti", YouTube video, March 1, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNIcUMhe1Vs&list=PL_3H97kZKVHKeZdKS5Tl0Bg8wK0yu7Lcd&index=2

discourse as efforts to combat irregular migration.[558] However, Syrian refugees perceive them as direct threats to themselves, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Data and developments related to irregular migration in Turkey are regularly shared on the official websites and social media accounts of the Ministry of Interior and the Presidency of Migration Management, such as X (formerly Twitter). This gives the impression that Turkey is effectively combating "irregular migration," but the information targets irregular migrants and migrant smugglers, not Syrians in Turkey. Information includes up-to-date details on operation results against irregular migration and the number of irregular migrants apprehended.[559] Thus, it is demonstrated that control and security are in the hands of the state through information and data, and that what constitutes security and what constitutes insecurity is determined by the state. Knowledge is presented as such.

There are inconsistencies between the government's discourse and bureaucratic practices. As will be discussed in the following chapter, while Syrian refugees are officially described as "guests" in the state's rhetoric, security-focused policies such as strict inspections and deportation procedures are implemented in practice.

[558] Presidency of Migration Management, "İçişleri Bakanımız Sn. Ali Yerlikaya, Mobil Göç Noktası Araçlarını Anlattı," YouTube video, March 1, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzRxXl-1nQc&list=PL_3H97kZKVHKeZdKS5Tl0Bg8wK0yu7Lcd&index=3 ; Presidency of Migration Management, "Düzensiz Göç ve Göçmen Kaçakçılarıyla Mücadelemiz Kararlılıkla ve Kesintisiz Devam Edecek," YouTube video, March 15, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMXhKrwI4X0&list=PL_3H97kZKVHKeZdKS5Tl0Bg8wK0yu7Lcd&index=6 ; Presidency of Migration Management, "İçişleri Bakanımız Ali Yerlikaya: "Mobil Göç Araçlarında 64 Bin 639 Düzensiz Göçmen Tespit Edildi"," YouTube video, March 18, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsXj6jCLIEQ&list=PL_3H97kZKVHKeZdKS5Tl0Bg8wK0yu7Lcd&index=7

[559] Presidency of Migration Management, "Sınır Dışı Sayısında Artış Devam Ediyor," Presidency of Migration Management, December 25, 2022, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.goc.gov.tr/sinir-disi-119817 ; Presidency of Migration Management, "Ülkemiz Düzensiz Göçe Hedef Olmaktan ve Transit Göç Rotası Olmaktan Çıktı," May 22, 2025, accessed May 27, 2025, https://www.goc.gov.tr/ulkemiz-duzensiz-goce-hedef-olmaktan-ve-transit-goc-rotasi-olmaktan-cikti ; Presidency of Migration Management, "Düzensiz göçle mücadelemiz kapsamında," X, December 22, 2022, https://x.com/Gocidaresi/status/1606962364322312192 ; Presidency of Migration Management, "Ali Yerlikaya, "Ülke genelinde göçmen kaçakçılığı organizatörleri," X, May 2, 2025, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1918171445064090036 ; Presidency of Migration Management, "İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya: Sosyal Medyada Paylaşılan Verilerin 8 Eylül 2022'den Önceki Veriler Olduğunu Tespit Ettik," July 5, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.goc.gov.tr/icisleri-bakani-ali-yerlikaya-sosyal-medyada-paylasilan-verilerin-8-eylul-2022den-onceki-veriler-oldugunu-tespit-ettik

Although public statements emphasize deportation measures for irregular migrants, the interviews reveal that these measures create a sense of deportability for all forcibly displaced migrants, whether documented or undocumented. This, in turn, generates feelings of insecurity and exclusion among refugees.

In conclusion, the Turkish government's policy towards Syrian refugees can be seen as an attempt to balance humanitarian rhetoric with security-focused practices. However, instead of fostering a sense of security among migrants, these measures create feelings of insecurity. Measures taken to ensure the host society's sense of security end up generating insecurity for the migrants. This points to the idea that security can be like a Mobius strip, where one side seamlessly transforms into the other.[560] This dual approach aims both to address apublic concerns domestically and to present Turkey as a responsible humanitarian actor internationally.

It was noted above that the government's response has also been shaped by the political positioning of the opposition. Opposition parties such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Victory Party have developed discourses that frame displaced people from Syria as a security, economic, and cultural threat. For example, in a study published in year 2024, tweets of the leader of Victory Party Ümit Özdağ's along with other party leaders were examined and it was found out that his tweets depict the arrival of refugees as an invasion and blame them for the country's ongoing economic and political challenges. Furthermore, it is argued that these tweets target the government for adopting an Islam-oriented foreign policy and for granting citizenship to Syrians. Essentially, the study contends that Özdağ's nationalist and anti-refugee discourse portrays refugees as scapegoats, critiques the government's policies, and deepens social divisions.[561] In addition, videos such as "Silent Invasion" and statements like "we will send Syrians back" have resonated with the public and reinforced negative perceptions regarding migrants in general

[560] Didier Bigo, "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts," *Security Dialogue* 45, no 3 (June 2014): 221, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614530459.

[561] Sefa Seçen, Al Serhun, Bekir and Arslan, "Electoral dynamics, new nationalisms, and party positions on Syrian refugees in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 25, no 3 (May 26 2024): 440, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2024.2310850.

and Syrians. These discourses have heightened public security concerns regarding refugees, putting pressure on the government's humanitarian rhetoric and contributing to the dual strategy described above.[562]

In fact, in the early years of mass migration, the Republican People's Party (CHP) included "an emphasis on human rights and universal values" in the report titled "Between Borders: From a Humanitarian Drama to a Test of Humanity," prepared by the Parliamentary Committee on Migration and Immigrants. Throughout the report, the principles of universal human rights are prominently highlighted. Moreover, in this report, which has also been published as a book, it is stated that "it should be acknowledged that most of the Syrian refugees who were initially admitted as guests and later granted temporary protection status have become permanent residents in our country."[563] However, the CHP's position later shifted and became more negative. For example, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was the leader of the CHP at the time, declared in 2021 that "We will send our Syrian brothers and sisters back to their homeland in peace... Under our government, we will bid farewell to our Syrian guests within two years."[564] In 2024, the CHP filed a lawsuit with the Council of State (Danıştay) to annul the regulation granting Syrians an exemption from work permit requirements.[565] However, the CHP's rhetoric does not advocate forced return. The shift in discourse has been analyzed by Erdoğan in his work on "societal securitization" and "societal acceptance."[566]

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[562] Bekir Berat Özipek, "CHP ve SURİYELİ SIĞINMACILAR: Ayrımcılık, Ötekileştirme ve Nefret Üretiminin Politik Dili," June 2021, https://www.sivilsayfalar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/chp-raporu-bekir-berat-o%CC%88zipek-.pdf?utm.

[563] Veli Ağbaba, *Sınırlar Arasında: İnsanlık Dramından, İnsanlık Sınavına*, 1st ed. (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2016), 166-67.

[564] CHP, "CHP lideri Kılıçdaroğlu: 'Suriyeli kardeşlerimizi, huzur içinde kendi ülkelerine göndereceğiz,'" June 16, 2021, accessed May 10, 2025, https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-kilicdaroglu-suriyeli-kardeslerimizi-huzur-icinde-kendi-ulkelerine-gonderecegiz

[565] CHP, "Murat Bakan: 'Suriyelilere Çalışma İzni Muafiyeti Getiren Yönetmeliğin İptali İçin Danıştay'a Dava Açtık,'" December 12, 2024, accessed May 10, 2025, https://chp.org.tr/haberler/murat-bakan-suriyelilere-calisma-zni-muafiyeti-getiren-yonetmeligin-ptali-cin-danistaya-dava-actik

[566] M. Murat Erdoğan, "'Securitization from Society' and 'Social Acceptance': Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 17, no. 68 (2020): 73–92, https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.883022.

Since its foundation, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi) has adopted the harshest rhetoric among opposition parties regarding Syrian refugees, making these issues the Party's main agenda. The party argues that the continued presence of refugees in Turkey poses a threat to the country's security and demographic structure and advocates for a policy of forced return. The party's leader, Ümit Özdağ, has stated that Syrian refugees should be returned to their home country and this process should be carried out in cooperation with the Syrian (Assad) government.[567]

In other words, the rhetoric of opposition parties towards Syrian refugees is shaped around themes of security and return. Moreover, the 2018 report of the Transboundary Migrations Commission, prepared for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is now a government partner, adopts a negative tone toward Syrian migrants.[568]

In terms of public perception, growing anxiety and security concerns have been clearly observable. The Syrian Barometer data, regularly compiled by Murat Erdoğan and his team, are noteworthy in this regard. The change in public perception is clearly evident in the following statement:

> Since April 2011, the Turkish public's attitude toward Syrians arriving in Turkey, which was initially quite supportive and fragile but generally considered "high" in terms of social acceptance, has steadily become more negative. In this context, it is possible to speak of a process that began with solidarity and "social acceptance," evolved into "fragility," then "tolerance," and finally "rejection."[569]

In fact, the transformation is so sharp that it is reflected in the report as follows:

> The demand and expectation of Turkish society in SB-2023 is 89% (the highest level among all SB studies) for "Syrians to leave/be sent out of Turkey." The Turkish public's previous

[567] Adem Demir, "Siyasetin göçmen söylemi: Dünün "misafirleri" bugünün "istilacıları"… Türkiye'nin sığınmacı politikası sertleşiyor," *Independent Turkish*, April 19, 2022, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.indyturk.com/node/499841/siyaset/siyasetin-g%C3%B6%C3%A7men-s%C3%B6ylemi-d%C3%BCn%C3%BCn-misafirleri-bug%C3%BCn%C3%BCn-istilac%C4%B1lar%C4%B1%E2%80%A6-t%C3%BCrkiyenin? ; *Halk TV*, "Geri Dönmek İstemeyen Suriyelilere Ne Olacak? Ümit Özdağ'dan Yanıt Geldi!" YouTube video, August 26, 2023, accessed May 10, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iVpbX34nIw

[568] MHP, *Sınır Aşan Göçler Komisyonu Raporu*, 2018, https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/kitaplar/sinirasan_gocler_komisyonu_raporu.pdf.

[569] Erdoğan, "Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi (SB 2023)," 255.

> view that they should be "sent to safe areas," which also took protection into account, has also changed and has turned into "they should be sent back to Syria," which means "wherever they go." This shows that the Turkish public's threshold for tolerance and kindness has been exceeded.[570]

In conclusion, the securitization of Syrian migration in Turkey is not a straightforward process driven solely by the government's political discourse or deliberate policy decisions. Rather, it emerges as a complex interplay of competing discourses, bureaucratic practices, and public perceptions. While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has maintained humanitarian rhetoric of brotherhood and historical responsibility, it has simultaneously implemented security-focused practices that generate a climate of uncertainty and fear among displaced Syrians. This dual strategy, balancing hospitality rhetoric with control measures, creates an ambiguous environment in which security and insecurity are mutually reinforcing.

4.4. Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter is to reveal how people who came from Syria are governed in Turkey and how governance, institutional structure, and border policies evolved and changed. Turkey, as stated earlier in this dissertation, was envisaged as a country without foreigners, and it did not have a fully fledged law on foreigners and international protection until 2013. Although legal and institutional arrangements have been made in this area with the LFIP adopted in 2013, Syrians have not been able to benefit from the international protection defined in this law. The overwhelming majority of Syrians in Turkey have been granted temporary protection status as stipulated by the Temporary Protection Directive, which entered into force in 2014. Although the presence of Syrians in Turkey has been legally established by TPD, this status has not been a satisfactory answer to their temporariness and the uncertainty of their future in Turkey. On the one hand, their existence is repeatedly presented as necessary and "cheap labor." The Temporary Protection Status can be terminated by a presidential decree, and this makes them vulnerable to changes in the political climate of Turkey. In addition to these, Syrians are trapped in Turkey due to the closure of the border crossings with the construction of the border walls. In the

[570] Erdoğan, 256.

next chapter, the effects of the increasingly centralized migration management on Syrian refugees in Gaziantep and how they experience it will be discussed.

CHAPTER 5

UNDERSTANDING THE LIVES OF DISPLACED PEOPLES FROM SYRIA FROM THE FIELD

5.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to unpack Turkey's management of displaced Syrians[571], primarily through the experiences, interpretations and perceptions of Syrians living in Gaziantep and civil society actors and municipalities that are actively engaged in protecting or serving displaced Syrians in Gaziantep. The historical context, Turkey's positioning within the global neoliberal economic order, and regional politics have been influential in the admission of the displaced people from Syria to the territory of Turkey and their management within the borders. However, this cannot be analyzed in isolation from the temporal dimension as time plays a crucial role in shaping the dynamics. In this context, Turkey's response to the mass migration from Syria will be analyzed within the framework of the security understanding presented in the theoretical framework chapter. The findings, which are expected to enrich the theoretical framework, will be presented without being ignored.

5.2. Notes on Interviews

Within the scope of this thesis, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with a total of 25 displaced persons from Syria and 17 stakeholders, including civil society and municipality actors. The interviews with people working in state

[571] In the literature, the term Syrian refugees is frequently used for persons from Syria who came to Turkey after 2011 and are under temporary protection. However, since Turkey has not lifted the geographical reservation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, these persons are not legally recognized as refugees in Turkey. In addition, the term Syrians in Turkey does not accurately reflect the current situation, as people from Syria in the post-2011 migration to Turkey come from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

institutions and bureaucracy, who have a role in the admission, stay and exit practices of people coming from Syria, could not be conducted due to the refusal of permission by the Presidency of Migration Management. However, even the denial of this permission may indicate that the Migration Management has entered into a spiral of increasing secrecy.[572]

The biggest challenge I experienced while searching for displaced people coming from Syria to interview within the scope of this study was the intense anxiety experienced by Syrians. First of all, they asked whether the interview questions contained political content or not and indicated they would accept or refuse to be interviewed accordingly. Some displaced Syrians asked me to see the questions planned to be asked in the interview, and there were some who refused to be interviewed after seeing the questions. However, the biggest difficulty I had with the interviews was the high level of anxiety among displaced Syrians as a result of the "Kayseri events" that took place in the summer of 2024. Many were worried that I might be a "spy," and there were Syrians who sincerely told me that "spie"' had infiltrated among Syrians and that there were various spies working for both the Assad regime and the Turkish government. Based on my observation, what Syrians experienced was "a state of intense uneasiness." However, I was still able to interview 25 displaced persons from Syria with whom I had a trusting relationship.

The community generally referred to as "Syrians" is actually made up of many different groups of people. Considering that their experiences and perceptions in Turkey will inevitably differ from each other, I paid attention to this while selecting the interviewees. As a result, I interviewed 18 Arabs, 6 Turkmen, and 1 Kurdish inviduals with diverse legal statuses in Turkey, such as residence permit, temporary protection status (TPS) or naturalized citizenship. Another important point is that their legal status, even the naturalized citizenship, is not fully guaranteed. During the interviews, I also paid attention to gender balance, and I interviewed 16 men and 9 women coming from Syria. However, due to the nature of this research, I cannot claim that they represent all individuals from Syria living in Gaziantep.

[572] On secrecy of migration management please see: Karadağ and Tatar, "Powered by Secrecy."

The main topics covered in the interviews with the displaced Syrians include their stories of coming to Turkey, their relations with the host community and other displaced peoples, experiences with regard to their legal status in Turkey and experiences with regard to their rights and responsibilities. They were also asked about their education, utilization of health services, and their children's educational experiences. The interview also included questions about their experiences with administrative detention, deportation, and time spent in removal centers, thoughts on voluntary return and future plans. The interview involved items about Turkey's migration and refugee policy, its changes over time, and recent developments, as well. During the interviews, I realized that some questions were unclear to my interviewees, so I rephrased the same question differently to make them clearer. However, when interviewees interpreted the same questions differently and gave varing answers, I took notes by listening without interrupting. Hence, I allowed participants to speak when they wanted to tell their own stories when prompted by some of the interview questions.

The questions posed to civil society actors or international organization staff mainly focused on their fields of activity, the challenges they faced when carrying out their activities, how their activities changed over time, and what role they played in Turkey's migration management. I specifically included questions that required them to interpret Turkey's migration and refugee policy in the context of security. Apart from these questions, how they served displaced persons from Syria and challenges they faced were asked. In my interview with the personnel at the Migration Management and Harmonization Branch Directorate of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality, I asked questions that would help me to understand the role of the municipality in migration and refugee management, different from the questions I asked civil society workers. One of the questions I asked all interview groups was how they perceived the future of Syrians in Turkey. Interestingly, after answering, the participants also asked for my opinion on the subject.

As a requirement of the interviews, they had to read the informed consent form, write their names, and sign it. This was a challenge, but I was able to overcome it with the assurance that their names and the organizations they worked for would remain

strictly anonymous. This is a common challenge in this type of research. As Bigo noted in one of his studies,

> On the research protocol, it was quite impossible to present and obtain a signed ethical form. All informants agreed to speak, but on the condition that they would not be identified directly or recorded. The secrecy and the fear of the hierarchy is one of the transversal characteristics of the professionals of security.[573]

Interestingly, my participants experienced such uneasiness even though they were not security sector employees.

5.3. Internal and External Immigration Control Mechanisms

Inspired by the work of Brochmann, this study is based on the argument that both external and internal controls are effective in the securitization/insecuritization processes and that there are not only direct but also indirect forms of tightening of controls. Immigration control mechanisms have both internal and external aspects, and can operate through explicit or implicit means. While these control mechanisms do not directly equate to the securitization of refugees, they nonetheless provide a useful framework for understanding the tightening of control. As provided by Brochmann, the framework for immigration and immigrant control policy consists of explicit and implicit, external and internal controls.

Explicit/direct external controls may be in the form of "entry restrictions/border control, visa schemes, … computerized data bases on 'unwanted persons",…, preventive measures abroad: safe heavens,…, readmission agreements". Implicit/indirect external measures include uneven management of entry restrictions, 'arbitrariness', "indistinct definitions of 'needs of the nation." On the other hand, internal explicit/direct controls are in the form of "deterrent measures during periods of application and examination, internal surveillance, regulated access to ID cards, regulated access to housing, social benefits, health care, education, temporary residence,…, naturalization,…, employer sanctions, remigration incentives…," work permit, repatriation, and deportation. Internal indirect/implicit controls are "no non-

[573] Bigo, "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control," 221.

enforcement of deportation/tolerated illegal status-administrative discretion in deciding on residence and employment permits etc., ethnic community formation and cultural recognition; policies and opinion building that facilitates initial integration and durable settlement or conversely, social segregation or discrimination."[574] To make a clarification, implicit denotes a hidden mechanism while explicit is public policy.[575]

Some states may resort to external control while some others may utilize internal control. This may be caused due to countries' historical and structural differences.[576] However, crossing borders without any problems does not guarantee that displaced people will be able to live within the borders without any problems or challenges. This also aligns with Loong's argument that "the securitization of migration must therefore be understood as a strategy imposed within the host state's territory, and not just at its borders".[577] Moreover, restrictive internal control mechanisms and a high number of police checkpoints may "increase the societal stigmatization of certain ethnic groups",[578] and hence contribute to securitization/(in)securitization of immigrants. In analyzing Turkey's response to Syrian refugee flow, I argue that internal and external security aspects are intertwined. Borders function not only as a geographical line but also as a means of management and control within territorial borders of states. In this respect, people coming from Syria are subject to internal and external control mechanisms.

Additionally, the response of host states to refugee populations can be lowly or highly restrictive and is affected by both external factors and internal management issues. In general terms, the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, the nature of the relations with the sending state, host community's capacity to receive refugees, and national security concerns all have an impact on refugee

[574] Brochmann, "The Mechanisms of Control," 14.

[575] Brochmann, "The Mechanisms of Control," 15.

[576] Brochmann, "The Mechanisms of Control," 12–13.

[577] Loong, "'This Country, Law Very Strong,'" 12.

[578] Brochmann, "The Mechanisms of Control," 15.

policies.[579] Furthermore, for the host state, the refugee response does not end with acceptance or non-admission at the border since it is also important to examine how the refugee is included or excluded within the country.[580]

Table 1. A Framework for the Analysis of Control Policy[581]

	Direct/explicit	Indirect/implicit
External	- Entry restrictions/Border control - Visa schemes - Carrier liability for transporting undocumented migrants - Computerized databases on "unwanted persons" - Legislation against illegal trafficking - Prevention measures abroad (safe havens, information campaigns, readmission agreements)	- Erratic handling of entry restrictions/ elements of arbitrariness - Indistinct definitions of "needs of the nation" - Preventive measures abroad (development aid, direct foreign investment, reducing trade barriers)
Internal	- Deterrent measures during periods of application and examination - Internal surveillance - Regulated access to ID-cards - Regulated access to housing, social benefits, health care, education - Temporary residence, denizenship, naturalization - Employer sanctions - Remigration incentives - Repatriation and deportation	Non-enforcement of deportation/tolerated illegal status - Administrative discretion in deciding on residence and employment permits - Ethnic community formation and cultural recognition - Policies and opinion building that facilitates initial integration and durable settlement, or conversely, social segregation or discrimination

[579] Karen Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," *The International Migration Review* 30, no. 3 (1996): 655, https://doi.org/10.2307/2547631.

[580] Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," 659.

[581] Grete Brochmann, "The Mechanisms of Control," in *Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, ed. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar (Routledge, 2020), 14.

In the literature, although there are slight differences, Turkey's response to the Syrian refugee influx is divided into three distinct phases. The initial phase was characterized by an open-door policy, reflecting a welcoming approach towards displaced Syrians. This was followed by a shift towards more restrictive measures as the influx of refugees exceeded initial projections, which also coincided with the institutionalization and formalization of migration governance. The final phase is marked by the emergence of increasingly restrictive policies and a discourse emphasizing possible returns of displaced Syrians. Turkey's refugee response was not a structured response following a coherent trajectory. Şahin Mencütek describes Turkey's response as multi-staged and multi-patterned.[582] Sunata and Güngördü examine Turkey's response to the refugee influx by dividing it into 3 periods. In the first period, Turkey declared an open-door policy and admitted Syrians through the discourse of ensar and muhacir to its territories.[583] The origins of the words ensar and muhacir are rooted in Ottoman immigration policy. In brief, this discourse reflects religious and cultural solidarity and is based on Turkey's hospitality towards displaced people from Syria. Consistent with this, Jacobsen states that Islam is generally tolerant in cases of temporary asylum.[584] In this context, Kloos argues that the government of Turkey's hospitality towards Syrians is based on strong religious sentiments, which largely determine whether refugees are "desirable" or "undesirable."[585] Nevertheless, the social receptiveness of the host community is not constant, often declining as time passes and the refugee community's stay in the host state becomes longer than expected, which is often the case in protracted refugee situations.[586] Therefore, the change in the perspective of Turkey and Turkish society towards Syrians is in line with the general assumption in the relevant literature.

[582] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 73.

[583] Ulaş Sunata and Feriha Nazda Güngördü, "(Non-State) Actors in Internal Bordering and Differential Inclusion: Syrian Refugees' Housing Experience in Turkey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 47, no. 12 (2024): 2592, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2024.2344684.

[584] Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," 668.

[585] Sophie Kloos, "The Neo-Ottoman Turn in Turkey's Refugee Reception Discourse," *Alternatif Politika* 8, no. 3 (2016): 547.

[586] Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," 668.

Building on this theme, Interviewee 1 emphasized the helpfulness of Turkish society even without being asked in the beginning, but also noted the change in attitudes afterwards. Similarly, Interviewee 7 emphasized that there was no discrimination in the beginning, which has now changed.

5.4. Borders Being a Problem at Different Temporal Junctures

In the early periods, displaced Syrians crossed the border without any problems or obstacles. This is also evident in the interview data retrieved from the stories of displaced persons crossing the border. Interviewee 9 describes crossing the Turkish-Syrian border with her family as follows: "When we crossed in 2015, there was no problem at the border. There was no wall. I mean, in 2015, the soldiers at the border gate did not care much anyway, so there was no problem at the border. Everyone could cross comfortably." Interviewee 6's story is similar to this one: "Our villages were already close to the Turkish border and at that time everyone could cross easily. The border is already 20 kilometers away from our village. At that time, there was nothing when we crossed. There was not much strict control." Yet, Interviewee 23, highlighting the nuanced dimensions of this phenomenon, notes: "We crossed (the border) on foot. It was difficult. We saw many people dying on the way, some had heart attacks." Nevertheless, displaced people still had to pay money to intermediaries and faced difficulties when crossing the border. In illustrating this dynamic, the following dialogue is illustrative:

> Interviewee 24: (At the border) There was only an old barbed wire, which was bent because people had stepped on it. Someone was helping us, we were crossing.
> Interviewee 23: We used to give money to someone to show us the way.
> Interviewee 24: There were mines, so they were guiding us.
> Interviewee 21: Even if he did nothing, he was paid for passing through his field.
> Interviewee 23: One of them made a deal with the driver to bring you and drop you off in (Gazi)Antep.
> Interviewee 24: He brings you and drops you off in a field. They would tell us to leave before we even took a breath. Someone who had made a deal with them would be waiting for us there. When you are young, you are fearless and go through those fields, but when you have a family, someone has to help you.
> Interviewee 23: They were smuggling people and it was not only in our village.
> Interviewee 21: Whoever owned the road (through the field) would ask for money.

Here, some crossings were made with a passport, others with only an ID card or without any documents. In addition, men of military age face more difficulties in

leaving and staying in Syria. Men, who did not want to fight for the regime forces in Syria, were trying to leave Syria and avoid returning at all costs. Interviewee 4 explains his position on this situation as follows:

> When I was studying, I didn't have to go to the military service. But after the graduation, I had no excuse. It's either to serve or to leave. Because serving the army in Syria during the war, it's like committing suicide. It's not like... Some people would argue that... It's not patriotic and you left your country, and you should go back and fight for it. This is not the case. Because it's a civil war and it's controlled by... It's just a proxy war for other countries. And all the people who are... Whatever party they are fighting for, they are just fuel for this war. So, I refused to be a fuel. That's it.

Thus, Syrians in different legal circumstances experienced diverse border crossing and legalization processes in Turkey. Like the story of Interviewee 5:

> All my family and children entered officially, I entered illegally because I didn't have a passport. I was of military age, so it was very difficult to get a passport. After that, I applied for a passport remotely and got it, so my existence in the country became legal.

It is worth noting that the border was not always open under all circumstances. In humanitarian situations, Turkey opened the borders, for example, when ISIS attacked Kobane in 2014. Interviewee 10 from Kobane expresses this as: “I crossed (the border) without any problems, it was open. The border was closed before the war (ISIS attacks), the war started, and the border was opened. When ISIS attacked, Turkey opened the borders. Everyone came here.” She further elaborated on the situation of the Turkish-Syrian border as follows: “In fact, in the beginning, we were crossing the borders as the clashes broke out. When the clashes broke out, we would enter the Turkish border and then we would return.”

However, in later periods, border crossings became difficult or even impossible. With Turkey building a wall on the Turkish-Syrian border, the closure of the borders and various crossing routes crossing from Syria to Turkey has become stiff. Interviewee 8 makes it clear by saying, “no more illegal routes.” Reflecting on this issue, he says that “there is now a wall. You can jump over the wall, but Turkish army is patrolling. Still, it's very expensive for those who can come, three thousand dollars or even five thousand dollars, it changes.” Still, the interviewees were very

sympathetic towards the construction of the wall or border controls. They even associated uncontrolled crossings with terrorist attacks. Interviewee 1 offers a compelling perspective, noting:

> Turkey is right in every way. After all, this is its own country and the safety of its own people. For example, how many times have there been explosions, why were there explosions? A terrorist crossing the border. For example, that last explosion in Taksim. A Syrian, from Afrin. She crossed from Afrin. He's right after all, he's right. If the doors are always open, an honorable man becomes a thief.

This sentiment is encapsulated in the words of Interviewee 16, who states:

> There used to be no wall, just a thin wire fence. Now there is a tall and thick wall. There is a wire on it, too. As you know, there were two explosions in Reyhanlı in 2013, we were staying in Kırıkhan. Smuggling was rife then, too. Everyone was entering illegally. After that explosion, a wall was built to prevent terrorists from entering. I remember it started to be built in 2015. The wall is very important both for the security of the people living in Turkey and the people who entered through proper means. The border is very important, all kinds of people can enter. It is also very important for the security of the people living here.

Current barriers and surveillance mechanisms existing at Turkey's eastern and southern borders are described by Ali Yerlikaya, Minister of Interior, as follows:

> "...we have installed 341 electro-optical towers along our borders, 250 on our eastern and 91 on our western borders, which provide services with high technological capacity. Thanks to this system, we monitor 740 km of our eastern border and 350 km of our western border. In addition, we ensure our border security with 284 thermal cameras, 151 elevator towers, 139 armored surveillance vehicles and seismic sensor systems..."[587]

These developments mean that the borders once determined by stones[588] are now protected by a security shield with high-tech devices.

Turkey's early refugee response has been characterized in three ways: a declared open-door policy, the presence of out-of-camp settlements in addition to camp-based

[587] Presidency of Migration Management. "Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya: 'We Never Allow Irregular Migrants and Human Smuggling Organizers,'" December 17, 2023. https://www.goc.gov.tr/icisleri-bakani-ali-yerlikaya-duzensiz-gocmenlere-ve-gocmen-kacakciligi-organizatorlerine-asla-gecit-vermiyoruz.

[588] Ayşe Yıldırım, "Sınır Taşlarından Dikenli Tel ve Mayına: Türkiye-Suriye Sınırının Kalınlaşması," *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 49 (January 2020): 29–47.

settlements, and protection financed by the Turkish government rather than through foreign aid. The overall response was based on "ad-hoc policies" with the belief that the presence of displaced people would be temporary.[589] In the face of the humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict in Syria, the Turkish government initially established refugee camps, without the help of UNHCR or other international organizations.[590] Sunata and Güngördü state that this period lasted from 2011 to 2016.[591] Nevertheless, the open-door policy was not continuously implemented until 2016. This period was followed by a period of stricter border policies, in which harmonization was also prioritized from 2016 to 2020. In the period after 2020, the internal mobility and settlements of displaced persons from Syria were also restricted.[592] This meant that freedom of movement and the ability to choose their settlements were severely restricted for Syrians. Jacobsen argues that refugees may be forced to live in camps or given the right to self-settlement. While the former is considered a negative response, the latter is considered positive.[593] In the case of displaced people from Syria, Turkey has allowed settlement outside of the camps and even closed the camps,[594] and most of the displaced people from Syria became urban refugees.[595] Nevertheless, in recent years, the government has imposed serious restrictions on settlement policy of Syrians under temporary protection regime. Even respondents who expressed their wish to stay within the legal borders claimed that they were forced to retreat into the illegal zone against their will due to increasing restrictions, bureaucratic hurdles, and long waiting times. Waiting is an

[589] Şahin Mencütek, *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East*, 73.

[590] Jessy Nassar and Nora Stel, "Lebanon's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis – Institutional Ambiguity as a Governance Strategy," *Political Geography* 70 (April 2019): 47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.01.005.

[591] Sunata and Güngördü, "(Non-State) Actors in Internal Bordering and Differential Inclusion," 2592.

[593] Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," 659.

[594] *Syrian Observer*, "Turkish Authorities Prepare to Close Five Refugee Camps," August 3, 2018, accessed October 10, 2024, https://syrianobserver.com/foreign-actors/turkish_authorities_prepare_close_five_refugee_camps.html.; *Syrian Observer* "Turkish Authorities Close Refugee Camps,", September 10, 2019, accessed October 10, 2024, https://syrianobserver.com/foreign-actors/turkish-authorities-close-refugee-camps.html.

[595] M. Murat Erdoğan, "Thinking Outside the Camp: Syrian Refugees in Istanbul," Migrationpolicy.Org, August 9, 2017, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul.

important aspect in Syrians' lives, which put them in limbo. This shows that Syrians frequently move back and forth between legality and illegality in their daily lives. They make considerable efforts to keep their ID cards active and to avoid the imposition of restriction codes that would limit their legal status. They frequently update their data, put effort to obtain various permits such as road authorization certificates, and at the same time strive to remain as invisible as possible within society.

Banerjee perceives borders as constructions that "became problematic at different historical junctures."[596] This situation can also be seen on the Turkish-Syrian border. During the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and Syria were part of the same political entity; Antep was even designated as a district (kaza) center and attached to the Aleppo Province.[597] With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the borders of these two different political entities were determined. Nonetheless, crossing these borders was not considered major problem until the Cold War period. During the Cold War era, the Turkish-Syrian border was gradually wired and mined.[598] However, the experience of Interviewee 11 is important to understand the artificiality of borders, highlighting that political and human realities do not always coincide: "Normally my uncles were already living in Antep. My aunt also lived here. They only came to Syria for visits… Our great-grandfather is from Antep, but when the border was drawn, we stayed on the Syrian side."

As mentioned in the previous chapters, Turkey-Syria relations remained highly security-oriented after the end of the Cold War but entered a period of détente and rapprochement in the 2000s. Even, the citizens of these two countries gained the right to visa-free travel in 2009 with an agreement signed between the two countries.[599] In 2011, relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly after

[596] Paula Banerjee, *Borders, Histories, Existences: Gender and Beyond* (Sage Publications, 2010), xii.

[597] Governorship of Gaziantep, "Our Province Gaziantep," *Official Website of the Governorship of Gaziantep*, accessed November 1, 2024, http://www.gaziantep.gov.tr/ilimiz-gaziantep.

[598] Saygı Öztürk, "Here Is the Mine Map of Southeastern Anatolia," *Hürriyet*, June 21, 2009, accessed October 1, 2024, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/iste-guneydogunun-mayin-haritasi-11759054.

[599] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "No: 162, 18 September 2009, On the Abolition of Visa Requirements Between Turkey and Syria," accessed November 4, 2024,

Turkey supported the Syrian opposition forces during the crisis, which later turned into a civil war, and Turkey admitted people fleeing the conflict in Syria. In 2016, Turkey unilaterally introduced visas for Syrians coming from third countries.[600] In addition, in 2018, Turkey completed the project to build a wall along the Turkey-Syria border (with which Turkey shares the largest land border), which was started in late 2015/January 2016 and completed to a large extent by TOKİ and local governorates.[601] 3.60 meters high and with barbed wire, this wall was known as "*Türk Seddi* (Turkish wall)" and the "security wall project," in reference to the Great Wall of China, regardless of its purpose.[602] Thus, it was aimed to prevent uncontrolled crossings from Syria to Turkey.

5.5. Which Poses a Greater Challenge: Staying Within the Border or Existing Beyond It?

Paris School scholars mainly focused on border policies and border zones of European countries while trying to understand security practices. Yet, the case for Turkey and people from Syria in Turkey is different. At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians were allowed to cross the border through an open-door policy as part of Turkey's foreign policy decision. Nevertheless, in the later stages of the conflict, entries were restricted, border controls were tightened, and border walls were built

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https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-162_-18-eylul-2009_-turkiye-ve-suriye_nin-vize-uygulamasini-kaldirmasi-hk_.tr.mfa.

[600] Republic of Turkey, Directorate General of Migration Management, "Termination of the Visa Exemption Agreement Between Our Country and Syria, January 28, 2016," accessed November 4, 2024, https://yozgat.goc.gov.tr/ulkemiz-ile-suriye-arasindaki-vize-muafiyeti-anlasmasinin-yururlukten-kaldirilmasi.; *Euronews*, "Visa Requirement Introduced for Syrians Coming to Turkey from Third Countries," January 9, 2016, accessed November 4, 2024, https://tr.euronews.com/2016/01/09/turkiye-ye-ucuncu-ulkelerden-gelen-suriyeliler-icin-vize-uygulamasi-basladi.

[601] Uğur Aslanhan, "Turkey Installs 764 Km Security Wall on Syria Border," *Anadolu Agency*, June 11, 2018, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-installs-764-km-security-wall-on-syria-border/1170257.

[602] *Milliyet*, "Turkish Wall at the Border! TOKİ to Build a 700-Kilometer Wall on the Syrian Border," September 28, 2016, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/sinira-turk-seddi-toki-suriye-sinirina-700-kilometrelik-duvar-orecek-2317923.; *Anadolu Agency*, "Turkey's Border Security to Be Boosted by Concrete Wall," September 2, 2016, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/turkeys-border-security-to-be-boosted-by-concrete-wall-/639435.

along the Turkey-Syria border. Additionally, the story did not end for the displaced persons after they entered the territory of another sovereign entity, like Turkey. They may face many restrictions within the borders as well. As displaced persons are forced migrants, even if they are not guaranteed refugee status according to international law, they cannot be sent back to a place where they face the risk of persecution according to the non-refoulement principle. However, measures within the state may push the forced migrant to leave the country voluntarily, as Interviewee 4 stated: "if they (displaced Syrians) face too many obstacles, sometimes, they just leave the country in case they have this chance." Changes in government policies have led to a perception among displaced Syrians, as Interviewee 4 mentioned:

> I mean, it's not clear what the policy as to the Syrians is about in general. But we can sense that they are pushing to limit the numbers or reduce the numbers. They are pushing people to leave by themselves. In recent months, we felt that it was very clear.

Today, there are more restrictions on the free movement of Syrians who are under temporary protection status (TPS) within Turkey between provinces and on their freedom of choice of settlement. This reflects a shift towards a more controlled and regulatory approach to migration management within the borders of Turkey in addition to the controlled crossing of bodies between the Turkish-Syrian border. This is also in line with the data coming from the interviews. All of the interviewees have complained about this situation, and even the naturalized Syrian interviewees mentioned this. Before I started to ask the interview questions, Interviewee 24 complained about this situation as follows:

> My biggest problem is that we are like prisoners in this country, it is forbidden to go to another city. For example, I cannot go to my hometown, I have a daughter in Istanbul, I cannot go. This is what I resent the most. He opened the door, but no one is satisfied. God bless him, he opened the door, and we were saved. The main thing is that those who come are satisfied. Just like when you come to my house as a guest, I don't tell you that you are not allowed entering the kitchen. We cannot go anywhere; we cannot do anything. I can't get permission, and it's getting tighter and tighter.

Namely, the Turkish approach, which initially focused on humanitarian solidarity, later evolved to focus on security, border control and internal regulation. This has been mainly materialized in the following ways: closure of provinces, districts and

neighborhoods to registration; address investigations to determine whether Syrians are present at their declared address and in relation to this, restriction code 160 that is put on the identities of Syrians under temporary protection (TP), closure of identity documents, use of restriction codes (*tahkikat kodları*) to categorize Syrians under temporary protection and the temporariness inherent in the temporary protection status, and the introduction and spread of mobile migration vehicles. These are the main issues that affect and regulate the lives of Syrians under different legal statuses, as captured from the interviews. In this way, the Syrian population in Turkey is disciplined and transformed into docile bodies by spreading fears among them.

5.6. The Looming Shadow: The Fear of Deportation and Deportability

Almost all of the Syrians I interviewed said that the most frightening thing for them in Turkey was being deported. None of them had experienced deportation, but they all had a story to tell about it. I concluded that the shadow of the fear of deportation had become something bigger than itself, and its impact expanded beyond its original boundaries. Although I would expect their experiences to differ significantly according to their legal status, even those who have acquired Turkish citizenship may not feel legally secure. Interviewee 10 explains this as: "Turkish citizenship is given exceptionally. They are the same as us, that is, they have Turkish citizenship, but it is exceptional. Not full Turkish citizens. They can be taken whenever they (the authorities) want." This notion finds further depth in the statement of Interviewee 11:

> I acquired Turkish citizenship exceptionally and there is a statement that the citizenship acquired exceptionally can be revoked. We sign under that document when we get our citizenship. This is a situation that is already unsettling enough. This is exacerbated by the discourses of some political parties during especially election periods.

The discourse that citizenship can be revoked also affected host community members. Interviewee 20 recounts the experience of a friend with a landlord after acquiring citizenship as follows: "When my friend was renting a house, he said, 'I am a Turkish citizen'. The landlord said, we will take your citizenship and send you back to Syria." That is, repatriation or deportation is a common fear among Syrians, regardless of their legal status. However, these people organize their lives based on

fear, even without experiencing it first-hand. De Genova conceptualizes this situation as "deportability."[603] In the original presentation of this concept, deportability refers to the "palpable sense of deportability" that is spread among illegal migrant workers.[604] Therefore, what is important here is not the actual deportation of that person, but the fear of "the possibility of deportation" among the whole vulnerable group of people.[605] In other words, it is not actual occasion but the likelihood of its occurance, which creates a general climate of fear beyond individuals.

In this regard, the fact that all interviewees had relatives or acquaintances who were deported in one way or another and the story of how it happened for trivial reasons is important. The stories of deportation and the belief that these people were deported for negligible reasons are evident in the respondents' discourse. For instance, Interviewee 5 states: "As far as I know, a few people did not register their home addresses or could not register their home addresses because some neighborhoods in Antep are closed to registration, so these people were deported to Syria." The story of Interviewee 8 also contains some other interesting aspects:

> Our neighbor has a 16-year-old son. While he was standing near his house, the police came and asked for his ID number and where his ID was. He said, "My ID is at home, I'll bring it," but the police didn't want him to. He said, "Let me call my brother and he can bring it," but they refused. The police took the phone and hung it up. They forced him to sign on a piece of paper that said "I am over the age of eighteen and I want to go to Syria, I consent to the revocation of my identity card." As a result, they sent him to Azez.

The story of Interviewee 2 shows how being a deportable body is reflected in their relations with host society members:

> Let me tell you something that happened last month. A neighbor of mine runs a grocery store in Kayseri. The man had a small argument with his neighbor. His neighbor was Turkish, he went and complained that this man doesn't pay taxes. The police came and took this man and questioned him. They saw the invoices; they saw that he paid taxes. But this man was deported. Again, in Kayseri, a person was

[603] Nicholas P. de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 419–47.

[604] de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," 439.

[605] de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," 438.

> suspected of terrorism. The man was innocent, he was not even taken to court. There was an Administrative Court decision. There was a decision to cancel the deportation decision. But despite this, the man was deported.

Interviewee 14 explains how this situation has a significant place in their lives and how they are forced to live in insecurity: “it makes me uneasy. I always have the thought that I will be deported. I wonder when they will send us away, we are left without an identity, we are left without a homeland... I have a lot of fears. I experience it all the time.”

Deportability is fully reflected in the daily lives of these people, which can be seen in Interviewee 15’s statement: “I see it every day, they take them and deport them.” And this sometimes happens despite those people trying to stay within legal boundaries in order not to be deported.” Interviewee 15 puts it this way:

> There are very strict rules for address registration. The other day we had a neighbor whose husband died in the earthquake. She couldn't make an appointment and get her procedures done. That's why they deported her. There are very strict rules. The woman even shared this on social media. New rules are very strict.

This is also important because it shows how tight controls are and how the discretionary power is not being used in favor of the displaced Syrians. However, those with social capital are believed to have a better chance of avoiding deportation. In this sense, social capital may function as a shield of protection, but it still does not provide complete security in all circumstances that displaced people face against arbitrary practices. Displaced Syrians often rely on intermediaries or social networks, especially in cases of legal uncertainty. Interviewee 19 puts it as:

> You have no rights, no law. Security forces took you and deported you, who will say what? My friend was a lecturer at the university, and he was deported. Another friend of mine had a traffic accident and the girl he hit was also Syrian, but the accident was very small, there was no major injury and if it wasn't for the intermediaries, they would have deported this professor immediately. Since the accident was not big, they had the chance to treat him according to their judgment. Although he showed his documents, he was in danger of being deported.

In this way, both the state and the capital holders can exert their power over Syrians. Thus, these people become docile bodies and disciplined in a Foucauldian way. As a result, in the workplace, in traffic, or in any other encounter, Syrians remain silent,

seeking or demanding rights are no longer an option for them. In the original formulation of the concept, it focuses on undocumented migrant workers who then become exploitable commodities by adding to their already existing vulnerability and precarity.[606] The topic of deportability has been frequently reworked in subsequent years, in various dimensions and topics, which included studies on different immigrant groups' deportability.[607] In the case of Syrians in Turkey, although it is legal for individuals from Syria to stay in Turkey under temporary protection regime as naturalized citizens or with a residence permit, they also consider themselves deportable bodies. This is due to the fact that they oscillate between illegality and legality and do not trust their legal status. This situation, in turn, fosters a sense of deep insecurity for the displaced Syrians through deportability. Micinski also draws a connection between the construction of refugees as security threats, especially during terrorist attacks, and their deportability, which is triggered by the former.[608]

De Genova discusses the condition of illegal immigrant status,[609] defining illegalization as the "legal production of migrant illegality."[610] Syrians living in Turkey, however, are mostly under the temporary protection regime. Still, the risk of losing this status, the fear of going into illegal zone due to the non-renewal of their work permits or becoming unregistered, if their identity stops due to data updating, not being at home, etc., and the associated transformation into a deportable body reinforces their insecurity. In addition, when De Genova's argument is examined based on illegality in the case of Syrians in Turkey, it can be seen that Syrians are positioned in a large illegal labor market. From this perspective, we can certainly discuss the advantages they provide for the employer.

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[606] de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life."

[607] Examples include: Maya Sager and Klara Öberg, "Articulations of Deportability: Changing Migration Policies in Sweden 2015/2016," *Refugee Review* 3 (2017): 2–14; Salah Punathil, "Precarious Citizenship: Detection, Detention and 'Deportability' in India," *Citizenship Studies* 26, no. 1 (2022): 55–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2021.2013444; Nicholas R Micinski, "Threats, Deportability and Aid: The Politics of Refugee Rentier States and Regional Stability," *Security Dialogue* 54, no. 6 (2023): 529–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211027464.

[608] Micinski, "Threats, Deportability and Aid," 534.

[609] de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," 422; 424.

[610] de Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," 429.

5.7. Mobile Migration Point Vehicles Which Make Fear Visible for Displaced People from Syria

Deportability materializes with mobile migration vehicles, which the interviewed displaced Syrians referred to as "removal vehicles." Mobile migration point vehicles serve as instruments that show deportability in the everyday lives of displaced Syrians. All of the respondents underlined the existence of mobile check points for Syrians. When I asked their experiences at the mobile checkpoints, their stories differed. These vehicles are not just seen by the Syrians on the streets but also noticed by the Turkish society and through social media.[611] Therefore, while Turkish citizens observe the existence of those vehicles on the streets, especially during periods of social unrest like the summer of 2024, Syrians perceive them as insecurity instruments in their lives. Although mobile migration point pehicles' existence is justified as a measure to combat illegal immigration,[612] they serve as instruments of fear for displaced Syrians regardless of their legal status. Although these vehicles look similar to the Mobile Office, Vehicle for Migration Management that Frontex introduced 4 years ago,[613] the function of mobile migration moint vehicles are introduced by Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya as:

> Our security forces carry out identity checks on foreigners when deemed necessary. Those who cannot present their ID cards are invited to the Mobile Migration Point vehicles. These vehicles are staffed by a migration specialist and an interpreter. In the vehicle, the foreigner is both fingerprinted and checked against the GöçNet

[611] Presidency of Migration Management, "Mobile Migration Points," YouTube video, published August 22, 2023, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4feTqoxdr7c.; "Our Minister of Interior, Mr. Ali Yerlikaya, Explained the Mobile Migration Point Vehicles," Presidency of Migration Management, YouTube video, published March 1, 2024, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzRxXl-1nQc.; A Haber, "How Does the 'Mobile Migration Point' Work? How Many Syrians Have Returned to Their Country?" YouTube video, published September 26, 2024, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5FqB5FdIiM.

[612] *Presidency of Migration Management*, "Number of Mobile Migration Points Facilitating and Accelerating the Identification of Irregular Migrants Increased to 162," February 27, 2024, accessed November 1, 2024, https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-gocmenlerin-tespitini-kolaylastiran-ve-hizlandiran-mobil-goc-noktasi-araclarinin-sayisi-162ye-cikti.

[613] TEKNE, "FRONTEX Mobile Office | Vehicle for Migration Management by TEKNE," YouTube video, November 16, 2020, accessed November 1, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mI9CGTMA_YI.

> database. If the foreigner is an irregular migrant, they are sent directly to Removal Centers for deportation procedures.[614]

In this sense, these vehicles serve as borders within the borders.[615] In other words, mobile migration point vehicles perpetuate border controls not only in geographical border zones but also within the country. Through these tools, border control practices are brought into the country, and migrants are kept under constant surveillance. In addition, practices such as checking whether migrants are at home (and if they are not at home, a restriction code (V160) is placed on their ID) or checking their documents extend border control into the interior of the country.

In addition to traveling to various points in the city, these vehicles can remain at certain points throughout the day. Thus, routine controls are carried out both while moving and when stationary. In this context, the function of these vehicles is related to the Paris School's understanding of the routinization of security practices. Through these vehicles, which are said to be the first of their kind in the world,[616] migration management and immigrant control are normalized, becoming a part of daily life. In this sense, this practice is part of daily routines rather than addressing an exceptional situation. As mentioned in the theory chapter, the monitoring of population and employment of surveillance technologies become "routines of everyday life, rather than exceptional practices," as Bigo argues.[617]

These vehicles also mobilize security practices and localize the practice of border control to manage "potential threats" within the country. The state, thereby, adopts a novel approach to governance that is fundamentally rooted in insecurity and unease.

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[614] "Number of Mobile Migration Points Facilitating and Accelerating the Identification of Irregular Migrants Increased to 162," February 27, 2024.

[615] For discussions on the concept of border internalization, please see the following references: Cecilia Manjivar, "Immigration Law Beyond Borders: Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 10, (2014): 353-69, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030842. ; Volker M. Heins, "Internalization of Borders: The Concept and Its Applications," *Society* 62, (2024): 419-29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-024-01004-5.

[616] "Number of Mobile Migration Points Facilitating and Accelerating the Identification of Irregular Migrants Increased to 162," February 27, 2024.

[617] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 46.

The state's understanding has shifted from a protective and supportive stance to one that consistently adopts precautionary measures in response to insecurity and potential threats. The expansion of internal security procedures represents a significant aspect of the ongoing endeavor to reevaluate the state's authority over its population.[618] However, mobile migration point vehicles serve only "foreigners/aliens." In this sense, Bigo's ban-opticon concept is useful. While the pan-opticon monitors everyone, everywhere, all the time, ban-opticon aims to monitor only those who are categorized as risky. Who is going to be monitored is decided with the help of surveillance technologies. Surveillance profiles a person as risky or not risky. As a result, depending on the profile of the person, they may or may not be under surveillance.[619]

The main institution that Syrians come into contact with is the local branch of the Presidency of Migration Management. In the field of migration management, the main authority is the Presidency of Migration Management, and its local counterparts. Syrians' interaction with the state is carried out through this state organization, as reiterated by the respondents. Staff at these offices and on the mobile migration vehicles have access to professional and statistical information about the displaced Syrians through software, such as qualified fingerprint recognition products developed by the local company Biyoteksan,[620] and non-public platforms like Göçnet where immigrant information is stored. Therefore, they possess professional capacity concerning this specific issue. Their professional knowledge and high-tech resources allow them to identify threats and risks. In contrast, non-professionals cannot determine these factors effectively as they lack the technological capital these professionals possess.[621]

Başaran, in her study on liberal democratic regimes' border zones, argues that technologies to govern people are crucial to understand the link between security and

[618] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 81–82.

[619] Bigo, "Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance," 46.

[620] *Biyoteksan.* "Qualified Fingerprint Recognition Product," accessed November 14, 2024, https://www.biyoteksan.com.tr/nitelikli-parmak-izi-tanima-urunu.

[621] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 74.

migration control. In her study, Başaran draws attention to the importance of various practices implemented by the state to control unwanted populations. Tools that are used by states to manage borders through techniques such as documentation practices including identification and passports, travel permits and visa regimes, and surveillance of populations, are technologies that define strategies to manage unwanted populations "at a distance" by keeping them at the border or monitoring them outside the borders. These practices filter populations through "technologies" located in border zones and control unwanted populations, often employing an oppressive style of government. Consequently, all these help to keep risky populations outside. Yet, for the ban-opticon to operationalize, the entire population should be identified, documented, and controlled.[622] While I agree with this argument, I would argue that this is not only applicable to the border zones of liberal democratic regimes but it is relevant to security and immigrant control within the borders of hybrid regimes like Turkey, where border practices are internalized within the country's borders, as explained above.

In the case of displaced people from Syria, while they feel under threat of detention and consequent deportation, they are also controlled in many ways within the borders of Turkey on a day-to-day basis. The issues mentioned by Başaran have also become tools used to discipline Syrians within the country. For example, all Syrians attach great importance to the issue of citizenship. Their primary interaction with the state is based on whether their identity cards are active or not, and they make efforts to ensure that. The codes put on their identity cards by the migration management authority function as a tool to regulate their lives.

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to give a detailed account of how Turkey's management of displaced people from Syria is experienced by them, with Gaziantep as the field site. Researching the experiences of this population in Gaziantep is significant because Gaziantep is one of the border provinces to Syria, and it is the city with the second

[622] Tuğba Başaran, "Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion," *International Political Sociology* 2, no. 4 (2008): 341–42, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00055.x.

highest number of Syrians under TPS living in Turkey as of November 2024. The main themes that emerged from the interviews I conducted were the negative changes in their lives over time, the fear of deportation that has become ingrained in their daily lives, the embodiment of this fear in mobile migration point vehicles, and the disciplining of this population by turning them into docile bodies or trying to be invisible for the authorities. These authorities are not always government officials; sometimes they are ordinary people Syrians encounter in their daily lives, whom they perceive as capable of exerting power over them.

As explained above, deportability refers to the displaced Syrians' belief that they are deportable, not the act of deportation that triggers their insecurity. This is embodied in mobile migration point vehicles, which function as border checkpoints within borders. As they target the immigrant population, they serve as the fuel for ban-opticon that decides who is risky and who is allowed to move. These vehicles also signify that border control practices are brought into the country and that immigrants are kept under constant surveillance. Although the existence of these vehicles and their presentation to the host community members promise to provide security through the discourse of combating irregular migration, this has been one of the main reasons why displaced Syrians feel insecure in Turkey. In other words, the tools intended to provide security have become a cause of insecurity for a certain group.

Mobile migration point vehicles have also served the function of controlling a moving population through a mobile border control mechanism. This is exacerbated by the various restriction codes that are put on the IDs of displaced Syrians, which categorized their riskiness. As a result, the displaced population, the majority of whom were admitted to Turkey through an open-door policy, has been subjected to mechanisms of control and surveillance within the country, which have progressively insecuritized them. The insecuritization process has yet occurred through banal security practices.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation addressed the governance of displaced Syrians in Turkey via the perspective of the Paris School of Security Studies, with a special emphasis on Gaziantep as a field site. The primary goal of this study was to look beyond macro-level official discourses and policy texts to see how Syrians experience and interpret everyday migration governance practices. While the Copenhagen School's emphasis on elite speech acts and the logic of exception has shaped much of the literature on securitization, this thesis takes a more practice-oriented approach, emphasizing the dispersed, mundane, and bureaucratic mechanisms that produce security and (in)security.

The dissertation's main research question has thus been: How do displaced Syrians in Gaziantep perceive and interpret local and everyday migration governance practices, and what do these experiences reveal about processes of (in)securitization? To answer this question, theoretical framework that the Paris School of security studies provided is combined with the data collected from the field from 42 semi-structured interviews with displaced persons from Syria, employees of NGOs, and other stakeholders who have a role in the management or protection of displaced Syrians. In addition to that, to better understand and contextualize this interaction, the international, regional, and domestic contexts of Syrians' reception in Turkey, as well as the framework of Turkey's migration management, have also been examined.

In answering this question, the thesis tried to show that (in)securitization is not merely the product of rhetorical constructions of threat but emerges from ordinary practices, routinized technologies, and bureaucratic procedures that shape migrants' lives on a daily basis. This conclusion chapter summarizes main findings by

providing an overview of the main outcomes. In addition, through a comparison of insights from the Copenhagen and Paris Schools it connects these findings to the theoretical framework. Moreover, this conclusion aims to situate the dissertation's contributions within the existing literature and emphasize the research gaps that it fills.

The fieldwork carried out in Gaziantep revealed a number of interconnected dynamics that shed light on how displaced Syrians experience and perceive insecurity. With regard borders and mobility, in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey's open-door policy was religiously framed with ensar and muhacir discourses which reflected a welcoming stance toward displaced Syrians. Over time, however, this approach gave way to increasingly restrictive measures. Syrians explained that border crossings used to be easy but gradually became more difficult. In the end, they were obstructed by the construction of a wall and the introduction of advanced surveillance technologies. Within the borders of the country, mobility was further constrained by bureaucratic requirements such as travel permits, bans on residence registration in certain districts, and the imposition of restriction codes on ID cards. These practices may be referred to as the internalization of borders, since, as a result of these practices, Syrians are subject to control not only at the state's borders but also in the places where they reside on a daily basis.

In the field research, one of the key findings concerned the mobile migration point vehicles. Displaced Syrians refer to these vehicles as "vehicles of deportation" or "removal vehicles". Mobile migration point vehicles represent the spread of border procedures into the daily life in the city. In fact they do not target only Syrians but all migrant groups specifically for identity checks and related procedures. In the media (including social media), mobile migration point vehicles are portrayed as Turkey's attempt to strengthen migration management. However, these vehicles are visible symbols of insecurity for Syrians, turning ordinary city streets into surveillance areas and making movement a source of fear.

The fear of deportation was the most common subject in all of the interviewees. Nearly all respondents knew someone who had been deported, even though none of

them had been deported themselves. Importantly, this fear go beyond all legal categories: even Syrians with Temporary Protection cards, residence permits, and even naturalized citizenship expressed insecurity, fearing that their status could be revoked at any time. This is in line with Nicholas De Genova's concept of deportability. According to this, people's behavior changes not because of actual deportation, but because of the constant possibility that it might happen. An important point to highlight here is that acquiring citizenship does not remove this feeling of insecurity. In this sense, being a citizen does not constitute a safe legal category for Syrians, since they know that their citizenship is exceptional and can be revoked.

In response to these insecuritized dynamics, Syrians stated that they had developed self-regulatory strategies. Most emphasized the need to remain invisible in public spaces, avoid encounters with authorities, and constantly update their documents to avoid administrative sanctions. These strategies demonstrate how surveillance and bureaucratic discretion produce compliance. Syrians internalize the logic of governance and adapt their daily practices accordingly. This reveals that power operates not only through overt coercion but also through subtle and routine mechanisms, which at the end produce docile bodies.

What is more, the research revealed that the experience of insecurity is not homogeneous. Syrians' perceptions and strategies differ according to legal status, economic resources, social capital, and ethnic identity. This diversity highlights the need to move beyond generalized categories such as "refugees" or "migrants" and to examine how insecurity is experienced in different ways.

The findings of the research support the theoretical approaches of the Paris School and broaden their application to a new field context. The Copenhagen School's securitization theory highlights the "logic of exception", whereby an issue is transformed into a security matter through the discursive acts of elites. Conversely, the Paris School emphasizes the "logic of routine": security/insecurity arises from everyday practices. The experiences of Syrians in Gaziantep definitely align with the latter. Insecurity does not stem from grand discourses, but rather from everyday

interactions with bureaucracy, identity and registration systems, police checks, and routine law enforcement practices.

Mobile migration point vehicles which can be seen as mobile checkpoints are a striking example of Bigo's ban-opticon concept. Unlike the pan-opticon, which monitors everyone, the ban-opticon selectively targets those categorized as risky. The narratives of interviewed Syrians center on their excessive exposure to inspections and monitoring. The degree of this exposure varies based on their legal status. Nonetheless, the narratives predominantly highlight that Syrians are subjected to procedures from which Turkish citizens are mainly exempt.

The findings also resonate with Foucault's concept of governmentality. The Paris School interprets this as a "governmentality of unease." Syrians live in a state of continuous uncertainty. In the displaced Syrians' belief, every administrative discrepancy, missed appointment, or failure to update records may put them subject to deportation. In this context, insecurity is not merely an unintended consequence but functions as a tool of governance in practice.

Using Bourdieu's framework, the field of migration governance in Gaziantep is characterized by interplay of various actors such as municipal officials, NGO workers, police officers, and international organizations. The forms of capital they hold such as legal authority, technical expertise or social networks shape their capacity to define and manage security/insecurity. Syrians, in turn, adapt their habitus to this field, employing methods of invisibility, silence, and compliance. Finally, the findings confirm Bigo's Möbius strip metaphor, where security and insecurity are inextricably intertwined. Practices in order to maintain order such as walls, identity systems, biometric controls, paradoxically produce insecurity for those targeted. For Syrians, security and insecurity are two sides of the same coin; they are produced simultaneously through the same mechanisms.

This dissertation also intends to offer important methodological contributions. First, by placing the voices of displaced Syrians at the center through semi-structured interviews, it shifts the focus from top-down policy analysis to bottom-up lived

experiences. This approach reveals how migrants interpret governance structures and navigate them; this aspect is often overlooked in securitization studies. Second, fieldwork highlights the challenges and sensitivities of conducting research among a population characterized by high levels of anxiety and insecurity. The reluctance of many Syrians to participate in the research, their fears of misrepresentation, and their suspicions that researchers might be spies, reveal the insecure context in which the research itself is embedded. This situation underscores the methodological insight that insecurity shapes not only the lives of migrants but also the research process itself. Third, by applying the theoretical tools of the Paris School to a non-European context, this study broadens the methodological scope of securitization research. The study demonstrates that the Paris School's emphasis on practices, routines, and technologies is not limited to liberal democracies but is equally valid for hybrid regimes such as Turkey. It is important to note, however, that the findings of this research cannot be generalized. While the fieldwork in Gaziantep provides valuable insights, these cannot automatically be extended to all Syrians in Turkey or to displaced Syrians elsewhere.

This dissertation has also aimed to contribute to the literature. First, it enhances the study of migration in International Relations discipline in Turkey, which generally concentrates on macro-level state policy, EU - Turkey relations, or humanitarian discourses. This study fills a gap in the literature by shifting the focus to everyday practices and migrants' lived experiences. Second, it contributes to securitization theory by demonstrating the applicability of the Paris School framework in the Turkish context. Given that the securitization literature in the field of migration is largely based on the Copenhagen School, this thesis highlights the analytical advantages of the Paris School's practice-oriented approach, particularly in understanding the (in)securitization of refugees. Third, it aimed to enrich the literature on concepts such as internalized borders and deportability. While these concepts are mostly discussed theoretically, they are demonstrated here with interview data. The thesis reveals how internalized borders became evident in mobile migration point vehicles, address registration bans, and restriction codes assigned to Syrians' ID cards, and how deportability is experienced as a widespread fear that transcends legal categories of Syrians.

In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates that the governance of displaced Syrians in Turkey is best understood not through the lens of exceptional securitizing discourses but through the Paris School's emphasis on routinized practices of control. Syrians' lived experiences in Gaziantep reveal a governmentality of unease in which borders are internalized, deportability is normalized, and bureaucratic routines shape everyday life in ways that continuously reproduce insecurity. Turkey's migration governance is marked by a paradox: measures aimed to provide security, whether for the state, the host community, or even the migrants themselves, actually create insecurity for displaced populations. Syrians in Gaziantep live not only under the shadow of deportability, but also under the pressure of routine surveillance, administrative discretion, and the constant obligation to prove their legal status.

The main contribution of this thesis is that it combines the theoretical insights of the Paris School with rich interview data from the field study. In doing so, it shows that insecurity is not limited to the discursive level, but is produced and reproduced through everyday practices. In this sense, it emphasizes the need to examine everyday bureaucratic practices which often rendered invisible in policy debates, as powerful control mechanisms that produce security and insecurity.

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
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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE



UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

DUMLUPINAR BULVARI 06800
ÇANKAYA ANKARA/TURKEY
T: +90 312 210 22 91
F: +90 312 210 79 59
uearc@metu.edu.tr
www.uearc.metu.edu.tr

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu — 06 MAYIS 2024

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Doç. Dr. Zerrin TORUN

Danışmanlığını yürüttüğünüz Ebru VURAL'ın ***"Türkiye ve Suriye'den Gelen Toplu Göç: Bir Güvenlikleştirme Örneği mi?"*** başlıklı araştırmanız İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek **0236-ODTÜİAEK-2024** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN
Başkan

Prof.Dr. İ. Şemih AKÇOMAK
Üye

Doç. Dr. Ali Emre Turgut
Üye


Doç. Dr. Şerife SEVİNÇ
Üye

Doç.Dr. Murat Perit ÇAKIR
Üye

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Süreyya ÖZCAN KABASAKAL
Üye

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Müge GÜNDÜZ
Üye

B. RESPONSE LETTER TO THE REQUEST FOR RESEARCH PERMISSION FROM THE PRESIDENCY OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT



T.C.
İÇİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI
Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı
Uyum ve İletişim Genel Müdürlüğü
Göç Politika ve Projeleri Daire Başkanlığı

Sayı : E-62103649-000-295436
Konu : Ebru VURAL Dilekçe

20.09.2024

Sayın Ebru VURAL
İşçi Blokları Mahallesi,1539.Sokak,Aksu Aşiyan Evleri No:9140 100.Yıl, Çankaya/ANKARA

İlgi : 31.05.2024 tarihli dilekçeniz.

İlgi dilekçede "Türkiye ve Suriye'den Gelen Toplu Göç: Bir Güvenlikleştirme Örneği mi?" adlı çalışma kapsamında Suriye'den Türkiye'ye gelen yerinden edinmiş kişiler, sivil toplum kuruluşları çalışanları ve kamu kurumu çalışanları ile görüşme yapma isteğiniz ifade edilmiştir.

Bahsi geçen çalışma kapsamında, kamu kurumu çalışanları ile görüşme talebi konuları açısından incelenmiş olup Başkanlığımızca uygun bulunmadığı hususu,

Bilgilerinize sunulur.

Soner DİVLİ
Bakan a.
Genel Müdür V.

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır
Doğrulama Kodu: VG7nvN-IARkqJ-yz68b1-CGn5/s-uD8JqZqN Doğrulama Linki: https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/icisleri-ebys

Lalegül Çamlıca Mahallesi 122.Sk. No: 4, 06370 Yenimahalle/ Ankara
Telefon No: (312)422 05 00 Faks No: (312)422 09 00
e-Posta: proje@goc.gov.tr İnternet Adresi: https://www.goc.gov.tr
Kep Adresi: icisleribakanligi@hs01.kep.tr

Bilgi için:
Göç Uzman Yardımcısı
Telefon No: (312)422 07 94

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C. LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH SYRIAN REFUGEES

Nickname	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Education	Ethnic Backgrou	Which part of	Occupation in Syria	Occupation in Turkiye	Duration of Stay i	Legal Status	Date of Interview	Place/Platform of Inte	Language of Interview
Interviewee 1	28	M	Married	Bachelors	Arab	Manbij	none	runs a small shop	since 2011	TPS	11.07.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 2	26	M		Bachelors	Arab	Aleppo	none	foreign e-trade (Faculty of Law graduate)	since 2014	TPS (registered in Kayseri)	11.07.2024	Whatsapp	Turkish
Interviewee 3	19	M	Single	Bachelors student	Arab	Aleppo	none	student-part time translator	since 2014	TPS	13.07.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 4	33	M	Single	Bachelors	Arab	Damascus	none	NGO worker (HR and finance)	since 2021	Work permit based residence permit	30.07.2024	Gaziantep	English
Interviewee 5	34	M	Married	Masters	Arab	Aleppo (rural)	part time instructor	varies - now translator	since 2014	TPS	1.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 6	23	M	Single	Bachelors student	Turkmen	Aleppo	none	student-part time translator	since 2012	naturalized	1.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 7	19	F	Single	Bachelors student	Arab	Idlib	none	student	since 2013	TPS (registered in Hatay)	4.08.2024	Zoom	Turkish
Interviewee 8	25	M	Single	Bachelors student	Arab	Humus	none	student-working at HR department of a humanitarian organization	since 2016	TPS	4.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 9	23	F	Single	Bachelors	Turkmen	Aleppo	none	student	since 2015	TPS	5.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 10	40	F	Single	Bachelors	Kurdish	Kobane	teacher	varies-now translator	since 2014	TPS	17.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 11	25	F	Single	Bachelors	Turkmen	Aleppo (rural)	none	NGO worker	since 2014	naturalized	25.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 12	21	F	Single/engaged	Bachelors student	Arab	Aleppo	none	student-working part-time	since 2013	naturalized (2016)	26.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 13	20	M	Single	Bachelors student	Arab	Aleppo	none	student	since 2015	naturalized (2023)	26.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 14	30	F	Single	Masters	Arab	Aleppo	none	varies (Faculty of Law graduate)	since 2011	TPS	29.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 15	34	M	Married	Bachelors	Arab	Cerablus (rural)	varies	runs a small shop	since 2012	TPS	29.08.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 16	32	F	Married	Bachelors	Arab	Idlib	none	none (Doctor)	since 2019	TPS (registered in Hatay)	31.08.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 17	32	M	Married	Secondary school	Arab	Aleppo	buthcer	daily jobs if any	since 2016	TPS	1.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 18	31	F	Married	Literate	Arab	Aleppo	none	none	since 2016	TPS	1.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 19	37	M	Married	Doctorate degree	Arab	Tel Abyad	none	academician	since 2016 (December)	Work permit based residence permit	12.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 20	33	M	Married	Masters degree	Arab	Latakia	none	NGO worker	since 2011-2013	residence permit	13.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 21	33	M	Married	associate degree graduate	Turkmen	Cerablus (rural)		NGO worker	since 2012	TPS	27.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 22	50	M	Married	secondary school	Arab	Aleppo	shoe-maker	shoe-maker	since 2014	TPS	28.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic
Interviewee 23	54	M	Married	Literate	Turkmen	Cerablus	shoe-maker	shoe-maker/daily jobs	since 2012	TPS	29.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 24	55	F	Married	Literate	Turkmen	Cerablus	none	daily jobs if any	since 2012	TPS	29.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
Interviewee 25	63	M	Married	Bachelors	Arab	Aleppo	theologian working at schools	volunteer (temporary)	since 2013	naturalized (since 2017)	30.09.2024	Gaziantep	Arabic

D. LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER ACTORS

Interviewee civil society and other actors #	Job title	Organization	Date of Interview	Place of Interview	Language of Interview
1	Senior Humanitarian Worker (20 years of professiona	INGO focusing on migration	16.07.2024	Ankara	Turkish
2	Anonymous Humanitarian Worker/translator	INGO	19.07.2024	Ankara	Turkish
3	Senior Humanitarian Worker (14 years of professiona	INGO focusing on migration	5.08.2024	Gaziantep	English
4	Working at the Migration Department	Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality	16.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
5	Senior Humanitarian Worker	Syrian-led NGO	19.08.2024	Gaziantep	English
6	Senior Humanitarian Worker (13 years of professional experience in humanitarian sector) humanitarian aid management department	INGO	27.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
7	Middle-level Humanitarian Worker (livelihoods)	INGO focusing on migration	27.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
8	Chairman of the Association Board	Gaziantep-based NGO	1.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
9	Senior Humanitarian Worker (9 years of professional experience in humanitarian sector) livelihoods department	Syrian-led local Turkish NGO	3.09.2024	Microsoft teams	Turkish
10	Coordinator of Child Protection Project (7 years of professional experience in humanitarian sector)	Civil Development Institution	5.09.2024	Microsoft teams	Turkish
11	Senior Humanitarian Worker (7 years of professional experience in humanitarian sector)	INGO	6.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
12	Chairman of the Association Board	Syrian led Turkish NGO	9.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
13	Senior Humanitarian Worker (13 years of professiona	INGO focusing on migration	9.09.2024	Microsoft teams	English
14	Middle level humanitarian worker (5 years of professional experience in humanitarian sector) socio-economic empowerment department	National Humanitarian Relief Organization	25.09.2024	Zoom	Turkish
15	Senior Humanitarian Worker (10+ years of professional experience in humanitarian sector) refugee and women empowerment department	Development-based International Organization	26.09.2024	Zoom	Turkish
16	Anonymous Humanitarian Worker/translator-counseling (7 years of experience in humanitarian sector)	INGO focusing on refugees	27.09.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish
17	Anonymous Humanitarian Worker	INGO	25.08.2024	Gaziantep	Turkish

E. INFORMED CONSENT FORM

This research is being conducted by Ebru Vural, PhD student at the Department of International Relations, METU, under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN. This form has been prepared to inform you about the research conditions.

What is the Purpose of the Study?

The aim of the research is to understand the relationship between the wave of forced migration from Syria to Turkey after 2011 and security in various aspects.

How Do We Ask You to Help Us?

If you agree to participate in the study, you are expected to answer the semi-structured interview questions that we have prepared in accordance with the purpose of the study. In this interview, which is expected to last approximately 60 minutes, if you give your consent, your answers to the questions will be audio-recorded. If you do not consent to be audio recorded, the answers to the questions will be noted down by the researcher.

How Will We Use the Information We Collect from You?

Your participation in the research should be entirely voluntary. During the interview, you will not be asked for any information that can be used to identify your identity or the institution that you work for. Your answers will be kept completely confidential and will be evaluated only by the researchers. The information obtained from the participants will be evaluated collectively and used in scientific publications. The data you provide will not be matched with the identity information collected in the voluntary participation forms.

What you need to know about your participation:

In general, the interview does not contain questions that may cause personal discomfort. However, if you feel uncomfortable with the questions or for any other reason during participation, you are free to stop answering and leave. In such a case, it will be sufficient to tell the person conducting the study that you want to quit the study.

If you would like to get more information about the research:

Thank you in advance for participating in this study. To get more information about the research, please contact Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin Torun (e-mail: _____) or Ebru Vural (e-mail: _____), PhD student at the Department of International Relations.

I have read the information above and I am participating in this study completely voluntarily.

(After completing and signing the form, return it to the practitioner).

Name Surname	Date	Signature
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F. LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview Questions for Displaced People from Syria

1. Could you briefly introduce yourself?
2. Can you share your story of coming to Turkey?
3. Have you ever stayed in a camp or temporary accommodation center before? Can you tell me about your experience?
4. What is the main reason for choosing to live in this province?
5. Do you have neighbors or friends who are Turkish citizens?
6. Do you speak Turkish? If yes, how did you learn Turkish? If no, do you plan to learn Turkish? Is it important for you to learn Turkish? Why?
7. Did you receive any assistance from any public institution, non-governmental organization, or international aid organization to come to Turkey and/or after your arrival?
8. Are you working? If yes, can you tell me about your working life? If no, how do you make a living?
9. If you find it appropriate to answer, what is your legal status in Turkey? Can you tell me about your experiences in gaining and/or losing this status?
10. Do you have information about the legal regulations regarding Syrians in Turkey? Where do you get information on this subject?
11. What does temporary protection mean to you?
12. How do you stay informed about the legal regulations regarding you? When you apply to public institutions on any issue, do you observe any differences between legal regulations and practices?
13. Do you think that any of Turkey's policies directly affect Syrians living in Turkey?
14. Where do you go/apply when you have a problem or difficulty? Can you tell me about your experience? (If the interviewee does not say anything, the following options will be offered: public institution, local community, person(s) they met in Syria, or aid organizations)
15. Did you need to go to the Presidency of Migration Management or Provincial Directorate of Migration Management during your stay in Turkey? If yes, what was the reason? Can you share your experience? Have you observed any changes in the behavior of the people you received services from over time?
16. Have you ever applied to AFAD or Turkish Red Crescent on any issue? Have you been contacted by these organizations? Why? Can you share your experience?

17. Have you ever needed to visit police station for any reason? If yes, could you share your experience?
18. Have you had any interactions with the police, gendarmerie, or municipal police force (zabıta)? Could you share your experience regarding this?
19. Are you satisfied with the healthcare and social services or assistance you are receiving? Could you talk about any difficulties you have encountered?
20. Have you ever needed to visit a hospital or a family health center? Could you share your experience?
21. Do you have any school-aged children? How many? Do they attend a public school? Based on your experience as a parent and what your child has shared with you, could you describe your experience?
22. Over time, have you observed any changes in the behavior of Turkish citizens, bureaucrats providing services in public institutions, or staff from non-governmental organizations offering services to you? Could you share your experience?
23. In your opinion, which critical turning points can be mentioned in the reception and management of displaced people from Syria in Turkey?
24. In which ways do the changes in government policies towards Syrians affect you?
25. Have you ever felt that you were treated differently because you are Syrian?
26. Do you plan to return to Syria? If yes, why? If no, why?
27. Have you heard from your friends or those around you that there are Syrians who were sent back to Syria against their will?

    <u>Question to those who have received or are in the process of receiving citizenship:</u>
28. How did you hear about the naturalization procedure?
29. What is the main reason for your decision to apply for Turkish citizenship? Could you explain your application process for citizenship?
30. Can you tell me about the changes in your daily life - if any - that have taken place since you became a naturalized citizen as a result of the change in your legal status?

    <u>Questions to those who have been to administrative detention, deportation, and removal centers:</u>
31. Can you tell me about your experience in administrative detention/deportation/removal centers?
32. What was the reason for you being sent to the removal/detention center? Has this reason been made clear to you? Did you receive legal assistance during this process? Can you tell me about your experience?
33. Were you told about your rights? Did you benefit from the services of an interpreter? Can you tell me about your experience in this regard?
34. Did you encounter any problems in meeting with your lawyer?
35. Can you tell me about the physical structure of the removal/detention center?

36. Would you like to share your general evaluation of the removal/detention center?

Interview Questions for Representatives and Employees of Non-Governmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations

1. Could you briefly introduce yourself?
2. How long have you been actively serving? What are your fields of activity and the services you offer? Which immigrant and refugee groups do you work with most?
3. Which other actors in migration management do you cooperate with?
4. What are the main difficulties you encounter in your work related to your field of activity?
5. Can you make a general evaluation about immigration policies and practices in Turkey?
6. May I learn your assessment of the compliance of policies and legislation regarding migration in Turkey with the human rights of displaced persons/refugees coming to Turkey from Syria?
7. How would you evaluate the difficulties or advantages experienced by the immigrant groups you serve in the implementation of Turkey's immigration policies and legislation?
8. In your opinion, what are the main critical problems of migration from Syria to Turkey since 2011? How can these problems be overcome and which institutions/organizations can play an active role in their solution?
9. What does it mean to you that Syrians are under temporary protection status rather than under international protection? What differences does it make in your activities?
10. How would you evaluate the experiences of displaced people coming to Turkey from Syria under the Temporary Protection Regime?
11. How would you evaluate the effects of the changes in legislation and the activities of the administration on your work and Syrians?
12. What is your assessment of the security perceptions of displaced Syrians in Turkey?
13. What are your views on the security perceptions of the host society in Turkey about Syrians?
14. What are the experiences of non-governmental organizations regarding social harmonization?
15. How would you evaluate Turkey's naturalization policy?
16. How would you assess the administrative detention and removal/return practices in Turkey?
17. In your opinion, are there any events that you can define as a “breaking point” in the change of migration and immigrant management policies followed by Turkey, specifically for displaced Syrians? If so, may I learn what they are? What are your evaluations on this subject?
18. What changes have occurred in the services and support you provide to displaced people coming to Turkey from Syria during the COVID-19 pandemic?

19. In your opinion, were there any difficulties that Syrians experienced differently from the locals due to the earthquakes that occurred on February 6, 2023? Can you evaluate them?
20. If a person or a relative who has been issued a deportation decision applied to you, can you tell me about your support activities in this regard?
21. What is your assessment of voluntary return?
22. Can we consider the management of Syrians as the management of a security threat? May I learn your views on this issue?
23. How do you see the future of Syrians in Turkey? (Explanatory follow-up questions: Will they return to Syria, will most of them go to third countries, will they become citizens, or will they integrate into Turkish society?)
24. Apart from what we talked about, is there anything you would like to add that you think is important?

Questions for Local Government Employees

1. Could you briefly introduce yourself?
2. What role does your organization play in Turkey's migration management?
3. What are the main responsibilities and areas of activity of the institution and office you are working for regarding Syrians?
4. What does it mean to you, as local government actors, that Syrians are under temporary protection status rather than international protection?
5. How have the changes in legal regulations regarding temporary protection status over time affected your activities and service areas?
6. Could you share your assessments regarding the institutions or individuals that Syrians turn to when facing challenges and difficulties in their daily lives?
7. Which critical junctures can we mention in the admission and management of Syrians in Turkey?
8. How did the COVID-19 pandemic and/or the earthquakes on February 6, 2023 change your organization's services to Syrians and your areas of activity?
9. In your opinion, what are the main critical problems of migration from Syria to Turkey since 2011? How can these problems be overcome and which institutions/organizations can play an active role in their resolution?
10. Apart from what we have discussed, is there anything else you would like to add?

G. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name:
Nationality:
Date and Place of Birth:
email:

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution
Ph.D.	METU International Relations
M.S.	METU European Studies
B.S.	Dokuz Eylul University International Relations

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2017- Present	Gaziantep University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Research Assistant
2008-2017	METU, Center for Europan Studies	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate German

H. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DE GÖÇMENLERİN GÜVENLİK(SİZ)LEŞTİRİLMESİ: GAZİANTEP'TEKİ SURİYELİLER ÖRNEĞİ

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle devletlerin göçü giderek daha fazla bir güvenlik meselesi olarak görmeye başlaması, güvenlik ve göç arasındaki ilişkiyi Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Çalışmaları'nın ana temalarından biri hâline getirmiştir. 11 Eylül saldırıları, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesine ilişkin çalışmalara ivme kazandırmıştır. Bu ilgi, 2015 yılında "mülteci krizi" olarak çerçevelenen Suriye'den Avrupa'ya yönelik kitlesel göç ile birlikte daha da yoğunlaşmıştır. Avrupa ülkelerinin ve Batı'nın göçü nasıl güvenlikleştirdiği sıklıkla incelenmiş olsa da Türkiye bağlamında bu konu uzun süre sınırlı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Ancak özellikle Suriye İç Savaşı'nın başlamasından sonra Türkiye'ye yönelen kitlesel mülteci akını, Türkiye'nin göç ve mülteci politikalarını güvenlikleştirme teorisi bağlamında analiz etmeyi ilgi çekici kılmıştır. Bu çalışma, 2011 sonrasında Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yaşanan kitlesel göçü bir vaka çalışması olarak ele almakta ve Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyelilerin deneyimlerine odaklanarak Türkiye'nin kitlesel göç politikaları ile yönetimine ilişkin kapsamlı bir analiz sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışma, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri dâhil olmak üzere altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümü, çalışmanın amacını, temel araştırma sorusunu ve metodolojisini ortaya koyarak genel çerçeveyi sunmaktadır. Ayrıca nitel araştırma tasarımı ile saha deneyimlerini de aktararak sonraki analizlere zemin hazırlamaktadır. Özetle giriş bölümü, tezin kapsamını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Uluslararası düzeyde kısa sürede "Suriye Mülteci Krizi" olarak çerçevelenen bir soruna dönüşen Suriye krizine Türkiye'nin verdiği tepki ve müdahale, ülkeyi küresel ve bölgesel aktörlerin yanı sıra insani yardım kuruluşlarının da odağına

yerleştirmiştir. Türkiye, uluslararası mülteci rejiminin temel yasal araçları olan 1951 tarihli Mültecilerin Hukuki Durumuna İlişkin Sözleşme (Mülteci Sözleşmesi) ve 1967 tarihli Protokol (New York Protokolü) dışında politikalar izlemiştir. Türkiye'nin 1951 Sözleşmesi'ne koyduğu coğrafi sınırlamayı sürdürmesi nedeniyle Suriyeliler yasal açıdan "mülteci" olarak tanınmamıştır. Türk makamları, 1994 Yönetmeliği'nin "iltica edenler" kategorisini uygulamak yerine, başlangıçta insani yardım söylemleri çerçevesinde şekillenen geçici politikaları benimsemiş ve Suriyelileri "misafir" olarak nitelendirmiştir. Ancak "misafir" kavramının hukuki bir karşılığı olmadığı için yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilere yönelik politika ve idari uygulamaları yönlendirecek kalıcı bir çerçeve oluşturulamamıştır. Bu boşluk, daha sonra geçici koruma rejiminin yürürlüğe konulmasıyla doldurulmuştur. Böylece Suriyeliler, Türkiye'de yönetilmesi gereken özgün bir hukuki ve idari kategoriye dâhil edilmiştir. Uluslararası hukukta mülteciler hak ve sorumluluklara sahip bireylerdir; ancak kitlesel göç durumlarında mülteci statüsü belirleme süreci çoğunlukla işletilmemekte ve geçici koruma rejimi, yalnızca Türkiye'de değil Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika ülkelerinde de uygulanan pratik bir araç hâline gelmektedir.

Suriyelilerin Türkiye'deki yasal statüsü ne olursa olsun, Türkiye küresel ölçekte en yüksek mülteci nüfusuna sahip ülkelerden biri olmayı sürdürmektedir. Bu durum, ülkeyi ve Türkiye'nin verdiği tepkiyi zorunlu göç ve mülteci çalışmaları alanında akademik ilginin odağına yerleştirmiştir. Türkiye'de Suriyelilere ilişkin literatür giderek artmaktadır. Bu çalışmalar çoğunlukla Suriyelilerin yasal statüsünü, geçici koruma rejiminin yarattığı kırılganlıkları, yaşam koşullarını ve göçmenlerin çalışma hayatına katılım koşullarını vurgulamaktadır. Diğer bir grup çalışma ise bu konunun bölgesel ve uluslararası politika açısından önemini sorgulamakta, Türkiye'nin göç hareketleri karşısındaki dış politikasını analiz etmektedir. Ayrıca, göç ve güvenlik arasındaki bağlantıyı inceleyen çalışmaların sayısı da azımsanmayacak düzeydedir. Bununla birlikte, güvenlikleştirmenin Türkiye bağlamında hâlihazırda gerçekleşmiş, durağan veya hep sürecek bir olgu olarak ele alınmaması gerektiğinin altı çizilmelidir. Bu durumu izlenmesi gereken dinamik bir süreç olarak değerlendirmek daha doğru olur. Bu noktada, bu tezde de vurgulandığı üzere, Kopenhag Okulu ile Paris Okulu'nun güvenlik yaklaşımları arasındaki farklar dikkate değerdir.

Mevcut literatürü göz önünde bulunduran bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin Suriye'den gelen kitlesel göç akımlarına verdiği tepkiyi güvenlikleştirme perspektifiyle ele alarak literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, tez, Suriye İç Savaşı'nın patlak vermesinin ardından yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin kabulü, kalışı ve geri dönüşüne ilişkin Türkiye'deki uygulamaların bu kişiler tarafından nasıl deneyimlendiğini ve yorumlandığını incelemektedir. Amaç, Paris Okulu'nun güvenlik(siz)leştirme yaklaşımını temel alarak, saha araştırmasına dayalı bir analiz yoluyla göçün ve yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin güvenlikleştirilip güvenlikleştirilmediğini ve bu sürecin işleyişini incelemektir.

Çalışmada temel amaç, Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyelileri bir vaka çalışması olarak ele almak, mikro düzeyde güvenlikleştirme/güvenlik(siz)leştirme izlerini ortaya koymak ve bu süreçlerin Suriyeliler tarafından nasıl deneyimlendiğini incelemektir. Tezin ana araştırma sorusu şudur: Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyeli mülteciler, göç yönetiminin yerel ve gündelik pratiklerini nasıl deneyimlemekte ve yorumlamaktadır? Bu mikro düzeydeki deneyimler, Paris Güvenlik Çalışmaları Okulu'nun yaklaşımı çerçevesinde güvenlik(siz)leştirme süreçlerine dair hangi sonuçları ortaya koymaktadır? Bu bağlamda, mikro ve makro düzeydeki analizler, bireysel deneyimleri, yapısal çerçevelerle birleştiren çok boyutlu bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Bu tez, Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyelilerin gündelik deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak Türkiye'nin göç yönetimi politikalarına uzanan çok katmanlı bir perspektif ortaya koymaktadır. Mikro düzeyde mültecilerin bürokratik yapılarla etkileşimleri ve uygulamalarla karşılaşmaları incelenirken, makro düzeyde Türkiye'nin göç politikalarının yasal, kurumsal ve uluslararası boyutları ele alınmaktadır. Böylece çalışma, bireysel deneyimlerin makro düzeyle nasıl kesiştiğini göstermeyi ve durumu Paris Güvenlik Çalışmaları Okulu'nun rutin güvenlikleştirme yaklaşımı çerçevesinde kapsamlı biçimde değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Metodolojik olarak, bu tez yazılırken yalnızca birincil ve ikincil kaynaklara dayanılmamıştır. Öncelikle, yasal belgeler, resmi metinler, makaleler, kitaplar ve alandaki çeşitli aktörlerin raporları aracılığıyla Türkiye'nin geçmiş ve mevcut göç rejimi incelenmiştir. Bunun yanında, gazete haberleri ve makaleler taranarak

olayların kamuoyuna nasıl yansıtıldığı anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Konuya ilişkin genel literatür, Suriye göçünün Türkiye'nin göç tarihi bağlamında nasıl konumlandırılması gerektiğine dair bir bakış açısı kazandırmıştır. Ayrıca, Gaziantep'te yaşayan 25 Suriyeli (bkz. Ek C) ile bu alanda çalışan 17 aktörle yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Katılımcılardan ikisi hem Suriyeli mülteci hem de sivil toplum çalışanı olarak görev yapmaktaydı (bkz. Ek D). Esnek yapıları nedeniyle yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler tercih edilmiştir; bu yöntem, katılımcıların deneyimlerini kendi anlatılarıyla ifade etmelerine olanak tanırken gerektiğinde ek ayrıntıların derinlemesine sorgulanmasını da sağlamıştır.[623] Zorunlu göç araştırmalarında anlatıların, mülteci deneyimlerini anlamada kritik rol oynadığı dikkate alındığında, bu yöntemin katılımcıların seslerini etkili biçimde yakaladığı ve analiz edildiği düşünülmektedir.[624] Kamu kurumlarında çalışanlarla da yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yapılması planlamıştır, ancak Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı'na yapılan başvuru birkaç ay sonra reddedilmiştir (bkz. Ek B). Bu nedenle görüşmelerin bu bileşeninin eksikliği, tezin sınırlılıklarından biri olarak değerlendirilmelidir. Bununla birlikte, İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü'nde görev yapan iki çalışanla gayriresmî görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu tez için gerekli olan etik kurul onayı, 0236-ODTÜİAEK-2024 protokol numarasıyla ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu'ndan alınmıştır (bkz. Ek A).

Bu çalışmada Gaziantep, saha çalışması alanı olarak seçilmiştir. Çalışmada, kentte yaşayan Suriyelilerin deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak Türkiye'nin Suriyelilere yönelik uluslararası göç rejiminin güvenlikleştirilme/güvenlik(siz)leştirilme durumunu sorgulamakta ve bu sürecin hangi biçimlerde işlediği incelenmektedir. Bu amaçla, mikro düzeydeki deneyimleri anlamaya yönelik bir saha araştırması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Gaziantep'in saha alanı olarak tercih edilmesinin çeşitli nedenleri vardır. Öncelikli neden ise, kentin İstanbul'un ardından Geçici Koruma altındaki en büyük ikinci Suriyeli nüfusa ev sahipliği yapmasıdır.

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[623] Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, *InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*, 3rd ed. (Sage Publications, 2015), 31–32.

[624] M. Eastmond, "Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 2 (2007): 249, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem007.

Gaziantep, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminden bu yana Halep ile güçlü bağlara sahip bir şehirdir ve Türkiye'deki Suriyeli nüfusun dikkate değer bir kısmı Halep kökenlidir.[625] Eklenmesi gereken bir diğer nokta, Kasım 2017'den bu yana Gaziantep'te yaşıyor ve çalışıyor olmamdır. Bu durum, bana altı yılı aşkın bir süredir Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyelilerin hayatlarını doğrudan gözlemleme imkânı sağlamıştır. Ancak, Ankara'da doğup büyümüş olmam nedeniyle, bunun beni "atanmış içeriden biri"[626] olarak nitelendirmek için yeterli olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Irgıl'in tanımına göre, "atanmış içeriden biri" konumunda olabilmek için araştırmacının ev sahibi topluluk üyeleriyle aynı yerel kökeni paylaşması gerekir ki, bu benim durumumda geçerli değildir.[627]

Saha verileri 2024 yazında meydana gelen ve "Kayseri olayları" olarak adlandırılan gelişmelerin hemen ardından toplanmaya başlanmıştır. Bu dönem, zaten son yıllarda gözlemlenen ev sahibi toplum ile Suriyeli nüfus arasındaki gerilimin açık biçimde patlak verdiği bir süreçtir. Kayseri'deki karışıklıklar yalnızca bu şehirle sınırlı kalmamıştır; Gaziantep'te de benzer gerginlikler yaşanmıştır.[628] Bu durum, potansiyel araştırma katılımcılarımla iletişimimi kaçınılmaz olarak etkilemiştir. Karşı karşıya kaldığım ortam, genel olarak "zorlayıcı bir bağlam" niteliğinde olmuştur. Böyle bir ortamda, "kilit bilgi kaynaklarına" ulaşmak, saha araştırmasına başlamadan önce aşılması gereken temel engellerden biri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.[629]

Kayseri olaylarının ardından yerinden edilmiş Suriyeliler arasında yoğun bir kaygı olduğu açıkça gözlemlenmiş ve hissedilmiştir. Birçoğu benim bir "casus"

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[625] *Anadolu Agency*, "İçişleri Bakanı Yerlikaya: Son 15 Günde Suriye'ye Dönenlerin Sayısı 25 Bini Geçti," December 25, 2024, accessed December 25, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/icisleri-bakani-yerlikaya-son-15-gunde-suriyeye-donenlerin-sayisi-25-bini-gecti/3432689.

[626] Ezgi Irgıl, "Broadening the Positionality in Migration Studies: Assigned Insider Category," *Migration Studies* 9, no. 2 (2021): 1215–29.

[627] Irgıl, "Broadening the Positionality in Migration Studies: Assigned Insider Category."

[628] *BBC Türkçe,* "Kayseri Olayları: Türkiye Genelinde Gözaltına Alınan 1065 Kişiden 28'i Tutuklandı," July 5, 2024, accessed July 5, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/crgmzv9p2y3o.

[629] Carla Alberti and Nicole Jenne, "Getting Prepared to Be Prepared: How Interpersonal Skills Aid Fieldwork in Challenging Contexts," *Qualitative Sociology Review* 15, no. 3 (2019): 47–48, 3, https://doi.org/10.18778/1733-8077.15.3.03.

olabileceğimden endişe duyduğunu dile getirmiştir. Bazı Suriyeliler ise, aralarına casusların sızdığını, bu kişilerin hem Esad rejimi hem de Türk hükümeti için çalıştığını samimiyetle dile getirmişlerdir. Gidecek başka yerleri olmadığı için, yakın çevreleri dışından gelen her türlü iletişim girişimine büyük bir şüpheyle yaklaştıkları gözlemlenmiştir ve katılımcılar tarafından dile getirilmiştir. Ayrıca sorularımın içeriğini özellikle hassas bulan potansiyel katılımcılar da olmuştur; hatta bazıları görüşme sorularımı gördükten sonra araştırmaya katılmamayı tercih etmiştir. Sonrasında, Suriyeli kanaat önderleriyle yaptığım görüşmelerde, Suriyelilere genellikle Türkiye'deki siyasi durum hakkında yorum yapmamaları ve mümkünse herhangi bir siyasi değerlendirmede bulunmamaları yönünde tavsiyelerde bulunulduğu öğrenilmiştir (Görüşmeci Sivil Toplum 12).

Vurgulanması gereken bir diğer nokta, genellikle "Suriyeliler" olarak adlandırılan nüfusun etnik köken açısından oldukça çeşitli olduğudur. Bunun yanı sıra, bu grup içinde eğitim düzeyi, sosyal ve ekonomik sermaye bakımından da önemli farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Suriye'den gelen mültecilerin ekonomik profilleri homojen değildir. Yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerle yapılan görüşmelerde, hepsinin yardıma muhtaç ve bağımlı oldukları yönündeki genel kanının aksine, ekonomik koşullarının oldukça farklı olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Yardıma ihtiyaç duyan birçok aile bulunmakla birlikte, kendi sermayeleriyle Türkiye'de iş kurmuş ve hatta istihdam olanakları yaratmış kişiler de bulunmaktaydı. Bu bağlamda, farklı ekonomik geçmişlere sahip birçok Suriyeli mülteciyle görüşme fırsatı elde edilmiştir.

Bu perspektif, Suriyelilerin deneyimlerinin çeşitliliğinin farkında olmanın önemini vurgulamaktadır, yani bu deneyimler tek tip bir anlatıya indirgenmemelidir. Aynı zamanda, istatistiksel bilgilerin, yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler gibi nitel verilerle desteklenmesi gerektiğini de göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, mikro düzeydeki deneyimleri nitel bir yaklaşımla yorumlamak amaçlanmıştır. Sosyal olguların karmaşık doğasını anlamak açısından nitel araştırma yöntemleri özellikle değerlidir, çünkü bu yöntemler araştırmacılara görüşülen kişilerin deneyimlerini ve algılarını derinlemesine keşfetme imkânı sunmaktadır.[630]

[630] Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 380–81.

Bu tez, Türkiye'de, özellikle Gaziantep şehrinde yerinden edilmiş Suriyelileri hedef alan göç yönetiminin saha düzeyindeki bürokratik ve gözetim uygulamalarının Suriyeliler tarafından nasıl algılandığı, deneyimlendiği ve yorumlandığı ve bu etkileşimlerin güvenlik(siz)leştirme süreçleriyle nasıl ilişkilendirilebileceğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada güvenlik, sabit ve nesnel bir gerçeklikten ziyade, iktidar ilişkilerini de içeren sosyal ve politik süreçler tarafından şekillendirilen bir kavram olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Bu anlamda, geleneksel güvenlik çalışmalarından açıkça ayrılmakta ve daha eleştirel, pratik odaklı bir yaklaşımı benimsemektedir.

İkinci Bölüm, tezin teorik çerçevesini geliştirmektedir. Güvenlik kavramının dar ve devlet merkezli bir yaklaşımdan, daha geniş ve eleştirel perspektiflere nasıl evrildiğini açıklamaktadır. Bölüm, söz edimlerine dayanan Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenlikleştirme teorisini sunmakta ve bunu Paris Okulu'nun sosyolojik ve pratik odaklı yaklaşımıyla karşılaştırmaktadır. Michel Foucault ve Pierre Bourdieu'dan hareketle, gündelik bürokratik pratiklerin, gözetim ve yönetimselliğin güvenlik(siz)leştirme süreçlerine nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu vurgulamakta; yani bu rutinlerin ve yönetim uygulamalarının söz konusu süreçleri nasıl şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Geleneksel, devlet merkezli güvenlik anlayışı 1980'lerden ve özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden sonra ciddi biçimde sorgulanmıştır. Barry Buzan'ın "İnsanlar, Devletler ve Korku" (ilk yayın yılı 1983, genişletilmiş 2. baskı yılı 1991) adlı çalışması güvenliğin yalnızca askeri tehditlerden ibaret olmadığını, algılarla da şekillendiğini ve devletin tek aktör sayılamayacağını ortaya koyarak önemli bir paradigma değişimi yaratmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında güvenlik kavramı hem bireyleri hem uluslararası sistemi kapsayacak şekilde dikey, hem de ekonomik, çevresel ve toplumsal boyutları içerecek şekilde yatay olarak genişlemiş; güvenliği sağlama sorumluluğu da ulus devletin ötesine taşmıştır. Bu süreçte sosyal inşaacılık yaklaşımı, güvenliği sabit değil, aktörlerin söylem ve etkileşimleriyle inşa edilen bağlama özgü bir olgu olarak görmüştür. Dil bu yaklaşımda merkezi öneme sahiptir. Nitekim Kopenhag Okulu'nun geliştirdiği güvenlikleştirme kavramı, varoluşsal

tehdit söylemleriyle konuların "normal siyasetin" dışına taşınarak güvenlik meselesine dönüştürülmesini ifade etmektedir.

Her ne kadar Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenlikleştirme yaklaşımı Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde güvenlik çalışmalarına önemli bir tartışma zemini sunmuş olsa da, Didier Bigo ve Jef Huysmans gibi araştırmacılar tarafından eleştirilmiş ve Paris Okulu ya da sosyolojik yaklaşım olarak adlandırılan alternatif bir yönelim ortaya çıkmıştır. Philippe Bourbeau'nun vurguladığı üzere, bu iki okul "istisna mantığı" ve "rutin mantığı"na karşılık gelmektedir. Kopenhag Okulu'na göre güvenlikleştirme, söz edimleri ve söylemler aracılığıyla dinleyicilerin ikna edilmesine dayanmaktadır. Tehdit algısı yerleştiğinde olağanüstü önlemler meşru hale gelmektedir. Bu süreç, Carl Schmitt'in "istisna durumu" kavramını yansıtmakta ve baskıcı politikaları meşrulaştırabilmektedir. Paris Okulu ise güvenlik(siz)leştirmenin yalnızca söylemlerle değil, günlük bürokratik kararlar, Weberci rasyonalizasyon rutinleri ve teknoloji kullanımı üzerinden de üretildiğini savunmaktadır. Burada aktörler yalnızca siyasi elitler değil, bürokratlar ve güvenlik uzmanlarıdır. Paris Okulu, Foucault'nun yönetimsellik ve panoptikon kavramlarından, Bourdieu'nun alan, habitus ve pratik araçlarından yararlanarak güvenliğe sosyolojik bir yaklaşım geliştirmektedir.

Alanlar "sosyal alt sistemlerdir". Belirli bir alandaki aktörler, oyunun kurallarına ve rollere uyarak bir dizi uygulama ve kalıp oluştururlar. Aktörler, sahip oldukları ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel veya sembolik sermayeyi kullanarak alanda daha iyi bir konum elde etmeye çalışırlar. Sermaye, aktörlerin alana girmelerine, tanınmalarına ve hiyerarşik düzende rekabet etmelerine olanak tanır; ancak görecelidir ve otorite kazanabilmesi için tanınması gerekir. Alan içindeki hiyerarşi bu farklı sermaye türlerine dayanır ve bireylerin stratejilerini şekillendirir. Alanlarda otorite, teknik uzmanlık ve istatistiksel bilgiye hâkimiyetle kazanılır. Profesyoneller veri toplama ve sınıflandırma yoluyla riskleri tanımlar; bu da sıradan aktörlerin erişemeyeceği bir bilgi alanı yaratır. Ancak alan, aynı zamanda rekabet ve çatışma mekânıdır. Aktörler, güvenliği veya riskleri tanımlama gücü için mücadele eder. Bu nedenle güvenlikleştirme, tek bir aktörün bilinçli tercihi değil, bürokratlar, uzmanlar ve teknolojik araçların etkileşimiyle oluşan bir alan etkisinin sonucudur.

Bourdieu'nun sosyolojisinde habitus, kalıcı ve aktarılabilir eğilimler bütününü ifade eder. Habitus geçmiş deneyimleri bütünleştirir; aynı zamanda çok sayıda görev ve yükümlülüğün yerine getirilmesini sağlayan algı, zevk ve eylem kalıpları olarak işlev görür. Önceki deneyimler habitusu şekillendirir, habitus da öznelerin pratiklerini etkiler ve onların deneyimlerini yeniden üretir. Alanın kuralları ve normlarıyla etkileşim içinde öznelerin kimliklerini, çıkarlarını ve stratejilerini biçimlendirir. Habitus ayrıca topluluğun kolektif hafızasını yansıtır. Bireylerin davranışları yalnızca kendilerine değil, içinde bulundukları topluluklara ve geçmiş deneyimlere de bağlıdır.

Foucault, yönetimsellik kavramıyla iktidarın yalnızca yasal ve zorlayıcı yollarla değil, kurumlar, prosedürler, analizler ve taktikler aracılığıyla işlediğini açıklar. Bu iktidar biçimi hedef nüfusa yönelir, politik ekonomiyi araçsallaştırır ve güvenlik aygıtları üzerinden gündelik yaşamda sürekli bir gözetim ve kontrol mekanizması üretir. Bigo ise gözetim ve denetim teknolojilerinin artık olağanüstü durumlara özgü değil, gündelik yaşamın sıradan pratikleri haline geldiğini ileri sürer.

Bigo'ya göre göçün güvenlik meselesine dönüştürülmesi, sınır kontrollerinin sıkılaştırılması ve refah devletinin zayıflaması, modern yönetimsellikte bir dönüşümün göstergesidir. Devlet artık koruyucu bir aktör olmaktan çok, güvensizlik ve tedirginlik üzerinden meşruiyet üretmektedir. Sürekli tehditlere karşı önlem alma pratiği, güvenliği sağlamaktan ziyade güvensizlik hissini kurumsallaştırmakta; iç güvenlik önlemlerinin artışı ise yalnızca politikaların sertleşmesini değil, devletin nüfus üzerindeki denetim biçimlerinin yeniden tanımlanmasını da ifade etmektedir.

Bigo'ya göre bu yeni yönetim sanatı, Foucault'nun tarif ettiği panoptikon değildir. Foucault'nun panoptikonu, her yerde herkesi izleyen ve nüfusu sürekli gözetim altında tutan bir durumu betimler. Bigo ise bunun yerine ban-optikon kavramını kullanır. Burada herkes değil, riskli olarak kategorize edilenler izlenir. Gözetim teknolojileri bireyleri riskli ve riskli olmayan diye profilleştirir ve buna göre kişi gözetim altında olabilir veya olmayabilir. Bu siyasi teknoloji, proaktif ve öngörülü tekniklere dayanır, amacı ise riskli grupları kontrol ederek geleceği yönetmektir. Veri ve istatistiksel bilgi sayesinde güvensizlik yönetimi, güç kullanımından çok risk

yönetimine dayanmaktadır. Bu süreçte politikacılardan ziyade güvenlik uzmanları belirleyici konuma gelmiştir. Devletler, sınır içi ve ötesindeki hareketliliği teknolojik ve bürokratik araçlarla denetler. Duvarlar, parmak izi ve görselleştirme sistemleri, biyometrik pasaportlar, vizeler, elektronik çitler, kayıt ve çalışma izinleri bu araçlar arasındadır. Tümü teknik uzmanlığa dayalı süreçlerdir ve hem riskli grupları dışarıda tutmayı hem de onaylanmış kişilerin girişini kontrollü biçimde düzenlemeyi amaçlar.

Bigo'ya göre güvenlik bir Möbius şeridini andırır. Bu bağlamda iç ve dış güvenlik arasındaki ayrım ortadan kalkar ve birbirine dönüşür. Rob Walker'ın iç/dış kavramlarını sorunlaştıran çalışmasına dayanan bu metafor, sınırların iç içe geçtiğini gösterir. Sosyolojik yaklaşıma göre güvenlik uygulamaları aynı zamanda güvensizlik üretir. Möbius şeridinde olduğu gibi, güvenlik ve güvensizlik birbirinden ayrılmaz. Sınır kontrolleri ve teknolojiler riskleri ortadan kaldırmaz, aksine gündelik yaşamda hareketlilikle ilgili kaygı ve güvensizlikleri yayar. Böylece güvenlik, güvensizliği yeniden üreten dinamik bir süreç haline gelir.

İç ve dış güvenlik alanlarının Möbius şeridi gibi iç içe geçmesi, tehditlerin artmasından çok benlik-öteki ilişkisinin problematikleştirilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Güvenlik uzmanlarının gündelik uygulamaları, güvenliği artırmak yerine çoğu zaman farkında olmadan güvensizliği besleyebilmekte; birinin güvenliği, başkasının güvensizliğine dönüşebilmektedir. Bu durum ise polis varlığının ve gündelik müdahalelerin artmasıyla görünür hâle gelmektedir. Ulusötesi tehditler -terörizm, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı ve organize suç gibi- iç ve dış güvenlik ayrımını bulanıklaştıran başlıca etkenler arasında yer almaktadır. Ancak bu gelişmelerin güvenliği mi güçlendirdiği, yoksa özgürlükleri kısıtlayarak yeni güvensizlikler mi yarattığı tartışmaya açık bulunmaktadır.

Bigo'ya göre güvenlikleştirme, söylemlere başvurulmasa bile, özellikle ordu ve polis gibi güvenlik aktörlerince pratikler ve uzmanlık aracılığıyla üretilebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda pratikler, disiplinler ve idari bilgi, siyasi elitlerin söylemleri kadar, hatta onlardan daha da etkili olabilmektedir. İdari bilginin idari güce dönüşmesi, bürokratik organlara tartışmalarda üstünlük sağlamaktadır; teknokratik uygulamalar ise çoğu zaman gizlilik içinde yürütülmektedir. Van Munster da bu hattı izleyerek,

bürokrasilerin sahip oldukları uzmanlık bilgisi sayesinde güvenlik kararlarında siyasi elitlerden daha etkili olabildiklerini vurgulamaktadır. Dolayısıyla yalnızca elit söylemlere odaklanmak, rutin ve gündelik uygulamalarla işleyen güvenlikleştirme süreçlerinin gözden kaçırılmasına yol açmaktadır. Paris Okulu çerçevesinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi, farklı aktörlerin pratikleri ve süreçlerinin ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Huysmans, bu sürecin yapısal etkiler taşıdığını vurgulamaktadır. Güvenlikleştirme yalnızca siyasi elitlerin eylemleriyle ya da izleyiciyi ikna süreçleriyle sınırlı kalmamaktadır. Ancak bu durum, alanın iktidar mücadelelerinden bağımsız olduğunu göstermemektedir; aksine, aktörler sahip oldukları sermaye ve habitus aracılığıyla bu ilişkilere dâhil olmaktadırlar. Bu bağlamda teknokrasi, ilişki ağları ve uzmanlık bilgisi belirleyici bir rol oynamaktadır.

Tezin 3. Bölümünde, Türkiye'nin Suriyelileri kabul sürecinin uluslararası, bölgesel ve ulusal bağlamları ele alınmaktadır. Bölüm, göçün Osmanlı dönemi ve Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca her zaman önemli olduğunu kısaca açıklamaktadır. Ardından neoliberal küreselleşmeyi tartışmakta ve 1980'lerden itibaren gerçekleşen ekonomik yeniden yapılanmanın Türkiye'nin göç rejimini nasıl dönüştürdüğünü göstermektedir. Son olarak, Türkiye–Suriye ilişkilerini ve bölgesel siyaseti incelemekte, ikili ilişkilerdeki iniş çıkışları izlemekte ve Suriye krizinin yanı sıra Türkiye'nin dış politikasının Suriyelilerin kabulünü ve sonrasındaki yönetimini nasıl şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye'nin göç politikaları tarih boyunca farklı dönemsel koşullara ve devletin varlığını sürdürme kaygısına bağlı olarak şekillenmiştir.

Türkiye'nin göç yönetimi, yalnızca iç dinamiklerin değil neoliberal küreselleşmenin de etkisi altındadır. 1980'lerle birlikte başlayan ekonomik yeniden yapılanma, özelleştirme, deregülasyon ve esnek istihdam uygulamalarıyla kayıt dışı ekonomiyi büyütmüş, göçmen emeğine dayalı işgücü piyasalarının önünü açmıştır. Vize rejimindeki esneklik, düzensiz göçmenlerin istihdamını kolaylaştırmış, tekstil, tarım, hizmet, inşaat ve ev işlerinde düşük ücret, uzun saatler ve sendikasızlık yaygın hâle gelmiştir. Göçmenler hem yerli işçilerin tercih etmediği "3D işler"de (dirty-kirli, difficult-zor, dangerous-tehlikeli) çalıştırılmış hem de kimi alanlarda rekabet yaratmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra Türkiye hem transit geçiş

ülkesi hem de emek piyasalarında çalışma alanı hâline gelmiştir AB sınırlarının sertleşmesiyle birlikte Türkiye'de sıkışan düzensiz göçmenler artmış ve geçici göçler kalıcılaşmaya başlamıştır. Bavul ticareti gibi döngüsel hareketler desteklenirken, uzun vadeli ikamet ve çalışma izinlerindeki kısıtlar göçmenlerin kırılganlığını artırmıştır.

2000'lerden itibaren neoliberal politikalar derinleşirken sosyal refahın gerilemesi, kırsal yoksulluğun artması ve işgücü piyasalarının esnekleşmesi, ucuz ve güvencesiz emek talebini yükseltmiştir. 2011 sonrası Suriyelilerin gelişi bu bağlamda gerçekleşmiştir. Suriyeli göçmen işçiler sanayi, tarım, ayakkabıcılık, tekstil ve hizmet sektörlerinde kritik roller üstlenmişlerdir; hükümet yetkilileri de Suriyelilerin ekonomiyi ayakta tuttuğunu açıkça dile getirmiştir.

Sonuçta, 1980'lerden itibaren Türkiye'nin neoliberal dönüşümü kayıt dışı ve esnek işgücü piyasasını beslerken ülkenin küresel ekonomiye entegrasyonu göç türlerini ve kabul koşullarını çeşitlendirmiştir. Bu dönüşüm, Suriyelilerin kabulüyle birleşerek onların büyük ölçüde güvencesiz, düşük ücretli işlerde istihdam edilmesine zemin hazırlamıştır Suriyelilerin kabulü böylece hem ekonomik ihtiyaçlara hem de küresel neoliberal iş bölümüne uyumlu bir şekilde gerçekleşmiştir.

Suriyelilerin Türkiye'ye kabulü, yalnızca neoliberal ekonomik dönüşümün yarattığı yapısal koşullarla değil, aynı zamanda bölgesel siyasal gelişmeler ve Türkiye–Suriye ilişkilerindeki dönüşümle de şekillenmiştir. İki ülke ilişkileri tarihsel olarak güvenlik merkezli olmuş; Hatay meselesi, sınır aşan sular ve Suriye'nin PKK'ya desteği gibi konular nedeniyle gerginlik yaşamıştır. 1998 Adana Mutabakatı kısmi bir normalleşme sağlamış, 2000'lerde ise diplomatik temaslar, ekonomik işbirliği ve vize serbestisiyle ilişkiler olumlu bir seyir izlemiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin dış politikası "komşularla sıfır sorun" ve "yeni-Osmanlıcı" vizyon çerçevesinde şekillenmiş, Batı ile yakınlık ve "ılımlı İslam–neoliberal ekonomi" imajı üzerinden meşruiyet kazanmıştır.

2011'de Arap Baharı'nın Suriye'ye sıçramasıyla ilişkiler hızla bozulmuş; Türkiye, Esad yönetimine reform çağrısında bulunmuş ancak rejimin sert tutumunu

sürdürmesi üzerine muhalefeti ve Özgür Suriye Ordusu'nu desteklemeye yönelmiştir. Bu politika bazı akademik çalışmalarda mezhepçi eğilim taşıdığı gerekçesiyle eleştirilmiştir. Aynı süreçte rejimin PYD'ye alan açması Türkiye açısından yeni güvenlik riskleri yaratmış; Batı'nın IŞİD'e karşı mücadelede YPG'ye dayanması Ankara'yı stratejik bir ikilemle karşı karşıya bırakmıştır. 2015'te yaşanan Rusya uçak krizi ilişkileri yeniden tanımlamış, sonrasında S-400 alımı ABD ile ciddi bir krize neden olmuş ve Türkiye'nin F-35 programından çıkarılmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu dönemde artan mülteci sayısı, sınır ötesi saldırılar ve güvenlik kaygıları, Türkiye'de toplumsal tepkilerin yükselmesine ve mülteci karşıtı söylemlerin güçlenmesine yol açmış, ekonomik krizle birleşen bu dinamikler iktidarın iç politikadaki maliyetini artırmıştır. 2022'den itibaren Moskova arabuluculuğunda normalleşme girişimleri gündeme gelmiş; Türkiye açısından mülteci baskısı ve YPG tehdidi, Suriye açısından ise ekonomik kriz ve yaptırımlar bu süreci teşvik etmiştir. Ancak Aralık 2024'te Esad rejiminin düşmesiyle bu çabalar sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Suriye'den gelen kitlesel akına verdiği tepki, insani söylemlerin ötesinde, dış politika hedefleri, jeopolitik dengeler ve iç politika kaygıları çerçevesinde anlaşılmalıdır.

4. Bölüm, Türkiye'nin göç yönetiminin yasal ve kurumsal çerçevesini ve bunun yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin kabulünü nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. 2014'te yürürlüğe giren Geçici Koruma Rejimi'ni açıklayarak Suriyelilerin bu statüye nasıl dâhil edildiğini, bu statünün bazı haklar sağlasa da geçiciliği ve hukukî belirsizliği koruduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Daha sonra geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilere yönelik sağlık ve eğitim politikalarını, ayrıca açık kapı politikasından sıkı kontrole ve güvenlik duvarının inşasına doğru evrilen sınır yönetimi önlemlerini tartışmaktadır. Bölüm, ayrıca "kardeşlik" ve "misafirlik" söylemleri gibi insani retorik ile denetimler ve sınır dışı prosedürleri gibi güvenlik odaklı uygulamalar arasındaki etkileşimi incelemektedir. Bu ikili yaklaşım, Suriyelilerin Türkiye'nin işgücü piyasasına dâhil edilirken aynı zamanda güvensizlik ve kırılganlığa maruz bırakıldıklarını göstermektedir.

2013 yılında kabul edilen Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu'nun (YUKK), Türkiye'nin Suriye'den gelen kitlesel göç dalgası sonrasında ortaya çıkan zorlukları

yönetmeyi amaçladığı ileri sürebilirse de söz konusu yasanın yalnızca bu bağlamda değil, aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği müktesebatına uyum sağlama hedefinden ve uluslararası göç rejiminin kurumsal bir parçası olma arayışından da kaynaklandığı söylemek daha doğru bir ifade olur. 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi ve 1967 Protokolü'ne taraf olan Türkiye, coğrafi çekinceyi sürdürdüğü için yalnızca Avrupa'dan gelenlere "mülteci" statüsü tanımakta, diğerlerini "şartlı mülteci" ya da "ikincil koruma" kategorileriyle sınırlamaktadır. Bu durum, özellikle Ortadoğu'dan gelen kitlesel akınlar söz konusu olduğunda Türkiye'yi "geçici çözümler" arayışına yöneltmiştir. 1994 Yönetmeliği, Körfez Savaşı sonrası Irak'tan gelen kitleler üzerine hazırlanmış ve güvenlik odaklı bir çerçeve sunmuştur. Bu yönetmelikle birlikte hem BMMYK hem de Türk makamlarının başvuru değerlendirmesi yapması "ikili bir iltica sistemi" yaratmıştır. 2018'de BMMYK statü belirleme sürecinden tamamen çekilmiş ve tüm yetki Göç İdaresi'ne devredilmiştir.

Avrupa Birliği ile tam üyelik müzakereleri ve adaylık süreci de Türkiye'nin göç yönetimini dönüştürmüştür. 2000'li yıllarda "Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatına Uyum Programı" çerçevesinde sınır yönetimi, vize politikaları, düzensiz göçle mücadele ve geri kabul anlaşmaları gündeme gelmiştir. Bu sürecin dönüm noktalarından biri olan 18 Mart 2016 Türkiye-AB Mutabakatı, göç konusunu Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin merkezine yerleştirmiştir. Bu mutabakat, Türkiye'nin sınır güvenliğini artırması ve Yunanistan'a geçen düzensiz göçmenleri geri alması karşılığında mali destek, Suriyelilerin AB'ye yeniden yerleştirilmesi ve Türk vatandaşlarına vize serbestisi vaatlerini içermiştir. Ancak uygulamada yeniden yerleştirme sayıları sınırlı kalmış, geri dönüşler 2020'den itibaren durmuştur. Buna rağmen, Türkiye'nin mülteci kartını bir "dış politika aracı" olarak kullandığı sık sık dile getirilmiş, özellikle Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın "Kapıları açarız" söylemleri hem Avrupa kamuoyuna hem de iç siyasete yönelik güçlü bir mesaj niteliği taşımıştır.

Ulusal düzeyde en köklü dönüşüm, 2013'te kabul edilen ve 2014'te yürürlüğe giren Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu (YUKK) ile yaşanmıştır. Bu kanun, yabancılarla ilgili giriş, çıkış, ikamet ve sınır dışı süreçlerini düzenlemiş, ayrıca uluslararası koruma statülerini tanımlamış ve Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü'nü (bugün Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı) kurmuştur. Güvenlik bürokrasisinden alınarak sivil

bir otoriteye devredilen göç yönetimi, bu kanunla birlikte kurumsallaşmış ve "devrimsel" bir adım olarak değerlendirilmiştir. YUKK, mülteci, şartlı mülteci ve ikincil koruma statülerini düzenlemiş; ayrıca 91. maddesiyle geçici korumaya ilişkin yasal çerçeveyi tanımlamış ve bunun ayrıntıları 2014 Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği ile belirlenmiştir.

2011'de başlayan Suriye İç Savaşı ile birlikte milyonlarca kişi Türkiye'ye sığınmıştır. Başlangıçta Suriyeliler "misafir" olarak adlandırılmış, bu söylem hem geçicilik inancını hem de toplumun misafirperverliğini yansıtmıştır. Ancak bu statünün hukuki karşılığı olmadığından, 2014'te çıkarılan Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği önemlidir. Yönetmelik, geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilerin hak ve yükümlülüklerini detaylandırmıştır. Ancak geçicilik ve belirsizlik doğası gereği korunmuş, ayrıca statünün Cumhurbaşkanı kararıyla sonlandırılabilir olması Suriyelileri siyasal iklimin değişimlerine karşı kırılgan kılmıştır. Vatandaşlığa geçiş ise 2016'da ilk kez kamuoyuna duyurulmuş, ancak kapsamı sınırlı kalmıştır.

Geçici koruma kapsamındaki Suriyelilere sağlık, eğitim ve işgücüne erişim konularında çeşitli haklar tanınmıştır. Sağlık alanında ilk yıllarda mevcut hastaneler ve STK'ların desteğiyle hizmet verilmiş, sonrasında AB destekli SIHHAT projeleriyle Göçmen Sağlığı Merkezleri kurulmuş ve Suriyeli sağlık personeli istihdam edilmiştir. Bu durum bir yandan sürdürülebilir sağlık hizmeti sağlamış, diğer yandan yerelde "eşitsizlik" algısına yol açmıştır. Eğitimde ise üç aşamalı bir süreç yaşanmıştır: İlk yıllarda Suriyeliler kendi topluluk temelli okullarını kurmuş, 2014'ten itibaren geçici eğitim merkezleri açılmış, 2016'dan sonra ise Türk eğitim sistemine entegrasyon hedeflenmiştir. Buna rağmen hâlâ eğitim dışında kalan çocuk bulunmaktadır.

Sınır yönetiminde ise süreç dalgalı olmuştur. Başlangıçta 2011'de ilan edilen açık kapı politikasıyla Suriyeliler kabul edilmiş, hatta sınır geçişlerinde çift yönlü hareketlilik görülmüştür. Ancak çatışmalar şiddetlendikçe, özellikle 2012'den itibaren girişler kısıtlanmış, 2014'te IŞİD saldırıları sırasında geçici açılıp kapanan sınır noktalarıyla seçici bir rejime geçilmiştir. 2015 sonrası açık kapı fiilen sona ermiş, 2018'e gelindiğinde TOKİ tarafından inşa edilen yüksek güvenlikli beton

duvar, gözetleme kuleleri, dronlar, termal kameralar ve sensörlerle donatılmış "Suriye sınır duvarı" Türkiye'nin güvenlik odaklı yaklaşımını somutlaştırmıştır.

Söylem düzeyinde iktidar partisi AKP, uzun süre Suriyelileri "ensar–muhacir kardeşliği" ve Osmanlı mirası sorumluluğu üzerinden sahiplense de, uygulamada güvenlikçi politikalar (mobil göç noktaları, sıkı denetimler, sınır dışı pratikleri) devreye sokulmuştur. Bu ikili strateji, hem uluslararası alanda Türkiye'nin insani imajını güçlendirmeyi hem de içerde artan toplumsal kaygılara yanıt vermeyi amaçlamıştır. Ancak pratikte bu uygulamalar, Suriyeliler arasında "sınır dışı edilebilirlik" duygusunu, güvencesizlik ve dışlanma hissini beslemiştir. Muhalefet partileri ise Suriyelilere yönelik farklı söylemler geliştirmiştir. CHP başlangıçta insan hakları temelli bir yaklaşım sergilerken, 2016 sonrasında söylemini sertleştirmiş ve "iki yıl içinde geri göndereceğiz" gibi vaatlerde bulunmuştur. Zafer Partisi ise en keskin mülteci karşıtı tutumu benimseyerek, Suriyelileri "istilacı" olarak nitelendirmiş ve zorla geri dönüşü savunmuştur. Kamuoyunda ise "Suriyeliler işimizi alıyor, suç oranlarını artırıyor" gibi söylemler yaygınlaşmış, Suriyeliler giderek bir güvenlik tehdidi çerçevesinde algılanmaya başlanmıştır. Murat Erdoğan ve ekibinin hazırladığı Suriyeliler Barometresi verileri de toplumsal kabulün giderek zayıfladığını, 2023'te halkın yüzde 89'unun Suriyelilerin gönderilmesini istediğini göstermektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin Suriyelilere yönelik göç rejimi, insani söylem ile güvenlikçi pratiklerin iç içe geçtiği, geçiciliğe dayalı ve kırılgan bir yapı sergilemektedir. Geçici koruma rejimi Suriyelilere temel haklar sağlasa da, kalıcılığın tanınmaması, vatandaşlık sürecindeki sınırlılık, belirsizlik ve sınırların güvenlikçi tahkimatı Suriyelilerin geleceklerini belirsiz kılmaktadır. İktidarın kardeşlik söylemi, muhalefetin güvenlik temelli eleştirileri ve toplumdaki artan huzursuzluk bir arada düşünüldüğünde, Türkiye'de Suriyeli göçünün yönetimi, hem iç siyasetin hem dış politikanın hem de neoliberal ekonomi ve emek piyasalarının kesiştiği karmaşık bir alan hâline gelmiştir.

Tezin 5. Bölümünde Gaziantep'te yapılan saha çalışmasının bulguları sunulmaktadır. Araştırma kapsamında 25 Suriyeli ile ve 17 paydaşla yarı yapılandırılmış

derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Sınırdan giriş, Türkiye'de kalış ve ülkeden çıkış pratiklerinde doğrudan rol oynayan kamu bürokrasisiyle görüşme talebi, Göç İdaresi'nin izin vermemesi nedeniyle karşılanamamıştır. Bu ret, kurumun giderek artan kapalılığına işaret eden bir bulgu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Saha çalışmasının en güç yanı, özellikle 2024 yazındaki "Kayseri olayları" sonrasında Suriyelilerde gözlenen yoğun kaygı ve güvensizliktir. Bazı katılımcılar soruların siyasi olup olmadığını öğrenmek istemiştir, kimileri ise soruları görüp görüşmeyi reddetmiştir. "Ajan" sızması söylentileri ve hem Suriye'deki rejim hem Türkiye adına çalışan muhbir endişesi yaygın olmuştur. Buna rağmen güven ilişkisi kurulan 25 kişiyle görüşmeler tamamlanmıştır. "Suriyeliler" olarak anılan topluluğun heterojenliği dikkate alınarak 18 Arap, 6 Türkmen ve 1 Kürt katılımcı seçilmiş ve ikamet izni, geçici koruma, vatandaşlık gibi farklı hukuki statüler kapsanmıştır. Cinsiyet dengesi gözetilerek 16 erkek ve 9 kadın katılımcıyla görüşülmüştür. Katılımcıların statülerinin -vatandaşlık dâhil- kendilerince tam güvenceli görülmediği dikkat çekmiştir.

Görüşmeler; geliş hikâyeleri, ev sahibi toplum ve diğer göçmenlerle ilişkiler, hukuki statü deneyimleri, çalışma, sağlık ve eğitim alanlarına erişim, idari gözetim, geri gönderme merkezleri, sınır dışı edilme tecrübeleri, gönüllü dönüş ve gelecek planları üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. STK ve belediye aktörleriyle ise faaliyet alanları, zaman içindeki değişimler, güvenlik bağlamında göç politikasına dair yorumlar ve Suriyelilere hizmette karşılaşılan engeller konuşulmuştur. Etik onam ve isim gizliliği titizlikle sağlanmış, isim ve kurumların tamamen anonim tutulmasıyla güvensizliğin kısmen azaltılması amaçlanmıştır.

Çalışma, Brochmann'ın dış–iç ve açık–örtük kontrol ayrımından hareketle, Türkiye'de güvenlikleştirme/güvenlik(siz)leşme süreçlerinin hem sınırda hem ülke içinde, hem de doğrudan ve dolaylı araçlarla şekillendiğini savunmaktadır. Literatüre paralel biçimde Türkiye'nin yanıtı üç evreye ayrılmaktadır: ilk dönemde açık kapı ve ensar–muhacir söylemiyle kapsayıcı yaklaşım; ikinci evrede kurumsallaşma ve seçici–kısıtlayıcı uygulamaların artması; son dönemde ise geri dönüş vurgusunun ve sınırlayıcı politikaların belirginleşmesi. Bu seyir, tek çizgisel bir planı değil, çok katmanlı ve çok kalıplı bir tepkiyi yansıtmaktadır.

Sınırlar, farklı dönemlerde farklı anlamlar taşımaktadır. Katılımcıların anlatımlarına göre, özellikle 2014–2015 yıllarında Türkiye–Suriye sınırından geçişler görece kolay olmuştur. Bu dönemde engellerin zayıflığı ve denetimlerin seyrekliği dikkat çekmiştir; ayrıca yerel aracı ya da kılavuzlar üzerinden yapılan ödemelerle işleyen yasadışı veya yarı-yasal güzergâhların yaygın olduğu belirtilmiştir. Zamanla sınır geçişleri, duvar inşası, yoğun devriyeler ve ileri gözetim teknolojilerinin devreye girmesiyle giderek zorlaşmıştır. Bu durum aynı zamanda kaçış maliyetlerini de artırmıştır. Görüşülen kimi katılımcılar ise söz konusu güvenlik önlemlerini Türkiye açısından yerinde bulduklarını ifade etmiş ve geçmişteki terör saldırılarını kontrolsüz sınır geçişleriyle ilişkilendirerek bu uygulamaları "güvenlik için gerekli" olarak değerlendirmiştir.

İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın verilerine göre elektro-optik kuleler, termal kameralar, zırhlı gözetleme araçları ve sensörlerle donatılan sınır hattı, taşlarla belirlenmiş eski sınır çizgilerinin giderek yüksek teknolojiye dayalı bir "güvenlik kalkanı"na dönüşümünü simgelemektedir. Bu dönüşüm, eşzamanlı olarak ülke içinde de hareketlilik kısıtlarının artmasına yol açmıştır. Açık kapı politikasından seçici kabul uygulamalarına ve nihayetinde sıkı bir kısıtlama rejimine geçiş süreci somut idari düzenlemelerle görünür hâle gelmiştir. Bu düzenlemeler; şehir, ilçe ve mahallelerin kayıt alımına kapatılması, düzenli adres denetimleri ve adreste bulunmama hâlinde V160 gibi tahkikat kodlarının uygulanması, kimliklerin "kapanma" riski, yol izin belgeleri için bekleme sürelerinin uzaması ve iç göçün tamamen izne bağlanması gibi uygulamaları kapsamaktadır. Bu koşullar, göçmenlerin gündelik hayatlarında sürekli olarak "yasal–yasadışı" sınırında gidip gelen bir bekleyiş rejimi içinde yaşamalarına neden olmaktadır.

Bu bölümün omurgasını oluşturan tema, "sınır dışı edilme korkusu" ve "deportabilite" yani "sınır dışı edilebilirlik" kavramı olmuştur. Görüşülenlerin neredeyse tamamı için Türkiye'deki en büyük endişe, sınır dışı edilme ihtimali olmuştur. Bizzat deneyimlememiş olsalar dahi, çevrelerinden aktarılan ve çoğu zaman "ufak" sebeplerle gerçekleştiği söylenen sınır dışı edilme hikâyeleri, bu kaygıyı kitlesel bir duyguya dönüştürmüştür. İstisnai vatandaşlık kazanmış olanlar

arasında bile, bu statünün "geri alınabileceği" yönündeki algı güvensizliği pekiştirmiştir. Görüşmecilerden birinin aktardığı, ev sahibinin kiracısı olacak bir Suriyeliye yönelik "zaten vatandaşlığınızı iptal edip gönderirler" sözleri, bu tür gündelik karşılaşmaların hukuki statüden bağımsız biçimde sürekli bir tehdit hissi doğurduğuna bir örnek olmuştur.

Bu durum, De Genova'nın tarif ettiği anlamda, fiilî sınır dışı edilmeden çok "sınır dışı edilebilirlik" duygusunun gündelik davranışları disipline etmesiyle ilgilidir. Görüşmelerde bu duygu, trafikte, işyerinde, kamu görevlileriyle ya da sıradan yurttaşlarla karşılaşmalarda sessiz kalma; hak aramaktan geri durma; sorunları çözmek için aracı veya tanıdık bulma ve mümkün olduğunca "görünmez" olmaya çalışma pratikleri üzerinden somutlaşmaktadır. De Genova'nın kavramsallaştırdığı biçimiyle, sınır dışı edilebilirlik yalnızca sınır dışı edilme ihtimaline işaret etmez; aynı zamanda bu ihtimalin sürekli hatırlatılması ve gündelik hayatın içine sızması yoluyla bir yönetimsellik tekniği işlevi görür. Böylelikle, sınır dışı edilme olasılığının fiilen gerçekleşip gerçekleşmemesinden bağımsız olarak, göçmenlerin davranışlarını yönlendiren ve onları sürekli bir "koşullu mevcudiyet" içinde tutan bir denetim mekanizmasına dönüşür. İdari takdirin çoğu durumda Suriyelilerin lehine işletilmediği yönündeki algı oldukça yaygın olmuştur. Görüşmecilerin algısına göre, sosyal sermaye kimi zaman koruyucu bir tampon işlevi görmüş olsa da, keyfî uygulama ihtimalini bütünüyle ortadan kaldırmamıştır.

Sınır dışı edilebilirlik hissini "görünür" kılan başat araç, "mobil göç noktası" araçlarıdır. Yani Suriyeliler için sınır dışı edilebilirlik mobil göç noktası araçları ile cisimleşmiştir. Görüşülen Suriyeliler bu araçları çoğunlukla "sınır dışı etme aracı" olarak adlandırmıştır. Sokak kontrollerinde kimliği yanında olmayan yabancının araca davet edilmesi, parmak izi ve GöçNet üzerinden anlık sorgular, düzensiz olduğu tespit edilenlerin doğrudan geri gönderme merkezlerine sevk edildiğine ilişkin inanış, sınır uygulamalarının ülke içine taşınmış bir versiyonu gibi işlemektedir. Bu hareketli kontrol, Paris Okulu'nun "güvenlik pratiklerinin rutinleşmesi" tezini doğrular biçimde olağan gündelik yaşamın parçasına dönüşmektedir. Aynı zamanda Bigo'nun "ban-optikon" kavramıyla da uyumlu olarak herkesi değil, "riskli" profilleri hedefleyen, teknolojik profil çıkarmayla

çalışan seçici bir gözetim rejimi olarak işlev görmektedir. Göç İdaresi'nin yereldeki birimleri ve bu araçlarda görevli uzmanlar; GöçNet gibi kapalı sistemler ve biyometrik yazılımlar üzerinden yüksek teknik kapasiteye sahiptir. Bu teknik-mesleki üstünlük, riskin kim olduğuna dair kararı profesyonelleştirirken, göçmen için kontrolün sürekliliğini ve öngörülemezliğini artırmaktadır. Kimliklerin aktif tutulması, veri güncelleme, kimliklere konulan tahkikat kodlarından kaçınma, izin alma gibi "evrak rejimi" gündelik yaşamın merkezine yerleşmekte, kodlar hayatı düzenleyen ve sınırlandıran idari teknolojilere dönüşmektedir.

Son tahlilde, Gaziantep örnek alanı üzerinden Türkiye'nin yerinden edilmiş Suriyelileri yönetimi, insani söylemle güvenlikçi pratiklerin iç içe geçtiği ikili bir strateji olarak deneyimlenmiştir. Açık kapı politikasıyla ülkeye giren nüfus, zaman içinde ülke içi kontrol ve gözetim mekanizmaları aracılığıyla 'uysal bedenler'e dönüştürülmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu süreçte görünmezlik ve kendi kendini disipline etme, gündelik hayatta ayakta kalma stratejilerine dönüşmektedir. Saha verileri, zaman içinde yaşam koşullarının olumsuzlaşması, sınır dışı edilme korkusunun içselleştirilmesi, bu korkunun mobil göç noktalarında somutlaşması ve idari-teknolojik kontrol ağının giderek genişlemesi gibi temaları öne çıkarmıştır. Ev sahibi toplum için güvenlik vaat eden araçların, Suriyeliler açısından aynı anda güvensizlik üretmesi, güvenlik ile güvensizlik ilişkisinin tek yüzeyde iç içe geçtiği bir Möbius şeridini çağrıştırmaktadır. Gaziantep'in hem bir sınır kenti olması hem de Türkiye'de geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilerin en yoğun yaşadığı yerlerden biri konumunda bulunması, bu dinamikleri net biçimde görünür kılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda sınır, artık yalnızca coğrafî bir çizgi değil, ülke içine yayılan hareketli bir idari pratik niteliği kazanmıştır. Hukuki statüler ise yalnızca haklar toplamı olarak değil, her an askıya alınabilir görülen kırılgan bir "koşulluluk" biçiminde yaşanmaktadır.

Tezin sonuç kısmını oluşturan Altıncı Kısım, Gaziantep'teki yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin mikro düzeydeki deneyimlerini ve Türkiye'nin göç yönetiminin makro düzeydeki analizini bir araya getirerek tezi sonlandırmaktadır. Gaziantep'te yapılan saha çalışması, yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin güvensizliği nasıl deneyimlediklerini ve algıladıklarını aydınlatan bir dizi birbirine bağlı dinamik ortaya koymaktadır. Sınırlar ve hareketlilik açısından, Suriye İç Savaşı'nın ilk aşamalarında Türkiye'nin

açık kapı politikası, ensar-muhacir söylemleriyle dini bir çerçevede meşrulaştırılmıştır. Ancak zamanla bu yaklaşım giderek daha kısıtlayıcı önlemlere dönüşmüştür. Suriyeliler, sınır geçişlerinin başlangıçta kolay iken giderek zorlaştığını, nihayetinde ise duvar inşası ve ileri gözetim teknolojileriyle neredeyse tamamen engellendiğini aktarmışlardır. Ülke içinde hareketlilik de seyahat izinleri, belirli bölgelerde ikamet kaydı yasağı ve kimlik kartlarına eklenen kısıtlama kodları gibi bürokratik gerekliliklerle sınırlandırılmıştır. Bu durum, sınırların içselleştirilmesi olarak görülebilir; zira Suriyeliler sadece devlet sınırlarında değil, gündelik yaşam alanlarında da kontrol altına alınmaktadır.

Araştırmanın bulguları, Paris Okulu'nun pratik-merkezli yaklaşımını desteklemekte ve yeni bir bağlamda uygulanabilirliğini göstermektedir. Kopenhag Okulu güvenlikleştirmeyi elit söylemleri ve "istisna mantığı" üzerinden açıklarken, Paris Okulu "rutin mantığı"na vurgu yapar: güvenlik/güvenlik(siz)lik, gündelik uygulamalardan doğar. Gaziantep'teki deneyimler de bununla uyumludur; güvensizlik büyük söylemlerden değil, bürokrasi, kimlik ve kayıt sistemleri, polis kontrolleri ve rutin uygulamalardan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bulgular, Foucault'nun yönetimsellik kavramıyla da örtüşmektedir. Paris Okulu bunu "tedirginlik yönetimselliği" olarak tanımlar. Suriyeliler sürekli belirsizlik içinde yaşamakta; en küçük idari aksaklığın dahi sınır dışı edilme riskini doğurabileceğine inanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda güvensizlik yalnızca istenmeyen bir sonuç değil, aynı zamanda bir yönetim aracı işlevi görmektedir.

Bourdieu'nun çerçevesiyle bakıldığında Gaziantep'teki göç yönetimi alanı, Göç İdaresi ve pek çok aktörün etkileşimiyle şekillenmektedir. Göç yönetimi alanındaki aktörlerin yasal yetki, teknik uzmanlık veya sosyal ağlar gibi sermaye biçimleri, güvenlik/güvensizlik üretme kapasitelerini belirlerken, Suriyeliler görünmezlik, sessizlik ve uyum stratejileriyle habituslarını bu alana uyarlamaktadırlar. Son olarak bulgular, Bigo'nun güvenlik ve güvensizliğin iç içe geçtiğini vurgulayan Möbius şeridi metaforunu doğrulamaktadır: duvarlar, kimlik sistemleri ve biyometrik kontroller gibi düzen sağlama pratikleri, paradoksal biçimde hedef alınanlar için güvensizlik üretmektedir. Suriyeliler açısından güvenlik ve güvensizlik aynı mekanizmalar aracılığıyla eşzamanlı biçimde ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Bu tez, önemli metodolojik katkılar sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak, yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yoluyla yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin seslerini merkeze alarak odağı yukarıdan aşağıya politika analizinden, aşağıdan yukarıya yaşanmış deneyimlere kaydırmaktadır. Bu yaklaşım, göçmenlerin yönetişim yapılarını nasıl yorumladıklarını ve onlarla nasıl başa çıktıklarını ortaya koymakta, bu boyut güvenlikleştirme çalışmalarında genellikle ihmal edilmektedir.

İkinci olarak, saha araştırması, yüksek düzeyde endişe ve güvensizlikle yaşayan bir nüfus arasında çalışmanın zorluklarını ve hassasiyetlerini göstermektedir. Suriyelilerin katılım konusundaki isteksizliği, yanlış temsil edilme kaygıları ve araştırmacılara duyulan şüpheler, araştırmanın kendisinin de güvensizlik bağlamında şekillendiğini açığa çıkarmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, Paris Okulu'nun teorik araçlarını Avrupa dışı bir bağlama uygulayarak güvenlikleştirme araştırmalarının metodolojik kapsamını genişletmektedir. Bu yaklaşımın yalnızca liberal demokrasiler için değil, Türkiye gibi hibrid rejimler için de geçerli olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak, bulguların Gaziantep ile sınırlı olduğu ve genelleştirilemeyeceği unutulmamalıdır.

Tez aynı zamanda literatüre katkı sunmaktadır. Birincisi, Türkiyedeki göç araştırmalarını, genellikle devlet politikaları, AB-Türkiye ilişkileri veya insani söylemler düzeyinde ele alan Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürünü, gündelik uygulamalara ve göçmen deneyimlerine odaklanarak zenginleştirmektedir. İkincisi, Paris Okulu'nun Türkiye bağlamındaki uygulanabilirliğini göstererek güvenlikleştirme teorisine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Göç alanındaki çalışmalar çoğunlukla Kopenhag Okulu'na dayandığından, bu tez Paris Okulu'nun pratik odaklı yaklaşımının analitik avantajlarını öne çıkarmaktadır. Üçüncüsü, içselleştirilmiş sınırlar ve sınır dışı edilebilirlik kavramlarını saha verileriyle örneklendirerek literatürü derinleştirmektedir. Mobil göç noktaları, adres kayıt yasakları ve kimlik kartı kısıtlamaları içselleştirilmiş sınırların; sınır dışı edilme korkusunun ise statüler üstü yaygın bir kaygı olarak deneyimlendiğini göstermektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin yönetişimi olağanüstü söylemlerle değil, Paris Okulu'nun vurguladığı rutin kontrol pratikleriyle anlaşılabilir. Gaziantep'teki

yaşam deneyimleri, sınırların içselleştirildiği, sınır dışı edilebilirliğin normalleştiği ve bürokratik rutinlerin güvensizliği sürekli yeniden ürettiği bir tedirginlik yönetişimine işaret etmektedir. Türkiye'nin göç yönetimi, ev sahibi topluma ve devlete güvenlik sağlamayı hedefleyen önlemlerin, paradoksal biçimde yerinden edilmiş nüfus için güvensizlik üretmesiyle karakterize edilmektedir. Suriyeliler, yalnızca sınır dışı edilme tehdidinin değil, rutin gözetim, idari takdir ve statülerini sürekli kanıtlama baskısının da gölgesinde yaşamaktadır. Tezin temel katkısı, Paris Okulu'nun teorik çerçevesini saha araştırmasından elde edilen zengin verilerle birleştirmesidir. Böylelikle güvensizliğin söylemsel düzeyin ötesinde, gündelik uygulamalarla üretildiği ortaya konmakta, politika tartışmalarında genellikle görünmez kılınan bürokratik pratiklerin güvenlik ve güvensizlik üreten güçlü mekanizmalar olduğunu göstermektedir.

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Soyadı / Surname : Vural
Adı / Name : Ebru
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

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