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Ideological orientations and generalized prejudice in Turkey: Adapting the dual process motivational model

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ABSTRACT

The mutually exclusive *authoritarianisms* (i.e., nationalist, secular, and elitist vs. religious-Islamist) in West Asia (Middle East) do not correspond to the political structures in Euro-American settings (i.e., one traditional/conservative authority). This distinction suggests that the relationships of RWA and SDO with political ideologies and generalized prejudice might differ from the predictions of the dual-process motivational model of ideology and generalized prejudice (DPM). To investigate this idea, we used the DPM's structure with culture-sensitive hypotheses in the light of the socio-cultural work on ideologies and social dynamics in Turkey. In Study 1 (N = 259), belief in a competitive jungle positively predicted SDO, and belief in a dangerous world did not predict RWA. RWA negatively predicted left-wing and positively predicted right-wing ideology. SDO negatively predicted left-wing ideology but did not predict right-wing ideology. In Study 2 (N = 312), the relations between worldviews and attitudinal orientations replicated. Further, we developed a context-specific (i.e., Turkey) generalized prejudice measure to test the hypotheses associated with intergroup prejudice, which had a factor structure compatible with the DPM. SDO predicted prejudice toward derogated groups positively and dangerous groups negatively, and it was not relevant to the attitudes toward dissident groups in Turkey. RWA predicted prejudice toward dissident and dangerous groups *positively,* and derogated groups *negatively*. These two studies showed the importance of analyzing political ideology and intergroup prejudice from a cultural-ecological perspective by revealing the contextual characteristics constructing social relations.

Scholars in the field of social and political psychology generally examine sociopolitical attitudes, including ideological orientations and intergroup prejudice, on a single dimension from left to right. However, some researchers argue that sociopolitical attitudes might be organized by dual motivational pathways expressed by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto et al., 1994). Combining these two views, the dual-process motivational model of ideology and prejudice (i.e., DPM, Duckitt et al., 2002) presents a comprehensive perspective on the individual precursors of ideological orientation and intergroup prejudice, two of the most heavily studied topics in social and political psychology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017).

According to DPM, the motivational bases of RWA and SDO represent different pathways that lead to conservative ideologies from beliefs in a dangerous world (BDW) and beliefs in a competitive jungle (BCJ). Scholars have tested the role of these two pathways in

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predicting nationalist and prejudiced attitudes across many settings in the world, including the USA, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, Italy, Germany (Perry et al., 2013), France, Greece (Lampropoulos et al., 2021), Lebanon (Levin et al., 2013), and Brazil (Cantal et al., 2015).

The model's fundamental predictions regarding ideology and prejudice seem to be established. However, there is no evidence from cultural settings such as West Asia (Middle East) where the political cleavages do not map on the traditional conservatism-liberalism continuum and higher authoritarianism levels are grounded in multiple conflicting sources (such as traditional religious authority and nationalist-elitist and secular authority). Further, even though these settings are culturally diverse, anti-ethnic policies are prominent in those settings. Some examples of these policies and legal regulations include, for example, the lack of an explicit recognition (except for non-Muslims) of ethnic minorities inhabiting those spaces. These characteristics and the literature associated with those settings guided our predictions of the DPM structure for Turkey. We tested these predictions in two studies. In Study 1, we examined the effects of worldviews and attitudinal orientations (RWA and SDO) on individuals' ideological orientations. In Study 2, we applied the same model on a measure of generalized prejudice explicitly developed for the cultural context of Turkey.

Dual process motivational model of ideology and generalized prejudice

DPM posits that social and political attitudes can be organized around two separate dimensions instead of a single left-right continuum, RWA and SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt, 2001). These two dimensions are of significant value in explaining a wide range of social and political phenomena, including intergroup prejudice, sociopolitical attitudes, and ideological orientations (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010).

The first attitudinal orientation, RWA, concerns maintaining and establishing stability, order, and security. RWA has three main dimensions: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006). *Authoritarian submission* refers to an unbreakable trust in authorities. *Authoritarian aggression* is the aggression toward "marginal" groups sanctioned by the authorities. Finally, *conventionalism* refers to the idea that everyone should follow the rules/norms generated and suggested by the authority (Altemeyer, 2006).[1]

Features of RWA afford right-wing authoritarians to see out-group members as threats to the traditional value system (Altemeyer, 1981) and endorse right-wing attitudes such as victim-blaming and religious conservatism (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996, 2006). According to the DPM, RWA develops as a function of *dangerous worldview* (i.e., the worldview that suggests the world is a dangerous and threatening place instead of safe, stable, and predictable), besides the other contributing factors such as dispositional characteristics and socialization experiences (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt et al., 2002).

The second attitudinal orientation, SDO, concerns reinforcing the hierarchical and unequal relations between social groups, which includes maintaining or generating power (Pratto et al., 1994) and superiority and dominance for one's in-group (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Features of SDO afford developing pro-capitalist and pro-war attitudes, ethnocentrism, and discrimination against social groups that challenge intergroup dominance and the hierarchical structure of a society (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1994). According to the DPM, SDO develops as a function of *competitive jungle worldview* (i.e., the world is a competitive jungle: a completely immoral, dog-eat-dog world where the struggle for resources is required for survival and the "might is the right"), alongside the personality and socialization factors (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

Turkey is a fertile context to study the predictions regarding motivational bases of political ideology and generalized prejudice, guided by DPM. Contrasting with the previous settings that the DPM has been tested on, Turkey embeds *two* central authorities (i.e., religious and nationalist) in constant opposition, which emerged at different time points in the Republic's history. Similar to the settings that the DPM has been tested so far, the traditional religious authority in Turkey is rooted in RWA through social conservatism (Aktürk, 2015). In other words, the way the RWA operates within the DPM in Turkey is similar to the previous settings in the DPM has been tested. More specifically, RWA in Turkey is positively associated with social conservatism, therefore, traditional religiosity (Islam, in Turkey), and conventionalism (Saribay & Yilmaz, 2018). However, traditional religious (Islamic) authority[2] does not support economic conservatism, nor do the rightist political parties in Turkey. Further, secularism constitutes the core piece of the nationalist authority, which is against the values of religious and social conservatism but in line with some leftist ideas such as feminism, obviously, in their own interpretation of feminism and modernity (Özbudun, 2013).

Ideological orientations and DPM

Political ideologies are shared ideas, beliefs, and opinions that affect intergroup relations and public policy (Freeden, 2003). According to Lane (1962, pp. 415), those ideologies stem from "certain common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts." Following the French Revolution, *left* and *right* are used to define and examine political ideology. This simple line abridged ideological tendencies between the two poles of left and right. Positioning different ideologies on that line is a well-accepted argument in the political science community (Brown, 2004; Converse, 2004).

[1] Yet, there are data showing that in politically unstable contexts, the factor structure of RWA may differ (e.g., Vilanova et al., 2020).

[2] Here, the authors refer to any type of Islamic authority (e.g., religious affairs department, political Islamic parties, Islamic public authorities such as hodjas) that is perceived as to be competent enough to know and suggest ways of living according to Islam. Therefore, this phrase refers to any public or political authority of Islamic accounts.

Beginning with the seminal study of Adorno and colleagues (Adorno et al., 1950), scholars from the field of social and political psychology have studied the psychological backdrop of ideological orientations (see Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003 for reviews). Although these investigations are valuable in understanding the components of political ideologies and variables associated with them, they mainly focus on the differences between the two poles, implying the necessity of broader frameworks explaining the psychological roots of ideological orientations.

Even though both RWA and SDO relate to right-wing ideologies, the antecedents for each, as well as their relevant outcomes, differ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Both can be traced back to an indirect influence of threat on right-wing policy support (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017; Duckitt, 2001). RWA stems from a social threat-based process. Informed by the social conformity orientation and BDW, people high in RWA are attracted to conservative ideologies and right-wing parties that promote law and order with a motivation to conserve the existing order, oppose change, and manage the perception of a chaotic, dangerous, and threatening world around them.

SDO's association with right-wing ideologies, on the other hand, stems from an economic threat-based process: people high in SDO prefer right-leaning ideologies that promote free-market capitalism and emphasize anti-welfare policies to ensure the elimination of competitive groups that pose an economic threat and establish their in-group's superiority and dominance (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). One can trace those to a view of human nature that is inherently competitive and selfish (BCJ) and, consequently, SDO. Evidence supports those postulations by showing that RWA and SDO, as well as BDW and BCJ, predict right-wing ideologies through different paths indeed (Federico et al., 2009; Weber & Federico, 2007).

Upon closer look, however, the relationship between threat and conservatism can be more complicated. According to the DPM, perceived threat (in the form of the dual social worldviews) is expected to predict conservatism indirectly. However, that relationship might vary as a function of the context in which the threat emerges, and the conceptualization of threat informed by cultural ecologies. For example, in a context that constructs threat through terrorism, the effect of threat on conservative policy support is moderated by authoritarian tendencies. For non-authoritarians, the perceived threat is directly related to increased conservatism (hawkish attitudes and restriction of civil liberties). However, for authoritarians, perceiving threat does not increase their endorsement of conservatism (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).

Some examples regarding the complex nature of the relationship between threat, worldviews, and attitudinal orientations come from Turkey. For safety and security, Turkey ranks 152nd in safety and security among 163 European countries (most peaceful to least) according to the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). It ranks 144th in "societal safety and security," and 158th in "ongoing domestic and international conflict". While reporting an increase in fatalities due to those conflicts, Turkey also has the worst terrorism score amongst the countries in the European and Balkan regions. These data also present an interesting case to study DPM in Turkey with regards to the salience and prevalence of physical safety/security threat, of which perceptions are theorized to construct attitudinal orientations in DPM. According to this analysis, endorsement of authoritarian tendencies in Turkey might not necessarily be based on the individual differences, but instead, they are afforded by the context that lacks a peaceful environment. Studies from Turkey indeed show that dual social worldviews are not related to right-wing ideologies or right-wing authoritarian tendencies (Sayılan, 2018; Sayılan et al., 2019).

Another argument that is potentially challenging the DPM's assumptions about worldviews and attitudinal orientations is the bidirectional relationship between threat and attitudinal orientations. In other words, RWA might be both the antecedent and the outcome of the perceived threat (Sibley et al., 2006). Especially in settings where one dominant orientation is prominent, it would be more difficult to observe the relationship between individual differences in worldviews and RWA. Further, RWA is a socially embedded construct that can have varying implications based on contextual characteristics.

One of these settings with respect to conservatism is Turkey. Like many West Asian (Middle Eastern) countries, Turkey is also predominantly Muslim and socially conservative. In fact, Turkey is more conservative than any European country, despite its geographical closeness to Europe and the early Republican secularism it experienced. The authoritarian values of Turkish citizens (indexed by the "Schwartz authoritarian values" included in the European Social Survey) show a strong and steady upward trend across generations (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; p. 107). This trend in conservatism also affects younger generations in Turkey. KONDA (2011) reports that 66,1% of the youngsters in Turkey agree that "traditions should be protected with no changes." (Yılmaz, 2008). In this regard, Kalaycıoğlu (2016) provides a striking analysis of the political culture in Turkey, underlining the "magnitude of the lack of tolerance, interpersonal trust, and confidence in […] institutions and agencies of the state." (p. 177). Taken together, the data point to culturally embedded forms of authoritarianism reflected in various forms of hostility and polarization present in people's daily practices. Consequently, the theoretical and empirical evidence from Turkey so far does not suggest a direct hypothesis regarding the relationship between BDW and RWA.

Cross-cultural analysis of political ideology

With regards to the DPM's predictions about political ideology and attitudinal orientations, the empirical evidence from settings that do not have political systems similar to Western settings (e.g., the U.S., New Zealand, Brazil) do not necessarily replicate the DPM's postulations in this regard as a function of what left and right represents. For example, authoritarianism in Russia is positively related to the economic left, and negatively related to support for democracy (McFarland et al., 1992). Similarly, former socialist countries, such as Poland and Hungary, do not signal overlap between RWA, SDO, and right-wing ideologies (Duriez et al., 2005; Todosijević & Enyedi, 2008). Researchers found some evidence that in Hungary, a country with multiple conflicting authorities in its history, authoritarianism is positively related to both right-wing and left-wing extremism (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2008). In other words, RWA was not only positively associated with right-wing ideologies but also left-wing ideologies.

The presumed positive relationship between RWA and SDO by the DPM is subject to contextual analyses as well. For example, RWA

and SDO were not related to each other in Poland, contrasting with the countries that have clear left-right dimensionality to define political ideology. This finding suggests that individuals with high levels of RWA do not necessarily hold strong SDO, and vice versa (Duriez et al., 2005). These studies demonstrate that RWA and SDO do not relate to political ideology in the same way across countries.

Even though there is not enough empirical data on the relationship between political ideology, attitudinal orientations, and worldviews in Turkey, the political science literature in Turkey clues particular differences between the political systems in Turkey and the Western countries (or those that have similar socio-political systems similar to Western countries). One analysis of cultural comparison to trace the roots of political ideology in a cultural setting would be through social cleavages. Social cleavages are of historical importance in the political science community when investigating the patterns of political systems, especially due to their complex and culture-bound nature.

Compared to Euro-American cultural settings, the main social cleavages that shaped political structures differ in Turkey. In other words, non-Western social cleavages that affected political meaning-making processes in Turkey gave different meanings to left-right ideologies than the Euro-American political systems. Analyses of Turkey's social cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Mardin, 1973) show that even though the center-periphery and church-state (in the form of Muslim-Secular divide, which is distinct yet functionally similar to the church-state tension in Western Europe) cleavages exist in Turkish politics, the center-periphery corresponds to the Muslim-secular divide (Özbudun, 2013, p. 6).[3] Therefore, what defines the ideological "left" and "right" in Turkey is different from the settings in which the social cleavages do not overlap (Çarkoğlu & Avcı, 2002; Çarkoğlu, 2007; Gülener, 2007; Öniş, 2009; Özbudun, 2006). Moreover, the recent authority shift (in 2002) fueled the sharp divide between the supporters of the secular, elitist, and nationalist (former) authority; and the supporters of the religious and conventionalist current authority. This clash, rather than the traditional left-right distinction, appears to be a more prominent feature of the political climate of contemporary Turkey (e.g., Güneş-Ayata & Ayata, 2002; Kalaycıoğlu, 1999, 2002).

Another analysis of cultural comparison of political orientations in varying settings considers the dominant religious and social orientations in a country. As mentioned above. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country. With respect to economic orientations, scholars argue that in predominantly Muslim nations, religious (Islamic) conservatism is positively associated with economic communitarianism. Scholars explain this association by the common ideology in Islamic groups, which suggests that the state is responsible for taking care of those in need and decreasing inequality (Davis & Robinson, 2006). In contrast, individuals and political parties with orientations towards modernity in those settings tend to be in favor of economic conservatism. This association is due to the very close link between modern ideologies, neoliberalism, and the emphasis on individuality (Adams et al., 2015; Davis & Robinson, 2006). Turkey is another example to observe these relationships.

Even though during the Ottoman Empire, the main authority (i.e., sultan) certainly had a religious character, the emergence of religious authority in Turkish bureaucracy is closely related to the nationalist reform in the Turkish Republic. Opposing the elitist, nationalist, and modern authority of Mustafa Kemal and his political party (i.e., CHP), the Islamic authority claimed to represent the low-SES people in Turkey during the early years of the Republic (Özbudun, 2006a, 2006b). Therefore, right-wing political parties in Turkey have had the discourse of representing the Islamist communities at the periphery, the peasants, rather than the powerful bourgeoisie or elites (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005; Özbudun, 2013; Yılmaz, 1997). Bylaws of right-wing parties are in line with conventionalism and protection of the traditional values (Özbudun, 2013), and therefore RWA, but against the economic motivations of SDO. This character of the Islamic authority was in line with previous findings from Turkey that suggest a positive relationship between religiosity and social conservatism, and a negative relationship between religiosity and economic conservatism (Yılmaz et al., 2016). These features of conservative authority in Turkey, therefore, would not afford a robust positive link of right-wing ideologies in Turkey to SDO as in Euro-American political systems (or those that resemble the ones in Euro-American cultural settings, e.g., Davis & Robinson, 2006; Özbudun, 2006a; Saribay & Yilmaz, 201; Yılmaz et al., 2016; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016).

In addition to the above-mentioned distinctions of religious and elitist/nationalist authorities in Turkey from those in Western settings, the nationalist authority claimed to be "the" defender of equality and freedom. More specifically, nationalist authority constructed a discourse, which suggested that liberation is necessary, and could only be possible by detachment from traditional Islamism in the Ottoman period. In this respect, nationalist authority resembles to neoliberal authorities with an emphasis on Westernization and modernity. However, it still is essentially different from those authorities in the sense that it centers around ethnic nationalist perspectives (Davis & Robinson, 2006).

The nationalist authority was in constant contradiction with its claims of freedom and equality – in the end, its ultimate goal was to establish an egalitarian nation-state that aimed to erase the presence of ethnic minorities (Hür, 2018). With regards to traditional constructions of gender relations, similar to other nation-building processes in East and West Asia, Turkish women are perceived as bearers of the nation-culture (Jayawardena, 1986). The Turkish Republic constructed the identity of the "ideal" Turkish woman in a way that asked Turkish women to be modern and progressive (liberated from Islam, sharing an image with their Western counterparts), and nationalist at the same time (Çağlayan, 2012; Kandiyoti, 1997). However, these tendencies did not prevent certain constructs to be associated with this authority, such as feminism.

Overall, the nationalist authority aligned with both American neoliberal political thought through orientations toward modernity and relatively libertarian economic plans (Davis & Robinson, 2006; Özbudun, 2013), conventional right-wing authoritarianism through nationalism, and fascistic policies it implemented over ethnic and sexual minorities (Hür, 2018). This background resulted in

[3] In the practice of Islam in Turkey, there has never been a "church", so laïcité refers notionally to" … not just separation of the state from the institutions of Islam but also liberation of the individualmind from the restraints imposed by the traditional Islamic concepts and practices, and modernizationof all aspects of state and society that had been molded by Islamic traditions and ways" (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 384).

two main interpretations of nationalism in Turkey, one being egalitarian nationalism and the other one being a synthesis of Islam and Turkishness (Turk-Islam synthesis). The latter interpretation of nationalism was more in line with the ideology of the Ottoman Empire and aimed at a Turkic Islamic state (Kadıoğlu, 2020). This ideology has frequently been used by conservative nationalists in Turkey as a solution to a seemingly contradictory combination of two identities (Kadıoğlu, 2020). The current administration and the coalition it is in with Nationalistic Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi), for instance, represent this ideology, which also suggests the mainstream idea of nationalism could align with its Islamic orientation (Kadıoğlu, 2020).

The historical background of Turkey we presented above suggests that right-wing ideological orientations in Turkey such as nationalism, religious conservatism, and national vision will cluster together through the social conservative sensibilities of these ideologies. In contrast, the emphasis on freedom-oriented discourse of this elitist authority, such as feminism and social democracy, will cluster together with left-wing ideologies such as ecologism and communism.

This analysis suggests the hypothesis that RWA will be positively related to right-wing ideologies and negatively related to left-wing ideologies via social conservative sensibilities. However, previous research on the political and social structures of Turkey does not suggest the replication of the associations between ideologies and SDO. The main reason for this, as explained in detail above, is the political motivations associated with SDO. For settings that do not construct right-wing political ideology at the intersection of traditional authoritarianism and laissez-faire economic ideology, such as Turkey, one would not expect to replicate the DPM's postulations with regard to SDO and ideological orientations. In other words, since right-wing political ideologies have contradicting motivations for social and economic conservatism, their link with SDO becomes blurry for political ideologies in Turkey. Furthermore, due to the lack of emphasis on economic conservatism in any ideological wing, and varying representations of ideologies such as feminism (traditional, modernist vs. decolonial, equality-oriented), one does not hypothesize any directive relationship between SDO and political ideology in Turkey.

Intergroup prejudice and DPM

Prejudice is a complex construct rooted in various factors and expressed through many different processes beyond a mere prejudiced personality (Akrami et al., 2011; Meeusen et al., 2017). Scholars revealed several triggers for prejudicial tendencies such as one's beliefs of insecurity and anxiety about in-group's cohesiveness, uncertainty about the out-groups, rivalry for the resources with other groups, submission to the in-group, ethnocentrism, RWA, and SDO (Adorno et al., 1950; Crandall & Stangor, 2005; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Uyan-Semerci et al., 2017; Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). DPM, informed by social psychological research, provides a systematic approach to prejudice with more specific predictions regarding the roles of worldviews and the relevant attitudinal orientations.

Based on the stability of the motives behind, one might distinguish between general and target-specific prejudice. *Target-specific prejudice* relates to the intergroup context, whereas *generalized prejudice* is a result of more stable characteristics of the individual like personality and ideology. Hence, generalized prejudice refers to a general attitude toward several types of minorities/out-groups (Meeusen et al., 2017). Empirical data validated the concept of generalized prejudice (e.g., Cantal et al., 2015; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), also by showing that RWA and SDO predict generalized prejudice (e.g., Duriez et al., 2007; Kteily et al., 2011; Meeusen et al., 2017; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Stenner, 2009). Furthermore, RWA and SDO predict generalized prejudice towards perceived-to-be despised and derogated minority groups through different paths (Duckitt et al., 2002).

DPM clusters minorities into three groups: dangerous, derogated, and dissident. *Dangerous* groups threaten the existing system, but they are not in direct competition for power in the existing hierarchical system. *Derogated* groups are low-status and subordinate groups in society, but they do not threaten the majority's position in the hierarchy. *Dissident* groups are perceived as both subordinate and threatening to existing power relations. According to the DPM, RWA positively predicts prejudice toward dangerous groups, SDO positively predicts prejudice toward derogated groups, and RWA and SDO simultaneously positively predict prejudice toward dissident groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

Cross-cultural analysis of intergroup prejudice

Turkey has a broad but not completely recognized minority spectrum (Bora, 2017; Karimova & Deverell, 2001). In other words, despite numerous ideological, ethnic, sexual, and gender minority groups, their representation is strictly limited (Aktürk, 2015; Kurban, 2007). Similar to the nation-building processes in East Asia, nationalism erased the identities of many minority groups in Turkey by reinforcing one umbrella identity of able-bodied heterosexual Muslim Turkishness (Jayawardena, 1986; Kaya, 2013; Kurban, 2007).

As for the regime the state of Turkey adopts for minorities, the laws recognize only non-Muslims as minorities. However, the Kurds and Alevis constitute about 15% of the population in Turkey (Aktürk, 2015). According to Esmer (2012), 10% of the population identify themselves with an ethnic minority, but that might even be an underrepresentation of the actual numbers. Although numbers seem to imply a cultural mosaic, Turkey presents an example of an anti-ethnic regime (Aktürk, 2015, p. 16).

Anti-ethnic regime refers to the allowance of multi-ethnic membership without recognizing any rights related to the expression of ethnic minority identities (ethnic autonomy, positive discrimination, recognition by the constitution, legal use of mother tongue). Turkey explicitly executed assimilation strategies after establishing the Republic, and the ethnic minorities (except for non-Muslim groups) are neither segregated nor recognized (Aktürk, 2015, p. 23). Therefore, not surprisingly, 76% of the population identify themselves as "Turkish" instead of their original ethnicities (Aktürk, 2015, p.20), which suggests that majority membership does not necessarily require actual belongingness to a certain ethnic group (Turkish), even though the content of this ethnic membership might vary.

The environment of threat and lack of security in Turkey affords dangerous groups to be salient. However, because empirical data does not suggest a positive relationship between BDW and RWA, one does not hypothesize a directional relationship between RWA and prejudice toward dangerous groups. From the perspective of BCJ, in this threatening environment where individuals fight for resources, dangerous groups are perceived to be increasing their chances of survival. However, due to the same threat environment in which "illegitimate" ways of power endorsement could actually threaten the established power dynamics, which could be a point of relevance for SDO. These interpretations suggest interesting dynamics to be explored in Turkey, to the extent which might complicate the established relations between SDO and attitudes toward dissident and dangerous social groups. As for the dissident and derogated groups, the empirical and theoretical literature suggest the hypothesized replication of previous findings in different settings that the DPM has been tested in.

Furthermore, there are some other accounts that suggest a positive relationship between SDO and prejudice toward any group in their work conducted in Europe. Zick and colleagues (2008; group-focused enmity) argue that inequality-focused orientations predict generalized prejudice toward social groups in general. They suggest that prejudice toward different groups are interrelated, and SDO is consistently associated with prejudice even though the cultural contexts determine the social groups to be targeted. Studies informed by Zick and colleagues' (2008) research provide evidence supporting the group-focused enmity idea by showing that prejudice one feels toward different groups is related to each other. Group-focused enmity, the ideology of inequality, predicts prejudice toward a range of social groups (e.g., the homeless, foreigners, women) categorized under different clusters by the DPM (e.g., Beierlein et al., 2014; Davidov et al., 2011).

Even though several studies have examined prejudice toward people from Turkey (e.g., Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) or investigating Turkish people's attitudes toward Kurds or Armenians (e.g., Balaban, 2013; Çoşgun, 2004; Marchand & Perrier, 2013; Saraçoğlu, 2011; Uygun, 2006), no study so far has been concerned about the worldview-based roots of prejudice toward a broad array of minorities in Turkey to our knowledge. Similarly, even though some studies examine prejudice toward more than one or two minority groups (e.g., Çoban-Keneş, 2015), the literature lacks a measure of generalized prejudice for social groups in Turkey (Uyan-Semerci et al., 2017). Because intergroup studies in the context of Turkey has yet to achieve its maturity stage, the data so far do not suggest unequivocal and definitive hypotheses regarding intergroup prejudice in Turkey and its predictors. However, we hope to address this gap by testing the relationships between attitudinal orientations and prejudice toward varying social groups of different types in Turkey, with the guidance of the theoretical background of Turkey's socio-political structures and the DPM.

Present studies

Following the structure of the DPM, in Study 1, we tested the proposed relations between ideological orientations, BDW, and BCJ through the mediators of RWA and SDO with a sample from Turkey. In Study 2, we focused on the relationships between the worldviews, RWA, SDO, and generalized prejudice toward three groups of minorities, again by using the DPM's structure with a sample from Turkey. To do so, we also developed a primary measure of generalized prejudice in Turkey.

Study 1

Method

Participants

We collected data from 259 university students (148 women, 111 men) who participated in the online study for course credit. Participants' ages ranged from 19 to 32 ($M = 21.79$, $SD = 1.81$). The majority of the participants identified with a religious group (63,3%). However, they were low in religiosity ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 2.99$ on an 11-point scale) and conservatism ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 2.48$ on an 11-point scale). They leaned slightly to the left-wing ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 2.13$ on an 11-point scale) in a single-item political self-placement scale, which is different from the ideological orientations scale, and we included this single-item measure for descriptive purposes only.

Measures

Demographic and Background Variables. Participants responded to demographic questions such as gender, age, and religiosity.

Ideological Orientation. Participants indicated their ideological orientations on an 11-point Likert-type scale from 1 (does not reflect me at all) to 11 (reflects me completely; Sayılan & Türkoğlu, 2015; revised Sayılan, 2018). The scale had 16 items that represent prevalent ideologies of contemporary Turkey.

We performed principal component analysis with Promax rotation to determine the factor structure of the ideological orientations measure. We decided the number of factors by using the Kaiser criterion (i.e., eigenvalues over 1.00), the Catell scree plot test, Monte Carlo parallel analysis, and the interpretability of scores.

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test score was.86, which indicated that the scale items were suitable for factor analysis. The analyses initially suggested 3 factors with eigenvalues over 1.00. These three factors explained 64.13% of total variance. However, the scree plot and parallel analysis showed that the original two-factor solution was more appropriate. With the guidance of these analyses, we repeated the factor analysis by removing the item "social democracy" due to a cross-load.

The two factors explained 56.76% of the total variance. The first factor included eight right-wing ideologies (Nationalist Conservatism, Idealism, Conservative Democracy, Conservatism, Turkism, Radical Islam, National Vision Movement, and Nationalism) and accounted for 33.78% of total variance with an eigenvalue of 5.07, α = .90. The second factor included seven left-wing ideologies (Marxism, Communism, Socialism, Anarchism, Kurdish Political Movement, Ecologism, and Feminism) and explained 22.98% of total variance with an eigenvalue of 3.45, α = .83. See Table 1 for the details of the analyses.

Belief in a Dangerous World (BDW). Participants indicated the extent to which they believe that the world is a dangerous and threatening place (rather than a safe and secure one) on the Turkish version (Sayılan, 2018) of Duckitt and colleagues' (2002) 10-item 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree), α = .75 (e.g., "Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial, a person's chances of being robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up."). We determined the factor structure of the scale by conducting a principal components analysis. Because Item 9 failed to load onto the single component significantly, we excluded this item in the analyses. We included the factor structure of the Turkish form in Online Supplementary Material 1 (OSM 1).

Belief in a Competitive Jungle (BCJ). Participants indicated the extent to which they believe that the world is ruthless and a competitive jungle (rather than a cooperative and peaceful one) on the Turkish version (Sayılan, 2018) of Duckitt and colleagues' (2002) 20-item 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree), α = .86. The scale had two dimensions: presence of competition (e.g., "Winning is not the first thing; it's the only thing.", α = .82) and ruthlessness (e.g., "The best way to lead a group under one's supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors."(reversed), α = .80). We included the factor structure of the Turkish form in Online Supplementary Material 1 (OSM 1).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Participants indicated the extent to which they endorse authoritarian tendencies on the Turkish adaptation (Güldü, 2011) of Altemeyer (1996) 22-item 9-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The scale had two dimensions: *high-level right-wing authoritarianism* (e.g., "Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs," α = .82) and *low-level right-wing authoritarianism* (e.g., "Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 'traditional family values,' α = .78). We included the factor structure of the Turkish form in OSM 2.

Social dominance orientation (SDO)

Participants indicated the extent to which they support social hierarchy on the Turkish adaptation (Akbaş, 2010) of Pratto and colleagues' (1994) 16-item 7-point Likert type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). The scale had two dimensions: *group-based dominance* (e.g., "Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.", α = .81) and *opposition to equality* (e.g., "All groups should be given an equal chance in life.", α = .91). We included the factor structure of the Turkish form in OSM 2.

Covariates

We controlled the following factors that might affect the associations between worldviews, ideological attitudes, and ideological orientations: age, gender, and religiosity. The models we present partial out the effects of these demographic variables. For the sake of simplicity and because our focus was testing the theoretical model, we presented the models (figures) without these covariates.

Table 1
Pattern Matrix Coefficients for Principal Components Analysis with Promax Rotation on Ideological Identities Scale (N = 259).

Ideological Identities	M	SD	C1	C2[a]
Nationalist Conservatism	3.11	2.79	.87	
Idealism	2.79	2.60	.84	
Conservative Democracy	2.99	2.63	.83	
Conservatism	2.79	2.66	.82	
Turkism	4.60	3.51	.78	
Radical Islam	2.01	2.08	.75	
National Vision Movement	4.64	3.36	.74	
Nationalism	5.29	3.30	.61	
Marxism	4.65	3.09		.86
Communism	4.85	3.13		.84
Socialism	6.62	2.97		.77
Anarchism	3.91	3.06		.68
Kurdish Political Movement	2.85	2.58		.65
Ecologism	6.73	2.98		.59
Feminism	6.71	3.30		.52
Eigenvalue			5.07	3.45
Variance (%)			33.78	22.98
Cronbach's α			.90	.83

[a] C1 = Right-Wing Ideologies; C2 = Left-Wing Ideologies.

Results and discussion

We checked the data in terms of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity assumptions prior to analyses. The results suggested that the data are suitable for multivariate data analyses. See OSM 3 for the details of data cleaning procedures.

Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables

See Table 2 for the descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and zero-order correlations between study variables.

According to the DPM, BDW is correlated with RWA positively, and it is not statistically related to SDO. In contrast to this expectation of the DPM, BDW was negatively, yet, weakly, associated with both RWA and SDO in our study. This finding clues a non-conventional relationship between threat and ideology in Turkey, which we elaborated above. In line with the postulations of the DPM, BCJ was positively correlated with SDO, and it was not related to RWA. RWA and SDO were moderately correlated.

RWA had a strong positive correlation with right-wing ideological orientation and a moderate negative correlation with left-wing ideological orientation. SDO had a moderate positive correlation with right-wing ideological orientation and a moderate negative correlation with left-wing ideological orientation. The correlation between right and left wing ideological orientations was not statistically significant. These patterns replicated the previous findings from the cultural context of Turkey (Sayılan, 2018; Sayılan et al., 2020).

Mediation analyses

We conducted two sets of mediation analyses using the PROCESS Macro version 4.3 Model 4 (Hayes, 2018) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and 5000 bootstrapped samples. We determined the criteria for statistical significance via CIs. If a CI did not contain zero, we reported the associated coefficient as statistically significant. We presented the unstandardized coefficients for both direct and indirect effects.

The models included the dual social worldviews (i.e., BDW and BCJ) as predictors, the two attitudinal orientations of DPM (i.e., RWA and SDO) as mediators, and two forms of ideological orientations (i.e., right-wing and left-wing ideological orientations) as outcome variables. Because our models include two predictor variables (namely BDW and BCJ), we tested the models for each of the predictor variables separately by controlling the effect of the other predictor variable, by adding it as a covariate (see Hayes, 2018 for details of the analyses).

Additionally, we included gender, age, and religiosity as covariates in the models to prevent potential confounding effects associated with demographic differences. For the sake of simplicity and our focus on testing the theoretical model led us to present the models without the path coefficients regarding these covariates. Interested readers may find all path coefficients including the covariates in OSM 4, in Tables S4.1–S4.4.

Right-wing political ideology

The model explained almost half of the variance in right-wing ideological orientation: $R^2 = .47$, $F(7, 251) = 32.13$, $MSE = 50.69$, $p < .001$. See Fig. 1 for the details.

The indirect effects of BDW on right-wing political ideology through RWA and SDO were not statistically significant. BCJ had a small indirect effect on the outcome through the mediation of RWA (B =.08, SE =.04, 95% CI [.0037,.1737]).

As for the relationship between the mediators and right-wing ideological orientation, RWA was positively associated with right-wing ideological orientation (B =.96, SE =.11, $t = 8.83$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.7424, 1.1688]). In line with the theoretical background on political ideologies in Turkey, SDO had no statistically significant association with right-wing political ideology.

Left-wing political ideology

The model explained less variance in left-wing political ideology compared to right-wing: $R^2 = .20$, $F(7, 251) = 8.83$, $MSE = 3.72$, $p < .001$. See Fig. 2 for the details regarding the path coefficients and relationships.

Similar to right-wing ideological orientation, the indirect effects of BDW on left-wing political ideology through the mediators were not statistically significant. BCJ had indirect effects through the mediation of both RWA (B = −.07, SE =.04, 95% CI [−.1617, −.0031]) and SDO (B = −.17, SE =.09, 95% CI [−.3578, −.0101]).

As for the relationship between the mediators and right-wing orientation, BDW was negatively associated with SDO (B = −.15, SE =.07, t = −2.24, p = .03, 95% CI [−.2821, −.0179]). BCJ was positively related to both RWA (B = 20, SE =.10, t = 2.02, p = .01, 95% CI [−.0048, 3864]) and SDO (B =.58, SE =.08, $t = 7.35$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.4271,.7398]).

As for the relationship between the mediators and left-wing ideological orientation, a similar pattern emerged. RWA was negatively associated with left-wing ideological orientation (B =.35, SE =.13, t = −2.83, p = .005, 95% CI [−.6008, −.1078]). The pathway from SDO to left-wing ideology was negative but failed to reach statistical significance.

The results provided some support for the cultural construction of threat and the political structure of Turkey. These cultural processes afforded the model fit with some unorthodox directions in relations between the variables, such as the lack of a significant relationship between BDW and RWA or the finding that SDO had no significant predictive role in explaining right- or left-wing ideologies. These would be considered as evidence of the complexity and cultural specificity of the relations between worldviews, attitudinal orientations, and political ideology.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 1 Variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. BDW	(.77)								
2. BCJ	-.05	(.87)							
3. RWA	-.15*	.00	(.91)						
4. SDO	-.17**	.38**	.44**	(.92)					
5. RWIO	.03	.07	.66**	.34**	(.93)				
6. LWIO	.12*	-.10	-.39**	-.30**	-.12	(.85)			
7. Gender	-.17**	.09	.14*	.13*	-.04	-.17**	–		
8. Age	.02	-.04	.01	.06	.04	.02	.13*	–	
9. Relig.	-.05	-.19**	.63**	.11**	.42**	-.28**	-.07	.00	–
Mean	5.01	2.66	3.04	2.72	3.56	5.19	1.43	21.79	3.96
SD	.81	.69	1.39	.97	2.27	2.12	.50	1.81	2.99

Notes. BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World; BCJ = Belief in a Competitive Jungle; RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; RWIO = Right Wing Ideological Orientation; LWIO = Left Wing Ideological Orientation; Gender = (1 = W, 2 = M); Age = Age in years, Relig. = A single-item religiosity score rated between 1 and 11.
Internal consistency coefficients are presented in parentheses across the diagonal.
** $p < 0.01$.
* $p < 0.05$.




Fig. 1. Path Model Depicting the Relationships between Worldviews, Attitudinal Orientations, and Right-Wing Ideological Orientation. Note. Non-standardized estimates are shown. Paths depicted in dashed lines indicate non-significant coefficients.




Fig. 2. Path Model Depicting the Relationships between Worldviews, Attitudinal Orientations, and Left-Wing Ideological Orientation. Note. Non-standardized estimates are shown. Paths depicted in dashed lines indicate non-significant coefficients.

Study 2

In Study 2, we focused on the relationships between worldviews, attitudinal orientations, and generalized prejudice. Like Study 1, we used the DPM's structure. First, we conducted a pilot study to construct a measure of generalized prejudice in the cultural context of Turkey with various minority groups that may be the target of prejudice under the categories of derogated, dangerous, and dissident groups. Then, we tested the same model with attitudes towards these three groups with the predictor variables BDW and BCJ, and mediator variables RWA and SDO. Similar to Study 1, we report the results of the analyses controlling for gender, age, and religiosity.

Method

Participants

We collected data from 305 university students (169 women, 134 men, and 2 missing) who participated in the online study for course credit.[4] Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 65 ($M = 23.04$, $SD = 5.47$). Participants were low in religiosity ($M = 2.80$, $SD = 2.85$ on a 11-point Likert type scale, higher scores indicated higher religiosity) and conservatism ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 2.29$ on a 11-point Likert type scale, higher scores indicated higher conservatism). Similar to Study 1, participants indicated their political self-placement from left to right on an 11-point Likert-type item. They leaned slightly to the left ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 2.23$).

Measures

We used the same scales as Study 1 to measure BDW, BCJ, RWA, and SDO. We conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses to test whether the proposed factor structure for each construct fit the data. The interested reader may find the details of these analyses in OSM 5.

Generalized prejudice

To our knowledge, there was no generalized prejudice measure specific to the cultural context of Turkey in the literature. To address this gap, we developed a generalized prejudice measure rooted in the cultural practices and group dynamics in Turkey. We first conducted a pilot study to determine the most prevalent social groups toward which people had negative attitudes in Turkey. We collected data from 36 university students (25 women and 9 men) from 7 different universities. Participants' ages ranged from 20 to 25 ($M = 21.42$, $SD = 1.20$).

Following the study conducted by Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), participants indicated the types of groups (e.g., ability, ethnicity, race, age, religion) that they think are categorized by today's society for this pilot study. The most frequent responses were Kurds ($n = 26$), Women ($n = 24$), Alevis ($n = 18$), LGBTQ+ individuals ($n = 16$), Armenians ($n = 9$) and Blue-Collar Workers ($n = 9$). We used these responses as the bases of our measure. The other groups in the measure were those that are prejudiced against by the citizens of Turkey and prevalent in intergroup prejudice literature (Cantal et al., 2015; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010; Duckitt et al., 2002; Esmer, 2012; Hadarics & Kende, 2018; Kurban, 2007).

The final version of the measure included the following groups: atheists, Jewish people, homosexual people, trans individuals, Armenians, activists (protestors), sex workers, Alevi people, feminists, aids patients, Kurdish people, and alcoholics (*dissident* groups); peasants, elderly, the poor, housewives, blue-collar workers, disabled, unemployed, psychiatric patients, and immigrants (*derogated* groups); criminals (murder, theft, etc.), terrorists, drug dealers, road hogs, beggars, and substance abusers (*dangerous* groups). Participants rated their warmth toward these social groups on a 0–100-degree feeling thermometer. In the thermometer, 0 represented the coldest, 50 represented the neutral, and 100 represented the warmest feelings towards the members of each group. Higher scores indicated positive attitudes (i.e., warmth), and lower scores indicated negative attitudes (i.e., prejudice).

We employed a principal components analysis with Promax rotation to determine the factor structure of the scale. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test score was.92, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. According to the results, five components emerged with eigenvalues over 1.00 (the eigenvalues were 9.52, 2.84, 2.28, 1.31, and 1.02), and they explained 62.81% of the total variance. However, a three-factor solution was more admissible based on the scree plot and the parallel analysis. Therefore, we repeated the analysis to force the items into three factors. The three-factor solution explained 54.21% of the total variance in positive attitudes towards these social groups. See Table 3 for the details of each dimension.

As presented in Table 3, the first factor included the *dissident* social groups, which the DPM defines as groups that challenge the norms and values of society and the social hierarchy: atheists, Jews, homosexuals, trans individuals, Armenians, activists (protestors), sex workers, Alevis, feminists, AIDS patients, Kurds, and alcoholics. The second factor included the *derogated* social groups, which the DPM defines as groups that are low in status and prestige, but not dangerous, threatening, or competitive: peasants, elderly, the poor, housewives, blue collar workers, disabled, unemployed, psychiatric patients, and immigrants. The third factor included *dangerous* social groups, which the DPM defines as groups that threaten the safety and well-being of society: terrorists, drug dealers, road hogs, beggars, and substance abusers.

Table 4 shows that bivariate correlations between the three dimensions of generalized prejudice measure were all significant and positive, which indicated that these three dimensions signified different aspects of the same construct. Perceived warmth towards dangerous social groups correlated positively with both derogated ($r = .24, p < .01$), and dissident social groups ($r = .40, p < .01$). The correlation between the warmth towards derogated and dissident groups was also positive, $r = .59$, $p < .01$. These results and the exploratory factor analysis revealed that the three dimensions of generalized prejudice scale we developed were compatible with the literature on generalized prejudice (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2010; Cantal et al., 2015; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Hadarics & Kende, 2018; Sibley et al., 2010).

[4] Unfortunately, due to access and budget restrictions, we collected data from university students in both studies, which is a factor that undermines the representativeness of the data.

Table 3
Pattern Matrix Coefficients for Principal Components Analysis with Promax Rotation on Generalized Prejudice Scale (N = 259).

Target Social Groups	Factor 1: Dissident	Factor 2: Derogated	Factor 3: Dangerous
Atheists	.93		
Jews	.87		
Homosexuals	.85		
Trans Individuals	.79		
Armenians	.75		
Activists (protestors)	.73		
Sex workers	.72		
Alevis	.65		
Feminists	.62		
AIDS patients	.59		
Kurds	.52		
Alcoholics	.43		
Peasants		.88	
Elderly		.86	
The poor		.81	
Housewives		.81	
Blue collar workers		.77	
Disabled		.71	
Unemployed		.49	
Psychiatric patients		.46	
Immigrants		.45	
Criminals (murder, theft, etc.)			.77
Terrorists			.73
Drug dealers			.71
Road hogs	-.31		.71
Beggars			.64
Substance abusers			.54
Eigenvalue	9.52	2.84	2.29
Variance (%)	35.24	10.50	8.46
Cronbach's α	.91	.88	.76

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 2 Variables (N = 312).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. BDW	(.77)									
2. BCJ	.00	(.89)								
3. RWA	-.04	.11*	(.89)							
4. SDO	-.09	.47**	.43**	(.90)						
5. Dang.	-.08	.14*	-.13**	-.17**	(.76)					
6. Dero.	.09	-.29**	-.00	-.31**	.24**	(.88)				
7. Diss.	.13*	-.08	-.54**	-.38**	.40**	.59**	(.91)			
8. Gender	-.25**	.22**	-.04	.15**	-.10	-.22**	-.09	–		
9. Age	-.13*	-.11	-.05	-.08	-.15*	-.03	-.01	.09	–	
10. Relig.	.10	-.22**	.41**	-.00	-.13*	.20**	-.24**	-.17**	-.05	–
Mean	4.91	2.80	2.80	2.66	12.30	70.31	63.41	1.45	23.04	2.80
SD	.92	.88	1.22	1.08	8.86	17.76	20.67	.51	5.47	2.85

Notes. BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World; BCJ = Belief in a Competitive Jungle; RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Dang. = Attitudes towards dangerous social groups; Dero. = Attitudes towards derogated social groups; Diss. = Attitudes towards dissident social groups; Gender = (1 = W, 2 = M); Age = Age in years, Relig. = A single-item religiosity score rated between 1 and 11.
Internal consistency coefficients are presented in parentheses across the diagonal.
** $p < 0.01$.
* $p < 0.05$.

Results and discussion

Descriptive statistics and correlations between the study variables

We checked the data in terms of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity assumptions prior to analyses and found it valid for multivariate data analyses. See OSM 3 for the details of the analysis, and Table 4 for bivariate correlations.

The results indicated that RWA was negatively related to warmth toward dissident social groups, who threaten the norms/values of society and hierarchical social order, $r = -.54$, $p < .01$. RWA was also negatively related to warmth towards dangerous groups ($r = -.13$, $p < .01$) but unrelated to warmth towards the derogated groups. SDO was negatively related to warmth towards all three

clusters of groups: dissident, $r = -.39$, $p < .01$, derogated, $r = -.31$, $p < .01$, and dangerous groups, $r = -.13$, $p < .01$.

Correlations between the worldviews and attitudinal orientations replicated the findings of Study 1. Similar to Study 1, BDW was not associated with RWA, $r = -.04$, $p > .05$, and BCJ was positively related to SDO, $r = .47$, $p < .01$.

Mediation analyses

Following the same analysis procedure in Study 1, we conducted the mediation analyses using the PROCESS Macro version 4.3 Model 4 (Hayes, 2018) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and 5000 bootstrapped samples. We determined the criteria for statistical significance for indirect effects via CIs. If a CI did not contain zero, we reported the associated coefficient as statistically significant. We present the unstandardized coefficients for both direct and indirect effects.

The models included the dual social worldviews (i.e., BDW and BCJ) as predictors, the two attitudinal orientations of DPM (i.e., RWA and SDO) as mediators, and warmth towards three clusters of social groups (i.e., dangerous, dissident, and derogated) as outcome variables. Same as Study 1, we included gender, age, and religiosity as covariates in the models to prevent potential confounding effects associated with demographic differences. For the sake of simplicity and our theoretical focus, we only present the path coefficients of the main variables, but details for covariates are provided in OSM 4, Tables S4.5–S4.9.

Warmth towards dangerous groups

The model explained 16% of variance in warmth towards dangerous groups: $R^2 = .16$, $F(7, 297) = 7.92$, $MSE = 62.48$, $p < .001$. See Fig. 3 for the model details.

BDW had a direct effect on the outcome construct ($B = -1.42$, $SE = .52$, $t = -2.75$, $p = .006$, 95% CI [−2.4452, −.4037]). In contrast, the indirect effect of BDW through RWA was not statistically significant. BCJ had a direct positive effect on warmth towards dangerous groups ($B = 2.73$, $SE = .62$, $t = 4.41$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [1.5115, 3.9435]) and a negative indirect effect through the mediation of SDO ($B = -1.45$, $SE = .36$, 95% CI [−2.2197, −.8018]). SDO, but not RWA, predicted warmth towards dangerous groups ($B = -2.44$, $SE = .53$, $t = -4.59$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [−3.4941, −1.3961]).

Warmth towards derogated groups

The model explained 17% of variance in warmth towards derogated groups: $R^2 = .17$, $F(7, 297) = 8.74$, $MSE = 267.51$, $p < .001$. See Fig. 4 for the details.

BCJ was negatively associated with attitudes towards derogated groups through the mediation of SDO ($B = -2.61$, $SE = .79$, 95% CI [−4.2606, −1.1698]), but it had no direct effects. BDW had no direct or indirect effects on the outcome. SDO predicted warmth towards derogated groups ($B = -4.39$, $SE = 1.10$, $t = -3.98$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [−6.5647, −2.2239]); but RWA did not.

Warmth towards dissident groups

The model explained one third of variance in warmth towards derogated groups: $R^2 = .34$, $F(7, 297) = 21.79$, $MSE = 288.91$, $p < .001$. See Fig. 5 for the details.

BDW had neither direct nor indirect effect on the outcome variable. BCJ indirectly predicted warmth towards dissident groups through both RWA ($B = -2.12$, $SE = .67$, 95% CI [−3.5081, −.8818]) and SDO ($B = -2.59$, $SE = .85$, 95% CI [−4.3149, −.9960]) with no direct effects on the outcome. Both RWA ($B = -7.07$, $SE = .99$, $t = -7.14$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [−9.0149, −5.1198]) and SDO ($B = -4.37$, $SE = 1.14$, $t = -3.81$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [−6.6193, −2.1081]) were negatively associated with warmth towards dissident groups.

BDW failed to predict RWA, but BCJ predicted both SDO ($B = .59$, $SE = .06$, $t = 9.13$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.4660,.7222]) and RWA ($B = .30$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.98$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.1516,.4483]).

Despite the directions of these relations that do not exactly match the DPM's postulations, the results of Study 2 provided some




Fig. 3. Path Model Depicting the Relationships between Worldviews, Attitudinal Orientations, and Warmth towards Dangerous Groups. Note. Non-standardized estimates are shown. Paths depicted in dashed lines indicate non-significant coefficients.




Fig. 4. Path Model Depicting the Relationships between Worldviews, Attitudinal Orientations, and Warmth towards Derogated Groups. Note. Non-standardized estimates are shown. Paths depicted in dashed lines indicate non-significant coefficients.




Fig. 5. Path Model Depicting the Relationships between Worldviews, Attitudinal Orientations, and Warmth towards Dissident Groups. Note. Non-standardized estimates are shown. Paths depicted in dashed lines indicate non-significant coefficients.

evidence for the DPM's fit toTurkey. Further, the patterns of results between worldviews and attitudinal orientations from Study 2 were consistent with those of Study 1. This replication corroborated the arguments regarding the prominent effect of cultural space on the relations between the social constructs, in line with the presented rationale and historical characteristics of Turkey.

General discussion and implications

This study tested the assumptions based on the DPM in a cultural context that does not represent the social and political structure of the Euro-American settings (i.e., West Asia) in two studies. Study 1 tested the relationships between dual social worldviews, RWA, SDO, and ideological orientations in Turkey by using the structure of the DPM. Similarly, Study 2 investigated the relationships between the worldviews, attitudinal orientations, and generalized prejudice toward social minorities in Turkey, again, using the DPM's structure.

DPM asserts that dual social worldviews differentially predict attitudinal orientations (i.e., RWA and SDO) and ideological orientations: BDW predicts RWA, BCJ predicts SDO, and RWA and SDO are related to both left and right ideologies. However, in line with the previous literature on the socio-political structure and construction of threat in Turkey (e.g., Sayılan, 2018, Sayılan et al., 2019), BCJ predicted SDO, but BDW did not predict RWA.

The assessment of social and economic conservatism abstracted from their contextual meaning would not be a conceptually relevant measure of political ideology. Turkey's political structure does not correspond to those that are prominent in the Euro-American settings. To accommodate that concern, we used the political ideology measure specifically developed for ideological identities and views in Turkey (and named it ideological orientations) and based our analyses on the local realities. As mentioned above, political ideologies in Turkey revealed the left and right to be uncorrelated two dimensions in the current study, and in line with the predictions, the data showed that the driving force of political ideologies is mostly related to social conservatism, hence, RWA.

RWA had a significant positive association with right-wing ideological orientation and a significant negative association with left-wing ideological orientation, both of which confirm the existing literature. Again, though, in line with previous data that suggests that the predictors of political ideology might be more complicated than what DPM predicts, SDO was not associated with either ideological wing. The lack of a significant link with the right-wing ideology seems to complement the previous assertions that self-identified right-wingers in Turkey tend to focus more on social conservatism (preserving traditional Islamic values), but not necessarily economic liberalism (free-market capitalism) component that is typically associated with SDO. Further, the results were in line with the varying representations of the same ideologies in Turkey that constitute the left-wing, such as feminism, through the lack of a negative relationship between SDO and left-wing ideologies (e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 2005; Özbudun, 2013; Yılmaz, 1997).

According to the DPM, RWA predicts prejudice towards the *dangerous* groups, those that are viewed as threatening the established norms and values but are not competitive in contrast to SDO's proposed weak-to-no relationship with those groups. As for the *derogated groups,* those that are neither threatening nor competitive, DPM suggests that SDO is the predictor of prejudice towards them while RWA does not have a significant effect on attitudes towards those groups. According to the DPM, *dissident groups*, the social groups that are perceived to be both threatening and competitive, are predicted by both RWA and SDO.

This context-sensitive research, informed by the context-specific generalized prejudice measure we developed, showed that SDO positively predicted prejudice toward all groups: dangerous, dissident, and derogated. RWA was only positively related to prejudice towards dissident groups. Dangerous groups in Turkey were perceived to be acting in accordance with BCJ, so the data show that BCJ is negatively associated with prejudice toward dangerous groups. However, these groups are also potential threats to the established power hierarchies. Therefore, they could concern people with high levels of SDO, which might have resulted in the positive relationship between SDO and prejudice toward dangerous groups, in a context of high threat and low safety/security (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). However, because RWA is not rooted in BDW in Turkey, as both the literature and the current study suggest, RWA had no association with prejudice toward dangerous groups in Turkey.

Ina similar line of thought, research associates disgust sensitivity, heightened threats of danger, and death threat with prejudicial orientations and preference of hierarchy through realistic threats to security (Hudson & Costello, 2007; Rozin et al., 2000). Given the threatening environment in Turkey that makes dangerous groups salient, SDO could be consequently positively associated with prejudice towards dangerous groups, because the perceived threat in Turkey is in fact, real threat. Therefore, even though BCJ is negatively associated with prejudice toward dangerous groups, preference for inequality and realistic threat in Turkey might be associating SDO and prejudice toward dangerous groups positively. In a similar vein, BDW is positively associated with prejudice toward dangerous groups, through the concerns about protecting security.

Another potential explanation for the relationship between SDO and all types of prejudice could be group-focused enmity (Zick et al., 2008). In their work conducted in Europe, Zick and colleagues (2008) found that generalized prejudice is essentially associated with orientations toward acceptance of and support for social hierarchy. The data from the current work corroborate Zick and colleagues' (2008) findings, but it is inconclusive that there is a driving mechanism in nation-states around Europe, or some other underlying variable is responsible for this relationship in Turkey, such as the particular socio-historical background of Turkey. A definitive answer awaits future research.

Like every study, this study is not without limitations. For instance, these data could only speak for correlational evidence. Therefore, one should be cautious while making causal claims with the current data. Further, the samples consisted of university students only. Similar to every other research with convenience sampling from university students, the generalizability of this study's data is very limited. Especially with regard to authoritarian tendencies, nationalism, and political Islam, the samples had limitations regarding the extent to which they represent the population in Turkey. Future research could investigate whether the established patterns replicate in broader populations in Turkey. Similarly, the literature lacked data from West Asian (Middle Eastern) countries regarding intergroup prejudice and political ideology from the lens of DPM. Future research could test the relationships in this current work in other West Asian settings: investigate the extent to which the effects replicate and why.

Establishing the effect sizes of the relationships of worldviews with attitudinal orientations and the outcome variables (i.e., political ideology and generalized prejudice) provide convincing evidence for the initial results of the current study. However, the political psychological work in Turkey has yet to reach its maturity stage, and the findings of competitive or threatening associations attributed to the different groups (derogated, dissident, and dangerous groups) require additional empirical tests. Similar to this future research consideration, we hope that the content and social construction of ideologies in Turkey will attract more scientific attention to reveal their social-psychological correlates from a cultural lens so that this study's data could be discussed in light of more evidence from the field.

Despite its limitations, the cultural psychological lens on intergroup relations that we apply in this research allowed us to develop a generalized prejudice measure, which is rooted in the cultural context of Turkey. The measure includes ethnic and religious minorities as well as the social groups that are believed to face prejudice in Turkey's cultural ecology (Esmer, 2012). Extending the existing generalized prejudice measures (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Hadarics & Kende, 2018), we represented a wide range of minority groups such as AIDS patients and ethnic/religious minorities in our generalized prejudice scale.

Our context-specific prejudice measure serves as an important measurement tool to study generalized prejudice in Turkey and provides an informative map of how people from Turkey perceive the salient minority groups. For instance, alcoholics appear as dangerous in Hungary (Hadarics & Kende, 2018) due to the social construction of intergroup relations in the cultural context of Hungary. However, people in Turkey tend to group alcoholics with dissident social groups, which is informative of the representation of alcoholics in Turkey. With the increasing levels of conservatism and religiosity in Turkey, alcohol consumption is associated with opposition to the current administration's conservative values and religious sensitivities (Esmer, 2012).

Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature by establishing the context-bound nature of political systems and, therefore, cultural-ecological interpretations of their correlates. DPM and associated work have suggested that RWA and SDO are dual pathways to left/right political ideology and generalized prejudice. However, this study showed that *content* is as important as the label of left and right, and derogated, dangerous, and dissident groups while drawing links between worldviews and political psychological constructs by providing support for the structure of the DPM.

Ethics Statement

This research was conducted ethically, responsibly, and legally. Results were reported clearly, honestly, and without fabrication, falsification or inappropriate data manipulation. New findings were presented in the context of previous research, which is accurately represented. The authors are willing to make their data available to the editor when requested. The methods were described clearly and unambiguously. Submitted work is original, not (self-)plagiarized, and has not been published elsewhere. The authorship accurately reflects individuals' contributions.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

Data Availability

Data from the two studies will be made available upon request and contact with one of the authors.

Appendix A. Supporting information

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2022.07.006.

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