ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION:
THE MAKING OF WARTIME SPACES IN TURKEY, 1935-1945

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ELİF KAYMAZ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY OF ARCHITECTURE

OCTOBER 2025

Approval of the thesis:

ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION:
THE MAKING OF WARTIME SPACES IN TURKEY, 1935-1945

submitted by **ELİF KAYMAZ** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in History of Architecture, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşem Berrin ÇAKMAKLI
Head of Department
Department of History of Architecture _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ekin PİNAR
Supervisor
Department of History of Architecture _____

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. T. Elvan ALTAN (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of History of Architecture _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ekin PİNAR (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of History of Architecture _____

Prof. Dr. Belgin Turan ÖZKAYA
Middle East Technical University
Department of History of Architecture _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bülent BATUMAN
Bilkent University
Department of Architecture _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Erdem TOZOĞLU
İstanbul Technical University
Department of Interior Architecture _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Elif KAYMAZ

Signature:

ABSTRACT

ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION:
THE MAKING OF WARTIME SPACES IN TURKEY, 1935-1945

KAYMAZ, Elif
Ph.D., The Department of History of Architecture
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ekin PİNAR

October 2025, 309 pages

This dissertation investigates how the anticipation of a coming global conflict reshaped spatial discourses and practices in Turkey between 1935 and 1945. Although officially neutral during the Second World War, Turkey's environments, institutions, and legislation were reorganized under the pressure of impending war. The conflict emerged as a lens through which the built environment was perceived, governed, and reconfigured in advance of its arrival. Drawing on state and military archives, daily press, and professional journals, the study problematizes the aerial threat and traces how war was envisioned, prepared for, and spatially enacted. It argues that anticipation operated as a catalyst for new modes of infrastructure, policy, and knowledge, produced through the interactions of national and international civil, legal, governmental, and militarist actors. The analysis maps how architects, planners, engineers, journalists, and municipal authorities responded to the affective and logistical demands of an approaching threat. Methodologically, the dissertation adopts a scalar framework shaped by airmindedness, where verticality, visibility, and vulnerability organize the spatial logic of military environments and wartime urbanism. It introduces frontiers as a conceptual tool for reading how defense shifted from the territorial edges of the nation to the airspace of the city, and finally to civilian bodies as both targets and agents of survival. By situating Turkey's case within wider histories of wartime urbanism, defense infrastructure, and crisis governance, the dissertation proposes "architectures of anticipation" as a new framework for understanding the spatial politics of the future.

Keywords: Wartime architecture and urbanism, defense infrastructure, air-raid preparedness, civil defense, Early Republican Period of Turkey.

ÖZ

BEKLENTİ MİMARLIĞI:
TÜRKİYE'DE SAVAŞ ZAMANININ MEKÂNSAL İNŞASI, 1935–1945

KAYMAZ, Elif
Doktora, Mimarlık Tarihi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ekin PİNAR

Ekim 2025, 309 sayfa

Bu tez, yaklaşmakta olan küresel bir çatışmanın beklentisinin 1935–1945 yılları arasında Türkiye'deki mekânsal söylem ve pratikleri nasıl dönüştürdüğünü incelemektedir. Türkiye, resmî olarak İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na katılmamış olsa da, savaşın olasılığı ülkenin çevresini, kurumlarını ve mevzuatını kökten biçimde yeniden düzenlemiştir. Çatışma, henüz yaşanmadan önce, inşa edilmiş çevrenin algılanma, yönetilme ve yeniden kurgulanma biçimlerini belirleyen bir mercek işlevi görmüştür. Devlet ve askerî arşivler, günlük basın ve meslek dergilerinden yararlanan çalışma, hava tehdidi etrafında gelişen söylemleri ve savaşın nasıl tahayyül edildiğini, nasıl hazırlanıldığını ve mekânda nasıl icra edildiğini sorgular. Tezin temel savı, beklentinin altyapı, politika ve bilgi üretiminde yeni biçimlerin ortaya çıkmasını tetikleyen bir katalizör olarak işlediğidir. Bu süreç, ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde sivil, hukuki, idari ve askerî aktörlerin etkileşimleriyle biçimlenmiştir. Yöntemsel olarak tez, "havacılık zihniyeti" kavramından beslenen ölçekli bir çerçeve benimser; düşeylik, görünürlük ve savunmasızlık eksenlerinde askerî çevrelerin ve savaş dönemi kentçiliğinin mekânsal mantığını çözümler. Tez, "sınır" kavramını, savunmanın ulusal toprakların kenarlarından kentin hava sahasına ve nihayetinde hem hedef hem de hayatta kalma öznesi hâline gelen sivil bedenlere kayışını okumak için kavramsal bir araç olarak önerir. Türkiye örneğini savaş dönemi kentçiliği, savunma altyapıları ve kriz yönetimi tarihleriyle ilişkilendirerek ele alan çalışma, beklenti mimarlığını geleceğin mekânsal siyasetine dair yeni bir kavramsal çerçeve olarak ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savaş dönemi mimarlık ve planlama, savunma altyapısı, hava tehlikesi, pasif korunma; Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi.

To my family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

So many people have found this research and its topic valuable, and their excitement sustained me throughout. In a process as solitary as the PhD, these encounters made the work feel shared I am grateful to my advisor, Ekin Pinar, for her calm, clear-minded guidance that dissolved worries before they grew. My heartfelt thanks go to Belgin Turan Özkaya, a lifelong mentor as well as a jury member. Her energy, openness to new ideas, and generosity have shaped me inside and outside the classroom. Her example continues to guide me, and I remain gladly under her influence. I thank Ahmet Erdem Tozoğlu, whose generosity in sharing knowledge has marked every stage of my academic life. As both mentor and collaborator, he helped shape this research from its beginnings in the TÜBİTAK project, giving me an extraordinary education in research, writing, and curiosity across periods. I am grateful to Bülent Batuman, an exceptional scholar in whom vast knowledge and humility meet. His encouragement, insight, and ability to ask the largest questions made his presence indispensable. Finally, I thank T. Elvan Altan for her passion for this period and her tireless motivation, which deepened my appreciation of its significance. Her meticulous eye and her dedication to keeping our community connected have been invaluable.

Many colleagues and mentors have sustained this research with their generosity and curiosity. Pelin Yoncacı Arslan has been the person I turned to whenever an idea sparked excitement—her curiosity always expanded mine. At the METU JFA, I thank Osman Balaban for welcoming me into the journal's fifty-year legacy as an editorial assistant, and Selen Tuğrul for making demanding work look effortless. Beyond METU, I have been privileged to work within international and interdisciplinary circles that gave this research its momentum. The EAHN Urban Emotions Workgroup, Miriam Paeslack, Ines Tolic, Davide Deriu, and Dorothy Barenscott, has been a true intellectual home. Since our first meeting in Athens in 2024, our monthly conversations have profoundly informed the core of this work I am also deeply thankful to Aydın Çam, Özde Çeliktemel, and the HoMER circle in Turkey, who welcomed me early in my academic path and whose generosity and warmth restored my belief in the value of scholarly community.

This research was financially and intellectually supported by the SALT Research Fellowship (2024), a recognition that strengthened both my confidence and my work. I thank Lorans Tanatar Baruh, Ayşe Erek, and Gülhan Balsoy, and especially Bilge İmamoğlu for his thoughtful feedback and shared enthusiasm this work. I am also grateful to the Institute of Istanbul Studies, whose 2023 conference travel award provided timely support and meaningful encouragement.

I thank my friends, who sustained me throughout this process. Onur and Richard gave me a home in Berlin during the summers I spent moving from library to library, their generosity turned those demanding research months into some of my most cherished memories. Bilge was always open to every stray piece of historical trivia I wanted to share, and somehow managed to host me in the most unexpected places, including Akademie Schloss Solitude. I am grateful to Hazal Pehlivan for sharing this demanding doctoral journey with me and showing me what true support means, at moments when I needed it most. I thank Zeynep Gür for her generous heart, her attentiveness, and her caring presence that kept me steady across deadlines and submissions even from far away.

I thank Ceyhun Tuncer, for his companionship and relentless wit, and for taking care of me through every deadline and submission. He somehow managed to make our home the most peaceful and comfortable place on earth, and he also brought Molly into my life. Between the two of them, mundane always turns into the most joyful.

Finally, I know that I have the best family in the world, and that how lucky I am to have them. My parents, Murat and Nesrin Kaymaz, and my sister, Yasemin (now with Yalın), have been my greatest supporters throughout a lifetime of being student. For almost thirty years, they have never tired of celebrating even my smallest accomplishments, always cheering me on with unwavering pride. I thank them above all, for the past and for the future, and I owe this work to them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM iii

ABSTRACT iv

ÖZ v

DEDICATION vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

LIST OF FIGURES xii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xviii

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. "This is What Air Threat Means": A Turn in the Archives 2

1.2. Positioning in the Field 6

1.3. Conceptual Anchors 9

1.4. Sources, Scales, and Methods 11

2. NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER PRESSURE 18

2.1. Political Technology and the Making of Territory 18

2.2. Diplomacy as Spatial Negotiation: Turkey in Second World War 20

2.2.1. Diplomacy, Caution, Realignment (1935–1939) 21

2.2.1.1. Military and Industry Capacity 28

2.2.2. Surrounded by the War: Regional Geopolitics During WW2 (1939-1945) 34

2.2.2.1. The Balkans, Thrace and Straits 35

2.2.2.2. The Aegean and Greek Connection: The Maritime Threshold 37

2.2.2.3. The Mediterranean Theatre: Southern Maritime Exposure 40

2.2.2.4. Turmoil in the South and the East: Syria, Iraq and Iran 41

2.2.2.5. The Black Sea and Soviet Pressure: The Northern Dimension 43

2.2.3. Actively Negotiating Neutrality: The Logic of Delay and Bargaining 45

2.3. The Making of National Territory: Three Frontiers 50
2.3.1. Defending the Borderlands: Construction of a Frontier 52
2.3.1.1. Militarization and Mobilization of an Exposed Zone: Thrace Region 53
2.3.1.2. Implementation of a Defense Strategy: The Çakmak-Çatalca Line 60
2.3.2. Securing the Seaways: Control of Coasts and Ports 71
2.3.2.1. Exercising Montreux Sovereignty: The Straits 72
2.3.2.2. Configuring a Logistical and Diplomatic Hub: Mersin 78
2.3.3. Commanding the Airspace: Infrastructures of Flight 84
2.3.3.1. Allied Demands for Bases and Land: İzmir 86
2.4. The Anticipatory Geography of War 93
3. THE WARTIME CITY: PLANS, CODES, AND FRAGILITIES 97
3.1. Introduction: The City as a War Object 97
3.1.1. Theorizing the City as Target 100
3.2. Imagining Safety: The Ideal and the Air-Raid-Resistant City 107
3.2.1. Peacetime Ideals to Wartime Rules 107
3.2.2. The Defensible City as a New Planning Vision 111
3.2.3. Interwar Urban Planning Experience in Turkey 115
3.3. Codifying Safety: Law, Knowledge and the Actors 120
3.3.1. Legislating Urban Protection 121
3.3.1.1. Spatial Measures 124
3.3.1.2. Medicalizing the City 126
3.3.1.3. Wartime Urban Economy 128
3.3.2. Manuals and Public Instruction: Teaching the Practices of Safety 131
3.3.3. Institutional Mobilization: Actors and Authority 140
3.4. Istanbul: A Laboratory of Wartime Urbanism and Passive Defense 144
3.4.1. Institutions and Responsibilities 147
3.4.2. A Chronology 148
3.4.3. Surveying the City Through the Lens of War 151
3.4.4. At the Building Scale: Duties and Materials of Protection 157
3.4.4.1. Assessing Threats and Assigning Duties 158

3.4.4.2. Shelters: Modern and Improvised ... 160
3.4.4.3. Trenches: Digging Ground for Protection ... 168
3.4.4.4. Material Culture of Passive Defense ... 175
3.4.4.5. Reality Check: Limits and Failures ... 178
3.4.5. The Wooden City: Governing the Incendiary ... 180
3.4.5.1. A City Already Burning: Fires, Collapses, Rubble ... 181
3.4.5.2. Containment and Partial Measures ... 187
3.4.6. Planning Under the Air Raid Question ... 191
3.4.6.1. Principles of Defensive Urbanism ... 191
3.4.6.2. Anticipating the Plan: Waiting as Governance ... 194
3.4.6.3. Budget, Feasibility, and Politics of Priority ... 198
3.4.7. Governing Through Anticipation ... 201
4. SPATIAL REGIMES OF WARTIME BODY ... 204
4.1. Atmospheres of Survival ... 204
4.2. Bodies in Motion: Ideal, Aspirational and Performative ... 207
4.2.1. The Ideal Body Of Citizenship ... 208
4.2.2. Airmindedness and the Aspirational Body ... 212
4.2.3. The Performance of the Ideal Body: Drills, Exercises, And Blackouts ... 216
4.3. The Red Cresent and the Infrastructures of Civilian Protection ... 224
4.4. Coda: Sleeping With Fear ... 237
5. CONCLUSION: ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION ... 239
5.1. Anticipation and Its Frontiers ... 239
5.2. The Operations of Anticipation ... 243
5.3. Reframing History through Anticipation ... 247
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 250
APPENDICES
A. PERIOD BOOKS ON PASSIVE DEFENSE AND POISON GAS ... 289
B. CURRICULUM VITAE ... 293
C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ... 296
D. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU ... 309

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Illustration depicting Istanbul under air raids (*Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.) 2

Figure 2. Illustrated news across newspapers within a few weeks from May 25, 1935 (*Zaman, Kurun, Ulusal Birlik, Cumhuriyet, Halkın Sesi, Son Posta, Tan, Ulus, Akşam, Haber*) 3

Figure 3. Militarization of the Straits on press (*Cumhuriyet*, July 21-22, 1936) 25

Figure 4. Balkan Pact in illustrations (*Cumhuriyet*. May 15, 1935; *Akbaba,*. July,1936; December, 1940.) 27

Figure 5. The Thrace Maneuvers (*Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1937) 30

Figure 6. Filming and screening the Aegean Maneuvers (*Cumhuriyet*, November 11, 1937) 31

Figure 7. Report on halted chromium shipments to Germany (*Cumhuriyet*, April 23, 1944) 33

Figure 8. Photographs of the sarcophagi and other artifacts safeguarded at the Istanbul Archaeological Museums during the WW2, SALT Archive, TASUH5879. 58

Figure 9. News about the relocation to Anatolia (*Cumhuriyet*, May 1,3, 1941) 59

Figure 10. Editorials about Defense Lines of Europe (Daver, 1939; Ezine, 1941) 62

Figure 11. Personification of defense lines (*Akbaba*. October 19, 1939; *Cumhuriyet*. September 9, 1944) 63

Figure 12. Report on the military exercise (*Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1941) 75

Figure 13. Sketch showing the defense of the Port of Istanbul against air raids with anti-aircraft batteries (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, File 0, Item 59. Two sketches appended at the end of the document). 77

Figure 14. Stills from the newsreel "Mersin'de Esir Mübadelesi" 80

Figure 15. Report on the prisoner exchange in Mersin (*Ulus*, March 25, 1943) 80

Figure 16. Map of Mersin (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, File 0, Item 113) 81

Figure 17. Vecihi Akın's Sketches (ATASE 110-9-1-14 (4/0/112–110)....82

Figure 18. Areas Chosen as Bases by the British (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, File 0, Item 36)....88

Figure 19. İzmir Base (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, File 0, Item 145)....90

Figure 20. Temporary depots requested by the British Forces in Izmir (ATASE 110-9-1-14 4/0/145)....91

Figure 21. Serio-comics from Cemal Nadir (*Cumhuriyet*, November 9; December 25; November 30, 1943.)....96

Figure 22. Illustration depicting an air raid (*Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935)....98

Figure 23. "In the Hideouts of the Tunceli Bandits" (*Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1937)....109

Figure 24. Diagrams showing air-raid resistant designs (Glover, 1941; 692-94)....112

Figure 25. Airraid-Proof City diagram (Chitale, 1942; 174)....114

Figure 26 Bürhan Arif's Scheme of an Ideal City (*Mimar*, 1932)....119

Figure 27. Plans for healthcare and mustard gas care center written into law (No. 3055, 5499)....127

Figure 28. Turkish and French Versions of *Passive Defense* booklet....132

Figure 29. Giray and Vural's booklet pages showing female students (Manisa Halkevi, 1939)....133

Figure 30. Covers of Turkish Aeronautical Association Congress Booklets from 1932 and 1935....134

Figure 31. Pages from the passive defense textbook for the 5th Grades (Maarif Vekilliği, 1939)....137

Figure 32 Ads of passive defense info material on *Cumhuriyet* (May 6, 1938; May 10, 1939; May 8, 1940)....138

Figure 33. Military film center operations (Korur, 1940)....139

Figure 35. Organizational scheme of air defense (Tuğaç, *Belediyeler Dergisi*, 1937)....141

Figure 36. A gas masked unit at the fire station in 1932 (IBB Atatürk Library, Alb_000468) 149

Figure 37. Underground Istanbul dossier (*Son Posta*, Coşkun, March 19–21, 1940. 152

Figure 38. Passive Defense Expert Mouren's Inspections (*Cumhuriyet*, 1940) 156

Figure 39. Types of bombs explained (*Cumhuriyet*, August 16, 1939.) 158

Figure 40. Illustrations showing the effects of bombs (*Arkitekt* ,1941 *Belediyeler Dergis*i, 1936) 159

Figure 42. Illustration showing how the shelter can protect the whole building (Erksal, 1940) 161

Figure 43. Examples from shelter designs (Refet, 1936) 164

Figure 44. Sheltering and consolidation instructions (Hava Harbinden Korunmada, 1940)**....** 165

Figure 45. Shelters rented out beneath apartment buildings. (Vakit, March 27, 1940) 168

Figure 46. Examples for Trench Manuals (*Ulus*, October 4, 1939; *Arkitekt* 1939) 170

Figure 47. Examples of well-type shelters from civil defense manuals, 1938–1940. 170

Figure 49. Methods of Shelter Construction (Sayar, 1940) 171

Figure 50. Methods of Shelter Construction (Sayar, 1940) 172

Figure 51. Public education trenches and model shelters, 1939–1941. 173

Figure 52. Altan Öymen's drawings of a trench digged in his childhood home's garden (2002) 174

Figure 53. Advertisements for passive defense materials, 1936–1941 176

Figure 54. Material culture of passive defense (*Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1940, and May 18, 1941) 176

Figure 55. Pazar Ola Hasan B. Diyor Ki (*Son Posta*, August 3, 1935) 178

Figure 56. Satirical cover and commentary on wartime themes (*Akbaba*, August 1935, November 1940) 178

Figure 57. Series on urban poverty and housing conditions (Suat Derviş, *Cumhuriyet*, 1935) 179

Figure 58. Incendiary bombs' effects (Tanık, 1937) 180

Figure 59. News on fires in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, 1935-1945) 182

Figure 60. Building collapses and urban accidents in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, 1935-37) 183

Figure 61. Building collapses and accidents in Istanbul, (*Cumhuriyet*, 1935-37) 184

Figure 63. Illustrated guide to how to behave during air raid (Özger, 1938) 186

Figure 64. Reports on wooden houses (*Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1936) 188

Figure 65. Urban clearance in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, September 28, 1937; Jan 18, 1941). 189

Figure 67. Satirical covers on urban planning process (*Akbaba*, December 1936; February 1, 1940) 195

Figure 69. Caricature on citizens' wishes from the city (*Akbaba*, November 1938) 196

Figure 70. Details of the Plan of Istanbul (*Belediyeler Dergisi*, 1938) 198

Figure 71. Illustration depicting a poison gas attack in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935). 205

Figure 72. Reports on anti-gas training courses (*Cumhuriyet*. June 9, 1936; November 16, 1937) 210

Figure 73. Recruitment for passive defense teams (*Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1939) 211

Figure 74. Türkkuşu camp and Sabiha Gökçen's flights (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1936; June 14, 1937) 213

Figure 75. Aviation Martyr's Monument in Fatih, Istanbul (IBB Atatürk Library, Krt_010079) 214

Figure 76. Sightseeing flights and aerial travel (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1936; September 1, 1937). 216

Figure 77. Fire brigade and blackout precautions against air threats (Süerdem, 1935) 217

Figure 78. Air-defense drill photographed by Tan (*Tan*, December 21, 1935). 218

Figure 79. Crowds watching air-defense drills in Taksim Square (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935) 218

Figure 80. Reports on the major air-defense exercise and inspections (*Cumhuriyet*, August 16, 1939). 220

Figure 81. Reports and advertisements following the air-defense exercises (*Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1939). 221

Figure 82. Nationwide blackout orders and full masking of city lights (*Cumhuriyet*, December 1–2, 1940) 222

Figure 83. Warnings and decoy bombs (*Cumhuriyet*, January 30, 1941; *Belediyeler Dergisi*, no. 48, 1939). 223

Figure 84. Opening ceremony of the national gas mask factory (*Ulus*, November 1, 1935) 226

Figure 85. Scenes from the opening of the Mamak Gas Mask Factory (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, no. 145, December, 1935) 227

Figure 86. Illustrations for using the Kızılay gas mask (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası,* no. 147, April 1936). 228

Figure 87. Scenes from the Gas Mask Factory (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 1936). 228

Figure 88. Fire-extinguishing tests under gas masks (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 147, April 1936) 229

Figure 89. Sale of poison gas masks to the public (*Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1938). 230

Figure 90. Kızılay child gas masks for protecting children (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 169, December 1939). 231

Figure 91. Kızılay protective cradle for infants from gas (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 170, February 1940). 232

Figure 92. Kızılay shelter design and construction details *(Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 173, August 1940). 233

Figure 93. Winkel-type shelter and resistance tests (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, 165, April 1939) 233

Figure 94. Kızılay Sheler in Construction (*Ulus*, September 16, 1939) 234

Figure 95. Women illustrated for passive defense (*Ev-İş*, November 1939; Refet, 1939; *Akbaba*) 236

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARP Air Raid Precautions

ATASE Arşiv Ve Askerî Tarih Daire Başkanlığı (Department Of Archives And Military History)

BCA Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Prime Ministry Republican Archives)

THK .....Türk Hava Kurumu (Turkish Aeronautical Association)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> "In tomorrow's war, there will be no place untouched by aircraft bombs or unentered by poisonous gas. If the plane finds the ground unguarded, it will burn even the crops in your field, the tree in your orchard, the animal in your barn, and poison even the stream that runs through your village. Those who save their lives will not be able to save their property; those who protect their property will not be able to save their lives."
> Abidin Daver[1]

> "The newspaper is a mass ceremony."
> Benedict Anderson[2]

One week in May 1935, Istanbul newspapers and other local outlets became unusually dense on a single subject. Following the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's public admission to the country's vulnerability to aerial warfare and inauguration of a donation campaign for the Turkish Aviation Society[3], across the headlines, editorials, and images, the media staged a sudden and unanimous awakening to a grim future. Bombs, poison gas, maps of national airspace, and vividly illustrated scenes of Istanbul under attack appeared one after another. Alongside the usual disputes over trams, water, or hospitals, the city now carried two adversaries: a foreign enemy who would strike from the skies, and its own evident fragility. Yet Istanbul's spectacle was less an isolated target than an exemplary one. Behind the flames and collapsing minarets, newspapers placed the country and its citizens within a broader cartography of danger: arrows drawn across national maps, speculation about border defenses, and reminders that any raid on the city would first cross the frontiers before downing onto homes. This week in May 1935 is not treated here as a singular origin story, but as a turn in the archives: a moment when aerial warfare entered public imagination, reshaping territorial, urban, architectural, and bodily spaces long before the first siren sounded. Each chapter of this dissertation returns briefly to this week from a different vantage point to trace how its discourses reverberated across scales of planning, governance, and everyday life.

---

[1] Abidin Daver, "Ulusun Hayatı Havadadır!," *Cumhuriyet*, May 25, 1935.

[2] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 2006).

[3] "Başbakan İsmet İnönü Dün Hava Tehlikesi Için Yeni Bir Söylev Verdi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

1.1. "This is What Air Threat Means": A Turn in the Archives

On May 26, 1935, the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* published the first of a series of striking illustrations by Ercümend.[4] It was a scene depicting Istanbul under attack from the skies: planes swarming over Hagia Sophia and Sultan Ahmad Mosque, minarets cracked and crumbling, smoke coming out from places where incendiary bombs fell. Shadowy figures hardly even seen on the streets. Down below, a caption warned: "A country suddenly attacked by enemy air fleets, burning and destroyed, its citizens torn apart and poisoned… This is what air threat means."[5]



Figure 1. Illustration depicting Istanbul under air raids (*Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.)

The image accompanied an editorial by Abidin Daver, who sketched in words what Kalmık rendered in lines: a detailed vision of urban catastrophe. "Let us take our Istanbul, for example," Daver wrote, "Thousand-kilo aircraft bombs would turn Mimar Sinan's masterpiece Süleymaniye and the Byzantine Museum Hagia Sophia into ruins… Poison gas would kill people, animals, and trees. Within an hour, this city where joyful and happy people live would turn into a hell filled with the smell of blood and smoke, and the cries of dying people." He staged the war vividly in the country's most recognizable monuments, terrifying civilians rather than clashing armies. Another

[4] Abidin Daver, "Başbakanın Gösterdiği Tehlike," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

[5] All translations are by the author unless stated otherwise. The phrase "hava tehlikesi" (literally air threat) was commonly used in the 1930s to describe the anticipated danger of aerial bombardment and poison gas, and is rendered here as "aerial threat."

piece asked: “How will tomorrow’s war begin?” and replied “Not with an ultimatum, but with an air raid: aerial fleets composed of three to four hundred planes will launch a sudden midnight attack, burning, destroying, shattering, and poisoning.”[6]

A repeated section of *Cumhuriyet* “We want!” took another approach to mobilize and encourage people: “500 planes are not enough, we want an aviation spirit! The most terrifying enemy is the airplane. The most powerful friend is also the airplane. When an enemy bomber comes to bomb the homeland, our fighter plane will chase after it like an eagle, attack it, and bring it down in flames along with its bombs. When an enemy plane comes to poison the nation, our assault aircraft will strike like lightning and crush its head like a snake before it has time to bite or release its poison.”[7] In such pieces, airplanes shifted rapidly between menace and salvation, embodying both mortal threat and national hope.



Figure 2. Illustrated news across newspapers within a few weeks from May 25, 1935 (Zaman, Kurun, Ulusal Birlik, Cumhuriyet, Halkın Sesi, Son Posta, Tan, Ulus, Akşam, Haber)

Editors, caricaturists, and headline writers responded directly to İnönü’s call. “Tomorrow’s wars will be in the skies,” announced one front page; “The greatest threat is gas!” warned another. Across *Akşam, Son Posta, Vakit, Ulus*, and *Tan*, the same symbolic repertoire recurred: clusters of airplanes, gas clouds, suffocating civilians, silhouettes running. A crisis lexicon emerged, composed of planes, gas, masks, and maps anchored in spatial markers: Turkey’s borders, Istanbul’s skyline, monuments, even bedrooms. Heroic and mythologized depictions also

[6] Abidin Daver, “Yarınki Harb Nasıl Başlayacak?,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

[7] “500 Tayyare Kâfi Değil, Bir Havacılık Havası Istiyoruz!,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1935.

appeared, in which airplanes transformed into female figures rising above, their wings wrapped in red and white. Altogether, the underlying message was clear: the aerial threat was real, national vulnerability was acute, and a catastrophic future was ahead unless urgent action was taken, particularly through public mobilization and donations to the Turkish Aeronautical Association to purchase more aircraft.

Civil organizations took the lead in putting the discourse into action. Sports clubs organized football tournaments to raise funds,[8] schoolchildren were depicted assembling model planes, and the *Türk Kuşu* initiative promised a generation of "winged youth" trained in the "national" skies.[9] Gas masks were introduced and explained in illustrated diagrams, together with taking shelter and protecting oneself.[10] News from around Europe on how they prepare for passive defense introduced novel methods.[11] The Turkish Aeronautical Association's call for donations and growing lists of civilian contributors called "*Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler*" published day by day[12] with praises and shamed the others claiming, "those who do not prepare for the air threat are those who wish to commit suicide". Local meetings in Istanbul, Bursa, and İzmir produced plans for action.[13]

On one hand, defining, imagining, and narrating the threat together with a future without action across illustrations, caricatures, and editorials highlighted the urgency, danger and patriotic attention to survival. On the other hand, performances of encouraging action, involvement and solidarity signaled ways of overcoming this threat. This kind of duality traversed from personification of airplanes "cruel monsters of destruction" in possession of the enemy, "iron eagles of salvation" in the Turkish hands; to headlines such as "The danger from the skies both exists and does not exist."[14] Eventually, they were not contradictory in the antagonistic setting of a wartime conflict. In the mid-1930s, it was common sense that there would be a "tomorrow's war" arriving "suddenly, one night," which necessitated "preparing from today." Fear and preparedness were bound together in an emotional alignment that tied danger to planning and planning to citizenship.

---

[8] "Çelik Kartalları Çoğaltmak Için: 8 Büyük Klüb Arasında Bir Futbol Turnuvası," *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1935.

[9] "Kanatlı Gençlik Türk Gençliği Için Hava Sporları Önemi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1935.

[10] "Gazdan Korunma Çareleri Sığınak, Gaz Maskesi ve Gaz Elbisesi Gibi Önlemler Alınmalı," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1935.

[11] "Boğucu Gazlere Karşı Pariste Tecrübeler Devam Ediyor, Bütün Halka Maske Vermeğe Çalışıyorlar," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

[12] "Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler: Parti Grubu Bu Işe Çok Ehemmiyet Verecek," *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

[13] "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı: İstanbul'da Büyük Bir Toplantı Yapılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1935.

[14] "Hava Tehlikesi Hem Vardır Hem Yoktur! Var Olan Tehlikeyi Ulusun Yurtseverliği ve Fedakârlığı Yok Edecektir," *Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1935.

At the core of these discourses and practices was a driving force, the anticipation of a global conflict ahead. Anticipation was both a spatial and an emotional condition: it materialized in the making of territory through maps, borders, and defense lines; in the city through visions of safety, shelter, and governance; and in the body through exercises of training, idealization and protection. The aim of this research is to trace these scales in their interrelation and to situate them within the lived experience of neutral Turkey.

This study investigates the spatial and discursive construction of wartime Turkey between 1935 and 1945, tracing how ideas, policies, and representations of/for/against "tomorrow's war" reshaped the country's territories, cities, and bodies. It is a history of intervention, governance, and speculation, as much as waiting, negligence, and disillusionment during the Second World War era, centering on military infrastructure, urban planning, architectural adaptation, and civilian regulation. Wartime space was produced through anticipatory practices, in which strategies of defense, diplomacy, and urban management acquired meaning and visibility across bureaucratic systems, media platforms, architectural publications, and civil defense campaigns. Across bureaucratic files, newspapers, technical manuals, and architectural journals, the specter of aerial bombardment and chemical attack filtered through local vulnerabilities, geopolitical calculations, and infrastructural limits. The aerial threat infiltrated national priorities and produced a heterogeneous archive shaped by diverse actors such as diplomats, military officers, foreign advisers, civil servants, scientists, architects, municipal officials, journalists, and ordinary citizens.

The conceptual anchor lies in the interrelation of territory and frontiers. Territory as a political technology emerges whenever action takes place, whether through law, regulation, construction, or representation. When territory encounters other realms, foreign powers, natural environments, infrastructures, or the civic body, it becomes a frontier. The wartime Turkey was defined by such encounters: defense lines inscribed on the national map, sovereignty negotiated across the Straits and ports, municipal governance reshaped by blackout regulations and shelter regimes, and civilians disciplined as the final scale of protection.

The guiding questions are therefore threefold: How was territory made in wartime Turkey? How did it become articulated as frontiers across multiple scales, land, sea, air, city, and body? And what does this reveal about urban governance under pressure, and about the interplay of neutrality, sovereignty, and public life?

This study does not argue that the expectation of war brought about sweeping urban reconstructions or dramatic architectural ruptures, because it did not. Vast bunker networks were not built, most ambitious plans remained unexecuted, and transformations were often

provisional. Yet the absence of monumental construction does not mean an absence of action. What emerged instead was a parallel framework of anticipation, emotional, bureaucratic, legal, and symbolic, that reshaped how space was imagined, regulated, and inhabited. This framework left its own archive of unintended consequences, failures, and improvisations, while opening new ground for debate and knowledge-making. It stretched from the militarization of the everyday to the aestheticization of public space; from digging trenches in garden plots to constructing the largest defense line outside Istanbul; from taping over the windows of modernist apartments to filming drills in repurposed hammams and theaters. It followed chemistry teachers writing manuals on air-resistant cities, Red Crescent factories producing protective equipment, and thousands of civilians who attended courses on chemical warfare or fled their homes in Thrace for central Anatolia. This chronicle is an architectural one, although it neither begins nor ends with the construction of a building. Its starting point is an urban representation: a young artist Ercümend illustrating aerial bombardment, or Abidin Daver's unrelenting newspaper commentary, through which the city and its citizens were continuously reimagined under the shadow of war.

1.2. Positioning in the Field

To write about architecture in Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s is to enter a crowded field of expectations. The period is heavy with meaning, defined by its proximity to the founding of the Republic, the cultural project of secularism, the nation-building efforts, the modernization project, and eventually the Early Republican Period. Any attempt to examine this era's architectural/urban history inevitably encounters familiar inclinations, the monumentalism of the new capital, the stylistic turns of the "First National Architectural Movement" to the modern, the narrative of Westernization as spatial rupture, architecture as a device of nation-building.[15] It is fair to say that they are now structuring habits of the field itself, rather than being themes. This study begins with full awareness of that inheritance, and benefits from the vast literature there is, but turns its attention elsewhere, departing from the questions of state ideology, identity, aesthetics, and symbolic rupture, monumentality, and political periodization.

This study is structured around a spatial condition: the pressures of war anticipation in a neutral state, and the periodization comes from the War and its reflections in the society. Rather than beginning with building type or biography, it began with a curiosity regarding how come we don't

[15] Elvan Altan Ergut and Bilge İmamoğlu, eds., *Cumhuriyet'in mekânları, zamanları, insanları*, 1. baskı, Dipnot yayınları (Dipnot : ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2010); Sibel Bozdoğan and Esra Akcan, *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*, Modern Architectures in History (Reaktion Books, 2012); Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (University of Washington Press, 2002); Zeynep Kezer, "The Making of a Nationalist Capital: Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara," *Built Environment (1978-)* 22, no. 2 (1996): 124–37; Zeynep Kezer, "An Imaginable Community: The Material Culture of Nation-Building in Early Republican Turkey," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27, no. 3 (2009): 508–30, https://doi.org/10.1068/d10907.

talk about the most devastating military event of the century within architectural history of Turkey? Then another question followed, how does the possibility of war reorganize the ways a city is governed, visualized, and experienced? Following Brigitte Sölch's formulation of a problem-oriented architectural history (drawing from problem history (Problemgeschichte), it foregrounds conditions, questions, and institutions over formal objects.[16] Additionally, it draws on the now fully accepted notion to read architecture in an expanded field, where media, regulation, and spatial discourse matter as much as built form (references to come). Consequently, the archive includes civil defense manuals, caricatures, blackout laws, evacuation drills, and zoning disputes, not marginal materials, but central instruments in wartime urbanism.

This dissertation also draws particular inspiration from Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz's *Global Locality, National Modernity*, which presents a compelling model for writing urban history of Early Republican İstanbul without collapsing transformation into nationalist ideology. Açıkgöz focuses instead on the "culture of negotiation" and "local articulations of urban modernity," foregrounding municipal actors, professionals, and residents rather than state-driven narratives.[17] His emphasis on "entangled webs of local, national, and global dynamics" informs this project's similar resistance to ideological unification, tracing spatial logics emerging from bureaucratic/international actions, media discourses, and urban crisis planning.

Despite its profound geopolitical implications, Second World War remains strikingly absent from Turkish architectural historiography, beyond architectural exhibitions as wartime propaganda.[18] The period has been vastly studied; however, it is not problematized around the war itself. Typically portrayed as a temporal void between early Republican modernization and postwar urbanization, the wartime years are often reduced to economic austerity, diplomatic caution, and stagnation. Even the years, late 1930s and early 1940s are ambiguous in terms of Early Republican Period, which sometimes end with the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, sometimes with the end of the War, sometimes with the Democrat Party replacing the People's Republican Party. Within architectural studies, these years are marked by what is not built, planned, or designed, often misread as inactivity. Indeed, this period economically and politically was tumultuous due to war pressures. However, even in a neutral state like Turkey, the war initiated legal reforms, municipal regulations, public campaigns, and infrastructural adaptations.

---

[16] "History/Theory - Brigitte Sölch - Architectural Problems," E-Flux, accessed June 23, 2025, https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/history-theory/162452/architectural-problems/.

[17] Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz, "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)" (PhD Dissertation, Rice University, 2018).

[18] Elvan Altan Ergut, "Displaying Abroad: Architecture and Town Planning Exhibitions of Britain in Turkey in the Mid-1940s," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 50 (2014): 145–70, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600006609; Evren Küçük, "Türkiye'de Nazi Almanya Propagandasına Bir Örnek: Ankara ve İstanbul'da Alman Mimari Sergileri," *Journal of Ankara Studies* 6, no. 1 (2018): 23–38, https://doi.org/10.5505/jas.2018.77527.

Architectural history has traditionally privileged the monumental and visible, buildings, styles, iconic figures. This emphasis obscures the infrastructural and discursive labor through which space is governed. However, architecture is constellations of bureaucratic, visual, regulatory, and strategic practices and systems shaping environments, often in the absence of built form. Air raid manuals, blackout regulations, zoning maps, civil defense drills, newspaper illustrations, and emergency guidelines become central artifacts of architectural knowledge. Especially in moments of crisis, architectural work unfolds through paperwork, speculation, and deferred projects, leaving instructions, routines, and conceptual reorganizations of space rather than iconic forms.

One reason for this absence might be that Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War has often been interpreted as strategic withdrawal, a passive avoidance of conflict. Historical accounts commonly represent neutrality as absence of violence, engagement, and transformation. This dissertation, informed by the valuable literature on economic and diplomatic history of Turkey relating to WW2, reframes neutrality not as passivity, but as active process of negotiation, bargaining, waiting, preparation, and survival. Even without direct combat, anticipation of war became the force that reorganized governance, militarization lands, prompting municipalities to develop blackout procedures, evacuation plans, and civil defense regulations. Neutrality meant a long "game of balance" mostly fought on the diplomatic front where the bargaining chips were environmental, infrastructural and logistical capacities of the very land of Turkey, while war, combat, and invasion were omnipresent on all borders.

The engagement of architectural history with war has typically centered on destruction, reconstruction, and occupied territories. However, there is also a fertile ground for discussion in preparation and wartime relations with space, architecture, and urbanism, from camouflage, coloniality, toxicity, defense as a driving force and a program, to mechanisms of architectural labor, industrialization, aviation, and total war dynamics.[19] The critical engagement with the interwar and wartime years in relation to architecture and planning has been advanced by scholars of cultural, urban, and architectural history, particularly those working on the Second

[19] Renyi Tang, "On Defensive Architecture: The Expansion of Boundaries and the Reshaping of the Environment," *Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media* 92 (May 2025): 14–22, https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/2025.22782; Sunčana Laketa, *Cities of Banal Warfare: Affective Geographies in Violent Times* (Bristol University Press, 2025); Samia Henni, *Colonial Toxicity: Rehearsing French Radioactive Architecture and Landscape in the Sahara*, with Megan Hoetger (Edition Fink, 2024); Rana Abughannam et al., *Architectures of Hiding: Crafting Concealment | Omission | Deception | Erasure | Silence*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2023); Maurizio Ferraris, "The Thrown Project: Architecture and War," *Khōrein: Journal for Architecture and Philosophy* 1, no. 2 (2023): 2; Samia Henni, ed., *War Zones*, Gta Papers (gta Verlag, 2018); Matthew Flintham, "The Military Spatial Complex: Interpreting the Emerging Spaces of British Militarism," in *Emerging Landscapes* (Routledge, 2014); Karey L. Draper, *Building for War: Examples of Temporary Structures Designed for Wartime Use in Britain (1939-1945)*, n.d.; Gastón R. Gordillo, *Rubble: The Afterlife of Destruction* (Duke University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822376903; Stefan Goebel et al., *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2017); Donald Albrecht and Margaret Crawford, *World War II and the American Dream : How Wartime Building Changed a Nation* (Washington, D.C. : National Building Museum ; Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995).

World War. Their research has illuminated civil defense programs, urbanism, exclusion, appropriation, and the formative role of the interwar years in shaping these trajectories.
Among them, Adam Page's[20] and Jean Louis Cohen's[21] work have been especially influential for this study: as Page's British context of interwar and wartime urbanism practices became a point of comparison, Cohen's work became an excellent companion to the rather silent circles of architecture on wartime architecture in Turkey.

In doing so, the project positions itself at the intersection of several fields: architectural history, urban history, the history of urbanism and planning theory, and military spatial history. It draws from architectural historiography but extends beyond buildings and styles to include municipal regulations, civil defense manuals, and infrastructural projects as legitimate architectural archives. It contributes to urban history by examining how cities were governed, visualized, and contested under the shadow of war. It engages with the history of planning theory by tracing how international debates on zoning, housing, and functional planning were refracted through the specific concerns of aerial bombardment and civilian protection. Finally, it intervenes in military spatial history by showing how defense epistemologies, surveying, fortification, evacuation, and logistics, shaped civilian environments as much as military ones. [22]

1.3. Conceptual Anchors

The notion of the frontier provides the starting point, thanks to the expanding take of Roxanne Panchasi[23] on Lucien Febvre's classic essay "Frontière, le mot et la notion" (1928) where he demonstrated how the word carried shifting architectural, military, and territorial registers: the

[20] Adam Page, "An Archive of Anxiety: The Papers of E. A. A. Rowse," *Planning Perspectives* 35, no. 6 (2020): 1097–105, https://doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2020.1781685; Adam Page, *Architectures of Survival: Air War and Urbanism in Britain, 1935–52*, 1st edition (Manchester University Press, 2019); Adam Page, "Planning a 'Militant Peace': Air Raid Precautions for Peace and for War," in *Architectures of Survival: Air War and Urbanism in Britain, 1935–52*, 1st edition (Manchester University Press, 2019).

[21] Jean-Louis Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War* (Editions Hazan, Paris, 2011).

[22] *"A Blessing in Disguise" War and Town Planning in Europe 1940 - 1945*, with Jörn Düwel et al. (DOM Publ, 2013), https://d-nb.info/1036194949/04; Joseph S. Meisel, "Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War," *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 3 (1994): 300–319, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/5.3.300; Ryan Bishop and Gregory Clancey, "The City-as-Target, or Perpetuation and Death," in *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, ed. Stephen Graham, Studies in Urban and Social Change (Wiley, 2008); Koos Bosma, *Shelter City: Protecting Citizens Against Air Raids* (Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Mary Dudziak, *War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2014); Stephen Graham, "Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annihilation and Urban Geopolitics," in *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, ed. Stephen Graham, Studies in Urban and Social Change (Wiley, 2008); Brett Holman, *The Next War in the Air: Britain's Fear of the Bomber, 1908–1941* (Routledge, 2014); Albrecht and Crawford, *World War II and the American Dream*; Peter J. Larkham, "Selling the Future City: Images in UK Post-War Reconstruction Plans," in *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain*, ed. Iain Boyd Whyte (Routledge, 2007); Meisel, "Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War," 1994; Aaron William Moore, *Bombing the City: Civilian Accounts of the Air War in Britain and Japan, 1939–1945*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108552479; Lloyd Rodwin and Robert M. Hollister, *Cities of the Mind: Images and Themes of the City in the Social Sciences*, Environment, Development, and Public Policy (Plenum Press, 1984).

[23] Roxanne Panchasi, *Future Tense: The Culture of Anticipation in France between the Wars* (Cornell University Press, 2009).

façade of a building, the line of battle, the edges of a state, or a defensive barrier.[24] Febvre showed that rulers long invoked "natural frontiers" (rivers, mountains, seas) to legitimize expansion or unity. His insight was that frontiers are never timeless or natural; they are historical inventions, shaped by political aims, anxieties, and strategies of rule. From here, the frontier can be read as a dynamic articulation of territory. Territory, understood as a political technology[25], materializes whenever law, regulation, surveying, or construction takes place. It is not a stable container but a field continually made and remade. When territory is pressed against external powers, natural environments, infrastructures, or civic bodies, it appears as a frontier, a space of negotiation and projection.

This brings temporality into focus. Drawing on Koselleck's categories of space of experience and horizon of expectation[26], the wartime decade in Turkey was shaped by inherited limitations while simultaneously projecting itself toward a future of imagined aerial bombardments and urban reforms. The selective anticipation of crises, investing in air defense while neglecting earthquake preparedness, reveals how governance itself was a practice of choosing which futures counted and which were bracketed away. Such anticipation operated through emotional registers. Fear, trust, anxiety, and humor were not private sentiments but political forces. Emotional regimes structured public imagination: caricatures dramatized destruction, drills taught composure, gas mask campaigns mixed terror with reassurance. These emotions produced new forms of publicity and intimacy: the blackout gathered strangers into collective vulnerability, while shelters transformed domestic fears into civic performance.

The proximity of war meant that these conditions collided with military logics. The city was reframed through spatial tactics of militarized urbanism[27]: concealment, dispersal, evacuation, compartmentalization. Even when only partially realized, these logics redefined Istanbul as a landscape of fragility, one where the priorities of circulation, housing, and infrastructure were reordered under the sign of defense. Behind these tactics lay defense epistemologies. Surveying, cartography, statistics, and reconnaissance were not neutral techniques but modes of power.[28]

---

[24] Lucien Febvre, *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, ed. Peter Burke (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

[25] Stuart Elden, "Land, Terrain, Territory," *Progress in Human Geography* 34, no. 6 (2010): 799–817, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132510362603.

[26] Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner (Stanford University Press, 2002).

[27] Abughannam et al., *Architectures of Hiding*; G. J. Ashworth, *War and the City* (Routledge, 1991); M. Bateman and R. C. Riley, *The Geography of Defence*, Routledge Library Editions. Human Geography (Routledge, 2016); D. Deriu, "Between Veiling and Unveiling: Modern Camouflage and the City as a Theatre of War," in *Endangered Cities: Military Power and Urban Societies in the Era of the World Wars*, ed. R. Chickering and M. Funck (Brill, 2004); Karey Lee Draper, "Wartime Huts: The Development, Typology, and Identification of Temporary Military Buildings in Britain 1914-1945," *Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository*, ahead of print, January 27, 2018, https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.17581.

[28] Graham, "Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annihilation and Urban Geopolitics"; Stephen Graham, ed., *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, 1st ed, Studies in Urban and Social Change (Wiley, 2008); Stephen Graham, *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*, Pbk. ed (Verso, 2011); Stephen Graham, *Vertical: The City from Satellites to*

They produced knowledge that stabilized neutrality itself: mapping the Çatalca Line, counting shelters, or cataloguing port facilities in Mersin and İskenderun. Such practices tied civilian and military environments into a single regime of visibility and control.

At the most intimate scale, corporeal governance extended these logics to the body. Civil defense manuals, drills, masks, and Red Crescent equipment mobilized the body as a fortification. Citizens were taught how to breathe, move, and survive; the body became a final frontier, disciplined and rehearsed to carry the weight of survival. Biopolitics here took architectural form: to govern the city was also to govern its populations.[29] Overlaying all of this was aviation. The airplane introduced a vertical axis of vulnerability, forcing cities and bodies to be reimagined from above. Airmindedness turned skylines into targets, reoriented urban planning toward concealment, and rendered civilians visible in new ways. Aerial warfare thus set the horizon against which territory, city, and body were continually reframed. These frameworks define the field of thought that informs this study: a landscape where territory is contingent, frontiers are constructed, time is selective, emotions regulate, tactics militarize, epistemologies govern, bodies are fortified, and airpower makes all vulnerable.

1.4. Sources, Scales, and Methods

This dissertation rests on a deliberately heterogeneous archive that captures how the built environment was narrated, regulated, and reimagined in Turkey between 1935 and 1945. His dissertation brings together a wide range of materials that reveal how space was governed discursively and visually under the pressure of war and crisis. The sources span official and municipal registers, legal documents, architectural drawings, various maps, public and professional media, ephemeral pamphlets, and visual culture. The sources span official and municipal registers, public and professional media, ephemeral pamphlets, and visual culture. The primary archive consists of the following types of materials:

- Official Documents and Municipal Records: These include state circulars, municipal reports, legal decrees, technical bulletins, and planning correspondence accessed through the Presidential State Archives, the Military Archives (ATASE), the National Library of Turkey, TBMM Zabıt Cerideleri, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's Atatürk

Bunkers (Verso, 2016); Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land* (Verso, 2017); Samia Henni, ed., *War Zones*, Gta Papers (gta Verlag, 2018).

[29] Hale Yilmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey 1923-1945* (Syracuse University Press, 2013); Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar: Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*, 4th ed. (İletişim, 2019); Jonathan Heaney, "Emotions and Nationalism: A Reappraisal," in *Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension*, ed. Nicolas Demertzis (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025661_13.

Library, Salt Archives, the Istanbul Research Institute, VEKAM Ankara Research Institute, and the Turkish Historical Institution.

- Newspapers: The national daily Cumhuriyet serves as the backbone of the media archive. Every issue from 1935 to 1945 was reviewed in full for this project. The newspaper's role in visualizing threat, translating bureaucratic language, and staging public campaigns makes it an essential source. Other newspapers (Ulus, Tan, Akşam, Haber, Vakit) supplement this reading, especially for comparative or regional perspectives.
- Caricature and Satirical Publications: Every issue of Akbaba, a widely circulated satirical weekly, was analyzed for its commentary on public life, urban space, and civil defense. Caricature serves here as both a cultural mirror and a tool of critique, dramatizing and often undermining the gravity of official campaigns.
- Professional Journals and Planning Periodicals: Specialized publications (Arkitekt, Belediyeler Dergisi, Yapı, Cankurtaran, Sıhhiye, Yeni Adam, Havacılık ve Spor, T.C. Kızılay Mecmuası) offered a platform for specialist but also architects, engineers, and planners to reflect on spatial challenges. These journals provide insights into how technical expertise and professional authority were mobilized in the public imagination of preparedness.
- Civil Defense Booklets and Manuals: Over sixty separate publications produced in Turkey were reviewed, ranging from school textbooks to short booklets and officially printed laws on passive defense, poison gas, aerial threat, blackout procedures, and emergency shelter construction. In addition, comparable materials from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were consulted. Often prepared by state agencies or civil defense committees, these documents offer granular insight into how space, behavior, and emotion were regulated through text and image.
- Memoirs and Novels: Select personal accounts and fictionalized narratives from the period help contextualize official language with subjective and everyday experiences. While these sources are used sparingly, they offer glimpses into how the public internalized, or resisted, the state's spatial scripts.
- Instructional and Educational Films: Two particular civil defense films, along with imported or translated works such as the British short *The Warning*, circulated in Turkey during this decade. These films serve as visual sources for understanding how threat, duty, and spatial behavior were communicated and rehearsed for public audiences.

The research question at hand requires a treatment that is responsive to the weight of each source. Two extremes of evidence structure this archive. At one end stand the military records: highly restricted, selective, and often abrupt. They document decision-making, deployments, and territorial calculations but are designed for secrecy rather than public communication. At the other end lie the newspapers: mass-circulation, daily, and relentlessly public, where state

directives were reframed into headlines, campaigns, and caricatures. Placing these two forms of evidence side by side allows a different reading of wartime conditions. For example, when archival records reveal troop movements to the Balkan frontier, Cumhuriyet and Akbaba simultaneously staged Balkan Pact solidarity through celebratory caricatures. Such juxtapositions expose the simultaneity of military secrecy and public narration, and they highlight the methodological value of treating both the hidden and the hyper-visible as complementary records of crisis management.

A central methodological choice in this dissertation is the systematic use of the daily press, especially Cumhuriyet, supplemented by Ulus, Tan, and Akşam. Every issue of Cumhuriyet from 1935 to the end of 1945 was scanned and read through the general perspectives of war and spatial matters, producing an extensive corpus of editorials, reportage, interviews, dossiers, caricatures, and advertisements exceeding 6000 pieces. This method rests on the conviction that for the questions pursued here, temporality is key. Newspapers allow one to follow the sequence of inspection, decision, announcement, implementation, and delay, not as neat stages but as overlapping processes visible in the rhythm of daily reporting. The press also enables the researcher to situate each theme in its wider context: to see how parallel issues circulated alongside debates on defense and planning. This breadth prevents the isolation of topics and provides a comparative frame.

At the same time, newspapers help balance the language of official decrees with reflections from everyday life: while state documents codify regulation, caricatures or reader letters capture unease, satire, or resistance. Even in an atmosphere of censorship and state control, individual voices slip through, preserved in anecdotes, editorials, or the humor of satire. This methodological reliance on newspapers has both advantages and limitations. The advantage lies in breadth, immediacy, and the ability to reconstruct public discourse as a form of governance. The limitation lies in their propagandistic tendencies, uneven coverage, and partial silences due to laws or ideology. This study acknowledges these constraints but argues that the daily press remains indispensable: not only as a record of what was said but as a site where urban futures were staged, contested, and normalized.

The archive also includes a wide spectrum of visual materials: diagrams of trenches, gas mask instructions, aerial maps, shelter sketches, photomontages, caricatures, and civil defense films. These were not ancillary illustrations but central tools of persuasion, instruction, and critique. Following approaches in media theory and critical urban studies, the dissertation treats visual evidence on two registers. First, as spatial data: showing how protection, vulnerability, or urban form was conceived. Second, as cultural instruments: encoding emotion, humor, and ideology in formats ranging from satirical caricatures to technical manuals. In this sense, visual sources are

read as forms of spatial governance, shaping how people were told not only what to do, but how to see the city, themselves, and their obligations under threat.

Discourses and practices are not treated here as separate spheres but as overlapping registers of action. Manuals, speeches, caricatures, and planning texts were often speculative or aspirational; practices such as training drills, municipal inspections, or the establishment of a gas mask factory sometimes proceeded without explicit discursive justification. The relationship was rarely linear. By reconstructing this ecology of action, the dissertation highlights the simultaneity of symbolic gestures, regulatory measures, improvisations, and partial implementations. Some acts reinforced state authority, others exposed its limits. Together they demonstrate how space was governed not by coherent policy alone but by parallel, fragmented, and often contradictory processes.

This dissertation adopts micro-cases as a methodological lens. By micro-case, I do not refer to microhistory in the strict historiographical sense of reconstructing the totality of a small world, but rather to a bounded unit of analysis, a defense line, a military exercise, a field report, a factory, an initiation, or a set of law. Each is examined in detail not because they are particularly representative or exemplary, but because it exposes specific dynamics central to the broader research questions. A micro-case often emerges at the intersection of multiple types of evidence: official decrees, press reportage, caricature, technical instruction, and everyday anecdote. In this sense, a micro-case is not simply a site but a mosaic of sources that crystallize around a particular problem or moment. Some cases are stronger or more fully documented than others, but each contributes to the overall argument by revealing textures, contradictions, or negotiations otherwise invisible in a general survey. Accumulated together, these micro-cases form a field of evidence that is both fertile and heterogeneous, making it possible to trace the many scales and registers through which wartime urbanism was articulated.

This dissertation is structured around a scalar movement that begins with geopolitical frontiers and zooms inward into cities, buildings, and bodies. This layered methodology reflects not only an analytical strategy but also a historically situated way of seeing. As Lucien Febvre (1928) showed in his etymological study of the term *frontière*, the frontier was never a single, fixed line; it oscillated between the frontline of an army, the façade of a building, and the boundaries of territory. The resonance of similar terms across languages, *cabha(t)* in Arabic, *cephe* in Turkish, underscores this elasticity.[30] A frontier could mark national edges, urban airspace, or the vulnerable surface of a human face behind a gas mask. Frontiers thus provide the conceptual thread through which scales of territory, city, and body form an argumentative whole.

[30] Elif Kaymaz and Emine Esra Nalbant, "Sessions: Frontiers: Kinetics of Expulsion, Expansion, and Contestation," accessed August 20, 2025, https://konferencer.au.dk/eahn26/call-for-papers-1/sessions.

To trace these shifting scales, the dissertation adopts three conceptual anchors. Airmindedness describes the cultural and perceptual transformation generated by aviation in the interwar and wartime decades. Defined by both fascination and anxiety, it marked a heightened awareness of aerial space as a domain of both opportunity and vulnerability. Aviation altered how people viewed borders, cities, and architectural surfaces, embedding the vertical gaze of the airplane into everyday imagination. In Turkey, the expansion of airpower, the proliferation of aerial photography, and the visibility of bombing campaigns in Europe reconfigured how planners and publics conceptualized scale, exposure, and security. Airmindedness provides both a subject of study and a methodological stance: this dissertation mirrors that aerial gaze by layering its own analysis vertically, from national defense lines to intimate bodily practices.

Verticality further grounds this approach. As Stephen Graham argues, verticality is not a neutral dimension but a field of power, organizing how threats and protections are distributed across spatial strata. In 1930s-40s Turkey, aerial threats activated new vertical imaginaries: sovereignty in the sky, municipal blackouts at street level, shelters dug beneath the ground, and fears of poison gas penetrating the lungs. Verticality thus provides the axis along which this dissertation's scalar narrative unfolds.

The future form the third anchor. Following Roxanne Panchasi's argument that the future itself functioned as a historical category in interwar France, this study takes seriously the temporal paradox of "wartime" in neutral Turkey. For belligerent states, wartime was destruction made real; for Turkey, wartime was a horizon that never fully arrived. Yet everything in this dissertation, laws, manuals, military deployments, municipal plans, public campaigns, even the smallest drills and pamphlets, worked, moved, prepared, planned, and equipped toward that future period called *wartime*. It is precisely this decade-long process of making space for a war that might come that the title *Architectures of Anticipation: The Making of Wartime Space in Turkey, 1935–1945* signals. The "making" refers to the processes of production of wartime space in anticipation, across territorial, urban, architectural, and bodily registers.

Eventually the *architectures of anticipation* builds through these arguments. These are the spatial policies, practices, representations, and infrastructures that prepare or transform environments, intentionally or not, for a specific imagined future *problem*: the outbreak of air raids and wartime destruction. Unlike planning in general, which is always to some extent anticipatory, architectures of anticipation emerge in the face of a threat. They problematize possible future violence in order to render it governable. In Turkey between 1935 and 1945, such architectures spanned law, pedagogy, urban planning, and material form: a trench dug in a schoolyard, a blackout regulation, a municipal shelter, a poster diagram of gas mask use, or a satirical newspaper critique. Together

they constituted a relational network that translated an uncertain horizon of attack into actionable governance and spatial transformation.

The following chapters develop this framework across four spatial scales: frontiers, the city, the building, and the body. Each chapter examines how war expectation reconfigured governance, planning, and discourse at its respective level, while together they demonstrate how wartime space in neutral Turkey was produced through architectures of anticipation.

Firstly, "National Territory under Pressure" situates Turkey within the geopolitical reordering of the late 1930s and 1940s by examining how land, sea, and air were reframed as defensive environments. Drawing on archival materials and contemporary press debates, the chapter follows three interlinked environments via various cases: the Çakmak–Çatalca Defense Line and the militarization of Thrace as a fortified hinterland; the Montreux Convention and the transformation of the Straits into both a diplomatic and fortified frontier; and the southern ports of Mersin and İskenderun as sites where allied cooperation, surveillance, and logistics reshaped local geographies. Across these cases, "territory" emerges not as static ground but as a layered medium of sovereignty and vulnerability, articulated through defense lines, poison-gas preparedness, port expansions, and aerial surveys.

Secondly "The Wartime City" traces how Istanbul became the primary arena where international doctrines of the "war-object city," interwar planning ideals, and Turkish passive defense regulations converged. It shows how aerial perspectives and planning discourse promised order and protection, while manuals and institutions codified shelters, blackouts, and evacuation as instruments of governance. Istanbul made these ambitions visible as contradiction: surveys and shelter schemes multiplied, yet combustible housing, limited budgets, and contested planning undermined their force. The chapter argues that the defensible city was less a realized condition than an unstable project, produced in the gap between technocratic regulation and the intractable materiality of the metropolis.

Thirdly, "Spatial Regimes of Wartime Body" analyzes how wartime governance constructed spatial regimes at the scale of flesh. It examines the ideal, aspirational, and performative body promoted in manuals and regulations, where posture, calm, and gesture were codified as techniques of survival. It interprets instruments of protection, gas masks, hoods, cradles, as technologies that translated fortification into intimate equipment. It traces how drills, training, and pedagogy mobilized schools, associations, and demonstrations to produce a disciplined civic body. By framing these practices as regimes rather than isolated measures, the chapter argues that the wartime body was actively produced through regulation, technology, and instruction, a site where survival itself was redefined as a political and spatial practice.

Finally, “Conclusion: Architectures of Anticipation” brings the arguments together and conceptualizes them under certain conditions and operations, also providing a theoretical background.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER PRESSURE

2.1. Political Technology and the Making of Territory

The geographic problematization of the aerial threat, that guides the spatial logic of this thesis, often took the form of warnings about Turkey's vulnerability. It was a country of "760,000 square kilometers" where "from any direction, enemy planes could enter, bomb one of our cities, and leave without injury." In this framing, "no part of Turkey could be assumed safe, not the mountains, not the distance, not even the air itself."[31] While the total environment of war was introduced to the public sphere, translating military threat into a shared spatial anxiety, the transformation of national territory by the state and military operated in a rather opaque realm. Before turning to the civic dimensions of wartime spatial practices, concerning the city, the building, and the body, this chapter focuses on how Turkey's national territory was positioned, pressured, and reshaped during the Second World War, through the lens of foreign policy and geopolitics, then through specific cases of defense planning and spatial intervention.

Firstly, it narrates a history of the Second World War from the geopolitical perspective of Turkey from 1935 to 1945, highlighting how spatial negotiations from obtaining international sovereignty over streams to increasing logistical capacity for warfare efforts became means of diplomacy before and during the War. These strategies were also shaped by the requests that specifically address all sorts of material and logistical capacities of Turkey from both sides of the war. This part also aims to demonstrate how Turkey was surrounded by the conflict, as all the neighboring countries, whether siding with Allied or Axis powers, were under occupation, fighting for freedom, or facing foreign invasion. By addressing the diplomatic efforts specifically by political leaders such as the Prime Minister, and later the President of the Republic İsmet İnönü and a long-term diplomat and a foreign minister Numan Menemencioğlu to keep the country out of the War, ranging from meticulous negotiations, strategies of waiting and delaying, together with actively performing neutrality.

Secondly, the chapter turns to a series of spatial operations that redefined Turkey's national territory under wartime pressure, drawing primarily from the Second World War section of the

[31] İsmet İnönü, *Türk Hava Kurumunun altıncı kurultayında başbakan İsmet İnönünün verdikleri söylev* (Türk Hava Kurumu, 1935).

Turkish military archives. These are organized around three interlinked domains, land, sea, and air, each revealing distinct yet overlapping modes of territorial control and defense. On land, strategies of fortification and containment were enacted along a vulnerable frontier, as the region itself became highly militarized. At sea, passage and sovereignty were tested through drills, exchanges, and port adaptations. In the air, new geographies emerged through surveying missions, infrastructure plans, and public health interventions woven into military logic. While each case stems from a particular site and archival trace, together they offer insight into how space was actively negotiated, reimagined, and prepared in anticipation of war. Rather than presenting a full account of wartime military and foreign policy, these episodes illuminate the varied logics, technical, diplomatic, and environmental, that shaped the making of wartime space. They stand as fragments of a broader spatial project: reactive, and uneven, yet fundamentally future-oriented, in effect, architectures of anticipation.

While these case studies to come are grounded in specific locations and archival materials, they also raise broader questions about how national space is defined, defended, and claimed in wartime. To analyze this process, the chapter draws on Stuart Elden's conception of territory as a political technology. Stuart Elden's theory of territory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how a certain kind of power defines, controls and protects their geographical spaces, emphasizing that territory is a "juridico-political notion" and a "political technology."[32] This position is particularly insightful when examining Turkey's complex position and actions in preparing the country for a possible war, since it highlights the interplay of economic, strategic, legal, diplomatic and technical factors. According to Elden, territory is not a natural or static entity, but rather something actively constituted and maintained through a complex interplay of specific techniques, practices, and forms of knowledge. It challenges unproblematic definitions of territory as simply a "bounded space," arguing that boundaries themselves are a "second-order problem" derived from specific calculative understandings of space.

This perspective is particularly useful for analyzing Turkey's wartime position, in which authority was asserted not only through diplomatic posturing but also through fortifications, emergency laws, base negotiations, and infrastructural adjustments.

Elden identifies four interrelated dimensions of territorial practice. The political-economic dimension concerns land as a finite resource shaped by issues of ownership, allocation, and control. The political-strategic dimension understands territory as terrain—a site of movement, planning, and contestation, what Elden terms the "site and stake of struggle." The political-legal

[32] Stuart Elden, *Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty* (University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Elden, "Land, Terrain, Territory"; Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (University of Chicago Press, 2013); Stuart Elden, "How Should We Do the History of Territory?," *Territory, Politics, Governance*, Routledge, May 1, 2013, world.

dimension defines territory as a space of law and sovereignty, determined by the state's capacity to assert and enforce jurisdictional claims. Finally, the political-technical dimension approaches territory as an object of measurement and regulation, made legible and governable through techniques such as surveying, cartography, and statistical planning.

Applying this framework to the Turkish case reveals how wartime space was produced not through a unified master plan, but through fragmented, reactive interventions driven by geopolitical tension. A defense line built near Istanbul, an emergency law enacted in the capital, a port upgraded in Mersin, an airfield surveyed near İzmir: each of these acts emerged from a different pressure point, involving different actors and calculations. They reflect not a singular territorial vision, but a set of contingent strategies shaped by both internal logic and external demands. British efforts to obtain autonomous control over airbases, for example, directly confronted Turkish assertions of territorial sovereignty. Yet when viewed through the lens of territory as a political technology, these tensions become legible as overlapping configurations of law, infrastructure, and strategic space. Ultimately, it allows us to read the wartime reshaping of Turkey not simply as national policy, but as a complex process of *territorial production*. Sovereignty had to be materialized, fortified, negotiated, drawn, and redrawn, amid ongoing uncertainty. What emerged was a spatial variety animated by defense logics, legal exceptions, and infrastructural improvisations.

Yet if we shift our perspective from the idea of a country to that of territory, as a political technology assembled through calculation, law, and spatial intervention, these operations become legible in new ways. What emerges is not a coherent wartime plan but a set of overlapping territorial configurations: juridical, infrastructural, strategic. Each was animated by distinct pressures, shaped by specific actors, and implemented unevenly across space. Even within the formal borders of a recognized state, territory had to be constituted, defended, and continuously negotiated into existence. This fragmented and reactive mode of spatial governance closely parallels what Deringil describes as the Republic's "balance policy" a strategy of measured engagement, calibrated distance, and flexible sovereignty under external pressure.[33]

2.2. Diplomacy as Spatial Negotiation: Turkey in Second World War

Diplomacy in this period operated through geography. Territory was not a passive backdrop but the field on which foreign relations were defined, contested, and leveraged. Ports, bases, airfields, and corridors entered negotiations as concrete instruments of bargaining. Neutrality was sustained by turning geography into exchange: access could be offered, transit allowed, resources

[33] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Beşinci Basım, Türkiye Araştırmaları (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014).

supplied, or territory adjusted, and each decision reshaped Turkey's position in the war. This is what is meant here by diplomacy as spatial negotiation. Foreign policy gains and pressures materialized through land, sea, and air, and the frontier appeared as the medium where international alignments were tested. Thinking about diplomacy in this way makes visible the spatial logic of neutrality, in which every interaction with the Allies or the Axis required the calculation of what territory could provide and what it must withhold.

The following three parts trace this process across different moments. The late 1930s set the stage, when sovereignty over the Straits was reasserted at Montreux, Hatay was incorporated, and new alignments began to define Turkey's place in a shifting order. These acts created a territorial framework that carried into the war years, when pressure surrounded Turkey from every direction: German expansion in the Balkans, Axis presence in the Aegean, naval confrontations in the Mediterranean, Soviet demands in the Black Sea, and instability across the southern frontier. Each theatre generated demands and opportunities that turned frontiers into bargaining tools. Out of this landscape emerged the strategy of active neutrality, sustained by constant delay and negotiation. Turkey's wartime stance is therefore presented here as a spatially bounded history of the Second World War in and around its territory, where diplomacy unfolded through the continual management of frontiers.

2.2.1. Diplomacy, Caution, Realignment (1935–1939)

The Turkish foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s was primarily characterized by caution, realism, and a steadfast focus on preserving the status quo and the independence achieved in 1923, and with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, reclaiming its sovereignty within its defined borders and a place equal to the Western powers.[34] After almost a decade-long constant warfare, in 1923, Turkey was in a dire state, characterized by depopulation, impoverishment, ruralization and widespread ruins of infrastructure and housing.[35] The need for steady domestic reconstruction, industrial development and overall increase in the well-being of the country, politically and economically, translated into a foreign policy that consolidated its motivation for recovery via confidence and affirmation. However, in an internationally hostile climate of the 1930s, other countries' motivations reshaped foreign relations.

---

[34] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, Rev. ed (I.B. Tauris : [Distributed by St. Martin's Press], 1993), 190–163. Lausanne marked the formal conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence and the international recognition of the Republic's sovereignty and borders. Chosen as a neutral venue after İzmir was rejected, the conference began amid tensions over representation, which the Ankara government resolved by abolishing the sultanate in November 1922. Led by İsmet İnönü, the Turkish delegation faced a patronizing Entente, particularly Lord Curzon, who viewed the talks as a revision of Sèvres. In contrast, Ankara entered negotiations as a victorious power, guided by the National Pact's maximalist vision. Early talks stalled over economic and minority issues, but resumed after Mustafa Kemal's intervention. In the final settlement, Turkey secured modest border gains in Thrace while abandoning claims to Mosul and other contested regions. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir narrated a vivid account of Lausanne Days in his biography of İsmet İnönü (1984). The anniversary of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, had been celebrated in Turkey until the end of 1930s.

[35] Zürcher, *Turkey*, 163–65.

Following the War of Independence and the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey initially pursued a multilateral foreign policy. In the period immediately after Lausanne, the young Republic, still recovering from years of conflict and focused on nation-building, acknowledged the necessity of having good friends. In the direct aftermath of Lausanne, close relations were forged with the Soviet Union, which became Turkey's primary friend. This was based on the good neighborly relations initiated by Lenin and Atatürk. At the same time, Turkey also maintained good relations with the West. Until around 1936-1939, decisions on matters concerning the Soviet Union were made after consulting Moscow's views.[36]

As the 1930s progressed, the international situation began to appear increasingly dangerous. A significant factor driving a shift in Turkey's foreign policy posture in the mid-1930s was the growing anxiety caused by Fascist Italy's aggressive stance and expansionist ambitions in the Mediterranean. Italy's "mare nostrum" policy and the conditioning of young fascists towards imperialist goals increased Turkey's concerns. This was exacerbated by Italy's strengthening of its navy and the fortification of islands in the Dodecanese, particularly Leros. These actions posed a direct threat to Turkey, as Italy had historical claims on parts of Anatolia.[37]

This growing threat led to a crucial realization, the Soviet Union, being primarily a land power without a significant presence in the seas, could not provide the necessary security against a naval power like Fascist Italy in the Mediterranean. To counter Italy's ambitions effectively, Turkey required an ally with an effective naval force. This necessity brought Britain into consideration, and the Turkish-British rapprochement began in 1934. The latter half of the 1930s largely involved Turkey's efforts to reconcile these two "strong friendships" (with the USSR and Britain)[38].

Along with the naval threat, there was a growing awareness of other vulnerabilities, including aerial threats and border security. While military modernization was not the primary focus in the early 1930s, the increasingly tense global situation prompted Turkish statesmen to place greater importance on defense after the mid-1930s.[39] In the years leading up to the Second World War,

---

[36] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 73.

[37] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 6; İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye*, 1. baskı, Birinci Cilt (İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 47–48.

[38] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 70.

[39] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, İletişim Yayınları (İletişim Yayınları, 2013). Tekeli and İlkin narrates one of the most detailed accounts of the prepareparations leading up to the Second World War, Turkey undertook a series of military and institutional reforms aimed at restructuring its defense capabilities and asserting greater territorial control. The separation of the military from direct political involvement marked an early shift, followed by the implementation of the First Supply Plan, which accompanied a deliberate reduction in army size. A national war industry was initiated in Kırıkkale, while the navy was reorganized and efforts began to establish the Gölcük Shipyard. Simultaneously, the air force was expanded with the

Turkey occupied an increasingly precarious position within a rapidly shifting international environment. While officially committed to peace, sovereignty, and non-revisionist/non-expansionist foreign policy under the Kemalist leadership, Ankara found itself increasingly drawn into complex geopolitical maneuverings that would test its capacity to remain outside of future war.[40]

Overall, the Lausanne system had given Turkey formal control over its Anatolian heartland, but left it strategically exposed on multiple fronts. In the 1930s, Turkey occupied a unique crossroads between Europe, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, a position that made it highly sensitive to broader transformations in European power politics. To the north stood the Soviet Union, whose earlier alliance with Ankara in the 1920s had stabilized Turkey's eastern frontier but whose long-term ambitions remained a central strategic concern. To the west, the unraveling of the European security order, the rise of Nazi Germany especially after they went against the Treaty of Versailles, the weakness of the League of Nations, and Italy's growing militarism began to threaten Turkey's western and southern flanks. To the south, British and French mandates dominated the Arab Middle East, placing Turkey near imperial interests whose future was increasingly uncertain.

By 1935, signs of impending conflict were already visible across Europe and the Mediterranean. Adolf Hitler's rearmament of Germany, his withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935) dramatically destabilized the continent's security structure. Italian expansionism introduced new threats to Turkey's southern coastline and maritime routes. Mussolini's ambitions for Mediterranean domination directly threatened Turkey's stance, as Italy's control over the Dodecanese Islands allowed it to project military power uncomfortably close to Turkish territory. In parallel, Turkey's relations with the Western powers were also complex. France and Britain recognized Turkey's stabilizing role in the region but remained cautious about Ankara's alignment. Initial efforts to include Turkey in various security arrangements, such as the 1935 Franco-Soviet Pact or Balkan mutual defense discussions, exposed Ankara to contradictory diplomatic expectations. France, Britain, and the USSR all wished to secure Turkey's cooperation against the growing Axis threat but on differing terms.

---

founding of the Kayseri Aircraft Factory. The army's operational readiness was tested through internal uprisings and military maneuvers. The establishment of the Supreme Defense Council and the launch of the Second Supply Plan further institutionalized military planning. Turkish forces assumed control of the Straits, and the size of the land army increased. Naval power was reinforced with new warships, and an ambitious target of 500 aircraft was set, accompanied by the creation of a dedicated Air War Academy. A Third Supply Plan followed, alongside plans to expand the army from 22 to 30 divisions. To meet logistical needs, programs were launched to strengthen horse breeding. The navy continued efforts to increase its combat capacity, while the air fleet was augmented with Polish aircraft. An Air Defense Command was also established. As war approached, preparations intensified with the formulation of a Fourth Supply Plan, and the emergence of private-sector involvement in arms production and trade.

[40] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 47–48; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 6.

At the same time, the Eastern Question was reconfigured as Turkey faced continuing Soviet strategic weight. Although formal relations between Ankara and Moscow remained cordial in the early 1930s, Turkish leadership never abandoned its underlying concern over Soviet expansionism, especially in relation to the Straits and the Black Sea. The possibility of Soviet pressures on Turkey's eastern and northern borders remained a constant feature of Ankara's strategic calculations. [41]

Turkey's reclamation of sovereign control over the Straits began not in Montreux, but in Geneva. As early as 1935, Turkish diplomats publicly objected to the demilitarized status of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, first imposed by the Lausanne Convention of 1923. Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras submitted an official protest to the League of Nations, stating that the Straits regime placed Turkey under unequal treatment and compromised its capacity for self-defense[42]. This early claim laid the groundwork for what would become one of Turkey's most consequential diplomatic campaigns of the interwar period.

The Montreux Convention, signed in July 1936, marked the culmination of that effort. Negotiated with the full participation of Britain, France, the USSR, and the Balkan states, Montreux granted Turkey full sovereignty and remilitarization rights over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, replacing the internationalized provisions of the Lausanne Straits Convention[43]. Control over the Straits was of immense strategic importance: it limited Soviet naval freedom while reassuring the Western powers that Turkey could secure this critical corridor against Axis encroachment. Montreux significantly elevated Turkey's regional bargaining position and became a cornerstone of Turkish defense policy as war approached. The agreement not only reasserted Turkish territorial control but also institutionalized Turkey's role as guardian of one of the most geopolitically sensitive passages in Europe.

Domestically, the Convention was received as a historic achievement through the public eye as well with the symbolic weight of the resolution. [44] Earlier, Turkey's claims were seen as justified efforts to revise an outdated treaty and the Turkish remilitarization of the straits was framed as "service to the global peace"[45], while later reports celebrated the diplomatic success as a moment

[41] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 72.

[42] "Boğazlar Meselesi, Dış Bakanımız Uluslar Kurumuna Boğazların Askerlikten Tecridi Hususundaki İtirazımızı Bildirdi," *Cumhuriyet*, April 18, 1935.

[43] Tekeli and İlkin, *Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye*, Birinci Cilt, 52–53.

[44] "Boğazlar Mukavelesi Dün Akşam Imzalandı - 13 Yıllık Bir Ayrılıktan Sonra Ebediyete Kadar Sürecek Bir Kavuşma...," *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1936.

[45] "Haricî Siyasetimiz ve Boğazlar – Sulha Hizmet Ederken Kuvvetlenmeği Ihmal Etmiyoruz!," *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1936.

of national reunification. Cumhuriyet described the remilitarization of the Straits as "a permanent reunion after thirteen years of separation" and emphasized the physical return of Turkish troops to the former Ottoman fortifications along the Dardanelles[46]. Dramatic images of artillery units, cavalry columns, and restored coastal defenses reinforced the spatial dimension of this diplomatic gain. Atatürk's leadership was cast in mythic terms: not only had he defended Çanakkale in 1915, but now, as the paper claimed, he had "saved it again" through diplomacy.[47]



Figure 3 Militarization of the Straits on press (*Cumhuriyet*, July 21-22, 1936)

The strategic importance of Montreux Convention would prove itself during the war at several occasions for instance when the foreign minister Saraçoğlu paid an official visit to Moskov, Molotov negotiated the control over straits, Stalin offered a revision of the agreement that claiming rights over the straits such as the passage of warships belonging to non–Black Sea countries through the Straits, in both wartime and peacetime, was made subject to the permission of Turkey and the Soviet Union. These revisions were not accepted by Ankara.[48] In 1944, British officials pressured Ankara to block the passage of suspicious German vessels, arguing that they carried war materials in violation of the Montreux Convention. Tensions escalated when Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu allowed the ships to pass following a personal assurance from Franz von Papen, prompting strong protests from the British and ultimately leading to Menemencioğlu's resignation.[49]

Another major event of the years leading up to the Second World War, the Hatay issue marked one of the most significant diplomatic gains for Turkey in the interwar period and represented the final major act of territorial consolidation following the Treaty of Lausanne. As France

[46] *Cumhuriyet*, "Boğazlar Mukavelesi Dün Akşam Imzalandı - 13 Yıllık Bir Ayrılıktan Sonra Ebediyete Kadar Sürecek Bir Kavuşma..."

[47] "Atatürk Çanakkaleyi Bir Defa Daha Kurtardı - Boğazlar Mukavelesi Bu Gece Törenle Imzalanıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, July 20, 1936.

[48] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 93–94.

[49] Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton Legacy Library, 2015), 261–65.

prepared to end its mandate over Syria in 1936, Ankara moved swiftly to assert its claim over the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay), citing the region's large Turkish population. Through a combination of bilateral pressure, public diplomacy, and strategic use of the Montreux Convention negotiations, Turkey brought the issue to the international stage. Unable to reach an agreement, France and Turkey agreed to submit the matter to the League of Nations. A special commission, heavily influenced by Turkish and British lobbying, drafted a constitution and granted Hatay autonomy under international guarantees. In September 1938, the independent Hatay State was proclaimed, and in June 1939, it officially voted to join Turkey.[50]

The event was framed as the completion of the national map. On the day of the agreement, Cumhuriyet declared: "Hatay is now ours", celebrating it as a long-awaited reunification. Phrases such as "Hatay joined the motherland" conveyed both territorial and emotional closure[51]. The front-page combined imagery of official ceremonies and diplomatic signatures with language emphasizing sovereignty, unity, and strategic resolve. The Turkish French joint declaration reaffirmed mutual cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean, casting Hatay's return as not just a national gain but part of a broader geopolitical alignment. Resolved without armed conflict, the Hatay issue demonstrated how legal argumentation, public diplomacy, and emotional territorialism could be mobilized to redraw borders. By 1939, Hatay and İskenderun had not only joined the map of the Republic but also emerged as key logistical nodes, soon to become some of the busiest sites in wartime transport and naval planning.

Throughout the 1930s, Turkey also sought to secure its western frontier through regional diplomacy. The Balkan Entente Pact of 1934, signed with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania, provided a limited regional defense arrangement aimed at mutual guarantees in the face of Italian and German expansionism[52]. The Balkan Pact had provided Turkey with a degree of security along its western borders, but it offered no guarantees against potential threats from the east. In the early Republican period, Turkey sought to establish bilateral relations with its eastern neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, aiming to form a ring of friendly states similar to its efforts in the Balkans. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 was interpreted in Ankara as the beginning of fascist expansionism, prompting renewed interest in eastern alignments. On 2 October 1935, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq initialed a tripartite agreement, later joined by Afghanistan.

[50] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 61–62.

[51] "Hatay Artık Bizimdir - Fransa Ile Varılan Anlaşma Dün Ankarada Büyük Bir Merasimle Imza Edildi.," *Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1939.

[52] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 49.

However, the treaty's ratification was delayed due to ongoing border disputes between Iran and Iraq. The Sadabad Pakt was eventually signed on 8 July 1937 at the Sadabad Palace in Tehran.[53]

British and French diplomacy simultaneously sought to bring Turkey closer to their emerging anti-Axis coalitions in the late 1930s. Yet Turkey's leadership resisted premature alignment, preferring to maintain diplomatic flexibility while expanding defensive preparations. This cautious diplomacy allowed Ankara to delay full alignment until the outbreak of war, preserving room for maneuver during the rapidly deteriorating European situation.[54]



Figure 4. Balkan Pact in illustrations (*Cumhuriyet*. May 15, 1935; *Akbaba,*. July,1936; December, 1940.)

Eventually, The Turkish-British Joint Declaration (May 12, 1939) and the Turkish-French Joint Declaration (June 23, 1939) were announced. The motivation behind these agreements was captured clearly in Prime Minister Refik Saydam's address[55] to Parliament: "Your government has found the most effective way to keep the nation away from the calamity of war, by taking war into account and working jointly in the pursuit of peace." These declarations expressed the intention for mutual assistance in the event of war in the Mediterranean. Germany expressed its displeasure by halting a credit agreement and not extending a trade agreement that expired on September 1, 1939. The Tripartite Agreement of Mutual Assistance (Turkey, Britain, and France) was signed on October 19, 1939[56]. This occurred shortly after Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, officially marking the beginning of World War II. This agreement, which included a military component signed by top military officials like General Weygand, General A.P.

---

[53] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 50.

[54] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 77.

[55] "Türk - İngiliz Anlaşması: İtilaf Dün Ankarada Büyük Millet Meclisinde Doktor Refik Saydam ve Londrada Avam Kamarasında Çemberlayn Tarafından Ilan Olundu," sec. 302, *Cumhuriyet*, September 13, 1939.

[56] "Türk - İngiliz - Fransız İttifakı - Üç Devlet Arasında Yapılan Muahade Dün Akşam İmzalandı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1939.

Wavell, and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, committed Turkey to assist Britain and France if aggression in Europe led to war in the Mediterranean, or in defense of Greece or Romania[57]. This expectation was particularly strong on the British side, who hoped that a German invasion of Greece would compel Turkey to enter the war directly. For much of the early war years, British strategy centered on enlisting Turkey as a combatant power, primarily due to its potential to provide a large number of ground troops. However, by 1943, this expectation had shifted. Turkey's strategic value was increasingly understood in terms of geography rather than manpower. Allied planners came to see Turkish territory less as a source of combat forces and more as a logistical and aerial platform, suitable for air bases, supply routes, and broader operational support in the eastern Mediterranean theater.[58]

2.2.1.1. Military and Industry Capacity

Besides complex, often untrustworthy foreign relations, one of the most valid reasons why Turkey maintain a stance of neutrality was that the nation was unprepared for a total war both in its military and civilian capacity, which was also tied to the industrial inadequacies. The Turkish leadership, particularly İsmet İnönü, recognized that the severe limitations made staying out of the conflict the only viable path for national survival. The country's industrial base was at a primitive level, directly translating into an inability to wage technological warfare and implement adequate defense measures. This limited economic potential was undeniable, making it impossible to conceal the nation's deficiencies in a modern conflict. Furthermore, existing industrial and energy production facilities were highly vulnerable to immediate destruction. The Karabük iron and steel facilities, crucial for heavy industry, were not even expected to commence production until 1939.[59]

Despite a historical emphasis on defense and security since the establishment of the Republic, Deringil argues that there were clear indications after 1923 that the Turkish populace was weary of war, leading to a shift in focus from military matters to economic reconstruction. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself aimed to move the country away from a constant state of siege, advocating for an "economy state" rather than a "conqueror state"[60]. By the 1930s, the defense minister no longer held the top position in the "minister pyramid," suggesting that military modernization was not a primary concern, despite maintaining a large standing army. Even with increased attention to defense in the mid-1930s due to escalating European tensions, the Turkish army remained "very primitive compared to European standards," an English ambassador reported in

[57] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 75–77.

[58] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 77.

[59] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 37.

[60] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 31.

1937 that the armament policy was "far from complete". By 1938, the armed forces were "generally equipped with World War I weapons".[61]

Deringil summarizes the situation by giving stark examples, claiming Turkey's military infrastructure was riddled with deep-rooted logistical and organizational inadequacies that rendered it unfit for modern combat, despite efforts at surface-level modernization. Transport and logistics were among the most visible weaknesses: the army's motorized mobility depended on a dysfunctional fleet of decrepit trucks (remarkably, of 28 different brands) while even necessities like feed for draft animals were difficult to obtain. The railway network was inadequate, with only a single, single-track railway crossing the country from east to west, leading to significant losses in the agility and speed of troop deployment during mobilization. Communication systems were equally insufficient.

These extensive shortcomings meant that Turkey would be "deprived of modern warfare necessities within a few weeks" if it engaged in war. Fuel storage tanks, even if full, could only last a week or less in wartime. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir summarized his observations by stating that the country was "weak and inadequate in almost every aspect" when faced with the possibility of war. The natural structure of Thrace was not suitable for defense against a mechanized attack, and the defense line there would only be sufficient for a delaying action, meaning Turkey risked losing a significant portion of its population and its largest city in the early days of a war. These military shortcomings, while sometimes used as a stalling tactic against British pressure, reflected genuine and sincere concerns among Turkish statesmen about the country's defense capabilities.

Cited often by Deringil and Weisband as well, Barbara Ward, in her book Turkey, published during the war in 1942, finalizes her assessment on Turkey's military and industrial capacity in light of War with these sentences:

> "Turkey is quite inadequately equipped for modern war. She must rely completely upon a powerful, industrialized ally. If she cannot rely on such an ally, she cannot hope to fight with very much more success than Holland or Yugoslavia. This radical insufficiency of arms and war material must be remembered whenever Turkey's foreign policy comes up for discussion."[62]

Her insights would be proven accurate in the following years of War, especially during Turkish-British negotiations on military aid to Turkey. The economic burden of defense was substantial, with defense expenditures constituting the largest item in the budget in 1938, amounting to

---

[61] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 30–31.

[62] Barbara Ward, *Turkey*, The World Today (Oxford University Press, 1942), 90.

108,995,000 Turkish Liras, or 43% of total state revenues[63]. This led to a significant increase in total state expenditures, underscoring Turkey's growing perception of a distant peace and its focus on security. However, Turkish officials struggled with financing large military orders.



Figure 5 The Thrace Maneuvers (*Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1937)

Yet the visibility of the army in public life did not decline. On the contrary, its symbolic presence intensified. Regularly staged parades, publicized training exercises, and theatrical maneuvers kept the military at the center of national spectacle. Headlines proclaimed "*Kahraman ordumuz bugün her zamankinden çok daha kuvvetlidir*" ("Today our heroic army is stronger than ever"), pairing triumphalist language with imagery of infantry drills, cavalry charges, and artillery lines[64]. The large-scale Thrace[65] and Eagen[66] maneuvers were presented as national events, covered across multiple days with detailed battle-style reporting and patriotic illustrations. Beyond the page, they were also turned into films "national, honorable films," as one ad declared, screened in

[63] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 36.

[64] "Mötörleşen Ordu," *Cumhuriyet*, August 14, 1936.

[65] "Büyük Ordu Manevraları Bugün Başlıyor: Atatürk Dün Gece Hususî Trenle Trakyaya Hareket Etti, Başvekilimiz Büyük Şefe Refakat Ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1937.

[66] "Manevra Sahasında - Atatürk Bu Sabahtan Itibaren Harekâtı Takibe Başlıyorlar," *Cumhuriyet*, October 7, 1937.

Istanbul cinemas to rally public morale and project the might of a modernized, mechanized force[67]. One image captures a camera crew filming Atatürk and military commanders at a maneuver site, underscoring how spectacle was deliberately constructed. [68]



Figure 6 Filming and screening the Aegean Maneuvers (*Cumhuriyet*, November 11,1, 1937)

These representations functioned as instruments of reassurance. Through repetition, visual display, and patriotic language, they reinforced the army's role as a stabilizing presence in public life. Regardless of its material limitations, the military occupied a central position in the symbolic architecture of the Republic. It appeared as organized, mobile, and resolute, a figure of national strength woven into everyday narratives of protection and state continuity, against the landscape of news of an upcoming world war. According to Weisband, Turkey's economic dependency on Germany was a significant concern for Turkish policymakers, who saw it as a potential threat to their political independence. This dependency was primarily a result of Hjalmar Schacht's "New Plan" for German economic ascendancy, which utilized a "clearing" (barter) system.[69] This system allowed countries to trade goods without using scarce foreign exchange currencies, making it attractive for Turkey to sell its raw materials and agricultural products in exchange for German finished goods.

Germany's dominance in trade figures were substantial by 1936, a full 51% of Turkey's total exports went to Germany, and 45.1% of its total imports came from Germany. This trend continued, and by 1938, Germany accounted for 46.9% of Turkey's total imports and 42.9% of its total exports, significantly more than trade with Britain or the United States.[70] This dominance in trade was not by chance but the result of deliberate German efforts, due to "the usual Nazi methods of economic penetration."[71]

---

[67] "Türk Kahramanlığının Büyük Delilini Ege Manevraları Filminde Göreceksiniz," *Cumhuriyet*, November 1, 1937.

[68] "Son Manevralarda Vücuda Getirilen Büyük Film," *Cumhuriyet*, November 11, 1937.

[69] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 98–99.

[70] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 96.

[71] Ward, *Turkey*, 91.

Germany provided Turkey with critical industrial and logistical materials, such as construction-grade iron and steel, refined copper, a range of vehicles and engines, heavy equipment, tires, rubber goods, glass, newsprint, and pharmaceuticals. In exchange, Turkey largely exported agricultural goods which Germany was often willing to purchase at prices far exceeding global market rates.[72] However, Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, became increasingly wary of the risks posed by this one-sided economic dependency. By 1939, concerns emerged that such a trade imbalance might undermine Turkey's ability to maintain political flexibility and pursue an autonomous foreign policy. Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu openly argued that no nation could claim to have an independent foreign policy if the bulk of its external trade was concentrated with a single partner, regardless of political alignment.[73]

Despite Turkish efforts to diversify trade during the war, economic exchanges with Germany fluctuated significantly. In 1943, Turkish exports to Germany remained substantial, largely because Germany offered extremely high prices and maintained control over key trade routes. Turkey, committed to fulfilling its existing agreements, remained formally loyal to its obligations, especially under the guidance of Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, who conducted relentless negotiations to get maximum benefit for Turkey, particularly in the case of chromite, a strategically vital resource. Although Turkey initially withheld chromite exports to Germany due to commitments made to Britain, it later complied with the terms of the Clodius Agreements (signed in October 1941 and April 1943), which authorized shipments in return for military supplies and industrial goods.[74] In response, the Allies launched proactive purchasing campaigns aimed at diverting Turkish exports away from Germany. Yet, as Edward Weisband argues, these efforts were largely ineffective. Turkey fulfilled its contractual obligations to both sides, and it was often Germany's own logistical failures, such as not delivering agreed-upon goods, that more directly shortened access to Turkish chromite, rather than Allied interference.[75]

In the early hours of March 31, 1944, a Turkish freighter named Krom, loaded with military-grade chromite was on the road from Istanbul to Alexandria, was torpedoed off the coast of Marmaris by an unidentified submarine.[76] The attack sank the 3,500-ton ship in just ten minutes. Most of the 43 crew members survived by jumping overboard; casualties were minimal but the symbolic and political impact was immediate. On April 1, Cumhuriyet reported the incident with alarm, quoting strong condemnations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and noting that a formal

[72] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 96.

[73] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 100.

[74] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 104–5.

[75] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 105.

[76] "Krom Şilepi Torpillendi / Gemiyi Meçhul Bir Denizaltı Karasularımızda Torpilledi / Hariciye Vekilinin Mecliste Izahatı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 1944.

protest would follow once the nationality of the submarine was confirmed. By the following day, Turkish authorities had dispatched a technical and military delegation to the site of the sinking to recover the torpedo remains. The aim was forensic clarity: to determine the submarine's country of origin through identifiable parts. Germany quickly denied any responsibility, insisting that "this submarine is not ours."[77]

In the weeks that followed, diplomatic pressure from the Allies intensified, particularly in the form of British and American demands to halt exports to Germany. Turkish officials, who had previously maintained that economic sovereignty could be managed through balanced trade, now faced the impossibility of such equilibrium. The chromite trade, once a lever of non-alignment, became a liability. On April 20, the government formally suspended all chromite exports to Axis countries. The decision was announced not as a capitulation but as a recalibration that responded to shifting global circumstances while preserving Turkey's political dignity. Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu underscored that the decision was made not as a neutral party, but "as if we were an Allied power," signaling a deliberate if still ambivalent reorientation[78].


Arkası Sahife 3. Sü. 5 te — | binlerce Fransızın
şikâyet etmiştir.
Numune, O. M. Kemal, Sa. 486.

Almanyaya sevki durdurulan kromlar

Memleketimizden Almanyaya yapılan krom ihracatı evvelki akşamdan itibaren fiilen durmuştur. Yukarıki resimler, İstanbuldan şimdiye kadar yapılan krom sevkiyatı alâ intıbalardır.

Sağda: Mavnalarla Ahırkapıdaki hususi istasyona getirilen krom tahliye ediliyor, ortada: Vagonlara doldurulmuş krom, solda: Ahırkapı civarında toplanan madenler açıkta bekliyor.

Figure 7. Report on halted chromium shipments to Germany (*Cumhuriyet*, April 23, 1944)

Photographs from Istanbul's Ahırkapı port made the policy shift visible. Shipments of chromite, once part of a carefully managed export corridor, now sat inert: stacked ore, paused railcars, half-loaded barges.[79] The suspension of trade was no longer just a diplomatic move; it had a spatial and logistical footprint. Chromite, previously circulated as a symbol of neutral pragmatism, now

[77] "Krom Şilepinin Battığı Yere Bir Heyet Gidiyor / Almanlar 'Bu Denizaltı Bizim Değildir' Diyorlar," *Cumhuriyet*, April 2, 1944.

[78] "Krom Hakkında Verdiğimiz Karar," *Cumhuriyet*, April 21, 1944.

[79] "Almanyaya Sevki Durdurulan Kromlar," *Cumhuriyet*, April 23, 1944.

appeared as stalled matter, marked by the interruption of both movement and strategy, until the government clarified that shipments to Allied countries would resume.[80]

Between 1923 and 1939, Turkish foreign policy was shaped by strategic caution, infrastructural limitation, and the pursuit of full territorial sovereignty. The Republic navigated complex relations with both the Soviet Union and Western powers, achieving two major diplomatic gains: the Montreux Convention, which restored control over the Straits, and the annexation of Hatay, which finalized the country's borders. While external threats grew, particularly from Fascist Italy and an increasingly unstable Europe, Turkey's leadership maintained a policy of non-alignment, reinforced by regional pacts and bilateral negotiations. At the same time, deep deficiencies in military capacity, industrial production, and logistical coordination constrained any possibility of entering a modern war on equal terms. Economic dependency on Germany further complicated Ankara's diplomatic options, despite attempts at diversification. By the end of the 1930s, Turkey had consolidated its geopolitical position through diplomacy rather than force. Yet this consolidation remained fragile. Its success depended on maintaining neutrality while managing competing demands from Axis and Allied powers. As global war broke out, Turkey entered the 1940s surrounded by conflict, with limited capacity but high strategic, geopolitical value, a position that would define its wartime diplomacy.

2.2.2. Surrounded by the War: Regional Geopolitics During WW2 (1939-1945)

For Turkey, the outbreak of the Second World War did not manifest as a single, clear event, but rather as an unfolding spatial condition that gradually transformed its entire periphery into a zone of military and diplomatic tension. Every regional frontier, west, north, east, and south, became militarized, contested, and deeply entangled in the rivalries of great powers. The war produced for Turkey a form of geopolitical encirclement, forcing Ankara into a continuous process of spatial management, military repositioning, and foreign policy calculation to maintain its precarious neutrality.

This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive narrative of the Second World War in general, nor for Turkey[81]. Instead, it focuses on Turkey's wartime experience through a spatial

[80] "Müttefiklerimize Krom Vermeğe Devam Edeceğiz," *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 1944.

[81] As will become evident throughout this study, the most comprehensive accounts of Turkey during the Second World War are found in the three-volume series *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi* by İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin. For foreign policy, Edward Weisband's *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (1975) and Selim Deringil's *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality* (1994) offer foundational frameworks built on diverse archival sources. On the internal dynamics of the era, critical insights come from biographies of İsmet İnönü and works chronicling the "National Chief" period, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's *İkinci Adam* and Cemil Koçak's *Milli Şef Dönemi*. For everyday life under wartime conditions, the works of Murat Metinsoy and Bülent Bakar are particularly valuable. While this thesis does not focus on the Wealth Tax, the analyses of Ayhan Aktar and Cahit Kayra provide crucial understandings of the economic and political pressures of the time. Sinan Niyazioğlu's *İroni ve Gerilim* stands out as a visually rich, underappreciated contribution. An especially rare and illuminating source has been *Burhan*

and territorial lens. The aim is to reconstruct how each border, its terrain, infrastructure, and positional value, was drawn into shifting diplomatic pressures, military requests, and strategic assessments. Rather than a chronological account, the section proceeds through a series of regional snapshots, each highlighting how wartime developments redefined the function and meaning of Turkey's land. What emerges is a story of a terrain becoming a political actor: mountains as buffers, coastlines as corridors, and airfields as bargaining chips. This is a brief spatial history of war from both the margins of the War and Turkey, where neutrality demanded as much calculation as prolongment.

2.2.2.1. The Balkans, Thrace and Straits

During the Second World War, the Balkans became a rapidly shifting theater of occupation, resistance, and great power intervention. The region was marked by early and aggressive Axis expansion, followed by a gradual Soviet military advance, both of which reshaped the political and territorial configuration of southeastern Europe by the end of the war. For Turkey, which maintained an official position of neutrality until 1945, the destabilization of the Balkan Peninsula produced both immediate security concern and actions together with longer-term strategic dilemmas. 1941 was the year in which the pressures and complexities of foreign maneuvers and relationships had reached the highest level, when Germany invaded Yugoslavia and Greece in April, following the earlier Axis alignments of Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. These invasions were swift and brutal, with Belgrade heavily bombed and Athens occupied within weeks. German control extended across the peninsula, while Italy and Bulgaria also administered portions of occupied territory. Widespread atrocities, forced labor, and population displacement defined occupation regimes.

By March 1941, German troops were stationed throughout Bulgaria, directly adjacent to Turkey's Thracian frontier. Turkish military planning responded by reinforcing defensive positions along the western border. The Çatalca Line, was constructed together with deployment of troops; also, the emergency state law was announced for the Thrace region and İstanbul.[82] The high command prepared evacuation, and destruction plans for critical bridges and infrastructure to impede any rapid Axis advance across Thrace.[83]

Diplomatic exchanges with Germany aimed to preserve neutrality while signaling Turkish resolve. In March 1941, Hitler assured İnönü himself with a letter that German forces in Bulgaria

Belge'nin Sesiyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı (Radyo Konferansları), which offered a contemporaneous, external perspective that proved invaluable in reconstructing the atmosphere of the war years. Numerous other theses and articles on Turkey and the Second World War will be cited where relevant throughout the text.

[82] All to be discussed in detail in the following part of this chapter.

[83] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 41.

would maintain a distance of 60 kilometers from the Turkish frontier to prevent accidental confrontations: "I have ordered that German troop divisions marching into Bulgaria remain so far away from Turkish borders that no stray shots will be fired".[84] While German officials emphasized the defensive character of their presence, Ankara regarded the proximity of German divisions as a sustained threat to territorial security. At the same time, British diplomacy sought to pull Turkey into a coordinated defense of the Balkans. Allied requests for joint military planning were repeatedly rejected in Ankara, as entry into the war was seen as carrying the risk of a rapid German incursion across the vulnerable western frontier. Churchill himself asked İnönü to allow airfields for the use of British forces, İnönü refused on the grounds that infiltration of experts who would build the airports would mean getting into the war which would also provoke Nazi forces to attack Turkey.

Bulgaria's formal alignment with the Axis in March 1941 added further complications. Although a Turkish-Bulgarian non-aggression pact had been signed only weeks earlier, Bulgaria's military cooperation with Germany transformed it into a logistical corridor for Axis operations. With the complete occupation of the Balkan states, the military infrastructure and supply lines of the Axis now extended continuously from Central Europe to Turkey's western gates. By mid-1941, Turkey's European flank was entirely exposed to the Axis military sphere, transforming Thrace from a peripheral border zone into a fully militarized and diplomatically sensitive frontier.

By early 1942, Turkish force deployment in Thrace was substantial. The defense was organized around six corps, fielding a total of 17 infantry divisions and supported by armored brigades positioned near Lüleburgaz. Forward delay units were stationed in Edirne and Kırklareli to slow any German penetration from Bulgaria, while Istanbul was further secured by defensive corps positioned along both shores of the Bosphorus[85]. Throughout 1940–41, British military planners strongly encouraged Turkey to allow the stationing of Allied forces in Thrace to deter possible Axis aggression. These proposals were repeatedly rejected by Ankara, which feared that the arrival of foreign troops might provide Germany with a pretext for immediate invasion.

The Straits themselves remained a focal point of strategic competition. Under the Montreux Convention of 1936, Turkey retained full sovereignty and the right to militarize the Straits, while wartime transit for belligerent warships was strictly limited. Both Germany and the Allies were fully aware of the critical importance of this maritime corridor. For the Germans, control of the Straits would have opened direct maritime routes into the Black Sea, especially for accessing

[84] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 40.

[85] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 454.

Caucasian oil. For the British and Americans, Turkish control over the Straits remained a key factor in protecting Middle Eastern sea lines and containing Soviet influence in the region.

2.2.2.2. The Aegean and Greek Connection: The Maritime Threshold

Following the rapid occupation of the Balkans in 1941, the Axis extended its military control directly into mainland Greece and the Aegean Sea. After the German invasion in April 1941, mainland Greece was brought under joint German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation, eliminating the last independent state directly west of Turkey's border. German and Italian forces extended their reach to the Aegean islands, transforming them into forward bases for Axis naval and air operations. The Dodecanese Islands, already held by Italy since 1912, became fully militarized.[86] In 1943, after Italy's capitulation, German forces seized control of Rhodes, Kos, Leros, and Samos, defeating limited British attempts to hold these islands.[87] The German presence placed Turkish Aegean ports and shipping routes under immediate threat.

Despite maintaining formal neutrality, Turkey played a limited but important role in facilitating British operations in the Aegean. Although, Turkey declined the British request of using air bases, Ankara quietly permitted Allied use of Turkish ports, such as Kuşadası and Bodrum, for logistical supply routes to British garrisons on Samos and Leros. Turkish crews operated small vessels to transport military supplies, food, and evacuating personnel. Between September and November 1943, approximately 3,000 tons of supplies reached Allied forces through Turkish assistance, before the German occupation of the islands forced a full British withdrawal.[88]

At the same time, British intelligence and military planning continued to explore scenarios involving Turkish participation in Aegean operations. Churchill personally advocated for increased Allied presence in the eastern Mediterranean as a mechanism to pressure Turkey into entering the war. In 1943, British planners considered seizing Rhodes and the Dodecanese not only to weaken German hold over the Aegean, but also to strengthen British diplomatic leverage in Ankara. Churchill reasoned that British military gains in the region could serve as an argument for Turkish alignment, though these efforts ultimately failed after British operations faltered in late 1943.[89]

---

[86] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 191.

[87] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 287–88.

[88] Tekeli and İlkin, *Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye*, Birinci Cilt, 289.

[89] Tekeli and İlkin, *Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye*, Birinci Cilt, 290.

While Germany solidified its military grip over Greece and the Aegean islands, Ankara carefully avoided any direct entanglement. Turkish leaders remained highly sensitive to any escalation that might trigger either German reprisals or broader Soviet interest in Aegean regional affairs. In public discourse, Turkish commentators stressed the importance of Graeco-Turkish solidarity, while simultaneously emphasizing the need to preserve Turkey's neutrality until conditions more securely favored Allied victory.

Refugee flows from Greece added another layer of political coordination between Turkey and the exiled Greek government. Throughout the occupation, waves of Greek civilians and Italian soldiers sought refuge along the Turkish coastline, creating both humanitarian challenges and discreet channels of contact between Ankara and Greek resistance representative. According to Esra Danacıoğlu, between 1941 and 1944, over 42,000 individuals, mostly Greek civilians and Italian military personnel, crossed the Aegean and sought refuge along Turkey's southwestern coast. These movements, driven by the German occupation, famine, and shifting control of the Dodecanese, transformed Turkey's coastal towns into a porous humanitarian and strategic frontier. She further argues that this largely overlooked history could only be explained by "a social aneurysm" a rupture left outside both Turkish and Greek national narratives[90].

Three major waves shaped the geography of displacement: the initial German advance in 1941; the famine-induced crossings of 1942; and the refugee surge following Italy's 1943 surrender. Entry points spanned from Çeşme, Kuşadası, Bodrum, Marmaris, and Söke to lesser-known coves such as Bozukkale and Kabağaç. In one peak month, over 8,800 people arrived. Refugees included not only civilians but Turkish returnees, British officers, and stateless Jews[91]. The Turkish response was ad hoc but increasingly systematized: legal gaps were addressed with a special law in August 1941 regulating the status of foreign military refugees. Refugee camps emerged as tools of containment and classification. Military personnel were interned in Niğde and Bergama, housing 1,625 and 1,832 Greek soldiers respectively, under strict provisioning and payroll structures. Civilian groups were settled in available homes, shops, and tent encampments. Çeşme hosted a critical node, where over 6,700 refugees were accommodated, including in a 120-tent camp in Ilıca. Kuşadası, Aydın, İzmir, and Muğla served as key redistribution centers, with the *İskân Umum Müdürlüğü* coordinating eventual repatriations. A unique registry from Kuşadası, complete with photographs and occupational data, shows the bureaucratic depth of these spatial arrangements[92].

[90] Esra Danacıoğlu Tamur, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Ege Kıyılarına Sığınan Yunanlılar," *Bilgi ve Bellek* 3, no. 6 (2006): 188–201.

[91] Danacıoğlu Tamur, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Ege Kıyılarına Sığınan Yunanlılar," 199.

[92] Danacıoğlu Tamur, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Ege Kıyılarına Sığınan Yunanlılar," 192–96.

Tahsin İşbilen's documentary *Asia Minor... Again* provides compelling testimony on the spatial dynamics of refugee arrival and settlement in wartime Turkey.[93] Individuals recall crossing by night into coves such as Kanapiça, where Turkish guard huts marked the threshold of arrival, and ports like Kuşadası were so crowded that boats filled the port entirely. Refugees were transported inland from Kuşadası to Selçuk by truck, then onward to İzmir by train, tracing a state-managed corridor that stitched together coastal arrival points with inland redistribution sites. Camps were set up in military barracks in Bergama, where some preferred sleeping in tents over infested dormitories, while others were placed in Ilıca's abandoned homes and tent clusters. One recalled twenty people sharing a space designed for a single family. These informal arrangements extended into rural hospitality: civilians were absorbed into private homes, customs zones, and even makeshift burial grounds, as locals were tasked with burying those who died on the way. Across these accounts, the Aegean coast emerges not only as a border but as a layered landscape of arrival, containment, movement, and encounter, where geography, logistics, and emotion interlocked under the pressures of war. By 1945, as Allied demands shifted, Turkey tightened its intake. The Foreign Ministry ceased accepting new arrivals and facilitated returns, reportedly repatriating 95% of Dodecanese refugees by year's end.[94] Yet for several years (in many ways still today), these coastal sites functioned as logistical and humanitarian corridors.

While civilian accounts emphasize humanitarian experience, military archives provide a spatialized and bureaucratic map of containment. A General Staff map dated 1 April 1942 identifies seven refugee camps distributed across western and central Anatolia, located in Ankara (53), Yozgat (105), Isparta (103), Erdek (251), Niğde (4), Sivas (1), Adana (4) with 521 refugees in total[95]. These sites are color-coded by nationality, reflecting the diverse and militarily significant makeup of wartime arrivals: Germans, Italians, Germans, Bulgarians, Russians, British, French, Greek, Iranian and Spanish, many of whom were former soldiers or escapees. A second map from 15 July 1942 refines this geography, listing precise counts of refugees in key provinces this time the total number reaching to 688[96].

Many of these individuals were held in closed camps such as Tefenni and only later reclassified as legal refugees in early 1944 before being deported in accordance with international law[97]. Together, these military maps illustrate how wartime displacement was not only humanitarian

[93] *Asya Minör Yeniden*, directed by Tahsin İşbilen, 2009.

[94] Danacıoğlu Tamur, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Ege Kıyılarına Sığınan Yunanlılar."

[95] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 30.

[96] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 31.

[97] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 638.

but geopolitical, with the refugee body treated as a securitized figure within a spatial regime of control, dispersal, and eventual return.

2.2.2.3. The Mediterranean Theatre: Southern Maritime Exposure

As mentioned above, Turkey's southern maritime frontier became increasingly vulnerable during WW2 due to the strategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean. Italy's military presence in the Dodecanese Islands, especially through air bases on Rhodes, posed a direct threat to southwestern Turkey. After Mussolini's fall in 1943, Germany took over the islands, further expanding Axis military reach in the region and intensifying pressure on Turkey.

British forces maintained key strategic bases in Cyprus and Egypt, which served as logistical and intelligence hubs for Allied operations across the Middle East and North Africa. For example, The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was a British organization formed during the War with the core mission of conducting **s**abotage, illegal political activities (including bribery), and subversive propaganda in enemy and enemy-occupied countries. It emerged as a response to perceived deficiencies in existing British intelligence agencies and as a means to execute covert operations. Its existence was kept secret from the public until after the war. SOE's Middle East headquarters was located in Cairo, with its operational scope extending to a wide region including Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Balkans. SOE established a undercover presence in Istanbul, even maintaining an office overlooking the German Consulate's garden. Initially, SOE's Section D operations in the Balkans were transferred to Istanbul as Nazi control expanded in those countries. SOE staff sometimes operated under diplomatic cover, such as within the "Shipping Department" of the British Embassy.[98]

These installations were central to British war planning and figured heavily in Allied diplomatic discussions with Turkey, especially as the Mediterranean campaign shifted momentum in 1942 following the Allied victory at El Alamein. Throughout 1942 and 1943, both Britain and the United States applied sustained pressure on Turkey to join the Allied war effort. British planners, led by Churchill, hoped that Turkey's entry would secure the eastern Mediterranean flank, provide airfields for operations against the Balkans, and facilitate broader Allied strategic access to Southeastern Europe. At the Adana Conference of January 1943, Churchill personally proposed a gradual military integration plan, including the provision of air defense, equipment, and coordinated Balkan operations, designed to ease Turkey into active participation.

[98] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 550–53.

The Adana Conference was one of the most prominent events of the War from Turkey's perspective, both sides came with firm but completely opposite motivations to the meeting. According to Weisband, İnönü stated that his visit to Adana had two purposes: to caution Churchill about the potential Soviet threat after the war and to push for faster delivery of military supplies promised to Turkey. Churchill, in contrast, attended the meeting with the goal of persuading İnönü that the moment had arrived for Turkey to enter the war.[99] Which turned the meeting into a "dialogue of the deaf" both sides speaking in total opposition. Deringil states that The Adana Conference produced only one concrete outcome: the so-called "Adana Lists," which detailed the military supplies to be sent to Turkey[100]. Ironically, while the British had intended this aid as a means to bring Turkey into the war, it ultimately laid the groundwork for a strategy that helped Turkey remain out of it[101]. Because Turkey then had the leverage to insist on full shipment and then denied entry before their arrival.

By late 1943, Allied frustration with Turkish caution intensified. At the Cairo[102] and Tehran[103] conferences, British, American, and Soviet leaders debated increasingly direct ultimatums to pressure Turkey into the war. Nonetheless, Turkey maintained its policy of conditional neutrality, tying any future entry to specific military preparations, guaranteed material support, and coordinated Allied operations in the Balkans.

Thus, despite the shifting strategic balance in the Mediterranean, Turkey succeeded in maintaining its cautious neutrality throughout this phase, navigating between Allied expectations and Axis threats while carefully preserving its territorial integrity.

2.2.2.4. Turmoil in the South and the East: Syria, Iraq and Iran

The southern frontier of Turkey was shaped by the evolving situation in Iraq, Syria, and the broader Middle East throughout the war, exposing Ankara to overlapping British, German, and regional pressures. Iraq remained a crucial zone of concern. Despite formal British control under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, the country witnessed increasing pro-German sentiment, culminating in the 1941 coup led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. The Rashid Ali regime sought Axis support and allowed German aircraft to land in Iraq, posing a direct threat to British communications in the region. Since the only viable route for such support was through Turkish territory, Germany began pushing for the transfer of military supplies via Turkey. In return for

[99] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 196.

[100] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 195.

[101] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 198.

[102] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 225–56.

[103] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 221–25.

transit permission, Germany expressed its willingness to agree to border adjustments in Thrace, a concession that would be outlined in a secret protocol.[104]

In Syria, the Vichy French administration initially maintained its mandate after France's fall in 1940. The region became strategically volatile as the Axis sought to use Syrian airfields and supply routes to support German operations in Iraq. British and Free French forces launched Operation Exporter in June 1941, occupying Syria and Lebanon and thereby eliminating Axis access to these territories. The fall of Vichy control over Syria directly secured Turkey's southern border, reducing the immediate Axis threat but introducing long-term complications regarding the French position in the Levant.[105] For Turkey, Syria remained intimately linked to the Hatay issue. The annexation of Hatay in 1939, formalized after prolonged negotiations with France and League of Nations mediation, was a significant territorial gain that continued to sensitize Ankara to French-Syrian developments.

In parallel, Turkey initiated significant military reinforcements in Southeastern Anatolia. The Turkish General Staff concentrated additional forces in the Diyarbakır-Gaziantep-Mardin triangle, establishing strongpoints and logistical lines to defend against possible Axis or regional destabilization. In November 1940, for instance, the British developed two proposals to enable direct military supply deliveries to Turkey via Iraq. The first involved building a railway from Diyarbakır to Cizre and on to Mosul, estimated to take two years to complete. The second option was the construction of a road linking Diyarbakır, Darnaklı, Zaho, and Mosul, which could be finished within six months. Turkey opposed the road project, favoring the railway instead. Ultimately, neither plan was implemented.[106]

In the east, another worrying development for Turkey was in 1941, The Allied occupation of Iran in August 1941 alarmed Turkish leaders. Although Britain and the Soviet Union justified the invasion as necessary for securing supply lines against Germany, Turkish media and officials condemned it as illegal aggression. Assurances from Allied diplomats about respecting Turkish sovereignty were met with skepticism, and British records acknowledged Ankara's growing distrust. Fears mounted that Iran's occupation could set a precedent, raising concerns that Turkey might face similar demands or military incursions. These anxieties were reinforced by reports of Soviet-backed separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan and by German propaganda drawing parallels between Turkey and Iran. Strategically, the risk of Axis control in Iran threatened to isolate Turkey from British forces in the Middle East. Though Turkey briefly explored opening a supply

[104] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 196.

[105] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 155–56.

[106] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 440.

route to Iran, Soviet opposition halted the effort. For İnönü and Menemencioğlu, Iran's fate underscored the importance of preserving Turkish neutrality and avoiding any scenario that might lead to foreign occupation or division.[107]

This southeastern frontier remained a critical element in Turkey's strategic calculations. While direct conflict was avoided, the fluctuating control of neighboring territories, German subversion attempts, and ongoing Allied demands repeatedly pulled Turkey into the complex territorial politics of the Middle East.

2.2.2.5. The Black Sea and Soviet Pressure: The Northern Dimension

According to Wiesband, The Soviet Union represented the most enduring strategic anxiety for Turkish leaders throughout the war. Unlike the rapid Axis advances in the Balkans, Soviet pressure developed as a sustained political and geographical tension across the northern frontier and Black Sea basin. This concern was due to both historical antagonisms and the unresolved legal ambiguities surrounding the Straits and Eastern Anatolia[108].

At the outbreak of the war, Turkey maintained a non-aggression pact with the USSR, originally signed in 1925 and repeatedly extended through additional protocols. Despite this formal arrangement, Turkish leadership viewed Soviet intentions with deep suspicion, rooted in longstanding fears of Russian territorial ambitions dating back to the Ottoman era. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 (Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) immediately exacerbated Ankara's concerns. The secret protocols of that agreement divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres, signaling Moscow's revived appetite for regional expansion.[109]

During the early war years, Soviet military stance in the Black Sea remained relatively restrained, but Turkish anxieties centered on potential Soviet moves toward the Straits. The Montreux Convention (1936) had restored Turkey's sovereign control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles while limiting foreign naval access during peacetime and granting extensive Turkish discretion during periods of war or threat. The strategic importance of this control was magnified as both the Germans and Soviets evaluated possible future scenarios involving Turkish territory. German advances into the Caucasus during 1942 dramatically shifted the regional dynamic. As Wehrmacht divisions pushed toward Grozny and the Caspian, Soviet defenses stabilized in Transcaucasia, positioning Red Army units close to Turkey's northeastern border. While this Soviet military concentration was aimed primarily at halting the German advance, Ankara closely

[107] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 156–60.

[108] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 20–22.

[109] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 80–81.

monitored these deployments as potential future pressure against Eastern Anatolia, particularly the sensitive Kars–Ardahan region.[110]

Turkish military preparations during this period included reinforcement of its eastern frontier, with troop deployments concentrated in Erzurum, Kars, and Van. Turkish defensive planning anticipated multiple scenarios, including possible Axis breakthroughs through the Caucasus as well as a sudden Soviet move across the northeastern mountains. Soviet pressure on Turkey intensified after 1943, particularly as the war began shifting decisively in favor of the Allies. In diplomatic exchanges, Moscow signaled its dissatisfaction with Turkey's continued neutrality. Stalin made clear that the Soviet government considered previous treaties with Turkey outdated and that postwar arrangements would require revisions concerning both the Turkish-Soviet border and the status of the Straits[111].

By 1945, Soviet demands became explicit. Molotov formally conveyed to Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper that the USSR sought revisions to the eastern border, specifically the return of Kars and Ardahan, as well as Soviet participation in the control of the Straits.[112] Stalin personally argued that these areas historically belonged to Georgia and Armenia, and that Soviet national security required expanded influence over the maritime access routes between the Black Sea and Mediterranean[113] The Soviet proposals were met with firm resistance in Ankara. Turkish leadership viewed these demands not simply as postwar adjustments but as existential threats to sovereignty. At the Potsdam Conference, tensions between Soviet and American interests became more pronounced. By the time the Truman Doctrine was announced, both Greece and Turkey had emerged as central arenas in the growing East–West conflict. The United States assumed a leading role in protecting Western interests from Soviet expansionism, nowhere more evident than in the case of Turkey. The strategic role with Turkey, which Churchill had once secured for Britain at Casablanca, had effectively passed into American hands[114]. Which was not surprising considering that this position is clearly reflected in British Foreign Office correspondence from the time. A memorandum dated 12 December 1945 states: "Just as we were unable to prevent Poland from being swallowed by Germany in 1939, we are now equally incapable of stopping the Soviet Union from dismantling Turkey. However, just as we offered Romania and Poland guarantees in 1939 that we could not actually uphold, it might now be useful to offer similar assurances to Turkey."[115]

---

[110] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 422,431.

[111] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 262.

[112] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 206.

[113] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 264.

[114] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 318.

[115] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 286–87.

2.2.3. Actively Negotiating Neutrality: The Logic of Delay and Bargaining

Since the 1930s, among the leaders of Turkey, an impending threat of war was perceived and expected. In 1931, even before Hitler came to power in Germany, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave an account of what might have happened in Europe and the globe in general to Mc Arthur and the journal Caucasus. Süreyya Aydemir narrates these insights in detail: He emphasized that Turkey could not remain neutral in such a conflict and that America would eventually be drawn in. Atatürk argued that global political leaders were failing to address key issues selflessly and that Europe's internal conflicts, particularly between France and Germany, had become unsolvable. He feared that a new war would push all of humanity into greater crisis and believed that Europe would be engulfed in a war involving ideological and imperial struggles. Atatürk's analysis warned of the dangers of militarism, fascism, and the fragility of peace in Europe. He predicted that even minor diplomatic mistakes could trigger catastrophe and stress the need for rational, interest-driven foreign policy to protect national security.[116] İnönü talked to Aydemir in retrospect to the 1930s by stating "I saw a new world war as certain, unavoidable, and imminent. From the very beginning, I anticipated that the Soviets would align with the Western bloc, and we needed to adjust our position accordingly. Our minds were constantly at work, trying to foresee the disasters and ripple effects such a war would bring. The weight of the immediate threat overshadowed all other considerations."[117]

Throughout the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was defined by a sustained effort to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity avoiding combat, occupation and invasion during increasing pressure from all major powers, without being taken by any kind of adventurous stance. Encircled by Axis-controlled or contested regions, Ankara pursued a policy of *active neutrality*, a deliberate strategy of delay, non-alignment, and conditional cooperation[118]. Far from passive, this approach involved continuous recalibration of Turkey's diplomatic posture and military readiness in response to rapidly evolving geopolitical conditions.

At the core of this policy was a refusal to commit to either block without clear and enforceable guarantees. In 1939, Turkey signed a Mut,ual Assistance Pact with Britain and France but secured a protocol that excluded obligations in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Two years later, Ankara also concluded a Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact with Germany. These parallel agreements were emblematic of a balancing strategy designed to prevent entrapment in the conflict while signaling deterrence. Turkish leaders, particularly İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, grounded their diplomacy in the logic of national self-

[116] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*, 6. baskı (Remzi Kitabevi, 1984), 2:85–86.

[117] Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*, 2:88.

[118] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 52.

preservation. Menemencioğlu's remark "We are selfish; we fight only for ourselves" captured the pragmatic ethos guiding Turkish policy[119].

This strategy of tactical delay, what İnönü termed a "waiting policy" or in Weisband's words "Operation Footdrag" structured Turkey's wartime diplomacy.[120] Turkish negotiators often responded to Allied demands with logistical objections or offered conditional participation in hypothetical operations, such as the Balkan front, that were unlikely to materialize. When pressed for action, Ankara underscored its unpreparedness and shifted discussion to longer-term commitments. Delay functioned not as avoidance but as a mechanism of controlled negotiation Military posture reinforced this strategy.

Cooperation with the Allies was carefully bounded. Turkey allowed limited use of its infrastructure for humanitarian and intelligence purposes (such as the transfer of supplies from Syria or the evacuation of Allied personnel during the Dodecanese campaign) but consistently refused to allow large-scale base operations or troop deployments. British and American intelligence agencies operated informally within Turkey, yet even these were subject to constraints. Allied proposals for using Turkish territory in aerial campaigns were consistently deflected.[121]

Besides the incapacities of Turkish military and industrial developments, İnönü idealized war and combat on survivalist, nationalist grounds. In 1923, after Karaağaç was included in Greek domain, he stated "War is a sacred matter. It is fought for an ideal. But that ideal cannot be satisfied by moral victories alone. It must lead to concrete, material results. Otherwise, the blood of the nation's sons cannot be spilled for a mere sentiment or sudden outburst. You have all raised children. To decide that a 25-year-old young man should be lost in an instant requires deep reflection. It is a heavy responsibility."[122] İnönü and his administration maintained this position consistently throughout the war, convinced that Turkey had neither a higher ideal to serve nor anything tangible to gain by joining the conflict.

According to Deringil, Turkey's wartime strategy went beyond mere non-involvement; it succeeded in leveraging both sides of the conflict, each willing to pay a high price to keep Turkey from siding with the other. In the context of a global war, this represented a significant achievement for the diplomacy of a small state. This approach was not shaped by moral or ethical

---

[119] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 5.

[120] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 48.

[121] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 161.

[122] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1884-1938)*, 6. baskı (Remzi Kitabevi, 1984), 1:258.

concerns. The administration viewed the war as a product of European internal conflicts, not Turkey's responsibility. Operating from that premise, they concentrated fully on maintaining Turkey's distance from the fighting[123].

Despite receiving various territorial offers during World War II, the Turkish government consistently rejected them and firmly reiterated its position of having no territorial claims against any state. This stance was reflected in repeated refusals to engage with either Allied or Axis proposals involving land transfers. In late 1941, for instance, İnönü turned down a Soviet offer to cede parts of Greece to Turkey, viewing it as a veiled precursor to potential Soviet demands on Turkish territory. According to Aydemir, İnönü interpreted the offer as a strategic trap and reaffirmed "Turkey has no claim to any right or territory from anyone, nor does it owe any right or territory to anyone."[124]

Similarly, in September 1943, German ambassador von Papen relayed Mussolini's suggestion to transfer the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey. Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu responded by stating that Mussolini no longer represented a legitimate government and that Turkey would not accept territory from such a source. Moreover, Turkey had already refused Germany's proposal to recognize Mussolini's regime. These rejections were communicated clearly to Allied representatives, and Britain formally thanked Turkey for maintaining its position.[125] According to British sources, Germany had made offers including Aleppo and parts of the Greek islands currently under Axis control. However, by late 1941, no concrete developments followed these suggestions. The British Embassy linked this silence to shifting military realities, particularly the slower-than-expected German advance in the East and the growing influence of British and Soviet forces along Turkey's southern and eastern borders.[126]

In sum, Turkey's refusal to accept or to seek territorial expansion, despite offers from both the Axis and the Allies, formed a key component of its wartime neutrality policy. Rather than using the war as an opportunity to revise borders, Turkish leadership sought to avoid entanglement and preserve the country's post-Lausanne territorial order. This position was not only communicated diplomatically but consistently upheld in the face of strategic temptations.

Some critics accused İnönü of undermining the nation's "manliness" by adopting an overly cautious approach, while others outside Turkey later characterized Turkish wartime foreign

[123] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 271.

[124] Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*, 2:247.

[125] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 171.

[126] Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 185–86.

policy as hesitant or lacking resolve.[127] However, İnönü firmly believed that his careful, measured decision-making spared the country from significant harm. Public opinion at the time largely supported this view. A March 1943 policy memorandum from the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicated that all sectors of society, including the military, opposed taking a more assertive stance that could lead to war[128]. İnönü's approach to neutrality was fundamentally shaped by a philosophy of caution and delay. His leadership style involved making decisions incrementally, based on close observation of unfolding events. As Aydemir noted, İnönü's wartime leadership was defined by his effort to buy time through constant vigilance. İnönü himself once expressed this mindset with the words: "Let us first get through the evening, let us first get through the morning, not the years, months, or weeks."[129]

This entire policy framework was anchored in the imperative of preserving Turkey's sovereignty. Border militarization, diplomatic balancing, and selective economic engagement together signaled both autonomy and resistance to pressure. The neutrality that Turkey practiced was not a refusal to engage with the war, but a constant effort to manage the war's spatial and political encroachment.

Turkey formally entered the Second World War on February 23, 1945, declaring war on Germany and Japan after years of maintaining a careful stance of non-belligerent neutrality. This late declaration was driven by the anticipation of a world after the war: it was a strategic move to secure participation in the Conference on World Organization in San Francisco, scheduled for April 26, 1945. At the Yalta Conference, the Allied powers had required that only countries that had declared war on Germany by March 1, 1945 would be eligible to attend, effectively compelling Turkey to act if it wished to take part in the postwar order and gain founding membership in the United Nations[130]. Leading up to this moment, Turkey had begun aligning more visibly with the Allied bloc: it severed diplomatic ties with Japan on January 3, and opened the Straits to Allied warships on January 12, signaling a shift from strict neutrality.

By 1945, Turkey had preserved its borders, avoided direct military conflict, and kept open diplomatic relations with all major powers. Its terrain had become an object of negotiation, airfields, railways, and ports were all treated as strategic assets to be withheld or conditionally offered. Active neutrality functioned as a form of anticipatory governance, enabling Turkey to remain formally outside the war while staying embedded in its unfolding dynamics.

---

[127] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 37–38; Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*, 2:269.

[128] Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 38.

[129] Aydemir, *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*, 2:158.

[130] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 533.

Overall, Selim Deringil's *denge oyunu* (balance game) thesis remains the central interpretive framework for understanding Turkey's foreign policy during World War II. He characterizes Turkey's position as a deliberate strategy of flexible neutrality, driven not by moral commitments but by geopolitical vulnerability, strategic self-interest, and a firm rejection of expansionism. İnönü and Menemencioğlu, the key figures behind this policy, prioritized territorial preservation over ideological alignment, refusing territorial offers from both Axis and Allied powers. Turkey leveraged its position and critical resources like chromite to secure diplomatic space, while repeatedly signaling defensive readiness without engaging in aggression. Deringil stresses that this balancing act was grounded in realist logic and consistent with the non-revisionist ethos of early Republican diplomacy[131].

Edward Weisband reinforces this interpretation, emphasizing Turkey's tactical use of delay, what he terms "Operation Footdrag" as a way to meet Allied expectations in principle while avoiding binding commitments[132]. Like Deringil, he highlights İnönü and Menemencioğlu's central role in orchestrating these maneuvers. Although Deringil criticizes Weisband's overstatement of the Soviet threat, their analyses largely align in portraying Turkish neutrality as a calculated act of geopolitical survival[133]. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin further support this view, framing Turkey's stance as "partisan but non-belligerent" an indirect strategy aimed at avoiding combat while defending national autonomy. Drawing on Liddell Hart's theory of "high strategy," they situate Turkey's diplomacy within a broader structure of statecraft that preserved the Republic's post-Lausanne gains and kept the country out of the war, despite immense external pressure[134].

The foreign policy strategies examined above did not operate in isolation from spatial practices. Decisions about neutrality, alignment, and refusal had material correlates across the territory of the Republic. To understand these consequences, this study adopts Stuart Elden's theorization of territory as a political technology, spatial apparatus produced through measurement, calculation, classification, and strategic enforcement. Territory, in this sense, is not a fixed landscape but a set of practices that render space governable under specific conditions. Before and during the Second World War, that condition was anticipation (of invasion, of alliance, of disruption) that structured how space was organized, secured, and interpreted.

Turkey's position as a non-belligerent state encircled by shifting alliances, invasions, and occupations generated a sustained atmosphere of spatial uncertainty. The state's response was

---

131 Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 276.

132 Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, 146.

133 Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 71.

134 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 27.

not discursive or diplomatic but technical and territorial. The very neutrality it sought to preserve had to be constantly recalibrated against its physical environment. The management of national territory became a form of anticipatory governance, structured around the fear of intrusion, the need to secure strategic corridors, and the imperative to maintain logistical viability in the face of potential isolation. Diplomacy thus operated alongside material actions, reinforcing borders, coordinating military rail corridors, recalculating port capacities, and preparing defensive architectures in areas most exposed to potential penetration.

What follows examines this territorial work in its operational forms. It focuses on the material practices through which the Turkish state sought to secure its position, from large-scale defense lines and fortifications to military-industrial constructions and infrastructural recalibrations. They were technical acts aimed at stabilizing the space of the nation under the pressure of global war, using architecture, planning, and engineering as tools of sovereign endurance.

This section has examined diplomacy as spatial negotiation, showing how Turkey's national territory was shaped in the late 1930s and 1940s through agreements, bargaining, and pressures that turned land and resources into instruments of power. The Montreux Convention exemplified this process, as an international agreement that redefined control over the Straits and set the framework for every wartime activity in that corridor. The incorporation of Hatay demonstrated a different mechanism, in which territorial consolidation was achieved through diplomatic maneuvering rather than combat. During the war itself, the country's mineral resources and its ports became matters of negotiation, with foreign powers seeking access to chrome, logistical bases, and transit routes. Each of these episodes highlights that the making of territory was inseparable from frontier activities: sovereignty, economy, and geography were bound into large-scale mechanisms of diplomacy, military planning, and global strategy. The next section turns to concrete cases on land, at sea, and in the air to show how these negotiations materialized as defensive infrastructures, fortified zones, and spatial practices that inscribed the pressures of war into the national landscape.

2.3. The Making of National Territory: Three Frontiers

Territory is not simply a bounded portion of land but an active, multi-dimensional construction shaped by both environmental materialities and human interventions. Contemporary scholarship has pushed against the long-standing "landward bias" of geopolitical thought, instead framing territory as a volumetric and relational process involving earth, sea, and air.[135] In wartime contexts, especially, territory becomes an operative field: it is surveilled, fortified, traversed, and

[135] "Introduction," in *Territory beyond Terra*, by Peters Kimberley A. et al., ed. Peters Kimberley A. et al., Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), 2.

imagined through overlapping spatial logics. Rather than treating land, sea, and air as discrete domains, this section approaches them as interconnected layers of a total environment, each with its own material properties, political tensions, and strategic vulnerabilities. The aim is not to offer a technical breakdown of these domains but to trace how they became integral to the construction and contestation of national space during the Second World War in Turkey.

Theorists such as Stephen Graham[136] and Kimberley Peters[137] have argued that territory is increasingly shaped through vertical and volumetric calculations, where height, depth, flow, and permeability challenge older cartographic imaginaries. Territory emerges through practices of measurement, control, and environmental design, encompassing not just land but also water currents, aerial corridors, and atmospheric conditions. Sloterdijk's concept of "atmoterrorism" reveals how the air itself became weaponized, reframing war as a climatic and environmental confrontation[138]. Similarly, Peter Adey[139] and Joe Phillips[140] show that aerial and oceanic environments defy the fixity of borders, demanding a spatial thinking attuned to movement, uncertainty, and three-dimensional perception. The territorial logics of the mid-twentieth century were already engaged in managing these layered geographies through survey operations, port infrastructures, airspace regulations, and military climatology.

This section also foregrounds how territory-making in wartime required both material manipulation and representational labor. From aerial surveys to port expansions and chromite logistics, territory was rendered governable through maps, infrastructural diagrams, and volumetric modeling. Scholars like Denis Cosgrove[141] and Eyal Weizman[142] have shown that the act of representing space, through mapping, imaging, or architectural framing, was itself a form of spatial production. Rachel Woodward deepens this perspective by arguing that militarism must be understood through its full geographical constitution: not only in terms of battlefield tactics

---

136 Stephen Graham, *Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers*, Paperback edition (Verso, 2018).

137 "Introduction."

138 Peter Sloterdijk et al., *Terror from the Air*, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series (Semiotext(e) ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2009); Peter Sloterdijk, "Airquakes," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27, no. 1 (2009): 41–57, https://doi.org/10.1068/dst1.

139 Peter Adey, "Holding Still: The Private Life of an Air Raid," *M/C Journal* 12, no. 1 (2009): 1, https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.112; Peter Adey, *Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects*, 1st ed. (Wiley, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444324631; Peter Adey, *Air*, Earth Series (Reaktion Books (Firm)) (Reaktion Books, 2014); Adey, "Holding Still"; Adey, *Aerial Life*; Adey, *Air*.

140 Jon Phillips, "Water: Order and the Offshore: The Territories of Deep-Water Oil Production," in *Territory beyond Terra*, ed. Kimberley A. Peters et al., Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

141 Denis E. Cosgrove, *Apollo's Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Denis Cosgrove, "Cultural Cartography : Maps and Mapping in Cultural Geography," Arts, *Annales de Géographie* 660661, no. 2 (2008): 159–78, https://doi.org/10.3917/ag.660.0159; Denis E. Cosgrove, *Geography and Vision: Seeing, Imagining and Representing the World*, International Library of Human Geography (I.B. Tauris ; In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

142 Weizman, *Hollow Land*.

but through training sites, logistics routes, and the everyday infrastructures of military presence.[143] This expands the scope of territoriality to include the blurred boundaries between civilian and military space, where the effects of war preparation imprint themselves on landscapes, routines, and logistical environments. These representational and spatial interventions were driven not by abstract planning alone but by the need to anticipate, visualize, and preempt conflict across a national geography increasingly mediated by geopolitical tension.

The national territory of wartime Turkey was shaped through frontiers that linked diplomacy with spatial practice. The negotiations described in the previous section created conditions in which land, sea, and air became active sites of contestation. Each frontier embodied distinct practices: the construction of a defensive line in Thrace, the regulation of maritime passages under Montreux, and the appropriation of land for airfields in western Anatolia. These were not isolated domains but zones where external pressures and domestic strategies converged. British demands for bases, Allied logistics in Mersin, and international scrutiny of fortifications in Thrace reveal how sovereignty was exercised through negotiation as much as through unilateral action. Each frontier carried paradoxes that defined the wartime geography of Turkey: Istanbul secured while Thrace was exposed, sovereignty over the Straits reinforced while subject to constant pressure, and airspace commanded through concessions of territory. These dynamics made the frontiers of land, sea, and air central to the making of national territory.

2.3.1. Defending the Borderlands: Construction of a Frontier

In today's Istanbul, through the districts of Çatalca, Büyükçekmece, Beylikdüzü, Esenyurt, Başakşehir, and Arnavutköy, from the Marmara Sea in the south, to the Black Sea in the north, Çatalca Defense line spans with it its more than 1400 pillboxes, additional dragon teeth, and some more demolished units since 1941. Apart from the main Çatalca Line, pillboxes (*koruganlar*) were constructed in various locations across Turkey to counter the possibility of a seaborne landing. These included the Çakmak Line (covering Kırklareli–Babaeski–Pehlivanköy–Uzunköprü), Gelibolu (Çanakkale), Foça (İzmir), the areas around Rumelifeneri and Anadolufeneri, located at the Black Sea entrance of the Bosporus, as well as the coastal zones of Şile, Ağva, and Karasu (Sakarya).[144]

The sheer scale of the Çatalca Line makes it one of the largest construction projects of the early Republican period. Yet, until recently, there existed no comprehensive or credible source

[143] Rachel Woodward, "From Military Geography to Militarism's Geographies: Disciplinary Engagements with the Geographies of Militarism and Military Activities," *Progress in Human Geography* 29, no. 6 (2005): 718–40, https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132505ph579oa.

[144] Salim Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı* (Kronik Kitap, 2025), 278.

documenting its construction and spatial extent. This absence is striking, given the project's military, financial, and territorial significance. Two key studies have since provided the groundwork for critical inquiry. Hasan Cenk Çelik's remarkable master's thesis, which integrates Turkish and British archival materials[145], and Salim Aydın's extensive field-based monograph on the Çakmak Line,[146] offer the first detailed accounts of Turkey's first modern defense line.[147]

Drawing from these sources, this part shifts attention away from the analyses of military strategy. Instead, it foregrounds the bureaucratic processes, institutional actors, and logistical decisions that shaped the territorialization of Thrace under the conditions of wartime anticipation. The defense lines of Çatalca, and the related fortification efforts across the Marmara and Aegean coasts, constituted the most resource-intensive rural infrastructural project of the period. They redefined the material and administrative landscape of the region, with considerable costs. Framed as a response to an anticipated threat, the project was marked by improvisation, limited coordination, and an uneven translation of strategic anxiety into spatial planning. While this section offers only a preliminary sketch, it seeks to underscore the urgent need for further research into the making of this *line*.

2.3.1.1. Militarization and Mobilization of an Exposed Zone: Thrace Region

During the interwar period, Turkish officials came to reimagine Thrace not as a settled interior but as a vulnerable frontier. The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty had imposed strict demilitarization on a 30-kilometer zone along the borders with Greece and Bulgaria, as well as around the Straits, weakening the region's defensive capacity. Although the capital had moved to Ankara, Thrace's proximity to Europe and the Straits ensured its continued strategic significance. By the early 1930s, the perception of Thrace had shifted from hinterland to potential battleground, urging efforts to reshape it through legal, demographic, and military means.

Gencer Özcan dates these transformations from the mid-1930s onward[148]. State policy accelerated in response to deteriorating regional geopolitics and the rise of militarism in Europe.

---

[145] Hasan Cenk Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları" (Master's, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2020).

[146] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*.

[147] Few other sources on Çakmak/Çatalca Line see: Akyol, "Çakmak Hattı: Bir Kültürel Peyzaj Rotası," *Tasarım Rehberleri*, November 30, 2024; Mustafa Armağan, "Askeri Mimari Mirasın Korunması Bağlamında Çakmak Hattı Kıyı Koruganları (Anadolu Feneri- Riva-Şile)," *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 24, no. 2 (2022): 2, https://doi.org/10.26468/trakyasobed.1163988; Melik Efeoğlu and Kemal Kutgün Eyüpgiller, "Çatalca Bölgesi Savunma Yapıları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Sanat Tarihi Dergisi* 30, no. 1 (2021): 1, https://doi.org/10.29135/std.834017; Melik Efeoğlu and Kemal Kutgün, "Askeri Mimari Mirasa Çatalca'dan Bakmak: Çakmak Hattı," *Mimarlık* 424 (2022); Hatice Çiğdem Zağra et al., "Arşiv Belgelerindeki Mimari Çizimlerin Dijitalleştirilmesi: Çatalca Savunma Yapıları Örneği," *KAPU Trakya Mimarlık ve Tasarım Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2022): 2.

[148] Gencer Özcan, "Savaşarası Dönemde Türkiye Trakya'sının Askeri Sınır Bölgesine Dönüşümü," *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2022): 2, https://doi.org/10.52792/tws.1185977.

Turkey initiated diplomatic maneuvers to reverse the demilitarized status of Thrace, most notably through the 1936 Montreux Convention, which allowed troop deployment in the Straits region, and a 1938 agreement that annulled land border restrictions with Bulgaria. These diplomatic gains were accompanied by sweeping domestic measures. The government established the General Inspectorate of Thrace in 1934 to consolidate control over infrastructure, settlement, and regional administration. Legal reforms followed, most prominently the 1934 Settlement Law, which reorganized the population distribution to prioritize cultural and linguistic uniformity[149]. This law permitted the removal or relocation of communities deemed politically or ethnically unreliable. In practice, this led to the targeting of Jewish populations, especially during the Thrace pogroms of 1934, which contributed to the forced demographic reengineering of the region[150]. The state simultaneously promoted Turkish migration into Thrace and initiated a program of place-name changes, rebranding the landscape in nationalist terms.[151]

These shifts culminated in an intensive militarization campaign. Between 1935 and 1937, Turkey conducted major war exercises in Thrace, testing troop mobility, armored capabilities, and the terrain's defensibility. The stationing of the first tank battalion in Lüleburgaz in 1935 further emphasized the region's rising strategic value[152].

During the Second World War, the Thrace region of Turkey emerged as a critical zone of military concern and strategic anticipation. Bordered by hostile trajectories and positioned as the primary land corridor into Anatolia from Europe, Thrace was identified as the likely direction of a potential German advance. In response, Turkish authorities undertook a series of extensive spatial, legal, and infrastructural interventions aimed at reinforcing the region's defensive capacity.

The earliest military restrictions in the region began with the declaration of First Military Restricted Zones in Nara and Umurbey within the Çanakkale Fortified Zone on 28 January 1939. These zones were part of a broader spatial regime that would expand over time to include Çatalca, Bolayır, and Kırklareli. The airspace above these areas was also declared prohibited to flights on 29 February 1940, a restriction that signaled Turkey's seriousness in enforcing territorial integrity[153]. From 22 July 1940 onward, foreigners were prohibited from entering or exiting the

[149] For an extensive study of the Law see: Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, *Settlement Law of 1934: Turkish Nationalism in the Age of Revisionism*, Brill, February 17, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1163/23519924-00601006.

[150] For the detailed account of the incident see: Banu Eligür, "The 1934 Anti-Jewish Thrace Riots: The Jewish Exodus of Thrace through the Lens of Nationalism and Collective Violence," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 1 (2017): 88–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1182422.

[151] Özcan, "Savaşarası Dönemde Türkiye Trakya'sının Askeri Sınır Bölgesine Dönüşümü."

[152] Özcan, "Savaşarası Dönemde Türkiye Trakya'sının Askeri Sınır Bölgesine Dönüşümü," 165.

[153] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 105.

region unless strictly confined to transit routes. Military technicians from Britain and France were only allowed access after explicit Council of Ministers approval[154].

The administrative overlay of these military actions included the imposition of a state of emergency across Istanbul, Kırklareli, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, and Kocaeli starting on 23 November 1940. This state was maintained until 22 December 1947. In tandem, the *Örfi İdare Kanunu* (Martial Law) was enacted on 22 May 1940,[155] granting sweeping powers to control public life, closing taverns and clubs, censoring publications, banning assemblies, and imposing curfews.[156]

In June 1940, the Turkish government enacted the *Milli Müdafaa İhtiyaçları İçin Yapılacak İstimlakler Hakkında Kanun* (Law No. 3887), authorizing the Ministry of National Defense to expropriate immovable properties, land, buildings, infrastructure, deemed necessary for national defense.[157] Expropriation decisions were made by the Council of Ministers, and owners were denied the right to contest the decision itself, though they could appeal the compensation amount within fifteen days. The law also permitted the immediate and cost-free transfer of state-owned properties. In extraordinary wartime circumstances, the Ministry was empowered to bypass formal procedures altogether and requisition private land upon depositing compensation at the local Ziraat Bank or treasury office. While framed as a legal instrument of wartime necessity, this law institutionalized a preemptive logic of militarized spatial control. It enabled the state to reconfigure rural geographies into a logistical terrain of future war, reinforcing a territorial imaginary in which landscapes were not simply governed but actively transformed in anticipation of conflict. The law's flexibility, especially in extraordinary circumstances, exposed the porous boundary between law and emergency, and marked a shift toward the normalization of expropriation as a sovereign technique of frontier militarization.

Çelik points at a significant situation where three villages Nakkaş, Orcünlü, and Bahşayiş which was located within the perimeter of the Çatalca Fortified Zone, were ordered to relocate with a decree[158]. Displaced villagers were to be resettled in one or two newly established sites chosen by the Ministry of Public Works. The Ministry of National Defense and Istanbul Governorship would cover all costs. Their original lands were expropriated for military use, but villagers were allowed to continue farming them until relocation was finalized, effectively becoming temporary

[154] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 106.

[155] "Altı Vilayette Örfî İdare," *Cumhuriyet*, November 23, 1940.

[156] Bülent Bakar, *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)* (Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2019), 195–96.

[157] "Milli Müdafaa İhtiyaçları İçin Yapılacak İstimlakler Hakkında Kanun (Law No. 3887)," *Resmi Gazete* 4548 (June 1940), https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/4548.pdf.

[158] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 107.

tenants on militarized ground[159]. The reach and implementation of this law is one of the questions remaining to be answered with further research.

Infrastructure development accelerated across multiple domains, but with a clear prioritization of military mobility. Road construction efforts were concentrated on key arteries: Istanbul-Edirne, Istanbul-Saray, Tekirdağ-Gelibolu, Silivri-Çerkezköy, Poyralı-Demirköy-İğneada, and Vize-Midye. In June 1939, the General Staff had already submitted requests for immediate maintenance and improvement of these roads.[160]

In September 1939, as regional tensions escalated and the threat of war became imminent, the Ministry of Public Works submitted a detailed memorandum concerning road construction activities in the Thrace region[161]. The document outlines the need for urgent infrastructure development to support military mobility and logistics, especially in the areas surrounding the Çakmak Line. It includes a table of planned routes in Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, and Edirne provinces, prioritizing connections that would facilitate defense coordination and access to military installations. The ministry emphasized that the military's demands necessitated rapid and coordinated interventions, with provincial governors and relevant directorates expected to cooperate with military planning offices in the field. The document also reflects the role of the General Staff in overseeing the strategic placement of routes and ensuring that all works align with broader defensive goals.

Due to the extraordinary wartime context and the widespread difficulty in securing private contractors willing to operate under tight deadlines and in rural or militarized zones, the ministry proposed that road construction begin immediately using military labor battalions (*amele taburları*). This recommendation was not only a response to logistical bottlenecks but also a reflection of institutional reliance on state-organized, disciplined labor structures during periods of national emergency. The ministry noted that waiting for civilian contracting mechanisms would introduce delays incompatible with defense timelines. As a result, the proposed solution relied on labor battalions already under military organization, capable of initiating work without bureaucratic or financial negotiation. This reveals the state's growing reliance on military labor as a functional extension of its wartime infrastructure regime.

Railway extension was similarly strategic. Çelik, based on the documents from the British National archives, states that, in 1942, as fortification efforts accelerated, the railway line reached

[159] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 106, Folder 72, Folder 5.

[160] BCA, 30-10-0-0, Box 155, Folder 92, Folder 11.

[161] BCA, 30-10-0-0, Box 155, Folder 92, Folder 12.

as far as Hadımköy. To improve connectivity, the line was extended to cover the Hadımköy–Kızılcaali segment. For security reasons, this extension was carried out not by civilian engineers, but by military engineers. Beyond Kızılcaali, the transport network was further expanded using a narrow-gauge (*dekovil*) system, linking the ammunition depot to northern sites like Lake Terkos and the village of Terkos[162]. Similarly, airfields formed another dimension of the militarized landscape. A total of 94 airfields were constructed or upgraded during the war, 38 of which were built with British assistance. Eighteen were located near Istanbul and the Marmara coast, with fifteen designated as all-weather. However, the shifting German threat led to a pivot toward inland airfield construction after 1941.[163]

One of the most significant expressions of wartime territorial governance in Turkey also took place in Thrace region. Beginning in March 1941, amidst intensifying conflict in the Balkans, the Turkish government initiated detailed evacuation measures for Istanbul and the Thrace region. The evacuation targeted a broad array of institutions and populations. Sabit Çetin[164] lists the relocation orders as military schools: the Harp Academy and Military Medical Academy moved to Ankara; the Fen and Tatbik School to Mamak; Artillery Schools to Polatlı; the Maltepe Infantry Firing School to Çankırı; the Cavalry School to Söke; Kuleli Military High School to Konya; and Maltepe Military High School to Akşehir. The Naval War School, Naval High School, and Naval Minor Officer Preparation School were transferred to Mersin, while the Naval War Academy was moved to Ankara. In parallel, cultural and bureaucratic assets were displaced: land registry archives from Istanbul, Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, and Çanakkale; the Darphane and Damga Matbaası; and the National Education Printing House were all transferred to Ankara. Judicial documents and property from prosecution offices in Thrace were also relocated. Valuable museum collections such as Topkapı Palace, Turkish & Islamic Arts Museum, Istanbul Archaeology Museum and rare books from Istanbul's libraries were moved inland to cities such as Çankırı and Niğde.[165]

Istanbul museums were closed to visitors within a week of the War had officially started. Officials had announced that historical artifacts were being moved to safer locations and that this precaution followed the outbreak of war in Europe, where the German invasion of Poland had already led to the suspension of cultural activities in many cities. The piece emphasizes that measures were being taken to protect Turkey's cultural heritage, ensuring that historical objects were stored in secure and appropriate places. The decision was framed as temporary and

[162] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 111.

[163] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 112.

[164] Sabit Çetin, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul ve Trakya'da Alınan Tedbirler: Pasif Korunma ve Tahliye" (Master's, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2008), 96–103.

[165] BCA, 30-10-0-0, Box 213, Folder 448, Folder 7.

necessary, part of broader protective actions during uncertain times, giving examples of how major cultural institutions abroad, museums in Paris, London, and elsewhere, were also shutting their doors and relocating artworks for safekeeping.[166]



Figure 8. Photographs of the sarcophagi and other artifacts safeguarded at the Istanbul Archaeological Museums during the Second World War, SALT Archive, TASUH5879.

In the spring of 1941, as regional tensions escalated with the Nazi occupation of the Balkans, Turkish authorities activated a preemptive evacuation plan for Istanbul and the Thrace region.[167] Though the official framing consistently emphasized the voluntary nature of this measure, the implementation revealed how easily a well-intentioned precaution could spiral into public confusion, bureaucratic overreach, and unintended consequences.

The earliest communications, such as the announcement on April 11, stressed that the government's evacuation initiative was "*tamamen ihtiyarîdir*" entirely voluntary. Headlines like "Anadoluya gitmek isteyen halkın kaydına başlandı" aimed to convey calm, portraying the state not as enforcing displacement but as facilitating protective mobility. The accompanying notice from the Martial Law Commander reiterated the civilian nature of the process and the importance of discipline and order. Yet these careful framings quickly encountered friction. Just days later, satirical columnist B. Felek mocked the sudden surge of Istanbulites rushing to register, questioning their motives and hinting at a growing disconnect between the evacuation's strategic logic and the population's psychological response[168]. "Where are you going?" - "To Anatolia." - "Why?" - "Just in case," became the shorthand for an easy escape for public responsibility.

[166] "İstanbul Müzeleri Dün Ziyaretçilere Kapatıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1939.

[167] "Anadoluya Gitmek Isteyen Halkın Kaydına Başlandı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 11, 1941.

[168] B. Felek, "Niyet Nereye?," Hadiseler Arasında Felek, *Cumhuriyet*, April 11, 1941.

Authorities struggled to manage both the scale and perception of the operation. On April 22, Cumhuriyet reported that the first wave would include 5,000 people, departing from Haydarpaşa via ships and trains toward Anatolia. Clippings from early May show images of families boarding state-provided ferries like the Turhan and Aksu, accompanied by cheerful headlines emphasizing the smoothness and joy of the journey "*Seyahat çok neş'eli geçti*"[169], "*Anadolu ile İstanbul sarmaş dolaş oluyordu!*"[170] These scenes, meant to assure the public, inadvertently fed the sense that this was an open-ended opportunity to flee an uncertain city.



Meccanî nakliyat

İlk kafile şehrimizden dün hareket etti

İnebolu yolcularını Tırhan, Zonguldağa çıkacakları da Aksu vapuru götürüyor

Tırhan vapurundaki yolculara refakat eden arkadaşımız, seyahatin gayet neşe'li geçtiğini telsizle bildirdi

Tırhan ve Aksu vapurlarile dün İnebolu ve Zonguldağa nakledilen yolcuların hareketinden muhtelif intibalar

(Yazısı 3 üncü sahifede)

İnebolu yolcularının şehrimizden hareketlerine aid intibalar

ilk kafile ineboluda

Seyahat, güzel havada çok neş'eli geçti

Yolcularla beraber giden arkadaşımız yolculuğun bütün tafsilâtını bildiriyor

İkinci kafile de dün limanımızdan hareket etti. trenle gideceklerin de hareket günü belli oldu

İnebolu 2 (Tırhan vapurile Anado - luya giden ilk kafileye refakat eden arkadaşımızdan) — «Tırhan vapuru İstanbuldan ayrılan ilk beyannameli kafileyi İnebuluya götürüyor» dediklerî zaman, eski günlere aid güç manzaraları gözlerimin önüne geldi. Şimdi rıhtımda kim bilir gene ne ahlmelerle karşılaşacaktım. Yer kapmak için vapurun merdivenlerinde saçışıp, haşhaş gelen adamlı kadınlar, annelerinin eteğine yapışarak cıyak cıyak haykırışan çocuklar. Galata rıhtımına geldiğim zaman bir de ne güreyim: Tırhan' bir kutu kadar sakin ve rahat, üstelik de yarı yarıya boş! Ne yolda çıkanlarda en ufak bir telâş, ne rıhtımda bekliyenlerde hiçbir teessür hali.

Vükuu teşyie gelenler arasında konduklerini tutturup mendillerini salıatılar

(Arkası sahife 5 sütun 3 te

Figure 9. News about the relocation to Anatolia (*Cumhuriyet*, May 1,3, 1941)

Logistical strains and misinformation soon followed. Rumors spread that those who evacuated would not be allowed to return for three years. In response, Cumhuriyet published a firm announcement on May 9: "*Bu lâkırdı yalandır*" (This rumor is false)[171]. The editorial insisted there was no such prohibition and criticized those undermining the state's effort through "naïve credulity." A *Cumhuriyet* reporter who accompanied the first group aboard the Turhan recounted encounters with evacuees[172]. A young mother holding her baby, when asked why she was leaving, replied, *"Oturup da ne olacak. Kuru kalabalık edecek değil miyiz?"* An elderly woman supported her, saying, *"Turpun sıkısından seyreyi iyidir."* Another woman, who brought along her bird in a cage, expressed no concern about leaving Istanbul, remarking, *"Her yokuşun bir inişi olduğu gibi*

[169] "Mecanni Nakliyat," *Cumhuriyet*, May 1, 1941.

[170] "İlk Kafile İneboluda," *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1941.

[171] "Bu Lakırdı Yalandır," *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1941.

[172] *Cumhuriyet*, "İlk Kafile İneboluda."

bu gidişin de gelişi olacak." Although this tone of calm resignation was prominently featured, the article[173] also noted that most people who had signed up for the trip did not show up. Out of 1,000 people who received tickets, only 250 boarded the ship. Meanwhile, *Çetin* reported that people who bought and sold secondhand furniture traveled to Thrace to take advantage of the urgency, creating rumors and urging people to sell their belongings at very low prices,[174] and in another instance, local government had to intervene after the cost of travel items, such as luggage and bags, increased by up to 60 percent due to opportunistic price gouging.[175]

What emerges from this sequence is not simply a record of evacuation logistics but a layered portrait of wartime civilian governance, one in which the state's spatial and demographic strategies were constantly mediated through rumor, satire, misinformation, and logistical improvisation. The evacuation plan, while designed with flexibility and foresight, ultimately collided with the social dynamics of fear, speculation, and mistrust. In this sense, the evacuation effort was not only a anticipatory policy, it became a test case in crisis communication, and an early example of how urban space, population management, and media circulation became intertwined under the pressures of total war preparation.

2.3.1.2. Implementation of a Defense Strategy: The Çakmak-Çatalca Line

The outbreak and escalation of the Second World War marked a radical rethinking of defense strategy across Europe and beyond, manifesting in the widespread construction of static fortification lines. These defense lines, massive, complex, and often embedded in national mythologies, named after highest ranking generals, were spatial inscriptions of anxiety, deterrence, and territorial control, translated into military environments. They reflected an enduring (and increasingly challenged during the war) belief in fixed fortifications even as warfare rapidly evolved, especially under the threat of aerial bombardment.

Among the most iconic of these was the Maginot Line in France. Officially proposed in 1927 and largely completed by 1936, it stretched from Alsace toward the Belgian frontier. This subterranean fortress network, with its artillery casemates, observation posts, and gas-proof chambers, embodied a vision of defensive modernism[176]. While it offered employment during the interwar years and appeared nearly invisible from above, its ultimate failure lay in strategic miscalculations, namely, the Germans' unexpected bypass through the Ardennes during the 1940 invasion. In response, Germany developed a far more layered and mobile-oriented counterpart:

[173] "Dün Gidenler," *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1941.

[174] Çetin, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul ve Trakya'da Alınan Tedbirler: Pasif Korunma ve Tahliye," 79.

[175] Çetin, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul ve Trakya'da Alınan Tedbirler: Pasif Korunma ve Tahliye," 81.

[176] Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform*, 221–22.

the Siegfried Line (Westwall). Initiated in 1936 under the direction of Organisation Todt, it extended over 500 kilometers from Switzerland to the Netherlands. The line evolved through successive programs, Limesprogramm, Aachen-Saar Programm, and others, each deepening the fortification and adapting it to shifting operational doctrines. By 1945, this belt of bunkers and anti-tank obstacles had played a key role in delaying the Allied advance[177]. The Atlantic Wall, meanwhile, represented the most ambitious fortification project of the war. Envisioned by Hitler in 1942, this 3,800-kilometer defensive coastal barrier from Spain to Norway absorbed staggering amounts of resources, 13 million cubic meters of concrete and over a million tons of steel[178]. While never fully completed or uniformly effective, its scale signified the extent to which Germany committed to a defensive architecture in response to Allied offensives, especially after the failed invasion of Britain.

Other nations also undertook substantial efforts to fortify their borders. The Stalin Line, begun in 1927 and expanded into the Molotov Line after the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in 1939, stretched for thousands of kilometers, reflecting a Soviet doctrine of strong static defense rather than flexible depth[179]. The Mannerheim Line in Finland, constructed sporadically since the 1920s, successfully resisted the Soviet advance during the 1939–40 Winter War, demonstrating the efficacy of fortifications when integrated with terrain and tactical adaptability[180]. Smaller but significant systems appeared throughout Europe. Switzerland's Redoubt National developed after 1940 as a fragmented yet fortified core in the Alps[181]. Greece's Metaxas Line, begun in 1936, sought to secure the northern frontier. Italy, responding to the shifting front in 1943, built multiple lines, including the Gustav, Hitler, and Green (Apennine) Lines. In Romania, the Carol Line drew inspiration from the Maginot system, while Belgium fortified key river crossings such as the Albert Canal, most notably with the Eben-Emael Fortress.[182] During the war, the Turkish press actively reported on the construction and performance of European defense lines, particularly the Maginot and Siegfried Lines, often dedicating special dossiers to their structure and strategic significance.[183]

---

[177] Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform*, 223.

[178] Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform*, 224–25.

[179] Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform*, 223.

[180] Bair Irincheev, *The Mannerheim Line 1920-39 : Finnish Fortifications of the Winter War*, with Brian Delf (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), https://ebook.yourcloudlibrary.com/library/oclc/detail/axombz9.

[181] "Swiss Weigh Future Role of Bunkers in the Alps - The New York Times," accessed July 21, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/europe/20swiss.html?pagewanted=all.

[182] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 60.

[183] Abidin Daver, "Alman - Fransız Cephesinde Majino Hattı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 1939; "Majino ve Zigfrid Hatları Yarılamaz Mı?," *Cumhuriyet*, November 4, 1939; "Mannerheim Hattı Yarılamadı," *Cumhuriyet*, February 10, 1940; "Rumanyada Müdafaa Hazırlığı: Karol Hattı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 7, 1940; "Fransız Maneviyatının Da Istihkâmı Olan Maginot Hattı Niçin Düştü?," *Cumhuriyet*, July 12, 1940; "Stalin Hattındaki Son Muharebeler," *Cumhuriyet*, July 15, 1941.

These two defense lines became so culturally embedded that they came to personify the French and the Germans themselves in columns of satire and caricatures[184]. As the war unfolded, these fortifications were revisited in the press in relation to shifting frontlines and military outcomes. The Maginot Line captured the imagination of many Turkish writers and commentators. Its immense scale, subterranean networks, and even the circulation of soldiers via elevators were portrayed with a mix of admiration and fascination.



Figure 10. Editorials about Defense Lines of Europe (Daver, 1939; Ezine, 1941)

Journalist Celâlettin Ezine, who visited the fortifications, published his own sketches, offering a visual account of their grandeur[185]. The fall of the Maginot Line in June 1940 came as a shock. The sense of awe that had surrounded it gave way to disbelief as German forces bypassed its strongest points and swiftly invaded France. In his unsigned column *Hem Nalına Hem Mıhına*, Abidin Daver captured this failure through a vivid metaphor[186]. France, he wrote, had surrounded one side of its garden with a high wall but left the other side protected by only a simple fence. Those who could not scale the wall simply jumped over the fence and entered the garden. Moreover, the guards assigned to watch behind the fence, to ensure no one passed through, ran to help the neighbors when they heard cries for help and left the fence unattended. Despite all its efforts, France failed to extend the Maginot Line daily, and one month and five days after the assault began, part of the fortified line had become useless. For these reasons, this portion of the Maginot Line had completed its task. In the end, half-measures not only wasted millions but also failed to protect the country from invasion.

[184] "Garb Cehpesinden," sec. 302, *Akbaba*, October 19, 1939; "Bir Atalar Sözü," *Cumhuriyet*, September 13, 1944.

[185] Celaleddin Ezine, "Majino Istihkâmlarında – Bir Kalenin Içinde… – Asansörle Yerin Dibine Iniyoruz. Raylarla Döşenmiş Caddeler, Yol Ağzaları, Gidip Gelen Tramvaylar…," *Cumhuriyet*, July 15, 1941.

[186] Abidin Daver, "Majino Hattı," Hem Nalına Hem Mıhına, *Cumhuriyet*, June 18, 1940.




Figure 11. Personification of defense lines (Akbaba. October 19, 1939; Cumhuriyet. September 9, 1944)

It was only three months before Maginot Line fell, and Daver ruled his judgements, on Marh 9, 1940, the Turkish government signed a decree to determine (according to Law No. 3772) that the allocation of 7,301,742 liras (either in one or two installments) under the budget item "Various Defense Services of the Land Forces" of the Ministry of National Defense was necessary for the defense works listed in the relevant documents.[187] This amount was to be added to the existing appropriations under decree 12769, specifically under the category of "Extraordinary Defense Expenses" (*Takriri Masraflar*), beginning in April 1940, and with this, the modern defense line of Turkey was set to be completed.

The Çakmak-Çatalca Line was laid out as a territorial defense apparatus intended to secure the western frontier of Turkey. First it was to be implemented along the Bulgarian Border, later it set back towards the İstanbul border, Çatalca. Its purpose was to transform this geographic corridor into a space of defense, surveillance, and delay, buying time in the event of an Axis advance through the Balkans. Rather than a continuous concrete barrier, it was designed as a system of spatially dispersed, terrain-integrated fortifications emphasizing depth, flexibility, and camouflage.

The Çatalca Line was organized as a comprehensive defense zone with three distinct lines of fortification, a design philosophy similar to Germany's Siegfried Line, which set it apart from the French Maginot Line.[188] The First Line of the Çatalca fortification formed the system's core defensive structure. It extended over 50 kilometers, from the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea, crossing through key inland valleys between Büyükçekmece and Terkos. Though often referred

[187] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 90, Folder 23, Folder 2.

[188] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 9.

to as a single line, it was in fact a layered formation in depth. [189] The outer perimeter began with barbed wire, followed by concrete-and-iron anti-tank barriers, known as "dragon's teeth" designed to trap and slow down advancing armored vehicles. Behind these stood a series of anti-tank ditches, built in one to three layers depending on strategic priority. These ditches were several meters wide and deep, expanding in size where the risk of breakthrough was greatest. The line's defense was further reinforced by a network of bunkers of varying sizes and capabilities. Larger bunkers were positioned to provide direct fire along the trench lines, while smaller ones supported secondary coverage and filled spatial gaps. Most were built above ground and camouflaged using earth and vegetation. In high-risk areas, some structures included ventilation systems for gas attacks, internal wells, and storage for supplies. At certain points, especially around major intersections like Dağyenice, the bunkers were linked to logistical tunnels equipped with narrow-gauge rail lines to support transport. Strategically, the First Line was constructed atop older Ottoman-era strongholds and aligned with the 1912 Çatalca defense line, reactivating proven defensive terrain with modern infrastructure.

The Second Line of the Çatalca fortification acted as an intermediate layer of defense positioned behind the main front[190]. Aligned along the eastern ridges overlooking the central valley, it was designed to reinforce the First Line if it were compromised. This line featured lighter fortifications, smaller bunkers and tank positions, placed at key intervals to provide coverage and delay advancing forces. Though less fortified than the front line, it played a vital role in extending the depth of the defensive system and absorbing the momentum of a potential breakthrough. The Third Line was the furthest back and the most expansive in terms of coverage[191]. It stretched across the interior of the region and marked the final defensive threshold before reaching central settlements. Like the Second Line, it was composed of lighter bunkers and supporting infrastructure, but large sections of it have since been lost due to urban expansion. Despite this, the original depth of the entire Çatalca system, especially between Büyükçekmece and Terkos Lake, could exceed 14 kilometers. Construction began in 1940, with the first heavy bunker completed in April 1941, and work continued into 1943. Designed with adaptability in mind, the fortification system concentrated its heaviest defenses where the terrain was most vulnerable to armored assault and relied on natural barriers elsewhere. Together, the three lines formed a layered, terrain-conscious defense architecture.

---

[189] Geographically, it stretched for over 50 kilometers from the Darboğaz Çakıl Pier on the Black Sea to the Gürpınar coast on the Marmara Sea. The land section between Bahşayiş and Yazlık measured approximately 29–30 kilometers. This line followed a north-south valley alignment: beginning at Gürpınar on the Marmara Sea, it ran along the eastern side of Büyükçekmece Lake, continued through Bahşayiş, curved east of Dağyenice, passed through Yazlık, and terminated at Darboğaz Çakıl Pier.

[190] It followed the eastern ridges of the main valley and passed through locations such as Ömerli, Yeşilbayır, Hadımköy, and Yassıören, ultimately reaching Terkos Lake.

[191] It began behind the Gürpınar coast on the Marmara Sea, crossed the E5 highway, and extended through Esenyurt, Başakşehir, Sazlıdere, Şamlar, Hacımaşlı, Sazlıbosna, Çilingir, and Dursunköy, continuing toward Terkos Lake.

Salim Aydın lays out the Çatalca Line's defense architecture as a comprehensive system of interlocking components, each tailored to slow, divert, or withstand enemy advances. Central to this system were the *korugan*s (bunker/pillbox) reinforced concrete bunkers used for both firepower and protection.[192] These structures, varying in shape from rectangular to circular and typically flat-roofed, were made of concrete and iron and were positioned both above and below ground. As the backbone of the "*manileme*" (barrier) system, korugans served to disrupt enemy advances and support flanking fire. They were camouflaged by stone and earth to resemble natural hills, thereby minimizing visibility from aerial reconnaissance and reducing artillery impact. The larger models equipped with heavy weapons, were placed directly on trench lines to defend against armored vehicles, while the smaller models were set behind these lines to reinforce the larger units and prevent flanking.

Complementing the bunkers were tank trenches, broad, deep ditches excavated to obstruct the movement of enemy armor: These trenches were typically 3 meters wide and 1.8 meters deep, expanding to 6.5 meters wide and 2.5 meters deep in high-risk zones; by the end of 1940, construction had moved 500,000 cubic meters of earth. Trenches were often camouflaged and sometimes topped with barbed wire for added protection. [193]

Dragon's teeth (ejderdişleri) formed the first solid barrier ahead of the trenches.[194] Made from concrete embedded with iron rods, these anti-tank cubes were installed in rows, often two deep, with parts buried underground and iron rods protruding above ground. In some cases, they were constructed from railway iron or interconnected in T-shaped patterns. At key locations, as many as six rows of these obstacles were deployed. Their spacing was calculated, often lying 50 to 100 meters ahead of korugans. Major concentrations were located between Bahşayiş and Eskice Tabyası, around the Büyükçekmece Dam, and at Darboğaz Çakıl Pier.

The first ring of the defense, however, was made up of barbed wire,[195] positioned in front of the dragon's teeth, this was designed to entangle and immobilize advancing tanks. Further reinforcement came from dedicated tank positions constructed behind the second line's ridges. These were arranged in crescent formations to allow a wide 180-degree firing range against uphill advances. The line also incorporated water depots, such as the one near Gazilertepe Şehitliği, ensuring consistent supply for stationed troops.[196]

---

[192] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 212–70.

[193] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 271.

[194] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 281–90.

[195] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 155.

[196] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 274.

In addition to these structural elements, trenches and dugouts (*siperler*) were dug to accommodate infantry, especially in less cultivated zones, which facilitated their preservation. Finally, decoy fortifications (*sahte tahkimat*) were built to mislead enemy reconnaissance, mimicking real defense structures but lacked depth, serving to absorb or misdirect initial attacks away from actual strongpoints. [197]

The construction of the Çatalca Line was underpinned by a sustained financial, institutional, and logistical mobilization that began well before the outbreak of the Second World War. Initial preparations were set in motion as early as 1934–1935, with a dedicated budget of one million Turkish Liras allocated specifically for fortifications in Thrace.[198] Classified as military secrets, the fortification projects in strategic regions such as İzmir, Çatalca, Erzurum, Kars, and İzmit bypassed competitive bidding processes in favor of negotiated procurement.[199] The project received further infusions of domestic and foreign currency in 1937 to acquire heavy machinery and cover essential expenses. By late 1938, Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak had begun site inspections in Thrace, according to Aydın, signaling the operationalization of the works even before Atatürk's death[200]. With the onset of global war in 1939, the effort escalated significantly: in October, the line was officially named the "Çakmak Line,"[201] and a massive budget request of over 7.3 million Liras was submitted, including an immediate 2.3 million Liras to speed up implementation[202]. Labor mobilization peaked in 1941, with the conscription of 30,000 novice reserve soldiers approved for construction in Çatalca and Kırklareli, supplemented by civilian workers for road and logistics infrastructure.[203]

The construction of the Çatalca Line heavily relied on reinforced concrete for the pillboxes, with walls and roofs sometimes over 1.5 to 2.25 meters thick, requiring significant amounts of steel and iron for reinforcement. Turkey encountered considerable scarcities of cement, its annual domestic cement production was insufficient to meet the extensive fortification needs during the Second World War.[204]

---

[197] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 176.

[198] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 29.; BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 53, Folder 29, Folder 4.

[199] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 29.

[200] Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*, 31.

[201] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 88, Folder 97, Folder 6.

[202] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 90, Folder 23, Folder 2.

[203] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 94, Folder 39, Folder 16.

[204] Hasan Cenk Çelik impressively evaluates the material feasibility of constructing the Çatalca Line by adapting German military construction benchmarks to the context of Turkey's domestic production capacity. Using figures from the *Her Sınıfa Mahsus İstihkam Hizmeti* booklet published by the General Staff in 1943, he notes that 1 cubic meter of concrete required approximately 350 kilograms of cement and 150 liters of water. Based on these proportions and excluding any imported material, Çelik estimates that Turkey could produce around 817,142 m^3 of concrete annually. Drawing from comparative data, from German fortification standards, states that one machine gun post required 90 m^3 of concrete.

To address these shortages, Turkey relied on imports, in 1941, a total of 28,000 tons of cement were purchased from abroad under two separate decrees specifically to prevent delays in the fortification efforts.[205] Other essential materials included barbed wire for defensive layering, and earth and stone for camouflage and structural reinforcement. For simpler defensive points, timber and wood were used, and even tiles and bricks were produced locally by skilled soldiers from available materials. However, Turkey faced significant material scarcities, particularly an insufficient supply of bar iron in 1941, which delayed fortification construction, prompting the Karabük Iron and Steel Factory to produce it.[206] Overall, Turkey's domestic cement production was inadequate for the extensive fortification needs, with calculations suggesting it could only produce a small fraction of the required structures. To address these shortages and equip the defenses, Turkey imported various crucial items: ventilation fans and poisonous gas filters (some locally designed when French fans were unavailable), power generators from America mounted on trucks, radio lamps from France, and infrastructure cables from England. Construction machinery like compressors, excavators, and concrete mixing machines were purchased from America as early as 1937 for fortified areas like Çanakkale and Kırklareli.[207] Critically, anti-tank weapons and mines were in high demand for the Çatalca defenses, leading to a rearrangement of aid shipments from England in 1943. In addition to specific components and materials, various weapons were acquired internationally, including rifles from Yugoslavia and anti-tank guns from Germany, along with tanks from Allied forces.

The construction of the Çatalca Line was not only a massive engineering and logistical effort but also a complex and deeply unequal labor regime. As Salim Aydın documents, the urgency of fortification works after 1939 led to extraordinary labor mobilizations, including the conscription of 30,000 reserve soldiers in 1941 and the employment of thousands of civilians, often under coercive conditions. Non-Muslim male citizens born between 1894 and 1913 were drafted into unarmed labor battalions and assigned to construction tasks without basic shelter or protection, many of them deployed in the Hadımköy–Çatalca sector.[208] Even escaped laborers were punished by being sent to Edirne or Erzurum and forced to work for a year without pay.[209] According to Ersoy Zengin and Serdar Göktaş's study, between September 1, 1939, and May 7, 1945, a total of 22,663 soldiers (13 person per day), including officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted men, and military students, died in hospitals from various illnesses while serving in the land, naval, and

---

Dividing total production by this figure, Çelik estimates that Turkey's yearly cement output could only facilitate the construction of approximately 9,000 German machine gun posts. p.122

[205] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 123.

[206] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 128.

[207] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 130.

[208] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 101.

[209] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 101.

air forces.[210] These deaths were largely the result of malnutrition, harsh climatic conditions, inadequate hygiene, poor living standards in barracks, and widespread infectious diseases. The issue was officially addressed in 1951 during a session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), where the Ministry of National Defense confirmed the number based on military health records.

Despite its ambitious scope, the Çatalca Line bore significant structural and conceptual limitations that undermined its strategic credibility in the eyes of contemporary observers. Çelik refers to British Archives to state that Allied experts, such as General James Cornwall, criticized the Turkish military's understanding of modern warfare, claiming that Turkish officers had "no comprehension of tactical depth" in the age of aerial bombardment and airborne operations, stating that "the Turks live in a fool's paradise," believing that a heavily mechanized assault could be repelled by fixed fortifications alone.[211] Tactical design flaws further amplified this vulnerability, allowing enemy artillery to effectively shell both without repositioning. While the fortification system was architecturally robust against a frontal land invasion from the Thrace border, it remained dangerously exposed to outflanking from Romania or Crimea, or through amphibious landings from the Aegean Islands.[212]

The design and execution processes was as complex as the labor and material problems, there is no single individual or entity as the sole "designer" of the Çatalca Line, both in terms of architectural features and site planning. Instead, the construction process and the design principles adopted for the Çatalca Line appear to have been a strategic adaptation and implementation process guided by top military leadership and influenced by existing fortification models. Also cited by Aydın and Çelik, Burhan Oğuz, in his voluminous memoir, provides exceptional details about the design process of the Çatalca Line, drawing from his personal experience within the *Tahkimat Teknik Bürosu* (Fortification Technical Bureau).[213] He recounts that this pivotal bureau was established within the School of Engineering (*Mühendis Mektebi*) specifically to utilize the expertise of its professors for defense efforts. The bureau maintained a high level of secrecy, marked by a "no entry" sign on its door and a sentry guarding it, most of the employees were civil engineers. Oğuz himself joined the bureau on August 1, 1941, to expand his knowledge as a student, and was affectionately called "*Küçük*" (junior) because by the head of the office Galip Bey. The bureau's primary function was the design and planning of the structural units of the Çatalca Line. This involved attention to their internal features, including the placement of

[210] Ersoy Zengin and Serdar Göktaş, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sürecinde Türk Ordusunda Yaşanan Salgın Hastalıklar Ve Ölümler," *Tarih ve Gelecek Dergisi* 6, no. 3 (2020): 3, https://doi.org/10.21551/jhf.796673.

[211] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 152.

[212] Çelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları," 163.

[213] Burhan Oğuz, *Yaşadıklarım Dinlediklerim: Tarihi ve Toplumsal Anılar* (Simurg, 2008), 122.

artillery and machine guns, ventilation systems for gas expulsion, poisonous gas filters, and power generator groups. A rare, reflective account by Burhan Oğuz, who worked at the *Tahkimat Teknik Bürosu* during the war, sheds a critical light on the political and material economy behind the Çakmak Line's construction.

Describing the atmosphere in 1941, Oğuz notes that "tons upon tons of concrete and iron were being poured" into the project, with seemingly unlimited resources and no hesitation. Yet behind this patriotic display of defense effort, he ironically points to the political protection (*himâye*) offered by Kemal Balıkesir Paşa and the lucrative gains amassed by contractors like Sait İbrahim (Esi) Bey and his Hungarian partner Boronkay Bela, who according to Oğuz"acquired tremendous wealth in a short time when they did not have a penny."[214] Oğuz suggests that while official narratives emphasized urgency and national duty, the actual implementation became entangled with patronage, speculation, and unregulated profiteering. Kemal Pasha, faced with circulating rumors, eventually withdrew from the project, while some contractors, such as Armenak Gönciyan, made their own fortunes. Oğuz's closing line, "may all their efforts be honored," reads as a raw commentary on the moral ambiguity of wartime infrastructural labor.

Oğuz's memoir informs the implementation of the Çakmak Line as a curious mixture of improvisation, speculations, and concealed economy. Sait İbrahim (Sait Esi), later the head of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, was responsible for site placement, operating under the directive of Cavalry General Altay Paşa. Across the terrain, Altay Paşa would ride on horseback, using his cane as a pointer, select locations for bunkers with commands: "Place one here, one there, and another over there."[215] Once these sites were determined, the Technical Fortification Office (*Tahkimat Teknik Bürosu*) began its work, issuing covert tenders and arranging the installation of military infrastructure, including ventilation systems and generator units, most of which were reportedly supplied through Sait Bey himself. Gas filters and other technical devices were procured from Kırıkkale and installed on-site. Armenak Gönciyan, operating under the guaranty of Kemal Paşa, was tasked with manufacturing and installing armored doors, yet he was later identified by Turkish national security as having joined an Armenian delegation sent to Cairo to negotiate with German agents, his travel expenses allegedly covered by German intelligence. Some of the construction bordered on the absurd, sometimes, a massive stone had been left directly in front of a defensive firing slit, requiring a team of soldiers with picks and shovels to level the terrain. Oğuz continues in his sharp, mocking tone, noting that while the state poured resources into the fortification works, General Altay's private mansion in Emirgan was also

[214] Oğuz, *Yaşadıklarım Dinlediklerim: Tarihi ve Toplumsal Anılar*, 404.

[215] Oğuz, *Yaşadıklarım Dinlediklerim: Tarihi ve Toplumsal Anılar*, 404.

completed.[216] With irony, he recounts how the mansion was initially built by soldiers working in uniform, until complaints forced them to change into the civilian clothes they had brought from their villages. He further ridicules the symbolic honor bestowed upon Altay Paşa by the IETT, which marked the general's front gate with a bus stop sign right in front of his mansion for his own name.

The account of Burhan Oğuz complicates any neat portrayal of the Çatalca fortifications as a purely technocratic or strategic enterprise. What emerges instead is a spatial field shaped by uneven sacrifice, political shielding, and opportunistic accumulation. Regardless of whether every detail he recounts is fully accurate, his narrative exposes the bewildering layers of improvisation, ego, and material excess that make up military construction on this scale. It points to the deep difficulty of grasping how military environments are conceived, built, and sometimes squandered, often at staggering cost. Just as importantly, Oğuz's observations gesture toward the informal production and circulation of military spatial knowledge, sometimes under the command of a general pointing with a cane, sometimes in the hustle of an engineering school office. These fragments and speculations carry weight precisely because official archive of plans, diagrams, or post-construction assessments are very limited. If Oğuz's story proves anything, it is the urgent need to look beyond laws and decrees to understand the layered realities of wartime space-making. His story is also important in light of all the recent publications that conclude with a call to preserve the Çatalca Line and turn it into a museum. Without knowing the process, how it was built, who was involved, under what conditions, a museum would risk becoming an empty shell, stripped of context and meaning. We simply do not have enough information to fully make sense of the Çatalca fortifications. And yet again, Oğuz's account underscores the need for more research, not only on the construction phase but also on the long durée, the eight decades of life these structures have lived, decayed, and been interpreted through.

The Çatalca Line both in scale and complexity stands as one of the most visible testaments to the Turkish military's wartime building capacity and urges questions as to how such capacity was assembled, under what material, political, and human costs, and for which imagined futures. As a defense environment, Çatalca exemplifies how military architecture operates within an anticipatory regime. The technical rationality of bunkers, trenches, and anti-tank installations cannot be disentangled from the improvised politics, labor mobilizations, and industrial dependencies that shaped them. The archive itself bears the contradictions of the Çatalca Line: structured by bureaucratic order yet punctuated by silences, omissions, and prohibitions. Çatalca was not the only fortified zone; remnants of bunkers remain scattered along the Black Sea coast, in Edirne, Çanakkale, Milas, Ula, and Kars. In Ankara, tunnel and shelter systems in Kalealtı,

[216] Oğuz, *Yaşadıklarım Dinlediklerim: Tarihi ve Toplumsal Anılar*, 405.

Dikmen, and Mamak continue to elude documentation. Despite repeated municipal announcements since 2011 to convert the Kalealtı shelter into a museum, no credible sources exist detailing their planning, construction, or the actors involved, only fragmentary, rumor-like claims that "the Germans constructed them". Yet this absence is not unusual, nor is it a sign of exceptional secrecy, as the local government and press tends to advertise as it was. It reflects the logic of military space itself: control over environments is achieved through operational opacity and spatial mastery, not through public visibility. The scarcity of information is not evidence of an obscured drama but an ordinary feature of militarized landscapes. In this sense, military architecture embodies a spatial paradox, designed for permanence, yet frequently abandoned; engineered for impenetrability, yet opaque even in documentation.[217] Positioned at the thresholds of land, sea, and air, such structures do more than defend, they convert geography into a strategic asset, recalibrating terrain, visibility, and access. In doing so, they not only inscribe power onto the landscape, however, they may remain equally idle and forgettable like Çakmak Line even for the histories of built environment.

2.3.2. Securing the Seaways: Control of Coasts and Ports

Theorizing seascapes as territory requires confronting the interface where land meets water as a strategic zone shaped by infrastructure, surveillance, and legal regimes. Territory here extends seaward, taking on fluid, volumetric, and dynamic forms.[218] The coastline becomes a frontier where the logics of land-based defense, fortifications, ports, radar systems, reach into the sea, projecting power across distances that are unstable by conventional means. From shore batteries to aerial reconnaissance, from lighthouse beacons to diplomatic agreements, states assert control over maritime space through a complex assemblage of technologies and laws that transform the sea into a governable, segmented, and militarized environment. While the water bodies resists stable ontologies, it moves, obscures, disperses, it also invites strategic calculations: visibility, access, and depth become attributes to be managed. Coastal fortifications, naval treaties, and submerged cables all participate in this spatial logic, where the defense of land, the very materiality, increasingly depends on the command of water.[219] This shifting terrain compels us to see maritime space not as peripheral to territorial politics but as central to the very ways modern states imagine, defend, and expand their spatial authority.[220]

---

[217] Elif Kaymaz and Caner Arıkboğa, "Exposing the Environments of Warfare: On the Permanency of Defence Epistemologies," 2025, https://www.virtual-lsa.uk/ahra2025/controlled-environments/.

[218] "Introduction."

[219] Phillips, "Water: Order and the Offshore: The Territories of Deep-Water Oil Production," 51.

[220] Claude Raffestin, "Elements for a Theory of the Frontier," trans. Jeanne Ferguson, *Diogenes* 34, no. 134 (1986): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1177/039219218603413401.

The Straits exemplify this layered functionality. While the Montreux Convention was a diplomatic victory, one of Turkey's key territorial consolidations of the interwar period, it was also a practical, spatial arrangement that required constant military and administrative labor. This section explores a military exercise involving the crossing of the Bosphorus from two points, revealing how even symbolic crossings demand structural preparation. The Straits are where two lands come close but do not meet. They create proximity without unity, they are passage and obstacle at once. During the war, the Bosphorus was seen as a likely aerial target. Istanbul's coastal defense was treated not only in naval terms but also as a potential air corridor to be monitored, visualized, and managed. Defensive strategies materialized in the form of diagrams, coastal installations, and surveillance points, all of which enforced the political meaning of the sea.

A different kind of maritime spatial production unfolded further south, around the port of Mersin and İskenderun. As German presence intensified in the Balkans and the Aegean, Turkey and Britain began redirecting maritime attention to the southeastern coast. These ports, formally civilian and neutral, became latent military hubs. One striking case is the multi-day survey mission of a British officer and a Turkish liaison, whose daily logs, sketches, and site visits reveal a granular and deliberate process of militarized spatial planning. Together they examined where to locate watchpoints, searchlights, and storage units, transforming coastal space into an operational diagram. In Mersin, a prisoner exchange was staged and filmed on the docks, temporarily turning the port into a diplomatic performance ground. These southern maritime sites formed an unofficial but highly active zone of cooperation, which generated an arena of expressive of alliance, projection, and spatial recalibration.

2.3.2.1. Exercising Montreux Sovereignty: The Straits

The Straits, the Bosporus and Gallipoli, as A.L. MacFie argues, played a continuous "perhaps even a decisive" role in shaping Second World War diplomacy, despite Turkey's neutrality and the closure of the Straits to belligerent warships until 1945.[221] Anchored in the Montreux Convention, Turkish control became a central strategic lever. Germany favored the closure to block Allied access to the Black Sea and even considered seizing the Straits. In the critical Russo-German talks of November 1940, Molotov's demand for control over the Straits led Hitler to abandon diplomacy and begin planning for war, what MacFie identifies as a decisive turning point.[222] The re-militarization of the Straits as seen in the previous section, was celebrated as a both diplomatic and strategic accomplishment on the Turkish side.

[221] A. L. MacFie, "The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45," *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (1989): 238.

[222] MacFie, "The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45," 242.

As mentioned above, from 1942 onward, the Allies pressured Turkey to open the Straits and enter the war, emphasizing their importance for Balkan operations. Churchill issued territorial warnings, Roosevelt advocated postwar free passage, and the Soviets consistently rejected the Montreux regime. By 1945, Moscow demanded both treaty revision and military bases, Turkey refused. The Straits, then, served as a geopolitical pressure regulator, shaping strategic calculations, diplomatic alignments, and the war's unfolding balance of power.[223]

While diplomatic agreements secured control over passage through the Straits, crossing them posed a different set of challenges for the Turkish Army. At the outset of the war in 1939, a primary focus for port and pier construction was the Marmara Sea, with numerous small ports and piers initiated. These constructions were strategically aimed at ensuring the logistics for military units stationed in Thrace and facilitating their potential evacuation if necessary. In late 1939, the Turkish government approved a new defense-related budget allocation for construction and equipment (*ameliyat ve tesisat*) at piers in the Marmara region. The funding, 800,000 lira, was drawn from unspent military allocations from earlier laws. A new budget line titled "construction and equipment costs at Marmara piers" was established under the National Defense budget, reflecting military logistics efforts to strengthen maritime infrastructure just before WW2 pressures peaked.

The decision involved coordination between the General Staff and the Ministry of Finance and was finalized by the Council of Ministers on December 11, 1939.[224] The decision to continue the construction of ten piers in the Marmara Basin through a public tender was formalized by a decree in February 1940.[225] The contract was awarded to the collective company of Sadık Diri and Halit Köprücü, by 1941 and 1942, the project's budget had nearly tripled with additional funds transferred from railway budgets,[226] justified by the designation of these piers as having "exceptional importance and urgency for national defense."[227] These constructions were strategically aimed at ensuring the logistics for military units stationed in Thrace and facilitating their potential evacuation. Halit Köprücü's Seferha company undertook these challenging projects, employing an innovati**v**e "piled system" using reinforced concrete honeycomb caissons, which were notably low in iron use and more resilient to damage. These caissons[228] were prefabricated on wooden planks above water, then dynamically dropped into place using TNT

[223] MacFie, "The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45."

[224] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 89, Folder 117, Folder 5.

[225] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 90, Folder 12, Folder 19.

[226] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 98, Folder 25, Folder 6.

[227] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 95, Folder 44, Folder 2.

[228] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 2, İktisadî politikaları ve uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, İletişim Yayınları (İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 381.

(obtained from the army) once construction was complete, followed by piling and concrete filling to create a monolithic pier. Initially, eight such piers were planned to enable the army to cross the Marmara Sea, as Tekeli & İlkin lists: four on the Thracian coast (Silivri, Marmara Ereğlisi, Şarköy, and Gelibolu) and four opposite them (Bandırma II, Erdek, Karabiga, and Lapseki). Following 1939, additional piers were commissioned to meet wartime demands, including those at Maltepe (Istanbul), Zeytinburnu (Istanbul), Mudanya, Gemlik, Tekirdağ, and Çanakkale. [229] By July 1941, the Tekirdağ Pier was provisionally accepted, and the Ereğli, Silivri, Bandırma, Gelibolu, and Lapseki piers were largely complete, while Erdek and Şarköy were still under construction. Pier construction also commenced in Kilya, designated as the supply center for Allied forces to be stationed in Thrace. Upon completion, these collective constructions were expected to achieve a loading and unloading capacity of 1,200 tons per day.

On a summer day in July 1941, Turkish newspapers reported the successful completion of a military exercise across the Bosphorus.[230] The headline struck a tone of composed achievement: *"A military trial was conducted in the Bosphorus. Various units were transferred from the Rumelian coast to the Anatolian side without entering the city of Istanbul."* In the photograph that accompanied the article, General Fahrettin Altay speaks with a reporter casually and confidently, as if recounting a peaceful tour. The text speaks of coordination, precision, and success. The city remained undisturbed. The crossing worked. Lunch was served. This is how spatial rehearsals often appear in public view: smooth, victorious, unburdened by their own complexity.

While the Bosphorus crossing was publicly presented as a discrete and successful event, it was part of a broader strategic framework aimed at maintaining internal mobility under the pressure of external threats. One year prior to the exercise, in anticipation of wartime disruption, a formal directive was issued specifying that, should transportation in the Sea of Marmara become compromised, mass mobilization and logistics would be rerouted through the Black Sea and Dardanelles. The same document instructed that piers and docks along both straits be surveyed, local port administrations activated, and key vessels identified from Sinop to İzmir, with advance preparations coordinated across all relevant civilian and military bodies.[231] Five large barges were assigned to support this potential diversion, and additional preparations included renovated barges, lumber supplies, reinforced ropes, and vehicle retrofits.[232]

---

[229] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 2, İktisadî politikaları ve uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 381.

[230] "Boğaziçinde Askeri Bir Deneme Yapıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1941.

[231] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 93.

[232] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 55; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 89.


Boğaziçinde askerî bir deneme yapıldı

Muhtelif birlikler, İstanbul şehrine uğramadan Rumeli kıyısından Anadolu yakasına muvaffakiyetle geçirildi

Figure 12. Report on the military exercise (*Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1941)

Behind the polished public language of military competence stood a series of coordinated logistical operations that required sustained material and institutional alignment. Crossing the straits under wartime conditions demanded not only navigational skill, but a systematic reconfiguration of civilian and military infrastructure. Transportation units and support services had to be made interoperable across land and sea. Civilian barges were refitted to accommodate animal transport.[233] Timber was procured to construct temporary piers and platforms.[234] Life jackets were distributed in bulk to soldiers involved in the crossing.[235] All participating units were instructed to cooperate fully and provide assistance during the crossing. Requests for equipment and personnel were accompanied by mandatory name lists, and facilitating the operation was described as an institutional responsibility.[236]

The operation involved a layered spatial choreography. Transfer points had to be selected for both strategic discretion and logistical efficiency. Modular use of piers was planned to allow for sequential and multi-modal loading.[237] Ferry services operated by Şirket-i Hayriye were requisitioned and adapted for military use.[238] Port authorities and regional administrators coordinated on vessel scheduling, pier capacity, and material allocation.[239]

[233] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 55

[234] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 89.

[235] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 48; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 32; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 49.

[236] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 05.

[237] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 51, ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 53.

[238] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 56, ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 57, BCA, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 81, ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 75, ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 72,

[239] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 42,

In addition to pier operations and logistical transfers, tactical exercises were also conducted to evaluate operational readiness across different layers of the military. Crossing drills were organized in the Black Sea Strait, both day and night, to test the capacity of coordinated troop and material movement. Observation posts were planned along the strait, and their activation was dependent on technical inputs and approvals, including foreign military advisors. In the Çatalca region, the navy conducted joint exercises to test visibility between sea-based aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines. These drills included the deployment of submarines for maneuver practice, with supply chains routed through Haliç for refueling and equipment. Commanders emphasized the need for precise mapping of crossing sites and surrounding waters, and all exercises were monitored in coordination with Istanbul's military command and strait control authorities.[240]

Preparations for a similar crossing at Çanakkale followed the same operational logic. Gelibolu, Bolayır, and the *Çanakkale Müstahkem Mevkii* were evaluated as key staging zones, asking the cooperation of pier contractors.[241] Material allocations, route planning, and interregional coordination were laid out in advance. In the case of Çanakkale, the operational plans extended to the movement of a full division within a single night. These crossings were designed and coordinated by the Naval Military Transport Command, which issued detailed plans covering vessel requirements, scheduling, and coordination protocols. Equipment procurement included life-saving materials, and site reconnaissance was conducted to identify viable pier locations for both night and daytime operations.[242] These inspections were carried out in coordination with logistics officers and technical staff to ensure alignment between spatial conditions and material availability. Field units were expected to manage movement independently, while remaining aligned with national logistics protocols. These efforts were part of a broader military strategy in which geographical chokepoints were structured as operational assets, subject to planning, expansion, and re-integration into a larger mobility framework.

The crossings demonstrate how wartime space was not passively inherited but actively structured. The straits, often viewed as geopolitical margins, were integrated into the logistical core of national defense planning. Movement across them depended not simply on command decisions but on infrastructural improvisation, inter-agency synchronization, and spatial foresight.

[240] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 34.

[241] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 91.

[242] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 59.

In parallel with the operational planning around the straits, the Istanbul port system was subjected to extensive defensive reconfiguration. A dedicated directive titled *"Liman, müessesat ve deniz nakil vasıtalarının hava hücumlarına karşı korunma tedbirleri"* established a coordinated framework for protecting the city's coastal infrastructure against air attacks during wartime mobilization.[243] This framework addressed both military logistics and civilian transport zones, recognizing their dual vulnerability and operational importance. The document defined defense measures for sites including Sirkeci, Galata, Tophane, Haydarpaşa, and Üsküdar, all of which were integrated into a spatially distributed system of alarm signals, machine gun detachments, camouflage, and fire suppression units.




Figure 13. Sketch showing the defense of the Port of Istanbul against air raids with anti-aircraft batteries (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, File 0, Item 59. Two sketches appended at the end of the document).

The plan distinguished between active defense (such as anti-aircraft batteries and machine-gun units stationed at critical port facilities) and passive defense, including blackout orders, smoke dispersion systems, and evacuation protocols. Coordination was handled jointly by the Naval Military Transport Command (*Deniz Nakliyatı Askerî Komiserliği*), Istanbul's municipal fire brigade, and civilian port authorities. Technical devices, such as searchlights and acoustic alarms, were positioned along key piers and rooftops, and approximately 50 fog/smoke dispersal units were designated for use in areas of highest exposure.

The accompanying maps, or rather sketches, are rough, almost schematic, yet they reveal more about the spatial logic of defense than a polished map could. Drawn to indicate anti-aircraft batteries and their firing ranges, they divide the Bosphorus into overlapping circles of vulnerability and control. What emerges is a way of seeing: Istanbul reimagined as a divided field

[243] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 9, Folder 0, Folder 103.

where each shore faces the other through lines of artillery. The maps register how the anticipation of attack reorganized perception itself, turning the city's connective geography, its harbors, crossings, and waterways, into potential lines of confrontation.

2.3.2.2. Configuring a Logistical and Diplomatic Hub: Mersin

As Axis influence expanded across the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey and Britain began shifting their maritime attention toward the country's southern coastline. Mersin and its port was reconfigured into a wartime domain. This transformation involved coordinated defense planning, infrastructure expansion, and covert logistical integration, often under the guise of technical missions or diplomatic alignment. In 1941, the Turkish government relocated its Naval War School and High School from Heybeliada to Mersin, a move that reflected both the strategic perception of Istanbul's vulnerability and the southeastern coast's relative security for naval operations and training.[244]

In line with the broader expansion of Mersin's port infrastructure, the British firm United Kingdom Commercial Corporation was formally authorized to undertake construction works in both Mersin and İskenderun. This included the building of piers, quays, stations, and auxiliary facilities. To support this effort, the Turkish government approved a full customs exemption for all imported construction machinery and materials required by the firm. The exemption, based on a series of ministerial approvals issued in March 1942, was officially ratified by the Council of Ministers on April 7, 1942. This bureaucratic facilitation highlights the collaborative framework that underpinned Allied-Turkish military logistics along the southern coast.[245] In addition to new constructions, the state consolidated control over existing infrastructure. In April 1942, five municipal piers at the Port of Mersin were transferred to the State Ports Administration to streamline loading and unloading activities in light of wartime exigencies.[246] This administrative measure reflects how existing urban infrastructure was reclassified and militarized to meet the heightened demands of defense logistics and port operations.

Planning documents from late 1941 and early 1942 show extensive collaboration between British and Turkish officers to assess Mersin's defensive potential.[247] Mersin, İskenderun, Adana, and Ulukışla were increasingly recognized as vulnerable export piers that required active defense against aerial threats. In response, military plans included the purchase of aircraft to secure these

[244] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 464.

[245] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 98, Folder 27, Folder 10.

[246] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 98, Folder 30, Folder 3.

[247] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 82.

strategic coastal and inland nodes,[248] while a total of thirty-two anti-aircraft guns were designated for deployment across these sites, underscoring the integration of these ports into a broader network of wartime spatial protection.[249] Joint reconnaissance missions were conducted across Mersin, İskenderun, Susanoğlu, and Taşucu, with the goal of selecting appropriate locations for searchlight installations, gun emplacements, storage areas, and observation posts.[250] These operations were supported by Turkish liaison officers and interpreters, among them Lieutenant Vecihi Akın, who was dispatched to the region and submitted detailed reports following his field visits.[251] His notes, complemented by sketches and route itineraries, offer rare insight into the granular processes of wartime spatial assessment and will be analyzed in the following subsection.

Alongside tactical preparations, port logistics became a key priority. Mersin's unloading capacity was expanded to 1,200 tons per day by late 1942, with British engineers (operating under civilian cover) overseeing inland distribution routes.[252] Road improvements connected Mersin to Tarsus, Pozantı, and Ulukışla to the north and Silifke and Karaman to the west.[253] These mobility corridors extended the port's reach into Anatolia and were overseen by units later identified as part of the British 1st Construction Group. Mersin also functioned as an entry point for British personnel involved in airfield constructions, with one report documenting the landing of technicians who traveled inland via Konya to initiate fieldwork.[254]

In tandem with its logistical role, Mersin became a site of covert concern for both Allied and Axis intelligence. British reports identified the port as a local node for the German Naval Command's intelligence activity. Ernst Friedrich Labod, operating under the cover of the Deutsche Levant Line, was tasked with organizing sabotage activities in Syria and reportedly coordinated with anti-Allied operatives crossing through the region.[255] British contingency plans even proposed the use of Mersin as a troop landing site in the event of German occupation, with approval granted for explosive storage at both Mersin and İskenderun.[256]

---

[248] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 82.

[249] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 24.

[250] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 12.

[251] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 13.

[252] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 2, İktisadî politikaları ve uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 382.

[253] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 484.

[254] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 100.

[255] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 590.

[256] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 592.



Figure 14. Stills from the newsreel "Mersin'de Esir Mübadelesi"



Figure 15. Report on the prisoner exchange in Mersin (*Ulus*, March 25, 1943)

On 21 March 1943, the port of Mersin became the stage for a meticulously coordinated exchange of wounded prisoners of war between Britain and Italy, underscoring Turkey's critical position as a neutral yet infrastructurally active player in the Mediterranean theatre. This event, widely recognized at the time, was covered in national newspapers under titles such as "*Mersin'de Yapılan Esir Değişimi*", which highlighted the Turkish government's successful mediation between the two warring sides and the logistical competence of the Umum Müdürlük in overseeing the operation.[257] Official diplomatic correspondence confirms that the exchange was conducted with high levels of coordination between Turkish, British, and Italian actors, despite adverse weather conditions. A letter received from the British Embassy expressed deep appreciation for Turkey's role, commending the civil and military officials as well as the Turkish Red Crescent Society for their oversight of medical inspections, security arrangements, and the humane handling of prisoners.[258] Special recognition was extended to Dr. Remzi Gönenç, who personally led the Red Crescent team on-site.

[257] "Mersin'de Yapılan Esir Değişimi," *Ulus*, March 25, 1943.

[258] BCA, 30-10-0-0, Box 179, Folder 236, Folder 1.




Figure 16. Map of Mersin (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, File 0, Item 113)

Beyond textual records, a wartime newsreel captured this moment in motion, providing rare visual evidence of the transfer.[259] The film, narrated in English and filmed in rough weather, shows the Italian hospital ship Gradisca and the British ship Talma anchored off the Mersin coast, with wounded prisoners waiting patiently aboard each vessel. The footage maps Mersin's shoreline and landmarks like Kızkalesi (Maiden's Castle), visually framing the harbor as a liminal and symbolically charged site of international passage. Turkish Red Crescent officers are seen boarding ships, coordinating logistics, and facilitating the transfer of wounded soldiers via small barges. The film emphasizes the emotional intensity of the exchange: the cautious optimism of prisoners returning home, warm salutes between officers, and the comforting promise of English beer and cigarettes awaiting the wounded aboard the Talma. The visual archive, paired with written diplomatic and journalistic records, marks the Mersin exchange was a humanitarian gesture but also a spatial performance of wartime neutrality, logistical capability, and controlled permeability at the maritime frontier.

In early 1943, Turkish Lieutenant Vecihi Akın was assigned to accompany British military officers Lieutenant Colonel Newey and Captain Luize on a coastal reconnaissance mission spanning from Mersin to Taşucu.[260] Officially dispatched as a liaison and interpreter, Akın's role extended far beyond translation. The detailed report he produced, complete with hand-drawn maps, offers an

[259] *Mersin'de Esir Mübadelesi*, 1943, T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, https://filmmirasim.ktb.gov.tr/tr/film/mersin-esir-mubadelesi.

[260] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 13.

unusually granular record of spatial reasoning at work: terrain judged by slope and soil, defensive horizons plotted by eye, and strategic visibility negotiated through field improvisation.

The mission proceeded in several stages, beginning in Mersin, where Akın and the officers examined the port area, the central lighthouse, and adjacent shoreline zones. At the lighthouse, where construction had previously ceased, the British officers determined it to be a suitable emplacement site for a 90 cm searchlight, despite Akın noting poor access conditions and damp soil. A second, movable searchlight was considered for placement in the parklands toward the western edge of the city. Akın, drawing from field work, recommended alternate access routes and even surveyed elevations by foot to assess sightlines, particularly important given the low and flat nature of the coast in this sector.




Figure 17. Vecihi Akın's Sketches (ATASE 110-9-1-14 (4/0/112–110)

From there, the team moved westward, stopping at Kazanlı, Susanoğlu, Narlıkuyu, and Dumlugöz. In each location, Akın reported on visibility ranges, potential threats from low-lying fog, and construction logistics. At Susanoğlu, he identified existing military installations and argued that deploying searchlights near the old German bathhouse would offer both elevation and concealment. At Dumlugöz, he flagged the terrain as promising for coastal oversight, though warned of seismic instability. In Narlıkuyu, Akın proposed relocating the searchlight plan slightly east of the British officers' initial suggestion, citing better soil and slope. He also repeatedly pointed out the lack of suitable access roads, recommending roadwork or trail marking as a prerequisite for any permanent emplacement.

What emerges from the report is not simply a list of coordinates but a deeply embodied form of spatial reasoning. Akın's sketches, which represent distances with walking times and mark observation fields with personal notations, convey a hybrid logic. They are at once cartographic

and experiential, military and vernacular, the terrain was measured and equipped. And in doing so, Akın inserted himself, quietly but assertively, into the strategic dialogue. His remarks about misidentified locations, poorly chosen access routes, or unsuitable construction points suggest a friction between local knowledge and imported military planning.

This friction reveals the subtle geopolitics of spatial expertise. While Akın's British counterparts retained formal authority, the Turkish lieutenant operated as a translator of both language and land. His report registers a muted tension: between imposed strategy and embodied terrain, between standardization and situated knowledge. That one of his annotated krokis corrects a misreading of topography by the British team points to the stakes of these field judgments. Defensive geographies were not only planned, they were argued, often in the margins of reports and the shading of a hand-drawn ridge.

The forwarding note from the General Staff, dated 16 February 1942, indicates that Lieutenant Vecihi Akın's reconnaissance mission to southern Turkey resulted in a six-page report accompanied by six visual materials. Akın himself directly references only three sketches in the body of his report: one depicting the vicinity of the lighthouse (Fener civarı), one covering the Mersin–Tarsus route, and one showing the Susanoğlu Gulf. These match three existing files in the digital archive, labeled Kroki No.1–3, although both the numbering and the titles appear to be later archival designations, not original authorial labels.[261] The remaining three visuals, referenced only in the forwarding letter, likely correspond to annotated military maps with hand-marked artillery and searchlight positions. Based on available evidence, these are 3 hand drawn maps of 1/100.000 scale, showing Mersin, Taşucu Gulf, İskenderun Port[262]. All six visual documents, the three sketches and the three maps, are dated 31 December 1941 in the digital archive. This is inconsistent with Akın's own account, which clearly states that he arrived in Mersin on 17 January 1942 and conducted his reconnaissance over the following 24 days.

Together, Akın's report and maps reveal a moment when technical observation, local knowledge, and transnational cooperation converged at the scale of terrain. The coastline, so often viewed from above as a strategic whole, here becomes fragmented into walkable segments, sightlines, and access paths. It is not the defense line as diagram, but the defense line as fieldwork.

The maritime frontier, whether along the heavily surveilled Straits or the diplomatically reconfigured ports of the south, operated through a spatial logic distinct from that of land-based

[261] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 110 "Susanoğlu Körfez Krokisi"; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 111 "Mersin ve Tarsus Yollarını Gösterir Kroki"; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 112 "Fener Civarındaki Alanı Gösterir Kroki"

[262] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 113 "Mersin ve civarını gösterir 1 100 000 ölçekli harita"; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 114 "Taşucu Körfezini gösterir 1 100 000 ölçekli harita"; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 115 "İskenderun Limanını gösterir 1 100 000 ölçekli harita";

defense. Sovereignty here was not anchored in fixed borders but enacted across moving surfaces, strategically positioned tools to render the seascape visible and controllable, intense field work, studying the terrain with reference to the sea, and building infrastructures to maximize wartime logistics from goods to prisoners. Defensive preparations demanded not only coastal emplacement but also multiple level coordination, between civil and military bodies, local terrain and aerial threat, foreign officers and local intermediaries. Ports like Mersin and passages like the Bosphorus as performative and infrastructural practices, were made legible through reconnaissance missions, planning directives, diplomatic exemptions, and visual records. In these hybrid zones, strategy unfolded across the coastline a permeable, monitored threshold, this point is especially crucial considering the refugee arrivals through the sea, from the Greek Islands.

2.3.3. Commanding the Airspace: Infrastructures of Flight

Air is a spatial problem, especially within the framework of aerial warfare. Long treated as an abstract void, it has become a militarized and governable medium as a zone of violence, defense, and territorial inscription.[263] From Giulio Douhet's doctrine of strategic bombing[264] to Peter Sloterdijk's concept of *atmoterrorism*[265], twentieth-century warfare transformed the atmosphere into a weaponized frontier, targeting not only bodies but the very air they inhabit. The emergence of aerial violence necessitated a volumetric understanding of territory, one that extended upward and rendered sky, cloud, and breath into operational domains.[266] As scholars like Peter Adey and Weiqiang Lin have argued.[267], air is not simply a background condition but a dynamic and politically charged environment, administered through surveillance, atmospheric sensing, and infrastructural regulation The wartime years witnessed the most heroic and the most catastrophic reaches of aviation, and what might the skies bring.

In Turkey, this reconfiguration of airspace as strategic terrain shaped both imagination and implementation. Aerial fear/pride and infrastructural planning joined in defense manuals, military cartographies, and foreign reconnaissance missions contributed to an emerging grammar of airspace. The İzmir case exemplifies this shift. In 1943, British and Turkish teams mapped the region for airfields, depots, and surveillance points, embedding the coastal and urban

---

[263] Frank Ledwidge, *Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions (Oxford University Press, 2020), https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198804314.001.0001.

[264] Giulio Doucet, *The Command of Air* (University of Alabama Press, 1927).

[265] Sloterdijk et al., *Terror from the Air*.

[266] Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev, *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, Social Visualities Series (Springer International Publishing AG, 2024); Graham, *Vertical*, Paperback edition; Davide Deriu, *On Balance: Architecture and Vertigo* (Lund Humphries Publishers Ltd, 2023).

[267] Adey, "Holding Still"; Adey, *Aerial Life*; Adey, *Air*; Weiqiang Lin, "Air: Spacing the Atmosphere: The Politics of Territorialising Air," in *Territory beyond Terra*, ed. Kimberley A. Peters et al., Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5316840.

landscape into Allied air strategy in the Aegean Coast. The Republic of Turkey, following the War of Independence, established an air force of 37 aircraft, leading to the relocation of the "Tayyare Mektebi" (Aircraft School) to Gaziemir in İzmir in 1923, where training commenced under French and Austrian experts. İzmir rapidly became a crucial early aviation hub for training and international collaboration. In a move towards greater self-sufficiency, the Kayseri Aircraft Factory was established in 1926, serving as a central point for aircraft maintenance, repair, and assembly, including the assembly of Junkers A-20 fighter planes. The Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK) was founded in 1925 to garner public support and financial resources for aircraft procurement. By the mid-1930s, Ankara had also started licensing and producing aircraft, such as the Curtiss 35 Hawk II fighter and PZL-24 fighters from Poland, with a significant number produced at the Kayseri Factory. The mechanist school was moved to Eskişehir in 1934, transforming it into another key aviation center, and in 1936, the Air War Academy was founded in Istanbul, notably with instructors from Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF). By 1939, the Turkish Air Force comprised 487 aircraft, though many were becoming outdated by the rapid technological advancements of the impending war.

Developing a strong air force required not only aircraft but also a robust airfield system. By 1942, Turkey had 139 suitable locations for landing and takeoff, most of which were dirt and needed to be concreted[268]. These locations needed fuel, oil, and repair services to function as proper airfields. The lengths of runways determined which types of aircraft could operate. With the outbreak of World War II, acquiring aircraft and materials from abroad became difficult, making the maintenance of the diverse fleet and the conversion of dirt runways to concrete ones crucial. Priority was given to upgrading four airfields for all-weather operations, with concreting beginning in Eskişehir in 1939. In June 1943, the British undertook a major effort to prepare 24 airfields across Turkey ("Afyon, Eskişehir, Tavşanlı, Alanyunt, Çardak, Dinar, Baladız, Uşak, Akşehir, Konya, Karaman, Çakmak, Mersin, Adana, İskenderun, İzmir, Bandırma, Balıkesir, Karacabey, Ankara, Ulukışla, Gemlik, İnegöl, Yenişehir ve Çan").[269] British technicians worked on these sites, completing the work in five months, faster than the projected year. The British intended to use these airfields, particularly for operations to liberate the Dodecanese Islands from German control. However, Turkish airfields could only accommodate 25 air squadrons, while the British proposed sending 45. To address this, the British suggested establishing advanced airbases near Afyon, and in Milas and Muğla. Despite British offers to undertake construction and increase port capacities in İskenderun and Mersin, Turkey only allowed British airbase establishment from August 1943, making the project's completion by year-end impossible.

---

[268] Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, 414–15.

[269] İlhan Tekeli, *Modernizm, modernite ve Türkiye'nin kent planlama tarihi*, 2. basım, İlhan Tekeli toplu eserler (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011), 504.

2.3.3.1. Allied Demands for Bases and Land: İzmir

Between 1939 and 1943, aviation aid to Turkey involved more than the provision of aircraft. British military planning extended into the terrain itself, generating a dispersed infrastructure of airfields, depots, and communication sites across western Anatolia. These installations had to be selected, surveyed, and camouflaged within the logic of Turkish neutrality. Military engineers and attachés were dispatched not to fight, but to measure ground conditions, sketch depot zones, and coordinate air defense logistics under diplomatic cover. İzmir emerged as one of the most intensively studied and spatially reconfigured sites in this process. Its port, rail junctions, and proximity to the Dodecanese rendered it strategically significant. British documents consistently prioritized İzmir as a logistics hub suitable for fuel storage, supply transfer, and personnel transit. Turkish military records from the same period reveal both the willingness to accommodate these plans and the consistent imposition of limits: uniforms were to be hidden, British technicians were to appear as civilians, and maps remained undisclosed. The base could be built, but its visibility had to remain blurred. This case study reconstructs the arc of British aviation planning in İzmir, using military correspondence, reconnaissance reports, and Turkish archival records. It follows the entry of foreign survey teams accompanied by Turkish officers, the ground-level assessments of airfield sites, the control measures over the terrain due to malaria concerns, and the contested negotiations over the use of civilian buildings in the city center.

The first proposals for Anglo-Turkish collaboration on air infrastructure appeared in mid-1939. On 21 June, a directive signed by Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak outlined necessary defense preparations in the event of a regional attack. İzmir appeared alongside Çanakkale and Marmaris as a zone requiring immediate military planning. Airfields at the western Anatolia, Eskişehir, Kütahya, İzmir were listed among the prepared or potentially usable sites. The Turkish General Staff proposed that these could be made available for joint operations, pending reconnaissance and technical adjustments.[270]

Diplomatic records from the same period confirm the urgency of these preparations. On 24 June 1939, British officials were briefed by the Turkish Chief of Staff on coordinated air defense measures for western Anatolia. British interest in İzmir accelerated in the following months.[271] Requests for access to Turkish coastal defense plans were lodged by the end of the year. By 31 December 1939, British representatives demanded detailed plans for the defense of İzmir and Çanakkale ports, warning that a lack of technical knowledge would hinder effective support in wartime conditions. These exchanges marked the point at which air defense planning became a

[270] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 3, Folder 0, Folder 38

[271] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 3, Folder 0, Folder 26

shared geopolitical project, binding Turkey's western ports to the strategic calculations of the British Empire. [272] Formal commitments followed. In a letter dated 13 February 1940, General Archibald Wavell, then Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in the Middle East, expressed his government's readiness to assist with the urgent task of planning and equipping of Turkish airbases.[273] The letter outlined a phased approach: Turkey would allocate land and begin initial works, and British personnel would provide technical equipment, materials, and planning expertise. French officers would also join the planning process. The communication named İzmir explicitly as one of the proposed focal points.

In early 1940, inspection teams began arriving. A French delegation initiated preliminary studies in İzmir[274], followed by a British team in February.[275] Turkish officer İhsan Gürkan accompanied the British mission across Balıkesir, Bandırma, and İzmir, and filed a detailed report on their survey activities. British engineers identified promising locations for aerodromes, assessed terrain conditions, and examined access to roads and coastal infrastructure. In May 1940, Turkish reports noted that preparation work continued at Çiğli and Cumaovası.[276] Simultaneously, new depot zones were identified for provisioning and armament storage.[277] These surveys and letters initiated a process of spatial coordination, unfolding through memoranda, covert visits, and diplomatic exchanges. İzmir, already of logistical interest due to its geography, began to function as a reference point for British military planning. The next phase would formalize this role through site selection, infrastructure mapping, and logistical simulations.

In early March 1941, British aviation planning in western Anatolia transitioned from preliminary surveys to active site selection. A team of British officers, including Major R.H. Batten, Flight Lieutenant R.P. Wallace-Tarry, and additional technical personnel, arrived in Ankara and proceeded to İzmir and its surrounding districts to evaluate conditions for permanent logistical infrastructure.[278] The mission was coordinated through the British military attaché, and its purpose was to define locations for aerodromes, fuel and munitions depots, hospitals, and staging grounds for potential future operations. The group was to be assisted by Alexander Gibb & Partners' Mr. Edkins on the issues of maritime infrastructure, a staff from Shell Company representatives about fuel depot logistics, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray for air raid defense planning.

---

[272] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 3, Folder 0, Folder 21

[273] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 92

[274] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 10

[275] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 10

[276] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 09

[277] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 142

[278] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 98

By 4 March, Turkish records confirm that the team was dispatched to the Menemen–İzmir–Cumaovası corridor to conduct ground assessments and initiate technical studies[279]. The selected area included access to railway lines, flat terrain suitable for expansion, and potential connectivity to existing civilian infrastructure. The document submitted by the British delegation proposed a facility that would require between 2,000 and 5,000 acres of open land. This base was envisioned as a multi-functional node, capable of hosting depots, barracks, vehicle repair centers, and logistical warehouses. Turkish authorities responded that the matter required higher-level political approval, noting that any installation would be formally presented as a Turkish facility and would serve under national ownership.




Figure 18. Areas Chosen as Bases by the British (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, File 0, Item 36)

The logic of camouflage emerged as a consistent spatial condition. According to the Turkish General Staff's internal notes, all facilities were to be presented as civilian storage centers or municipal infrastructure.[280] Foreign technicians were to appear as commercial agents or workers under contract. All supplies brought in by British personnel would be registered as Turkish

[279] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, Folder 0, Folder 38

[280] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 10, Folder 2, Folder 3

military property. Turkish authorities emphasized that British officers and engineers were not to appear in uniform and should remain indistinct from civilians. These protocols were intended to preserve the optics of neutrality while enabling discreet preparation for Allied cooperation in the event of Axis aggression.

Throughout March 1941, the planning process intensified. In Karşıyaka, Gaziemir, and the southern districts of İzmir, additional borehole tests and land assessments were conducted by British engineers with Turkish guides.[281] Access requests for infrastructure plans, port layouts, and shoreline piers were filed, but not all were granted. A telegram issued by the British delegation on 13 March notes that a local commander, Colonel Berköz, refused to grant access to certain military-controlled areas without explicit instructions from Ankara, delaying key inspections. The same message requested copies of İzmir's urban plans, including roads and harbor facilities.

Despite these tensions, the British team completed its reconnaissance mission by 19 March, submitting a map identifying over a dozen strategic locations throughout the İzmir metropolitan area and its hinterland: In Asarok Village (Menemen south) a primary munitions depot; Koyundere Village (Menemen) secondary munitions depot; Harmandalı Valley (Çiğli north) fuel depot site; West of Karşıyaka (Papas–Dedebaşı line) food depots, Bornova–Narlıköy axis – food, material depots; vehicle park and repair center; Pınarbaşı Road axis ordnance depots, Southwest of Seydiköy–Uzundere – fuel depot, Buca racetrack zone – provisional fuel storage; Civilian Hospitals old German consulate, French hospital; Military Field Hospitals: road from Buca to Karabağlar Harbor Depots: Transfer warehouses near port and distribution centers for urban delivery. Turkish commanders formally acknowledged receipt of the report, which included hand-drawn maps and British topographical overlays.[282]

At this stage, the İzmir planning zone began to crystallize as a coherent, if covert, spatial system. Unlike other airfield locations surveyed across Anatolia, the İzmir cluster exhibited dense concentration and functional segmentation, suggesting a more ambitious logistical role. It combined coastal access, overland distribution routes, and immediate links to aerodromes under development at Çiğli, Gaziemir, and Cumaovası[283]. The British files suggest that İzmir was envisioned as both a base and a relay, a structure of support rather than direct combat, but one whose readiness would enable Allied operations across the eastern Mediterranean if needed, or could defend İzmir in case of an enemy attack.

[281] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, Folder 0, Folder 37

[282] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, Folder 0, Folder 36

[283] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 3




Figure 19. İzmir Base (ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, File 0, Item 145)

In April 29, 1941, another report proves that British planning in İzmir shifted from surveying open terrain to identifying existing urban properties suitable for short-term depot use.[284] Along with an updated and expanded list of areas around the İzmir Gulf, the 1/100000 hand drawn İzmir Map shows additional areas marked between Balçova and Yenikale coast, also giving ideas about the sizes of these areas.

The survey led by British engineers also concluded in a formal list of 23 requested sites across İzmir's urban core and port districts. Among the requested sites, Ahmet Bey's tobacco warehouse, Selâmet box lumber factory, Warehouse of Hafız Recep, Ford garage, Italian school, Warehouse of the B.A.T. Company, Italian workshop (Luis Tins), Backup tobacco warehouse, building for port officers, two vacant lands, a large empty building, pier transit zone, and dock transit zone were accepted. However, the local military authorities did not allow the use of the fire station, municipal bus depot, three workshops, Chrysler garage and two large concrete buildings in Kültürpark.[285] The list was attached to a 1:15,000 scale British reconnaissance map, with targeted buildings marked for rapid conversion into storage and distribution centers. When the city map is analyzed closely, likely that these structures were selected for immediate usability and their proximity to İzmir's port and railway terminals. The intention was to activate a spatial network without new construction, relying instead on civilian building stock that could be co-opted and redefined without external visibility. The list reflects a broad spatial ambition that infiltrates both

[284] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 145

[285] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 4, Folder 0, Folder 145 "İzmir ile Kilye-Gelibolu bölgelerinde İngilizler tarafından kurulacak üslerin yerlerinin tespit edildiği, bu yerlerin bölgelerini gösterir krokilerin ilişik olarak sunulması."

private, public and international grounds, aiming to embed logistical infrastructure into the civic fabric of the city. In a way, the map consolidated the architectural infrastructure of a military base without ever declaring one. The city's logistical landscape, from tobacco warehouses to municipal garages, became an informal extension of British planning. The depots were temporary, reversible, and subject to symbolic masking. Yet they were materially present, mapped, and partially approved by Turkish authorities under conditions of controlled ambiguity.




Figure 20. Temporary depots requested by the British Forces in Izmir (ATASE 110-9-1-14 4/0/145)

Turkish military offices repeatedly emphasized this ambiguity that any British use of city buildings must appear formally civilian. Depots were to be labeled as Turkish military property. Personnel were instructed to dress in civilian clothing, and supply chains were to be routed through Turkish channels. One memo, dated 8 April 1941, reiterated that "no British personnel will be stationed in buildings marked with national signage" and that all materials must be stored under Turkish command[286]. The logic of spatial camouflage extended beyond uniforms and signage. British officers requested customs exemptions for tents, tools, and personal supplies, but agreed to store uniforms and military equipment in sealed containers within Turkish depots. In practice, this arrangement allowed for the circulation of foreign personnel and materiel throughout İzmir while preserving the outward appearance of Turkish control.

By April 1941, ground assessments conducted in İzmir's outer districts had revealed a critical environmental limitation. The proposed aerodrome sites at Çiğli, Gaziemir, Cumaovası, and Halilca were located in low-lying terrain prone to stagnant water accumulation. British engineers reported that these areas were malaria-endemic and unsuitable for continuous military use without substantial drainage and sanitation measures.[287] A formal survey, coordinated between

[286] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 1, Folder 0, Folder 99

[287] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 3

British military planners and Turkish health authorities, was launched in mid-April. The Manisa Malaria Institute, a regional branch of the Ministry of Health, was tasked with dispatching inspectors and laborers to the airfield zones for mosquito control and terrain improvement. British calculations estimated the need for over 140 local laborers across four sites, with work durations ranging from one to two months, depending on the severity of marsh conditions. These operations were to begin immediately, with British officers requesting priority access to anti-malaria teams stationed in İzmir and Balıkesir. The vector environment was not incidental to military planning; it constituted an operational variable. Terrain had to be rendered epidemiologically viable before any construction could proceed. Airfields were not only engineered but also sanitized, and the process of military site-making now required the coordination of medical institutions, civilian health labor, and specialized mosquito control programs.[288] The Çiğli landing ground, one of the most mentioned sites, was listed as requiring a two-month drainage campaign prior to any infrastructure development.

The infrastructure planned for 1941 did not remain speculative. By May 1943, British personnel were re-deployed to western Turkey to conduct a second phase of inspections. The new mission focused on the placement of air operations rooms and communication relay infrastructure, indicating a shift from site selection to operational functionality. Two senior officers, Lieutenant Colonel Ross and Major Walker, were tasked with this circuit. Their itinerary included İzmir, Gaziemir, Ulukent, and an extended network of airfields across Bandırma, Balıkesir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Yenişehir, and Eskişehir.[289] The map attached to the report visually registers the outcome of the British inspections, identifying a multiple field locations in the İzmir, Akhisar, Balıkesir, Bandırma corridor, indicating preliminary selections for military use. While not a finalized construction plan, the map represents the earliest coordinated spatial layout proposed by the British for aviation-related infrastructure in western Anatolia.

British plans included the deployment of up to 2,000 aviation personnel to Turkish airfields, as noted in Turkish General Staff documents.[290] In response, Ankara stipulated that British personnel could not operate independently; Turkish air units had to be present, and even in wartime, British crews would not be permitted to fly aircraft. This cautious framework reflected Turkey's concern with maintaining neutrality. The British also requested new sites beyond the İzmir region, including Milas, Gökovası, Dalaman, Antalya, Aydın, and Akhisar, aiming to build a southern logistical corridor. The General Staff approved only Milas and Kısıklı, rejecting or deferring the others. These negotiations revealed the limits of Allied access and Turkey's firm grip

[288] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 4; ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 10, Folder 0, Folder 6

[289] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 2, Folder 0, Folder 119

[290] ATASE, 110-9-1-14, Box 5, Folder 0, Folder 1

over territorial military planning. İzmir and its provinces as a British-backed base with its aerodromes, landing fields, depots, hospitals and piers, shows first and foremost the reflection of the aviation on the ground.

National territory in wartime Turkey was produced through construction, negotiation, and infrastructural intervention. Land, sea, and air were drawn into a shared field of defense where sovereignty materialized through frontiers. These frontiers were zones of concentrated activity in which building, organizing, and surveying intersected to anticipate and manage external forces. Diplomacy created the conditions for this spatial order, while fortifications, maneuvers, port logistics, reconnaissance, and aerial surveys gave it material form. The Çakmak–Çatalca Line, the Straits, Mersin, and İzmir demonstrate how military, bureaucratic, and diplomatic practices together fabricated national space under wartime pressure. Cement and steel, amele taburları, customs exemptions, and reconnaissance missions expose sovereignty as a material and organizational process shaped by domestic priorities and foreign interventions. Neutrality required extensive spatial labor. Sovereignty under pressure took shape through trenches, ports, maps, and airfields. Anticipation reorganized the configuration of territory at its broadest scale, defining wartime Turkey as a geography made through defense, negotiation, and infrastructural transformation.

2.4. The Anticipatory Geography of War

Territory as political technology established the frame of this chapter: national space takes form through instruments and procedures that act on it. Maps, treaties, fortification plans, logistical corridors, survey campaigns, and emergency regulations organized the field of action. These instruments produced a governable surface, a set of corridors and thresholds, and a grammar of intervention that directed how the state prepared for contact with hostile forces.

It presented diplomacy as spatial negotiation across two distinct tempos. Between 1935 and 1939, negotiations consolidated rights and capacities: the Montreux Convention configured command over the Straits, the Hatay settlement completed territorial consolidation, pacts and alignments recalibrated exposure and leverage, military and industrial programs set limits for what could be built and supplied, and trade policy fixed dependencies that shaped logistics. From 1939 to 1945, the same diplomatic work operated under wartime pressure along multiple thresholds. The Balkans, Thrace, and the Straits formed a northern and western line of anxiety. The Aegean and the Greek connection defined a maritime threshold under surveillance and interdiction. The Mediterranean theatre produced southern exposure through shipping lanes and port regimes. Syria, Iraq, and Iran created a volatile southern and eastern rim where events forced constant recalculation. The Black Sea registered Soviet pressure and naval constraint. The section identified the operating principle across these theatres: an active neutrality that practiced delay

and bargaining. Rights of passage, base requests, inspection visits, and aid schedules became spatial levers. Neutrality functioned as a positional technology that assigned specific uses to specific sites.

Then it traced how these negotiated conditions materialized as three frontiers of practice. The land frontier in Thrace concentrated labor and materials into a defensive line. The maritime frontier organized passages and ports as instruments of control and diplomacy under Montreux sovereignty and wartime logistics. The aerial frontier tied command of the skies to territorial surveys, land appropriations, and the siting of airfields around İzmir. A frontier in this chapter means a zone of anticipated contact. It is a place where planning, construction, and reconnaissance accumulate in advance of events. It is where the state concentrates resources to manage timing, delay, and movement.

Paradox and entanglement mark the outcome. Protection of Istanbul produced exposure elsewhere in Thrace. Legal strength over the Straits increased scrutiny and pressure. Mersin enabled neutrality through logistics and presented a stage for diplomatic performance. İzmir affirmed sovereignty while accommodating Allied demands for land and facilities. Anticipation generated selective geographies of defense and bound territorial decision making to allied calendars, technical missions, and intelligence practices. The concluding maps make this economy of knowledge visible. Industrial sites, transport lines, and deployment zones appear as targets and lifelines, as instructions for how to fortify, where to land, where to inspect, and how to bargain.

Institutional participation defined the scale of what could be achieved. The General Staff supplied plans and labor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained the balance of neutrality through bargaining, and the Turkish Aeronautical Association mobilized civic contributions to aviation. Foreign missions, especially British experts, intervened through inspections and aid programs. Together these actors embedded external pressure and domestic limits into the very process of territorial reconfiguration. Several institutional actors took part in the surveying, gathering information, and reconfigurations. The geographical information and locations itself became a currency, as the maps above shows the locations of industrial centers and military forces of Turkey, obtained from Italian prisoners of war in Libya by the British. The Turkish General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated military preparedness with diplomatic balancing. The Turkish Aeronautical Association helped cultivate aviation culture while channeling donations for fleet development. Foreign missions, especially British technical experts, participated in inspections, planning visits, and aid negotiations. Laws, regulations, and decrees played key roles in land allocation and local implementation. These actors operated across a fragmented bureaucratic landscape. Their decisions intersected with the limits of material capacity, the

changing tempo of the global war, and the ambiguity of Turkey's foreign commitments. What these practices reveal is how anticipation took architectural form at the scale of territory. It was territorial, in the sense that danger was consolidated into lines, thresholds, and corridors that could be fortified and governed. It was mobilizing, pushing ministries, commissions, and construction battalions into action in advance of conflict. It was epistemic, producing maps, surveys, and reconnaissance reports that translated terrain into legible and actionable knowledge. And it was instrumental, enabling authorities to extend control, demolish, and reorganize under the justification of defense.

These four characteristics defined how anticipation operated when the state prepared outward. The frontier became an experimental zone where political technology, diplomatic negotiation, and military labor combined to produce governable space. In this sense, the territorial scale discloses the architecture of anticipation in its most infrastructural and juridical form. The following chapters trace how the same anticipatory grammar moved inward, reorganizing cities through civil defense law and planning doctrine, and inscribing itself onto bodies through masks, manuals, and drills. Together these scales show how anticipation assigned roles, ranked risks, allocated materials, and sequenced action across Turkey's wartime landscape.

Burning Mountains, and Blooming Fields

As the war drew to its final phases, the image of Turkey's national territory was no longer one of precarious exposure but of poised distance. Closing this chapter with the serio-comic maps of Cemal Nadir offers a fitting lens. During 1943 and 1944 in *Cumhuriyet*, Cemal Nadir published a series of large size caricatures depicting the turmoil of the war, mostly using maps of the countries, adorned with national symbols for an easy comprehension. On occasions, Turkey also appeared in these maps, its neutrality was dramatized, proudly aestheticized, and militarized in its own terms. In one cartoon, Thrace is portrayed as a fenced-off landscape of swords and bayonets, warding off the contagious chaos of the Balkans.[291] In another, a single Turkish soldier lays on the map, watching the grotesque disarray of European nations collapse into caricatured absurdity with a serious, ready to attack posture.[292] The final map "*Yanan Dağlar, Sönen Dağlar*" presents a near-utopian tableau.[293] A green, blooming Anatolia secured by outward-facing cannons, a white dove nesting calmly, and visible locks clamped onto the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Around it, the Mediterranean erupts in red plumes, militarized limbs, and drowning ideologies.

[291] Cemal Nadir, "Balkan Festivali!..," *Cumhuriyet*, December 25, 1943.

[292] Cemal Nadir, "Avrupanın Bugünkü Durumu," *Cumhuriyet*, November 9, 1943.

[293] Cemal Nadir, "Yanan Dağlar, Sönen Dağlar," *Cumhuriyet*, November 30, 1943.



Figure 21. Serio-comics from Cemal Nadir (Cumhuriyet, November 9; December 25; November 30, 1943.)

The serio-comic maps transform Turkey into a theatrical space of stability bordered by disorder, where political restraint and geographic containment become performative virtues. If the chapter opened with anxious caricatures of Turkish territory as a projected landing field for foreign bombs, listed several military maps with airfields, pillboxes, refugee camps, spy-drawn industry locations, it ends with a nationalist fantasy of control: an image of territory that has not just survived the war but transcended it through disciplined distance. The cartoon map, here, becomes a medium of territorial self-assertion, where neutrality is not a void between alliances, but a visual claim to sovereignty, competence, and spring-like renewal.

In wartime years, maps had become a means of orientation as much as representation, a way to locate the nation's position within a world consumed by war. In his column "From the City", Salahaddin Güngör captured this impulse precisely. [294] Writing at the height of Europe's collapse, he invited readers to see, literally through maps, a Turkey encircled by instability yet preserved within its borders – unpenetrated. The act of looking at a map became an act of reassurance: to trace the outline of the country was to confirm its endurance. Güngör's vision reflects the grateful mindset of neutrality, where the map served not only to depict the world but to affirm a coherent place within it.

These illustrations reveal how anticipation could culminate in self-assertion. Neutrality was translated into a visual language of discipline and stability, where Turkey's borders were not simply preserved but symbolically fortified. The cartoon maps condensed a decade of negotiation, militarization, and surveillance into theatrical allegories of renewal. By ending with this imagery, the chapter underscores how the anticipatory geography of war was not confined to fortifications and treaties, but also took shape in the realm of representation, where sovereignty and survival were dramatized for a public audience.

[294] Salahaddin Güngör, "Şehrin Içinden – Hartalara Baktıkça – Özü ve Rengi Değişmeyen Yalnız Biz Varız. Kendi Misakı Milli Hududları Içinde Dipdiri Bir Türkiye!," *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1940.

CHAPTER 3

THE WARTIME CITY: PLANS, CODES, AND FRAGILITIES

3.1. Introduction: The City as a War Object

Returning to the last week of May 1935, comes another piece. *Cumhuriyet* published a headline that asked: *How Will Tomorrow's War Begin?* [295] In a long article (again accompanied by Ercümend's illustration), Abidin Daver wrote an answer as if the catastrophe had already taken place, describing a future air raid in the past tense so that readers would feel the devastation even closer. "The city I describe as being under air raid, imagine it to be whichever city you live in," he warns at the outset, making the threat an omnipresent urban reality. He narrates the night from the beginning, "midnight falls, everyone had long since fallen asleep… suddenly, from afar came a low rumbling sound," and the attack unfolds with relentless precision. "Searchlights cut through the darkness, long white arms probing the sky… gas seeped into lungs, eyes watered, breath caught." The enemy does not have a name or nationality, it does not matter; what matters is how the city with its inhabitants is "poisoned, demolished and killed" as "planes rain bombs." The infrastructure will collapse with its "railways, bridges, harbors, stations, trade vessels, factories, forests, fields, military bases." And from the sky, not only bombs descend but words too: "Leaflets scattered through the city… declaring war on the capital, threatening repeated raids unless the people force their government to sue for peace." Violence and command fall together, mapping the city as both target and audience. The violence comes vertically, spreading horizontally via panic, gas and fire.

A few days later Daver reflected on the effect his writings had.[296] Friends told him, "you terrify us," and he admitted that fear was necessary, "only by working hard can we escape it." He regretted how national defense had been avoided in public discussion until that week, how press and politics had left the country content and vulnerable. The admission by İsmet İnönü that "our air force is not sufficient" shattered the narrative of preparedness and opened a new public agenda. He was celebratory for the fact that from this moment on, newspapers could act as instruments of caution, warning citizens, feeding fear, hope and pride, urging donations, and drafting imagined threats along with solutions.

---

[295] Daver, "Yarınki Harb Nasıl Başlayacak?"

[296] Abidin Daver, "Evet, Korkmalı ve Çalışmalı!," *Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1935.



Figure 22. Illustration depicting an air raid (*Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935)

Three years later, and far from Istanbul, in 1938's *The Culture of Cities*, Lewis Mumford under "A Brief Description of Hell" describes the metropolis as "the focus of war forces," a ground for "periodic preparation for defense against an attack by air: the materialization of a skillfully evoked nightmare."[297]

> "The sirens sound. School-children, factory hands, housewives, office workers, one and all don their gas masks. Whirring planes overhead lay down a blanket of protective smoke. Cellars open to receive their refugees. Red Cross stations to succor the stricken and the wounded are opened at improvised shelters: underground vaults yawn to receive the gold and securities of the banks: masked men in asbestos suits attempt to gather up the fallen incendiary bombs. Presently the anti-aircraft guns sputter. Fear vomits: poison crawls through the pores, Whether the attack is arranged or real, it produces similar psychological effects. Plainly, terrors more devastating and demoralizing than any known in the ancient jungle or cave have been reintroduced into modern urban existence. Panting, choking, spluttering, cringing, hating, the dweller in Megalopolis dies, by *anticipation*, a thousand deaths. Fear is thus fixed into routine: the constant anxiety over war produces by itself a collective psychosis comparable to that which active warfare might develop. Waves of fear and hatred rise in the metropolis and spread by means of the newspaper and the newsreel and the radio program to the most distant provinces."[298]

The resonance between Daver's newspaper warnings and Mumford's urban hell illustrates what Paul Saint-Amour has called "air war prophecy" -a mode of anticipating aerial bombardment that generates a kind of "pre-traumatic stress syndrome," in which fear of a not-yet-realized catastrophe reorganizes life in the present. For Saint-Amour, the point is not mystical foresight but the "counterintuitive magic of the symptom": whether drill or actual raid, the embodied responses are the same. Anticipation itself becomes a governing force.[299] As Saint-Amour insists, making sense of this atmosphere requires "treating the lexicon of futurity, terms such as

[297] Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (Harvest/HBJ, 1970), 275.

[298] Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 275.

[299] Paul K Saint-Amour, "Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism," *Comparative Literature Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 130–61.

premonition, prevision, prophecy, prolepsis, foresight, forethought, anticipation"[300]. What Daver wrote as a newspaper warning, and what Mumford described as urban hell, already embodies this temporal suspension between present and future, between rehearsal and event.

The anticipation of aerial warfare reshaped not only the material city but also the institutions that claimed to protect it. In Turkey, the history of civil defense has been mostly treated as a bureaucratic chronology of measures and decrees, valuable yet detached from the spatial transformations it produced. The most comprehensive account of civil defense in Turkey *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935–1945)*, begins in that same year, 1935, and proceeds chronologically through measures, laws, drills, and actors, relying on an extensive and material of press archive.[301] Other works follow similar lines, documenting how air-raid preparedness was organized administratively and technically during the late 1930s and early 1940s. The literature remains limited and largely descriptive, offering valuable reference points but little conceptual engagement. Existing studies examine regional impacts of passive defense and evacuation on daily life and socio-economic patterns[302]; the legal and parliamentary decisions of Turkey's defensive strategy;[303] the regulatory structures, instructions, and institutions that organized civilian protection, from ministries to local commissions,[304] and analyze educational efforts, and public information campaigns.[305] Zafer Toprak introduces a psychological dimension, reading passive defense as a response to "war trauma in peacetime" and a means of awakening a civilian response while providing exceptional visual materials. [306] These works offer essential documentation of the period and provide important bibliographic pathways for this research.

Existing accounts, while invaluable as documentation, tend to treat passive defense as a bureaucratic sequence—drills, decrees, committees—without addressing its spatial propositions

[300] Saint-Amour, "Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism," 131.

[301] Bakar, *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[302] Çetin, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul ve Trakya'da Alınan Tedbirler: Pasif Korunma ve Tahliye."

[303] Burak Güney, "II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Türkiye`nin aldığı pasif savunma tedbirleri" (masterThesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2021), https://acikbilim.yok.gov.tr/handle/20.500.12812/709789.

[304] Eyüp Talha Kocacık and Emre Dölen, "İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türkiye'de Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kursları ve Yasal Düzenlemeler," *Osmanli Bilimi Arastirmalari (Studies in Ottoman Science)* 21, no. 1 (2020): 1, https://doi.org/10.26650/oba.669431; Umut Karabulut, "Davetsiz Misafiri Beklerken İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'sinde Pasif Güvenlik Önlemleri (1939-1940)," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (2014): 28.

[305] Sena Coşğun Kandal, "Zehirli Gaz Saldirilarina Karşi Halkin Bilinçlendirilmesi Ve Eğitimdeki Yansimasi: Gazdan Korunma Dersi (1931-1940)," *Turkish History Education Journal* 5, no. 2 (2016): 2, https://doi.org/10.17497/tuhed.279938; Ferit Yücebaş, "Türkiye'de İkinci Dünya Savaşı Arifesi ve Savaş Esnasında Olası Saldırılara Karşı Halkı Bilgilendirme Çalışmaları," *Anasay*, no. 26 (November 2023): 26, https://doi.org/10.33404/anasay.1374989; Gurbet Gökgöz, "Türkiye'de Hava Saldırılarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri (1923-1960)," *Tarih ve Günce*, no. 6 (January 2020): 6.

[306] Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye'de Barış Ortamında Savaş Travması: Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Pasif Korunma," *Toplumsal Tarih* 163 (2007): 40–47.

or emotional economies. This chapter approaches those same measures as acts of urban imagination: efforts to define what a "safe city" could be, how it should function, and how its inhabitants were expected to live within it. By reading local sources alongside international debates on militarized urbanism and the architectures of survival, it examines how aerial threat entered Turkey's planning agendas and legal frameworks, and how these anticipatory measures shaped both civic behavior and professional discourse.

Wartime urbanism in Turkey unfolded within the tension between anticipation and realization. The air-raid city was conceived through global ideals of safety, translated into national regulations, and materialized in municipal improvisations. Its making involved engineers, planners, journalists, and householders who turned fear into technical reason and vulnerability into civic duty. Safety, in this sense, was never a fixed condition but a project—fragile, contested, and continually negotiated against the limits of material resources and political will.

Although Turkey remained officially neutral, its urban imagination was fully entangled with the transnational atmosphere of anticipation that marked the late 1930s. The same anxieties that animated European visions of the bombed city shaped debates in Istanbul, where writers like Abidin Daver and critics such as Lewis Mumford converged in diagnosing the modern metropolis as both target and instrument of future war.

The chapter unfolds across two broad movements. The first reconstructs the conceptual and institutional foundations of wartime urbanism, how the idea of safety entered the language of planning, law, and governance. It traces the global discourses of aerial defense and their Turkish translations, from legislative reforms and bureaucratic hierarchies to the moral vocabulary that linked civic virtue with preparedness. The second movement turns to Istanbul as the city where these anticipatory regimes were most intensely tested and visualized. Drawing on municipal archives, press reports, and planning documents, it follows the making of the "air-raid-ready city" through concrete operations: cistern surveys, shelter excavations, wooden-house debates, and the entanglement of Prost's master plan with emergency defense measures. The analysis moves between paper plans and lived improvisations, between official decrees and public caricature, to reveal how war preparedness became a framework for re-imagining the modern metropolis.

3.1.1. Theorizing the City as Target

The formation of airpower in the early twentieth century fundamentally transformed how cities were conceptualized in warfare. Historically, cities had been battlefields primarily through sieges, with violence tied to territorial occupation. The First World War shifted this logic when German Zeppelin raids on London introduced the possibility of striking cities directly from the sky,

bypassing frontlines and exposing civilians to attacks.[307] Giulio Douhet's seminal *Command of the Air* (1921) gave this new mode of warfare its theoretical foundation. He argued that the traditional boundary between combatants and non-combatants had become "obsolete and impossible," designating cities as "nerve centers" of national life where destroying infrastructure and morale would guarantee victory.[308] He defended that airpower was the most efficient when used to attack on civilians and workers in cities, "who would be unable to bear this terror from the air."[309]

In Britain, similar reasoning underpinned the doctrines of Hugh Trenchard and Stanley Baldwin. Baldwin's 1932 address to Parliament, "A Fear for the Future," admitted that in modern war "the bomber will always get through," conceding that survival might depend on "killing more women and children more quickly than the enemy." [310] As Adam Page has shown, such admissions made bombing not an exceptional tactic but an enduring urban problem[311], embedding threat itself into the fabric of planning and governance. [312]

Legal efforts to restrain aerial warfare proved ineffective. Susan Grayzel shows The 1922–1923 Hague Convention prohibited "aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants," but she finds these efforts unrealistic and weakly motivated.[313] Similarly, Christiane Wilke deals with the ethical and legal roots of air warfare and shows interestingly that the idea of the "civilian" in international law arose alongside aerial bombardment, shaped by the 1923 Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare,[314] these rules were racially and gender-biased, aimed mainly at protecting white European populations while excluding colonized peoples. They also shifted responsibility onto civilians to make themselves "visible" as non-targets, embedding victim-blaming into the law. Wilke argues that this framework acted as a technology of warfare, legitimizing aerial violence in ways that still echo in contemporary legal approaches.

---

[307] Charles S. Maier, "Targeting the City: Debates and Silences about the Aerial Bombing of World War II," *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 859 (2005): 432, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383100184322.

[308] Page, *Architectures of Survival*, 26.

[309] Page, *Architectures of Survival*, 27.

[310] Stanley Baldwin, "A Fear For The Future," 1932, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Fear_For_The_Future.

[311] Adam Page, "Planning Permanent Air Raid Precautions: Architecture, Air War and the Changing Perceptions of British Cities in the Late 1930s," *Urban History* 43, no. 1 (2016): 117–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926815000164.

[312] Page, *Architectures of Survival*, 199.

[313] Susan R. Grayzel, *At Home and under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz*, Literature in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 138, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139021197.

[314] Christiane Wilke, "How International Law Learned to Love the Bomb: Civilians and the Regulation of Aerial Warfare in the 1920s," *Australian Feminist Law Journal* 44, no. 1 (2018): 29–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1465335.

The operationalization of aviation into warfare also produced a new way of seeing, knowing, and reshaping cities. Flight introduced a "God's-Eye View" or "Bird's-Eye View," historically associated with mastery and control, which transformed urban space into a legible, targetable surface.[315] As Davide Deriu notes, nineteenth-century panoramic imagery prepared the ground for this "total vision", offering a detached viewing experience that transformed complex cityscapes into comprehensibe patterns.[316] This perspective was magnified by aviation: early reconnaissance photography rendered cities as flat abstractions, allowing military planners to designate targets on two-dimensional maps.[317] In *The View from Above*, Jeanne Haffner examines how aerial photography reshaped urban planning and social science in the interwar years, showing that the "aerial view" offered a new way to analyze cities, fueling spatial critiques of capitalism and modernity. By turning cityscapes into visual data, it made sociological expertise essential to planning, promising a more comprehensive understanding of urban life through techniques like aerial surveys and photographic mapping. Christine Boyer describes this as the "eagle eye of the airplane", offering evidence of the "spectacle of collapse," indicting the perceived chaos of modern urban form while opening it up to disciplinary control from above.[318]

This airmindedness, defined by Joseph Corn as "believing in the potential of airplanes to better human life," was widely celebrated in interwar culture,[319] as Michael McCluskey demonstrate, it encompassed enthusiasm for aviation's promise of progress and global connectivity but carried within it the shadow of airpower as terror.[320] Luke Seaber introduces the idea of "groundmindedness," showing how landscapes disrupted by flight resisted this aerial mastery,[321] while Deriu contrasts the traditional *flâneur* with the new *planeur*, whether an aviator, journalist, or urban planner, looked at the city from above, translating its complexity into an instant, structured visual pattern. This elevated perspective promised an "escape from the labyrinth" of modern urban life while simultaneously feeding into the intertwined dynamics of spectacle and surveillance.[322]

---

[315] Cosgrove, *Apollo's Eye*, 8.

[316] D. Deriu, "The Ascent of the Modern Planeur: Aerial Images and Urban Imaginary in the 1920s," in *Imagining the City. Vol. 1, The Art of Urban Living*, nos. 7–8, ed. C. Emden et al., nos. 7–8 (Peter Lang, 2006), 190–92.

[317] Deriu, "Between Veiling and Unveiling."

[318] M. Christine Boyer, "Aviation and the Aerial View: Le Corbusier's Spatial Transformations in the 1930s and 1940s," *Diacritics* 33, no. 3 (2003): 95.

[319] Jeanne Haffner, *The View from above: The Science of Social Space* (MIT Press, 2013), 14.

[320] Michael McCluskey, "Introduction: Airminded Modernism," in *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, ed. Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber (Springer International Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_1.

[321] Luke Seaber, "'From This New Culture of the Air We Finally See': 'Groundmindedness' in the 1930s," in *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, ed. Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber (Springer International Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_3.

[322] Deriu, "The Ascent of the Modern Planeur."

Stephen Graham[323] and Anna Jackman[324] carry this discussion into the post-war era, analyzing urban space and airspace through the concepts of "verticality" and "volume." The vertical gaze now extends beyond airplanes to high-rise buildings, drones, and satellites. Anthony Downey highlights drone reconnaissance and satellite monitoring as an epoch-defining shift in aerial technologies, driven by predictive algorithms that create a "god-like, disembodied gaze."[325] Francisco Klauser adds that these aero-visual techniques of power, embedding politics of visibility into how aerial surveillance operates.[326]

Urban emotions such as anticipation, fear, anxiety, as collective sensations and generators of wartime publicities have been the topics of relevant literature. Italo Brandimarte's work on "breathless war" and the "atmospheres of empire" highlights how air raids and the threat of gas attacks operated "excessive of human bodies, sensing and imagination," making breathing itself precarious.[327] The anticipation of chemical warfare tied vulnerability directly to lungs and skin, fusing air, atmosphere, and mortality into urban experience. These anticipatory conditions reshaped domestic life and civic identity. Susan Grayzel documents how air raid precautions (ARP) were "domesticated," transforming interiors into semi-militarized spaces where curtains, windows, and furniture became instruments of survival. [328]

Citizenship under aerial threat became a form of household labor, heavily gendered, linking women's caregiving roles to national endurance. James Greenhalgh deepens this perspective, showing how blackout rules and civil defense instructions intruded into the home, destabilizing psychological boundaries of safety and privacy, turning every domestic interior into an arm of state control.[329] Michele Haapamäki's *The Coming of the Aerial War* traces public debates on "fearmongering," showing how panic became a political instrument, mobilized to provoke action and define wartime citizenship.[330] Brett Holman's *The Next War in the Air* demonstrates how

[323] Stephen Graham, *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*, Pbk. ed (Verso, 2011).

[324] Anna Jackman, "Vocabularies of Drone Sensing," in *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, ed. Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev, Social Visualities Series (Springer International Publishing AG, 2024).

[325] Anthony Downey, "The Algorithmic Apparatus of Neocolonialism: Counter-Operational Practices and the Future of Aerial Surveillance," in *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, ed. Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev, Social Visualities Series (Springer International Publishing AG, 2024).

[326] Francisco Klauser, "Wassily Kandinsky and the Aerial Gaze: Questioning the Punctual, Linear and Planar Forces Inherent in the Politics of Visibility Conveyed by Police Drones," in *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, ed. Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev, Social Visualities Series (Springer International Publishing AG, 2024).

[327] Italo Brandimarte, "Breathless War: Martial Bodies, Aerial Experiences and the Atmospheres of Empire," *European Journal of International Relations* 29, no. 3 (2023): 525–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231153259.

[328] Grayzel, *At Home and under Fire* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[329] James Greenhalgh, "The Threshold of the State: Civil Defence, the Blackout and the Home in Second World War Britain," *Twentieth Century British History* 28, no. 2 (2017): 186–208, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwx009.

[330] Michele Haapamäki, *The Coming of the Aerial War: Culture and the Fear of Airborne Attack in Inter-War Britain*, 1st ed., International Library of Twentieth Century History (I.B. Tauris, 2014).

popular literature and speculative journalism prefigured catastrophe, scripting emotional and civic responses to air raids long before bombs actually fell.[331]

Adam Page's *Architectures of Survival: Air War and Urbanism in Britain, 1935–1952*, and his several other contributions offer a crucial rethinking of planning history by placing both expectation and realization of aerial destruction at its core.[332] Page challenges the dominant narrative of utopian modernism, demonstrating how visions of the future city were equally shaped by dystopian projections of loss and militarization in the face of defense. Drawing on archival sources such as E.A.A. Rowse's papers, he argues that planning in mid-twentieth-century Britain was deeply entangled with a search for stability amid vulnerability, striving "to take out of one's life and the lives of others the feeling of insecurity."[333] He shows how Air Raid Precautions (ARP) ceased to be temporary wartime measures; they became a "new and permanent factor" in design and construction, ushering in an era of "constant danger and vulnerability, of constant pre-war."[334] Reform groups like PEP and MARS linked slum clearance, national survival, and urban order into a single project of rational planning.

Other scholars have approached similar questions from different perspectives, collectively mapping a professional field of warfare for architectural and urban practice. Jean-Louis Cohen challenges architectural history's neglect of wartime dynamics, arguing that conflict reoriented architecture towards defense, survival, and strategic indispensability. Architects adapted their expertise for warfare production and economies, shifting design's ends toward preservation against annihilation.[335] John Harwood uncovers an early "risk society" in architecture, where engineers and planners confronted aerial bombing as a civilizational threat.[336] Projects like Ove N. Arup and Tecton's *Planned A.R.P.* reorganized spatial logic to address vulnerability, linking density, protection, and the three-dimensional reality of air war in new ways. Joseph S. Meisel examines interwar shelter policies as contested sites of expertise, where architects and scientists proposed mass safety solutions that clashed with government plans.[337] His work highlights how technical visions of protection were tied to broader ideologies of civic responsibility and social reform. Jennifer S. Light traces Cold War transfers of military thinking into urban governance in the United States. Systems analysis, aerial surveillance, and modeling techniques reframed cities

[331] Holman, *The Next War in the Air*.

[332] Page, *Architectures of Survival*.

[333] Page, "An Archive of Anxiety."

[334] Page, "Planning Permanent Air Raid Precautions."

[335] Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform*.

[336] John Harwood, "The Other End of the Trajectory: Danger Zones," *Grey Room*, no. 54 (January 2014): 80–106, https://doi.org/10.1162/GREY_a_00133.

[337] Meisel, "Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War," 1994.

as complex, controllable systems, blurring distinctions between defense strategy and civilian planning.[338] Michiel Dehaene examines how wartime Britain transformed urban planning into a technocratic, research-based practice built on surveys, interdisciplinary collaboration, and rational administration of space.[339] Using wartime London plans as case studies, Dehaene traces a shift from earlier Geddesian ideals of civic education toward coordinated expert knowledge and collective "composite minds," where planning teams synthesized data to guide national and regional development. The chapter shows how wartime planning institutionalized comprehensive, science-driven methods and directly influenced planning education and professional standards in post-war Britain. Peter J. Larkham[340] and Keith D. Lilley[341] analyze reconstruction planning, where imagery of devastation became a tool for envisioning radical redesigns and mobilizing public consent. Their work exposes the visual and rhetorical power of urban planning under the shadow of past and future attacks. Peter Hall, Lloyd Rodwin, and Robert Hollister contribute a broader conceptual lens on how "cities of the mind," (also the name of the excellent compilation) are shaped by collective imaginaries, demonstrating that urban practice operates within powerful cultural narratives about future threat, order, and transformation.[342]

By the mid-1930s, these international doctrines of aerial warfare and civil defense had begun to shape Turkey's own spatial and institutional responses. The country's official neutrality did not exempt it from the atmosphere of anticipation that pervaded Europe. On the contrary, its geopolitical exposure, bordering Axis and Allied spheres, intensified domestic anxieties about the vulnerability of its cities. Within this climate, Turkish military authorities, planners, and journalists absorbed the lessons of foreign experience, translating the abstract language of airpower into local legal frameworks, technical manuals, and urban reforms.

Abidin Daver's writings in Cumhuriyet epitomized this translation. His serialized accounts of hypothetical air raids on Istanbul narrated future catastrophe in the past tense, collapsing warning and recollection into the same act. Through this rhetorical inversion, he transformed anticipation into memory, forcing readers to inhabit the imminence of attack as a lived condition. Such imaginaries redefined Istanbul as a universal target, a city whose skyline, streets, and even domestic interiors were potential extensions of the battlefield. The frontier of war was no longer

---

[338] Jennifer S. Light, *From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/bios/jhu052/2003006229.html.

[339] Michiel Dehaene, "Surveying and Comprehensive Planning: The 'Co-Ordination of Knowledge' in the Wartime Plans of Patrick Abercrombie and Max Lock," in *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain* (Routledge, 2007).

[340] Larkham, "Selling the Future City: Images in UK Post-War Reconstruction Plans."

[341] Keith D. Lilley, "Conceptions and Perceptions of Urban Futures in Early Post-War Britain: Some Everyday Experiences of the Rebuilding of Coventry, 1944–62," in *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain*, ed. Iain Boyd Whyte (Routledge, 2007).

[342] Rodwin and Hollister, *Cities of the Mind*.

coastal or territorial but vertical, cutting through the air above and the shelters below. This aerial consciousness intertwined with the modernization of Turkish urbanism. Aerial photography, cadastral surveys, and mapping projects became both scientific tools and defensive instruments. The "view from above" not only promised administrative order but also habituated citizens to seeing their city as transparent to surveillance and regulation. Newspapers reproduced these images as symbols of progress and preparedness, reinforcing a civic pedagogy of vigilance. The emotional dimension of this transformation was equally pronounced.

Fear was not a symptom but a mode of governance. Civil-defense campaigns, particularly in the Thrace region, mobilized alarm to cultivate discipline and participation. Manuals, exhibitions, and press reports rehearsed future disaster as if already experienced, turning fear into an anticipatory frontier that bridged the present and its imagined catastrophe. This emotional regime was infrastructural: it demanded codification in the very laws, municipal regulations, and architectural standards that would govern blackouts, shelters, and evacuations.

By the late 1930s, the language of defense had entered the core of planning discourse. Articles in Mimar/Arkitekt, municipal bulletins, and parliamentary debates began to reinterpret open spaces, boulevards, and zoning as interior lines of safety, new frontiers within the city itself. Istanbul, already the stage of national modernization, became the experimental ground where ideals of urban hygiene converged with doctrines of civil defense. War did not interrupt planning; it redefined its logic. The safe city emerged as both a technical and moral project, one that sought to reconcile modernity with vulnerability. In this way, Turkey's wartime urbanism occupied a space between anticipation and realization. It drew from international repertoires yet remained bound to local anxieties and administrative capacities.

The frontier migrated inward, cutting through the material and symbolic fabric of the city—its combustible housing, circulation grids, and skyline silhouette. Istanbul stood at the center of this shift, the metropolitan site where fear, modernization, and defense were most visibly entangled. From this vantage, the following sections examine how safety was imagined as a planning principle and codified in law, tracing how anticipation itself became an urban practice.

These perspectives show that twentieth-century cities were tested in relation to aerial threat, where planning, law, and emotional governance converged around the possibility of attack. Against this global landscape, Turkey offers a revealing but understudied case: a neutral state that nonetheless developed its own repertoire of measures, debates, and representations to manage the urban consequences of war. Because the expectation of war did not cease when it started, it continued as the World witnessed the kind of destruction and catastrophe happening right at the borders.

At this scale, the frontier migrated inward. No longer only drawn at fortified lines or maritime thresholds, it cut through the very fabric of the city: its combustible housing, circulation grids, and skyline silhouette. Wartime urbanism in Turkey thus occupied a space between anticipation and realization: ideals of the safe city, regulatory frameworks, technical improvisations, and critical counter-voices intersected without coalescing into a coherent program. Istanbul, dense, symbolically charged, and under active modernization, became the primary arena where these processes were articulated and contested. By positioning the city in this way, the chapter turns directly to the question of how safety was imagined as a planning principle and codified in law, the themes of the following sections.

3.2. Imagining Safety: The Ideal and the Air-Raid-Resistant City

If aerial threat recast cities as targets, the next question was: what would a city look like if designed to survive such an attack? Between the two World Wars, urban planning became a global arena where ideals of health, order, and modernization intersected with emerging logics of vulnerability and defense. The period's major planning theories, whether reformist, authoritarian, or colonial, all carried spatial principles that could be reinterpreted in wartime as tools for survival.If aerial threat redefined the city as a target, planning culture responded by imagining the city itself as an instrument of survival. These efforts certainly were not extensive, also it was generated with the contribution of actors outside of the planning and architecture circles.. What was interesting is that the "defense" as a planning motivation consulted similar principles that we know as modern planning tools. Zoning became a method of dispersal, firebreaks were reframed as strategic voids, and open spaces were enlisted as assembly grounds. This reorientation reveals how the frontier of war migrated into the city's own fabric: through its density, its combustible districts, and its circulation networks. The defensible city was conceived as a vertical volume—shelters and basements below, regulated movement at ground level, exposure to bombardment above—in which every layer of the urban environment was evaluated for its capacity to absorb or deflect attack. This section reconstructs those visions of safety, examining both the international doctrines of the interwar period and the Turkish planning debates that translated them into local terms.

3.2.1. Peacetime Ideals to Wartime Rules

In the efforts of defining the interwar urban, Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz and Ilham Khuri-Makdisi frames this dynamic and uneven global phenomenon being marked by modernization drives, demographic growth, ideological projects, and social contestations.[343] Cities expanded rapidly,

[343] Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz and Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, "The Urban," in *The Interwar World*, ed. Andrew Denning and Heidi J.S. Tworek (Routledge, 2023).

with urban planning institutionalized as a multidisciplinary response to health crises, housing shortages, and demands for social order. Zoning, infrastructural upgrades, and mass housing reshaped urban fabrics across continents, while ideologies from nationalism to colonialism recast cities as symbols of political authority, often producing segregated, "dual cities." In these decades, urban spaces became contested arenas where residents fought for housing, services, and rights, setting the foundations of contemporary urbanism under looming threats of economic depression and war.[344]

The early twentieth century left a grim inheritance, cities marked by industrial sprawl, overcrowded tenements, pollution, disease, and stark inequality. By the 1930s, planners, architects, and reformers across Europe and the United States saw these "nineteenth-century horrors" not just as technical failures but as social pathologies demanding radical cures. The ideal city was no longer an organic outgrowth of its market or geography but a planned construct, rationally designed for health, order, and modern life. These ideals arose from multiple traditions, utopian, social reformist, authoritarian, technocratic, often competing, sometimes overlapping, each responding to density, chaos, and perceived vulnerabilities of the industrial city.[345]

Patrick Geddes's ecological vision influenced the Regional Planning Association of America (Mumford, Stein, Wright, Chase, MacKaye), who proposed self-sufficient communities embedded in a "green backcloth" of farms and parks. In the United States, Wright's State Plan, Catherine Bauer's housing advocacy, and New Deal projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority aimed to decentralize population and industry into planned communities, reducing density for health and livability. Ebenezer Howard's Garden City[346] model persisted, adapted into greenbelt towns like Wythenshawe (Barry Parker) and American examples under Rexford Tugwell's leadership. Post-war Britain's New Towns Act and Abercrombie's Greater London Plan[347] institutionalized dispersal and functional separation[348], principles that, in wartime, could double as passive defense strategies.[349]

Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, used monumental urbanism to stage political power such as Mussolini's Rome, Nazi Berlin, and Stalin's Moscow all reshaped space as theater. Yet these legible

[344] Açıkgöz and Khuri-Makdisi, "The Urban."

[345] Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow : An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design Since 1880*, New York Academy of Sciences Ser (John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2014), 1–11.

[346] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 90–148.

[347] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 198.

[348] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 8,165.

[349] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 167, 183, 187.

monumental cities also offered highly visible targets from the air.[350] Modernist visions diverged: Le Corbusier's Radiant City sought total spatial control through towers in parkland,[351] later claiming such open spacing made cities less flammable and more defensible.[352] Frank Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City dissolved the metropolis into dispersed acre-plots, aligning, unintentionally, with later wartime strategies of decentralization. [353]


Tunceli şakilerinin sığındıkları yerlerde

Kahraman bir Türk çavuşu tek başına koca bir dağı zaptetti

Harekât sahasına giden muhabirimizin müşahedeleri

Açlar ve çıplaklarla meskûn olan bir yer medenileştiriliyor, geriliğin ana merkezi olan bu muhitte şimdi Türk motörlerinin uğultusu birbirine karışıyor

Figure 23. "In the Hideouts of the Tunceli Bandits" (*Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1937)

In non-Western contexts, planning was entangled with colonial legacies, entangled modernisms, and early developmentalist experiments. The Master Plan, developed in Europe and North America, was exported to colonies to serve political and economic control. This produced "dependent urbanization," where cities grew without parallel industrial development, while planning codes enforced military control and segregation.[354] Examples ranged India's cantonment systems or the carefully zoned administrative city of New Delhi (1911–1940). In Africa, colonial laws restricted African residency, providing only rudimentary male labor housing, while women navigated legal loopholes to live in towns. In the Middle East,[355] new laws like Algeria's 1930 *Plan d'Urbanisme* or British interventions in Baghdad imposed zoning and Western

[350] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 203–36.

[351] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 244.

[352] Page, "Planning Permanent Air Raid Precautions," 74.

[353] Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 310.

[354] Anthony D. King, "Colonialism and Urban Development," in *Cities of the Global South Reader*, 1 edition, ed. Faranak Miraftab and Neema Kudva, Routledge Urban Reader Series (Routledge, 2015).

[355] Karim Hadjri and Mohamed Osmani, "The Spatial Development and Urban Transformation of Colonial and Postcolonial Algiers," in *Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World*, [New edition], ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy, Planning, History, and the Environment Series (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010).

planning codes, often replacing Ottoman frameworks without regard for local needs.[356] Importantly, aerial reconnaissance and bombing were deployed first in imperial contexts, making the colonial city a pre-war laboratory of war urbanism. Military control, segregation, surveillance, and spatial toxicity were embedded in planning decades before European cities conceived of themselves as vulnerable targets. This genealogy complicates Western-centered narratives of wartime defensive urbanism.[357] For Turkey, the Dersim Revolts of 1937-38 and its excessive military operations over the region exemplifies the same logic of "exercise" before the global war.[358] Following the same colonial vocabulary of brining civilization into the lands of "backwardness with the hungry and the naked."[359]

In non-Western contexts, modernist planning was never a simple matter of importing foreign blueprints. Local actors translated and adapted these models to resource constraints, cultural traditions, and nation-building aims, yet always under the weight of colonial power structures that had long weaponized planning and aerial vision for dominance. Long before Western nations codified civil defense during the Second World War, warfare had been inscribed into colonial urbanism: cities were planned to secure military control, enforce social and racial segregation, facilitate surveillance from above, and even impose toxicity into everyday life.[360] Aerial reconnaissance and bombing, first deployed as technologies of imperial control, mapped, policed, and devastated colonized landscapes from the sky. In this sense, the colonial city was a pre-war laboratory of "war urbanism," where spatial order served governance and violence in equal measure.

This genealogy unsettles the notion that wartime planning in the 1930s–40s was purely a European phenomenon. Civil defense regulations in Europe emerged from a longer history of militarized spatial thinking forged through colonial expansion and airpower experimentation abroad. Recognizing this continuity allows analysis of wartime "safe cities" without reproducing a Western-centric chronology and opens further questions about the Second World War's defensive paradigms within a broader global history of planned control, destruction, and enforced safety.

---

[356] Hoshiar Nooraddin, "Globalization and the Search for Modern Local Architecture: Learning from Baghdad," in *Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World*, [New edition], ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy, Planning, History, and the Environment Series (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010).

[357] Duanfang Lu, *Third World Modernism: Architecture, Development and Identity* (Routledge, 2011), http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=667868.

[358] Taha Baran, *1937-1938 Yılları Arasında Basında Dersim* (İletişim Yayınları, 2024).

[359] "Tunceli Şakilerinin Sığındıkları Yerlerde — Kahraman Bir Türk Çavuşu Tek Başına Koca Bir Dağı Zapetti," *Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1937.

[360] Samia Henni, *Architecture of Counterrevolution: The French Army in Northern Algeria*, Reihe "Architektonisches Wissen." (gta Verlag, 2017); Henni, *Colonial Toxicity*.

Moreover, while interwar planning ideals were framed in terms of health, harmony, and rational order, their logics of dispersal, zoning, and infrastructural control overlapped uneasily with the new defensive imperatives of aerial war. Strategies first imagined to solve congestion, poverty, and industrial chaos were reframed as passive defense: dispersal reduced vulnerability to bombing, green belts became firebreaks and evacuation zones, and rational road networks doubled as escape routes. The wartime city, however, differed fundamentally from its peacetime counterpart: rather than projecting a better life, it was designed in anticipation of catastrophe, shaping urban space for survival rather than for progress.

3.2.2. The Defensible City as a New Planning Vision

One of the most detailed articulations of the "defensible city" as an urban and architectural project emerged from Britain's Air Raid Precautions (ARP) program, publicly introduced in 1935.[361] ARP brought urban planning and military logic into unprecedented alignment, promoting what officials called a form of "militant peace," a condition in which preparations for war promised simultaneous social reform. Measures such as slum clearance, creation of new open spaces, rationalized traffic systems, and relocation of industry were justified not only as public health improvements but also as passive defense strategies.[362] Across official reports, expert proposals, and civic propaganda, a shared vocabulary of defensible urbanism emerged, projecting an ideal city designed to survive aerial assault through spatial dispersal, infrastructural resilience, protective architecture, and legal codification.

This vision was codified through interlinked principles drawn from ARP manuals, technical treatises, and planning debates in Britain and beyond.[363] Dense city centers were redefined as catastrophic vulnerabilities, requiring strategic decentralization: populations and industries would be relocated into garden suburbs or smaller satellite towns, separated by green belts functioning simultaneously as firebreaks, resource zones, and evacuation corridors.

Industrial facilities were to be moved out of city cores into rural or peri-urban sites, so that a single airstrike could not cripple national logistics. Parks, squares, and agricultural belts doubled as assembly areas during raids, buffers against fire spread, and sources of emergency food production.[364]

---

[361] Page, *Architectures of Survival*, 24, 58.

[362] Page, "Planning a 'Militant Peace': Air Raid Precautions for Peace and for War."

[363] Home Office, *The Protection of Your Home Against Air Raids* (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938).

[364] L. M. Chitale, *Air Raids And Civil Defence*, 2nd ed. (The Madras Publishing House, 1942), http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.278563; Charles William Glover, *Civil Defence: A Practical Manual Presenting with Working Drawings the Methods Required for Adequate Protection against Aerial Attack,* 3rd edition (Chemical Publishing Company, 1941).

Buildings were to be treated as defensive structures. Reinforced concrete and steel frames became preferred, with dual-use basements designed as car parks or recreation rooms in peacetime but convertible to shelters during war.[365] Design standards discouraged expansive glazing, flammable materials, and inadequate exits, while advocating cruciform building plans with generous setbacks to mitigate blast and gas effects. Roof gardens, flat roofs for incendiary control, and wide separations between structures were recommended. Infrastructure networks would be duplicated and decentralized: independent wells for water, dispersed power stations, underground cabling, and rational road systems to facilitate evacuation, firefighting, and decontamination. Visibility was also addressed as a liability: blackout discipline was enforced, while camouflage techniques aimed to fragment and disguise the city's silhouette.




Figure 24. Diagrams showing air-raid resistant designs (Glover, 1941; 692-94)

Two monumental publications consolidated these ideas into long-term planning doctrines. C. W. Glover, a British civil engineer and government advisor, authored the 965-page *Civil Defence* (1941), arguing that town planning was "the most far-sighted civil defense policy", and was now legally mandated under Section 70 of the Civil Defence Act (1939) to make urban areas "less vulnerable to air raids."[366] He promoted self-contained satellite towns of 50,000 inhabitants, circular layouts, dome-shaped bomb-deflecting roofs, and underground communal facilities, calling on architects and planners to embrace civil defense as a patriotic duty: "What an opportunity for the town planner!"[367]

[365] Page, "Planning Permanent Air Raid Precautions."

[366] Glover, *Civil Defence;*

[367] Glover, *Civil Defence;*, 550–51.

L. M. Chitale, an architect who served in the British Military, and later became the first Indian member of RIBA, adapted similar principles to local conditions, warning against complacency and calling for national planning commissions to permanently redistribute population and industry. An effectively defensible city, according to Chitale, requires bomb-proof shelters for all inhabitants, resilient structures and services immune to dislocation, active defense systems such as anti-aircraft guns, balloon barrages, and fighter planes, and a properly planned urban layout that minimizes defensive difficulties and enhances their effectiveness. Then he asks: "What is the ideal combination and how will this pattern of a city look like?" [368] His answer spans 50 pages combining strategic dispersal, self-sufficiency, and open design, reconfiguring the modern city as an interconnected network of protected units.[369] He envisions residential estates of one or two-storey, fire-resistant detached houses, each with a garden to absorb incendiary bombs and allow small-scale food production, achieving densities of no more than twelve houses per acre. These would form self-contained townships or villages, supplied with independent wells, sanitation, and community centers convertible to air raid shelters, physically separated from industrial and administrative zones by green belts serving as firebreaks, evacuation corridors, and agricultural buffers.

At the center of Chitale's plan lay a park hosting monumental and civic buildings, isolated from likely targets but retaining symbolic prominence. Surrounding commercial and governmental zones would be interspersed with open spaces to localize blast effects. Industry would be located beyond city limits in small, dispersed units to reduce concentrated damage, prevent smoke from guiding enemy aircraft, and ensure production continuity. Essential services such as power, water, transport depots, food storage, would be duplicated, widely scattered, and, where possible, placed underground or reinforced. Movement was integral: broad, rational roads would expedite evacuation, firefighting, and decontamination, with surfaces designed for easy cleaning after gas or incendiary attacks. Water tanks and ponds would be systematically distributed for firefighting and sanitary needs.

Chitale's advocacy for the circular city plan, which he framed as an "Air Raid Proof City," placed his design within a deep intellectual lineage. He linked its geometry to ancient ideals of political equality and democratic life, citing Aristotle's dictum that "perfect equality of situation" required every citizen to occupy an equally accessible position within the city, able to hear the town crier's voice. Ancient Greek planners, he noted, organized cities to sustain public amenities and collective deliberation; modern sprawl, by contrast, fragmented civic dialogue. In his vision, the circular form not only reactivated this egalitarian logic but also met modern aerial threats: its shorter

[368] L. M. Chitale, *Air Raids And Civil Defence*, 173.

[369] L. M. Chitale, *Air Raids And Civil Defence*, 173–223.

perimeter simplified anti-aircraft defense, reduced resource demands for protection, and facilitated active defense coordination. In this way, Chitale reimagined urban form as a spatial instrument for both political virtue and wartime survival.




Figure 25. Airraid-Proof City diagram (Chitale, 1942; 174)

By the eve of the Second World War, the defensible city had been envisioned as dispersed, green-belted, infrastructurally redundant, reinforced with shelters, darkened to evade targeting, and militarized in its domestic sphere. This "architecture of survival" transformed urban planning into a permanent exercise in risk management, governing infrastructures and private lives alike under the shadow of aerial warfare. Yet, as Page observes, even in Britain civil defense was planned but rarely materialized at the scale envisioned, remaining fragmented, contested, and underfunded.[370] The safe city existed largely on paper, revealing a shared international condition, the persistent gap between imagined urban safety and the political, institutional, and material constraints of planning under threat.

Underlying these doctrines was a redefinition of the urban frontier. No longer marked by city walls or gates, the frontier was relocated inside the urban fabric: zoning codes that dispersed

[370] Page, *Architectures of Survival*, 81.

density, firebreaks that cut through residential quarters, and open spaces reclassified as emergency assembly points all served as interior boundaries between safety and danger. The defensible city was therefore conceived not as a bounded enclosure but as a layered volume. Verticality structured its logic: shelters and basements below ground, circulation routes and firebreaks at the surface, and exposure to aerial bombardment above. To imagine safety meant to govern the city as a vertical frontier, one whose every layer required anticipatory design.

3.2.3. Interwar Urban Planning Experience in Turkey

Interwar planning ideas reached Turkey amid an already active planning culture negotiating order, health, beauty, and modernity under Republican nation-building. The terrain was not blank. Zoning disputes, housing shortages, infrastructure deficits, and questions of identity were already structuring municipal agendas when passive-defense thinking arrived. The classic account frames early Republican planning as a state-led, technocratic project: foreign experts, centralized legislation, master plans translating secular, hygienic modernity into axes, squares, and public buildings. [371] A textured view complicates that picture. As Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz argues, urbanism functioned as a dynamic field shaped by entangled global, national, and local forces. [372] Plans were technical instruments and public discourses at once, debated across journals, newspapers, municipal councils, and ministries, where imported models were adapted to Istanbul's topography, heritage, and social realities. *Arkitekt* (and, for cultural polemics, *Yapı*) became the key forum where these negotiations crystallized.

Turkish planning discussions of the 1930s and early 1940s reveal how these global doctrines of dispersal and defense were absorbed into an already dynamic field of urban reform. In the pages of Arkitekt, authors debated whether beautification, hygiene, and modernization could be aligned with safety, or whether defensive concerns distorted the city's aesthetic and civic ideals. Calls to beautification were increasingly layered with appeals to rationalize circulation, to regulate combustible wooden neighborhoods, and to anticipate the risks of fire and panic in wartime. Municipal figures echoed these concerns in council discussions, weighing the promises of Prost's master plan against the vulnerabilities of the existing fabric. In this sense, Turkey did not passively adopt foreign templates but articulated a hybrid vision in which national aesthetics, everyday vulnerabilities, and modernist ideals converged. The wooden house, emblematic of both

---

[371] Hüseyin Çağatay Keskinok, "Urban Planning Experience of Turkey in the 1930s," *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* 27, no. 2 (2010): 173–88; Ali Cengizkan, *Ankara´nın İlk Planı: 1924-25 Lörcher Planı* (Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı, 2004); Cana Bilsel, "'Les Transformations d'Istanbul': Henri Prost's Planning of Istanbul (1936-1951)," *A|Z ITU JOURNAL OF THE FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE* 8, no. 1 (2011), https://www.az.itu.edu.tr/jfa/article/view/639; İlhan Tekeli, *İstanbul'un Planlaması ve Gelişmesinin Öyküsü* (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013).

[372] Açıkgöz, "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)."

Istanbul's tradition and its risk, became a symbol of how local urban realities redefined the meaning of a defensible city.

If the preceding section outlined the institutional and cultural terrain of interwar urbanism in Turkey, the period from 1931 to 1945 reveals that this terrain was far from static. In these years, a distinctive body of planning thought emerged, articulated most vividly in the professional debates carried in *Arkitekt*. These articles show that urbanism was not a marginal or purely technical topic but a central arena for negotiating what the modern, civilized, and economically prosperous Turkish city should be. It was conceived simultaneously as an art and a science, a matter of technical competence and of cultural vision: the deliberate shaping of environments capable of sustaining healthy, cultured communities while projecting the Republic's aspirations.

The vision of the planned city was aspirational, forward-looking, and deeply intertwined with notions of public welfare, cultural identity, and resilience against future threats. Planning was imagined as an instrument for life itself, capable of organizing housing, industry, commerce, transport, and recreation in harmony with one another and with the surrounding region.[373]

Urban plans were expected to be comprehensive, extending decades into the future, anticipating not only immediate needs but the long-term trajectory of population growth, economic development, and technological change.[374] Authors, especially Wagner and Reuter, repeatedly emphasized that plans had to be grounded in economic reality: exaggerated, expensive blueprints disconnected from municipal budgets and local incomes would never move beyond paper.[375] Wagner questioned whether planners of grand urban projects ever considered "how much such a great city would cost and how the capital needed for its reshaping would be procured"[376] Reuter warned against "imaginary plans" too ambitious to be implemented, urging municipalities to anchor their visions in realistic financing and cost-effective construction.[377] These ideas, as we will se in the following sections, were not limited to the professional circles, it reached to the daily press, in the form of a reprint and even in the letters from readers.

The social dimension of planning occupied a central place in these debates. Housing was described as the foundation of civilized life, demanding sunlight, air circulation, sanitation,

---

[373] Bürhan Arif, "Modern Bir Şehirin Uzviyeti," *Mimar*, 1932; R. Öelsner, "Tabiatın ve Şehirlerin Yeşilliği," *Arkitekt*, 1945.

[374] "İstanbul Şehir Plânı," *Arkitekt*, 1935; "Şehirlerde Yeşil Sahalar," *Arkitekt*, 1937; Martin Wagner, "Büyük Şehirler Nasıl Tadil Edilir?," *Arkitekt*, 1937.

[375] Ernst Reuter, "Belediye Reisliği," trans. Adnan Kolatan, *Arkitekt*, 1943; Martin Wagner, "İnşa Etmeyen Bir Millet Yaşamıyor Demektir," *Arkitekt*, 1937.

[376] Wagner, "Büyük Şehirler Nasıl Tadil Edilir?"

[377] Ernst Reuter and Adnan Kolatan, "Belediye Yapı İşlerine Luzumlu Paranın Temini," *Arkitekt*, 1943.

privacy, and comfort. Contributors condemned speculative apartment buildings that compromised health for profit, likening them to "rat and mole nests". Proposals for cooperative housing and Siedlungen, planned neighborhoods with shared amenities and gardens, sought to provide affordable, dignified living environments for workers and middle-income families alike.[378] Municipalities were repeatedly called upon to intervene directly in the housing and land markets, acquiring land at low cost, curbing speculation, and offering long-term leases to ensure planned growth and equitable access to homes.[379] Public health and comfort were not considered luxuries but the very measure of modern urban civilization.

Green space was elevated as a civic necessity, not a decorative addition. Articles proposed integrated networks of parks, tree-lined streets, promenades, and sports fields as "the lungs of the city," essential for recreation, aesthetics, and urban hygiene.[380] Water management, reforestation of watersheds, and protection of Istanbul's natural setting were treated as planning priorities tied to both health and long-term sustainability.[381] Urbanists envisioned regional planning as an organic system linking the city to its agricultural hinterland, industrial zones, and natural resources, with transportation corridors structured to serve collective needs rather than private speculation.

The debates also highlighted a growing awareness of urban vulnerabilities. Turkey's seismic risks were well understood, and authors called for scientific, earthquake-resistant construction using appropriate materials and rational engineering methods.[382] Similarly, air raid protection was seen a "principle of modern urbanism," demanding decentralized factories, evacuation routes, and standardized basement shelters equipped with ventilation and sanitation.[383]

Underlying these principles was a strong plea for cultural and aesthetic responsibility. Istanbul's uniqueness, its domes, topography, views of the Bosphorus, was repeatedly cited as a heritage to be protected against the encroachments of unplanned apartment blocks, warehouses, and

---

[378] Bürhan Arif, "Yeni Şehirlerin İnkişafı ve 'Siedlung' Lar," *Mimar*, 1932.

[379] Abidin Mortaş, "Ankara'da Mesken Meselesi," *Arkitekt*, 1943; Veysel Tunalı, "Bizde Mesken Meselesi," *Arkitekt*, 1937; W. Schütte, "Bugünkü Kültür ve İkametgâh," *Arkitekt*, 1944; Ernst Reuter, "Mesken Meselesinin Halli Çareleri," *Arkitekt*, 1943.

[380] Öelsner, "Tabiatın ve Şehirlerin Yeşilliği"; Mimar Şahabettin, "Şehir Mimarisinde Usuller: Şehir Yeşillikleri," *Mimar*, 1933.

[381] Martin Wagner, "İstanbul Havalisinin Plânı," *Arkitekt*, 1936.

[382] "Çankırı'da Yer Depremi Tahribatı," *Arkitekt*, 1944; Abdullah Türkmen, "Depremler ve Bunlara Dayanıklı Evler," *Arkitekt*, 1944; W. Schütte, "Yer Depremleri Hakkında Yeni Araştırmalar," trans. Adnan Kolatan, *Arkitekt*, 1943; A. Türkmen, "Yer Depremlerinin Sebebleri ve Mukavim Yapılar," *Arkitekt*, 1944.

[383] Von Luchman et al., "Barselon'da Hava Hücumlarına Karşı Alınan İnşaî Tedbirler," trans. Adnan Kolatan, *Arkitekt*, 1939; "Hava Bonbardımanlarına Karşı Müdafaa Usulleri," *Arkitekt*, 1940; "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Sığınaklar (Utki'nin Tetkiki)," *Arkitekt*, 1938; Behçet Ünsal, "Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Mimarlık ve Şehircilik Sanatı," *Arkitekt*, 1935; Adnan Suner, tran., "Sivil Halkın Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Kollektif Korunması," *Arkitekt*, 1936; Adnan Kolatan, "Sığınak İnşaatı Kaideleri ve Tavsiyeler," *Arkitekt*, 1939; Zeki Sayar, "Sığınak İnşası Usulleri," *Arkitekt*, 1940.

industrial sites that threatened to turn a world-renowned city into a "city of smoke and tin roofs".[384] Authors insisted that only local experts, "the city's own children," could design plans that balanced modern needs with the preservation of historical and natural beauty.[385] Blind imitation of French, German, or American models was rejected in favor of a "Turkish urbanism" that adapted modern forms to local climate, traditions, and spirit, while fostering a distinct national architectural language rooted in rational, functional design.[386] These notions spoke louder in the journal *Yapı* where Sedat Çetintaş took the lead for insisting on the Turkishness, whether it was a house or an innate understanding of the life ahead.

Many contributors diagnosed the failures of Turkish cities as stemming from weak municipal authority, fragmented legislation, and lack of professional oversight: Technical committees were under-equipped, laws outdated, and unqualified foremen frequently took on construction projects, undermining safety and aesthetics.[387] Solutions proposed in *Arkitekt* were both institutional and spatial: empowering municipalities to manage land and infrastructure, unifying transport under public control, establishing "construction stations" in earthquake zones to standardize techniques, and professionalizing architecture and engineering to guide urban growth; competitions, public surveys, and greater civic education were suggested to democratize planning and align it with collective needs. [388]

The circular logic of Chitale's "Air Raid Proof City" finds a striking local counterpart in Burhan Arif's *Modern Bir Şehirin Uzviyeti* (1932).[389] His diagram of concentric zones, radial axes, and proportionally distributed functions—drawn with the same crisp abstraction that characterized British town planning graphics, offered a vision of the city as a balanced organism (uzviyet), its industrial, residential, civic, and green components held together in infrastructural harmony. Although Arif presents this as an original contribution to Turkish planning thought, the morphological kinship with Ebenezer Howard's Garden City plans is unmistakable: the radiating

---

[384] Naci Cemal, "Şehirlerin Mıntıkalara Ayrılması ve Tertibi," *Mimar*, 1934; Mimar Servet, "Apartman İnşaatı," *Mimar*, 1931; Burhan Arif, "İstanbul'un İmarı Hakkında Notlar," *Mimar*, 1931.

[385] Burhan Arif, "İstanbul'un Plânı," *Mimar*, 1933; Mimar Abidin, "Memlekette Türk Mimarının Yarınki Vaz'iyeti," *Mimar*, 1933.

[386] Burhan Arif, "İstanbul'un Plânı"; Wagner, "İnşa Etmeyen Bir Millet Yaşamıyor Demektir"; Martin Wagner, "Şehir İnşası Ne Demektir?," *Arkitekt*, 1938.

[387] M. Vedat, "İstanbul'un İmarı Meselesi," *Mimar*, 1931; Mimar Vedat, "İstanbul İkametgahları," *Mimar*, 1931; Burhan Arif, "İstanbul'un İmarı Hakkında Notlar"; Martin Wagner, "Şehircilikte Sermayenin Yanlış İdaresi," *Arkitekt*, 1936; Martin Wagner, "İstanbul Şehrinin Düzeltilmesi Meseleleri," *Arkitekt*, 1936; Zeki Sayar, "Biz Ne Yapıyoruz?," *Arkitekt*, 1943; Zeki Sayar, "Şehri Çirkinleştiren Binalar!...," *Arkitekt*, 1945.

[388] Ernst Reuter, "Belediyelerin Yapı İşletmeleri," trans. Adnan Kolatan, *Arkitekt*, 1943; Martin Wagner, "İstanbul'un Münakale Tahlili," *Arkitekt*, 1937; W. Schütte, "Zelzele Sahalarının Yeniden İmarı Hakkında Düşünceler," *Arkitekt*, 1940; Behçet Ünsal, "Zelzele Karşısında Yapı," *Arkitekt*, 1939; V.N., "Mimar Yetiştirmek, Mimara İş Vermekle Olur," *Mimar*, 1933; Alec Spoor, "İngiltere'de Mahalli Devlet Teşkilleri Nasıl Çalışır?," *Arkitekt*, 1944; Reuter, "Mesken Meselesinin Halli Çareleri."

[389] Bürhan Arif, "Modern Bir Şehirin Uzviyeti."

boulevards, green-belt perimeters, and nodal secondary centres echo the Garden City's promise of decentralization, fresh air, and spatial order. Yet in Arif's hands, the Garden City form was neither utopian pastoralism nor wholesale import. It became a pedagogical device, a way to teach municipalities the logic of functional zoning, and a diagnostic tool to critique the congested, unregulated spread of Turkish cities. This adaptation reveals how interwar Turkish planners could selectively borrow from international models, inflecting them with local spatial ethics, while producing diagrams that, decades later, would resonate uncannily with the circular, green-belted defensible city imagined by wartime civil defense theorists like Chitale.




Figure 26 Bürhan Arif's Scheme of an Ideal City (*Mimar*, 1932)

These debates outline a locally articulated, multidimensional planning thought in Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s. It combined functional zoning, public health, economic rationality, resilience, and cultural preservation into a vision of the "good city": airy, green, hygienic, economically viable, respectful of heritage, resilient to disaster, and socially just. This intellectual framework did not always translate into practice, speculation, financial limits, and political inertia often challenged its implementation, but it reveals that early Republican urbanism was more than imported master plans. Turkish and foreign professionals were actively theorizing their own approach to planning, negotiating between global models and local realities, and laying down a set of principles that would shape debates on modernization, safety, and the future of cities well into the wartime era.

Passive defense entered this environment as a reframing rather than a rupture. As the aerial threat intensified in the late 1930s, governments and experts codified survival, decentralization, redundancy, regulated combustibility, shelter standards, by translating existing planning ideals

into the language of civil defense. The legal image of the "safe city" aimed high, yet remained entangled with enduring constraints in municipal finance, authority, and enforcement. This is the ground on which Istanbul's wartime urbanism would be built in practice.

3.3. Codifying Safety: Law, Knowledge and the Actors

Passive defense in mid-20th century Turkey operated as an interlocking system of rules, representations, and organizations. Legal authority codified obligations and penalties, printed knowledge translated technical and military expertise into prescriptive form, and institutional power assigned responsibilities and resources to specific bodies. Each domain anchored a distinct dimension of the defensible city. Laws legislated blackout regulations, shelter requirements, and chains of command, defining how ministries, municipalities, and citizens interacted under wartime conditions. Booklets and manuals carried expert knowledge into schools, households, and workplaces, while the press amplified and debated these prescriptions. Institutions, from ministries and municipal departments to voluntary associations, gave these norms the capacity to operate within the built environment. These components reveal a wartime project of governance that worked through legal codes, educational campaigns, and organized authority. The following subsections trace their development, showing how the defensible city took shape through legislation, communication, and coordinated action.

This section reconstructs the safe city as it was imagined in mid-twentieth-century Turkey. Passive defense produced a theoretical urbanism of survival in which laws prescribed forms of space and conduct, printed knowledge translated prescriptions into routines, and institutions assigned responsibility for enforcement. The result is a legal and textual image of urban safety that exists whether or not implementation followed. Shelters, blackouts, evacuation corridors, hygienic infrastructures, material standards, and temporal disciplines were codified as principles that together formed a grammar of survival. These instruments inscribed interior frontiers into the city and organized it as a vertical volume across basements, streets, and skies. The chapter moves from ideals to codification. It shows how planning doctrines were recast as rules, manuals, and organizational charts that taught the city how to survive attack.

Interwar and wartime debates named this urban project in several ways. International planners wrote of a defensible city that aligned urban form with military logics through dispersion, firebreaks, and strategic voids. Technical experts proposed an air-raid resistant city that reduced the problem to engineering specifications of reinforced basements, shelters, and fireproofing. Turkish legal and pedagogical texts articulated a third register that can be described as the safe city, a juridical and institutional construct in which survival was written into codes and disseminated through booklets, school lessons, and civic associations. These idioms overlap, but each highlights a different register of the same transformation: comparative doctrine, technical

specification, and juridical imagination. Read together, they clarify how the frontier of war migrated inward and how verticality structured urban protection as a layered problem.

This vocabulary must also be set against the distinction between active and passive defense. Internationally, active defense referred to fighter squadrons, anti-aircraft systems, and fortification lines, while passive defense named the measures civilians were expected to adopt in order to survive attack. Turkey adopted the same binary but consistently translated passive defense as *pasif korunma* (protection) rather than *pasif savunma* (defense). The nuance matters. *Savunma* signals counteraction and strategy. *Korunma* emphasizes shielding and preservation. Citizens were instructed to protect themselves, not to defend themselves. The adjective passive introduced a further paradox. Blackout drills, shelter construction, evacuation planning, procurement, and inspection required sustained activity and municipal reorganization, yet the language framed these labors as endurance and obedience rather than initiative. Publications were inconsistent in naming the threat, alternating between *hava tehlikesine karşı* (against the threat of air raids), *hava taarruzlarına karşı* (against air attacks), and even *havaya karşı* (against the air). The instability of phrasing was part of the anticipatory apparatus. It taught the public how to imagine the object of danger and how to locate their role between exposure and protection. Law, print, and institutional routines therefore functioned as spatial theory. They redefined circulation, density, materials, and times of day as governable elements of an urban body that had to be kept alive under pressure.

What follows analyzes this theoretical city through its three interlocking dimensions. First, laws and regulations that reordered space by mandating shelters, blackouts, evacuation, medicalization, provisioning, and temporal regimes, and by extending peacetime planning statutes into a war condition. Second, a corpus of booklets and manuals that converted statutes into prescriptive knowledge for schools, workplaces, and households. Third, the institutional ecology that carried these prescriptions into action at municipal and national scales. The focus here is on how these instruments imagine and codify the city. Their uneven urban effects will be examined in the next section.

3.3.1. Legislating Urban Protection

If interwar planning in Turkey imagined the city as an ordered, hygienic, and rational organism, wartime passive defense legislation reimagined it as an organism under threat, and it should shrink and disperse at the same time. Between 1935 and 1944, the state issued a dense web of laws, regulations, and manuals that sought to anticipate the effects of aerial bombing, gas attack, and infrastructural collapse and to pre-empt them through spatial design, material standards, behavioral discipline, and institutional coordination. Previous scholarship has tended to treat these laws as little more than lists of decrees and dates. The approach here differs by treating

them architectural and spatial texts in their own right, decoding the infrastructures and behaviors they prescribe and tracing their continuities with earlier republican planning laws.

In doing so, the aim is to show that these wartime regulations were conceived across multiple, nested scales, from the national territory down to the urban scale and finally to the individual body. They mobilized land, industry, and population at the national level; re-scripted the visibility, density, and circulation of the city; and, as the next chapter will show, trained into the bodily scale, to a certain extent, through civilian duties, participation, and another domain to be protected.

Not all of these official decisions carried equal legislative weight or practical impact, some were full parliamentary laws, others ministerial decrees, regulations, or circulars, but together they formed the most sustained legal effort to define the wartime "safe city" in Turkey. The most relevant are:

- 1935 – No. 3055: "Hava Harbinden Korunmada Yurt Sıhhat İşleri Talimatı" [Directive on Public Health Measures in Air Defense], Resmî Gazete, July 1935, pp. 5485–5501.
- 1935 – No. 3070: "Hava Tehlikesini Bilen Üye Kaydedilecek Memurların Verecekleri Beyanname Hakkında (Tamim)" [Circular on the Declaration to be Submitted by Public Employees Registered as Knowing the Air Threat], Resmî Gazete, February 1935, p. 5537.
- 1937 – No. 3548: "Hava ve Zehirli Gazden Korunma Kurslarına Devam Hakkında (Tamim)" [Circular on Attendance at Courses for Protection Against Air and Poison Gas], Resmî Gazete, August 1937.
- 1938 – No. 3955: "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Korunma Kanunu" [Law on Protection Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, September 1938, pp. 10228–10229.
- 1939 – No. 4142: "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Işıkların Söndürülmesi ve Karartılması Nizamnamesi" [Regulation on the Extinguishing and Dimming of Lights Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, February 1939, pp. 11323–11325.
- 1939 – No. 4178: "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi" [Regulation on Passive Protection Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, August 1939, pp. 11543–11555.
- 1939 – No. 4302: "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Talimatnamesi" [Instruction Manual on Passive Protection Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, May 1939, pp. 12545–12563.
- 1940 – No. 4417: "Millî Korunma Kanunu" [National Protection Law], Resmî Gazete, January 1940, pp. 13213–13216.
- 1940 – No. 4418: "Pasif Korunma Bakımından Yapılarda Tatbik Edilecek Esaslar ve Sığınaklar Hakkında Kararname" [Decree on Principles to be Applied in Buildings and Shelters Regarding Passive Protection], Resmî Gazete, January 1940, pp. 13225–13230.

- 1940 – No. 4432: “Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi Hakkında Talimatname” [Instruction Manual Regarding the Regulation on Passive Protection Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, February 1940, p. 13358.
- 1940 – No. 4532: “Şehir Plânlarının Tanziminde ve Mühim Bina Yerlerinin Tayininde Tatbik Edilecek Pasif Korunma Şartlarına Dair Nizamname Hakkında Kararname” [Decree on the Regulation Regarding Passive Protection Conditions to be Applied in the Arrangement of City Plans and Designation of Important Building Sites], Resmî Gazete, November 1940, pp. 14065–14066.
- 1940 – No. 4666: “Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesinin 22 Nci ve 98 Inci Maddelerine Bazı Hükümler Eklenmesi Hakkında Nizamname Hakkında Kararname” [Decree on Adding Certain Provisions to Articles 22 and 98 of the Regulation on Passive Protection Against Air Attacks], Resmî Gazete, November 1940.
- 1944 – No. 5782: “Şehir, Kasaba ve Köylerin Lüzumunda Tahliye Veya Seyrekleştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun” [Law on the Evacuation or Thinning Out of Cities, Towns, and Villages When Necessary], Resmî Gazete, August 1944, p. 7499.

Between 1935 and 1944, the Turkish state produced a new framework of passive defense regulations that redefined the city as a governable field of civilian protection. Air raids were not imagined only as military events, but as crises that could wound the physical fabric, disrupt economic life, spread disease, and collapse civic order. The earliest directives conceived the city as a vulnerable organism: mapped into medical zones, equipped with first-aid posts, gas cleansing stations, and marked casualty flows. Health personnel were trained to treat poison gas victims, manage epidemics, and direct street-level triage, foreshadowing a wartime urbanism in which medical governance and spatial planning merged.

By the late 1930s, this vision was given legal force. New laws obliged all citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 to acquire air protection knowledge, while municipalities and state institutions were tasked with preparing city-wide passive defense plans, funding the necessary infrastructure, and organizing auxiliary teams. A comprehensive regulatory apparatus followed: blackout regimes that demanded total masking of light, household-level responsibilities for water sealing and evacuation drills, standardized shelter designs with ventilation and sanitation systems, and planning rules that dispersed populations, camouflaged buildings, and built redundancy into infrastructure networks.

Economic controls extended into the household. The state could mobilize land, labor, and goods for defense purposes, compel property owners and tenants to share the cost of shelters, and relocate populations as agricultural or industrial labor when cities were thinned out or evacuated. By the final years of the war, evacuation powers, shelter standards, and urban camouflage

strategies had been woven together into a legal image of the "safe city": a space of enforced discipline, medicalized care, and infrastructural foresight. Together, these measures transformed the urban environment into a field of administered risk, where every building, neighborhood, and citizen was inscribed into a network of defense governance.

The wartime "safe city" imagined by these laws operated through four interlocking domains. Spatial order governed shelters, blackout regimes, evacuation plans, and camouflage, re-scripting the form and visibility of urban space. Medicalized infrastructure divided the city into zones of triage, cleansing, and survival logistics, framing contamination as both a health and a security threat. Economic command mobilized property, labor, and resources through compulsory contributions and requisitions, establishing the material foundations of defense. Finally, temporal discipline synchronized civilian life with the rhythms of anticipated attack through drills, siren codes, and continuous training. Together, these domains produced an urban order in which everyday routines, spatial arrangements, and bodily gestures were coordinated under the logic of preparedness.

The first of these domains, spatial order, was where the wartime imagination of the safe city most visibly touched the urban fabric. Passive defense laws turned planning into an exercise in concealment, dispersal, and protection: prescribing where and how buildings could stand, how light could escape, how streets could serve both everyday circulation and emergency clearance, and how the city's silhouette could be altered to mislead an enemy from above.

3.3.1.1. Spatial Measures

The Passive Protection Regulation of 1939 and the Shelter Decree of 1940 imposed a typology of shelters that ranged from the improvised to the monumental. Public shelters, meant for up to 300 people, were to be subdivided into smaller 50-person units, with tunnel complexes permitted to exceed these limits. Private shelters, built by households or institutions, could be retrofitted into basements or integrated into new construction, but all were subject to resistance standards calibrated to bomb weights set by the General Staff.[390]

Medical shelters were a distinct category, equipped for triage, gas decontamination, and emergency treatment, effectively small clinics embedded in the city's defense grid. Even the simplest trenches or reinforced rooms were regulated for dimensions, materials, and access. Full shelters had to include antechambers for gas sealing, mechanical ventilation if air volume was insufficient, sanitary facilities, independent water supplies, and emergency communications. The

[390] "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Talimatnamesi," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4302 (May 1939): 12545–63.

laws prescribed wall thicknesses by material, steel doors with gas-proof seals, and banned oxygen-consuming lighting. Every shelter was assigned a trained commander responsible for order, maintenance, and evacuation. Shelter siting was strategic: carved into hillsides where possible, buried in flat terrain, and prohibited near high-risk targets like depots or power stations. Natural caves, historic bastions, and existing tunnels were to be reused. Accessibility was a priority in a way that family shelters had to open internally into dwellings to avoid exposure, while public ones required multiple exits and clear approach routes.

Blackout enforcement, codified in the 1939 lighting regulation, was full coverage.[391] It treated light itself as a navigational weapon for enemy aircraft, demanding its elimination or masking in every inhabited area. Street lighting was reduced to dim blue bulbs under strict wattage limits and shielded to prevent upward or lateral emission. All building openings had to be masked; where full masking was impossible, only low-intensity blue lighting was permitted. Chimneys, stoves, and industrial furnaces were to be modified to hide flame or glow, and reflective surfaces like rooftops or asphalt roads had to be darkened. The blackout regime extended to vehicles, trains, and ships, which had to operate without visible lights or with masked, minimal illumination. Public buildings required vestibules or double doors to prevent light leakage, and masking materials from heavy fabrics to metal shutters, they were standardized in regulations. Enforcement was a shared responsibility: local administrators were legally accountable for their jurisdictions, while individual households and building owners had to secure their own compliance.

The 1944 Evacuation Law gave the state sweeping powers to relocate populations from vulnerable cities and towns.[392] Evacuation could be partial or total, applying to people, goods, and even institutional property. Priority was given to moving children, the elderly, and the infirm, while retaining those essential to defense, administration, or the local economy. Relocated populations were to be resettled in rural areas, often on farms or in villages, with the Ministry of Interior coordinating transport and accommodation. Public buildings could be requisitioned, and if necessary, unoccupied parts of private homes could be used. Transport to state-designated destinations was free; voluntary relocation elsewhere was permitted but at personal expense. Refusal to evacuate without authorization was criminalized. The law also linked evacuation to labor mobilization, evacuees could be reassigned to agricultural or industrial work in their new locations, making movement itself part of the wartime production chain.

---

[391] "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Işıkların Söndürülmesi ve Karartılması Nizamnamesi," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4142 (February 1939): 11323–25.

[392] "Şehir, Kasaba ve Köylerin Lüzumunda Tahliye Veya Seyrekleştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 5782 (August 1944): 7499.

The 1940 Planning Decree reinterpreted urban planning through the lens of aerial defense. [393]It capped residential construction at 30% of plot area, imposed green belts of 20–30 meters between structures to act as firebreaks, and set maximum densities at 154 people per hectare. Street alignments had to follow prevailing winds to aid smoke dispersion, and continuous building facades were discouraged to reduce fire spread. Camouflage became a planning principle. New towns, industrial zones, and critical facilities were to be sited with topography and tree cover in mind, dispersed to reduce the risk of concentrated bombing. Large buildings could not be clustered without at least 100 meters between them. Utility networks were to be buried or hidden, with redundant power, water, and communications lines to ensure function after attack. Agricultural zones were ordered to incorporate firebreaks planted with non-flammable crops, prioritizing root vegetables for wartime food security. Urban entertainment venues were even encouraged to move underground, provided safety and ventilation standards could be met. All new city plans were subject to review by a joint commission of the Interior and Public Works ministries and the General Air Defense Command, making military oversight a formal part of peacetime planning. This reordering of space prescribed the siting, materials, and technical performance of shelters; it dictated how light and heat could be used; it determined which populations could remain in place; and it rewrote city plans for dispersal and concealment. Together, these laws produced a parallel layer of urbanism, one in which visibility, density, and proximity were regulated as matters of survival.

These rules layered a wartime geometry onto the peacetime city, reversing the logic of interwar openness. What had been designed for light, air, and circulation was now regulated for concealment, sealing, and dispersal. Distance became a virtue, density a liability, visibility a threat. Streets, green belts, and topography were repurposed as instruments of survival rather than amenity. In this vision, the defensible city was not only a functional arrangement of buildings and routes but an anticipatory landscape of absence, of light, of proximity, of permanence, in which urban form was continuously measured against its ability to vanish or withstand attack.

3.3.1.2. Medicalizing the City

In Turkish passive defense law, the city under aerial threat was conceived not only as a potential ruin but as a *contaminable body*, liable to infection, suffocation, and collapse unless kept under constant medical regulation. Protection required transforming the urban environment into a vast infrastructure of filtration, triage, and survival care. Between 1935 and 1944, laws constructed an anticipatory medical architecture that worked simultaneously at the scale of the street, the neighborhood, and the shelter.

[393] "Şehir Plânlarının Tanziminde ve Mühim Bina Yerlerinin Tayininde Tatbik Edilecek Pasif Korunma Şartlarına Dair Nizamname Hakkında Kararname," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4532 (November 1940): 14065–66.




Figure 27. Plans for healthcare and mustard gas care center written into law (No. 3055, 5499)

The 1935 *Hava Harbinden Korunmada Yurt Sıhhat İşleri Talimatı* (Directive on Public Health Measures in Air Defense, No. 3055) offered the earliest and most detailed vision. It divided cities into *sıhhiye bakım bölgeleri* (health care zones), each equipped with first-aid posts, gas decontamination units (*iperit bakım merkezleri*), temporary clinics, and allocated hospital beds. The directive specified a strict sequence: casualties were to be collected from attack zones, triaged, chemically cleansed, and then either hospitalized or quarantined at home. Casualty removal used a range of means, stretchers, bicycles, and horse carts, and followed pre-mapped medical corridors, keeping treatment flows unobstructed. These measures effectively reconceived the city as a distributed hospital, its streets turned into therapeutic channels and its buildings linked into a coordinated chain of emergency care.

The directive's annexed schematics made this vision architectural. The *Sıhhiye Bakım Merkezi* (Health Care Center) was segmented into rooms for triage, anesthesia, quarantine, rest, and decontamination, with gas and waste kept in separate zones. The *İperit Bakım Merkezi* (Mustard Gas Treatment Center) contained changing chambers, disinfection spaces, and isolation rooms. These facilities were to be built to standard scale and replicated across municipalities, embedding a wartime medical typology into local planning.

Medicalization was not only infrastructural but disciplinary. The 1937 *Hava ve Zehirli Gazdan Korunma Kurslarına Devam Hakkında Tamim* (Circular on Attendance at Courses for Protection Against Air and Poison Gas, No. 3548) made training a civic obligation for all government and municipal employees, as well as representatives of industrial and commercial enterprises. Attendance was strictly monitored, sign-in sheets at entry and exit, and absence was treated as dereliction of an assigned state duty. The text framed this not as a professional requirement but as a *vatanî borç* (national duty) to protect oneself, one's family, and one's fellow citizens. Failure

to comply could trigger disciplinary measures from provincial governors, and repeat offenders could be reported to their ministries for further sanction.

This coupling of technical preparedness with moral obligation shows how wartime law embedded biopolitical governance into the urban fabric. Public health became a field of military readiness, and readiness became a form of civic virtue. The medicalized city was about neutralizing toxins or treating wounds; also it was about producing a population trained to enact survival protocols, and an urban space designed to channel those protocols with maximum efficiency.

3.3.1.3. Wartime Urban Economy

Wartime passive defense in Turkey was never just about the built environment, it also relied on an invisible but equally prescriptive infrastructure of economic command. This system transformed urban survival into a compulsory civic economy, operating from the level of the household to the scale of the national market. Private property, income, and labor were drawn into a wartime calculus where protection was measured as much in liras and labor hours as in meters of reinforced concrete. By the early 1940s, the state had reframed shelter construction and civil protection as shared financial responsibilities. New regulations empowered house air wardens to collect contributions from tenants and landlords, proportionate to rent or property tax, to fund local shelters and firefighting squads. Landlords could be required to purchase protective equipment for building-based brigades. In this way, each apartment block became its own fiscal cell in the wider defense network, with residents paying not only for their own safety but for the maintenance of a collective apparatus.

These localized duties were nested within a far broader framework of state control. The National Protection Law of 1940 extended wartime provisioning to the entirety of the economy. The state could requisition raw materials, tools, vehicles, and idle farmland, and if owners failed to produce essential goods, it could cultivate the land directly. Labor was reallocated to factories, farms, mines, or transport systems as needed, bypassing normal market freedoms. Price and rent controls stabilized supply chains, while hoarding and speculation became punishable offenses. Crucially, these interventions were shielded from judicial challenge, locking economic life into a legal state of exception. The economic reimagining of the city also extended to population management. The 1944 evacuation law made clear that moving people was not only about saving lives, it was about redistributing labor. Provincial authorities could requisition private transport to relocate both people and goods, while uninhabited portions of buildings could be appropriated to house evacuees. Displaced civilians were expected to integrate into productive work in their host locations, turning evacuation into a logistical maneuver in the broader wartime production system.

These measures envisioned the wartime city as an economic organism in which every household, workshop, and vacant field was wired into a state-managed circuit of contribution, requisition, and labor. They did not simply collect money or goods, they reorganized urban society into a hierarchy of fiscal and productive roles. The scalar logic that shaped spatial and medical regulations was reproduced here: household economies feeding municipal protection budgets, municipal logistics embedded in national provisioning, and all bound under centralized wartime command.

Although not directly tied to passive defense law, the *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax) of 1942 stands as one of the most infamous wartime economic measures in Turkey. Officially framed as a patriotic sacrifice to meet the extraordinary costs of national defense, it disproportionately targeted non-Muslim citizens, often imposing assessments far beyond their liquid assets. Non-payment could lead to the seizure of property, forced auctions, and in some cases deportation to labor camps in Aşkale, Erzurum, and other remote locations. Historians have described the measure as an instrument of economic dispossession and demographic engineering, accelerating the transfer of commercial assets from minority to Muslim-Turkish ownership. [394] While legally separate from the passive defense apparatus, it belongs to the same wartime atmosphere in which economic survival was subordinated to state-defined imperatives, here, in ways that entrenched deep social and political inequalities.

3.3.1.4. Temporality and Training

In the Turkish passive defense regime, the "safe city" was beyond spatial arrangements, shelters, firebreaks, camouflage. It was also a temporal formation, held in readiness by constant rehearsal. Between 1938 and 1944, legislation transformed time into an infrastructure of security, binding the rhythms of urban life to the anticipation of aerial war. The first decisive step came with the *Law on Protection Against Air Attacks* (No. 3955, 9 July 1938). It framed preparedness as a civic obligation: all citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 were required to acquire air protection knowledge, with annual training quotas of up to thirty hours. Factories, public services, and municipal bodies were tasked with organizing their own cycles of instruction, so that the skills of defense, blackout enforcement, shelter operation, gas mask use, were continuously refreshed. The law also authorized the *General Air Defense Command* to impose full-scale exercises on entire cities, embedding a schedule of emergency into peacetime administration.

This civic clockwork was operationalized in the *Regulation on Passive Protection Against Air Attacks* (No. 4178, 8 April 1939) and its *Instruction Manual* (No. 4302, 5 September 1939). Here,

[394] Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale yolcuları: varlık vergisi ve çalışma kampları*, 1. baskı (Doğan Kitap, 2009); Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" politikaları*, 10. baskı, İletişim yayınları Tarih dizisi, 599 4 (İletişim Yayınları, 2010).

anticipation became granular. Distinct siren signals, *alert*, *imminent danger*, *all-clear*, were standardized across the country, turning the city into a synchronized auditory field. Prescribed reactions were measured in seconds: extinguish lights, seal openings, descend into shelters, fit gas masks. Delay itself was reclassified as vulnerability. The manual instituted a 24-hour *nöbet sistemi* (watch system), in which civilian patrols monitored neighborhoods for breaches of blackout or readiness, partitioning even ordinary time with surveillance shifts.

By the war's later years, the Drill Manual on Passive Air Defense in Cities and Towns (January 1944) staged this temporal discipline as theatre. Municipalities were instructed to simulate bombings, gas attacks, fires, and mass casualties in real time, with every participant assigned a sequence of tasks and a maximum completion time. Outcomes were recorded, failures catalogued, hesitations, confusion, disobedience, so that civilian performance could be recalibrated. The city became a test site for its own destruction, its competence measured not in abstract preparedness but in practiced speed.

Time emerged as a governed medium. It was segmented with training periods, watch shifts, evacuation intervals, and synchronized with alarms and drills aligning entire populations into unified movements and silences, and rehearsed, future catastrophe transformed into a repeatable civic exercise. The temporality of passive defense was not necessarily an emergency exception but a continuous state of anticipation. This legal-temporal order made the safe city a machine for anticipation: a place where daily life was shadowed by the timing of its possible interruption. It extended the rationalizing ambitions of early republican planning, which had already sought to discipline urban rhythms through zoning, traffic flows, and work hours, into the domain of wartime survival. What changed was the object of regulation: not only the circulation of people and goods in the name of hygiene and efficiency, but their choreography in the face of destruction from the air.

Overall, the passive defense legislation of the Second World War had roots in Turkish planning culture. It extended the same legalistic, top-down rationalization that had shaped cities since the 1920s, while redirecting it toward the anticipation of aerial war. The statutes that had once promised a hygienic, ordered, and rational city were not discarded, they were reinterpreted. Sanitary housing standards became sealed, gas-proof shelters. Green belts became firebreaks. Minimum street widths became evacuation corridors. The spatial tools of republican modernization were absorbed into a militarized urbanism designed for survival under bombardment.

This continuity was not accidental. Pre-war laws had already furnished municipalities with the powers and technical standards needed to discipline urban form: the 1933 Building and Roads

Law (No. 2290) regulated plot sizes, setbacks, and street widths "for public health, light, and air"; the Municipal Expropriation Law allowed the seizure of property for civic improvements; building codes mandated fire-resistant materials and safe staircases. Wartime regulations, such as the 1940 Passive Defense Planning Decree (No. 4532) and the Shelter Construction Decree (No. 4418), reused these same parameters, reframing them for the management of rubble clearance, target dispersal, and the survival of sealed interiors during gas attacks. Even property appropriation, long justified in the name of public welfare, was widened under the 1944 Evacuation Law (No. 5782) and the National Protection Law (No. 4417) to house evacuees and requisition idle land, factories, and vehicles for defense logistics. In both peacetime and wartime, law was the instrument through which the state sought to produce urban order. In both, spatial form was an object of regulation as much as of design. Yet in wartime, the same rationalized prescriptions were layered with new threat models, anticipating firestorms, debris, toxic air, and mass displacement. Hygiene became decontamination. Street geometry became a clearance and movement system under emergency. Building codes became minimum survival standards.

These continuities also meant that passive defense inherited the structural fragilities of interwar urbanism. The ambitious plans of Jansen and Prost had already been undermined by speculative land markets, municipal weakness, and unplanned settlement growth. Wartime decrees prescribing standardized shelters, coordinated evacuations, and military oversight of city plans faced the same constraints. In many cases, the vision of the "safe city" remained a legal projection rather than a built reality, reinforcing a pattern of paper urbanism in which spatial order existed more fully in statutes than in streets. The defensible city imagined between 1939 and 1944 was therefore not a legal anomaly but a mutation of the early Republican planning state, a militarized extension of its technocratic ambition to master space through rules, measurements, and decrees. In the following section, the focus shifts from the drafting of these laws to the institutions, campaigns, and media that translated them into public knowledge. Here, the "safe city" emerged not only in the text of legislation but also in the posters, manuals, training programs, and civic drills that sought to embed passive defense into the rhythms of everyday life.

3.3.2. Manuals and Public Instruction: Teaching the Practices of Safety

While legal texts articulated the structural requirements of a resilient city, booklets, manuals, and public guides, many predating the formal legal agenda, translated these precautions into spatially actionable knowledge. These publications formed a vast corpus of instructional material, including school textbooks, technical manuals, illustrated guides, and air raid-related speeches, for this study, a total of 57 such publications were systematically identified, scanned, and analyzed. Some focused on the technicalities of poison gas, others explained shelter behavior through diagrams and scenarios. Some were adapted from foreign sources or used illustrations, such as *Pasif Korunma*, a translation of *La Défense Passive*, originally published by *L'Illustration*

and later issued by the Ministry of Public Works as a supplement to the *Bayındırlık* journal.[395] While photographs were omitted in this version, the original illustrations were retained.




Figure 28. Turkish and French Versions of *Passive Defense* booklet.

Others were the product of local, collaborative civil initiatives. One example is *Halk Zehirli Gazlara Karşı Kendini ve Başkalarını Nasıl Koruyabilir?* (How Can the Public Protect Themselves and Others Against Poisonous Gases?), authored by Halit Giray, chemistry teacher at Manisa ortaokulu and member of the Manisa Halkevi Kurs Şubesi, and Nefi Vural, an infectious diseases specialist at the Manisa public hospital and a member of the Halkevi's social aid section.[396] Their book includes photographs of female students (a very rare occasion where a woman is depicted in the manuals) performing gas mask drills, generating artificial smoke as part of training. It also documents Giray's poison gas exhibition held at the Manisa Halkevi. These printed materials aimed to animate the defense knowledge, through images, demonstrations, and sometimes speaking directly to the reader urging them to take action.

A significant portion of passive defense publications consisted of official state texts, some were direct reprints of laws, others served as explanatory manuals intended to guide their implementation.[397] On one end of the spectrum, regulations, decrees were published verbatim in

[395] *Pasif korunma* (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1939).

[396] Halit Giray and Nefi Vural, *Halk zehirli gazlara karşı kendini ve başkalarını nasıl koruyabilir?* (Manisa Halkevi, 1939).

[397] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Halk için havaya karşı korunma talimatı, D.86*, T.C. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği IV. Şube 18710 (Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği, 1932); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Hava taarruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi* (Maarif Vekilliği, 1939); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Hava taarruzlarına karşı pasif korunma nizamnamesi* (Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1939); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Hava taarruzlarına karşı ışıkların söndürülmesi ve karartılması nizamnamesi* (İnkılâp, 1940); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Hava taaruzlarına karşı fabrikaların ve müesseselerin passif korunmaları hakkındaki genel esasları gösteren talimat*, T.C. Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı IV. Şube, sayı: 7244 (Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı, 1940); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Şehir planlarının tanziminde ve mühim bina yerlerinin tayininde tatbik edilecek pasif korunma şartlarına dair nizamname* (Başvekalet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed., *Yapılarda pasif korunma*

journals and newspapers, often without commentary, signaling their status as public directives. Yet many other documents took the form of detailed guides and procedural instructions issued by ministries, military commands, or provincial commissions.[398] These handbooks translated abstract legal mandates into executable protocols, addressed directly to relevant parties, municipal officers, factory managers, or local commissions. Functioning as instruments of command, these documents outlined institutional roles, operational flows, and spatial requirements. Their tone was procedural, and their structure modular, designed for circulation and replication across regions. They illustrate an ambition to shape passive defense as an administrative and technical practice, governed by clarity, coordination, and reproducibility.



Figure 29. Giray and Vural's booklet pages showing female students (Manisa Halkevi, 1939).

Despite their administrative tone and formal layout, many passive defense manuals depart from strict technocracy by speaking directly to the reader, collapsing the institutional distance between state authority and civilian responsibility. In *Teşkilâtlı Pasif Müdafaa*, the preface begins not with policy but with moral urgency: "Protection is a duty. Each of us has tasks to fulfill in protecting ourselves, our families, and our homeland." The emphasis on *vazife* (duty) transforms civil defense into a personal obligation, appealing not through law but through conscience. In later pages, after detailing team formations and alarm systems, the tone again shifts: *"Those who disobey the instructions endanger not only themselves but also those around them."* The implication

bakımından tatbik edilecek esaslar ve sığınaklar nizamnamesi (Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940); *Hava taaruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi* (Maarif Vekilliği, 1939).

[398] Gibrin and L. C. Heckiy, *Teşkilâtlı passif müdafaa* (Dahiliye Vekâleti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1938); *Pasif korunma*; *Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri*, T.C. Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekâleti neşriyatından, no. 42 (Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekaleti, 1937); Cemal Topakoğlu, *Memleket içinin havaya karşı passif korunması hakkında genel bilgiler* (Açıksöz Matbaası, 1939); Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, *Halk için havaya karşı korunma talimatı, D.86*; Erzurum Havaya Karşı Pasif Korunma Komisyonu, *Hava tehlikesinde halkımızı ilgilendiren ödevler*, T.C. Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü (Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1939); *Passif koruma teşkilatına ait notlar* (Rıza Coşkun Matbaası, 1940).

is clear, disobedience was both a failure and endangerment of the collective. Similarly, *Pasif Korunma* (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1939), a translation-adaptation of a French manual, interrupts its illustrated shelter diagrams with a striking line: "Your life depends on reading and applying these few pages with utmost seriousness." This sentence both flatters and disciplines the reader, suggesting survival is a function of literacy and behavioral compliance. Elsewhere, it warns: "Panic is deadlier than gas" The reader is not simply being instructed on spatial modifications or trench measurements; they are being psychologically addressed, made into a rational subject of emergency governance. *Memleket İçinin Havaya Karşı Pasif Korunması Hakkında Genel Bilgiler*[399] goes even further in this pedagogical voice: "This book should serve not only as a guide but also as a mirror. Every citizen must look into it and ask whether they are truly prepared." This metaphorical framing introduces a moment of reflective citizenship, passive defense as an ethical mirror. In this way, even procedural manuals become hybrid forms of address, mixing technocratic form with emotional pedagogy. Their tone hovers between instruction and exhortation, authority and anxiety, turning readers into both potential victims and empowered agents.



Figure 30. Covers of Turkish Aeronautical Association Congress Booklets from 1932 and 1935.

In contrast to the hybrid tone of manuals, a subset of publications framed passive defense entirely as ideological appeal, printed speeches and declarative addresses that positioned aerial danger as a civilizational challenge and national calling.[400] These texts did not aim to teach citizens how

[399] Topakoğlu, *Memleket içinin havaya karşı passif korunması hakkında genel bilgiler*.

[400] *Beşinci Tayyare Kongresi : Hava Tehlikesi* (Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, 1932); Nuri Kutkan, *Zehirli gaz konferanslarım* (Eskişehir, 1935); *Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri*, Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti neşriyatından, Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma

to build a trench or wear a gas mask; they sought to mold a wartime subjectivity, vigilant, patriotic, and emotionally mobilized. In the *Beşinci Tayyare Kongresi: Hava Tehlikesi* (1932), the keynote declares: "Today's wars no longer take place on the ground, but in the skies." This elevation of the sky as the new battlefield redefines national defense as aerial vigilance. The enemy is abstracted, no longer a marching army, but a spectral presence in the atmosphere. The speaker warns: "Nations must be prepared for this new disaster descending from the skies; otherwise, they may lose their claim to civilization." Here, preparedness is moralized, to fail to prepare is to regress. The 1933 booklet *Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri* is even more explicit in its emotional address: "We think we will not be afraid until we hear the sound of the airplane. Yet when that sound is heard, it is already too late."

This dramatization performs fear in advance, teaching the reader to inhabit danger before it materializes. It continues: "To take precautions is not to be afraid. On the contrary, it is the requirement of reason and civilization." The reframing of fear as reason mirrors a broader civilizing discourse, where modernity is measured not by urbanization alone, but by aerial preparedness. In İsmet İnönü's *Altıncı Kurultay Söylevi* (1935), the rhetorical register rises to national myth-making: "The Turkish nation will stand tall even against the danger that comes from the skies." The phrase *göklerdeki tehlike* "the danger from the sky" fuses cosmic imagery with existential threat, while the declaration of Turkish steadfastness becomes a performative gesture of national will. He continues: "Aviation is not merely a matter of technique, but a matter of the nation's future." In this formulation, aviation is no longer about machines; it is destiny. Air danger is thus re-scripted as opportunity, a call to modernize, to discipline, and to unify. Together, these speech-texts provided the moral grammar for passive defense. They saturated the public sphere with patriotic urgency and emotional rhetoric, lending weight and resonance to the bureaucratic materials that followed. In doing so, they anchored the technical in the symbolic, turning urban protection into a national ethos.

From middle school classrooms to People's House seminars, passive defense became part of civic pedagogy. This layer included schoolbooks, scientific treatises, and technical courses, all presenting gas warfare as knowable and survivable through rational preparation.[401] Curricular

Çareleri, Ankara (Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti, 1933); İnönü, *Türk Hava Kurumunun altıncı kurultayında başbakan İsmet İnönünün verdikleri söylev*.

[401] *Gaz ve gazdan korunma dersleri hakkında müfredat programı* (İstanbul, 1936); *Havadan ve zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri, V. sınıf* (T.C. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939); Hikmet Konuralp and Kadri Yaman, *Zehirli gazlardan korunma dersleri: Ortaokullar için* (Maarif Vekilliği, 1939); Nuri Özkaya, *Zehirli gazlar hakkında halkevinde verilen dersler* (Halkevi Neşriyatı, 1936); Nurettin Münşi Algan, *Gaz kimyası: zehirli gazlar ve kimyevi savaş*, Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi Kütüphanesi 32 (Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi, 1936); Mazlum Boysan and Nuri Refet Korur, *Harp gazları ve bunlara karşı korunma* (İnkılab Kitabevi, 1938); Hüsnü Bey, *Muharebe gazları ve koruma çareleri* (Gayret Matbaası, 1934); Ömer Şevket Öncel, *Zehirli gazlar kimya dersleri ve korunma usulleri* (Şirketi Mürettibiye Basımevi, 1938); *Zehirli gazlar: Tesirleri, tedavi ve korunma çareleri* (Bursa İlbaylığı Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kurumunun Aydınlatma Kolu, 1936); Moynier, *Harp gazları: zehirli gazlardan ileri gelen afetlerin seriri mütalaası tesemmümlerin tedavisi*, trans. Şerif Atakan (Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936).

programs such as *Gaz ve Gazdan Korunma Dersleri Hakkında Müfredat Programı* (1936) and *Havadan ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Dersleri* (1939) formalized this knowledge at the national level, mandating the integration of gas protection into school science classes. Here, students were not only introduced to the chemical properties of asphyxiating agents, but were also taught how to identify symptoms, administer basic treatment, and use protective equipment.

Passive defense was institutionalized as a subject through a dense program of teacher training "*zehirli gaz kursları*" anti-gas classes and school-based drills. Beginning in 1935, the Ministry of Education opened special summer courses in Ankara for cultural inspectors and teachers from 43 provinces, followed by intensive one-week and two-week sessions in cities like Istanbul. These courses targeted chemistry and science teachers, figures such as Hikmet Konuralp, Avni Refik Bekman, and Hüsnü Bey, authors of some of the instructional manuals also trained colleagues in both theory and practice. Graduates of these courses were expected to return to their schools and regions to conduct lessons, run demonstrations, and hold public conferences, effectively multiplying the state's pedagogical reach.

Textbooks addressed students directly as "you," urging vigilance, composure, and bodily discipline. This rhetorical intimacy positioned the child not as a passive listener but as an active custodian of national safety. In *Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Dersleri*, for example, Vefa Lisesi chemistry teacher Mazhar Tobur opens with a direct moral appeal:

> "Dear child, the lessons you have learned so far and the advice you have received prepare you to think well for tomorrow, to work diligently, and to become a truly good person. Yet, with these few lines, I want to place before your eyes certain truths… The enemy… will not hesitate to use this poisonous gas to destroy your home and homeland… Keeping calm will be your greatest weapon in this matter. Avoid panic; take your measures… If you know what to do in the face of such threat, immediately begin applying your protective measures."[402]

This form of address blends instruction with narrative urgency. It folds the abstract threat of aerial and chemical warfare into the imagined life of the reader, transforming technical guidance, mask usage, calmness under attack, into a deeply personal moral duty. The educated child was imagined not only as a potential survivor but as a messenger, carrying passive defense knowledge into the home. In this way, scientific instruction exceeded the lab and the classroom, becoming part of a national campaign for psychological and spatial readiness.

In the classroom, the curriculum combined technical apparatus with hands-on rehearsal. Students learned the components of gas sample boxes, practiced donning masks, handled small

[402] M. Mazhar Tobur, *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri* (İnkılâp Kütüphanesi, 1936).

incendiary and smoke devices under supervision, and rehearsed evacuation routines. Designated "experience rooms" displayed diagrams of gas attacks and protection methods, while chemistry and physics courses embedded these topics into regular instruction. By 1939, schools were required to form their own passive defense organizations, with students assigned roles from first aid to alarm signaling. Drills became a performative routine: on December 1, 1939, for example, Istanbul's 44th Primary School evacuated all students to its basement shelter in under two minutes during a mock air raid.[403] Similar exercises proliferated, often accompanied by mask inspection days and lectures by People's House specialists. Gas mask procurement, facilitated by the Red Crescent through installment plans, was treated as a civic necessity, despite financial barriers for families.




Figure 31. Pages from the passive defense textbook for the 5th Grades (Maarif Vekilliği, 1939)

The circulation of passive defense courses through schools positioned education as a primary instrument of anticipatory governance. Chemistry and physics lessons doubled as training in fear management, bodily discipline, and coordinated action under threat. Technical knowledge was bound to moral duty, turning the classroom into a microcosm of the wartime city, regulated, rehearsed, and aligned to collective rhythms of vigilance.

Beyond state-issued laws and bureaucratic manuals, a parallel corpus of public-facing publications emerged to translate the abstract language of civil defense into accessible, actionable terms for ordinary citizens.[404] Titles such as *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma*

[403] Bakar, *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[404] *Gaz ve gazdan korunma dersleri hakkında müfredat programı*; Giray and Vural, *Halk zehirli gazlara karşı kendini ve başkalarını nasıl koruyabilir?*; Nuri Refet, *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?* (İnkılab Kitabevi, 1936); M. H. Tanık, *Gök savaşlarından korunma yolları* (Hilmi Kitabevi, 1937); *Passif havadan korunma* (Alâeddin Kral Basımevi, 1939); Tobur, *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*; Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Gaz Bombaları* (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938); Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Genel Korunma ve Sığınaklar* (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938); Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Maskeler* (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938); Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Tahrip Bombaları* (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938); Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın*

çareleri (Bahar, 1940), *Halk zehirli gazlara karşı kendini ve başkalarını nasıl koruyabilir?* (Giray & Vural, 1939), and *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?* (Korur, 1936) represent just a few among dozens of manuals, pamphlets, and serialized newspaper guides that sought to make the threat of gas warfare legible to the public. These texts often blended simple scientific explanation with intimate and moralistic appeals to civic duty. Similar to the other publications they posed direct questions to the reader, and dramatized everyday risks: What would you do if the siren sounded? How quickly could you put on your mask? Who else might depend on your preparedness?



Figure 32 Ads of passive defense info material on *Cumhuriyet* (May 6, 1938; May 10, 1939; May 8, 1940)

Newspapers and magazines became crucial amplifiers. Major dailies published advertisements and bibliographies of passive defense books[405], functioning as distribution networks in their own right. Popular outlets like *Ev İş*, professional journals such as *Sıhhiye Mecmuası*, and specialized titles like *Havacılık ve Spor, Cankurtaran, Harb Mecmuası, Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlardan Korunma Mecmuası* all carried articles, diagrams, or serialized instructions, embedding passive defense into both domestic advice culture and technical readerships.

The visual and didactic strategies extended into moving images. Nuri Refet Korur's 1940 article "Gaz Filimleri" in Kızılay Mecmuası offers a rare inside account of how visual pedagogy became part of Turkey's passive defense apparatus.[406] He described how, under Kızılay's initiative and in collaboration with the Army Film Unit and the Chemical Battalion, a series of gas-defense training films was produced using meager resources—"only four or five masks, no two alike." Despite this scarcity, he emphasized their pioneering character, claiming they were "the first of their kind even in Europe and America." The resulting four films: *Gazların Tesiri* (The Effects of Gas), *Maske* (Mask), *Gaz Keşfi* (Gas Detection), and *İstanbul'da Pasif Korunma Tatbikatı* (Passive Defense

Bombaları (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938); Abidin Haşim Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Zehirli Gazlar* (Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938).

[405] "Bibliyografya - Zehirli Gazlar ve Korunma Çareleri," *Cumhuriyet*, July 2, 1936; "Bibliyografya – Zehirli Gazlara Dair Eserler," *Cumhuriyet*, June 17, 1937.

[406] Nuri Refet Korur, "Gaz Filmleri," *Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 15, 1940.

Maneuver in Istanbul) [407], combined documentary realism with staged instruction. They demonstrated the physiological effects of gases, proper mask use, cleansing and detection procedures, and the coordinated roles of civil defense teams.




Figure 33. Military film center operations (Korur, 1940)

By 1939, new Turkish-language versions replaced earlier foreign footage, aligning the imagery of protection with national symbols and uniforms. Screened in military garrisons, schools, and community halls, these films transformed cinema into a civic classroom, where the invisible atmosphere of war could be seen, studied, and domesticated through repetition and instruction. Korur framed this visual labor as both scientific and moral, a means of cultivating calm, discipline, and technical competence as the foundations of survival. International works also circulated, such as the British film *Warning*, screened in Turkey as part of public awareness efforts.[408]

Despite their varied formats and origins, ranging from local Halkevi imprints to translated European manuals, these publications and media pieces shared a recognizable structure and iconography. Gas mask diagrams, shelter layouts, and step-by-step procedures recurred across titles, standardizing a visual and procedural grammar of survival. Yet within this template, authors shaped the tone to fit their intended audiences: Tanık's plainspoken table for

[407] T. C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, "İstanbul'da Ağustos 1939'da Yapılan Pasif Korunma Manevrası," WebTV, accessed October 3, 2025, http://filmmirasim.ktb.gov.tr/tr/film/harp-kimyasi-egitimi--gaz--maske--alev--sis--9--kisim-.

[408] "Don Kazakları – Programa Ek Olarak: Pasif Korunma (The Warning)," *Cumhuriyet*, February 29, 1940.

schoolchildren, Korur's technically precise yet urgent prose, or Giray and Vural's inclusion of photographs showing women actively participating in drills. This cross-media ecology, booklets, posters, newspaper columns, magazine articles, and films, ensured that passive defense knowledge was not confined to official channels. It permeated domestic spaces, workplaces, and leisure reading, encouraging the public to see survival as a civic routine. These works collectively built a vernacular architecture of anticipation, linking the technical demands of the state to the everyday environments where protection would actually take shape.

3.3.3. Institutional Mobilization: Actors and Authority

Between 1935 and 1945, passive defense in Turkey took shape as a sprawling apparatus of command, coordination, and persuasion. It bound together state ministries, military commands, municipal authorities, civil society organizations, and the media in a multi-scalar network of governance. Its purpose was not only to devise contingency plans for aerial bombardment and chemical attack but to translate those plans into executable protocols embedded in the routines of city life. At the center stood the Ministry of Interior's Mobilization Directorate (*Seferberlik Müdürlüğü*), the principal engine of passive defense. It convened conferences, published official guides, ran training courses, supervised the establishment of air intelligence posts, coordinated alarm whistle networks, and initiated fire prevention programs. One of its most ambitious initiatives was the "Poisonous Gas Library," a central repository designed to collect and disseminate technical knowledge on chemical warfare.[409]

Other ministries contributed according to their domains. The Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, through its *Directorate for Protection Against Poisonous and Asphyxiating Gases and Air Raids*, issued procedural instructions for hospitals, clinics, and first-aid teams, while providing expert guidance on gas hazards. The Ministry of National Defense attended international conferences on chemical warfare, was authorized to import gas-related materials, and eventually took control of the Kızılay Gas Mask Factory[410]. The Ministry of Agriculture issued announcements on animal protection; the Ministry of Transport instructed the Directorate of Maritime Lines to implement protective measures aboard ships.[411] This expansion into non-urban sectors demonstrates the breadth of the passive defense vision and the state's attempt to bind every domain of life into a single wartime framework. The Ministry of Culture and Ministry of National Education mandated gas defense lessons in schools, organized related conferences,

[409] Bakar, *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[410] "Gaz Maske Fabrikası Milli Müdafaa Vekâletine Geçiyor," *Ulus*, March 2, 1943.

[411] A. Rıza Tarlan, *Passif korunma sıhhıye ekip için harp gazlarına karşı korunma* (Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1939); "Havâî Seyrüsefer: Tayyarelerin Tabi Olacağı Hükümler Belirlendi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1939.

and publicly rewarded compliant principals. Together, these agencies projected the reach of passive defense into military, civilian, maritime, and agricultural domains.

Parallel to the civilian infrastructure, the General Staff's Air Defense General Command, under General Hüseyin Hüsnü Kılkış, drafted peacetime protection plans, conducted field inspections, and coordinated with local authorities. The Gas General Command, in part led by chemist-officer Nuri Refet Bey, extended these efforts by acquiring gas munitions from abroad and refining Turkey's technical capacity in chemical defense.




Figure 34. Organizational scheme of air defense (Tuğaç, *Belediyeler Dergisi*, 1937)

The intended chain of command for a major city was set out in municipal publications such as Belediyeler Dergisi, which visualized the air protection apparatus as a tightly integrated hierarchy[412]. At its apex stood the governor or military commander, supported by provincial

[412] Hüsamettin Tuğaç, "Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Belediyelerimiz," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 5, no. 22 (1937): 23–27.

commissions and district-level directors, with responsibilities cascading to neighborhood protection groups and specialized emergency units, from police and fire brigades to gas cleaning squads, medical services, and transport detachments. This diagrammatic vision captured the desired unity of purpose across ministries, municipalities, and local actors, even if such coherence often proved elusive in practice.

Municipal fire departments served as both symbolic and practical front-line units. Equipped for firefighting under air raid conditions, trained in gas mask use, and tasked with clearing toxic residues, they became visible embodiments of readiness. Auxiliary fire teams were formed to support main brigades. Municipal governments were charged with building and inspecting shelters, establishing warning systems, and designating civil defense zones. Yet their ability to execute these tasks was uneven: Istanbul's municipal authorities, in particular, faced budgetary constraints, jurisdictional overlaps with central ministries, and the logistical challenges of working in a dense, topographically irregular metropolis. Provincial governors, through their air protection commissions, attempted to coordinate resources regionally, organize public drills, and manage local training programs.

Security and emergency enforcement extended to the police and gendarmerie, who patrolled blackout compliance, controlled shelter access, and managed crowd behavior during alarms. These forces, supplemented by auxiliary police, received specialized training in chemical threat response, riot prevention, and civil order maintenance. A spectrum of specialized units broadened the operational field: gas search and cleaning teams, damage control and rescue crews, repair squads for utilities, unexploded bomb removal teams, and anti-paratrooper combat groups. Veterinary services were established to protect livestock and food supplies, while air intelligence organizations monitored the skies for enemy aircraft. Under martial law, military commanders assumed expanded policing powers.

Civil society organizations broadened the apparatus' legitimacy and reach. The Turkish Aeronautical Association, formerly the Tayyare Cemiyeti, shifted from promoting aviation to air danger awareness campaigns, exhibitions on gas warfare, and even plans for youth passive protection battalions. The Red Crescent Society opened its gas mask factory in Ankara around 1935, producing "*Türk Halk Maskesi*" in multiple sizes and offering installment plans to make them accessible to students and public servants. The Association for Protection Against Air Attacks, founded in 1933, attempted to popularize precautionary measures through public lectures and its proposed journal *Cankurtaran*, though its role diminished once the state consolidated authority. Community centers (Halkevleri) and the Chamber of Physicians hosted public courses on gas protection, while various associations organized fundraising campaigns for aircraft, demonstrating the civic and philanthropic dimensions of the wartime safety effort.

Together, these ministries, commands, municipal bodies, and civic actors constituted an institutional ecology of passive defense, an apparatus designed on paper, animated through manuals, broadcasts, and drills. Yet when transposed onto the layered, congested, and historically dense fabric of Istanbul, this centralized vision encountered resistance and obstacles. Wooden housing stock, irregular topography, fragmented governance, and uneven infrastructure complicated uniform application. What emerged was not a seamless imposition of central policy, but a negotiated and improvisational choreography of surveys, adapted spaces, and staged drills. The following section turns to this ground: Istanbul not as passively defended, but as a city that continuously tested, and often strained, the very logics intended to secure it.

From the moment Abidin Daver described future war descending from the skies, the city entered the frame of military imagination as both target and stage. The literature on aerial warfare, civil defense, and wartime urbanism underscored this transformation: cities were redefined as sites of anticipation, where military strategy and civic administration converged to prepare for a conflict that had not yet arrived. In Turkey, this shift unfolded in the mid-1930s, when political leaders, military planners, and commentators recognized that modern war would test not only armies but the resilience and adaptability of the urban fabric itself.

The first half of this chapter has traced how that recognition took institutional form. Legal codes established chains of command, delineated responsibilities, and prescribed modifications to the built environment. Technical manuals, illustrated booklets, and press campaigns moved protective knowledge beyond specialist circles, into classrooms, workplaces, and households. Ministries, commissions, municipal offices, and civic organizations assembled an apparatus capable (at least on paper) of coordinating the city's defense in the face of aerial and chemical attack. This apparatus blended imported models with local adaptations. It centralized authority while dispersing practical responsibilities, embedding the logics of passive defense into multiple scales of governance. It disciplined space and behavior, reorganizing aspects of municipal services, public education, and even leisure under the sign of wartime readiness. Yet it also operated within constraints: fragmented jurisdiction, uneven resources, and the unpredictable responses of the public.

With this groundwork established, the chapter now turns to Istanbul. As the largest and most complex metropolis in the country, it served as both showcase and proving ground for the defensible city. Here, the national apparatus encountered a layered urban landscape, dense, topographically irregular, historically accreted, and a political-administrative environment that often complicated the smooth application of central directives. The Istanbul case reveals how the vision constructed in law, print, and institutional planning was interpreted, adapted, and sometimes undermined in the city's streets, neighborhoods, and civic spaces.

3.4. Istanbul: A Laboratory of Wartime Urbanism and Passive Defense

"Who is the enemy of İstanbul?" Abidin Daver asked this as a reply to a journalist who had called the people pointing out Istanbul's problems, the city's enemies. That made him one of them. He answered: *"Gözlerimiz geride değil, ileride olduğu için, bize İstanbul'un düşmanı demek gülünçtür*." (It is absurd to call us enemies of Istanbul, for our eyes are not fixed on the past but on the future.)[413] That forward gaze, the anticipatory problematic urban care, part civic ethic, part political dispute, part Daver's ego, sets the frame here. For the eyes fixed ahead, Istanbul actually faced two enemies: an external attacker imagined in an international war, and an internal one made of its own vulnerabilities. In these years, urban problems and wartime ways of thinking, operating, and doing overlapped. Much of the fight happened through words first: pointing to one problem after another, and sometimes one after a hundred.

That forward gaze also produced tools: laws, circulars, manuals, posters, and lessons. Anticipation turned into instruction, inspection, and rehearsal. Laws, booklets, and manuals circulated through municipal debates and long-term urban visions; emergency preparedness, peacetime planning ambitions, and wartime threat perceptions unfolded simultaneously. Legislation gave these measures a forceful and punitive edge, compelling compliance under the threat of sanction, yet it often fell short of securing the intended transformations. In that gap, municipal guidance and public campaigns translated codes into actionable steps and pressed citizens toward participation. This intertwined landscape of authority, planning, and enforcement is where Istanbul's wartime urban governance, and its distinctive frictions, comes into view.

Istanbul was both a strategic frontier and a city in the midst of profound transformation, an unmatched lens for examining wartime urbanism. Situated on the Bosphorus and exposed to possible Balkan incursions and maritime assault, the city operated under emergency rule. At the same time, Istanbul was a work in progress: chronic problems in water management, transportation, port infrastructure, and housing collided with a surge of apartment construction and civic projects, all while the city awaited a new master plan under wartime conditions. These overlapping dynamics exposed the gap between urban ideals and their partial, often improvised, implementation.

The city generated two architectures of anticipation: one tied to the promise of a master plan as a blueprint for the future; the other to the immediate need to prepare for aerial attack, poison gas, fire, and bomb damage. The second demanded mechanisms of protection to safeguard residents, heritage, and infrastructure and to slow escalation. Istanbul's own characteristics amplified risk:

[413] Abidin Daver, "İstanbulun Düşmanı Kimdir?," *Cumhuriyet*, January 20, 1937.

dense wooden housing functioned as a fire accelerant; local wind and weather were discussed as potential dispersers of gas. The fabric also offered adaptive possibilities as planners considered cisterns, tunnels, and other substructures for protective use. Budget limits and material scarcity shaped the repertoire. What we have here is a laboratory: a wide field of spatial practice that is not the way we are used to seeing it. It lets us watch new relationships forming between the city and its past and future, between underground and aboveground. This is a very material story, and it sets material demands that call for material solutions.

Start with what could be changed by rule and by brick. Early essays framed Istanbul's task as stewardship anchored in daily facts and fiscal realism[414] . Housing quality and form sat at the core: authors argued for healthy, efficient dwellings and criticized the speculative apartment trend without proportion, ventilation, or light[415]. Zoning and section control followed, how to divide the city into functional zones- *mıntıka*-, how to hold a consistent street wall while keeping air and sun, how to keep rooflines and massing within a civic silhouette[416].

The archive shows a constant push to make circulation do the city's heavy lifting. Writers documented new concrete road building and argued that street hierarchy, pavement standards, and junction design decide everyday welfare[417] . By decade's end, the critique sharpened at the pedestrian scale too, sidewalks, curb lines, and frontage discipline as tests of modern governance[418]. Transport analysis moved beyond geometry to economics and equity: population spread, commute patterns, and the costs of moving people became planning's base layer.[419]

The economic and procedural criticism shows diversity: District-scale studies proposed concrete adjustments while keeping an eye on budgets and sequence[420]. At the metropolitan edge, the regional frame tied routes, hinterland, and growth to a larger territorial order, anticipating later debates about dispersal and risk[421]. The archive also keeps a long memory of disaster: retrospective lessons from the 1509 earthquake placed repair logistics and collective labor on the urban agenda, a reminder that resilience is administrative as much as structural.[422]

---

[414] "İstanbul'un İmarı Meselesi," 1931; "İstanbul'un İmarı Hakkında Notlar," 1931

[415] "Apartman İnşaatı," 1931; "İstanbul İkametgâhları," 1931

[416] "Şehirlerin Mıntıkalara Ayrılması ve Tertibi," 1934; "Yapı Yükseklikleri," 1934)

[417] "İstanbul'da Yapılan Beton Şosalar," 1935

[418] "Şehir ve Kaldırım," 1945

[419] "İstanbul Nüfusunun Yayılışı ve Münakale," 1937; "İstanbul'un Münakale Tahlili," 1937.

[420] "Kadıköy ve Civarı İmar Plânı İçin Bir Etüd," 1938

[421] "İstanbul Havalisinin Plânı (Devamı)," 1936)

[422] "1509 (Hicri 915) Senesinde İstanbul'u Baştanbaşa Harab Eden Zelzelede Şehri Tamir İçin Alınan Tedbirler," 1940.

Through the mid-1930s, newspapers and professional journals tracked a city pulled between repair and redesign. Port modernization framed the waterfront as a national project expanding docks from Fındıklı to Sarayburnu and mechanizing operations to bring the harbor up to modern standards[423]. At the street scale, day-to-day works sat beside large promises: road activity pieces and "city plan" commentaries rehearsed the language of improvement and future form.[424] Housing and daily life appeared as pressure points. Feature series probed where and how people lived; later wartime housing shortages turned "*mesken sıkıntısı*" (housing trouble) into a recurring headline and proposed corporate fixes.[425] Sidewalks and street discipline entered the urban agenda with a disappointed tone: "*İstanbul sokaklarında çürüyen bir nesil*"[426] (A generation decaying in the streets of Istanbul.)

Open space and recreation were argued as matters of urban health. Calls for a culture park and for children's gardens, free baths, and large parks attached social welfare to form.[427] The skyline, meanwhile, counted as a civic asset in its own right: "A building that spoils the city's skyline" named visual harm and used aesthetic injury as an argument for regulation.[428] Transport debates cut across scales. Opinion pieces argued that Istanbul is "not a tramway city," critiquing network form and safety. Bridge and square works signaled a politics of nodes and vistas; ferry services and harbor operations remained a indicator of metropolitan competence.[429] Water supply returned as a civic refrain, marked by headlines on Terkos, outages, and consumption[430].

Overall these debates describe a city imagined as governable through standards, sections, and sequences: housing fit for air and sun; heights that respect the skyline; streets that carry movement; sidewalks that organize frontage; district plans that spend money where it counts; a region that sets limits and links. This is the stage on which the air-raid question entered. When passive-defense codes arrived, they landed on an existing grammar of *mıntıka, yükseklik, yol,* and *mıntıka-üstü* plan: widening could double as firebreak, basements as shelters, corridor logics as evacuation routes, and regional dispersal as risk management. Istanbul's wartime governance took shape as a temporal apparatus layered onto a scalar apparatus. Decrees, alarms, drills, and

[423] Cumhuriyet, 24 Jan 1935, "İstanbul Rıhtımları…",; Cumhuriyet, 18 Jun 1936, "İstanbul limanında yapılacak ıslahat…",

[424] Cumhuriyet, 16 Feb 1935, "İstanbulda Yol Faaliyeti"; Cumhuriyet, 5 Feb 1935, "İstanbulun Planı",

[425] Cumhuriyet, 26–27 May 1935, "İstanbul halkı nerelerde otururlar", Cumhuriyet, 1–2 Jul 1944, "Mesken sıkıntısı…",

[426] Cumhuriyet, 11 Mar 1937,

[427] Akşam, 9 Jan 1936, "İstanbulun da bir Kültür parka ihtiyacı var",; Cumhuriyet, 6 Aug 1938, "İstanbulun üç derdi: Çocuk bahçeleri, parasız banyolar, geniş parklar",

[428] Cumhuriyet, 10 Jan 1937

[429] Akşam, 3 Mar 1936,

[430] Cumhuriyet, 18 Jan 1938, "İstanbul'da Su Meselesi"; Cumhuriyet, 27 Jul 1936,; Cumhuriyet, 4–5 Jul 1944,

inspection cycles set the rhythm; households, buildings, streets, districts, and city commissions supplied the tiers of action. The result was governance through anticipation.

3.4.1. Institutions and Responsibilities

In 1935, Istanbul's mobilization around aviation and passive defense peaked into a city-wide institutional campaign mostly led by *Türk Hava Kurumu* (THK). Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's warnings about "hava tehlikesi" supplied the political frame, while THK, translated rhetoric into structure: pledge rolls, quota campaigns, and sector-by-sector organizing.[431] In June 1st, 1935, at the İstanbul THK Headquarters, mostly civilian parties met to discuss future plans agains "hava tehlikesi."[432] Beyoğlu Halk Partisi hosted mass meetings that routed volunteers and small donors into THK committees. The Ticaret Odası and Sanayi Odası formed dedicated boards to canvass members for recurring pledges. Traders' associations, butchers, bakers, craftsmen, shopkeepers, bound themselves to fixed annual subscriptions. Municipal and utility enterprises, Şirket-i Hayriye, Tramvay, Elektrik, Telefon, also contribuited with institutional capacity. Public-employee societies normalized payroll deductions (often 2% monthly) mostly pressured as patriotic obligation.[433] The campaign also showcased big givers: industrialists like Abdurrahman Naci (120,000 lira) and his brother Nuri (200,000 lira) and merchants such as Vehbi Koç (5,000 lira) became headline commitments that set the pace for guild totals (Istanbul shopkeepers alone pledged roughly 200,000 lira).[434] District governors campaigned these efforts across neighborhoods, and even wage-earners, celebrated by name, such as Sabri and Bekir Tüten, entered the rolls by assigning a slice of their pay. The city's press, with poems[435] ("Bin yeni uçak!"), and encouraging news such as "Women of İstanbul is buying a plane!," [436] "Workers of

---

[431] *Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Türk Ulusunun Hamiyeti*, June 29, 1935.

[432] "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı: İstanbul'da Büyük Bir Toplantı Yapılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1935. The invited parties are listed as 1. Chamber of Commerce, Executive Board 2.Commodity Exchange, Executive Board and Commissioner, 3. Livestock Exchange, Executive Board and Commissioner 4. Industrial Union, Secretary General, 5. Guild Institutions, Supervisory Board President, 6. Chamber of Arbitrators, President, 7. Society for the Assistance of Physicians, President, 8. Bar Association, Executive Board, 9. Pharmacologists' Union, President, 10. Guild Associations, President, 11. Delegates of National Banks: İş Bank, Agricultural Bank, Sümerbank, Republican Central Bank, Real Estate Bank, Reconstruction Bank, Adapazarı Bank, and the National Savings Bank, 12. Editors-in-Chief of Newspapers, 13. Deputy Mayor, 14. Republican People's Party, District (Kaza) Chairmen, 15. People's House (Halkevi) Presidents, 16. Turkish Aeroplane Society (Tayyare Cemiyeti), Istanbul Branch Director, 17. Eastern Railways, Directorate and Commissioner, 18. State Railways, Haydarpaşa Operations Directorate, 19. Steamship Company (Vapureculuk Anonim Şirketi), 20. Butchers' Association, 21. Tramway, Electricity, and Tunnel Companies, 22. Telephone Company, 23. Şirket-i Hayriye (Bosporus Ferry Company), Directorate, 24. Üsküdar Tramway Company, 25. General Directorate of Monopolies, 26. İş Limited Company, 27. Milli Reasürans (National Reinsurance) Company, 28. Official and Private Advertising Companies, 29. Istanbul Port Company, General Directorate, 30. Maritime Lines (Denizyolları) and Akay Directorates

[433] *Memurlar Tayyareye Ayda %2 Verecekler*, June 28, 1935.

[434] "Hava Kurumuna Yardım İçin Yapılan Toplantılar," *Cumhuriyet*, June 20, 1935; "İsTanbul Esnafı Senede 200,000 Lira Verecek," *Cumhuriyet*, June 19, 1935; "Abdurrahman Naci'nin Kardeşi Nuri Tayyareye 200.000 Lira Verdi Yurttaşların Hamiyet Yarışı Devam Ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1935; "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Canlı Çalışma Başlıyor Bir Yurtsever Hava Kurumuna 120 Bin Lira Verdi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1935.

[435] *Bin Yeni Uçak!*, June 20, 1935.

[436] *İsTanbul Kadınları Bir Tayyare Alıyorlar*, June 14, 1935.

trams is buying a plane!"[437] had combined philanthropy, party branches, and chambers into an apparatus, one that treated aircraft procurement and passive-defense readiness as intertwined responsibilities of business, bureaucracy, and labor alike.

Participation had tricks; refusal carried stigma. Coverage was celebratory and coordinated: the press functioned as a synchronization layer under government direction, and a state-archives dossier tracks passive-defense placements across the dailies. Read these items as operational traces with a propaganda overlay. This is the pattern that will recur in the years that follow. Quotas and payroll channels reappear as blackout enforcement and shelter signage. Commission minutes become alarm policy. School timetables become evacuation drills. Istanbul learned to govern through lists, whistles, wayfinding plates, and nightly routines.

What follows is a chronological narrative surfaces actions, mobilizations, and also suspense, showing how peacetime systems were recoded into wartime functions: transport routes into evacuation corridors, waterworks into firefighting logistics, historic substructures into shelters, and newspaper headlines into public address. The chronology also shows the actors and institutions in motion. Each entry shows who acted (Governor's Office, Municipality, Seferberlik, Genelkurmay, İtfaiye, Kızılay, Halkevleri, schools, utilities), on what instrument (regulation, drill, shelter, signage, procurement), and at which scale (household, district, city). After the timeline, The chapter zooms into four friction cases: (1) underground surveys; (2) shelters, trenches, and material responsibility; (3) the wooden city and fire; and (4) planning under the air-raid question. Detailed drill choreography and mass exercises appear in the next chapter.

3.4.2. A Chronology

Prewar debates over Istanbul's form and function stayed active as global conflict loomed and then interwove with a new layer of wartime priorities. Streets slated for widening under the master plan were recast as firebreaks and evacuation routes. Historic monuments identified for preservation were reconsidered as potential hazards or as shelters. Long-standing weaknesses, combustible wooden housing, narrow streets, fragmented infrastructure, translated directly into vulnerabilities under aerial attack, gas contamination, and mass fires. Wartime governance introduced additional tools, martial law, emergency building codes, that could bypass or reinforce existing mechanisms. Istanbul's wartime transformation took shape through plans and decrees and through a dense network of civilian and institutional actors. Municipal engineers, fire brigades, schoolchildren, neighborhood committees, and workplace units turned regulations into daily routines, while navigating overlapping agendas of modernization, preservation, and

[437] *Tramvay İşçileri Tayyare Alacak*, June 9, 1935.

defense. The Chronology is constructed via newspaper articles and following the guidance of Bülent Bakar's richly narrated book on history of passive defense in Turkey.[438]



Figure 35. A gas masked unit at the fire station in 1932 (IBB Atatürk Library, Alb_000468)

The process gathered momentum in July 1935 with the Municipality's Poisonous Gas and Protection Affairs Office, the first permanent city bureau dedicated to civilian protection. In September 1935, Dr. Zeki Bey, the municipality's chief hygiene specialist, toured Germany, Poland, and Russia to examine foreign systems.

On 20 December 1935, Beyoğlu staged the first large drill, combining a citywide blackout with fire brigade operations and traffic halts; reports from pilots indicated effective masking. In January 1936, the Istanbul Air Attack Protection Commission acknowledged the city's exposure and adopted measures for an air intelligence network, thirty alarm whistles, health and accident units, and expanded gas-protection courses and publicity. The province allocated 25,000 lira in February 1936 for equipment and communications, including masks for police and fire brigades.

International expertise entered in October 1936 with German specialist Hamsley, who inspected facilities and lectured. In January 1937, the municipality earmarked 30,000 lira for a model public shelter. That spring, Halkevleri integrated civil-defense training, launching mandatory two-month courses for two representatives per household. Shelter provision advanced in planning,

[438] Bakar, *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

beginning with official buildings such as the Hygiene Directorate. By late 1937, evening gas-protection courses ran across 44–46 sites; 4,200 people completed the first phase by November, and subsequent phases followed immediately. On 2 December 1937, the Fire Department held its first contaminated-fire drill, combining mask use, decontamination, and suppression.

In January 1938, graduates reached ~18,000; the Commission resolved to establish a gas-clearing team and a public information library. In May 1938, a simulated attack managed by the fire department demonstrated readiness. In December 1938, Kızılay began selling civilian masks at six lira, and the Commission announced that public training would resume on 15 January 1939.

With the outbreak of war, the program shifted into operation. On 15 February 1939, the Regulation on Blackout and Masking of Lights came into force. In April, the municipality moved to convert the historic Kıztaşı cistern (Fatih) into a shelter; in May, the Ministry of Agriculture mandated passive-protection courses for animal owners.

By August 1939, preparations intensified. A large drill on the 19th proved broadly successful but was followed that day by a false alarm from a factory whistle; a second drill on 23 August targeted operational gaps. In September, the Commission ordered sandbags for roofs and communal apartment shelters, designated protection officers, and restarted public courses in early October. On 1 December, the first school-based drill at the 44th Primary School reached the shelter in under two minutes.

French specialist Admiral Lucien Mouren inspected the city in March 1940. In May, the Governor's Office required apartment and stone-house owners to designate and reinforce a shelter room, with fines and imprisonment for non-compliance. In June, THK began forming youth passive-defense battalions.

A full blackout followed the European escalation. Outdoor lighting and vehicles were darkened from 21 November 1940, with indoor restrictions from 1 December; 7,000 streetlights were removed and replaced with 150 masked blue lamps. Minor leaks were reported, and restrictions were lifted on 10 December.

On 30 January 1941, a major drill simulated multiple attack scenarios over one hour, testing rescue, decontamination, repair, auxiliary police, and fire brigades. In February, the Governor requested 3.5 million lira from the Interior Ministry for urgent needs. Between March–May 1941, district-level drills in Sarıyer, Üsküdar, Eminönü, Beşiktaş, Kadıköy, and Şişli introduced parachute destruction teams to counter simulated landings. By July 1941, inspections counted 12,500–13,000 completed shelters. On 4 October 1941, the Council of Ministers authorized the

return of residents evacuated from Istanbul and Thrace. In February 1943, the province required all properties to store drinking and utility water, with compliance checks set for April (extended to May). Through March–April, public training resumed in Halkevleri across multiple neighborhoods.

Tensions rose again in 1944. In April, unidentified aircraft dropped incendiary and demolition bombs in Sütlüce and near Yuşa Hill, prompting intensified measures. On 5 May, a large drill coupled with a light-masking test produced 136 fines for leaks; drills on 9 and 13 May showed better response but persistent technical issues. On 15 June, the first unannounced night drill of the year darkened the city after alarm whistles; teams deployed as planned.

After Turkey severed relations with Germany on 7 August 1944, a strict nationwide blackout ensued, banning all external illumination and masking visible interior lights. Between 9–17 August, multiple alarms answered unidentified (later confirmed British) aircraft; anti-aircraft batteries engaged. From 5–11 October, Istanbul held active air drills with aircraft flights and live AA fire, coordinated with passive-defense teams. On 3 November 1944, the blackout lifted nationwide as the front lines moved away.

The timeline exposes that orders, drills, quotas, and headlines did not only prepare for an air raid; they rewired everyday routines, turned utilities into signaling devices, and converted space into rules. İstanbul becomes legible here as a laboratory where anticipation takes administrative form: Firstly, passive defense works through translation: national codes become municipal tasks, and municipal tasks fall onto stairs, cellars, cisterns, and courtyards. Effectiveness depends on this chain of translation rather than on statute alone. Secondly, media and measurement operate as infrastructure. Whistles, sirens, signage, and the newspaper page synchronize behavior and manufacture proof. Numbers and drills produce compliance but also performance, reputation, and pressure. Finally, material city and legal city meet at points of resistance. Wood ignites, basements leak, tunnels breathe; budgets stall. These frictions do the real explanatory work.

The next sections pursue these claims in places that they turn into operations, discussions and theories: the subsurface survey of cisterns and tunnels; the material and organizational burden of shelters and trenches; the wooden city's fire trouble; and planning under the air-raid question. Each case tests how anticipatory rule becomes urban practice, how futures are made actionable, and where they fail, adapt, or mutate.

3.4.3. Surveying the City Through the Lens of War

By the mid-1930s, Istanbul began to be read from underground. Air-raid anticipation redirected attention to cisterns, tunnels, vaults, and cellars; the city's ground became a ledger of survivable

voids. Journalists, municipal teams, foreign specialists, and residents with local knowledge all contributed to a new practice of inventory, part survey, part persuasion, part project brief.

Nusret Safa Coşkun's *Son Posta* dossier on "Underground Istanbul" stands as a concentrated example of how the anticipation of air raids reshaped the way the city was seen, measured, and valued.[439] Faced with the blunt reality that "the city has no money to build shelters," Coşkun turned his gaze below ground, proposing that existing Byzantine cisterns, underground roads, and vaults could serve as "natural shelters" if reimagined and adapted. His premise was pragmatic: rather than lament the absence of new construction, rediscover the protective potential of what was already there.



Figure 36. Underground Istanbul dossier (*Son Posta*, Coşkun, March 19–21, 1940.

The series was built on direct site visits, he wrote he "entered as a journalist into these dark corridors" to places like Yerebatan, Binbirdirek, and the Theodosius cistern under the Municipality. What he found was neglect: locked doors, waterlogged floors, rusting stairs, mud from coal depots, cobwebbed display cases, and debris-filled column bases. Yet these conditions were not, in his view, terminal. Instead, they became prompts for an imagined program of conversion: clean the ground, prevent humidity, pave the floor with stone, wood, or concrete, plaster the walls and ceilings, widen stairs, open wide doors on all four sides, install a simple electrical system, and provide amenities such as toilets and play areas for children. The question of structural strength loomed large, "It is essential that the tops of the shelters built to protect from destructive bombs are strong," and he worked through potential solutions, from reinforcing vaults with arches to adding thick layers of concrete against bomb penetration. Capacity estimates anchored the argument in numbers: Binbirdirek could hold "at least 5,000, and if necessary 10,000," while even the municipal cistern could be made serviceable "with a small

[439] Nusret Safa Coşkun, "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Edirnekapıdan Ayasofyaya Gelen Geniş Yeraltı Yolu," *Son Posta*, March 19, 1940; Nusret Safa Coşkun, "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Binbirdirek," *Son Posta*, March 20, 1940; Nusret Safa Coşkun, "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Belediye Binasının Altında Bulunan Tarihi Sarnıç," *Son Posta*, March 21, 1940; Nusret Safa Coşkun, "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Yerebatan Sarayı," *Son Posta*, March 22, 1940.

effort." The rhetoric mixed pragmatism and civic attachment: "İstanbul is poor in money, but very rich in capacity," insisting that the city's underground spaces had "no equal in any country to be utilized." Survival would come from repurposing, not from waiting for capital-intensive new works.

Coşkun's vision was not limited to wartime utility. He considered peacetime transformations: cold storage, markets, or "a very attractive underground casino" and contrasted Istanbul's inaction with "many big European cities" that had already adapted underground spaces for public use. In this, he framed the cisterns and vaults were both as potential shelters, and also as forgotten civic infrastructure whose adaptation could bridge heritage, leisure, and protection.

The series operated as both journalism and informal urban survey. Over "ten days of research," the *Son Posta* team inspected potential sites "one by one," producing a set of observations that blended technical feasibility, historical description, and speculative design. The publications, according to Coşkun, were met with "importance" by relevant authorities: the Governor of Istanbul and passive protection officials began considering capacities, examining sites, and weighing their suitability in light of French expert advice. While municipal and state actors were already aware of some of these structures, the dossier sharpened public and administrative attention, aligning the city's dormant historical fabric with the urgent temporalities of wartime protection.

In this way, Coşkun's work captures the reframing of the urban environment under the shadow of war. The city was mapped not necessarily for its vulnerabilities but its hidden resources, a spatial archive of survivable voids that could be reactivated in the name of civilian safety. His excursions reveal a layered sensibility: part survival planning, part heritage awareness, and part speculative urbanism. They demonstrate how, in a moment of constraint, existing space could be re-seen, not as obsolete remnants, but as adaptive infrastructures in waiting. Yerebatan Sarayı then crystallized how inspection, identification, arrangements, and preparedness/measures worked on the ground. [440] In 1937 the municipality secured control and tied the cistern to utility upgrades. In 1938 it improved access and surface flow and moved to expropriation and repair. Public pieces framed the site as a historical asset, while in 1940 the entrance block was cleared to form an open area, space for circulation, assembly, and oversight. Coverage in 1941 returned to the surface works and visitor access and logged the cistern in city affairs and budget planning.

[440] "Belediye Kanalizasyon Şebekesi Tevsi Edilecek; Yerebatan Sarayı Belediyece Satın Alınıyor; Belediye Bir Kömür Deposu Yaptırıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, April 25, 1937; "Tek Karanlık Sokak Kalmayacak, Yerebatan - Nuruosmaniye Asfalt Yolu," *Cumhuriyet*, September 26, 1938; "Yerebatan Sarayı İstimlâk Ediliyor: Tarihî Mahzen Yeniden Islah ve Tamir Edilecek," *Cumhuriyet*, October 31, 1938; "Tarihi Binalarımız – Yerebatan Sarayı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 6, 1939; "Belediye, Yerebatan Sarayının Methal Kısmındaki Binaları Yıktırarak... Bir Bahçe Vücuda Getirmek Kararı Vermiştir," *Cumhuriyet*, August 9, 1940; "Müferrik – Yerebatan Sarayının Üstü," *Cumhuriyet*, April 5, 1941; "Şehir İşleri: Yerebatan Sarayının Imarı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 1941.

This frame reached back to 1933. From then on, Istanbul's underground heritage was reimagined through a civil-defense lens. Reports argued that instead of spending "millions of lira" on new works, the city could adapt its historic cisterns, cellars, and vaults into *tabii sığınaklar*, natural shelters, against poison gas. The lists were long: Yerebatan and Binbirdirek, the Teodos and Soğuksu chambers, the Ayvansaray cellars, and many others. This cataloging was about economy as much as ingenuity: survival could come not from grand projects but from reinforcing what already lay underground. However, these movements on basilicas, did not turn into consolidation of the structures. In 1955, Tahsin Öz, was still writing about their situation in despair.[441]

The idea fit a wider public quarrel over money. In "İstanbul'u Güzelleştirmek İçin," Vefa Birson week after week sketched ways to improve the city without spending any money, or by finding funds outside it.[442] Hamdi Başar, head of the Port Company, wrote "*İstanbul'u parasız imar etmek mümkündür*," insisting that "'no money' is only an excuse for not doing the work… the question is not whether there is cash, but whether money put into a city will raise its value." [443] Another columnist, weary of the constant "paramız yok," (to the point of a reply to a simple greeting) noted that even a municipality with an empty cashbox could still carry out many necessary works, and then listed measures that required organization more than cash.[444]

The "no-money" refrain mattered for what got done. Roads, waterworks, and ports at least promised a utilitarian return; even those struggled to find funds. Passive defense, by contrast, offered protection against a *probability* -vital for survival but with no revenue attached. That made City Hall harder to move. So, advocates leaned on a different playbook: argue for reuse (cisterns, cellars), stress that measures were simple and cheap, pull in outside money and volunteer labor, and use the press to insist that some things "cost nothing." What we see is a rare public push aimed at the municipality, part persuasion, part irritation, part patience, trying to make preparedness legible and acceptable in a city that is in need of money. In the following sections, another implication of this situation will occur in the form of transferring the responsibility to individuals and facing a criticism for it.

---

[441] Tahsin Öz, *İstanbul sarnıçları: Yerebatan, Binbirdirek, Cebehane, Saray, Acımusluk, Bodrum, Sultan Selim, Bulvar Sarnıçları ve diğer açık sarnıçlar.*, in *Panorama, sayı 13*, May 1955, 24,4-32,5 cm, SALT Research, FFT274009, https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/21234.

[442] V. Birson, "İstanbulu Güzelleştirmek İçin: Dolmabahçe Meydanı Nasıl Açılabilir? Paraya Lüzum Yok Sadece Bir Kaç İdare İle Anlaşıp Harap Duvar Ve Binaları Yıkmak Kafi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1935; V. Birson, "İstanbul'u Güzelleştirmek Için: Hipodromu Eski Güzelliğiyle Ortaya Çıkarabilir ve Bir Stadyom Yapabiliriz. Buraya Lazım Olan Masrafı Şehre Para Bırakacak Yabancılar Getirerek Elde Edeceğiz," *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935; V. Birson, "İstanbul'u Güzelleştirmek Için: Çırağan'da Plaj ve Strand. Florya Plajına Sarf Edilecek Para Ile Burasını Kurtarabiliriz ve Kurtaralım," *Cumhuriyet*, May 17, 1935.

[443] Hamdi Başar, "İstanbul'u Parasız Imar Etmek Mümkündür," *Cumhuriyet*, November 28, 1937.

[444] Kandemir, "Şehrin Işıkları – İstanbul Belediyesi ve Para Meselesi – Belediye, Şehirde Beş Para Sarfetmeden Ne Işler Yapabilir?," *Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 1937.

By 1935, this rediscovery had taken on a more systematic form. Foreign experts were invited to inspect the city's subterranean stock, as in the case of a European specialist brought by the municipality to survey *mahzens* and *sarnıç*s for their suitability as poison gas shelters.[445] These inspections worked both as technical exercises and as public statements: they visualized the city's preparedness, mapped its underground spaces, and transformed heritage into infrastructure. The scope of such surveys widened. In late 1935, attention turned to less obvious spaces, the Galata Tunnel and the city's hamams, whose sturdy construction and spatial depth made them attractive as potential shelters.[446] Articles described municipal commissions drawing up inspection lists, calculating how many people could be accommodated, and imagining neighborhood-level defense teams operating from these sites.

By 1939, with war looming larger, even more obscure structures entered the conversation. A former palace worker came forward to tell officials about a massive underground reservoir hidden beneath Yıldız Park, accessed through the grounds of Çırağan and Yıldız.[447] After the inspections, *Tan* reported that the tunnels were large enough to accommodate all the employees of the governor's office, and that with minimal expense, they could be converted into a shelter.[448] The municipality also conducted surveys across the city to identify buildings suitable for use as shelters.[449] This revelation underscores how much of the shelter network depended not just on formal surveys but on the city's living memory, the knowledge of workers, caretakers, and residents who knew the city under and above ground.

Another strand of wartime surveying in Istanbul came through the official visit of Admiral Lucien Mouren, a French expert in passive protection known for his organizational work in major French cities. Invited by Prime Minister Dr. Refik Saydam to prepare a report on Turkey's major cities, Mouren's itinerary included Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul.[450] In each city, he examined existing measures, conducted experiments, and met with key authorities, among them Air Defense Commander Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Kılavuz, the Ministry of Interior Mobilization Director, and the Istanbul Provincial Mobilization Director. In Istanbul, he reviewed graphics and maps at the Mobilization Directorate, visited the University, several hospitals, shelters of İstanbul, Firefighter's headquarters and attended drills and exercises in these units[451], met with Governor

---

[445] "Zehirli Gazlara Karşı Halkı Koruma Yerleri," *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1935.

[446] "Hava Tehlikelerine Karşı: Galata Tüneli ve Hamamlar Da Sığınak Olabilecek," *Cumhuriyet*, November 21, 1935.

[447] "Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri," *Cumhuriyet*, November 27, 1939.

[448] "Hava Hücumuna Karşı Umumi Sığınaklar," *Tan*, November 18, 1939.

[449] "Sığınağa Elverişli Binalar," *Haber*, October 13, 1939.

[450] "Türkiye'nin Pasif Müdafaası – Başvekilimizle Görüşen Fransız Amirali Bir Rapor Hazırlayacak," *Cumhuriyet*, March 17, 1940.

[451] *Amiral Muren Dün Sığınak Yerlerini Gezdi*, April 5, 1940; *İtfaiye Merkezinde Pasif Korunma – Müze Tetkiki ve Tulumba Arabaları*, April 6, 1940.

and district governors present.[452] While generally praising Turkey's preparedness, Mouren underscored the value of its "important historical buildings with strong tops and deep foundations," inherently suited as shelters against destructive bombs and poisonous gas.[453] His observations, grounded in technical assessment rather than journalistic curiosity, reinforced the idea, already circulating in public debate, that Istanbul's historical underground and monumental architecture could be mobilized as part of its wartime defense infrastructure. After his departure, inspections continued with a team of Deputy Governor Haluk, Provincial Mobilization Director Ekrem and chemist İsmail, on various locations that are to be designated as shelters. [454]



Figure 37. Passive Defense Expert Mouren's Inspections (*Cumhuriyet*, 1940)

Exploratory work in wartime Istanbul followed a repeatable chain of action that officials and newspapers named into being. The city learned to operate through a sequence, *tetkik* (inspection), *tespit* (identification), *tertip/tertibat* (equipmenting, provisioning), and *hazırlık/tedbir* (preparedness, protective measure). The vocabulary sounded bureaucratic and forward-looking on purpose. Each verb carried a task, a tempo, and a promise that the next step would be ready before danger arrived. In practice, *tetkik* put bodies on sites. Faik Öztrak's tour with Lütfi Kırdar through the metro works, electric plant, and tram depots turned abstract orders into on-the-spot directives[455]. *Tespit* translated inspection into lists and ledgers: big institutions and apartment blocks filed written replies, put in control cycles, and awaited follow-up checks.[456] *Tertibat* and *Teşkilat* moved protection into hardware and layout, seventy neighborhood fire

[452] *Amiral Muren Şehrimizde - Pasif Korunma Tetkikleri Başlıyor - Âni Bir Tecrübe Yapılması Muhtemeldir*, March 30, 1940; *Amiral Muren Tetkiklere Başladı - Mütehassısa, Şimdiye Kadar Yapılan Işler Etrafında Izahat Verildi*, March 31, 1940.

[453] *Pasif Korunma Teşkilâtı – Amiral Mouren, Bazı Umumî Bilgilere Ihtiyaç Olmakla Beraber, Vaziyeti Memnuniyete Şayan Bulduğunu Söyledi*, April 15, 1940.

[454] "Sığınaklar Için Tetkikat," *Cumhuriyet*, May 8, 1940.

[455] "Pasif Korunma Için Yapılan Hazırlık / Alınacak Tedbirler Hakkında Dahiliye Vekili Tetkiklerde Bulundu," *Cumhuriyet*, August 13, 1939.

[456] "Pasif Müdafaa: Müesseselerde Alınacak Tedbirler Üzerinde Çalışmalara Devam Ediliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 6, 1939.

pumps purchased and existing units repaired at municipal expense[457]; gas-cleaning teams stood up inside the sanitation service as gear arrived and courses began.[458] *Hazırlık* and *Tedbir* closed the loop as rule and routine: commissions met, reviewed resolutions, and extended shelter obligations with a specific emphasis on poison-gas measures[459]; drill reports fed into the announcement of a standing defense command and officer summaries[460]. The same verbs extended to the urban edge, where barns, haystacks, and kerosene stores were separated, walled, and cleared as rural *tedbir.*[461] This administrative grammar mattered. It turned the city into a field of actionable findings and timed obligations. Tetkik made the ground legible; tespit fixed responsibility; tertibat stocked the neighborhood; hazırlık and tedbir synchronized people and places in the final state of readiness imagined before attack. What counted as credible action in the period was defined through this sequence, and anticipation became a civic practice that ranged from cistern surveys to commission tables, from pump houses to school basements.

The chain of verbs promised order and continuity, offering reassurance that each step carried the city closer to safety. Even when outcomes remained partial or improvised, the language itself created a sense of forward motion. Journalists gave visibility to these explorations, experts elaborated on their potential, and the municipality acted selectively on the findings. The surveys did not remake Istanbul's underground in the imagination of the whole city, but they established a channel where anticipation, publicity, and administration converged. Documentation itself brought cisterns, aqueducts, and basements into the realm of protective discourse, shifting their significance from relics of the past to latent resources of survival. Istanbul's underground was recast as a latent infrastructure of protection, while the rhetoric of measures projected that inspection, listing, provisioning, and preparedness would converge in time.

3.4.4. At the Building Scale: Duties and Materials of Protection

The city appeared as a laboratory of wartime governance, where anticipation took form in procedures and vocabulary as much as in walls or shelters. The conclusion of these efforts was not a finished system but a way of imagining survival through documentation, enumeration, and the careful staging of readiness. In this process, the subterranean fabric of Istanbul entered wartime discourse as an environment of potential refuge, shaped by the convergence of administrative words and anticipatory acts.

---

[457] "Pasif Korunma Hazırlıkları," *Cumhuriyet*, September 17, 1939.

[458] "El Arabası Talimatnamesi / Zehirli Gaz Temizleme Ekipleri / Eyüb Belediye Teşkilâtı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 8, 1938.

[459] "Hava Tehlikesi — Korunma Komisyonu Toplantılarına Başlıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, August 18, 1936.

[460] "Yeni Bir Karar – İstanbul'da Bir Müdafaa Kumandanlığı Kurulacak," *Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1939.

[461] "Müferrik: Köylerde Hava Tehlikesi Tedbir," *Tan*, September 29, 1940.

The frame of passive defense narrowed from the city at large to the scale of individual buildings. Walls, staircases, and basements became objects of calculation, judged for their capacity to withstand attack or to serve as improvised refuges. In official discourse, the building appeared as a unit of protection, a place where material structure, legal duty, and financial burden intersected. Responsibility could no longer remain abstract: it was assigned to landlords, mediated by municipal inspectors, and negotiated by tenants who lived in daily proximity to risk. This section examines how threat was assessed at the level of the building and how responsibility for shelter was distributed across social and institutional actors

3.4.4.1. Assessing Threats and Assigning Duties

Before turning to shelters, trenches, and material choices, Istanbul's passive-protection discourse standardized what exactly the city was planning against. Officials, engineers, and popular writers worked from a shared threat model that shaped every prescription that followed. The information in circulation was surprisingly transnational, from shelters from Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War to Dutch architectural journals, from militarist research of chemistry of poison gases to American design journals.



Figure 38. Types of bombs explained **(***Cumhuriyet*, August 16, 1939.)

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, aerial attack was consistently parsed into three categories: incendiary bombs, explosive bombs, and poisonous substances (gaz ve kimyevî maddeler), with occasional reference to *bakteriyel bombalar* in more technical pieces[462]. This tripartite vocabulary appears across municipal circulars, public pamphlets, and professional journals and served both public education and design guidance.

[462] Suner, "Sivil Halkın Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Kollektif Korunması."




Figure 39. Illustrations showing the effects of bombs (*Arkitekt* ,1941 *Belediyeler Dergis*i, 1936)

Professional publications such as *Arkitekt* and *Belediyeler Dergisi* translated these categories into measurable effects, drawing on foreign test data and wartime observations. In the *uçak bombalarının tesirleri*[463] literature, explosive bombs were analyzed through blast overpressure and negative-phase suction that could dislodge masonry, shear slabs from supports, and trigger progressive collapse; fragment throw was calculated by plate thickness and standoff (e.g., a 10 mm cast-iron plate perforated at ~57 m, damage possible to ~180 m). Street-canyon diagrams showed how confined blast stripped façades and blew out openings up to ~45 m from detonation.[464] Incendiary weapons were treated as a distinct thermal hazard. Magnesium/thermite compositions could exceed 2,000–3,000 °C; guidance warned against water application in such cases and prescribed smothering with earth or sand. Chemical agents were addressed separately as an inhalation/skin-contact risk (e.g., phosgene, mustard), requiring gas-tight construction, controlled ventilation, and protective entry sequences (gas locks) rather than firefighting techniques.

From this technical frame came graded assessments of building types. Unreinforced masonry ranked as highly vulnerable to sudden collapse under blast; framed reinforced-concrete or steel skeletons were expected to retain structural integrity at greater damage levels; dense wooden housing was flagged for ignition risk and rapid fire spread, making internal sheltering there an unsafe strategy. These judgments fed directly into siting and form. Underground shelters, covered by thick layers of earth and concrete, were preferred for their resistance to gas penetration and blast, though their effectiveness depended on ceiling thickness relative to bomb size, up to four

[463] Luchman et al., "Barselon'da Hava Hücumlarına Karşı Alınan İnşaî Tedbirler."

[464] "Uçak Bombalarının Tesirleri," *Arkitekt*, 1941.

metres of concrete for a one-ton bomb.[465] Basement shelters, if structurally reinforced and fitted with independent exits, offered a cost-effective adaptation of existing buildings, while purpose-built above-ground shelters, if carefully designed, could protect both occupants and structures. Across all cases, guidelines stressed separating shelter structures from load-bearing walls, providing multiple exits, and ensuring sufficient ventilation for prolonged occupancy.

3.4.4.2. Shelters: Modern and Improvised

In contemporary wartime civil defense discourse, a shelter against war gas was defined as "a place designed to prevent the entry of toxic substances, gas, steam, dust, and similar materials, intended for the protection of many people and to allow them to reside there for a sufficient period of time. An ideal shelter must be able to protect against both toxic gas attacks and the bombardment of exploding howitzers. Such a place must be underground and capable of withstanding direct hits from howitzers, or at least the shrapnel from their explosions. Its walls must be completely impermeable, and the entrance points, such as doors, must be able to be tightly sealed." [466] This standard set a clear technical ideal for wartime protection, yet the historical record of shelter construction in Istanbul between late 1939 and 1940 reveals a far more uneven reality. Tracing the actual implementation of these measures is complicated: the archival and press accounts are dense with ambitious announcements, shifting terminology, and inflated figures, but thin on verifiable, completed works. These ambiguities, between regulation and practice, between promise and delivery, shaped both the public narrative of preparedness and the material limits of protection.

Newspaper reports on shelter construction in Istanbul between late 1939 and 1940 often blended aspiration, improvisation, and ambiguity, leaving the boundary between realized and imagined measures difficult to trace. Some items used imprecise or shifting terminology, as in the case of "*11 kazaya sığınak yapılmasına başlanıyor,"*[467] where the works described were in fact open *siper hendekleri*. Others announced projects that likely never materialised, such as the "*nümune evler*" [468] in each district to demonstrate passive protection practices, or the 200,000-person shelter capacity claimed in March 1940, supposedly to be achieved by adapting underground cisterns and cellars despite prohibitive costs and uncertainty over their resistance to bombing. [469]

---

[465] Şakir Hazım Ergökmen, "Hava Tehlikesi: Halkı Bilgilendirmek Işi," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 10, no. 15 (1936): 65–67.

[466] R. Dubrisay, "Halkı Collectif Olarak Gazlara Karşı Korumak," in *Harp gazları: zehirli gazlardan ileri gelen afetlerin seriri mütalaası tesemmümlerin tedavisi*, trans. Şerif Atakam (Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936), 8.

[467] "Pasif Müdafaa Hazırlıkları Ilerliyor," *İkdam*, February 26, 1940.

[468] "Nümune Evler Yapılacak," *Tan*, February 29, 1940.

[469] "İstanbulda 200,000 Kişilik Sığınak Temin Edildi," *Tan*, March 26, 1940.




Figure 40. Illustration showing how the shelter can protect the whole building (Erksal, 1940)

Capacity figures were easily inflated by conflating categories—*siper*, *sığınak*, and hybrid "*siper sığınak*." In June 1940, officials claimed 30,000 privately dug units[470]; in July, a report announced "5000 shelters" in Beyoğlu apartments without explaining the types[471]. By August, *Tan* reported over 90,000 "shelters," most of which were *numune siper*[472]. In September, the same paper claimed a 100,000-person capacity in ten public shelters, alongside plans for four vast 25,000-person *umumi siper*.[473] Prisoners, working eight-hour shifts under guard, were assigned to the construction, a project significant enough to enter later memoir and fiction, including Rıfat Ilgaz's wartime novel *Karartma Geceleri*. In the book, Ilgaz depicts wartime "shelter" construction in Istanbul as coerced trench-digging by prisoners under watchful officials. [474] Men with calloused hands worked in the heat, the air heavy with sweat and damp earth. These excavations, officially called *sığınak*, were in reality "*açıkta kazılmış koca çukurlar*," offering dubious protection but satisfying bureaucratic requirements for preparedness. The scene exposes both the physical brutality of the labour and the emptiness of the term's bureaucratic use, how state directives translated into crude, symbolic compliance rather than functional defense. Shifting definitions, speculative projections, and selective accounting produced an official record in which protective capacity was as much rhetorical as it was material.

---

[470] "İstanbulda 30 Bin Siper Sığınağı Kazıldı," *Akşam*, June 30, 1940.

[471] "Sığınak Mecburiyeti," *İkdam*, July 22, 1940.

[472] "Şehirde 90 Binden Fazla Sığınak Yapıldı," *Tan*, August 21, 1940.

[473] "Şehrimizde Yeni Sığınaklar Yaptırılıyor," *Tan*, September 22, 1940.

[474] Rıfat Ilgaz, *Karartma Geceleri* (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 10–15.

In 1936, the Istanbul Municipality issued a detailed technical regulation for the construction of air raid shelters within buildings.[475] It prescribed that shelters be located in basement floors, with a clear internal height of no less than 3.20 meters. Required floor area was calculated as a percentage of total building floor space, 10% for buildings up to four stories, decreasing proportionally to 6% for seven-story structures. Rooms were to be no smaller than 1.80 meters in any dimension and no less than five square meters. Two separate doors were mandated, positioned as far apart as possible, each leading to an antechamber, one opening into the building and the other to the outside, with precise minimum dimensions and inward-opening doors. Sheet metal doors with iron frames were to be sealed with rubber or felt to ensure gas-tightness. Windows were prohibited, except for a small external control window with triple glazing, rubber seals, protective wire mesh, and an internal locking cover. Sanitation facilities, a syphon toilet and washbasin, were required. Walls were to be at least 0.50 meters thick, of solid brick or stone set in cement mortar, with perforated or agglomerate bricks prohibited. Ceilings and floor slabs were specified in reinforced concrete to defined thicknesses, with a calculated total of 27 centimeters if combined. Ventilation was to be provided through at least two dedicated filtered air vents, proportioned to the shelter's capacity and installed according to official drawings.

With the start of the war, regulations had extended beyond new construction to mandate the designation of a room in every apartment or large building as a gas-proof shelter[476]. Provincial authorities ordered compliance within fifteen days, the formation of building committees, and the procurement of required equipment and materials. The Istanbul Provincial Mobilization Directorate clarified that citizens constructing protection rooms in masonry or concrete buildings of three stories or more could apply for site-specific technical guidance[477]. These committees would advise on location and technical precautions. Construction in wooden buildings was prohibited, though trenches could be dug in suitably large gardens unaffected by the potential collapse of adjacent structures. Either a protection room or a trench was deemed sufficient; both were not required.

Passive protection was understood as extending beyond construction to preparedness. In September 1940, the Mobilization Directorate reported 91,755 trenches and shelters dug by the public, and required every household to keep specific tools, shovels, picks, saws, axes, ropes, crowbars, buckets, sand, and lime, ready for use[478]. Institutions were to form in-house rescue teams trained in gas detection, firefighting, first aid, and rescue operations, functioning

[475] "Hava Hücumuna Karşı Yapılacak Sığınaklar," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 03, no. 9 (1936): 99–100.

[476] "Apartmanlarda Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri," *Cumhuriyet*, March 28, 1940.

[477] "Evlerde Yapılacak Sığınaklar: Seferberlik Müdürlüğü Bu Hususta Izahat Veriyor," *Cumhuriyet*, June 18, 1940.

[478] "Pasif Korunma: Evlerde Bazı Aletler Bulunacak, Müesseselerde de İmdat Ekipleri Teşkil Edilecek," *Tan*, September 1, 1940.

independently of municipal services. Questions of cost allocation emerged in 1941. The Ministry of Interior clarified that permanent shelters in gardens were to be built at the homeowner's expense, while interior shelter measures fell to tenants[479].

That same year, the six-point directive *Hava Taaruzlarına Karşı Alınacak Tedbirler* (Measures to Be Taken Against Air Raids) outlined sheltering as part of a wider behavioral regime. [480] Issued by the Ministry of Interior after the devastation of the recent air attack on Belgrade, the directive defined a set of civic duties to be followed by the public. [481] It prohibited mass gatherings and running during attacks to prevent casualties; ordered immediate evacuation to prepared shelters or, where unavailable, to nearby trenches, walls, or open grounds; and required the pre-emptive evacuation of wooden buildings while leaving designated fire watchers in place. It mandated the continuous construction, cleaning, and covering of shelters; the digging of trenches and allocation of public land for their use by nearby residents and institutions; and the provision of tools and equipment by municipal and public works departments, which were to report their progress periodically to the Ministry. Through these measures, sheltering was defined simultaneously as a technical and civic obligation: a regulated practice that tied personal safety to public order, established minimum construction standards, and wove defense into the routines of municipal governance and everyday life.

Eventually, these rules shifted passive defense from an architectural specification to a behavioral regime. The 1936 basement-shelter code defined the object; wartime orders redefined the subject, owners, tenants, caretakers, and in-house teams, by fixing timelines, toolkits, and reporting routines. Cost assignments (garden shelters to owners, interior measures to tenants) embedded preparedness in property relations, while the ban on protection rooms in wooden houses diverted risk management into gardens and public ground. In short, *tertibat* (equipment) and *hazırlık* (preparedness) became enforceable obligations, and compliance became something that could be counted, however imperfectly, through inventories of rooms, trenches, tools, and teams. What remains to be seen is how these legal intentions were made buildable: the technical standards that translated mandates into thicknesses, seals, vents, and exits, and the uneven implementations that followed. The followin turnsto those standards, and to what their material grammar reveals about Istanbul's sheltering in practice.

From the mid-1930s onward, expert manuals and official guidance sought to define not only the legal framework of sheltering but the technical standards by which such spaces should be

[479] "Sığınakların Parasını Kim Verecek?," *Cumhuriyet*, July 31, 1941.

[480] "Hava Taaruzlarına Karşı Alınacak Tedbirler," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 5, no. 69 (1941): 2.

[481] "Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Alınacak Tedbirler," *Cumhuriyet*, May 21, 1941.

constructed and equipped. Authors such as Nuri Refet presented these prescriptions in the form of public question-and-answer sections, offering both cost estimates and practical methods for adapting existing structures. In *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?*, Refet calculated that a shelter for 50–100 people, built fully in line with contemporary scientific requirements, would cost between 8,000 and 10,000 lira, whereas retrofitting a basement with simple protective measures could be achieved for only a few hundred. [482] These savings were possible through reinforcement techniques such as inserting thick vertical logs, laying additional beams across them, and filling the intervening space with soil or sandbags to form a secondary ceiling, measures illustrated in contemporary diagrams (Fig. 34). The principle was to create resistance to the pressure of debris following structural collapse, calculated at approximately 2,500 kilograms per square meter for a medium-weight bomb striking a three-story building.[483]




Figure 41. Examples from shelter designs (Refet, 1936)

Refet advised that windows be blocked entirely or reduced to minimal openings of reinforced glass, their edges sealed with rubber or felt and fitted with metal shutters. The intention was to prevent the infiltration of poisonous gases, which could otherwise enter through the smallest gaps.[484] For heavier ordnance such as howitzers, M. Mazhar Tobur specified even more formidable specifications: underground positioning, walls of at least three meters of reinforced concrete or four meters of ordinary concrete, or alternatively, a 25-meter earth covering. Entrances were to be equipped with two tightly fitted, rubber-sealed doors, constructed of thick wood or iron, and shielded internally by layered curtains to protect against blast and contamination.[485]

By the end of the decade, practical guides such as *Pasif Havadan Korunma: Ev Veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri* (1939) translated these prescriptions into accessible instructions for

[482] Refet, *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?*

[483] Refet, *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?*, 70.

[484] Refet, *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?*, 70–71.

[485] Tobur, *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*, 53.

domestic adaptation. The most common recommendation was to convert the basements of masonry houses and institutional buildings into bomb and gas protection rooms. This entailed sealing half or all of the basement windows with solid walls, lining their joints with cloth or felt, securing them with bolted wooden covers, and then protecting the whole assembly with loose sandbags. Ceilings, too, were to be reinforced according to calculated blast loads. [486]




Figure 42. Sheltering and consolidation instrauctions (Hava Harbinden Korunmada, 1940)

Technical literature of the period stressed that protection against 100–200 kilogram bombs required both depth and material thickness. Şakir Hazım Ergökmen specified that a safe shelter roof should measure 2.5 meters for masonry arches, 1.7 meters for ordinary concrete, or 1.1 meters for reinforced concrete if located eight meters underground.[487] These figures assumed direct impact; additional overburden from floors or earth could improve performance. Since wooden buildings were considered entirely unsuitable for internal sheltering, external reinforced structures were recommended. While these measures could block blast and fragments, they did not necessarily protect against gases, an entirely separate engineering problem requiring sealed ventilation systems and filtered inlets.

The Ministry of Health and Social Assistance's *Hava Harbinden Korunmada Yurd Teşkilât ve Tertibatı Genel Bilgileri* (1937) expanded the discussion to where to locate these shelters in the city.[488] Shelters in open terrain were to be concealed, shielded from prevailing winds and artillery fire, and placed to avoid low points where gas could accumulate. In cities, large parks, squares, and other open but accessible spaces were preferred; in institutional and commercial settings,

[486] *Passif Havadan Korunma: Ev Veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri* (Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi, 1939), 14.

[487] Şakir Hazım Ergökmen, "Hava Tehlikesi: Halkı Bilgilendirmek Işi," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 11, no. 16 (1936): 75–79.

[488] *Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri*, 12.

on-site or nearby underground shelters were mandated. International examples reinforced these principles, citing French laws requiring shelters in the basements of public buildings, Soviet metro systems designed for dual use, and Italian metro stations mandated to serve as bomb shelters.

The press played a central role in shaping public understanding of these measures, with writers combining technical guidance and moral exhortation. Among these voices, A. Ahıskal stood out for his detailed, practical advice and his consistent emphasis on civic responsibility. He published several articles on passive defense[489], treating it as both an engineering problem and a moral imperative. In *Sığınakların Rolü,* Ahıskal identified the basements of masonry buildings as the most reliable starting point for urban protection, noting that such spaces often withstood even heavy bombardment. [490] Their effectiveness depended on reinforcement, secure entry points, and adequate ventilation. He considered the municipal requirement to incorporate shelters into new apartment buildings from the construction phase as "proof of sound thinking." The safest refuge, in his view, was a properly prepared basement with sealed window and door openings and both entrance and exit doors in place. He dismissed shallow, improvised trenches as ineffective, describing them as "modest shelters" dug just to satisfy regulations, covered with a few branches and a thin layer of soil. He urged readers to study examples of well-built shelters closely, to understand their protective value, and to apply such knowledge to reduce potential harm in the event of disaster. Even for those working alone or in dispersed locations, small shelters and defensive trenches were, for him, essential elements of protection against air attack. He placed the provision of such refuges alongside the distribution of food to disaster victims or clothing to soldiers, forms of organized, intelligent assistance that he considered the primary goal and duty in times of crisis as well as in peacetime. Ahıskal's writing typified a broader style in which journalists, engineers, and municipal officials combined technical advice with a moral appeal, reminding citizens not only how to build, but why they must do so.

Writers like Ahıskal were part of a wider landscape in which both public persuasion and formal regulation moved in parallel. Newspapers carried detailed advice on protective construction, often infused with moral appeals about civic responsibility, while government bodies issued increasingly precise technical directives. Shelter provision unfolded across overlapping arenas: individual homeowners sealing and reinforcing basements; municipal crews excavating large-capacity trenches in parks and vacant lots; and architects integrating protective spaces into the

[489] Arif Ahıskal, "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı – Siper ve Sığınaklar," *Cumhuriyet*, December 14, 1940; Arif, "Hava Müdafaası Karşısında Ferdlerin Hazırlanması," *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 1940; Arif A., "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı – Sığınakların Rolü – Apartman Bodrumları Iyi Tedbirlerle Emniyetli Birer Korunma Yuvası Olurlar, Açık Arazide Ise," *Cumhuriyet*, December 2, 1940.

[490] A., "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı – Sığınakların Rolü – Apartman Bodrumları Iyi Tedbirlerle Emniyetli Birer Korunma Yuvası Olurlar, Açık Arazide Ise."

design stage of apartment blocks. In the same years that columnists urged readers to roof trenches with planks and layer them with sandbags, official bulletins set out standardized dimensions, ventilation systems, and emergency access points. The result was a layered approach in which exhortation and enforcement worked side by side to embed shelters into the city's fabric.

In 1938, Istanbul's Health Directorate was reported as the site of "the first official institution shelter," in the years to come, there wasn't announcement regarding "the second". Built in the directorate's garden, this singular example was designed for the most feared scenario of the period, a poison gas attack, and could accommodate fifty people. The shelter was a reinforced underground chamber, seven to eight meters below ground, entered by a stairway that led from a small hall to the protected space. Thick wooden doors lined with iron sheet marked both the inner and outer thresholds, sealing the chamber from outside contamination. Air filtration pipes and exhaust chimneys ensured breathable air, while electric lighting and a dedicated water supply made the interior habitable for extended stays. This modern, technically equipped refuge stood apart from the more common adaptations of the period, converted basements and modest garden shelters, by offering a fully engineered defensive environment. It was also unique: despite the label "first," no comparable second example appears in the record. In Ankara, the parliament building housed a purpose-built shelter of similar ambition, although its construction was not announced, nor mentioned in press, other the initial planning phase. Together, these isolated cases point to the rarity of modern institutional shelters in Turkey's late 1930s urban defense landscape, where most protective works emerged through retrofits rather than original construction.

While the Health Directorate shelter represented a singular, purpose-built model, the far more common approach to shelter provision unfolded in apartment buildings. Regulations made the inclusion of basement shelters a condition for obtaining construction permits in new apartment projects for at least five years, but enforcement was inconsistent and largely bypassed existing buildings. In practice, this meant that while many new buildings nominally included basement shelters, these spaces were often ill-suited for actual defense or diverted to other uses. [491] Inspections in neighborhoods such as Nişantaşı, Ayaspaşa, Maçka, Şişli, and Kadıköy found that basements designated as shelters had been rented out as storage rooms or otherwise repurposed. Garden plots intended for external shelters had, in some cases, been turned into garages. Municipal authorities threatened to reclaim these spaces for their intended defensive use, promising heavier penalties for non-compliance, and ordered protective roofing over garden shelters to guard against shrapnel.

[491] "Bir Ay Zarfında Apartımanlar Altında Sığınak Yapacaklar," *Vakit*, March 27, 1940.


Apartıman sahiplerine tebligat yapıldı

Bir ay zarfında apartımanlar altında sığınak yapacaklar

Altlarındaki sığınakları kiraya verilen apartımanlar (Yazısı 5 incide)

Figure 43. Shelters rented out beneath apartment buildings. (Vakit, March 27, 1940)

These inspections also recorded more ambitious municipal undertakings on the city's periphery: a 600-person shelter in the courtyard of the Kadıköy municipality building, and a 1,500-person shelter in Beylerbeyi, part of a planned network intended to house 18,000 people once complete. Yet the contrast between such formal announcements and the quiet reality of everyday construction is striking. In my review of apartment plans published in Arkitekt from this period, not a single example explicitly incorporated a shelter space, despite the regulatory requirement. The gap between the visible architecture of regulation and the invisible architecture of compliance, or evasion, speaks to the complex reception of passive defense policy in Istanbul.

Shelter policy in Istanbul combined showcase examples, like the Health Directorate's purpose-built gas-proof chamber, with a diffuse and uneven effort to adapt existing spaces. Regulations promised citywide coverage, but inspections revealed that enforcement was patchy and public compliance partial. Municipal projects in Kadıköy and Beylerbeyi demonstrated the scale that was imagined possible, while everyday apartment basements showed the limits of state authority within private property. The result was a fragmented network, partly publicity, partly improvisation, that embodied both the ambitions and contradictions of passive defense in the city. If shelters were meant to absorb the impact of an attack, trenches addressed the need for rapid, accessible protection in open spaces. Their implementation drew on a different set of resources, sites, and labor, extending passive defense from the interiors of buildings to the public ground of streets, squares, and parks.

3.4.4.3. Trenches: Digging Ground for Protection

From the earliest months of the war, public authorities in Turkey invested considerable effort in standardizing trench design and disseminating these specifications to a broad audience. In

October 1939, Ulus published detailed public guidance under the title "*Bahçede bir sığınak siper nasıl kazılır*?" that distinguished between two officially recognized types: *daimi siperler (*permanent trenches) and *muvakkat siperler* (temporary trenches). Permanent trenches, recommended when time and materials permitted, were laid out in zigzag patterns and reinforced with 4 cm concrete linings. They were topped with concrete slab covers and 30–50 cm of earth for shrapnel protection, included ventilation openings, and had concrete floors. Dimensions were standardized at 1.80 m wide at the surface, narrowing to 1.20 m at the base, with a depth of 2 m. Access was via concrete-covered stairways. Temporary trenches followed similar proportions, 1.80 m deep, 1.20 m wide at the top, 0.80 m at the base, but were constructed more rapidly, without concrete, and instead used earth banks and sandbags. Both forms were to be sited on elevated, well-ventilated ground to minimize gas accumulation, and drainage, camouflage, and the provision of tools, first-aid kits, and gas masks were framed as essential elements of household and institutional passive defense.

Guidance on smaller-scale solutions circulated alongside these municipal standards. As outlined in *Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri*, in situations where no shelter existed, whether in houses, apartments, schools, large gardens, rural courtyards, or vegetable plots, families were advised to dig single- or two-person pits.[492] These were 1.80 m deep, 0.80 m wide at the top, and 0.60 m at the base, covered with gas-impermeable tarpaulins or oiled cloth secured to stakes and weighted with 15–20 cm of soil, leaving only one entrance that could be sealed from inside. The logic was explicitly tactical: the fewer people per trench, and the farther apart they were, the fewer the casualties.

The 1939 booklet *Passif Havadan Korunma: Ev Veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri* reinforced this principle, warning against crowding and advising camouflage to avoid aerial visibility.[493] It cautioned that shell or bomb craters, especially those contaminated with incendiary or poisonous gas, must never be used as improvised shelters. Recommended equipment included a branch or ladder for rapid entry and exit, and ventilation immediately after an attack if gas infiltration was suspected. Technical manuals added further specifications. In *Teşkilâtlı pasif müdafaa*, Gibrin and Heckiy advised that any trench intended for overhead cover should bear at least 50 cm of soil—preferably vegetated—to absorb blast and shrapnel, with excavation output calculated at 2 cubic meters per person per day. [494] Drainage systems were to be laid so that water flowed according to planned gradients, a detail emphasized as part of the construction process.

---

[492] *Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri*, 7–8.

[493] *Passif Havadan Korunma: Ev Veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri*, 12–13.

[494] Gibrin and Heckiy, *Teşkilâtlı passif müdafaa*, 129–30.




Figure 44. Examples for Trench Manuals (*Ulus*, October 4, 1939; *Arkitekt* 1939)




Figure 45. Examples of well-type shelters from civil defense manuals, 1938–1940.

Some recommendations targeted domestic builders directly. In *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri*, Hâmit Bahar urged that households with gardens, especially those in buildings under three storeys, construct their own *siper sığınak*.[495] For small gardens at risk from collapsing buildings, trenches could be built in nearby empty lots designated by the district officer. These were to be two meters deep, one meter wide at the top, 0.80 m at the base, camouflaged to blend into surrounding terrain, and protected from rain by perimeter drainage. Gas-proof covers were to be fitted, one side left open for entry, and then sealed internally with 15–20 cm of soil. Overhead protection required a 50 cm soil layer laid over timber or similar supports. For larger groups (7–8 people), Bahar proposed straight trenches with entry points at both ends.

[495] Hâmit Bahar, *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri: pasif korunmada çalışacak vatandaşlara rehber*, 4th ed. (Tan Matbaası, 1940), 18.

Architect Zeki Sayar's 1940 article on *sığınak* construction offers one of the most detailed and practically grounded discussions of wartime civilian protection in Turkey, drawing on examples from Germany, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Finland.[496] Although he consistently uses the term *sığınak*, many of the solutions he illustrates, particularly timber-framed, semi-subterranean forms, are effectively trenches adapted to local conditions. Sayar rejects the notion that shelters are "useless" or prohibitively expensive, insisting they can be built from any available material and tailored to the character of each site. His most context-specific advice combines technical precision with local knowledge, such as recommending certain soil types for optimal stability. For example, he suggests a type of shelter sunk only about 50 cm into the ground for Suadiye, where water tends to collect during the winter season.




Figure 46. Methods of Shelter Construction (Sayar, 1940)

These types built with a timber frame and plank cladding, it could be constructed very quickly and was among the cheapest models. This grounding in the physical qualities of Istanbul's neighborhoods reflects a pragmatic adaptation of foreign models to local terrain and resources. The accompanying illustrations were taken from the Dutch journal *Tijdschrift voor Volkshuisvesting en Stedebouw* (Journal for Housing and Urban Planning), and reinforced his comparative method, showing a range of light, quickly assembled structures in use abroad. By situating these designs within a survey that spans Germany's pre-war completion of concrete shelters to the Netherlands' light timber solutions, Sayar presents trenches as a low-cost, rapid-deployment "middle ground" between total evacuation and the absence of any protection. In doing so, he reinforces the idea, widely echoed in contemporary writing, that while gas-proof structures were rare, well-placed and well-dug earthworks could meaningfully reduce casualties fromhigh-explosive bombs.

[496] Sayar, "Sığınak İnşası Usulleri."




Figure 47. Methods of Shelter Construction (Sayar, 1940)

By late 1939, the Mobilization Directorate was actively engaged in preparing model examples to serve as templates for broader civilian defense. According to a report in *Cumhuriyet* on December 7, 1939, the trench plans originated from the Ministry of the Interior and were costed at 610 kuruş each.[497] Provincial authorities communicated the construction requirement to relevant parties, stipulating that trenches should, as far as possible, be located away from buildings. Where institutional gardens, such as those of schools, proved insufficient, nearby vacant plots would be appropriated for this purpose. Preparations began promptly, with engineering committees inspecting dense urban districts for large shelter sites. The municipality committed to financing these public shelters and providing the necessary land, constructing them either underground or, where appropriate, above ground. Private property owners were also targeted: a total of 200,000 printed instruction sheets were to be distributed, outlining shelter requirements in domestic settings.

By early 1940, activity had expanded considerably. [498] Especially around the time when French Admiral Mouren's inspection visit. The Istanbul Provincial Mobilization Directorate had prepared a detailed briefing for him, reflecting intensified official interest in passive protection. The city had procured equipment worth 150,000 lira, including twelve ambulances, and implemented passive protection training in major institutions. Schools became a key focus: where possible, shelters were to be built on-site, all schools equipped with sirens, and alternative precautions taken if neither was feasible. In Üsküdar, the Tramway Administration dug multiple trenches near its building, while some residents constructed their own in private gardens.

[497] "Siper ve Sığınaklar: Alâkadarlar Inşaat Hazırlıklarına Başladılar," *Cumhuriyet*, December 7, 1939.

[498] "Pasif Korunma: Şehrin Muhtelif Mahallerinde Faaliyet Arttı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 26, 1940.

The program also moved into a more visible, demonstrative phase. On April 19, 1940, it was reported that twelve model trenches were commissioned for construction in central districts, four of them in Eminönü, Fatih, and Beyoğlu, with the remainder in other neighborhoods.[499] Public visibility was deliberate: each trench measured 2 meters in depth and 7 meters in length, intended to instruct and encourage local replication. Circulars sent to households urged the building of garden shelters or the designation of a shelter room within apartment buildings. Failure to comply would be recorded during general inspections. For residents without gardens, the state offered nearby public plots for shelter construction.



Figure 48. Public education trenches and model shelters, 1939–1941.

These works continued into 1941, when enforcement became more stringent. On January 28, 1941, *Cumhuriyet* published images of prepared shelters in Şehzadebaşı[500], while a later article on July 1, 1941 warned that damaging public trenches or shelters would incur severe penalties: three months to one year of imprisonment, and for intentional damage, no less than one year.[501] The prosecuation on the grounds of violating passive defense law was not an ungrounded threat. A year earlier, a guard at İstinye Docks & Factories , was charged for violating Article 18 of the Passive Defense Law.[502] He'd been assigned to the İstinye fire unit within the passive-defense organization but failed to attend drills/trainings. Judge took his statement: Sadeddin claimed he "always complied with

[499] "Nümune Sığınaklar - 12 Tanesinin Inşası Dün Müteahhide Ihale Olundu," *Cumhuriyet*, April 19, 1940.

[500] "Pasif Korunma: Dün Hâkem Heyeti Toplandı ve Alâkadarlar Son Talimatı Verildi / Şehzadebaşı'nda Hazırlanan Sığınaklardan Biri," *Cumhuriyet*, January 28, 1941.

[501] "Siper ve Sığınakları Tahrib Edenler Ağır Ceza Görecekler," *Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1941.

[502] "İlk Dava: Pasif Müdafaa Kanununa Muhalefet Eden Bir Işçi Mahkemeye Verildi," *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 1940.

the law, was already enrolled in the factory's passive-defense course, and couldn't be in two places at once"; the factory management, he said, had notified Sarıyer district authorities of his conflict. The court read the file and requested corroboration from the relevant offices; no other news followed the incident. State archives also holds the record of cancellation of a prison sentence, again on the grounds of violating passive defense law, two years after the War ended.[503]




Figure 49 Altan Öymen's drawings of a trench digged in his childhood home's garden (2002)

In his memoir, Altan Öymen recalls how passive defense orders in Ankara suddenly made shelter construction a pressing household responsibility.[504] With no basement in their rented house, his father and the landlord took responsibility for a garden shelter. Soon after the directive was announced, men roamed the streets with shovels over their shoulders calling, "*Sığınak kazarız!*" offering their services individually or in small crews. A three-man team "*sığınakçılar*" was hired, a spot chosen among the trees. The resulting excavation was deep enough to require crouching for taller adults, and a second phase was planned: a timber cover and a bench inside so people could sit during alerts. That phase never materialized, the boards arrived but remained stacked against the garden wall. Even unfinished, the pit was considered "good enough" to be made ready in a real emergency. In the meantime, it became an improvised playground, where neighbourhood children staged "battles" with stick rifles and mock bayonet charges. Beyond its anecdotal warmth, this scene distills the lived complexity of building-scale passive defense: official mandates meeting local improvisation, even creating jobs, the blend of technical intention and partial completion, and the way protective space could oscillate between serious preparedness

[503] BCA, 30-18-1-2, Box 113, Folder 23, Folder 17.

[504] Altan Öymen, *Bir dönem bir çocuk* (Doğan Kitap, 2002), 242–44.

and everyday social use. It reveals how materiality, responsibility, and resource constraints interacted through adaptive, sometimes playful, appropriation.

Similarly, Ali H. Neyzi in his memoir *Hüseyin Paşa Çıkmazı No. 4* narrates the days during WW2, when Istanbul residents were ordered to build shelters in case of bombardment.[505] In Erenköy, Neyzi recalls how his family's landlord, İhsane Hanım, commissioned one in the garden after being told it was compulsory. Tenants objected, "*Biz karışmayız,*" leaving her to pay 100 lira to have it dug. Later, she quarreled with one tenant because children played over the shelter, causing it to collapse. Her anxiety over potential inspections "*Bekçi yine gelirse bana ceza yazar mı?*" became part of their daily conversations. Although the war ended without incident, the memory lingered as a mix of bureaucratic imposition, neighborly disputes, and again children taking over. Eventually, rather than security, it produced petty disputes, financial strain, and bureaucratic anxiety, showing how wartime governance could intrude into private space while generating unintended absurdities.

3.4.4.4. Material Culture of Passive Defense

Passive defense's material implications reached from the ground of gardens to the bulbs for blackouts. Especially in the early 1940s, an expanding array of objects entered the civilian and municipal landscape, reflecting both functional needs and the broader cultural imagination of wartime protection. Newspaper advertisements, trade catalogues, and the final pages of passive defense manuals reveal a dense commercial layer underpinning this protective infrastructure.

In the press, the advertisement was not only for the civilian reader but for the municipality as well. The *Akşam* advertisement for "Canavar Düdükleri" offered powerful alarm whistles designed to alert against air raids, a sonic device meant to mobilize neighborhoods and municipal responders.[506] Shelter doors were another prominent category. *Cumhuriyet* carried multiple advertisements in 1940 for gas- and shrapnel-resistant doors, such as the "Halk Tipi Sığınak Kapıları" and the Munir Hersek factory models.[507] These ads referenced municipal specifications and national standards, aligning commercial production with legal codes. Other ads, like A. Samurkaş's illustrated listing promoted entire lines of firefighting and passive defense equipment, blurring the boundary between municipal procurement and private consumer access.[508]

---

[505] Ali H. Neyzi, *Hüseyin Paşa Çıkmazı No.4* (Cem Yayınevi, 2005), 24.

[506] "Canavar Düdükleri," *Akşam*, February 9, 1936.

[507] "HALK TİPİ SIĞINAK KAPILARI," *Cumhuriyet*, June 3, 1940; "SIĞINAK KAPILARI," *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1940.

[508] "Reklam – A. Samurkaş Fabrikası – Bilumum Itfaiye ve Pasif Korunma Malzemeleri," *Cumhuriyet*, April 3, 1941.



Figure 50. Advertisements for passive defense materials, 1936–1941.

Lighting technologies also entered the passive defense market. Tungsram's advertisement for passive protection lamps offered bulbs designed to limit light leakage during blackouts, underscoring how even household fittings became part of civil defense planning.[509] Protective gear against gas warfare was marketed both in the press and in specialist literature, as seen in the AUER company's pink-backed book listings for gas masks, filters, and detection devices.[510] These pages, alongside imports from German chemical firms and local pharmaceutical distributors, illustrate how passive defense manuals doubled as procurement catalogues.



Figure 51. Material culture of passive defense (*Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1940, and May 18, 1941)

Beyond print, the Passive Defense Exhibition organized by Beyoğlu Municipality offered a curated material display of wartime preparedness.[511]. Inspected by Governor Lütfi Kırdar and the Martial

[509] "Tungsram Pasif Korunma Ampulları Gelmiştir," *Cumhuriyet*, February 3, 1941.

[510] Boysan and Korur, *Harp gazları ve bunlara karşı korunma*.

[511] "Pasif Korunma Sergisi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 18, 1941.

Law Command, the exhibition presented phosphorescent lighting arrangements designed to be visible only at close range, useful in shelters and public spaces during blackouts, and staged live drills in Şişli. These exhibitions acted as both public pedagogy and market showcase, reinforcing the civic legitimacy of the products.

Material culture also extended into symbolic and commercial realms. A notable example is the 1940 İş Bankası advertisement, "*En Sağlam Sığınak*", which depicted the bank itself as a colossal bunker-piggy-bank hybrid. While Turkey lacked reinforced concrete bunkers on the scale implied by the image, the visual mobilized the word *sığınak* to convey security, stability, and collective protection. The advertisement's bunker form, abstracted into a monumental, smooth-surfaced vault, shows how the aesthetics of fortification were absorbed into commercial branding.

What Istanbul built under the heading of "shelters" was less a uniform object than a governance regime. The ideal type, gas-tight, bomb-resistant, underground, existed in codes and a handful of showcase rooms. What scaled were procedures: timelines, committees, inventories, drills, and inspections that pushed preparedness into basements, gardens, and work sites. In this sense, sığınak named both a space and a script: who must act, with which tools, under what penalties. The numbers that saturated the press such as 30,000 units, 90,000 shelters, 100,000 places functioned as performative accounting. They synchronized actors and reassured audiences, but they also blurred categories (siper/sığınak) and exaggerated capacity. Counting became a technology of rule even when the counted thing was a shallow pit or a locked basement rented for storage. It also re-defined what counts as evidence. The swollen numbers in the press, units, capacities, kilometres of trenches; they are performative proofs that things that are not functioning. Counting blurred categories (siper/sığınak) because the purpose of counting was synchronization and reassurance, not audit. Exhibitions, model pits, and photo spreads belong to the same evidentiary regime: they make preparedness visible even when protection remains partial.

Spatially, the regime did not land on a blank slate. Masonry districts with basements and gardens could internalize protection; dense wooden quarters were pushed to exposed lands or to evacuation. In practice, sheltering amplified existing urban differences while claiming universal reach. That distributional effect is the hinge to the next cases: the wooden city and the politics of fire, and a planning apparatus recalibrated by the air-raid question. Finally, shelters were provisional infrastructures by design, built to host a possibility that never fully materialized. Their afterlives (half-roofed pits, repurposed basements, compliance habits that outlived alerts) matter analytically: they show a city governing through deferred events, where the measure of success was not a finished bunker but a choreography that could be reactivated on demand.

3.4.4.5. Reality Check: Limits and Failures

In one of the *Pazar Ola Hasan Bey Diyor ki* caricature series of Orhan Ural, a man crawls out of a cave-like hollow. [512] Hasan Bey greets him: "*What's the matter, poking your head out of the hole and laughing so cheerfully?*" Another man "*Serseri*", wearing a gas mask, cuts in: "*"Don't you know, dear Mr. Hasan, everyone is busy building a shelter in a corner of their house to protect themselves from poisonous gas*." The "cave-dweller" gestures to his surroundings and replies: "*You see the situation, we don't need that right now.*" The humor works because it exposes a sharp contrast: while municipal authorities were pushing regulations for airtight, well-equipped shelters and many residents were taking part in this construction drive, others inhabited conditions so rudimentary that the very idea of building a "proper" shelter was absurd. In an Akbaba cover, an obviously foreign *seyyah* standing against the Sultanahmet skyline watches a man getting into a torn, cave-like shack: "*Aşkolsun size, hava tehlikesine karşı ne kadar çok korunma yeri yapmışsınız!*" (You built so many shelter place for the air raid threat).



Figure 52 Pazar Ola Hasan B. Diyor Ki (*Son Posta*, August 3, 1935)



Figure 53. Satirical cover and commentary on wartime themes (Akbaba, August 1935, November 1940)

The joke hinges on misrecognition: what the traveler reads as a proliferation of shelters are really makeshift holes, temporary, underground, barely habitable. The phrase "*ne kadar çok*" hints at a city supposedly full of them. The same *seyyah* shows up on Babıali Street and sees the roadway

[512] "Pazar Ola Hasan B. Diyor Ki," *Son Posta*, August 3, 1935.

covered with rubble and a long trench. He praises the "excellent shelter preparations" but in fact it's just roadworks. The joke is that the mess is so extreme a stranger can only assume it's passive-defense, not "normal" construction. The misrecognition here appears as critique: a foreign *seyyah* reads rubble and trenches as civil-defense works; locals know it's just chronic roadworks and neglect. And the city's everyday mess looks like wartime preparedness because everyday life is already precarious.


İSTANBUL HALKI NERELERDE OTURURLAR: 4

Şehrin göbeğinde etrafı surlarla çevrili 9 hanelik bir köy!

Avluda oturanlar dalgın gözlerle tıpkı bir havuz veya bir dere seyreder gibi bu dokuz evlik köyün yegâne halâsının meydana getirdiği göle bakıyorlar

İSTANBUL HALKI NERELERDE OTURURLAR: 10

Edirnekapı surlarının içinde dört nüfusu barındıran mağara

Tek kollu ihtiyar: «Ben cenazelerde Kur'an okurum, karım bekâr camasırı yıkar. Bir oğlum var, fakat o da sakat, çalışamaz» diyor

Figure 54. Series on urban poverty and housing conditions (*Suat Derviş*, Cumhuriyet, 1935)

The clearest window into this other side of the city comes from Suat Derviş's 1935 *Cumhuriyet* series *İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar*[513]. In her pioneering investigative work, Derviş traces Istanbul's most precarious living quarters with vivid, site-specific detail. She describes overcrowded "sultan rooms" where six food sellers share a space barely larger than a palm[514]; a homeless man who slept twelve years in a mosque courtyard before receiving a tiny hut through charity[515]; a nine-house cluster in the city center functioning like a rural village[516]; a 35-room lodging house sheltering 150 tenants[517]; and families living in a cemetery's coffin and washing-room storage[518], where an elderly woman drily calls it "poverty," the "Tin Can District,"[519] also known as the "Meşrutiyet" neighborhood, and Edirnekapı, where a family of four lives in a "cave"

[513] *Çöken İstanbul röportajlar*, 1. baskı, with Suat Derviş, İthaki yayınları (İthaki, 2021).

[514] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? Bekar Yatağı Sultanodaları," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

[515] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? On Iki Senedir Kış, Yaz Cami Avlusunda yaTan Garib Adam," *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

[516] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? Şehrin Göbeğinde 9 Hanelik Bir Köy!," *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1935.

[517] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? 150 Kiracısı Olan 35 Odalı Taşhan," *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935.

[518] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Oturur: Tabut ve Teneşir Deposunda Yaşayanlar," *Cumhuriyet*, June 3, 1935.

[519] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Oturur? Belediye 'Meşrutiyet' Adını Takmış, Fakat Halk Ona Teneke Mahallesi Diyor," *Cumhuriyet*, June 6, 1935.

carved into the crumbling city walls where the surrounding "rooms" meaning the remnants of ruined towers, barely habitable.[520] Set against municipal shelter codes, reinforced walls, gas-tight doors, marked exits, Derviş's rooms show the mismatch. One cannot designate a compliant "shelter room" where there is no room to spare; and when the law bans interior protection in wooden buildings, the burden shifts to garden trenches that poor tenants often don't have. In short, passive defense laws are built on an assumption on an ideal city, while İstanbul was aware of how not ideal the city was. That is why the "cave" joke lands, and why the next section turns to the wooden city itself, where the material of everyday housing doubles as fuel, and vulnerability is built into the fabric.

3.4.5. The Wooden City: Governing the Incendiary

By the mid-1930s, civil defense experts and municipal authorities in Istanbul spoke with growing urgency about *yangın bombaları*, incendiary bombs, as the most destructive threat the city could face from the air. Their reasoning was blunt: Istanbul's urban fabric still consisted largely of tightly packed wooden houses, in neighborhoods where a single spark could leap across streets. In *Belediyeler Dergisi*, a 1936 policy draft warned that "the greatest enemy of towns and cities with many wooden houses" would be incendiary attacks, and that the first priority must be to "save our towns and cities from wooden neighborhoods" by replacing them with concrete or flat-roofed structures.[521]


11) Yakıcı bombalar nerelere ve ne vakit atılır: Böyle
12) Yakıcı bombalar nerelere ve ne zaman atılır:
13) Sis nerelerde ve nasıl yapılır:
14) Uçular:

Figure 55. Incendiary bombs' effects (Tanık, 1937)

Newspaper writers translated this into stark arithmetic. Nüzhet Abbas argued in *Cumhuriyet* that fire bombs were "more dangerous than poison gas," even because they could start hundreds of blazes at once, overwhelming even the largest and best-equipped brigade.[522] A front-page

[520] Suat Derviş, "İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar: Edirnekapı Surlarının Içinde Dört Nüfusu Barındıran Mağara," *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1935.

[521] "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı - Bir Kanun Projesi," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 9, no. 14 (1936): 2–3.

[522] Nüzhet Abbas, "Müstakbel Harblerde – Yangın Bombaları Zehirli Gazdan Daha Tehlikeli," *Cumhuriyet*, April 4, 1936.

scenario imagined ten large aircraft dropping 20,000 such bombs; even if only a tenth landed in flammable spots, that would mean 2,000 simultaneous fires, "no fire brigade could possibly contain such a disaster" Military-technical writers extended the scale further.[523] Authors continued to their attempts to convince people how dangerous the situation was, Özger gives a rather smaller numbers, still enough to scare,

> "Let us explain with an example how many fires the airplanes attacking a city during an air raid could cause: If we assume that a fleet of 36 airplanes, each carrying 1,000 incendiary bombs, comes over the city, the total number of bombs would be 36,000. Now, if we suppose that most of these dropped bombs fall on streets and other open areas, and that only one in ten hits houses, that would make 3,600 bombs. If we then assume that one-fourth of these actually cause fires and that the rest are extinguished by the public, even in this minimal scenario, about 900 fires would break out in the city. With so many fires, it would be impossible for the fire brigade alone to cope."[524]

In such a case, he wrote, the "major responsibility for firefighting" would fall on the inhabitants themselves, not the official services. Articles piled up, as a *Cumhuriyet* editorial of February 1937 warned, again almost with the same words that the greatest danger from the air would not come from demolition or gas bombs, but from "small bombs that cause fires." And those fires would not be limited to military zones: electricity plants, water installations, bridges, ports, factories, warehouses, roads, and tram lines were all "exposed to danger" in an air attack, meaning "everything is in danger,"[525] naturally destroying or disabling these would paralyze the life of the city. Manuals such as M. H. Tanık's *Gök Savaşlarından Korunma Yolları* (1937) followed upon this point, mapping out both the fire risk and the disastrous failures in supply, mobility, and basic services that would follow.[526] By framing the incendiary threat through repeated, escalating scenarios, Istanbul's planners and commentators made a single, unavoidable point: in a wooden city, aerial fire was not a military problem, not even a governance one, but it was a total civic crisis waiting to happen.

3.4.5.1. A City Already Burning: Fires, Collapses, Rubble

And all these warnings, one after another, were right. Through the second half of the 1930s and through the war years, fires were a routine urban emergency in Istanbul, frequent enough to prompt incremental but persistent adjustments to prevention and response systems. The municipality rolled out "*yangın zilleri*" and later household-linked "*yangın telefonları*" to reinforce early warning[527], but incidents kept mounting. In quick succession, a gas-works fire hit

---

[523] "Hava Taaruzları Karşısında İstanbul: 1," *Cumhuriyet*, September 14, 1936.

[524] Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın Bombaları*, 6.

[525] "Hava Hücumlarına Karşı Kendimizi Nasıl Korumalı," *Cumhuriyet*, February 11, 1937.

[526] Tanık, *Gök style="background-color*.

[527] *Yangın Zilleri Konuyor*, February 2, 1935; "Yangın Telefonları," *Cumhuriyet*, April 24, 1935.

Kağıthane,[528] three separate neighborhood blazes struck Tahtakale, Şehremini, and İslambey[529], thirty-three houses burned in Kağıthane village[530], the Paşabahçe factory caught fire[531], and a mixed factory–housing blaze broke out in Yeşildirek[532]. Central districts remained highly exposed: thirty homes in Beşiktaş burned in June 1937[533]; Üsküdar's courthouse partially burned the following month[534]; Taksim narrowly escaped a major blaze in January 1938[535]; and Galata lost a factory in February 1938.[536]



Figure 56. News on fires in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, 1935-1945)

By March 1938, firefighters in gas masks were tackling Beyoğlu fires[537] , while municipal notes flagged hydrant expansions and planning for risk zones.[538] Losses could be immense: the Sultanhamam fire of March 1939 was valued at 12,000,000 lira, and repeated fires in Bahçekapı's pharmaceutical period's famous Hasan Ecza depots triggered sabotage investigations[539]. Wartime layered on blackout hazards and passive defense drills, distributing hand pumps to neighborhoods, staging public firefighting experiments, and coping with peacetime

[528] "Gaz Fabrikasında Yangın," *Cumhuriyet*, February 16, 1935.

[529] "Üç Yangın," *Cumhuriyet*, February 18, 1935.

[530] "Kâğıthane Köyünü Süpüren Felâket – Dün Çıkan Yangında 33 Ev Tamamen Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 1935.

[531] "Paşabahçedeki Yangın," *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1935.

[532] "Dün Yeşildirekte Bir Yangın Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1935.

[533] "Beşiktaş'ta 30 Ev Tamamen Yandı – İhtiyar Bir Kadın Yanarak Öldü – Yangının Bir Kıvılcımdan Çıktığı Söyleniyor. Açıkta Kalan 150 Aileye Yardım Edilmektedir," *Cumhuriyet*, June 21, 1937.

[534] "Üsküdar Adliyesi Kısmen Yandı – Binada Ateş Evvelki Gece Sabaha Karşı Çıktı, Müşkülatla Söndürüldü," *Cumhuriyet*, August 13, 1937.

[535] "Dün Gece Taksim Büyük Bir Yangın Tehlikesi Atlattı," *Cumhuriyet*, January 8, 1938.

[536] "Galata'da Dün Bir Fabrika Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, February 8, 1938.

[537] "Dün Beyoğlunda Tehlikeli Bir Yangın Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, March 31, 1938.

[538] "Şehir İşleri: Yangınlardan Eşya Kurtarmak Için Vesait," *Cumhuriyet*, July 6, 1938; "Yangın Musluklarının Sayısı Artırılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 1938.

[539] "Bahçekapıda Hasan Ecza Deposu Tamamen Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 17, 1939; "Sultanhamamındaki Yangın: Zarar Miktarı 12.000.000 Lira Olarak Tahmin Ediliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, March 5, 1939.

vulnerabilities like a Sirkeci photo studio fire[540] and dense-housing disasters such as the Ferah cinema blaze in Şehzadebaşı.[541] Governance mechanisms were tested when the Fener/Patrikhane fire destroyed ninety-four houses, Beşiktaş lost homes and shops to a children's mishap, more than 200 stores burned down in Kapalıçarşı and the Hayriye High School building burned to the ground in two hours.[542] Even working through this abbreviated list can feel like navigating a dense map of calamities. And this is only a selection, but it is enough to show just how frequent, wide-ranging, and unavoidable fire was in Istanbul, making systematic cataloguing essential to grasp the city's vulnerability in this era.



Figure 57 Building collapses and urban accidents in Istanbul (Cumhuriyet, 1935–1937)

In this period, fires were not the only vulnerability for urban fabric, the collapse of buildings, walls, and other structures was a recurring urban danger in Istanbul, often deadly, and occurring without any "outer attack." While aerial threat loomed large in civil defense rhetoric, the city's own built fabric was failing from within. A store collapse in Balıkpazarı injured four workers in June 1935; days later, a demolition in Şişli left a family homeless, and by year's end storms had flattened multiple houses in Süleymaniye.[543] The sequence continued: a Beyoğlu house collapse in January 1936; a wall fall in Sirkeci; a building failure in Üsküdar killing one worker and injuring

[540] "Pasif Korunma Için Alınan Tedbirler - Mahallelere 110 Yangın Tulumbası Tevzi Edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, March 20, 1940; "Yangın Söndürme Tecrübesi Iyi Netice Vermedi (Devam)," *Cumhuriyet*, May 14, 1940; "Dün Bir Fotoğrafhaneden Yangın Çıktı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 8, 1940.

[541] "Ferah Sineması Yandı: Evvelki Gece Sabaha Karşı Çıkan Yangın Esnasında Bu Binada Oturanlar Müşkülatla Kurtarıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1941.

[542] "İstanbul'un Atlattığı Felâket – Dün Rum Patrikhanesinden Yangın Çıktı, 94 Ev Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 22, 1941; "Fener Yangınında Açıkta Kalanlar: Kızılay 476 Vatandaşa Eşya ve Bir Aylık Iaşe Ücreti Verdi, Kira Bedeli de Tevzi Olunacak," *Cumhuriyet*, September 25, 1941; "Beşiktaş'ta Dün Büyük Bir Yangın Oldu – İki Çocuğun Talaşlara Yanan Kibrit Atmasından Çıkan Yangında Sekiz Ev ve on Dört Dükkân Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1942; "Kapalıçarşıda Büyük Bir Yangın – 200'den Fazla Dükkan Yandı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 11, 1943; "Hayriye Lisesi Yangını: Yangın Yerinde Keşif Yapıldı, Mekteb Idaresi, Itfaiyenin Geç Geldiğini Iddia Ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, January 19, 1944.

[543] "Bir Mağaza Çöktü ve Dört Amele Yaralandı İhtiyatsızlık Eseri Olan Faciadan Yaralananlardan Ikisinin Hayatı Tehlikededir," *Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1935; "Şişli'de Bir Bina Yıkıldı ve Aile Evsiz Kaldı," *Cumhuriyet*, June 6, 1935; "Birçok Ev Yıkıldı, Mavna Battı; Nüfus Kaybı Yok," *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1935.

seven; and a Yeldeğirmeni house collapse killing a woman[544]. Entire leisure and residential spaces gave way, an upper floor in Aksaray, a Yenikapı pavilion during a circumcision ceremony, and a double house collapse in Balat killing two children[545]. Structural failures became deadly, a five-story apartment collapse in Kurtuluş in March 1939 and repeated fatal *inhidams* (decayed buildings) in Üsküdar and two houses collapsed killing a child. [546]



Figure 58. Building collapses and accidents in Istanbul, (*Cumhuriyet*, 1935–1937)

Not all collapses were accidental, demolition for road widening, port modernization, and "passive defense" rubble clearance reshaped the streetscape yet also created hazards for workers and residents.[547] Large-scale urban interventions added to the churn, with demolition programs clearing swathes of Sirkeci, Eminönü, and Taksim under Henri Prost's plans, and even the Byzantine walls scheduled for removal under the new zoning regime.[548] These incidents, again, a partial list, show a city whose material vulnerability could be as lethal as any bomb, where walls, roofs, and entire buildings fell, underscoring the chronic instability of Istanbul's interwar and wartime built environment.

---

[544] "Kadıköyünde Bir Ev Yıkıldı ve Bir Kadın Öldü," *Cumhuriyet*, March 5, 1937; *Cumhuriyet*, "Bir Mağaza Çöktü ve Dört Amele Yaralandı İhtiyatsızlık Eseri Olan Faciadan Yaralananlardan Ikisinin Hayatı Tehlikededir"; "Sirkecide Bir Duvar Yıkıldı, Yaralananlar Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, January 10, 1936; "Bir Bina Yıkıldı - Bir Amele Öldü, Yedi Kişi Ağır Surette Yaralandı," *Cumhuriyet*, July 2, 1936.

[545] "Balattaki Inhidam Faciası – İki Ev Yıkıldı, Enkaz Arasında Iki Çocuk Öldü," *Cumhuriyet*, April 14, 1938; "Bir Evin Üst Katı Çöktü – İki Işçi Tehlikeli Surette Yaralandı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 10, 1937; "Yenikapıda Bir Gazino Çöktü: Sünnet Düğünü Esnasında Çöken Gazino," *Cumhuriyet*, September 10, 1937.

[546] "Beyoğlunda Bir Facia: Kurtuluş Civarında Beş Katlı Büyük Bir Apartman Çöktü," *Cumhuriyet*, March 26, 1939; *Üsküdar'da Feci Bir Inhidam | Bir Ev Yıkıldı, 3 Kişi Öldü, 4 Kişi de Yaralandı*, December 23, 1941.

[547] "Tehlikeli Duvarlar Yıktırılırken... Temel Çöktü, Üç Amele Enkaz Altında Kaldı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1937.

[548] "Eminönü Meydanı - Evkafa Aid Binalar, Parasız Istimlâk Edilecek," *Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1937; "Yedikule - Sirkeci: Hat Boyundaki Harap Binalar Kaldırılacak," *Akşam*, February 22, 1936; "Yeni Şehir Plânına Göre Bizans Surları Yıkılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, April 5, 1938.

If individual fires and collapses punctuated the headlines, the background condition of wartime Istanbul was one of chronic disarray. Newspaper photographs from the late 1930s and early 1940s show streets and squares swallowed by rubble, Tophane, Balıkpazarı, the piers, each caption caught between documenting the mess and demanding to know who was responsible for it.[549] Even in places untouched by flames or sudden *inhidam*, piles of debris lingered for months, blocking streets, exposing foundations, and turning public spaces into landscapes of abandonment.[550] On top of this, the civil defense push to dig anti–air raid trenches, some reports claimed as many as 30,000 across the city, layered yet more disruption into the urban fabric. The result was a city perpetually under excavation, perpetually littered with *hafriyat*, where wartime precaution and peacetime neglect combined to make rubble a near-permanent feature of everyday life.

The aerial and incendiary bomb scenarios that filled Istanbul's newspapers in the late 1930s drew their force not from abstract speculation but from the city's everyday vulnerabilities. Fires, collapses, and rubble were already part of life, and both officials and residents knew exactly how difficult it was to live with them, let alone to respond effectively. This was precisely why wooden housing stock and narrow, flammable streets were framed as so dangerous: in a city where peacetime crises already taxed the fire brigade, wartime incendiary raids promised catastrophe on a new scale. In that sense, passive defense planning was not separate from the city's existing emergency landscape, it was layered directly on top of it. The very measures promoted for war readiness often made sense in peacetime too: a better-equipped firefighting capacities, more *tulumbas* in more neighborhoods, households keeping water and sand at the ready, even the creation of a dedicated *enkaz temizleme teşkilatı* all offered benefits beyond air raids. The wooden house fire risk, then, becomes a clear case study of what might be called the "architectures of anticipation," a cycle beginning with the exploration phase, in which threats were defined and researched, and continuing into measures that, while never able to solve every problem from scratch, acknowledged the overlap between preparing for wartime hazards and building a more resilient city for ordinary days.

Regulations and manuals like in the previous cases offered rules and advices for fire protection. Attics were a central focus: nothing flammable should be stored there, and in new construction the roof should be either reinforced concrete or fire-resistant timber; in older houses, wooden beams were to be coated with fireproof material.[551] Every attic was to be equipped with materials

[549] "Tophane Meydanını Bu Hale Getiren Kim?," *Cumhuriyet*, May 5, 1937; "Tophane Rıhtımı Temizleniyor – Neşriyatımız Nazarı Dikkate Alındı," *Cumhuriyet*, May 8, 1937; "Balıkpazarı Caddesi Kapatıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 22, 1938.

[550] "Yeni Bir Bahçe Mi? Hayır!," *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1936; "Soruyoruz? Yaklaştığını Ilan Eden Bir Tehlikeyi Önlemenin Bir Felâketin Vukuu Mu Bekleniyor?," *Cumhuriyet*, May 1, 1940; "Şehrin ve Sahillerin Temizliği!," *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1935; "Asfalt Yollarımız / Enkazı Vaktinde Kaldırmayan Müteahhidler," *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1938.

[551] "Bir Hava Hücumunda Yangına Karşı Korunma," *Cumhuriyet*, February 16, 1937.

to put the fire out. The official lists varied slightly across publications, but the core kit was consistent: a barrel of water, a sack or box of sand, a brush or broom, a large shovel, a long-handled hook or axe, a box of earth, and an electric hand lamp.[552] In some guides, the correct arrangement of these items was illustrated, showing the sand and water in easy reach and clear paths through the roof space to avoid obstruction. [553]

Bomb-handling instructions were just as precise. A burning bomb was to be smothered immediately with sand, then lifted with the shovel; any items set alight were to be doused with water.[554] Modern incendiary devices, manuals warned, could not be put out by water alone if made from Elektron (magnesium) alloy or thermite alloys, in those cases, sand and earth were indispensable.[555] Public pamphlets explained how to keep sand on the roof in peacetime as both a fire precaution and an anti-air measure, and urged each household to appoint a "fire hazard officer" responsible for maintaining readiness, making contact with neighbors, and coordinating with the municipal fire brigade. [556]




Figure 59. Illustrated guide to how to behave during air raid (*Özger*, 1938)

These domestic prescriptions sat alongside new municipal regulations, such as the 1940 police instructions, which required owners to clear the rubble of burned or collapsed buildings immediately, block off dangerous structures, and eliminate hazards from open wells, cellars, and

[552] Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın Bombaları*, 10–11.

[553] Hikmet Konuralp and Kadri Yaman, *Zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri* (İstanbul, 1938).

[554] Turgut Kömürcüoğlu, *Hava saldırmaları ve bunlardan korunma* (Bilgi Matbaası, 1940).

[555] Konuralp and Yaman, *Zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri*.

[556] Özger, *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın Bombaları*, 10–11.

cisterns.[557] Workshops in fire-prone trades were to be built of masonry with proper partitions, and the use of fireworks or sirens in neighborhoods was prohibited, aimed at reducing combustible waste and managing crowded, flammable environments.

3.4.5.2. Containment and Partial Measures

One document reached Ankara at a moment when passive defense planning was already preoccupied with the devastating potential of incendiary bombs and the city's own fire-prone fabric. In July 1939, the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an English-language report by Kazuo Suzuki, Chief Architect of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, on protecting wooden cities from air raids.[558] The embassy underlined that the text had been "considered useful," signaling a clear recognition that Istanbul's dense timber neighborhoods shared the same vulnerabilities as Tokyo's. Suzuki's work condensed Japan's interwar fire-defense experience into precise, enforceable measures: legal authority to mandate fire-resistant construction in crowded districts, cutting blocks with firebreaks, upgrading roofs and openings to incombustible materials, and subsidizing retrofits for existing houses. His guiding principle was stark and pragmatic, an incendiary bomb might destroy the building it hits, but its spread must be stopped at the property line.

Destructive and gas bombs have their place in war planning, but for an entire city, "our anti-air raid measures must be based upon the principle of fire defense first." Suzuki turns to Tokyo's 1923 firestorm to make his point: even the best-equipped brigades and trained household teams will be outpaced in a mass attack. What saves the city is containment—letting the struck building go, if that sacrifice keeps the flames from crossing to the next lot.

His language is urgent, even blunt: wooden Japanese cities are "very much inferior" to European ones for air defense; "it is too late to repent after our cities are reduced to ashes"; "a city which cannot be taken by the sword can be reduced by fire." His objective was clear keeping an incendiary from spreading beyond its point of impact. That means cutting blocks with firebreaks, giving their outer edges incombustible roofs and fire-resistant walls, and always putting spread control ahead of saving the hit structure itself.

The manual also captures a moment of policy shift in Japan: new legal powers for the Home Minister to impose anti-air raid regulations on buildings and their placement, a nationwide

[557] "Yangınlara Karşı Esaslı Tedbirler: Yeni Zabıta Talimatnamesine Mühim Maddeler Konuyor," *Cumhuriyet*, February 27, 1940.

[558] Dışişleri Bakanlığı Türk Diplomatik Arşivi, Fon 543, Box 44737, Folder 214731, Folder 36. Ahşap şehirlerin hava taaruzlarına karşı müdaafaası hakkında mimar Kazuo Suzuki`nin yazısı. 1939-07-12

ordinance extending to major cities, and subsidies to retrofit existing houses. For new wooden buildings, outer shells must be fire-resisting according to local density, blocks divided by firebreaks, roofs made from incombustible materials, and all doors and windows fitted with rated, fireproof assemblies. For the existing stock, the state urged immediate, citywide campaigns, ideally compulsory, but at least subsidy-aided, to treat timber with fireproofing chemicals, replace or over-clad openings, upgrade roofs, and reinforce external walls in dense quarters. Shortages of preferred materials like steel were no excuse: substitutes could be used, and details that stop spread at the block perimeter should come first.

Suzuki situates these architectural and planning measures within a broader civil-defense system, watching, warning, blackout, camouflage, and refuge from both bombs and gas, but the message stays the same, the true test for a wooden city is whether one incendiary remains one fire or becomes a hundred. For Istanbul, with its timber neigbhorhoods, narrow streets, and attached houses, was not a foreign material. It was a ready-made template for confronting a threat the city already understood too well, distilled into legal authority, enforceable standards, block segmentation, incombustible envelopes, and public funding for retrofits.


Hava tehlikesine karşı

Kanuna çok mühim maddeler konuldu

Hükûmete, lüzumunda ahşab mahalleleri kısmen yıkarak yangın tehlikesini bertaraf etmek salâhiyeti verilecek ve hususî tedbirler alınacak

Şehrimizin meşhur ahşab mahallelerinden birisi

Figure 60. Reports on wooden houses (*Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1936)

Regardless the Suzuki report made it to the İstanbul policy makers, the problem and the alternative solutions were no stranger to both state and local governments, the problem was the cost. A 1935 bill prepared by the Ministry of the Interior proposed giving municipalities explicit authority to act in districts “where fire hazard is high, such as densely built wooden houses,” including widening streets, opening firebreaks, and replacing combustible structures. At the time,

an administrative count recorded 146,379 buildings in Istanbul: 70,000 exclusively wooden, 7,193 partially wooden, and 69,186 entirely kârgir (non-wood masonry), wooden stock concentrated in Eyüp, Fatih, Eminönü, and Kasımpaşa.[559] This ratio made fire risk structural, in a city where more than half the stock included timber, any aerial incendiary scenario scaled immediately to the block level.

The cost of wholesale removal was staggering. In 1940, the Ministry and Governorship estimated that expropriating every wooden house in the city would require around 22 million lira, well beyond available funds. Officials instead began planning for phased elimination, prioritizing the most hazardous districts.[560] Municipal surveys mapped wooden concentrations and prepared demolition plans for Üsküdar, Fatih, Eyüp, and other dense quarters, with Air Defense Commander General Hüseyin Hüsnü Kılkış inspecting sites and advising on firebreak creation.[561] On the same day, *İkdam* reported ministerial discussions on "dividing" wooden neighborhoods into separate islands for fire control, part of a broader review of passive protection readiness.[562]



Hava taarruzlarına kârşı

Hükûmet, lüzum görürse ahşab evleri istimlâk ederek ortadan kaldıracak

İstanbulun meşhur tahta mahallerinden...

Ankara 17 (Telefonla) — Haber verildiğine göre, hükûmet mühim bir kanun projesi hazırlamaktadır.

Hava taarruzları dolayisile meydana gelecek yangınlara karşı bazı tedbirler alınmasına dair olan bu projeye göre hükûmet lüzüm gördüğü takdirde şehir ve kasabalardaki ahşab evleri istimlâk etmek suretile ortadan kaldıracaktır.

Yenicaminin etrafı açılıp temizleniyor

İstanbulun bu güzel abidesi bütün ihtişamile meydana çıkarılacak

İstanbulun bellibaşlı tarihi abidelerinden biri olan Yenicami, asırlarca kendisini mahpus vaziyette tutan dört duvar arası hayatından nihayet kurtuluyor. Bu güzel haberi, dün akşam bizzat Nafıa Vekili Ali Çetinkaya bize müjdelemek lûtfunda bulundu.

Tramvay şirketinden, uzun ve çetin müzakerelerden sonra, alınan paranın bir milyon lirasile, bu hayırlı işin başarılması Nafıa Vekâletince kat'i surette takarrür etmiştir. Yenicami, bütün ihtişam ve heybetile meydana çıkarabilmek için istimlâk, çok geniş mikyasta yapılacaktır.

Bu arada, Köprübaşındaki Valide hanile, Selânik bonmarşesinin işgal etmekte olduğu bina ve Yenicami kemeri karşısındaki dükkânlar, avluyu ihata eden sahaşlar baştanbaşa yıkılacak, Eminönü meydanı, güzellik ve ihtişamdan hoşlanan yürekelere ferahlık verecek surette genişliyecektir.

Para, hazır olduğu için istimlâk muamelesine, vakit geçirilmeden başlanacaktır.

[Arkası 3a. 7 sütun 6 da]

İstanbulun en muhteşem abidelerinden biri olan, fakat bugün etrafı mahsur bulunan Yenicami

Figure 61. Urban clearance in Istanbul (Cumhuriyet, September 28, 1937; January 18, 1941).

By 1941, the government was drafting legislation to give itself direct authority to "expropriate and remove wooden houses" wherever deemed necessary for air-raid protection.[563] In practice, such powers dovetailed with Henri Prost's urban renewal plans, where expropriation for defense

[559] "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Alınacak Mühim Tedbirler," *Cumhuriyet*, November 14, 1935.

[560] "Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri," *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1940.

[561] "Şehirdeki Ahşab Binaların Vaziyeti," *Cumhuriyet*, March 12, 1940.

[562] "İstanbul'daki Ahşap Evler Istimlâk Edilecek," *Cumhuriyet*, June 22, 1940.

[563] "Hava Taaruzlarına Karşı: Hükümet, Lüzum Görürse Ahşap Evleri Istimlâk Ederek Ortadan Kaldıracak," *Cumhuriyet*, January 18, 1941.

could serve redevelopment goals, Eminönü's clearance for the new square being one example of fire-prevention rhetoric aligned with large-scale demolition policy.[564]

From the mid-1930s onward, Istanbul's fire brigade became an increasingly visible part of the city's passive defense apparatus, its modernization framed not only as an urban service upgrade but as a wartime necessity. In 1935, Beyoğlu firefighters were issued gas masks for air raid drills, and public demonstrations introduced fireproof clothing, symbolic of the brigade's shift toward a militarized readiness.[565] Technical improvements came alongside organizational reforms: the establishment of a dedicated fire school in 1936, investments in vehicles and hydrants, and integration into civil defense exercises where police and firefighters moved in tandem under simulated bombing conditions.[566] Press images of firefighters in gas masks, "moving at lightning speed," linked their work directly to the threat of chemical warfare. By the war years, this integration was material as well as symbolic. Urban vulnerability mapping and neighborhood preparedness drills placed the fire brigade in the center of Istanbul's defense planning. In 1941, the municipality distributed 110 fire pumps to 13 districts, including Beyoğlu, Üsküdar, Kadıköy, and Büyükada, with another 110 on order 3,000 residents were organized into neighborhood teams, 36 of which completed internships and stood ready for duty, with a second cohort of 3,000 in training.[567] These were modest but tangible gains: more pumps, more trained hands, more tools ready for the moment a blaze broke out.

Incendiaries turn a single point of damage into a wider spread, and governance operates within that spread. The estimated numbers that filled the press, 2,000 fires, 900 fires, were less forecasts than instruments: they shifted responsibility downward (households as first responders with sand and hooks) and outward (blocks to be cut with firebreaks, roofs and façades to harden), preparing the ground for measures that re-coded streets, parcels, and materials in the name of containment.

Seen from this angle, passive defense was not a discrete wartime add-on. It was a program of material replacement and spatial division: timber to masonry, continuous fabric to segmented blocks, private rooms to public fire lines. Suzuki's Tokyo memo distilled the logic, let the struck house go if the perimeter holds, and Istanbul absorbed that principle even when funds were scarce. That scarcity mattered: when expropriation of the housing stock was unaffordable, the city governed through partials, household kits, attic discipline, hydrants, model trenches,

[564] "Yenicaminin Etrafı Açılıp Temizleniyor – İstanbulun Bu Güzel Abidesi Bütün Ihtişamile Meydana Çıkarılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, September 28, 1937.

[565] "İtfaiyede Yapılacak Islahat," *Cumhuriyet*, January 15, 1935.

[566] "İtfaiye Mektebi Açılıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 28, 1936.

[567] *Cumhuriyet*, "Pasif Korunma Için Alınan Tedbirler - Mahallelere 110 Yangın Tulumbası Tevzi Edildi."

neighborhood pumps. The line between safety and redevelopment blurred into a single grammar of opening, widening, and exposing. This is why the incendiary question becomes the planning question. Once fire control is framed as a problem of block form, street width, roof skins, and demolition jurisdiction, passive defense migrates into the planning realm. The next section follows that migration: how air-raid thinking and master-plan ambitions collide and collude, where defense rationales underwrite openings and alignments, where aesthetic "revelations" of monuments double as firebreaks, and where the future-tense of planning meets the present-tense of hazard.

3.4.6. Planning Under the Air Raid Question

In the interwar decades, and especially in the years surrounding the Second World War, Turkish architects, engineers, municipal officials, and commentators began to imagine the city through a new lens: not only as a machine for living or a vessel of modernization, but as a vulnerable target in the age of aerial bombardment. The air raid and chemical attack, catalyzed a discourse that cut across professional, bureaucratic, and public spheres. This discourse articulated a repertoire of measures: dispersal of population and critical functions; open spaces and firebreaks to slow conflagration; circulation networks for evacuation and emergency access; camouflage of buildings and infrastructure; and the integration of shelters into the everyday fabric of the city.

As mentioned previously, the 1940 *Şehir Plânlarının Tanziminde ve Mühim Bina Yerlerinin Tayininde Tatbik Edilecek Pasif Korunma Şartlarına Dair Nizamname* would give legal form to many of these principles: mandating open space per capita, height restrictions, shelter provision, and separation of hazardous uses — but the thinking that fed it was already well-developed by the mid-1930s. In journals such as *Arkitekt*, newspapers like *Vakit* and *Akşam*, and in the *Belediyeler Dergisi*, a diverse array of actors were sketching the outlines of an "ideal defensive city" that could survive modern war. These ideas remained largely parallel to, rather than integrated into, Istanbul's formal master planning process. Yet their structural logics, rationalised street systems, controlled density, zoning separations, strategic open spaces, overlapped in important ways.

3.4.6.1. Principles of Defensive Urbanism

One of the most consistent principles was the break with the compact, dense and monumental urban forms of the nineteenth century. In 1935, M. Şevki argued in *Akşam* that the city should be divided into irregular parts, with its buildings scattered and small in scale, to frustrate aerial observation and limit bomb damage.[568] Similarly, architect Behçet Ünsal, writing in *Arkitekt*,

[568] M. Şevki, "Askerlik Yazıları: Hava Saldırmaları ve Şehir Planları," *Akşam*, July 1, 1935.

insisted that residential buildings must be detached (*müstakil evler*), streets should be separated from building frontages, and only ten percent of land in new cities should be built upon.[569] Functional zoning, with clear separations between industrial, governmental, and residential areas, would help reduce the clustering of high-value targets. Large, open squares planted with trees could both disperse poisonous gases and serve as breaks in the built fabric. Hasan Fehmi Süerdem extended this dispersion logic to industrial and infrastructural planning.[570] Factories were to be moved outside city centers, preferably into forested peripheries, and their operations divided among widely separated units. Government buildings and depots should be bomb-resistant, camouflaged, and equipped with underground vaults for vital records. Rail stations, bridges, and viaducts were to be concealed with vegetation, while tunnels were to be duplicated or reinforced with thick concrete to withstand attack.

If dispersal was about reducing concentration, camouflage was about reducing visibility. Süerdem's proposals to conceal industrial plants and infrastructure with dense tree cover were part of a broader redefinition of forestation as an urban design tool. [571] M. Şevki's *ağaçlandırma* proposals called for tree planting at every scale, from individual house plots to metropolitan green belts, to render the city less legible from the air. [572] In this view, the monumental visibility celebrated by earlier urbanists was now a tactical liability. Even the siting of barracks, government offices, and public buildings was to be reconsidered: no longer set in axial symmetry or grand alignment but scattered and irregular to avoid recognition.

Shelter provision emerged as the most discussed and technically elaborated component of defensive planning. As early as 1933, *Vakit* published "Hava Hücumları ve Biz," proposing the conversion of Istanbul's Byzantine cisterns, Binbirdirek, Yerebatan, Mangana, and others, into vast public gas-proof shelters. Museum Director Aziz Bey estimated that, for fifty million lira, existing basements and cisterns could be adapted to protect half a million people. Yet Professor Ömer Şevket cautioned that shelters unprepared to proper standards could become "tombs" for their occupants.[573] Ünsal's prescriptions in *Arkitekt* treated shelters as integral to every new building, whether underground with thick concrete roofs or as specially designed upper floors for structural protection. [574] Gas-proof rooms (ideally on higher levels, since most gases are heavier than air) would be sealed, ventilated, and rapidly accessible. The most technically detailed schemes came from Adnan Suner's 1936 translations in *Arkitekt*, describing European "standard

[569] Ünsal, "Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Mimarlık ve Şehircilik Sanatı."

[570] Hasan Fehmi Süerdem, "Hava Tehlikesi: Şehir İnşaat Planları," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 01–02, no. 8 (1936): 72–76.

[571] Süerdem, "Hava Tehlikesi: Şehir İnşaat Planları."

[572] M. Şevki, "Askerlik Yazıları: Hava Saldırmaları ve Şehir Planları."

[573] "Hava Hücumları ve Biz," *Vakit*, November 5, 1933.

[574] Ünsal, "Zelzele Karşısında Yapı."

shelters" that were prefabricated, gas-impermeable, equipped with airlocks, positive-pressure ventilation, emergency power, sanitation, and provisions.[575] Capacities ranged from a few dozen people in residential basements to thousands in large underground quarries. Public facilities like theatres, cinemas, and even warehouses were proposed to be built underground, with multiple exits and massive earth or concrete coverage.

The other side of passive protection was planned disappearance. Şakir Hazım Gökmen, writing in the *Belediyeler Dergisi*, outlined a municipal duty sequence: rapid warning; planned dispersal routes; public instruction in concealment and self-protection; provisioning and safety for evacuees; and pre-designated sites in wide streets and squares for trench construction in wartime.[576] Suner's translated proposals added a grander infrastructural vision: deep, multi-level tunnels in dense urban centres (upper levels for high-speed vehicular traffic, lower levels for gas-proof pedestrian galleries) leading to peripheral distribution points. From there, evacuees could be transported to semi-forested camps several kilometres outside the city, pre-prepared with supplies and accommodation. Such systems linked urban form to regional geography in a single defensive network.

By the mid-1930s, these ideas were no longer confined to professional debate. The Ministry of Interior's 1936 draft law required collective shelters in all new constructions, central approval of city plans, and the diversion of one percent of municipal revenues to passive defense.[577] The 1940 *Nizamname* would echo many earlier proposals, separation of hazardous uses, building height limits, while omitting more adaptive or speculative ideas such as the dual-use of public parks or the strategic reuse of historic underground structures.[578] Passive defense had thus become a disciplinary interface, drawing in planners, architects, engineers, municipal administrators, and military authorities. It recasts the responsibilities of urban governance under the pressure of a potential aerial attack.

What emerges from these interlinked proposals is a set of technical measures, and a coherent vision of an urbanism shaped by the anticipation of catastrophe. This "ideal defensive city" was low-rise, dispersed, camouflaged, threaded with wide streets and open spaces, equipped with ubiquitous shelters, and linked to its hinterland through evacuation routes and reception zones. It was an intellectual construct as much as a physical one, a planning thought-world that defined what a modern city should be under the conditions of modern war. While Istanbul's formal master

[575] Suner, "Sivil Halkın Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Kollektif Korunması."

[576] Şakir Hazım Gökmen, "Hava Tehlikesi: Şehirler Nasıl Boşaltılır?," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 8, no. 13 (1936): 74–78.

[577] "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı - Bir Kanun Projesi."

[578] "Şehir Plânlarının Tanziminde ve Mühim Bina Yerlerinin Tayininde Tatbik Edilecek Pasif Korunma Şartlarına Dair Nizamname Hakkında Kararname."

planning process in the late 1930s would not explicitly adopt this framework, it would operate in its shadow. The overlap in spatial logic between the rationalized, beautified, and hygienic city of Henri Prost's vision and the concealed, dispersed, and shelter-equipped city of passive defense set the stage for a complex negotiation. The next section turns to Istanbul's own material conditions, political debates, and the long anticipation of a master plan, to see how these two modes of imagining the future converged, conflicted, and, at times, quietly reinforced one another.

3.4.6.2. Anticipating the Plan: Waiting as Governance

In the mid-1930s, Istanbul found itself in a peculiar state of suspended transformation. For years, the promise of a comprehensive master plan, the long-awaited framework that would modernise, rationalise, and beautify the city, lingered over public debates and municipal policy. A master plan is by definition a projection into the future; in this case, however, the city was experiencing the anticipation of a *future yet to be designed*. This "future of a future" created its own urban condition: a mixture of waiting, speculation, and interim regulation that shaped both the built environment and the civic imagination. The situation was complicated by the fact that another "future," the wartime scenario envisioned by passive defense, was already shaping aspects of urban thought. While the air raid plans imagined a city designed to withstand extraordinary days, the master plan promised a different future: one of orderly growth, improved infrastructure, and the public amenities of modern life. In the anticipation years before Henri Prost's arrival, these two visions did not merge, but they overlapped in subtler ways, both orienting the city's planning discourse toward the long term.

While awaiting the master plan's completion, municipal authorities began issuing interim regulations "until the city plan is made."[579] The *İzahname* were framed as temporary, yet they had immediate and concrete effects. They designated no-build zones, from 30-metre setbacks along railways and waterfronts to 10-metre buffers around monuments, and tied building heights to street widths. They regulated roof slopes, dictated the treatment of side walls and downpipes, and, in some cases, prohibited building in large swaths of the city. These measures were meant to prevent incompatible development and to pre-emptively align the urban fabric with the principles of the still-hypothetical master plan.

The call for a master plan had been a constant refrain since the Republic's founding. From the early 1920s, local architects, journalists, and municipal officials urged the municipality to abandon piecemeal works in favor of a comprehensive vision. By the mid-1930s, this conversation had escaped technical and bureaucratic circles to become a popular cultural topic.

[579] "Şehrin İstikbal Plânı Yapılıncaya Kadar Yapı ve Yollar Kanununun Tatbikatı Hakkında İzahname," *Arkitekt*, 1936; "Şehrin İstikbal Tanzim Ediliceye Kadar Yapı ve Yollar Kanununun Tatbikatı Hakkında Bazı İzahlar," *Mimar*, 1933.

Newspapers, satirical magazines, and public meetings amplified the idea that Istanbul's future hinged on a master plan. Themes later embedded in Prost's plan, such as new boulevards, public squares, port relocation, and zoning reform, had already been proposed in the local press and in council chambers. As Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz also proved, the eventual master plan would not arrive into a vacuum, but into a city whose residents had been discussing its outlines for over a decade.[580]



Figure 62. Satirical covers on urban planning process (*Akbaba*, December 1936; February 1, 1940)

Anticipation had costs. Fires and other disasters forced rebuilding in burnt areas before any overarching plan could guide it. Under pressure from property owners, the municipality issued construction permits that critics argued were producing of poorly connected, architecturally dull districts, or as Peyami Safa wrote "*İstanbul'un dar, çarpık, ecicbücüc, ihtiyar bünyesi*" was in need of care.[581] Financial and legal constraints further slowed progress: the municipal budget was small, and the tangled property regime, especially the large share held by charitable endowments (*vakıf*), complicated expropriation and redevelopment. Meanwhile, in rapidly growing quarters like Taksim and Şişli, speculative high-rises proliferated, making future planning more difficult. Public impatience was palpable. Satirical magazines mocked the endless talk without visible results. By the time Henri Prost was appointed in 1936, Istanbul had not only a backlog of physical problems, crumbling streets, water shortages, collapsing walls, chronic fires, and even a persistent fly infestation, but also a public that was deeply invested in what a master plan might deliver. [582]

---

[580] Açıkgöz, "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)."

[581] Peyami Safa, "Hadiseler Arasında: Yeni İstanbul - 2," *Cumhuriyet*, September 15, 1936.

[582] "Şehrin Suyu (Resmî Cevap)," *Cumhuriyet*, March 16, 1939; "Çöp ve Sinek Derdine Karşı - Çöpler Dereye Atılıyor, Üstlerine Kireç Dökülüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 22, 1936; "Şehir İşleri - Sinek ve Çöp Derdi Etrafında," *Cumhuriyet*,



Figure 63. Caricature on citizens' wishes from the city (*Akbaba*, November 1938)

This long gestation had a paradoxical effect: it left Istanbul ill-prepared in some respects but unusually well-prepared in others. The delays and stopgap rules created an urban fabric already partially disciplined by the master plan's anticipated principles. The debates had cultivated a well-informed public sphere, ready to scrutinize and discuss planning proposals in detail. Prost arrived into a city with both acute material needs and a population primed to think about its spatial future, a future that, as we have seen, was already being imagined in at least two registers: more of the modernizing, aesthetic city of the master plan and less of the dispersed, sheltered, evasive city of passive defense.

When Henri Prost assumed the role of Chief Planner of Istanbul on 15 May 1936, he stepped into a city shaped as much by expectation as by its physical form.[583] The decade-long public conversation about a master plan had produced a civic imagination attuned to long-term transformation, while the parallel discourse of passive defense had introduced its own visions of open boulevards, dispersed building masses, and protected spaces. Prost's challenge, and his opportunity, was to translate these overlapping yet distinct imaginaries into a coherent, executable urban design.

Prost was no stranger to complex, historically layered cities. His work in Antwerp, Paris, and above all Morocco had honed an approach that combined large-scale intervention with selective conservation, aiming to modernize without erasing. The Kemalist regime saw in him a planner capable of reshaping Istanbul into a modern, secular capital-in-all-but-name, while respecting its monumental silhouette. Although archival evidence does not confirm the oft-repeated story that

October 29, 1936; "Çöp Işindeki Beceriksizliği Valimiz de Anladı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 21, 1936; "İstanbulun Hallolunmaz Dertlerinden Biri: Yollar," *Cumhuriyet*, January 9, 1937.

583 "M. Prost Geldi," *Cumhuriyet*, September 22, 1936.

Atatürk personally invited him, it is clear the decision carried his approval. From the outset, Prost framed Istanbul's transformation in three interlinked terms: Transportation (*la circulation*): modern mobility through arterial boulevards and rationalized street networks; Hygiene (*l'hygiène*): improved sanitation, light, and air through decongestion and green space; Aesthetics (*l'esthétique*): visual order, monumental framing, and the creation of "espaces libres" for public life. He advocated a "concentration plan" rather than extension, arguing that Istanbul's declining population and sprawling fringe settlements called for densifying the historic core while opening it with generous public spaces.[584]

Several scholars worked on Henri Prost's 1937 plan for the European side of Istanbul and his 1939 plan for the Asian side set out a comprehensive vision that combined mobility, recreation, conservation, and zoning into a coherent urban strategy.[585] At the heart of the design was a new road system: Atatürk Boulevard was planned as a central north–south axis across the peninsula, while Vatan and Millet boulevards were conceived as wide east–west arteries terminating in major public squares. Together with bridges, tunnels, and widened streets, these interventions aimed to ease congestion and prepare the city for modern motor traffic. Green space played a central role as well. Prost envisioned large parks, including a "Parc Éducatif" in the Yenibahçe valley with sports grounds, botanical gardens, and cultural facilities, and the Taksim–Maçka Valley development, which incorporated Gezi Park after the demolition of Topçu Barracks in 1943. While these parks were framed as recreational amenities, they could also serve as assembly points or firebreaks in times of crisis. The plan also emphasized preservation: Byzantine and Ottoman monuments were to be protected and set within newly cleared plazas, a 40-metre height limit preserved the skyline, and the eastern tip of the peninsula was designated as an Archaeological Park linking the city's ancient acropolis, Hippodrome, and imperial palace into an open-air museum. Zoning measures sought to separate incompatible functions, relocating factories to the shores of the Golden Horn in line with earlier proposals to keep hazardous industries away from dense residential districts. Although housing was not Prost's main focus, he proposed differentiated schemes ranging from garden city settlements for low-income residents in Yedikule, mid-income housing in Fatih, to upscale developments in Elmadağ and Levent.

---

[584] Ipek Akpinar, "The Rebuilding of Istanbul after the Plan of Henri Prost, 1937-1960: From Secularisation to Turkish Modernisation," in *Doctoral Thesis, UCL (University College London).* (Doctoral, UCL (University College London), 2003), https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10106165/; Bilsel, "'Les Transformations d'Istanbul'"; Açıkgöz, "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)."

[585] Bilsel, "'Les Transformations d'Istanbul'"; Özlem Sıla Durhan, "Erken Cumhuriyet İstanbul'unda Kentsel Değişim (1928-1950)" (Doctoral Thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü, 2009), https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=16341611103504138427&hl=en&oi=scholarr; Hülya Coskun, "Henri Prost's Paris and Istanbul Plannings: Zoning Regulations as Urban Planning Tools: Housing, Green Areas, Parks, Axis," in *Innovations in Green Urbanization and Alternative Renewable Energy*, ed. Federica Rosso et al. (Springer International Publishing, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07381-6_9; Açıkgöz, "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)"; Akpinar, "The Rebuilding of Istanbul after the Plan of Henri Prost, 1937-1960."



Figure 64. Details of the Plan of Istanbul (*Belediyeler Dergisi*, 1938)

The *İstanbul İmar Planının Program Metni*, developed under Prost's tenure, made no claim to design a city for air raid survival.[586] Yet several provisions overlapped with passive defense principles: Road widening and new arteries supported mobility in peacetime and evacuation in wartime.; No-build belts, such as the proposed 500-metre clear zone around old fortifications created buffers that could slow fire spread and reduce target concentration.; Decongestion in Beyoğlu and Galata, through plot reorganisation and better spacing, reduced structural vulnerability.; Public parks, while intended for recreation, could serve as refuge spaces. When questioned during the early war years about adapting the plan for bomb resistance, Prost replied that "no decision has been made" as no official instructions had been received.[587] He acknowledged that such an adaptation would require fundamental changes, using less iron, building lower, even underground, but these ideas remained hypothetical. The master plan and passive defense thus remained formally separate, though structurally compatible.

3.4.6.3. Budget, Feasibility, and Politics of Priority

By the early 1940s, Istanbul's urban debates were compressed into a high-stakes dilemma: should the city's scarce resources serve its long-planned modernization, or be redirected toward immediate passive defense? The press spoke in urgent tones, and public opinion began to frame

[586] "İstanbul Imar Planının Program Metni," *Belediyeler Dergisi* 4, no. 32 (1938): 10–23.

[587] "Şehrin Plânı - Mütehassıs Prost, Plânda Bir Değişiklik Olmadığını Söylüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, August 5, 1940.

every municipal project in terms of protection or vulnerability, since in 1940, the impending war, already arrived at the borders of Turkey. In March 1940, the newspaper *Korunma mı? İmar mı?* (Protection or Development?) posed the question with blunt force. Istanbul, it argued, was "economically and commercially, as well as in terms of culture and historical monuments, and finally in terms of its dense population and symbolic significance, a city that is highly vulnerable to air raids… one-fifth of Turkey's urban population is concentrated here."[588] In such circumstances, "what would currently satisfy Istanbul's residents most is this matter of protection," and they "will not be too upset… if the city's reconstruction plan prioritizes protective measures over… theaters or casinos." Here, the rhetoric of urban progress, long tied to monuments, boulevards, and civic grandeur, was temporarily displaced by a demand for survival first, beauty later. Governor-Mayor Dr. Lütfi Kırdar publicly endorsed the principle. In an extensive statement, he insisted there was "no dispute… on the importance of passive protection and its precedence over everything else," and admitted that "large development campaigns naturally remain for after the war."[589] His first priority, tellingly, was also a planning intervention: "the first thing… as a passive protection measure… is to eliminate wooden neighborhoods." In that sentence, fire prevention, planning policy, and wartime security converged.

Tiyatro mu Sığınak mı? (Theater or Shelter?) argued that a photograph of Kırdar inspecting the site of a new city theatre, "ninety percent" of readers saw inappropriate priorities. The article pointed at the administration by noting that shelters in hospitals had been under construction "for two or three months," and pointed out that if a casino in Taksim could be built in a few months, so too could more shelters. The controversy became less about one building than about how the municipality signaled its priorities, and how the press amplified public judgement. Some sought to dissolve the binary altogether. *Hem korunma hem imar faaliyeti* proposed that the answer was "Both protection activity, and development activity!" Protection, it argued, was "an issue of organization and discipline" rather than purely money and construction, while development was "one of our national causes" to be pursued "at any cost."[590] This populist framing suggested that the city could continue to modernize while also preparing for attack, an appealing vision, but one that underestimated the zero-sum nature of wartime budgets and the destructive power of air raids.

Other voices shifted the focus from *how much* to spend on defense to *how* to spend it. In *İstanbul Sığınakları Meselesi Yanlıştadır!*, the author dismissed the fixation on vast, city-wide bomb-proof shelters as unrealistic, and proposed instead a two-tier system: strategic shelters for

---

[588] M.S., *Bir Mes'ele: "Korunma" Plânı Mı, "Imar" Plânı Mı Lâzım?*, March 5, 1940.

[589] "Vali Dün Matbuata Geniş Izahat Verdi: Yapılan Imar Hamlesi Değil, Alelade Belediye Hizmetlerinden Ibarettir," *Cumhuriyet*, March 6, 1940.

[590] "Hem Korunma Hem Imar Faaliyeti," *Cumhuriyet*, March 6, 1940.

priority sites, and a network of "general civilian shelters" that "can very well be done already." The emphasis was on feasibility and pragmatism, cutting through the all-or-nothing thinking that often-paralyzed public debate. From another angle, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, in *Pasif korunma*, criticized the municipality's reliance on household-level preparedness. Advising "every family" to convert a cellar into a shelter, he argued, was "not a good approach." Without public shelters and general organization, expecting individual households to shoulder the burden was like "expecting a doctor to administer first aid from outside a house."[591]

Architectural professionals added their own precision attacks. In *Sığınak İnşası Usulleri*, the sound commentator of the period Zeki Sayar criticized the municipality for "wrongly implementing [shelter] methods for years… 'deficient and primitive'," warning that some designs "would become graves in case of collapse" because they "lack exits to the streets."[592] He called for learning from "the great evolution of shelter knowledge" abroad, and for building simple, cheap, collective shelters in public facilities and open spaces. For Sayar, the issue was also about whether they would function when needed, not about their existence.

In *Akbaba*, Orhan Seyfi Orhon and Yusuf Ziya Ortaç two main actors of urban issues discussions who were able to bring a nuance in the agenda. Orhon in *Ahşap Evler* gives a nostalgic take on Istanbul's wooden houses gave way to a wartime verdict: "Now, what good are these wooden houses in wartime?" These houses were treated more like the object of the changing of times and its burdens, than as an economic problem.[593] This was the only instance when someone was close enough to think that there are people living in those wooden houses, they are not empty shells of timber. Ortaç, the article *İmar!* cautioned against "burying the city's money in trenches," and argued for maintaining municipal services and building durable improvements that would outlast the emergency.[594] Development meant securing the city's long-term capacity, not exhausting it on speculative defenses. The positions were diverse and mostly binary, but the generator of the discussion was the interface between wartime protection and peacetime planning. Measures like eliminating wooden housing or relocating hazardous industries, which Henri Prost had advised in 1940, were both defensive and developmental. In such cases, wartime urgency provided political cover for projects aligned with the long-term master plan. Conversely, investments in roads, parks, and public buildings could be justified as morale-boosting and resilience-enhancing, blurring the line between beautification and protection.

---

[591] Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "Çerçeve: Pasif Korunma," *Son Telgraf*, March 12, 1940.

[592] Sayar, "Sığınak İnşası Usulleri."

[593] Orhan Seyfi Orhon, "Ahşap Evler," *Akbaba*, March 21, 1940.

[594] Yusuf Ziya Ortaç Ortaç, "İmar!," *Akbaba*, March 14, 1940.

Eventually, the press debates carried little direct policy force, but they reveal how vulnerability itself became a resource in wartime discourse. Istanbul's density, wooden housing, monuments, and symbolic stature were invoked not only as risks but as arguments to privilege one project over another. Familiar planning concerns, slum clearance, fire prevention, industrial relocation, acquired the urgency of survival when reframed through the lens of air raids. Yet if fear gave gravity to these concerns, it also unsettled the language of urban modernity. Newspapers, journals, and satirical magazines staged theatres, casinos, shelters, and boulevards as proxies for larger questions: what should a city be in a time of danger, and who should decide its priorities? Within this discourse, the rhetoric of "burying money in trenches" was more than fiscal caution; it signaled an elite cynicism that equated protective infrastructures with waste, distancing decision-makers from the very vulnerabilities that ordinary residents endured. The compromise formula of "both protection and development" likewise often meant doing neither, shelters remained incomplete, and planning reforms stalled. Fear amplified urgency, but it also provided cover for delay, indecision, and symbolic gestures.

This ambivalence is a hallmark of wartime urbanism. It is a mode of governance in which the specter of imminent attack lends weight to long-standing planning ideals, while simultaneously legitimizing inaction by framing protection as prohibitively expensive, technically premature, or socially destabilizing. The result was a city suspended between survival and progress, where vulnerability became both a justification for intervention and an excuse for postponement. What endures from these debates is not a coherent program but a record of how wartime fear made the future of Istanbul thinkable in new, uneasy terms, urgently imagined, yet chronically deferred.

3.4.7. Governing Through Anticipation

Istanbul's wartime story shows that air-raid planning was never a detachable add-on to the city but a framework refracting through every layer of governance, architecture, and daily life. Passive defense became a lens through which the city was judged, regulated, and reimagined, even in the absence of bombs. Laws and manuals provided a technical grammar translating international doctrines into local rules, wall thicknesses, roof treatments, attic toolkits, permissible materials, while newspapers and illustrated guides transformed these codes into civic pedagogy, mobilizing households, schools, and workplaces as sites of everyday preparedness. Istanbul's institutions did not merely teach protection; they moralized it, binding survival to discipline and civic duty.

The city's experience, however, was defined by tension rather than coherence. Official shelter codes assumed masonry or reinforced concrete, yet most of the housing stock was timber. Regulations mandated airtight rooms and reinforced basements, but many families lived in overcrowded tenements or semi-ruins. Trench programs produced tens of thousands of pits, but memoirs and caricatures show how many remained unfinished, repurposed, or mocked. Even

model shelters and exhibitions functioned more as public theatre than as assurances of safety. The city was governed through numbers, 90,000 shelters, 200,000 instruction sheets, endless drills, that synchronized citizens without providing equivalent material security. Passive defense thus operated as a rhetorical performance of readiness as much as a technical infrastructure.

The confrontation with wood made this contradiction tangible. Authorities agreed that incendiaries posed the greatest danger, and the wooden city became the symbol of vulnerability. Statistics about fires and imagined bombardments amplified this into a civic crisis. Because everyday Istanbul already burned, collapsed, and flooded, the aerial threat mapped directly onto lived emergencies. Wartime urgency gave political cover to urban renewal: the call to eliminate timber housing dovetailed with Prost's modernist projects and long-standing demands for boulevards and firebreaks. In this way, survival became indistinguishable from modernization. The incendiary problem was not merely technical, it was a planning problem about reconfiguring streets and materials in the name of both safety and progress. Press debates reveal how vulnerability itself became a political resource. Whether arguing "shelter or theatre," "protection or development," or both, commentators turned air-raid measures into proxies for larger disputes over the city's priorities. Some dismissed them as waste, others demanded collective provision or household duty. This discursive field unsettled the language of urban modernity: beautification, circulation, and monumentality could no longer be invoked without reference to survival. Istanbul became a site where modernization and protection overlapped sometimes reinforcing, sometimes contradicting each other.

In sum, Istanbul's wartime urbanism shows that passive defense functioned less as a finite project than as a governing condition. It redefined evidence (a trench, a number, an inspection report), shifted responsibility onto households and tenants, and reframed planning in the idiom of vulnerability. The city was managed for an event that never came, yet this management left durable traces: in rules about materials and form, in the clearing of wooden quarters, and in embedding preparedness into municipal routines. Wartime urbanism in neutral Turkey was not a suspension of planning but one of its generative environments.

This chapter has argued that wartime urbanism in Turkey operated less as emergency response than as a system of anticipation, assembled through law, print, and institutions. Legal codes prescribed both authority and form, embedding protection within the grammar of planning. Manuals and courses extended pedagogy into classrooms and households, turning civic education into preparedness. Istanbul itself became the test ground where central prescriptions met material limits, wooden housing, scarce budgets, competing priorities, so that protection and modernization blurred together. Public debate, finally, made technical questions civic and moral, recoding the language of the city around danger and discipline.

What emerges is a distinctive form of governance through anticipation. The city was administered not for what it was, but for what might happen to it. Anticipation structured law, pedagogy, drills, and debate, producing architectures of anticipation that were as much legal and communicative as they were built. These architectures connected a trench dug in a schoolyard, a poster diagram of gas-mask use, a mayoral decree, or a satirical cartoon—all devices that translated the imagined catastrophe into an object of governance. The safe city, therefore, was as much imagined as constructed: its infrastructures lived in statutes, textbooks, and gestures of rehearsal as much as in concrete and steel. The wartime city was both frontier and medium, where national defense met municipal governance, where aerial verticality cut into everyday routines, and where the anticipation of war redefined the meaning of urban modernity. It was organizational, coordinating institutions and drills; instrumental, repurposing planning for defense; provisional, built on improvisation; and communicative, saturating civic life with manuals and decrees. These are the qualities the City contributes to the architectures of anticipation: organizational, instrumental, provisional, communicative. They demonstrate that anticipation operated not only through shelters and boulevards but through the everyday systems that governed uncertainty itsel

CHAPTER 4

SPATIAL REGIMES OF WARTIME BODY

4.1. Atmospheres of Survival

That same week in late May 1935, which has anchored each of these chapters, Abidin Daver and Ercüment Kalmık offered yet another scenario of doom in words and lines. This time Daver declared: "The greatest danger is gas."[595] Earlier depictions of air raids had imagined bridges collapsing or timber houses going up in flames; here, destruction entered the body itself—its lungs, eyes, and skin. Daver argued that poison gas belonged to a different order of violence. A bullet lost its threat once fired; a bomb destroyed only within a defined radius. Gas, by contrast, was both durational and expansive: its reach spread across hours and neighborhoods, extinguishing "human, animal, even plant life," and leaving behind not a wrecked quarter but an emptied world. In these lines, destruction shifted from terrain to respiration, from masonry to atmosphere. Survival was no longer a matter of walls and trenches but of lungs and air. Daver, without knowing it, captured what Peter Sloterdijk would later call *atmoterrorism*, war waged through the very medium of life. [596]

His tone oscillated between alarm and irony. He mocked those who nailed "*ya Hafız*"[597] plaques to their doors as if divine invocation could ward off suffocation, calling such gestures "slothful resignation." Yet his own fatalism bordered on paralysis: "*Düşman acımasızsa, ki elbette acımayacaktır, zehirli gazlarla… memlekette canlı hiçbir şey bırakmayabilir*" (If the enemy is merciless, and it surely will be, poison gas may leave not a single living thing in the country)[598]. Preparedness was demanded and denied in the same breath. The contradiction was telling. In confronting a weapon that dissolved the boundary between environment and organism, Daver exposed the body as the final frontier of aerial warfare. Territory had borders, cities had firebreaks, but the body's porous skin and fragile lungs now defined the limits of survival. The gas

[595] Abidin Daver, "Hava Tehlikesi: En Büyük Tehlike Gazdır!," *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935.

[596] Peter Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, trans. Amy Patton and Steve Corcoran, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series (Semiotext(e) ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2009).

[597] "Ya Ḥafız" (O Preserver) is one of the ninety-nine names of God in Islamic tradition, invoked for protection and safety. In interwar Turkey, the phrase was often inscribed on door plaques or amulets as a talisman against harm, an act that Daver mocked as passive fatalism in the face of modern warfare.

[598] Daver, "Hava Tehlikesi: En Büyük Tehlike Gazdır!"

mask emerged as the architecture of this frontier, a layer designed to separate atmosphere from life. Daver's exaggerations mattered not for their accuracy but for how they spatialized vulnerability, rendering air itself a weapon and the human body its last line of defense.


HAVA TEHLIKESI:

En büyük tehlike gazdir!

Kendimizi sade «Ya hafız!» levhasile korumağa kalkar ve gazle mücadeleye hazırlanmazsak, çıkacak bir savaşta, memleket, mezar olur

Yazan : Abidin Daver

Figure 65. Illustration depicting a poison gas attack in Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935)

Debates about the morality and practicality of gas divided the interwar period. Michele Haapamaki describes how British newspapers popularized the "dew of death," a phrase that condensed anxieties about phosgene and Lewisite into a vocabulary of terror.[599] Fictional works such as Cicely Hamilton's Theodore Savage and Storm Jameson's Challenge to Death dramatized the collapse of urban life under poison clouds. J.B.S. Haldane argued in *Callinicus* (1925) that gas caused fewer fatalities than explosives and therefore represented a more "humane" form of war. James Kendall and F.N. Pickett advanced similar views, claiming that the greater danger was public panic rather than gas itself.[600] Joseph Meisel shows that British authorities took this line seriously: government budgets and *Air Raid Precautions* programs prioritized respirators, with thirty-eight million gas masks distributed by 1938, while far less was spent on shelter construction.[601]

Scholars of modern war highlighted how these debates shifted the meaning of atmosphere. Peter Sloterdijk describes the 20th century as the age of "atmoterrorism," in which air became a battlefield.[602] Gas clouds produced "microclimates of death" that suffocated populations by

[599] Michele Haapamäki, *The Coming of the Aerial War: Culture and the Fear of Airborne Attack in Inter-War Britain*, 1st ed., International Library of Twentieth Century History (I.B. Tauris, 2014).

[600] Page, *Architectures of Survival*.

[601] Joseph S. Meisel, "Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War," *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 3 (1994): 300–319, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/5.3.300.

[602] Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*; Sloterdijk, "Airquakes"; Erik Bordeleau, "On Sloterdijk's Terror from the Air: The Book of (Political) Air Conditioning," *Cultural Politics* 6, no. 3 (2010): 389–91.

attacking their conditions of respiration. Brandimarte emphasizes the colonial dimensions of this practice, showing how Italian strategies in Ethiopia produced "atmospheres of empire," racially structured environments of destruction.[603] In 1935–36, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia marked the first large-scale use of chemical weapons from the air. Mustard gas was dispersed as a "thin deadly rain," suffocating soldiers and civilians, poisoning water and crops, and killing livestock. Entire regions became uninhabitable as gas burned skin, blinded eyes, and corroded lungs. The attacks instilled terror, broke resistance, and carried a racial dimension, with Ethiopians depicted as powerless and animalized in propaganda. The campaign demonstrated how aerial bombing and chemical weapons could devastate entire populations and environments. Dietmar Süss extends the idea of atmospheric threat into the shelter, noting contemporary fears that overcrowded bunkers would incubate tuberculosis and "blackout bacteria." Atmosphere became a contested site of governance and health as much as of strategy.[604]

Apart from gas-proof shelters, oxygen machines, respirator, gas masks most of all, condensed these concerns into a visible, symbolic, cultural and defensive object. Peter Thompson describes the "People's Gas Mask" in Germany as both a protective device and a marker of chemical modernity, widely distributed and woven into daily life.[605] Gennifer Weisenfeld traces the role of mask parades in Japan, where public drills turned respirators into tools of spectacle and civic pedagogy, calling the phenomena "anxious modernisms."[606] In Britain, Davide Deriu characterizes masks as psychological palliatives, while Mass Observation surveys showed how quickly people abandoned them when no raids occurred.[607] Susan Grayzel shows how infant gas masks dramatized the horror of a world in which protection required enclosing babies in grotesque contraptions, while government propaganda emphasized mothers' responsibilities in ensuring their children's safety.[608] Surely, Roxanne Panchasi, the cultural historian this thesis owes its conceptual framing, brilliantly puts the monumental fortification of the Maginot Line with the fragile seal of the gas mask next to each other, showing how the frontier migrated from territory to the surface of the body.[609] These works reveal that the gasmasks were devices that

---

[603] Italo Brandimarte, "Breathless War: Martial Bodies, Aerial Experiences and the Atmospheres of Empire," *European Journal of International Relations* 29, no. 3 (2023): 525–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231153259.

[604] Dietmar Süss et al., *Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in World War II*, First edition (Oxford University Press, 2014).

[605] Peter Thompson, *The Gas Mask in Interwar Germany: Visions of Chemical Modernity*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009314862.

[606] Gennifer Weisenfeld, "Gas Mask Parade: Japan's Anxious Modernism," *Modernism/Modernity* 21, no. 1 (2014): 179–99.

[607] D. Deriu, "Managing the Body and the City: The Contested Re-Appropriation of London Underground in Wartime," in *Organizing Metropolitan Space and Discourse*, ed. B. Czarniawska and R. Solli (Liber, 2001), https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/940zw/managing-the-body-and-the-city-the-contested-re-appropriation-of-london-underground-in-wartime.

[608] Susan R. Grayzel, *At Home and under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz*, Literature in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[609] Panchasi, *Future Tense*, 96.

established the intimate relationship between the body and a public warfare, all the while creating its own culture with connections reaching out to fashion, humor, alienation and obedience. They show how preparedness was enacted through breath, posture, and routine, and how future war was rehearsed in classrooms, homes, and parades as much as in bunkers.

This chapter brings the discussion into the Turkish context, tracing how the anticipation of air war extended from the collective spaces of the city to the gestures of everyday life. It begins with Abidin Daver's insistent return to vulnerability and follows how this anxiety materialized in drills, blackouts, and public exercises that transformed urban routines into rehearsals of survival. Survival became an act of performance and spatial improvisation: doors turned into thresholds of concealment, windows demanded blackout, stairwells became escape routes, and courtyards functioned as communal shelters. Manuals, laws, and civic courses codified these gestures, transforming composure, vigilance, and obedience into civic duties.

Aviation culture added a parallel pedagogy of aspiration and discipline, training citizens to embody the modern, airminded body under the same skies imagined as sites of threat. Together, these practices reveal how wartime preparedness operated through movement, posture, and routine, producing a civilian body that was at once vulnerable, regulated, and performative.

The discussion then turns to the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), which positioned itself as protector, healer, and researcher in equal measure. Through its factories, journals, and exhibitions, Kızılay transformed passive defense from a matter of distribution into one of invention. Gas masks, shelters, and protective devices were not merely supplied but designed, tested, and publicized as instruments for sustaining life across men and women, children and infants. At the center of this effort stood the Mamak Gas Mask Factory, where anticipation was recast as research and production rather than temporary alarm.

Figures such as Nuri Refet Korur and İzzet Erksan bridged laboratory work and public instruction, translating chemical knowledge into civic preparedness through the pages of *Kızılay Mecmuası.* Read alongside caricatures, satire, and the gendered imagery of passive defense, Kızılay's enterprise reveals how scientific authority, care, and propaganda intertwined, how the work of protection itself became a politics of knowledge and of the body.

4.2. Bodies in Motion: Ideal, Aspirational and Performative

The wartime citizen was imagined through spaces that disciplined and rehearsed the body. Manuals and regulations turned interiors into training grounds where posture, calm, and routine were codified as instruments of survival. Aviation culture opened another register of bodily practice: parks, squares, and airfields became classrooms of flight and theaters of spectacle,

producing citizens who embodied risk, skill, and civic pride. In the streets and courtyards of the city, these scripts culminated in drills and blackouts that transformed everyday architecture into stages of concealment and cooperation. Law, spectacle, and performance converged to make the body both the medium and the measure of wartime pedagogy.

4.2.1. The Ideal Body Of Citizenship

The cultivation of the wartime citizen built on a much longer Republican project of shaping the "ideal body" as the foundation of a moral and productive nation. From the 1920s onward, state ideology defined the body as a public asset, to be trained, displayed, and disciplined through law, education, and ritual. Schools, military service, and youth organizations mobilized citizens in graded stages of formation, each charged with rehearsing loyalty and vitality. National holidays and sports festivals transformed public space into a theater of order and endurance, where parades, gymnastics, and collective drills enacted the unity of the nation through synchronized motion.[610] Behind these spectacles operated an extensive infrastructure of schooling, health campaigns, and military training that linked hygiene, physical fitness, and obedience. Atatürk's rhetoric of "*gürbüz ve yavuz evlatlar,*" robust, bright children, embodied the state's expectation that the future citizen would be at once healthy, disciplined, and patriotic.[611] The interwar apparatus of air-raid preparedness did not invent this model but extended it: the wartime body emerged as the latest expression of a biopolitical ideal that had already organized youth, soldiers, and civilians into a single choreography of duty.

The aerial threat and the wartime years introduced a new register of urban governance in Turkey, one that cast the population at once as a body at risk and as an instrument of protection. Just as manuals and regulations sketched principles for the ideal wartime city, they also delineated the traits of the ideal citizen. This scalar, interdependent logic between city, structure, and body was articulated through organic metaphors such as *bünye* (system/body) and *uzviyet*, (organism) terms that linked survival to the soundness of every constituent part.[612] Wartime legislation translated this analogy directly onto the individual, prescribing not only the form of a safe city but also the capacities of the bodies it required. If the urban organism was to withstand aerial assault, each of its members had to remain fit, disciplined, and responsive. Laws set the standards of this

---

[610] Ahmet Tozoğlu et al., "Kamusal Mekan, Toplum ve Tören: İstanbul'da Milli Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekansal ve Toplumsal İzleri," in *Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılında Mimarlık*, ed. İpek Akpınar Aksugür and Şebnem Önal Hoşkara (İdealkent Yayınları, 2024); Ahmet Erdem Tozoğlu et al., "Ankara'da Millî Bayram Kutlamaları: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde Kamusallığın Performatif Biçimleri," *Ankara Araştırmaları Dergis*i 10, no. 2 (2022): 203–28, https://doi.org/10.5505/jas.2022.38233; Ahmet Tozoğlu et al., "Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekânsal Bağlamını Görselleştirmek: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İstanbul'da Millî Bayramlar," in *Dijital Beşeri Bilimler ve Osmanlı Çalışmaları* (Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, 2023).

[611] Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*.

[612] Burhan Arif, "Türk Şehirlerinin Bünyesi," *Mimar*, 1932; Bürhan Arif, "Modern Bir Şehirin Uzviyeti."

"ideal body," while courses and drills trained citizens to embody them. In this framework, survival rested less on the protective urban infrastructure than on the disciplined adjustment of movement, vigilance, and steadiness as everyday gestures transformed into the vital functions of the city's organism under attack.

Air defense was imagined as much a matter of bodily organization as of urban form, with laws and regulations treating citizens as components in a distributed machinery of survival. The 1938 *Law on Protection Against Air Attacks* established a militarized hierarchy of safety, extending from the General Air Defense Command down to the warden of a single apartment block.[613] This statute envisioned not only the construction of shelters or alarm systems, but the organization of people into graded layers of responsibility. For example, the 1939 Passive Defense Regulation (No. 4178) introduced the *Ev Hava Korunma Amiri*, a "House Air Defense Warden" for every building, tasked with enforcing blackout rules, checking firefighting equipment, and leading residents to safety[614] (4178, Art. 22). Regulations specified the qualifications required for civil defense: observers had to have perfect eyesight, auxiliary firefighters had to be free of hernias or vascular conditions, gas detection squads needed keen smell and endurance.[615] The *Instruction for Passive Air Defense Drills* prescribed timed movements, queues in silence, obedience to sirens, and the simulation of panic control.[616] In these texts, the civilian population was reorganized through a military lens, each house treated as a unit and each resident as a ranked participant. Protection became a matter of categorization and command, the ordinary fabric of life recast into layers of defense.

Newspaper reports demonstrate how this juridical figure was translated into pedagogy and participation via public courses. Already in June 1936, Ali Çetinkaya argued in *Cumhuriyet* that "every citizen between the ages of 18 and 60 must attend gas protection courses" and denounced those who neglected their obligations, calling for the mobilization of teachers, doctors, and 2,000 instructors to educate the city's population.[617] In November 1937, Cumhuriyet announced that each school would form a passive defense committee under the supervision of science teachers, with students practicing drills under close inspection.[618] Universities, too, were drawn into this system: commissions were created under rectors, who oversaw the establishment of active

[613] "Hava Taarruzlarına Karsı Korunma Kanunu," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 3955 (September 1938): 10228–29.

[614] "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4178 (August 1939): 11543–55.

[615] "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi Hakkında Talimatname," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4432 (February 1940): 13358.

[616] "Pasif Korunma Bakımından Yapılarda Tatbik Edilecek Esaslar ve Sığınaklar Hakkında Kararname," *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4418 (January 1940): 13225–30.

[617] Ali Çetinkaya, "Zehirli Gaz Kurslarına Her Vatandaş Alınmalı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 15, 1939.

[618] "Gaz Kursları Bu Akşam Açılıyor: Kırk Dört Kursta 4400 Kişi Okuyacak," *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 1937.

defense teams in each faculty and institute, with members subjected to "*sıkı murakabe*" (strict supervision) and repeated exercises.[619]



Figure 66. Reports on anti-gas training courses (*Cumhuriyet*. June 9, 1936; November 16, 1937)

From 1939 onward, Istanbul's press was saturated with reports of gas courses. In April that year, *Cumhuriyet* described how evening classes filled party buildings and community centers in Beyoğlu, Galata, and Şişli, with participants promised certificates at the end.[620] By October, the Ministry of Health coordinated forty-four courses in twenty districts, enrolling 4,400 citizens under instructors drawn from the ranks of chemists, pharmacists, and doctors; demonstrations included plaster samples corroded by gas, dramatizing the threat.[621] Two months later, the number had risen to forty-five simultaneous courses across the city, a mobilization that turned the evening schedule of Istanbul into a choreography of survival.[622] Bülent Bakar states that in Istanbul, approximately 18,000 people had graduated from these courses in four cycles by January 1938. By the end of 1940, over 12,500 people in Istanbul had completed passive protection courses, with nearly 4,000 still attending; attendance was made mandatory, penalties ranging from 5 to 25 lira fines for non-compliance, in accordance with the Provincial Law. Police would escort those who failed to attend.[623]

Specialized courses expanded this civic pedagogy into technical professions. In August 1939, debris removal courses began at Taşkışla for eight thousand men[624] aged sixty to sixty-one, each

[619] "Dün Akşam 45 Zehirli Gaz Kursu Birden Açıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 1937.

[620] "Zehirli Gaz Kursları Faaliyete Geçti," *Cumhuriyet*, October 3, 1939.

[621] *Cumhuriyet*, "Zehirli Gaz Kursları Faaliyete Geçti."

[622] *Cumhuriyet*, "Dün Akşam 45 Zehirli Gaz Kursu Birden Açıldı."

[623] Bülent Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)* (Tarihçi, 2019).

[624] "Pasif Müdafaa - Ekiplerde Çalışacak Olan Sekiz Bin Kişi Seçildi," *Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1939.

medically examined and sorted into lighter or heavier duties depending on fitness.[625] In September, the chemist Necmeddin lectured at the university on *iperit* and phosgene, performing experiments before audiences of teachers and officials.[626] By 1940, the Mobilization Directorate extended the system to policing, opening auxiliary police courses in Istanbul, whose graduates would put on uniforms and perform duties "exactly lika a policeman" during air raids.[627]


Pasif müdafaa

Ekiplerde çalışacak olan sekiz bin kişi seçildi

Bina ve müesseselerdeki korunma tedbirlerini tespit eden yeni bir talimatname hazırlandı

Figure 67. Recruitment for passive defense teams (*Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1939)

Alongside laws and courses, a stream of advice manuals addressed the public in an intimate register, teaching survival as a matter of posture, composure, and moral resolve. Most importantly besides pages of first aid, specific poison gas treatments, the underlying motivation of all was the standardization of behavior, response, and action. For example, *Halk İçin Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı* (1931), defines the standard move during a poison attack as to cover their faces with chemically soaked cloths, to disperse from crowds, to lie flat in open areas, and to keep buckets of sand and disinfectants at hand. Others define how to put the mask on, how to rush to the shelter, how to behave in the shelter, or more technical aspects such as how to clean the poison gas, how to treat the burnt, wounded, electrocuted, and the fainted victims. Standards were reasoned with compassion for family, and the country. Teachers such as Mazhar Tobur, from Vefa High School, warned the "dear child" that an enemy might one day poison the very air, killing "your innocent mother, father, and siblings" and urged calmness and learning the code is "your greatest weapon."[628] Framing calmness as as a civic responsibility resonated with many others. Nuri Refet Korur reminded instructors to avoid jargon and reassure the public of protection's

[625] "Pasif Müdafaa: Enkaz Kaldırma Kursu Dün Faaliyete Geçti," *Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 1939.

[626] "Zehirli Gaz Kursu Bitti," *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1936.

[627] "Pasif Korunma: Yardımcı Polis Kursları Açılıyor," *Tan*, September 1, 1940.

[628] Tobur, *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*.

effectiveness, while anonymous pamphlets insisted that "the greatest of all preparations is to calmly and without panic take the recommended precautions," noting that the roar of airplanes caused more terror than the bombs themselves.[629] Even more personal voices emerged: Hâmit Bahar republished his booklet in 1940, explaining that he did so out of "patriotic duty" after teaching thousands in public courses, so that even those who had missed them could learn how to act in their homes.[630]

Through this apparatus of laws, courses, and manuals, the body emerged as both target and tool of wartime governance. Protection was defined less by fortification than by comportment—how one stood, moved, breathed, and obeyed. The citizen was trained to internalize vigilance as habit and calmness as civic virtue, to transform anxiety into discipline and action into proof of loyalty. The "ideal body" of wartime Turkey was therefore not only healthy and obedient but educable, a body capable of translating command into reflex. Yet this logic of order and composure was only one face of anticipation. Alongside it unfolded another, more aspirational vision of the modern subject, one animated by flight, speed, and uplift, which redefined air as the space of courage rather than fear.

4.2.2. Airmindedness and the Aspirational Body

This notion of airmindedness, defined by Joseph Corn as "believing in the potential of airplanes to better human life" was widely celebrated in interwar culture.[631] As Michael McCluskey shows, it encompassed both the exhilaration of aviation's promise for progress and global connectivity, and the darker recognition of airpower as a medium of destruction and terror.[632] In interwar and wartime Turkey, airmindedness described more than enthusiasm for flight; it was a cultural and pedagogical project that reshaped how bodies, cities, and technologies were imagined under the shadow of war. Newspapers, institutions, and public ceremonies portrayed aviation as both promise and peril: the same skies that might deliver bombs and poison gas were staged as sites of exhilaration, discipline, and civic pride. By turning youth into glider pilots, celebrating exemplars like Sabiha Gökçen, or circulating aerial photographs of Istanbul's new plans, aviation culture inscribed the body into a dual grammar, trained to endure attack yet also uplifted as participant in aerial modernity. In this sense, airmindedness was separate from passive defense but complemented it, offering a repertoire of aspiration and mastery that stood alongside the drills of survival.

---

[629] Boysan and Korur, *Harp gazları ve bunlara karşı korunma*.

[630] Bahar, *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri: pasif korunmada çalışacak vatandaşlara rehber*.

[631] Haffner, *The View from Above*.

[632] Michael McCluskey, "Introduction: Airminded Modernism," in *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, ed. Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber (Springer International Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_1.

Founded in 1935, under the *Türk Hava Kurumu* (Turkish Aeronautical Association) and inaugurated by Atatürk, *Türkkuşu* (Turkish bird) became the institutional engine of a civic pedagogy in aviation.[633] Its program combined training and spectacle: youth camps at Rami, Yeşilköy, and İnönü produced graded competence through glider lessons, parachute jumps, and brevet exams, while public exhibitions staged these same routines before crowds in city squares and parks.[634] The press covered each detail, numbers of passes, photographs of students preparing for flight, official inspections, so that bodily exercises translated into a national curriculum of aviation. The ecosystem extended outward: Kayseri factories supplied gliders, schools received equipment for their students, and municipal spaces were reorganized to accommodate displays and receptions. Instructors' records, ministerial visits, and month-long activity reports turned aviation into a managed chain of practice that joined industry, governance, and education into a visible system.



Figure 68. *Türkkuşu camp and Sabiha Gökçen's flights* (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1936; June 14, 1937)

Within this ecosystem, Sabiha Gökçen embodied the symbolic force of the aviation body, called as "The winged amazon of the Turks".[635] Her training flights at Yeşilköy were reported with technical precision, while her leadership at the opening of İnönü camp in 1937, where she addressed female glider candidates, bound women's participation to discipline, courage, and national service. Newspapers emphasized both her daring as a pilot and her role as a teacher, staging her as a pioneer whose she became an aviation celebrity. Later ceremonial receptions

[633] "Tarihsel Bir Gün: Türk Sivil Havacılığı Kuruldu. Türkkuşu Kurumunun Açılışını Kıymetli Bir Söylevle Atatürk Yaptı…," *Cumhuriyet*, May 4, 1935.

[634] "Rami Türkkuşu Kampında – Türk Havalarını Koruyacak Olan Yarının Kahraman Tayyarecileri Nasıl Hazırlanıyorlar?," *Cumhuriyet*, June 14, 1937; "Türkkuşu Filosu Dün İzmirden Geldi: Kahraman Tayyarecilerimiz Yeşilköyde Kalabalık Bir Halk Kitlesi Tarafından Tezahüratla Karşılandılar," *Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 1937; "İnönü Türkkuşu Kampı Büyük Merasimle Açıldı: Kız Planör Namzedlerine Hitabe," *Cumhuriyet*, July 5, 1937.

[635] "Türkün Kanatlı Amazonu – Hava Kahramanımız Sabiha Gökçen Yalovada Atasına Tazimlerini Sundu," *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1937.

placed her at the center of civic gatherings, where her presence fused spectacle with instruction and demonstrated that skill in the sky could be transposed into public virtue on the ground. Gökçen's repeated appearances in print and in person made aviation not only a domain of youth and training but also a field where gendered modernity was dramatized and institutionalized.

Beyond the training grounds, aviation unfolded as spectacle. Air rallies and Aviation Week celebrations turned Istanbul's Taksim Square and Yeşilköy into aerial theaters where speed records, aerobatics, and parachute descents were staged for mass audiences. International encounters amplified this culture of display: Greek aviators received public welcomes, while detailed reports of Britain's Hendon maneuvers and the sight of 700 planes over the Thames offered Turkish readers models of foreign modernity. Private enterprise joined the repertoire when Nuri Demirağ's fleet performed choreographed flights above Istanbul, their paths inscribing industry into the sky.[636] Touring shows extended the exhilaration across Anatolia, presenting aviation as a roving spectacle that taught collective excitement as much as technical possibility.



Figure 69. Aviation Martyr's Monument in Fatih, Istanbul (IBB Atatürk Library, Krt_010079)

If spectacles projected exhilaration, mourning ceremonies cultivated sobriety and sacrifice. Each January, the *Hava Şehitlerini Anma Günü* Memorial Day for the Aviation Martyrs, also known as *Kırık Kanatlar* (Broken Wings) gathered citizens at Fatih before Vedat Tek's monument, its fractured marble column symbolizing unfinished journeys.[637] Programs combined military salutes, aerial flyovers, and municipal delegations marching from Fatih to Beyazıt and Taksim, honoring their loss into the city's civic topography. Funerals for individual pilots, such as

[636] "Misafir Yunan Tayyarecileri Şerefine Hava Gösterileri," *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1935; "Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Hangarı ve Meydanı - Bu Güzel Müessesenin Küşad Merasimi Dün Yeşilköyde Yapıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 18, 1941; "Yeşilköy Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Alanında – Tayyare ve Planör Müsabakaları," *Cumhuriyet*, August 3, 1942; "Nuri Demirağ Yeşilköy Tayyare Alanında," *Cumhuriyet*, August 8, 1942.

[637] "Kahraman Hava Şehitlerimiz Için Dün Yapılan Ihtifal," *Cumhuriyet*, May 16, 1938.

Salahaddin in 1938, were folded into this wider liturgy, linking burials in Istanbul or Eskişehir with the national idea of aerial martyrdom. Here, citizens ritualized aviation service under the sign of sacrifice, as the same airplanes that entertained in rallies circled overhead to mark loss. In contrast to exhilaration, these rituals scripted aviation as endurance, memory, and discipline.

The eye from above also reshaped how cities were imagined. From the mid-1930s onward, aerial photography was celebrated as a scientific tool of urban reform: Henri Prost and Halid Ziya Türkkân argued that cadastral surveys and city plans should be drawn directly from photographs, ensuring accuracy and accelerating modernization.[638] Istanbul's master plan relied on thousands of aerial images (14,000), with costs and figures reported in the press as markers of progress.[639] Articles explained the14 technique's history and uses, from Boston in 1860 to the battlefields of the First World War, before turning to Istanbul's own surveys, where photographs promised to rationalize the city's unruly growth.[640] Travel reports extended the theme, claiming that only from the airplane could the true beauty and geography of the city be seen, while weekend sightseeing flights made this elevated gaze available to ordinary passengers. Cemil Fikret, so impressed by this journey wrote:

> "On the way there, the airplane was "almost" ours; by the evening, returning to Yeşilköy, it was "completely" ours. There is no need to even state that the return trip, like the departure, was impeccable and flawless. In this way, a very small group departed from Istanbul in the morning and went to Ankara. After having lunch there at seven and resting for a short while, they returned to Istanbul again around half past six in the evening. By now, the expression "like a bird" [kuş misali] should no longer have a place in our language. To say "like a bird" is no longer enough; it should be said "like a human-bird." Humans have by far surpassed birds in flying. Indeed, those who ate their lunch in Ankara and returned the same day would find it difficult to believe they still belong to the species of bird." [641]

The State Airlines Administration begun a new program of fifteen-minute sightseeing "*tenezzüh"* flights every Saturday afternoon and Sunday, departing from Yeşilköy and circling over Istanbul, Beyoğlu, and Üsküdar.[642] These flights, especially attractive to women, offered passengers the rare chance to view the Bosphorus and the city from above, an experience described as fearless, enjoyable, and entirely novel. In this way, aerial vision produced a new territorial imagination: the airplane put the eyes on the sky, mapping the city, its streets and quarters flattened into legible surfaces for planners, travelers, and readers alike.

---

[638] "Hava Fotoğrafı - Her Şehrin Bir Fotografik Plânı Olursa Türkiyede Şehircilik Terakkileri Kolaylaşacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, March 31, 1940; "İmar Işlerimiz – Hava Fotoğrafı Usulile Şehir Haritaları," *Cumhuriyet*, April 30, 1940.

[639] "İstanbulun Tayyare Ile Alınan Resimleri," *Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 1936.

[640] A.A., "Halk Dili Ile Havacılık: Tayyareden Alınan Fotograflar," *Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1941.

[641] Cemil Fikret, "İstanbul - Ankara: İstanbulun Güzelliğini Tam Olarak Ancak Tayyareden Görmek Kabil Olabilir," *Cumhuriyet*, September 1, 1937.

[642] "Tayyare Ile Tenezzüh Uçuşları," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1936.



Figure 70. Sightseeing flights and aerial travel (*Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1936; September 1, 1937).

Aviation culture thus granted the skies with a civic promise. Türkkuşu's regimen of training and spectacle, Gökçen's exemplary body, the exhilaration of rallies, the solemnity of mourning, and the cartographic authority of aerial photographs together scripted a repertoire of aspiration. Citizens were invited to leap, glide, salute, and survey, inhabiting a vertical theater of national life. Yet this pedagogy did not displace the defensive grammar of wartime governance. The same atmosphere that lifted gliders or revealed cities from above was also imagined as carrying poison clouds and incendiaries. The aspirational body of airmindedness stood alongside the disciplined body of passive defense: one trained to master the skies, the other drilled to endure attack. It is to this second repertoire, of blackout, shelter, and silence, that the discussion now turns.

4.2.3. The Performance of the Ideal Body: Drills, Exercises, And Blackouts

Mid December 1935, the press reported an intensifying activity of preparation that cast the coming event as both bureaucratic drill and civic spectacle. On 12 December, Cumhuriyet noted that the local government committee had already begun detailed planning, stressing that the trial would mobilize military aircraft, searchlights, and anti-aircraft guns[643].

By 14 December, the paper described a full program being devised at the governor's office, with Kızılay, police, fire brigades, health officials, and the Air League all assigned roles: police would secure the premises against pickpockets and burglaries, firefighters would take positions across Beyoğlu, Red Crescent nurses would be stationed for emergencies, and even provisions for childbirth during halted traffic were discussed.[644] In the following days, preparations extended visibly into the street. The 18 December piece announced that detailed control measures had been set: aircraft would patrol above the city, reporting on any uncovered lights, while whistles

[643] "Beyoğlundaki Denemelerden Sonra: Bütün Memlekete Şamil Muazzam Bir Gaz Hücumu Tecrübesi Yapılacak," *Cumhuriyet*, December 12, 1935.

[644] "Hava Hücumu – Yapılacak Tecrübenin Bir Programı Hazırlanıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1935.

positioned at Galata, Kasımpaşa, Taksim, and the Metro would give the alarm. The governor's deputy publicly declared that preparations were entirely complete and urged citizens to begin observing blackout rules even before the trial itself.[645]. Finally, on 19 December, the paper reported that gas masks had been distributed to Beyoğlu's firefighters, who had already begun training with them, while police and additional fire crews were placed on standby. Notices posted in the streets warned that non-compliance with masking orders would be punished with fines.[646] The weeks leading up to the December 1935 blackout were published almost like a civic script in serial form: commissions met, gas masks were distributed, whistles ordered, and citizens told where to stand and what to expect. These preparations framed the drill as a rehearsal of urban crisis, with institutions cast in specific roles and the public invited as both participants and spectators.



Figure 71. Fire brigade and blackout precautions against air threats (Süerdem, 1935)

In December 20, 1935, Istanbul witnessed its first large-scale air-raid rehearsal, staged across the Kasımpaşa–Şişli corridor. At the appointed hour, around 20:30, the whistles and sirens sounded; as the paper recorded: At the appointed hour, sirens installed at Metro Han and the Şişli tram depot wailed in short bursts, announcing to the public that the rehearsal had begun. Almost instantly, the Beyoğlu district transformed into a shadow play: electric lamps were shrouded, apartment lights extinguished, and shop displays went dark. "In a matter of moments," one report noted, "the neighborhood was covered in darkness," as pedestrians either rushed back to their homes or, just as often, strolled onto the sidewalks to watch the spectacle.

[645] "Hava Hücumu Tecrübesi – Hazırlıklar Tamamen Bitirildi," *Cumhuriyet*, December 18, 1935.

[646] "Hava Hücumu Için Yapılacak Tecrübe: Beyoğlu Itfaiyesine Gaz Maskesi Dağıtıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 1935.


Hava Denemesinde "TAN„ Objektifi

Figure 72. Air-defense drill photographed by Tan newspaper (*Tan*, December 21, 1935).



Taksim meydanını dolduran halk tayyarelerin uçuşuna seyrediyor

Figure 73. Crowds watching air-defense drills in Taksim Square (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935)

Two minutes later, the soundscape expanded as factory sirens from across the city and the horns of ships in the harbor joined the chorus, collectively signaling a moment of danger. According to the drill program, in nine locations presumed to have been bombed, requests for the fire brigade's assistance were made. A combined force from the Beyoğlu and Istanbul fire brigades immediately

set out to fulfill their assigned duties once the exercise began, and they conducted masked rescue drills in Kasımpaşa (two sites), Osmanbey, Taksim, Kurtuluş, Halıcıoğlu, and Firuzağa.[647]

Yet the public response inverted the authorities' script. Instead of scattering to shelters, people poured into the streets. *Cumhuriyet*'s reporter described how Taksim Square filled with spectators, the people watched the airplanes flying overhead.[648] Far from fearful, the mood was buoyant, people were cheerful and untroubled, almost sorry the entertainment ended early. Tan's photographic montage reinforced this atmosphere, showing masked firemen standing guard, a cinema façade being draped, and a dense crowd gazing upward as if at a festival[649]. The city's first blackout unfolded not as a scene of discipline, but as civic theater, a half-hour of urban sociability under the cover of darkness.

Other reporters captured a different emotional register, shifting from the collective square to the intimate household. Burhan Felek, in his column" When the lights went out", wrote of the sudden weight that descended: "*birdenbire üzerime bir ağırlık çöktü… sanki havasızlıktan boğuluyor gibiydim.*"[650] He realized the almost derogatory fact that that in the twentieth century, the people in the city will hide their very light and go down into the basements in order to run away from the danger and save their life. His account blends anxiety with resignation, evoking how domestic interiors felt smothered by the city's sudden withdrawal. The short columnist pushed this imagery further. Looking from the waterfront toward Beyoğlu, the writer witnessed that "This great city, in an instant, plunged into darkness like a mole fleeing a mountain rat."[651] Where the square was festive seeing it as a spectacle, the home was anxious with this new kind of claustrophobia and the downing of a future dark as the city was.

Eventually, officials declared the exercise a success. The captain and interior minister inspected the operation, and newspapers highlighted the efficiency of police and firefighters, some in gas masks, who had been stationed with ladders, hoses, and ambulances ready[652] This first excercise revealed a civic experiment unfolding on multiple fronts. Firefighters drilled with masks, Red Crescent nurses waited on standby, and households turned off their lights. At the same time, it tested how danger might be sensed in the city. In Taksim Square, the blackout reversed the intended logic of space: a square designed for assembly became, under the scenario of air attack, the least appropriate place to gather.

---

[647] "Beyoğlunda Hava Hücumuna Karşı Denemeler Yapıldı," *Tan*, December 21, 1935.

[648] S.D., "Beyoğlunda Dün Gecenin Intibaları," *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935.

[649] "Hava Denemesinde Tan Objektifi," *Tan*, December 21, 1935.

[650] Burhan Felek, "Işıklar Sönünce!," *Tan*, December 21, 1935.

[651] N., "Biz Bize – Işıkları Maskeleme Tecrübesi," *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935.

[652] "Beyoğlundaki Deneme Muvaffakiyetle Yapıldı," *Tan*, December 21, 1935.



Figure 74. Reports on the major air-defense exercise and inspections (*Cumhuriyet*, August 16, 1939).

Yet people chose it as a vantage point, turning a precautionary measure into a spectacle. In private interiors the mood was different, described as heavy, stifling, and claustrophobic. Journalists pointed to the unsettling fact that in the twentieth century, the modern city would be forced to hide its light and retreat to basements in order to survive. The December 1935 trial shows how rehearsal worked at once as bureaucratic drill and as collective experience. Even when treated lightly, the sudden darkness, the sound of whistles, and the sight of airplanes overhead impressed themselves on the body in ways written instructions never could. Four years before the war started Europe, the exercise in Istanbul was both premature and formative: premature because the full gravity of air raids had not yet been realized, formative because it introduced the city to the bodily sensation of emergency, to the reprogramming of its public spaces, and to the possibility that ordinary life could be suspended in an instant.

By August 1939, the rhythm of civil defense in Istanbul had shifted markedly from the theatricality of 1935. The imminence of war lent a gravity to the rehearsals, which were no longer civic curiosities but integrated components of military planning. [653] Newspapers described a program that mobilized not only municipal actors, fire brigades, police, Red Crescent nurses, it was also synchronized with military exercise with anti-aircraft batteries, searchlights, and uniformed army units.[654] The emphasis was on coordination across scales: firefighters rehearsed with gas masks, medical teams were placed in readiness, and civilians were assigned to designated shelters.

The structure of the exercise itself underscored this new seriousness. Conducted along the Galata–Şişli axis, the drill was followed within days by a second, almost identical rehearsal, in

[653] "Bütün Pasif Müdafaa Tedbirleri Ikmal Edildi – Bugün Tehlike Işareti Verilebilir," *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1939.

[654] "Hava Manevrası: Şehrimize Yapılacak Hava Hücumu Bugün Bekleniyor," *Cumhuriyet*, August 18, 1939.

which officials explicitly sought to correct deficiencies observed in the first. Reports stressed that this iteration was a sign of learning, that civil defense would only be effective if practiced repeatedly and refined in response to flaws.[655] In contrast to the one-off spectacle of 1935, 1939 established rehearsal as a continuous technique of governance.



Figure 75 Reports and advertisements following the air-defense exercises (Cumhuriyet, August 20, 1939).

Urban space was reshaped through this choreography. Squares and boulevards, once celebrated as stages of collective gathering, were redefined as potential targets and evacuation corridors. Residential neighborhoods were mapped onto a logic of concealment and dispersal: basements repurposed as shelters, gas drills performed in schoolyards and courtyards, and shopfronts blacked out under inspection.[656] At the same time, a visual archive of the exercises circulated through the press and later in film screenings, showing masked firefighters, searchlight beams sweeping the sky, and crowds observing the performance of discipline.[657] The drills thus oscillated between the didactic and the spectacular, reminding residents of vulnerability while also framing preparedness as a civic duty. This duality, at once technical rehearsal and public display, defined the 1939 exercises. They signaled that Istanbul was now folded into the wartime temporalities of Europe, even before formal entry into the conflict. The drill was no longer

[655] "Zehirli Gaza Karşı – Dün Şehrimizde Yapılan Ikinci Tecrübe de Tam Bir Muvaffakiyetle Sona Erdi," *Cumhuriyet*, August 24, 1939.

[656] "Pasif Müdafaa – Hava Taarruzundan Korunma Tecrübesi Muvaffakiyetle Yapıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1939.

[657] *Seferberlik Müdürlüğü – Pasif Korunma Filmi FERAH Sinemada Gösterilecek*, April 9, 1940.

premature or playful; it was institutionalized, iterative, and suffused with the material culture of modern warfare. In November 1940, blackout ceased to be an occasional rehearsal and became a binding routine. Beginning on the 21st, regulations mandated that all lights in Istanbul be extinguished or masked by nightfall, with work hours rescheduled so that banks, offices, and schools closed earlier. Tramways, buses, ferries, and automobiles were ordered to fit covered lamps or painted headlights, and patrols were dispatched to enforce compliance. [658]Newspapers carried notices that any uncovered light would be "severely punished," reflecting a sharper disciplinary tone than in earlier years. These measures extended beyond emergency drills to reshape daily urban life: traffic was curtailed, evening commerce reduced, and cinemas forced to dim their façades or end screenings before blackout.


Bu gece bütün Türkiyede ışıklar tam maskelenecek

Evlerden sokaklara hiç ziya sızmıyacak aksine hareket edenler ağır surette cezalandırılacaktır

Hitler Laval'i Berline çağırdı

Petain'in beyanatı

"Fransayı bu günkü uçuruma sürükliyenler birer canidir,,

Mareşal, Fransadaki yeni nizamın her şeye rağmen yaşatılacağını söylüyor

Kristof Kolomb'un Yumurtası

Garib akıbet

Fransanın Suriye Komiseri Chianne'

İstanbul tamamen karanlığa gömüldü

Dün gece bütün ışıklar maskelendiği için koca şehir gözlerden silinmişti

Figure 76. Nationwide blackout orders and full masking of city lights (*Cumhuriyet*, December 1–2, 1940)

Reports emphasized the calm obedience of citizens, presenting compliance as a civic duty, yet they also registered how uncanny the darkened metropolis appeared: "I*şıksız İstanbul daha heybetli bir şehir oldu*" Güngör remarked. In his column, he reported from the darkened streets, attentive to how ordinary routines strained under blackout rules. He described trams and buses masked with dimmed lamps colliding in the confusion, their passengers laughing or shouting to warn each other in the dark.[659] Shopkeepers kept doors half-open, some using small torches to guide customers, while street vendors lit their stalls with hand flashlights. Pedestrians hugged the walls, moving in clusters, their voices substituting for lost visibility as they called out warnings. Accidents and interruptions became part of the night's rhythm, yet Güngör also

[658] "Bu Gece Bütün Türkiyede Işıklar Tam Maskelenecek - Evlerden Sokaklara Hiç Ziya Sızmıyacak Akşamine Hareket Edenler Ağır Surette Cezalandırılacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, December 1, 1940.

[659] Salahaddin Güngör, "Şehrin Içinden: Işıksız İstanbul," *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1940.

remarked that Istanbul appeared unexpectedly majestic when veiled in darkness, as if the city's silhouette gained a new weight. His column reveals how people and everyday life resisted against blackout regulations; the city, perhaps experienced in a extraordinary way, it gave way to new strategies and tactics among its residents.



Figure 77. Warnings and decoy bombs (*Cumhuriyet*, January 30, 1941; *Belediyeler Dergisi*, no. 48, 1939).

Passive defense exercises and blackouts continued in cities and provinces in a steady way until the mid-1941[660], during those months one of the big inventions was the placement of decoy bombs in city squares as a way of communicating with the public that an exercise might happen soon. Following the German-Turkish Friendship Agreement, Other than occasional institutional drills until 1944, not much happened on this front. When Turkey's neutrality was hard getting harder to negotiate in the last year of the war, the announcements were a call back to these years.

Across manuals, aviation displays, and blackout rehearsals, the wartime body in Turkey was never imagined in isolation but through spatial regimes that tethered individuals to the urban fabric. The ideal body was defined juridically, specified in regulations that catalogued capacities and assigned every apartment block a warden. The aspirational body was staged in the skies, where aviation pedagogy, celebrity exemplars, and aerial vision promised exhilaration and national pride. The performative body appeared in drills and blackouts, where ordinary routines were suspended or inverted, and where citizens collectively rehearsed what it meant to live in the shadow of attack. It is how civil defense worked less through the provision of material shelters than through the continual production of embodied practice: calibrating breath and gesture, celebrating daring and spectacle, or improvising tactics in the darkened city.

The chronology also matters. In 1935, rehearsal remained playful, even festive, as Istanbul treated the blackout as civic theater. By 1939, with war imminent, drills became iterative, synchronized

[660] Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

with military maneuvers, and increasingly didactic. By late 1940, blackout regulations were binding, reorganizing daily life in Istanbul's streets, vehicles, and interiors. In this sequence, we can see how the wartime body was produced not once but repeatedly, shifting between law, spectacle, and practice. The effect was a dual pedagogy: citizens were imagined as resilient survivors and daring aspirants, as disciplined units of defense and as actors in a vertical theater of aviation.

The blackout rehearsals and air-raid drills rendered the city into a stage of extraordinary experience, where danger was rehearsed as civic spectacle and institutions paraded their roles. Yet this dimension of defense represented only a small fragment of wartime reality. For most, survival was not measured in whistles, sirens, or masked performances, but in the relentless hardships of daily life. As Murat Metinsoy shows, everyday life in Turkey during the Second World War was marked by *karaborsa* (black market trading), rationing, and chronic shortages of basic goods such as bread and coal.[661] Ration cards did not guarantee supply, and many families queued for hours only to return home empty-handed, while those with means turned to inflated black market prices. Coal, indispensable for heating and cooking, became a site of acute struggle, with urban households suffering bitterly cold winters and resorting to burning furniture or scavenging wood when official allocations fell short. Can Nacar's studies of workers emphasize how these shortages weighed most heavily on the laboring poor.[662] In state factories like Sümerbank, conditions were harsher still: employees remembered that "our lives were not as valuable as an animal", revealing how labor was conscripted under a regime that prioritized production over subsistence.

4.3. The Red Cresent and the Infrastructures of Civilian Protection

The establishment of The Red Cresent Gas Mask Factory in 1935 and the simultaneous expansion of its journal created an institutional platform where passive defense was not only practiced but also researched, standardized, and circulated. Within a few years, the Red Cresemt emerged as the primary civilian site in Turkey where chemical warfare was translated into problems of production, design, pedagogy, and publicity. The factory provided laboratories, workshops, and testing grounds that transformed gas masks and related equipment into industrial objects. The journal extended this work into print, cataloguing technical specifications, reporting on international developments, and embedding chemical protection into domestic and educational

[661] Murat Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye: savaş ve gündelik yaşam*, 1. basım, İnceleme ve araştırma (Homer Kitabevi) (Homer Kitabevi, 2007).

[662] Can Nacar, "Ekmegin Yoklugunu Bilirim, Kıtlığı Gördüm: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Kentsel Alanlarda Emekçiler," *Praksis* 16 (January 2006): 195–218; Can Nacar, "'Our Lives Were Not as Valuable as an Animal,'" *International Review of Social History* 54, no. S17 (2009): 143–66, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859009990277.

routines. Together they produced an infrastructure of preparedness that complemented state initiatives while operating with its own rhythms of experimentation and instruction.

This section traces how Red Cresent positioned itself as an alternative locus of research and development in passive defense. Beginning with the genealogy of gas masks in Turkey, it follows the establishment of the Mamak factory, the dissemination of masks and protective devices, and the elaboration of child hoods and cradles. It then examines the range of equipment and training materials developed in the late 1930s, the distinctive shelter designed under Nuri Refet Korur, and the dense editorial program of the Kızılay Mecmuası. Finally, it considers how gender politics intersected with these practices, revealing both the limits and the possibilities of female participation in the culture of civilian protection.

Bülent Bakar traces the gas mask back to the First World War, when Germany first released chlorine at Ypres in 1915. This, he explains, triggered a new race in chemical warfare: gas-filled shells followed, and respirators became standard military equipment. The Ottoman Empire, too, was drawn into this technological shift. Turkish troops on the Galicia front encountered poison gas directly, and Bakar notes a striking photograph published at the time: a soldier overcome by "suffocating gas," surrounded by doctors and comrades wearing masks. Ottoman authorities issued instructions on gas protection, acquired new masks from Germany, and distributed filters produced by the Hilal-i Ahmer Society (later Kızılay).[663]

Bakar shows that after 1918 the danger of chemical warfare only expanded. He recalls Spain's use of mustard gas against civilians in Morocco in the 1920s as proof that the threat had become a global civilian problem rather than a purely military one. By the late 1920s, he explains, international meetings such as the 1929 Frankfurt conference stressed the inadequacy of existing respirators and urged greater civilian protection. Turkish experts at the *Darülfünun* echoed these concerns, warning that future wars would inevitably involve poison gas. At first, Bakar notes, some doubted entire populations could ever be equipped and emphasized public education instead. But by the early 1930s this view shifted: universal distribution of gas masks came to be seen as the core of "passive protection," the key individual measure for surviving aerial attack.[664]

The history of gas masks in Turkey can be traced in the state archive, where documents chart both their circulation and the growing institutional concern with poison gas across the 1920s and early 1930s.[665] Already in 1921, records note deliveries of masks from Soviet Russia, suggesting

[663] Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[664] Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[665] Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA) holds a series of files tracing the early attention to gas masks and poisonous gases: "Rusya'dan Türkiye'ye sevkedilecek gaz maskeleri" (571/34669–136712–49, 20 August 1921; 571/34669–136712–54, 11 September 1921); "Harp zamanında denizaltıların ve zehirli gazların ne suretle kullanılacağına dair

an early recognition of their necessity in the aftermath of the First World War. The following year, Turkey followed international debates closely: a 1922 file records the agreement signed by the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the use of submarines and poison gas during war. Through the later 1920s, the issue shifted from procurement to infrastructure. A 1928 decree authorized contracts for the repair of masks and adjustment of their costs, while in 1929 Darülfünun petitioned for the creation of an institute to study poisonous gases. By 1930, the state was negotiating fees for a German expert to assist in developing a domestic gas and mask industry. Archival files from 1931 record the purchase of bunker filters and the arrival of sample masks from the Polish Sepewe factory, while in 1932 the government ordered 2,500 kilograms of granules for mask filters. This gradual build-up culminated in 1933 with a draft law banning the importation of poisonous gases and their equipment, insisting that such matters should be handled within the country.


Gaz maskesi fabrikamız törenle açıldı

Figure 78. Opening ceremony of the national gas mask factory (*Ulus*, November 1, 1935)

Following these developments, in August 1934, Cumhuriyet announced that the gas mask factory planned for Ankara was to be tendered, with final negotiations underway between Hilal-i Ahmer and representatives of German and Czechoslovak companies.[666] The report emphasized that the factory, expected to cost around 500,000 lira, would be able to produce every type of mask and aimed to secure all raw materials domestically. Military masks would be delivered directly to the Ministry of Defense, while civilian models were to be purchased by municipalities and other

Amerika, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya ve Japonya arasında akdolunan anlaşma" (534/37170–148362–1, 6 February 1922); "Gaz maskelerinin tamiri için gerekli malzemenin temini hususunda sözleşme yapılmasına izin verilmesi" (30-18-1-1/27–77–10, 30 January 1928) and "Gaz maskelerinin tamiri için gerekli malzeme kararnamesindeki ihale bedelinin düzeltilmesi" (30-18-1-1/29–46–4, 22 July 1928); "Zehirli gazların tetkiki için Darülfünun bünyesinde bir enstitünün acilen kurulması talebi" (30-10-0-0/45–292–19, 13 February 1929); "Gaz ve maske sanayinin temini maksadıyla Almanya'dan getirtilecek uzmana verilecek ücret" (30-18-1-2/14–62–8, 28 September 1930); "2 adet sığınak filtresi satınalınması" (30-18-1-2/21–43–15, 17 June 1931) and "Polonya bulunan Sepewe Fabrikası tarafından ülkemize numune olarak gönderilen gaz maskeleri" (566/38824–157375–37, 4 February 1931); "Gaz maskeleri için 2500 kg. granülün satın alınması" (30-18-1-2/28–31–18, 27 April 1932); and finally, "Zehirli gazlarla bunları kullanmaya mahsus masrafların sokulmasının ve memlekette yapılmasının yasaklanması hakkında kanun layihası" (30-18-1-2/40–80–6, 5 November 1933).

666 "Maske Fabrikası Ihale Ediliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, August 28, 1934.

institutions for storage and distribution. The newspaper stressed that the factory would soon become operational, underscoring both the urgency and national significance of this new site of passive defense.



Figure 79. Scenes from the opening of the Mamak Gas Mask Factory (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, no. 145, December, 1935)

The Red Cresent Gas Mask Factory started to operate with a ceremony on October 31, 1935. The report announcing that the first gas-mask factory had begun operations, İsmet İnönü framed masking as a civic duty rather than a military accessory. He called it "a public matter, a citizen's matter" and defined the mask itself as "a civil instrument, an instrument of life". The article reiterated capacity figures, 100,000 masks per year on a single shift, up to 300,000 with continuous operation, and underscored Kızılay's lead, with İnönü noting that "this work belongs with the Red Crescent… the steadiness in these affairs is Refik Saydam's achievement."[667] After the speeches, the guests toured the facility: first the raw materials depot and laboratory where each component was examined, then the halls of press machines, dyeing sections, and sewing workshops. In the sewing rooms, masks were tested on different head types before being finalized. The tour concluded at the dispensary and administrative offices, with Health Minister Refik Saydam providing detailed explanations.[668] İnönü himself inspected the very first mask produced by the factory, placing it on his face to test its seal.

The establishment of the gas mask factory was framed not only as a national achievement but also as the product of international expertise. After extensive preparations, the tender was awarded to the German Auer company, renowned for its experience with such technologies. Auer oversaw the construction, completed the facility within the designated inspection period, and formally handed it over to Kızılay in operational condition.[669]

[667] "Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Dün Çalışmağa Başladı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 1, 1935.

[668] "Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Törenle Açıldı," *Ulus*, November 1, 1935.

[669] "Mamakta Kurduğumuz Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Açıldı," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1935.




Figure 80. Illustrations for using the Kızılay gas mask (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası,* no. 147, April 1936).




Figure 81. Scenes from the Gas Mask Factory (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 1936).

The Kızılay Mecmuası devoted a special issue to the new gas mask factory, presenting the "Kızılay Halk Maskesi" as one of the most modern in the world.[670] The text described its four-layer construction, canvas, rubber, fabric, and another rubber lining, highlighting its extraordinary durability, able to withstand the weight of 100 kilograms without tearing. The lenses, made of unbreakable "Triplex" glass, were fitted with anti-fog plates and could only be replaced with a special key to prevent tampering. Detailed instructions explained how to put on the mask: pulling the straps over the head, securing the chin, and tightening the back strap, with illustrations showing proper use. The magazine also introduced the "maskometer," a measuring device used to determine which of the three available sizes (small, medium, large) fit a person's face. Citizens could purchase the device from Kızılay depots for 25 kuruş, ensuring that "everyone could find

[670] "Kızılay Maskesi," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 15, 1936.

the mask that suited their own face." Properly maintained, a mask would last five years, and its filters were said to allow survival under poisoned air for several hours.

Equally important was the presentation of the factory itself. Photographs showed laboratories, sewing workshops, and metal shops where women stitched mask bodies, men assembled filter canisters, and technicians tested every seam, screw, and lens. Each mask reportedly underwent 20–30 separate inspections before leaving the factory, with defective units immediately discarded. The pictorial sequence turned production into a spectacle of modern industry, emphasizing both discipline and national self-sufficiency.



Figure 82. Fire-extinguishing tests under gas masks (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 147, April 1936)

The *Kızılay Mecmuası* also reported on fire-fighting demonstrations that highlighted the civilian uses of the mask.[671] The article warned that modern wars would bring not only explosive bombs but also incendiary and gas bombs, which meant firefighters without masks would be forced to abandon their work under toxic smoke. Masks were therefore presented as essential equipment, useful not just in chemical warfare but also in the thick smoke of factory or depot fires. The *Kızılay* Mask Factory staged its own exercise: a controlled blaze was set near the facility, and the factory's fire brigade, fully masked, extinguished it swiftly and without exhaustion. This part is especially valuable, since the published photographs, showing masked men at work around the factory grounds, offer a rare visual record of the building itself.

In 1936, the gasmasks they were sold for 19.5 lira, but by 1938 Kızılay was offering them for 6 lira, with packaging and postal fees covered.[672] Civil servants and students were required to buy them, often in installments. Kızılay depots in Ankara and Istanbul became points of sale, and eventually masks were available in other cities as well. Newspapers framed them as indispensable, insisting that survival in an air raid would depend on wearing one correctly. Bülent

[671] "Maske Altında Yangın Söndürme Tecrübeleri," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 15, 1936.

[672] "Zehirli Gaz Maskeleri Satışa Çıkarıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1938.

Bakar points out to the criticism regarding the state for delays and called for monopoly control to prevent profiteering. Shortages of materials like blackout fabric drove up prices, and mask courses were often pitched at a level too technical for much of the public to follow. Regulations were tightened to compel attendance and ensure seriousness. Even so, by 1940, nearly 10,000 students in Istanbul had obtained their own masks.[673]



Zehirli gaz maskeleri satışa çıkarıldı

Maske satışından bir görünüş

Kızılay, halkı zehirli gazlerden korumak için yaptırdığı gaz maskelerini üç boy üzerine altışar liradan, ay başından itibaren İstanbul ve Ankarada satışa çıkarmıştır.

Gri bir lâstik, gözlük ve süzgeçten ibaret olan bu maskeler son maske tekâmülâtı gözönünde tutularak yapılmıştır. Bir kotu içinde mahfuz bulunan maskelere birer mufassal tarife ilâve edilmiştir.

Gaz maskesi satışı hararetle devam ediyor

Kızılayın elinde, milyonlarca insanı bir günde techiz edecek külliyetli stok var

Yazan: SALAHADDIN GÜNGÖR

Kızılay satış deposundaki maske satışından bir görünüş

Figure 83. Sale of poison gas masks to the public (*Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1938).

In December 1938, Salahaddin Güngör published a long article on the new gas masks produced by Kızılay, at once advertisement, instruction manual, and social reportage.[674] Writing from the sales depot, he spoke with the seller, observed the buyers, watched those who tried the masks on, and even tested one himself. The piece explained that "millions of masks" had already been stockpiled and were now offered to the public at six lira each, with the option of paying in installments. Special payment plans were even arranged for children, who could be equipped for as little as fifty kuruş per month. The article is a great window to see how the public encountered the mask. Sales staff reported that most of the interest came from older people and women, many of whom visited Kızılay depots in Ankara and Istanbul less to purchase than to look. They tried masks on before mirrors, laughed at their appearance, and compared themselves to exoticized photographs of Africans. The mask thus oscillated between a life-saving device and a curiosity, an object of ridicule as much as necessity. The article admitted that for poor families, especially those with many children, the cost remained heavy even at a subsidized price. Yet it also insisted that survival in the coming war would depend on acquiring one. What emerges from this reportage is the double life of the mask in 1938: a technical apparatus designed to safeguard respiration, and a cultural object that provoked laughter, hesitation, and parody. The newspaper both instructed

[673] Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*.

[674] Salahaddin Güngör, "Gaz Maskesi Satışı Hararetle Devam Ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 1938.

its readers in proper storage and use and documented the ironies of their first encounters with the technology of survival. The Kızılay Gas Mask Factory's civilian program did not stop at the adult mask. From the late 1930s, it moved deliberately down the ladder of age, extending protection to ever-younger citizens. First came the *çocuk maskesi*, a specially designed hood for children between one and four years old.[675] This was no ordinary downsized version of the adult mask but a thoughtful adaptation to the physiology and psychology of the child. It was made light, with wide cellon windows so vision would not be impaired, and fitted with a flexible air-supply system that prevented suffocation, overheating, or resistance to breathing. Parents could supply air with a hand-pumped balloon, ensuring that the child inhaled only filtered air. The hood allowed free head movement, hand use, and even play, normalizing its presence and minimizing distress. Its design reflected the conviction that even children could be trained, through repetition, to accept equipment that once seemed alien.



Figure 84. Kızılay child gas masks for protecting children (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 169, December 1939).

Yet the factory quickly recognized that infants under one year old, those who could not tolerate or physically manage even the hood, required an altogether different solution. Thus emerged the *gazdan korunma kundağı*, the protective cradle.[676] Crafted from gas-proof rubberized cloth, reinforced with a frame and fitted with a large transparent window, the cradle allowed babies to be sealed inside while remaining visible to mothers and caregivers. Air was pumped in through the same system of filters and balloons, circulated to prevent carbon dioxide buildup, and expelled through valves that guaranteed freshness. Ingeniously, the cradle included pockets for toys and even food, ensuring that the infant could be distracted or soothed. Tests conducted at the laboratory showed that while babies initially cried, they soon calmed and adjusted, just as older children had to the hood.

[675] İzzet Erksal, "Küçük Çocukların Gazdan Korunması: Kızılay Çocuk Maskesi," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1939.

[676] İzzet Erksal, "Bebeklerin Gazdan Korunması: Kızılay Gazdan Korunma Kundağı," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, February 15, 1940.

By the end of the 1930s, the Kızılay Gas Mask Factory had expanded its repertoire far beyond the masks. Reports detail a broad catalogue of protective devices and training aids that reveal the scale of its ambition. Alongside the adult public mask and the children's hood, the factory produced dust masks for industrial use, light enough to be worn in cement plants, tobacco workshops, or mines, where ordinary inhalation was already compromised by particulate hazards.[677] It also manufactured alkali cartridges to accompany oxygen breathing apparatuses, designed to filter carbon dioxide and moisture, a reminder that respiratory protection extended into medical and technical fields as well as civil defense.[678] For the frontline of chemical war, the laboratory designed 'iperit suits', rubberized jackets, trousers, and boots resistant to mustard gas, complete with storage hangers that underlined their systematic use.[679]



Figure 85. Kızılay protective cradle for infants from gas (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 170, February 1940).

In addition to these protective products, the Kızılay Society, which held a monopoly on gas protection materials, also acquired or produced various training and ancillary materials for gas warfare education.[680] Boxes of chemical samples circulated through Kızılay depots, containing

[677] "Kızılay Toz Maskesi," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, June 15, 1940.

[678] İzzet Erksal, "Kızılay Alkali Kartuşu," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, June 15, 1940.

[679] "Kızılay İperit Elbiseleri," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, August 15, 1940.

[680] Nuri Refet Korur, "Gaz Talim ve Terbiye Malzemesi, Ne Işe Yaradıkları, Ne Suretle Kullandıkları," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, August 15, 1940.

irritant gases, odor bags, and impregnated papers that allowed citizens to smell and recognize toxic substances. Instructors used fake iperit liquid, gas matches, and cartridges to familiarize participants with the sensory reality of poison. Smoke bombs and incendiary devices, some imported, some locally assembled, provided dramatic demonstrations for courses and exercises. In this way, the factory's laboratories staged chemical warfare as a knowable environment: lethal substances were domesticated into teaching aids, something to be handled, demonstrated, and rehearsed. Civil defense was articulated through a technical repertoire of protection, spanning the infant's cradle, the worker's dust mask, and the instructor's box of chemical samples.




Figure 86. Kızılay shelter design and construction details *(Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası* 173, August 1940).



Figure 87. Winkel-type shelter and resistance tests (*Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, 165, April 1939).

Kızılay's engagement with passive defense research and development culminated in the design of a distinctive shelter in Ankara. Dr. Nuri Refet Korur presented what came to be known as the Kızılay Shelter, a Turkish adaptation of the recently standardized Winkel system in Europe. [681] The shelter was formally endorsed by the national commission for passive defense. Its emergence

[681] Nuri Refet Korur, "Kızılay Sığınağı," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, August 15, 1940.

coincided with the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in September 1939, when Kızılay resolved to construct a protective refuge for its own staff. Under the direction of board member Hüsameddin Kural, alternative prototypes were reviewed: underground dugouts, above-ground bunkers, hybrid steel-and-concrete structures. Korur ultimately identified the conical geometry of Winkel as the most promising solution, and architect Fuad Saylam translated these principles into a new plan. The resulting Kızılay Shelter stood as both technical adaptation and architectural invention, a structure that condensed international models, local expertise, and institutional authority into a singular form, and one of a kind in Turkey.



Pasif korunma tecrübesi hazırlıkları

Ankara'nın hava hücumlarına karşı pasif korunma tecrübesinin çok yaklaştığı anlaşılmaktadır. Hücum tayyarelerinin atmaları melhuz olan bombalar hakkında halka bir fikir vermiş olmak için bu sabahtın itibren Ankranın muhtelif yerlerinde içi boş bombalar teşhir edilecektir.

Kızılayın arkasındaki bahçe içersinde diğerlerine örnek olmak üzere bir sığınak yaptırılmaktadır. Yukarıdaki resimde bu sığınağın inşaatını görüyorsunuz.

Diğer taraftan alâkalı makamlar çocuklar için maske temini teşebbüslerine girişmişlerdir. Memleketimizde küçük çocuklar için kâfi miktarda maske bulunmadığı ve hariçten temini çarelerine başvurulduğu haber verilmekle beraber bu teşebbüsten henüz bir netice alınmış değildir.

Figure 88. Kızılay Sheler in Construction (*Ulus*, September 16, 1939)

The article described the shelter in the precise register of engineering. Economy was emphasized as a decisive quality, since the structure was meant to be replicated widely. [682]Built of half-meter thick concrete, it was calculated to resist bombs of 50 to 100 kilograms, while its conical form dispersed the impact of even 300 kilogram bombs, reducing destructive force by two-thirds. The geometry also allowed a compact footprint to accommodate a large number of people. Unlike traditional dugouts, the Kızılay Shelter was positioned above ground, a choice that reduced the psychological strain of descending into darkness and eliminated the danger of entombment under debris. The conical profile further deflected near-misses, adding to its structural resilience. The interior was equipped with an air intake and filtration system, lavatories, a first-aid station, seating, water supply, and electric lighting. Outside air was filtered before circulation, assuring safety against gas. Korur even remarked on its aesthetic suitability, noting that the prototype did not disturb the appearance of the Kızılay garden where it had been erected. By the time of

[682] Korur, "Kızılay Sığınağı."

publication the shelter had been in use for nine months without incident. Korur acknowledged limitations, such as the heat that built up during summer when windows were fully sealed, but he anticipated that the filtration system would mitigate this problem. He also recommended improvements: replacing the prototype's ordinary glass with Triplex shatter-resistant panes and reinforcing its doors, already layered with double steel and sand, to provide greater assurance against chemical attack.

The article also provided costing. A technical table listed excavation needs at 38,000 cubic meters, priced at 1.20 TL per unit and totaling 45.60 TL for that portion of the work. Soil would be transported, leveled, and refilled as required by municipal regulations. The shelter was presented not only as a design but as a replicable model: inexpensive, structurally resilient, and already tested under everyday conditions. It appeared as another strand in Kızılay's broader program of passive defense, standing alongside the gas mask factory and public training courses, and extending protection from the individual body to the institutional collective. What stands out in this account is the double register through which the shelter was framed. Technical specifications, concrete thickness, bomb calibers, filtration systems, were interwoven with psychological and symbolic claims. Emphasis on its above-ground form, for instance, underscored that entry required no descent into darkness and carried no risk of entombment under debris. The conical shelter was described as a protector of spirits as much as of bodies, sparing citizens the humiliation of crouching in subterranean spaces. In this narrative, science and design appear as instruments capable of taming catastrophe and transforming lethal force into survivable risk.

Alongside the establishment of the factory, the *Kızılay Mecmuası* functioned as an essential organ for disseminating knowledge and cultivating a culture of preparedness around chemical warfare. Throughout the late 1930s, the journal of Kızılay devoted an extraordinary amount of space to the subject of poisonous gases, so much so that it regularly published annual indexes listing all articles and responses on the matter. For 1938 alone, this index spanned four dense pages, a measure of how frequently and insistently the topic was treated.[683] Passive defense became a sustained field of expertise within the Factory's professional circles.

Across issues, the journal published technical studies on mask construction, decontamination methods, iperit suits, and alkali cartridges; reports from foreign manuals and international conflicts; and practical instructions for households, schools, and factories. Articles ranged from highly technical analyses of filter materials and detector devices to everyday advice on how to prepare a cellar as a shelter or clean foodstuffs contaminated by gas.

[683] "Bir Sene Içinde Mecmuamızda Çıkan Zehirli Gazlara Ait Yazıların Indeksi," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, February 15, 1939.

Much of this corpus was authored or translated by Nuri Refet Korur and İzzet Erksal, who were directly engaged in the work of the mask factory. Korur, frequently cited as director, and Erksal, head of the laboratory, also published specialized booklets and textbooks, embedding chemical defense within the wider repertoire of public instruction. Their writings moved fluidly between detailed specifications, translated foreign standards, and responses to reader questions, producing a register that fused scientific authority with pedagogy. In this way the *Kızılay Mecmuası* extended the work of the Mamak factory into print, consolidating passive defense as a recognized domain of expertise and situating chemical protection within both institutional practice and everyday life. This editorial program sustained its momentum through the late 1930s and into the early years of the war, but it did not continue indefinitely. In October 1941 the journal was rebranded, its format shifting toward a more popular magazine. The detailed technical analyses, specifications, and professional debate gave way to a broader, more accessible repertoire of content.



Figure 89. Women illustrated for passive defense (*Ev-İş*, November 1939; Refet, 1939; *Akbaba*)

Finding a coherent place for women within the culture of passive defense proved difficult. The gendered politics of passive defense appear most vividly in the visual and textual record of gas masks. In the popular press and especially in caricature, the mask became a prop for entrenched misogyny. Women were drawn as refusing to wear masks for fear of looking unattractive, mocked as grotesque when they did wear them, or portrayed as requiring no mask at all because their appearance was already likened to one. The satirists of *Akbaba* seized every new device as an opportunity to renew old insults. In the more serious illustrations that circulated in newspapers, women were rarely depicted as agents of protection; they appeared instead as figures of panic, being carried away or collapsing under attack. Instructional booklets reinforced this marginalization, with very few images of women actually wearing masks.

The Kızılay Mecmuası occupied a different, if limited, position within this spectrum. Its pages did not challenge prevailing assumptions that cast women as caregivers, nurses, or patriotic mothers,

but it did present those roles as essential to family survival and national resilience. Articles emphasized that mothers should accustom children to protective equipment, reported on female participation in Kızılay's own institutions and factories, and regularly published stories of women's wartime service abroad, from nursing to industrial work.[684] Female professionals such as Dr. Fatma Memik Benal appeared as institutional figures, while international exemplars like Marie Curie and Florence Nightingale were invoked to align Turkish women with a global lineage of scientific and humanitarian authority.[685] These portrayals offered a more affirming, though still constrained, repertoire of female participation. Rather than objects of ridicule, women were depicted as disciplined, compassionate, and central to household and institutional preparedness. Within the gendered landscape of passive defense, this placed the journal not at the vanguard of change but at the less hostile end of representation, shaping an image of women as indispensable within carefully bounded domains.

4.4. Coda: Sleeping With Fear

The anticipation of air war redefined protection at its smallest and most volatile scale. Where territory was secured through borders and the city through infrastructures, the body became a frontier of governance. Poison gas and aerial threat rendered the atmosphere itself a battlefield, turning breath into a matter of regulation. Laws, manuals, drills, and spectacles organized citizens into postures of vigilance, composure, and obedience, transforming ordinary gestures into acts of defense. Factories, shelters, and classrooms extended this logic into production and pedagogy, binding research, discipline, and care into the same apparatus. Even sleep, the most private rhythm of life, was drawn into this regime, measured against the siren that could at any moment demand alertness and evacuation. To sleep under the threat of the raid was to inhabit anticipation as a condition of being.

What emerges from these trajectories is a body redefined as a frontier of governance. The scale of protection was atmospheric and corporeal, not only material but affective. Survival was provisional, enacted through masks, cradles, routines, and drills that were often unfinished, improvised, or ridiculed but nonetheless carried weight. It was pedagogical, performed through courses, parades, and blackouts that trained citizens to embody composure, vigilance, and obedience. It was affective, mobilizing fear, ridicule, compassion, and duty as elements of preparedness. It was communicative, translating vulnerability into a constant flow of instructions, manuals, posters, and drills that standardized gestures of protection across the

[684] Fuat Kerman, "Kadınlarımız Nasıl Çalışıyor?," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, March 15, 1941.

[685] Muhterem Gökmen, "Madam Curie ve Radiumun Beşeriyete Hizmeti," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1938; Saim Umar, "Florans Nightingale," *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1938.

population. And it was mobilizing, compelling men, women, and even children into circuits of training, production, and discipline that reshaped daily life as rehearsal.

These qualities, performative, affective, communicative, mobilizing, provisional, form the principles that the Body contributes to the architectures of anticipation. Anticipation did not reside solely in defensive infrastructures but in the orchestration of emotion, gesture, and pedagogy. The wartime body reveals how architectures of anticipation operated at their most intimate register, where the management of possible futures was inscribed into breath, posture, and the rhythms of sleep itself.

The body chapter has been about constructing the answer to a single question: what happens in the moment when you wake to a siren and must leave your bed? Manuals and laws prescribed gestures of composure; masks and shelters promised technical survival; drills rehearsed movement; satire and caricature ridiculed bodily appearances; Kızılay texts sought to inscribe duty, compassion, and discipline. All these registers converged on the same premise: that the body was both the most fragile and the most governable scale of wartime preparation. Unlike the national frontier or the fortified city, the body was secured through devices and routines. Gas masks, helmets, cradles, and manuals turned flesh into a defended surface, translating the abstractions of war into portable architectures.

Among the many images used to describe life under threat, Refik Halid's choice of the bed captured this intimacy most powerfully. [686] Writing of civilians torn from their quilts and mattresses by the shriek of sirens, he suggested that civilization itself might be measured by the comfort of sleeping without fear. His insight encapsulates the condition this chapter has traced: anticipation inscribed onto the body, regulating its gestures and even its rest, transforming the act of falling asleep into a quiet rehearsal for survival.

[686] Refik Halid, "Yatak ve Harp," *Tan*, September 29, 1940.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION

5.1. Anticipation and Its Frontiers

This dissertation has asked a simple but demanding question: what happens to governance, planning, and architecture when futures saturated with threat enter the present? Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War offered an acute vantage point. Never drawn into battle yet constantly exposed to its possibility, the country inhabited a fluctuating state of organized anticipation, at once strategic and improvised, disciplined and reactive. The prospect of war became a rationale for reform, a justification for delay, and at times a source of resignation in the face of scarcity and fatigue. Anticipation did not always lead to preparation; it produced uneven forms of action and inaction that reshaped how survival was imagined and managed. The argument unfolds through a scalar methodology, tracing how these shifting conditions materialized across the nation's borders, the fabric of the city, and the intimate registers of daily life, each revealing distinct versions of the architectures of anticipation shaped by different actors, concerns, and spatial practices.

At the territorial scale, anticipation operated as a political technology that reshaped sovereignty under the pressures of neutrality. Fortification lines along the western borders, defense corridors in Thrace, and watchpoints along the coast rendered the frontier a living diagram of possible invasion. Treaties, inspections, and foreign missions inscribed this terrain with the priorities and calendars of others, translating diplomacy into geography. Maps, surveys, and decrees converted vast landscapes into governable fields where risk was distributed, resources allocated, and labor mobilized. The same infrastructures that promised defense exposed the country to foreign influence, logistical dependency, and economic strain. Anticipation materialized in this unstable balance between autonomy and accommodation, between the projection of control and the experience of vulnerability.

The city expressed these dynamics through its own grammar of emergency as it became a target under the air warfare. While the professional circles of urbanism discussed the principles of air raid-resistant cities, in Istanbul, planning ideals met the contingencies of possible air raids, turning the modern capital of commerce and culture into a laboratory of survival. Directives on zoning, hygiene, and demolition were reinterpreted through the logic of defense. Shelters,

trenches, and blackout rules merged with plans for boulevards and housing clearances, binding security to visions of urban reform. Municipalities improvised works with limited means, while architects, engineers, and chemists translated state orders into scattered acts of compliance. Decrees, manuals, and inventories circulated across ministries, extending the city's administrative reach even as resources thinned. Vulnerability became a new civic measure: to govern the wartime city was to choreograph exposure, to regulate how danger could be seen, avoided, or endured.

At the bodily scale, anticipation entered the routines and gestures of everyday life. Survival became a pedagogical project that demanded discipline, obedience, and imagination. Gas masks, drills, and public demonstrations trained citizens to perform preparedness as civic duty. Kızılay coordinated these efforts through research, production, and instruction, establishing laboratories that tested filters and measured breathing resistance, and publishing guidance on household defense. Aviation culture exalted alertness and pride, but fatigue, ridicule, and indifference also shaped the public mood. Between collective drills and private resignation, anticipation blurred into acceptance and parody, as protection became both a moral obligation and a spectacle of futility. These small acts and devices, often improvised, fragile, and temporary, nonetheless carried political and emotional weight, binding the scale of the body to the wider architectures of anticipation.

What emerges across these scales is a recursive process through which anticipation reorganized environments before catastrophe arrived. Each frontier, territorial, urban, and bodily, functioned as a zone where threat animated knowledge, design, and authority. The threat did not just provoke defense; it energized the production of expertise, institutions, and spaces that sought to manage uncertainty. These operations often advanced outward, projecting power through fortifications, treaties, and surveillance, at other times turned inward, withdrawing into domestic, civic, or emotional fortresses. Through this wavering between expansion and containment, anticipation generated new forms of governance and material practice. It redefined how structures functioned, how authority was distributed, and how futures were folded into the present. From this dynamic field of frontiers emerges the conceptual frame of the architectures of anticipation.

From this field of frontiers, the discussion turns toward anticipation itself, its temporal, affective, and spatial dimensions. Across disciplines, anticipation has been described as emotion, cognition, technology, and ethic, a structure that links the perception of threat to the organization of life. Psychology reads it as a basic orientation toward what is to come; philosophy and phenomenology treat it as a mode of consciousness; social theory and governance studies trace how it becomes institutionalized as risk management and preemption; and affect theory exposes its moral weight as hope, dread, and responsibility. These perspectives outline a modern

condition in which the future is no longer distant but continuously designed, administered, and felt.

Across psychology, phenomenology, and affect theory, anticipation has been examined as a structure that links emotion, perception, and action, shaping how individuals and societies orient themselves toward the future. It is recognized in psychology as a primary emotion, bound to curiosity and the search for resources but also as the root of anxiety when joined with fear.[687] Philosophers and phenomenologists describe it as an immediate structure of consciousness, present in perception and imagination alike, unfolding through bodily states, mental images, and cultural habits.[688] This dual register, affective and cognitive, makes anticipation both visceral and social, always entangled with the environments where people live. Urban historians and affect theorists remind us that anticipation takes shape in material forms. Emotions not only course through bodies but also guide how spaces are built, altered, and inhabited.[689] Infrastructures of defense or security render projected threats tangible, inscribing possible futures into the very fabric of the city.[690] To speak of anticipation, then, is to speak of an orientation that moves between inner states and outward worlds, making futures experientially and materially present. Seen from this perspective, anticipation appears as both a universal human capacity and a historically mutable condition, one that modernity radically redefined by turning the future into a field for calculation and control. In this shift from emotion to history, anticipation moves from an inner disposition to a collective temporal order, where the management of the future becomes a defining feature of modern life.

Modernity transformed the horizon of time by stripping the future of inherited meanings and fixing it as an open domain to be occupied. Adam and Groves describe how this emptied-out future became available for planning, calculation, and colonization, no longer guaranteed by gods or tradition but made by humans for humans.[691] This shift tied progress to the constant demand for invention: the future must always be remade, filled with rational plans and human projects. Yet the effort to manage this openness produced its own paradox, as new technologies and institutions multiplied unintended consequences and heightened uncertainty.[692] Ulrich Beck's

---

[687] Warren D. TenHouten, *A General Theory of Emotions and Social Life*, Routledge Advances in Sociology (Routledge, 2009), 227; TenHouten, *A General Theory of Emotions and Social Life*, 435.

[688] Christopher Stephan and Devin Flaherty, "A Phenomenology of Anticipation: Experience, Culture, Social Distribution, and Collectivity," in *A Time of Disastrous Anticipations* (Routledge, 2025), 333–41.

[689] Katie Barclay and Jade Riddle, eds., *Urban Emotions and the Making of the City*, 1st edition (Routledge, 2021), 239.

[690] Derek Gregory and Allan Pred, eds., *Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence* (Taylor and Francis, 2013), 92–94, http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=112632.

[691] Barbara Adam and Chris Groves, *Future Matters: Action, Knowledge, Ethics* (Brill, 2007), 5–13, https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004161771.i-218.

[692] Adam and Groves, *Future Matters*, 17.

account of the risk society captures the same dynamic, where modernization creates risks that demand ever more anticipation and control. [693] In this sense, the modern future is both a promise and a liability, an obligation that ties societies to constant acts of foresight. As the future turned uncertain, anticipation became not only a cultural sensibility but a mode of governance.

When the future becomes uncertain, governing turns toward managing that uncertainty. Anticipation in this sense is not a background orientation but a deliberate technique. Adam and Groves describe how modern societies create "specialists in producing futures to blueprints," making the future into a social domain that can be administered.[694] Governance organizes that work through bureaucracies, expert systems, and discourses of preparedness. Conceptual distinctions clarify these techniques. Risk translates uncertainty into calculable probabilities, a "social technology for grappling with the specter of an uncertain future."[695] Stockdale in his brilliant book *Taming an Uncertain Future* shows *precaution* allows decisions in contexts of extreme uncertainty and potential irreversible damage, making anticipatory action ethically legitimate. *Preemption* anchors itself directly in uncertainty, acting even before a determinate threat is identified. It produces futures by foreclosing catastrophic ones, relying on imagination as much as evidence. Systems theory extends this logic, in different field, Rosen and Nadin describe anticipatory systems as those whose present states depend on possible futures as much as past trajectories.[696]. Political organizations, from planning offices to foresight institutes, mobilize such logics to manage development under conditions of uncertainty. This rationalization of futures converges with what Foucault described as biopolitics: power exercised through the management of life. Anticipatory governance makes futures present not only through knowledge but also through affects and materialities, extending surveillance and control into the temporal horizon itself.[697] Such governance transforms anticipation from an interpretive framework into an operational system, one that governs through the affective charge of danger and responsibility.

Once the future is understood as open and subject to human action, responsibility becomes inescapable. Adam and Groves argue that what was once the privileged domain of prophecy or

---

[693] *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Reprinted, with Ulrich Beck and Mark Ritter, Theory, Culture & Society (SAGE, 2013), 19–24; Klaus Rasborg, *Ulrich Beck: Theorising World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism*, 1st ed. (Springer International Publishing, 2021).

[694] Adam and Groves, *Future Matters*, 42.

[695] Liam P. D. Stockdale, *Taming an Uncertain Future: Temporality, Sovereignty, and the Politics of Anticipatory Governance*, Future Perfect (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), 178, https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1130802.

[696] Mihai Nadin, ed., *Anticipation Across Disciplines*, Cognitive Systems Monographs (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 29:253, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22599-9.

[697] Mikael Linnell, "Governing (through) Anticipation, Architecture, Affect," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 38, no. 3 (2021): 354–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2021.1927321.

fate is now a public duty: the future must be handled, sustained, and cared for.[698] This ethical demand sits uneasily with the emotional weight of anticipation. Fear, dread, and anxiety shape everyday orientations to uncertain futures. Saint-Amour describes the "anticipatory syndrome" as a psychic wounding, a pre-traumatic condition where violence anticipated is violence already felt.[699] Goldberg identifies dread as distinct from fear or anxiety, a condition of waiting without clear object or resolution. These affective states compress political time, demanding immediate action on uncertain grounds. Stockdale shows how decisions are increasingly made through "affective facts," gut feelings that replace deliberation with urgency. Hope also works within this terrain. Ahmed suggests that hope expands the body toward possibility, even as fear constricts it[700]. Hope is fragile but necessary, sustaining action where knowledge is limited and outcomes unclear. In this sense, anticipation always carries an ethical and emotional double edge: it presses for responsibility while moving through registers of dread and desire. To speak of anticipation, then, is to speak of an orientation that moves between inner states and outward worlds, making futures experientially and materially present.

The conceptual terrain traced above reveals how anticipation governs through emotion, knowledge, and power, yet its spatial consequences remain only loosely understood. Rising from these discussions, the focus now turns to architecture, not as style or profession, but as the medium through which anticipation becomes operative. Anticipatory thought materializes through spatial instruments: infrastructures, routines, and forms that translate uncertainty into regulation and habit. Across the territorial, urban, and bodily scales, these instruments rendered possible futures tangible and governable. Survey maps and neutrality treaties, blackout decrees and gas-mask drills all belong to this dispersed architectural field. Examined together, they outline a distinctive spatial logic that this study defines as the architectures of anticipation.

5.2. The Operations of Anticipation

These conceptual layers come into sharpest relief in the wartime urban environment. Anticipation, in the sense that matters here, is a structured relation to a singular kind of future: destructive, threatening, and beyond immediate control. This is the horizon of air raids, bombardments, and collapse. The possibility of ruin organizes action before any attack has taken place. Anticipation works on the not-yet, but it does not imagine freely. It imagines under duress, against catastrophe. The fact that this destructive horizon is manmade does not make it more negotiable. Aerial warfare arrives like a natural disaster that one cannot prevent at the source.

---

[698] Adam and Groves, *Future Matters*, 9–22.

[699] Paul K. Saint-Amour, "On the Partiality of Total War," *Critical Inquiry* 40, no. 2 (2014): 420–49, https://doi.org/10.1086/674121.

[700] Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Second edition (Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

Confronted with this inevitability, anticipation produces practices of hiding, sheltering, disguising, and protecting. This dynamic produces a fundamental asymmetry. Individuals may embrace fatalism, submitting to destiny rather than preparing. Institutions, however, cannot. Their very legitimacy depends on action in advance—on preparing, organizing, and assuring protection even when no attack has yet occurred. The distinction between individual fatalism and institutional duty is essential: one can refuse defense for oneself, but responsibility for a city, a port, a frontier, or a population cannot be set aside.

Yet the kind of anticipation at stake here differs from the one usually celebrated in architecture and planning. In those fields, anticipation is cast as an optimistic projection—the ability to prefigure and control the future through design. What this study traces is the opposite: an anticipatory regime born of threat, not progress. It detects problems rather than promises, and acts within conditions of uncertainty rather than mastery. Its operations are reactive, defensive, and often contradictory. Architecture and planning, as inherently anticipatory professions, imagine that their tools can contain the future, that form will resolve crisis. Wartime anticipation exposed the limits of that belief. It turned architecture into an instrument of endurance rather than invention, revealing how spatial practice can be mobilized to mitigate harm rather than to project progress.

Anticipation always begins by assigning space to danger. A bomb might fall here, a ship might appear there, a city may be blacked out from above. By spatializing the threat, anticipation creates the conditions for its counter-action. Threat recognition is also territorial claim: the site that might be invaded, destroyed, or taken must be fortified, standardized, and made governable. Once space is identified as vulnerable, it must be secured through architecture in the widest sense: walls, trenches, shelters, plans, and protocols. This is territory in the making, not as a static map but as a dynamic field of threat and countermeasure. To make such futures governable requires standardization. The unknown must be measured, compared, and classified until it can be acted upon. Manuals, directives, and laws crystallize this process, producing standards of space, behavior, and even mood. In these forms, anticipation is made communicable. Citizens can be taught how to walk in a blackout, where to gather during a drill, how to mask fear with composure.

From these histories emerge a set of recurring operations through which anticipation took spatial form. They reveal how threat became a problem of design and how governance worked through architecture. The following five operations, spatialization, activation, standardization, intervention, and provisionality, draw from the lexicon developed across the dissertation: territorialization, mobilization, organization, communication, instrumentality, epistemic practice, and performativity. Together they outline how anticipation was built, taught, and lived.

Spatialization: Anticipation begins by giving threat a location. It operates through territorial and epistemic acts that bind uncertainty to ground and translate imagined danger into a governable field. Lines of defense, air routes, and evacuation corridors turned anxiety into geography. In Thrace, the Çakmak Line defined corridors of labor and surveillance; along the Straits, Montreux sovereignty codified passage into a legal topography of control. In Istanbul, zoning separations, setback rules, and shelter grids redrew the city through gradients of risk and safety. Even domestic interiors were redefined: gas-proof rooms and cellar shelters created boundaries between air that could be breathed and air that could not. Through these operations, anticipation produced geography as a mode of governance, transforming territory, city, and dwelling into instruments of foresight.

Activation: Anticipation reorganizes time by moving institutions, materials, and people before any event has taken place. It converts uncertainty into activity, turning possibility into a schedule of duties and rehearsals. Ministries, municipalities, and committees coordinated inspections, resource transfers, and drills in the name of readiness. Construction brigades, neighborhood wardens, and volunteer corps operated as extensions of civil defense, enacting mobilization across daily life. The same momentum reached the household, where courses, parades, and blackout routines disciplined movement and gesture. These mobilizing and organizational operations made anticipation kinetic. They set governance in motion, translating the not-yet into the continuous labor of preparation.

Standardization: Anticipation depends on making danger legible. It operates through communicative and epistemic systems that codify uncertainty into rules, diagrams, and lessons. Manuals, decrees, and technical surveys transformed threat into measurable categories of space and behavior. Posters, radio broadcasts, and illustrated guides translated expertise into public language, teaching citizens how to act, where to shelter, and when to remain still. Schools and workplaces became laboratories of preparedness, where instruction and obedience converged. These pedagogical infrastructures produced anticipation as a shared discipline. Knowledge and conduct were standardized so that fear could be managed and the future could be administered through routine.

Intervention: Anticipation authorizes transformation. It gives institutions the mandate to alter environments under the promise of protection. In the name of defense, villages were relocated, ports fortified, and new airfields imposed on agricultural land. In cities, demolition and clearance advanced under civil-defense decrees, replacing wooden houses with concrete grids and widening boulevards as imagined firebreaks. Everyday objects and domestic routines were reclassified as protective infrastructure: sandbuckets, blankets, and basements folded into the logic of survival. These instrumental operations extended authority across territory and home

alike. Through them, anticipation became a political tool that reorganized space, justified intervention, and naturalized control.

Provisionality: Anticipation builds under conditions it cannot master. Its infrastructures remain partial, improvised, and temporary, sustained by repetition rather than completion. Trenches were re-dug as terrain shifted; shelters multiplied in unfinished forms; gas masks were tested, revised, and distributed in uneven cycles. Preparedness persisted through substitution and repair, not stability. These provisional and performative operations depended on affect as much as material: drills, parades, and rehearsals sustained vigilance, transforming fear and fatigue into civic habit. Anticipation governed through incompleteness, holding uncertainty at bay through constant maintenance and display.

rchitecture, in this sense, is not confined to buildings. It operates through laws, surveys, shelters, manuals, posters, and bureaucratic procedures that reorganized environments under the sign of future danger. Governance itself takes architectural form: it is spatialized, materialized, and embodied. The construction of trenches and shelters mattered, but so did the codification of blackout rules, the circulation of technical diagrams, and the orchestration of drills. Anticipation became architectural because it inscribed future-oriented governance into material infrastructures and social routines, arranging relations between people, institutions, and environments through spatial design.

Viewed through this lens, architectures of anticipation operate as a historical category that reveals how wartime Turkey transformed the practice of planning under the pressure of uncertainty. What once seemed a collection of emergency measures—surveys, regulations, drills, and evacuations—emerges as a structured mode of governance. Neutrality did not suspend modernization; it redirected it. The period from 1935 to 1945 appears not as an interval of waiting but as one of reorganization, when planning and design adapted to the possibility of destruction and turned expectation itself into an administrative task. This perspective provincializes dominant narratives of wartime urbanism focused on ruin and reconstruction, showing that anticipation was equally generative in shaping modern space.

At the same time, the framework of architectures of anticipation functions as an analytical tool for understanding how design and governance continue to operate through imagined threats. Its logics—spatialization, activation, standardization, intervention, and provisionality—recur in contemporary practices of disaster management, civil defense, and environmental adaptation. They reveal a persistent impulse to govern the uncertain through design, translating risk into material and procedural order. In this sense, architectures of anticipation describe both a

historical formation and an ongoing condition: the continual reorganization of space around the management of what cannot yet be known.

5.3. Reframing History through Anticipation

Anticipation reveals how neutrality became a mode of governance rather than a pause in modernization. Between 1935 and 1945, Turkey's institutions, experts, and citizens reprogrammed territories, cities, and bodies in response to a war that never arrived. The expectation of conflict shaped how futures were visualized, legislated, and materialized, making unrealized events as formative as those that occurred. This reframing broadens architectural history beyond the design of buildings to include commissions, surveys, drills, directives, and emotions as instruments of spatial practice. Trenches and blackout decrees stand beside boulevards and master plans; manuals and caricatures join monuments as records of urbanism. Neutrality, seen through this lens, generated its own architectures—structures of preparation that governed through imagined danger.

This account draws on a wide and neglected archive: military and state records, municipal files, Arkitekt and Kızılay journals, newspapers, caricatures, technical manuals, and speeches. These sources trace how anticipation was debated and enacted across scales, from the fortification of frontiers to the organization of neighborhoods and the routines of households. They show how wartime infrastructures—shelters, lines, regulations—persisted into the postwar decades, shaping later demolitions, road-widenings, and reconstruction schemes. What appeared as discontinuity emerges instead as the endurance of emergency governance.

The method links these materials through a scalar framework that follows anticipation across territory, city, and body without collapsing their differences. Each scale anchors micro-cases—the Çakmak Line, Istanbul's blackout grids, Kızılay's gas-mask trials—showing how governance circulated between the administrative, the infrastructural, and the intimate. Reading across these registers turns directives, diagrams, and visual culture into evidence of design, revealing that anticipation operated at once as discourse, material practice, and emotional regime. This approach offers a model for writing architectural history through the pressures of the future rather than the products of the past.

Architectures of anticipation describe a recurring mode of spatial organization under conditions of uncertainty. Wherever governance confronts risk, similar operations appear: mapping danger, mobilizing resources, codifying behavior, legitimizing intervention, and sustaining provisional order. They mark how societies design, legislate, and inhabit space through the expectation of crisis. The framework developed here resonates beyond its historical ground. The logics traced in wartime Turkey reappear wherever governance faces uncertain futures. Cold War civil defense,

nuclear shelters, and early resilience planning followed the same grammar of mobilization, territorialization, and communication. More recent crises—pandemics, earthquakes, floods, climate change—have renewed this architecture of foresight. Each transforms anticipation into design, producing provisional infrastructures and emotional regimes that promise safety while rehearsing catastrophe. These parallels do not conflate eras; they mark the persistence of anticipation as a way of organizing life under risk.

For architectural history, this demands a broader archive and a different mode of attention. The materials of anticipation are not limited to plans or monuments but include directives, drills, caricatures, and campaigns through which governance takes spatial form. Reading these materials as architecture reveals how vulnerability, emotion, and regulation operate as design forces. Fear, vigilance, and reassurance are not backdrops to urban modernity but elements that shape how cities are drawn, policed, and inhabited. As Uğur Tanyeli has noted, fear itself can structure the metropolis. To write history in this register is to follow the circulation of power through mood as much as through form. Territory, in this sense, also returns as an architectural question. The fortification line, the coastal battery, and the air corridor were as much constructions of knowledge as of concrete. Wartime transformed the ground into a layered medium—land, sea, and sky joined in one continuous field of surveillance and defense. These environments expose how architecture participates in the classification of danger, how it maps vulnerability into the landscape. Their study matters now more than ever, as the boundaries between war, disaster, and security dissolve into one continuous horizon of anticipation.

In the 1930s, as the threat of destruction drew closer, theorists reminded their readers that "the ideal city is a village that does not lose its culture and its inner mechanism." [701] When war approached, Refik Halid wrote his farewell to cities, a lament for a world on the edge of annihilation:

> "How right people were to fear hurricanes, storms, lightning, fire, and showers of stars, always imagining calamities descending from the sky. They envisioned an eternal and dreadful power above, prayed to the heavens, trembled before its wrath, and lived their whole lives with eyes turned upward, anxious and expectant.
>
> The warplane, as the embodiment of oppression and mercilessness descending from the sky, has now fully justified that fear; the sky today is more perilous than ever, more dangerous than any natural wrath of the past. If a way could be found to prevent aerial warfare, the concept of cities, as we know them today, would be utterly transformed: settlements would no longer spread across the land but would instead sink into the depths of the earth. In other words, instead of leaping over them on horseback or

[701] Ünsal, "Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Mimarlık ve Şehircilik Sanatı."

> passing through them by car, what will become of the Anatolian villages of tomorrow? They will be reshaped in modern form, and no trace of today's settlements will remain.
>
> Farewell then, to the cool rivers and blue seas, to the sparkling waters, to the flocks of birds in the shade of the trees, to the shining domes and slender minarets glimmering under clouds, to the cities proud of their histories. You too are monuments of history! It turns out that the solace you gave was nothing but a dream, as sweet and beautiful as it was fleeting!"[702]

To write in the presence of such words is to recognize that architecture has always been shadowed by the sky. The horizon of threat has only widened. The destructive force of the war machine is now so total that no shelter can resist its definitive will. The air that once carried bombs now carries algorithms, drones, and invisible systems of targeting. The spaces of anticipation have multiplied, from bunkers and borderlands to data centers and urban sensors. The condition that defined the 1930s—the sense of danger suspended but imminent—has become permanent.

And yet architecture endures as an act of anticipation, inseparable from the hope of survival. Every plan, shelter, and protocol holds traces of this fragile intelligence—the effort to give form to endurance when protection is impossible. The architectures traced here show that space is not a passive container of history but its most persistent instrument: a medium through which societies organize what they fear, what they expect, and what they still choose to build. To defend a city, a frontier, or a population is to defend this capacity to imagine continuity within rupture, to keep constructing futures even under the weight of their possible destruction.

[702] Refik Halid, "Günler Geçerken: Şehirlere Veda," *Tan*, October 5, 1940.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A., Arif. "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı – Sığınakların Rolü – Apartman Bodrumları Iyi Tedbirlerle Emniyetli Birer Korunma Yuvası Olurlar, Açık Arazide Ise." *Cumhuriyet*, December 2, 1940.

"A Blessing in Disguise" War and Town Planning in Europe 1940 - 1945. With Jörn Düwel, Dmitrij S. Chmel'nickij, Niels Gutschow, et al. DOM Publ, 2013. https://d-nb.info/1036194949/04.

A.A. "Halk Dili Ile Havacılık: Tayyareden Alınan Fotograflar." *Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1941.

Abbas, Nüzhet. "Müstakbel Harblerde – Yangın Bombaları Zehirli Gazdan Daha Tehlikeli." *Cumhuriyet*, April 4, 1936.

"Abdurrahman Naci'nin Kardeşi Nuri Tayyareye 200.000 Lira Verdi Yurttaşların Hamiyet Yarışı Devam Ediyor." *Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1935.

Abughannam, Rana, Émélie Desrochers-Turgeon, Pallavi Swaranjali, and Federica Goffi. *Architectures of Hiding: Crafting Concealment | Omission | Deception | Erasure | Silence*. 1st ed. Routledge, 2023.

Açıkgöz, Ümit Fırat. "Global Locality, National Modernity Negotiating Urban Transformation in Early Republican Istanbul (1923-1949)." PhD Dissertation, Rice University, 2018.

Açıkgöz, Ümit Fırat, and Ilham Khuri-Makdisi. "The Urban." In *The Interwar World*, edited by Andrew Denning and Heidi J.S. Tworek. Routledge, 2023.

Adam, Barbara, and Chris Groves. *Future Matters: Action, Knowledge, Ethics*. Brill, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004161771.i-218.

Adey, Peter. *Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects*. 1st ed. Wiley, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444324631.

Adey, Peter. *Air*. Earth Series (Reaktion Books (Firm)). Reaktion Books, 2014.

Adey, Peter. "Holding Still: The Private Life of an Air Raid." *M/C Journal* 12, no. 1 (2009): 1. https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.112.

Ahıskal, Arif. “Hava Tehlikesine Karşı – Siper ve Sığınaklar.” *Cumhuriyet*, December 14, 1940.

Ahmed, Sara. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Second edition. Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

Akar, Rıdvan. *Aşkale yolcuları: varlık vergisi ve çalışma kampları*. 1. baskı. Doğan Kitap, 2009.

Akbaba. “Garb Cehpesinden.” Sec. 302. October 19, 1939.

Akın, Yiğit. *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar: Erken Cumhuriyet’te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*. 4th ed. İletişim, 2019.

Akpinar, Ipek. “The Rebuilding of Istanbul after the Plan of Henri Prost, 1937-1960: From Secularisation to Turkish Modernisation.” In *Doctoral Thesis, UCL (University College London).* Doctoral, UCL (University College London), 2003. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10106165/.

Akşam. “Canavar Düdükleri.” February 9, 1936.

Akşam. “İstanbulda 30 Bin Siper Sığınağı Kazıldı.” June 30, 1940.

Akşam. “Yedikule - Sirkeci: Hat Boyundaki Harap Binalar Kaldırılacak.” February 22, 1936.

Aktar, Ayhan. *Varlık vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” politikaları*. 10. baskı. İletişim yayınları Tarih dizisi, 599 4. İletişim Yayınları, 2010.

Akyol. “Çakmak Hattı: Bir Kültürel Peyzaj Rotası.” *Tasarım Rehberleri*, November 30, 2024.

Albrecht, Donald, and Margaret Crawford. *World War II and the American Dream : How Wartime Building Changed a Nation*. Washington, D.C. : National Building Museum ; Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995.

Algan, Nurettin Münşi. *Gaz kimyası: zehirli gazlar ve kimyevi savaş*. Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi Kütüphanesi 32. Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi, 1936.

Amiral Muren Dün Sığınak Yerlerini Gezdi. April 5, 1940.

Amiral Muren Şehrimizde - Pasif Korunma Tetkikleri Başlıyor - Âni Bir Tecrübe Yapılması Muhtemeldir. March 30, 1940.

Amiral Muren Tetkiklere Başladı - Mütehassısa, Şimdiye Kadar Yapılan Işler Etrafında Izahat Verildi. March 31, 1940.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, 2006.

Arif. "Hava Müdafaası Karşısında Ferdlerin Hazırlanması." *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 1940.

Arkitekt. "Çankırı'da Yer Depremi Tahribatı." 1944.

Arkitekt. "Hava Bonbardımanlarına Karşı Müdafaa Usulleri." 1940.

Arkitekt. "Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Sığınaklar (Utki'nin Tetkiki)." 1938.

Arkitekt. "İstanbul Şehir Plânı." 1935.

Arkitekt. "Şehirlerde Yeşil Sahalar." 1937.

Arkitekt. "Şehrin İstikbal Plânı Yapılıncaya Kadar Yapı ve Yollar Kanununun Tatbikatı Hakkında İzahname." 1936.

Arkitekt. "Uçak Bombalarının Tesirleri." 1941.

Armağan, Mustafa. "Askeri Mimari Mirasın Korunması Bağlamında Çakmak Hattı Kıyı Koruganları (Anadolu Feneri- Riva-Şile)." *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 24, no. 2 (2022): 2. https://doi.org/10.26468/trakyasobed.1163988.

Ashworth, G. J. *War and the City*. Routledge, 1991.

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İkinci adam (1884-1938)*. 6. baskı. Vol. 1. Remzi Kitabevi, 1984.

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İkinci adam (1938-1950)*. 6. baskı. Vol. 2. Remzi Kitabevi, 1984.

Aydın, Salim. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Savunması Çatalca Hattı*. Kronik Kitap, 2025.

B. Felek. "Niyet Nereye?" Hadiseler Arasında Felek. *Cumhuriyet*, April 11, 1941.

Bahar, Hâmit. *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri: pasif korunmada çalışacak vatandaşlara rehber*. 4th ed. Tan Matbaası, 1940.

Bakanlığı, T. C. Kültür ve Turizm. "İstanbul'da Ağustos 1939'da Yapılan Pasif Korunma Manevrası." WebTV. Accessed October 3, 2025.

http://filmmirasim.ktb.gov.tr/tr/film/harp-kimyasi-egitimi--gaz--maske--alev--sis--9--kisim-.

Bakar, Bülent. *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*. Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2019.

Bakar, Bülent. *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma (1935-1945)*. Tarihçi, 2019.

Baldwin, Stanley. "A Fear For The Future." 1932. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Fear_For_The_Future.

Baran, Taha. *1937-1938 Yılları Arasında Basında Dersim*. İletişim Yayınları, 2024.

Barclay, Katie, and Jade Riddle, eds. *Urban Emotions and the Making of the City*. 1st edition. Routledge, 2021.

Başar, Hamdi. "İstanbul'u Parasız Imar Etmek Mümkündür." *Cumhuriyet*, November 28, 1937.

Bateman, M., and R. C. Riley. *The Geography of Defence*. Routledge Library Editions. Human Geography. Routledge, 2016.

Beşinci Tayyare Kongresi : Hava Tehlikesi. Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, 1932.

Bilsel, Cana. "'Les Transformations d'Istanbul': Henri Prost's Planning of Istanbul (1936-1951)." *A|Z ITU JOURNAL OF THE FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE* 8, no. 1 (2011). https://www.az.itu.edu.tr/jfa/article/view/639.

Bin Yeni Uçak! June 20, 1935.

Birson, V. "İstanbul'u Güzelleştirmek Için: Çırağan'da Plaj ve Strand. Florya Plajına Sarf Edilecek Para Ile Burasını Kurtarabiliriz ve Kurtaralım." *Cumhuriyet*, May 17, 1935.

Birson, V. "İstanbulu Güzelleştirmek İçin: Dolmabahçe Meydanı Nasıl Açılabilir? Paraya Lüzum Yok Sadece Bir Kaç İdare İle Anlaşıp Harap Duvar Ve Binaları Yıkmak Kafi." *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1935.

Birson, V. "İstanbul'u Güzelleştirmek Için: Hipodromu Eski Güzelliğiyle Ortaya Çıkarabilir ve Bir Stadyom Yapabiliriz. Buraya Lazım Olan Masrafı Şehre Para Bırakacak Yabancılar Getirerek Elde Edeceğiz." *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

Bishop, Ryan, and Gregory Clancey. “The City-as-Target, or Perpetuation and Death.” In *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, edited by Stephen Graham. Studies in Urban and Social Change. Wiley, 2008.

Bordeleau, Erik. “On Sloterdijk’s Terror from the Air: The Book of (Political) Air Conditioning.” *Cultural Politics* 6, no. 3 (2010): 389–91.

Bosma, Koos. *Shelter City: Protecting Citizens Against Air Raids*. Amsterdam University Press, 2012.

Boyer, M. Christine. “Aviation and the Aerial View: Le Corbusier’s Spatial Transformations in the 1930s and 1940s.” *Diacritics* 33, no. 3 (2003): 93–116.

Boysan, Mazlum, and Nuri Refet Korur. *Harp gazları ve bunlara karşı korunma*. İnkılab Kitabevi, 1938.

Bozdoğan, Sibel. *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. University of Washington Press, 2002.

Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Esra Akcan. *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*. Modern Architectures in History. Reaktion Books, 2012.

Brandimarte, Italo. “Breathless War: Martial Bodies, Aerial Experiences and the Atmospheres of Empire.” *European Journal of International Relations* 29, no. 3 (2023): 525–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231153259.

Brandimarte, Italo. “Breathless War: Martial Bodies, Aerial Experiences and the Atmospheres of Empire.” *European Journal of International Relations* 29, no. 3 (2023): 525–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231153259.

Bratchford, Gary, and Dennis Zuev. *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*. Social Visualities Series. Springer International Publishing AG, 2024.

Burhan Arif. “İstanbul’un İmarı Hakkında Notlar.” *Mimar*, 1931.

Burhan Arif. “İstanbul’un Plânı.” *Mimar*, 1933.

Bürhan Arif. “Modern Bir Şehirin Uzviyeti.” *Mimar*, 1932.

Burhan Arif. “Türk Şehirlerinin Bünyesi.” *Mimar*, 1932.

Bürhan Arif. “Yeni Şehirlerin İnkişafı ve ‘Siedlung’ Lar.” *Mimar*, 1932.

Çelik, Hasan Cenk. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sınır Savunma Tedbirleri Ve Türkiye'nin Çakmak Ve Çatalca Hatları." Master's, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2020.

Cengizkan, Ali. *Ankara´nın İlk Planı: 1924-25 Lörcher Planı*. Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı, 2004.

Çetin, Sabit. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul ve Trakya'da Alınan Tedbirler: Pasif Korunma ve Tahliye." Master's, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2008.

Çetinkaya, Ali. "Zehirli Gaz Kurslarına Her Vatandaş Alınmalı." *Cumhuriyet*, April 15, 1939.

Cohen, Jean-Louis. *Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War*. Editions Hazan, Paris, 2011.

Çöken İstanbul röportajlar. 1. baskı. With Suat Derviş. İthaki yayınları. İthaki, 2021.

Cosgrove, Denis. "Cultural Cartography : Maps and Mapping in Cultural Geography." Arts. *Annales de Géographie* 660661, no. 2 (2008): 159–78. https://doi.org/10.3917/ag.660.0159.

Cosgrove, Denis E. *Apollo's Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Cosgrove, Denis E. *Geography and Vision: Seeing, Imagining and Representing the World*. International Library of Human Geography. I.B. Tauris ; In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Coskun, Hülya. "Henri Prost's Paris and Istanbul Plannings: Zoning Regulations as Urban Planning Tools: Housing, Green Areas, Parks, Axis." In *Innovations in Green Urbanization and Alternative Renewable Energy*, edited by Federica Rosso, Donato Morea, and Didit Okta Pribadi. Springer International Publishing, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07381-6_9.

Coşkun, Nusret Safa. "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Belediye Binasının Altında Bulunan Tarihi Sarnıç." *Son Posta*, March 21, 1940.

Coşkun, Nusret Safa. "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Binbirdirek." *Son Posta*, March 20, 1940.

Coşkun, Nusret Safa. "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Edirnekapıdan Ayasofyaya Gelen Geniş Yeraltı Yolu." *Son Posta*, March 19, 1940.

Coşkun, Nusret Safa. "Yerin Altındaki İstanbul: Yerebatan Sarayı." *Son Posta*, March 22, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "500 Tayyare Kâfi Değil, Bir Havacılık Havası Istiyoruz!" May 28, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Almanyaya Sevki Durdurulan Kromlar.” April 23, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. “Altı Vilayette Örfî İdare.” November 23, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Anadoluya Gitmek Isteyen Halkın Kaydına Başlandı.” April 11, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Apartmanlarda Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri.” March 28, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Asfalt Yollarımız / Enkazı Vaktinde Kaldırmayan Müteahhidler.” December 4, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Atatürk Çanakkaleyi Bir Defa Daha Kurtardı - Boğazlar Mukavelesi Bu Gece Törenle Imzalanıyor.” July 20, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Bahçekapıda Hasan Ecza Deposu Tamamen Yandı.” March 17, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. “Balattaki Inhidam Faciası – İki Ev Yıkıldı, Enkaz Arasında Iki Çocuk Öldü.” April 14, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Balıkpazarı Caddesi Kapatıldı.” September 22, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Başbakan İsmet İnönü Dün Hava Tehlikesi Için Yeni Bir Söylev Verdi.” May 26, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Belediye Kanalizasyon Şebekesi Tevsi Edilecek; Yerebatan Sarayı Belediyece Satın Alınıyor; Belediye Bir Kömür Deposu Yaptırıyor.” April 25, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Belediye, Yerebatan Sarayının Methal Kısmındaki Binaları Yıktırarak... Bir Bahçe Vücuda Getirmek Kararı Vermiştir.” August 9, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Beşiktaş’ta 30 Ev Tamamen Yandı – İhtiyar Bir Kadın Yanarak Öldü – Yangının Bir Kıvılcımdan Çıktığı Söyleniyor. Açıkta Kalan 150 Aileye Yardım Edilmektedir.” June 21, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Beşiktaş’ta Dün Büyük Bir Yangın Oldu – İki Çocuğun Talaşlara Yanan Kibrit Atmasından Çıkan Yangında Sekiz Ev ve on Dört Dükkân Yandı.” May 27, 1942.

Cumhuriyet. “Beyoğlunda Bir Facia: Kurtuluş Civarında Beş Katlı Büyük Bir Apartman Çöktü.” March 26, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. “Beyoğlundaki Denemelerden Sonra: Bütün Memlekete Şamil Muazzam Bir Gaz Hücumu Tecrübesi Yapılacak.” December 12, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Bibliyografya - Zehirli Gazlar ve Korunma Çareleri.” July 2, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Bibliyografya – Zehirli Gazlara Dair Eserler.” June 17, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Bir Atalar Sözü.” September 13, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. “Bir Bina Yıkıldı - Bir Amele Öldü, Yedi Kişi Ağır Surette Yaralandı.” July 2, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Bir Evin Üst Katı Çöktü – İki Işçi Tehlikeli Surette Yaralandı.” August 10, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Bir Hava Hücumunda Yangına Karşı Korunma.” February 16, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Bir Mağaza Çöktü ve Dört Amele Yaralandı İhtiyatsızlık Eseri Olan Faciadan Yaralananlardan Ikisinin Hayatı Tehlikededir.” June 4, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Birçok Ev Yıkıldı, Mavna Battı; Nüfus Kaybı Yok.” December 4, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Boğaziçinde Askeri Bir Deneme Yapıldı.” July 1, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Boğazlar Meselesi, Dış Bakanımız Uluslar Kurumuna Boğazların Askerlikten Tecridi Hususundaki İtirazımızı Bildirdi.” April 18, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Boğazlar Mukavelesi Dün Akşam Imzalandı - 13 Yıllık Bir Ayrılıktan Sonra Ebediyete Kadar Sürecek Bir Kavuşma...” July 21, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Boğucu Gazlere Karşı Pariste Tecrübeler Devam Ediyor, Bütün Halka Maske Vermeğe Çalışıyorlar.” May 26, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Bu Gece Bütün Türkiyede Işıklar Tam Maskelenecek - Evlerden Sokaklara Hiç Ziya Sızmıyacak Akşamine Hareket Edenler Ağır Surette Cezalandırılacaktır.” December 1, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Bu Lakırdı Yalandır.” May 9, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Bütün Pasif Müdafaa Tedbirleri Ikmal Edildi – Bugün Tehlike Işareti Verilebilir.” August 17, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. “Büyük Ordu Manevraları Bugün Başlıyor: Atatürk Dün Gece Hususî Trenle Trakyaya Hareket Etti, Başvekilimiz Büyük Şefe Refakat Ediyor.” August 17, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Çelik Kartalları Çoğaltmak Için: 8 Büyük Klüb Arasında Bir Futbol Turnuvası.” May 28, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Çöp Işindeki Beceriksizliği Valimiz de Anladı.” October 21, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Çöp ve Sinek Derdine Karşı - Çöpler Dereye Atılıyor, Üstlerine Kireç Dökülüyor.” October 22, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Akşam 45 Zehirli Gaz Kursu Birden Açıldı.” November 16, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Beyoğlunda Tehlikeli Bir Yangın Oldu.” March 31, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Bir Fotoğrafhaneden Yangın Çıktı.” August 8, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Gece Taksim Büyük Bir Yangın Tehlikesi Atlattı.” January 8, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Gidenler.” May 9, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Dün Yeşildirekte Bir Yangın Oldu.” September 24, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “El Arabası Talimatnamesi / Zehirli Gaz Temizleme Ekipleri / Eyüb Belediye Teşkilâtı.” March 8, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Evlerde Yapılacak Sığınaklar: Seferberlik Müdürlüğü Bu Hususta Izahat Veriyor.” June 18, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Fener Yangınında Açıkta Kalanlar: Kızılay 476 Vatandaşa Eşya ve Bir Aylık Iaşe Ücreti Verdi, Kira Bedeli de Tevzi Olunacak.” September 25, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Ferah Sineması Yandı: Evvelki Gece Sabaha Karşı Çıkan Yangın Esnasında Bu Binada Oturanlar Müşkülatla Kurtarıldı.” March 11, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Fransız Maneviyatının Da Istihkâmı Olan Maginot Hattı Niçin Düştü?” July 12, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Galata’da Dün Bir Fabrika Yandı.” February 8, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. “Gaz Fabrikasında Yangın.” February 16, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Gaz Kursları Bu Akşam Açılıyor: Kırk Dört Kursta 4400 Kişi Okuyacak.” November 15, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Dün Çalışmağa Başladı.” November 1, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Gazdan Korunma Çareleri Sığınak, Gaz Maskesi ve Gaz Elbisesi Gibi Önlemler Alınmalı.” May 31, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “HALK TİPİ SIĞINAK KAPILARI.” June 3, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Haricî Siyasetimiz ve Boğazlar – Sulha Hizmet Ederken Kuvvetlenmeği Ihmal Etmiyoruz!” May 27, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Hatay Artık Bizimdir - Fransa Ile Varılan Anlaşma Dün Ankarada Büyük Bir Merasimle Imza Edildi.” June 1, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Fotoğrafı - Her Şehrin Bir Fotografik Plânı Olursa Türkiyede Şehircilik Terakkileri Kolaylaşacaktır.” March 31, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Hücumlarına Karşı Kendimizi Nasıl Korumalı.” February 11, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Hücumu – Yapılacak Tecrübenin Bir Programı Hazırlanıyor.” December 15, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Hücumu Için Yapılacak Tecrübe: Beyoğlu Itfaiyesine Gaz Maskesi Dağıtıldı.” December 19, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Hücumu Tecrübesi – Hazırlıklar Tamamen Bitirildi.” December 18, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Manevrası: Şehrimize Yapılacak Hava Hücumu Bugün Bekleniyor.” August 18, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Taaruzları Karşısında İstanbul: 1.” September 14, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Taaruzlarına Karşı: Hükümet, Lüzum Görürse Ahşap Evleri Istimlâk Ederek Ortadan Kaldıracak.” January 18, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Alınacak Tedbirler.” May 21, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Tehlikelerine Karşı: Galata Tüneli ve Hamamlar Da Sığınak Olabilecek.” November 21, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. “Hava Tehlikesi — Korunma Komisyonu Toplantılarına Başlıyor.” August 18, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Hava Tehlikesi Hem Vardır Hem Yoktur! Var Olan Tehlikeyi Ulusun Yurtseverliği ve Fedakârlığı Yok Edecektir." June 1, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Alınacak Mühim Tedbirler." November 14, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Hava Tehlikesine Karşı: İstanbul'da Büyük Bir Toplantı Yapılacak." May 31, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler: Parti Grubu Bu Işe Çok Ehemmiyet Verecek." May 27, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Havâî Seyrüsefer: Tayyarelerin Tabi Olacağı Hükümler Belirlendi." May 13, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Hayriye Lisesi Yangını: Yangın Yerinde Keşif Yapıldı, Mekteb Idaresi, Itfaiyenin Geç Geldiğini Iddia Ediyor." January 19, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. "Hem Korunma Hem Imar Faaliyeti." March 6, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "İlk Dava: Pasif Müdafaa Kanununa Muhalefet Eden Bir Işçi Mahkemeye Verildi." April 22, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "İlk Kafile İneboluda." May 3, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "İmar Işlerimiz – Hava Fotoğrafı Usulile Şehir Haritaları." April 30, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "İnönü Türkkuşu Kampı Büyük Merasimle Açıldı: Kız Planör Namzedlerine Hitabe." July 5, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "İstanbul Müzeleri Dün Ziyaretçilere Kapatıldı." September 6, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "İstanbul'daki Ahşap Evler Istimlâk Edilecek." June 22, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "İstanbul'un Atlattığı Felâket – Dün Rum Patrikhanesinden Yangın Çıktı, 94 Ev Yandı." September 22, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "İstanbulun Hallolunmaz Dertlerinden Biri: Yollar." January 9, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "İstanbulun Tayyare Ile Alınan Resimleri." September 12, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "İtfaiye Mektebi Açılıyor." October 28, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "İtfaiyede Yapılacak Islahat." January 15, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Kadıköyünde Bir Ev Yıkıldı ve Bir Kadın Öldü." March 5, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Kâğıthane Köyünü Süpüren Felâket – Dün Çıkan Yangında 33 Ev Tamamen Yandı." July 23, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Kahraman Hava Şehitlerimiz Için Dün Yapılan Ihtifal." May 16, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Kanatlı Gençlik Türk Gençliği Için Hava Sporları Önemi." May 31, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Kapalıçarşıda Büyük Bir Yangın – 200'den Fazla Dükkan Yandı." September 11, 1943.

Cumhuriyet. "Krom Hakkında Verdiğimiz Karar." April 21, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. "Krom Şilepi Torpillendi / Gemiyi Meçhul Bir Denizaltı Karasularımızda Torpilledi / Hariciye Vekilinin Mecliste Izahatı." April 1, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. "Krom Şilepinin Battığı Yere Bir Heyet Gidiyor / Almanlar 'Bu Denizaltı Bizim Değildir' Diyorlar." April 2, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. "M. Prost Geldi." September 22, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Majino ve Zigfrid Hatları Yarılamaz Mı?" November 4, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Manevra Sahasında - Atatürk Bu Sabahtan Itibaren Harekâtı Takibe Başlıyorlar." October 7, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Mannerheim Hattı Yarılamadı." February 10, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Maske Fabrikası Ihale Ediliyor." August 28, 1934.

Cumhuriyet. "Mecanni Nakliyat." May 1, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Misafir Yunan Tayyarecileri Şerefine Hava Gösterileri." September 24, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Mötörleşen Ordu." August 14, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Müferrik – Yerebatan Sarayının Üstü." April 5, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Müttefiklerimize Krom Vermeğe Devam Edeceğiz." April 22, 1944.

Cumhuriyet. "Nümune Sığınaklar - 12 Tanesinin Inşası Dün Müteahhide Ihale Olundu." April 19, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Hangarı ve Meydanı - Bu Güzel Müessesenin Küşad Merasimi Dün Yeşilköyde Yapıldı." August 18, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Nuri Demirağ Yeşilköy Tayyare Alanında." August 8, 1942.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma: Dün Hâkem Heyeti Toplandı ve Alâkadarlar Son Talimatı Verildi / Şehzadebaşı'nda Hazırlanan Sığınaklardan Biri." January 28, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Hazırlıkları." September 17, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Için Alınan Tedbirler - Mahallelere 110 Yangın Tulumbası Tevzi Edildi." March 20, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Için Yapılan Hazırlık / Alınacak Tedbirler Hakkında Dahiliye Vekili Tetkiklerde Bulundu." August 13, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma: Şehrin Muhtelif Mahallerinde Faaliyet Arttı." March 26, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Sergisi." May 18, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri." November 27, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri." March 11, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Müdafaa - Ekiplerde Çalışacak Olan Sekiz Bin Kişi Seçildi." November 12, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Müdafaa: Enkaz Kaldırma Kursu Dün Faaliyete Geçti." December 20, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Pasif Müdafaa: Müesseselerde Alınacak Tedbirler Üzerinde Çalışmalara Devam Ediliyor." October 6, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Rami Türkkuşu Kampında – Türk Havalarını Koruyacak Olan Yarının Kahraman Tayyarecileri Nasıl Hazırlanıyorlar?" June 14, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Reklam – A. Samurkaş Fabrikası – Bilumum Itfaiye ve Pasif Korunma Malzemeleri." April 3, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Rumanyada Müdafaa Hazırlığı: Karol Hattı." March 7, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehir İşleri - Sinek ve Çöp Derdi Etrafında." October 29, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehir İşleri: Yangınlardan Eşya Kurtarmak Için Vesait." July 6, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehir İşleri: Yerebatan Sarayının Imarı." April 26, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehirdeki Ahşab Binaların Vaziyeti." March 12, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehrin Plânı - Mütehassıs Prost, Plânda Bir Değişiklik Olmadığını Söylüyor." August 5, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehrin Suyu (Resmî Cevap)." March 16, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Şehrin ve Sahillerin Temizliği!" October 16, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "SIĞINAK KAPILARI." May 30, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Siper ve Sığınaklar: Alâkadarlar Inşaat Hazırlıklarına Başladılar." December 7, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Siper ve Sığınakları Tahrib Edenler Ağır Ceza Görecekler." July 1, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Sirkecide Bir Duvar Yıkıldı, Yaralananlar Oldu." January 10, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Şişli'de Bir Bina Yıkıldı ve Aile Evsiz Kaldı." June 6, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Sığınaklar Için Tetkikat." May 8, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Sığınakların Parasını Kim Verecek?" July 31, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Son Manevralarda Vücuda Getirilen Büyük Film." November 11, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Soruyoruz? Yaklaştığını Ilan Eden Bir Tehlikeyi Önlemenin Bir Felâketin Vukuu Mu Bekleniyor?" May 1, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Stalin Hattındaki Son Muharebeler." July 15, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Sultanhamamındaki Yangın: Zarar Miktarı 12.000.000 Lira Olarak Tahmin Ediliyor." March 5, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Tarihi Binalarımız – Yerebatan Sarayı." October 6, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Tarihsel Bir Gün: Türk Sivil Havacılığı Kuruldu. Türkkuşu Kurumunun Açılışını Kıymetli Bir Söylevle Atatürk Yaptı…." May 4, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Tayyare Ile Tenezzüh Uçuşları." May 31, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Tehlikeli Duvarlar Yıktırılırken... Temel Çöktü, Üç Amele Enkaz Altında Kaldı." December 15, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Tek Karanlık Sokak Kalmayacak, Yerebatan - Nuruosmaniye Asfalt Yolu." September 26, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Tophane Meydanını Bu Hale Getiren Kim?" May 5, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Tophane Rıhtımı Temizleniyor – Neşriyatımız Nazarı Dikkate Alındı." May 8, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Tungsram Pasif Korunma Ampulları Gelmiştir." February 3, 1941.

Cumhuriyet. "Türk - İngiliz - Fransız İttifakı - Üç Devlet Arasında Yapılan Muahade Dün Akşam İmzalandı." October 20, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Türk - İngiliz Anlaşması: İtilaf Dün Ankarada Büyük Millet Meclisinde Doktor Refik Saydam ve Londrada Avam Kamarasında Çemberlayn Tarafından Ilan Olundu." Sec. 302. September 13, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Türk Kahramanlığının Büyük Delilini Ege Manevraları Filminde Göreceksiniz." November 1, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Türkkuşu Filosu Dün İzmirden Geldi: Kahraman Tayyarecilerimiz Yeşilköyde Kalabalık Bir Halk Kitlesi Tarafından Tezahüratla Karşılandılar." March 10, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Türkün Kanatlı Amazonu – Hava Kahramanımız Sabiha Gökçen Yalovada Atasına Tazimlerini Sundu." June 23, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Üç Yangın." February 18, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Üsküdar Adliyesi Kısmen Yandı – Binada Ateş Evvelki Gece Sabaha Karşı Çıktı, Müşkülatla Söndürüldü." August 13, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Yangın Musluklarının Sayısı Artırılacak." May 7, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Yangın Söndürme Tecrübesi Iyi Netice Vermedi (Devam)." May 14, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Yangın Telefonları." April 24, 1935.

Cumhuriyet. "Yangınlara Karşı Esaslı Tedbirler: Yeni Zabıta Talimatnamesine Mühim Maddeler Konuyor." February 27, 1940.

Cumhuriyet. "Yeni Bir Bahçe Mi? Hayır!" October 11, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Yeni Bir Karar – İstanbul'da Bir Müdafaa Kumandanlığı Kurulacak." August 20, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Yeni Şehir Plânına Göre Bizans Surları Yıkılacak." April 5, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Yenicaminin Etrafı Açılıp Temizleniyor – İstanbulun Bu Güzel Abidesi Bütün Ihtişamile Meydana Çıkarılacak." September 28, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Yenikapıda Bir Gazino Çöktü: Sünnet Düğünü Esnasında Çöken Gazino." September 10, 1937.

Cumhuriyet. "Yerebatan Sarayı İstimlâk Ediliyor: Tarihî Mahzen Yeniden Islah ve Tamir Edilecek." October 31, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Yeşilköy Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Alanında – Tayyare ve Planör Müsabakaları." August 3, 1942.

Cumhuriyet. "Zehirli Gaz Kursları Faaliyete Geçti." October 3, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Zehirli Gaz Kursu Bitti." June 9, 1936.

Cumhuriyet. "Zehirli Gaz Maskeleri Satışa Çıkarıldı." December 10, 1938.

Cumhuriyet. "Zehirli Gaza Karşı – Dün Şehrimizde Yapılan Ikinci Tecrübe de Tam Bir Muvaffakiyetle Sona Erdi." August 24, 1939.

Cumhuriyet. "Zehirli Gazlara Karşı Halkı Koruma Yerleri." July 24, 1935.

Danacıoğlu Tamur, Esra. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Ege Kıyılarına Sığınan Yunanlılar." *Bilgi ve Bellek* 3, no. 6 (2006): 188–201.

Daver, Abidin. "Alman - Fransız Cephesinde Majino Hattı." *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 1939.

Daver, Abidin. "Başbakanın Gösterdiği Tehlike." *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

Daver, Abidin. "Evet, Korkmalı ve Çalışmalı!" *Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1935.

Daver, Abidin. "Hava Tehlikesi: En Büyük Tehlike Gazdır!" *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935.

Daver, Abidin. "İstanbulun Düşmanı Kimdir?" *Cumhuriyet*, January 20, 1937.

Daver, Abidin. "Majino Hattı." Hem Nalına Hem Mıhına. *Cumhuriyet*, June 18, 1940.

Daver, Abidin. "Ulusun Hayatı Havadadır!" *Cumhuriyet*, May 25, 1935.

Daver, Abidin. "Yarınki Harb Nasıl Başlayacak?" *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

Dehaene, Michiel. "Surveying and Comprehensive Planning: The 'Co-Ordination of Knowledge' in the Wartime Plans of Patrick Abercrombie and Max Lock." In *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain*. Routledge, 2007.

Deringil, Selim. *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. Beşinci Basım. Türkiye Araştırmaları. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014.

Deriu, D. "Between Veiling and Unveiling: Modern Camouflage and the City as a Theatre of War." In *Endangered Cities: Military Power and Urban Societies in the Era of the World Wars*, edited by R. Chickering and M. Funck. Brill, 2004.

Deriu, D. "Managing the Body and the City: The Contested Re-Appropriation of London Underground in Wartime." In *Organizing Metropolitan Space and Discourse*, edited by B. Czarniawska and R. Solli. Liber, 2001. https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/940zw/managing-the-body-and-the-city-the-contested-re-appropriation-of-london-underground-in-wartime.

Deriu, D. "The Ascent of the Modern Planeur: Aerial Images and Urban Imaginary in the 1920s." In *Imagining the City. Vol. 1, The Art of Urban Living*, Nos. 7–8, edited by C. Emden, C. Keen, and D. Midgley. nos. 7–8. Peter Lang, 2006.

Deriu, Davide. *On Balance: Architecture and Vertigo*. Lund Humphries Publishers Ltd, 2023.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Oturur? Belediye ‘Meşrutiyet’ Adını Takmış, Fakat Halk Ona Teneke Mahallesi Diyor.” *Cumhuriyet*, June 6, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Oturur: Tabut ve Teneşir Deposunda Yaşayanlar.” *Cumhuriyet*, June 3, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? 150 Kiracısı Olan 35 Odalı Taşhan.” *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? Bekar Yatağı Sultanodaları.” *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar: Edirnekapı Surlarının Içinde Dört Nüfusu Barındıran Mağara.” *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? On Iki Senedir Kış, Yaz Cami Avlusunda yaTan Garib Adam.” *Cumhuriyet*, May 27, 1935.

Derviş, Suat. “İstanbul Halkı Nerelerde Otururlar? Şehrin Göbeğinde 9 Hanelik Bir Köy!” *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1935.

“Don Kazakları – Programa Ek Olarak: Pasif Korunma (The Warning).” *Cumhuriyet*, February 29, 1940.

Doucet, Giulio. *The Command of Air*. University of Alabama Press, 1927.

Downey, Anthony. “The Algorithmic Apparatus of Neocolonialism: Counter-Operational Practices and the Future of Aerial Surveillance.” In *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev. Social Visualities Series. Springer International Publishing AG, 2024.

Draper, Karey L. *Building for War: Examples of Temporary Structures Designed for Wartime Use in Britain (1939-1945)*. n.d.

Draper, Karey Lee. “Wartime Huts: The Development, Typology, and Identification of Temporary Military Buildings in Britain 1914-1945.” *Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository*, ahead of print, January 27, 2018. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.17581.

Dubrisay, R. “Halkı Collectif Olarak Gazlara Karşı Korumak.” İn *Harp gazları: zehirli gazlardan ileri gelen afetlerin seriri mütalaası tesemmümlerin tedavisi*, translated by Şerif Atakam. Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936.

Dudziak, Mary. *War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.

Durhan, Özlem Sıla. "Erken Cumhuriyet İstanbul'unda Kentsel Değişim (1928-1950)." Doctoral Thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü, 2009. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=16341611103504138427&hl=en&oi=scholarr.

Efeoğlu, Melik, and Kemal Kutgün Eyüpgiller. "Çatalca Bölgesi Savunma Yapıları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." *Sanat Tarihi Dergisi* 30, no. 1 (2021): 1. https://doi.org/10.29135/std.834017.

Efeoğlu, Melik, and Kemal Kutgün. "Askeri Mimari Mirasa Çatalca'dan Bakmak: Çakmak Hattı." *Mimarlık* 424 (2022).

E-Flux. "History/Theory - Brigitte Sölch - Architectural Problems." Accessed June 23, 2025. https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/history-theory/162452/architectural-problems/.

Elden, Stuart. "How Should We Do the History of Territory?" *Territory, Politics, Governance*, Routledge, May 1, 2013. world.

Elden, Stuart. "Land, Terrain, Territory." *Progress in Human Geography* 34, no. 6 (2010): 799–817. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132510362603.

Elden, Stuart. *Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty*. University of Minnesota Press, 2009.

Elden, Stuart. *The Birth of Territory*. University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Eligür, Banu. "The 1934 Anti-Jewish Thrace Riots: The Jewish Exodus of Thrace through the Lens of Nationalism and Collective Violence." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 1 (2017): 88–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1182422.

"Eminönü Meydanı - Evkafa Aid Binalar, Parasız Istimlâk Edilecek." *Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1937.

Ergökmen, Şakir Hazım. "Hava Tehlikesi: Halkı Bilgilendirmek Işi." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 10, no. 15 (1936): 65–67.

Ergökmen, Şakir Hazım. "Hava Tehlikesi: Halkı Bilgilendirmek Işi." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 11, no. 16 (1936): 75–79.

Ergut, Elvan Altan. "Displaying Abroad: Architecture and Town Planning Exhibitions of Britain in Turkey in the Mid-1940s." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 50 (2014): 145–70. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600006609.

Ergut, Elvan Altan, and Bilge İmamoğlu, eds. *Cumhuriyet'in mekânları, zamanları, insanları*. 1. baskı. Dipnot yayınları. Dipnot : ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2010.

Erksal, İzzet. "Bebeklerin Gazdan Korunması: Kızılay Gazdan Korunma Kundağı." *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, February 15, 1940.

Erksal, İzzet. "Kızılay Alkali Kartuşu." *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, June 15, 1940.

Erksal, İzzet. "Küçük Çocukların Gazdan Korunması: Kızılay Çocuk Maskesi." *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1939.

Erzurum Havaya Karşı Pasif Korunma Komisyonu. *Hava tehlikesinde halkımızı ilgilendiren ödevler*. T.C. Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü. Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1939.

Ezine, Celaleddin. "Majino Istihkâmlarında – Bir Kalenin İçinde… – Asansörle Yerin Dibine Iniyoruz. Raylarla Döşenmiş Caddeler, Yol Ağzaları, Gidip Gelen Tramvaylar…." *Cumhuriyet*, July 15, 1941.

Febvre, Lucien. *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*. Edited by Peter Burke. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

Felek, Burhan. "Işıklar Sönünce!" *Tan*, December 21, 1935.

Ferraris, Maurizio. "The Thrown Project: Architecture and War." *Khōrein: Journal for Architecture and Philosophy* 1, no. 2 (2023): 2.

Fikret, Cemil. "İstanbul - Ankara: İstanbulun Güzelliğini Tam Olarak Ancak Tayyareden Görmek Kabil Olabilir." *Cumhuriyet*, September 1, 1937.

Flintham, Matthew. "The Military Spatial Complex: Interpreting the Emerging Spaces of British Militarism." In *Emerging Landscapes*. Routledge, 2014.

Gaz ve gazdan korunma dersleri hakkında müfredat programı. İstanbul, 1936.

Gibrin, and L. C. Heckiy. *Teşkilâtlı passif müdafaa*. Dahiliye Vekâleti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1938.

Giray, Halit, and Nefi Vural. *Halk zehirli gazlara karşı kendini ve başkalarını nasıl koruyabilir?* Manisa Halkevi, 1939.

Glover, Charles William. *Civil Defence: A Practical Manual Presenting with Working Drawings the Methods Required for Adequate Protection against Aerial Attack,*. 3rd edition. Chemical Publishing Company, 1941.

Goebel, Stefan, Derek Keene, Stefan Goebel, and Derek Keene. *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War*. 1st ed. Routledge, 2017.

Gökgöz, Gurbet. "Türkiye'de Hava Saldırılarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri (1923-1960)." *Tarih ve Günce*, no. 6 (January 2020): 6.

Gökmen, Muhterem. "Madam Curie ve Radiumun Beşeriyete Hizmeti." *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1938.

Gökmen, Şakir Hazım. "Hava Tehlikesi: Şehirler Nasıl Boşaltılır?" *Belediyeler Dergisi* 8, no. 13 (1936): 74–78.

Gordillo, Gastón R. *Rubble: The Afterlife of Destruction*. Duke University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822376903.

Graham, Stephen. "Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annihilation and Urban Geopolitics." In *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, edited by Stephen Graham. Studies in Urban and Social Change. Wiley, 2008.

Graham, Stephen. *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*. Pbk. ed. Verso, 2011.

Graham, Stephen. *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*. Pbk. ed. Verso, 2011.

Graham, Stephen, ed. *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*. 1st ed. Studies in Urban and Social Change. Wiley, 2008.

Graham, Stephen. *Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers*. Verso, 2016.

Graham, Stephen. *Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers*. Paperback edition. Verso, 2018.

Grayzel, Susan R. *At Home and under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz*. Literature in Context. Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139021197.

Grayzel, Susan R. *At Home and under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz*. Literature in Context. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Greenhalgh, James. "The Threshold of the State: Civil Defence, the Blackout and the Home in Second World War Britain." *Twentieth Century British History* 28, no. 2 (2017): 186–208. https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwx009.

Gregory, Derek, and Allan Pred, eds. *Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence*. Taylor and Francis, 2013. http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=112632.

Güney, Burak. "II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Türkiye`nin aldığı pasif savunma tedbirleri." masterThesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2021. https://acikbilim.yok.gov.tr/handle/20.500.12812/709789.

Güngör, Salahaddin. "Gaz Maskesi Satışı Hararetle Devam Ediyor." *Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 1938.

Güngör, Salahaddin. "Şehrin Içinden – Hartalara Baktıkça – Özü ve Rengi Değişmeyen Yalnız Biz Varız. Kendi Misakı Milli Hududları Içinde Dipdiri Bir Türkiye!" *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1940.

Güngör, Salahaddin. "Şehrin Içinden: Işıksız İstanbul." *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1940.

Haapamäki, Michele. *The Coming of the Aerial War: Culture and the Fear of Airborne Attack in Inter-War Britain*. 1st ed. International Library of Twentieth Century History. I.B. Tauris, 2014.

Haapamäki, Michele. *The Coming of the Aerial War: Culture and the Fear of Airborne Attack in Inter-War Britain*. 1st ed. International Library of Twentieth Century History. I.B. Tauris, 2014.

Haber. "Sığınağa Elverişli Binalar." October 13, 1939.

Hadjri, Karim, and Mohamed Osmani. "The Spatial Development and Urban Transformation of Colonial and Postcolonial Algiers." In *Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World*, [New edition], edited by Yasser Elsheshtawy. Planning, History, and the Environment Series. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

Haffner, Jeanne. *The View from above: The Science of Social Space*. MIT Press, 2013.

Hall, Peter. *Cities of Tomorrow : An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design Since 1880*. New York Academy of Sciences Ser. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2014.

Harwood, John. "The Other End of the Trajectory: Danger Zones." *Grey Room*, no. 54 (January 2014): 80–106. https://doi.org/10.1162/GREY_a_00133.

Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri. T.C. Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekâleti neşriyatından, no. 42. Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekaleti, 1937.

"Hava Hücumuna Karşı Yapılacak Sığınaklar." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 03, no. 9 (1936): 99–100.

"Hava Kurumuna Yardım İçin Yapılan Toplantılar." *Cumhuriyet*, June 20, 1935.

"Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Işıkların Söndürülmesi ve Karartılması Nizamnamesi." *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4142 (February 1939): 11323–25.

"Hava Taarruzlarına Karsı Korunma Kanunu." *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 3955 (September 1938): 10228–29.

"Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi." *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4178 (August 1939): 11543–55.

"Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi Hakkında Talimatname." *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4432 (February 1940): 13358.

"Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Pasif Korunma Talimatnamesi." *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4302 (May 1939): 12545–63.

"Hava Taaruzlarına Karşı Alınacak Tedbirler." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 5, no. 69 (1941): 2.

Hava taaruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Türk Ulusunun Hamiyeti. June 29, 1935.

Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri. Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti neşriyatından. Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri, Ankara. Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti, 1933.

"Hava Tehlikesine Karşı - Bir Kanun Projesi." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 9, no. 14 (1936): 2–3.

"Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Canlı Çalışma Başlıyor Bir Yurtsever Hava Kurumuna 120 Bin Lira Verdi." *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1935.

"Hava Tehlikesine Karşı: İstanbul'da Büyük Bir Toplantı Yapılacak." *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1935.

Havadan ve zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri, V. sınıf. T.C. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Heaney, Jonathan. “Emotions and Nationalism: A Reappraisal.” In *Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension*, edited by Nicolas Demertzis. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025661_13.

Henni, Samia. *Architecture of Counterrevolution: The French Army in Northern Algeria*. Reihe “Architektonisches Wissen.” Gta Verlag, 2017.

Henni, Samia. *Colonial Toxicity: Rehearsing French Radioactive Architecture and Landscape in the Sahara*. With Megan Hoetger. Edition Fink, 2024.

Henni, Samia, ed. *War Zones*. Gta Papers. Gta Verlag, 2018.

Henni, Samia, ed. *War Zones*. Gta Papers. Gta Verlag, 2018.

Holman, Brett. *The Next War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908–1941*. Routledge, 2014.

Home Office. *The Protection of Your Home Against Air Raids*. His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1938.

Hüsnü Bey. *Muharebe gazları ve koruma çareleri*. Gayret Matbaası, 1934.

İkdam. “Pasif Müdafaa Hazırlıkları Ilerliyor.” February 26, 1940.

İkdam. “Sığınak Mecburiyeti.” July 22, 1940.

Ilgaz, Rıfat. *Karartma Geceleri*. İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015.

İnönü, İsmet. *Türk Hava Kurumunun altıncı kurultayında başbakan İsmet İnönünün verdikleri söylev*. Türk Hava Kurumu, 1935.

Irincheev, Bair. *The Mannerheim Line 1920-39 : Finnish Fortifications of the Winter War*. With Brian Delf. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013. https://ebook.yourcloudlibrary.com/library/oclc/detail/axombz9.

İşbilen, Tahsin, dir. *Asya Minör Yeniden*. 2009.

“İsTanbul Esnafı Senede 200,000 Lira Verecek.” *Cumhuriyet*, June 19, 1935.

“İstanbul Imar Planının Program Metni.” *Belediyeler Dergisi* 4, no. 32 (1938): 10–23.

İsTanbul Kadınları Bir Tayyare Alıyorlar. June 14, 1935.

İtfaiye Merkezinde Pasif Korunma – Müze Tetkiki ve Tulumba Arabaları. April 6, 1940.

Jackman, Anna. "Vocabularies of Drone Sensing." In *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev. Social Visualities Series. Springer International Publishing AG, 2024.

Kandal, Sena Coşğun. "Zehirli Gaz Saldirilarina Karşi Halkin Bilinçlendirilmesi Ve Eğitimdeki Yansimasi: Gazdan Korunma Dersi (1931-1940)." *Turkish History Education Journal* 5, no. 2 (2016): 2. https://doi.org/10.17497/tuhed.279938.

Kandemir. "Şehrin Işıkları – İstanbul Belediyesi ve Para Meselesi – Belediye, Şehirde Beş Para Sarfetmeden Ne Işler Yapabilir?" *Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 1937.

Karabulut, Umut. "Davetsiz Misafiri Beklerken İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'sinde Pasif Güvenlik Önlemleri (1939-1940)." *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (2014): 28.

Kaymaz, Elif, and Caner Arıkboğa. "Exposing the Environments of Warfare: On the Permanency of Defence Epistemologies." 2025. https://www.virtual-lsa.uk/ahra2025/controlled-environments/.

Kaymaz, Elif, and Emine Esra Nalbant. "Sessions: Frontiers: Kinetics of Expulsion, Expansion, and Contestation." Accessed August 20, 2025. https://konferencer.au.dk/eahn26/call-for-papers-1/sessions.

Kerman, Fuat. "Kadınlarımız Nasıl Çalışıyor?" *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, March 15, 1941.

Keskinok, Hüseyin Çağatay. "Urban Planning Experience of Turkey in the 1930s." *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* 27, no. 2 (2010): 173–88.

Kezer, Zeynep. "An Imaginable Community: The Material Culture of Nation-Building in Early Republican Turkey." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27, no. 3 (2009): 508–30. https://doi.org/10.1068/d10907.

Kezer, Zeynep. "The Making of a Nationalist Capital: Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara." *Built Environment (1978-)* 22, no. 2 (1996): 124–37.

Kimberley A., Peters, Philip E. Steinberg, and Elaine Stratford, eds. "Introduction." In *Territory beyond Terra*, by Peters Kimberley A., Philip E. Steinberg, and Elaine Stratford. Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018.

King, Anthony D. "Colonialism and Urban Development." In *Cities of the Global South Reader*, 1 edition, edited by Faranak Miraftab and Neema Kudva. Routledge Urban Reader Series. Routledge, 2015.

Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. “Çerçeve: Pasif Korunma.” *Son Telgraf*, March 12, 1940.

Klauser, Francisco. “Wassily Kandinsky and the Aerial Gaze: Questioning the Punctual, Linear and Planar Forces Inherent in the Politics of Visibility Conveyed by Police Drones.” In *Vision and Verticality : A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Gary Bratchford and Dennis Zuev. Social Visualities Series. Springer International Publishing AG, 2024.

Kocacık, Eyüp Talha, and Emre Dölen. “İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türkiye’de Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kursları ve Yasal Düzenlemeler.” *Osmanli Bilimi Arastirmalari (Studies in Ottoman Science)* 21, no. 1 (2020): 1. https://doi.org/10.26650/oba.669431.

Kolatan, Adnan. “Sığınak İnşaatı Kaideleri ve Tavsiyeler.” *Arkitekt*, 1939.

Kömürcüoğlu, Turgut. *Hava saldırmaları ve bunlardan korunma*. Bilgi Matbaası, 1940.

Konuralp, Hikmet, and Kadri Yaman. *Zehirli gazlardan korunma dersleri: Ortaokullar için*. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Konuralp, Hikmet, and Kadri Yaman. *Zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri*. İstanbul, 1938.

Korur, Nuri Refet. “Gaz Filmleri.” *Kızılay Mecmuası*, April 15, 1940.

Korur, Nuri Refet. “Gaz Talim ve Terbiye Malzemesi, Ne Işe Yaradıkları, Ne Suretle Kullandıkları.” *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, August 15, 1940.

Korur, Nuri Refet. “Kızılay Sığınağı.” *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, August 15, 1940.

Koselleck, Reinhart. *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Translated by Todd Samuel Presner. Stanford University Press, 2002.

Küçük, Evren. “Türkiye’de Nazi Almanya Propagandasına Bir Örnek: Ankara ve İstanbul’da Alman Mimari Sergileri.” *Journal of Ankara Studies* 6, no. 1 (2018): 23–38. https://doi.org/10.5505/jas.2018.77527.

Kutkan, Nuri. *Zehirli gaz konferanslarım*. Eskişehir, 1935.

L. M. Chitale. *Air Raids And Civil Defence*. 2nd ed. The Madras Publishing House, 1942. http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.278563.

Laketa, Sunčana. *Cities of Banal Warfare: Affective Geographies in Violent Times*. Bristol University Press, 2025.

Larkham, Peter J. “Selling the Future City: Images in UK Post-War Reconstruction Plans.” In *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain*, edited by Iain Boyd Whyte. Routledge, 2007.

Ledwidge, Frank. *Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction*. Very Short Introductions. Oxford University Press, 2020. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198804314.001.0001.

Light, Jennifer S. *From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/bios/jhu052/2003006229.html.

Lilley, Keith D. “Conceptions and Perceptions of Urban Futures in Early Post-War Britain: Some Everyday Experiences of the Rebuilding of Coventry, 1944–62.” In *Man-Made Future: Planning, Education and Design in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain*, edited by Iain Boyd Whyte. Routledge, 2007.

Lin, Weiqiang. “Air: Spacing the Atmosphere: The Politics of Territorialising Air.” In *Territory beyond Terra*, edited by Kimberley A. Peters, Philip E. Steinberg, and Elaine Stratford. Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5316840.

Linnell, Mikael. “Governing (through) Anticipation, Architecture, Affect.” *Journal of Cultural Geography* 38, no. 3 (2021): 354–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2021.1927321.

Lu, Duanfang. *Third World Modernism: Architecture, Development and Identity*. Routledge, 2011. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=667868.

Luchman, Von, G. Cronenberg, and Frommhold. “Barselon’da Hava Hücumlarına Karşı Alınan İnşaî Tedbirler.” Translated by Adnan Kolatan. *Arkitekt*, 1939.

M. Şevki. “Askerlik Yazıları: Hava Saldırmaları ve Şehir Planları.” *Akşam*, July 1, 1935.

M. Vedat. “İstanbul’un İmarı Meselesi.” *Mimar*, 1931.

MacFie, A. L. “The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (1989): 238–48.

Maier, Charles S. “Targeting the City: Debates and Silences about the Aerial Bombing of World War II.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 859 (2005): 429–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383100184322.

McCluskey, Michael. “Introduction: Airminded Modernism.” In *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, edited by Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber. Springer International Publishing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_1.

McCluskey, Michael. “Introduction: Airminded Modernism.” In *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, edited by Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber. Springer International Publishing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_1.

Meisel, Joseph S. “Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War.” *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 3 (1994): 300–319. https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/5.3.300.

Meisel, Joseph S. “Air Raid Shelter Policy and Its Critics in Britain before the Second World War.” *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 3 (1994): 300–319. https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/5.3.300.

Memurlar Tayyareye Ayda %2 Verecekler. June 28, 1935.

Mersin’de Esir Mübadelesi. 1943. T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı. https://filmmirasim.ktb.gov.tr/tr/film/mersin-esir-mubadelesi.

Metinsoy, Murat. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: savaş ve gündelik yaşam*. 1. basım. İnceleme ve araştırma (Homer Kitabevi). Homer Kitabevi, 2007.

“Milli Müdafaa İhtiyaçları İçin Yapılacak İstimlakler Hakkında Kanun (Law No. 3887).” *Resmi Gazete* 4548 (June 1940). https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/4548.pdf.

Mimar. “Şehrin İstikbal Tanzim Ediliceye Kadar Yapı ve Yollar Kanununun Tatbikatı Hakkında Bazı İzahlar.” 1933.

Mimar Abidin. “Memlekette Türk Mimarının Yarınki Vaz’iyeti.” *Mimar*, 1933.

Mimar Şahabettin. “Şehir Mimarisinde Usuller: Şehir Yeşillikleri.” *Mimar*, 1933.

Mimar Servet. “Apartman İnşaatı.” *Mimar*, 1931.

Mimar Vedat. “İstanbul İkametgahları.” *Mimar*, 1931.

Moore, Aaron William. *Bombing the City: Civilian Accounts of the Air War in Britain and Japan, 1939–1945*. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108552479.

Mortaş, Abidin. “Ankara’da Mesken Meselesi.” *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Moynier. *Harp gazları: zehirli gazlardan ileri gelen afetlerin seriri mütalaası tesemmümlerin tedavisi*. Translated by Şerif Atakan. Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936.

M.S. *Bir Mes’ele: “Korunma” Plânı Mı, “Imar” Plânı Mı Lâzım?* March 5, 1940.

Mumford, Lewis. *The Culture of Cities*. Harvest/HBJ, 1970.

N. “Biz Bize – Işıkları Maskeleme Tecrübesi.” *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935.

Nacar, Can. “Ekmegin Yoklugunu Bilirim, Kıtlığı Gördüm: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Kentsel Alanlarda Emekçiler.” *Praksis* 16 (January 2006): 195–218.

Nacar, Can. “‘Our Lives Were Not as Valuable as an Animal.’” *International Review of Social History* 54, no. S17 (2009): 143–66. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859009990277.

Naci Cemal. “Şehirlerin Mıntıkalara Ayrılması ve Tertibi.” *Mimar*, 1934.

Nadin, Mihai, ed. *Anticipation Across Disciplines*. Vol. 29. Cognitive Systems Monographs. Springer International Publishing, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22599-9.

Nadir, Cemal. “Avrupanın Bugünkü Durumu.” *Cumhuriyet*, November 9, 1943.

Nadir, Cemal. “Balkan Festivali!..” *Cumhuriyet*, December 25, 1943.

Nadir, Cemal. “Yanan Dağlar, Sönen Dağlar.” *Cumhuriyet*, November 30, 1943.

Neyzi, Ali H. *Hüseyin Paşa Çıkmazı No.4*. Cem Yayınevi, 2005.

Nooraddin, Hoshiar. “Globalization and the Search for Modern Local Architecture: Learning from Baghdad.” In *Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World*, [New edition], edited by Yasser Elsheshtawy. Planning, History, and the Environment Series. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

Öelsner, R. “Tabiatın ve Şehirlerin Yeşilliği.” *Arkitekt*, 1945.

Oğuz, Burhan. *Yaşadıklarım Dinlediklerim: Tarihi ve Toplumsal Anılar*. Simurg, 2008.

Öncel, Ömer Şevket. *Zehirli gazlar kimya dersleri ve korunma usulleri*. Şirketi Mürettibiye Basımevi, 1938.

Orhon, Orhan Seyfi. "Ahşap Evler." *Akbaba*, March 21, 1940.

Ortaç, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç. "İmar!" *Akbaba*, March 14, 1940.

Öymen, Altan. *Bir dönem bir çocuk*. Doğan Kitap, 2002.

Öz, Tahsin. *İstanbul sarnıçları: Yerebatan, Binbirdirek, Cebehane, Saray, Acımusluk, Bodrum, Sultan Selim, Bulvar Sarnıçları ve diğer açık sarnıçlar.* In *Panorama, sayı 13*. May 1955. 24,4-32,5 cm. SALT Research, FFT274009. https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/21234.

Özcan, Gencer. "Savaşarası Dönemde Türkiye Trakya'sının Askeri Sınır Bölgesine Dönüşümü." *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2022): 2. https://doi.org/10.52792/tws.1185977.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Gaz Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Genel Korunma ve Sığınaklar*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Maskeler*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Tahrip Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Zehirli Gazlar*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özkaya, Nuri. *Zehirli gazlar hakkında halkevinde verilen dersler*. Halkevi Neşriyatı, 1936.

Öztan, Ramazan Hakkı. *Settlement Law of 1934: Turkish Nationalism in the Age of Revisionism*. Brill, February 17, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1163/23519924-00601006.

Page, Adam. “An Archive of Anxiety: The Papers of E. A. A. Rowse.” *Planning Perspectives* 35, no. 6 (2020): 1097–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2020.1781685.

Page, Adam. *Architectures of Survival: Air War and Urbanism in Britain, 1935–52*. 1st edition. Manchester University Press, 2019.

Page, Adam. “Planning a ‘Militant Peace’: Air Raid Precautions for Peace and for War.” In *Architectures of Survival: Air War and Urbanism in Britain, 1935–52*, 1st edition. Manchester University Press, 2019.

Page, Adam. “Planning Permanent Air Raid Precautions: Architecture, Air War and the Changing Perceptions of British Cities in the Late 1930s.” *Urban History* 43, no. 1 (2016): 117–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926815000164.

Panchasi, Roxanne. *Future Tense: The Culture of Anticipation in France between the Wars*. Cornell University Press, 2009.

“Paşabahçedeki Yangın.” *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1935.

Pasif korunma. Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1939.

“Pasif Korunma Bakımından Yapılarda Tatbik Edilecek Esaslar ve Sığınaklar Hakkında Kararname.” *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4418 (January 1940): 13225–30.

Pasif Korunma Teşkilâtı – Amiral Mouren, Bazı Umumî Bilgilere Ihtiyaç Olmakla Beraber, Vaziyeti Memnuniyete Şayan Bulduğunu Söyledi. April 15, 1940.

“Pasif Müdafaa – Hava Taarruzundan Korunma Tecrübesi Muvaffakiyetle Yapıldı.” *Cumhuriyet*, August 20, 1939.

Passif havadan korunma. Alâeddin Kral Basımevi, 1939.

Passif Havadan Korunma: Ev Veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri. Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi, 1939.

Passif koruma teşkilatına ait notlar. Rıza Coşkun Matbaası, 1940.

Phillips, Jon. “Water: Order and the Offshore: The Territories of Deep-Water Oil Production.” In *Territory beyond Terra*, edited by Kimberley A. Peters, Philip E. Steinberg, and Elaine Stratford. Geopolitical Bodies, Material Worlds. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018.

Raffestin, Claude. “Elements for a Theory of the Frontier.” Translated by Jeanne Ferguson. *Diogenes* 34, no. 134 (1986): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/039219218603413401.

Rasborg, Klaus. *Ulrich Beck: Theorising World Risk Society and Cosmopolitanism*. 1st ed. Springer International Publishing, 2021.

Refet, Nuri. *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?* İnkılab Kitabevi, 1936.

Refik Halid. “Günler Geçerken: Şehirlere Veda.” *Tan*, October 5, 1940.

Refik Halid. “Yatak ve Harp.” *Tan*, September 29, 1940.

Reuter, Ernst. “Belediye Reisliği.” Translated by Adnan Kolatan. *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Reuter, Ernst. “Belediyelerin Yapı İşletmeleri.” Translated by Adnan Kolatan. *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Reuter, Ernst. “Mesken Meselesinin Halli Çareleri.” *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Reuter, Ernst, and Adnan Kolatan. “Belediye Yapı İşlerine Luzumlu Paranın Temini.” *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Reprinted. With Ulrich Beck and Mark Ritter. Theory, Culture & Society. SAGE, 2013.

Rodwin, Lloyd, and Robert M. Hollister. *Cities of the Mind: Images and Themes of the City in the Social Sciences*. Environment, Development, and Public Policy. Plenum Press, 1984.

Safa, Peyami. “Hadiseler Arasında: Yeni İstanbul - 2.” *Cumhuriyet*, September 15, 1936.

Saint-Amour, Paul K. “Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism.” *Comparative Literature Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 130–61.

Saint-Amour, Paul K. “On the Partiality of Total War.” *Critical Inquiry* 40, no. 2 (2014): 420–49. https://doi.org/10.1086/674121.

Sayar, Zeki. “Biz Ne Yapıyoruz?” *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Sayar, Zeki. “Şehri Çirkinleştiren Binalar!...” *Arkitekt*, 1945.

Sayar, Zeki. “Sığınak İnşası Usulleri.” *Arkitekt*, 1940.

Schütte, W. “Bugünkü Kültür ve İkametgâh.” *Arkitekt*, 1944.

Schütte, W. “Yer Depremleri Hakkında Yeni Araştırmalar.” Translated by Adnan Kolatan. *Arkitekt*, 1943.

Schütte, W. “Zelzele Sahalarının Yeniden İmarı Hakkında Düşünceler.” *Arkitekt*, 1940.

S.D. “Beyoğlunda Dün Gecenin Intibaları.” *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1935.

Seaber, Luke. “‘From This New Culture of the Air We Finally See’: ‘Groundmindedness’ in the 1930s.” In *Aviation in the Literature and Culture of Interwar Britain*, edited by Michael McCluskey and Luke Seaber. Springer International Publishing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60555-1_3.

Seferberlik Müdürlüğü – Pasif Korunma Filmi FERAH Sinemada Gösterilecek. April 9, 1940.

“Şehir, Kasaba ve Köylerin Lüzumunda Tahliye Veya Seyrekleştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun.” *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 5782 (August 1944): 7499.

“Şehir Plânlarının Tanziminde ve Mühim Bina Yerlerinin Tayininde Tatbik Edilecek Pasif Korunma Şartlarına Dair Nizamname Hakkında Kararname.” *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 4532 (November 1940): 14065–66.

Sloterdijk, Peter. “Airquakes.” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27, no. 1 (2009): 41–57. https://doi.org/10.1068/dst1.

Sloterdijk, Peter. *Terror from the Air*. Translated by Amy Patton and Steve Corcoran. Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series. Semiotext(e) ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2009.

Sloterdijk, Peter, Amy Patton, and Steve Corcoran. *Terror from the Air*. Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series. Semiotext(e) ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2009.

Son Posta. “Pazar Ola Hasan B. Diyor Ki.” August 3, 1935.

Spoor, Alec. “İngiltere’de Mahalli Devlet Teşkilleri Nasıl Çalışır?” *Arkitekt*, 1944.

Stephan, Christopher, and Devin Flaherty. “A Phenomenology of Anticipation: Experience, Culture, Social Distribution, and Collectivity.” In *A Time of Disastrous Anticipations*. Routledge, 2025.

Stockdale, Liam P. D. *Taming an Uncertain Future: Temporality, Sovereignty, and the Politics of Anticipatory Governance*. Future Perfect. Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1130802.

Süerdem, Hasan Fehmi. "Hava Tehlikesi: Şehir İnşaat Planları." *Belediyeler Dergisi* 01–02, no. 8 (1936): 72–76.

Suner, Adnan, tran. "Sivil Halkın Hava Tehlikesine Karşı Kollektif Korunması." *Arkitekt*, 1936.

Süss, Dietmar, Lesley Sharpe, and Jeremy Noakes. *Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in World War II*. First edition. Oxford University Press, 2014.

"Swiss Weigh Future Role of Bunkers in the Alps - The New York Times." Accessed July 21, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/europe/20swiss.html?pagewanted=all.

Tan. "Beyoğlunda Hava Hücumuna Karşı Denemeler Yapıldı." December 21, 1935.

Tan. "Beyoğlundaki Deneme Muvaffakiyetle Yapıldı." December 21, 1935.

Tan. "Hava Denemesinde Tan Objektifi." December 21, 1935.

Tan. "Hava Hücumuna Karşı Umumi Sığınaklar." November 18, 1939.

Tan. "İstanbulda 200,000 Kişilik Sığınak Temin Edildi." March 26, 1940.

Tan. "Müferrik: Köylerde Hava Tehlikesi Tedbir." September 29, 1940.

Tan. "Nümune Evler Yapılacak." February 29, 1940.

Tan. "Pasif Korunma: Evlerde Bazı Aletler Bulunacak, Müesseselerde de İmdat Ekipleri Teşkil Edilecek." September 1, 1940.

Tan. "Pasif Korunma: Yardımcı Polis Kursları Açılıyor." September 1, 1940.

Tan. "Şehirde 90 Binden Fazla Sığınak Yapıldı." August 21, 1940.

Tan. "Şehrimizde Yeni Sığınaklar Yaptırılıyor." September 22, 1940.

Tang, Renyi. “On Defensive Architecture: The Expansion of Boundaries and the Reshaping of the Environment.” *Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media* 92 (May 2025): 14–22. https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/2025.22782.

Tanık, M. H. *Gök savaşlarından korunma yolları*. Hilmi Kitabevi, 1937.

Tarlan, A. Rıza. *Passif korunma sıhhıye ekip için harp gazlarına karşı korunma*. Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1939.

Tekeli, İlhan. *İstanbul’un Planlaması ve Gelişmesinin Öyküsü*. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013.

Tekeli, İlhan. *Modernizm, modernite ve Türkiye’nin kent planlama tarihi*. 2. basım. İlhan Tekeli toplu eserler. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. *Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye*. 1. baskı. Birinci Cilt. İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 1, Dış siyaseti ve askerî stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye’si*. İletişim Yayınları. İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi. 2, İktisadî politikaları ve uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*. İletişim Yayınları. İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

TenHouten, Warren D. *A General Theory of Emotions and Social Life*. Routledge Advances in Sociology. Routledge, 2009.

Thompson, Peter. *The Gas Mask in Interwar Germany: Visions of Chemical Modernity*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009314862.

Tobur, M. Mazhar. *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*. İnkılâp Kütüphanesi, 1936.

Topakoğlu, Cemal. *Memleket içinin havaya karşı passif korunması hakkında genel bilgiler*. Açıksöz Matbaası, 1939.

Toprak, Zafer. “Türkiye’de Barış Ortamında Savaş Travması: Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Pasif Korunma.” *Toplumsal Tarih* 163 (2007): 40–47.

Tozoğlu, Ahmet Erdem, Elif Kaymaz, and Öykü Su Sezen. “Ankara’da Millî Bayram Kutlamaları: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi’nde Kamusallığın Performatif Biçimleri.” *Ankara Araştırmaları Dergis* 10, no. 2 (2022): 203–28. https://doi.org/10.5505/jas.2022.38233.

Tozoğlu, Ahmet, Elİf Kaymaz, and Öykü Sezen. “Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekânsal Bağlamını Görselleştirmek: Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e İstanbul’da Millî Bayramlar.” In *Dijital Beşeri Bilimler ve Osmanlı Çalışmaları*. Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, 2023.

Tozoğlu, Ahmet, Elİf Kaymaz, and Öykü Sezen. “Kamusal Mekan, Toplum ve Tören: İstanbul’da Milli Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekansal ve Toplumsal İzleri.” In *Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılında Mimarlık*, edited by İpek Akpınar Aksugür and Şebnem Önal Hoşkara. İdealkent Yayınları, 2024.

Tramvay Işçileri Tayyare Alacak. June 9, 1935.

Tuğaç, Hüsamettin. “Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Belediyelerimiz.” *Belediyeler Dergisi* 5, no. 22 (1937): 23–27.

Tunalı, Veysel. “Bizde Mesken Meselesi.” *Arkitekt*, 1937.

“Tunceli Şakilerinin Sığındıkları Yerlerde — Kahraman Bir Türk Çavuşu Tek Başına Koca Bir Dağı Zapetti.” *Cumhuriyet*, July 4, 1937.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Halk için havaya karşı korunma talimatı, D.86*. T.C. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği IV. Şube 18710. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği, 1932.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı ışıkların söndürülmesi ve karartılması nizamnamesi*. İnkılâp, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi*. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı pasif korunma nizamnamesi*. Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1939.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taaruzlarına karşı fabrikaların ve müesseselerin passif korunmaları hakkındaki genel esasları gösteren talimat*. T.C. Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı IV. Şube, sayı: 7244. Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Şehir planlarının tanziminde ve mühim bina yerlerinin tayininde tatbik edilecek pasif korunma şartlarına dair nizamname*. Başvekalet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Yapılarda pasif korunma bakımından tatbik edilecek esaslar ve sığınaklar nizamnamesi*. Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Bir Sene Içinde Mecmuamızda Çıkan Zehirli Gazlara Ait Yazıların Indeksi." February 15, 1939.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Kızılay İperit Elbiseleri." August 15, 1940.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Kızılay Maskesi." April 15, 1936.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Kızılay Toz Maskesi." June 15, 1940.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Mamakta Kurduğumuz Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Açıldı." December 15, 1935.

Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası. "Maske Altında Yangın Söndürme Tecrübeleri." April 15, 1936.

"Türkiye'nin Pasif Müdafaası – Başvekilimizle Görüşen Fransız Amirali Bir Rapor Hazırlayacak." *Cumhuriyet*, March 17, 1940.

Türkmen, A. "Yer Depremlerinin Sebebleri ve Mukavim Yapılar." *Arkitekt*, 1944.

Türkmen, Abdullah. "Depremler ve Bunlara Dayanıklı Evler." *Arkitekt*, 1944.

Ulus. "Gaz Maske Fabrikası Milli Müdafaa Vekâletine Geçiyor." March 2, 1943.

Ulus. "Gaz Maskesi Fabrikamız Törenle Açıldı." November 1, 1935.

Ulus. "Mersin'de Yapılan Esir Değişimi." March 25, 1943.

Umar, Saim. "Florans Nightingale." *Türkiye Kızılay Mecmuası*, December 15, 1938.

Ünsal, Behçet. "Hava Tehlikesi Karşısında Mimarlık ve Şehircilik Sanatı." *Arkitekt*, 1935.

Ünsal, Behçet. "Zelzele Karşısında Yapı." *Arkitekt*, 1939.

Üsküdar'da Feci Bir Inhidam | Bir Ev Yıkıldı, 3 Kişi Öldü, 4 Kişi de Yaralandı. December 23, 1941.

Vakit. "Bir Ay Zarfında Apartımanlar Altında Sığınak Yapacaklar." March 27, 1940.

Vakit. "Hava Hücumları ve Biz." November 5, 1933.

"Vali Dün Matbuata Geniş Izahat Verdi: Yapılan Imar Hamlesi Değil, Alelade Belediye Hizmetlerinden Ibarettir." *Cumhuriyet*, March 6, 1940.

V.N. "Mimar Yetiştirmek, Mimara İş Vermekle Olur." *Mimar*, 1933.

Wagner, Martin. "Büyük Şehirler Nasıl Tadil Edilir?" *Arkitekt*, 1937.

Wagner, Martin. "İnşa Etmeyen Bir Millet Yaşamıyor Demektir." *Arkitekt*, 1937.

Wagner, Martin. "İstanbul Havalisinin Plânı." *Arkitekt*, 1936.

Wagner, Martin. "İstanbul Şehrinin Düzeltilmesi Meseleleri." *Arkitekt*, 1936.

Wagner, Martin. "İstanbul'un Münakale Tahlili." *Arkitekt*, 1937.

Wagner, Martin. "Şehir İnşası Ne Demektir?" *Arkitekt*, 1938.

Wagner, Martin. "Şehircilikte Sermayenin Yanlış İdaresi." *Arkitekt*, 1936.

Ward, Barbara. *Turkey*. The World Today. Oxford University Press, 1942.

Weisband, Edward. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. Princeton Legacy Library, 2015.

Weisenfeld, Gennifer. "Gas Mask Parade: Japan's Anxious Modernism." *Modernism/Modernity* 21, no. 1 (2014): 179–99.

Weizman, Eyal. *Hollow Land*. Verso, 2017.

Wilke, Christiane. "How International Law Learned to Love the Bomb: Civilians and the Regulation of Aerial Warfare in the 1920s." *Australian Feminist Law Journal* 44, no. 1 (2018): 29–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1465335.

Woodward, Rachel. "From Military Geography to Militarism's Geographies: Disciplinary Engagements with the Geographies of Militarism and Military Activities." *Progress in Human Geography* 29, no. 6 (2005): 718–40. https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132505ph579oa.

Yangın Zilleri Konuyor. February 2, 1935.

Yilmaz, Hale. *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey 1923-1945*. Syracuse University Press, 2013.

Yücebaş, Ferit. "Türkiye'de İkinci Dünya Savaşı Arifesi ve Savaş Esnasında Olası Saldırılara Karşı Halkı Bilgilendirme Çalışmaları." *Anasay*, no. 26 (November 2023): 26. https://doi.org/10.33404/anasay.1374989.

Zağra, Hatice Çiğdem, Doğa Hazal Günaydın, and Sibel Özden. "Arşiv Belgelerindeki Mimari Çizimlerin Dijitalleştirilmesi: Çatalca Savunma Yapıları Örneği." *KAPU Trakya Mimarlık ve Tasarım Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2022): 2.

Zehirli gazlar: Tesirleri, tedavi ve korunma çareleri. Bursa İlbaylığı Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kurumunun Aydınlatma Kolu, 1936.

Zengin, Ersoy, and Serdar Göktaş. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sürecinde Türk Ordusunda Yaşanan Salgın Hastalıklar Ve Ölümler." *Tarih ve Gelecek Dergisi* 6, no. 3 (2020): 3. https://doi.org/10.21551/jhf.796673.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Turkey: A Modern History*. Rev. ed. I.B. Tauris : [Distributed by St. Martin's Press], 1993.

APPENDICES

A. PERIOD BOOKS ON PASSIVE DEFENSE AND POISON GAS

Algan, Nurettin Münşi. *Gaz kimyası: zehirli gazlar ve kimyevi savaş*. Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi Kütüphanesi 32. Nafia Vekaleti Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi, 1936.

Bahar, Hâmit. *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri*. Tan Matbaası, 1940.

Bahar, Hâmit. *Halk için havadan ve zehirli gazlardan korunma çareleri: pasif korunmada çalışacak vatandaşlara rehber*. 4.3 bs. Yayl.y.], 1940.

Beşinci Tayyare Kongresi : Hava Tehlikesi. Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, 1932.

Boysan, Mazlum, and Nuri Refet Korur. *Harp gazları ve bunlara karşı korunma*. İnkılab Kitabevi, 1938.

Candan, H. L. *Hava tehlikesi ve korunma çareleri*. Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1939.

Candan, H. L. *Hava tehlikesi ve passif korunma tedbirleri*. Bursa, 1940.

Ergökmen, Şakir Hazım. *Hava tehlikesi*. Güneş Matbaası, 1940.

Erzurum Havaya Karşı Pasif Korunma Komisyonu. *Hava tehlikesinde halkımızı ilgilendiren ödevler*. T.C. Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü. Erzurum Vilayeti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1939.

Fırat, Sedat. *Zehirli gaz ve korunma dersleri*. Genelkurmay X. şube, 1938.

Gaz ve gazdan korunma dersleri hakkında müfredat programı. İstanbul, 1936.

Gibrin, and L. C. Heckiy. *Teşkilâtlı passif müdafaa*. Dahiliye Vekâleti Seferberlik Müdürlüğü, 1938.

Giray, Halit, and Nefi Vural. *Halk zehirli gazlara karşı kendini ve başkalarını nasıl koruyabilir?* Manisa Halkevi, 1939.

Hava harbinden korunmada yurd teşkilât ve tertibatı genel bilgileri. T.C. Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekâleti neşriyatından, no. 42. Sıhhat ve İçtimaî Muavenet Vekaleti, 1937.

Hava taarruzlarına karşı korunma bilgileri. Çituris Biraderler, 1940.

Hava taaruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri. Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti neşriyatından. Hava Tehlikesi ve Korunma Çareleri, Ankara. Türk Teyyare Cemiyeti, 1933.

Havadan ve zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri, V. sınıf. T.C. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Hüsnü Bey. *Muharebe gazları ve koruma çareleri*. Gayret Matbaası, 1934.

İnönü, İsmet. *Türk Hava Kurumunun altıncı kurultayında başbakan İsmet İnönünün verdikleri söylev*. Türk Hava Kurumu, 1935.

Karaaslan, Hayreddin. *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*. T.C. Münakalât Vekâleti İstanbul Mıntıka Liman Reisliği, 1939.

Keskin, Said, ed. *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*. Kütahya Vilâyeti neşriyatı 1. Kütahya Vilayeti, 1937.

Kömürcüoğlu, Turgut. *Hava saldırmaları ve bunlardan korunma*. Bilgi Matbaası, 1940.

Konuralp, Hikmet, and Avni Refik Bekman. *Zehirli gazlardan korunma dersleri*. İstanbul, 1937.

Konuralp, Hikmet, and Kadri Yaman. *Zehirli gazlardan korunma dersleri: Ortaokullar için*. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Konuralp, Hikmet, and Kadri Yaman. *Zehirli gazlerden korunma dersleri*. İstanbul, 1938.

Korur, Nuri Refet. *Hava tehlikesi ve harp gazlarına karşı korunma tedbirleri*. Ulussesi Basımevi, 1938.

Kutkan, Nuri. *Zehirli gaz konferanslarım*. Eskişehir, 1935.

Mithat Salih. *Denizde kimya harbi*. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği XII. Deniz Şubesi, 1930.

Moynier. *Harp gazları: zehirli gazlardan ileri gelen afetlerin seriri mütalaası tesemmümlerin tedavisi*. Translated by Şerif Atakan. Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936.

Öncel, Ömer Şevket. *Zehirli gazlar kimya dersleri ve korunma usulleri*. Şirketi Mürettibiye Basımevi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Gaz Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Genel Korunma ve Sığınaklar*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Maskeler*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Tahrip Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Yangın Bombaları*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özger, Abidin Haşim. *Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma: Zehirli Gazlar*. Öğretmenler Gazetesi, 1938.

Özgüler, Şefik. *Savaşda ağulu gaz saldırmaları*. Yavrular Yurdu Neşriyat Evi, 1935.

Özkaya, Nuri. *Zehirli gazlar hakkında halkevinde verilen dersler*. Halkevi Neşriyatı, 1936.

Özöner, Mehmet Ali. *Zehirli gazlardan korunma kılavuzu*. Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, 1940.

Pasif korunma. Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1939.

Passif havadan korunma. Alâeddin Kral Basımevi, 1939.

Passif koruma teşkilatına ait notlar. Rıza Coşkun Matbaası, 1940.

Refet, Nuri. *Herkes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?* İnkılab Kitabevi, 1936.

Tanık, M. H. *Gök savaşlarından korunma yolları*. Hilmi Kitabevi, 1937.

Tarlan, A. Rıza. *Passif korunma sıhhıye ekip için harp gazlarına karşı korunma*. Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1939.

Tobur, M. Mazhar. *Zehirli gazlar ve korunma çareleri*. İnkılâp Kütüphanesi, 1936.

Topakoğlu, Cemal. *Memleket içinin havaya karşı passif korunması hakkında genel bilgiler*. Açıksöz Matbaası, 1939.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Halk için havaya karşı korunma talimatı, D.86*. T.C. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği IV. Şube 18710. Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisliği, 1932.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı ışıkların söndürülmesi ve karartılması nizamnamesi*. İnkılâp, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı korunma kanun, nizamname ve talimatnamesi*. Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taarruzlarına karşı pasif korunma nizamnamesi*. Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1939.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Hava taaruzlarına karşı fabrikaların ve müesseselerin passif korunmaları hakkındaki genel esasları gösteren talimat*. T.C. Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı IV. Şube, sayı: 7244. Hava Müdafaa Genel Komutanlığı, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Şehir planlarının tanziminde ve mühim bina yerlerinin tayininde tatbik edilecek pasif korunma şartlarına dair nizamname*. Başvekalet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ed. *Yapılarda pasif korunma bakımından tatbik edilecek esaslar ve sığınaklar nizamnamesi*. Başvekâlet Neşriyat ve Müdevvenat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1940.

Zehirli gazlar: Tesirleri, tedavi ve korunma çareleri. Bursa İlbaylığı Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kurumunun Aydınlatma Kolu, 1936.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

Elif KAYMAZ

EDUCATION

PhD in Architectural History, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TR (2019–2025)

MA in Architectural History, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TR (2015–2019);

BA in City and Regional Planning, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TR (2009–2015); Minor in Architectural Culture (2012–2015).

ACADEMIC POSITIONS & EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant**,** Department of Architecture & Graduate Program in Architectural History, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TR (2022–Present)

Editorial Assistant, *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* (2022–Present)

Instructor, Department of Architecture, Başkent University, Ankara, TR (2021)

Doctoral Researcher, TÜBİTAK-funded project *Invention and Official Celebration of National Days in the Building of the Nation-State in Turkey: Spatial Manifestations of Ceremonial Legitimization in Istanbul and Ankara (1908–1946)* (2020–2022)

FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS

SALT Research Fellowship (2024) *Kentsel Duygular, Sivil Tedbirler: Türkiye'de Hava Tehlikesi ve Zehirli Gazlarla Mücadelede Mekânsal Söylem ve Pratikler (1935-1946)*

Conference Travel Award, Istanbul Research Institute (2024)

Course Performance Award**,** METU Institute of Social Sciences (2021)

PUBLICATIONS

Paeslack, Miriam; Ines Tolic; Elif Kaymaz; Davide Deriu; Dorothy Barenscott. “Feeling through Images: Architectural Histories after the Emotional Turn.” *Architectural Histories* (forthcoming, 2025).

Kaymaz, Elif. “Nocturnal Architectures of Allure: On Celebration and Illumination in Early 20th-Century Turkey.” *Mediapolis: A Journal of Cities and Culture* 10(2), 2025.

Tozoğlu, Ahmet Erdem; Kaymaz, Elif; Sezen, Öykü Su. “From the Ambivalent to the Material: Personification, Spatialization and Ritualization of Liberty in the Late Ottoman Period (1908–1913).” *Turkish Studies* (2025).

Tozoğlu, Ahmet Erdem; Kaymaz, Elif; Sezen, Öykü Su. “Celebration of National Days in Ankara: Performative Forms of Publicity during the Early Republican Period.” *Journal of Ankara Studies* 10(2):203–228 (2022).

Tozoğlu, Ahmet Erdem; Kaymaz, Elif; Sezen, Öykü Su. “Kamusal Mekan, Toplum ve Tören: İstanbul’da Milli Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekansal ve Toplumsal İzleri.” In *Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılında Mimarlık*, eds. İpek Akpınar Aksugür and Şebnem Önal Hoşkara, 376–411. Ankara: İdealkent Yayınları, 2024.

Tozoğlu, Ahmet Erdem; Kaymaz, Elif; Sezen, Öykü Su. “Bayram Kutlamalarının Mekânsal Bağlamını Görselleştirmek: Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e İstanbul’da Millî Bayramlar.” In *Dijital Beşeri Bilimler ve Osmanlı Çalışmaları*, 293–332. İstanbul: Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, 2023.

Kaymaz, Elif. “‘Vitrin’ için Mekânsal Tezler: İşlevsel, Sıradan ve Olağandışı Üzerine.” In *Acil Toplanma Yerinden Manzaralar*, ed. Tahir Onur Çimen, 16–26. Ankara: Goethe-Institut, 2022.

CONFERENCES & PANELS

Frontiers: Kinetics of Expulsion, Expansion, and Contestation, 9th EAHN International Conference, Aarhus (June 2026). (Session Convener)

Exposing the Environments of Warfare: On the Permanency of Defence Epistemologies, AHRA 2025 *Conceptualizing Environments: Continuity & Change*, Liverpool (Nov 2025). (Session Convener)

Nocturnal Architectures of Assurance: Spectacles of State Legitimacy in Early 20th-Century Turkey, NECS Graduate Workshop *L/Nightscapes: Perspectives on Illumination and the City*, Cologne (Nov–Dec 2024).

Mediating Duty and Spectacle: Curating and Representing Public Space as Wartime Measures in Turkey (1938–1946), NECS Conference *Emergencies*, İzmir (June 2024).

İstanbul (will be) in Peril: Illustrating Anxiety, Air Raids and a National Emotional Regime during the Interwar Period, EAHN 2024 International Conference, Athens (June 2024).

Fear, Crisis and Space: Wartime Urbanism and Policies of Passive Defense in Turkey (1939–1945), Symposium of Urban Design History and Theory, Zuid-Holland (Nov 2023).

Crossing Borders of the City, Screen and Identity: Children, Moviegoing and National Holidays in Ankara (1929–1946), HoMER Annual Conference *Across Borders: Audiences, Exhibition and Reception*, Rome (July 2022).

Trains, Stations, Peoples' Houses: Spatial Experiments in Educational Film Exhibitions in Early Republican Turkey, NECS Conference *Epistemic Media: Atlas, Archive, Network*, Bucharest (June 2022).

LANGUAGES

Turkish, English, Ottoman Turkish

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, 1935–1945 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin savaşsız fakat savaş beklentisi altında şekillenen mekânsal düzenlemelerini incelemektedir. Tez, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na resmen katılmayan bir ülkenin, savaşın henüz gerçekleşmeden önceki olasılığı etrafında nasıl seferber hâle geldiğini araştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, savaşın kendisini değil, savaşın gelecekteki ihtimalini üretken bir tarihsel kuvvet olarak ele almaktadır. Savaşın beklenişi, yani anticipation (beklenti), bu dönemde yalnızca bir ruh hâli veya politik yönelim değil, aynı zamanda bir mekânsal ve idari düzenleme biçimi hâline gelmiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin toprağı, şehirleri ve bedenleri; diplomatik dengeler, askeri altyapılar, yasalar, kent planları, mimarlık tartışmaları ve gündelik pratikler üzerinden "yaklaşan savaşın coğrafyası" olarak yeniden tanımlanmıştır. Tez, bu yeniden tanımlama sürecini "beklenti mimarlığı" (*architecture of anticipation*) kavramı üzerinden açıklamaktadır. Beklenti mimarlığı, henüz yaşanmamış bir olayın bugünde kurumsallaşması, görünürlük kazanması ve gündelik hayatın örgütleyici ilkesi hâline gelmesini tanımlamaktadır. Bu yönüyle çalışma, mimarlığı yalnızca inşa edilen yapılarla sınırlamamakta; haritalar, yönetmelikler, raporlar, fotoğraflar, gazete haberleri ve pedagojik belgeler gibi geniş bir belge evreni üzerinden okumaktadır.

Tezin temel amacı, savaş beklentisinin modern Türkiye'nin mekânsal yönetiminde oynadığı kurucu rolü açığa çıkarmaktır. Savaşın olasılığı, hükümetin karar süreçlerinden belediyelerin imar uygulamalarına, bilim insanlarının deneylerinden yurttaşların gündelik davranışlarına kadar uzanan çok katmanlı bir düzen üretmiştir. Bu üretim, mimarlık tarihi literatüründe sıklıkla göz ardı edilmiş bir alan olan "tarafsızlık döneminin" idari ve mekânsal siyasetlerini görünür kılmaktadır. Böylece tez, savaşın yıkımından ziyade beklentinin üretkenliğine odaklanmakta; savaşsız bir dönemin nasıl savaş mekânlarını önceden kurduğunu göstermektedir.

Çalışma, üç ölçekli bir analiz çerçevesi benimsemektedir. İlk olarak, ulusal toprak ölçeğinde savunma hatları, haritalar ve sınır düzenlemeleri incelenmiştir. Bu bölümde, ülke coğrafyasının nasıl bir "cepheler bütünü" olarak tahayyül edildiği; özellikle İngiliz askerî danışmanlarının etkisiyle harita üretimlerinin, liman projelerinin ve maden sahalarının "gelecekteki savaş coğrafyasının altyapısı"na dönüştüğü ortaya konulmaktadır. İkinci olarak, kent ölçeğinde İstanbul örneği üzerinden, pasif korunma (passive defense) rejiminin kent planlama ilkeleriyle nasıl kesiştiği tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Prost planı, karartma uygulamaları, sığınak inşaları, yangın tatbikatları ve yönetmelikler aracılığıyla kent mekânının "havadan saldırıya karşı dirençli şehir" (air-raid-resistant city) idealine göre yeniden düzenlendiği gösterilmektedir. Üçüncü

olarak, beden ölçeğinde, zehirli gaz tehdidi ve kimyasal savaş korkusu etrafında örgütlenen duygusal, pedagojik ve teknik uygulamalar ele alınmıştır. Kızılay fabrikalarında üretilen maskeler, okullarda verilen gaz dersleri, sivil savunma tatbikatları ve bedenin disipline edilme biçimleri, savaşsız bir savaş pratiğini kuran mikro-mekânsal düzenlemeler olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu üç ölçek birlikte düşünüldüğünde, "beklenti mimarlığı" kavramı, farklı düzeylerde işleyen bir yönetsel ve duygulanımsal ağın adı olarak belirginleşmektedir. Beklenti, yalnızca geleceğe yönelik bir hazırlık değil, bugünü biçimlendiren bir bilgi ve iktidar rejimi hâline gelmiştir. Bu rejim, haritaların çiziliş biçiminden gündelik mekânların kullanımına kadar uzanan bir süreklilik içinde işlemektedir. Tez, bu çerçevede savaş tarihine ve mimarlık tarihine ilişkin yerleşik önkabulleri sorgulamakta; savaşın mimarlığının yalnızca yıkım ve yeniden yapım olmadığını, aynı zamanda henüz gelmemiş olana yönelik idari ve duygulanımsal bir üretim olduğunu göstermektedir.

Kapsam dâhilinde kullanılan kaynaklar geniş bir çeşitlilik arz etmektedir. Askerî ve diplomatik arşivler (ATASE ve Dışişleri), Resmî Gazete'de yayımlanan kanun ve nizamnameler, belediye ve planlama raporları, meslek dergileri (Arkitekt, Belediyeler Dergisi), gündelik basın (Cumhuriyet, Son Posta, Akşam), teknik el kitapları ve eğitim materyalleri ile film ve sergi gibi görsel-işitsel malzemeler, çalışmanın bellek alanını oluşturmaktadır. Bu materyaller, beklenen savaşın mekânlarını belgeleyen ve ölçüye getiren nadir bir arşiv üretmiş bulunmaktadır.
Sonuç olarak, tez; (i) savaşsız bir seferberlik rejiminin nasıl kurulmakta olduğunu, (ii) tarafsızlığın idari bakımdan nasıl etkinleştirildiğini ve (iii) mimarlık tarihinin nesnesinin binadan bürokrasiye, duygu siyasetine ve altyapıya doğru nasıl genişlemekte olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. İzleyen bölümler, bu çerçeveyi ulusal toprak (cepheler), kentsel alan (hava tehdidi altında İstanbul) ve bedensel düzey (zehirli gaz, maske, eğitim) üzerinden ayrıntılandırmakta; son bölümde ise "beklenti mimarlığı" kavramı, tez boyunca elde edilen bulgular ışığında bütüncül bir kavramsal öneri olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, disiplinlerarası bir belge evrenine yaslanmakta ve çok-ölçekli bir analiz yöntemi izlemektedir. Kaynaklar; askerî ve diplomatik arşivler (ATASE, Dışişleri), Resmî Gazete'de yayımlanan kanun, nizamname ve talimatnameler, belediye ve planlama raporları, meslek dergileri (Arkitekt, Belediyeler Dergisi), gündelik basın (Cumhuriyet, Son Posta, Akşam), teknik el kitapları ve eğitim kılavuzları, Kızılay'ın üretim ve eğitim belgeleri ile film, sergi ve fotoğraf gibi görsel-işitsel materyallerden oluşmaktadır. Bu malzeme, savaşın henüz gerçekleşmediği bir bağlamda "beklenen olay"ın nasıl yönetilmekte ve mekânsallaştırılmakta olduğunu çok katmanlı olarak görmeyi mümkün kılmaktadır.

Yöntem, ölçekler arası bir okumaya dayanmaktadır. Ulusal toprak ölçeğinde, savunma hatları, liman altyapıları, maden sahaları ve hava sahasına ilişkin haritalar ve krokiler üzerinden; kentsel ölçekte, mevzuatın kent planlaması ile kesiştiği noktalar, karartma ve sığınak düzenleri, yangın ve çökme gibi gündelik afetlerle iç içe geçen tatbikat rejimleri üzerinden; bedensel ölçekte ise zehirli gaz bilgisi, maske teknolojileri ve eğitim pratikleri üzerinden analiz yürütülmektedir. Bu yaklaşım, aynı konunun farklı ölçekte farklı görünüşler aldığını ve beklenti mimarlığının (*architecture of anticipation*) bu görünüşlerin bileşiminde tezahür etmekte olduğunu göstermektedir.

Kavramsal çerçeve üç eksenden oluşmaktadır. Birincisi beklenti (*anticipation*) kavramı olup, çalışmada edilgen bir bekleyişi değil, geleceği bugünde örgütleyen bir yönetişim biçimini ifade etmektedir. İkincisi cephe kavramıdır; burada cephe yalnız askerî bir hat olarak değil, diplomatik, idari ve teknik temas yüzeyi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncüsü, kentin hava tehdidiyle birlikte dikeylik (verticality) ve hava sahası (airspace) üzerinden yeniden düşünülmesidir; bu eksen, şehir mekânının yukarıdan aşağıya yeniden tanımlanmakta olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu üç kavram birlikte, savaşsız bir savaş rejiminin nasıl kurulduğunu açıklamaktadır.

Sınır ve kapsam bakımından, çalışma 1935–1945 dönemini esas almakta ve Türkiye coğrafyasını merkezde tutmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, özellikle danışmanlık ve işbirliği ilişkileri üzerinden İngiltere ile kurulan teknik ve diplomatik hatlar izlenmekte; maden ihracatı, liman altyapıları ve hava üssü talepleri gibi konular, ulusal mekânın uluslararası bağlarla nasıl şekillenmekte olduğunu göstermektedir. Kent ölçeğinde odak İstanbul olmakla birlikte, ulusal toprak ölçeğinde Trakya, Boğazlar-Akdeniz ve Ege kıyıları kritik temsili alanlar olarak ele alınmaktadır. Beden ölçeğinde ise Kızılay'ın üretim ve eğitim ağları ile okul-halkevi temelli pedagojik dizge, beklenen savaşın gündelik hayata sızma biçimleri olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Son olarak, çalışma mimarlık nesnesinin genişletilmesi yönünde bir metodolojik iddia taşımaktadır. Bina ve anıtsal inşadan çok, idari düzenekler, altyapı ağları, görsel-işitsel temsil ortamları ve pedagojik teknikler, mekânsal üretimin asli bileşenleri olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu yaklaşım, savaşın yokluğunda dahi mekânın nasıl askerîleştirilmekte olduğunu ve "beklenti mimarlığı"nın bu geniş alan içinde görünür hâle geldiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

İlk bölüm, 1935–1945 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin ulusal toprağının yaklaşan bir savaşın beklentisi altında nasıl yeniden tanımlanmakta olduğunu incelemektedir. Çalışma, bu dönemde ülke mekânının yalnızca askerî bir güvenlik alanı olarak değil, aynı zamanda idari, diplomatik ve teknik müdahalelerle yeniden biçimlenen bir yönetim coğrafyası olarak kurgulandığını göstermektedir. Bu çerçevede, beklenti mimarlığı (architecture of anticipation), toprak ölçeğinde hem stratejik bir hazırlık hem de sembolik bir inşa biçimi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. 1930'ların

ortasından itibaren savunma planlaması, ekonomik kalkınma ve imar politikalarıyla iç içe geçmiştir. Cumhuriyet'in erken döneminde ulusal egemenliğin temeli olarak düşünülen toprak, bu dönemde görünmez bir seferberlik ağıyla örülmüştür. Haritalar, coğrafi raporlar ve mühendislik çizimleri, yalnızca bilgi belgeleri değil, aynı zamanda geleceğe yönelik birer hazırlık aygıtı hâline gelmiştir. Böylece mekân, daha savaş başlamadan, olası bir çatışmanın koşullarına göre yeniden yazılmaktadır.

Bu dönemin en çarpıcı örneklerinden biri, Trakya savunma hattıdır. Çatalca ve çevresinde yürütülen istihkâm çalışmaları, Türkiye'nin Batı sınırını bir tür beklenti cephesine dönüştürmüştür. Beton bloklar, siperler ve tahkimatlar kadar, bu hatları belgeleyen haritalar, fotoğraflar ve planlar da savunmanın maddi dünyasını oluşturmuştur. Bu görsel-iddari üretim, gelecekteki bir savaşın olasılığına göre şekillenmiş; toprak, gerçekleşmemiş bir olayın etkisiyle yeniden düzenlenmiştir. Bu anlamda, beklenen savaş, gerçekleşmeden önce bile coğrafyanın biçimini ve anlamını değiştirmiştir.

Bu süreç, yalnızca sınır bölgelerinde değil, tüm ülke mekânında hissedilmiştir. Boğazlar, liman kentleri ve maden bölgeleri, savaşın olasılığına göre yeniden sınıflandırılmıştır. Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin ardından Boğazlar bölgesi, egemenliğin yeniden tarif edildiği bir coğrafya hâline gelmiş; İstanbul ve Çanakkale, diplomatik müzakerelerin ve savunma hazırlıklarının odak noktası olmuştur. Aynı dönemde İzmir, Mersin ve İskenderun gibi liman kentlerinde inşa edilen altyapılar, hem uluslararası askeri işbirliklerinin hem de tarafsızlık politikasının somut mekânsal uzantıları olmuştur. Liman düzenlemeleri, depo alanları ve hava savunma tesisleri, geleceğin muhtemel savaş senaryolarına göre şekillendirilmiştir.

Bu yeniden yapılanma süreci, Türkiye'nin tarafsızlık statüsünün pasif bir konum değil, tersine aktif bir stratejik dengeleme aracı olarak işlediğini göstermektedir. Beklentinin mekânsal yönetimi, diplomasi ile mühendislik arasında kurulmuş bir ilişki üzerinden yürütülmüştür. İngiliz askerî heyetlerinin talepleriyle hazırlanan planlar, Türk idaresinin egemenlik sınırlarını yeniden tanımlamasına yol açmış; hangi alanların "uygun" ya da "uygunsuz" sayılacağı, yalnız teknik bir karar değil, siyasi bir pozisyonun ifadesi olmuştur. Dolayısıyla ulusal toprak, bu dönemde hem diplomatik hem de kartografik bir sahneye dönüşmüştür.

Haritalar, raporlar ve planlar, bu sürecin en belirgin araçlarıdır. Her yeni harita, olası bir saldırıya göre hazırlanmakta; her düzenleme, henüz yaşanmamış bir geleceğe karşı tedbir geliştirmektedir. Coğrafyanın ölçülmesi, sınıflandırılması ve yeniden adlandırılması, beklenti mimarlığının idari dilini oluşturmuştur. Bu dilde, mühendislik terimleri politik anlamlar kazanmış; "saha", "mıntıka" ve "cephe" gibi kelimeler hem teknik hem de ideolojik işlevler üstlenmiştir.

Ulusal ölçekteki bu yeniden yapılanma, aynı zamanda bir görme biçiminin dönüşümüdür. Hava fotoğrafçılığı, harita üretimi ve coğrafi raporlama teknikleri, yalnızca mekânı kaydetmekle kalmamış, onu beklenen bir savaşın perspektifinden yeniden tanımlamıştır. Bu bakış açısı, geleceğin tehdidini bugünün yönetim aygıtına dâhil etmiştir. Bu nedenle beklenen savaş, bir mühendislik faaliyeti kadar bir idari tahayyülün de sonucudur.

Basın ve mesleki dergilerde yer alan yazılar, bu dönüşümün kamusal yüzünü oluşturmuştur. Arkitekt ve Belediyeler Dergisi gibi yayınlarda savunma coğrafyası, modern ulusun teknik kapasitesinin bir göstergesi olarak sunulmuştur. "Vatan haritasının yenilenmesi" ya da "hava saldırılarına karşı şehirlerin korunması" gibi başlıklar, teknik bilginin ulusal güvenlikle özdeşleştirildiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece bilgi üretimi ile mekânsal yönetim arasında yeni bir simbiyoz kurulmuştur.

Toprak ölçeğindeki bu analiz, beklenen savaşın Türkiye'de nasıl idari bir coğrafya yarattığını göstermektedir. Haritalar, planlar ve diplomatik belgeler, geleceğe ait bir arşivin parçaları hâline gelmiştir. Bu belgeler, savaşın başlamasından önce bile savaş sonrası bir düzenin öngörüsünü taşımaktadır. Dolayısıyla, toprak yalnızca savunulan bir yüzey değil, aynı zamanda geleceğin yönetim biçimlerini taşıyan bir organizma hâline gelmiştir.
Bu bulgular, beklenen savaşın yalnızca askerî değil, aynı zamanda duygusal, yönetsel ve epistemik bir hazırlık dönemi yarattığını göstermektedir. Toprak, beklenen olayın hem nedeni hem sonucu hâline gelmiştir: hem korkunun mekânı, hem de güvenliğin temeli olmuştur. Bu çift yönlü işleyiş, beklenti mimarlığının en belirgin özelliğini oluşturur savaşın yokluğunda bile mekân üretimi sürmektedir.

Sonuç olarak bu bölüm, 1930'ların sonu ve 1940'ların başında Türkiye'nin ulusal toprağının, gerçekleşmemiş bir savaşın ihtimaliyle nasıl biçimlendiğini göstermektedir. Trakya'daki savunma hatlarından liman kentlerinin yeniden örgütlenmesine kadar uzanan bu süreç, mekânın "geleceğe göre yönetilmekte olan" bir varlık hâline geldiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece ulusal ölçekteki yeniden yapılanma, tezin ana iddiasını desteklemektedir: Beklenti, bir duygulanım biçimi olduğu kadar bir yönetim mantığı, bir mimarlık biçimi ve bir tarih yazımı pratiği olarak işlemektedir.

İkinci bölüm, 1939 sonrasında İstanbul'un hava saldırısına karşı dirençli kent (air-raid-resistant city) ideali etrafında nasıl yeniden yazılmakta olduğunu incelemektedir. Avrupa'da 1930'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren güç kazanan "hava savaşı kehaneti" (prophecy of air war) ve ona eşlik eden pasif korunma düşüncesi, Türkiye'nin tarafsızlık zemininde dahi kent yönetimini, imar siyasetini ve gündelik hayatı kökten dönüştürmüştür. İstanbul örneği, bu küresel tahayyülün yerel bir "beklenti rejimi"ne tercüme edildiği özgül bir laboratuvar işlevi görmektedir: yasalar,

yönetmelikler, plan kararları, tatbikatlar ve duyusal rejimler üst üste binmekte; kent, yukarıdan gelen tehdide göre (dikeylik/airspace) yeniden düzenlenmektedir.

Hukuksal-idarî çerçeve, bu dönüşümün iskeletini oluşturmaktadır. 1935–1940 arasında yürürlüğe giren düzenlemeler Hava Harbinden Korunmada Yurt Sıhhat İşleri Talimatı (3055), Hava Tehlikesini Bilen Memurlar Hakkında Tamim (3070), Hava ve Zehirli Gazdan Korunma Kurslarına Devam (3548), Hava Taarruzlarına Karşı Korunma Kanunu (3955) ve özellikle Pasif Korunma Nizamnamesi (4178), Talimatnamesi (4432), Binalara ve Sığınaklara Dair Kararname (4418) ile Şehir Planlarının Tanziminde Pasif Korunma Şartları (4532) İstanbul'da kentsel yönetimin gündelik rutinlerine doğrudan nüfuz etmiştir. Bu metinler, karartma (blackout), sığınak, tahliye, aydınlatma ve haberleşme düzenini ayrıntılı olarak tarif etmiş; kent idaresi, apartman bekçisinden mahalle komitesine uzanan bir sorumluluk zinciri içinde yeniden kurgulanmıştır. Böylece planlama, emniyet ve sağlık rejimleri tek bir idari mimarlık (administrative architecture) altında buluşmuştur.

Bu hukuksal çerçeve, Prost'un İstanbul nazım planı ile karmaşık bir biçimde kesişmektedir. 1936'dan itibaren geliştirilen açılma, genişletme ve yangın güvenliği ilkeleri; tarihi dokuda boşaltma, meydan açma ve yol genişletme gibi kararlar; park ve yeşil bant önerileri, pasif korunma mantığıyla "dirençli şehir" idealine eklemlenmiştir. Ahşap dokunun seyreltilmesi ve rizikolu adaların boşaltılması, yalnız modernist bir estetik tercihin değil, aynı zamanda yangın ve bombardıman riski altındaki bir kentin zarar azaltma (risk mitigation) siyaseti olarak gerekçelendirilmiştir. Böylece ahşap İstanbul meselesi, moralist-modernist bir temizlik söyleminden çok, pasif korunmanın somut teknikleriyle bağlantılanmıştır: ışık sızdırmayan doğrama, yangın kaçış güzergâhları, sokak genişlikleri, kütle aralıkları ve saçak düzenleri gibi ayrıntılar, yönetmelik metninden imar çizimine doğru akmaktadır.

Kentsel uygulamalar, "hava tehdidi"ni görünür kılan bir dizi yeni mekânsal pratik üretmiştir. 1939'dan itibaren düzenli hâle gelen tatbikatlar (drills), kenti "düşman yokken savaş hâli"ne sokan pedagojik gösterilere dönüştürmüştür. Sirenler, hoparlör anonsları, trafik kesmeleri ve toplu tahliye senaryoları, sadece güvenlik tedbiri değil, aynı zamanda duygulanımsal bir altyapı (affective infrastructure) inşa etmektedir. Karartma geceleri 1–2 Aralık 1940'ta bütün ülkeyi kapsayan rejimde olduğu gibi İstanbul'u bilinçli bir biçimde görünmezleştiren bir mekân politikasına dönüşmüştür. Pencerelere yapılan bantlama, lambalara takılan maskeler, sokak aydınlatmalarının söndürülmesi ve vitrinde düşük dirençli ampullerin kullanımı, "gecenin mimarlığı"nı kurmakta; kent, ışığın disiplinine tabi olmaktadır.

Sığınak ve siper ekonomisi, bu dönemin en somut mimarlık üretimidir. Geçici hendekler, bina altı sığınaklar, örnek sığınak programları ve apartman ölçekli oda güçlendirmeleri; betonarme

davranışa ilişkin basit ilkelerin halka mal edildiği tipolojiler üretmiştir. "Nümunelik sığınak"ların ihaleye çıkarılması, yer yer kazı ve tahkimat işlerinin belediye ve mahalle inisiyatifleriyle yürütülmesi, bu mimarlığın modüler ve emprik karakterini göstermektedir. Sığınak standartları yalnız kesit ve malzeme tarif etmemekte; giriş-çıkış sayısı, nefes alma rejimi, maske kullanımı ve ilk yardım donatısını da disipline etmektedir. Böylece barınak, bir davranış protokolü ile birlikte düşünülmekte; mekân, eylemle tamamlanmaktadır.

Yeraltı meselesi, İstanbul'da savaş beklentisinin tarihsel derinlikle buluştuğu özgül bir örüntü üretmiştir. Roma-Bizans sarnıçları, yer yer tüneller ve bodrum-kemer dokuları, hem popüler basında hem mesleki çevrelerde "hazır bir sığınak ağı" olarak yeniden keşfedilmiştir. "Yerin altındaki İstanbul" anlatıları, kentin tarihselliğini beklenen geleceğe bağlayan bir temsil stratejisi üretmekte; modern pasif korunma söylemi, antik yeraltı altyapısıyla süreklilik kurulabilecek bir kaynak olarak sahnelenmektedir. Bu, beklenmemiş bir birikim devridaimini açığa çıkarmaktadır: tarihsel altyapı, modern güvenliğin pedagojik malzemesine dönüşmektedir.

Yangınlar ve çöküşler, pasif korunma disiplininin "içsel cephesi"ni oluşturmuştur. 1935–1943 arasında ardışık yangın ve bina göçmeleri, kamusal bellekte modern kentin kırılganlığını somutlayan olay dizilerine dönüşmüştür. İtfaiye ve sivil savunma teşkilatının tecrübe tatbikatlarında yaşanan aksamalar, basında "öğrenme süreci"nin bir parçası olarak çerçevelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda afet yönetimi, yalnız teknik kapasite değil, alışkanlıkların koreografisi olarak da kavranmaktadır: merdiven ve koridorların boşaltılması, avluların geçici toplanma alanına dönüşmesi, mahalle tulumba arabalarının dağıtımı, gazlı el fenerlerinin standartlaşması, günlük hayatın bedenlenmiş ritüellerine dönüşmüştür.

Kamu pedagojisi ve görsel rejim, İstanbul'u "dirençli şehir" idealine bağlayan iletişim katmanını kurmaktadır. Belediyelerin ve Seferberlik İdaresi'nin hazırladığı pasif korunma filmleri, sergiler ve kılavuzlar; Arkitekt ve Belediyeler Dergisi'nde yayımlanan teknik yazılar; gazetelerdeki "dikkatli olunuz" uyarıları ve "sığınak kapıları", "karartma ampulleri", "itfaiye ve pasif korunma malzemeleri" ilanları; tümü bilgi dolaşımını yönetmektedir. Bu rejim, görmek–öğrenmek–uygulamak zincirini kurmakta; modern kentliden beklenen davranış repertuarını standartlaştırmaktadır. Mizah dergilerindeki (ör. Akbaba) gaz maskesi ve sığınak karikatürleri dahi, bu rejimin toplumsal alımlanışını belgeleyen karşıt bir pedagojidir: korku ile alışkanlık arasındaki gerilim, ironi üzerinden yönetilmektedir.

Prost planı ile pasif korunma arasındaki eklemlenme, İstanbul'un morfolojisinde en kalıcı izleri bırakmıştır. Genişletilen akslar, açılan meydanlar, yeşil bantlar ve temizlik/dolgu operasyonları, bir yandan modernist temsil siyasetinin estetik çerçevesini kurarken, öte yandan yangın yayılımını sınırlandırma ve kitlesel tahliyeyi kolaylaştırma gibi operasyonel gerekçeler

taşımaktadır. “Yapı adası–sokak kesiti–kütle aralığı” üçlüsü, pasif korunma şemasına uygun bir geçirgenlik ve kaçış mantığıyla yeniden düşünülmektedir. Böylece Prost’un “eski şehrin açılması” yönündeki müdahaleleri, sadece düzenleyici bir estetik değil, aynı zamanda kriz mekânının rasyonalizasyonu olarak işlev görmüştür.

Ahşap konut dokusu, bu tartışmanın en kritik eşiğidir. Ahşap, bir yandan yangın riski ve ışık sızdırma potansiyeli nedeniyle kontrol edilmesi gereken bir malzeme olarak görülmüş; diğer yandan Boğaziçi ve Haliç çevresindeki yerleşmelerde sosyal ve ekonomik gerçekliklerin taşıyıcısı olmuştur. Pasif korunma, bu ikiliği seyreltme, güçlendirme ve denetleme ekseninde yönetmiştir: “tümüyle tasfiye” yerine seçici inceltme ve teknik uyarlama (karartma doğraması, yüksek riskli parsellerin boşaltılması, kaçış rotalarının açılması) yoluyla şehir, “dirençli şehir” idealine kısmi ama süreğen adımlarla yaklaştırılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, beklenen savaşın yokluğunda dahi, büyük yıkım yerine küçük müdahaleler ağı belirleyici olmaktadır.

Kurumlar arası işbölümü, bu kent rejiminin sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamaktadır. Belediyeler, Emniyet ve Sıhhiye idareleri ile Kızılay, eğitim ve ekipman temininde bir arter ağı kurmuştur. Kızılay’ın maskeden sığınağa uzanan üretim ve eğitim hattı, fen bilgisi öğretmenlerinin okul içi kurslarıyla birleşmekte; apartman, okul ve sinema gibi farklı mekânlarda tekil davranış protokolleri standartlaştırılmaktadır. Böylece kent, dağıtık bir makine gibi çalışmakta; her hane, her merdiven boşluğu ve her bodrum, aynı senaryonun farklı düğümleri hâline gelmektedir.
Bütün bu öğeler, İstanbul’u küresel hava saldırısına karşı dirençli kent tartışmasının yerel ve tarafsız bir örneği hâline getirmektedir. Buradaki özgünlük, anıtsal savunma mimarlığından çok, idari süreklilik ve duyusal disiplin üzerinden ilerleyen bir modelin kurulmuş olmasıdır. Kent, kanun ve kılavuzlarla, karartma ve sergilerle, tatbikat ve ilanlarla geleceğe göre yönetilmekte; karanlık, sessizlik, sıra ve nefes, mimarlığın yeni ölçülerine dönüşmektedir. Bu nedenle İstanbul örneği, “hava savaşı kehaneti”nin yalnızca bir korku siyaseti değil, mekânsal bir üretim rejimi olduğunu göstermektedir: yukarıdan gelen tehdidin dili, zemindeki düzenin kılavuzuna çevrilmiştir.Sonuç itibarıyla, İstanbul’da beklenti mimarlığı, hukuksal-idari metinlerden gündelik jestlere, plan kararlarından yeraltı anlatılarına uzanan bir çok katmanlı ağ olarak belirginleşmektedir. Bu ağ, ahşap doku tartışmasından Prost planına, sığınak ekonomisinden karartma gecelerine kadar farklı başlıkları tek bir amaçta birleştirmektedir: henüz gelmemiş olana karşı dayanıklılık (resilience) üretmek. Bir sonraki bölümde bu rejimin en küçük ölçeği beden ele alınacak; gaz maskesi, nefes, sükûnet ve eğitim üzerinden bireyin bu mimarlığın taşıyıcısı ve ölçüsü hâline nasıl getirildiği gösterilecektir.

Üçüncü bölüm, savaş beklentisinin en içsel ölçeğini, yani bedenin savunulması meselesini ele almaktadır. Hava saldırılarının ve zehirli gazların gündelik söylemlerde belirginleştiği 1930’ların sonu ile 1940’ların başında, insan bedeni bir cephe hattı olarak düşünülmeye başlanmıştır. Artık

savaş, yalnızca toprağın ya da kentin değil, nefesin, tenin ve duyuların da işgal edilebileceği bir olasılık olarak tahayyül edilmiştir. Bu dönüşüm, hem kamusal hem bireysel düzeyde yeni bir korunma kültürünün kurulmasına yol açmıştır. Beden, bu kültürde hem korunması gereken bir varlık, hem de korunmayı öğrenmesi, göstermesi, ve temsil etmesi beklenen bir aktör hâline gelmiştir.

Bu yeni kültürün en kurumsal aktörlerinden biri Kızılay olmuştur. Kızılay, yalnızca tıbbî yardım ya da insani destek örgütü olarak değil, savaşın yaklaşmakta olduğu bir dünyada, teknik bilgi ile ulusal öz-yeterlilik arasında aracılık eden bir kurum olarak yeniden tanımlanmıştır. 1939 yılında kurulan gaz maskesi fabrikası, bu çerçevenin sembolik merkezidir. Kızılay, ithalata bağımlılığı azaltmak, maskeleri yerli malzemelerle üretmek ve sivil halkı eğitmek amacıyla geniş bir organizasyon ağı kurmuştur. Ankara'daki fabrika, hem kimyasal malzeme bilgisinin hem de mühendislik becerisinin odak noktası hâline gelmiş; üretim, laboratuvar çalışmaları ve sivil tatbikatlar arasında kesintisiz bir bilgi dolaşımı yaratmıştır. Bu üretim süreci, aynı zamanda ulusal gurur ve dayanıklılık söylemiyle çevrelenmiştir: "Türk gaz maskesi" yalnız bir aygıt değil, beklenen savaş karşısında kendi kendine yeterli ulusun bir simgesi olarak yüceltilmiştir.
Kızılay'ın faaliyetleri, yalnız üretimle sınırlı kalmamış; eğitim, sergileme ve pedagojik gösteri alanlarına da taşınmıştır. "Gaz ve havadan korunma kursları," "pasif korunma filmleri," ve "tatbikat sergileri," bu dönemin şehir kültüründe sürekli görünürlük kazanmıştır. Bu gösterilerde öğretmenler, belediye görevlileri, sağlıkçılar, kadın dernekleri üyeleri ve öğrenciler, koruyucu ekipman kullanımı, ilk yardım, tahliye ve sığınak disiplini konusunda uygulamalı eğitim almışlardır. Bedenin korunması, bir yandan bilimsel bilgiye, öte yandan duygusal denetime dayanan bir öğrenme süreci hâline gelmiştir. Tatbikatlar, yalnızca olası bir saldırıya hazırlık değil, korkuyu yönetmenin pedagojisi olarak kurgulanmıştır.

Bu dönemde hazırlanan yayınlar ve kitapçıklar, bedenin nasıl davranması gerektiğini, nasıl nefes alacağını, nasıl sessiz kalacağını, nasıl yatacağını ve ne kadar süre dayanabileceğini öğretmiştir. Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi'nin bastığı Pasif Havadan Korunma: Ev veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri (1939) veya Hâmit Bahar'ın Halk İçin Havadan ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Çareleri (1940) adlı kılavuzları, gaz maskesi takmanın ötesinde, bir davranışlar dizisini tarif etmektedir. Maskeyi yalnızca kullanmak değil, bedeni maskeye uygun hâle getirmek gerekmektedir: gözleri kapamak, nefesi yavaşlatmak, sakinliği korumak, hareketleri ölçülü tutmak. Beden, bu anlamda, savaşın görünmez cephesinde disipline edilen bir nesneden, öğretilmiş bir özneye dönüşmektedir.

Gaz tehdidi, aynı zamanda kimya ve fizyoloji bilgisinin gündelik dile karıştığı bir dönemi başlatmıştır. Zehirli gazlar yalnızca bir savaş malzemesi olarak değil, halk sağlığı tartışmalarının, ders müfredatlarının ve popüler bilim metinlerinin de konusu olmuştur. Gaz ve gazdan korunma

dersleri hakkında müfredat programı gibi belgeler, ortaöğretim düzeyinde öğretmenleri koruyucu bilimsel bilginin aktarıcısı hâline getirmiştir. Fen öğretmenleri, gazla temas hâlinde kalmış bir bedenin nasıl temizleneceğini, sirke, soda, sabun, su gibi maddelerin nasıl "nötrleştirici" işlev gördüğünü öğreten figürlere dönüşmüştür. Böylece bilimsel bilgi, askeri bir tehlikenin aracına değil, sivil hayatta güven duygusu üretmenin temel aracına dönüşmüştür.
Bu süreçte, bedenin savunulması yalnızca yetişkinlere değil, çocuklara ve annelere de yönelmiştir. Kızılay'ın ürettiği çocuk maskeleri ve bebek gaz karyolaları, bu dönemin en çarpıcı nesnelerindendir. Özellikle 1940 tarihli fotoğraflarda görülen "çocuk maskesi denemeleri" ya da "bebek koruma karyolası" gibi uygulamalar, hem bilimsel hem duygusal bir temsili taşımaktadır. Burada korunma, yalnız biyolojik bir güvenlik değil, aynı zamanda annelik, aile ve gelecek kavramlarının savaşın dilinde yeniden yazıldığı bir alandır. Kadın bedeni, hem eğitimci hem koruyucu rolüyle, pasif korunmanın ahlaki taşıyıcısı olarak sunulmuştur. Bu söylem, modern vatandaşlığın "fedakâr, sakin ve itaatkâr" yüzünü kadın bedeni üzerinden kurmaktadır.

Gaz korkusunun gündelik hayata sızması, görsel kültürde de açıkça izlenmektedir. Akbaba dergisinde yayımlanan karikatürler, maskelerin komik, ürkütücü veya grotesk biçimlerde temsil edildiği bir ironi alanı yaratmıştır. Bu ironi, toplumun korkuyla başa çıkma biçimini de göstermektedir: gaz maskesi, hem koruyucu hem yabancılaştırıcı bir nesne olarak, modernleşmenin karanlık yüzünü görünür kılmıştır. Bu görsel mizah, bilimsel disiplinin katılığını yumuşatmakta, korkunun pedagojik etkisini toplumsal mizah aracılığıyla dengelemektedir.
Kızılay'ın gaz maskesi üretimi, teknik bir süreç olmanın ötesinde toplumsal dayanışma ve millî seferberlik söylemini güçlendirmiştir. Maskeler, yalnızca askeri veya sağlık kurumlarına değil, okullara, fabrikalara ve kamu kurumlarına da dağıtılmıştır. Her dağıtım, bir tür "hazırlıklı olma töreni" gibi sunulmuş; fotoğraflar, raporlar ve gazete haberleriyle bu dağıtımlar, ulusal kararlılığın sembolü hâline gelmiştir. Korunma, böylece bir vatandaşlık pratiği olarak yeniden tanımlanmıştır. Vatandaş, artık yalnız oy veren ya da vergi ödeyen değil, kendisini düzenli biçimde koruyan, disipline eden ve eğiten bir bedene sahip olma sorumluluğunu taşımaktadır.
Tüm bu örnekler, savaşın fiziksel olarak yaşanmadığı bir ülkede dahi, savaşın duyusal biçimlerinin inşa edildiğini göstermektedir. Maskenin kokusu, sığınaktaki karanlık, sessiz kalma mecburiyeti, dar alanda nefesin paylaşımı… tümü, savaşın olasılığını bedensel bir deneyim olarak yeniden üretmektedir. Bu dönemde korunma, yalnız maddi bir hazırlık değil, aynı zamanda bedensel bir duygulanım eğitimi hâline gelmiştir. Korku, alışkanlık, dikkat, dayanıklılık ve sakinlik, bu eğitimin ana duygusal öğeleridir.

Bu çerçevede, "bedenin savunması" mimarlığın dışında değil, tam kalbinde yer almaktadır. Sığınakların planları, maskelerin biçimi, tatbikatlarda bedenlerin konumlanışı, hatta nefes almanın ritmi tümü, mekânın ve eylemin eşzamanlı örgütlenmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Bu bağlamda "mimarlık", sadece duvarlar arasında değil, bedenin içinde sürmektedir. Kızılay'ın

atölyelerinde üretilen maskeler, kimya laboratuvarlarında hazırlanan eğitim malzemeleri, okullarda yapılan nefes egzersizleri ve film gösterimleri, bu yeni mimarlığın parçalarıdır. Beklenen savaş, böylece bedenin sınırlarında, duyuların hafızasında ve davranışların kılavuzlarında şekillenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu bölümün temel iddiası, savaşın beklenmediği bir ülkede bile, beklentinin bedenselleştiğidir. Zehirli gaz, hiçbir zaman İstanbul semalarından inmemiştir; ancak onun hayaleti, laboratuvarlarda, sınıflarda, afişlerde ve maskelerde varlığını sürdürmüştür. Bu hayalet, gelecekteki felaketin simülasyonu üzerinden bir kamusal disiplin yaratmış; nefes, sakinlik, dikkat ve korku, modern bedenin ölçü birimlerine dönüşmüştür. Dolayısıyla, "bedenin savunması" aynı zamanda "geleceğin hazırlanması"dır. Bu hazırlık, inşa edilen bir duvar ya da kazılan bir siper değil; öğretilmiş bir davranışlar mimarlığıdır.

Bu çalışmanın sonunda, bütün bir dönemin mekânsal tarihini yönlendiren ortak bir duygusal ve yönetsel mantık görünür hâle gelmiştir: beklenti. Bu tez, 1935–1945 yılları arasında Türkiye'de, savaşın kendisi değil, savaşın olasılığı etrafında örülen mimari, kentsel ve idari düzenlemeleri incelemiştir. "Beklenti mimarlığı" kavramı, bu araştırmanın kavramsal odağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu ifade, mekânın bir olaydan önce yani henüz gerçekleşmemiş bir tehlike ya da felaket varsayımı üzerinden nasıl üretildiğini, düzenlendiğini ve hissedildiğini açıklamak için kullanılmaktadır. Bu mimarlık, bir binayı değil, bir olasılığı inşa etmektedir. Bu araştırmanın izini sürdüğü üç ölçek ülke, kent ve beden aslında aynı tarihsel duygunun farklı yüzleridir. Ulusal toprakta ortaya çıkan savunma hatları, liman düzenlemeleri ve diplomatik planlamalar, kentin pasif korunma rejimleriyle birleşmiş; kentteki bu hazırlık da bireylerin davranışlarında, nefes alışlarında, hatta sessizliklerinde yeniden üretilmiştir. Dolayısıyla savunma, yalnızca fiziksel bir tedbir değil, aynı zamanda sosyal bir organizasyon biçimi hâline gelmiştir. "Sınır", "cephe", "sığınak" ve "maskenin" ortak paydası, geleceği bugüne dâhil eden bir hazırlık düşüncesidir. Bu düşünce, modern Türkiye'nin mekânsal kurgusuna, çoğu zaman görünmez biçimlerde yerleşmiştir.

"Beklenti" bu bağlamda ne yalnızca psikolojik bir haldir, ne de salt politik bir strateji. O, aynı anda hem duygusal bir atmosfer, hem de yönetsel bir teknolojidir. Koselleck'in ifadesiyle, "beklentinin ufku" tarihsel bilinci yeniden biçimlendirir; Nadin'in tanımladığı biçimiyle "anticipatory system," olası bir gelecek durumuna göre bugünün davranışlarını düzenler. Bu çalışmada bu kavramlar, mekân tarihine aktarılmıştır: bir ülke, bir kent, bir beden, geleceğe göre yönetilmekte; bugünün biçimi, henüz gelmemiş bir yarına göre kurulmaktadır. Bu, ne kadercilik ne de önceden belirlenmişliktir olasılıklarla yaşama pratiğidir.

Bu pratik, tezin ortaya koyduğu gibi, belirli bir mantıkla çalışmaktadır. Öncelikle, ölçekler arası süreklilik temel bir özelliktir. Savunma hattı, sığınak ve maske arasında kopukluk değil,

geçirgenlik vardır. Aynı haritalama, planlama ve standartlaştırma dili, bir savunma planından bir yönetmeliğe, oradan da beden eğitimine kadar uzanmıştır. Bu süreklilik, modern yönetimin çok katmanlı doğasını gösterir: farklı kurumlar belediye, Kızılay, Seferberlik İdaresi, Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti birbirine temas eden ama tek bir merkezden yönetilmeyen bir hazırlık ağı kurmuştur.
İkinci olarak, dikeylik ve görünürlük kavramları, bu hazırlık mantığının mekânsal düzenini belirlemiştir. Savaş tehdidi yukarıdan, havadan gelmektedir; bu durum, coğrafyanın, şehrin ve bedenin bütün düşünme biçimini değiştirmiştir. Yerden bakmak değil, yukarıdan görmek önem kazanmış; harita, hava fotoğrafı ve plan, bu yeni bakışın araçları olmuştur. Bu dikey görme biçimi, yalnız savunma hatlarını değil, kamusal davranışları da düzenlemiştir: karartma geceleri, maskelenmiş ışıklar, yeraltı sığınakları ve gaz maskeleri, görülmemenin ve görmemeye dayanmanın yeni bir estetiğini oluşturmuştur.

Üçüncü olarak, bu dönemin mekânsal politikası, kırılganlık ve dayanıklılık arasında salınmaktadır. Beklenen savaş, hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmemiş olsa da, onun ihtimali her şeyi harekete geçirmiştir. Bu ikili durum "yokluğunda varlık" modern mimarlığın temel bir çelişkisini açığa çıkarmaktadır: görünmeyen tehdide karşı kalıcı düzenlemeler yapılmakta, geçici yapılar üzerinden sürekli bir kontrol duygusu inşa edilmektedir. Beklenti mimarlığı, tam da bu aralıktadır; ne yıkım ne de yeniden doğuştur, sürekli bir hazırlık hâlidir.

Bu bağlamda, İstanbul'un hava saldırısına karşı dirençli kent tasavvuru, Trakya'daki savunma hatlarıyla, Kızılay'ın maskeleriyle aynı zihinsel evrene aittir. Her biri, geleceği yönetilebilir kılma arzusunun farklı biçimlerini temsil etmektedir. Bu arzu, teknik bir planlamadan çok, duygusal bir mantıkla işlemiştir: korku, sakinlik, dikkat ve dayanıklılık, bu dönemin görünmez duvarlarıdır. Bu nedenle, beklenti mimarlığı aynı zamanda bir duygulanım mimarlığıdır.

Tez, bu üç ölçek üzerinden ilerleyerek, savaş mimarlığını yalnız yıkım ya da seferberlik bağlamında değil, bekleme ve hazırlık hâli üzerinden okumanın gerekliliğini ortaya koymuştur. Bu bakış, mimarlık tarihindeki "Architecture in Uniform" geleneğini tersine çevirmektedir. Burada mimarlar üniforma giymemiştir; üniformayı giyen, sıradan yurttaşın bedenidir. Kenti planlayanlar kadar belediye memurları, mühendisler, kimya öğretmenleri, kadın dernekleri üyeleri ve apartman bekçileri de bu tarihsel mimarlığın üreticileridir. Bu durum, mimarlığın sınırlarını genişletmekte; onu yalnız bina yapımıyla değil, davranış biçimlerinin, bilginin ve duygunun örgütlenmesiyle ilişkilendirmektedir.

Bu araştırmanın en önemli katkısı, mimarlık tarihine zamansal bir derinlik kazandırmasıdır. Olayın kendisine değil, olayın beklenişine bakmak, tarihyazımında yeni bir perspektif açmaktadır. "Beklenti mimarlığı", yalnız bir dönem tanımı değil, aynı zamanda bir yöntemsel öneridir: mekânı, olmuş bitmiş bir durum değil, olasılıklar alanı olarak okumak. Bu yöntem, hem savaş hem barış

dönemlerini, hem kriz hem istikrar anlarını birlikte kavramaya olanak tanımaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bu kavramın etkisi yalnızca 1930–40'larla sınırlı değildir. Bugün, farklı biçimlerde sürdüğünü görmek mümkündür. İklim krizi, göç, salgın ya da siber güvenlik gibi çağdaş meseleler, aynı mantıkla işlemektedir: tehdit henüz gerçekleşmeden, altyapılar, politikalar ve davranış rejimleri oluşturulmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, "beklenti mimarlığı", modernitenin süreğen hâlini tarif eder: her an yaklaşmakta olan bir felakete göre kendini düzenleyen toplum biçimi. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışma yalnız geçmişi anlatmamaktadır; bugünün korkularına ve geleceğin tahayyüllerine de ayna tutmaktadır.

D. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Kaymaz

Adı / Name : Elif

Bölümü / Department : Mimarlık Tarihi / History of Architecture

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): **ARCHITECTURES OF ANTICIPATION: THE MAKING OF WARTIME SPACES IN TURKEY, 1935-1945** / BEKLENTİ MİMARLIĞI: TÜRKİYE'DE SAVAŞ ZAMANININ MEKÂNSAL İNŞASI, 1935–1945

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora** / PhD ☒

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☐
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. ***** ☒

***** *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

Yazarın imzası / Signature ..... **Tarih** / Date .....

(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)

(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.