THE ELABORATION OF THE CATEGORY OF THE SUBJECT: AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN ALTHUSSER AND EARLY BADIOU

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis elaborates on the category of the subject within the intersection of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Starting from Althusser's theoretical innovations in the domains of causality, determination, and science, the tension that occurs between the standpoint of theoretical articulation and the category of the subject is elaborated. By focusing on Althusser's definition of science, with an emphasis on the unity of discourse and object, the exceptional object of psychoanalysis is discussed through a comparison of the concept "interpellation" with its psychoanalytic criticism and application. The intersectionality of Marxism and psychoanalysis is further addressed in the context of meta-applicability of psychoanalytic logic, i.e., the logic of the signifier. By emphasizing Badiou's criticism of psychoanalytic logic, the intermediary political and philosophical works of Badiou that lead to *Theory of the Subject* are analyzed in terms of dialectics, contradiction, and ideology. Providing the discussion of "One" and "Two" within the context of Hegelian dialectic, the elaboration of the category of the subject is articulated by mentioning how Badiou relates Lacan to Hegel and provides a criticism according to his understanding of the dialectic. The conclusion of the thesis is the association of the structural and

historical contradictions with their corresponding conceptions of the category of the subject, where the intersection of Marxism and psychoanalysis is discussed in relation to history, the Lacanian real, materialism, and the relationship between theory and practice.

Keywords: Althusser, Badiou, Psychoanalysis, Subject, Contradiction

ÖZ

ÖZNE KATEGORİSİNİN İNCELENMESİ: ALTHUSSER VE ERKEN BADIOU ARASINDA BİR KARŞILAŞMA

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Bu tez, Marxizm ve psikanaliz kesişiminde özne kategorisini ele almaktadır. Althusser'in nedensellik, belirlenim ve bilim alanlarındaki kuramsal yeniliklerinden yola çıkarak, teorik artikülasyonun bakış açısı ile özne kategorisi arasındaki gerilim incelenmektedir. Althusser'in bilimi tanımlama biçimi bağlamında söylem ve nesnenin birliği üzerinde yoğunlaşarak, psikanalizin istisnai nesnesi, "interpelasyon" kavramının psikanalitik eleştirisi ve uygulamasıyla karşılaştırmalı olarak tartışılmaktadır. Marxizm ve psikanalizin kesişimi, psikanalitik mantığın meta-uygulanabilirliği, yani imleyenin mantığı bağlamında ele alınmaya devam etmektedir. Badiou'nün, psikanalitik mantığa yönelik eleştirisine vurgu yapılarak, "Özne Teorisi" eseri öncesi ara dönemdeki politik ve felsefi çalışmaları, diyalektik, çelişki ve ideoloji bağlamında analiz edilmektedir. Hegelci diyalektiğin "Bir" ve "İki" kavramları çerçevesinde tartışılması, özne kategorisinin açıklanmasını sağlamaktadır; burada Badiou'nun Lacan'ı Hegel ile ilişkilendirme biçimi ve diyalektiğe ilişkin eleştirisi vurgulanmaktadır. Tezin sonucu, yapısal ve tarihsel çelişkilerin ilgili özne kavramlarıyla ilişkilendirilmesiyle kurulmakta; Marxizm ve

psikanalizin kesişimi tarih, Lacancı gerçek, materyalizm ve teori-pratik ilişkisi bağlamında ele alınmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Althusser, Badiou, Psikanaliz, Özne, Çelişki

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to analyse the changing presentation and the use of the category of the subject, by arguing that accepting the premises of psychoanalysis may not directly confine oneself to ideological criticism in political theory. Starting from the "Althusserian" Marxism and its conception of the philosophical subject, I will examine the debates concerning "interpellation" and how Lacanian psychoanalysis could be interlinked with Marxism. Finally, I will analyse the debate that took place between Alain Badiou and Jacques-Alain Miller about the concept of "suture". By indicating two different possibilities for approaching Lacanian psychoanalysis, I will be linking Badiou's position which was articulated in *Theory of the Subject.* By underlining Badiou's criticism and use of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the thesis will compare the corresponding conceptions of the subject according to historical and structural contradiction.

The first reason for tracing such a conceptual line from Althusser to Badiou in the context of the concept of the subject stems partly from the historiography, which takes its theme as "Western Marxism". While problematizing the deadlocks of its theme, I will argue that the historiography fails to notice the theoretical subtleties of its conceptual field. This "overlooking" could be attributed to the late translation of many works in the French context[1] or resistance to engaging in "non-Marxist" theoretical practices such as structuralism and post-structuralism.

The second reason for tracing such a conceptual line could be attributed to the popularization of psychoanalysis in Zizek's social theory. In his first book, Zizek (2008) argues that the usage of Lacanian psychoanalysis could contribute to the

[1] While Lacan's very first seminar was published in 1988, the journal *Cahiers pour L'analyse* was published as a compilation in 2012 by the name *Concept and Form* in English, the archival works of Althusser, which I shall be dealing with, were published in 2003, and *Theory of the Subject* was published in 2013.

theory of ideology[2]. However, his historical way of "rehabilitating" Lacan is mediated by mentioning the missed debate between Althusser and Lacan. In his reconstruction of this mis-encounter, however, there is no mention of Badiou despite the striking conceptual resemblance in the context of his reading of Hegel via Lacan in the *Theory of the Subject,* which I will dwell on in the fourth chapter. As Bosteels (2009) explains in the endnote to *Theory of the Subject*, the book gets no mention from writers who seek to employ psychoanalysis in social theory:

> ...despite the book's obvious interest for Lacanians. *Theory of the Subject* receives no mention whatsoever in Slavoj Zizek's own well-known analysis of Badiou in *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* ...nor in Yannis Stavrakakis. (p. 334)

While discussing Badiou in another book, Zizek (1997) argues that Badiou's theoretical enterprise should be understood with the index of difference from Althusser:

> This is perhaps the moment to return to our starting point: how well are the authors we have been dealing with equipped to accomplish this step of political universalization? Here, the reference to Althusser as their starting point again becomes crucial. As I have already emphasized, their theoretical edifices are to be conceived as four different ways of negating this common starting point, of maintaining (or, rather, gaining) a distance towards Althusser… (p. 232)

Zizek (1997) analyses the concepts articulated by Badiou following the publication of *Being and Event*. He claims that the dichotomy of Truth-Event and Being should be understood homologous to the reduction of the concept of the subject to subjectivization. In other words, because of the lack of a middle term (which, for Zizek, is the subject), two realms (Truth and Being) can only interact through an ambiguous or miraculous Event. The omission of *Theory of the Subject* is more striking here since the book contains the different ways of subjectivization, and its corresponding political modalities. Since Zizek's discussion of Badiou in relation to Althusser, as I will argue, is a theoretical one, in this chapter, I will elaborate on these points that constitute the background of the thesis. The first part will focus on

[2] "To contribute to the theory of ideology via a new reading of some well-known, classical motifs (commodity fetishism, and so on) and of some crucial Lacanian concepts which, on a first approach, have nothing to offer to the theory of ideology: the 'quilting point' (*le point de capiton*: 'upholstery button'), sublime object, surplus enjoyment, and so on" (Zizek, 2008, p.xxx).

missed encounter by providing the basic concepts of psychoanalysis to elaborate their relationship to the concept of the subject. The second part will elaborate on the historiography of Western Marxism. The last part of this chapter will be pointing out a conceptual ambiguity pertaining to language. This ambiguity will be forming the base for evaluating and discussing Althusser's conception of Marxist philosophy internally.

1.1. Framing the "missed-encounter"

The framing regarding the missed encounter between Althusser and Lacan requires further elaboration, specifically in terms of the words of the phrase "the missed encounter" and this dissection's relation to the theoretical framing itself. First, the "missed" part of the phrase initially refers to a historical construction which can be understood as a psychoanalytic interpretation or reconstruction. The interpretative part, as Zizek (1995) argues, can only come after a prior misrecognition of the problem. In other words, the arrival of the means of interpreting the misrecognition comes from the future (p. 188). Zizek (1995) explains this point as follows:

> Symptoms are meaningless traces; their meaning is not discovered, excavated from the hidden depth of the past, but constructed retroactively. The analysis produces the truth, i.e., the signifying frame which gives to the symptoms their symbolic place and meaning. As soon as we enter the symbolic order, the past is always present in the form of historical tradition, of interwoven traces which constitute a synchronic network of signifiers. The meaning of these traces is not given; it changes continually with the transformations of the signifier's network. Every historical rupture, every advent of a new master signifier, changes retroactively the meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in an other, new way. (p. 189)

The second part of the phrase, "encounter", I argue, refers to a conflict pertaining to a common problem. This common problem appears to be the theory of the subject, where the conflicting views of Lacan and Althusser constitute the "interwoven traces which constitute a synchronic network of signifiers" (p. 189) for Zizek. However, this juxtaposition also implies that a previous set of framing the theory of subjectivity constituted a "symptom" to be explained for the juxtaposed figures. Hence, my question would be "What would locating a conflict in the theory of the subject entail theoretically for the theory of the subject?"

The interesting fact about Zizek's framing of the question concerning the theory of the subject is that his framing aspires to give the history of *the* theory of the subject. That is, by including conflicting views and interpreting them, the previous frames become internalized as a historical step for giving a historical account of the subject. In order to understand Zizek's historical reconstruction, certain conceptual tools need to be elaborated. These conceptual tools are derived from structural linguistics, which psychoanalytic theory made for its use.

The most elementary tools for establishing relations between signs are metaphor and metonymy. Metaphors refer to a figure of speech in which one concept is expressed through another based on similarity or analogy, whereas in metonymy, one concept is expressed through another based on a relation of contiguity or association.

To reach the same conceptual apparatus used by Zizek, Jakobson's elaboration on the linguistic concepts, as well as his utilization of the terminology of metaphor and metonymy, needs to be explained. Jakobson (2003) defines the metaphoric and metonymic poles in language and questions how they relate to psychoanalysis. He starts his analysis by mentioning how a speech disturbance called "aphasia" could be illuminating for a linguist. In the case of aphasia, either the metaphorical or the metonymical pole is severely hindered. He mentions that:

> The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively. (p. 42)

In other words, Jakobson evokes aphasia in order to point out the irreducible difference between the poles that seem overtly interdependent in typical speech. His analysis emphasizes the metonymic usage of language in novels "underlies and actually predetermines the so-called 'realistic' trend" (Jakobson, 2003, p. 43) while juxtaposing metaphorical language in the context of romanticism and symbolism, which becomes visible in poetry. The contiguious or metonymic pole, then, refers to a type of discursive articulation where "a knowledge of permissible and desirable contiguities pertinent in the language and context of utterance", whereas the similar

or metaphoric pole refers to “an ability to form substitution sets” (Bredin, 1984, p. 91).

Jakobson (2003), in the following passage, applies two poles of language for the explanation of psychoanalytic concepts:

> A competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest in any symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social. Thus, in an inquiry into the structure of dreams, the decisive question is whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on contiguity (Freud’s metonymic “displacement” and synecdochic “condensation”) or on similarity (Freud’s “identification and symbolism”) (p. 46).

The operation of psychoanalytic terminology, then, can be re-interpreted according to two poles of language. Lacan (2005), in a similar vein, against the conception of the unconscious as a substratum of instincts, tries to underline the homology between the structure of language and the status of the unconscious (p. 413). However, at the beginning of the essay “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud”, Lacan warns that the parallelism which could be established between the structure of language and the conception of the unconscious can only be established if one thinks “beyond speech”. Speech, here, refers to the domain where the “letter” is utilized:

> This simple definition assumes that language is not to be confused with the various psychical and somatic functions that serve it in the speaking subject – primarily because language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a certain point in his mental development makes his entry into it. (Lacan, 2005, p. 413)

Although Lacan tries to divorce the conception of language from the “naturalistic” conception of a speech act, the relationship of language and the context in which the language is utilized also constitutes a problem. In other words, the problematic concerning the origins of language and its relationship to society within which the language originates is founded to be essentialist by Lacan. He also problematizes Marxism in a similar manner to anthropology, however, rather than focusing on the origins of language, the problematic aspect of Marxism is argued to be located at the “general function of *praxis* [emphasis in original] in the genesis of history” (Lacan, 2005, p. 414). The problematic part is argued to be caused by a failure to establish a universal grammar where “the relations of language to socialist

realities would have rendered any literary formalism radically impossible" (Lacan, 2005, p. 414). At this point, the most adequate "science" which would resemble Esperanto or universal grammar is argued to be linguistics. In other words, the problematic of "beyond speech" which could be located at the human individual could be extended to human sciences in the context of "beyond meaning".

However, the linguistic paradigm, which is designated as the domain in which psychoanalysis can operate, is revealed to be Saussurean, where its emergence "… is contained in the constitutive moment of an algorithm that is its foundation. This algorithm is the following" (Lacan, 2005, p. 414):

$$\frac{S}{s}$$

The algorithm is argued to be signifying the distinction of the signifier and the signified by a barrier, where the barrier marks the resistance of the primordial establishment between the signifier and the signified. The capitalization of the symbol of the signifier as "S" could be understood in a similar vein, where the signified could only be understood as "study of the connections proper to the signifier, and of the extent of their function in the genesis of the signified" (Lacan, 2005, p. 415). In other words, capital inscription of the letter symbolizes the primacy of the signifier vis-à-vis the signified, where the signified could be seen as an "effect" of the signifier.

However, Lacan warns against a possible "nominalism", where the absolute incommensurability of the signifier and the signified presented with a bar is interpreted as "signifier answers to the function of representing the signified, or better, that the signifier has to answer for its existence in the name of any signification whatever" (Lacan, 2005, p. 416).

To present the importance of the bar in the algorithm, Lacan (2005) juxtaposes a classic and his own version of the algorithm via illustrations (p. 416):




Figure 1: Lacan's comparative illustration of the signifier and the signified

While the signifier "tree" and its corresponding image are argued to be the classic illustration, Lacan (2005) explains the second illustration by evoking a comical story:

> A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated in a compartment face to face next to the window through which the buildings along the station platform can be seen passing as the train pulls to a stop. 'Look', says the brother, 'we're at Ladies!'; 'Idiot!' replies his sister, 'Can't you see we're at Gentlemen'. (p. 417)

The story tries to present the second illustration to render the "meaning" of the algorithm. Homologous to the identity of the signified in the illustration, buildings also pertain to an identity. What demonstrates the bar in the story is that the signifier, which is "attached"[3] to the singular signified, produces an antinomy. The antinomy in question is caused by the signifier's relationship to another signifier, where the former's value is defined by the difference from the latter (a relationship between ladies and gentlemen can only be conceived if the terms have a prior dichotomous position). Bruce Fink (2004) comments on this passage as:

> The signifier here—the juxtaposition of these two binary terms—generates 'Dissension' (Lacan, 2005, p. 417), inspiring the two children to fly off indivergent directions, without telling us what Gentlemen are and what Ladies are. It is the opposition itself that is crucial, not its meaning. (p. 84)

[3] Bruce Fink discusses this attachment as follows: "Although one is on top and 'stuffs' the one on the bottom –'signifier stuffs the signified' (37/37)– the relationship seems to be culinary relationship, not a sexual one." In other words, the demonstration of the bar in the context of two sexes is not a coincidence. Fink argues that the non-relationship between sexes is mediated by the "phallus," where its signifier property is argued to be "the signifier that has no signified" (Seminar XX, 75/81). I shall be analysing how Badiou establishes a homology between two sexes and two classes in the fourth chapter.

It is only after the clarification of the "meaning" of the algorithm that Lacan starts to elaborate the signifier through metaphor and metonymy. The preliminary conception of the signifier or the modification of Saussure's sign could be attributed to the lack of the linguistic unit in Jakobson's article. Jakobson draws parallels ranging from literature to psychoanalysis without giving the definition of the elemental unit in which he is working. In other words, impairment (aphasia), which unconceals the two poles of language according to Jakobson, could generate questions such as the problematic status of the shift from nature to culture, etc. As I have already pointed out, Lacan explicitly rejects the dichotomy of nature and culture and tries to refer to language by drawing on linguistics.

Fink (2004) explains the functions of metaphor and metonymy by evoking the contradictory possibility of a sentence's positive structure and its latent meaning: "If I tell a friend that I am going to Cracow, I may convey the exact opposite, precisely because he knows that I always try to mislead him" (pp. 91-92). The mechanism of metonymy is described as the replacement of one term by another based on a similar/same nomenclature. For example, a minister could be referred to as "insignia" or as "muenster" (which happens to be a type of cheese). Metaphor, on the other hand, is designated for a substitution mechanism where the immediate similarity between the referents cannot be seen. Fink gives the example of the substitution of "stink contest" for "election". However, because the initial unfamiliarity of the terms is not clear, the excess effect (Lacan refers this excess as "poetic spark" [Lacan, 2005, p. 422]) of the metaphor becomes realizable by a retroactive mechanism where "one word put in the place of another, the latter disappearing while its meaning is preserved, in some sense, in the former" (Fink, 2004, p. 92). The excess effect mentioned above is explained by Fink as "production of meaning by non-meaning" or intrusion of non-meaning into meaning if one wants to refer the function of metaphor in jokes. However, in order for the functions of metaphor and metonymy to work and hence in order to refer to any configuration of the signifier that produces effects, there must be a subject in which these operations could take place. To pursue or locate the effects of the signifier, it is argued that the subject in question should be in a position where the workings of the signifier should be working "unconsciously". In other words, "like the signified itself, the subject here is an effect of the signifier" (Fink, 2004, p. 91).

This terminology equips Zizek with the concepts through which he can to problematize the omission of the name of Althusser in Western theoretical thinking. To locate the effects that precede its cause, Zizek reviews Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, however, it is only mentioned in the context of the grouping of the names, where Lacan and Althusser are only discussed in relation to other figures. Zizek (2008) points to the absence of the discussion of Althusser as such, and names it as the "eclipse of the Althusserrian school":

> It is more as if there were, in Althusser's theory, a traumatic kernel which had to be quickly forgotten, 'repressed'; it is an effective case of theoretical amnesia. Why, then, was the opposition Althusser–Lacan replaced, in a kind of metaphorical substitution, by the opposition Habermas–Foucault? At stake here are four different ethical positions, and at the same time four different notions of the subject. (p. ii)

In addition to the definition of metaphor as the substitution of one term with another, which is reiterated in Zizek's case, the meaning of the substituted term must be preserved. In other words, it remains unclear what the signifier couple Althusser-Lacan "metaphorizes". The status of the substituted term is also not carefully elaborated in the sense of whether or not the couple "Althusser-Lacan" should be taken as a homogenous signifier homologous to the "Ladies-Gentlemen" as discussed above. The conceptualization of Althusser's thought as a monolithic block could be harder than it seems by comparing how his "exoteric" and "esoteric" texts contain a tension within his own works. In other words, the signifier "Althusser" can also be conceptualized by pointing out the bar in his signification.

In a similar vein, Zizek analyzes Althusser's "students" theoretical enterprise according to their reaction and apprehension of Althusser. However, while referring to Badiou, Zizek (1997) calls it a "strange case":

> Finally, there is the strange case of Alain Badiou. Is not Badiou also intimately related to Althusser, not only on the level of his personal intellectual biography (he began as a member of the Lacano-Althusserian legendary Cahiers pour L'Analyse group in the 1960s; his first booklet was published in Althusser's Theorie series) but also on the inherent theoretical level: his opposition of knowledge (related to the positive order of Being) and truth (related to the Event that springs from the void in the midst of being) seems to reverse the Althusserian opposition of science and ideology: Badiou's 'knowledge' is closer to (a positivist notion of) science, while his

> description of the Truth-Event bears an uncanny resemblance to Althusserian ' ideological interpellation'. (p. 128)

Funny enough, the curious case replaces itself as a strange case, and once again, as I have mentioned in the introductory lines, the *Theory of the Subject* remains omitted. This omission, coupled with the mention of the journal, becomes an even stranger case because Badiou (2013) explicitly deals with Lacan and Hegel and even states that "Lacan is our Hegel" (p. 132). Considering Badiou's account on the signifier "Althusser/Lacan", as I will argue, this initial comparison that Zizek made between two metaphors is significant to show the changing conceptual framings of the category of the subject.

To reformulate the frame that I shall be operating in the problematic of dreamwork, pointing out how Zizek conceptualizes it seems adequate. Zizek (2008) claims that the structure of a dream contains three elements "manifest dream-text, the latent dream content or thought and the unconscious desire articulated in a dream" (p. 6). What is important, Zizek notes, is that the unconscious desire in question "has no 'original' in the 'normal' language of everyday communication, (…) its only place is in the mechanisms of the 'primary process'." (p. 5). In other words, the unconscious desire has no primordial signification mechanism attached to it. And since the latent thought could be argued to be stemming from the effects of the signifier, which takes its material contingently, the unconscious desire in question, if it remains unsymbolized or uninterpreted, employs a decoy by insisting in the subject's psyche. The non-relationship of "latent dream content" and "unconscious desire" is explained by Zizek (2008) as:

> Herein, then, lies the basic misunderstanding: if we seek the 'secret of the dream' in the latent content hidden by the manifest text, we are doomed to disappointment: all we find is some entirely 'normal' – albeit usually unpleasant - thought, the nature of which is mostly non-sexual and definitely not 'unconscious'. This 'normal', conscious/preconscious thought is not drawn towards the unconscious, repressed simply because of its 'disagreeable' character for the conscious, but because it achieves a kind of 'short circuit' between it and another desire which is already repressed, located in the unconscious, a desire which has nothing whatsoever to do with the 'latent dream-thought'. (p. 5)

Then, it can be argued that the true metaphor which must be "worked" is "Althusser/Lacan", whereas the "Habermas/Foucault" can be seen as a latent content

distortion. However, as I already argued, the same metaphor was already worked by Badiou but was not mentioned in Zizek's works. I will argue that to grasp the true effects of the signifier, a closer look at the political terminology must be taken, rather than generalizing Badiou's oeuvre without looking at his "political" texts, as Zizek does so while commenting on "Badiou's knowledge" as quoted above.

Although I will also argue a similar conceptual continuation between Althusser and Badiou, I will not examine *Being and Event* or any of Badiou's later works. This choice is deliberate in locating the concept of the subject within its relationship to structuralism and psychoanalysis, rather than proliferating the discussion concerning the subject with religious themes or overtly philosophical terminology. Framing the terminology within psychoanalysis and structuralism will enable us to locate the changing conceptual framings of the subject. Accordingly, these conceptual framings will be the category of the subject in the philosophical discourse, as elaborated by Althusser in the discussion of Marxist philosophy and Marxist science (Chapter 2), the comparison between subject as an ideological category and its possible Lacanian criticisms (Chapter 3), critique of psychoanalytic logic and Badiou's contribution to the concept of the subject with political emphasis (Chapter 4).

The restriction of political terminology also implies a historical period within which the texts are going to be selected. I argue that focusing on the French context will enable us to reach conceptual clarity, particularly in the case of structuralism.

1.2. Conceptual History of Western Marxism

In order to frame the political terminology, I shall be discussing how the historiography concerning "Western Marxism" frames it for a more particular discussion. As pointed out in the opening lines of his book, Perry Anderson (1976, p. vii) states that "Western Marxism" tries to frame the general coordinates of a common intellectual tradition and is not concerned with a specific scrutiny or comparative analysis. To point out the "Westernness" in question, the essay starts by presenting a historical narrative of the preceding and "Eastern" current of Marxism. The latter current, which is also known as "Second International", inaugurated a Marxist science of politics. However, prior to the proliferation of the political texts,

some members of the Second International also contributed to the systematization of Marxism. As Colletti (1992) states, systematization of Marxism stems from the influence of Engels. The conditions of possibility for inserting the discourse of politics into Marxism could be attributed to the extension of the scope of Marxist analysis from economic analysis alone to the general framework of society by Engels. As Colletti (1992) points out:

> Engels became the man who perfected and crowned Marxism, not only in virtue of his systematization of Marx's thought, but also because his creative and original development of that thought has given a *basis* [emphasis in original] to Marx's analyses. (p. 10)

Colletti also notes that the Russian reception of Engels differs from the German counterpart in the sense that the basis of Marx's analysis was taken more seriously in the former. Hence, the canonization of the term "dialectical materialism" finds its origins here, where it is seen as a preliminary to the theory of historical materialism. The importance of mentioning canonization stems from the fact that, by definition, canon designates what is important and excludes what is inessential. As Colletti notes, the particular adaptation of dialectical materialism as a state doctrine in the USSR and the diminishing inclination of "free debate" in European communist parties determine the reception of publishing the early works of Marx. After the publication of the "1844 Manuscripts" in 1932, it was subsequently removed from the collected works of Marx and Engels intentionally. It is further argued that the publication of Marx's early works received a positive reception by non-Marxist strands of thought after the Second World War (Colletti, 1992). However, Colletti also notes that "structural Marxism" in France comes to share a similar view with the policy of the Soviet Communist Party towards the "1844 Manuscripts" or even extends the dismissal to argue for an epistemological break in Marx's own works.

Anderson (1976) discusses the canonization from a political perspective by arguing that the Leninist political thought comes to a halt and becomes "sterilized by the Stalinization of the Third International, which progressively subordinated the policies of its constituent parties to the foreign policy objectives of the USSR" (p. 21). The emphasis on the political becomes important for Anderson because of the fact that, compared to continental Europe, where the communist movements were defeated, the establishment of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union as a state

policy causes the theoretical enterprise of Marxism in Europe to be confined to economic analyses in the inter-war period. In other words, it could be said that the ground on which Western Marxism comes to be discussed is argued to be founded in political defeats. After mentioning the stabilization of capitalism following the Second World War and the establishment of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, Anderson (1976) defines the scope of Western Marxism as:

> It was in this altered universe that revolutionary theory completed the mutation which produced what can today retrospectively be called "Western Marxism". For the body of work composed by the authors with whom we shall now be concerned, in effect constituted an entirely new intellectual configuration within the development of historical materialism. In their hands, Marxism became a type of theory in certain critical respects quite distinct from anything that had preceded it. In particular, the characteristic themes and concerns of the whole ensemble of theorists who came to political maturity before the First World War were drastically displaced, in a shift that was at once generational and geographical. (p. 25)

The mutation in question is subsequently argued to be "structural divorce of this (Western) Marxism from political practice" (Anderson, 1976, p. 35). The peculiarity of the French case is that it has "no significant contribution to the great Marxist debates of the pre-1914 epoch; triumphal start of the French Communist Party in 1920", with a large member base and attraction from intellectuals (p. 35). However, similar to Colletti's argument concerning the freedom of opinion in European communist parties, Anderson, too, mentions strict internal regulations within the party. According to him, only in the environment of de-Stalinization and relative freedom of the 1960s, the first "major theoretical system was articulated within the PCF, whose power and originality were conceded even by its most determined opponents" (Anderson, 1976, pp. 38-39). This point is important because I shall be discussing the esoteric and exoteric texts of Althusser, which are shaped by the strict doctrinal policies of the PCF. To follow the conceptual elaboration, I will not be limiting myself to the political criticisms of Althusser and will be redirecting the political criticisms to theoretical assumptions.

Anderson (1976) continues to examine the defining properties of Western Marxism, which consist of the substitution of "Marxist theory and proletarian science" with "Marxist theory and bourgeois theory" (p. 55). The bourgeois theory is philosophically designated as "European idealism" and is argued to be antagonistic

and “unknown to Marxist theory before the First World War” (Anderson, 1976. p. 58). Hence, this move of substitution is argued to be an “invariable construction of a philosophical ancestry extending *before Marx* [emphasis in original]” (Anderson, 1976, p. 59). Similar to Coletti, the roots of this lineage construction are located at the importation of dialectical method from Engels, but also consist of a twist in the sense that all figures which Anderson attributes to Western Marxism, reject the theoretical legacy of Engels. The intention to ground Marx’s works in a philosophical system is argued to stem from the aforementioned rejection. The political cause of the diversification of references to different philosophical lineages is argued to be located at the “… the victory of ‘Socialism in One Country’ in the USSR” where the

> … nationalist perspectives adopted by European Communism during and after the Second World War, the dominant framework of Marxist discussion underwent a fundamental change. It now increasingly proceeded, not merely at a distance from political militancy, but also from any international horizon (Anderson, 1976, p. 68-69).

Hence, the inter-theoretical debates which could be located in “Western Marxism”, combined with the lack of “overall command of the international range,” are argued to remain “vague”, “scattered and anachronistic”, “amateurly confused” or “preemptively dismissed”. However, despite the lack of political legacy and theoretical obscurity, Anderson argues that the thematic innovations of Western Marxism could be considered as its most basic strength.

The contributive domain concerning the thematic innovations of “Western Marxism” is founded on “superstructure”. The discussion of superstructure is specified in the concept of ideology. The debate in which the concept of ideology is framed in Althusser’s conception is the theme of pessimism where its overtones could be found in the discussion concerning communism: “Althusser declared that even communism would remain opaque as a social order to the individuals living under it, deceiving them with the perpetual illusion of their liberty as subjects” (Anderson, 1976, p. 89). The actual political situation where Althusser utilizes the concept of ideology is argued to be “the upheavals of the university protests” which the piece “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” was written as a reply. However, the pessimism in question can also be attributed to the discussion of social class belongings of the “Western Marxists”, where Anderson (1976) notes that “the

most striking single fact about the whole tradition from … the overwhelming predominance of professional philosophers within it. Socially, this change meant an ever-increasing academic emplacement of the theory that was produced in the new epoch" (p. 49).

Contrary to Anderson's depiction of "Western Marxism", Jacoby argues that the overemphasis of the "original unity" of the "theory and practice" in "classical Marxism" could be seen as a symptom that could use a theoretical scrutiny. The first argument that Jacoby (1981) proposes is that the "sophistication" of Marxist theory should not be viewed as a regression:

> I do not view Western Marxism as an unfortunate detour from "classical" Marxism; nor do I look forward to its extinction. The myth of a heroic Marxism, harmonizing philosophy, economics, science, and praxis, overwhelms the feeble efforts to rethink Marxism. Yet I do not mean to ratify, but to recognize, the distance between philosophy and politics; and I endeavor to establish some of the links. Philosophical Marxism incorporated an implicit, sometimes explicit, politics. (p.12)

Although not seeing the "thematic innovations" of "Western Marxism" as a deviation from an original purity, Jacoby still shares the theme of defeat, which could characterize its environment. However, defeat is not seen as something negative in itself, but rather argued to be a site for critical scrutiny. Against defeat, Jacoby (1981) juxtaposes the conceptualization of success in "Orthodox Marxism" where the hunt for success "paralyzed its critical nerve, past and present" (p. 12). Jacoby continues to argue that the quest for success places one's subjective position outside of history, where any kind of judgement which could be attributed to the subject in question is omitted. In other words, there are no "choices, failures, mistakes or successes", but a confinement to the "tired wisdom that history is bunk and vanity" (p. 13). The political appearance of this non-engagement is argued to be a "continual shifting of its object" where the success is constantly re-searched. However, differing from Anderson, philosophical engagement that does not indicate a deviation but shifts to an overemphasis on "science", where the science in question is seen as an apolitical rhetoric. Jacoby (1981) argues that the grounding of one's political position under the aegis of science is related to theme of "success":

> Distancing oneself from the political plane reveals the theoretical outline of orthodox Marxism, which is marked by a commitment to science. An esteem

> for science is hardly unique to Marxism; it infuses modern society. Science guarantees success. Marxism inherited this proposition from bourgeois society and hammered it into a deadly weapon. For Marxists, it became the revolver for shooting dissidents and opponents. The primal and final charge that orthodox Marxism invokes is that its opponents have violated the canons of science; they are prescientific, nonscientific, literary, romantic, Utopian, historicist, humanist, aesthetic. (p. 20)

In other words, what characterizes the ill aspect of the subsequent developments of Marxism for Jacoby could be found in the legitimization of a theoretical enterprise that takes its points of reference from a definition of science that confines the subjective party to apoliticism. The reason for such apoliticism is caused by the definition of a discourse that grants itself absolute guarantee. Differing from Anderson, Jacoby (1981) locates the position of Althusser in parallel with "Orthodox Marxism", and he sees this position as being "forever wrong":

> Althusser represents a Marxism that is forever wrong, or right too late. To explain his multiple miscalculations, he reaches for an alibi beyond reproach: history. The irony is missed: Althusser and his followers have dedicated themselves to slaying the dangerous dragon of historicism. Historicism threatens the autonomy, rigor, objectivity, and, finally, the success of Marxism. For Althusser, historicism corrupts with Hegelian effluents the science of Marxism. (p. 16)

Despite the changing indicator for reviewing Marxist thought, Althusser is seen negatively both by Jacoby and Anderson. The political solution ascribed by Jacoby (1981) in order to correct the diversifying influence of theoretical sources is to retrieve the "warm current" of Marxism to be replaced with the "cold current" of "technocratic Marxism" (p. 34). The prescription advises looking more closely at the conservative critics of capitalism, where the overemphasis on the linear progress of history is replaced with the effects of the capitalist society. However, Jacoby mostly focuses on the Frankfurt School and the Hegelian legacy, where the how-ness of the appreciation of non-Marxist sources, such as conservatism, is not methodologically elaborated. This aversion to defining a methodology in a focused manner could be caused by Jacoby's criticism of the overemphasis on success and particularly rejection of any theoretical enterprise that tries to define itself under the aegis of science. The figure that represents the "scientific" attitude is Althusser in Jacoby's account, but without delving into an internal reading or criticism, Althusser is dismissed.

Considering Althusser as a scientific figure, however, I argue that this should be framed by focusing on the concept of the subject as the main component. However, the conceptualization of the subject includes the basic theoretical premises of "structural linguistics" and its application in the context of psychoanalysis by Lacan. In a similar manner to his historicization of "Western Marxism", Anderson's analysis of the effect of structural linguistics, particularly in the "French context", seems important in order to further frame or find the reception of "structural linguistics". Following that, I shall be summarizing how, in "Eastern Marxism" (the USSR) the initial reception of structural linguistics was done and how the phenomenon of language could be explained in the Stalinist period. The reason for making such a comparison stems from the fact that by the end of the comparison, I shall be arguing that the phenomenon of language cannot be conceived in a once and for all manner. Then I will return to the meaning of the "French Context" considering the problem of language which could be detected both in Western and Eastern Marxist and will argue that all theoretical problem which pertain to politics, theoretical elaboration of Marxism and subjectivity because of its engagement with "structuralist linguistics" would seem to be the most fruitful are of analysis.

As a sequel to the thematic study of "Western Marxism", Anderson tries to make a contemporary analysis which would limit itself to the period 1981. He expands the geographical scope of Marxism and argues that the developments within the Anglo-American world have reached a point where:

> It is henceforward impossible for Marxist to proceed – as they did many years, on either side – as if their history and their theory were two separate mental worlds, with little more than occasional tourism, mildly curious, between them. Theory now is history, with a seriousness and severity it was never in the past; as history is equally theory, in all its exigency, in a way that it typically evaded before. (Anderson, 1983, p. 26)

However, although the expansion of the geographical confounds is proportionally larger in the discussed period, the basic theme, which was outlined in the definition of Western Marxism, still continues in the context of political failure. The unity of theory and practice is still argued to be lacking, and the retroactive analysis of "poverty of theory" could be argued to be replaced by "poverty of strategy" (p. 28) despite the plausible historical development, which could result in an approximate transferable language (Anderson, 1983). What interests Anderson

this time, however, is the theme of "crisis of Marxism", where the crisis in question, although being mediatized for American and European audiences, is in fact geographically confined to Latin Europe – essentially France, Italy, and Spain. The crisis is argued to have resulted from two reasons: a) Abrupt and widespread renunciation of Marxism altogether, and b) An increasing scepticism towards the very idea of a revolutionary rupture with capitalism (Anderson, 1983, p. 29).

In order to understand what could give rise to such a crisis, its theoretical underpinnings need to be analysed. Here, the emphasis becomes even narrower, and the scope of analysis is limited to "French Marxism". The theme of the defeat of historical materialism is addressed as "Structure and Subject". The cause of the defeat is argued not to be an external cultural, theoretical, or political threat but a defeat which is internal to the field, namely "structuralism and then its post-structuralist successors" (Anderson, 1983, p. 33).

The definition of this theoretical defeat is argued to be found not in the change of the structure of the problematics of the previous era, but the structuralist and post-structuralist way of defining the Marxist problematic became the norm unanimously. The exact frame in which the defeat is located is "the nature of the relationships between structure and subject in human history and society" (Anderson, 1983, p. 33). However, the problem in question is not considered as a marginal one but rather a fundamental point in the theory of historical materialism. Ranging from Marx's own works to Lenin's political antinomies and problems which characterize Marxist historiography is seen as carrying the problem of the "structure and the subject". However, the French context is defined by "neither a directly political nor a historiographic form" but a problem that is presented in philosophy (p. 35).

After addressing the role of philosophy, Anderson (1983) argues that Althusser's construction of Marxism with the terminology of structuralism is so dependent upon the structuralist premises that the structuralism outlived the so-called "Althusserrian project". The outliving in question is proposed as the proclamation of reduction of Marxism into "an involuntary effect of an out-dated Victorian episteme, and no more derivative one at that" (p. 38). Anderson (1983) locates the problem in Althusser's conception of Marxism in *Reading Capital* to be the inability to the respond to the question of "introduction of the problem of the historical subject into the machinery of structural causality" (p. 39). However, Anderson sees the problem

not confined to the theory itself but in the absence of a response. Although Anderson frames the problem within Althusser's theoretical enterprise, the problem that he addresses is *the* problem of structuralism. Anderson's framing of the problem can be compartmentalized into many subsets; for example, the relationship of the structure and the subject can be emphasized as a general problem, or it could be posed by emphasizing the point at which the subject emerges in the structure. In the case of Althusser, since he argues that the scientificity of Marxism could be delineated by defining its object, the relationship of the discourse and the place of the subject in this discourse could be separately discussed. Since I will be addressing the place of subjectivity in multiple discourses, the question of inserting or defining the theoretical space in which the subject position of a scientific discourse will also be a theme in all three chapters.

The main theoretical premise of the so-called "structuralist and post-structuralist" victorious position against historical materialism is named as "exorbitation of language" (Anderson, 1983, p. 40). Anderson (1983) argues that the structuralist terminology, which was borrowed from Saussure, was used illegitimately: "a human institution of such a kind that all other human institutions, with the except of writing, can only deceive us as to its real essence if we trust in their analogy" (Saussure, 1960, as cited in Anderson, 1983, p. 42). However, the passage, if compared to the algorithmic systematization of sign by Lacan and its expansion by inclusion of two poles of language, i.e., metaphor and metonymy, is utilized as an external criticism of the application of linguistics in the context of Lacan. The account of structuralism in this case also overlooks the dimension of the concept of the subject in order for the relevant paradigm (in this case, psychoanalysis) to be operative. However, the point that underlines the potential danger in which the whole "human institutions" could be assimilated to the operating logic of structuralism will be important for the discussion in chapter 4. I shall be focusing on how Badiou will characterize structuralism as "Structural Dialectic" and how this dialectic could be expanded and could be argued to remain as a method that is not suitable for thinking politics or political thinking.

Although the policies of actually existing socialism (the USSR in this context) could be discussed seemingly independent from the function of language, the image that Anderson depicts concerning the inflation or hierarchy of language in

theory, particularly in the French context, could be seen at the practical or political level in the USSR. If one adds the USSR to the discussion pertaining to language, the theoretical status of language becomes even more questionable. The ambiguous and complicated role of language could be seen in the Soviet Union, where the decline of economic compulsion of capitalism resulted in the overtly politicized role of language (Groys, 2022). Thus, I will compare Anderson's account concerning the infiltration and overemphasis of structural linguistics in "human sciences" by providing a very early and an "internal" Marxist criticism by Voloshinov. Voloshinov's problematic, one could argue, originates from the lack of a critical apparatus in the Marxist enterprise. This lack becomes clear since Voloshinov (1986) "makes no reference to *Das Kapital* at all" (p. 1). Instead, he focuses on ideology:

> Everything ideological possesses *meaning:* it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a *sign. Without signs, there is no ideology., A* physical body equals itself, so to speak; it does not signify anything but wholly coincides with its particular, given nature. In this case there is no question of ideology. (p. 9)

1.3. Conceptual History of "Eastern" Marxism

Consequently, if one designates the basic unit of analysis of ideology as a sign, the ideological analysis should be undertaken in a semiotic universe. However, as could be understood from the equation of ideology with meaning, the sign in question should not be understood as originating from consciousness. Voloshinov (1986) argues that "consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs" (p. 11). In other words, before embodiment, there is no essential relationship between an individual consciousness and the operative sign. The embodiment is going to be located at the level of social interaction. By underlining social interaction, consciousness becomes a "social-ideological fact". It is argued that after designating the singular consciousness mediated by social interaction as a fact, we can make either "objective psychology" or "objective study of ideologies". Yet, it is argued that, because social interaction takes the prime and mediating role, the "usual concept of word and language as worked in non-sociological linguistics and philosophy of language" (p. 15) cannot be taken for

granted. The “non-sociological linguistics” or “abstract objectivism” is going to be the name for Saussure’s conception of structural linguistics for Voloshinov.

Saussure’s conception of language is summarized by focusing on three distinctions that he made within the language: 1) speech meaning the sum of all manifestations of the verbal faculty (language); 2) language meaning a “self-contained whole and a principle of classification”; and 3) utterance meaning “the combinations through which a speaker utilizes a particular language code for expressing his own personal thoughts, and the psychophysical mechanism that enables him to exteriorize those combinations” (Voloshinov, 1986, p. 60).

Voloshinov (1986) formulates Saussure’s conception as “language stands in opposition to utterance in the same way as does that which is social to that which is individual”. What is problematized in Saussure’s conception, initially, is the theoretical background “philologism” which reifies the “abstract segregation to the status of a principle” and “language form divorced from ideological impletion” (p. 71). By philologism, what is meant is “practical and theoretical focus of attention on the study of defunct, alien languages preserved in written documents”. In other words, since the linguistic orientation in question is trained to derive its object of methodology from dead languages, the “utterance” and its ideological significance are totally omitted. What is further argued is that the objects of analysis, i.e., monuments, are by their definition “natural abstractions” which, in their course of being developed, were situated in a chain of individual utterances. The subjective position of the philologist vis-à-vis the monuments remains passive because of the lack of contextual understanding of the monuments; the understanding that the philologist possesses is argued to be projected onto the theory.

What is put forward against the reification of the actuality of the speech act is the emphasis on the sociality where a discourse is connected to another discourse, which resists the “monolothization” of the language. Against the “monologic” conception of language, by pointing out the sociality, the “dialogic” character of the language, or more precisely, the speech act, is underlined. Hall (1986) discusses the importance of the “multi-accentual” or “dialogic” character of the speech act by arguing that:

> This approach replaces the notion of fixed ideological meanings and class-ascribed ideologies with the concepts of ideological terrains of struggle and

> the task of ideological transformation. It is the general movement in this direction, away from an abstract general theory of ideology, and towards the more concrete analysis of how, in particular historical situations, ideas 'organise human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.,' (p. 40)

However, what I want to underline is the extent to which the theoretical applicability of the "Marxist theory of the sign" could be demonstrated within the Marxists' texts themselves. In other words, rather than making a "concrete analysis of particular historical situations" or a political criticism, what could "Marxist theory of the sign" could derive or benefit from researching into the political and theoretical texts of its own tradition; would it be an adequate place for outlining a general theory of subjectivity and its relationship to discourse? The political criticism mentioned above could be understood by looking at Anderson's account of the Third International, where he argued that Leninist political thinking became "sterilized". It could be argued that the most adequate place for locating the "un-sterile" account of the subjective position can be found in the policy which is ascribed to Lenin's "vanguard party". Lenin (1999), in the following lines, quotes Kautsky:

> Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without [von Aussen Hineingetragenes] and not something that arose within it spontaneously [urwüchsig]. Accordingly, the old Hainfeld programme quite rightly stated that the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat (literally: saturate the proletariat) with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its task. There would be no need for this if consciousness arose of itself from the class struggle. (p. 27)

To put the question more precisely, what happens if the position ascribed to the vanguard party as defined above becomes the sovereign and tries to reproduce the same rhetoric throughout its reign, and what could this tell us from the perspective of subjectivity and language?

Rather than adhering to a political explanation, but pointing out the common problem of language in eastern and western branches of Marxism, Groys' conceptualization of "phenomenon of language" needs to be emphasized.

Groys (2022). argues that "communism is the transcription of society into the medium of language" (pp. 5-6), where rather than discussing communism's egalitarian, political, and economic promises, the argument is focused on interpreting

communism as a “world-shaking transcriptive enterprise”. The basic premise that grounds the mentioned conception of communism by Groys (2022) is communism’s being the project:

> of subordinating the economy to politics in order to allow politics to act freely and sovereignly. The economy functions in the medium of money. It operates with numbers. Politics functions in the medium of language. It operates with words –with arguments, programmes and petitions, but also with commands, prohibitions, resolutions and decrees. The communist revolution is the transcription of society from the medium of money to the medium of language. (p. 6)

Distinguished from the utilization of language in the capitalist society where every speech-act is deemed to be commodified and hence mute, it is only with the social transformation of the society that the process of commodification can be destroyed since “only communism performs the total linguistification of human fate that opens the space for a total critique” (Groys, 2022, p. 7). The case in which the “linguistification” is going to be analyzed by Groys is located to be the USSR. Without delving into an external criterion of what makes a society “communist”, Groys argues that if within a society, power and the critique of power are operating in the same medium (language), the society in question can be designated as a communist society.

Returning Kautsjy’s quote to discuss the position of the political subjective position of the vanguard party, Groys (2022) argues that “neither the economic success nor the economic failure of the political leadership could be established ‘objectively’, that is to say, neutrally, non-ideologically” (p. 8). In other words, it could be said that the total representation of the state party of its citizens introduced the problem of ideologization-linguistification of every sphere of society, where “everything that is decided in language can be criticized in linguistically as well” (Groys, 2022, p. 9).

For Groys (2022), this means that criticism concerning eggs and shoes becomes as available as criticism concerning the official doctrines of historical materialism. However, this openness to criticism puts the position of authority in an ambiguous role compared to a relatively alienated civil society. That is, because the government officials are composed of Soviet citizens, the location of the operation of power becomes harder to detect in the absence of a strict separation between state

and society. According to Groys this situation occurs because “the theory of Marxism-Leninism is ambivalent in its understanding of language” (p. 10). The revolutionary spirit of supplanting correct ideas to masses practice an “ideal linguistic compulson function” which must transform the revolutionary force into a constitutive power (Groys, 2022, p.11). However, it is subsequently argued that rather than trying to avoid this ambiguity, it was adopted in the doctrine itself where the world comes to be defined as “contradictory in itself, with these contradictions being constantly reproduced in every worldly thing” (p. 35). The crucial question, according to Groys, is the medium in which this contradiction is to be formulated. In other words, if the base and the superstructure are constantly in contradiction with each other, there needs to be an adequate “medium” which can articulate this contradiction. Groys, by stating Stalin’s view, points out that the medium is designated by language.

However, language as such should not be confused with the sign, where it could be taken as the most basic abstracted unit of language. Instead, language is discussed by Stalin (1954) in relation to base and superstructure and argued to belong to neither:

> Language exists, and it has been created precisely in order to serve society as a whole, as a means of intercourse between people, in order to be common to the members of society and the single language of society, serving members of society equally, irrespective of their class status…In this respect, while it differs in principle from the superstructure, language does not differ from the implements of production, from machines, let us say, which may equally serve a capitalist system and a socialist system. (p. 11)

The reason for distancing language by Stalin stems from the domain in which the superstructure is classically defined. Accordingly, if one defines superstructure as dependent on base, then it could only be partial. That is, if language is conceived under the domain of superstructure, one cannot claim the discursive operation to be referring to totality. Hence, the problem of directing or policying the economy within language could imply representing a partial view. In other words, the subjective position of the political entity (in this case, Stalin) could be challenged by relying on dialectical materialism. The paradox of defining language distanced from the domain of superstructure is argued by Groys (2022) to grant the language an immediacy which “becomes the medium in which the superstructure achieves to power of

immediately shaping the base" (p. 38). Groys argues that the Stalinist conception of language "language possesses the capacity to connect base and superstructure directly and immediately, thereby eliminating the market economy". If we adopt the explanation of "speech-act" given by Voloshinov, the analysis of Stalin becomes paradoxical in the sense that because of the capability of assimilating the contradictory views concerning the matter in to a homogeneous discourse which defines the matter as such could be seen as a "monologic" way of conceptualizing discourse but at the same time because the same conception can give an account for both poles it could be seen as a "dia-logic" or "multi-accented" discourse.

This gesture of double inclusion, according to Groys, reflects a dominant attitude that prevailed through Western philosophy, where its main representative could be argued to be the Platonic conception[4]. Groys outlines the Platonic accent via a dichotomy that is established between the position of Socrates and the sophists. Sophistic position consists in the substitution of the whole of language with the whole of capital. Because in every speech-act one also participates in the language as a whole to for sophistic relativization of language to occur there must be a "compromise" between the "whole" of language and the "whole" of some particular interest. This interest is argued to be Capital by Groys (2022):

> Sophistical speech appears to be coherent only because it is one-sided, because it is cut off from the whole, and because it obscures its paradoxical relationship to the whole of language. The sophist continues to deliver his plea for a particular position even though he knows that there is much to be said at the same time for the opposing position. In endeavouring to lend his utterance coherence and consistency, the sophist employs in his speech only those arguments that strengthen the position he represents, passing over all possible opposing arguments in silence. The sophist thereby replaces the whole of language with the whole of capital. (p. 16)

Therefore, Groys (2022) argues that "Stalinist communism proves finally to be a revival of the platonic dream of the kingdom of philosophers, those who operate by means of language alone" (p. 41). Although Groys argues that the Stalinist conception of language could be understood homologous the philosophical realization of language, the psychoanalytic account of language should be distinguished from a philosophical one. However, differing from "philosophy", the

[4] For a more detailed account about the position of art in relation to the Stalinist phenomenon of language, see Boris Groys's *The Total Art of Stalinism*.

terms which characterize the paradoxical status of sign was not pointed out via a contrast made between the positions of "textualism and Talmudism" (p. 54) by Stalin (1954). Rather, the paradox in a preliminary way was thematized in the context of "sexuation". In other words, Lacanian psychoanalysis can only operate through an analysis of the subject of science rather than a science of subject. That is, the paradox of language could only be pointed out by pointing out the incommensurable subjective positions to the same "signified" or phenomenon. The reason for underlining such a difference between psychoanalysis and "philosophy" as defined by Groys is that a political formulation cannot, in the proper sense, operate if one utilizes psychoanalysis. The subjective position of enunciating a political thesis is barred to psychoanalysis precisely because psychoanalysis, can only concern itself with the subject of enunciation which is forgotten or concealed in the act of enunciation.

The position of psychoanalysis compared to philosophy becomes unattainable if we adhere to the definition of "Western Marxism" outlined by Anderson in the context of the sophistication of Marxism and overemphasis on language in the context of the French case. The theoretical background that composed "Western Marxism" was argued to be a proliferation of theoretical resources that preceded Marx, and in the French case, this background concentrated upon philosophy. However, if we adhere to Groys' explanation of the phenomenon of language in Stalinism and its relationship with Platonism, we can argue for a unity of opposites between "East and West" where both sides reflect an adherence to philosophy. In a similar manner, as Anderson notes, the dissolving relationship between theory and practice results in the overemphasis on theory in the Western branch and concentration of theory and practice in the USSR, which could paradoxically resemble a philosophical position as outlined by Groys.

While these two positions of Groys and Anderson introduces the theoretical theme I use via the intermediacy of Lacan in the context of language, I also argued that Lacan's position may not be suitable for political thinking or conceptualizing political subjectivity. In this context, Badiou's *Theory of the Subject*, as I shall be arguing, is an attempt to synthesize a theory of political subjectivity by operating between the theoretical innovations of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Maoism. To provide a theoretical history that culminates in Badiou, I will discuss how the

theoretical enterprise of Althusser, particularly in the context of subject, reaches antinomies with the utilization of structuralism in France and the discussions pertaining to “structural Marxism” in Chapter 2. This conceptual clarity will enable an introduction to Chapter 3 where Althusser’s conception of the subject and interpellation can be discussed. Then, in Chapter 4, I will discuss how Badiou criticizes psychoanalytic logic, and how this criticism is related to his thought.

CHAPTER 2

MARXISM AS A SCIENCE: BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY

The introductory chapter presented the frame in which I will analyse the concept of the subject. To that end, I argue that the proper ground needs to be within the paradigm of structuralism, psychoanalysis, and the ambiguous status of language within the Marxist theory (the comparison between the "Eastern" and "Western" branches of Marxism). This chapter will try to locate these themes within the thought of Althusser.

The analysis, which pertains to the methods of economic study and historiography, will not be in the scope of the analysis. Instead, my focus will be concentrated upon the theoretical implications of Marxist philosophy. Accordingly, I will analyse how Althusser conceptualized the scientific status of Marxism, and compare how his concept of ideology in relation to the notion of the subject is related to the scientific Marxism.

Differing from the introductory chapter, the secondary sources that I will use analyse the oeuvre of Althusser from the standpoint of theoretical scrutiny. That is, rather than having an external judgement for the theoretical enterprise of Althusser, the problems conceived for theory will be addressed internally. The mentioned internal readings could be found to be explicated by Elliott (2006), where he defines his status as "anti-anti Althusser" (p. xxi). Similarly, Benton (1984) declares that the criterion in which the analysis that is to be conducted should acknowledge that "there is an irreducible specificity to theoretical work" (p. 1). Elliott and Benton begin with this warning/declaration shortly before or after citing the reception of Althusser by E.P. Thompson.

Although Thompson's polemic (1995) admits that the task of the text "is much more a defense of history than an exposition of an alternative to Althusser's

views of Marxism", the parts which discuss the importance of history are revealing to indicate how Althusser was received.

Thompson (1995) summarizes Althusser's view on history as follows:

> Repeated references to history and to 'historicism' display his theoretical imperialism in its most arrogant forms. His comments display throughout no acquaintance with, nor understanding of, historical procedures: that is, procedures which make of 'history' a *discipline* and not a babble of alternating ideological assertions: procedures which provide for their own relevant discourse of the proof. (p. 18)

Against Althusser's conception, Thompson (1995) argues that Marxist concepts are "true" not because of their derivation from a "true Theory outside this discipline" but because they "stand up better to the test of historical logic" (p. 60). Anderson (1980) claims that Thompson was provoked by the writings of Hindess and Hirst because, in their view, even Althusser was "too empiricist" (p. 125). However, for Anderson (1980), the reaction of Thompson should be located elsewhere, namely in Althusser's influence in the subsequent studies in Marxist literature (p. 126). Against Thompson's declaration about "Althusserianism" as a "reactionary ideology" which signifies "blight on mind," Anderson (1980) claims that "Althusserianism" influenced and provoked "*an impressively wide range of works dealing with the real world, both past and present* [emphasis in original]" (p. 126). However, a brief examination about Hindess and Hirst may reveal a similarity which could be seen in the reception of Althusser's theory of interpellation. That is, the transition from problems pertaining to combination to overall contingency in the social formation could also be seen in the subsequent conceptualization of the subject.

Thompson's critique mostly focuses on the application of historical materialism. However, Althusser's Marxism could also be analysed apart from the early British reception. Olsen (2017) tries to explain the historical reception of the concepts developed in *Reading Capital*, such as mode of production and social formation, which lead up to "class-analytic" Marxism. He begins by mentioning Balibar's (2009) contribution to *Reading Capital* as the "pseudo-combinatory" conception of the theory of "modes of production and social formations (MPSF)" (p. 343). Pseudo-combinatory is argued to differ from being "genuinely structuralist" by Balibar (2009) because in his combinatory, the elements are transformed in each

combination rather than remaining static within a structure. What remains in the context of property of elements is the “relationality”, i.e., “to be is to be related”. Consequently, the elements in question “is an example” of the general concepts that must be specified for every mode of production. The reality of class exploitation which binds the society is argued to be “the center or purpose that binds the social domain into a structured whole, and it is this center that gives the economy primary deterministic influence to assign to other aspects of the social structure their place in that structure” (Olsen, 2017, p. 344). The importance of Balibar's contribution in the context of MPSF is argued to be stemming from the interpretation of the economy by exploitation. Olsen argues that “orthodox MPSF theory” primes the importance of social forces rather than relations of production (which is the case for Balibar). In other words, by emphasizing the determining part of the economy while differentiating the dominating structures from it, the relation in which the whole is comprehended is designated as “not a simple relation, but rather a relation between relations; not a transitive causality, but rather a structural causality” (Balibar, 2009, p. 224).

Olsen (2017) underlines the importance of the conception of structural causality because the subsequent reception of it by Hindess and Hirst, who affected E. P. Thompson’s interpretation of Althusser, is to be situated between the “MPSF theory and dialectical complexity.” Olsen argues that the difference between Balibar and Hindess and Hirst can be understood by the latter's regionalization of the conception of structural causality with criticism. The regionalization is argued to be located at the “Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (PCMP)” where it is argued that the “structural causality requires the conditions of existence of the structure to be effects of the structure itself” (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, p. 273). Hence, the definition of the mode of production in general becomes problematic since the reproduction of the mode of production becomes necessary for structural causality**.** The problematic part is argued to stem from a lack of explanation concerning the transition from one mode of production to the other. Olsen argues that what Hindess and Hirst suggested is that the conditions of existence of the mode of production are contingent rather than assured.

At this point, Elliott (2006) argues that the Hindess and Hirst made the “anti-historical reconstruction of Marxist theory” possible to argue that “...Marxism per se

was vulgar and revolutionary socialism utopian" (p. xvi) and thus was responsible for Thompson's critique. Olsen (2017), on the other hand, underlines the importance of the Althusserian theoretical enterprise for economic analysis of "class-analytic Marxian theory", where the vanishing of the previous literature (Thompson, Hindess, and Hirst) made it possible for the new literature.

Considering how other people define Althusser's position, apart from the early British reception, would locate the conceptual pillars for an alternative reading. Elliott (2006) suggests that the works of Althusser could be divided into five periods: "early, works of the break, mature works, transitional works, late works" (p. 365). The chapter will focus on the "mature works" which is periodised to be located within 1960-1975, which could be divided into two: "the 'rationalist' moment of 1960-6, or the articles and seminar papers assembled in *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*" and "the 'politicist' moment of 1967-1975, represented in texts from *PSPS*[5] through to *Essays in Self Criticism (1973-5)*" (Elliott, 2006, p. 366).

Differing from Elliott, Montag (2013) emphasizes the post-mortem discovery of Althusser's manuscripts, and argues that the accent could be shifted to prioritizing the importance of "theoretical conjuncture" (p. 9), where it could be seen that the effort to locate himself within his contemporaries occupies a large portion of his effort. Montag (2013), against the commentary of Althusser which focuses on "the theme of agency, opposition of science and ideology, on the meaning of anti-humanism," or on his critique of "historicism;" proposes to locate the domain of discussion within the specificity of French thought where "three nodal points, sites of intensive overdetermination" are designated to be crucial (p. 10). Accordingly, these three points are revealed to be structure, subject, and origin/end.

By mentioning the importance of Montag's conjunctural contextualization, Peden (2014) argues and proposes in a similar manner that Althusser's thought must be read in parallel with French philosophy, where his domain of analysis is declared to be French Spinozism. The peculiarity of Spinozism is argued to be located in being against "phenomenology", where the problematics pertaining to consciousness are to be replaced with the problematics of the concept. Peden (2014) also argues that the conceptualization of "French Theory" should be seen as external to France, where there seems to be an antagonism between the internal developments of the so-

[5] Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of Scientists

called “French Theory” and the subsequent assimilation of it by the history of philosophy. In order to further understand this peculiarity, Peden argues that investigating the internal dynamics of the period where the classical thematics ascribed to the French context could be seen as non-existent in the context of structuralism and post-structuralism. He considers the role of Althusser in the history of French Spinozism as paving the way “to the theoretical exhaustion of Marxism as a positive political platform, to the extent that it offers no constructive, much less programmatic, guidance for a transformative political agenda” (p. 9).

Yet, Ipola (2018) proposes to view the Althusserian corpus as a whole. The reason for resisting compartmentalization in the reception of thought is that the inquiry concerning thought “manages to transcend the conditioning of the historical moment in which he lived, and especially there where he manages to break out of the ‘long-term prisons’ in which some of these theoretical positions had enclosed him” (p. 8). Combining the posthumous publications and the early publications, Ipola claims that his own reading is more philosophical than political and more theoretical than militant in tendency. This tendency is explicated by the premise that, in order to claim the transcendence of thought, despite the possibility of anachronism, it is necessary, since in this way more untimeliness will be added to untimeliness.

Dosse (1997), in a two-volume history of structuralism, contains all figures that could be associated with this school of thought within the French context, and discusses Althusser both as the result and the cause of the structuralist paradigm. He argues that “Althusser's effort was fated to be carried off by the undercurrent of the waning of Marxism,” yet also claims that “… the most ambitious and totalizing in the gamut of speculative structuralism” (p. 188). Although Dosse claims that the effect of Althusser did not affect “structuralist research in other more specific areas, particularly in textual sciences” (p. 188), it can be argued that outside of its local reception, particularly in the context of the conception of ideology and interpellation, the effects could be traced.

Hall (1985) argues that against the conceptualization of Althusser’s thought as pure difference or pure unity, one should emphasize “to rethink both in terms of a new concept-articulation” (p. 93). Against the conceptualization of “meaning” in the context of “discourse”, Hall, “despite all of its fault” (p. 93), mentions the importance of “Ideological State Apparatuses” (2001) and “On Contradiction and

Overdetermination" (2005). It could be argued that specifying the mentioned two texts stems from finding the objective and subjective counterparts of the concept "articulation" in operation. Hall (1985) argues that Althusser, while trying to elaborate the "general theory of ideology" in the "Ideological State Apparatuses" (2001), "the theory of the subject- came to be substituted, metonymically, for the whole of the theory itself" (p. 102). I argue that Hall's framing gives an adequate starting point for elaborating the category of the subject, since it resembles the change from pseudo-combinatory to contingency in Althusser's British reception.

Hall (1985) juxtaposes "Foucault's silence concerning the state" with Althusser's conceptualization of the subject under reproduction and state (in the Marxist sense) and claims that there occurs a "shift from practice to discourse" (p. 92) in theory. Butler (1997), almost anticipated by Hall, argues that "the notion of discourse emerges in Foucault in part to counter the sovereign model of interpellative speech in theories such as Althusser's…" (p. 7). The metonymy, which Hall (1985) claims to exist in "Ideological State Apparatuses", where the general theory of ideology becomes substituted with the theory of the subject, could be applied to Butler. Her theory of the subject becomes intermingled with the "theory of the psyche". She (1997) proposes two key aspects in the theorization of the subject:

> What remain to be considered are: (a) how the formation of the subject involves the regulatory formation of the psyche, including how we might rejoin the discourse of power with the discourse of psychoanalysis; and (b) how we might make such a conception of the subject work as a notion of political agency in post liberatory times. (p. 18)

Preliminary review of the two types of literature which focuses a) the problems concerning the "scientific theory" and its relationship with structuralism in the context of mode of production b) problematic (the function of state is argued to be highly contested for Hall) but fertile ground of conceptualization of subjectivity and ideology could be argued to share the same theoretical deadlock. That is, the reconceptualization of MPSF theory by utilizing structural causality indicates a change from a traditional Marxist account of determination and causality. Similarly, the conceptualization of ideology in general, which changes into the theory of subjectivity, indicates a shift from traditional Marxist understanding.

As stated, this chapter will focus more on the conditions of theorizing the concept of the subject in the domain of science and philosophy rather than focusing on Althusser's theoretical effects on economic and historical theories. Accordingly, I will be summarizing and reviewing *Reading Capital* following *For Marx*. In doing so, I will compare and contrast the "political criticisms" and try to engage these criticisms with the literature that involves itself with structuralism.

2.1. Reading "Reading Capital" and "For Marx"

Althusser (2005) begins *For Marx* by telling the historical conditions in which the theoretical interventions he seeks to engage became possible. He argues that during the post-war conditions in France, as a philosopher, he forced the intellectual environment to consider all "arts, literatures, philosophies, sciences" in terms of "pitiless demarcation of class" (p. 22). This demarcation is summarized with the dichotomy of "bourgeois science, proletarian science" (p. 22). Althusser ascribes the international reason for such a theoretical narrowing to Stalin by He argues that the relatively weak position of philosophy caused its confinement to "commentary and silence" in the Soviet Union (p. 22). Stalin is argued to "induce delirium" in the context of the position of language qua superstructure:

> Reading between the lines of the few simple pages in which he [Stalin] reproached the zeal of those who were making strenuous efforts to prove language a superstructure, we could see that there were limits to the use of the class criterion, and that we had been made to treat science, a status claimed by every page of Marx, as merely the first-comer among ideologies. We had to retreat, and, in semi-disarray, return to first principles. (Althusser, 2005, p. 22)

The weak position of philosophy in the Soviet Union is compared with the lack of "heritage and assistance of a national *theoretical* tradition" (Althusser, 2005, p. 26), which was caused by a lack of theoreticians. This mentioned lack, he adds, rendered the activity of philosophy to be "sacrificed to political and ideological conflicts alone" (p. 27). The sacrifice in question, for Althusser, results in two philosophical attitudes that place themselves in Marxism. Accordingly, those who base themselves on the "end of philosophy" thesis formulated by Marx in the eleventh thesis of "Theses on Feuerbach", instrumentalized philosophy which

resulted in “theoretical pragmatism”. The second attitude similarly bases itself to “end of philosophy” but emphasized the substitution of science for philosophy rendering the philosophical problems meaningless. Althusser (2005) summarizes these two positions as following: first, makes “peace with politics” but have “bad philosophical conscience”; second, claims a “practico-religious or positivist death of philosophy”. Both, however, cannot argue the “death” of philosophy within the domains of philosophy.

What Althusser (2005) wants to develop is to construct “Marxist theoretical concepts” which would reveal the nature of “theoretical formations and their history” (p. 38). This construction is also stated as the “application of Marxist theory to Marx himself”, which would make the “Marxist philosophy” “capable of accounting for itself” (p. 39). The first question concerning this theoretical enterprise arises from the selection of Marx’s works. In other words, the latent hierarchization which would inevitably occur in the selection of the texts needs to be explained. Other questions involve the choice of method and the conceptual tools that these constructions are going to be made with. Althusser (2005) claims that the construction of “Marxist theory” is to be done with two operational concepts: a) the concept of “problematic” which is used to “designate the particular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the location to be assigned to this specific difference” b) the concept of “epistemological break” which aspire to designate “the mutation in the theoretical problematic contemporary with the foundation of a scientific discipline” (p. 32). The concept of “epistemological break” is used to periodize and designate the “scientific” and “ideological” problematics within Marx’s works.

The two philosophical positions that Althusser is against are criticized in “Contradiction and Overdetermination” and “On the Materialist Dialectic”. While in the former Althusser analyzes Lenin’s political texts to render theoretical concepts, in the latter, he discusses the specificity of the Marxist dialectic distinct from the Hegelian one. Accordingly, the former essay tries to divorce the reign of philosophy over politics in the context of conceptualization, while the latter tries to formulate the scientificity as such. Concerning the periodization of Marx’s works, Althusser (2005) argues that the mature works of Marx present his “revolutionary theoretical project” (p. 34).

What remains unanswered, however, is the explicit pronunciation from which standpoint (say, philosophical-theoretical) the deduction of the "Marxist philosophy" is going to be made. In other words, if we accept Althusser's words concerning the competing philosophical standpoints which he aspires to reject, the attitude could be seen as an "intervening" one; whereas if we focus only on the deduction part, it could be said that the position in which he locates himself is an "interpreting" one. Montag (1993) claims that in order to solve this antinomy, one should address the Spinozism that is present in Althusser. Homologous to the scriptural criticism of Spinoza:

> The order and coherence of the text has been imposed or added to it by subsequent generations of readers and must therefore be rejected at the outset. Knowledge therefore does not lead us from the appearance of disorder to a hidden original simplicity and purity, but rather to the recovery of the complexity proper to Scripture itself. (Montag, 1993, p. 54)

Montag argues that the same unconcealment of the complexity exists within Althusser's treatment of Marx's texts. Montag (1993) indicates that Althusser's reading is a strategy which "stressed the necessarily contradictory character of theoretical texts, not as a fault for which they might be reproached but as the very principle of their intelligibility…" (p. 57). The reason for following such a strategy is to avoid or challenge "partisans of textual unity or coherence, whether the hermeneutic readers who sought the polysemy of the structuralist who described the system proper to every text, against whom Althusser argued" (p. 57).

Perhaps the best way to start discussing the analytic operation attributed to Althusser by Montag, which reveals the complexity and its positive appreciation, is to look at how the concept "contradiction" was supplemented with "over-determination" because the necessarily contradictory character of a text comes to be discussed in its concept.

2.2. Contradiction and Overdetermination

The essay starts with stating that the concept of Marx's "inversion metaphor": "With (Hegel, the dialectic) is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" (Althusser,

2005, p. 89). Even though it is argued that the metaphor in question is used "gestural" or merely "metaphorical" (p. 90), the gesture aims to facilitate a question.

Althusser (2005) argues that if in the activity of inversion only the term "Idea" is changed to "real world", then dialectic in its structure remains "untouched" (p. 91). Instead, what needs to be revealed is that "the Marxist dialectic is 'in principle' and not mystical-mystified-mysitificatory, this radical distinction must be manifest in its essence, that is, in its *characteristic determinations and structures*" (p. 93). In other words, Althusser is seeking to find a way to think the distinctiveness of the Marxist dialectic beyond the inversion metaphor. The concept in which the metaphorical relationship is proposed to be superseded is designated as "contradiction". The concept of contradiction is argued to be worked upon by a further metaphor, i.e., Lenin's metaphor of the "weakest link" (p. 94).

The weakest link, figured by Lenin, is argued to be defining the "objectively revolutionary situation" (Althusser, 2005, p. 95) where the "*accumulation and exacerbation of all the historical contradictions then possible in a single State* [emphasis in original]" (pp. 95-96) would define the status of Russia as the "*'most backward'* country" while at the same time "*produce a triumphant revolution* [emphasis in original]" (p. 95). What makes Russia a backward country is the existence of a historical "gigantic contradiction between the stage of development of capitalist methods of production," while what is deemed ahead is the exiled status of the "Russian revolutionary elite". The exile enabled the absorption of "the whole heritage of the political experience of the Western European working classes" (p. 96). The "exceptional" situation that constructed the possibility of a victorious revolutionary moment was possible since Russia was "overdue with its bourgeois revolution on the eve of its proletarian revolution; pregnant with two revolutions, it could not withhold the second even by delaying the first" (p. 97).

By contrast, the German experience is different in terms of "rapid economic growth" (Althusser, 2005, p. 98) and the social democratic party's electoral victory. Although the seemingly correct objective condition of the contradiction between capital and labour could be located in a pure form, this, according to Althusser, is only an "abstract" conceptualization of contradiction. He (2005) argues that the "circumstantial" events, such as "powerful state machinery", "bourgeois class giving up its revolutionary potential", etc., proved the irrelevancy of the status of

contradiction in “pure form” (p. 98). The real contradiction, Althusser argues, is to be located within the circumstances where it was not only “discernable, identifiable” but also “manipulable *through them and in them*” (p. 98)

Therefore, Althusser (2005) continues to argue that the circumstances are not only vital but also “radically heterogeneous” in the sense that the they are not “merely the *pure phenomena* of the general contradiction” (p. 100). Hence, contradiction is seen to be inseparable from the “social body”. Here one can find the contradiction, but also come to be “radically affected by them”. However, within the state of contradiction, what is found is not its pure state but a contradiction that is “overdetermined in its principle” (p. 101).

The concept of “overdetermination”, Althusser (2005) argues, fills a conceptual lack which is seen “both as an index and as a problem”. The indexial part is to mark the specific difference of the Marxist contradiction from the Hegelian one. In contrast, the problematic part is designated to be lacking a proper word. The difference between the Marxist contradiction and the Hegelian one, he (2005) states, stems from the possibility of thinking or bringing the external elements as contradictory terms:

> … none of these determinations is essentially *outside* the others, not only because together they constitute an original, organic totality, but also and above all because this totality is *reflected in a unique internal principle*, which is *the truth* of all those concrete determinations. (p. 102)

The above-mentioned internal principle or the simple contradiction which includes and assimilates the other contradictions to itself, is the ideology of the “philosophical consciousness” since every historical fact -ranging from wars to “ethics, art, religion, philosophy”- is deemed to be viewed as the “most abstract form of that epoch’s consciousness of itself”. Hence, the “mystical shell” (in this case the internal principle), regardless of the change of terrain in terms, affects the “kernel” where contradiction is “contaminated” whether or not it is posited in the spiritual or in the real world (p. 103). The rendering of the term contradiction with the adjective over (and maybe under) conceptually changes the validity of the original term since:

> … *the Capital-Labour contradiction is never simple, but always specified by the historically concrete forms and circumstances in which it is exercised.* It is specified by the forms of the *superstructure …* specified by *the internal*

> *and external historical situation* which determines it … (Althusser, 2005, p. 106)

Then, the question posed towards the (underdetermined) concept of contradiction is: "What can this mean but that apparently simple contradiction is *always overdetermined?*" *(*Althusser, 2005, p. 106) Perhaps the most adequate way to grasp the "meaning" in question is to look at the *form* in which the terms relate to each other. The simple contradiction, i.e., the base, is posed, grammatically, to be subjected to the "forms of the superstructure" or by the "historically concrete forms and circumstances". The question in which the mentioned relationship between the "forms of the superstructure" and the base is formulated as: "*... the theory of the specific effectivity of the superstructures and other 'circumstances' largely remains to be elaborated...*" (p. 113) In other words, the way in which the superstructure can contribute to the articulation of the base constitutes the critical Althusserian question. Yet, this research project overlooks an important conceptual change of function between contradiction and over-determination. After providing externality between contradictions and rendering the original term, contradiction, to be found overdetermined rather than to be found in a simple state, the conceptual status of the "contradiction" becomes nullified. In other words, adding an adjective to the concept of contradiction hinders the definition or conceptualization of contradiction proper.

Zizek (1994) claims that in order to understand the relationship between contradiction and overdetermination, the grammatical conjunctive verb "and" must be explained in its function:

> What is at stake here could also be formulated as the problem of the status of 'and' as a category. In Althusser 'and' functions as a precise theoretical category: when an 'and' appears in the title of some of his essays, this little word unmistakably signals the confrontation of some general ideological notion (or, more precisely, of a neutral, ambiguous notion that oscillates between its ideological actuality and its scientific potentiality) with its specification which tells us how we are to concretize this notion so that it begins to function as non-ideological, as a strict theoretical concept. 'And' thus *splits up* the ambiguous starting unity, introduces into it the difference between ideology and science. (p. 15)

At first sight, Zizek's account strengthens Althusser's thesis in the sense that the philosophical consciousness criticized for being ideological, produces a simple contradiction. However, it does not mention to which concrete problem the essay

"Contradiction and Overdetermination" was written for. The concrete problem, also in the essay, is not declared immediately but revealed at the end of the text in the context of discussing "*survivals*". The survival in question, again, is understood to be thought in its relationship to "existence and nature of the superstructures" (Althusser, 2005, p. 114). In order to understand "survivals", Althusser gives several examples ranging from "*customs, habits,* even '*traditions'* such as the *'national tradition'* with its specific traits" (p. 114). The discussion continues on the Soviet society as "… the new society produced by the Revolution may itself *ensure the survival, that is, the reactivation of older elements* through both the forms of its new superstructures and specific (national and international) 'circumstances' (p. 116). However, Althusser does not address to Marx's discussion on survival, which seems problematic, or even symptomatic since Marx's point locates the problem in the historical analysis, rather than locating it as an output of overdetermination.

Marx (1993), in his introduction to *Grundrisse*, discusses the ambiguous position of Greek art in the context of "survival":

> In the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their flowering are out of all proportion to the general development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization. For example, the Greeks compared to the moderns or also Shakespeare. It is even recognized that certain forms of art, e.g. the epic, can no longer be produced in their world epoch-making, classical stature as soon as the production of art, as such, begins; that is, that certain significant forms within the realm of the arts are possible only at an undeveloped stage of artistic development. If this is the case with the relation between different kinds of art within the realm of the arts, it is already less puzzling that it is the case in the relation of the entire realm to the general development of society. The difficulty consists only in the general formulation of these contradictions. As soon as they have been specified, they are already clarified. (p. 110)

This passage also seems to be posited homologous to Althusser's (2005) discussion in the context of defining "the theory of specific effectivity of superstructures" (p. 113). That is, Marx argues that because the art in question is related to the general development of society, the problem of establishing the relationship between art and society is only an operation of establishing *specific* relationships. Michael Sprinker (1987) argues that Marx's remarks on Greek art are an adequate setting for establishing the relationship between aesthetics and ideology (p. 274). He adds that Marx's comments on Greek as possessing an "eternal charm"

imply that on the one hand the reception of the artworks reaches "beyond the moment and the immediate social context of their production" (p. 274), and on the other hand, the works of art are a product of their historical epoch where the epoch's mode of production can be specified (p. 274). Sprinker explains the relationship between the object of political economy and Greek art as follows:

> Just as classical classical political economy produced the concept of value without recognizing it, and just as apes possess opposable thumbs without fully understanding the significance of this fact, so the Greeks produced art, as it were, without knowing it, 'naively' in Marx's terms. (p. 275)

However, the question that remains to be answered, for Marx (1993), is not the *specific* relationship that waits to be established, but its persistence in its ideological form:

> But the difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm and as an unattainable model. (p. 86)

In other words, regardless of the conceptual scientificity of "contradiction", the initial starting point that renders a discourse to access a scientific property, as Zizek (1995) argues, is an ideological one. If the term "contradiction" is used in the actual sense, as Zizek argues, the term loses its scientific character and must be supplemented with the adjectives "-over" and "-under" to acquire a scientific actuality. Hall (2003), in the context of Marx, points out a similar discussion:

> The whole of Marx's mature effort is, indeed, the critique of the categories of Political Economy. The critique of method is positively opened, though not closed, in the 1857 Introduction. Yet Political Economy remains Marx's only theoretical point-of-departure. Even when it has been vanquished and transformed, as in the case of the dismantling of the Ricardian theory of wages, or in the break-through with the 'suspended' concept of surplus value, Marx keeps returning to it, refining his differences from it, examining it, criticising it, going beyond it. Thus even when Marx's theoretical formulations lay the foundations of a materialist science of historical formations, the 'laws' of Political Economy still command the field, theoretically – because they dominate social life in practice. To paraphrase Marx's remarks on the German 'theoretical conscience', Political Economy cannot be realized in practice without abolishing it in theory, just as, on the other side, it cannot be abolished in practice until it has been theoretically 'realised'. (p. 145)

As Hall (2003) argues, the concepts or 'laws' of political economy are still relevant because of the persistence of the same laws. Similar to the persistence of the laws of political economy, the apprehension of the "classical Greek art" still remains as a theoretical problem. A possible domain of conceptualization of the persistence of apprehension could be argued to be located in the domain of "consciousness" or (to use consciousness pertaining to our discussion) ideology. Hall (2003) argues that Marx's own comments pertaining to the Greek art reception problem are not discussed theoretically but rather "stylistically". However, the context of persistence or the "survival" is elaborated differently in Marx and Althusser. Perhaps, the preliminary definition of such difference could be formulated as "subject qua ideological" and "subject qua political" respectively. I have argued that the context of Marx is ideological, because what remains to be explained is the form of ideology, i.e., the form in which Greek art could be appreciated; Althusser, on the other hand, discusses the problem of survival in the context of concrete political "circumstances" and his reference in order to problematize the "survival" is Lenin.

Yet, what remains of the concept "contradiction" in its "scientific potentiality" in the sense of proper conceptual determination, remains unanswered in Althusser's case and posited as a theoretical urgency:

> ... But there is obviously much *theoretical* work which has priority – precisely because of this priority, priority is given to essential of any Marxist *concepts, their implications and their development; a rigorous conception and investigation of what appertains to them in particular, that is, what distinguishes them once and for all from their phantoms.* (Althusser, 2005, p. 116)

Despite the postponement of the theoretical project, Althusser (2005) still defines the frame in which contradiction is to be conceived by himself, i.e., "abstractly" (p. 98). In other words, the lack of a properly elaborated concept of contradiction, if we are going to judge Althusser by his own words, may seem to be an irrelevant question. Perhaps a better way to delve into the mentioned question is to examine how Lenin is used as a function of the text. Contrary to Marx, Althusser is not interested in the ideological remainder that still persists after a historical explanation that adequately establishes the relationship between heterogeneous contradictions. Instead, the question seems to be political in the sense that both the

survival of the elements and the "reactivation" of older elements by the revolutionary regime are related to "Stalin's crimes and repression" (p. 116).

The importance of the political reality stems from the role of the place in which the theory abstracts and relates Lenin's political explanations to Lenin's own position. The two are not qualitatively equal to one another. In other words, as opposed to Althusser's usage of the term, the politically engaged usage of contradiction does not problematize the relationship of "simple" contradiction conceptually, instead reduces it into political accusation, such as "economism".

Montag (2015) mentions that in Althusser's oeuvre, Lenin's usage is received with numerous responses ranging from "relative silence", to "illegibility", and "little attention has been devoted to the place of Lenin in his thought" (p. 49). Montag continues to argue that Lenin's function in Althusser's various readings was thought to be serving "as a temporary representative or emissary who had been delegated to speak on behalf of other political theoreticians or philosophers" (p. 49). The impersonation just mentioned, Montag argues, carries its own risks, where its unintended consequences could result in theoretical contradictions.

The precise operation of delegation (or ventriloquizing Lenin), Montag (2015) argues, is the "logic of *lieu-tenance*"[6]. The logic of stand-in causes a certain confusion between the operator and the operated or "the impersonator and the impersonated", if it is confronted with a certain deadlock in its operation. Montag argues that the constant usage of the logic of stand-in in Althusser's writings enables "constant strategic and tactical ruses and evisions" which ultimately grants the operator to constitute "a chain of substitutions without origin or end". Lenin's usage becomes the "name" in which the contradiction that is adequate for Althusser's conception is operationalized. The operation, which is argued to be located between Mao and Hegel's conceptions of contradictions chooses Lenin as a middle term since the Maoist one resembles a "structuralist" conception of contradiction according to Althusser. The structuralist conception of contradiction is argued to stem from the conceptualization of history, which necessarily "appears in the invariant forms of each aspect of contradiction" (p. 57).

[6] Montag (2015) argues that the logic of lieu-tenance is Althusser's own conception by referencing "Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses".

Montag (2015) argues that the designation of Mao's contradiction as structuralist is strangely criticized by Badiou (1975) without citing anyone, since within the context "1960s France", it was typical "to translate the theory of contradiction into a synchronic order of places, something like a syntax of history" (p. 57). Instead, after giving a preliminary warning for a "typical" reading associated with structuralism, Badiou (1975) argues that the "structuralist" terms in which the contradiction must be thought should be replaced with the concept of forces:

> The thought of contradiction does not consist in a duplication of the system of places by a structural estimate of forces (a combinatory). The process is essentially dissymmetrical, with a dissymmetry that cannot be schematized because it is qualitative. (p. 100-101)[7]

Strangely, Montag (2015) does not mention the theoretical reason for the non-usage of Mao in the context of the conceptualization of contradiction, but rather delegates the issue to Althusser's "strategic usage of concepts", which is related to the orthodoxy of PCF. The aim of this mentioned strategy is argued by Montag (2015) to "protect philosophy (and its privileged relation to the sciences) from the contamination of the political" (p. 53), where the protection is to be targeted against the "official philosophy" of PCF. The protection, as Montag (2015) states, can be understood homologous to Lenin's fusion of "heterogeneous contradictions". The fusion enables one to engage the enemy "on the terrain of philosophy itself".

The problem of structuralist terminology (articulated and criticized by Badiou) is also acknowledged by Althusser (2009) in the foreword to the Italian edition of *Reading Capital*:

> Despite the precautions we took to distinguish ourselves from the 'structuralist' ideology (we said very clearly that the 'combination' to be found in Marx 'has nothing to do with a 'combinatory'), despite the decisive intervention of categories foreign to 'structuralism' (determination in the last instance, domination, overdetermination, production processs, etc.) the terminology we employed was too close in many respects to the 'structuralist' terminology not to give rise to an ambiguity. With a very few exceptions (some very perceptive critics have made the distinction), our interpretation of Marx has generally has been recognized and judged, in homage to the current fashion, as 'structuralist'. (p. 7)

[7] Translation is from Warren Montag.

In order to discuss the context of philosophy, I shall be reviewing how the "reading" of *Reading Capital* is articulated while at the same time how it articulates the "writing" in the course of the same reading.

2.3. *Reading Capital*

Althusser (2009) starts explaining the project of *Reading Capital* by stating the peculiarity of his reading being composed of locating the text's "*relation to its object*". Hence, both the question of the specificity of text's *object,* and the question of text's *relation* to that object are problematized (p. 14). This specific reading, designated as a philosophical reading, tries to relate the object-relations of the text to locate the status of the text's discourse, i.e., "the question of scientific discourse" (p. 14). In other words, what interests Althusser in *Capital* is the precise question of the specificity of the "*discourse-object* unity" (p. 15) which distinguishes itself from other discourse-object unities. The specificity in question, if addressed in its conceptual terminology, is formulated as:

> And is *Capital* merely a continuation or even a culmination of classical political economy, from which Marx inherited both object and concepts? And is *Capital* distinguished from classical economic not by its object, but only by its *method,* the dialectic he borrowed from Hegel? Or, on the contrary, does *Capital* constitute a real epistemological mutation of its object, theory and method? (Althusser, 2005, p. 15)

However, without delving into the deduction of Marx's scientific discourse, Althusser (2009) problematizes a "non-conceptual" term which he deploys, i.e., reading, and asks "*what is it to read?* [emphasis in original]" (p. 15). The absence of the concept "reading", combined with the "'simplest' acts of existence: seeing, listening, speaking," is conceptualized not because of the psychological conception, which "is built on the absence of a concept" but because of Freud's conceptualization (Althusser, 2009, p. 16). In other words, "the simple acts", in their discursive articulation, reveal a "*quite different* discourse", i.e., "the discourse of the unconscious" (p. 16). The ideological philosophy's conceptualization of the simple acts resembles the articulation that places itself in the distinction between "essence" and "appearance". This culminates in the moment of "Absolute Knowledge" where "the concept at last becomes fully visible" (p. 16). Against the "complicity between

Logos and Being" or a reading that takes part to reveal the whole, the reading in question is conceptualized as "the inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of a structure of structures" (p. 17). Hence, the construction of the mentioned structure rests on the possibility of a new conception. This new conception would reveal the latent operation of Marx's rupture seen in its effects.

To reflect the mentioned rupture, Althusser (2009) proceeds to locate Marx's position in his reading of political economists. However, this locating is also pre-emptive for not remaining in the "retrospective theoretical reading" (p. 18). That is, if one does not detect the reading operation latent in Marx, his contributions to political economy remains in the problematic of "vision". The problematic of vision according to Althusser (2009) is "the work of knowledge is reduced in principle to the recognition of the mere relation of *vision*; in which the whole nature of its object is reduced to the mere *given* [emphasis in original]" (p. 19). What Althusser (2009) wants to disengage in his reading of Marx is the repetitive, eternal, and hence ideological conception of Marx's problematic, which condemns "to see in Marx only what he *saw* [emphasis in original]" (p. 20).

Althusser (2009) argues that the to-be-discovered "reading", which has to be notated with quotation marks because of the infusion of the terminology of vision, is related to the structuralist "problem of *combination* [emphasis in original]". According to Althusser (2009), the meaning of combination lies in its being distinct from remaining itself with the problem of "remarkable oversights". As he states, the problem of "remarkable oversights" judges it with absolute measures of presence and absence rather than locating "necessary invisible connexion between the field of the visible and the field of the invisible" (p. 20). The reading practice of Marx is constructed as a theory of reading, which remains latent if it is left as a practice. According to Althusser (2009), Marx's reading problematizes the category of "price of labour" that is central to classical political economy. Accordingly, Marx notes that spontaneously applying the movements of the "category 'price of labour'" to the relations of demand and supply, reaches a meaningless state when the relation of supply and demand reaches an equilibrium. In other words, "the price of labour..." - in the state of equilibrium- "… no longer depends on their action and must be determined as if they did not exist" (p. 20). The problem of eliminating the effects of demand and supply, as Marx (1975, as cited in Althusser, 2009) argues, change the

classical political economist's calculation of price of labour to "calculating the averages to which the alternative rising and falling movements could be reduced by continuous compensations" (p. 20). Marx's own conceptualization of the operation, which is absent in the classical political economists, is to detect the price of labour "by the value of the subsistence goods necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of the labourer" (p. 20). What interests Althusser (2009) in Marx's reading of classical political economists is the metaphorical usage of language where Marx articulates the shift from the price of labour to labour power:

> *It thus unwittingly changed terrain* by substituting for the value of labour, up to this point, *the apparent object of its investigations,* the value of labour power… The result the analysis led to, therefore, was *not a resolution of the problem as it emerged at the beginning, but a complete change in the terms of that problem.* (p. 21)

Althusser (2009), to break away with the linear comparison of Marx's theory and classical political economy, formulates the terms of the "second reading" of Marx as "the problem of the necessary connexion which unites the visible and the invisible" (p. 22). The tautological formulation of the price of labour in the discourse of classical political economists, as Althusser (2009) argues, is "sentence identical to a concept" (p. 23). He argues that the repetitive answer, i.e., "value of labour" to the concept-sentence of the question "*What is the value of labour* [emphasis in original]" in its answering reveals the *"the site of the omission* [emphasis in original]" where the repetition "marks of an omission produced by the 'fullness' of the utterance itself" (p. 23).

Althusser (2009) points out that the omitted concept by the political economists is established by Marx in his conceptualization of "labour power". Rather than restricting itself to the question of "what is the value of labour", the concept "labour power" is articulated by expanding the concept its definition into the "*value of subsistence goods necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of labour*" (p. 24). Althusser's conception of knowledge as production becomes apparent in this discussion. The "concept-identical" sentence is seen as an "index of a possible critical transformation and of a possible latent mutation which affect the reality of this terrain throughout its extent, including the extreme limits of its 'horizon'" (p. 25). In other words, what could be seen from the tautological utterance of the

concept is the "symptom" of a scientific discourse where in the possibility of conceiving a new objectivity "these new objects and problems are necessarily *invisible* in the field of the existing theory, because they are not objects of this theory, because they are *forbidden* by it" (p. 27).

Yet, as Althusser (2009) warns the usage of spatial metaphors[8] during "a change of terrain" from classical political economy to a critical one, the forbidden object of the symptomatic discourse is its "internal limit" and precisely because the limit remains internal or because there is no external criterion in which the discourse is determined, the "theoretical field is … an *infinite*... [emphasis in original]" (p. 28). However, within this infinity of the theoretical field, what appears as an omission, if considered or evaluated only with the means of the same theoretical field, is not the confrontation with a problem or an "appearing". Rather, it is "*production* of the *fleeting presence of an aspect* [emphasis in original] of its invisible within the visible field of the existing problematic" (p. 28). In other words, it is a "lack of a symptom". The infinite distance which separates Marx from classical political economists is going to be analysed in the presentation or ordering of the concepts, i.e., "'Darstellung' and its avatars" (p. 30). The concept in which the presentation is proposed to be thought, by Althusser, is "*the concept of the effectivity of a structure on its elements* [emphasis in original]" (p. 30). The omission of this concept is argued to be a "philosophical omission" where the usage of Hegelian terminology "scene" the absence of the concept (p. 31).

Returning to the discussion of "Contradiction and Overdetermination", Althusser (2005) argues that the reference which he made to Mao Tse-tung's piece of "On Contradiction" was not enough for conceptual elaboration because Mao's text was "a description of the structures of the Marxist dialectic reflected in political practice" (p. 34). In other words, what is argued is that if one remains within the

[8] "The recourse made in this text to spatial metaphors (field, terrain, space, site, situation, position, etc.) poses a theoretical problem: the problem of the validity of its *claim* to existence in a discourse with scientific pretensions. The problem may be formulated as follows: *why* does a certain form of scientific discourse necessarily need the use of metaphors borrowed from non-scientific disciplines?" (Althusser, p. 28, Footnote 8). Elden (2007) problematizes the immediate application of spatial terminology by emphasizing that the immediacy of usage could be seen to mirroring "the actual uses and experience of space. For example, where the space of town planners is seen as a scientific object, as pure and apolitical…" For more discussion concerning Foucault's use of spatial metaphors (Althusser also, prior to using them, mentions Foucault), see: Neil Smith & Cindy Katz, "Grounding Metaphor: Towards a Spatialised Politics," in *Place and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Michael Keith & Steve Pile (London: Routledge, 1993).

confines of “description”, the “inversion” metaphor still remains to be conceptually un-elaborated in the sense that “the inversion metaphor shows that it cannot itself think itself” (p. 35). Considering the same problem, the “name” Lenin functioned for Althusser as a way to distinguish science and ideology without engaging what political practice and its related subjective position entail. Here, in *Reading Capital*, the question concerning political practice is left aside and the scientificity is sought in Marx’s text, i.e., *Capital,* which is claimed to be scientific. Yet, perhaps because of the intellectual honesty or a theoretical problem that remains to be solved, Althusser (2005) formulates the question under which “the militant texts” are to be investigated:

> … it was not possible to *read* these classical texts, which are not scholarly but militant texts, other than the enigmatic letter of their *ideological* expression, without being able to show why this expression had necessarily to take the *form* of ideological expression, i.e., without being able to isolate this form in its real essence. (p. 36)

The problem mentioned above, is delegated by Althusser (2009) to the correct reading of Marx’s “production of the concepts”. The correct production of a concept would render the “reasons for this unreason” (p. 36), unreason being the ideological form in which the texts express themselves. To elaborate on what production of the concepts or, in general, to conceive knowledge as production, what Althusser does is to engage in a criticism of a philosophical lineage which is called “empiricism” (p. 37). Distinguished from the process of production, what empiricism does in its operation of conceiving knowledge is defined as “real abstraction” (p. 36). The object conception of the “real abstraction” process is explained by referring to the abstracted essential part of the object found in a compound with its inessential part. This compound is defined as the “real object” (p. 38). Empiricism, then,follows a homology with the “problematic of religious vision of the essence in the transparency of existence” in the context of the definition of knowledge.

What Althusser (2009) wants to emphasize is that the empiricism “admits something important and denegates it in the same instant: it admits that the object of knowledge is not identical to the real object, since it declares that it is only a part of the real object” (p. 42). Althusser argues that the admission of empiricism of two

"real" objects, also reflected in Marx's own discourse[9], must be distinguished so that the "fraudulent unity of the *word* 'object'" would be freed from the confusion. This confusion caused by Marx's engagement with the Hegelian terminology as described as "true play on words" (p. 43).

Althusser (2009) proposes that contrary to the terminology of the empiricist conception of knowledge, the absolute separation of the object of knowledge from the real object, even to the extent that the historical analysis of a field, is also designated in the logical order (p. 44). In other words, the "*real* genesis" of a historical field of analysis can only be "reproduced" in the logical order, however, as the term "reproduction" connotes, the logical order "is the historically constituted system of an *apparatus of thought*" (p. 41). The apparatus in question, which combines its relevant raw materials (and these materials could also be spiritual, where it would deem the apparatus to be ideological), and within that combination "constitutes it as the object it will transform" (p. 46).

The initial entry or raw materials to the apparatus of knowledge, Althusser claims (2009), is never to be found in its objective purity but "with an ever-already complex raw material" (p. 43). The complexity of the materials implies a "reign of a new logic" because the previous framework in which the materials were analyzed i.e., "the inversion metaphor" confines the process of knowledge to a teleological history. That is, knowledge is seen in the inversion metaphor as a "history of the progressive manifestation or emergence into consciousness of a Reason which is completely present in germ" (p. 44). The emergence of this new logic is explained conceptually as "the necessity of its contingency", where the concepts describe the "arrival of a science, not as its goal, but as its surprise" (p. 45). A similar conception, i.e., "epistemological rupture", is used for marking the pre-scientific history of a science, i.e., its ideological history and its contingently established scientific beginning, where the relationship between these two histories is argued only to be thought as the "science of ideology" (p. 49).

Balibar (1978) argues that by borrowing the concept "epistemological break", Althusser actually changes the conceptual status of the concept. He (1978) argues that Bachelard's usage -from whom the concept was borrowed- implies "the primacy

[9] The real object (Althusser, 2005, p. 43), "which exists outside the subject, independent of the process of knowledge". The quote is attributed to Marx without giving an explicit citation.

of epistemology over the history of sciences" (p. 208), where the "pre-scientific techniques" which were developed into a science by the break are not conceptualized. This non-conceptualization, Balibar (1978) continues, leads to a conception of scientific history where "the 'progressivity' of scientific knowledge appearing as the expression of an internal 'logic' and its 'normativity' as that of an implicit teleology" (p. 215). What changes in the conceptual application of "epistemological break" in the domain of historical materialism is that "historical materialism *in its turn* [emphasis in original] presents the already referenceable characteristics in the 'theoretical practice' of other sciences" (p. 216). The substitution of the "truth/error" dichotomy with "ideology" replaces the "logical" criterion of evaluating "truth/error" with the conception of ideology not as an epistemological category but as an instance of the social formation. In other words, if the definition of "science of history" is accepted for historical materialism, one can only conceive of it as "*transporting the whole problem of the constitution of sciences into the field of the materialist (historical) theory of ideologies* [emphasis in original]" (p. 217). Balibar agrees with Althusser in the domain that the break which must be applied to historical materialism must be articulated as Marxist philosophy. That is, because one falls into a self-referential loop of defining a concept in the domain of history qua history or in Balibar's (1978) explanation "emergence of the concepts of historical materialism with a fact of the intellectual biography of Marx or a group of young revolutionary intellectuals", what must be emphasized is the "contingency of the beginning" (p. 218).

Yet, there is also a problem that must be emphasized in the context of "presentation" of a historical materialist analysis in the sense that the relationship between the "logical" and "historical" order of assembling a discourse on history must be explained. In other words, the science of ideology must analyse the objectivity of the historical ordering.

Homologous to the explanation concerning the absolute differentiation between object-in-thought and real-object, Althusser (2009) argues that the relationship, if conceived under the criterion of "correspondence" or "one-to-one correspondence", is an "empiricist problematic" (p. 50). The relationship that Althusser (2009) argues cannot be thought of also as an "inverted" relationship because, as he also showed, concerning the relationship between the Marxist and the

Hegelian dialectic, the term inversion is not a concept, but a metaphor. Hence, the relationship in question is designated to be conceived as “meaningless” unless an adequate theory concerning the distinction can be made.

In order to clarify the difference between logical and historical orders, it would be adequate to locate it within a historical materialist analysis. Mooers (1991) compares France, England, and Germany in their history of becoming capitalist societies by emphasizing the relationship of politics and the societies’ particular social formations. Mooers’s main thesis is to “insist upon the connection between the character of capitalist transition in various parts of Europe and the type of bourgeois revolution that was experienced”, against the “assault on the Marxist concept of bourgeois revolution” without falling into “abstract notions of the transition from feudalism to capitalism” (p. 2). What I want to emphasize in Mooers’ study is that, despite maintaining a heterogeneous conception of history among the three countries, the particular transitions from feudalism to capitalism are concluded with a *symptomatic* descriptive conclusion. I argue that Mooers’ comparison of different countries shows a striking case of the difference between logical and historical ordering while showing how historical materialist analysis cannot grasp contradiction and over-determination if it conceives contradiction as a simple relation at the same time. First, while discussing England, Mooers argues that:

> Moreover, far from being the product of conscious design by any of the economic actors involved, the emergence of capitalist relations should properly be seen, as Brenner has suggested, 'as an unintended consequence of the actions of individual pre-capitalist actors and especially the conflicts between pre-capitalist classes'. (p. 33)

Second, while talking about the French case, Mooers (1991) concludes as follows:

> The dynamics of the revolutionary struggle made the bourgeoisie just as much as the bourgeoisie made the revolution. But the political revolution should not be confused with the development of capitalism which was a much longer and tortuous process. What the former did was to clear away much of the 'medieval rubbish' which stood in the way of capitalism. The bourgeois revolution thesis, therefore, does not require the prior existence of a class-conscious bourgeoisie separate in its ideology and forms of wealth from the nobility, waiting in the wings for its moment to smash the fetters of feudalism. The point is rather that the crisis of absolutism, rooted in the collision of two quite contradictory sets of productive relations, left the bourgeoisie with only one way forward: the abolition of seigneurialism. the creation of legal equality and guaranteed property rights, and the unification

> of France into a single economic market - all of which were central to capitalist development. (p. 95)

Thirdly, while emphasizing the transition of the German case, Mooers (1991) states that:

> A useful model for understanding the contradictory nature of this process, is to see it as an instance of what Robert Brenner has termed an 'unintended consequence' of the rationally self-interested actions of pre-capitalist actors. l82 That is to say. the actions taken by the Bismarckian state to consolidate new sources of surplus compelled it to pursue policies which had the effect of strengthening capitalism. even though the intended outcome was to reinforce pre-capitalist social relations. (p. 144)

In these three accounts of capitalist transition histories by Mooers (1991) what strikingly resembles the implicit understanding of the "cunning of reason" is not the teleological conception of history apparent in the repeated use of the terms "non-conscious actions" or "unintended consequences". Instead, despite its careful and scientific pretensions, the persisting ideological form that the historical analysis cannot escape is what I want to emphasize[10]. Althusser (2009), in this context, delegates the issue to the analysis of "knowledge effects":

> A theory of the history of the production of knowledges can only ever give us an observation: here is the mechanism by which these knowledges have been produced. But this observation treats the knowledge *as a fact*… without ever reflecting *the fact that these products are not just any products, but precisely knowledges*… A theory of the history of the production of knowledges therefore does not account for what I propose to call the *'knowledge effect'*. (p. 66)

Badiou (2011) problematizes this delegation by arguing that the domain selected for analyzing the "knowledge effect", that is, dialectical materialism, does not "represent" the scientific operation of the first, that is, historical materialism, but rather represents its existence. The existence in question, Badiou (2011) argues, is not not-present in historical materialism or, in other words, "the theoretical presentation of the *system* of a science does not belong to this science" (p. 152). Hence, the status of dialectical materialism becomes "hesitantly" as philosophy where the distinction between "ideology/non-ideology" becomes applicable to

[10] Yet, the conceptual result of Mooers' historization seems to resemble Hindess and Hirst's emphasis on the contingency of the mode of production, if one remains within the conceptual scheme of Balibar's discussion.

philosophy, which it sought to destroy, locate, and criticize in the first place within the analysis of science (p. 160). The problem becomes, as Badiou (2011) states, if the criterion of ideology/non-ideology is applied by dialectical materialism, its reflective judgment on its own products comes to resemble "formal characteristics of ideological philosophy" in which "*teleology* and *auto-intelligibility* [emphasis in original]" can be addressed (p. 161). As Badiou states, "dialectical materialism" distinguishing itself from "other sciences" (or philosophies by being non-ideological) "must be capable of thinking its own break, to *reflect its difference*, when *a* science is nothing but the developed *act* of this difference" (p. 162). Or, in other words, what we reach after the possibility of developing concepts by auto-referentiality is not a purified state of theoretical discourse but a full circle. The conceptual counterpart of this circle, as Badiou argues, locates the philosophy in question in an ideological domain where "it differs less from absolute knowledge than Althusser concedes" (p. 162).

Balibar (1978) argues that ideology pertains to both the conception of knowledge and to a separate instance, then the question becomes, on what common grounds the terms "ideology, politics, science, and economy" are going to be thought together. Althusser (2005) argues that it is the term "practice" where "all the levels of social existence are the sites of distinct practices" (p. 62). In other words, the term "practice" is argued not to be thought in opposition to theory but to be conceived only as "distinct practices which are not related in any Manichaean way with a theory which is opposed to them in every respect" (Althusser, 2005, p. 62).

At this point, Balibar (1978) argues that Althusser's conception is in fact a postulation of "pure practice" which does not conceive practice as dialectical but rather as "unilateral". Balibar continues to argue that the mentioned postulation of pure practice is the displaced form of the "opposition of truth and error" where the displaced opposition is to be found as ideology and practice: "if practice, *qua* theoretical practice and *qua* revolutionary practice, *transforms ideology* [emphasis in original], it is impossible to say if it is genuinely affected by it in turn or 'transformed' by it". However, Badiou (2017) argues that the nominalization of the concept of practice is the precise operation where Althusser's materialism could be located.

Badiou (2017) argues that Althusser's definition of theory, as conceived as a single practical enterprise, replaces the "guarantee of relation" with the "real of production" (p. 22). This substitution is argued to affirm "a new form of materialism", that is called the materialism of production. The materialist or "immanentist" aspect of Althusser,Badiou argues, is found in the word play concerning the term "theory" where it could be located at "the transition from the noun 'theory' to the adjective 'theoretical'" (p. 23). Yet, this transition from "noun" to "verb" comes with consequences, or as Badiou calls it, "the return of the repressed" (p. 26). That is, there arises a disparate amount of philosophical vocabulary. For example, we encounter the term "knowledge", which, as Badiou argues, brings with it the "process of the production of knowledge" that takes place "entirely in thought". At this point, according to Badiou, the wording "entirely in thought" acquires a dangerous connotation where it can be separated from the "Real, outside the material Real" (p. 26). And with the dichotomy of "thinking and Real", Badiou argues, the opposition between theory and practice can be reproduced. Badiou also tries to understand how Althusser's use of metaphors serves as a function in scientific thinking. He argues that the metaphoric words such as "production", "mechanism", "apparatus" are used to "prevent thinking from exceeding its materialist determination" since they belong to "technological and materialist" vocabulary and also protect "against the idealist function of an external guarantee" (p. 28). In other words, as Badiou argues, in the Althusserian project, "there is no theory" and "there is no practice" but only "different variations on the 'theoretical'" (p. 30). However, Badiou argues that these variations on the theoretical cause a circular loop. For example, to give a precise account of a problem that is particular to a theory, the term "problematic" is used. However, the term "problematic" becomes "theoretical problematic" since the conception of a problem is already "theoretical" (p. 30). The circularity, as Badiou (2017) proposes, becomes intimately linked with the way in which materialism was utilized by the Spinozist conception of totality:

> In the end, the question of the interpretation of the whole text would be: we have the theoretical as an attributive or predicative determination of the Real; and we have external objectivity, which is what is not completely within thinking, as a realization of the real, which is, in some sense, the same real.

> But the difficulty here is that, for Althusser, there is no relationship, point by point, between the two. (p. 32)

In other words, as Badiou (2017) argues, the precise point between the scientific and ideological practice in the "appropriation of the real object", cannot be explained since two respective practices (in their appropriation of the knowledge-object and false images of the real respectively) are "effected" by the same substance. However, Badiou argues, Althusser does not accept the same order that is present in the two practices whereas in the case of Spinoza, there is no such problem. Hence, Badiou argues that the conceptual status of "theory" remains a "mystery" because the relationship between the "object of knowledge" and "real object" remains unsolved. Badiou (2017) argues that the problem of "theory" should be thought of as a philosophical problem:

> In Althusser, "theory," theoretical nature, and so on, must be understood as a mixture of the immanent Spinozist vision of two attributes of the same real with this Kantian schematism. There is only one real: it is not an ontological dualism, but instead we find two attributes of the same substance but without parallelism, without identity of the order. This existence of two attributes, thinking object and real object, must be completed by a sort of materialist mechanism, a materialist schematism, in the sense of Kant. A mechanism, after all, which is absolutely enigmatic, and which is formulated by Althusser, as a question. Furthermore, we know that schematism is described by Kant himself as some- thing enigmatic, something obscure. And so, we find in Althusser a mixture of something that stands in relation to the transcendental of Kant, alongside something clearly on the side of the materialism of Spinoza. (p. 34)

Badiou (2017) refers to his earlier essay where he argues that the conclusions that he reached in 1967 (2011) remain the same concerning the association that was made about Kant and Spinoza. Yet, there is a minimal difference in the original essay in the point of the mechanism of the structure:

> neither determination (which manifests itself within the linked multiplicity of instances by the effects of displacement, and thus of limitation of efficacy), nor the dominant (from which we can think the conjuncture, or the existing type of unity of the instances) allow us to produce the collectivizing concept of the instances. (Badiou, 2011, p. 163)

And in the case of the philosophical articulation of the structure mentioned above, as Badiou (2017) notes, the governing principle is the "transcendental

dialectic". The principle, while doing its operation, returns to the "subject/object" dichotomy in its language:

> When even to escape the empiricist 'circle' that endlessly confronts the subject to the object, Althusser talks about the 'mechanism of the cognitive appropriation of the real object by means of the object of knowledge, he is not so far from schematism, which also sidesteps the problems of the guaranteeing, of the 'policing' of the true, in the direction of the positive question of the structures of the concept's functioning. (Badiou, 2011, p. 169)

In terms of its political consequences, Ranciere (2011) criticizes Althusser on the account that the latter corresponds to a position that "There is no hope of articulating a just politics by systematizing the ideas and practices of mass revolt which constituted the reality of life in France in the 1960s" (p. 30). Rancière argues that the theoretical basis of such accusation is found in the implications of the "logic of Althusserianism", where one can see "a certain suspension of political judgement" (p. 32). What is favoured contra political judgement, Ranciere (2011) argues, is to give oneself to "autonomous time of theory" (p. 32). By criticizing Althusser with his own language, Ranciere (2011) states that the most essential concept in the Althusserrian reading of Marx, as "oversight", is argued to represent the denial of "the political implications of a theoretical discourse" (p. 36).

The language in which the diversification process of practices was articulated is argued not to be immune to the subject-object dichotomy it aspires to destroy. Geras (1978) states that the scientific practice and its relation to other practices in the social formation are only discussed "gesturally" (p. 267). This lack of articulation, Geras (1978) argues, leads the theoretical practice to be conceived as "purely intellectual one, i.e., idealistically" since the effects of the "ideological, political and economic practice" are not analysed precisely but taken for granted abstractly (p. 267). The political implication of this "idealism", Geras (1978) argues, is that "the relation between Marxist theory and the working class movement as on of exteriority" where "the former is produced *outside* the latter, and must be *imported* [emphasis in original] into it, failing which this movement can only arrive at conceptions which are ideological, and bourgeois ideological at that" (p. 267). Geras (1978) argues that the mentioned conception of Marxist theory produces an effect in which "the relation between Marxist theory and the working class a unilateral and

purely pedagogic one: the intellectuals 'give' the class the knowledge it needs" (p. 268).

Yet again, in terms of the diverse processes of practices, Badiou (2008) analyses Althusser in the context of the relationship of politics and philosophy by using the concept of "suture" (p. 158). Accordingly, Badiou (2008) argues that the suturation of "philosophy to politics" is under the influence of Maoism in the sense that the evaluation of philosophy is viewed from putting "politics at the commanding post" (p. 160). Although Badiou's analysis is interlinked with his conception of philosophy and its conditions, the description of the concept of suture is still relevant for our discussion. Badiou defines the concept of "suture" as following: "I called this rupture of symmetry and determining privileging of one of philosophy's conditions a *suture* [emphasis in original]" (p. 160). In other words, the concept of suture designates a point where "the philosophical act" comes to be determined with a "singular determination concerning its truth, destroys the categorial void necessary to the philosophical site as a site of thought by filling it" (p. 160). Badiou (2008) comments concerning the suturation of philosophy to politics is the following:

> But if the philosophy-effect is strictly immanent, then philosophy's (possible) external effects, for instance, its political effects, can only be completely opaque to philosophy itself. So philosophy as a supposed 'political practice' is at best an indirect and blind activity. (p. 161)

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has tried to trace the development and reception of Althusser's conception of Marxist philosophy by highlighting both its conceptual innovations and the tensions that arose from these innovations. Starting from the British reception, comments of Thompson, reception by Hindess and Hirst, and the analysis of Stuart Hall underlined how the introduction of structural causality and the problem of contingency created a tension in the classical understandings of Marxist theory. Althusser's conceptual elaboration of contradiction and overdetermination, supplemented by Lenin's account, underlined the heterogeneity of social relations. By contrasting this conceptual elaboration with Badiou's criticism, which underlined the dissymmetry and the qualitative property of contradiction, the explanation concerning the absence of a theory of conjuncture was also provided.

Through a re-reading of *Reading Capital*, the chapter explored Althusser's theoretical innovations: reading which tries to articulate the unconscious of the text, the terminology of vision as a problem in the uncovering of Marx's discourse, and the concept of epistemological break, which reframes knowledge as production rather than a teleological history of the concept. The analyses were further supplemented with the difference between historical and logical orders, the unilateral nature of philosophical practice, and the persistent problem of certain survivals that linked Marx's reflections on Greek art. At the end of the chapter, by mentioning Ranciere, Geras, and Badiou, the limits of Althusser's framework were underlined. Particularly concerning the political effects of philosophy and the suturing of philosophy to politics. Perhaps the omission of aesthetics in Althusser's discussion of the survivals can be read as a consequence of this suture. This suturing causes philosophy's political stakes to take priority over other dimension of theoretical scrutiny.

As a result, this chapter has shown that Althusser's conceptual innovations introduced a reconfiguration to Marxist theory while producing further problems concerning subjectivity, conjuncture, and the political. Starting from these tensions, the next chapter will focus on the intersection of Marxism and psychoanalysis. In particular, it will analyse the literature on interpellation by underlining how subject formation, ideology, and the location of the unconscious are theorized at this intersection.

CHAPTER 3

BETWEEN MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE LOCATION OF THE SUBJECT

In this chapter, I will try to trace a conceptual line that starts from Althusser's understanding of Lacan in his article "Freud and Lacan". The questions that pertain to the article will also be the questions of the chapter. After underlining the key points of Althusser's article, I will show the development of the object of psychoanalysis in order to discuss its status as an object. After pointing out how object-a could be conceptualized, I will be locating the registers of Lacanian psychoanalysis by showing its early development. The examination of the registers will be interlinked with the basic Lacanian concepts and will enable us to reach a conceptual clarity to discuss the intersection of psychoanalysis and Marxism. After discussing the intersection, I will relate it back to the discussion of discourses, where Althusser's discussion of this subject will be elaborated. After mentioning how Althusser defines multiple discourses, I will analyse the key themes that pertain to the article "Ideology and State Ideological Apparatuses". In the course of analysis, after summarizing how interpellation is defined, I will discuss the literature that seeks to establish a connection between psychoanalysis and Marxism. The transition to the next chapter will be established by Judith Butler's remarks on the meta-application of psychoanalytic concepts.

Appendix to the English edition of Althusser's *Freud and Lacan* (1996) mentions that the aim of the text was to make "a philosophical *intervention* urging members of the French Communist Party (PCF) to recognize the *scientificity* [emphasis in original] of psychoanalysis, of Freud's work, and the importance of Lacan's interpretation of it" (p. 31). Therefore, Althusser's assessment of the Lacanian psychoanalysis is similar to his understanding of Marx, where the central theme revolves around the question of sciences.

The project of Lacan is defined by Althusser (1996) as containing:

> a serious labor of historical-theoretical criticism intent on identifying and defining, within the concepts Freud obliged to employ, the true *epistemological relation* existing between those concepts and the content that he was thinking. (p.14)

In other words, the scientificity of Lacanian psychoanalysis emerges from its focus on the "discourse-object" unity. Hence, Althusser (1996) claims that to talk about the discourse of psychoanalysis, one must situate the object with the concepts that make the object localizable. The object that is deduced from its effects, Althusser argues, could be conceptualized starting from the analytic practice where its effects could be understood. Accordingly, he designates three objects of Freud:

> 1. a practice (analytic therapy)
> 2. a technique (method of therapy), which leads to an abstract exposition of theoretical aspect, and
> 3. a theory that relates to the practice and the technique (p. 17)

Althusser (1996), within this tripartite distinction of the object, questions the existence of theory in psychoanalysis by arguing that the theory in question is no more than "the blind technical concepts in which it thinks the rules of its practice; a simple practice without theory…" (p. 17). The absence of theory, for Althusser, renders the theoretical status of psychoanalysis resembling "social magic of modern times" (p. 17).

Althusser (1996) argues that the object of psychoanalysis, is the unconscious. He claims that the process of "becoming-human" for "little biological being" produces effects which subsequently become objectivized as unconscious (p. 22). To return to our theme of "survivals" discussed in the previous chapter, Althusser argues that the "*human child* [emphasis in original]" survives with the quality of remaining *"forever amnesiac* [emphasis in original]". He claims that psychoanalysis is concerned with a struggle that is contained in its survivors without being monumentalized or having been able to write a memoir. The survivors are the designated "*subjects*" where disciplines such as "history, 'sociology', and anthropology will not find their affair" because the domain in which the subject emerged has "traversed that infinite space that separates life from humanity, the biological from the historical, 'nature' from 'culture'" (p. 23).

Althusser (1996) introduces Lacan in the context of using linguistics for the refinement of psychoanalytic concepts, where "laws" of "*displacement* and *condensation* [emphasis in original]" (p. 24) were translated into "metonymy and metaphor". The unit that composes the laws of metaphor and metonymy is explained to be signifiers that are "inscribed in the chain of an unconscious discourse" (p. 24). The paradox, which Althusser argues, happens in the context of the "duplication" of the signifier, where one part composes the unconscious and the second part the verbal. The "double field deployment", which is composed of a "single field", is argued to be the "signifying chain", i.e., the chain in which the unconscious discourse is articulated (Althusser, 1996, p. 24).

Althusser (1996) argues that "the meaning of the *primacy* of language's formal structure and its mechanisms" (p. 25) remains to be defined because everything that occurs in psychoanalytic practice comes to be apprehended with and through language. In other words, the definition is needed because the analytic practice is "grounded *in principle* [emphasis in original] in its object" and hence, contemplation of practice with its object will reveal the "theory of its object" (p. 25). However, there comes a theoretical in-mixing on the part of Althusser where the "order of language" comes to be understood homologous to the "Law of Order", which Althusser (1996) calls "Law of Culture" (p. 25). The law is later associated with the Symbolic order (or Law of the Symbolic), where its "formal laws" or "formal concepts" are "furnished to us by linguistics" (Althusser, 1996, p. 28).

In the light of these explanations, Althusser (1996) formulates two questions concerning the intersecting region of language adopted by psychoanalysis with other disciplines. The first is about the relationship between the "the formal structure of language, the absolute condition of possibility of the existence and understanding of the unconscious" and "the concrete structures of kinship", or "concrete ideological formations in which the specific functions (paternity, maternity, childhood) implied in the structures of kinship are experienced" (p. 30). The relationship between two "structures" is further explained by mentioning the possibility of "historical variation". That is, the question is whether or not the structures of "kinship and ideology" could affect the structure of the unconscious or vice versa (Althusser, 1996, p. 30).

The second question is about the relationship of psychoanalysis to other sciences in the context of objectivity. Althusser asks if psychoanalysis, in its distinguishing of itself from other disciplines, "provoke in them questions about the (occasionally problematic) status of their object?" (p. 30). In addition to these questions, Althusser (1996) argues that "the eternal question of the 'end of analysis'" could be related to "*failure to think those problems*" since they are embedded in the "epistemological history of psychoanalysis and a social (and ideological) history of the analytic world" (p. 30). After formulating the mentioned question, he (1996) argues that the function of "ego" in the psychoanalytic subject could be enlightening for inquiring into ideological formations since the "center filling" (p. 31) function of the ego and the ideological recognition could be similar, as I will dwell on later concerning the topic of "interpellation".

In his warning to the English translation of his article, Althusser (1996) argues that his thesis concerning psychoanalysis should "*either* be corrected *or* expanded" (p. 32). In the course of this chapter, while explaining the object of psychoanalysis, the theses of Althusser are going to be "expanded". However, in the case of discussing the role of the subject and the interpellation mechanism, some of the premises are going to be "corrected". In other words, Althusser's formulation of the *either/or* is going to be abandoned.

3.1. Object of Psychoanalysis: Object little "a"

Evans (1996) summarizes the conceptual history of object-a by chronologically pinpointing the shift in which Lacanian theoretical enterprise conceptualizes the object. The first appearance of object-a, which is juxtaposed to the big "A", designated for the big Other, is used to address the ego and its counterpart. In other words, Evans (1996) argues that "a and a' designate indiscriminately the EGO and the COUNTERPART/SPECULAR IMAGE [emphasis in original], and clearly belong to the imaginary order" (p. 128). He (1996) argues that the subsequent use of object-a is formulated as "object of desire" where the object is "an element which is imagined as separable from the rest of the body" (p. 129). The later use of the concept is contextualized in the "other" where the previous conception "object of desire", now, receives a body that keeps the "precious object hidden inside a

relatively worthless box" (p. 129). In other words, the object-a becomes the object of desire in which "we seek in the other" (p. 128). The final uses of object-a, Evans (1996) argues, are conceptualized as being "remnant left behind by the introduction of the symbolic in the real" (p. 129), and the corresponding "discourses" of the introduction of the "symbolic" entail.

According to Fink (1997), although "Lacan felt he made his most significant contribution to psychoanalysis" with object-a, the conceptual history of the object has been "worked over from so many different perspectives, and required so many modifications in our usual ways of thinking about desire, transference, and science" (p. 83). He (1997) acknowledges the "highly polyvalent" quality of the object-a and asks whether or not the object in question could have any contribution to the discussion of science. However, before engaging with the possible meaning of object-a, in the context of science, Fink, too, gives a conceptual history of the object.

For Fink (1997) the initial conceptualization of the object-a emerges in the domain of the ego. Ego, Fink (1997) argues, has an "inherently foreign and object-like nature" (p. 84) according to Lacan. The definition of ego as "crystallization or sedimentation of images of an individual's own body and of self-images reflected to him or her by others" (Fink, 1997, p. 84) is distinguished from Freud's account. However, the "crystallization" does not constitute an agency, as in the case of Freud, but rather an object.

The ego is located under "imaginary relations" where the term "imaginary" is not "illusory" or non-existent but instead designating a type of relation in which the elements are related to one another by opposition, i.e., same or different. Hence, Fink (1997) argues, an object-a thought under the domain of ego, may be adequate for designating the "minimal difference" between two subjects (p. 85). For this minimal difference, Fink gives the example of identical twins, where, due to contingent circumstances, the treatment of one of the twins may differ, and this different treatment may generate "great reactions". Underlying this great reaction is the proximity: "the closer the relationship at the outset, the greater the rage over minute differences is likely to be" (Fink, 1997, p. 85). The example clarifies the reason for the marking of the letter "a" with the small letter instead of the capital A. In other words, the symbolic register, i.e., the family, which generates the ground of the ego of the twins, is not taken into account.

However, as Fink notes (1997), for Lacan the same object-a acquires a new dimension and thus transforms into a "real object" or the "cause of desire" (p. 86). Fink (1997) argues that this is the analytic situation where the analyst tries to resemble the big Other by mimicking the symbolic network of the analysand. In other words, the analyst becomes the "avatar of the Other" in order to "get imaginary interests out of the way so as to confront the analysand with his or her problems of the Other as such" (p. 87). At this stage, the subject "*consists in a stance adopted with respect to this Other* [emphasis in original]" where the subject tries to "maintain the 'right' distance from the Other, never fully meeting the Other's demands but never frustrating them altogether either" (p. 87). The Other, or the analyst, in respect acquires the status of the "subject supposed to know" where the ascribed "knowing" contains the knowledge of the analysand's "symptom, desire, fantasy, and pleasure" (Fink, 1997, p. 88). However, this status of the analyst must be assumed provincially because the knowledge in question "can never be known in advance, but only constructed in the course of analysis" (p. 88). In this context, the analyst rather than considering herself as the "representative of knowledge" must take analysand's "unconscious as the representative of knowledge" where the unconscious in question makes itself known by "interruptions, slips and slurs of the analysand's speech, bungled actions, forgotten appointments, mistaken dollar amounts" (p. 89), etc.

As Fink (1997) argues, the object of the analysand in the mentioned analytic situation is designated as a "love object" where the subject (analysand) projects this object in order to receive a reaction. This reaction, which is related to the subject's assumed knowledge about love, signifies a demand that is ascribed to the analyst. As Fink (1997) argues, Lacan aims to de-couple demand from desire in order to realize the relationship between the subject in question and the subject's corresponding symbolic relationship with the big Other. However, freeing desire from demand does not free the subject but "leaves him or her at the level of demand, dependent upon the Other's demand" (p. 90). Accordingly, this theoretical deadlock leads to several theoretical formulations:

> In examining the various roles of the analyst as the analysand's object other *(a')* or Other (A)-we have seen that the analyst must avoid the pitfalls of the imaginary (thinking of him or herself as like the analysand, however true this may be in many respects) and must not interpret from the position of the omniscient Other. Where then is the analyst to situate him or herself? If the

> analyst is to be neither imaginary rival nor representative of the Other, what kind of object is there left to be? What role then is left the analyst? What part does the analyst play in the analysand's psychic economy? (Fink, 1997, p. 96)

Fink continues to articulate the modalities of desire and questions from which standpoint the corresponding object-a must be conceptualized. Accordingly, Fink (1997) states that "*Desire, strictly speaking, has no object*", and what constitutes the movement of desire is the "*movement* of one signifier to the next". The movement "is opposed to fixation" and seeks its "own continuation and furtherance" (p. 90). Fink (1997) argues that since the conception of desire is freed from thinking with its object, the status of the object-a is delegated to be a *cause* object. In other words, this new conception is not an object in the proper sense or, the word "object" implicitly suggests that it is only secondary importance. Fink (1997) argues that the object-a in this context becomes animated in "things" resisting symbolization. In other words, the object-a is conceptualized in the psychic register of the "real" which is "that which resists symbolization". Fink (1997) gives examples of "gaze" and "voice" which, rather than signifying a concrete object, provide the conditions of possibility for desiring that occurs as "metonymic slippage from one object to the next" (p. 91, 92). However, the subject's psychic economy revolves around these "thing-like" entities where the subject has to "come back to them over and over again" (p. 91).

Considering the late stage of Lacan's conceptualization of object-a, Kirshner (2005) argues that the function of the object stems from an "attempt to derive desire from the infantile origins of subjectivity and from the 'real' of the body" (p. 2). In other words, the "thing-like" quality of the gaze and voice is synonymous with the Lacanian register of the real. Kirshner contends that thinking object-a in the relation to the "real" of the body enables the conceptualization of the psychoanalytic subject's uncomfortable domain of affection, i.e., enjoyment. The object-a signifies the horizon of "beyond the pleasure principle" through enjoyment or jouissance. Kirshner notes on the framework of the psychoanalytic subject's libidinal economy as follows:

> There is thus in the Lacanian theory of desire a tension between its partial expression within the limits of the symbolic order, which defines the possibility of enjoyment according to the pleasure and reality principles (with the crucial distinctions of enjoyment/pain and existence/fantasy), and the

> unconscious pursuit of *jouissance* (an impossible fantasy of contact with the "real"). (p. 4)

Kirshner (2005) argues that the objectivity of the "object" is constituted with a retroactive process which is "neither a concrete feature of her anatomy nor a specific memory, but the fantasy of a loss established retrospectively, after the child has been 'subjectified'" (p. 6). He summarizes the definition of object-a as "a fantasy attempting to bridge the gap between separate symbolic existence and the unmediated biological 'real of harmonious mix-up with the primal other" (p. 7).

Adrian Johnston (2013) argues, by paraphrasing Lacan, that the object-a is excluded by the sciences. He proposes that this exclusion could be better understood if one views the relationship of object-a with sciences by referring to a neologism of Lacan: extimacy. The extimacy (i.e., intimately exterior) of the object-a in relation to other sciences is explicitly admitted in the case of psychoanalysis, where its knowledge-effect is not disavowed. According to him, the object-a constitutes a theoretical nodal point for Lacan where one the one hand the object-a is conceived of being "impossible to inscribe within the spatio-temporal registers of representation" and on the other hand "it is equated with a series of determinate libidinal (i.e., breast, feces, phallus, gaze and voice)" (p. 252). He also argues that the antinomical property of object-a leads Lacan to conceive the object in a topological[11] sphere. That is, as Johnston states, Lacan's comparison of the object-a with the Möbius band (a topological figure) allows him to "abandon the problematic Euclidean geometrical picture-thinking permeating the depth psychological discourse, with its misleading metaphors of outer layers and inner recesses" (p. 253). He argues that the use of the Möbius band resembles the "switch point" of the apparently separate conscious and unconscious domains of the psyche. However, at the later stage of Lacan's thinking, the status of the object-a is defined as an object which defies "the capture by mirror, to reflect nothing in the reflecting devices" (p. 253). That is, distinguished from conceiving the object-a in the intersection of conscious and unconscious, Johnston argues that the latter status of the object is defined as "an invisible blank in the clear surfaces of surrounding mirrors" which "tangibly haunts its subject in a similarly elusive, hard-to-see fashion" (p. 253). He, while summarizing the function object-a

[11] Johnston (2013) gives the definition of topology as follows: "with topology being a mathematical science of configurations formed through continuous series of permutations of surfaces" (p. 253).

as “window, frame, or platform”, links the same object functioning as an “invisible transcendental condition of possibility (i.e., the cause of desire) for the visible parade of desired empirical objects” (p. 257).

Since the definition or the place of the object of psychoanalysis, i.e., object-a, is interlinked with other concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis, particularly with imaginary, symbolic, and the real, discussing the early conceptualizations of the three registers seems essential in order to show their link to the discussion of ideology.

3.2. The Initial Definitions of the Lacanian Registers

While discussing “The topic of the Imaginary”, Lacan (1988) states that without the guidance of the three registers (imaginary, symbolic, real), “it would be impossible to understand anything of the Freudian technique and experience” (p. 73). While talking about the objective and subjective properties of the “imaginary” through the analysis of the term “image”, he gives the example of a rainbow. Accordingly, Lacan argues that the “subjective phenomenon” of the rainbow could be captured by a camera and could be represented objectively. In order to further explicate how the symbolic and the imaginary could be represented, Lacan borrows an optical experiment which is called “*the experiment of the inverted bouquet*” (p. 78). The illustration of this “experiment” is the following:




Figure 2: The experiment of the inverted bouquet

Lacan (1988) proposes that the image of the body in which “the subject” gains the “the first form which allows him to locate what pertains to the ego and what does not” is going to be read in a similar way like “the imaginary vase which contains the bouquet of real flowers” (p. 79).

Lacan (1988) notes that if the rays of light meet at a “symmetrical point of luminosity”, there could be an appearance of “a real image”. However, in the illustration, the existence of the eye allows the perception of different reflections of the bouquet based on the movements of the eye. For example, in contrast to the “real image” occuring when rays of light meet at a specific point, “if the rays happen to meet the eye in the opposite sense, then a virtual image is formed” (p. 78). Accordingly, Lacan argues that the box representing the body and the bouquet symbolizes the instincts and desires. In the illustration, the function of the eye is explained as the “symbolic of the subject” (p. 80). To paraphrase the function of the eye as the symbolic of the subject, Lacan argues that “in the relation of the imaginary and the real, and in the constitution of the world such as results from it, everything depends on the position of the subject” (p. 80).

The illustration serves to locate and explain the three registers by examining Melanie Klein’s case. The case includes a four-years old boy who, compared to his age, possesses a very limited vocabulary. However, Lacan argues that the the child’s use of language must be considered as “incorrect” since despite knowing the meaning of the words, he still “uses them inopportunely most of the time” (p. 81). In other words, Lacan proposes that the child “possesses something of language”, but because his “attitude” is seemingly apathetic and indifferent, everything seems “equally real for him, equally indifferent” (p. 81). Lacan, by referring to Klein, argues that “the child’s world… is manufactured out of a container - this would be the body of the mother – and out of contents of the body of this mother” (p. 81). Lacan continues to argue that the contents which are derived from the container reveal a “symbolic equation” where the child projects or introjects certain objects that resemble his mother’s body. Lacan asserts that since the child’s vocabulary is limited with his mother’s body, what does not happen at the level of the objects is the “...free play, the conjunction between the different forms, imaginary and real, of objects” (p. 82). Hence, recalling the vase illustration Lacan points out that the dividing line between the vase and the bouquet cannot be located. In other words, to

return to Fink's (1997) explanation concerning the early usage of the object-a, the child's vocabulary can be thought to be composed by referring to the mother's body, where the meaning of the object is derived either by the similarity to the body or by its difference. According to Lacan, the confinement of the objects to the body causes "the impossibility of this child entering into an effective relation with objects *qua* structures" (p. 83).

Lacan (1988) further explicates this impossibility by contrasting the difference between language and speech (which, for the child, is incapable of being utilized) as follows:

> The system whereby the subject comes to locate himself in language is interrupted, at the level of speech. Language and speech are not the same thing - this child is, up to a certain point, a master of language, but he doesn't speak. There is a subject here who quite literally does not reply. Speech has not come to him. Language didn't stick to his imaginary system, whose register is extremely limited - valorisation of trains, of door-handles, of the dark. His faculties, not of communication, but of expression, are limited to that. For him, the real and the imaginary are equivalent. (p. 84)

Lacan (1988) suggests that because the speech is not available for the analytic situation, due to the child unresponsiveness to "communication", Melanie Klein had to give up the "technique" of psychoanalysis. For Lacan, what must be addressed is the unorthodox psychoanalytic practice of Klein where the officials rules of the "technique" are suspended. Lacan argues that what Klein did was not an interpretation, seeking to resolve the analysand's symptom. Rather, what she did entails "nothing other than to bring in verbalisation" (p. 85). Lacan (1988) explains the process of verbalisation as follows:

> She starts off, she says, from ideas she already has, which are well known, as to what happens at this stage. I won't beat about the bush, I just tell him - Dick *little train, big train daddy-train.* Thereupon, the child starts to play with his little train, and he says the word, *station.* Crucial moment, when the sticking of language to the subject's imaginary begins to sketch itself. Melanie Klein plays this back to him - *The station is mummy. Dick is going into mummy.* From this point on, everything starts firing. She'll only feed him these kinds of lines, and no others. And very quickly the child makes progress. That's a fact… She symbolised an effective relationship, that of one named being with another. She plastered on the symbolisation of the Oedipal myth, to give it its real name. It's from that point on that, after an initial ceremony, taking refuge in the dark in order to renew contact with the container, something new awakens in the child. (p. 85)

Lacan (1988) argues that Klein's intervention in the child's psychic economy by symbolizing the previously unsymbolized objects reveals a key feature of the unconscious. Since prior to symbolization "there is remotely nothing like an unconscious in the subject", but following the intervention it can be formulated that "*the unconscious is the discourse of the other*" (p. 85). Although in the child's case the form of the symbolic is the Oedipus complex, Lacan notes that the myth "seems only to be so abridged an edition that in the end it cannot always be used" (p. 86). He, then, claims that the passage from the pre-verbal to post-verbal domain in the child's psyche "can only be constituted when a series of encounters have occurred in the right place" (p. 87). Returning to his illustration, Lacan argues that the right place just mentioned is similar to the position of the eye: "These positions belong to the same order as those which, in my schema, cause a given structuration of the situation to depend upon a given position of the eye" (p. 87).

Then, Lacan (1988) concludes that the eye, which is synonymous with the ego, in the illustration, "cannot be fruitfully employed as an apparatus in the structuring of this external world" (p. 88). In other words, if the symbolic order does not structure the external world as a world, "the poor position of the eye, the *ego* quite simply doesn't appear" (p. 88). Before the intervention of the symbolic, the vase (which Lacan resembles the body) "doesn't appear, and the subject remains in a reduced reality, with a similarly reduced imaginary baggage" (p. 88). However, there arises a problem in Lacan's account in the context of representing the registers of imaginary, symbolic, and the real in an illustration. It is unclear how one should relate the three registers in a discourse that defines the relationship between the subject and the Other to an illustration. Should it be understood as an attempt to perform a presentation of the three registers? If so, how should we represent this presentation and articulate the relationship between each register? Could we argue that Lacan assumes the "reality" of optical devices in the sense that they pertain to a "more" real apparatus than theoretical apparatuses? In any case, the relationship between psychoanalytic concepts and other discourses, such as ideological, remains an open question in the above-mentioned account. Now, I will examine how Jameson attempts to establish a relationship between psychoanalysis and Marxism to explore the potential intersection.

Jameson (1977), in the context of the secondary role of the subject's ego compared to the primary role of symbolic order, argues that:

> To say that both psychoanalysis and Marxism are materialisms is simply to assert that each reveals an area in which human consciousness is not 'master in its own house': only the areas decentered by each are the quite different ones of sexuality and of the class dynamics of social history. (p.385).

However, he also argues that "human reality is fundamentally alienated in more than one way, and in ways which little enough to do with each other" (Jameson, 1977, p. 386). Despite their seemingly different ways of conceiving human alienation, Jameson argues, two systems (Marxism and psychoanalysis) "have to teach each other in the way of method" (p. 386). These two systems have "striking analogies", thus the themes they share may provide an adequate comparison point. Accordingly, Jameson (1977) provides several key themes:

> the resistance of false consciousness and the problem as to its opposite (is it truth or knowledge? science or individual certainty?); the role and risks of the concept of a "midwife" of truth, whether analyst or vanguard party; the reappropriation of an alienated history and the function of narrative; the question of desire and value and of the nature of "false desire;" the paradox of the end of the revolutionary process, which, like analysis, must surely be considered "interminable" rather than "terminable;" and so forth. (p. 386)

Jameson (1977) also argues that the same two systems receive similar theoretical criticism, where both are deemed to be sharing "naive semanticism" (p. 386). He states that the "nineteenth century is to blame for the absence, in both Marxism and psychoanalysis, until very recently, of a concept of language which would permit the proper answer to this objection" (p. 386). However, despite Lacan's emphasis on the role of language in the construction of reality, Jameson insists that the third theoretical register of the Lacanian psychoanalysis, the real, "causes all the trouble" (p. 387). According to him (1977), although Lacan "did not yet have the appropriate conceptual instruments" for conceiving the real, it must be distinguished from "model-building" and "language-oriented philosophy" which claim to put the primacy of language to the pre-ordering of reality or consciousness. The real refers to a "persistence behind our representations, of that indestructible nucleus" (p. 387). Jameson claims that the mentioned conception of the Lacanian real should be equated with the Marxist conception of history. In the context of the materiality of

the Lacanian real, he argues that the real, conceived as the "absent cause", is "both indistinguishable from the Symbolic (or the Imaginary) and also independent of it" (p. 388).

In the context of conceiving history and the real in the same domain, Jameson (1977) argues that a certain objection concerning the conception of history must be addressed. This conception refers to that "history is a text, and that in that case, as one text worth another, it can no longer be appealed to as the 'ground' of truth" (p. 388). If one subscribes to the idea of assimilation of every text to the same domain, Jameson argues, the distinction between the mentioned narrative and Marxism/psychoanalysis cannot be made. Accordingly, he contends that "history is not so much a text, as rather a text-to-be-(re-)constructed" (p. 388). He further explains the importance of historicality as follows:

> means and techniques are themselves historically irreversible, so that we are not at liberty to construct any historical narrative at all and the refusal of the Marxist paradigm can generally be demonstrated to be at one with the refusal of historical narration itself, or at least, with its systemic pre-preparation and strategic delimitation. (p. 388)

Therefore, the position of the Lacanian real in relation to psychoanalytic and political history must be distinguished. Since its definition is that which "resists symbolization absolutely, "our narratives", i.e., political and subjective narratives, "can only approximate in asymptotic fashion" (p. 389). In other words, the proper conception of language, identified as "a materialistic philosophy of language", must be able to designate the real "without claiming to coincide with it" (p. 389). He also states that the distinction between "truth and knowledge (or science) must be decisive". That is, both the "abstract schemata of psychoanalysis" and the "Marxian philosophy of history" constitute a body of knowledge which does not "embody the 'truth' of the subject" (p. 389). Consequently the "Lacanian conception of science" constitutes "a historically original form of the decentring of the subject – rather than a place of 'truth'…" (p. 390). Comparing the Lacanian conception of science with the Marxist one, represented by Althusser, Jameson indicates that the Marxist conception is "still locked in the outmoded antinomy of that opposition between ideology and science" (p. 390). However, when drawing for a need concerning the "elaboration of a properly Marxist 'ideology'", Jameson refers to Althusser's

definition of ideology despite its "insufficiently developed conception" yet owing its originality "to a Lacanian inspiration" (p. 394).

Before engaging the literature concerning "interpellation" and the "Althusserrian conception of ideology", it should be noted that the text which Jameson refers to misses an important intermediary text, Althusser's "Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses". This lack of text is natural because the missing text was published after Althusser's death. Rather than being a complete text, it is a research proposal acknowledging its theoretical deadlocks. However, Jameson also misses an important point in the context of "Lacanian inspiration". In *Reading Capital,* Althusser (2005) refers to his theory of reading as the "symptomatic reading". This omission of the evaluation of the "symptomatic reading" by Jameson becomes even more striking concerning the similarity between "the Marxian image of the *camera obscura* [emphasis in original] and the inversion of the image on the retina and the Lacanian experiment with the vase of flowers" (p. 394). The symptomatic reading tries to disengage itself from the "eye" and the "gaze" that surrounds the immediate conception of "reading". Concerning the "gaze" as the form-giving entity to object-a, the "reading" in question can also be conceptualized in a different way. In other words, Jameson does not explain why the conceptual resemblance between Marxism and psychoanalysis should be established with an external apparatus (camera and the inverted bouquet) rather than with the theory of symptomatic reading which already includes psychoanalytic concepts.

Concerning the symptomatic reading, Macherey (2022) argues that Althusser was "particularly fond" of a categorical opposition that characterized it:

> that of the intellectual posture that consists of *seeing*, according to the modality of the *gaze*, and more precisely the specular gaze whose mirror records the reflections that have come from the real, and another posture, of a completely different nature, which consists of *reading*. [emphasis in original] (p. 168)

As explained in the second chapter in the context of the empiricist conception of knowledge, Macherey (2022) states that Althusser "rejects the immediacy of the gaze directed at the real" (p. 168) and tries to conceive a theory of reading which is "against vision". This new theory of reading moves toward "an intervention whose objective is the development of a new image of thought purged of the paradigm of

the gaze" (p. 168). He argues that Althusser designated the domain in which the symptomatic reading operates as philosophy. The importance of the domain of philosophy stems from the fact that in the "theory of knowledge", the existing categories, such as "categories of immediacy and of origin" and "the representation of subject and object as foundational instances facing each other", produce ideological knowledges (p. 169). What is done with the intervention of reading, as Macherey states, is "to obstruct the scopic drive that governs the mental system specific to ideology" (p. 169). In other words, in the activity of seeing, the seen is "originary or the immediately given" whereas the process of reading is "a process without beginning or end, a circle that turns on itself indefinetely and produces differences by repeating itself" (p. 169).

Then, the question of whether or not the de-coupling of the reading from the "scopic drive", as Macherey argues, could be understood similarly to de-coupling desire from the demand emerges. As I already mentioned, Fink (1997) argues that freeing the desire from the demand may make the subject more dependent on the big Other. In the case of Althusser, freeing the reading from ideological "demands" may have caused the same reading to end up in an ideological philosophy, i.e., a Hegelian one, as Badiou argues. The domain in which these "problems" are to be discussed could remain separate; however, a thematic resemblance between Althusser's "Marxist philosophy", and the psychoanalytic subject can still be established. In order to further articulate this similarity, I will review how Althusser conceived the problem of intersectionality of Marxism and psychoanalysis in "Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses".

3.3. Intersectionality of Marxism and Psychoanalysis

Althusser (2003) states that his "Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses" were primarily motivated by the theme of "reflection on the status of unconscious discourse and its articulation with ideological discourse" (p. 37). The broader problematic the absence of a general theory of psychoanalysis and the use of linguistics as its regional theory. The absence of a general theory in psychoanalysis indicates that it should not be confined to a regional theory. The evidence that he puts forward for psychoanalysis possessing an absent theory is the generalization of the

object of psychoanalysis, i.e., the unconscious. Accordingly, Althusser states that "Freud's topographies think the unconscious *in general,* that is, provide the concepts that account *not only* for what goes on *in the cure…* but also for what goes on *outside the cure…* [emphasis in original]" (p. 39). However, psychoanalysis only has "a practice or regional theory" which limits it from being able to "*provide objective proof of its scientificity* [emphasis in original]" (p.41). In other words, what Althusser (2003) wants to examine is to "differentially to define or (locate) its theoretical object in the field of theoretical objectivity" (p.41).

Psychoanalysis; use of linguistics, according to Althusser (2003), may produce a theoretical ideology since either "one might suppose that it is psychoanalysis which holds the keys to linguistics, or the other way around" (p. 45). In order to overcome the mentioned either/or situation, Althusser (2003) proposes to search a general theory of psychoanalysis clarifying the regional part. Althusser formulates this as investigating "the discourse *of the unconscious* as both a *discourse* and a discourse *of the unconscious* – that is, not one but two general theories, whose articulations we need to think" (p. 47). That is, if one de-couples the objectivity of the unconscious from the discourse in which its effects are made present, two conceptualizations are possible: a theory concerning discourses and further objective analysis concerning the unconscious.

In order to clarify the mentioned regionalization, Althusser (2003) formulates certain theses under the heading of "the character of the unconscious". The definition of unconscious is mentioned to be "a structure whose elements are *signifiers"* (p. 48). Accordingly, Althusser argues that "Inasmuch, as its elements are *signifiers,* the laws of combination of the unconscious and the mechanisms of its functioning depend on a general theory of the signifier" (p.48). However, the signifier in question is not any signifier (by any signifier he means in comparison with other fields where the unit signifier could also be found such as: "language [*la langua*], ideology, art, science, etc.") but a signifier which pertains to the unconscious (p. 48). In order to delimit the discourse in which the signifier of the unconscious could be formulated, Althusser argues that "the specific difference that distinguishes the discourse of science from the discourses of ideology, art and the unconscious" must be articulated in the "theory of discourse" (p. 48). As Althusser states, the theory of discourse cannot be deduced from the general theory of the signifier, rather, what is proposed is

the comparison of the existing "*forms* [emphasis in original] of discourse" (p. 48). The forms just mentioned are "unconscious, ideological, aesthetic, and scientific" (p. 48) which pertain to their relevant discourses. These specific discourse forms, he argues, produce a common effect: "*every discourse produces a subjectivity-effect* [emphasis in original]" (p. 48).

Under the mentioned forms of discourse, Althusser (2003) tries to demarcate the relationship of the signifier and the subject, where in each discourse the relationship is articulated differently. He argues that "the ideological subject *in person* [emphasis in original] forms part of ideological discourse, *is present in person* [emphasis in original] in it, since it is itself a determinate signifier of this discourse" (p. 49). Whereas the subject of scientific discourse "is *absent in person* [emphasis in original] from scientific discourse, for there is no signifier designating it" (p. 49). In other words, scientific and ideological discourses could be contrasted with each other in the context of subjectivity. The discourse of the unconscious, for Althusser, "occupies a position that is different from all those described so far" (p. 49). He explains this difference by arguing that the subject of the unconscious "is 'represented' in the chain of signifiers by *one* [emphasis in original] signifier which *'stands in'* [emphasis in original] for it." (p. 49). In other words, the subject of the unconscious is absent from the discourse of the unconscious with a specific difference where the absence is represented by another signifier or by "delegation" (p. 49).

Based on these explanations concerning different forms of discourses and their corresponding functions of the subject, Althusser (2003) "very cautiously" proceeds to examine "which mode of articulation is at work in the case of the structure of the unconscious" (p. 51). The articulating discourse is revealed to be the discourse of the ideology, where the articulation is problematized in accordance with the general problematic of the articulation. Althusser argues that "in every social formation, the base requires the support function as a function to be assumed" (p. 51). The same support function is applied to the ideological superstructure, where the supporting function is designated as the subject. As Althusser argues, the subject's function is designated in the discourse of the ideology. In other words, Althusser asserts that the ideology "must *interpellate it* [emphasis in original] as subject, providing it with the reasons-of-a-subject for assuming the function" (p. 51).

The structure of the ideological discourse, according to Althusser (2003), "is a structure of *guarantee* [emphasis in original]" which takes the form of "interpellation" (p. 52). It "contains the subject it interpellates in its discourse" (p. 52), in which there can be not one but two subjects exist (p. 52). The second subject, Althusser argues, is the "subject *par excellence* [emphasis in original]" (p. 52) who provides or possesses the property of guarantee. God, then, is its most striking form. Based on these explanations, Althusser further proposes a formulation concerning the relationship of ideological discourse and the discourse of the unconscious as follows:

> I would propose the following idea: that the *subject-function* which is the characteristic effect of ideological discourse in turn requires, produces or induces… a characteristic effect, the unconscious-effect or the effect *subject-of-the-unconscious,* that is, the peculiar structure which makes the discourse of the unconscious possible. The latter function makes it possible for the subject-function to be guaranteed amid misrecognition. (p. 53)

One could conclude that Lacan's formulation of "unconscious is the discourse of the other" (p. 85) could be reformulated as "unconscious is the discourse of the ideology". Similar to Klein's initiation of the symbolic order to the child, here Althusser proposes that it is the ideological discourse that initiates the subject. However, he also establishes some similarities between ideological and unconscious discourses.

The homology that Althusser (2003) establishes between psychoanalytic terminology and the ideological terminology is based on the Freudian concepts. He argues that the ego "that says 'I' is closely akin to the 'subject' of ideological discourse", whereas the superego is likened to "the Subject who interpellates every ideological subject in the form of a subject" (p. 60). The remaining element of the topography, i.e., "id", he argues, does not find a corresponding counterpart in the ideological discourse, id is that which is realized in the ideological discourse. In the context of establishing a homology between ideological discourse and Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts, Althusser defines his problematic as follows:

> The question we might ask – although I do so only very cautiously – is whether something of the structure of ideological discourse is not 'taken up' in the structure of the discourse of the unconscious, with, however, an utterly different status hinging, precisely, on the *structure* of the discourse of the unconscious: this would be, in the form of the radical absence whose presence in person in the structure of ideological discourse marks the contrast

> that distinguishes the two, Lacan's big other, which is the true 'subject' of the discourse of the unconscious. The big Other, which speaks in the discourse of the unconscious, would then be, not the *subject* of the discourse of the ideological – God, The Subject, and so on – but the *discourse* of the unconscious, and established in the specific form of the subject of the discourse of the unconscious, that is, as an *effect* of this discourse, present in the signifiers of this discourse as absent by representation in a signifier (present-absent by 'delegation'). (p. 61)

This passage shows that the discourse of the other, i.e., the discourse of the unconscious, is the ideological discourse in which the small subject is represented with a signifier but nevertheless remains absent from it. Althusser explains the assumption that the ideological discourse concerns the small subject by the formulation of "subject presumed to exist" (p. 55). The small subject in return, "misrecognizes" the interpellating call in which she is represented by a signifier.

In the context of the status of the term "discourse", which Althusser uses, Montag (2013) argues that the term creates a dualism. That is, it is primarily "practices" that are real, discourses, on the other hand, produce effects which remain internal to "meaning" (p. 133). Montag formulates the mentioned dualism by asking "if discourses are not in the real, how can they be 'used' by practices to produce real effects?" (p. 134). He starts answering his question by indicating that Althusser restricts the production of a subjective position by a discourse to the ideological discourse (p. 134). Montag proceeds to locate the answer in the conceptual elaboration of the term "interpellation", where he argues that the term means "neither a 'commandment', an act of 'naked violence', nor 'an injunction pure and simple', he tells us [Althusser], but 'an enterprise of conviction-persuasion.' (p. 138). In light of the definition of interpellation, he argues that the subject-to-be-interpellated is prior "logically if not chronologically" to the other, since in order to recognize the recognition of the other, it must constitute herself as a subject (p. 138). The prior existence of the subject, as Montag argues, reproduces itself in the objective articulation of the ideological discourse as well. That is, the guarantee-giving subject with the capitals, i.e., God, is explained by the sentence "I am that I am". In other words, "God is thus a 'subject' before he is the 'Subject' where "each individual subject must be as a God in order then to subject himself, by his own action, to God" (p. 139). Montag (2013) argues that the relationship between unconscious and ideological discourses articulated by Althusser imply a functionalism where

"unconscious being essential to the functioning of the ideological and produced by it" (p. 139). He concludes by arguing that to "whom ideological discourse addresses itself becomes undecidable" (p. 140). In other words, the sense in which the interpellation becomes possible is not conceivable because the subject who existed prior to interpellation could be thought to be "responding" to the summons of the ideological discourse (p. 140).

İpola (2018) problematizes the intersectionality of unconscious and ideological discourses by reminding Badiou's criticism of Althusser, which was elaborated at the conclusion of the first chapter. İpola (2018) summarizes the problematization of Althusser's structural causality by Badiou as "elaborating a theorization of the conjuncture that would be free of economism and that of 'deciding' the status of the subject in said theorization" (p. 57). İpola (2018), by paraphrasing Badiou, argues that the dominant instance "at the conjunctural level is not always, perforce, the economy; it can be politics, ideology, science, etc." (p. 57). İpola (2018) argues that since Althusser's conception of structural causality conceptualizes the determining instance as economy, the conjunctures are "merely a 'whim' of economic practice" (p. 57). In other words, as İpola (2018) states, the determining instance, i.e., economy, "thrown out the front door, reenters through the back" (p. 57). The problem of conceptualizing the determination of the conjuncture, then, continues as Badiou addresses; however, concerning the "problem of the subject", İpola argues that Badiou and Althusser "completely coincide" (p. 57). He demonstrates this coincidence by referring to Badiou's own words concerning the Lacanian subject and Althusserian (non) subject:

> The very frequent attempt to supplement Althusser with Lacan on this question, which seeks support in some of Althusser's passages on psychoanalysis, is in my view unworkable. In Lacan there is a theoretical concept of the subject, which even has an ontological status. For the being of the subject in Lacan is the coupling of the void and the 'objet petit a'. There is no such thing in Althusser, for whom the object exists even less than the subject. Althusser writes: 'object = a mirror reflection of subject'. The object is therefore the image of an inexistence. The process without a subject functions just as effectively as the process without an object. (Badiou, 2005, p. 60)

In order to demonstrate what the mentioned “attempts” of supplementing Althusser with Lacan are, as Badiou (2005) argues, Althusser’s article “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” needs to be examined.

3.4. Interpellation and Consequences

Althusser (2001), before formulating the place of the subject and the process of interpellation, makes a conceptual clarification concerning the place and its corresponding terminology. The place has an important role because to conceive ideology as such, the broader frame in which the conceptualization of ideology becomes possible must be elaborated. Accordingly, Althusser argues that the domain in which he is going to articulate ideology is the state, and the function of the state is reproduction. To articulate the definition of reproduction, he argues, the metaphor of base and superstructure must be questioned (p. 135). The metaphor confines the relationship of the base and the superstructure to be conceived as a “description” (p. 136). Althusser states that the metaphor “makes something visible” (p. 135), where the “upper floors” are argued to be dependent on the base since they cannot float in the air alone. To “go beyond the metaphor”, then, he would review the superstructure “on the basis of reproduction” (p. 136). In other words, to examine the functions of the superstructure (and hence the state), Althusser proposes to begin differently from the classical understanding of the determination of the superstructure by the base (p. 136).

Althusser (2001) continues his line of inquiry where he tries to conceive the state from the “point of view of reproduction” (pp. 136-137). He argues that the state in “Marxist classics” was conceived as “the State apparatus” (p. 137). The State designates not only the specialized apparatuses but a general function where the force of repressive execution is applied in the interests of the ruling classes. However, the function of the state remains “descriptive” for Althusser. He argues that the descriptive definition of a concept reveals two things concerning the concept:

> (1) that the ‘descriptive theory’ really is, without a shadow of a doubt, the irreversible beginning of the theory; but (2) that the ‘descriptive’ form in which theory is presented requires, precisely as an effect of this ‘contradiction’, a development of the theory which goes beyond the form of ‘description’. (p. 138)

The problematization of a descriptive articulation of a concept could be understood similarly to the "concept-identical sentence" of political. Althusser (2001) gives textual evidence to the "concept-identical sentence" where he argues that the repressive definition of the state:

> … really does give us the means to identify and recognize the facts of oppression by relation them to the State, conceived as the repressive State apparatus, this 'interrelationship' gives rise to a very special kind of obviousness… 'Yes, that's how it is, that's really true!' (p. 139).

To "supersede" this obviousness, Althusser (2001) argues that something else must be added to the conception of the Marxist theory of the state, i.e., ideological state apparatuses. Accordingly, he contends that the repressive state apparatus functions by violence, whereas the ideological state apparatuses function by ideology (p. 145). The reason for the existence of ideological state apparatuses, according to Althusser, stems from the fact that the repressive aspect of the state cannot function for an extended period of time. Hence, the state needs the functioning of the ideological state apparatus, which provides the means of reproducing the relations of production (p. 146). By narrowing the field in which ISA's could be discussed, Althusser (2001) argues that the dominant ideological state apparatus in capitalism is the school (p. 155). Schools by making an "obligatory audience", puts the "totality of children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a day for five or six days out of seven" (p. 156). As Althusser (2001) argues, this compulsory audience becomes induced with the ideology of the ruling class by "an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the massive inculcation" (p. 156). The conceptualization of ISA does not continue in the proceeding part of the essay, where it is replaced with the discussion of ideology in general.

Although Althusser (2001) argues that Marx's works before *Capital* give an explicit theory of ideology in general, he deems this theory as being "not Marxist". As for *Capital,* he states that "it does not contain that theory itself, which depends for the most part on the theory of ideology in general" (p. 158). The formulation of the "ideology in general" starts with the emphasis on history, where he claims that "ideology has no history" (p. 159). He refers to the phrase to Marx's conception of ideology in *The German Ideology,* where he states that Marx conceived ideology "in a plainly positivist context" (p. 159). For him, in *The German Ideology,* the term was

conceptualized as “pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e., nothingness” (p. 159). Althusser (2001) argues that the illusory nature of the ideology could be linked to Freud’s conception of dreams, where the latter saw dreams as the “residue” of the contents of the day in an inverted or confused form (p. 160). The non-historical part of the ideology, as Althusser claims, stems from the fact that just as the history of a concrete individual exists outside of the dream, the history of an ideology stands outside of the philosophical consciousness (p. 160). He re-formulates the conceptualization of ideology by arguing that “ideolog*ies have a history of their own* [emphasis in original]”, and hence it has no history (p. 161). However, Althusser argues that the non-historical aspect of ideology should not be seen as a negative thesis but should be conceived in an “absolutely positive sense” (p. 161). To define this positivity, the structure of ideology should be understood in parallel with the structure of the unconscious (p. 161). Althusser characterizes the structure of the unconscious as being “eternal” (p. 161). As he states, the eternality of the unconscious does not mean that it is “transcendent to all history” but “omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history” (p. 161).

Althusser (2001) proceeds to give an explanation of the structure of the ideology in general. Accordingly, he formulates two theses: 1. “Ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence” (p. 162) and 2. “Ideology has a material existence” (p. 165)

The first thesis is formulated against the conception of ideology as the inversion of the real conditions of existence. Althusser (2001) questions the “inversion” form by asking “why do men ‘need’ this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence to ‘represent to themselves’ their real conditions of existence?” (p. 163). The first answer for him is the existence of a “small number of cynical men who base their domination and exploitation of the ‘people’ on a falsified representation of the world” (p. 163). Whereas the second reason is to be more “profound” but “just as false” (p. 163). This profound second reason, as Althusser (2001) states, originates from the problematic of “alienation”:

> This cause is the material alienation which reigns in the conditions of existence of men themselves. This is how, in *The Jewish Question* and elsewhere, Marx defends the Feuerbachian idea that men make themselves

> alienated (=imaginary) representations of their conditions of existence because these conditions of existence are themselves alienating (in the *1844 Manuscripts:* because these conditions are dominated by the essence of alienated society – '*alienated labour'* [emphasis in original]) (p. 164)

For Althusser both of them are problematic since they "presuppose, and on which they depend, i.e., that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e., their real world" (p. 164). In other words, the immediate relationship between real and imaginary is found problematic. Althusser proceeds to examine the intermediary element, which he defines as the "relation" (p. 164). He argues that it is the "relation" that must be focused on that contains the "cause" of the "ideological representation of the real world" (p. 164). With emphasis on the "cause" that generates the ideological distortion of the relationship, he formulates the question as "why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation?" (p. 165). Since this question is not provided with an answer I will try to give an adequate account of it. The silence concerning this question, preliminarily, can be conceived as a lack of mediation between that what is material and that what is imaginary. By maintaining this gap, Althusser jumps to the explanation of his second thesis: Ideology has material existence. However, the answer to the question is postponed, and Althusser jumps to the explanation of his second thesis: Ideology has material existence.

Considering the material existence of ideology, Althusser (2001) claims that the imaginary relation has a property of being material (p. 167). That is, regardless of the content of the ideological behaviour, the contents become articulated in practices. In other words, if a "man" is not "cynical, or perverse", he will act according to what he believes. These practices, as Althusser argues, are inserted into the material existence of ISA's where certain "rituals" are performed (p. 168). Similar to Badiou's analysis concerning the adjectivization of the theoretical in the first chapter, Althusser (2001) defines the materiality of the ideology as follows:

> I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that *his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by material*

> *ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject* [emphasis in original]. (p. 169)

The comment Althusser (2001) provides concerning the usage of the word material as an adjective is even more striking here because he admits that there exists a difference of materiality between practices and ideological apparatus. However, he omits the examination of this issue by stating that "I shall leave on one side the problem of a theory of the differences between modalities of materiality" (p. 169). As I will dwell on later in this chapter, this omission is important because just as Badiou argued that the conception of structural causality implied Spinozism, Mladen Dolar argues that Althusser's conception of the subject "suffers" from a Spinozistic conception.

After explaining the materiality of ideology, Althusser (2001) lists the terms in which he is going to formulate his last thesis. The list is made by grouping disappeared, *survived,* and appeared terms:

> Disappeared: the term *ideas* [emphasis in original]
> Survive: the terms *subject, consciousness, belief, actions* [emphasis in original]
> Appear: the terms *practices, rituals, ideological apparatus* [emphasis in original] (Althusser, 2001, p. 169)

Althusser (2001) argues that the central term in which he will be formulating the thesis *"*ideology interpellates individuals as subjects" (p. 170) is the notion[12] of the subject.

Althusser (2001) starts formulating the mentioned thesis by declaring that "there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject" (p. 170). Accordingly, he states that the definition of ideology which he seeks to employ in the thesis is not for "concrete individuals" but is conceived through "*the category of the subject* [emphasis in original] and its functioning" (p. 170). The category of the subject, then, as Althusser (2001) argues, becomes "constitutive of all ideology" where "*the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects* [emphasis in original]" (p. 171). Accordingly, he himself is also not exempt from

[12] As Badiou argues, Althusser's formulation of the terms is tripartite. The term "notion" corresponds to ideological terms, "concept" corresponds to scientific terms, and "category" corresponds to philosophical terms.

being designated as a subject since ideology is lived "spontaneously" or "naturally" (p. 171). Then, he argues that "man is an ideological animal by nature" (p. 171). According to Althusser, the function in which ideology operates is the mechanism of "recognition" or "misrecognition" (p. 172). This function is distinguished from the function of science, where Althusser argues that science operates through "knowledge" in opposition to recognition. He provides examples for explaining recognition/misrecognition range from daily activities such as handshakes to responding to the question "Who's there?" as "Me" following a door knock (p. 172). According to these examples, Althusser argues that everyone is "*always already* [emphasis in original] subjects" (p. 173) since the practice of rituals composes an inescapable part of everyday reality.

The recognition/misrecognition function of ideology is reworked by adopting the position of ideology where the formulation becomes: "*all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects* [emphasis in original], by the functioning of the category of the subject" (Althusser, 2001, p. 173). Althusser (2001) explains the hailing mechanism by mentioning "the most commonplace every day police hailing: 'Hey, you there!'" (p. 174). The recognition appears when the subject in question turns to the police, where he believes that the call was "really" addressed to him.

The question that Hall (1985) formulates about the structure of the essay is the substitution of a single element for the whole itself. He argues that the essay could be divided into two parts, where the first part is about "ideology and reproduction of the social relations of production", whereas the second part is "about the constitution of subjects and how ideologies interpellate us in the realm of the Imaginary" (p. 102). Accordingly, Hall (1985) contends that the theory of the subject substitutes, "metonymically", the whole theory itself. The second part of the essay accomplishes "considerable theorizing" (p. 102), however, Hall also reminds that the problematic which pertains to the unconscious and its relationship to subjective processes actually belongs to Lacan. For the first part of the essay, Hall states that "the inquiry simply halted with Althusser's inadequate formulations about the reproduction of the social relations of production" (p. 102). This uneven structure of the essay, according to Hall (1985), affected the subsequent reception of the essay, where he argues that the first part was "assigned" to the "Marxist" and "male" pole,

whereas the second part was assigned to the "psychoanalytic" and "feminist" pole (p. 102). Yet, the second pole constituted a research area that included themes such as the "question about the 'insides' of people, about psychoanalysis, subjectivity and sexuality" (p. 102). Hall (1985) argues that within this constituted field of the second pole, the themes that are associated with it became increasingly linked to feminism. In the first pole, however, the field is constituted of the themes such as "social relations, production and the 'hard edge' of productive systems, and that is what Marxism and the reductive discourses of class are 'about'" (p. 103). In his essay, Hall does not articulate the meaning of the assigned genders that correspond to particular themes. This classification, despite being highly reductive if not conceptualized, enables the frame in which Butler's elaboration of interpellation and subjectivity could be discussed, as I will also elaborate on. The lack of conceptual explanation concerning the "reproduction of the social relations of production" argued by Hall is included by Pecheux in his account of "interpellation".

Pecheux (1994) starts his essay "The Mechanism of Ideological (Mis)recognition" by elaborating what "ideological conditions of the reproduction/transformation of the relations of production" would entail for founding "a materialist theory of discourse" (p. 141). He argues that the stressing of the "ideological conditions" in the domain of reproduction of the relations of production is needed because ideology is not the sole and dominant element that defines the mentioned domain. The contradictory character of the term "reproduction/transformation" should be founded upon class struggle where "these contradictory conditions are constituted, at a given historical moment and for a given social formation, *by the complex set of ideological state apparatuses* [emphasis in original] contained in that social formation" (p. 143). Concerning the form of the contradiction, he states that the elements which form the contradiction "cannot be thought as the opposition between two forces acting against one another *in a single space* [emphasis in original]" (p. 144). Pecheux criticizes the dichotomous conceptualization of the ideological contradiction by arguing that the two elements conception reduces contradiction to an evident fact. He links this evident fact to the evidence of the "society" where inferring contradiction from the existence of society confuses the priority of struggle. In other words, he argues that the idea which *sees* the reproduction of the relations of production as an eternal process that could

continue of its own is an "eternalist and anti-dialectical illusion" (p. 145). Hence, Pecheux bases his "materialist theory of discourse" on analysing Althusser's central thesis of "ideology interpellates individuals as subjects" (p. 141). That is, the eternalist conception of the reproduction of the relations of production, for Pecheux, must also be criticized at the level of interpellation.

Pecheux (1994) notes that Althusser's thesis of "ideology is eternal" and Freud's conception of "unconscious is eternal" should not be thought of as an accidental conceptual affinity. Accordingly, he argues that both ideology and unconscious "conceal their own existence" with an operation that produces "'subjective'[13] evident truths" (p. 147). Pecheux, in order to further analyse these evident truths, returns to the "illustrative" examples of Althusser in his explanation of interpellation. The illustrations signify an important point where the relationship between the repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatuses is established. That is, the illustration "Hey, you there!" signifies the causal chain of "legal political apparatus which assigns-verifies-check 'identities", "the link between the 'subject in law' (he who enters into contractual relations with other subjects in law, his equals" and "the ideological subject (he who says of himself: 'It'me!')" (p. 148).

This causal chain, or in Pecheux's (1994) words "little theoretical theatre" (p. 148), indicates an important point because it does not assume the existence of the subject prior to interpellation. As he states, the non-existence of the subject prior to interpellation creates a paradox:

> In fact, what the thesis "Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects' designates is indeed that 'non-subject' is interpellated-constituted as subject by Ideology. Now, the paradox is precisely that interpellation has, as it were, a *retroactive effect* [emphasis in original], with the result that every individual is 'always-already a subject'. (p. 148)

Pecheux (1994) supplements the mentioned paradox with a joke: "Mister So-and-so, remind me of your name!" (p. 149). The paradox of interpellation implies a contradiction in the interpellation process between the "familiar strangeness of this outside located before" and "the identifiable, responsible subject, answerable for his

[13] Pecheux (1994) notes that this usage of the term "subjective" should be conceived not as "affecting the subject" but "in which the subject is constituted." (p. 147).

actions" (p. 149). Pecheux frames this contradiction by arguing that the contradiction could be ignored by the subject ("i.e., stupidity") or could be inferred with a joke ("i.e., irony") as indicated above (p. 149). He claims that the contradiction could also be named as a symptom (p. 149). Accordingly, the existence of the symptom implies "a process of the signifier, in interpellation-identification" (p. 149). In other words, Pecheux utilizes Lacan's definition of signifier, which is "a signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier" (p. 149). For him, the utilization of Lacan's definition of the signifier constitutes the index for framing the cause and effect of the subject. That is, since the "non-subject constituted by the network of signifiers, in Lacan's sense: the subject is 'caught' in this network… such that he results as 'cause of himself'" (p. 150). According to Pecheux, the conception of the subject as thought to be causing itself should be "obliterated" and must be replaced with the conception of the subject as a "process" (p. 150). Otherwise, the former conception confines the conception of the subject to "metaphysical phantasies". Consequently, Pecheux argues, at the subjective level, there could be seen a "phantasy effect" or "Münchhausen effect" which refers to "the immortal baron who lifted himself into the air by pulling on his own hair" (p. 150). Although Pecheux's account includes a possible way to indicate the contradictory process of interpellation, in order to get more technical with the inclusion of object-a, I will mention Zizek's account.

Zizek (2008) criticizes Althusser on the grounds that the link between the ISA's and the mechanism is not adequately established. The link for Zizek is the "internalization" of the surrounding signifying automatism of the ISA's that produces the "effect" of a belief in a cause, which allows the subject's "recognition of one's ideological position" (p. 43), i.e., the mechanism of "Münchhausen effect", which Pecheux argues. Zizek argues that the mechanism could only work if "State Apparatuses exercises its force only in so far as it is experienced, in the unconscious economy of the subject, as a traumatic, senseless injunction" (p. 43). Zizek carries out a similar inquiry to Pecheux in terms of emphasizing the contradictory process of interpellation with a minimal difference. This minimal difference, as he argues, is the "stain of traumatic irrationality and senseless sticking to it" where the senselessness acts as a cause for complying with the law (p. 43). In other words, the senselessness in question grants the law an unconditional authority that "escapes ideological

sense". Zizek juxtaposes Kafka with Althusser, arguing that Kafka developed a criticism of Althusser "avant la lettre" since Kafka's emphasis on the "irrational" aspect of bureaucracy, which includes the subjectivation of the hero in *Castle* before any interpellation or recognition mechanism. In other words, the hero in *Castle* wanders in the bureaucratic apparatus without a cause, and it is this wandering that tries to find a meaning that is what produces the authority of the law. According to Zizek, Althusser's overlooking of the problem of internalization should be understood with the close relationship of the subject and the object-a. He articulates the importance of object-a by evoking Pecheux's (1994) use of Lacan in the context of subject as caught up in the chain of signification (p. 149). That is the subject in question is "trapped by the Other" in the sense that subject's cause of desire is barred from her reach and resides in the domain of the Other.

The use of object-a in the conceptualization of the subject changes the frame in which the relationship of ideology and reality is to be conceived. According to Zizek (2008), the conception in which the subject is dependent upon the Other in terms of her psychic economy changes the "opposition between dream and reality":

> Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our 'reality' itself: an 'illusion' which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some insupportable, real impossible kernel. (p. 45)

In the context of subjectivation prior to interpellation, Rastko Mocnik (1993) problematizes the discourse that enables the field of subjectivity. For Mocnik, this discourse remains an open question, and he refers to this discourse as "other" discourse. The other discourse which constitutes the subject must be conceived "non-ideological" yet at the same time constituting "the whole field of intersubjectivity" (p. 140). According to Mocnik, if one accepts this thesis about the other discourse, the position of historical materialism in relation to psychoanalysis becomes a relation of exteriority or even psychoanalysis "undermines" the historical materialist project (p. 140). That is, if the other discourse is equated with the ideological discourse, a "vicious circle" is inevitable because "an ideology would then always already presuppose another ideology" (p. 140). Yet, if one accepts Althusser's thesis about interpellation, either "ideological universe" is broken down into "as many

communities as there ideological" or there is an assumption about the "transversal function" of the ideological discourse (p. 140). According to Mocnik, the transversal function of the ideological discourse, different from the mechanism of interpellation, entails the question of how the transversal function "catches the individuals" (p. 140). The mechanism of transversal function and interpellation could be examined closely by indicating that the process of subjectivation includes "two interdependent mechanisms" (p. 140). Accordingly, these two mechanisms are a) "a purely symbolic mechanism that has always the same stereotypic structure", i.e., subjectivation proper b) "an imaginary relation concerned with ideological 'contents,' where the ideological conflict as an instance of class struggle is being carried out" (p. 140). For Mocnik, the functioning of the ideology "works" in the domain of identification, however its success is measured from the "capacity to the trigger subjectivating mechanism" (p. 140). The emphasis upon two mechanisms is needed, Mocnik argues, because the two domains in which ideology works, imaginary and symbolic, exclude each other (p. 140). That is, a purely symbolic conception of ideology could render the ideological analysis to be operating in a homogenous field or worse in a falsely claimed political neutrality. Yet, the imaginary analysis of ideology "may well do justice to the richness of political conflict" while missing that which relates to "subjectivating effect" (p. 140).

Mocnik (1993) first locates the intersection of the imaginary and the symbolic in the context of interpretation, where he gives the example of everyday communication. He argues that the success of everyday communication should not be thought of as if it is freed from theoretical problems. As Mocnik (1993) states, the everyday situation is residing in an antinomy where the determination of the meaning is either determined by the structure of the situation or the utterance which shapes the situation. Accordingly, the success is related to the third, which designates the point of identification, i.e., "the subject supposed to believe" (p. 141). The supposed guarantor of the meaning induces an effect of "it is *possible* [emphasis in original] that this string of signifiers makes sense" (p. 142) to the communicating parties. Mocnik illustrates "the subject supposed to believe" (p. 142) by giving an example of a scenario where an unstable social situation is taking place. The illustration is as follows:

> ...the rumor starts that "the oil (or sugar) is going to run out," this rumor may not be true at the moment of its launching (the stocks of oil being sufficient for the normal trend of its consumption); but when people start acting upon this (originally "false") rumor, it may well become true. How do people act upon such a rumor? Suppose I am enlightened enough not to believe the rumor. I may even positively know it to be false. But not with standing my rationality and/or knowledge, I will reason this way: "I know the rumor to be false; but other people may beleive it; acting upon their (false) belief, they will rush out and pile up private stocks; and the oil is likely to run out. So I better rush to the store myself and get some oil." Even under the supposition that everybody in the population reasons this way, the implicit consensus as to the falsity of the prediction will not prevent its finally coming true; the general recognition that it is possible to believe the rumor, i.e., the identification of every member of the population with the subject supposed to believe, will do the trick. (Mocnik, 1993, p. 142)

Mocnik (1993) argues that the interpretation process of the communicating parties should be linked to the Freudian notion of the "phantasy". The process of interpretation, Mocnik claims, constitutes an ambiguous domain which links the subject's psychic economy to the Subject of ideology. Accordingly, he gives an example of a scenario where interpreters are expected to interpret the line "Let a hundred flowers bloom" (p. 142). Mocnik argues that even when an interpreter attributes the line to Mao Zedong and subsequently learns that it is not Mao Zedong who said it but the last emperor of China; the interpreter could argue that the emperor learned it "while being re-educated at the Fushu prison" (p. 142), or in the case of line being said after imprisonment it could be argued that the emperor was expressing his devotion to gardening after re-education. Mocnik expands the scenario by substituting the line as "Comrade Zhdanov said: "Let a hundred flowers bloom" (p. 143). According to Mocnik, in the second line what constitutes the point of interpretation is the name (p. 143). The line could be interpreted as "But he did not mean it!" where the interpreter would grant the authority to him/herself in order to utilize meaning (since the interpreter implies that the "true" meaning resides in him/her) according to possible means which is determined by the "the economy of communication" (p. 143).

Mocnik (1993) argues that the field of interpretation where the interpreter tries to fill the "lack" by perceiving a "semantic trait" that makes the line understandable is the process in which the interpreter constitutes him/herself "as a member of an imaginary community" (p. 144). In other words, the mechanism of the

"Munchhausen effect" becomes further explained by pointing out how both the ideological discourse and the subject-to-be-interpellated are defined by a lack. As Mocnik claims, the "contribution of the addressee" (p. 145) is less developed in the aforementioned explanations. The position of the Subject of ideology or the addressee, Mocnik indicates, entails an assumption of a "*universal* [emphasis in original] instance of the understanding speaker-hearer (the subject supposed to believe)" (p. 145). By mentioning how both positions of addressee and addresser are related to identification process, Mocnik proceeds to develop the domain of subjectivation proper. According to him, the place of the subjectivation proper or the place of the unconscious subject "arises at a place that supports the identifying operation" (p. 145), which is supplemented with the notion of "fantasy".

Mocnik (1993) argues that the structure of interpretation could be understood similar to "the structure of Freudian *fantasy* [emphasis in original]":

> We may proceed by distinguishing two elements within the ad hoc concept of the principle of interpretation: one is the definition a speaker or an interpreter her/himself gives of the communicational situation (this component has all the characteristics of a "rationalization"); the other is its belief-nucleus, the element that comprises the formal necessity that it be an object of belief. This feature of the second component makes it a point at which desire (that an utterance be meaningful) and constraint (the compulsion to believe) coincide. It has the structure of Freudian fantasy. (p. 147)

Mocnik (1993) claims that the frame in which the response could be posed for the interpreter works by the individual fantasies of the interpreters, where "fantasy" works as the "material basis of the identification process" (p. 148). In other words, the success of the ideological mechanism depends on its capability of "catching the always idiosyncratic individual unconscious fantasies" (p. 148), where it fuses the fantasies into the social dimension. Mocnik further explains "the material basis" of ideology by drawing parallels to Freudian dream analysis. At the start of the analysis, he gives some clues concerning which terms are seen as homologous to each other, the term ideological mechanism becomes substituted with "dream mechanism", and the fantasy or material basis becomes substituted with "dream material" (Mocnik, 1993, p. 148). Mocnik argues that the mechanism by which the dream material becomes articulated a) is already an interpretation and is exterior in relation to the dream material b) the mechanism is a "tendentious or a *deformed* [emphasis in

original] interpretation" (p. 148). In other words, the mechanism in which the dream material is articulated "presents a sense of the dream", but this sense is "a false sense" that points to the fact that "*the intelligibility blocks the understanding* [emphasis in original]" (p. 148). According to Mocnik, this false sense actually indicates something positive, the falseness of the mechanism is not to be found in the distortion but in its mechanism i.e., "its interpretative character" (p. 149). Therefore, as Mocnik indicates, in order to penetrate the dream-content the interpretive mechanism must be "broken" while acknowledging the fact that the frame in which the interpretation does its work is not "accidental" (p. 149).

Mocnik (1993) argues that the framework of dream-mechanism is "made of pre-fabricated dream material" (p. 150). In other words, the material of the framework is that which survives despite the dream content. Freud (1962) explains the process as follows:

> It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these dream facades are nothing other than mistaken and somewhat arbitrary revisions of the dream-content by the conscious agency of our mental life. In the erection of a dream-facade, use is not infrequently made of wishful phantasies which are present in the dream-thoughts in a pre-constructed form, and are of the same character as the appropriately named "day dreams" familiar to us in waking life. The wishful phantasies revealed by analysis in night-dreams often turn out to be repetitions or modified versions of scenes from infancy; thus, in some cases, the facade of the dream directly reveals the dream's actual nucleus, distorted by an admixture of other material. The labour of, as it were, building up a facade of the dream-the case, namely, in which a formation of that kind already exists, available for use in the material of the dream-thoughts. I am in the habit of describing the element in the dream-thoughts which I have in minds as "phantasy" (Phantasie). (p. 150)

Mocnik (1993) argues that the point of "phantasy" is a "quilting point" that binds the facade (or the mechanism of dream) and the actual dream material (p. 150). That is, the "phantasy" induces an ideological effect of coherence which enables the translation of "conscious demand for sense" to "unconscious subject's desire, which supports the identification-process" (p. 151). Mocnik claims that ideology, similar to dream mechanism, tries to build a coherence that provides the framework for intelligibility by "incorporating fantasy" rather than working directly upon reality. Accordingly, he lists several ideological fantasies that quilt the internal psychic economy of the subject and the ideological exterior Mocnik mentions several

examples that would exemplify the fantasies in question: “decline of the West, fantasy of Oriental despotism, and any number of racist stereotypes” (p. 151). Mocnik (1993) argues that, there is “nothing” beyond the framework of ideology that would grant the framework with a substance except the class struggle. In other words, class struggle indicates the point which is beyond ideology, meaning, or coherence. However, what would the framework of “beyond interpellation and ideology” outside of ideological criticism is not elaborated by Mocnik. At this point, Mladen Dolar’s conceptualization of the frame of “beyond interpellation” becomes relevant.

Dolar (1993) argues that a recurring theme of the “clean cut” could be found in Althusser’s theoretical position. This theme is explained by emphasizing the ruptural transformation of an ideology to science and the sudden recognition of the fact that one is always-already a subject. Dolar claims that the either/or scenario about choosing materiality or subjectivity in Althusser’s theoretical position is constitutive. As he indicates, in the scientific analysis, the research field is reduced to the exteriority, whereas outside of it, the scientists’ position is subjective and ideological, as everybody else. The problem Dolar elaborate on does not lie in the either/or situation but with the inability to conceptualize the “remainder” which is produced by the clear cut. Accordingly, he states that “the psychoanalytic subject is the failure to become an Althusserrian one” (p. 78). The subject becomes functional for ideology in the case of Althusser, whereas for psychoanalysis, the emergence of the subject is tied to the failure of ideology. Dolar argues that the remainder is to be located at the “exteriority in the very kernel of interiority” (p. 78) or to put it as the Lacanian neologism, the relationship of the remainder with the subject is a relation of “extimacy”.

Dolar (1993) emphasizes the importance of the Lacanian conception of subjectivity by indicating that although Lacan shares the language of structuralism and does not primarily associate the subject with cogito, the Lacanian unconscious is a structure “*with* [emphasis in original] a subject” (p. 79). For Lacan, the dichotomy of recognition/misrecognition is not enough to explain the subject because “the subject emerges only at the point of a non-recognition” (p. 80). According to Dolar, the effects of the non-recognition could be found in the sentences such as “this is not me”, “I was not there”, where the denial indicates something important concerning

the subject (p. 80). However, modalities of non-recognition, i.e., symptoms, may persist even "its meaning is deciphered in analysis" (p. 80). Therefore, Dolar argues that the successful mechanism of interpellation, which results in the utterance of "this is me", cannot account for the existence of the symptom. In other words, the object-a is unthinkable for Althusser's theoretical position.

Dolar (1993) argues that in order to demonstrate the relationship of extimacy, the mechanism of "falling in love" is an adequate reference point since it reveals the "empty gesture" of subjectivity in the context of "forced choice" (p. 81). The contingent encounter at the start of a love story becomes transformed into "the realization of his/her innermost and immemorial wishes and desire" (p. 83). In other words, the choice becomes delegated to Other in its avatars such as "fate, providence, eternal plan, destiny, or whatever one might call it" (p. 83). According to Dolar, the moment of subjectivation proper occurs only when the subjectivity is suspended to the Other. He argues that the setting of the analytic situation produces an artificial love because the only rule in the analytic situation is the absence of rules, enabling the analyst to assume the position of "the subject supposed to know" (p. 85). This position of the analyst enables the analysand to free associate better, but at the same time increases the impact of embarrassment because of the presence of the Other. Dolar claims that at the point when the subject's halting of speech occurs, the halting point should be conceived as the site of "the subject's jouissance" where "the silent being of the subject manifests itself as love" (p. 86).

According to Dolar (1993), the experience of love is not a symptom, but a "necessary illusion" in the analytical setting where the immediate associations with the love objects of a subject are dissociated. Dolar locates the intersectionality of love and interpellation as follows:

> Thus far, one could see falling in love as largely comparable to the mechanism of interpellation – the transformation of contingency into necessity, the external into the internal- and one might rightly ask where the difference between the two lies. Could one say that love is what we find beyond interpellation? The point is that psychoanalysis, with the mechanism of transference, makes love appear as a symptom. It produces transference-love as a "necessary illusion," a new pathology and its major lever, but psycho analysis also bares the mechanism which produces love, and thus makes it appear in its very contingency. The analytical process can be seen as a demonstration that love involves a dimension "beyond interpellation." The conclusion of analysis occurs precisely with the realization of the contingency

> of the object that has up to then covered "the lack in the Other." The analyst occupies precisely the position of the remainder. The contingent bit of the Real that was covered up by the narcissistic deception of love now appears as such. (p. 87)

Dolar (1993) argues that the artificially produced "pure form of" love in the analytic setting could have illuminating implications concerning "love as an ideological mechanism" (p. 87). Accordingly, love could be likened to a mask that hides the "external origins of subjectivity" because in its self-offering in the process of love, the subject responds with his/her "own particularity" to "external contingency" (p. 88). In other words, a locatable relationship becomes established between the inner-most kernel of the subject, i.e., object, and the Other. That is, the "opacity of the Other" which resides in the contingent articulations of the signifier becomes "transparent by love" (p. 88). Dolar interprets the appearance of the Other by arguing that the opaque feature of the Other could be seen as "lawless", while in the case of love, it becomes "lawful" (p. 88). He argues that the big Subject of ideology in Althusser's conception does not give an account of the fact that both the interpellated subject and the Subject of ideology are constituted by a lack. In other words, by returning to Althusser's formulation of ideological discourse in "Three Notes", which emphasized the place of the small subject with a determinate signifier, Dolar's question can be formulated as: Why does the big subject need a signifier to fill the ideological discourse?"

Dolar (1993) argues that the conceptualization of the lack should be understood by emphasizing the symbolic dimension of the subject, which could be entered only by a debt or a forced choice. In other words, in the interpellation mechanism, "there is no place of loss, for the price paid for becoming a subject" (p. 89). Hence, Dolar argues that the lack of a lack (and the lack of the symbolic order also) in Althusser's theoretical position entails that "being is continuous either in the Real or in the Imaginary" (p. 89). According to Dolar, the lack of a lack in the theoretical discourse and the omission of the symbolic order coincides with Althusser's Spinozism (p. 89).

Dolar (1993) concludes by arguing that the fuel (or Trager function as Althusser would put it) in which ideological mechanism work cannot be fully integrated by the same mechanism. As a result, as Dolar states, the non-ideological part of psychoanalysis is located in its acknowledgement that any attempt to unite

two heterogeneous elements is a failure and that failure could be named for the subject in question. To contrast the psychoanalytic influenced interpretations of the "interpellation", Butler's role in the discussion would be adequate to underline a different approach to relationship of the subject and the corresponding discourse.

Butler (1997) claims that Althusser's "doctrine of interpellation" should be examined in its allegorical character, where the point of "staging the call" occupies an important point which resists the conceptual apparatus of the doctrine (p. 107). As Butler argues, the presentation of the interpellation is executed in two domains, the first is the utilization of "voice" and the second is the usage of "religious metaphors" (p. 109). Butler (1997) state that in the examples of ideological discourse, Althusser's references "assumes the status of a paradigm for thinking ideology as such, whereby the inevitable structures of ideology are established textually through the religious metaphor: the authority of the "voice" of ideology, the "voice" of interpellation" (p. 110). The use of voice indicates that the subject in question must already have a relationship with the voice that "redoubles" the subjection-interpellation stage (p. 111). However, the "narrative" in which the subject is discussed presupposes a subject of a different kind, i.e., the grammatical subject. For Butler (1997), a contradiction occurs in the assumption of the grammatical subject because the redoubled subject must be explained in a "temporality", however, the narrative "presupposes that there is no subjection without a subject who undergoes it" (p. 112).

Butler (1997), in the context of voice, argues that the response given to the call of interpellation could be understood as an "acoustic mirror" to the "face of authority", which achieves the sociality of the subject (p. 112). This achieved sociality is mediated by the subject's "perverse" desire to continue its existence, which is inseparable from the religious theme of "condemnation" (p. 113). According to Butler (1997), Althusser's higher point of abstraction through the interpellation process, namely the reproduction of social relations, exemplifies the theme of condemnation (p. 117). That is, Althusser's reference to school apparatus, where certain skills are acquired and know-how's of speech are institutionalized, implies that the compulsion of working is a mechanism of proving oneself innocent in the face of an original guilt. In the light of the last point, Butler formulates the following question:

> But inherent to any performance is a compulsion to "acquit oneself," and so prior to any performance is an anxiety and a knowingness which becomes articulate and animating only on the occasion of the reprimand. Is it possible to separate the psychic dimension of this ritualistic repetition from the "acts" by which it is animated and reanimated? The very notion of ritual is meant to render belief and practice inseparable. (p. 120)

Considering Mocnik's points on how the ritual and the subjectivation could be separately analysed, I argue that the issue that Butler addresses can be solved by locating the "identification" mechanism and how "subjectivation proper" relates to it. However, it is still worthwhile to examine how Butler criticizes Dolar and Zizek regarding Butler's problematization of the universal application of psychoanalytic concepts.

According to Butler (1997), Dolar's account of the subject, the "consenting subject appears to precede and condition 'entrance' into the symbolic and, hence, the becoming of a subject" (p. 124). Butler argues that the circularity of the arguments stems from the ascription of an ontological status to the grammatical subject (p. 124). This ascription implies that there is a "mimetic relation between grammar and ontology" that becomes established "always and already retroactively" (p. 124). That is, the location of the grammatical subject is given by the narrative, which makes the two necessarily interlinked. Butler formulates the question about this interlinkage in the context of the voice as: "Is it the voice of the symbolic, is it the ritualized voice of the state, or have the two become indissoluble?" (p. 127). This question can be linked with Butler's silence concerning the status of object-a. In order not to remain in a conceptual confusion, it would be relevant to mention how Dolar in *A Voice and Nothing More* establishes the link between object-a and the voice. Dolar (2006), in order to demonstrate the symbolic part of the interpellation process, which at the same time reveals the particularity of the voice, tells a story about Italian soldiers:

> There is a story which goes like this: In the middle of a battle there is a company of Italian soldiers in the trenches, and an Italian commander who issues the command "Soldiers, attack!" He cries out in a loud and clear voice to make himself heard in the midst of the tumult, but nothing happens, nobody moves. So the commander gets angry and shouts louder: "Soldiers, attack!" Still nobody moves.And since in jokes things have to happen three times for something to stir, he yells even louder: "Soldiers, attack!" At which point there is a response, a tiny voice rising from the trenches, saying appreciatively "*Che bella voce!*" "What a beautiful voice!" (p. 3)

According to Dolar (2006), the soldiers constitute themselves as "the community 'the friends of the Italian opera'… people of refined taste" where the concentration on the voice turns it into a "fetish object" (p. 4). He claims that voice as object-a should be considered as a third option between voice as "symbolic mandate" and "fetish object"[14] (p. 11).

In the context of ISA's and interpellation, Dolar (2006) argues that all ISA's include a domain of "the sacred and ritual", where, without a voice, the domain would be inoperative (p. 107). That is, in the religious rituals, despite the knowledge of the texts by participants, the ceremony can only operate with an impersonator of the voice (p. 107). According to Dolar (2006), the effectivity of the voice stems from its echoing of the "archaic voice", which is "not bound by *logos* [emphasis in original]" (p. 107). This echoing constitutes a social link between believers that mediates "the foundational moment of origin and stored by tradition" and "what all believes keep in their memories anyway" (p. 108).

In his explanation of "university apparatus", Dolar (2006) states that "within the Anglo-American academia there is an institution actually called *viva voice,* or just viva: the defense of a dissertation, of a doctoral thesis, which has to be made 'in the living voice.' (p. 110). According to him, the impersonation of the voice by the candidate marks the "initiatory ritual," where, until the initiation, "in theory one could actually survive the whole of academic life and get a degree without opening one's mouth" (p. 110). However, the initiation ritual points only to the "extreme case" of the utilization of the voice, whereas in the discussion of Althusser, where the dominant ISA is claimed to be school, the voice, because of its omnipresence remains as "imperceptible" (p. 110). According to Dolar, the voice works as a "minimal mechanism" which becomes impersonated in the "teacher's voice" (p. 110). The teacher's voice functions "in a way somewhat analogous to justice" where the teacher, as "the transmitter of Knowledge by his voice", regulates the otherwise all-accessible textbooks (p. 111). In other words, for a student to be qualified with knowledge by utilizing his/her voice, the use of knowledge should already be "staged by the teacher's voice" (p. 111).

I have argued that by providing a psychoanalytic and object-a driven expansion of the interpellation process, with the texts of Dolar, Mocnik and Zizek,

[14] For Dolar (2006), this triad can be thought of as "army, opera, psychoanalysis" (p. 4).

the questions which are formulated by Butler can be significantly answered. However, I left two important areas untouched. The first area, or question, posed by Butler is about the unacknowledged Christian/religious themes which dominate Althusser's account, which I think exceeds the scope of this thesis[15]. The second is about the meta-application of the psychoanalytic concepts concerning the field of subjectivity. Butler (1997) poses the question as follows:

> Let us provisionally accept this psychoanalytic account of subject formation, concede that the subject cannot form except through a barred relation to the Other, and even consider this barred Other to reappear as the introjected condition of subject formation, splitting the subject at its inception. Even so, are there other forms of "losing" the Other that are not introjection, and are there various ways of introjecting that Other? Are these terms not culturally elaborated, indeed, ritualized, to such a degree that no meta-scheme of symbolic logic escapes the hermeneutics of social description? (p. 128)

Although this question can be answered by reiterating Mocnik's explanation[16] which refutes the thesis of "to each ideology-a certain type of subject" (p. 140), still, the meta-scheme of the symbolic logic points to an important point.

In this chapter, the psychoanalytic criticism was analysed in its intersection with the ideological discourse. However, the scientific discourse that Althusser argues is absent from the subject was not addressed by psychoanalysis. Accordingly, in the following chapter, I will be examining how the debate between Jacques Alain-Miller and Badiou took place in the journal *Cahiers pour l'Analyse* in order to point out the relationship between psychoanalysis (or the logic of the signifier) and the scientific discourse. After mentioning the relationship between discourses, Badiou's

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[15] The proliferation of religious themes in the inquiry of subjectivity and politics takes an important place in contemporary debates. Some works on this topic include: *The Puppet and the Dwarf and The Fragile Absolute* by Zizek, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* by Badiou, and *The Time that Remains* by Agamben.

[16] Zizek (2008) also provides some explanation (without any reference to Butler) concerning the meta application of the symbolic in the domain of subjectivity: "Let us take one of the common places of the Marxist-feminist criticism of psychoanalysis, the idea that its insistence on the crucial role of the Oedipus complex and the nuclear family triangle transforms a historically conditioned form of patriarchal family into a feature of the universal human condition: is not this effort to historicize the family triangle precisely an attempt to elude the 'hard kernel' which announces itself through the 'patriarchal family' - the Real of the Law, the rock of castration? In other words, if over-rapid universalization produces a quasi-universal Image whose function is to make us blind to its historical, socio-symbolic determination, over-rapid historicization makes us blind to the real kernel which returns as the same through diverse historicizations/symbolizations." (p. 51)

subsequent application of the psychoanalytic concepts in *Theory of the Subject* will be analysed.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, the conceptual interlinkage of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism established in the context of the category of the subject. By indicating the key points which Althusser discussed in Freud and Lacan, the outline of the chapter was introduced by underlining the relationship between the object of psychoanalysis and its relationship with an adequate discourse. The discussion on the object of psychoanalysis, i.e., object-a, also elaborated its relationship with the key themes of psychoanalysis. These key themes included the relationship of the analyst and the analysand, the frames in that object-a clings, such as "gaze" and "voice", the definition of phantasy and its relationship with object-a, and possible representations of the psychoanalytic object.

To further explain the concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the psychoanalytic registers of the imaginary, symbolic, and real were discussed by following one of Lacan's lectures. While explaining the registers, a case study was introduced to relate how the registers acquire meaning in the psychoanalytic conception of the discourse. In conclusion, a possible point of confusion in Lacan's account concerning the presentation of psychoanalytic concepts was noted. "The experiment of the inverted bouquet" was pointed out to show the lack of rigour for understanding psychoanalytic concepts.

By giving Jameson's remarks about the importance of psychoanalysis in the context of the conceptual resemblance between the Marxist conception of history and the Lacanian register of the real, a possible dialogue between two disciplines was analysed. However, the difficulty of establishing proper demarcating lines between registers was also underlined by mentioning Jameson's remarks. The transition was made by emphasizing Jameson's criticism of Althusser to discuss psychoanalysis as a discourse.

Althusser's account of multiple discourses was explained by relating their point of intersection. In the discussion of ideological discourse, the first mention of the term interpellation was provided. By contrasting Montag and İpola's

accounts, Badiou's comment on the incommensurability of Althusser and Lacan was provided to discuss the debates about interpellation. After explaining the role of ideological state apparatuses, which enables the conception of the subject in Althusser's discussion, the account of interpellation was supplemented by Hall's analysis of the article. By analysing the remarks of Pecheux, Zizek, Dolar and Mocnik, the transition from an Althusserrian conception of the subject to a Lacanian one allows me to emphasize the role of object-a. I have underlined different functions of the Lacanian registers in the discussion of interpellation to ensure conceptual clarity concerning the early confusion of the psychoanalytic concepts. The psychoanalytic accounts were contrasted with Butler's analysis, where possible problematic points were answered by using psychoanalytic terminology. By underlining Dollar's account on the precise explanation of the voice as object-a, the different ways of conceiving the process of interpellation with the psychoanalytic object were provided. In the next chapter, I will discuss the relationship between scientific discourse and psychoanalysis, as hinted at by Butler in her claim of the symbolic status as a meta-scheme.

CHAPTER 4

BETWEEN STRUCTURAL AND HISTORICAL DIALECTIC: ELEMENTS FOR THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT

In this chapter, I will be examining the key themes of the journal *Cahiers pour L'analyse* to initiate the relationship between the scientific discourse and the place of the subject.

By comparing Badiou and Miller's approaches, which can be characterized as attempts to define the contours of the symbolic formally, I will argue that Badiou's approach is characterized by his take on dialectics. This move will be supported by referencing another article written by Miller, titled "Action of the Structure", as I will argue that Badiou's concept of the "structuralist dialectic" is significantly influenced by Miller's approach to formalizing psychoanalysis. After initially arguing how Badiou's *The Rational Kernel in the Mystical Shell* could be conceived as a preface to his subsequent work *Theory of the Subject*, I will examine how the thinker's take on dialectics gets infused with the Maoist understanding of contradiction. While analysing the conception of contradiction, I will argue that the conceptual ambiguity about theorizing the "contradiction of proper" in Althusser's case, provided in Chapter 1, is further articulated by Badiou. Then, I will indicate how Badiou differentiates between structural and historical contradictions. This differentiation will also lead us to Jameson's remarks on the relationship between the Lacanian register of the real and the Marxist conception of history provided in Chapter 2. As I will discuss, Badiou formulates a very similar relationship between real and symbolic by underlining their "asymptotic" character.

However, this conceptual articulation will bear a new conception of the subject that brings several foreign concepts. Accordingly, these new concepts, such as "offsite, splace, force", could be understood as an attempt to articulate the theory of the subject within a theoretical enterprise that remains between Lacan and

Althusser. After linking how these concepts orient Badiou to criticize Lacan's account of the subject, I will try to argue that the difference between Lacan and Badiou could be addressed as "*a* theory of the subject" and "*the* theory of the subject", respectively.

4.1. A Brief History of the Journal

The history of the journal *Cahier pour l'Analyse* was significant for the French theoretical scene. Peter Starr (1995) claims that the year 1965 marks an important point in terms of political and theoretical flourishing where Althusser's *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* and Lacan's *Ecrits* were published (p. 4). Starr argues that this theoretical moment in French history starts in 1965 and ends in 1977. According to him, the end of this theoretical moment is associated with political events such as "Mao's succession", "Khmer Rouge massacres", the rise of anti-Marxism in the intellectual circles, and the abandonment of the principle of "dictatorship of the proletariat" by the PFC (p. 4). The first issue of the journal *Cahier pour l'Analyse* was published in 1966, and the journal dissolved itself with the outbreak of the May '68 events. Dosse (1997) defines the contributors of the journal as "Althussero-Lacanian" and argues that the journal aimed to investigate "scientificity of psychoanalysis, linguistics, and logic to construct *the* science, conceived as a theory of discourse or philosophy of the concept" (p. 282). Ranciere (2001) states that the journal was concerned with the construction of the theory of the subject (p. 51).

As the editor of the journal, Jacques Alain-Miller (2013) states that the journal is invested with the construction of a theory of discourse, in his foreword to the first issue of the journal (p. 82). According to him, the meaning of discourse is synonymous with epistemology, but in a broader field which encompasses both the theory and the history of the discourse (p. 82). Miller argues that a discourse entails "a process of language that truth constraints", hence, any discourse could be reduced to a function that "places units that produce themselves and repeat themselves" (p. 82). The construction of the theory of discourse is closely related to dialectical materialism in the Althusserrian sense that it deals with the "concepts of element and combination" (p. 82).

The journal also includes a piece by Lacan**,** which I will relate to Miller's piece in order not to proliferate the discussion with psychoanalytic terminology. Lacan (2005), in his lesson "Science and Truth", argues that the "historically defined moment" in which the emergence of science could be located is Descartes' cogito (p. 727). Although for Lacan (2005) the point of cogito implies "the defile of a rejection of all knowledge", it also allows the definition of "the subject of science" (p. 727). According to Lacan (2005), the examination of the subject of science accentuates the relationship between "truth and knowledge" (p. 727).

Zizek (2013) argues that as the journal constitutes a "nodal point" of psychoanalysis and Marxism or Lacan and Althusser, the key point concerning the journal is the debate between Badiou and Jacques-Alain Miller on the notion of "suture" (p. 505). As Zizek states, the debate could be read as a variation on the "key problem of structuralism", which is formulated as "the relationship between subject (or lack) and structure" (p. 505).

4.2. The Debate Between Badiou and Miller: Suture

Miller (2013), in his attempt to export the logic of the signifier for the general usage of other discourses, states that the logic which he is going to articulate differs from "logician's logic" (p. 121). For him, logic of the signifier designates "the logic of origin of logic", which prescribes the laws for logic but remains exempt from them because of its judicial position (p. 122). Miller states that the examination, or "archaeology" in his own words, will find the point at which the "misrecognition" of the logical field becomes initiated (p. 122). Accordingly, following a general description of the structure, he argues that the lack that is accompanied by the structure is the point at which the subject can be pinpointed (p. 122). The definition of "suture" for Miller, "names the relation of the subject to the chain of discourse", where "it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of *[tenant-lieu]*" (p. 122).

The domain for the concept of suture for Miller (2013) is Frege's *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, where the suturing point is the axiomatics of Frege's theory (p. 122). Accordingly, Miller states that the question with which he will be operating in Frege's theory is "*what is it* [emphasis in original] that functions in the series of

whole numbers to which we can assign their progression" (p. 123). The answer to the question, as Miller argues, is located "in the process of the constitution of the series, in the genesis of progression, *the function of the subject* [emphasis in original], miscognized, is operative" (p. 123). As Reza Naderi (2024) notes, Miller finds in Frege's account an assumption for an object, which simultaneously constitutes a numeric unit, objectivizes the "thing" with a latent "concept of identity to a concept" (p. 26). In other words, the transition of objectivizing a "thing" is presupposed with a principle of identity. Miller's proposition for the discovery of the subject according to the mentioned account replaces the latent principle of identity to a concept with a concept with the principle of a concept "not identical with itself" (p. 126). Hence, Miller argues that the concept "which is not identical with itself" subsumes an object, a non-object, that is assigned to the number zero (p. 126). Consequently, Miller argues that "*the concept of not-identical-with-itself is assigned by number zero* [emphasis in original]" (p. 126) is that which sutures the logical discourse.

According to Miller (2013), the series of numbers can only be accounted for with this assumption of zero that does not share the same conceptual definition as the other numbers in the series. For him, this system or series of numbers is "constituted *with 0 counting as 1* [emphasis in original]" (p. 127). According to Naderi (2024), the principle of Miller's account of the logic of the signifier could be reduced to two principles: "1. It inscribes what does not exist as something that is registered within the structure 2. It allows for what does not exist to cause the structure exist to expand" (p. 28). Hence, Naderi states that what is essential to any subject in Miller's account is a "subjective core" which renders this core as a "meta-logical or even ontological apparatus" without any need for referring to any substantial entity such as "human individuals" (p. 28).

To reiterate the logic of the signifier with the terms metaphor and metonymy, as Naderi (2024) argues, the counting of a non-being (non-being according to the concept of identity to a concept) metaphorizes or sutures the external element to the structure while at the same time "ties this non-being to a chain of repetition (metonymy)" (p. 29). As Naderi indicates, Badiou's criticism of Miller stems from Miller's misunderstanding of the principles of axiomatic thinking, where the meta-schematic application of psychoanalytic thinking confuses the domains in which it can operate and falsely attributes its operation as "truth" (p. 29). According to

Naderi, Badiou's criticism starts by indicating how the logic of the signifier first assumes the definition of truth and then operates in discourses unilaterally (p. 30). In other words, as Naderi states, Badiou's conception of truth differs from Miller's in the sense that for Badiou the definition of truth is not equal to the lack of the structure. However, as Naderi indicates, Badiou also criticizes Frege's conception of logic due to its reduction of "mathematics to logic and logic to a conceptual construction of truth functions" (p. 31). Naderi argues that this reduction of mathematics to logic "is a sort of metaphysics in disguise" because the logic in question does not produce objects internal to its field but rather represents the mathematical field with external truth criteria (p. 31). In terms of criticizing the logic of the signifier, as Naderi emphasizes, Badiou's conception of logical discourse does not start with a presupposition of lack that is constitutive of the structure but rather starts with an assumption of "foreclosure" which does not lack anything other than its failures of formalization (p. 31). Hence, for Badiou (2013), the explanation of the concept "suture" implies an ideological representation because rather than following the axiomatic rules of inscription, Miller's account confuses the realm of discourse with a discipline that axiomatically declares its laws of inscription:

> To deploy the concept of suture in the very place where it is inadequate (mathematics), and to conclude that this concept enjoys a universal legitimacy over discourses by exploiting scientists' conflation of their own activity (science) with its (ideological) re-presentation, is to reflect science in ideology: it is to de-stratify it so as to prescribe to it its lack. (p. 211)

Hence, as Naderi (2024) argues, for Badiou, the overlapping discourses of science and ideology could only be productive for science if the science in question can establish a "break" from the ideology or when "science thinks about itself" (p. 44). The distinction that Badiou makes in terms of discourse and the process of inscription is to bring the debate "over logic from the level of discourse to the level of discipline" (p. 46). Then, according to Naderi, the consistent emphasis on formalization on the part of Badiou indicates that for Badiou, the scientific process is viewed "as a process of fidelity" (p. 46).

Oliver Feltham (2008) argues that Badiou's criticism of the concept of suture is a "reconstruction of Althusser's argument" where the dichotomy of science and ideology "takes place within a dialectical process which their coupling is irreducible"

(p. 18). However, what is different from the Althusserian conception is that the couple science/ideology is "inaugural" in the sense that the couple cannot be divorced from each other to form their particular instances in the social totality. For Feltham, the task of philosophy that is ascribed by Badiou is the construction of a dialectic in order to mark the "breaks" of science, which it distinguishes from ideology (p. 22).

Yet, the project of *Cahiers* was significantly influenced by Lacan because his idiosyncratic way of merging "a theory of formal structures, developed as the logical theory of signifiers, and a theory of subjective adventures" paved the ground for conceiving a unified discourse which took its central category as the subject (Naderi, 2024, p. 47). However, Naderi also notes that in order to understand "Badiou's rebuttal" of *Cahier's* project, the article "Action of the Structure" by Miller must be underlined. While discussing the conceptualization of "Structural Dialectic" by Badiou, I will be returning to Miller's article to relate how the article functions to articulate "Historical Dialectic" for Badiou. After summarizing the article, I will mention how Zizek's retrospective remarks to relate how Badiou found his dialectic by a reading of Hegel.

4.3. Action of the Structure

Miller (2013) claims that what Lacan has "put to work" in his seminars and writings is the "concept of structure" (p. 97). According to him, "working a concept" (p. 96) means the process in which the concept in question is extended, generalized with its exceptional traits, and exported beyond its origin, which ultimately means the discovery of the form of the concept.

Miller (2013) declares that the term structure, which he is going to elaborate, does not in any way imply transcendence by being latent or beyond the scientific discourse. He claims that the "action" of the structure should not be confined to a substraction which removes the "empirical" part from the "natural" part of the object (p. 97). Then, the discourse of the structure must include two key components: subjectivity and temporality (p. 97). The reason for stating these two elements, according to Miller, comes from that without these two elements the structure in question could refer to "categories" such as "social life", "culture", "anthropology",

"biology", and "mind". In other words, these two elements pertain to all categories; if the discourse of the structure is built upon "categories", the function of temporality and subjectivity becomes displaced in the contents of the categories.

According to Miller (2013), this discourse of the structure is composed of two functions: "structuration, or the *action* of the structure, and subjectivity, *subjected* [emphasis in original]" (p. 98). He argues that the first function, structuration, is divided into two planes where the first plane is the actuality or the "structuring structure" whereas the second plane is the virtuality or the "structured structure" (p. 98). As Miller states, the relationship between these two plains implies that the first plane is the "immanent cause" of the second or the first plane is the *explanan* of the second plane. Miller argues that in this "simple" relationship between two structures, there occurs no delay or "structural time" (p. 98).

In this simple relationship of two structures, Miller (2013) argues that a distortion can only occur if an "element" or a "signifier" could give an account of the latent virtuality. In other words, a distortion could only occur if there exists a self-reflexive signifier. As soon as the mentioned signifier emerges, a) that which is actual, i.e., the structuring operation, can be represented, b) since the actuality is represented, the actuality is substituted by a lack (p. 98). According to Miller, the emergence of this signifier changes the number of the previous elements and their quality: the structuring structure "by nothing being there" because of being represented becomes the real, the relations between the elements become symbolic, and the *subject* of the structure, i.e., the reflexive signifier becomes imaginary. He argues that the quality of the subject becomes imaginary because prior to its introduction, the value in which the elements were related to each other were in a homeostatic balance (p. 99). This second instance of the structure, as Miller (2013) states, changes the function of the structure because the emergence of the imaginary forces the structure to "*exist only in order to hide the reason for their existence* [emphasis in original]" (p. 99).

The absent cause (which is the result of the representation of the signifier), according to Miller (2013), becomes "overdetermined" in its effects because it comes to be mediated by the "unequal" relationship of the imaginary (p. 99). This mediation of the imaginary at the same time gives a false "consistency" to the structure. Miller claims that the double function of the signifier is the point of "suturation" which

simultaneously fills the lack and inserts itself as the “irrational” part of the “rational” reality. According to Miller him, if one wants to translate this structure formed by three units as a topographical model, the adequate description of it would be a representation whose “peripheral exterior is its central exterior” where its “outside passes into the inside” (p. 100).

Miller (2013), after defining the basic outline of the structure, argues that the theory of the subject must be outlined from the premises of the theory of the structure to return to the basic immediacy. The basic immediacy here refers to the assumption that provided the means for constructing the theory of the structure, i.e., the virtual and actual planes of the structure. However, as Miller claims, the point of subjectivity can only be defined from the position of being subjected (p. 101). That is, it is only from the localized point of the signifier that causes the imaginary distortions that a theory of subject can be defined. For Miller (2013), in the light of the above-mentioned explanations, the sole characteristic of the subject can only be “miscognition” (p. 102). According to Miller (2013), the domain of intersubjectivity is also saturated by an imaginary formation “that sutures” it since the participants of it are constituted by a lack.

Within this newly defined “human condition”, Miller (2013) questions the possibility of a construction of a discourse that would give “an adequate object” which would develop in its own form (p. 104). According to Miller (2013), the discourse of science is constructed based on a “doctrine of science” which it derives from its premises (p. 104). Miller (2013) argues that the relationship of the doctrine of science and the discourse of science can be homologously understood as the relationship between “the field of statement” and “the field of speech”, i.e., between logic and psychoanalysis, respectively (p. 104).

According to Miller (2013), the space in which the discourse of science must articulate itself is located between a logically constructed formalized system which “do no doubt themselves with any virtual dimension” (p. 105) and a linguistic field in which the transmission of the statements refer to a “virtuality” in which a codification of the statements occurs. Therefore, as Miller states, in the scientific discourse, there occurs a substitution between the subject of the structure and the code that constitutes the scientific discourse. For Miller, this substitution implies that the subject can only occupy a place as a “subject-agent” where everything he/she

utters relates to the code that the subject "guarantees its intellection and its truth" (p. 105). Hence, Miller (2013) states that the lack of a "code", i.e., a master signifier that stands as the "true" referent, at the level of speech and the lack of "subject-agent" at the place of the code "upon up the splitting of the unconscious within the interior of language" (p. 105).

Miller (2013) ascribes the position of psychoanalysis to the articulation of this splitting. The domain in which this articulation occurs, as he states, is the "scene" in which "the human animal" becomes interlinked with language (p. 105). The interlinkage, for Miller, signifies the "primordial and generative" (p. 105) place of language where the subject's speech becomes dependent on it. He questions the possibility of constructing "other" scenes, scenes which are other than psychoanalysis's Other scene (p. 105). Miller's example for a possible other scene is "class struggle" where its combinatory "deals with" class interests; in the case of science, which Miller aims at constructing, the speech is motivated by a construction of a discourse while at the same time being constrained by it. He ascribes the operation of "any scientific" discourse to specifications of "lacks [*manques*]" (p. 106).

According to Miller (2013), the meaning of "structuralism" designates a theoretical point that must be superseded because structuralism only "searches" the "placeholding [*tenant-lieu*]" lack that provides the "support" of the structuring function (p. 106). As an alternative to structuralism for a reading strategy which he calls "analysis", Miller states that the lack which is located by structuralism must be addressed at the level of "enunciation" rather than remaining at the level of statement.

Miller (2013) argues that the specification of speech is central because it should not be understood within the structuralist paradigm, which would contrast speech with silent speech. Rather, the location of the speech is exterior to where it is enunciated, "the exteriority of the speech" (p. 106) persists while the distance between the point of speech and the point of discourse is interior. The title of his article *Action of the Structure* gains importance in this sense, as he argues that the principle of the title is constituted by a "circling of a lack" that, while making that action, *marks* the action as "*the suture*" (p. 106).

To recapitulate, according to Miller (2013), in the *analysis*, initially, the placeholder is found where contradiction is located. Then, this contradiction is addressed at the level of enunciation of the subject, which reveals the subject's relation to the Other discourse in the first person. In other words, the absent cause, which is an effect for the subject that resides in the discourse, becomes inverted so that the effect can be taken up as a cause for the subject in question.

Miller's (2013) analysis leads him to ask the possibility of a discourse that "only takes orders from itself", which would render the discourse as "flat" and "without unconscious" (p. 107). According to him, the project of establishing a scientific discourse must be based upon the negation of the lack that constitutes the discourse, in other words, the "scientific discourse is not stricken with a simple lack-*rather the lack of a lack is also a lack* [emphasis in original]" (p. 107). To translate the statement "lack of a lack" in psychoanalytic concepts, Miller states that "every science is structured like a psychosis" (p. 108), which means that there is no remainder in the scientific operation apart from the terms that it uses. Hence, the closure of the science by negating the lack implies that in the scientific discourses there are no internal limits, whereas if looked from the exterior, it is a "foreclosed" space (p. 108).

Zizek (2013) reads the debate between Miller and Badiou by summarizing another article of Jean-Claude Milner in the journal, which sought to utilize the "logic of the signifier" in Plato's *Sophist.* Accordingly, Zizek argues that Gorgias caused the destruction of the closed and mythical Greek universe by emphasizing the "self-referential abyss of language" that lacks any external verification and blurs the objective criterion for "truth" (p. 507). Zizek remarks that after Gorgias' challenge, Plato had to revise his philosophical enterprise, which previously placed itself in the realm of eternal ideality (p. 507). Then, Plato in *Parmenides* adopts a self-critical attitude towards his previous theory of ideas, which brings him very close to a sophistic position. Zizek explains Plato's new theoretical position as follows:

> here all variations of the relation between the signifier (One) and the real (Being), even if they are contradictory (self-contradictory and contradictory with regard to each other) are in some sense true. That is to say, each of the hypotheses of the second part of Parmenides can be read as an invitation to describe a specific ontological sphere within a 'crazy' pluralist ontology, such that the conclusion of these 'sophistic' logical exercises covering the matrix

> of all logically possible relations between Being and the One is a Gorgias-like one: nothing exists. In all his later dialogues, Plato endeavours to control this self-inflicted damage, desperately trying to draw a clear line of separation between self-referring sophistic language games on the one hand, and a true speech referring to substantial truths external to it, on the other. (p. 507)

Zizek asserts that Plato, in order to find a middle way between Parmenides' position of the "unconditional One" and Gorgias' play with non-being, turns to counter Parmenides' arguments. Accordingly, Zizek argues that Plato changes the definition of non-being by locating its domain within the being. That is, non-being's definition changes from "absolute negation of being" to a "relational negation of a predicate" (p. 508). Zizek claims that Plato's displacement of absolute nothing to a relative one implies that Plato lacks "the full deployment of self-referentiality" (p. 508). In other words, Plato lacks the "structuralist concept of *differentiality* [emphasis in original]" (p. 508) where the positive value of a signifier is determined by the series of what it is not. Zizek argues that the paradox of the countability of an absence in the determination of a value of a signifier implies that there has to be one signifier without a determinate meaning. According to Zizek, the reason for such a signifier, a signifier without a signified, is to supplement, i.e., *to suture* the other signifiers to constitute a signifying chain.

Zizek (2013) asserts that Miller's article *Suture* "elevates" a causal word in Lacan's teaching and demonstrates that this empty signifier without any reference to imaginary (p. 511). After discussing the importance of the concept "suture" in film theory, Zizek argues that the concept's usage favoured on Miller's side, whereas Badiou's reply "was largely ignored, or, rather, drowned in Althusserrian orthodoxy" (p. 513). Zizek claims that Badiou's position in his later works came closer to Miller's, but there is still a gap that separates them. According to Zizek, the contemporary use of the debate could benefit by taking from both sides. Zizek claims that "against Badiou" one must stress anxiety as the human condition which provides the ground for further subjectivations; "against Miller" who accepts the unavoidable pitfalls of anxiety, the persistence of anxiety in the human condition should not force us to a position of "cynical pessimism" or "tragic grandeur" (p. 527) in political issues. That is, Miller's insistence on politics as a domain of "imaginary and symbolic identifications" and hence "the domain of illusions" (p. 527) imply that change in a political sense is not conceivable. While concluding, Zizek argues that

Badiou's position is crucial because it does not prefer anxiety of enthusiasm in the sense that it does not conceive the former as more "authentic".

Although Zizek's account implies the meta-schematic applicability of the concept of suture in his summary of a journal article by evoking Plato, his account of Badiou is highly reductive in the sense that the particularity of Badiou's theoretical position is conceived in opposition to a subjective affect (anxiety). However, what remains important for Badiou is not the affective part of the subjectivity but its resistance to be subjectivized by remaining faithful to the "machinic" inscription. According to Naderi (2024), Badiou's deepened commitment to formalism and the "question of the immediacy of praxis and the role of the subject" (p. 48) constitutes his shift to Maoism. Naderi questions the "sudden change" of theoretical domain in Badiou's thinking, which shifted from "extreme point of strict formalism" (p. 55) in logic and mathematics to political thought. As Naderi indicates, the Althusserrian conception of politics was not preferable by Badiou because in Althusser's account all questions pertaining to "political interventions" were related to "ideological inquiry" (p. 55). Hence, the impossibility of conceiving "politics as an independent domain for either practice or thought" (p. 56) in the Althusserrian theory was both a theoretical and political problem for Badiou. As I have already indicated at the end of the first chapter, Badiou criticized Althusser for suturing philosophy to politics.

According to Feltham (2008), the sequence that composes "the Maoist turn" of Badiou should first emphasize how ideology is conceptualized against the Althusserian conception. Feltham argues that Badiou's criticism of Althusser is related to Althusser's conception of "ideology in general", where the latter's analysis lacks giving an account for "proletarian ideology" (p. 33). As Feltham indicates, the reason for underlining the importance of proletarian ideology for Badiou is that without it "one cannot explain the occurrence of revolt" (p. 33). The plurality of ideology, as Feltham states, is explained by the spontaneous knowledge of "both sides of the class struggle of its stakes" (p. 34). In the context of spontaneity of knowledge on both sides, Feltham underlines the emergence of the concept "force" in Badiou's theoretical terminology, where the term indicates a materialist thesis. The materialism in question is addressed as: "thought is driven by external material forces, and in a strike it is those forces physical, financial that are brought to bear through discourse" (p. 34). Feltham argues that "these forces" in an ideological

conflict, say, in a conflict of working conditions, may develop into a resistance or revolt. It is with the potentiality for resistance and revolt that the spontaneity of the working class becomes a problem for strategies of organization. According to Feltham, the "remedy" for the organization problem ascribed by Badiou is designated as a "dose of *consistency* [emphasis in original]", which refers to "the Marxist dialectic of history and the party" (p. 34).

Feltham (2008) argues that Badiou ascribes two "universal agents" for the process of political transformation; "revolutionary masses" and "the proletarian class" constitute the gap in which Badiou's Maoism is articulated (p. 35). The first of the universal agents, revolutionary masses, which in Badiou's language compose the "communist invariants", are insufficient unless they are "directed" by the Marxist-Leninist theory (Feltham, 2008, p. 35). For Badiou, what organizes and concentrates the "isolated revolts" of the revolutionary masses has to be represented in the dialectical process where the "truth" emerges in revolt, but at the same time, this truth is also a truth for the dialectical process (Feltham, 2008, p. 35). According to Feltham, the theme that composes a large part of the *Theorie de la contradiction* is related to the organization problem where the revolt of the exploited has to be represented in the dialectic. As Feltham indicates, this representation becomes "the thought of thought" (p. 36). The space for the subject in Badiou's question of political organization comes to be designated as the party (Feltham, 2008, p. 36). The practice of the party is composed of "division" where the "subject-party" systematizes "the masses' ideas by dividing them according to a class analysis; certain ideas are revisionary and ultimately serve bourgeois interests, other ideas are revolutionary" (p. 36). The practice of division, according to Feltham, is composed of five stages:

This process consists of five stages: first, various ideas emerge in a dispersed manner during a mass revolt, which Badiou terms an 'ideal force'. Second, this force splits due to class struggle within the revolt, during which the ideas are partially systematized into old and new ideas. Third, a party practising a Marxist Leninist class analysis systematically places these divided ideas. Fourth, the party translates these ideas into directives for action. Finally, the realization of these directives both produces new dispersed ideas and evaluations of their correctness, and so the cycle

begins again as an ideal force. Far from being impractical and esoteric, Marxist theory resembles common sense: if one idea does not work, try another. (p. 37)

According to Feltham (2008), the five stages above imply a continuity with Althusser's construction of dialectical materialism, where the real object is correlated with the proletariat as a logical force, and the object in thought is associated with the proletarian organization as the body of this new logic (p. 37).

According to Jason Barker (2002), Badiou's conceptualization of the subject-party diverges from the Althusserian conception of "process without a subject" in terms of "suppression" of ideological forms of subjectivity, where in the process of suppression, the act of the party employs "division" (p. 22). That is, the potentiality of the subject achieves actuality by engaging in militant practices that divide the contradiction in question into further contradictions. The constant division of contradiction, according to Barker, destroys the form of the social reality as a "whole" and articulates "disequilibrium" (p. 23). Articulation of disequilibrium, as Barker argues, reveals that the parties which are antagonistic to each other have "nothing in common", where this nothingness implies that the antagonistic classes share a unity not in the sense of an identity but as a relation (p. 23). Yet, as Barker notes, the contradiction in question always includes a primary contradiction in which the secondary contradictions "refine the precise nature of the principal contradiction" (p. 23). He claims that placing a principal contradiction behind every secondary contradiction implies that the determining function of the principle contradiction could be understood as a "permutation" (p. 23). Accordingly, Barker, by citing Badiou, formulates the resemblance of Maoist understanding of contradiction to the structuralist one: "But how does such practice actually manage to exit the vicious circle movement as a *virtual* [emphasis in original] process, where 'every struggle is reciprocal benefit, every victory is defeat'" (p. 24). The provisional answer given to this conceptual resemblance is the division between "antagonistic and non-antagonistic tendencies" (p. 24). However, Barker emphasizes that without a "clear understanding of a historical process", the relation between "a dominant and dominated term" (e.g., bourgeoisie/proletariat) will remain in a static state (p. 24). That is, in the example of "free exchange" of labour, the dominant and the dominated are "arbitrary" markers of the "indifference of one class's relation to the other" (Barker, 2002, p. 25). In order for a change to occur between the terms, Barker

argues that there has to be “an event like May ‘68” where the one term of the contradiction “makes a bid to seize hold of the dominant place occupied by the bourgeoisie” (p. 25). Barker argues that at these points of “ascendancy” where one class loses and the other class actualizes the “real movement of history”, the antagonistic aspect of the contradiction finally becomes revealed (p. 25). However, what remains to be theorized is the historical contradiction, which at this theoretical juncture in Badiou’s thinking is only indicated with a mark.

Naderi (2024) suggests that the continuity of Badiou’s theoretical position in *Cahiers* could be understood by the influence of Sylvian Lazarus (p. 56). Accordingly, Naderi argues that Lazarus’s conception of politics as an independent “discipline” has close conceptual affinity with Badiou’s conception of science as an independent discipline. However, what Naderi wants to underline in Badiou’s conceptual development of immanent politics is the emphasis of Hegel and Lacan in *Theory of the Subject*. According to Naderi, deriving from the importance of immanent disciplines in Badiou’s thinking, one can derive a theoretical outline:

> Definition: Discipline (as defined in “Mark and Lack”)
> Axiom 1: Something like discipline could exist.
> Theorem 1: Science is a discipline (proved in “Mark and Lack”)
> Theorem 2: Politics is a discipline (proved by Lazarus)
> Theorem 3: Any immanent system develops through the division of the one system into two (proved by “Mark and Lack” as well as Lazarus)
> Syllogism:
> Major Premise: Hegel is divisible into two
> Minor Premise: Lacan is our Hegel
> Conclusion: Lacan is divisible into two (p. 57-58)

I will provide a similar explanation based on this outline.

Before engaging what would politics entail as an immanent discipline, it would be adequate to show how the major premise of the above mentioned outline is deduced by Badiou. In order to show that I will be analysing how Badiou derives “scission” from his reading of Hegel in the context of dialectics.

4.4. Rational Kernel in the Mystical Shell

Badiou’s (2011) introduction to his reading of Hegel starts by analyzing the reception of the latter in France. The reception is argued to be represented by two

approaches, where the early and first reception corresponds to “a tragic idealism against a scientific idealism”, with its central concept being “alienation” (Badiou, 2011, p. 12). Whereas the second reception, associated particularly with Althusser, is defined by its break from Hegel in its reading of Marx, which valorizes knowledge and takes structuralism as its conceptual grid (Badiou, 2011, p. 12). Badiou argues that both approaches imply a break with Hegel; the first reception is accused of reducing Marx to Hegel, whereas the second, the Althusserian one, is criticized for not taking *The Science of Logic* into account (p. 13). Accordingly, his reading is built on the premise that “Marx is neither the same nor the other of Hegel” but rather is “the divider” of Hegel (p. 15). Hence, what he claims is that there is an “irreversible validity” or a rational part and an “integral falsity” in the Hegelian dialectic (p. 15).

What Badiou (2011) problematizes in Hegel’s account of dialectics is that the dialectic process is not operated from the perspective of contradiction but rather from the point of commencement (p. 51). Accordingly, he states that Hegel starts with an identity which is posed “under the form of two marks”, i.e., being and nothing (p. 51). Badiou states that they share an identity because in their posing, their difference from each other remains “absolutely undifferentiated” (p. 51). That is, for Hegel, their difference consists only of being placed under two different places. For Badiou, understanding difference only in relation to spatial difference entails that Hegel is conceiving a “weakest sort of difference” (p. 51). According to Badiou, the minimal difference can be pointed out when the terms (being and nothing) fuse into each other (p. 51). That is, he argues that although the change from being to nothing indicates a movement, it is not a transformation in the proper sense but “the movement of the same, of the one” (p. 51). Badiou recapitulates the account of Hegel by invoking two terms: “the mark and its ground” (p. 52). Accordingly, the process is initially constituted by a marking in a space of inscription; then, the ground on which the mark appears is also retroactively marked (p. 52). Hence, the difference in this account for Badiou is composed of a difference between the mark and its ground (p. 52). What gets *unmarked* [emphasis mine], then, is the operation of “inscription” (p. 52). Hence, as Badiou states, after the positing of the first term (being), the ground on which the term is posited becomes constituted as a second mark (nothing) (p. 52). The mark of difference which could be posited after the emergence of these two terms (being and nothing), for Hegel, is becoming. According to Badiou, what

becoming functions for Hegel is the ability to posit “infinite iteration” or a repetition (p. 52).

According to Naderi (2024), the validity of posing the term “becoming” can only occur if “being” and “nothing” fuse into each other by remaining qualitatively the same. As Naderi states, a double relationship exists between being and nothing; on the one hand, positing one of the terms is equal to the positing of the other, on the other hand, the positing causes the former to disappear and the latter to appear (p. 67). Hence, Naderi argues that becoming functions as a “category that watches over this double relation” (p. 67). As a result, he claims that because the difference between “pure being” and “pure nothing” cannot be posited, the operation of becoming comes to be equated with the “category of One” (p. 67). That is, Naderi claims that if being and nothing truly stand in opposition to each other, their difference cannot be accounted for in the process of becoming (p. 67). As a result, the difference between the terms must be “assumed” at the start so that, despite their change from one to another, their difference could be addressed (just the sheer fact of their naming as being and nothing) (Naderi, 2024, p. 68). As Naderi suggests, the coupling of the terms under the category of the becoming implies the dominance of the “one”, whereas the simultaneous existence of the terms shows the existence of the “two” (p. 68). However, the question concerning the insertion of two heterogeneous terms (being and nothing) into the law of “repetition” still remains. At this point, Badiou (2011) argues that Hegel “forces” the two terms under the law of “one” (p. 54). That is, the first appearance of becoming occurs in the “moments” of “coming-to-be” and “ceasing-to-be”; then, this process of fusion “settles” into a stable unity where being and nothingness in this fusion appear only as vanishing moments (Badiou, 2011, p. 55). However, because the appearance of becoming can only occur at a particular level (namely, the first step), when becoming acquires a general character, it becomes contradictory due to its dependence on a prior opposition (Badiou, 2011, p. 55). According to Naderi (2024), this process indicates that there are “two” dialectics are at work in Hegel’s thought; as the “main motor of progression” there exists the dialectic of “two” (the opposition of the terms being and nothing) and as “what maintains the impression of the overall system of thought” the dialectic of the “one”. For Naderi, what interests Badiou in Hegel is the constant appearance of the contradiction in every development of a category that resembles “a

return of the repressed" (p. 71). In other words, for Badiou, Hegel is "an unconscious materialist as his thought embodies the contradiction between contradiction and the perpetual defense against it" (Ruda, as cited in Naderi, 2024, p. 71).

The question that remains to be answered in this context is how Badiou can start conceptualizing contradiction without falling under the domination of the "one". To understand this question, the initiative step that Hegel takes to construct his dialectic needs to be understood. That is, as Naderi (2024) indicates, Hegel begins his construction of the dialectic by positing "One (Being)" [emphasis in original] that sutures the beginning to the category of One (p. 71). According to Naderi, Badiou opts for choosing "something" rather than "being" (p. 71). As Naderi indicates, this choice is related to "preservation of the dialectic of interiority", where the immanent contradiction between the terms is preserved while at the same time a de-coupling from the "one" of being is made (in the sense that choosing an indeterminate, i.e., something rather than an immediate, i.e., being) (p. 71). However, according to Naderi, there is still a lack of conceptualization pertaining to the "beginning" for Badiou, despite its "correct" aversion to "metaphysical" theories about the beginning in question (p. 71). However, I think what must be emphasized in Badiou's reading of Hegel is its relationship with subjectivity and, consequently, politics. That is, while discussing Marx's relation with Hegel, Badiou (2011) claims that there could be two readings concerning the Hegelian history of philosophy (p. 68). As Badiou indicates, the first reading approaches philosophy from a materialist standpoint and claims that it has "as foundation an enormous historical sentiment" (p. 68). In other words, Hegel's history of philosophy is understood as an understanding that mirrors the whole history (Badiou, 2011, p. 68). The second one, on the contrary, judges the history of philosophy as a distortion that conceives the world as a progressive history of the idea (Badiou, 2011, p. 68). Accordingly, Badiou provides Marx's analysis which falls under the category of the second reading: First, one must decouple ruling ideas from the empirical rulers, conditions and individuals to discover "the rule of ideas or illusions in history"; second, one must gather the ideas in order and present them as "acts of self-determination on the part of the concept"; and lastly, one must return this activity of self-determination of the concept to the concrete figures who represent the concept in question in person (Marx cited in Badiou, 2011, p. 69).

Both readings of the history of philosophy can be understood in relation to the "matter" by emphasizing the role of the Spirit in terms of being either an object or a subject. That is, in the first reading, the Spirit could be understood as an effect of its surrounding materiality, whereas in the second reading, the Spirit could be conceived as a cause for the materiality. In light of these explanations, it would be adequate to mention how Badiou conceives the Hegelian topology, i.e., the interior and the exterior. That is, the subject that can embody both the cause and the effect, i.e., the Spirit, could also be represented in terms of topological concepts such as exteriority and interiority. According to Badiou (2011), Hegel introduces a rupture to the "immediate spatial schemas" that are found "on the opposition of inside and outside (the hidden inside being the truth of the merely apparent outside) (p. 58). For Badiou, this rupture indicates the understanding of being as "contradictory self-development" that results in the conception of "the exterior" being thought as the same "as the interior" (p. 58). As Badiou indicates, this relation of interiority and exteriority could be conceived in a structural manner where their difference could be located "at each point" (p. 58). In other words, Badiou argues that there is a local "subject" in the point of the separation between the exterior and the interior, however, this location presupposes "an unconditional global unity of law" (p. 58). According to Badiou, "the evidence of the law" can only be understood from its "punctual effect", i.e., from its separation (p. 58). At this point, Badiou mentions Lacan by comparing him to Hegel's topology while emphasizing that for Lacan the beginning implies a "cut" rather than an immediate category as being (p. 59). However, as demonstrated in Miller's account of the relationship of the subject and structure, the inversion that proceeds from the effect of the structure to the assumption of the cause by the subject is explained by a procedure with an if clause. That is, the structure in question is a static structure, or in Badiou's (2011) words, "Lacan's subject-cut, for which lack is a fixed clause" (p. 59). What Badiou proposes for his conception of the subject is the "subject-scission of dialectical materialism" for which "the disorganization of force and place is a mobile cause" (p. 59). That is, for Badiou, the relationship between the subject and structure (explained in Miller's account of the "Action of the Structure") does not include exteriority as history and hence comes to be designated as "a" theory of the subject.

In light of these explanations, the first part of the *Theory of the Subject* is composed of locating the place of the subjective by reworking the process dialectic. Accordingly, by positing something rather than immediate being, what is trying to be articulated for Badiou is the operation (One) that posits this something in question. In the next chapter, I will analyze how the dialectic gets infused with the political terminology, i.e., Maoism.

4.5. Theory of the Subject

4.5.1. The Place of the Subjective

In the introduction of the chapter "The Place of the Subjective", Badiou (2009) claims that the notion of the "something" indicates the first instance of "being-there" in Hegel's *Logic* (p. 4). Accordingly, he claims that for "orthodox Marxists", the numerous modalities of "something" are exemplified in the process of change from quantitative to qualitative (p. 4). As Badiou indicates, the "dawn" of the qualitative can only appear when this something is placed as "this" or "that" (p. 6). That is, the difference of one term from another, at this point, can only be acquired "by the literal placement" (p. 6). Therefore, Badiou argues that the "something" in question can be split as "something-in-itself" and the "something-for-the-other" or something in its pure and placed identity (p. 6). Hence, the term "something", in its single state, becomes the unity of the determinations, i.e., the movement of their duality (p. 6). To translate it in more rigid terms, Badiou proposes to name the pure component as A, whereas the placed component as Ap (while what does the operation of placement, the space of placement is named as "P") (p. 6). According to this explanation, Badiou formulates the "constitutive scission" of "A" as: A(AAp) (p. 6). However, what he underlines is that the contrary of the pure identity is not its placed identity but the space of placement, i.e., the "P" (p. 7). In other words, Badiou claims that the scission pertaining to "A" is a result of being placed rather than the location of its contradiction. For him, the true contradiction must be located in the relation of "A" in its pure identity and the locus of space, "P" (p. 7). To concretize this point, Badiou takes the proletariat as his example; he claims that the contrary of

the proletariat is not the bourgeois but the bourgeois world or the imperialist society in which the proletariat is a part of (p. 7). However, he claims that having a part in the world also amounts to having a double determination where the first part is defined as "principal productive force", whereas the second part is defined as "the antagonistic political pole" (p. 7). Badiou claims that the reason for positing the proletariat contrary to the world rather than to the bourgeoisie is because he ascribes the "project of the proletariat" as communism (p. 7). That is, for Badiou, the project of the proletariat entails the "abolition of any place" where something resembling a proletariat can be installed (p. 7). Hence, socialism for him becomes another name to indicate the space of placement (P' in this case) which should not be confused with communism (p. 8).

The question then becomes in which possible way the project of communism is to be realized. Accordingly, Badiou formulates how the working class in its split nature is to be conceived according to the dialectic: On the one hand, it could achieve its "true political identity" in the midst of mass movement, on the other hand, it can be corrupted by the world in which it belongs by ideas and practices (p. 8). In other words, the space in which the working class is inscribed is composed of two possibilities: the working class may acquire a political unity, or it can remain within the confines of the space which he accuses of revisionism (p. 9). Hence, if the working class purifies itself from the contamination caused by being placed, it achieves proper determination and exceeds the place. However, if the working class designates the bourgeoisie as its antagonistic counterpart, then the state apparatuses, such as "PCF, the unions", prevail and determination will fall under a relapse (Badiou, 2009, p. 10). Badiou illustrates these possibilities as follows:




Figure 3: The figure concerning determination proper and relapse

However, as Badiou (2009) notes, the determination proper must also be rethought in the context of "determination of the determination" or as A(Ap(A)) (p.

11). In other words, to preserve the heterogeneity of the working class and to resist against the law of the place, what must be reminded is the "outplace" character of the working class. Badiou argues that if determination of determination is not comprehended, the terms such as "totalitarianism" may prevail where the term only designates left-wing and right-wing (Ap(Ap) and A(A) respectively) deviations of a proper political strategy (p. 12). In other words, he argues that because totalitarianism does not account for the "outplace" character of the working class, it reduces contradiction into a mere "structural figuration" without recognizing the historical contradiction that is forced in the structural one (p. 12). What composes this structural figuration is the contradiction between working class and the world (A/P); however, because Badiou starts with "something", the working class is the term which "insists" [emphasis in original] as an indexed term in the space (Ap) (p. 14). Yet, because the structural figuration is a reality, Badiou argues that the proletarian politics must also take the structured "masses" into account, which would concentrate its political force (p. 14).

At this point, Badiou (2009) reflects on the philosophical terminology he uses and asks whether it is necessary or justified to employ political terminology such as "the proletariat, imperialist society, revisionism" (p. 15). He objects by stating two reasons; first, he claims that being a Marxist entails the assumption that "contents drain the forms", which ultimately means that dialectical formulations must be based on "an explicit political practice" (p. 15). Second, he reminds that Hegel also builds his dialectics within a content, i.e., the Christian theology. The tension that he wants to create between the content of his model of dialectics based on politics and the theological model of Hegel is to show how the history achieves a closure in the latter's conception. Accordingly, Badiou argues that the Christian contradiction should be understood as composed of the space of the finite (P) and God as infinite or "outplace" (A) (p. 15). Badiou reproduces his schema of dialectics in the context of Christianity by claiming the posited term (Ap) is Christ, who creates a scission in God (p. 15). What interests Badiou in the theological model is the reconciliation of the finite and the infinite, where at the point of determining determination, it achieves circularity (p. 18). That is, Badiou argues that the Hegelian model conceives of "action" as being completed only if it fulfills the destiny of God, where its final destination is prescribed by the "world-concept" (p. 19). Badiou contrasts this

teleological model by emphasizing the ambiguous appearance of the outplace, which needs to be supplemented by an actual political practice (p. 19). In other words, he claims that the action of the posited term (working class or the proletarian party) is "rare" and is dependent on the contingent appearance of the outplace (p. 19)[17]. Badiou exemplifies this rare action by mentioning how the Bolshevik party read the previous history of failed revolutionary movements and assessed them for their strategy. Accordingly, what was failed in the Paris Commune can only be "periodized" in the history of the world by the action of the Bolshevik party. Hence, he argues that the outplace that constitutes the Bolshevik context is the accumulated political "failures" of the previous historical period, which can only be determined by creating an internal scission within the party, the liquidation of the Mensheviks (p. 20). The importance of the determination of the determination comes right after the revolution, when the Stalinist party fuses Marxist theory with the "real workers' movement" (p. 20). Badiou juxtaposes the Stalinist understanding with the reality of the Cultural Revolutions to emphasize the determination of determination and to accuse Stalinism as the "new bureaucratic state bourgeoisie" (p. 20). In other words, the sequence in which Badiou aspires to periodize the history designates the Soviet reality as a new space that achieves closure (or P') (p. 20). The conclusion he reaches underlines the importance of outplace and force in the conceptualization of history and the necessity of starting from "something" stemming from historical political accumulation.

According to these explanations, the question then becomes in which manner a political entity should determine the determination without achieving a closure. Accordingly, Badiou (2009) re-interprets the Lacanian real as formulated as "the impasse of formalization" in a subjective manner and claims that "formalization is the im-passe of the real" (p. 23). That is, he argues that the Lacanian formula of the real falls under the category of the "structural dialectic" and falsely encircles the potentiality of the real. He claims that the structural dialectic, in its encounter with the real, warns against the "trespassing" in the real and "orders a return" (p. 23). To exceed the structure or the space, Badiou argues that there needs to be a "theory of the pass of the real" in which the real in question is not merely designated as a point

[17] Here, Badiou associates this appearing with the Lacanian real.

that is lacking in the structure but what could "*passes through by force* [emphasis in original]" (p. 23).

To theorize or politicize the Lacanian real, Badiou (2009) divides the contradiction in the two where the structural contradiction corresponds to the weak difference, whereas the historical contradiction corresponds to the strong and qualitative difference (p. 25). The illustration for the respective contradictions is the following:

COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPT	DIVISION OF THE CONCEPT	
	structural contradiction	*historical contradiction*
difference	weak (difference of place)	strong (qualitative heterogeneity)
correlation	weak (scission)	strong (struggle)
position	invariant asymmetry	reversible asymmetry

Figure 4: Division of the concept of contradiction

On the one hand, Badiou (2009) argues that the "simple class contradiction" is a permanent effect of the structure and should be located in the domain of economy; on the other hand, he claims that the class struggle cannot be deduced by the economic relations alone and must be thought political in its essence (p. 24). Accordingly, he re-interprets these contradictions by contrasting them to "orthodox" Marxist interpretations. The structural contradiction refers to the "fundamental" contradiction constituted by the productive forces and the social relations of production, whereas the historical contradiction refers to the principal contradiction constituted by antagonistic social classes (Badiou, 2011, p. 26). What is important for him is the political activity of the working class, in which it finds itself divided into two (p. 26). Hence, the activity ascribed to the working class is the "forming of a knot" that binds the structural and historical contradictions in a political unity (Badiou, 2009, p. 26). The question at this juncture becomes how this achieved political unity is going to relate to the imperialist society or the world in which it is posited in terms of strong and qualitative heterogeneity.

To further articulate the last remark, Badiou (2009) returns to his application of the category of "something" for explaining a qualitative and strong contradiction

that can be thought (p. 29). Accordingly, he repeats the claim that the place which assigns the proletariat into the world at the same time excludes one part of it (p. 29). The excluded part cannot be represented in terms of placement since the pure identity of the term (A) is heterogeneous to the operator that does the placing. Hence, Badiou argues that this heterogeneity must be understood as a "*relation of forces* [emphasis in original] which divides the quality of the relation into two (p. 31). He exemplifies the heterogeneity of forces by criticizing the "antirepressive conception of the politics of the people" (p. 31). Accordingly, Badiou states that the "antirepressive" conception of politics conceives the mobilization of people as an effect of their mistreatment (p. 31). However, the urgent political object for Badiou is to achieve "active autonomy", "real independence", and "affirmative political virtuality" (p. 32). That is, he argues that the urgent political task is the definition of the way in which the capacity to "*repress the repression* [emphasis in original]" could be achieved (p. 32). According to Badiou, this capacity is already independent:

> We must come to understand that what raises me up reactively against the active of the Other must also be the active of a force in which the Other is no longer represented. Even if it is required by the adverse power in its repressive excess, the force that rises up in revolt against this repression is itself interior excess over this requistitioning. (p. 32)

Then the question becomes how to articulate this political force, which is related to another force in a non-relation. Accordingly, Badiou (2009) argues that the people (and the party) posit an enemy which should be understood as an internal figure of their own politics (p. 32). Here, we can translate this process with a Lacanian formula and claim that the enemy in question is the "adversary supposed to exist". Similar to the psychoanalytic subject's relation with its innermost being, object-a, the analyst occupies the role of "the subject supposed to know". The analytical situation provokes an artificial "love" situation where the analyst and the analysand are engaged in a non-relation. However, what must be noted in Badiou's account is that the "people" are not the political subject, and the adversary is not the Other. In the context of the working class forming a knot between two contradictions, Badiou uses a quote by Lenin: "Politics is the concentration of the economy" (Lenin, as cited in Badiou, 2009, p. 28). Then, he immediately refers to the libidinal economy and argues that it is the "economy of the drives" (p. 28). Perhaps it can be

argued that the role of the masses or the people is akin to a political drive. Badiou establishes a similar relation when he states that the purification of the working class of its bourgeois elements could be understood similarly to an individual's combat with its his/her own accumulated inert habits (p. 35). However, he also notes that this similarity does not entail the representation of the exteriorization of the internal force as a "Möbius strip" (p. 36). That is, Badiou argues that the proletariat as a political class cannot be conceived either as the place nor as the lack of place but rather as that which "surpasses its place by force" (p. 36).

According to Badiou (2009), the force in question is always impure because it is always placed (p. 38). However, in its impure placement, it becomes "homogenized" with the space (p. 38). Therefore, as Badiou argues, the force in question also divides into two; the internal expansion or the constant purification of itself by itself "sketches out the history of a contradiction" (p. 41), whereas this expansion starts with an impure placement. Hence, he argues that if the force can purify itself, it comes to be named as a subjective force, and if it is "assigned to its place" (p. 41), it is an objective force. Badiou exemplifies this division by giving the example of May '68, where the lack of concentration is defeated by the peaceful transition or the objective force (p. 42). Accordingly, he argues that the bourgeoisie should also be thought of as a subject in the context of strong contradiction (p. 42). That is, the space, i.e., "P", should be conceived in its division: "We must conceive of imperialist society not only as substance but also as subject" (p. 42). The reason for stating such a view stems from the confusion between the state and the bourgeoisie. According to Badiou, at the level of objective force or the structural contradiction, the composing agents are masses and the state (p. 43). However, at the level of the subjective force or historical contradiction, the agents are the class party and the bourgeoisie (p. 43). In the light of these explanations, Badiou claims that the history is made by the masses, yet history is not politics (p. 43). For him, politics occurs at the subject level where it is "made by the classes in the masses" (p. 43). Therefore, the subjective force of the bourgeoisie is not realized by the sanctioning of the state power or intensification of the relations of exploitation but by the "dilution" of the concentration of its antagonistic force, the force of the class party (Badiou, 2009, p. 43). Badiou illustrates the aforementioned categorization as follows:




Figure 5: Schema of the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat

In this context, Badiou argues that "a minimal and purified political heterogeneity" is more powerful than a politics that aspires to find "convergence of struggles" (p. 44). That is, in the revolt of the masses, what appears is history, and history should not be confused with politics. Then, Badiou claims that even the subscribers of Marxism, under the guise of "science of history" (p. 44), are part of an objectivist deviation. Badiou articulates the last claims as follows:

> There is no shortage of people under their thumb among the 'Marxist': All those who embroider their dispiriting niceties around a 'Marxism' reduced to the morose virtue of a 'science of history'. Science of history? *Marxism is the discourse with which the proletariat sustains itself as subject* [emphasis in original]. We must never let go of this idea. (p. 44)

In this context, the manner in which the masses make history needs to be explained. Before explaining how masses make history, Badiou makes a theoretical detour to reflect on Lacan. This move can be explained by the fact that, up to this point, Lacan was associated with structural dialectic. The structural dialectic also designated a point in which objectivity and hence masses were conceived. Accordingly, Badiou (2009) accuses structural dialectic for making the theory of the space where the regulated universe "predominate over the emergence of the outplace" (p. 54). However, he also notes that structural dialectic must be conceived differently from structuralism, where the former "encounter the real as obstacle" and tries continuously to establish the "authority of the structure" (p. 55). Accordingly, for Badiou, what needs to be explained in the structural dialectic is the instantiation

of the causality that bases itself on a weak difference. He names this causality as the "causality of lack" (p. 55), where its philosophical representative is designated as the Greek atomists. Accordingly, Badiou argues that the relationship between the atoms and the void, if conceived as a "radical qualitative exteriority", there is no action in the structure, "*nothing happens* [emphasis in original]" (p. 56). What starts the action of the structure is the appearance of an element, i.e., clinamen (Badiou, 2009, p. 57). Badiou claims that the clinamen "marks the void" in the sense that the marking is an "atomistic designation of the void itself" (p. 58). Because it is an atomistic designation, the strong difference that comes from the void becomes homogenized in the relationship with the atoms and becomes reduced to a weak difference (Badiou, 2009, p. 58). Badiou exemplifies the appearance of the clinamen to the mass movements, which render the "absolute opposition of principle between bourgeoisie/proletariat" (p. 58) into a space. Hence, he claims that just as the atoms make the world, so the masses make history. In terms of Marxist politics, Badiou argues that history becomes the "fortune of the event" where it designates the "chance" of political necessity (p. 60). In terms of the dialectic, he argues that the appearing of the masses "constitute the historical world" (p. 63) which, from the state, finds its material for reproduction. Accordingly, Badiou claims that the "being of the mass movements is to disappear" (p. 64) and class politics must base itself in the mass movements by attaching them to the force.

The dispute between Badiou and Lacan does not end at the level of dialectics, in the next sub-chapter, I will be analysing how Badiou criticizes Lacan's conception of structural time.

4.5.2. Subjectivization and Subjective Process

Lacan (2005) tells a story about three prisoners who are announced to be freed on the condition that their solution to the problem is explained in a logical manner (p. 198). The problem is stated by saying that from the total of five disks, of which three are white and two are black, three of the white disks are going to be inserted on the prisoners without their knowledge of it (Lacan, 2005, p. 162). The winner becomes the first one to know the colour of the disk.

Zizek (1993) deduces three possibilities from this scenario; if one of the prisoners has a white disk and the others have black, the reasoning has no time since the prisoner with the white disk can "see" and decide his/her action in an "instant of the gaze" (p. 74). In the second scenario, two of the prisoners have white and the remaining has a black disk. Hence, he claims that in this scenario, time has to elapse because to reach a conclusion one needs a "time for understanding" (p. 74). That is, the prisoner with the white disk may think as: "I see one black and one white disk, so mine is either white or black. However, if mine is black, then the prisoner with the white disk would see two black disks and immediately conclude that his is white; since he does not do it, mine is also white" (Zizek, 1993, p. 74). In the third scenario, where all the disks are white, it is explained as follows:

> I see two white hats, so mine is either white or black. If mine is black, then any of the two remaining prisoners would reason the following way: 'I see a black and a white hat. So if mine is black, the prisoner with the white hat would see two black hats and would stand up and leave immediately. However, he does not do it. So mine is white. I stand up and leave.' But since none of the other two prisoners stand up, mine is also white. (Zizek, 1993, p. 75)

According to Zizek (1993), in the third scenario, there is a double delay (p. 75). He states that if all three prisoners are of equal intelligence, after the first delay, when no one moves, they will stand up at the same moment and remain still (p. 75). In the second delay, what happens is that they all look to each other in perplexity and question their common hesitation by asking whether they stood up for the same reason or if they see a black disk (Zizek, 1993, p. 75). Zizek claims that after they notice they share the same hesitation, they reach the conclusion that they are in the same situation. At this moment, he claims that the hesitation and delay turn to haste, and they rush to the door before one of them reaches their destination. Accordingly, Zizek associates three types of subjectivities to three scenarios: in the first subjectivity what is "seen" is an impersonal instance which reduced to the "instance of gaze"; in the second, there is intersubjectivity in the sense that the prisoner looks to him/herself from the place of the other; in the third, the undecidability of the situation leads to the conclusion of the assumption of a "symbolic identity" (p. 76). In other words, he argues that in the acceptance of the position, the prisoner's indeterminate identity comes to be filled by the "symbolic intersubjectivity" (p. 76).

Therefore, the objective social identity is established by a "subjective anticipation", in which, to avoid "death" (remaining in prison), the prisoner assumes a symbol that represents him/her to the signifying chain (p. 76). According to Zizek, this identification resembles a "preemptive strike" where the answer to the question "what I am for the Other" is delegated by assuming a symbol (p. 76).

According to Badiou (2009), the subjectivization resides in the hidden in the moment of conclusion, which retroactively establishes itself in the moment of haste (p. 250). He claims that the subjectification in Lacan's account is established by the competition with the other, since the prisoner is dependent on the time of the other prisoners (p. 250). However, the constraint that the prison situation puts on to the prisoners, i.e., the logical time, has an exteriority or an outplace (p. 250). Therefore, the time in question must be divided into two, which amounts to saying that the subjectivization must also be divided into two, as subjectivization and subjective process (Badiou, 2009, p. 251). Accordingly, Badiou argues that the three scenarios in which the prisoners act can be compartmentalized into three different modalities of time (p. 252). Badiou claims that the second instance, or the "time for understanding", is contained within the third instance, or the "time for conclusion" (p. 252). For him, Lacan's scenario assumes the primacy of the third modality of time in which all prisoners are thought to be equal (p. 253). However, as Badiou states, the other prisoner may act according to the second instance in which it might be too late to reach the door (p. 253). By contrast, if all prisoners calculate according to the third modality of time, what is achieved is not the suspension of doubt but the "surplus certainty" (Badiou, 2009, p. 253). To emphasize the heterogeneity of times, Badiou claims that at the second modality, one prisoner may stop while the second may continue (p. 254). Then, what is recognized by the first prisoner is the "nonidentity of the other" in which different "speeds" of reasoning appear. In other words, as Badiou states, the recognition of haste of the first prisoner is dependent on the "stupidity" of the second one (p. 254).

According to Badiou, the heterogeneity between prisoners proves the "qualitative element" in every subjective determination (p. 254). Hence, he argues that the competition scenario in which the logical time becomes the determining factor, reveals its exteriority when the first prisoner recognizes the non-identity of the second one (p. 255). Although by merely depending upon an "intellectual force", the

first prisoner may achieve victory, this victory restores the "law on the basis of the outplace" (Badiou, 2009, p. 255). However, Badiou claims that the subject (the first prisoner) still may gain mastery of its haste in its being placed over the contradiction of forces (p. 256). In other words, Badiou claims that because the subject is placed in a structural manner, he/she cannot comprehend its force unless a disturbance to his/her reasoning comes from the other's "stupidity" (p. 256). According to Badiou, what must be done in this scenario is to hurry, because only with the primacy of practice that the victory in the face enforcement can be achieved (p. 257). He exemplifies this point by mentioning the popular insurrection, which appears as an incalculable moment that is not dependent on correct reasoning. Accordingly, Badiou claims that subjectivization occurs in the moment of insurrection, whereas the subjective process is related to the "recomposition of consequences in light of the interruption" (p. 257). Hence, Badiou claims that the subjectivization in question is divided into two, where if it is dependent on the law of placing its determining affect becomes anxiety; and if it bases itself on its own heterogeneity with regard to the law, its determining affect becomes courage (p. 258). As Badiou argues, the condition of victory is achieved by "not waiting" for the end of reasoning but by a "wager on the real" (p. 258). As a result, Badiou argues that the subjective process, which is based on courage, will act upon a wager that "recompose a world in which the law must wither" (p. 258).

According to Badiou (2009), the politics of communism can be understood in a similar vein to Lacanian sexuation[18]. That is, according to Badiou, communist politics is the form in which the universality of the proletariat both inscribes the emancipation of itself while at the same time emancipation of all humanity (p. 262). In other words, because the proletariat is "inexistent" to the world, its political project entails the destruction of the place that can only think the terms that it places (Badiou, 2009, p. 262). Accordingly, Badiou argues that there is no "the" communist party but merely communist *parties* [emphasis mine] (p. 262).

In the context of subjectivation, Ed Pluth and Dominiek Hoens (2004) argue that Zizek's conception of the act emphasizes the negative nature of the act, where the "real" of an act is thought independent from its symbolic location (p. 202).

[18] "There was something irreducibly masculine about the Third International" (Badiou, 2009, p. 262).

Accordingly, they argue that Badiou is more Lacanian than Zizek in the context of conceiving the act as a process (p. 187). According to them, the contribution of Badiou to the "Logical Time" essay is the inference of the "ethical and political" implications (p. 188).

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter initially examines the debate between Miller and Badiou, focusing on the notion of "suture". Miller's approach locates the "subject" in the non-identical zero where the logical discourse is "sutured". Badiou's criticism of Miller's conceptualization is a critique of ideology within science where the critique underlines the importance of formalistic procedures and the sanctioning law of the axiomatic beginning. By providing Miller's analysis of the interrelationship between the structure and the subject in "Action of the Structure", the initial theoretical trace of the "structural dialectic" as conceptualized by Badiou was provided.

By summarizing how the "Maoist turn" of Badiou is related to his critique of Althusser in terms of criticizing the latter's conception of ideology, the early concepts within which Badiou's political theory was underlined. Before explaining how Badiou interprets the Hegelian dialectic, the continuity of Badiou's early work in terms of scission and immanence was contextualized in terms of politics.

I provided the reading of Hegel by Badiou by focusing on how the contradictory nature of the Hegelian dialectic entails the law of the One. Badiou's dialectic was explained by its positing the category of something in the context of conceptualizing the beginning of the dialectic. The emphasis of "two" in Badiou's account of dialectics was juxtaposed to the reconciling Hegelian one. The terms "force, placement, and scission" were central concepts of Badiou's dialectic, which were explained in-depth in their political content.

The theorization of the proletariat as an antagonistic force opposed to imperialist society rather than the bourgeoisie was explained in terms of how the proletariat relates to space. In this context, the importance of conceiving classes and masses as separate was underlined. This conceptual separation was supplemented by the schema of the dialectic. Lastly, by comparing different approaches to interpreting "Logical Time", the importance of force as the constitutive category for the political

subject was explained. To conclude, Badiou's conception of political subjectivity was explained in terms of a psychoanalytic interpretation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis tried to answer the question of the possibility of constructing a meta-theoretical discourse concerning the category of the subject. To reach this formulation, I started with analyzing an already formulated theoretical discourse, i.e., Zizek's conceptualization of the theory of the subject. My claim was that it includes the previous theories that pertain to the conceptualization of the subject as a function of his theory.

According to Zizek's analysis, the main theoretical pillar for the theory of the subject should be located between Lacan's and Althusser's theories. I attempted to recapitulate a similar theoretical history, albeit with differing accounts of Badiou's interpretation. I claimed that Badiou's theoretical position simultaneously intersects and opposes psychoanalysis. That is, his conceptualization of the subject entails the psychoanalytic theory. While Badiou's theory of the subject incorporates both Lacan and Althusser, to mark Badiou's difference, it was necessary to dwell on how Althusser was conceptualized within the framework of psychoanalytic theory. The first part of the introductory chapter was devoted to the elaboration of this approach.

For Zizek, the theory of the subject entails a secondary theoretical dispute that renders the importance of a primary theoretical dispute obsolete by replacing it. Hence, to understand the "reason", there needs to be an "effect" which precedes it. The theoretical assumption in this explanation is that historicity is understood as a function of the theory.

Accordingly, Zizek, for his construction of the theory of the subject, uses the previous debates pertaining to the same theme as a function. Considering his approach, I argued that tracing the historical debates would reveal whether they are clear enough to be a function. If we trace the historicity of the debates and conclude it with Badiou's discussion, I argued, we can claim a new theoretical trajectory. To

arrive at this theoretical trajectory, a point must be identified that both critiques and encompasses psychoanalytic theory simultaneously. Then, it would be possible to make a comparison among the theoretical trajectories concerning their meta status.

In the second part of the introduction chapter, I analyzed the previous debates in their complexity (and not directly as a function) to draw a clear conceptual line between Althusser and Badiou. In this context, Western Marxism was the first historical account I analyzed in terms of how it frames Althusser. The reason for doing this was to determine whether the frame of Western Marxism is valid in its theoretical assumptions. Western Marxism is first defined as philosophical, then as defeated by the theories based upon linguistic premises, especially in the context of Althusser. Accordingly, in the context of politics, Western Marxism's defining characteristic consists of a history of political defeat and an obsession with victory. In this political-theoretical framework, Althusser is characterized by his adherence to science that corresponds to a false political position.

In both accounts, Althusser's position is deemed to be problematic. To question the adequacy of the criterion in which Althusser's theoretical position is analyzed, I added another Marxist account of language and discussed its applicability in Eastern Marxism. The reason for introducing Eastern Marxism into the discussion is to examine the geographical markers associated with a theory, such as Western Marxism. In this context, the Soviet reality is designated as a philosophical/Platonic project in terms of its use of language. Therefore, it composes monologic and dialogic poles of language in its philosophical terminology. If we adhere to this account, the criterion by which a theory can be judged becomes ambiguous. That is, while retaining some of the criteria, if viewed from the perspective of language, it can be argued that these criteria lose their universal applicability and could be examined in a philosophical context. Accordingly, we are left without a predetermined criterion for discussing an idea.

The second chapter aimed to trace the historical theoretical debates surrounding Althusser's Marxist philosophy project without a definite external criterion. In this chapter, I first examined the commonality between two different interpretations of Althusser. The first concerns the determination of society by the economy, while the second concerns the transformation of the discussion on ideology into a debate about the subject. The common feature of these two debates, however,

highlighted the problems concerning the transition to structural causality within traditional Marxist causality. To trace this indicated problem, I aimed to understand how Althusser constructed structural causality and, thus, how he read Marx. To do so, I focused on identifying potential issues within the text.

The first text I focused on was “Contradiction Overdetermination”. In this text, I pointed out that the critique of the classical concept of contradiction is carried out through a political figure. This process itself is an ideology critique. Two points caught my attention while conducting this analysis: first, the loss of the singular use value of the concept of contradiction itself, a point to which I returned in Chapter 4 in the context of Badiou; second, the difference between the respective discursive positions of Althusser and the figure he used in the critique of the concept of contradiction, namely Lenin.

Rather than engaging in a conceptual critique of ideology, I focused on Althusser's *Reading Capital* to understand the framework within which the criterion of scientificity can be grounded or constructed. This work itself attempts to understand Marx's critique of political economy through the criterion of the unity of object and discourse. In other words, it focuses on the theoretical discourse behind the concepts Marx used in his criticism. Then, it becomes possible for Althusser to systematically reveal Marx's difference in the context of object-discourse unity and to complete the conceptual research left unfinished in “Contradiction Overdetermination” according to scientific criteria. The conceptual possibility of defining the concept of contradiction in Marx’s own theory also requires distinguishing Marx’s dialectic from the Hegelian one. The reason for doing this is not to remain within the confines of the inversion metaphor, but to explain it in its conceptual framework. Yet, the process of demonstration in its concept not only necessitates ideological criticism but also the development of a scientific discourse. At this point, in the context of object-discourse unity, the object in question is a theoretical object and is distinct from the “real object”.

The definition of the theoretical object also raises the question of how this theoretical object is produced; therefore, knowledge is considered in the context of production. Understanding knowledge as a form of production indicates that theory acquires a practical property, which removes the abstract separation of theory and practice. Consequently, the distinction between theory and practice begins to express

itself in various forms of practice, such as theoretical practice, political practice, economic practice, ideological practice, etc. The claim that knowledge is produced indicates that scientific developments do not progress teleologically, but rather that they acquire a scientific status within the unity of discourse and object. The point at which science separates itself from its prior ideological history is called an epistemological break. Accordingly, science also becomes the science of ideology. At this point, I pointed out the various contradictions this conceptualization leads to.

The first contradiction was that, because ideology is both a definable point within science and a social instance, the possibility of scientific and political practices changing ideology becomes uncertain. The second contradiction was related to the absence of a concept capable of demonstrating the total account of instances. Third, because the instances were considered separate practices, Althusser's theoretical thought fails to account for the political consequences of his own theoretical discourse. Starting from this point, I argued that Althusser's philosophy is sutured to politics, where these two distinct fields can be heterogeneous in their relationship. However, this heterogeneity has no theoretical counterpart within Althusser's theory.

In the third chapter, I explained Althusser's discussion of ideology by taking into account both his thoughts and his use of psychoanalysis to conceptualize ideology as a social instance. This discussion serves to clarify both the concept of the subject and the intersectionality of Marxism and psychoanalysis within the context of the subject. After stating that Althusser discusses psychoanalysis within the unity of object discourse, I explained that he problematizes two questions. The first is determining the relationship between superstructures and the unconscious, and the second is what psychoanalysis can say about the objects of other sciences. To conceptually expand Althusser's interpretation of the object a in psychoanalysis as the unconscious, I put the status of the object a in psychoanalysis up for discussion. That is, object a is not a proper object, but has a mediating status between the other and the subject. Accordingly, it must be considered as the object of desire in the context of desire's lack of an object, and it attaches itself to various bodily regions, such as the gaze and the voice. To link these explanations to three Lacanian registers, I focused on a case study by Lacan. I identified the problematic aspect of the case study as Lacan's use of an illustration to explain these three concepts, namely his

inability to express them with discursive precision. In Lacan's explanation, I clarified the point that what is decisive is that the unconscious is the discourse of the other, to emphasize the discourse debate in the context of psychoanalysis. In the context of Marxism and intersectionality, I indicated that Lacan's concept of the real is defined ambiguously. However, the concept possesses a materiality that exceeds the linguistic articulation. I emphasized that this materiality may align with the Marxist understanding of history.

To analyze the subject within a discursive context, I returned to Althusser's theory of discourses. After analyzing ideological discourse, scientific discourse, and the discursivity of the unconscious, I stated that the unconscious and ideological discourse are intertwined. To examine this intertwining within the context of interpellation, I explained that Althusser examines ideology within the context of ideological apparatuses. I emphasized that these ideological apparatuses are addressed within the context of reproduction and, consequently, continuity; therefore, a distinction must be made between ideologies and ideology in general. I stressed that ideology in general entails the emergence of the subject and was explained through the process of interpellation. This process of interpellation employs both the concept of the subject and psychoanalytic concepts, arguing that the subject in question should be understood in relation to misrecognition. To examine this process of interpellation in more detail, I drew on various interpretations of it. I analyzed the contradictory nature of the process of interpellation and its discursive structure in Pecheux's discussion, and then brought the discussion together with object a. At this point, I returned to studies that could be called psychoanalytic interpretations of interpellation, where object a comes to be centrally used: in Zizek's discussion through the concept of the symbolic, in Mocnik's discussion through the phantasmal character and identification, and in Dollar's discussion through the psychoanalytic subject and its emergence as an instance of the failure of interpellation. Finally, by highlighting Butler's argument that psychoanalytic concepts are universally applicable, I laid the groundwork for the following chapter.

In the fourth and final chapter, I explained the intersection of Marxism and psychoanalysis through Althusser's debate on scientific discourse, which was not addressed in the context of interpellation. The debate between Badiou and Miller discussed here focused on how psychoanalytic logic can be conceived at the most

formal level. While Miller's discussion of suture asserts that every discursive structure has a subject, Badiou's discussion emphasizes that examining the formal with a criterion outside the formal (i.e., psychoanalysis in our discussion) is ideological. Therefore, I sought the beginning of the answer to the question posed in the introduction chapter: “Could there be a theory that opposes psychoanalysis's conceptualization of the subject, yet still incorporates it?”

In the debate concerning the concept “suture”, I underlined the meta-applicability of the subject/structure unity by emphasizing Miller. I have contrasted Miller’s account by emphasizing how Badiou criticizes the meta-claims of psychoanalysis as ideological. I have argued that the immanent approach of Badiou could be traced to the debate of “suture”.

After examining Miller’s “Action of the structure”, which combines structural causality and psychoanalysis, I proceeded to explain how Badiou’s thought acquires a political character, to trace the origins of the theory that Badiou will later conceptualize as structural dialectics, building on Miller.

I have summarized how Badiou, in his early Maoist turn, criticizes Althusser’s conception of ideology and conceptualizes contradiction. The theoretical ground of Badiou’s dialectic was underlined in his reading of Hegel. I have related the important concepts from Badiou’s conception of contradiction and dialectics such as “one” and “two” to the subject/structure dispute.

I have underlined the relationship between the terms such as “scission, force, and placement” and Badiou’s interpretation of dialectic and analyzed it in relation to its political content. I explained the relationship of Badiou’s understanding of communism in relation to contradiction and the primacy of the political practice. I emphasized masses, classes, and the state with their objective and subjective sides. I juxtaposed the historical contradiction with the circular understanding of Hegelian history where the possibility of periodization was discussed. I explained the structural contradiction in terms of structuralism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the Greek atomists. Lastly, I have provided an ethical and political interpretation of “Logical Time”, comparing Zizek and Badiou according to their understandings of the Lacanian real.

To return to my initial question concerning the possibility of constructing a meta-theoretical discourse regarding the category of the subject, I think this project

fails if one adheres to Badiou's conception of subjectivity. That is, because he sees the primacy in practice and delegates thought to a secondary role, any conception of the category of the subject that does not take account of the history fails. However, it can also be argued that Zizek's approach can be criticized from Badiou's perspective for reducing the history of the subject to a functional tool that asserts the importance of psychoanalysis. That is, the theory of subjectivity in Zizek's case remains confined to ideological criticism.

It would be adequate to argue that ideological criticism aspires to show the contradiction in the structural contradiction whereas the primary locus of the subject for Badiou resides in the historical one.

I believe the shortcoming of this thesis is the lack of analysis regarding the contemporary political situations. It is unclear today whether one can adhere to or subscribe to the idea of class politics and its representative party.

A partial motivation for this thesis was the recent proliferation of memoirs that narrated Turkish political history from a subjective perspective. Although this proliferation could be addressed at the level of contemporary ways of historicization, what interested me in these accounts was the possibility of objective ways of conceptualizing subjectivity with different modalities of theoretical frameworks. Although the thesis deals with this question on a conceptual level, another shortcoming of this thesis could be argued to be a lack of engagement with the actual historiography at the "particular" level if one argues that the "cognitive mapping" of the contemporary political situation designates a "universal" point.

The second motivation of this thesis was on the elaborate the relationship between "truth" and "knowledge", which, if one tries to locate this relationship at its most elementary or abstract form, articulating that which is subjective and objective becomes the most important question. Hence, in the articulation of this relationship in question, a certain discussion towards the "scientificity" of discourses in reference to Marxism and psychoanalysis became inevitable. Perhaps another shortcoming of this thesis was the lack of engagement with the contemporary analysis of the status of scientific or academic discourses in this sense, which could reveal the ideology at work in the domain of "knowledge".

Within the limits of this thesis, a further articulation of the topic of "persistence of the Greek art" could also be made. Badiou's comparative analysis of

the Greek plays in the Theory of the Subject could have enabled the discussion to be addressed at the subjective level.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tezin odaklandığı iki temel soru vardır: 1) Özne kategorisi psikanaliz ve Marxism kullanılarak nasıl artiküle edilir? 2) Bu artikülasyonlar ideoloji eleştirisinden bağımsız olabilir mi?

Bu soruları cevaplayabilmek için, önceden formüle edilmiş bir teorik söylemi, Zizek'in özne teorisine ilişkin kavramsallaştırmasını analiz etmek başlangıç noktası olarak belirlenmiştir. Çünkü bu çalışma, Zizek'in özne teorisinin, özne kavramsallaştırmasına dair daha önce geliştirilmiş olan teorileri kendi kuramsal çerçevesi içerisinde bir işlev olarak kapsadığı iddiasını taşımaktadır.

Zizek'in analizine göre, özne teorisinin temel teorik dayanağı, Lacan ve Althusser'in teorileri arasında konumlanmalıdır. Bu tez, benzer bir teorik tarihsel çizgiyi benimsemekte, fakat aynı zamanda Badiou'nün yorumuna dair farklı bakış açılarını da dikkate almaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, Badiou'nün teorik pozisyonunun, eşzamanlı olarak psikanalizle hem kesiştiğini hem de ona karşı çıktığını, yani, Badiou'nün özne kavramsallaştırmasının psikanalitik teoriyi içerdiğini, iddia etmektedir. Badiou'nün özne teorisi hem Lacan'ı hem de Althusser'i kapsar. Fakat yine bu sebeple, Badiou'nün farklılığını gösterebilmek için, Althusser'in psikanalitik teori çerçevesinde nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığını detaylı biçimde ele almak gereklidir. Bu nedenle, giriş bölümünün ilk kısmı bu yaklaşımın ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklanmasına ayrılmıştır.

Zizek'e göre özne teorisinin kurulumun ön koşulu, temel teorik tartışmanın önemini, temel teorik tartışmaya ikincil bir teorik tartışma tarafından ortadan kaldıran veya onun yerine geçen bir süreç içerir. Dolayısıyla, "neden"i anlamak için, önceden gerçekleşmiş bir "etki"nin varlığı gereklidir. Bir başka deyişle, temel teorik tartışmaya ikincil olan tartışma, zorunlu bir "etki" olarak ele alınmış ve bu etkinin üzerine "neden" kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Zizek'in özne kategorisine dair

kavramsallaştırmasında tezin iddası, temel teorik tartışmanın gerçekleşebilmesi için onu hazırlayan ikincil teorik tartışmaların bir fonksiyon olarak kullanılmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, tarihsel olan (yani ikincil teorik tartışma) temel teorik tartışma için yalnızca bir fonksiyon olabilir.

Zizek, özne teorisini inşa ederken, aynı tema etrafında geçmişte yürütülmüş tartışmaları kendi teorisinin birer işlevi olarak kullanır. Bu tezde, bu yaklaşım göz önünde bulundurularak, tarihsel tartışmaların izini sürmenin, bunların birer işlev olarak kullanılmasının zeminini ortaya koyacağı savunulmaktadır. Bununla paralel olarak, tartışmaların tarihçesi takip edilip Badiou'nun tartışmasıyla sonlandırıldığında, yeni bir teorik yönelimin ileri sürülebileceği iddia edilmektedir. Bu teorik yönelime ulaşabilmek için, psikanalitik teoriyi hem eleştiren hem de kapsayan bir noktanın belirlenmesi gereklidir. Böylece farklı teorik yönelimler arasında meta-düzeyde karşılaştırma yapmak mümkün olur.

Tezin giriş bölümünün ikinci kısmında, önceki tartışmalar, birer işlev yerine kendi karmaşıklıkları içerisinde analiz edilerek Althusser ile Badiou arasında net bir kavramsal hat çizilir. Bu bağlamda, Althusser'i çerçeveleme biçimi bakımından ilk olarak "Batı Marksizmi" tarihselleştirmesi ele alınır. Bunu yapma gerekçesi, Batı Marksizmi çerçevesinin teorik varsayımları bakımından geçerliliğini sorgulamaktır. Batı Marksizmi, önce felsefi bir yaklaşım olarak tanımlanmış, ardından, özellikle Althusser bağlamında, dil temelli teorilerle yenilgiye uğramış bir konum olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu siyasi-teorik çerçevede, Batı Marksizmi'nin belirleyici özelliği, bir politik yenilgiler tarihine sahip olması ve zafer kazanmaya yönelik saplantısıdır. Bu bağlamda Althusser, yanlış bir politik konuma karşılık gelen bilimsel bir tutum sergileyen bir figür olarak karakterize edilmiştir.

Her iki değerlendirmede de Althusser'in pozisyonu problematiktir. Bu doğrultuda, Althusser'in teorik pozisyonunun analiz edildiği kriterin yeterliliğini sorgulamak için, başka bir Marxist dil yaklaşımını tartışmaya dahil edilerek bunun Doğu Marksizmi bağlamında uygulanabilirliğini incelenmiştir. Doğu Marksizmi'ni tartışmaya dahil etme gerekçesi, Batı Marksizmi gibi bir isimlendirmeyle işaret edilen, teorinin coğrafi belirleyicilerini incelemektir. Bu bağlamda Sovyet gerçekliği, dil kullanımı açısından felsefi/Platonik bir proje olarak değerlendirilmiş ve felsefi bağlamda monolojik ile diyalojik dil kutuplarını birleştiren paradoksal bir pozisyon olarak ele alınmıştır. Coğrafi değerlendirme yönteminin, felsefi bir sabit alınırsa, bir

teoriyi değerlendirme kriterinin belirsiz hale gelebileceği savunulmuş; politik kriterler korunmakla birlikte, dil perspektifinden bakıldığında teorik öncüllerin evrensel geçerliliğinin tartışmalı olabileceği ortaya konmuş ve felsefi bağlamda ele alınabilir olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bir teorik pozisyonu tartışmak için önceden belirlenmiş bir kriterin olasılığı tartışılmış ve incelenecek metinlerin içsel bir okuma stratejisine göre değerlendirileceği belirtilmiştir.

İkinci bölüm, Althusser'in Marksist felsefe projesi etrafında yürütülen tarihsel teorik tartışmaları, belirli bir dış kriter olmaksızın izlemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu bölümde, öncelikle Althusser'in iki farklı yorumunun ortak noktaları olduğu tespit edilen bir başlık incelenmiştir. Başlığın bir ayağını oluşturan yorum, toplumun ekonomi tarafından belirlenmesiyle ilgilidir; ikincisi ise ideoloji tartışmasının özne üzerine bir tartışmaya dönüşümünü ele alır. Ancak, bu iki tartışmanın ortak özelliği, geleneksel Marksist nedensellik içinde yapısal nedenselliğe geçişte ortaya çıkan sorunları ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu sorunun teorik kordinatlarını daha iyi tespit edebilmek ve tanımlayabilmek için, Althusser'in yapısal nedenselliği nasıl inşa ettiğini ve aynı süreçte Marx'ı nasıl okuduğunun anlaşılması hedeflenmiştir. Bunu yaparken, metin içinde potansiyel sorunların belirlenmesi hedeflenmiştir.

İlk olarak odaklanılan metin "Contradiction and Overdetermination" olmuştur. Bu metinde, klasik çelişki kavramına yönelik eleştirinin bir politik figür üzerinden gerçekleştirildiği iddia edilmiştir. Klasik çelişki anlayışının eleştirisi kendi başına "ideoloji eleştirisi" başlığı altında incelenebilir. Eleştirinin incelenmesi sırasında iki noktaya dikkat çekilmiştir: birincisi, çelişki kavramının kendisinin tekil kullanım değerinin kaybolması (bu noktaya dördüncü bölümde Badiou bağlamında geri dönülmüştür); ikincisi, Althusser'in çelişki kavramına yönelik eleştirisinde kullandığı figürün, yani Lenin'in, söylemsel konumları arasındaki farktır.

Bahsedilen eleştirinin olası çelişkileri takip edilmek yerine, Althusser'in *Reading Capital* eserine odaklanılmıştır; bu eser, bilimsellik kriterinin hangi çerçevede temellendirilebileceğini veya oluşturulabileceğini anlamayı sağlar. Dolayısıyla çelişki kavramının eleştirisi yerine bu kavramın bilimsel bir nitelikle nasıl kavramsallaştırılabileceği takip edilmiştir. *Reading Capital*, Marx'ın siyasal iktisat eleştirisini, nesne ve söylem birliği kriteri üzerinden anlamayı hedefler. Başka bir deyişle, Marx'ın klasik siyasal iktisadı eleştirisinde kullandığı kavramların pratik

operasyonun açıkça telaffuz edilmemiş teorik söylemine odaklanır. Böylece, Althusser'in Marx'ın farkını sistematik biçimde nesne-söylem birliği bağlamında ortaya koyması ve "Contradiction and Overdetermination" makalesinde tamamlanmamış kavramsal araştırmayı bilimsel kriterler çerçevesinde tamamlaması açıklanmıştır.

Marx'ın kendi teorisinde çelişki kavramını tanımlama olasılığı, Marx'ın diyalektiğini Hegel'in diyalektiğinden ayırmayı da gerektirir. Bunun nedeni, yalnızca tersine çevirme metaforu içinde kalmak değil, diyalektiğin kendisinin kavramsal çerçevede tartışılmasıdır. Ancak, kavram bağlamında gösterim süreci yalnızca ideolojik eleştiriyi değil, aynı zamanda bilimsel bir söylemin geliştirilmesini de gerektirir. Bu noktada, nesne-söylem birliği bağlamında, söz konusu nesne teorik bir nesnedir ve "gerçek nesne"den farklıdır.

Teorik nesnenin tanımı, aynı zamanda bu nesnenin nasıl üretildiği sorusunu gündeme getirir; dolayısıyla bilgi üretim bağlamında ele alınır. Bilgiyi bir üretim biçimi olarak anlamak, teorinin pratik bir özelliğe sahip olduğunu ve teori ile pratiğin soyut ayrımını ortadan kaldırdığını gösterir. Sonuç olarak, teori ile pratiğin ayrımı, teorik pratik, politik pratik, ekonomik pratik, ideolojik pratik gibi çeşitli pratik biçimlerinde kendini göstermeye başlar. Bilginin üretildiği iddiası, bilimsel gelişmelerin teleolojik olarak ilerlemediğini, bunun yerine söylem ve nesne birliği içinde bilimsel bir statü kazandığını gösterir. Bilimin önceki ideolojik geçmişinden ayrıldığı nokta epistemolojik kopuş olarak adlandırılır. Bu bağlamda, bilim aynı zamanda ideolojinin bilimi haline gelir.

Bu noktada, bu kavramsallaştırmanın yol açtığı çeşitli çelişkileri de ortaya konulmuştur. Birinci çelişki, ideolojinin hem bilim içinde tanımlanabilir bir nokta hem de sosyal bir kerte olması nedeniyle, bilimsel ve politik pratiklerin ideolojiyi değiştirme olasılığının belirsizliğidir. İkinci çelişki, kertelerin toplamını gösterebilecek ya da kertelerin kolektif değişimini kavramsal bir biçimde artikülе edecek bir kavramın yokluğuyla ilgilidir. Üçüncü olarak, kerteler ayrı pratikler olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Althusser'in teorik düşüncesi kendi teorik söyleminin politik sonuçlarını açıklamada yetersiz kalır. Dolayısıyla Althusser'in Marksist felsefe inşaasındaki özne sorunu bu noktada gündeme gelir. Bu noktadan hareketle, Althusser'in felsefesinin politika ile iç içe geçtiğini, bu iki farklı alanın heterojen bir

ilişki kurabileceğini savunulmuştur. Ancak bu heterojenliği Althusser'in teorisi içinde artiküle edebilecek herhangi bir teorik karşılık olmadığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Üçüncü bölümde, Althusser'in ideoloji tartışmasını, hem daha önceki bölümdeki nesne-söylem birliği bağlamında ideolojinin nasıl düşünülebileceğini açıklamak hem de ideolojiyi bir sosyal kerte olarak kavramsallaştırmak için psikanalizi kullanması dikkate alarak açıklanmıştır. Bu tartışma hem özne kavramını hem de özne bağlamında Marksizm ile psikanalizin kesişimselliğini netleştirmeye hizmet etmektedir. Althusser'in psikanalizi nesne-söylem birliği içinde ele aldığını belirttikten sonra, iki sorunu problematize ettiği açıklanmıştır. Birincisi, üstyapılar ile bilinçdışı arasındaki ilişkinin belirlenmesidir; ikincisi ise psikanalizin diğer bilimlerin nesneleri hakkında ne söyleyebileceğidir.

Psikanalizdeki "nesne a"yı bilinçdışı olarak kavramsallaştıran Althusser yorumunu genişletmek amacıyla, psikanalizde nesne a'nın statüsü tartışmaya açılmıştır. Yani nesne a, geleneksel anlamda bir nesne değildir; öteki ile özne arasında dolayımlayıcılık yapan bir konuma sahiptir. Buna uygun olarak, nesne a, arzunun nesnesinin eksikliği bağlamında arzu nesnesi olarak ele alınmış ve bakış, ses gibi çeşitli bedensel alanlara bağlanmıştır. Tezde, bu açıklamaları üç Lacancı kavramsal (imgesel, sembolik, gerçek) ilişkilendirebilmek için Lacan'ın bir vaka çalışmasına odaklanılmıştır. Vaka çalışmasındaki problemli yönün, Lacan'ın bu üç kavramı açıklamak için bir illüstrasyon kullanması ve bu üç kavramı söylemsel kesinlikle ifade edememesi olduğu belirtilmiştir.

Lacan'ın açıklamasında, belirleyici olanın bilinçdışının ötekinin söylemi olduğunun altı çizilmiştir; böylece psikanaliz bağlamında söylem tartışmasına giriş yapılmıştır. Marksizm ve psikanalizin kesişimselliği bağlamında, Lacan'ın gerçek kavramının Jameson'ın tartışmasından hareketle müphem bir biçimde tanımlandığı belirtilmiştir. Ancak bu kavramın, dilsel ifadenin de ötesine geçen bir maddiyat taşıdığı belirtilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu maddiyatın, Marksist tarih anlayışı ile beraber düşünülebileceği vurgulanmıştır. Jameson'ın Marksizm ve psikanalizin benzerliği bağlamında işaret ettiği bir diğer nokta, bahsedilen bu iki teorik alanın ortak bir "saf semantik" anlayış bulundurmakla itham edilmeleri ve ancak dilbilimdeki gelişmeler ışığında bu ithamın eleştirilebilir olduğudur. Materyalist dil felsefesinin olanaklılığı bağlamında, Lacan'ın gerçek kavramının sembolizasyona mutlak direnç anlamına geldiğinden hareketle, tarih anlatısının gerçeklikle özdeşleşerek değil ancak

yakınsayarak yapılabileceğinin altı çizilmiştir. Jameson tarafından iddia edilen yakınsama ilişkisinin niteliği olan "asimptotik" ilişki, dördüncü bölümde Badiou'nun diyalektik anlayışı olan "ikinin öncelliği" bağlamında heterojen ilişkileri anlamak için önemli bir teorik girizgah olarak düşünülebilir. Her ne kadar Jameson, Marksizm ve psikanalizin kesişimselliği bağlamında Althusser'in ideoloji tartışmasını önemli bulsa da, bilim ve ideoloji ayrımını yetersiz bulduğunun altı çizilmiştir. Bahsi edilen yetersizlikten ne kadar bahsedilebileceği kavramsallaştırılmak üzere, Macherey'in metninden hareketle Althusser'in sadece ideoloji kavramsallaştırmasının psikanalitik etkiler içermediği, semptomatik okumanın teorik öncüllerinin de psikanaliz bağlamında tartışılabileceği iddia edilmiştir. Jameson'ın Marksizm ve psikanaliz arasındaki bir başka benzerliği illüstrasyonlar üzerinden yapması ve bahsi edilen illüstrasyonların incelenen Lacan metninde de problematize edilmesi yüzünden Althusser'in söylemler teorisi metni üzerine odaklanılmıştır. Macherey'in de ifade ettiği gibi *Reading Capital* eserinin "okumak" kısmı, bakışı görüşün tahakkümünden ayrıştırmak ve dolayısıyla okuma eylemini söylemsel ve bilimsel bir zemine oturtma amacı içerir, dolayısıyla farklı söylemlerin artikülasyonları Marksizm ve psikanaliz kesişimselliğini tartışmak bakımından önemli bulunmuştur.

Özneyi söylemsel bağlam içinde analiz etmek amacıyla, Lacan'ın söylemsel netlik konusunda müphemliğinden hareketle, Althusser'in söylem teorisine geri dönülmüştür. İdeolojik söylem, bilimsel söylem ve bilinçdışının söylemselliğini analiz edildikten sonra, bilinçdışı ile ideolojik söylemin iç içe geçtiğini belirtilmiştir. Bu iç içeliği interpelasyon bağlamında inceleyebilmek için, Althusser'in ideolojiyi devletin ideolojik aygıtları bağlamında ayrı bir şekilde ele aldığı belirtilmiştir. Devletin ideolojik aygıtlarının yeniden üretim bağlamında ve dolayısıyla süreklilik bağlamında ele alındığı vurgulanmıştır. Tartışmanın devamı çoğul ideolojiler ile genel olarak ideoloji arasındaki ayrım bağlamında sürdürülmüştür. Çoğul ideolojilerin toplumsal formasyondaki fonskiyonu gözetildiğinde tarihlerinden bahsedilebilirken, genel olarak ideoloji tanımının tarihsiz olduğu kavramsallaştırması vurgulanmıştır.

Genel olarak ideolojinin, öznenin ortaya çıkışını içerdiğini ve interpelasyon süreci aracılığıyla açıklanabileceği vurgulanmıştır. Bahsi geçen interpelasyon süreci, hem özne kavramını hem de psikanalitik kavramları kullanır ve söz konusu öznenin yanlış tanıma bağlamında anlaşılması gerektiğini savunur. Interpelasyon sürecini

daha ayrıntılı inceleyebilmek için, bu sürece dair psikanaliz ağırlıklı yorumlardan yararlanılarak tartışma genişletilmeye çalışılmıştır. Pecheux'un tartışmasında interpelasyon sürecinin çelişkili doğası ve söylemsel yapısı analiz edilmiş ve ardından tartışma psikanalitik literatüre geçebilmek için nesne a'yı içeren yorumları incelemiştir.

Bu noktada, interpelasyonun psikanalitik yorumları olarak adlandırılabilecek çalışmalara dönülmüştür. Bu noktada, interpelasyonun psikanalitik yorumları olarak adlandırılabilecek çalışmalara dönülüp, nesne a'nın merkezi bir şekilde kullanıldığı psikanalitik tartışmalara odaklanılmıştır. Zizek'in tartışmasında Lacan'ın daha önce bahsedilen üç kavramından biri olan sembolik kavramı, Mocnik'in tartışmasında fantazmal karakter ve özdeşleşme, ve son olarak Dolar'ın tartışmasında psikanalitik özne ve interpelasyonun başarısızlığının bir örneği olarak psikanalitik öznenin ortaya çıkışı aracılığıyla interpelasyon kavramının psikanalitik yorumları açıklanmıştır. Zizek'in tartışması psikanalitik öznenin kavramsallaştırılmasında sembolik kavramının önemini irrasyonel mekanizmalar üzerinden açıklarken, Mocnik'in tartışması salt sembolik düzlemde özne kavramsallaştırması ve bahsi geçen öznenin ideolojik içeriği arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklar. Biçimsel açıklama bakımından psikanalitik teoriye bağlı kalan Mocnik'in tartışması, içerik bakımından sınıf mücadelesinin önemini vurgularken tarihsel inceleme yapmaktan uzak durur. Dolar'ın tartışmasında ise daha çok psikanalitik teorinin klinik ortamından türetilebilir olanakları tartışırken, Althusser'in özne kavramsallaştırmasındaki sınırlılıklar gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, Butler'ın psikanalitik kavramların evrensel olarak uygulanabilir olduğu argümanını vurgulayarak bir sonraki bölüm için temel oluşturulmuştur. Butler'ın tartışmasında Althusser'in ideoloji ve özne kavramsallaştırmasının problematize edilen noktaları kısmi olarak cevaplanmaya da çalışılmıştır. Genel ideoloji kavramından farklılaşma içeren Butler'ın tartışması, ideoloji kavramını "söylem" kavramı ile ikame etmeye çalışmıştır.

Dördüncü ve son bölümde, interpelasyon bağlamında ele alınmamış olan Althusser'in söylemler teorisi altında bilimsel söylem olarak kavramsallaştırdığı söylem türü üzerinden Marksizm ile psikanalizin kesişimi en formel nitelikte açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Burada ele alınan Badiou ile Miller arasındaki tartışma, psikanalitik mantığın en formal düzeyde nasıl kavramsallaştırılabileceğine odaklanmıştır. Miller'ın "suture" tartışması her söylemsel yapının bir öznede

somutlaştığını ileri sürerken, Badiou'nun tartışması, formali formel dışındaki bir kriterle (yani bizim tartışmamızda psikanaliz ile) incelemenin ideolojik olduğu görüşünü vurgulamıştır.

Bu nedenle, giriş bölümünde ortaya konulan soruya ilişkin yanıtın başlangıcına geri dönülmüştür: "Psikanalizin özneyi kavramsallaştırmasına karşı çıkan, ancak onu hâlâ içeren bir teori mümkün olabilir mi?"

"Suture" kavramı üzerine yapılan tartışmada, özne/yapı birliğinin meta-uygulanabilirliği vurgulanarak Miller'in kavramsallaştırmasına dikkat çekilmiştir. Miller'in yapı ve özneyi aynı teorik düzlemde birleştiren teorisiyle, Badiou'nun psikanalizin meta iddialarını ideolojik olduğuna yönelik eleştirisi öne çıkarılarak karşılaştırılmıştır. Badiou'nun içkin yaklaşımının, ki bu içkinlik sadakat gibi kavramlarla bağdaşabilir, "suture" tartışmasına kadar izlenebileceği savunulmuştur.

Miller'ın, yapısal nedensellik ile psikanalizi birleştiren "Action of the Structure" çalışmasını Badiou'nün sonradan "yapısal diyalektik" olarak adlandıracağı görüşü daha iyi açıklayabilmek adına inceledikten sonra, Badiou'nun düşüncesinin nasıl politik bir karakter kazandığı açıklanmıştır. Bahsedilen teorik geçiş, Badiou'nun daha sonra Miller üzerine inşa edeceği yapısal diyalektiği kavramsallaştıracağı teorinin kökenlerini izleyebilmek ve teorik problemlerin sürekliliğini gösterebilmek için gerekli görülmüştür.

Bu bölümün devamında, Badiou'nün erken siyasi yazılarında Althusser'in ideoloji anlayışını nasıl eleştirdiği ve çelişkiyi nasıl kavramsallaştırdığı özetlenmiştir. Badiou'nün diyalektiğinin teorik temeli, Hegel okumasında vurgulanmıştır. Badiou'nün çelişki ve diyalektik kavramların, örneğin "bir" ve "iki" gibi kavramları, Miller'in kavramsallaştırdığı haliyle özne/yapı tartışmasının içinde gösterilmiştir.

Ayrıca, "scission, force, placement" gibi terimlerin Badiou'nun diyalektik yorumuyla ilişkisi vurgulanmış ve politik içerik bağlamında analiz edilmiştir. Bahsi geçen diyalektik yorum, Badiou'nun Hegel okumasının özgüllüğü bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Badiou'nun komünizm anlayışı, çelişki ve siyasi pratiğin önceliği bağlamında ilişkilendirilmiştir. Kitleler, sınıflar ve devletin nesnel ve öznel yanları özellikle vurgulanmıştır. Tarihsel çelişki, Hegelci tarihin döngüsel anlayışı ile yan yana koyularak dönemselleştirme kavramı ile tartışılmıştır. Bahsi geçen dönemselleştirme, döngüsel tarih anlayışından farklı olarak siyasi bir nitelik taşımasının önemi vurgulanarak aynı zamanda bu siyasi niteliği kendi bağlamında

gerçekleştirecek ve bu dönemselleştirmeye angaje olacak olan politik öznenin rolünün altı çizilerek tartışılmıştır. Dönemselleştirme çatısı altında tartışılan tarihsel çelişkiyle karşılaştırmalı incelenebilecek olan yapısal çelişki; yapısalcılık, Lacancı psikanaliz ve Yunan atomcuları bağlamında açıklanmıştır. Yunan atomcularının sapan atomu Badiou'nun kitleler-sınıflar-devlet şemasının içinde kitleler kavramına işaret ederken, tıpkı sapan atomun hareketi başlatması gibi kitlelerin de benzer bir hareket içerisinde olduğu ve bahsi geçen hareketin başladığı gibi bittiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu noktada kitleler hem tarihi yapmış hem de aynı zamanda tarih olmuştur. Bahsedilen şemanın başka bir elemanı olan devlet, Badiou tarafından varlığını kitlelerin hareketinden sağlarmışçasına açıklanmış ve bu momente ilişkin Badiou tarafından yapılan siyasal analizlerin altı çizilmiştir. Badiou için siyasal analizin devreye girdiği nokta şemanın üçüncü üyesi sınıflar ile açıklanmış, kitlelerin hareketi ve sınıfların ilişkisi incelenmiş, doğru politikanın üç elemanlı şema içerisinde Badiou tarafından nasıl düşünüldüğünün altı çizilmiştir. Kitlelerin ve devletin ilişkisinden doğan tarihe ek olarak Badiou'nun siyasal öznenin periyodizasyonuna bağlı tarih anlayışının materyalizm ve tarihsel çelişkiyle ilişkisi incelenmiştir. Bu noktada daha önceki bölümlerde işaret edilen tarihsel materyalizm ve psikanalizin tarihe maddi bir nitelik atfetmemeleri tartışmasına geri dönülmüştür. Politik özne ve dönemselleştirme bağlamında tarih tartışmasına ek olarak birey bağlamında, "Mantıksal Zaman" kavramına etik ve politik bir yorum getirilmiş; Zizek ve Badiou'nun Lacancı gerçek anlayışları karşılaştırılmıştır. Badiou'nun Lacancı gerçek kavramına getirdiği yorum, mantıksal zaman bağlamında bu sefer afektler dolayımıyla yeniden açıklanmıştır. Sembolizasyona mutlak direnç olarak açıklanabilecek "gerçek" kavramı, Badiou tarafından "gerçek, biçimselleştirmenin çıkmazıdır" olarak formülleştirilirse, cümle aksanının formülleştirmeyi yapan özneye doğru nasıl değiştiği, bahsi edilen "mantıksal zaman" kavramıyla açıklanmıştır. "Mahkumun ikilemi"ne benzeyen bir senaryoyu sunan Lacan'ın mantıksal zaman makalesi, Badiou tarafından zamanın farklı öznelere göre algılanabileceğinden hareketle modalitelere bölünmüştür. Badiou tarafından yapısal bir zorunluluk içerisinde sunulduğu iddia edilen senaryo, eğer özneleşme anksiyete düzeyinde kalırsa yapının çerçevesi içerisinde kalınacağının önemi vurgulanmıştır. Bu noktada "mantıksal zaman" kavramının Zizek tarafından nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı karşılaştırılmalı olarak incelenmiş ve Zizek'in yorumunun anksiyete düzeyinde

kaldığı tespit edilmiştir. Badiou'nun Lacan'ı yapısal bir diyalektisyen olarak adlandırması tekrar vurgulanmış ve yapısal diyalektiğin temel işlevinin "kuvvetli fark"ın "zayıf fark"a çevrilmesi işlemi olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bu noktada Badiou tarafından yapılan özneleşme ve öznel süreç ayrımının, yapısal çelişki ve tarihsel çelişki ayrımıyla olan kavramsal benzerliği vurgulanmıştır. Sonuç olarak Zizek'in başlangıç bölümünde tarihsel bir fonksiyona dönüşmesi iddiası sadece politik öznenin tarih karşısındaki konumu bağlamında değil mantıksal zaman tartışmasında bireysel bir yerden de tartışılmıştır.

Özne kategorisi ile ilgili meta-teorik bir söylem oluşturma olasılığına ilişkin ilk soruya geri dönecek olursak, Badiou'nün öznellik anlayışına bağlı kalındığında bu projenin başarısız olacağı düşünülebilir. Çünkü Badiou'nün pratiğe öncelik vermesi ve dolayısıyla madde ile karşılaşmanın yalnızca politik pratik ile mümkün olabildiği iddiası düşünceyi ikincil bir konuma devreder; dolayısıyla tarihe dikkat etmeyen herhangi bir özne kategorisi kavramı başarısız olur. Böylece, Zizek'in yaklaşımının Badiou perspektifinden eleştirilebileceği de söylenebilir; Zizek, özne tarihini, psikanalizin önemini vurgulayan bir işlevsel araca indirger. Yani Zizek'in öznellik teorisi, ideolojik eleştiri ile sınırlı kalmaktadır. İdeolojik eleştirinin, yapısal çelişkideki çelişkiyi göstermeyi amaçladığını, oysa Badiou için öznenin birincil yerinin tarihsel çelişki olduğunu söylemek uygundur.

Bu tez, Badiou'nun tarih anlayışının Althusser'in çelişki kavramı ile önemli ölçüde kavramsal benzerlik taşıdığı iddiasındadır; ancak Althusser'in kavrayışında çelişki ve üstbelirlenim ayrımından ibaret olan çelişki kavramı ve özne kategorisinin salt olarak ideoloji bağlamında tartışılması, Badiou tarafından yapısal ve tarihsel çelişkiler olarak konumlandırılarak bahsi geçen çelişkilere öznel ve nesnel karşılıklar verilerek yeniden işlenir. Tarih söz konusu olduğunda, Badiou de tarihe karşı anti-teleolojik bir bakış açısını paylaşır. Ancak Badiou'nün tarih anlayışı, kitlelerin tarih yaptığını ve aynı zamanda tarih olduğunun altına çizerken, siyasi özne için dönemselleştirilmesiyle beraber düşünülmesi gerekmektedir. Dönemselleştirme kavramsallaştırmasının ön basamağı olan Badiou'nün Hegel yorumu, Fransa bağlamında Hegel'in nasıl alımlandığının analizi ile başlar. Hegel'in mantığının ön plana çıkarılması gerektiğini ve Marx'ın Hegel'i ikiye böldüğünü iddia eden Badiou, bu bağlamda Althusser'in Hegel yorumunu mantığı es geçmesi bakımından eleştirdiği belirtilmiştir. Niteliksel ikiliğin, tek bir kavram altında düşünülemeyeceği

yorumuna dayanan Badiou'nun görüşü, Hegel'in diyalektik anlayışının materyalist bir bağlamda düşünülmesi gerektiğini vurgular. Bu bağlamda Badiou için diyalektik içerisinde materyalizmi ortaya çıkaran ya da Hegel'i "ikiye bölen"in Marx olduğu idda edilmiştir.

Bunlarla beraber, tezin bazı sınırlılıkları vardır. Bunların ilki, tezin çağdaş politik durumlara ilişkin analizlerinin yetersizliğidir. Günümüzde sınıf siyaseti ve onun temsilci partisi fikrine bağlı kalınıp kalınamayacağı belirsizdir. Bu doğrultuda tez, kavramsal bir araştırma sunarken, belki de tarihsel çelişkinin ve tarihsel olanın fonksiyonel bir şekilde kullanılamayacağının altını çizerken onun güncel gerçekliği hakkında kavramsal araştırmanın sınırları dışına çıkamamıştır.

Tezin motivasyonu öncelikli, "gerçek" ile "bilgi" arasındaki ilişkiyi detaylandırmaktı. Bu ilişki en temel veya soyut biçimde konumlandırılmaya çalışıldığında, öznel olan ile nesnel olanı birlikte ifade etmek en önemli soru hâline gelir. Dolayısıyla bu ilişkinin ifadesinde, Marksizm ve psikanalize referansla söylemlerin "bilimselliği" üzerine bir tartışma kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. Tezin bir diğer eksikliği, bu bağlamda çağdaş bilimsel veya akademik söylemlerin statüsünün analizine yeterince değinilmemiş olmasıdır; bu, "bilgi" alanında işleyen ideolojiyi açığa çıkarabilirdi.

Bu tez çerçevesinde, "Yunan sanatının sürekliliği" konusunun daha ileri bir biçimde ele alınması da mümkün olabilirdi. Badiou'nun *Theory of the Subject* kitabında Yunan tragedyalarını karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmesi, tartışmanın öznel düzeyde ele alınmasını sağlayabilirdi.

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