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STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTONS OF NATIONAL/ETHNIC IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

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ABSTRACT

STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTONS OF NATIONAL/ETHNIC IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

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Present dissertation aims to achieve three related objectives. First, it is aimed at investigating the theoretical view of Reicher and Hopkins (2001) that some people called 'identity entrepreneurs' actively try to re-define the limits and the contents of the social categories. For this purpose social political milieu of Northern Cyprus is chosen as it is intended to achieve the ingroup members' support by portraying national/ethnic identity constructions of National Unity Party, which acknowledges supporting the independence of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the Republican Turkish Party, which acknowledges supporting the unification of Cyprus. In accordance with the first objective, the official documents of two parties were analyzed by Structural Analysis of Group Arguments (SAGA) technique. The results confirm that the definitions of Northern Cypriots, the Cyprus Problem, the solutions of the problem, and collective threats and interests were constructed by these parties in the service of their own political projects. Second study purposes to explore the identity constructions of lay Northern Cypriots in order to investigate the relationship between political and lay constructions. By the second objective 19 Turkish Cypriots who were not involved in politics actively (classified as anti and pro-integrationists

based on their votes at the Referenda of Annan Plan) were interviewed. The results indicate that the lay Northern Cypriots narrated three identities when defining themselves as 'Turkish', 'Turkish Cypriots' and 'Cypriots', each of which implicated different constructions of the Cyprus problem, its possible solutions, and perceptions of collective threats and interests. All the constructions were made in accordance with their identity definitions and their votes at the referenda. The analysis also shows that the political and lay constructions are convergent at a great extent. Lastly, present work aims at investigating the relationship between national/ethnic identities and collective projects, quantitatively. Regarding the third objective a questionnaire study was conducted in North Cyprus, with 206 participants. The data confirmed the model, which proposed that social identities (Turkish, Turkish Cypriots and Cypriots) influenced attitudes towards unification through perceived collective interests and threats.

Keywords: National identity Construction, Collective Threats, Collective Interests, SAGA, Northern Cyprus

ÖZ

STRATEJİK ULUSAL/ETNİK KİMLİK İNŞASI: KUZEY KIBRIS ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu çalışma birbiriyle ilişkili üç amaca ulaşmayı hedeflemiştir. Birincisi, Reicher ve Hopkins'in (2001), '*kendi gruplarına mensup diğerlerinin desteğini kazanabilmek için, 'kimlik girişimcileri' olarak adlandırılan bazı kimseler, ulusal kategorilerin sınırlarını ve içeriğini yeniden ve amaçlı olarak inşa ederler'* şeklinde özetlenebilecek kuramsal görüşleri araştırılmak istenmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki iki siyasi partinin, bağımsız Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni (KKTC) savunan Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP) ile Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesini savunan Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi'nin (CTP), ulusal/etnik kimliklerini nasıl inşa ettiklerini ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır. Birinci amaca uygun olarak, sözü geçen iki siyasi partinin resmi yayınları toplanarak Grup Argümanlarının Yapısal Analizi (Reicher & Sani, 1998) yöntemiyle çözümlenmiştir. Sonuçlar, Kıbrıs'ın kuzeyinde yaşayan topluluğun, bu iki parti tarafından, kendi siyasal tasarılarına (bağımsız KKTC veya Birleşik Kıbrıs tasarıları) hizmet edecek biçimde tanımlandıklarını göstermektedir. İkincisi, bu çalışma siyasetçi olmayan Kuzey Kıbrıslıların ulusal/etnik kimliklerini nasıl inşa ettiklerini ortaya koymayı ve siyasi ve siyasi olmayan kimlik inşaaları arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, Annan Planı referandumunda kullandıkları oy temelinde 'birleşme ve ayrılma yanlıları' şeklinde sınıflandırılan 19 Kuzey Kıbrıslı ile mülakat yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar siyasetçi

olmayanların, adanın kuzeyinde yaşayan topluluğu, ‘Türk’, ‘Kıbrıslı Türk’ ve ‘Kıbrıslı’ olmak üzere üç şekilde tanımladıklarını göstermiştir. Bu üç etnik/ulusal kimlik tanımından her biri, Kıbrıs Sorunu, KKTC ve birleşik Kıbrıs konularında farklı kurgulara ve yaklaşımlara işaret etmektedir. Kıbrıs sorunu, Çözüm ve Kollektif tehdit ve çıkarlar, Kuzey Kıbrıslıların sosyal kimlik tanımlarına ve referendumda kullandıkları oya uygun olarak inşa edilmiştir. Ayrıca, sonuçlar, siyasi ve siyasi olmayan kmlik inşalarının büyük oranda uyuştuğunu göstermektedir. Son olarak, bu çalışma ulusal/etnik kimliklerle kolektif projeler arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu amaca yönelik olarak Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta 206 kişinin katıldığı bir anket çalışması yapılmıştır. Veriler, sosyal kimliklerin (Türklük, Kıbrıslı Türklük, ve Kıbrıslılık), Kıbrıs’ın birleşmesine karşı tutumları, algılanan kolektif çıkarlar ve tehditler aracılığıyla yordandığını öngören modeli doğrulamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal kimlik inşası, Kolektif tehdit, Kolektif çıkar, GAYA, Kıbrıs.

Canım Annem Sevil Arslan'a

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Nationhood comprises a fundamental part of the social world. In the past few decades, several nations have unified under the roof of a superordinate union, whereas the others have left the previous superordinate structure to establish their own independent states. For example while European Union brings several national states together to form a new political, economic and social unit, former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia which consisted of several ethnic groups have divided into several independent states. It could be said that the last thirty years have been characterized by integrations and disintegrations at the same time. Perhaps that's why group identification at the national level and the concepts of nationhood, nationalism and national identities turned out to be so popular in the past three decades.

Researchers have found national and ethnic identity as a rich area to study. National identities are among the most studied subjects of philosophy, history, social and political sciences (Davis, 1999). Davis (1999) mentions that numerous studies on nationhood and national identity from various disciplines were mainly based on Anderson's (1991) conception of nations as imagined communities. In these works identities in general, national identities in particular were viewed as social constructions. That is, as Tilley puts it ''social constructivist approaches have conceived identity as an idea or discourse rather than as an empirically observed unit defined by features such as dress, language or customs' (Tilley, 1997, p.511).

In social psychology, with the emergence of social identity/self categorization theories, all group identifications and relations between groups, including nations have become center of attentions (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1999). Tajfel's theoretical framework explaining group psychology and Turner's elaboration of social identity processes have provided a base for research on nationhood phenomenon.

The basic proposition of Social Identity Theory (SIT) is that the concept of group is a distinct psychological mechanism by which people can orient themselves in order to have a reference point for the self. A social category to which one belongs

provides a basis for self-definition. This cognitive definition of self as a member of a group, together with the values and emotions attached to it, is called social identity (Tajfel, 1978, p.273). At the beginning of 1980's Turner, with Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), elaborated the propositions of SIT in order to explain the underlying possible cognitive mechanisms of social categorization of self. By both theories, the definition of self in terms of group membership has been considered primarily as a cognitive process, which reflects the existing structure of social reality in a given context (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Hence social identity is achieved through the social categorization of the self in a comparison context. As a result of such consideration, when the comparative context changes, social identities also change.

Relatively recently, such consideration of social identities as if they are automatic reflections of the given context has been contested. It is argued that this consideration might lead some misunderstandings, such as the members of the same group necessarily develop a common understanding of the particular context (Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarthy, & Reynolds, 1998). That is, context-dependence characteristic of social identities does not mean that those who share the same social identity should agree on the nature of the context and the norms/values of the group they belong.

It has been argued that the definition of social categories should be considered as an attempt to create what the category and its relations with other categories should be, rather than a simple perception of what it is (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). That is social groups and the relations between them are not just given, but they are actively tried to be re-structured. In this process, the category boundaries and the category contents (stereotypes, norms, values, interests and threats) are construed purposefully in a way that allows to bring the desired changes into the social structure by getting support of the group members (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). Thus, identity definitions and contents do not only define the group's and its members' place in a wider society, but also encompass the implication of realization of a new set of social relations.

Based on above analysis Reicher et al. (2005) suggest that a psychological consideration of nationhood must account the reciprocal relationship between national categories and action, like any other social categories. Accordingly, some

people in national groups called 'identity entrepreneurs' actively try to re-define the boundaries and the contents of their national category in order to get support of the rest of the people. That is, the endeavor to define the national categories in particular way intents to mobilize the other people who belong the same nation in order to realize their own collective projects. Thus, it could be suggested that relationships between social groups, particularly between nations partly depend on the processes within each social groups, or nations. That is intragroup dynamics of international relations must be taken into account to make proper psychological analysis.

Being based on theoretical frame of Reicher et al. (2005), the present study aims at investigating how national/ethnic identities together with their contents (stereotypes, norms, values and threat/interest definitions) are constructed strategically by different political parties in accordance with each of their collective projects, and how these political constructions are reflected in the identity constructions of laypersons, among the Turkish community in Northern Cyprus. Given the fact that the two native communities, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots have had a conflictual relation for several years, Cyprus Island provides a rich environment to study international/ethnic relations by focusing on the intra-group dynamics. The relationship between the two communities in the island cannot be considered as consistent, in the sense that there is a substantial variability in the attitudes towards each other within each community. Indeed, this is not a surprising situation, given the fact that in the large-scale social categories (e.g. national categories), there are always different parties suggesting different kinds of inter-categorical relations, each of which is objected by the other party.

Being the third largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, with a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, Cyprus was invaded by several kingdoms and empires in the history. In 1571, Ottoman Empire gained control and Turkish people came to settle down in the island. In 1878 Cyprus was taken under British rule. Until 1960 when the independent Republic of Cyprus was established it remained under the control of United Kingdom (An, 1996).

In the early 1960's serious communal violence started between the two communities, which resulted in withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Republic's government and they were gathered in ethnic enclaves. In 1974 a

Greek- inspired coup against president Makarios took place, and interethnic conflicts were then intensified (İsmail, 2000). Turkey, as a guarantor power by the 1960 agreements sent troops to intervene, which is considered as an "invasion" by Greek Cypriots and a peace operation by Turkish Cypriots. As a result, a borderline was drawn which is called 'The Green Line'. Turkish Cypriots in the South had to leave their properties in the south of the line and move to the north part. Some Greek Cypriots also moved to the south from the north (Anastasiou, 2002; Gazioğlu, 1999).

In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognized by Turkey alone. From 1983 to 2004, several international meetings and talks were held to bring a viable solution to the island. In the interim, Greek Cypriot administration applied to European Union (EU) on behalf of the whole island. Then, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan developed a plan in 2003 to unify the island. Finally in 2004, separate referenda were held in both sectors of the island to decide unification, which was foreseen by the Annan Plan. However, the unification could not be attained. The majority of the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan (76%), while the majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted it (65%).

During the period at which the Annan Plan was in the agenda of the Cypriot communities, the North side of the island has witnessed some critical discussions about the national identity of Turkish community. During that period the Turkish Cypriots were divided mainly into two camps in terms of their attitudes towards the plan, namely supporters and opponents, each of which claimed different versions of the categorical definition of the Turkish community and different versions of intra and international relations.

Based on these preliminary observations, three complementary studies were conducted to explore how national/ethnic identities and their contents in Northern Cyprus are constructed by two opposite political parties; it is also aimed to explore whether these constructions and the collective projects (united Cyprus or keeping separate state) were consistent with the identity constructions of the laypersons; and lastly it is aimed to investigate the relationship between social identities of laypersons and collective projects of political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state).

The first study comprises a qualitative analysis of the official documents' of National Unity Party (UBP, supports separate state, second largest party in the Parliament) and Republican Turkish Party (CTP, supports unification, the largest party in the parliament) of Northern Cyprus. With this purpose of exploring whether ethnic/national identities in North Cyprus are constructed strategically, various official documents (booklets, speeches, press declarations, party programs etc.) from both parties are collected and analyzed with Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique in the light of Social Identity/ Self Categorization Theories. The second study was an analysis of interviews made with 19 laypersons in North Cyprus in order to reveal how their views about their own identity correspond with political parties' considerations. Like the documents, these interviews were also analyzed based on Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique. The last study was a questionnaire study conducted in Northern Cyprus including 206 respondents, to investigate quantitatively the relationship between the laypersons' identity constructions and collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state).

The present dissertation is made up of 7 chapters. After this first and introductory chapter, the following chapter covers the theoretical framework on which the studies were built. Theoretical framework consists of the approaches on nationhood, basic promises of Social Identity and Self Categorization Theories (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) and lastly Reicher and Hopkin's (2001) approach on social identities. Again in this chapter, the purposes, research questions and the proposed model on identity construction are presented.

In the third chapter, a brief history and the political climate of Cyprus Island are portrayed. Having at least basic knowledge about the near history and the political atmosphere in the island seems to be necessary in order to follow the studies presented at this dissertation.

The fourth, fifth and the sixth chapters present the documentary study, interview study and the questionnaire study following order, together with the methods by which the studies conducted and the findings and the results.

By the seventh chapter, all the findings and the results derived from the three studies are discussed in the light of the literature. The dissertation is ended by addressing the weaknesses and strong points, and the future implications.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, social psychological accounts of social groups and its special form "national groups" will be presented. Then, the processes and the purposes of construction of social groups and particularly nations will be portrayed.

2.1. Social identity /Self Categorization Theory

Davis (1999) mentions that numerous studies on nationhood and national identity from various disciplines were mainly based on Anderson's (1991) conception of nation as inherently limited, sovereign but imagined community. The conception of nations as imagined communities has been incorporated into numerous studies much of which has been focus on the social construction of identities (Davis, 1999). In these works identities in general, national identities in particular were viewed as social constructions. That is, as Tilley (1997) asserts social identities or national identities are seen as an idea or discourse rather than as an empirically observed unit defined by features such as dress, language or customs, by social constructivist approach. Similarly, Condor and Abell (2006) stress national identities as social constructions by claiming that a national identity is an emic rather than etic construct, which is defined subjectively by the individuals. Accordingly each individual experiences and defines their own national identity in practice and subjectively.

In various disciplines, including social psychology, nations and national categories are considered as social constructions. However these constructions constitute most consequential divisions of people hence based on these constructions, states are established, and wars occur, people die and so on. Because people's thoughts, feelings and actions are influenced seriously from these constructions, social psychology confronts with engaging in the explanation of nationhood and national identities.

Reicher and Hopkins (2001) also mention that once people have been categorized as nations, then all practices are built on them. Therefore, psychological

consideration of nationhood must account the reciprocal relationship between national categories and action, like any other social categories.

By 1970's with the emergence of Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT), group behavior and the relations between groups has started to draw attention and to be examined again. According to SIT human mind is not a purely individual process or product; rather its content, structure and functioning are socially shaped and interdependent with society (Turner, 1999).

The basic proposition of SIT is that the concept of group is a distinct psychological mechanism by which people can orient themselves in order to have a reference point for the self. A social category to which one belongs provides a basis for self-definition. This cognitive definition of self as a member of a group, together with the values and emotions attached to it, is called social identity (Tajfel, 1978, p.273). For example defining oneself as 'woman' requires that she accepts herself as a member of a group to which all women belong. Besides, definition of 'woman' embraces the feelings related with 'being a women' (e.g. I am very glad to be a women) and values (e.g. women are solicitous)

SIT provides a cognitive explanation of when people define their selves in terms of their group membership or their personal identities, by the interpersonal-intergroup continuum hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, at the interpersonal end of the continuum, individuals define themselves in terms of differences from other individual persons. Thus, through the process of interindividual comparisons, people can set their idiosyncratic attributes and define themselves as distinct and unique individuals. On the other hand, at the intergroup end of the continuum, individuals define themselves and behave in accordance with their group membership as a product of comparison between one's own group and the other groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). For defining one's self as a group member, attitudes of the ingroup towards outgroups should be perceived as homogeneous and its members should be perceived as undifferentiated (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Tajfel, 1978). Thus, personal identity requires categorization of self in terms of individual differences from other people, while social identity is achieved through the social categorization of the self in terms of

shared similarities with the members of a certain social category regarding other social categories.

Spears (2001) states that the definition of the self-based on group membership includes psychological processes that are similar to individual psychology, such as the desire for the maintenance of positive self view. Because individuals are motivated to evaluate their selves in a positive light, they are inclined to evaluate their group positively in order to acquire a positive social identity (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Positive social identity is achieved through establishment of positive distinctiveness of the ingroup from relevant outgroups (e.g. 'Turks are warmer than the Europeans', 'Turks are more civilized than the Arabs') (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tajfel, 1978). If positive social identity cannot be achieved on comparison dimension, collective self uses some strategies such as leaving the group or taking collective action (Jetten, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2001; Mummendey, Kessler, & Klink, 1999).

Turner, at the beginning of 1980's elaborated the propositions of SIT related with self-concept in order to explain the underlying possible cognitive mechanisms of social categorization of self. Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner et al., 1987) suggests that categorization is a cognitive grouping process, which is an unavoidable outcome of human perception system that convert differences into similarities (vice versa), in order to turn the stimuli into meaningful objects and events. That is, categorizing all stimuli and objects, including self, in terms of similarities and differences is an inevitable consequence of the working principles of human mind (Oakes et al., 1994).

Turner and Haslam (2001) argue that the self can be categorized at many different levels of abstraction. Some categories can be more inclusive or abstract than others. Three levels of abstraction have been distinguished: interpersonal (e.g. being smart), intergroup (being Turkish), interspecies (being human) (Oakes et al., 1994).

For SCT social categorization of self depends on the interaction between the relative accessibility (determined by past experiences, present expectations, current motives, values, goals and needs) and the fit between category specifications and the stimulus reality (match between category and reality)(Oakes et al., 1994). Fit between a given category and the reality has two aspects: comparative and

normative. Comparative fit is defined by meta-contrast principle, which proposes that perceived similarities within a category should be greater than perceived similarities between that category and the other category. Similarly, perceived differences within the category should be smaller than the perceived differences between that category and the other categories. Normative fit, on the other hand, refers to the content aspect. That is, the similarities and differences must be consistent with our normative believes about the social meaning of the social category. For instance if an individual perceives all men behave in a similar way when comparing all women, that individual see people in terms of gender categories. Moreover if the actions of men match our expectation of masculine behavior, probability of gender categorization increases. The former corresponds to comparative fit, whereas the second refers to normative fit of categorization process.

One of the most important consequences of the meta-contrast principle is that self definition is seen as dependent on the context. That is the prototype of a category changes when the comparative context changes (Turner & Oakes, 1997). The prototype of the category is defined as the position which best differentiate the ingroup from relevant outgroup (Oakes et al., 1994). Putting another way, a prototype is a position which accelerates the perceived differences between ingroup and the outgoup. For example being Turkish is somewhat different when we compare ourselves with Iranians than when we compare ourselves with Europeans. Thus a given category is not a fixed entity, rather its prototype changes when the context changes. In this point of view, psychological group formation is not simply the result of interpersonal relationships, but a consequence of cognitive process, which is determined by the interaction between the individual and the comparison context. Turner and Oakes (1997) assert that the self is not a relatively fixed mental structure that is activated according to the situation, but it is a varying, reflexive representation of the perceiver. In other words, if the groups in the comparative context change, the prototype also changes. Thus, social identities are changeable or they reflex the context. As such, the result which is obtained from intergroup comparisons is the reality of social world which is achieved through cognitive processes.

As understood from the above propositions, in the tradition of Social Identity/Self Categorization Theory, the definition of self in terms of group

membership has been viewed primarily as a cognitive process, which reflects the existing structure of social reality in a given context (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). To say it again, in a given context, people compare their groups with relevant other groups and the cognitive representations they obtain reflects the social context (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Tajfel, 1978).

2.2. Social Identity Constructions

Relatively recently, such consideration of social identities as if they are automatic reflections of the given context has been contested. It is argued that this consideration might lead some misunderstandings, such as the members of the same group necessarily develop a common understanding of the particular context (Haslam, 1997; Haslam et al., 1998). That is, context-dependence characteristic of social identities does not mean that all people who share the same social identity should agree on the nature of the context and the norms/values of the group they belong. Rather, with the agreement expectation, group members participate in an active discussion process to achieve a common understanding on a variety of inter and intra group issues. In other words, developing a shared view on the in-group/out-group definitions and the related issues is expected and desired. That is why group members stress on ingroup similarities rather than differences. However, it is not a simple and direct consequence of shared social categorization. It is something to be achieved through the active interaction between group members, which is called consensualization process (Haslam et al., 1998).

Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have argued that although group members expect to agree with each other on the nature of the given context and the meaning of their social identity -for this reason they engage in active discussion-; consensualization process does not necessarily result in a consensus. Rather, there might be different and inflexible views on the existing social structure of the context. And sometimes, a debate on the norms and the values of in-group might produce fragmented groups or divisions (Sani, 2005; Sani & Reicher, 2000). Indeed especially when considering large-scale social categories (e.g. national categories), there are always different parties proposing different identity definitions, each of which could be rejected by the other party. In other words, even if people belong to

same group and they compare their group with other groups in the same comparative context, there might be differences in their perceived prototype. Thus ingroup members might struggle with each other about it.

Again, according to Reicher and Hopkins (2001) such rigid consideration of the relationships between category stereotypes and social reality makes difficult to understand social change. However, different readings of social context within the same group might reflect different collective projects for the group's future (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher et al., 2005).

According to this view, social realities are not settled on a priori, nor are social categorization made after that. It has been suggested that the divergent readings of the social context stem from different future aspirations for the in-group (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher et al., 2005). Accordingly, the definition of social categories should be considered as an attempt to create what the category and its relations with other categories should be, rather than a simple perception of what it is. That is, social groups and the relation between them are not just given, but they are actively tried to be re-structured.

The people who intend to produce a particular change in the social structure need to generate definitions of the context and categories in a way that renders realizing the collective project possible. Thus, category boundaries (who are included and who are excluded) and the category contents (category stereotypes, norms, values) could be considered as strategically construed to realize a particular future project. These definitions make possible to activate the rest of the in-group members and thus serve to achieve desired future (Turner, 2005). In other words, some ingroup members might purposefully define their group's boundary, its norms and values, and its relations with other groups, in a particular way, that makes it possible to bring some desired changes to the existing structure. Such people, who actively try to re-define the boundaries and the contents of their national category in order to get support of the rest of the people, are called 'identity entrepreneurs' (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Reicher and colleagues (2005) put it, those who concern with shaping the social world actively define the nature of categories as a function of their social projects.

The 10th Anniversary Speech of Atatürk provides us a valuable example in this regard. When Ataturk characterized Turkish nationality as industrious and intelligent, this kind of collective stereotyping reflected strong wishes, may be more than the actual characteristics of the Turkish people at that time:

> …We will complete harder jobs in less time. I have not even a slightest doubt on it. Since, Turkish nation has the most qualified characteristics. Turkish nation is industrious. Turkish nation is intelligent… (Atatürk, 1933).

There might be different views on whether such stereotypes reflect the essence of Turkness or not. But beyond this debate, it becomes clear that such characterization was made purposefully to achieve some desired ends and values, when we read the very previous statements in the same speech:

> We've done great jobs in a limited time… However, we can never evaluate our work as sufficient. Hence we have to complete more and superior commitments and we are determined to do so. We will enhance our country to the level of those, which are the most civilized and the most prosperous. We will provide the largest resources and means for welfare to our nation. We will make our national culture superior than the contemporary civilization level… We will complete harder jobs in less time. I do not have even a slightest doubt on it… (Atatürk, 1933).

Atatürk had a clear vision on the future of the new Republic. It should have been civilized, contemporary and wealthy. In the way of building this new independent and developed Turkish Republic, Turkish nation was strategically construed as having the required qualities, such as being industrious and intelligent. The stereotyping Turkness in such a way was most probably indented to give the sense of strength and self-confidence to the Turkish people to create their future. This speech gives us an excellent example of how category stereotypes aim to mass influence and function to activate the in-group members to bring particular future projects into existence.

The other relevant example here is the qualitative analysis of the documents on the rescue of Bulgaria Jews during the Second World War (Reicher, Cassidy, Hopkins, & Levine; 2006). The study shows that those who opposed to the legislation which had foresaw deportation of Jews from Bulgaria and those who

wanted to rescue Jews from a forced deportation succeeded in their endeavors because they were able to draw Bulgarian national identity boundary in a way that captures the Jews as in-group members (Jews are Bulgarians). Besides, they were able to define the Bulgarian national values successfully as civilized, tolerant and humane. So, if the Bulgarian people were civilized, tolerant and human, they had to help to the Jews. The analysis of various official documents, newspapers' articles and personal letters demonstrates that both the category boundaries (who is in and who is out) and category contents (the ingroup characteristics, norms, values, and interests) are related to ingroup mobilization in order to realize specific political projects.

In consequence, defining a social identity by both defining the category boundaries and defining the associated norms, values, interests and threats in a particular way does not only define the group's and its members' place in a wider society through reflecting the existing structure of social relations, but also encompass the implications for realization of new set of social relations. The definition of category boundaries determines those who are to be mobilized and category contents define the direction of the mobilization (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The discussion about the nature of the context and the meaning of the social identities which group members engage in does not necessarily bring consensus. Different or may be conflicting views might come from different future projects. In other words, if there are different versions of the ingroup definition, together with its norms, values, interests and its relations with other groups, this discrepancy might be assumed as the consequence of the contradictory collective projects.

In line with this assumption, Cinnirella (1997) has observed that the definitions of Britishness differed between those who supported European integration and those who opposed it. Similarly, Reicher, Hopkins and Condor (1997) showed that between the different political views there was no stereotypic definition of Scottishness. While the Scottish leaders who desired a separate Scottish parliament tended to describe Scots as independently minded people; the other leaders who wanted the union in the UK, characterized them as having entrepreneurial instincts; and the others who hold devolution tended to describe them as communitarian. Besides, the separatist parties expressed the English-Scottish relation as a kind of

superior-inferior relation, whereas the unionists presented the relations between all nationalities in the United Kingdom as the relations between the equals.

Realizing particular projects or bringing desired changes to the structure requires the capacity to getting people to act in line with those particular projects. This capacity to activate in-group members in order to make desired changes in the structure is defined as a special kind of social power, namely 'through power' (Turner, 2005). Turner suggests that without having this kind of power, it is impossible to impact on the structure of social relations between groups. That is, influencing the social world and making desired changes in the structure becomes possible only by the ingroup members' support and mobilization (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner, 2005).

Such theoretical frame directs our attention to the intra-group dynamics of inter-group relations. If future projects, each of which foresees different kind of relations between their own group and the other groups, require the support of ingroup members, there should be struggles between the different project holders in the intra-group context. That is, in an intra-group context, the different collective project holders have to struggle with each other to gain the power, which means getting ingroup members' support and mobilizing them to realize their own kind of collective projects.

To summarize the different parts that have different collective projects in the same group need support and activation of rest of the ingroup members to realize their own project or to make real the desired changes. For this reason they construct the group's boundaries, norms, values and interest/threat definitions in accordance with their intentions.

Future projects take essential part in interpretations of existing social context, and subsequently in constructing social identities, as mentioned above. In this process, identity threat might constitute a crucial factor, in the sense that it helps to activate the in-group members in realizing the collective project. Indeed, identity threats have a central place in explaining variety of inter and intra-group outcomes, such as collective actions, out-group derogations, individual mobility and disidentification (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doojse, 1999). Yet, there has

been no precise theoretical conceptualization of what constitutes a threat at the collective level (Branscombe et al., 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).

In social identity research, the two forms of identity threat have been frequently studied, namely distinctiveness and positivity threats (e.g., Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993 for distinctiveness; e.g. Doosje, Spears, &, Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Baretto, & Spears, 1999 for positivity). These threats are defined as the sense of failure in conceptualizing the group as distinct from or more positive than the other groups, respectively. Indeed, besides these two specific circumstances, an identity threat can take a variety of forms. In accordance with this point, Vignole, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, and Scabini (2006) argue that any events or information that undermines the basic needs at the group level such as continuity, meaning and control could constitute the identity threat.

As far as national categories are concerned, it is usually mentioned by the researchers of international relations or political science that the need for recognition, the need for security and the need for self-determination/sovereignty play crucial roles in variety of international affairs, such as alliances, conflicts or wars (e.g., Azar, 1990; Richmond, 2005; Ringmar, 1996). If we follow Vignoles et al.'s (2006) identity threat conceptualization, it could be accepted that any aspects of the context, that induces the members of a nationality to feel their nation's security, recognition, self-determination or sovereignty is undermined, constitutes an identity threat.

Furthermore, a particular circumstance (e.g. a situation that undermines sovereignty feeling) might be supposed as 'identity threatening' by some in-group members, but not by the others. For example, Sindic and Reicher (2006) has observed that lacking a separate Scottish Parliament was perceived as a threat by not all high Scottish identifiers, but only those who perceived in-group norms are incompatible with the English and who perceived they would be powerless to defend their national identity in the super-ordinate body (Britain).

It is also possible that different parties within the group might propose different forms of identity threats (e.g. sovereignty vs. recognition) as 'really threatening' their identity. That is, a particular aspect of the context might be

suggested as identity intimidating by some group members, while the other group members might present another aspect of the context as threatening.

Following the previous theoretical frame, which aspect is to be taken as an identity threat seems to be dependent on the specific future projects. In other words, it can be suggested that the views on which aspect of the context constitutes a 'threat' to an identity varies along with the different collective projects. Stressing one aspect of the context, as intimidating the in-group, but ignoring the other potential identity threatening aspects seems to be intentional to achieve certain aspirations. In this sense, particular collective project holders might stress the seriousness of one form of identity threat over others. By doing so, it becomes possible to make accepted their own collective project to the other in-group members, and to mobilize them. By claiming that there is a real threat to the identity, which is to be avoided, collective project owners present 'sufficient reasons' to the rest of the in-group members to give their supports and to act in line with the project.

To summarize, just like the group boundaries, norms and values, the identity threats are also used to gain required power to bring desired changes in the structure of social relations. Therefore, threats are purposefully construed in accordance with the specific collective projects to get in-group members' support and to activate them.

CHAPTER III
THE NORTHERN CYPRUS CASE

Cyprus Island provides a rich environment to study international/ethnic relations by focusing on the intra-group dynamics, given the fact that the two main communities, Turkish and Greek Cypriots have had a conflictual relation over 50 years. Exploring how different political parties within the each community construct their ethnic identities in line with their collective projects helps to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the processes in which inter-group relations are shaped. In this chapter, firstly a brief history and the political climate of the island will be presented, and later national identity definitions particularly in North Cyprus will be explored.

3.1. Historical Background

Being the third largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, with a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, Cyprus was invaded by several kingdoms and empires in the history. In 1571, Ottoman Empire gained control and Turkish people came to settle down in the island from Anatolia. In 1878 Cyprus was taken under British rule. Until 1960, when the independent Republic of Cyprus was established, it remained under the control of United Kingdom. Short after the establishment of the Republic, Greek Cypriots aspired union with Greece. This was reacted by the Turkish Cypriots with desire for partition of the island between Greece and Turkey (Gazioğlu, 1999; İsmail, 1997; Mavratsas, 2000).

In the early 1960's serious communal violence started between the two communities, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Republic's government and they were gathered in ethnic enclaves. In 1974, a Greek- inspired coup against president Makarios took place, and interethnic conflicts intensified. Turkey, as a guarantor power by the 1960 agreements sent troops to intervene, which is known as an invasion by Greek Cypriots and a peace operation by Turkish Cypriots (Somuncuoğlu, 2003). Consequently a borderline was drawn which is called 'The Green Line'. As a result of the" population change

agreement" between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, a large number of Turkish population who had lived in the south part, had to leave their properties and to move to the north part. Some Greek Cypriots also moved to the south from the north (Anastasiou, 2002; Gazioğlu, 1999).

Today a United Nation (UN) mediation effort continues with UN soldiers remaining on the 'Green Line', which separates the two ethnicities. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized by Turkey alone. The international community now recognizes the Greek Cypriot administration as the only legal authority in the island, though practically it governs only the Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, Turkey does not recognize The Greek Cypriot administration as a legitimate administration of the island. As the Greek Cypriots demand, TRNC has been under very strict economic embargo since its establishment until the present day. As a result of such embargo, the North became less developed and much poorer (İsmail, 2000).

From 1983 to 2004, several international meetings and talks were held to bring a viable solution to the island. In the interim, The Greek Cypriot administration submitted an application to the European Union (EU) on behalf of the whole island. UN General Secretary Kofi Annan developed a plan in 2003 to unify the island (Denktaş, 2005). Finally in 2004, separate referenda were held in the both sectors of the island to decide unification, foreseen by the Annan Plan. However, the unification could not be attained. The majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan (76%), while the majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted it (65%).

Eventually, the Greek Cypriot administration joined the European Union in 2004 as the representative of the whole island. Yet, international societies, especially EU commissions made promises to take some measures to end the economic and social isolation of the Turkish community, in return to their affirmative efforts in their votes. However, until now, there is no improvement in the north either economically or socially. The embargo still continues.

3.2. Political Climate in Northern Cyprus

Cyprus is a country in which the issue of integration and the divisions within both of the existing sub-units (Turkish and Greek) are clearly of critical importance. At

the time of the unification referenda there were (and there continue to be) sharp polemics both in North and South parts about whether to vote for or against the Annan Plan – although in the Turkish north the majority voted for the plan while in the Greek south the majority voted against it. Initial analysis of the polemics in the North suggests that they construed the issues and the identities of the protagonists in very different ways (see Bac, 1999).

During referenda time, Turkish Cypriots were divided mainly into two camps in terms of their attitudes towards the Annan Plan and thus towards unification of the island, pro and anti-integrationists, each of which claimed different versions of the categorical definition of the Turkish community and different versions of intra and international relations (see Denktaş, 2004; Talat, 2003; and also see official websites of Turkish Republic Party and National Unity Party).

The pro-integrationists represented people as $_{\text{Turkish}}$ Cypriots. They saw the major threat to the group as the lack of recognition as a legitimate state, which lead to an exclusion from the European Union, and undermined the economic and social well being of members. They stressed that the domination of Turkey over Turkish Cypriots damaged to their group economically, socially and especially culturally. They therefore saw the interests, indeed the very survival, of the group as being served by a unified Cyprus.

The anti-integrationists represented people as $_{\text{Cypriot}}$ Turks. They saw the major threat to the group as being the hellenization of Cyprus and the political, economic and cultural disappearance of Turks as a community. They therefore saw the interests, indeed the very survival, of the group as being served by keeping a separate state.

3.3. National Identities in Cyprus

It is usually mentioned that various concept of national identities coexist in Cyprus, ranging from Greek to Turkish and from Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot, and from Cypriot to European (Mavratsas, 1999; Witting, 2005). However each form of identity definitions implies different stands before the Cyprus problem. For instance the definition of 'Greek Cypriot' that includes both nationalist and Cypriotist elements might reflect less cooperative attitudes towards a solution to the

issue (Mavratsas, 1999). Greek Cypriot identity is strongly defined by Greek characteristics such as speaking Greek, belonging to orthodox Greek church, being a part of Hellenic culture and being superior to the Turkish Cypriots; whereas Turkish Cypriot identity carries the meaning that they are not either purely Greek or purely Turkish (Witting, 2005).

Witting (2005) points out that although the concept of Cypriotism constitutes an alternative to the Hellenic-based and the Turkish-based identity definitions, it carries different meanings for each community. For the Greek Cypriots, Cypriotism refers to the 'Greek identity', because they believe Cyprus is a part of Hellenism and thus a Greek one. Similarly, the concept of being European implies that ancient Hellenism is the base for European civilization. As such, being European could be seen as equal to being Greek.

On the other hand, the definition of the identity as Turk emphasizes Turkness as opposed to Greek nationalism and domination. However, Witting (2005) suggested that for Turkish Cypriots the concept of Cypriotism refers to the attempts to detach themselves from Turkey and the Turkish concept of national identity. This re-definition of national identity by Turkish Cypriots is usually attributed to the history, which left them without status and without an identity for over 20 years (Akcakoca, 2005).

As seen, one can define him/herself in various ways, each of which implicates different connotation both in the North and in the South part of the island. Besides, there is asymmetry in the attributed meanings of being Greek Cypriot, being Turkish Cypriot, and even being Cypriot between these two communities.

3.4. Collective Threats and Interests in North Cyprus

In political science or international relations, the Turkish Cypriots have considered suffering from two unsatisfied or undermined collective needs, the recognition and the sovereignty need (Richmond, 2005). Although the terminology of social psychology shows a disparity from the terminology used in history, international relations or political science, there is some convergence in collective need conceptualizations, in the sense that the different terms sometimes refer to the same or similar situations.

In political science or international relations, the recognition need is defined as the need for being accepted and recognized as a separate nation by other nationalities, or a sense of existence in the eyes of the other nations (Azar, 1990; Ringmar, 1996; Richmond, 2005). The recognition need is also acknowledged in social psychology as one of the basic needs at collective level. Self-Verification Theory suggests that people need to be known and to receive feedbacks from others consistent with the current self-understandings, either at individual (Swan, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992) or at collective level (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004). This is because being acknowledged as a person or as a collective entity gives a sense of meaningful entity and provides reasonable understanding of the world in which the self is embedded (Chen et al., 2004; Swan et al., 1992). Following this reasoning, it can be inferred that being recognized as a separate group by the other groups gives people a sense of being part of a meaningful unit, by which they can achieve sensible understandings of themselves and the social world. Indeed, the definition of a group makes no sense unless there are other groups around who accept their existence or reality. A group becomes a group only if the other groups perceive them as a separate entity having common characteristics or common fate (Chen et al., 2004; Ringmar, 1996; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). By being accepted or recognized as a separate entity, people feel that the existence of the group they belong is meaningful and worthed. Here, I use the term recognition, rather than self-verification, referring to the need for being recognized and accepted as a separate collective entity by the other groups.

In international relations or political science, sovereignty need refers to the need for control over one's own nation's fate and acting based on the nation's own decisions, in contrast to being ruled by the other nations. In social psychology, the similar need is termed as collective agency, referring to the feeling of exercising some control over the collective's destiny (Bandura, 2000). Besides, collective self-realization term is used to describe the need for realizing the group's values, norms and priorities in practice (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Though these two terms are not the same and their implications are totally different, both of them signify the practical dimensions of identities. That is, both of them stress the importance of acting based on the collective's own decisions or will, or the collective's own norms,

values and priorities, in contrast to being subordinated or ruled or assimilated by others. In line with the purpose of this study, I prefer to use the term sovereignty, rather than collective agency or collective self-realization, referring to the need for acting on the nation's own values, norms, decisions or will, in contrast to being ruled or subordinated or assimilated by the other groups.

Currently, the Turkish Cypriots and their separate state (TRNC) are not recognized by the rest of the world apart from Turkey. Indeed the Turkish Cypriots have been treated as if there is no such community in the island and even in the world. They cannot travel to other countries unless they use either Turkish or EU passports; they directly cannot trade with other countries; their children cannot go to schools in other countries using their own identity cards etc. Therefore the continuation of the current situation constitutes an identity threat that undermines their recognition need (Akcakoca, 2005; Richmond, 2005).

On the other hand, the possibility of being minority and losing their sovereignty in the united Cyprus is also perceived as a serious danger if they are not accepted one of the equal communities in the island in every respect, and if they cannot gain the constitutional guarantee for their political, social and economical equality. Indeed even constitutional assurance does not necessarily guarantee their equality according to some views, because the Greeks has not abandoned their dreams of hellenization of the island and ENOSIS (unifying with Greece) yet, which eventually would destroy them as a separate sovereign entity in the island. So the threat comes from the possibility of being destroyed in united Cyprus (losing their sovereignty, losing their ability to act in behalf of themselves as a separate group) (Richmond, 2005).

However, for some Turkish Cypriots, the threat of losing sovereignty does not come from united Cyprus, but from Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey has not allowed Turkish Cypriots to act based on their own decisions, but instead Turkey has ruled them. Besides, the politics of Turkey to send some people to settle down to Cyprus destroys the cultural tissue. So the threat comes from the possibility of becoming minority in their own country by Turkish immigrants.

The Turkish Cypriots suffer from international non-recognition and also fear from becoming minority and losing their sovereignty, at the same time. Therefore, as

frequently mentioned they have developed very strong need for recognition and need for sovereignty, none of which are either respected by Greek Cypriots or by the international community (Akcakoca, 2005; Anastasiou, 2002; Witting, 2005; Richmond, 2005).

However, the assigned priority to one of these needs might vary from one part to another in Turkish community. That is the different parts of the society take one or the other identity threat as more consequential. Assigning priority to one need over others seems to be intentional to activate the in-group members to realize their own project. By claiming different kind of threats as most consequential, it becomes possible to claim that realizing their own collective project is the only possible way to dispose of this threat. It could be assumed that the answers of 'who we are' are based partly on the different threat perceptions and thus attitudes towards unification of Cyprus.

In addition to the perceptions of threats towards one's own group, the perceptions of interests might play an important role in social identity processes and attitudes towards integration with other social groups. Although collective threats have been subjected in research of various disciplines, collective interests have not been conceptualized in the literature yet. However, like the collective threats, the collective interests might influence the processes of intergroup relations. The possibility or perceived opportunity to satisfy the basic needs such as security, and the perceived opportunity develop the group socially and economically which allows the group members to realize the group's customs, values, and norms in practice, is conceptualized as collective interests, in line with the purposes of this dissertation.

3.5. The Objectives of the Research and the Studies

The general purpose of the present dissertation is to explore the intra-group processes through which the inter-group relations are shaped, by focusing on the Cyprus case, which is characterized by the conflicting relations between the island's two native communities, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Present work aims to achieve three complementary objectives in line with this general purpose.

First, it is aimed at enlarging Reicher and Hopkins' (2001) findings on national identities and their theoretical approach in a different setting. Specifically,

their theoretical views on the reciprocal relations between national categories and action constitute the subject of this work. According to Reicher and Hopkins (2001), some people in national groups called 'identity entrepreneurs' actively try to re-define the boundaries and the contents of national categories with the intention of getting support of the ingroup members. Given the fact that in large-scale social categories, there are always more than one party or 'identity entrepreneurs', in a national group, there must be different identity definitions. In North Cyprus, there are also opposite camps which reflect different attitudes in support for integration of Cyprus. Based on such frame, this work focuses on the narrative and strategic construction of national identities by analyzing official documents of North Cyprus' two political parties. Particularly, this work investigates how national/ethnic identities together with their contents (stereotypes, norms, values and threat/interest definitions) are constructed by different political parties, pro and anti-integrationists, in accordance with their own collective projects (keeping separate state or unification), in Northern Cyprus where the Turkish community live.

Second, this study purposes to explore the identity constructions of laypersons, or in other words the other ingroup members rather than 'identity entrepreneurs'; and to investigate the relationship between lay constructions and the collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state). It is hypothesized that the laypersons who support particular collective projects (united Cyprus or separate state), define their group and the context convergent with the corresponding political parties' constructions, because political parties made these constructions with the intent of influencing the ingroup members' stands towards their collective projects. If 'identity entrepreneurs' try to influence the ingroup members and to shape their attitudes towards various group-related issues by re-defining the group's boundaries and contents, their constructions of identities would be reflected in the identity constructions of the people who are accepted as the other ingroup members (lay Turkish Cypriots in our case). Through the analysis of interviews, the question of whether the laypersons' narratives are influenced from the political narratives is tried to be answered, by focusing on the consistencies between the constructions of political parties and laypersons.

And lastly, present work aims at investigating the relationship between laypersons' national/ethnic identity constructions and the collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state), quantitatively**.** Specifically, this research is aimed at elucidating why people sustain their existing group to become part of a larger (superordinate) structure. More specifically, it is hypothesized that unification will be supported where it is seen to help 'realize' social identity and it will be opposed where it is seen to threaten social identity. Similarly, separate state will be preferred if unification is seen to threaten social identity and is seen to help realize social identity. From this perspective, differences within a community in support for integration can be explained at two levels at the very least: first, they may reflect differing social identities held by different members of the community; second, they may reflect different appraisals of the 'threat' or 'opportunity' identity affords to the social identity. Often, these factors will be interdependent. That is, the definition of identity in a particular way has an impact on the perception of threats or opportunities which in turn impacts on support of particular collective projects (support for integration in our case).

For the first objective, a qualitative analysis of the official documents' of National Unity Party (UBP, supports separate state, second largest party in the Parliament) and Republican Turkish Party (CTP, supports unification, the largest party in the parliament) of Northern Cyprus was conducted. Various official documents (booklets, speeches, press declarations, party programs etc.) from the both parties are collected and analyzed with Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique in the light of Social Identity/ Self Categorization Theories. For the second objective, interviews with 19 laypersons in North Cyprus were conducted. Like the documents, these interviews were also analyzed based on Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique. For the third objective, a questionnaire study with 206 respondents was carried out in Northern Cyprus.

The three studies, with their specific expectations and the hypotheses of proposed models, their methods, findings and discussions will be presented in detail, in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively.

CHAPTER IV

STUDY 1: ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICAL DOCUMENTS OF REPUBLICAN TURKISH PARTY AND NATIONAL UNITY PARTY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

In order to explore how national/ethnic identities and their contents in Northern Cyprus are constructed strategically by two opposite political parties in accordance with their own collective projects, a qualitative study was conducted.

Two political parties' official documents of North Cyprus, including booklets, public speeches, press declarations, party programs etc. were collected in November 2006. All the collected documents were published between 2000-2006 years. These two political parties were selected because of their different and contradictory stands towards 'Cyprus' unification problem'.

The first party is National Unity Party (UBP) which called Turkish Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan at the referendum. This party is the second largest party in the Parliament at the moment. The other, the largest party in the parliament, Republican Turkish Party (CTP) is a leftist party which supported the unification at the referendum. CTP has governed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 2003. When looking at their attitudes during the referendum, it is seen that UBP's collective project for the people who live in the north part of Cyprus was an independent state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), whereas CTP supported 'united Cyprus' under which Turkish and Greek Cypriots would live together. UBP was selected as representatives of anti-integrationists, whereas CTP was preferred because of their pro-integrationist stand.

4.1. Method of Analysis

After collecting the documents of these two political parties which could be considered as the representatives of two different collective projects for the same group of people, all of them were read to identify the arguments related with the debate under consideration (unification problem of Cyprus). Then the structural relations between the arguments were analyzed based on the technique of Structural

Analysis of Group Arguments (SAGA, Reicher & Sani, 1998). With this technique, the logical relationship between the arguments used by opponents and supporters of unification are revealed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, how different definitions of the same group of people (the people who live in the north part of Cyprus) and categorical contents are constructed strategically in accordance with each collective projects (keeping separate state or unification) were analyzed.

SAGA (Reicher & Sani, 1998) were developed to determine arguments of different polar of the same group and to explore the structural relationship between these arguments. The method is concerned not simply with numerating what arguments are used but with the logical relationships between these arguments.

SAGA requires that one pays close attention to the details of how positions and identities, and also overall interrelations among the elements are construed. On the other hand it requires one to look for systematic patterns in the way the arguments relate to each other. In other words, it requires both qualitative and quantitative elements in the analysis.

The raw material could be the public meetings, leaflets, booklets, public speeches, newspaper articles which would be analyzed with SAGA. The material should cover all the arguments that are available in the debate. Some material such as interviews might need to be transcribed. After transcription, the arguments used in the debate need to be defined. An argument could be a phrase, assertion, comment, attribution and so forth. Coding the arguments is guided by theoretically grounded categories. Every time an argument is found, it is allocated to a file, given a brief summary referenced for source. Similar arguments are located into the same file. When all the material has been read once and all arguments allocated to files, materials need to be reread so as to some arguments have to be merged and the others divided. Ideally all the material would be double coded. However reasons of practicality, subsamples could be selected randomly and recoded by another coder. The intercoder reliability can be calculated by means of Cohen's kappa statistics. Low reliability indicates that argumentative structure is ambiguous and initial coding needs to be redone. After reaching a satisfying reliability, the overall organization of the arguments is defined. Listing, numbering and organizing the arguments used by each faction is made to figure out the common arguments (arguments used by all

factions), asymmetrical arguments (an argument used by one faction which is the opposite used by the other faction) and the unilateral arguments (used by one faction but not the other). For the arguments of each faction a contingency table should be produced to illustrate the logical relations between the various types of arguments.

In order to investigate whether political parties in Northern Cyprus construct strategically their national/ethnic identities in accordance with their own collective project, five argument categories were set up theoretically and a priori based on the researcher's preliminary analysis of the documents related with the debate. These are 'Cyprus Problem', 'Solution of the problem', 'Definition of the identity', 'collective interests/threats', and 'Attitudes towards European Union'. The various publications (booklets, public speeches, party programs, press declarations etc.) of two political parties in Northern Cyprus, between 2000-2005 years were collected. After selecting those which were related with the issue under examination, all arguments were determined and allocated to the categories mentioned above. The findings from this documentary study will be presented in the following section with the phases of SAGA.

4.2. Analysis

4.2.1. The Material, Coding the Arguments and Listing

All the material used in this study was collected in November 2006 by the researcher in North Cyprus. The researcher explained the purpose of the study to the political parties' officials and demanded the materials personally.

Eleven published materials from 2000 to 2005, such as party declarations, booklets, press declarations of Republican Turkish Party (CTP) were collected and read. Those which were not related with the debate under consideration (unification of Cyprus) were excluded and remained 6 documents were re-read to code the arguments. The arguments in each document were determined and then allocated to the categories which were defined theoretically and a priori. Lastly, all the arguments in the argument categories were numbered.

Same procedure was applied to the documents of National Unity Party (UBP). Together with the party program which had been accepted in general party congress in 2001 and 83 press declarations from 2004 to 2006 were read. 72 of these

press declarations were not included in the analysis because of their irrelevance with the debate. The remained 11 declarations and the party program were re-read to code the arguments. The arguments in each document were identified and then allocated to the categories which were defined theoretically and a priori. Lastly, all the arguments in the argument categories were numbered. All the documents to be analyzed and arguments are presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.

Table 4.1. The List of the Analyzed Documents

	Documents of CTP
Document 1 Number of Arg.:4	Political Thesis in the Context of Europe and the Solution, CTP United Powers 19. Congress, November 27, 2004, Nikosia.
Document 2 Number of Arg.:5	We have the words to say, CTP-United Powers, Electoral Declarations, Fabruary 20, 2005.
Document 3 Number of Arg.: 4	For the Solution and the EU: CTP- United Powers, The Congress of New Powers for a New Cyprus, July 10, 2003
Document 4 Number of Arg.: 3	The Way Out of the Economic and Politic problems and Cyprus Problem. CTP Press declaration, May 2, 2001.
Document 5 Number of Arg.:7	The Way of Our Existence, Thesis of Congress of CTP 2001.October 2001, İleri Publications.
Document 6 Number of Arg.: 8	Why Chaos? What is the Solution? Accepted in Party Assembly Meeting in August 2, 2000.
	Documents of UBP
Document 1 Number of Arg: 1	Program, 2001
Document 2 Number of Arg: 1	The Message of UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu for August 30 Victory Day. 29.8.2005.
Document 3 Number of Arg: 7	The speech of UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu at the press meeting in Republic Assembly Blue Saloon. 19.10.2006.
Document 4 Number of Arg: 3	The text of press meeting of UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu and General Secretary Dr. Salih Miroğlu about the meeting with the government and the politicians between 4-8 July. 15.07.2005.
Document 5 Number of Arg: 2	An Interview with UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş at the program of "Ada Sabahı" on Genç TV. 4.8.2005.
Document 6 Number of Arg: 3	UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu' answers to the questions of Tanfer Taşkan, journalist from "CYPRUS TODAY" newspaper. 15.9.2004.
Document 7 Number of Arg: 3	UBP's Leader Hüseyin Özgürgün's message for August 30 Victory Day. 29.8.2006.
Document 8 Number of Arg: 5	The message of UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu for 67. anniversary of death of Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of Republic of Turkey. 9.11.2005.
Document 9 Number of Arg: 5	The message of UBP's Leader Dr. Derviş Eroğlu for 22. Anniversary of establishment of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus 14.11.2005.
Document 10 Number of Arg: 4	UBP's evaluations about the last developments of Cyprus Problems 26.1.2006.
Document 11 Number of Arg: 3	UBP's Leader Hüseyin Özgürgün's message for July 20 "Peace and Freedom Festival". 19.7.2006.

Table 4.2. Argument Categories and the Arguments

Categories		Arguments
Cyprus Prob.	1	Cyprus Problem originated from the stands of the Greeks who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as politically equal. (UBP)
	2	Mainly, the Greeks are responsible for Cyprus Problem (they are obstacle to the unification of Cyprus) Hence they have tried to make Cyprus as Hellenic (ENOSIS) (UBP)
	3	Some domestic powers (Talat's group) do not take responsibility to keep TRNC. Doing this, they help to realize ENOSIS dream of the Greeks (UBP).
	4	Cyprus Problem originated from status quo (keeping TRNC, failing to unify Cyprus = problem) (CTP)
	5	Cyprus problem is the consequence of the policies of integration with Turkey (CTP)
	6	The Problem originated from Denktaş-UBP policies (CTP)
	7	EU also has some responsibilities because EU accepts the Greeks as the only representative of the Island before the solution UBP).
	8	Annan Plan serves to the Greek's ENOSIS dream (UBP).
	9	Cyprus Problem is that Turkish Cypriots have not developed as a result of status quo (CTP).
	10	Status quo harms the prestige of Turkish Cypriots in the eyes of foreign countries (CTP).
Solution of Cyprus Problem	1	We are on the side of solution (United Cyprus) (UBP) (CTP).
	2	We are on the side of European Union (UBP) (CTP).
	3	TRNC is ready to be reconciled with a partnership based on the equality of Turkish and Greek Cypriots politically. (UBP).
	4	A Recognized TRNC is not an obstacle to a fair and permanent agreement; rather TRNC helps it (UBP).
	5	Recognition of TRNC as an independent state by world countries is a must for a permanent solution in the Island (UBP).
	6	The solution is not that Turkey rules us. The solution is that we govern ourselves (CTP).
	7	We should use a currency distant from inflation and devaluation (CTP).
	8	We have to have a real and autonomous central bank that belongs to us (CTP).
	9	If we want a solution the policy of integration with Turkey should be ended (CTP).
Threats Interests	1	Turkish Cypriots are wanted to be destroyed through giving some fake rights in Republic of Cyprus (UBP).
	2	The problem (status quo) threatens collective entity of Turkish Cypriots (especially economically) (CTP).
	3	Today, TRNC, which was established with great expectations, is under serious threats and attacks (UBP).
	4	The attacks of Greek to our sovereignty still continue. If we lose our unity and if we abandon TRNC we will go under rule of Greeks (UBP).
	5	The game which started with Annan Plan that aims at getting more and more from Turkish people and at converting Turkish people into a minority continues (UBP).
	6	The conditions of European Union presented as solution (Green Line Regulation, opening seaports to the Greeks etc.) means that we will lose our sovereignty ((UBP).
	7	The problem (status quo) facilitates ENOSIS (CTP).
	8	The problem (status quo) feeds TAKSIM (division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey) idea (CTP).
	9	Connecting with the rest of the world through unification serves Turkish Cypriots (CTP).
Definition of Ingroup	1	The people of Turkish Cypriots are inexcractable part of Turkish Nation (UBP).
	2	Turkish Cypriots and their siblings in Anatolia are like nail and finger (UBP).
	3	Turkish Cypriots are cognizant (CTP).
	4	Turkish Cypriots deliver all promises they give (CTP).
	5	It is a big unfairness to derogate Turkish Cypriots through characterizing them as lazy or parasites, which cannot be accepted. (CTP).
Attitudes towards European Union	1	European Union stands contrary to its own values (human rights, democracy etc.) (UBP).
	2	European membership is such as unity that economic, democratic and political integration would be carried to the base of human rights, social justice and democracy (CTP).
	3	European Union has treated us very unfairly by accepting South Cyprus government as legitimate representative of Republic of Cyprus (UBP).
	4	European Union did not deliver its promises that were given after referenda of Annan Plan to Turkish Cypriots (about elimination of isolation and embargo) (UBP).
	5	It is unjust to force Turkey to expose its sea and airports to the Greek ships and planes (UBP).

4.2.2. Identifying Arguments used in Each Documents and Intercoder Reliability

After allocation of all arguments to the categories and numbering all of them, another independent coder read two of six CTP's and three of eleven UBP's documents which were selected randomly. This second coder checked the accuracy of identified arguments and allocation of arguments to the proper categories. In this phase, while the second coder was not able to identify two of 38 arguments which had been identified by the researcher, he identified only one argument that could not be identified by the researcher. The difference about the arguments among the researcher and the second coder did not differ significantly (Cohen's kappa = .053, $p < .739$). Minor disagreement between the researcher and the second coder was solved by discussion and concession and it was decided to utilize the 38 arguments in total. In table 4.3 all the arguments in each document are presented.

Table 4.3. The Arguments Allocated in 'Cyprus Problem' 'Solution of Cyprus Problem', 'Threats/Interests' 'In-Outgroup Definitions', and 'Attitudes towards European Union' Categories used by each Individual UBP and CTP Documents

	Arguments in 'Cyprus Problem'										Arguments in 'Solution of Cyprus Problem'								
	A1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A 5	A 6	A 7	A 8	A 9	A10	A1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A 5	A 6	A 7	A8	A9
Doc1 (CTP)				+		+													
Doc 2 (CTP				+					+		+	+							
Doc 3(CTP)					+				+		+	+							
Doc 4(CTP)						+			+	+									
Doc 5(CTP)									+							+	+	+	
Doc 6(CTP)				+	+	+			+										+
Doc 1 (UBP)																			
Doc 2 (UBP)		+																	
Doc 3 (UBP)			+					+											
Doc 4 (UBP)		+																	
Doc 5 (UBP)														+					
Doc 6 (UBP)	+						+												
Doc 7 (UBP)	+		+											+					
Doc 8 (UBP)																			
Doc 9 (UBP)											+		+						
Doc 10 (UBP)											+	+			+				
Doc 11 (UBP)																			

	Arguments in 'Threats/Interests'									Arguments 'In-Outgroup'					Arguments in 'Attitudes EU'				
	A1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A 5	A 6	A 7	A 8	A 9	A1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A 5	A1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A 5
Doc 1 (CTP)							+	+											
Doc 2 (CTP		+																	
Doc 3(CTP)																			
Doc 4(CTP)																			
Doc 5(CTP)																			
Doc 6(CTP)								+	+			+	+	+		+			
Doc 1 (UBP)										+									
Doc 2 (UBP)																			
Doc 3 (UBP)	+					+									+		+		+
Doc 4 (UBP)			+															+	
Doc 5 (UBP)				+															
Doc 6 (UBP)											+								
Doc 7 (UBP)																			
Doc 8 (UBP)			+		+						+				+			+	
Doc 9 (UBP)										+	+							+	
Doc 10 (UBP)																		+	
Doc 11 (UBP)					+										+				+

Note: Shadow cells show that the arguments that are supposed to be in CTP and UBP documents logically.

4.2.3. Defining Overall Organization of the Arguments

In this phase, the numbered and categorized arguments are organized as 'common', 'asymmetrical' and 'unilateral'. By organizing the arguments of National Unity Party (UBP) and of Republican Turkish Party (CTP) as common, asymmetrical and unilateral, the structural relationship between them were portrayed. In table 4.4 arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category, in Table 4.5 the arguments in 'Solutions for Cyprus Problem' category, in Table 4.6 the arguments of 'Threats/Interests' category, in Table 4.7. the arguments in 'Ingroup/Outgroup Definitions' category, and lastly in Table 4.8. arguments in 'Attitudes towards European Union' category are presented with the structural relationship between the arguments in each category.

Table 4.4 Structural Relationship between the Arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' Category

COMMON ARGUMENTS	
-	-
ASSYMETRİCAL ARGUMENTS	
1. Cyprus Problem originated from the stands of the Greeks who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as politically equal. (UBP)	4. Cyprus Problem originated from status quo (keeping TRNC, failing to unify Cyprus = problem) (CTP)
2. Mainly, the Greeks are responsible for Cyprus Problem (they are obstacle to the unification of Cyprus) Hence they have tried to make Cyprus as Hellenic (ENOSIS) (UBP)	5. Cyprus problem is the consequence of the policies of integration with Turkey (CTP)
3. Some domestic powers (Talat's group) do not take responsibility to keep TRNC. Doing this, they help to realize ENOSIS dream of the Greeks (UBP).	6. The Problem originated from Denktaş-UBP policies (CTP)
UNILATERAL ARGUMENTS	
7. EU also has some responsibilities because EU accepts the Greeks as the only representative of the Island before the solution UBP).	9. Cyprus Problem is the fact that Turkish Cypriots have not developed as a result of status quo (CTP).
8. Annan Plan serves to the Greek's ENOSIS dream (UBP).	10. Status quo harms the prestige of Turkish Cypriots in the eyes of foreign countries (CTP).

Table 4.5. Structural Relationship between the Arguments in 'Solutions for Cyprus Problem' Category

COMMON ARGUMENTS	
1. We are on the side of solution based on the principle of economic, social and political equality between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (United Cyprus) (UBP) (CTP).	
2. We are on the side of European Union (UBP) (CTP).	
ASSYMETRİCAL ARGUMENTS	
-	-
UNILATERAL ARGUMENTS	
3. TRNC is ready to be reconciled with a partnership based on the equality of Turkish and Greek Cypriots politically. (UBP).	6. The solution is not that Turkey rules us. The solution is that we govern ourselves (CTP).
4. A Recognized TRNC is not an obstacle to a fair and permanent agreement; rather TRNC helps it (UBP).	7. We should use a currency distant from inflation and devaluation (CTP).
5. Recognition of TRNC as an independent state by world countries is a must for a permanent solution in the Island (UBP).	8. We have to have a real and autonomous central bank that belongs to us (CTP).
	9. If we want a solution the policy of integration with Turkey should be ended (CTP).

Table 4.6. Structural Relationship between the Arguments in 'Threats/Interests' Category

COMMON ARGUMENTS	
-	-
ASSYMETRİCAL ARGUMENTS	
1. Turkish Cypriots are wanted to be destroyed through giving some fake rights in Republic of Cyprus (UBP).	2. The problem (status quo) threatens collective entity of Turkish Cypriots (especially economically) (CTP).
UNILATERAL ARGUMENTS	
3. Today, TRNC, which was established with great expectations, is under serious threats and attacks (UBP). 4. The attacks of Greek to our sovereignty still continue. If we lose our unity and if we abandone TRNC we will go under rule of Greeks (UBP). 5. The game which started with Annan Plan that aims at getting more and more from Turkish people and at converting Turkish people into a minority continues (UBP). 6. The conditions of European Union presented as solution (Green Line Regulation, opening seaports to the Greeks etc.) means that we will lose our sovereignty ((UBP).	7. The problem (status quo) facilitates ENOSIS (CTP). 8. The problem (status quo) feeds TAKSIM idea (division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey) (CTP). 9. Connecting with the rest of the world through unification serves Turkish Cypriots' interests (CTP).

Table 4.7. Structural Relationship between the Arguments in 'Ingroup/Outgroup Definitions' Category

COMMON ARGUMENTS	
-	-
ASSYMETRİCAL ARGUMENTS	
-	-
UNILATERAL ARGUMENTS	
1. The people of Turkish Cypriots are inexcractable part of Turkish Nation (UBP). 2. Turkish Cypriots and their siblings in Anatolia are like nail and finger (UBP).	3. Turkish Cypriots are cognizant 4. Turkish Cypriots deliver all promises they give 5. It is a big unfairness to derogate Turkish Cypriots through characterizing them as lazy or parasites, which cannot be accepted.

Table 4.8. Structural Relationship between the Arguments in 'Attitudes towards European Union' Category

COMMON ARGUMENTS	
-	-
ASSYMETRİCAL ARGUMENTS	
1. European Union stands contrary to its own values (human rights, democracy etc.) (UBP).	2. European membership is such as unity that economic, democratic and political integration would be carried to the base of human rights, social justice and democracy (CTP).
UNILATERAL ARGUMENTS	
3. European Union has treated us very unfairly by accepting South Cyprus government as legitimate representative of Republic of Cyprus (UBP). 4. European Union did t deliver its promises that given after referenda of Annan Plan to Turkish Cypriots (about elimination of isolation and embargo) (UBP). 5. It is unjust to force Turkey to open its sea and airports to the Greek ships and planes (UBP).	

As seen from Table 4.4, while there is no common arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category between CTP and UBP, three arguments of each party are asymmetrical. According to UBP Cyprus problem has been originated from Greek Cypriots who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as equal partner and still dream ENOSIS (unify Cyprus to Greece). According to CTP the problem is originated from status quo in North Cyprus that is keeping a separate state of TRNC instead of unification. While UBP attributes the responsibility of the problem to the Greek Cypriots and domestic politics who cooperate with the Greeks (e.g. Mehmet Ali Talat); CTP attributes the responsibility of the problem to policies of integration with Turkey and such politicians (e.g. Rauf Denktaş). Besides, UBP views Annan Plan as serving ENOSIS dream of the Greek Cypriots, and European Union also shares the responsibility of the problem by accepting Greek Cypriots as a member. On the other hand, according to CTP, status quo has destroyed Turkish Cypriots economically and damaged their prestige in the eyes of world countries.

Related with the solution of Cyprus problem category, there are two common arguments between UBP and CTP. According to the both parties, solution was to be 'United Cyprus' and 'European Union membership'. Whereas there is no asymmetrical arguments between these two parties, UBP put forwards some conditions as a must to reach such solutions. Both UBP and CTP mention the necessity of the solution which is based on economic, politic and social equality between the two communities. However, according to UBP, keeping Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) alive and preserving its recognition as an independent state is the precondition of unification. Other kind of unification causes Greek sovereignty over Turkish Cypriots. Alternatively, CTP claims that in order to realize the solution (unification) Turkish Cypriots (not Turkey) have to govern themselves and they need separate currency (from Turkey) and separate central bank (from Turkey). Moreover, 'integration with Turkey' policies should be ended.

There is no common argument between UBP and CTP about threat and interest definitions, while only one argument of each party is asymmetrical. According to UBP, with the proposed solutions until present, the people of Turkish Cypriots have been intended to become minority. That is the threat to existence of the community comes from the solution proposals. According to CTP, status quo

itself threatens existence of the community. In other words, UBP considers Annan Plan and the conditions required by EU and United Nations (e.g. opening the ports to the Greek Cypriots) which would have caused loosing sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots and converting them into a minority in the island. On the other hand, CTP views status quo (failing at reaching unification) facilitates ENOSIS and TAKSIM ideas (division of island between Turkey and Greece), both of which threaten collective existence of Turkish Cypriots, although collective interests of Turkish Cypriots would only be saved through establishment of 'United Cyprus'

In the category of 'Ingroup-Outgroup Definitions', while there is no common and asymmetrical arguments, UBP regards Turkish Cypriots as inextractable part of Turkish nation. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots and their siblings in Anatolia are nail and finger. On the other side, CTP defines Turkish Cypriots as cognizant and trusted. Accordingly Turkish Cypriots cannot be defined as lazy or parasites.

Similarly, there is no common argument in 'Attitudes towards European Union' category. According to CTP, EU is such a unity that goes beyond economic integration. It is a democratic and political integration based on the values of human rights, social justice and supremacy of law. In contrast, UBP considers EU which stands contrary to its own values (human rights, democracy etc.). According to UBP, EU has treated Turkish Cypriots unfairly, because it accepted The Greek Cypriot administration as a member as if it were the only legitimate representative of the island, and also it has not delivered the given promises after the referenda. Accordingly, it was also unjust to demand Turkey to expose its sea and airports to Greek Cypriots, which meant to strengthen Greek Cypriots' ENOSIS dream.

4.2.4. Coding the Logical Relationship between Arguments of the Two Parties and Their Collective Projects

Table 4.9. presents a contingency table in which it is seen that how each argument of CTP and UBP related logically (positive or negative) with their own and the opposite collective projects. Although present findings from the analysis of UBP's official documents reveal that their proposed solutions are 'United Cyprus' and 'European Union membership', UBP's call for rejection during the referenda of Annan Plan and their conditions for the solution such as keeping separate state imply

that UBP's collective project for Turkish Cypriots is keeping independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC), rather than unification. On the other hand CTP called people to vote for the Annan Plan during the referenda and it did not put the condition of keeping separate state for unification. Therefore, it could be suggested that collective project of CTP is 'United Cyprus', whereas collective project of UBP is independent and recognized TRNC.

As mentioned before, the purpose of this study is to explore how national identities and their norms, values, threats and interests are defined in the service of particular collective projects. More specifically, how constructions of identities vary according to the project of unification of two national groups (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) under the same roof (United Cyprus) or according to the project of keeping separate state (TRNC) is under investigation. In accordance with the purpose of the study, by which arguments the political parties support or reject unification of Cyprus are presented at this phase of the analysis. Whether the arguments of UBP and CTP are logically consistent or inconsistent with their own collective project or with the opposite project (keeping TRNC or United Cyprus) is seen from the Table 4.9.

The findings reveal that, each argument in the parties' official documents relates positively or at least neutral with their own collective project, whereas relates negatively or at least neutral with the other party's collective project. At this point it should be noted that these relations are not statistical, but logical.

When we look at in detail, all the arguments of UBP in 'Cyprus Problem' category are consistent with the project of keeping Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) alive, but inconsistent with project of United Cyprus foreseen by Annan Plan. According to UBP, the problem is originated from the attitudes of Greek Cypriots who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as politically equal (Argument 1), hence Greek Cypriots has not still abandoned their ENOSIS dream (Argument 2); some domestic powers (Argument 3), European Union (Argument 7) and Annan Plan (Argument 8) serve to ENOSIS. If so, the solution must be keeping TRNC alive and to reject United Cyprus foreseen by Annan Plan. As seen, the arguments are related with each other and with TRNC solution positively, but relates with United Cyprus negatively. On the other hand, according to CTP, Cyprus problem is

originated from the status quo (Argument 1), from the policies of integration with Turkey (Argument 2), and from the owner of these policies, Rauf Denktaş and his team. Therefore these policies should be ended as soon as possible and Cyprus has to be unified. All these arguments are negatively related with keeping TRNC.

Regarding the category of 'Threats and Interests' According to UBP Turkish Cypriots are intended to become minority in the island (Argument 1), TRNC is under serious threats (Argument 3), If Turkish Cypriots loose TRNC they would go under rule of Greek Cypriots (Argument 4). Moreover, both Annan Plan (Argument 5), and EU (Argument 6) would bring the loss of sovereignty and will lead the Turkish Cypriots to become minority as a group. If so, in order to save their right of being sovereign and not to become minority they should keep TRNC alive, this is the only way. Naturally, all these arguments are inconsistent with the concept of united Cyprus. On the other side, according to CTP status quo and failing at unifying Cyprus threaten the collective existence of Turkish Cypriots (Argument 2); the status quo feeds both ENOSIS (Argument 7) and TAKSIM ideas (Argument 8). Unification serves to the interests of Turkish Cypriots (Argument 8). That is, unification is a must to get rid of these threats.

In regard to 'Ingroup/Outgroup Definitions' category, UBP claims Turkish Cypriots are inextractable part of Turkish Nation (Argument1); Turkish Cypriots and their siblings in Anatolia are like nail and finger (Argument 2). As such, instead of being ruled by the Greeks, keeping TRNC fits well for the characters of Turkish Cypriots. Hence, Turkish Cypriots do not belong the same group with Greek Cypriots. On the other hand CTP avoids a clear ingroup definition. But, instead, it defines the content of the category such as defining Turkish Cypriots as cognizant, and far from being lazy or parasites. Such arguments could not be claimed as positively or negatively but impartially related with the projects of keeping TRNC or United Cyprus.

When we come to the category of 'Attitudes towards European Union (EU)', UBP considers EU as acting in contrast to its own values such as human rights and democracy (Argument 1). Accordingly EU treated Turkish Cypriots unfairly by accepting South Cyprus Greek government as a legitimate representative of the Cyprus Republic (Argument 3). And it did not deliver all the promises (e.g.

elimination of isolation and embargo) which were given before the referenda of Annan Plan (Argument 4). Moreover, demanding from Turkey to expose its sea and airports to Greek Cypriots' ships and planes might cause serious damages to the economy for the Turkish Cypriots and the struggle for the solution based on equality between two communities (Argument 5). Therefore, becoming a member of EU which tends to act in contrast to its own values and which tends to treat Turkish Cypriots unfairly is not desired. In that situation the only solution is to keep TRNC alive. On the contrary, CTP considers European Union membership as such a unity that economic, democratic and political integration with the union will bring the island social justice, democracy and respect for the human rights (Argument 2), that's why CTP supports being member of EU under the roof of United Cyprus.

Table 4.9. Logical Relations between the Arguments and Collective Projects

		UBP		CTP	
	Argument	**TRNC**	**United Cyprus**	**TRNC**	**United Cyprus**
Cyprus Problem	1	+	-		
	2	+	-		
	3	+	-		
	4			-	+
	5			-	+
	6			-	+
	7	+	-		
	8	+	-		
	9			-	+
	10			-	+
Threats/Interests	1	+	-		
	2			-	+
	3	+	-		
	4	+	-		
	5	+	-		
	6	+	-		
	7			-	+
	8			-	+
	9			-	+
Ingroup/Outgroup Definitions	1	+	-		
	2	+	-		
	3	+	-		
	4			-/+	+/-
	5			-/+	+/-
	6			-/+	+/-
European Union	1	+			
	2			-	+
	3	+			
	4	+			
	5	+			
	6	+			

+ = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation

4.3. Summary of the Findings and Discussion

This study investigates how two political parties in North Cyprus define the same group of people in accordance with their own collective projects, 'keeping Turkish Republic of North Cyprus alive' or 'United Cyprus'.

In social psychology, most of the studies on intergroup relations with the frame of Social Identity theory have been based on the notion that social identities reflect the social context which is usually accepted as given and fixed. Accordingly, in such studies, how people perceive the given context and their groups and how any change in the context influences the people's perceptions and behaviors are subjected. However, how social context itself changes or the role of group members in a changing context is usually ignored. It could not be wrong to say that in such studies the context is considered as if a latent hand touches it and changes it; and after that people adapt themselves to this novel context. However, the context itself may be tried to change by the group members (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005). The definition of social groups and the relationship between groups in a particular way also reflect the endeavour to change the given context. In other words, social groups and the relationships between them are not given. In contrast, by the members of social groups it is continuously tried to be re-constructed.

This archive study which focuses on the documents of two political parties of North Cyprus, supports these notions. The study made clear that two political parties which perceived 'Cyprus Problem' differently and thus proposed different solutions defined various issues about within and between group contexts differently. The findings revealed that each argument in the parties' official documents relates positively or at least neutral with their own collective project, whereas relates negatively or at least neutral with the other party's collective project. That is, each argument in all categories was set up in a way that would serve to their own parties' collective projects.

According to National Unity Party (UBP), Cyprus problem has been originated from Greek Cypriots who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as equal partner and still dream ENOSIS (unify Cyprus to Greece); some domestic powers, the Annan Plan and European Union all serve to ENOSIS dream of the Greek Cypriots.

As such, the solution is to keep Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) and reject United Cyprus which is foreseen in Annan Plan. Because UBP's collective project for Turkish Cypriots is an independent state, the aspect of Cyprus problem, the definition of Turkish Cypriots, and the threats towards the ingroup, that is all the arguments in each category were constructed in accordance with the project. The community who live in the north part of Cyprus is defined as an inextractable part of Turkish nation. The border of the category is drawn as excluding Greek Cypriots, but as including all Turkish people who live in Turkey. The findings reveal that all arguments of UBP are related positively with an independent TRNC and negatively with united Cyprus. That is, all the arguments were set up to serve the project of keeping TRNC alive.

According to Republican Turkish Party (CTP) the problem is originated from status quo in North Cyprus that is keeping a separate state TRNC instead of unification. CTP attributes the responsibility of the problem to policies of integration with Turkey and such politicians who support the integration with Turkey (e.g. Rauf Denktaş). Moreover, status quo has destroyed Turkish Cypriots economically and damaged their prestige in the eyes of world countries. United Cyprus would serve the interests of Turkish Cypriots. Accordingly, being a member of European Union via unification would naturally save Turkish Cypriots' rights. All these arguments are related negatively with the purpose of keeping TRNC alive.

While CTP avoids a clear ingroup definition, it defines the content of the category such as defining Turkish Cypriots as cognizant, and far from being lazy or parasites. Such arguments could not be claimed as positively or negatively but neutral related with the projects of keeping TRNC or United Cyprus. It is seen that some arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category are constructed as in the direction of differentiation of the community who live in North Cyprus from those who live in Turkey. For example suggestions for an independent currency and central bank imply desire for differentiation from Turkey. As recognized easily, all the arguments of CTP in each category are built in the service of 'United Cyprus Project'.

The findings of present study support the notion that the borders (who is in) and the contents (threats, interests, attitudes towards other groups etc.) are constructed purposefully in order to realize specific collective projects. These

findings are in accordance with the Reicher and Hopkins' (2001) approach that social groups are constructed with the intention of making desired changes in the social structure.

CHAPTER V
STUDY 2: INTERVIEWS WITH LAY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

The second study purposes to examine the identity constructions of laypersons; and to examine the relationship between their identity constructions and attitudes towards unification of Cyprus, consequently the social influence of political parties towards lay Turkish Cypriots will be considered by focusing on the convergence between the constructions of laypersons and political parties. Specifically, it is hypothesized that if political parties in North Cyprus construct the identities in order to shape the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots towards Cyprus' unification problem (as shown by the first study), the lay Turkish Cypriots will be expected to support political parties' specific collective projects (keeping separate state or unification) through sharing their identity constructions. That is, lay anti-integrationist Turkish Cypriots should have common identity constructions with National Unity Party (UBP; supports keeping separate state) and lay pro-integrationist Turkish Cypriots should have common identity constructions with Republican Turkish Party (CTP; supports united Cyprus).

Reicher and his colleagues (2005) suggest that strategic identity constructions are made in order to activate the rest of the ingroup members, by some initiative people who desire to change the social structure. These initiative people called 'identity entrepreneurs' need the support of the other ingroup members. At the referenda of the Annan Plan, some of Turkish Cypriots voted for, and the others voted against it. Following from the views of Reicher and his colleagues (2005), it could be claimed that the constructions of political parties affect the lay Turkish Cypriots' identity constructions, and in turn their solution preferences for Cyprus problem. If so, investigating the identity constructions of laypersons and their relationship with the collective projects proposed by political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state) is required to be examined in order to explore whether there is an influence of political constructions upon them. In line with Reicher et al.'s (2005) point, it is proposed that the laypersons develop an

understanding of their group and the social context convergent with the political parties' constructions, which in turn leads laypersons to prefer one collective project over another. Hence, political parties aim at influencing the understandings of the ingroup members to provide support for their collective projects. If they try to influence the ingroup members and to shape their stands for various group-related issues by re-defining the group's boundaries and contents, their constructions of identities would be reflected in the constructions of the people who are accepted as the other ingroup members rather than 'identity entrepreneurs' (lay Turkish Cypriots). That is, lay Turkish Cypriots and political parties should share the same constructions. Through the analysis of interviews, this second study purposes to examine whether the laypersons' understandings are influenced from the constructions of political parties by focusing on the consistencies between the political narratives and the lay discourses.

For the second objective of present dissertation, 19 laypersons in Northern Cyprus were interviewed. Like the documents of political parties, these interviews were also analyzed mainly based on Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique.

5.1. Method

5.1.1. Material

The data were collected in November and December 2006. 19 Turkish Cypriots from various age and occupation groups were interviewed in semi-structured format (for questions see Appendix A). The interviewees were those who voluntarily accepted the interviews. The questions were designed mainly to cover all the relevant topics related to Cyprus Problem. All interviews which lasted between 20 to 90 minutes were recorded. After completing, all the interviews were transcribed and loaded on computer.

The interviewees are classified as pro and anti-integrationists based on their votes at the referenda of Annan Plan. Interviewees' votes in the referenda and brief descriptions are presented in 5.1. Five of 19 interviewees voted against and the remaining voted for the Annan plan at the referenda.

5.1.2. Method of Analysis

After all interviews were transcribed and loaded on computer, all transcriptions were read several times in order to identify all the arguments used by each interviewee. After identifying the arguments, all of them were allocated in the categories which were theoretically grounded and set up before the analysis. These categories were 'Ingroup's boundaries and contents', 'Cyprus Problem', and 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' and 'Perception of Collective Threats and Interests'. Again the structure of the arguments and the relationship between them were analyzed mainly based on Structural Analysis of Group Arguments method (Reicher & Sani, 1998).

Table 5.1. The Interviewees and their Votes at the Referenda of Annan Plan

Subject	Descriptions	Vote
1	Man, 62 years old. Retired teacher. Chairperson of Turkish Mücahitler Association.	No
2	Man, 55 years old. Retired police officer. Now he is a farmer (orange).Married with two children.	No
3	Man, 69 years old. Chairperson of Güzelyurt Unity of Orange Producer.	No
4	Woman, 21 years old. Student at Girne American University Public Relations Department.	Yes
5	Woman, 21 years old. Graduated from Near East University English Language Department.	Yes
6	Man, 50 years old. Journalist. Married with 3 children.	Yes
7	Man, 26 years old. Electric-electronic engineer. Now he is working as safeguard.	Yes
8	Woman, 42 years old. Owner of a village store. Married with two children.	Yes
9	An old lady, her age is over 90.	Yes
10	A house woman, 32 years old with two children.	Yes
11	Man, 67 years old. Retired teacher. Married with four children.	No
12	Man, 42 years old. Chairperson of Development of Güzelyurt Association, dentist.	Yes
13	Man, 80 years old. Farmer.	Yes
14	Man, 49 years old. Head of Turkish Farmer Association. Married, has two grandchildren.	No
15	Man, 50 years old. Owner of a bookstore. Married with two children.	Yes
16	Man, 56 years old. Businessmen, electric-electronic engineer. Married with three children.	Yes
17	Man, 60 years old. Retired government officer. Married with two children.	Yes
18	Man, 18 years old. Student at Near East University Public Relations Department.	Yes
19	Ma n, 19 years old. Student at Near East University English Language Department.	Yes

5.2. Analysis

After identifying and numbering the arguments of pro and anti-integrationists and allocating them to the categories, the structural relationship between them are tried to be formed. Before presenting the main analysis, I will present a summary of each pro and anti integrationists' interview.

5.2.1. Summary of Interviews with Pro-integrationists

Interviewee 4, a 21-year-old female student at Girne American University Public Relations Department, voted for the unification suggested by Annan Plan. While she defines herself just as a Cypriot rather than a Turkish Cypriot, she describes Turkish Cypriots as relax and trusted people. She claims that the whole island belongs to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to her, if Cyprus would be united, all Cypriots (Turkish and Greeks) would have benefited from it. But especially it would be advantageous for Turkish Cypriots. For example the youth could have entered European countries easily and could have attended European schools at a much cheaper price. Accordingly, north Cyprus could have been wealthier and more developed; unemployment could have been prevented. She also stresses that the Turkish Cypriot youth were on the side of peace and unification. Therefore, she asserts, Cyprus should have been unified. When she talks about the problems that Turkish Cypriots confront currently, she mentions Turkish people who came from Turkey after 1974 military operation threaten them. She claims that with increasing number of those people, undesired events such as robbery, sexual harassments and murders increase in north Cyprus. And, she maintains, perhaps the Greek Cypriots did not accept unification because of amplified number of Turkish people in the island. She emphasizes, because of such reasons the number of Turkish people who came from Turkey to settle down in Cyprus (who are named as 'Turkish Settlers' especially by Greek Cypriots) should be decreased in order to attain unification. Then she argues all the Cypriots, Turkish and Greek people, are alike culturally.

Interviewee 5, a 21-year-old female who graduated from Near East University English Language Department recently, voted 'yes' at the referenda just like the first interviewee. Unlike the first one, she defines herself as a Turkish Cypriot. She

mentions that she gave all the efforts to realize 'United Cyprus'. She attended to the meetings and organizations for unification. But she says she did not see -at least equal- effort from the Greek people. In contrast, she states, after opening the borders between Greek and Turkish side, the Greeks showed hostile attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots (e.g. the Greeks thrown stones to Turkish cars). She also stresses that Turkish people who come from Turkey should be decreased because they destroy the cultural structure of the island. And she claims Turkish Cypriots do not feel themselves secure in their own country because of increasing number of Turkish people. Like the first interviewee, she also argues that Turkish and Greek Cypriots are alike in terms of way of life.

Interviewee 6 is a male journalist at his 50, married with three children. He defines himself as 'Cypriot who speaks Turkish'. He argues that Turkish troops' stay in the island after 1974 operation was a mistake, and also unjust. Hence Greek Cypriots had to leave their own lands, homes and businesses. He claims that Turkey divided Cyprus. Accordingly, it was also second mistake of Turkey to take Turkish people from Turkey to Cyprus to settle down, because such application have destroyed demographic structure of the island. He argues that existence of the 'Turkish settlers' in the island constitute a big barrier to the solution of Cyprus problem. He also argues that imperialist powers supported the status quo as a result of 'divide and rule' principle. He claims that keeping an independent Turkish state is impossible. Autonomy might be given to Turkish Cypriots under the roof of united Cyprus. He also considers Turkish and Greek Cypriots similar to each other in terms of way of life. And he states under the roof of European Union the problems between Turkish and Greek Cypriots could be solved easily. And Turkish Cypriots could save their own rights; hence European Union values human rights and democracy.

Interviewee 7 is a 26 year-old, electric-electronic engineer who is working as safeguard. He defines himself as a Turkish Cypriot. He says Turkish Cypriots' culture is different from Anatolian culture. He stresses that Annan Plan was a good deal. But he also emphasizes that even if Cyprus is unified, the two communities, the Greeks and the Turkish should be equal in all ways. Accordingly status quo constitutes a disadvantage for Turkish Cypriots because of nonrecognition of Turkish

Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) by other countries and because of the embargo. Meanwhile, he considers Greek Cypriots as racists.

Interviewee 8 is a 42 year-old woman, who is owner of a village store and married with two children. She voted for the Annan Plan. She defines herself as Turkish Cypriot. And she describes Turkish Cypriots as outspoken and honest. She depreciates status quo, because, she mentions, they feel as if their own properties do not belong to themselves. Thus Turkish Cypriots do not feel comfortable themselves. She says if unification could have been attained, they would be rescued from ambiguity. She also suggests that Turkey should withdraw some troops (not all) from the island. She views Greek Cypriots as revengeful.

Interviewee 9 is an old lady over 90. She lives in a small village. She voted for the Annan Plan. She defines herself as Turkish. She remembers the Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together in peace, and there was no problem between the two communities. She also suggests that Turkish Cypriots are cleaner than Greek Cypriots.

Interviewee 10, a 32-year-old house woman, married with two children, defines herself as Turkish Cypriot. She voted 'yes' at the referenda. She describes Turkish Cypriots as determined and stubborn. She says unification would be better for Turkish Cypriots. Status quo makes them victims, hence no other countries recognizes TRNC. She also wants Turkish Cypriots to become citizens of European Union.

Interviewee 12 is 42 year-old man, head of Development of Güzelyurt Association, and he is a dentist. First, he defines himself as Cypriot and then Turkish. He says the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are alike in terms of several features such as eating, dancing, and music. However he considers Greek Cypriots as more accomplished than Turkish Cypriots in terms of being unified as a community, moving together and supporting their own state. He describes Turkish Cypriots as emotional. He considers taking Turkish people from Turkey to settle down in Cyprus as a big mistake because, he says, the two communities, Turkish and Turkish Cypriots are different from each other in terms of life habits and customs although they share same religion and language. According to him, there is no real problem between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The problem stems from contradictory

interests of Turkey, Greece and England. He mentions that Annan Plan was an opportunity for integration. And all Turkish Cypriots including 'Turkish settlers' endeavor in order to realize unification based on Annan Plan. Hence all of them wanted rescue from being oppressed by Turkey and from lack of identity. He asserts that Turkey should leave Turkish Cypriots free in the road of EU. He stresses that, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots should persuade Greek Cypriots to unification and should make believe them Turkish Cypriots are sincere in their desire for unification. He claims that unless any solution could be attained, Cyprus problem will go under very critic process in which two communities might end in war.

Interviewee 13 is an old farmer at his 80. He defines himself as Turkish Cypriot. He claims that there were no problems between the two communities before 1955. According to him particular policies made the two communities enemy to each other. England used Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots who started to struggle for independence. He says nowadays each community treats the other one in good manner strategically. But indeed, the Greeks are revengeful. He asserts Turkish and Greek Cypriots are not alike. In contrast they are completely different in terms of way of life and way of think. He voted for the Annan Plan, because, he mentions, he wanted certainty in terms of his properties. Hence some of their properties at present were of Greeks before 1974. He maintains, for example they cannot sell their farms because of lack of official title deed. If any agreement between the two communities would be achieved, he claims, they would feel certainty. But he has no hope for any agreement because the Greeks circumstance Turkish troops' withdrawal. However, he states, the existence of military power of Turkey is advantageous for both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

Interviewee 15 is a 50-year-old man, owner of a bookstore and married with two children. He voted for the Annan Plan. He defines the community who live in north Cyprus as 'Cypriots who speak Turkish', and he defines the other community who live in south Cyprus as 'Cypriots who speak Greek'. He argues that the people who speak Turkish are those who have accepted Islam through the Ottoman's Islamization policies. Accordingly this process brought the consequence of becoming Turkish for some Cypriots. As a result, all Cypriots (both Turkish and Greek people) are alike each other. He maintains claiming Turkish Cypriots being similar to

Turkish people in Turkey or claiming Greek Cypriots being similar to Greek people in Greece would be wrong. He also argues that Turkey invaded the island in 1974 and divided the country. Indeed there is no such state as TRNC. Consequently unification could be attained on the condition that invader Turkey is removed from the island. He also claims that Turkey stays in the island because its interests require it. Actually, Turkey does not give any importance to Turkish Cypriots, he asserts. In contrast, Turkey tries to assimilate Cypriots just like Kurdish people, through sending Turkish people to settle down in Cyprus. The ratio of Turkish Cypriots to Turkish settlers lessens because of status quo. He lastly claims that European Union would be a mean for unification of Cyprus.

Interviewee 16 is a businessman at his 56, electric-electronic engineer and married with three children. He defines himself as Turkish Cypriot. He considers the definition of the community as 'Cypriots speaking Turkish' as imposed by European Union. However he has not any objection to this definition. He views Turkish Cypriots as different from Turkish people. Hence Turkish Cypriots have contacted with foreigners more frequently than Turkish people. He describes Turkish Cypriots as less quarrelsome and more consensual than Greek Cypriots. He considers Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike in terms of family life. For example both communities give exceptionally importance to the education of their children. He mentions that Turkish Cypriots feel themselves as left alone by Ottoman (when Ottoman left the island to England in 1878) and by Turkish Republic (when Turkey excluded Cyprus from Misak-ı Milli, national boundary) as well. He claims that whenever Turkey confronts any situation that requires concession, Turkish Cypriots are sacrificed easily. For example if the process of being member of European Union (EU) requires, Turkey would take out its troops from Cyprus. According to him, if the English did not accentuate and feed the differences between them, there would have been no real problem between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. He also mentions Turkish Cypriots' assimilation fear stems from 'Turkish settlers' and from the Greeks as well. He considers EU as a desired end for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, because EU brings a state structure that considers human rights, democracy, transparency, supremacy of law, economic wellbeing and so on.

Interviewee 17 is a retired government officer at 60 years old, married with two children. He defines himself as Turkish Cypriots. He mentions 'Turkish settlers' are unemployers and uneducated people who have no properties or occupations in Turkey. He emphasizes the main difference between the two communities that Turkish Cypriots are Muslims and Greek Cypriots are Christians. He also stresses that there has been no any incidence of intermarriage between the two communities. He says he voted 'yes' to the Annan Plan with the desire of unification. Because, he maintains, he wanted removal of uncertainty. However he also mentions that if Turkish troops leave the island, Turkish Cypriots would be massacred in 24 hours by the Greeks.

Interviewee 18 is a young man at his 18 who is a student at Near East University Public Relations Department. He claims that there are no two different communities in the island. All the people who live in Cyprus are Cypriots. The only difference is language. In contrast, all Cypriots are very different from Turkish people. He maintains Turkey's engaging in military operation was right at 1974. However, staying Turkish military power in the island was completely strategic. He asserts Turkey is an invader in the island now. And this is the main cause of failure in attaining unification. Accordingly only if Turkey's troops leave Cyprus, unification could be achieved. He also mentions that EU membership will bring economic well-being for Turkish Cypriots. He attributes current problems to the former governments of Turkey and North Cyprus. But he asserts present governments of Turkey (R.T. Erdoğan) and North Cyprus (Sabri Soyer) are on the side of solution.

Interviewee 19 is a young student at his 19, at Near East University English Language Department. He defines himself as Turkish Cypriots. He stresses European characteristic of Turkish Cypriots. And he describes their group as warm and relaxed. He says the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are more than the similarities between Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots. He also maintains that Turkey's engaging in military operation was right at 1974. However, staying Turkish troops in the island is wrong. He maintains Cyprus problem is not a problem between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. But it was a problem between the states. He also emphasizes the importance of EU for the people of North Cyprus.

5.2.2. Summary of Interviews of Anti-Integrationists

Interviewee 1 is a 62-year-old retired male teacher. Also he is head of Turkish Combatant Association. He asserts that geographically Cyprus is part of Anatolia. And Turkish Cypriots also are part of Anatolian Turks. He defines his community as Turkish who came from Anatolia. He does not think Turkish Cypriots and Anatolians as different nations. He asserts all customs, way of life; religion and language of Turkish Cypriots come from Anatolia. On the other hand, he states Turkish and Greek Cypriots are completely different. He views Cyprus problem as a national case, Turkey's case. He claims if Turkey abandons Cyprus case in order to gain any profit (e.g. becoming member of EU), it would bring serious consequence for Turkey itself. Hence Cyprus has strategic importance. He also mentions that minority status of Turkish Cypriots cannot be accepted and Turkish troops should not leave the island. According to him, only viable solution is to keep TRNC alive. He thinks that Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots believed the promises given by EU and United Nations (UN) by which if Turkish Cypriots would have voted for the Plan, the embargo would have been removed. But these promises were not delivered. He stresses that Turkish Cypriots were deceived at that time. He again emphasizes that the only viable solution should be built on bicommunal, biterritorial confederation under the active guarantee of Turkey. But Greek Cypriots will never accept this solution. In that condition only solution is to keep TRNC alive. He considers EU as unfair because by making Cyprus Problem an excuse, EU tries to prevent Turkey's membership.

Interviewee 2 is a retired police officer at his 55, married with two children. Now he is a raiser of oranges. He defines himself as citizen of TRNC and Turkish. He describes Turkish Cypriots as warm, lively, hospitable and secular. He criticizes those people who suggest that Cyprus problem started at 1974. In contrast, he states the problem started at 1960's by Greek government's prevention of the Turkish Parliamenters' entry to the Assembly of Cyprus Republic. He claims that Greek Cypriots do not want unification given the fact that they voted against the Annan Plan. He also mentions that Annan Plan foresaw huge territory lost for Turkish Cypriots. If the plan would have been realized, the number of Turkish Cypriots would lessen and lessen and they would lose their sovereignty rights, consequently

all the island would become Greek island in 20 years. He claims that the Turkish Cypriots regretted voting for the Annan Plan at that time. He says they thought if they voted yes at the referenda, the embargo and unemployment would be removed. But they started to understand no such events occur. He also claims that the officials of EU and Turkish government did endevour to deceive Turkish Cypriots during the referenda. He also claims that Turkish Cypriots cannot survive without Turkey's support.

Interviewee 3 is an old man at his 69. He is head of Güzelyurt Unity of Orange Raisers. He defines himself as Turk first and then Cypriot. He does not believe that unification can be attained. He asserts that there has been no real integration of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the history. He mentions there should be two sovereign independent states. Unification is not possible if this reality is not beared in mind, according to him. He considers EU as favouring Greeks. He asserts Greek Cypriots rely on EU.

Interviewee 11 is a 67 year-old retired teacher, married with four children. He defines himself as a Turk first, and then defines himself as a Turkish Cypriot. He claims he knows the history very well. He is sure about his ancestors come from Anatolia. He describes Turkish Cypriots as nationalist and Kemalist. He asserts that Cyprus problem stems from Greeks' aspirations to make Cyprus as a Greek island, like Crete and Rhodos. If unification would have been attained he maintains Cyprus problem would have emerged soon. Hence, the Greeks never approach to share the island with Turkish Cypriots. If, he maintains, in the current structure of Cyprus Republic, Turkish Cypriots unify with the Greeks, there would be no chance to survive as a community. He considers EU as a Christian club. And he states if Turkish troops leave the island, the situation of Turkish Cypriots would worsen, just like Phelistinian people.

Interviewee 14 is 49 years old man who is head of Turkish Farmer Association of North Cyprus. He states that they are Turkish who are born in Cyprus. He claims that 'Cypriotness' was fabricated after EU membership comes into the agenda in order to deteriorate the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people. He asserts there are not any differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people. He also claims that all Mediterranean people are alike, including

Greek Cypriots, Greeks, Italians, Turks etc. He states that Cyprus problem is not Turkish Cypriots' problem. It is Turkey's problem. He says if Cyprus to be lost, Turkey will become like Iraq; hence all sides of Turkey will be closed (referring the sea). That's why Cyprus problem is related with the security of motherland Turkey. And also he states, if the situations in Turkey gets worse, Turkish Cypriots would disappear. He claims that Annan Plan means Turkey's withdrawal from Cyprus Problem. United Cyprus Republic that is proposed by Annan Plan means there should be no Turkish military power in the island, and this cannot be accepted. He says currently there are two different states in the island: TRNC and Republic of Cyprus (RC). If this reality is accepted, a solution could be attained. Otherwise, all kind of solutions will bring destruction of Turkish Cypriots, as Greek Cypriots are richer and have power to assimilate Turkish Cypriots. Besides, any solution which undermines the reality of existence of two different states threatens Turkey's security.

5.3. Analysis of Arguments

As mentioned before, after reading the interviews' transcription and identifying the arguments, all of them were numbered, listed and allocated into pre-established categories. When identifying the arguments, any comment, phrases, sentence, stereotype and so on which were considered as related with the debate under consideration were included.

In order to reduce the complexity and substantial number of arguments, some of them were merged under more inclusive subcategories. All the arguments related with the category of 'Ingroup Boundaries' were reduced to three major arguments: Argument 1 'We are Turkish ', Argument 2 'We are Turkish Cypriots', and Argument 3 'We are Cypriots'. Besides identifying the arguments and categorizing them, the interviewees' stereotypes related with ingroup and outgroups were also identified.

All the arguments related with the category of 'Cyprus problem' were reduced to three main arguments: Argument 1 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', Argument 2 'Cyprus problem

stems from Turkey's wrong actions and attitudes', and Argument 3 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers'.

All the arguments related with the category of 'Solution' were reduced to three major arguments: Argument 1 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) should be kept alive', Argument 2 'The Annan Plan provided a base for unification', and Argument 3 'Becoming member of European Union should be necessary'.

And lastly, all the arguments related with the category of 'Collective threats and interests' were reduced to two major arguments: Argument 1 'Greeks threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)', and Argument 2 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' which constitute the collective threat definitions. Besides, the counterparts of these two arguments are considered as collective interests definitions. These are Counterargument 1 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' and Counterargument 2 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots'

The categories and the arguments are presented in table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Argument Categories and Arguments of Interviewees

Argument Categories	No	Arguments
Definition of Ingroup	1.	We are Turkish
	2.	We are Turkish Cypriots
	3.	We are Cypriots
Cyprus Problem	1.	Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek
	2.	Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong actions and attitudes
	3.	Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers
Solution	1	TRNC should be kept alive
	2	Annan Plan provided a base for unification
	3	Becoming member of European Union is desired
Threats	1	Greeks threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)
	2	Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots
Interests	1	United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots
	2	The status quo (TRNC) is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots

5.3.1. Analysis of Arguments in 'Ingroup Boundaries' Category

In this part, the arguments used by the interviewees in 'Ingroup Boundaries and Contents' category are analyzed. According to Reicher et al. (2006), definition of social identities in particular way through defining category boundaries (who are in and who are out) and category contents (the ingroup stereotypes) are related to ingroup mobilization in order to realize specific political projects. This proposal is made for those who are defined as 'identity entrepreneurs'. That is some people within the group –the politicians usually- intend to change the social structure and they define category boundaries and contents purposefully so as to achieve their goals. In Chapter 4, it is revealed how 'identity entrepreneurs' define their groups in line with their own collective projects regarding Cyprus problem. This second study purposes to examine the identity constructions of laypersons in order to investigate the relationship between these constructions and attitudes towards unification of Cyprus. In other words, it is addressed whether laypersons' constructions of category boundaries and contents are shaped by – or at least in line with- their attitudes towards unification of Cyprus.

From the 14 pro-integrationist interviewees, six interviewees define their social identities as 'Cypriot'; seven interviewees define their social identities as 'Turkish Cypriot', and only one of them (Int 9) views himself as 'Turk'. On the other hand 5 of 5 anti-integrationists define their social identities as 'Turk'. Beside their individual social identity definitions, some interviewees from the both camp describe the people who live in north part of Cyprus in more detailed manner. These descriptions are gathered under three main arguments: Argument 1 'We are Turkish', Argument 2 'We are Turkish Cypriots' and Argument 3 'We are Cypriots'.

In addition to open expressions used by the interviewees, any expressions about similarities and differences within and between groups are also accepted as 'Ingroup Boundary' arguments, in line with SCT's meta-contrast principle (see Chapter 2). For example the open expression of Interviewee 15, 'The people who live in the north part of the island are the Cypriots who speak Turkish' is accepted as Argument 3 'We are Cypriots'. Or the similarity/differences expressions such as " All the Cypriots, it does not matter being Greek or Turk, are similar to each other, rather than Turkish Cypriots being similar to Turkish people in Turkey" (used by

Interviewees 4,6,12,15,16,18) are also accepted as Argument 3 'We are Cypriots'. Similarly the open expression used by interviewee 1 and 4, 'Turkish Cypriots are a part of Anatolian Turks' is acknowledged as Argument 1 'We are Turkish '. Again, the similarity/differences expressions such as 'Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people are the same in terms of customs and way of life (interviewees 1 and 14)' or 'Turkish Cypriots have differentiated themselves from Greek Cypriots in order to save their Turkish identity' (Interviewee 1) are also accepted as Argument 1 'We are Turkish'.

The arguments used by each interviewee in this category are presented in Table 5.3. The shadow cells reveal the arguments which are supposed to be used by individual pro or anti-integrationists.

As seen from the table, Argument 1 'We are Turkish' was used by three interviewees. Interviewee (Int) 1 mentions that Turkish Cypriots come from Anatolia and they are also inextractable part of Anatolian Turks, and as a result Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people are the same in terms of customs and way of life (increasing within-group similarities). On the other hand Turkish Cypriots have differentiated themselves from the Greeks and they have never been integrated with the Greeks (increasing between-group differences). He also suggests that those who define themselves as 'Cypriot' instead of 'Turkish' expect to gain some profit and they have been deceived. To look at how interviewee 1 argues, let me present an example:

Extract 1

Int1 'when talking about Turkish Cypriots, I always emphasize that Turkish Cypriots came from Anatolia. Why? Because, in September 1572, as a requirement of Firman of Ottoman Padişah II. Selim, from Anatolia, especially from Karaman region, some people had been taken to Cyprus to settle down. Those people are our ancestors … We have official documents… After immigration, those people have become to be known as Turkish Cypriots. Of course they (Turkish Cypriots) are not a different nation. They are a part of Turkish people who live in Anatolia. They have brought their customs from Anatolia. They have brought their religion from Anatolia. And also they have brought their language from Anatolia. All the customs are still

alive today...Some people try to poison our youth through spreading the idea that we are not Turkish who come from Anatolia…'

Like Int 1, Int 14 also argues that they are inextractable part of Anatolian Turks, and they are similar to Anatolian Turks in terms of customs and way of life (increasing ingroup similarities). Similarly, Int 3 agrees with Int1 that people who define themselves as Cypriots instead of Turkish have been cheated.

To notify again, the three interviewees, Int1, Int3 and Int14 voted against the Annan Plan. So they are anti-integrationists. These people draw ingroup boundary as including all Turks (Anatolian and Cypriot Turks) and excluding Greek Cypriots, via using open expressions or increasing within-group similarities and increasing between-group differences (between themselves and the Greeks).

Like anti-integrationists, pro-integrationist also uses both open-expressions and similarity/differences arguments when drawing their group boundaries. However in this case, they try to make clear that 'They are Cypriots' (Argument 3). Six of 14 pro-integrationists define themselves as 'Cypriot'. Int15 proposes that the people who speak Turkish are those who accepted Islam through the Ottoman's Islamization policies. Int 15 claims explicitly that the people who live in north part are not Turkish. Let's look at his own words:

Extract 2

Int 15 'Turkish and Greek Cypriots are similar in every aspect of life. For example whenever I hear Greek music, I feel it is mine. Even you cannot differentiate Cypriots who speak Turkish from Cypriots who speak Greek in a restaurant. It is impossible...I think the people who live in north are those who were forced to live in north and similarly the people who live in south are those who were forced to live in south. Actually, those people who live in north are the Cypriots who speak Turkish. It is not my subjective view. It is the reality…The Cypriots had accepted Christianity at some period in the history. And then some of them had accepted Islam after Ottoman invasion, as the Ottoman had applied Islamization policies on them. The Ottoman had lessened the taxes when the Cypriots changed their religion. That's why some people changed their religion. At the same period they started to speak Turkish. That is process of Islamization that brought process of Turkization'.

Int 18 also rejects differentiation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots:

Extract 3

'I think there are no two different communities in Cyprus. I mean all people live in Cyprus are Cypriots. The only difference between them is the language. Certainly there is no Turkish or Greek. All of us are Cypriots If instead of Turkey, any other country saved us, and we would be their colony. For example English colony…I think like this…'

Int 15 and Int 18 also use similarity/differences arguments when drawing the group boundaries: 'The Cypriots, it does not matter being Greek or Turk, are similar to each other, rather than Turkish Cypriots being similar to Turkish people'. The same argument is used by all the Int 4, 6,12,16,18. For example Int 4 states that:

Extract 4

'…Because they (the Greeks) are Cypriots. Because we have lived together. For example I can distinguish Cypriots from Turkish people easily. That is I tell a Turkish Cypriot easily. But I cannot distinguish a Greek Cypriot from a Turkish Cypriot. Because there are several similarities (between Greek and Turkish Cypriots)'. I mean, there is a reality that Turkish and Greek Cypriots are similar to each other, rather than Turkish Cypriots being similar to Turkish people in Turkey. It is natural. We all live in Cyprus. For example siblings are more similar each other than being similar to cousins. Culture, faces, foods... everything is similar….'

Int 12 says that:

Extract 5

'There are a lot of similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots such as way of thinking, way of life, way of talking, way of child rearing…For example visiting a friend, eating together, drinking something, chatting, … this is so common in both communities. But in Turkey it is a bit different. It is not the same. I graduated from a university of Turkey. So I know their habits…'

Int16 asserts:

Extract 6

'Family structure of Greek and Turkish Cypriots is the same. It is different from Turkey. For example both Greek and Turkish Cypriots overvalue education of their children. They live for their children….'

Similarly Int 18 maintains:

Extract 7

'There are no differences between Turkish and Greek communities apart from trivial things. These two communities have been aparted from each other for 30 years. On the other hand, between Turkish Settlers and Cypriots there are big differences culturally…No similarities between them. For example language…'

All the interviewees who define themselves and their group as 'Cypriot' include the Greek Cypriots and exclude Turkish people from Turkey, when they draw their group's boundary. Two of the interviewees (15 and 18) use open and clear expressions. The others use similarity/differences arguments. By these arguments the interviewees state that the people who live in north part or speak Turkish are similar to those who live in south part or speak Greek (increasing similarities); or they state that the people who live in north part or speak Turkish are different from Turkish people, in terms of way of life or culture.

Although seven of 14 pro-integrationists define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots', only three of them (Int 13, Int 8 and Int 5) argue the issue openly or express their ideas why they define themselves as such. When we scrutinized these three interviews, they differentiate Turkish Cypriots from Turkish people or from Greek people, or both. Int 13 claims that Turkish Cypriots are not similar to Greek Cypriots and also they have not become tangled with Turkish people from Turkey. Similarly Int 8 mentions that Turkish Cypriots are different from both Turkish people live in Turkey and Greek Cypriots. For example Int 8 asserts:

Extract 8

Int 8 'We see people from Turkey. Their customs are completely different. For example their wedding ceremonies…The Greeks are also different from us...'

To summarize, whereas anti-integrationists who rejected Annan Plan draw their group's border as including all Turkish people (who live in Anatolia); the pro-integrationists who voted for the Plan define their group in two ways. First, some of them who define themselves as 'Cypriot' reject the existence of two different communities in the island, or try to increase similarities between the people who live in the north and the south part and increase the differences between Turkish people from Turkey and Cypriots. Thus they draw their group boundary as excluding Turkish people and including the Greek Cypriots. Second, the others who voted for the Plan define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' and try to differentiate themselves from Turkish people or from Greek people, or both.

Identity definitions of interviewees reveal consistencies with their votes at the referendum of Annan Plan. For the anti-integrationist excluding the Greek Cypriots from the ingroup relates positively with voting against unification of Cyprus, in logical sense. On the other hand, for the pro-integrationists excluding Turkish people (from Turkey) from the ingroup associates positively with voting for unification of Cyprus, again in logical sense. However, excluding both Turkish people and Greek Cypriots from the ingroup shows vague relation with voting for the Plan. In Table 5.4. it could be seen the logical relationship between the interviewees' votes and their ingroup definitions.

5.3.2. Categorical Content Considerations of Interviewees

When we come to the ingroup content considerations, anti-integrationists state eight positive stereotypes: Kemalist (Int 1), Hospitable (Int 2), Secular (Int 1), Tender (Int 2), Altruistic (Int 2), On the side of democracy (Int 2), Patient (Int 1), and Cognizant (Int 1). The anti-integrationist interviewees do not assert any negative stereotype when describing their ingroup characteristics.

On the other side, pro-integrationist interviewees mention 7 positive stereotypes: Hospitable (Int 10), Outspoken (Int 8), Honest (Int 8), Clean (Int 9), Tolerant (Int 12), Determined (Int 10) and Less quarrelsome (Int 16); 3 negative stereotypes: Stubborn (Int 10), Lack of the ability to struggle with the enemy (Int 13), Lazy (Int 6). All these stereotypes refer to the people who live in North Cyprus,

although they can be defined as 'Turkish', 'Turkish Cypriots' or 'Cypriots (see Table 5.5.)

Regarding outgroup stereotyping, we should take into account two different groups. One of them is Greek Cypriots who are accepted as outgroup for those who define themselves as 'Turkish'. The other is Turkish people who come from Turkey after 1974 military operation and these are known as Turkish settlers. This group is accepted as outgroup especially by those who define themselves as Cypriots. For those who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots', both groups constitute outgroups, hence they argue the both group as dissimilar or different from themselves, as revealed previously.

While Greek Cypriots are described as negatively - 'Can not be trusted' (Int 2, 3 and 11), Enemy of Turks (Int 1) and Cheater (Int 1) - neither positive nor neutral stereotypes are expressed about them by anti-integrationists. From pro-integrationist interviewees, those who define themselves as 'Cypriot' state three positive -Warmer (Int 12), Being unit as a group (Int 12), More accomplished in business (Int 12 and 16), and only one negative stereotypes –racists (Int 6) referring Greek Cypriots. The other pro-integrationists who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots' express only negative stereotypes referring Greek Cypriots: Not mature (Int 5), Covetous (Int 5 and 8), Revengeful (Int 5, 7 and 8), Bad intentional (Int 5, 7, 8 and 13)and cannot be trusted (Int 13).

The other outgroups –Turkish people came from Turkey – known as Turkish Settlers are described only in negative terms by pro-integrationists. These stereotypes are Thief (Int 4,5), Unreliable (5), Aggressive (Int 4,5, 15), Hypocrite (Int 15), Trickster (Int 15), Unemployed (Int 4,5), Yokel (Int 4,5), Uneducated (Int 4,5), Conservative (Int 15), Narrow-minded (Int 15), Dirty (Int 4,5), Not respectful to women rights (Int 15), and Ignorant (Int 4,5,15). While only three pro-integrationists express their descriptions for Turkish people, the anti-integrationists do not describe them in any positive, negative or neutral ways.

Such findings reveal that anti-integrationists show a clear ingroup favoring but no ingroup derogating attitudes. In contrast, they mostly express their outgroup derogating (the Greeks) evaluations. However it is not observed any outgroup favoring or derogating attitudes regarding Turkish people who came from Turkey

after 1974. Indeed, for all anti-integrationist, Turkish people came from Turkey after 1974 do not constitute an outgroup. It might be more accurate to accept this group as a part of ingroup.

Although pro-integrationists state more positive ingroup stereotypes, they also express some negative ones which might be accepted as ingroup derogation. Similarly they show some outgroup (the Greek Cypriots) favoring expressions, but more often they describe the Greek Cypriot with negative terms which means outgroup favoring is rarer than outgroup derogation among pro-integrationists. Yet, it is required to make a distinction between 'Cypriots' and 'Turkish Cypriots'. Cypriots express three positive and only one negative stereotypes when describing the Greek Cypriots which clearly refer to outgroup favoring evaluations. But when we consider that they draw their ingroup boundary by including the Greek Cypriots, it could be argued that positive evolutions of Greek Cypriots might refer to ingroup favoring rather than outgroup favoring attitudes. As such it couldn't be claimed any outgroup favoring attitudes for the 'Cypriots'. On the other hand the 'Turkish Cypriots' show a clear outgroup derogating attitudes, given the fact that no positive stereotype is mentioned regarding Greek Cypriots.

Only three pro-integrationists express their thoughts which are all negative about Turkish people who came from Turkey after 1974. This situation reveals clear outgroup derogating attitudes.

Ingroup stereotypes, outgroup stereotypes (the Greeks) and the other outgroup stereotypes (the Turkish people) are presented in Table 5.5, Table 5.6. and Table 5.7., respectively.

Table.5.3. The Arguments of Interviewees in 'Ingroup Definition/Boundary' Category

Interviewee	We are Turkish	We are Turkish Cypriots	We are Cypriots
1	+		
2	+		
3	+		
4			+
5		+	
6			+
7		+	
8		+	
9	+		
10		+	
11	+		
12			+
13		+	
14	+		
15			+
16			+
17		+	
18			+
19		+	

Note: Note1: Shadow cells show that the arguments are supposed to be used by that interviewee logically.

Table 5.4. Logical Relations between 'Ingroup Boundary' Arguments and the Votes during Referenda

	Int	Voting 'Yes'	Voting 'No'
We are Turkish	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+
	11	-	+
	14	-	+
	9	-	+
We are Cypriots	4	+	-
	6	+	-
	12	+	-
	15	+	-
	16	+	-
	18	+	-
We are Turkish Cypriots	5	+/-	+/-
	7	+/-	+/-
	8	+/-	+/-
	10	+/-	+/-
	13	+/-	+/-
	17	+/-	+/-
	19	+/-	+/-

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation
Note2: Shadow areas refer that the vote of the interviewee and the argument used by the same interviewee are not consistent. Logically it was not expected that these interviewees use this argument.

Table.5.5. Ingroup Stereotyping

Pro-integrationists	Anti-integrationist
Positive Stereotypes	
1.Hospitable (10)	8.Kemalist(1)
2.Outspoken (8)	9.Hospitable(2)
3.Honest (8)	10.Secular (1)
4.Clean (9)	11.Tender (2)
5.Tolerant (12)	12.Alturistic(2)
6.Determined (10)	13.On the side of democracy (2)
7.Less quarrelsome (16)	14.Patient (1)
	15.Cognizant (1)
Negative Stereotypes	
16.Stubborn (10)	
17.Lack of the ability to cope struggle with the enemy (13)	
18.Lazy (6)	

Note: The numbers in the parentheses show the number of interviewees who claim the arguments

Table.5.6. Outgroup Stereotyping –Greek Cypriots

Pro-integrationists	Anti-integrationist
Positive Stereotypes	
1. Warmer (12)	
2. Unity (12)	
3. More accomplished in business (12,16)	
4. More accomplished in terms of being unity (12)	
Negative Stereotypes	
5. Not mature (4,5)	12.Can not be trusted (2,3,11)
6. Covetous (5, 8)	13.Enemy of Turks (1)
7. Revengeful (5,7,8)	14.Cheater (1)
8. Bad intentional (5, 7, 8, 13)	
9. Racists (6)	

Note: The numbers in the parentheses show the number of interviewees who use the arguments

Table 5.7. Outgroup Stereotyping –Turkish People who come from Turkey

Pro-integrationists	Anti-integrationist
1. Thief (4,5)	
2. Unreliable (5)	
3. Aggressive (4,5, 15)	
4. Hypocrite (15)	
5. Trickster (15)	
6. Unemployed (4,5)	
7. Yokel (4,5)	
8. Uneducated (4,5)	
9. Conservative (15)	
10. Narrow-minded (15)	
11. Dirty (4,5)	
12. Not respectful to women rights (15)	
13. Ignorant (4,5,15)	

Note: The numbers in the parentheses show the number of interviewees who use the arguments

5.3.3. Analysis of Arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' Category

After several readings of the transcription of interviews, any phrase, expression, comment, sentence, claim, term, and so on related with 'Cyprus Problem' were detected and coded as arguments. Finishing this process, all the arguments used by each interviewee were examined again, and then merged into more inclusive three arguments. These are 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong actions', and 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers'.

From Table 5.8., the arguments used by each interviewee in this category could be seen. The shadow cells reveal the arguments which are expected to be used individual by pro or anti-integrationists logically.

The first argument could be summarized as 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek'. Accordingly, Greece and Greek Cypriots desired to make Cyprus as completely Greek, which is called 'Hellenization'. This situation would have threatened Turkey's security and in turn Turkish Cypriots' security. Hence in such situation, the three sides of Turkey would have been surrounded by Greece, and Turkey would have lost its ability to move in Mediterranean Sea. This situation would have weakened the entire Turkish nation. Thus, 'Cyprus Problem' is a national problem and Turkey's case. Let's focus on their comments:

Extract 9

Int 1 'In any war context, the supply is transported through the west and the south seaports. However all these ports are located in front of Cyprus. If the country in the west of Turkey (referring Greece) would be the same country which rules Cyprus, it would have surrounded Turkey actively. No any state can give out its security to any other country. And today, considering the strategic importance of the island, if Cyprus would be left to the Greeks, Turkey cannot take or transport any supply and cannot exit from the sea, in any war situation. That's why Cyprus cannot be left… If it is to be left, it would be a big mistake, according to all nations (including Turkish Cypriots)'.

Extract 10

Int 14: Cyprus problem is not only Turkish Cypriots' problem. Cyprus is the case of homeland Turkey…Cyprus is a window of Turkey that faces Mediterranean sea. If Turkey wants to close this window, it's up to Turkey…In any way, 80 thousands of Turkish Cypriots can be transported and placed in Turkey easily. However, Cyprus problem is the problem of all 80 million Turkish people (Anatolian Turks). If Cyprus is lost, homeland Turkey would be locked. To be more precise, if we lost Cyprus…Turkey would become like Iraq in any war situation, because all sides of it would be closed…The land cannot be left or sold. On behalf of the land we can die, but we never leave it.

According to the interviewees who state the first argument, the Greeks have still not abandoned their aspiration, and even today all their actions and attitudes serve this aspiration. Interviewee 11 asserts:

Extract 11

'Cyprus problem will never end unless the Greek takes the whole island like Crete and Rhodos…The Greeks assert and declare several times that Cyprus is their thirteenth big island. Their intention is obvious…'

Extract 12

Int 2 '…the Greek does not want any solution or unification. How unification could be attained in this island according to the Greeks? If Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is cancelled and if Turkish people accept to become minority, and then the unification could be attained.… Yes, if sovereignty rights are undermined, and then unification could be attained. Otherwise, the Greek does not want any agreement or unification…'

The first argument also has some evidence of Greeks' bad intentions that revealed by the interviewees. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots had forced to leave the island even after establishment of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC). Thousands of Turkish Cypriots have been deceived and they felt they should emigrate from the island. Let's leave the words to the Interviewee 11 again:

Extract 13

'Turkish Cypriots left Cyprus to immigrate to London and Australia. They have been 'persuaded!' by the Greek government. They have been given money and found good jobs and got their tickets, but one-way, only to go. All of these have been done. The number of Turkish Cypriots in the island reduced to 80 thousands from 120 thousands in that period… The aim was to get rid of Turkish Cypriots from the island.'

Interviewee 3 also states:

Extract 14

'When I graduated from high school, the Greek government officials came and offered me money and good job in Canada. They said I would not spend any money. All of them would have been afforded by Greek government. They have made this to make Turkish Cypriots immigrated to other countries in order to take the entire island. This will occur again.'

Until 2003, the gates at the borders that separated Turkish and Greek sides were strictly closed and passing from one side to another was impossible. In 2003, these gates were opened. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have been allowed to pass other side using with their identity cards. The events that have been experienced after the gates opened were also indicated as evidence for the first argument.

Extract 13

Int 11: 'Those who pass to the Greek side thought that they were humiliated. For example some illegal organizations were formed there. They broke the windows of cars that belonged to Turks. …The Turkish architects were hold in the prison, because their own cars were damaged. But, this event was closed fast in order not to attract the public reaction… Why should I go there and be derogated?'

To summarize, all the interviewees who define themselves as 'Turk' and voted against the Annan Plan utilized Argument 1, with regards to the 'Cyprus Problem' category. The different reasons behind this argument were narrated by some of the interviewees. For example 'Cyprus Problem is a national problem and that's why Cyprus should be protected from being entirely Greek' (Int 1, 14, 2, 11),

'even today the Greeks do not give up ENOSIS aspiration' which is evidenced by the Greeks' aggressive attitudes in the past (Int 11 and 3) and today (Int 11). All these reasons behind the first argument used by anti-integrationist interviewees associated positively with their votes against the Annan Plan.

However not only anti-integrationists, but also some pro-integrationists used the first argument in 'Cyprus Problem' category. Interviewees 5, 13, 17 and 19 who also defined themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots' considered Cyprus problem as originated from the Greeks' ENOSIS goal. Let's focus on their comments:

Extract 16

Int 19: The Greeks claim that the problem started at 1974. They argue that the problem started because Turkey invaded Cyprus. But it is wrong. This problem started at 1955, and it continued at 1963 and at 1974 and still continues. Because the Greek wanted to make the island completely Greek. Turkey's military operation was right and it was in accordance with Republic's constitution. Turkey was guarantor of the Republic. The operation was done in order to bring peace and stop blood...'

Extract 17

Int 17 'I am not one of them who do not want Turkey as a guarantor power of United Cyprus. I do not think Turkey also will accept it. Our insurance is Turkey. But if Turkey's power cannot be felt here, the Greek will never abandon Megal-i Idea which means hellenization of the island. In the Church, they still pray to achieve in their hellenization goal, even today. They do not allow Turkish Cypriots to trade with foreign countries. That is, they are still back on their long lasted aspiration.'

Argument 2 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions' is used by the interviewees 4, 5, 6,12, 13, 15, and 16. Accordingly, although Turkey's military operation might be right, Turkey should have withdrawn its troops from the island after operation. Turkish troops' stay in the island constitutes a major problem. Even for Int 15 and Int 18, it was an invasion. Let's listen to these two interviewees.

Extract 18

Int 18: 'At that time, Bülent Ecevit started the military operation to Cyprus with the secret code 'Ayşe have gone to the holiday'. It was right. But what happened then? Turkey embedded its troops in the island. Cyprus has critical importance for Turkey. That's why Turkey efforts not to give away Cyprus. Nevertheless… This event is completely out of law, out of guarantee agreements. And today Turkey is an invader. Everybody knows that. The Europe knows that. Turkey also confesses that. It is an invader.'

Extract 19

Int 15: 'We have experienced the most dangerous situation after 1974 military operation. Our condition is obvious. Our number reduced to 90 thousands…After the gates opened, we are always getting together with the friends from the south. There is no problem between us, just like before the *invasion*.'

Nevertheless, if it is not an invasion, at least it is perceived as an invasion by the world as Int 6 puts:

Extract 20

'Turkey acted contradictory to international law and to the international agreements which gave Turkey the guarantee right. The first operation might have been right. But I object to the rest. I have objection to Turkey's stay. Because it divided the country… and Turkey become invader.'

In addition to Turkish soldiers' staying in the island, taking some Turkish people from Anatolia to settle down here is also another big mistake which creates the 'Cyprus Problem' according to the interviewees (Int 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16). Hence, such people have destroyed the demographic and cultural structure of island, and made difficult to reach any agreement with the Greek Cypriots. The words of some interviewees are presented below.

Extract 21

Int 5: 'A person who knows him/herself tries to get adapted to where s/he goes, doesn't s/he? But these people do not. Instead they are changing here.

When we visit middle of Nikosia, we tell as if we are in Hatay (a city in south part of Turkey) Republic'.

Extract 22

Int 6: 'There has been a demographic transportation… Turkey made a mistake here. And Turkey caused deformation of demographic structure of Cyprus. And I think the history will never forgive Turkey on this issue. Because Turkey would destroy Turkish Cypriotness identity'

Extract 23

Int 12: 'Indeed it was a sociological murder. There is an infringement of human rights. That is, you put different groups together which will never come into any harmony…'

Extract 24

Int 15: 'Before invasion of Turkey, we used to leave our doors open… But these people are thieves. They are not suitable to the tissue of Cyprus, to the culture of Cyprus. The tissue is completely different here. The culture of Cyprus is unique which has been established in a unique geography…They (Turkish people) deteriorate the culture, instead of saving us. They have done this consciously. They made a program and they operated it…Turkey tries to make here a Turkish island. It also has done this to the other places, not only to Cyprus… The Kurdish people have been forced to move from their own villages, because they were Kurdish. They forced Kurdish people to change their names. They did same thing here, after invasion. They change our names, and names of our places. They tried to make everything Turkish. But it is foreign to us. At least I can say I am not Turkish. I do not mind some people call themselves as Turkish. But I want to live with my own culture. Nobody have the right to change it forcefully. It cannot be. This is the problem'.

Besides, after division of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have faced with a very difficult situation that no other countries recognized them (Int 12, 17). The interviewees attributed the responsibility of 'Cyprus Problem' to Turkey. Hence Turkey is considered as the first responsible actor of division of Cyprus.

Extract 25

Int 12: 'Greece does not have such problem; Turkey does not have such problem. But we have. We are not recognized by international community. We have no identity…'

Extract 28

Int 15 'There is no such place. Only Turkey behaves as if there is such country. Because Turkey wants Cyprus in his hand as a card in the road of EU, to increase its bargaining power. It is that simple.'

However, the interviewees claimed that, Turkey did not care about the difficult situation of Turkish Cypriots and it did not give any importance to Turkish Cypriots. Turkey is in Cyprus because of its interests (Int 12, 13, 15, 16). The narrative of some interviewees as follow:

Extract 27

Int 12: 'Cyprus is not a single land at which people from Turkish origin live. There are other lands such as Balkans, Middle Asia…Why Turkey have intruded only Cyprus? The problem here is related with the land, it is not related with humanity etc. Turkish Cypriots are only instruments. We are used by Turkey. Turkey uses Turkish Cypriots to protect its own interests'

To summarize, Interviewees 4,5,12,13,15,16, and 18 considers 'Cyprus Problem' as stemmed from Turkey's wrong actions and attitudes. First of all, Turkish troops' stay in the island after 1974 military operation is seen as a big mistake, or even as an invasion. Some interviewees hesitated to express that it was an invasion. But instead, they claimed that it is perceived as an invasion by the world which also created a major problem. In addition to Turkish soldiers' staying in the island, taking some Turkish people from Anatolia to settle down in Cyprus is also perceived as another big mistake. Hence, it was mentioned that such people have destroyed the demographic and cultural structure of the island, and made it difficult to reach any agreement with the Greek Cypriots. Besides, after division of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have faced with a very difficult situation that no other countries recognized

them. And Turkey did not care about this situation. Accordingly, Turkey undermined the real needs of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey seemed to be in the island because of its interests.

Argument 3 used by the interviewees 6, 13, 15, 16 and 17, is that 'Cyprus problem stemmed from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers'. Accordingly, some international powers want Cyprus in their own control. Hence, the location of Cyprus, which is embedded in East Mediterranean Sea, had a strategic importance for those who want to dominate Middle East and its petrol.

Extract 28

Int 6: 'USA and UK and France and Germany, all of them are included in the Cyprus Problem, because of their particular interests. They cannot act against their colonization spirit. They are imperialist in nature. Of course this place is a plane ship which can never be plunged into the sea. The English has the base here but all of the others use this base. This is the situation. That's why there is such a problem...'

Extract 29

Int 17 'The English exploited this island for many years…I think the English keep the idea of taking this island again in their mind. Indeed they own some of this territory.'

Extract 30

Int15: '… (Cyprus problem) is part of Middle East problem. Cyprus problem is related with the latent accounts of imperialist powers. Indeed Cyprus problem is very simple. But imperialists make it complicated… If Cyprus is located in any other sea, we would not have such problem…'

Extract 31

Int 16:'But the English accentuated the existing differences between the two communities and used them against each other, just as what happened in other places such as Indian and Malta. When Greek Cypriots started their fight for independence, the English used Turkish Cypriots against them. It lasted until 1955. .'

Extract 31

Int 17 'When you examine the history of Cyprus, you see that Cyprus never have belonged to the Cypriots. This is the 'Cyprus problem'. The Arabians, the Venice, Ottoman and then English… There will be others I think. Because there is petrol in Middle East and the war of interests between the powers will never end…'

When we examine the transcriptions of the interviews, it is seen that apart from Interviewees 7, 8, 9 and 10, all the interviewees use first, second or the third arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category. It can be seen from Table 5.5. which interview uses which argument.

Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 11, and 14 who also voted against the Annan Plan, and thus classified by the researcher as anti-integrationist, tended to use Argument 1 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek'. The different reasons behind this argument which were narrated by some of the interviewees can be summarized as 'Cyprus Problem is a national problem and that's why the Cyprus should be protected from being entirely Greek, as the Greeks do not give up ENOSIS aspiration. This long lasted goal of Greeks is evidenced by the Greeks' aggressive attitudes and actions towards Turkish Cypriots in the past and today.' Argument 1 used by Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 11, 14 and 17 who also define themselves as 'Turks' as remembered from the previous part positively associates with these interviewees' own votes at the referenda and with their identity definitions logically. Hence, if the problem stems from the Greek Cypriots' intention to make island completely Greek, voting for unification would obviously be contradictory to their own 'Turkish' identity.

Argument 1 is also used not only by anti-integrationists but also by some pro-integrationists who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots'. These are Interviewees 17 and 19. This finding is surprising because these interviewees voted for the Annan Plan at 2004 referenda. And, their votes relate negatively with their arguments that Cyprus Problem originated from the Greeks' bad intentions. Hence one can be cautious why they want to unify with the Greeks who are considered as perpetuating the ENOSIS goal by themselves? But perhaps, after finishing the

analysis of the all arguments in other categories, their attitudes become understandable for us.

On the other hand, the other pro-integrationists, most of which define themselves as 'Cypriot' tended to use Argument 2 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions' which is in accordance with their positive votes at the referenda. Interviewees 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 18 consider that staying Turkey troops in the island as a big mistake, or even as an invasion. In addition to Turkish soldiers' staying in the island, taking some Turkish people from Anatolia to settle down in Cyprus is also viewed as another big mistake. Hence, such people who are named as 'Turkish Settlers' have been perceived to destroy the demographic and cultural structure of island, and made it difficult to reach any agreement with the Greek Cypriots. Besides, after division of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have faced with a very difficult situation that no other country recognized them. And Turkey undermines this need of recognition of Turkish Cypriots. As such, voting for the Annan Plan which required the withdrawal of Turkish troops and reducing the number of Turkish Settlers is consistent with their own arguments and also with their identity definitions (Cypriots). Moreover, voting 'yes' for unification would solve their recognition problem, because under the roof of Cyprus Republic they can trade with and transport to other countries easily.

Similarly, Argument 3 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers' is used by interviewees 6, 12, 13, 15, and 16 who define themselves as 'Cypriots' and voted for the Annan Plan. Moreover, only interviewee 17 among those who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' used this argument. Accordingly, Cyprus' location which is embedded in East Mediterranean sea has a strategic importance for imperialist powers in dominating Middle East and having its petrol. Although this argument does not seem to relate with pro or anti-integranionism in any way at the first glance, none of anti-integrationists referred to it. In Table 5.9. the logical relationship between the three arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category and the votes of interviewees can be seen. As mentioned before, the three interviewees, 5, 13 and 17 voted 'yes' at the referenda of Annan Plan. However, they also used the first argument, which constituted an inconsistency with their own votes.

Table.5.8. The Arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' Category

Int	Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions	Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle
1	+		
2	+		
3	+		
4		+	
5	+	+	
6		+	+
7			
8			
9			
10			
11	+		
12		+	+
13	+	+	+
14	+		
15		+	+
16		+	+
17	+		+
18		+	
19	+		

Note: Note1: Shadow cells show that the arguments are supposed to be used by that interviewee logically.

Table 5.9. Logical Relations between 'Cyprus Problem' Arguments of Political Parties and the Votes at the Referenda

	Int	Voting 'Yes'	Voting 'No'
Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+
	5	-	+
	11	-	+
	13	-	+
	14	-	+
	17	-	+
	19	-	+
Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions	4	+	-
	5	+	-
	6	+	-
	12	+	-
	13	+	-
	15	+	-
	16	+	-
	18	+	-
Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle	6	+	+/-
	12	+	+/-
	13	+	+/-
	15	+	+/-
	16	+	+/-
	17	+	+/-

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation
Note2: Shadow areas refer that the vote of the interviewee and the argument used by the same interviewee are not consistent. Logically it was not expected that these interviewees used this argument.

5.3.4. Analysis of Arguments in 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' Category

After several readings of the transcription of interviews, any phrase, expression, comment, sentence, claim, term and so on related with 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' were detected and coded as arguments. Finishing this process, all the arguments used by each interviewee were examined again, and then merged into more inclusive three arguments. These are 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus should be kept alive', 'Unification should have been attained on the base of Annan Plan which was an opportunity', and 'European Union membership is desired'.

From Table 5.10., the arguments used by each interviewee in this category could be seen. The shadow cells reveal the arguments which are expected to be used by that interviewee logically. The symbol + means that the interviewee uses the argument, symbol '-' means that the interviewee uses the counterpart (or opposite) of this argument.

Whereas the first argument 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) should be kept alive' is used by interviewees 1, 2, 3, 11, 14, and 17; the counterpart of this argument 'keeping TRNC alive cannot be possible' is used by interviewee 6. According to the interviewees who use the first argument, Turkish Cypriots experienced unification in the past. It was an awful experience for them, because the Greeks broke the Republic's constitution and acted against the law. As a lesson from such experiences, it is claimed that, Turkish community cannot live together with the Greeks and also without Turkey's active support. Int 1 tells in detail:

Extract 32

> 'Look my daughter, we experienced it. An agreement on the paper can never be on the side of Turkish Cypriots and it did not. We experienced it. Whatever the agreements you sign, if there is no territory on which you live securely, to which you call as yours, your community will never live in tranquility. We spent all our adolescence years as fighting. Our beloved friends, siblings, mothers, fathers died in our arms. Even we did not witness our children's growing. We struggled on the mountains. I think we will never be duped again. A number of Greek Cypriots, who have aspired to make Cyprus a Greek island for long long time, are more

than us. Whenever they have found an opportunity they have tried to exclude Turkish people from the Republic. And they have done that. Against a community like the Greeks if Turkish people do not have a territory with its clear borders and they give their sovereignty, Turkish people cannot survive, cannot exist, certainly. We want a confederation with bi-territorial, bi-communal and two sovereign states in the island and we want active guarantorship of Turkey. The partnership can be established only if these conditions are met. Otherwise, there is no opportunity that Turkish people can live in peace and protect their own national and religion identities.'

Similarly interviewee 2 states the only solution is to keep TRNC alive.

Extract 33

Int 2 I am on the side of keeping TRNC alive…We should change our unification policy as soon as possible. Because it becomes obvious that the Greek aspires to gain the entire island. The Greeks says it, everyday… TRNC is the solution'

Besides their own experiences, it is claimed that the history of other nations also teach that completely different nations cannot live under the same roof without their own sovereignty. Interviewees 11 and 14 assert this dimension.

Extract 34

Int 11 My daughter I know the geography very well. Please look at the world map: Yugoslavia was a republic made up of Macedonians, Croatians, Serbians, Bosnians… under Tito leadership. What happened then? Did it work? It is working now. How? All the people under the roof of former Yugoslavia established their own sovereign states. Whatever happens, but our independence and sovereignty is to be protected. Cyprus can be integrated but on the condition of two-state structure which cannot be diluted. But, if Cyprus Republic would remain with its current structure, and then Turkish Cypriots would be depended on it, we can do nothing but be lessened, lessened and be disappeared at the end.'

Extract 35

Int 14 If a solution is compulsory, there is only one solution. There are two different states in Cyprus at the present: TRNC and Republic of Greek Cypriots. The Turkish and Greek Cypriots should protect their own states. When required because of trade or something like that, they would come together occasionally, sometimes the gates might open. This is the solution. Otherwise, I always say, there is only one way to integrate these two people: Gathering all singles in the island and make the Turkish girls marry with Greek boys or the Turkish boys to marry with Greek girls. The only way is that. Because, forcing the two different communities to live in an integrated structure is contradictory to the logic. Best example is Philistine. Arafat was given Nobel Peace Prize. From that day to present, the blood never ended in Philistine'

Although Interviewee 17 voted for the Annan Plan, he states he is on the side of the solution by which TRNC should be kept alive.

Extract 36

Int 17 'The solution must include TRNC. We should keep TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots ask for this. We do not want any confrontation with the Greek again. But Annan Plan required that the Greek join among us…The Greeks smile to your face, they behave as if they are friends, but actually they try to find a way to destroy you.'

In contrast, Int 6, a pro-integrationist, claims that 'keeping TRNC alive' is neither desired nor possible which constitutes the opposite of Argument 1.

Extract 37

'It is not possible to establish a separate state here. If it is established, several separate states should be established in Turkey, such as Kurdistan, and Lazistan. Even if the Greek allows establishment of that state, Turkey would not allow it. Neither United Nations would allow it. Existing borders cannot be changed…A separate state cannot be established. Turkish Cypriots

might gain autonomy under the roof of Republic of Cyprus. At present there is no such state as TRNC. TRNC is an illusion. There is no such state according to international laws, the European Union and for human rights… Even Turkish Football Federation does not recognize TRNC. There is no such state in the world.'

Argument 2 'Unification should be reached' is used by interviewees 4, 5, 6, 8,10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 19 all of whom are pro-integrationists . According to the interviews, the Turkish Cypriots want unification because the zygest is different now. Both the Greeks and Turkish people change. Therefore Annan Plan provided a good base for unification. And Greek Cypriots should be persuaded that Turkish people are sincere in their desire for integration. Let's listen to some of them.

Extract 38

Int 10: 'I mean it would be better to be unified. A common solution is better. In current situation we are the sufferers…They (the Greeks) are recognized but we are not. I have not any fear for the consequences of unification. They changed, and so did us ….If consensus is attained…I wish the borders would be open. Wherever people want to go, they can go, they can settle down. We can go there, they can come here… I think it is better…'

Extract 39

Int 12: 'All the Turkish Cypriots, including those who came from Turkey after 1974 struggled for unification during the time when the Annan Plan was in the agenda. A common struggle. They all provided a model for solution of the Cyprus problem. May be they all wanted to be free from lack of identity, lack of personality. They all wanted to be free from Turkey's rule. That's why they voted 'yes' to Annan Plan which seemed to be an opportunity. This reality cannot be ignored…The Greeks voted against the plan. May be they have good reasons. But we have to persuade them to unification. We should show some evidence that we are sincere. For example we can reduce the number of Turkish troops…'

On the other hand, anti-integrationist interviewees 1, 2, 3, and 11 use the very opposite of the same argument. For example interviewee 11 asserts:

Extract 40

'Let's consider the Annan Plan. I voted against the plan and if it is required I can reject it million times. Because it was not a plan that could bring peace. It was a war plan. It would have brought fight.'

Interviewee 2 also uses opposite of the argument by stressing disadvantageous for Annan plan:

Extract 41

'Annan Plan required a huge territorial concession, a huge concession…'

Argument 3 'European Union membership is desired' is used by interviewees 6, 12, 15, 16 and 18. Accordingly European Union (UN) is a mean for unification of Cyprus (asserted by Int 15). If unification could be attained, this country would be a member of EU and the membership brings a state structure that considers human rights, democracy, transparency, supremacy of law, economical wellbeing and so on (asserted by Int 16). Let's listen to interviewee 16:

Extract 42

'Human rights, democracy, supremacy of law, and transparency of the state, which only controls and orients the economy could be achieved. All of them are desired not only for Turkish Cypriots, but also for Turkey. Increased income ect…When we come close to Europe, life quality also increases. But we should believe in that…'

The opposite of the third argument is used by interviewees 1, 2, and 3. Accordingly EU cannot be trusted mainly because of its Greek favoring attitudes.

Extract 43

Int1: 'It is not just that EU tries to prevent Turkey's membership using Cyprus Problem. But also, EU does not have any right to endevour for a solution. Why? Because the 23 states of EU accepted

Cyprus Republic as a member, although it was against the international law. EU favors the Greeks. On the other hand, EU did not deliver its promises given to Turkish Cypriots after the referenda. Indeed if Turkey is not accepted to EU, that structure is not secure for Turkish Cypriots. Because Turkey never allows realization of the Greeks' Hellenization dream. But EU seems not to accept Turkey. Under that condition EU is not desired for Turkish Cypriots. Between 1963 and 74 Turkish people were forced to live in enclaves. European countries did nothing at that time. In contrast they supported the Greeks. I never trust EU, nor their fake values in the name of human rights'

Extract 43

Int 3: 'Look, the Turkish people of Iskece live under the roof of EU, because of Greece membership. But there is still restriction on them. They cannot build or repair their own houses… Greece considers them as a Muslim minority, not Turkish. But EU does not react to them…'

To summarize, the first argument 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) should be kept alive' is used by interviewees 1, 2, 3, 11, and 14. According to the interviewees who used the first argument, Turkish Cypriots had terrible experiences in the past, because of Greeks actions against the Republic's constitution. As a lesson from such experiences, they claimed that Turkish community cannot live together with the Greeks again, especially if there is no Turkey's active support. The interviewees' (1, 2, 3, 11, and 14) negative votes at the referenda, their arguments used in 'solution' category and their identity definitions as 'Turks' indicated consistency with each other. Although Interviewee 17 voted for the Annan Plan, he also uses the first argument. His vote and his argument in this category are inconsistent. On the other hand, the counterpart of this argument, 'keeping TRNC alive cannot be possible', is used by Interviewee 6, which relates positively with his positive vote at the referenda and with his 'Cypriot' identity, in logical sense.

Argument 2 'Unification should be reached' is used by interviewees 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 19. Accordingly, all the Turkish Cypriots were on the side

of unification. Therefore Annan Plan provided a good base for unification. And thus, Greek Cypriots should have been persuaded that Turkish people were sincere in their desire for integration. The interviewees' (4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 19) votes associated positively with their positive votes at the referenda. Conversely, Interviewees 1, 2, 3, and 11 use the very opposite of the same argument.

Argument 3 'European Union membership is desired' is used by interviewees 6, 12, 15, 16 and 18. Accordingly European Union (UN) is a mean for unification of Cyprus. If unification could be attained, under the roof of EU, Turkish Cypriots would be safe, because it would bring human rights, democracy, transparency, supremacy of law, economical wellbeing and so on. The opposite of the third argument, 'EU cannot be trusted mainly because of its Greek favoring attitudes', is used by interviewees 1, 2, and 3. The third and the counterpart of the third arguments of all the interviewees showed positive association with their votes that were used at the referenda.

From Table 5.11. the logical relationship between the arguments in 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' category and the votes during referenda can be seen.

Table 5.10.The Arguments in 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' Category

Interviewee	TRNC should be kept alive	Unification should be reached	European Union membership is desired
1	+	-	-
2	+	-	-
3	+	-	-
4		+	
5		+	
6	-	+	+
7			
8		+	
9			
10		+	
11	+	-	
12		+	+
13		+	
14	+		
15		+	+
16	-	+	+
17	+		
18		+	+
19		+	

Note1: Shadow cells show that the arguments are supposed to be used by that interviewee logically.
Note 2: The symbol + means that the interviewee uses the argument, symbol '-' means that the interviewee uses the counterpart (or opposite) of the argument.

Table 5.11. Logical Relations between 'Cyprus Problem' Arguments and the Votes

	Int	Voting 'Yes'	Voting 'No'
Argument 1 'TRNC should be kept alive'	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+
	11	-	+
	14	-	+
	17	-	+
Counterpart of Argument 1 'TRNC is not possible'	6	+	-
Argument 2 'Unification should be reached'	4	+	-
	5	+	-
	6	+	-
	8	+	-
	10	+	-
	12	+	-
	13	+	-
	15	+	-
	16	+	-
	18	+	-
	19	+	-
Counterpart of Argument 2 'Unification is not desired'	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+
	11	-	+
Argument 3 European Union membership is desired	6	+	-
	12	+	-
	15	+	-
	16	+	-
	18	+	-
Counterpart of Argument 2 'European Union membership is not desired'	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation
Note2: Shadow areas refer that the vote of the interviewee and the argument used by the same interviewee are not consistent. Logically it was not expected that these interviewees use this argument.

5.3.5. Analysis of Arguments in 'Threats/Interests' Category

As soon it can be seen from following analysis, collective threat and interest arguments are merged. Hence the opposite of one threat argument constitutes one of the collective interests. For example the counterpart of the argument of 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' is 'the status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' which clearly refer a collective interest definition. For that reason, the threat and interest discourses of interviewees are merged into the same 'Threat/Interest' category.

The analysis of the arguments in ' Collective Threats/Interests' category is started with the detection of the phrases, expressions, comments, sentences, claims, terms and so on through readings of the transcriptions of interviews. Afterward, all the arguments used by each interviewee were examined again, and then merged into more inclusive two arguments. These are 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots'. The counterparts of these two arguments are also used by some interviewees. These are 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' as the opposite of first argument and 'Status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' as opposite of the second argument.

The arguments used by each interviewee in this category could be seen From Table 5.12. The shadow cells reveal the arguments which are expected to be used by that interviewee logically.

The first argument 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots' is used by all anti-integrationist interviewees (Int 1, 2, 3, 11, 14). Accordingly, Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots in three ways. First, the Greeks might follow a way by which Turkish Cypriots will be destroyed physically (a massacre), as interviewees 3 asserts:

Extract 44

'If they (Turkish troops) go, you cannot find any Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. I mean…the Greeks eat all of us in an hour. In an hour. It is obvious from their attitudes showed in their national days. They pass over us like a cylinder.'

Second, the Greeks will not abandon their ENOSIS dream. When they catch a little opportunity, they will take Turkish Cypriots' rights, especially to govern themselves.

Extract 45

Int 1: 'in Cyprus Republic (in united Cyprus), they will be five times more than us. They have aspired making Cyprus as a Helen island for a long long time. If they found a little possibility they have initiated to derogate Turkish Cypriots. They have done this for years. If Turkish Cypriots does not have their own territory, the border of which is clearly drawn, they cannot be survive, cannot be.'

That's why if the unification will be attained, Turkish Cypriots' sovereignty rights will be violated as interviewee 2 put it.

Extract 46

Int 2: '(if united Cyprus which is foreseen by Annan Plan is established) this island becomes a Greek one in 15-20 years. The sovereignty rights (of Turkish Cypriots) will be lost completely… And this society votes for such a proposal.'

And third, mainly because of economical reasons, Turkish Cypriots will be assimilated by the Greeks, as interviewee 14 puts it:

Extract 47

'If the unification would be attained, Turkish and Greek Cypriots will live together. In that condition Turkish troops will have to leave the island. I am sure the other day the troops leave, the number of Turkish Cypriots will reduce to 5 thousands from 80 thousands. All of them will migrate to Turkey. They will not stay here… Because we confront with such a rich community that assimilate all of us. If this scenario does not occur, the Greeks assimilate us in a long term and… The most important thing is the economy. Today, only because the gates are open, 15 thousands Turkish Cypriots go to Greek side and work there. If they (Turkish Cypriots) can, they will go and live there, because they want to live in a place where close to their work. But in a time, this brings assimilation.'

Similarly Interviewee 11 asserts:

Extract 48

'I think the Greeks hesitate from a massacre because of Turkey's close location to the island… If we unify with the Greeks, they prefer to destroy us economically. And this will not take a long time. They will see us as a minority and they use their money which is given to them by the Christian countries, and I think they will destroy us economically.'

The counterparts of the first argument in this category, 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots is used by interviewees 4, 5 and 10. Interviewee 4 states:

Extract 49

'Of course if unification could have been attained, Turkish Cypriots would have benefited from it. First of all, we suffer from the embargo. For example, if I go to England for my education, I have to pay 15-20 thousand sterling. If Cyprus would have been unified, I would have paid only 3000 sterling. A big advantage. Who does not want it? At the end, everybody rely on their money; look for the opportunities given by the state.'

Extract 50

Int 5: 'But if unification could have been established, the state would have become much richer, Cyprus would have developed, and there would be a reduction in unemployment…'

The second argument 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' is used by the interviewees 7, 12, 15 and 16. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots suffer from lack of identity which stems from status quo (living under the roof of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus) as interviewee 12 puts:

Extract 51

'Turkish Cypriots had given a struggle to be free from Turkish rule, from lacking of identity…at the referenda time.'

Moreover, Turkish Cypriots also face with the danger of being assimilated by the Greeks because the status quo weakens Turkish Cypriots economically.

Extract 51

Int 16: 'At present most of families send their children to the schools at south part. Again most people go to the hospitals at the south, when they get ill. What happens now? Unification is turning true in the south. What happens to the north then? It becomes economically and socially deserted. And demographic change fastens. Turkish Cypriots begin to live in the south. The places which are left by them are filled by Turkish people from Turkey. Because there cannot be a vacuum in nature. If you go there, some others come here. This is the end, if TRNC stays like this. That is, the assimilation fear of Turkish Cypriots does not only stem from Turkish people who come from Turkey to change the character of Turkish Cypriots, but also it stems from the fact that Turkish Cypriots migrate to the south part. Because if you go somewhere to work, you have to integrate with the people who live there… '

Besides interviewee 16, interviewees 7, 12 and 17 assert that Turkish Cypriots get worsen economically due to the current situation. For example Int 7 states:

Extract 52

Int 7: 'To me, the current situation is a disadvantage for Turkish Cypriots; hence economic embargo prevents economical growth.'

In addition to the fear of assimilation of Turkish Cypriots because of the status quo which weakens them economically and makes Turkish Cypriots immigrated to the Greek side, the status quo also threatens security of Turkish Cypriots as Int 4, and 5 assert:

Extract 53

Int 5: 'They create a feeling of disturbance. We are afraid of going to the center of Nikosia. If we go there, we have to close our cars' windows. The doors of the cars have to be always locked. If I get out

to take something from a store, usually I leave the doors open here (periphery of Nikosia), but I lock the doors in the center of Nicosia. Because I do not feel secure myself.'

Extract 54

Int 4: 'For example last year I was working in a tourism agent. A woman came whose ears and hands were bandaged. She said she wanted a ticket to Turkey as soon as possible. We asked what happened. She told that she had had golden earrings and golden bracelets. And some people attacked to her to steal them. They cut her ears and wrists. And that woman was scared, and then she went to Turkey. And she had come only two days ago and she escaped in third day. These people (Turkish from Turkey) attacked their own people (from Turkey).'

Another reason behind second argument is the uncertainty of the current situation which is mentioned by interviewees 8, 13 and 17. Let's give the words to them:

Extract 55

Int 8: 'For example there is conflicting situation here. You cannot claim that your property is yours. For example you want to repair your house; you can do that only if an agreement could be attained. …'

Extract 57

Int 13 'I voted 'yes'. Because I want to get rid of this ambiguous situation. I thought this ambiguity could be eliminated. Most people thought like that.'

The counterparts of the second argument in this category, 'the status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' is used by the Int 1 and 3.

Extract 58

Int 1: 'As far as Turkish troops stay in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots will be secure on their territory which has clear borders...'

Extract 59

Int 3: 'They made propaganda that if you go to Europe you will benefit from it. They said the Europeans save their own money and they live under good conditions…But I have been to Europe. It was a fake propaganda… The situation here is even better than there. If you go and live there, you should work as if you are a slave...'

To summarize, the interviewees 1, 2, 3, 11 and 17 uses the first argument 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the umbrella of united Cyprus)' which reveals positive relationship with their own votes against the Annan Plan and their identity definitions as 'Turks'. On the other hand Int 4, 5, and 10 use the counterparts of the first argument 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' which is consistent with their votes for the Annan Plan. Moreover, identity definition of interviewee 4 also shows consistency with her collective interest arguments.

The second argument 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' is used by the Int 7, 12, and 16 whose votes were also positive at the referenda. Again, identity definitions of Int 12 and Int 16 as 'Cypriots' relate positively with their threat arguments in logical sense. And lastly, the counterpart of this second argument 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' is used by interviewee 1, and 3. This interest definition is also positively related both with the interviewees' votes and their identity definition as 'Turks'. From Table 5.13. the logical relationship between the votes of interviewees and their arguments in this category can be seen.

Table 5.12.The Arguments in 'Collective Threats/Interests' Category

Interviewee	Argument 1: The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the umbrella of united Cyprus)	Counterargument1: United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	Argument 2: Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots	Counterargument2: The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots
1	+			+
2	+			
3	+			+
4		+		
5		+		
6				
7			+	
8				
9				
10		+		
11	+			
12			+	
13				
14	+			
15		+		
16			+	
17				
18				
19				

Note1: Shadow cells show that the arguments are supposed to be used by that interviewee logically.

Table 5.13. Logical Relations between 'Threats/Interests' Arguments and the Votes at the Referenda

	Int	Voting 'Yes'	Voting 'No'
Argument 1 The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the umbrella of united Cyprus)	1	-	+
	2	-	+
	3	-	+
	11	-	+
	14	-	+
Counterargument1: United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	4	+	-
	5	+	-
	10	+	-
	15	+	-
Argument 2: Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots	7	+	-
	12	+	-
	16	+	-
Counterargument2 the status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots'	1	-	+
	3	-	+

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation

5.3.6. The Structural Relationship between the Arguments and the Votes At the Referenda

After the analysis of the arguments in 'Ingroup Boundary and Contents', 'Cyprus Problem', 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' and 'Collective Threats/Interests' categories; and establishing their logical relationship with the votes of each interviewee (individually), the overall structural relationship between the arguments and the votes is presented in this part.

Table 5.14. reveals the summary of logical relationship between the arguments and the votes at the referenda. Accordingly, the arguments of 'We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'TRNC should be kept alive', 'Unification is not desired', 'European Union membership is not desired', 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots' and lastly 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' are related positively with the votes against for the Annan Plan.

On the other hand, the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Unification should be reached', 'European Union membership is desired', 'TRNC is not possible', 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' are related negatively with the votes against the Annan Plan and positively related with the votes for the Annan Plan.

The argument of 'We are Turkish Cypriots' and 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers' show vague association with both positive and negative votes.

Table 5.14. Logical Relationship between the Arguments and Votes of Interviewees at the Referenda

		Votes at the Referenda	
	Argument	**'No'**	**'Yes'**
Ingroup Definitions	1.We are Turkish	+	-
	2.We are Cypriots	-	+
	3.We are Turkish Cypriots	+/-	+/-
Cyprus Problem	1.Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	+	-
	2.Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions	-	+
	3.Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers	+/-	+/-
Solutions for Cyprus Problem	1.TRNC should be kept alive	+	-
	C1.TRNC is not possible	-	+
	2.Unification should be reached	+	-
	C2.Unification is not desired	-	+
	3.European Union membership is desired	+	-
	C3.European Union membership is not desired	-	+
Threats/interests	1.The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)	+	-
	2.United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	-	+
	3.Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots	-	+
	4.The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	+	-

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation
Note2: C= Counterpart of the argument

Table 5.15. The Logical Correlation between the Arguments

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1.We are Turkish															
2.We are Cypriots	-														
3.We are Turkish Cypriots	+/-	+/-													
4Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	+	-	-												
5.Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions	-	+	+	-											
6.Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-										
7.TRNC should be kept alive	+	-	-	+	-	+/-									
8.TRNC is not possible	-	+	+	-	+	+/-	-								
9.Unification should be reached	-	+	+	-	+	+/-	-	+							
10.Unification is not desired	+	-	-	+	-	+/-	+	-	-						
11.European Union membership is desired	-	+	+	-	+	+/-	-	+	+	-					
12.European Union membership is not desired	+	-	-	+	-	+/-	+	-	-	+	-				
13.The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of united Cyprus)	+	-	-	+	-	+/-	+	-	-	+	-	+			
14.United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	-	+	+	-	+	+/-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-		
15.Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots	-	+	+	-	+	+/-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	
16.The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	+	-	-	+	-	+/-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-

Note1: + = positive relation - = negative relation -/+ = neutral/vague relation

Table 5.16. The Logical Consistency of the Arguments used by each Interviewee

Arguments	Interviewees																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1.We are Turkish	+	+	+						+		+			+					
2.We are Cypriots				+		+						+			+	+		+	
3.We are Turkish Cypriots					+		+	+		+			+				+		+
4.Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	+	+	+		+						+		+	+			+		+
5.Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions				+	+	+						+	+		+	+		+	
6.Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle						+						+	+	+	+	+			
7.TRNC should be kept alive	+	+	+								+			+		-			
9.Unification should be reached	-	-	-	+		+		+		+	-	+	+	-	+			+	+
11.European Union membership is desired	-	-	-			+						+			+		+		
13.The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of United Cyprus)	+	+	+								+			+					
14.United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots				+	+					+					+				
15.Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots							+					+				+			
16.The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	+	+																	

Note 1: Shadowed arguments reveal the arguments that should be used by the anti-integrationists and shadowed numbers reveal the anti-integrationists
Note 2: The symbol + means that the interviewee uses the argument, symbol '-' means that the interviewee uses the counterpart (or opposite) of the argument.

Table 5.15. shows the logical correlations between the arguments. Accordingly, the arguments in the first set, 'We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'TRNC should be kept alive', 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of United Cyprus)' and 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' are correlated positively with each other in logical sense. And the arguments of the second set, 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Unification should be reached', 'European Union membership is desired', 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots' are correlated positively with each other. On the other hand, each argument in the first set is negatively correlated with the each argument in the second set. The arguments in the third set, 'We are Turkish Cypriots', and 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle' shows no correlation, or in the other words vague correlation with the remaining arguments in the first or the second set.

5.3.7. Logical Consistency of Individual Arguments

As a last phase of the interview analysis, Table 5.16 shows the logical consistency between the arguments of each interviewee. Interviewee (Int) 1 and Int 2 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'TRNC should be kept alive', 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of United Cyprus)', 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' and used the counterpart of the arguments of 'Unification should be reached' and 'European Union membership is desired'. All the arguments in each category used by Int 1 and Int 2 reveal logical consistency with their identity definition as 'Turks'.

Similarly Int 3 who used the arguments ''We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'TRNC should be kept alive', 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)', and used the counterpart of the arguments of 'Unification should be reached' and 'European Union membership is desired', also showed logical consistency in his argumentation.

Int 4 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Unification should be reached', and 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots'. All the arguments in each category used by Interviewee 4 reveal logical consistency with each other.

Int 5 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish Cypriots', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', and 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots'. At the first glance, the arguments, which Interviewee 5 claims, are not logically consistent with each other. For example 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', and 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions' seem to be contradictory, in the sense that as a result of the first one, it is expected that one stands against 'United Cyprus' and voted against the Annan Plan. But as a result of the latter, it is expected that one stands against 'independent TRNC' and voted for the Annan Plan. These two arguments seems opposite in terms of their logical consequences. Nevertheless, Int 5 voted for the Annan Plan, perhaps she expected to gain collective interests from 'United Cyprus' and perhaps perceived threats from the Greeks are less important than perceived collective interests for Interviewee 5. Hence she did not mention any collective threat, but she argued that 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots'.

Int 6 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers', 'Unification should be reached', and 'European Union membership is desired', which showed consistency with each other except from the argument of 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers'. This argument seems not to relate to his other arguments.

Int 7 used only two arguments: 'We are Turkish Cypriots' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots', which seem to relate to each other impartially. Similarly, Int 8 also used two arguments: 'We are Turkish Cypriots' and 'Unification should be reached' which seem to relate each other impartially.

Int 9 who voted for the Annan Plan used only one argument: 'We are Turkish'.

Int 10 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish Cypriots', 'Unification should be reached', and 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots', all of which appear logically consistent.

Int 11 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', the reverse of 'Unification should be reached', and 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)'. All the arguments used by Int 11 reveal consistency with each other.

Int 12 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle', 'Unification should be reached', 'European Union membership is desired' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots', all of which showed consistency with each other except for the argument of 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle'. This argument seems not to relate to any other arguments evidently.

Int 13 used 'We are Turkish Cypriots', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle' and 'Unification should be reached'. Like Int 5, Int 13 seems to use logically inconsistent arguments.

Int 14 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek', 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle', 'TRNC should be kept alive', the reverse of 'Unification should be reached', and 'The Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under united Cyprus roof)', all of which reveal consistency with each other.

Int 15 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers', 'Unification should be reached', 'European Union membership is desired', and 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots', all of which are consistent apart from 'Cyprus problem stems from 'divide and rule' principle of imperialist powers'.

Int 16 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', the reverse of 'TRNC should be kept alive' and 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots', all of which show consistency with each other, except for 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle'.

Int 17 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish Cypriots', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek' and 'European Union membership is desired', which show no clear consistency.

Int 18 used the arguments of 'We are Cypriots', 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions', 'Unification should be reached', which show consistency with each other.

And lastly, Int 19 used the arguments of 'We are Turkish Cypriots', 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek' and 'Unification should be reached'. The second and third arguments used by Int 19 show inconsistencies.

5.4. The Convergence between the Arguments Used in Political Parties' Documents and the Arguments Used in Interviews

In addition to the exploration of the identity constructions of laypersons and investigating the relationship between these constructions and attitudes towards unification of Cyprus, this second study aims at elucidating whether the laypersons' constructions converge with the constructions of politicians. For the latter purpose, the arguments used in the documents of Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and National Unity Party (UBP) were compared with the arguments used by interviews, and the two convergence tables were produced.

In Table 5.17 the convergence between the arguments of UBP and anti-integrationists is presented. Accordingly, in the category of 'Cyprus Problem', all the UBP's arguments ('1. Cyprus Problem is originated from the stands of the Greeks who does not accept Turkish Cypriots as politically equal', '2. Mainly, the Greeks are responsible for Cyprus Problem as they have tried to make Cyprus as Hellenic (ENOSIS)', '3. Some domestic powers (Talat's group) help to realize ENOSIS dream of the Greeks' and '8. Annan Plan serves to the Greek's ENOSIS dream')

except for Argument 7 (EU also has some responsibilities because EU accepted the Greeks as the only representative of the Island before the solution) seem to correspond with the argument of 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek' of non-politician anti-integrationists.

In 'Solutions of Cyprus Problem' category, while Argument 1 (We are on the side of United Cyprus) and Argument 2 (We are on the side of European Union) appear to be contradictory; the others ('3.TRNC is ready to be reconciled with a partnership based on the equality of Turkish and Greek Cypriots politically', ' 4.A Recognized TRNC is not an obstacle to a fair and permanent agreement, rather TRNC makes it easy', '5.Recognition of TRNC as an independent state by the world is a must for a permanent solution in the Island') match up with the argument of 'TRNC should be kept alive'.

In 'Collective Threats/Interests' category, the argument of 'Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots' appear to be equivalent to UBP's arguments of '1. Turkish Cypriots are wanted to be destroyed through giving some fake rights in Republic of Cyprus', '3.Today, TRNC, which was established with great expectations, is under serious threats and attacks', '4.The attacks of Greeks to our sovereignty still continue. If we lose our unity and if we abandon TRNC we will go under rule of Greeks', '5. The game which started with Annan Plan that aims at getting more and more from Turkish people and at converting Turkish people into a minority continues' and '6.The conditions of European Union presented as solution (e.g. opening seaports to the Greeks.) means that we will lose our sovereignty'. There is no equivalent of 'The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots' argument in UBP's documents.

And lastly, in 'Ingroup Boundaries' category, the argument of 'We are Turkish' corresponds to UBP's arguments of '1. The people of Turkish Cypriots are inexcractable part of Turkish Nation' and '2. Turkish Cypriots and their siblings in Anatolia are like nail and finger'.

In Table 5.18. convergence between the arguments of CTP and pro-integrationist interviewees is presented. In 'Cyprus Problem' category, the pro-integrationists' argument of 'Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions' converges with the CTP's arguments of '4. The Problem originated from

Denktaş-UBP policies (CTP)' '5. Cyprus Problem originated from status quo (keeping TRNC, failing to unify Cyprus)', '6. Status quo harms the prestige of Turkish Cypriots in the eyes of foreign countries', 'Cyprus Problem is that Turkish Cypriots have not developed as a result of status quo' and 'Status quo harms the prestige of Turkish Cypriots in the eyes of foreign countries', as Denktaş-UBP policies is perceived by CTP to support Turkey's wrong actions, which in turn perpetuate the status quo, and thus the problem. On the other hand the argument of 'Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divides and rule' principle' has no equivalent in CTP's documents.

While there is not any convergent argument in CTP's documents and pro-integrationist interviews in 'Solution for Cyprus Problem' category, the arguments in this category could be considered to fit the arguments in 'Ingroup boundaries' category. Hence, the arguments of '6.The solution is not that Turkey rules us. The solution is that we govern ourselves', '7.We should use a currency distant from inflation and devaluation', '8.We have to have a real and autonomous central bank that belongs to us' and '9.If we want a solution the policy of integration with Turkey should be ended' might be viewed as the efforts to differentiate Turkish Cypriots from Turkish people, as mentioned in previous chapter. If so, these arguments can be accepted as corresponding to the arguments of 'We are Turkish Cypriots' and 'We are Cypriots' of pro-integrationists. In 'Collective threats/interests' category only one argument (8. Connecting with the rest of the world through unification serves Turkish Cypriots' interests) in CTP' documents converges with the argument of 'United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots', and corresponds to the pro-integrationists' 'Unification should be reached' argument in 'Solution' category as well. The other arguments in 'Collective threats/interests' category (2.The problem (status quo) facilitates ENOSIS, and 7. Status quo feeds TAKSIM idea) match the pro-integrationist argument of 'Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots'.

And lastly, CTP's argument of 'European membership is such a unity that economic, democratic and political integration would be carried to the base of human rights, social justice and democracy' in 'Attitudes towards European Union' category corresponds to the pro-integrationist 'European Union membership is desired' argument in 'Solution' category'.

Table 5.17. Convergence between the Arguments of UBP and Anti-integrationist Interviewees

Argument Categories	Arguments of Anti- integrationists					
	UBP Arg No	Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek	TRNC should be kept alive	Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots	The status quo is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	We are Turkish
1.Cyprus Problem	1.	+				
	2.	+				
	3.	+				
	7.					
	8.	+				
2.Solution of Cyprus Problem	1.		-			
	2.		-			
	3.		+			
	4.		+			
	5.		+			
Threat/Interests	1.			+		
	3.			+		
	4.			+		
	5.			+		
	6.			+		
4. Ingroup Boundaries	1.					+
	2.					+

Note: + = consistent, - =inconsistent

Table 5.18. Convergence between the Arguments of CTP and Pro-integrationist Interviewees

Argument Categories	**Arguments of Pro- integrationists**								
	CTP Arg No	Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions	Cyprus problem stems from imperialist powers' 'divide and rule' principle	Unification should be reached	European Union membership is desired	Status quo threatens Turkish Cypriots	United Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots	We are Turkish Cypriots	We are Cypriots
Cyprus Problem	4	+							
	5	+							
	6	+							
	9	+							
	10	+							
Solution of Cyprus Problem	6							+	+
	7							+	+
	8							+	+
	9							+	+
Collective Threats/ Interests	2					+			
	7					+			
	8			+			+		
Ingroup Boundaries									
European Union	1				+				

Note: + = consistent, - =inconsistent

5.5. Summary of the Findings and Discussion

As mentioned before, this second study aims to examine the identity constructions of laypersons; and to investigate the relationship between their identity constructions and attitudes towards unification of Cyprus, in order to explore whether there is an impact of political parties' identity constructions on the laypersons' constructions, through focusing on the convergence between them.

The analysis of the interviews show that, the anti-integrationists draw their ingroup's border as including all Turkish people and excluding Greek Cypriots, which seem to be consistent with their negative votes at the referenda of Annan Plan. Anti-integrationists also show a clear ingroup favoring but no ingroup derogating attitudes. For example, they describe Turkish people as cognizant and altruistic. In contrast, they mostly express their outgroup (the Greeks) derogating evaluations (e.g. Greeks are cheaters). On the other hand they do not express any outgroup favoring or derogating attitudes regarding Turkish people who came from Turkey after 1974. Hence, they do not constitute an outgroup for anti-integrationists.

The anti-integrationists view that Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek, as they do not give up their ENOSIS (unification with Greece) dream. If the problem stems from the Greek Cypriots' intention to make island completely Greek, supporting unification would have been contradictory to their own argument and their 'Turkish' identity as well. Moreover, because the European Union (EU) has explicit Greek favoring attitudes, it cannot be trusted. Thus, to unify with the Greeks under the roof of EU does not guarantee their rights as a community. For that reason the anti-integrationists do not desire EU membership, either. In consistent with their problem argument, they defend the solution of keeping Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) alive. Similar to their problem definition, the anti-integrationists also argue that Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of united Cyprus), either economically or physically. On the other hand, as their existence as a community would be protected under the roof of a separate state, the current situation constitutes the advantageous for Turkish Cypriots. All the arguments in each category used by the anti-integrationists are logically consistent with their negative votes at the referenda and their ingroup definitions.

On the other hand, the pro-integrationists who voted for the Annan Plan draw

their group boundaries in two ways. First, some who define themselves as 'Cypriots' reject the existence of two different communities in the island as Turkish and Greeks; they exclude Turkish people (from Turkey) and include the Greek Cypriots, when drawing their group boundary. Regarding their content considerations, the Cypriots express three positive (e.g. warmer) and only one negative stereotype (not mature) when describing the Greek Cypriots, which could be viewed as outgroup favoring evaluations. However, when we consider that they include the Greek Cypriots within their group, it could be also argued that positive evaluations of Greek Cypriots might refer to ingroup favoring rather than outgroup favoring attitudes. Regarding Turkish people came from Turkey after 1974; the pro-integrationist Cypriots express their thoughts that are all negative (e.g. thief, ignorant). This situation reveals clear outgroup derogating attitudes.

The pro-integrationist Cypriots argue that Cyprus problem stems from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions. Accordingly, Turkish troops' stay in the island is a big mistake, or even it is an invasion. Moreover, taking some Turkish people from Anatolia to settle down in Cyprus is also viewed as another fault. Hence, these people who are named as 'Turkish Settlers' have destroyed the demographic and cultural structure of island, and made difficult it to reach any agreement with the Greek Cypriots. As such, voting for the Annan Plan which required withdrawal of Turkish troops and to reduce the number of 'Turkish Settlers' is consistent with their own arguments and also with their identity definitions (Cypriots). The other argument regarding problem category, some of the pro-integrationists Cypriots assert that the problem is originated from policies of imperialist powers. As regards the fact that Cyprus Republic gained its independence from United Kingdom, which is one of the world powers, it becomes more understandable why the 'Cyprus Problem' is attributed to imperialist powers and why unification under the roof of Cyprus Republic is desired. Furthermore, Cyprus Republic was very close to former USSR ideologically and against the big world powers and NATO during the cold war (Kızılyürek, 2001). And also the two countries belong to the same church (Orthodox Church) (Mavratsas, 2000). When taking into account these facts, the positive -rather than neutral or negative- relationship between the argument of 'the problem is originated from policies of imperialist powers' and voting for the Annan plan, and

also defining the identity as 'Cypriot' make sense. Yet, when taking into account the other fact that united Cyprus would have become a member of European Union which is accepted as one of the world powers, their argument against imperialism seem to be ambiguously related with their votes for unification.

As guessed easily, the pro-integrationist Cypriots who support the solution of unification also support being member of EU. Accordingly if unification could be attained, under the roof of EU Turkish Cypriots would be safe, because it brings human rights, democracy, transparency, supremacy of law, economical wellbeing and so on. Besides, they also consider the status quo as a major threat towards the existence of their group, as they believe that status quo prevents their social and economical development. On the other hand, they think 'United Cyprus' is advantageous for their group.

All the arguments in each category used by the pro-integrationist 'Cypriots' are logically consistent with their positive votes at the referenda and their ingroup definitions, apart from their imperialism argument which is vaguely related with the votes and 'Cypriotism'.

The second pro-integrationists who voted for the Annan Plan define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots' and try to differentiate their group both from Turkish people and from Greek people. For them excluding Turkish people (from Turkey) from ingroup seem to be converged with their positive votes at the referenda and with their identity definitions. On the other hand, excluding the Greeks from ingroup shows vague relation with their votes, but it is not contradictory with their identity definition, by which both the Cypriotness (against Turkness) and the Turkness (against Greek Cypriots) are emphasized. The Turkish Cypriots characterized ingroup with positive terms generally (e.g. hospitable). But they considered the Greeks (e.g. revengeful) and the Turkish people (e.g. dirty) negatively.

Some of the 'pro-integrationist Turkish Cypriots used the arguments of 'Cyprus Problem stems from Turkey's wrong actions and attitudes' and 'Cyprus Problem stems from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek' at the same time. The latter argument is explicitly inconsistent with the former one, with their votes for unification and with their own argument of 'Unification should be attained'. However, when we consider their arguments in 'Collective

Threats/Interests' category, their votes and their arguments for solution make more sense. While they did not mention any threat, they stressed that united Cyprus would be advantageous for their group in terms of economical and social terms. Moreover, they mentioned their tiredness and uneasiness from uncertainty of the current situation. It is seemed that although they attribute the responsibility of Cyprus problem to Greek Cypriots, in addition to Turkey and 'Turkish Settlers', they seem to expect to benefit from unification, which also would end the current ambiguous situation. According to them, the Annan Plan provided a good base for unification.

The differences within the community (Turkish Cypriots) in support for integration could be explained at two levels. First, they might reflect differing social identities held by different members of the community. For example some people define their group as 'Cypriots', the others describe the same group as 'Turkish Cypriots', and some others name it as 'Turks', in our case. Second, the differences in support for integration may reflect different appraisals of the 'threat' or 'opportunity' for the social identity. For instance, according to UBP, threats come from Greek Cypriots and thus keeping KKTC alive is perceived as a collective interest. On the other hand CTP considers status quo as the most serious threat towards the existence of Turkish Cypriots and united Cyprus is presented as the way out. Probably, these factors are interdependent. That is, particular definition of identity influences the perception of problem definitions, threats or opportunities, which in turn influences support for integration.

When looking at the general structure of the arguments used in the documents of political parties and interviews, it could be claimed that there is convergence at a great extent between the constructions of political parties and non-politician interviewees. Especially for National Unity Party (UBP) and anti-integrationists, there is total correspondence between the arguments in each category. Although UBP claims that it is on the side of unification and European Union membership, when taking into account its call for rejection during the referenda of Annan Plan and their conditions for the solution such as keeping separate state, it becomes obvious that UBP's collective project for Turkish Cypriots is keeping independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC), rather than unification. Therefore, it can be claimed an entire convergence between the arguments of UBP and non-politician

anti-integrationists. Also, for Turkish Republican Party (CTP) and pro-integrationists, the majority of the arguments are matched, although their categories might differ for some cases.

The data from the analysis broadly support the expectation of mass social influence from political parties towards lay Northern Cypriots. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, realizing particular projects requires the capacity to get people to act in line with those particular projects. This capacity to get support of in-group members is defined as a special kind of social power, namely 'through power' (Turner, 2005). Influencing the social world and making desired changes in the structure become possible only by the ingroup members' support and mobilization (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner, 2005). In Northern Cyprus case, the two political parties, UBP and CTP, strategically constructed the problem, threats or opportunities, which aimed to influence the members of their group. Present findings that reveal convergence between the constructions of political parties and laypersons imply a mass social influence (from political parties to the group members). The anti-integrationists who voted against the Annan Plan shared the same identity constructions with UBP, which called Turkish Cypriots to reject the Plan; and the pro-integrationists who voted for the Plan, shared the same identity constructions with CTP, which called Turkish Cypriots to accept the plan. If some people followed UBP's call, then voted in that line; and if the others followed CTP's call, then voted accordingly, then such an influence seems to occur via sharing the same problem, threats, interests, and solution constructions, as present data suggested. That is, social influence from the identity entrepreneurs towards the rest of the group members appears to occur through influencing their understandings of the social context and social groups. Therefore via sharing the same constructions, group members (lay Turkish Cypriots in our case) support particular collective projects of the identity entrepreneurs (political parties in our case). The data supports Reicher and Hopkins' (2001) notion that category definitions have an influential effect.

The analysis of interviews reveals that the laypersons' understandings are influenced from the constructions of political parties, as there is convergence between the political narratives and the lay discourses to a great extent. However, it should be also noted that a mass influence needs to be subjected to further

investigation via appropriate research design (See Herrera & Reicher, 1998, as an example of a research design to investigate mass influence). Although necessary, the research design and the findings of this study are not sufficient to claim a mass influence. Therefore exploring the mechanisms and the processes (e.g. role of media, duration of exposure to the messages of the politics, prior ideologies, and the role of power) of a mass social influence requires to be examined, especially by experimental manipulations.

CHAPTER VI

STUDY 3: SOCIAL IDENTITIES, PERCEIVED COLLECTIVE THREATS/INTERESTS AND SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF CYPRUS

The third purpose of the present dissertation is to quantitatively investigate the relationship between laypersons' national/ethnic identity constructions and the collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state)**.** Particularly, the present research aims to investigate the role of collective threats and interests in explanation of diverse attitudes within the group towards integration with other groups under a larger (superordinate) structure. It is hypothesized that by defining national/ethnic identities in a particular way, Northern Cypriots prefer one solution over the other (unification of Cyprus or keeping independent state). However this relationship between the identity definitions and collective projects would be mediated by the perceptions of the collective threats/interests. Defining social identities would lead to particular threats/interests perceptions, which would result in support for unification of Cyprus or for keeping separate state.

As mentioned in theoretical framework, any event or information that undermines the basic needs at the group level such as continuity, meaning and control is conceptualized as collective threats, in accordance with Vignoles et al.'s (2006) view. It is assumed that collective threats might play an important role in identity processes. Accordingly, just like the group's boundary and the content, collective threats towards the group might be constructed in order to realize collective projects, such as integrating with other groups under a common structure.

Besides threats towards one's own group, the perceptions of collective interest also might play an important role in social identity processes and the processes of intergroup relations. In line with the purposes of this dissertation, collective interests are conceptualized as the possibility or perceived opportunity to satisfy the basic needs at collective level. For example any situation, which is perceived as providing security for the group, or any event, which is perceived as an opportunity to develop the group socially and economically, constitutes collective

interests. Besides, the situations, which allow the group members to realize the group's customs, values, and norms in practice, are also conceptualized as collective interests.

As reviewed in Chapter 3, it is commonly mentioned that Turkish Cypriots suffer from two unsatisfied needs, namely, need for recognition (refer to the need for being recognized and accepted as a separate collective entity by the other groups) and the need for sovereignty (refer to the need for acting based on the collective's own decisions or will, or the collective's own norms, values and priorities, in contrast to being subordinated or ruled or assimilated by other groups) (Azar, 1990; Ringmar, 1996; Richmond, 2005). On the other hand, perceived collective interests are not mentioned in the literature.

While sovereignty and recognition are acknowledged in the literature as collective threats regarding Turkish Cypriots' case, and while the analysis of the documents of National Unity Party (UBP) and Republican Turkish Party (CTP) suggested sovereignty and recognition are conceptualized as major collective threats, the analysis of interviews with laypersons indicate somewhat different threat definitions. According to the analysis of threat/interests arguments of the interviewees, there are two kinds of collective threats towards Turkish Cypriots, and two kinds of collective interests. According to the first kind of threat the Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots, since they might execute a massacre. Moreover, as the Greeks do not abandon their ENOSIS dream, they try to rule Turkish Cypriots or try to assimilate them, which are referred as the sovereignty threat. According to the second kind of threat, Turkish Cypriots suffer from lack of identity, which stems from status quo (living under the roof of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus). Turkish Cypriots also face with the danger of being assimilated by the Greeks because the status quo weakens Turkish Cypriots economically, and by the Turkish people (Turkish settlers). The status quo also threatens security of Turkish Cypriots, because of the increased number of Turkish people. To summarize, the interviewees mentioned the sources of the threats (the Greeks and the status quo), rather than stressing one or the other specific threat.

When coming to the collective interest considerations of political parties, CTP mentions that united Cyprus is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots, hence

Turkish people can connect with the other countries, and hence they become citizens of European Union, which brings economic and democratic development, human rights, and social justice. On the other hand UBP does not state any collective interests. Some of the interviewees also emphasize the social and especially the economical development after unification. The other interviewees, in contrast, claim that keeping TRNC alive is advantageous for Turkish Cypriots, hence they feel themselves as secure and they protect their own way of life. Like the collective threat considerations, the interviewees also stress the sources of the interests.

Present research intends to investigate the role of collective threats and interests in explanation of diverse attitudes within the group towards integration with other groups under a larger (superordinate) structure. The differences within a community in support for integration, as in the Cyprus Case, might reflect different appraisals of the 'threat' towards or 'opportunity' for the social identity. That is, particular definitions of social identity have an impact on the perception of collective threats and interests, which in turn influence the support for integration. In Cyprus case, the analysis of interviews shows that some people define their group as 'Cypriot', the others describe the same group as 'Turkish Cypriots', and some others name it as 'Turks', all of which emphasize different kinds of threats and interests. These people who make different definitions of the group of people, who live in north part of Cyprus, underline the different collective threats and interests. Based on the findings of the first two studies as summarized above, it is proposed that particular definitions of social identities influence the perception of collective threats or opportunities, which in turn influences support for integration.

6.1. The Model and the Hypotheses

The general research question is of why people sustain their group to become part of a larger (superordinate) structure, or in other words, support for integration is addressed by the model which proposes that particular definition of identity influences the perception of collective threats or opportunities, which in turn influences the support for integration (see figure 6.1).




Figure 6.1. Theoretical Model




Figure 6.2. Proposed Model In the Context of Cyprus Case

In general, it is hypothesized that, unification will be supported where it is seen as an opportunity for the social identity and it will be opposed where it is seen to threaten social identity. Similarly, separate state will be preferred if unification is seen to threaten social identity and is seen to help realize social identity. However, defining the social identities in a particular way influences the perception of collective threats or opportunities (Sindic & Reicher, 2006).

To be more precise, if people perceive threats towards their ingroup from those whom their group is to integrate (from the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus case), and if they perceive collective benefits from separation (keeping TRNC); they tend to prefer separatism and reject integration. On the other hand, if people perceive the integration as an opportunity for their group (perceived collective interests), and they perceive collective threats from separation (keeping TRNC), they tend to prefer integration and reject separatism. However, particular definitions of social identities influence the perception of collective threats or opportunities, which in turn influences support for integration, illustrated in the proposed Model (see figure 6.2). The specific hypotheses are:

1. Direct effect of identification with 'Turkness' on support for keeping separate state: Those who identify with 'Turkness' are likely to support for keeping separate state (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, TRNC).

2. Direct effect of identification with 'Cypriotness' on support for integration: Those who identify with 'Cypriotness' are likely to support integration with Greek Cypriots (United Cyprus).

3. Indirect effect of identification with 'Turkness' on support for keeping separate state: Those who identify with 'Turkness' would tend to support separation via perceived interests from separate state (TRNC).

4. Indirect effect of identification with 'Turkness' on support for keeping separate state: Those who identify with 'Turkness' would tend to support separation via perceived threats toward their group from Greek Cypriots.

5. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Cypriotness’ on support for integration: Those who identify with ‘Cypriotness’ are likely to support integration with Greek Cypriots (United Cyprus) via perceived interests from integrated structure (United Cyprus)

6. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Cypriotness’ on support for integration: Those who identify with ‘Cypriotness’ are likely to support integration with Greek Cypriots (United Cyprus) via perceived threats toward their group from Turkey and Turkish people.

7. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ on support for keeping separate state: Those who identify with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ are likely to support separate state (TRNC) via perceived interests from integrated structure (United Cyprus).

8. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ on support for keeping separate state: Those who identify with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ are likely to support separate state (TRNC) via perceived threats toward to their group from Greek Cypriots.

9. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ on support for integration: Those who identify with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ are likely to support integrated structure (United Cyprus) via perceived interests from integrated structure.

10. Indirect effect of identification with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ on support for integration: Those who identify with ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ are likely to support integrated structure (United Cyprus) via perceived threats toward their group from Turkey and Turkish people.

6.2. Method

In order to test the proposed model and the specific hypotheses of the present research, a questionnaire study was conducted in North Cyprus in January 2007.

6.2.1. Participants

The sample consisted of Turkish Cypriots who had settled in the island after Ottoman rule in 1571. Those who came to the island from Turkey after 1974 military operation were excluded. Two hundred and six Turkish Cypriots from various age and occupation groups (70 women, 136 men) participated voluntarily to the study. Participants aged between 17 and 80 with a mean of 39.7 (SD=15.36). The ages of respondents were recoded into as the youth (between 17-29 years; n= 94, composed 46% of the participants), the adults (between 30-50 years; n= 62, composed 30% of the participants) and the older (51 and +; n= 47 composed 23% of the participants). The educational level ranged as 1 (primary-secondary school; n=9, 4.4 %); 2 (high school, n=93, 40.3%), and 3 (university, master and PhD; n=114, 55.3 %). The descriptive statistics indicated a higher educational level of participants. There were no statistically significant difference between men and women in terms of educational level (t=-.081, p=.936). 163 of the participants (79%) were the citizens of Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC); 20 of the participants (10%)were the citizens of both TRNC and Republic of Cyprus (RC); 12 of the participants (6%) were the citizens of both TRNC and Republic of Turkey (RT); 8 of the participants (4%) were the citizens of only RC; and the rest of the participants were either citizens of other countries or did not mention their citizenship. While 45 of the participants (21%) did not mention their religion; majority of them were Muslim (n=154; 74.8%), and a few number of participants declared themselves as Atheist (n=7; 3.4%).

Table 6.1. Sample Characteristics

N=206		Frequency	Percent	Cum.Percent
Gender	Men	136	66.0	66.0
	Women	70	34.0	100.0
Education	Primary&Secondary	9	4.4	4.4
	High	83	40.3	44.7
	University +	114	55.3	100
Age group	Youth	94	45.6	46.3
	Adult	62	30.1	76.8
	Older Adult	47	22.8	98.5
	No response	3	1.5	100
Citizenship	RC	8	3.9	3.9
	TRNC	163	79.1	83
	TRNC&RC	20	9.7	92.3
	TRNC &Turkey	12	5.9	98.2
	Other	3	0.8	100
Religion	No response	45	21.8	21.8
	Atheist	7	3.4	25.2
	Muslim	154	74.8	100.0

Note: TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; RC: Republic of Cyprus

6.2.2. Measures

The questionnaire consisted of demographic questions and three scales, namely Identification with Social (National) Groups Scale, Collective Threat Perception Scale, and Collective Interests Scale. Moreover, the questionnaire includes two items to assess respondents' preferences for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Demographic measures include questions such as sex, age, religion, citizenship, and education level (Appendix B). All the scales were developed by the researcher. The scales' validity and reliabilities were computed and presented below.

6.2.2.1. Identification with Social (National) Groups Scale

Based on Cameron's (2004) Three-Factor Model of Social Identity Scale, 17 items were developed by the researcher to measure participants' identification level

with three social/national groups. These three groups were Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turks. All items, which were Likert type with 5-point scale, were in Turkish language. High scores indicated high identification level with the social groups. To assess the items construct validity and to determine the factor structure of the scale, a principal component analysis with varimax rotation method was used. In exploratory factor analysis procedure, the items having factor loading less than .30 were also eliminated from the study in order to achieve a more reliable factor structure and higher internal consistency. KMO and Bartlett's test gave the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy as .86, so factorability of R assumption was very satisfactory. Three factors accounted for the 66 % of the total variance. First, second, and third factor explained the 33 %, 22 %, and 11 % of the total variance respectively. Factor loadings of the items ranged from .54 to .86. Factor loadings of the items were very high, and the number of items in each latent variable was sufficient. Factor structure also confirmed the underlying structure of the scale which enhances the construct validity of the scale. In the study, the expected a 3-factor structure was confirmed by the analysis. The results of factor analysis are shown by Table 6.2.

Table 6.2. Results of the Factor Analysis of Identification with Social (National) Groups Scale

Items	Loading
Factor-1 Cypriotness	
eigenvalue = 6.917; **explained variance = 32.52%; α= .92**	
11. Regardless the ethnic origin person, the only important thing is the reality that all of us are Cypriots.	.867
10. In general, I am glad to be Cypriot. It does not make any difference to be Turk or to be Greek.	.851
12. In general, being a Cypriot regardless of my national origin is an important part of my self-image	.795
16. I feel strong ties to all Cypriots regardless of their nationality	.788
8. I define myself as Cypriot	.788
13. It is not important for me to be Turk or Greek; I am pleased to be Cypriot.	.775
14. I feel good when I think I am a Cypriot	.763
9. The Greeks and the Turks, all of us are Cypriots	.698
2. Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots have a lot common characteristics, as all they are Cypriots	.567
Factor-2 Turkness	
eigenvalue = 3.195; **explained variance = 21.88%; α=. 89**	
3. In general I am glad to be a Turk	.858
4. I feel good when I think I am a Turk	.834
17. I feel strong ties with all other Turks. I do not separate them as Cypriots or Anatolians	.795
1. I define myself as a Turk	.772
6. In general, being a Turk is an important part of my self-image	.657
Factor-3 Turkish Cypriotness	
eigenvalue = 1.06; **explained variance = 11.30%; α= .67**	
5. I feel strong ties with all other Turkish Cypriots.	.842
15. In general, being a Turkish Cypriot is an important part of my self-image	.637
7. I feel good when I think I am a Turkish Cypriot	.548

According to the results of explanatory factor analysis, 9 items (items 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16) were loaded on the first factor "Identification with Cypriotness" with Cronbach's Alpha's .92. 5 items (1, 3, 4, 6, and 17) were loaded on the second factor, namely "Identification with Turkness", with Cronbach's Alpha's .89. The third factor, "Identification with Turkish Cypriotness", composed of 3 items (5, 15, 7; Cronbach's Alpha's .67). Items' item total correlations were between .53 and .83 for identification with Cypriotness, between .66 and .83 for Identification with Turkness, and lastly between .42 and .53 for Identification with

Turkish Cypriotness. These results indicated high internal consistency for each factor of Identification with Social (National) Groups Scale.

6.2.2.2. Collective Threat Perceptions Scale

Based on the findings of the first two studies, 20 items were developed by the researcher to measure respondents' perceived collective threats to their own social group. All the items were Likert type with a 5-point-scale and in Turkish language. High scores indicated high threat perceptions towards one's own social groups. To assess the scale's construct validity and to determine the factor structure, a principal component analysis with varimax rotation was used. In exploratory factor analysis procedure, the items having factor loading less than .30 was also eliminated from the analysis in order to achieve a more reliable factor structure and higher internal consistency. Three items were extracted from the analysis because of their lower loadings on the factors. One more explanatory factor analysis was computed with the remained 23 items and scree plot showed that two-factor solution was suitable. Hence the data was forced to two factors. KMO and Bartlett's test gave the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy as .88, so factorability of R assumption was very satisfactory. Three factors accounted for the 63 % of the total variance. First and second factors explained the 47 %, and 16% of the total variance respectively. Factor loadings of the items ranged from .50 to .90. Factor loadings of the items were very high, and the number of items in each latent variable was sufficient. Factor structure also confirmed the construct validity of the scale. In the study, the expected 2-factor structure was confirmed by the analysis. The results of factor analysis are shown by Table 6.3.

Table 6.3. Results of the Factor Analysis of Collective Threat Perceptions Scale

Items	Loading
Factor-1 Threats from the Greeks	
eigenvalue = 7.98; **explained variance = 46.785%; α= .94**	
7. If Cyprus unifies, Turkish Cypriots would not save their own way of life	.902
20. If Cyprus unifies, Turkish Cypriots would not realize their own values and customs because of Greek oppression	.893
12. Turkish Cypriots would be treated as if there is no such community	.890
17. Because of non-recognition of TRNC, Turkish Cypriots would face with economical difficulties	.883
4. If Cyprus unifies Turkish Cypriots would become Greek in time	.861
9. Turkish Cypriots would not trade with other countries directly	.833
13. Turkish Cypriots would be isolated from the other societies in the world	.823
2. If Cyprus unifies, Turkish Cypriots would lose their control over their own fate because of the Greeks	.801
10. Turkish Cypriots would not fly from their own airports	.755
18. The non-recognized situation of Turkish Cypriots would continue	.747
14. Turkish Cypriots would not travel with their own passports	.715
1. Turkish Cypriot identity would be lost if Cyprus unifies without Turkish Cypriots equality in every respect (social, political and economical)	.592
Factor-2 Threats from Turkey and Turkish people	
eigenvalue = 2.70; **explained variance = 16.037%; α= .64**	
19. Turkish Cypriots could be under the rule of Turkey (could be depend on Turkey completely)	.868
8. The way of life in Cyprus would be deteriorated by those who came to Cyprus to settle down from Turkey	.818
15. Turkish Cypriots would be disappeared if the number of Turkish people (from Turkey) increases.	.767
6. If the status quo continuous (keeping TRNC) we would lose our identity.	.614
11. Turkish people from Turkey would destroy the cultural structure of Cyprus	.501

According to the results of explanatory factor analysis, 12 items (7,20,12,17,4,9,13,2,10,18,14,1) were loaded on the first factor (perceived threats towards sovereignty) with Cronbach's Alpha's .94. The second factor, perceived threats from being non-recognized, composed of 5 items (19, 8, 15, 6, 11; Cronbach's Alpha's .64). Items' item total correlations ranged from .54 to .87 for the factor of 'Greeks Threaten Turkish Cypriots', and from .33 to .60 for the factor of 'Turkey and Turkish people threaten Turkish Cypriots'. These results indicated high internal consistency for each factor of Threat Perception Scale.

6.2.2.3. Collective Interest Perception Scale

11 items were developed by the researcher to measure respondents' collective interests perceptions. All the items were Likert type with 5-point-scale (1= strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) and in Turkish language. To assess the items construct validity and to determine the factor structure of the scale, a principal component analysis with varimax rotation was performed. All the items were loaded on 2 factors. KMO and Bartlett's test gave the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy was found as .86, so factorability of R assumption was very satisfactory. Two factors accounted for the 79 % of the total variance. First and second factors explained the 48.38 %, and 34.71% of the total variance respectively. Factor loadings of the items ranged from .80 to .94. Factor loadings of the items were very high, and the number of items in each latent variable was sufficient. Factor structure also confirmed the construct validity of the scale. The results of factor analysis are shown by Table 6.4.

According to the results of explanatory factor analysis, 7 items (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) were loaded the first factor (Perceived Collective Interests from United Cyprus) with Cronbach's Alpha's .94. 5 items (8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) were loaded on the second factor (Perceived Collective Interests from separate Turkish Republic of North Cyprus) with Cronbach's Alpha's .94. Items' item total correlations were between .76 and .88 for the first factor, and between .73 and .91 for the second factor. These results indicated high internal consistency for each factor of Collective Interests Scale.

Table 6.4. Results of the Factor Analysis of Collective Interest Perceptions Scale

Items	Loading
Factor-1 Interests from Unification	
eigenvalue = 6.20; **explained variance = 44.38%; α= .94**	
4. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as they develop economically	.904
5. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as they develop socially	.892
7. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as their tourism develop	.878
3. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as their unemployment problem would be solved	.875
6. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as their sea and air ports would be opened to the world	.855
1. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as they would reach welfare	.827
2. If unification could be attained, Turkish Cypriots would benefit, as their children would go to foreign schools easily	.826
Factor-2 Interests from TRNC	
eigenvalue = 3.29; **explained variance = 34.71%; α=. .94**	
9. Turkish Cypriots benefit from keeping Republic of Northern Cyprus, as the island's Hellenization would be prevented	.945
11. Turkish Cypriots benefit from keeping Republic of Northern Cyprus, as they feel secure themselves because of Turkey's guarantee	.921
10. Turkish Cypriots benefit from keeping Republic of Northern Cyprus, as they realize their own way of life	.910
8. Turkish Cypriots benefit from keeping Republic of Northern Cyprus, as they are not under the control of the Greeks	.907
12. Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people (from Turkey) benefit from keeping Republic of Northern Cyprus, as their interests are common	.807

6.3. Results

6.3.1. Descriptive Information of the Variables in the Model

Prior to the main analysis, the variables of gender, education, age, identification with social identities, collective threat perceptions, collective interest perceptions, and solutions for Cyprus problem were examined using SPSS programs in order to determine accuracy of data entry, missing values and fit of the distributions in respect to the assumptions of structural equation modeling. Missing values in quantitative variables, which constituted less than 5%, were replaced by mean value of distributions. Before and after missing value replacement, correlations among variables were checked.

For univariate normality, the recommended skewness should be smaller than 2 and the kurtosis should be smaller than 7 (Curran, West & Finch, 1996). All variables in the models met the assumptions of normality.

Before and after elimination of univariate and multivariate outliers (7 cases in total), the model testing was carried out. As there were no differences in significance levels of the variables, it was decided to keep these cases for the main analysis.

Descriptive information about the variables has been presented in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5. Descriptive Information of the Variables in Data Set

	Mean (SD)					
	Total	Men	Women	Youth	Adult	Older Adult
Turkness	4.00 (1.04)	3.99 (1.07)	4.01(.99)	3.82 (1.14)	3.97 (.93)	4.40 (.90)
Cypriotes	3.22 (1.17)	3.18 (1.21)	3.30 (1.07)	3.57(1.00)	3.28(1.20)	2.45(1.09)
Cypriotturkness	4.04 (.85)	4.02 (.81)	4.06 (.93)	3.84 (.94)	4.17(.78)	4.28 (.67)
Interest Unification	3.39 (1.20)	3.26 (1.22)	3.63 (1.13)	3.64 (1.15)	3.57 (1.11)	2.60 (1.13)
Interest TRNC	3.63 (1.25)	3.68 (1.27)	3.52(1.19)	3.44 (1.24)	3.50 (1.32)	4.25 (.96)
Threat Greeks	4.11(1.04)	4.09 (1.01)	4.15 (1.08)	3.92(1.54)	3.45 (1.26)	3.03(1.07)
Threat Turkey	3.58 (1.40)	3.55 (1.48)	3.64 (1.23)	4.01(1.02)	3.96 (1.12)	4.49(.88)
Solution1(TRNC)	3.95 (1.44)	3.89 (1.48)	4.05 (1.37)	3.89 (1.46)	3.74 (1.49)	4.38(1.24)
Solution2 (unification)	2.73 (1.65)	2.76(1.67)	2.67 (1.62)	3.02 (1.75)	2.60 (1.51)	2.31(1.57)

6.3.2. Intercorrelations Among the Variables

Intercorrelations among the variables are presented in Table 6.6. Endorsement of keeping separate state (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, TRNC) (SOLUTION 1) correlated negatively with Endorsement of United Cyprus (SOLUTION 2, r= -.514, p<.01), Identification with Cypriotness (r= -.419, p<.01), Perceived Interests from Unification (r= -.236, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish People (r= -.176, p<.05). SOLUTION 1 also correlated positively with Identification with Turkness (r= .555, p<.01), Identification with Turkish Cypriotness (r= .313, p<.01), Perceived Interests from TRNC (r= .629, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from the Greeks(r= .543, p<.01).

SOLUTION 2 correlated negatively with Identification with Turkness (r= -.349, p<.01), Identification with Turkish Cypriotness (r=-.219, p<.01), Perceived Interests from TRNC (r=,-.413 p<.01), and Perceived Threats from the Greeks(r= -.202, p<.01). And it correlated positively with Identification with Cypriotness (r= .588, p<.01), Perceived Interests from Unification (r= .430, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish People (r= .460, p<.01).

Identification with Cypriotness correlated negatively with Turkness (r= -.408, p<.01), Identification with Turkish Cypriotness (r=-.161, p<.01), Perceived Interests from TRNC (r=,-.451 p<.01), and Perceived Threats from the Greeks(r= -.368, p<.01). Identification with Cypriotness correlated positively with Perceived Interests from Unification (r= .610, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish People (r= .412, p<.01).

Identification with Turkish Cypriotness correlated negatively with Perceived Interests from Unification (r= -.163, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish People (r= -.230, p<.01). Identification with Turkish Cypriotness correlated positively with Identification with Turkness(r= .585, p<.01), Perceived Interests from TRNC (r= .492, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from the Greeks(r= .530, p<.01).

Identification with Turkish Cypriotness correlated positively with Perceived Interests from TRNC (r= .266, p<.01), and Perceived Threats from the Greeks (r= .286, p<.01).

Perceived Interests from Unification correlated negatively with Perceived Interests from TRNC (r=.-383, p<.01), and positively with Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish People (r= .282, p<.01).

Perceived Interests from TRNC correlated negatively with Perceived Threats from the Greeks (r= -.349, p<.01), and positively with Perceived Threats from the Greeks (r= 368, p<.01).

Table 6.6. Intercorrelations among the Observed Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. SOLUT1								
2. SOLUT2	-.514(**)							
3. CYPRIOT	-.419(**)	.588(**)						
4. TURK	.555(**)	-.349(**)	-.408(**)					
5. CYPTURK	.313(**)	-.219(**)	-.161(*)	.585(**)				
6. INTUNIFY	-.236(**)	.430(**)	.610(**)	-.163(*)	-.041			
7. INTTRNC	.629(**)	-.413(**)	-.451(**)	.492(**)	.266(**)	-.282(**)		
8. GRTHREAT	.543(**)	-.202(**)	-.368(**)	.530(**)	.286(**)	-.110	.368(**)	
9. TRTHREAT	-.176(*)	.460(**)	.412(**)	-.230(**)	-.090	.383(**)	-.349(**)	.065

Note 1: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Note 2: 1: Solution 1(TRNC), 2: Solution 2 (unification), 3.Cypriotness, 4: Turkness, 5: Cypriot Turkness, 6: Perceived collective interest from unification, 7: Perceived collective interests from independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, 8: Perceived collective threat from unification, 9: Perceived collective threat from Turkey

6.3.3. Gender Differences

In this study, it is examined whether there are differences between men and women in terms of their identity definitions, as well as their solution preferences. Independent Samples T-Test was conducted to explore the possible gender differences regarding their solution preferences (independent TRNC or unification) and their identification levels with each social identity: Cypriotness, Turkness, and Cypriot Turkness. The results revealed there were no statistically significant differences between men and women in terms of all variables (for independent TRNC solution t(204)=-756, p=.45; for Unification solution t(204)=368, p=713; for identification with Cypriotness t(204)=-703, p=483; for identification levels with Turkness t(204)=-121, p=903; for identification levels with Cypriot Turkness t(204)=-314, p=754).

6.3.4. Analysis of the Model: Structural Equation Modeling

In this study, structural equation modeling (SEM) technique was utilized to analyze the

Quantitative data using AMOS, version 7. There are various techniques to conduct SEM analyses in the literature. (1) Path analysis, the original SEM technique, concerns the effects of observed variables which are the mean scores computed from the items of scales. (2) The technique of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) tests whether the items of a factor load on that factor, which is defined as a latent variable. (3) The technique of structural models (SR) combines both path analyses and factor analyses. In this technique, relationships between latent constructs are generally the focus of analysis (Şimşek, 2007).This study used only the firstly mentioned technique. A path analysis was conducted to test the Model.

Structural equation modeling gives several fit statistics in order to assess how well the proposed model fits the data. The fundamental fit statistic is model chi square (χ^2). As the value of χ^2 increases, the fit of the model gets worse. That is, the proposed model does not fit well with the data, when χ^2 increases. Theoretically, the p-value for χ^2 *has* to be nonsignificant. Another fit statistics is root mean square of error approximation (RMSEA). RMSEA smaller than .05 shows good approximate fit; values between .05 and .08 refer reasonable fit, and RMSEA

bigger than .10 refers poor fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). There are some other fit indices, such as goodness-of-fix-index (GFI), adjusted goodness-of- fix-index (AGFI) and comparative-fit-index
(CFI), both of which range between 0 and 1.0, and refer good fit when larger than .90 (Kline, 2005).

All the variables in the proposed model were observed variables and hence it was a path model. In examining the model, direct paths from 'Turkness' to Separation (SOLUTION1), from 'Cypriotness' to Integration (SOLUTION 2); the indirect paths between 'Turkness', 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks' and SOLUTION 1, between 'Turkness', 'Perceived Interests from TRNC' and SOLUTION 1, between 'Cypriotness', 'Perceived Threats from Turkey/Turkish people' and SOLUTION 2, between 'Cypriotness', 'Perceived Interests from unification' and SOLUTION 2, between 'Turkish Cypriotness', 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks' and SOLUTION1, between 'Turkish Cypriotness' 'Perceived Interests from TRNC' and SOLUTION 1 , between 'Turkish Cypriotness', 'Perceived Threats from Turkey/Turkish people' and SOLUTION 2, between 'Turkish Cypriotness', 'Perceived Interests from unification' and SOLUTION 2 were estimated. The model did not fit well with the data, χ^2 (17) = 112.018, p =.000, χ^2 /df= 6. 59, AGFI= .732, RMSEA = .16 (.10-.29), GFI = .90, CFI = .87 and AIC = 168.

After the examination of the path coefficients in the proposed model, the analyses were repeated by removing the paths which were not significant. The modification indices suggested that the error terms between 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks' and 'Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish people', and between SOLUTION 1 and SOLUTION 2 were highly correlated (r = 27 for the first two variables and r = -22 for the second two variables). Therefore the correlated errors between them were added to the model. The indices also suggested a direct path from Turkish Cypriotness to SOLUTION2. Therefore the suggested direct path was also added to the model. The modified model fit better with the data, χ^2 (21) = 61.40, p =.000, χ^2 /df = 2.9, GFI = .94, AGFI= .87, CFI = .95, RMSEA= .09 (.00-.10).

The results indicate that those who identified with Turkness perceived high threat from the Greeks (β= .54, p<.000, B= .54, p<.000), high interests from keeping

separate state (TRNC) (β= .49, p<.000, *B*= .58, *p*<.000) and tended to prefer a separate state (TRNC) (β= .53, p<.000, *B*= .59, *p*<.000). Those who identified with Cypriotness perceived high threat from Turkey and Turkish people (β= .45, p<.000, *B*= .55, *p*<.000), high interests from unification (β= .61, p<.000, *B*= .62, *p*<.000) and tended to prefer a United Cyprus (β= .44, p<.000, *B*= .61, *p*<.000). Those who define themselves as Turkish Cypriots tended to reject unification (β= .-12, p<.05, *B*= .-23, *p*<.05) Those who perceived high threats from the Greeks tended to prefer separate state (TRNC) (β= .29, p<.01, *B*= .39, *p*<.01), and who perceived high interests from keeping separate state tended to prefer separate state (TRNC) (β= .40, p<.01, *B*= .45, *p*<.01). Those who perceived high threats from Turkey and Turkish people tended to prefer unification (β= .27, p<.01, *B*= .31, *p*<.01) (see Figure 6.3).




Figure 6.3. Standardized Estimates for the Model after Modifications

In general, the model, which proposes that particular definitions of identity influence the perception of collective threats or opportunities, which in turn influences the support for integration, is supported by the Structural Equation Modeling analysis. Precisely, the hypotheses that if people perceive threats towards

their ingroup from those whom their group is to integrate (from the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus case), and if they perceive collective benefits from being separated (keeping TRNC), they tend to prefer separatism; and if people perceive the integration as an opportunity for their group (perceived collective interests), and if they perceive collective threats from being separated (keeping TRNC); they tend to prefer unification.

The results support the direct effect of 'Turkness' on separatism (hypothesis 1), direct effect of 'Cypriotness' on integrationism (hypothesis 2), indirect effect of Turkness on separatism through perceived interests from TRNC (hypothesis 3), indirect effect of Turkness on separatism through perceived threats from the Greeks (hypothesis 4), indirect effect of identification with 'Cypriotness' on integrationism via perceived threats from Turkey and Turkish people (Hypothesis 6).

However, the results do not confirm the indirect effect of identification with 'Turkish Cypriotness' on support for keeping separate state via perceived interests from TRNC (Hypothesis 7), indirect effect of identification with 'Turkish Cypriotness' on support for keeping separate state via perceived threats toward their group from Greek Cypriots (Hypothesis 8), indirect effect of identification with 'Turkish Cypriotness' on support for integration via perceived interests from integrated structure (Hypothesis 9), indirect effect of identification with 'Turkish Cypriotness' on support for integration via perceived threats toward their group from Turkey and Turkish people (Hypothesis 10).

The results also indicate that there is a direct effect of identification with 'Turkish Cypriotness' on SOLUTION 2 (unification with Greeks), which was not proposed by the model.

6.3.5. The Alternative Model

Although mediation by perceived threats and interests of the effect of identification with national/ethnic groups on support for integration is largely supported by the analysis of the model an alternative model was also tested in which perceptions of threats and interests were entered as outcomes, and solutions (separation and integration) were entered as mediators.

First, all the paths which were defined by the model were included. The direct paths from 'Turkness' to 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks' and to 'Perceived Interests from TRNC'; the direct paths from 'Cypriotness' to 'Perceived Threats from Turkey/Turkish people' and to 'Perceived Interests from unification'; the indirect paths between 'Turkness', SOLUTION 1 and 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks'; the indirect paths between 'Turkness', SOLUTION 1 and 'Perceived Interests from TRNC'; the indirect paths between 'Cypriotness', SOLUTION 2 and 'Perceived Threats from Turkey and Turkish people'; the indirect paths between to 'Cypriotness', SOLUTION 2 and 'Perceived Interests from unification'; the indirect paths between 'Turkish Cypriotness', SOLUTION1 and 'Perceived Threats from the Greeks'; the indirect paths between 'Turkish Cypriotness', SOLUTION1 and of 'Perceived Interests from TRNC'; the indirect paths between 'Turkish Cypriotness', SOLUTION2 and 'Perceived Threats from Turkey/Turkish people'; the indirect paths between 'Turkish Cypriotness', SOLUTION2 and 'Perceived Interests from unification' were estimated.

As it was stated above, the main model yielded the following fit statistics, χ^2 (17) = 112.018, p =.000, χ^2 /df= 6. 59, AGFI= .732, RMSEA = .16 (.10-.29), GFI = .90, CFI = .87 and AIC = 168. On the other hand, the alternative model in which the perception of threats and interests were outcomes, not mediators, yielded also a poor fit statistics, χ^2 (16) = 95.263, p= .000, χ^2 /df = 6, GFI = .91, AGFI=.75, CFI = .89, RMSEA= .15 and AIC=153.263 . Although the alternative model has lower χ^2 and AIC values, none of the models fit with the data well.

Secondly, the main model and the alternative model after deletion of all nonsignificant paths and correlating the error terms were compared. When all nonsignificant paths deleted from the main model and after adding the error covariance and the path between Turkish Cypriotness and SOLUTION 2 suggested by the modification indices, the main model fit the data very well, as explained above, χ^2 (21) = 61.40, p =.000, χ^2 /df = 2.9, GFI = .94, AGFI= .87, CFI = .95, RMSEA= .09 (.00-.10) and AIC=109. On the other hand, when all nonsignificant paths deleted from the alternative model and after adding the error covariance, the alternative model still did not fit with the data, χ^2 (21) = 76.350, p =.000, χ^2 /df = 3.6, GFI = .92, AGFI= .83, CFI = .92, RMSEA= .11 (.00-.10) and AIC= 124.

A comparison of the modified main model with the modified alternative model showed that the main model had lower AIC values (109) and thus was a better model than the alternative model (AIC = 124).

6.4. Discussion

By the third study of present dissertation, the relationship between laypersons' national/ethnic identity constructions and the collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state), was examined quantitatively**.** The results of the second study revealed that people endorse collective projects of political parties through developing common identity and context constructions. With this third study, the reasons why people support their group's becoming a part of a larger (superordinate) unit was tried to be answered in the light of the second study's findings. It was suggested that people perceive the collective threats and interests in accordance with their particular group definitions, which results in endorsement of particular collective projects. Specifically, it was hypothesized that by defining national/ethnic identities in a particular way (Turk, Turkish Cypriot, or Cypriot), Northern Cypriots prefered one solution over the other (unification of Cyprus or keeping independent state). However this relationship between the identity definitions and collective projects would be mediated by the collective threat/interest perceptions.

Before discussing the results of the study one issue requires to be clarified. As mentioned in theoretical framework, any event or information that undermines the basic needs at the group level is conceptualized as collective threats. Similarly any event or information that is perceived as an opportunity to satisfy the needs of the group is defined as collective interests. Based on these conceptualizations, it was assumed that collective threats and interests might play important roles in identity processes. Accordingly, just like the group's boundary and the content, collective threats towards the group or perceived interests might be constructed in order to realize collective projects, such as integrating with other groups under a common structure. Although preliminary analysis of the documents (books, newspapers, scientific articles and so on) and the analysis of the documents of political parties signify two undermined needs of Turkish Cypriots, namely sovereignty and

recognition, the analysis of the interviews implicates the sources of the collective threats and interests, rather than mentioning particular threats. When preparing the scales which intend to assess the participants perceived threats and interests, the sources which cause various possible threats and interests, rather than specific sovereign and recognition threats were taken as the basis. That is, as in the interviews, the Greeks and the Turkish people were identified as the sources of the possible threats. For example for some Turkish Cypriots, the Greeks were perceived as responsible for their non-recognized situation. Similarly, unified and separate structures were identified as the sources of the collective interests, such as social or economical development of Turkish Cypriots, or protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots. As indicated previously, the results of factor analysis supported the operationalizations of collective threats and interests as such. The factor analysis indicates that the items related with both the recognition and sovereignty threats are loaded on the same factor; hence both of them were attributed to the Greeks. On the other hand, the other items (e.g. Turkish Cypriots might disappear because of increased number of Turkish Settlers in the island) were loaded on the second factor, hence their sources were perceived as Turks and Turkey.

It should also be noted that there are great convergence between their constructions and lay Turkish Cypriots' constructions. That is, although political parties named the collective threats as sovereignty and recognition, their construction of threat source is the same with the lay Turkish Cypriots' perceptions. Both political parties and lay Turkish Cypriots mentioned the sources of threats, which indicate that they share the same constructions.

In general, the results of the third study confirm the model, which proposes that a particular definition of social identities influence people's attitudes towards their group's becoming part of a superordinate structure. But this relationship is mediated by perceived collective threat and interest. Those who identified with 'Turkness' tended to be separationists. However, their preferences for separate independent state (TRNC) were mediated by their perceived threats from the Greeks (e.g. their sovereignty needs would be undermined by the Greeks and their perceived interests from keeping separate state as well). That is, identification with 'Turkness' influences the perceptions of collective threats and interests, which in turn seem to

cause negative attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots' becoming a part of United Cyprus (superordinate structure). Similarly, those who identified with 'Cypriotness' tended to be integrationists. Again their preferences for integrated structure (united Cyprus) were mediated by their perceived threats from Turkish people and Turkey (e.g. deterioration of cultural tissue of Cyprus by 'Turkish Settlers'). Although expected, the results do not confirm that perceived interests from United Cyprus did mediate the relationship between the 'Cypriot' identity and support for integration. Yet, the 'Cypriots' seemed to perceive high collective interests from united Cyprus (e.g. economical development).

The results of the present study support the hypothesis that defining one's national/ethnic identity in a particular way has an impact on that person's perceptions of collective threats and interests. The collective threats and interests, which are perceived in a particular way, in turn, seem to determine the attitudes towards integration. The directions of the arrows in the model which come from particular definitions of national/ethnic identities to collective threats/interests and from the threats and interests to the particular collective projects (separation or unification) implicate that collective threats and interests are construed by ingroup members in line with their identity definitions, probably in order to provide sufficient reasons to their attitudes towards integration of their group with the other group. Although Structural Equation Modeling does not provide a casual relationship between variables, such interpretation of the findings appears to be consistent with the theoretical approach which proposes that defining a social identity by both defining the category boundaries and defining its content in a particular way encompass the implications for realization of new set of social relations. The findings are in accordance with the results of the second study, which suggest people prefer one collective project over another through developing the common identity and context constructions of corresponding political parties.

Lastly, it should be noted that present findings did not support any hypothesis about those who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots'. Although it was expected that if Turkish Cypriots perceived high threats from the Greeks and high interests from keeping TRNC, they would have preferred a separate state, and if they perceived high threats from the Turkish people/Turkey and high interests from

unification, they would have supported the integrated structure (united Cyprus), in fact it was just found that the Turkish Cypriots tended not to prefer a United Cyprus. Indeed, such results are not surprising when we take into account the arguments of some of Turkish Cypriots. As shown in previous chapter, some of interviewees who defined themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots' used some inconsistent arguments regarding Cyprus Problem, Solution, Threat/Interests and Ingroup Definition categories. For example they sometimes used two logically inconsistent arguments such as 'the Greeks threaten Turkish Cypriots' and 'Unification should be reached'. Based on the analysis of the arguments of 'Turkish Cypriots' and the results of the model, it could be assumed that those who define themselves as Turkish Cypriots might experience an identity confusion. Whatever the case, it becomes clear that those who identify with 'Turkish Cypriotness' needs to be re-studied in future.

In consequence, the findings of the second study was supported quantitatively with the third study that laypersons endorse specific collective projects through sharing same identity and context constructions with the identity entrepreneurs. Most of the hypotheses of the third study are confirmed by the analysis, except for the identity of 'Turkish Cypriotness'. The results are in the direction of the theoretical frame, which suggests collective threats and interests play crucial role in social identity and intergroup processes. Hence, defining national/ethnic identities in a particular way seems to influence the perceived threat sources and perceived benefit sources, which, in turn, affects people's support for their group's becoming a part of larger (superordinate) group. In general it could be claimed that integration is supported where it is seen to help 'realize' social identity (collective interests) and it will be opposed where it is seen to threaten social identity.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDIES

In social psychology, most of the studies on intergroup relations with the frame of Social Identity theory have been based on the notion that social identities mirror the social context, which was generally considered as set a priori. Usually, social group researchers subject people's perceptions of the given context and the reactions of them to any change in the context. However, how social context itself changes and the role of the group members in a changing context is usually disregarded. Recently, a few researchers challenge such an understanding and suggest that the context itself might be tried to change by the group members actively (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005). Accordingly, through re-construction of social groups and the relationships between them, some group members endeavour to change the given context. Sometimes, in the intra-group context there is more than one camp of people who try to change the social reality; they might struggle with each other to realize their own kind of social structure. Following from this perspective, intergroup relations could be considered as shaped by intra-group process, in addition to the inter-group process. In general, this study investigates the intra-group processes through which inter-group relations are shaped, focusing on the Northern Cyprus case.

Within this theoretical frame, present dissertation includes three separate but complemantary studies in order to achieve three main objectives. With the first study, (an archive study), it was aimed at exploring the strategic national/ethnic identity constructions of two political parties in Northern Cyprus, in accordance with their collective projects (united Cyprus and separate independent state). By analyzing several official documents of Republican Turkish Party (CTP; supports unification of Cyprus) and National Unity Party (UBP; supports keeping Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) using Structural Analysis of Group Arguments technique (SAGA; Reciher & Sani, 1998), it was explored that the two political parties constructed the definitions of 'Ingroup', 'Cyprus Problem', 'Threat/Interests', and 'Attitudes toward

European Union' differently and thus each of them proposed different collective projects. The findings revealed that each argument in all categories was set up in a certain way, hence they would serve to their own parties' collective projects.

According to National Unity Party (UBP), Cyprus problem has been originated from Greek Cypriots who do not accept Turkish Cypriots as equal partners and still dream ENOSIS (unify Cyprus to Greece); some domestic powers, the Annan Plan and European Union, all serve to ENOSIS dream of the Greek Cypriots. As such, the solution is to keep Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) alive and reject Annan Plan, which requires unification of Cyprus. Because UBP's collective project for Turkish Cypriots is an independent state, the aspect of Cyprus problem, the definition of Turkish Cypriots, and the threats towards the ingroup were constructed in the service of this project. The community, who live in the northern part of Cyprus, is defined as an inextractable part of Turkish nation. The border of the category is drawn as excluding Greek Cypriots, but including all Turkish people who live in Turkey. The findings reveal that all arguments of UBP are related positively with an independent TRNC and negatively with united Cyprus.

According to Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the problem is originated from the status quo in North Cyprus that means keeping a separate state TRNC. CTP attributes the responsibility of the problem to policies of integration with Turkey and such politicians who support the integration with Turkey (e.g. Rauf Denktaş). Moreover, CTP claims that status quo has destroyed Turkish Cypriots economically and damaged their prestige in the eyes of world countries. United Cyprus would serve the interests of Turkish Cypriots. Accordingly, being a member of European Union via unification would naturally save Turkish Cypriots' rights. CTP stays away from a clear ingroup definition. However, some arguments in 'Cyprus Problem' category are constructed to differentiate the North Cyprus community from Turkish people. For example, offering an independent currency and a central bank imply desire for separation from Turkey. All the arguments of CTP in each category are built in the service of 'United Cyprus Project'.

The findings of the first study support the notion that the borders (who is in) and the contents (threats, interests, attitudes towards other groups etc.) of the group are constructed purposefully in order to realize specific collective projects. These

findings are in accordance with the Reicher and Hopkins' (2001) recent approach that social groups are constructed with the intention of making desired changes in the social structure by some ingroup members called 'identity entrepreneurs'. Reicher et al. (2005) assert that such people called identity entrepreneurs need the support from the rest of the group members. For this reason, they construct all the group issues in order to activate the group members for realizing their collective projects. In other words, all constructions and re-constructions of group-related issues are made in order to influence the other group members whose support is needed for realizing the collective projects. The second study of present dissertation concentrated on the identity constructions of laypersons whose support is needed by the entrepreneurs. Therefore, this second study highlighted the other side of the equation, in which the 'identity entrepreneurs' are on the one side and the other ingroup members are on the other side. This second study, therefore, aims to portray the identity constructions of laypersons; and to explore the relationship between their identity constructions and the political parties' collective projects, in order to investigate whether there is an influence of political parties on lay the laypersons.

It was proposed that, lay Turkish Cypriots should construct all the issues related with Cyprus problem and their community as consistent with the constructions of the political parties, if laypersons' understandings are influenced from the constructions of identity entrepreneurs, as Reicher et al. (2005) claim. That is, those, who voted for the Annan Plan, should have to share the same constructions with CTP, which called Turkish Cypriots to vote for the plan; and those who voted against the Annan Plan, should develop same constructions with UBP, which called Turkish Cypriots to vote against the plan. These were the exact findings of the second study, in which 19 lay Turkish Cypriots (those who are not actively involved in the politics) were interviewed and the interviews were analyzed by SAGA.

The analysis of the interviews show that, the anti-integrationists draw their ingroup's border as including all Turkish people and excluding Greek Cypriots, which seem to be consistent with their negative votes at the referenda of Annan Plan. The anti-integrationists consider that the problem is originated from the Greek Cypriots' intention to make island completely Greek, hence endorsement of unification would have been contradictory to their own argument and their 'Turkish' identity as well. Furthermore,

because the European Union (EU) has overt Greek favoring attitudes, it cannot be trusted. So the anti-integrationists do not wish for EU membership, either. Agreeing with their problem argument, they support the solution of keeping Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) alive. Like their problem definition, they also argue that Greek Cypriots threaten Turkish Cypriots (under the roof of united Cyprus), and the current situation comprises advantageous for Turkish Cypriots. All the arguments in each category used by the anti-integrationists are logically consistent with their negative votes at the referenda and their ingroup definitions.

Conversely, the pro-integrationists, who voted for the Annan Plan, draw their group boundaries in two ways. First, some who define themselves as 'Cypriots' refuse the reality of two different communities in the island as Turkish and Greeks; they leave out Turkish people (from Turkey) and include the Greek Cypriots. The pro-integrationist 'Cypriots' claim that Cyprus problem is originated from Turkey's wrong attitudes and actions. Turkish troops' stay in the island and taking some Turkish people from Anatolia to settle down in Cyprus are the two big mistakes. Hence, as a result of both mistakes, it becomes difficult to reach any agreement with the Greek Cypriots. As such, voting for the Annan Plan, which requires withdrawal of Turkish troops and reducing the number of 'Turkish Settlers', is consistent with their own arguments and also with their identity definitions (Cypriots). The pro-integrationist 'Cypriots', who support the solution of unification, also support being the member of EU. Hence, under the roof of EU, Turkish Cypriots would be protected, because it brings human rights, democracy, transparency, supremacy of law, economical wellbeing and so on. Besides, they also think the status quo as a major threat, as they believe that it prevents their social and economical development. On the other hand, they think 'United Cyprus' is advantageous for their group. Majority of the arguments used by the pro-integrationist 'Cypriots' are logically consistent with their positive votes at the referenda and their ingroup definitions.

The second pro-integrationists, who voted for the Annan Plan, define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriots' and try to distinguish their group both from Turkish people and from Greek people. Some of the 'pro-integrationist Turkish Cypriots use the arguments of 'Cyprus Problem as stemming from Turkey's wrong actions and

attitudes' and 'Cyprus Problem as stemming from Greeks' aspiration of making the island completely Greek' at the same time. The first argument is clearly inconsistent with the second one. While they did not mention any threat, they stressed that united Cyprus would be advantageous for their group in terms of economical and social terms. Moreover, they mentioned their tiredness and uneasiness from uncertainty of the current situation. It seems that although they attribute the responsibility of Cyprus problem to Greek Cypriots, they appear to expect to benefit from unification, which also will end the current ambiguous situation. According to them, the Annan Plan provided a good base for unification.

When examining the general configuration of the arguments used in the documents of the political parties and the interviews, it is seen that there is convergence to a great extent between the constructions of them. Especially for National Unity Party (UBP) and anti-integrationists, there is total correspondence between the arguments in each category. Also, for Turkish Republican Party (CTP) and pro-integrationists, the majority of the arguments match, although their categories might differ for some cases.

The analysis of the interviews with lay Northern Cypriots broadly supports the expectation of mass social influence from political parties towards lay Northern Cypriots. As stated earlier, realizing particular projects requires the capacity to get people to act in line with particular projects. Changing the social structure turns into real only if the ingroup members support the collective projects of identity entrepreneurs (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner, 2005). In Cyprus case, the two political parties, UBP and CTP, purposefully constructed the ingroup, the problem, and the collective threats and interests. Present findings reveal that those who followed UBP's call for rejection of the Annan plan at the referenda share UBP's constructions entirely; and those who pursued CTP's call for accepting of the Annan Plan, share most of the constructions of CTP. The data shows a great convergence between the constructions of political parties and laypersons, which implies a social influence (from political parties to the group members). Therefore, through developing the same constructions, laypersons come to the conclusion of supporting the collective projects of the identity entrepreneurs (political parties in our case).

Although the analysis implies a social influence from political parties to

laypersons, present findings are far from being sufficient to claim such a direction of influence. Such causality should be studied especially within an experimental manipulation design. Furthermore, future research should also take into account the power factor when examining the social influence. Although those, who are called identity entrepreneurs, define the border and the content of the groups to influence the ingroup members, the desired influence might depend on how those entrepreneurs are perceived as having enough power to realize their projects. However, sometimes, perceived power might depend on the external agents. For example, in Northern Cyprus case, during the referenda, the government of Turkey, EU, and United States of America (USA) supported Northern Cypriots' accepting of the Annan Plan. The position of world powers might be considered by the Turkish Cypriots that unification cannot be objected and should be obeyed. For such reasons CTP might be perceived as more powerful than UBP, and most of the Turkish Cypriots (65%) followed its call for acceptance of the Annan Plan. Therefore, the complicated power relationships within and between groups should be taken into account when studying mass influence from identity entrepreneurs towards rest of the ingroup members.

With the third study of the present dissertation, the relationship between laypersons' national/ethnic identity constructions and the collective projects proposed by different political parties (unification of Cyprus or keeping separate state), was aimed to achieve by a quantitative method. Specifically, in the light of the second study's findings, the third study tried to find the answer of why people support their group's becoming a part of a larger (superordinate) unit. It was hypothesized that people perceived the collective threats and interests in accordance with their particular group definitions, which in turn resulted in endorsement of corresponding collective project. Precisely, it was hypothesized that by defining national/ethnic identities in a particular way (Turk, Turkish Cypriot, or Cypriot), Northern Cypriots preferred one solution over the other (unification of Cyprus or keeping independent state). However, this relationship would be mediated by the collective threat/interest perceptions. Such hypotheses were formulated as a model, by which it was expected that those, who identified with 'Turkness', tended to be separationists via perceived threats from the Greeks and perceived interests from

keeping separate state; those, who identified with 'Cypriotness', tended to be integrationists via perceived threats from Turkish people and Turkey, and perceived collective interests from unification; and if those, who defined themselves as Turkish Cypriot, perceived threat from keeping independent state and interests from unification, they would prefer integration, but if they perceived threats from unified structure and interests from keeping separate state, they would prefer separation. The model was analyzed by Structural Equation Modeling, using AMOS 5 program.

The results of the third study confirmed the hypotheses proposed by the model with a few exceptions. Contrary to the expectations of the present study, the results did not confirm that perceived interests from United Cyprus did mediate the relationship between the 'Cypriot' identity and support for integration. Yet, the 'Cypriots' seemed to perceive high collective interests from united Cyprus (e.g. economical development). The hypotheses related with Turkish Cypriotness were not confirmed, either. The only finding related with Turkish Cypriotness was that identification with Turkish Cypriotness correlated negatively with integration solution.

These findings replicate the results of the second study that people favor one collective project over another through developing a common identity and context constructions of corresponding political parties.

The third study focused on the question of why different parts of the same group support different future projects for the same group of people. The differences within a community in terms of attitudes towards integration of the groups could be explained at two levels at least. First, the differences might reflect differing social identities held by different members of the community. Second they may reflect different appraisals of the 'threat' and 'opportunity' for the social identity. Often, these factors would be interdependent. Defining the same group of people differently might reflect the differences in threats/interests perceptions at the beginning. But in time this process might require re-definition of social identities. That is, identity definitions, which are strategically constructed in order to realize particular purposes, might come into real and main group might divide into subgroups in time. Nevertheless, the results of the third study imply that integration is supported where

it is seen to help 'realize' social identity (collective interests) and it is opposed where it is seen to threaten social identity. However, the collective threats and interests seem to be construed by ingroup members in line with their identity definitions, which consequently lead favoring the corresponding collective project. However, given the correlational nature of the analysis of the last study, it is impossible to claim any causal relationships between social identities, perceived collective threats / interests and collective projects. With an interdisciplinary longitudinal study, it might become possible to understand the causal sequence of them. Yet, the findings of the third study gives an insight about the role of the relationship between collective threats / interests and particular definitions of social groups in explaining why people support different collective projects for their groups, specifically in explaining why people have different attitudes towards their group becoming a part of larger (superordinate) group.

To conclude, present dissertation makes important contributions to the recent theoretical approach to Social Identity /Self Categorization theories. With the first study, it is explored that the collective project holders (political parties in our case) define their group and group-related issues strategically in order to accomplish their projects. Thus, the Northern Cyprus case provides strong evidence for Reicher and Hopkins' (2002) notion of strategic identity constructions. With the second study, the rarely touched side of recent theoretical approach of Reicher et al. (2005) is examined. Reicher et al. (2005) claim that the identity entrepreneurs construct the identities strategically as they need the support of ingroup members. Such proposal comprises the notion of influence from the entrepreneurs towards the lay ingroup members. Though there are number of studies on how identities are constructed strategically by the entrepreneurs (see Cinnirella, 1997; Reicher et al., 2006), and a few studies on lay understandings of identities (see Condor & Abel, 2006), none of the research focuses on and brings together the both side of the equation. To put it differently, present dissertation takes into account both the entrepreneurs' constructions, which are made to influence the ingroup members, and the constructions of the lay ingroup members at the same time. By doing this, it became possible to portray the similarities and differences between the two kinds of constructions. By doing so, the notion of influence from the entrepreneurs towards

the lay ingroup members was supported. That is, people favor one collective project over another through developing the common identity and context constructions of corresponding political parties. With the third study, such findings of the second study were also replicated quantitatively. The results of the third study indicated that one collective project over another is endorsed by lay ingroup members through developing corresponding constructions of collective threats and interests which are determined by particular identity definitions.

In addition to the contributions of present research to the new theoretical approach to Social Identity / Self Categorization theories, present dissertation also makes methodological contribution to social psychological studies in Turkey. Structural Analysis of Group Arguments (SAGA, Reicher & Sani, 1998) which includes both the quantitative and the qualitative elements and which is different from content analysis technique is introduced to Turkish researchers in social sciences. The documents of the political parties and the interviews were analyzed by SAGA technique through which it becomes possible to reveal the structural relationship between the arguments of opposite parties and pro and anti-integrationist interviewees.

The research in the dissertation has also some practical implications for the policymakers and especially for those who have been involved in Cyprus problem. Hence, the importance of social identity processes by which the attitudes towards unification of Cyprus are shaped, is presented in detail manner. Particularly, it becomes obvious that perceived collective threats and interests of Turkish Cypriots should be taken into account when establishing policies.

In addition to the contributions, the limitations of the studies should also be mentioned. The first two studies are qualitative which makes difficult to achieve generalized conclusions. These qualitative studies also include the researcher's subjective judgments. For these reasons, the notion of strategic identity construction needs to be tested by appropriate experimental manipulations. Moreover, present research was conducted only in the north part of Cyprus. The construction of identities and group-related issues in the south part of the island should also be investigated and compared with the findings of the present study in order to comprehend the identity processes in the island with all dimensions.

As mentioned above, exploring the mechanisms and the processes of mass influence by focusing the power relationships within the frame of Social Identity Theory is required. Although the results of the second and the third studies provide support for social influence, by using more appropriate research design and including the power factor, the subject should be studied in future. Moreover, I should remind the correlational nature of the third study, which prevents us claiming any causality between identity constructions and endorsement of specific collective projects. The causal relation between social identities, threat and interest perceptions, and attitudes towards superordinate identities needs to be studied longitudinally.

Lastly, it should be noted that although present dissertation aimed at investigating the intra-group processes through which the inter-group relations are shaped, by focusing the Northern Cyprus case, the intergroup issues cannot be reduced to simple intra-group processes. A researcher should take into account the intergroup context, as Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel, 1978) suggests. Probably, intra and intergroup factors (e.g. status of the ingroup relative to outgroups) are interacted in attitude formation of group members towards each other. Consequently, it would be a more accurate approach to view the intergroup relations (e.g. integrations or separations of different groups) as the product of the interaction between intra and intergroup context. Thus excluding the interaction between intra and intergroup context is seen as the limitations of this study.

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APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

1. As far as the identities are concerned in Cyprus, various definitions can be made. For example people may define themselves as Turks, Cypriot Turks, Turkish Cypriots or simply Cypriots. In this regard, which one of those terms do you prefer when defining your community? And why?

2. How would you describe the characteristics of your own community?

2. In general what is your point of view regarding the Cyprus problem? How do you describe the problem? Where the problem originates? What are your solutions?

3. What are the obstacles to your proposed solutions? How do you plan to overcome these obstacles?

4. If we consider the worse case (if your solutions wouldn't take place), what kind of dangers do you think the Turkish Cypriots would face with?

5. How do you evaluate the European Union in general, and particularly in terms of its role in the Cyprus problem?

6. How do you evaluate Turkey in general, and particularly in terms of its role in the Cyprus problem?

APPENDIX B

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Cinsiyet: □Erkek □Kadın
Yaş:……..
Vatandaşlık:□ KKTC □Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti □Türkiye □ Diğer……
Doğum yeri:……
Dini:
Eğitim:□ İlk-ortaokul □ Lise □ Üniversite ve üstü
Meslek: ……

ULUSAL/ETNİK GRUPLARLA ÖZDEŞLEŞME ÖLÇEĞİ

	Bu bölümde hangi grupların sizin için daha önemli olduğunu öğrenmek istiyoruz. Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı, ifadelerin yanındaki rakamları işaretleyerek belirtiniz	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum Ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
1	Kendimi bir Türk olarak tanımlıyorum	1	2	3	4	5
2	Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türklerin birçok ortak özelliği vardır çünkü hepsi de Kıbrıslıdır	1	2	3	4	5
3	Genel olarak bir Türk olmaktan memnunum	1	2	3	4	5
4	Genellikle, bir Türk olduğumu düşündüğümde kendimi iyi hissederim	1	2	3	4	5
5	Diğer Kıbrıslı Türklerle aramda güçlü bağlar olduğunu hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
6	Genel olarak, Türk olmak benim kendi benliğim açısından çok önemlidir	1	2	3	4	5
7	Genellikle, Kıbrıslı Türk olduğunu düşündüğümde kendimi iyi hissederim	1	2	3	4	5
8	Kendimi Türk veya Rum diye ayırmadan Kıbrıslı olarak tanımlıyorum	1	2	3	4	5
9	Türkler ve Rumlar hepimiz Kıbrıslıyız	1	2	3	4	5
10	Kıbrıslı olmaktan, Rum veya Türk fark etmez, memnunum	1	2	3	4	5
11	Geldiğimiz köken ne olursa olsun bence önemli olan Kıbrıslı olduğumuz gerçeğidir.	1	2	3	4	5
12	Genel olarak, benim ulusal kökenim ne olursa olsun Kıbrıslı olmak benim benliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır	1	2	3	4	5
13	Türk veya Rum olmak benim için önemli değildir, Kıbrıslı olmaktan memnunum	1	2	3	4	5
14	Bir Kıbrıslı olduğumu düşündüğümde kendimi iyi hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5
15	Genel olarak, Kıbrıslı Türk olmak benim benliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır	1	2	3	4	5
16	Bütün Kıbrıslılarla güçlü bağlarım olduğunu hissediyorum, hangi kökenden oldukları fark etmez	1	2	3	4	5
17	Kıbrıslı veya Anadolulu diye gözetmeksizin, diğer bütün Türklerle aramda güçlü bağlar olduğunu hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5

KOLEKTİF TEHDİT ALGILARI ÖLÇEĞİ

	Aşağıdaki durumların, Kıbrıslı Türkler için ne oranda gerçek birer tehdit oluşturduğunu, ifadelerin yanındaki rakamları işaretleyerek belirtiniz	Kesinlikle böyle bir tehdit yoktur	Böyle bir tehdit yoktur	kararsızım	Böyle bir tehdit vardır	Kesinlikle böyle bir tehdit vardır
1	Eğer, her açıdan (ekonomik, sosyal ve politik olarak) eşit statüde olduğumuz kabul edilmeden Rumlarla birleşirsek kimliğimiz yok olabilir.	1	2	3	4	5
2	Kıbrıs birleştiğinde Kıbrıslı Türkler, Rumlar yüzünden kendi kaderleri hakkında söz sahibi olamazlar	1	2	3	4	5
3	Kıbrıs birleştiğinde Kıbrıslı Türkler adada egemenliklerini kaybedebilirler	1	2	3	4	5
4	Kıbrıs birleştiğinde Kıbrıslı Türkler giderek Rumlaşabilir					
5	Kıbrıslı Rumlar Kıbrıslı Türkleri asimile edebilir (Kıbrıslı Türkler Kıbrıslı Rumlar arasında eriyip gidebilir)	1	2	3	4	5
6	Eğer mevcut durum bu şekilde kalacak olursa (KKTC olarak kalmaya devam edersek) kimliğimiz yok olabilir	1	2	3	4	5
7	Kıbrıs birleştiğinde Kıbrıslı Türkler, Rumların baskısı yüzünden kendi yaşam tarzlarını sürdüremeyecek duruma düşebilir	1	2	3	4	5
8	Kıbrıs'taki yaşam tarzı Türkiye'den gelenler tarafından tamamen bozulup yok edilebilir	1	2	3	4	5
9	Kıbrıslı Türkler diğer ülkelerle doğrudan ticaret yapamamaya devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
10	Kıbrıslı Türkler kendi hava limanlarından dünyanın diğer ülkelerine doğrudan yolculuk yapamamaya devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
11	Türkiyeli Türkler Kıbrıs'taki kültürel yapıyı bozabilirler	1	2	3	4	5
12	Kıbrıslı Türkler sanki dünyada böyle bir topluluk yokmuş gibi muamele görmeye devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
13	Kıbrıslı Türkler dünyadaki diğer toplumlardan yalıtılmış biçimde kalmaya devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
14	Kıbrıslı Türkler kendi pasaportlarıyla yolculuk edememeye devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
15	Türkiyeli Türklerin Kıbrıs'taki sayısı bu şekilde kalmaya ve artmaya devam ederse Kıbrıslı Türkler onların içinde eriyip gidebilir	1	2	3	4	5
16	Daha iyi ekonomik ve sosyal şartlara kavuşmak için Kıbrıslı Türkler yurtdışına göç etmeye devam edebilir	1	2	3	4	5
17	Diğer ülkeler tarafından tanınmıyor oldukları için Kıbrıslı Türkler kendi ekonomik ve sosyal yaşantılarını sürdüremez hale gelebilir	1	2	3	4	5
18	Kıbrıslı Türkler uluslararası camiada tanınmamaya devam eder	1	2	3	4	5
19	Kıbrıslı Türkler tamamen Türkiye'nin güdümünde kalır, onlara bağımlı hale gelebilir	1	2	3	4	5
20	Kıbrıs birleştiğinde Kıbrıslı Türkler, Rumların baskısı yüzünden kendi değer, gelenek ve göreneklerini yaşatamayabilir	1	2	3	4	5

KIBRIS SORUNUNA ÇÖZÜM ÖLÇEĞİ

	Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı, ifadelerin yanındaki rakamları işaretleyerek belirtiniz	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
1	Kıbrıslı Türk halkının kendi ayrı, egemen bir devleti olması gerekir (KKTC)	1	2	3	4	5
2	Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Rumlar Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti çatısı altında birleşmelidirler	1	2	3	4	5

KOLEKTİF ÇIKAR ALGILARI ÖLÇEĞİ

	Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katıldığınızı, ifadelerin yanındaki rakamları işaretleyerek belirtiniz	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
1	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu, çünkü ambargolar ve izolasyon kalkacağı için refah düzeyleri artardı	1	2	3	4	5
2	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türkler çocuklarını yurtdışında rahatça okutabilirlerdi	1	2	3	4	5
3	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türklerin işsizlik sorunu çözülürdü	1	2	3	4	5
4	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türkler kalkınırdı	1	2	3	4	5
5	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türkler sosyal açıdan daha ileri seviyeye gelirlerdi	1	2	3	4	5
6	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türkler'in hava ve deniz limanları tüm dünyaya açılırdı	1	2	3	4	5
7	Adada birleşme sağlansaydı Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olurdu çünkü Kıbrıslı Türklerin turizm gelirleri artardı	1	2	3	4	5
8	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti mevcut şekliyle kalırsa Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olur çünkü mevcut durumda Kıbrıslı Türkler adada azınlık statüsünde değiller	1	2	3	4	5
9	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti mevcut şekliyle kalırsa adanın Rumlaşması engellenmiş olmaktadır	1	2	3	4	5
10	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti mevcut şekliyle Kıbrıslı Türkler kendi yaşam tarzlarını rahatça sürdürebilirler	1	2	3	4	5
11	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti mevcut şekliyle kalırsa Türkiye'nin güvenliği garanti altına alınmış olduğu için Kıbrıslı Türkler de kendilerini güvende hissetmektedir	1	2	3	4	5
12	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti mevcut şekliyle kalırsa hem Kıbrıslı Türklerin hem de Türkiye'nin çıkarına olur çünkü zaten çıkarları ortaktır	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX C
TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Ulus tipinde örgütlenme, sosyal dünyanın önemli bir parçasını oluşturmaktadır. Ulusla özdeşleşme, ulus kavramı, ulusçuluk ve ulusal kimlikler, sosyal psikolojide son otuz senedir oldukça popüler hale gelmiştir. Araştırmacılar, ulusal ve etnik kimlikleri, zengin bir çalışma alanı olarak görmektedirler. Ulusal kimlik konusu, felsefe, tarih, sosyal ve siyasal bilimler alanlarında en çok çalışılan konulardan biridir (Davis, 1999). Bu alanların çoğunda da ulusal kimlik, Anderson'un ulusun hayali bir topluluk olduğu şeklindeki görüşü temel alınmaktadır (Davis, 1999). Yapılan çalışmaların çoğunda, özellikle ulusal kimlikler bir sosyal inşa olarak ele alınmakta, kimlikler gözlenen birimler olmaktan çok, bir fikir veya söylem olarak kabul edilmektedir (Tilley, 1997).

Sosyal psikolojide, Sosyal Kimlik /Benlik Kategorizasyonu kuramlarının (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1999) ortaya çıkışıyla beraber, ulus dahil bütün grup kimlikleri ve gruplar arasındaki ilişkiler, çalışılması gereken ayrı bir alan olarak dikkatleri çekmeye başlamıştır. Tajfel' in grup psikolojisini açıkladığı kuramsal çerçeve ile Turner'ın ayrıntılı sosyal kimlik süreci açıklamaları, ulus olgusunun çalışılması için temel sağlamıştır.

Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı'nın (SKK) temel önermesi, grubun insanların kendi benliklerine bir referans noktası oluşturabilmek için, kendilerini yönlendirdikleri ayrı bir psikolojik mekanizma olduğudur. Yani, bir kişinin ait olduğu sosyal kategori, kişinin benlik-tanımlaması için bir temel sağlamaktadır. Benliğin, bilişsel olarak bir grubun üyesi olarak tanımlanması, -o gruba yüklenilen duygular ve değerlerle birlikte- *sosyal kimlik* olarak adlandırılmaktadır (Tajfel, 1978, s.273). SKK, 'kişilerarası - gruplararası süreklilik' (interpersonal-intergroup continuum) önermesiyle, insanların kendilerini kişisel kimliklerine veya grup üyeliklerine göre nasıl tanımladıklarına ilişkin bir açıklama getirmektedir. Önermeye göre, sürekliliğin kişiler arası ucunda, bireyler kendilerini, özgün özellikleri ve diğer

insanlardan farklılıkları temelinde (örn. zeki olmak, başarılı olmak); sürekliliğin gruplararası ucunda ise, grup üyelikleri bakımından (örn. Türk olmak, Fenerbahçeli olmak) tanımlamaktadır. Eğer kişi, kendisini ait olduğu grup bakımından tanımlayacaksa, kendi grubu ile diğer grupları karşılaştırmaktadır. Bireyler kendi benliklerini diğerlerinden daha farklı ve olumlu algılamaya güdülendiklerinden, grup üyeliği temelinde tanımladıkları benliklerin olumluluğunu da sürdürmek istemektedirler. Bu da kendi gruplarının ilgili dış gruplardan olumlu yönde ayrıştırılmasıyla edinilmektedir (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tajfel, 1978). Böylece, ait olunan gruplar aracılığıyla benliğin olumluluğu sürdürülmektedir (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Yapılan karşılaştırma sonucunda olumsuz benlik algısına ulaşılması durumunda ise grup üyeleri benliklerini tehdit altında hissetmekte; bunun sonucundaysa kolektif hareketlerden (protestodan savaşa kadar) grup üyeliğini terk etmeye kadar çeşitli tepkiler verebilmektedirler (Jetten, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2001; Mummendey, Kessler, & Klink, 1999).

Turner, 1980'lerin başında, benliğin sosyal kategorizasyonunu olası kılan bilişsel mekanizmaları açıklayabilmek için, SKK'nin benlikle ilgili öne sürdüğü varsayımları derinleştirmiştir. Benlik Kategorizasyonu Kuramı'na (BKK, Turner ve ark., 1987) göre bilişsel gruplama, uyaranları anlamlı nesneler veya olaylar haline getirmek için, farklılıkları benzerliklere veya benzerlikleri farklılıklara dönüştüren insan algı sisteminin kaçınılmaz bir sonucudur. Bilişsel gruplama, benlik algısının da temelini oluşturmaktadır. Yani, insan zihninin işleyiş ilkelerinin sonucu olarak, benlik de dahil olmak üzere bütün uyaranlar ve nesneler, benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları temelinde kategorize edilmektedir (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner 1994). Turner ve Haslam (2001), benliğin birçok farklı soyutlama düzeyinde kategorize edilebileceğini ileri sürmektedirler. BKK, üç soyutlama düzeyi belirtmektedir: kişiler arası (örn. zeki olmak, güzel olmak), gruplararası (örn. Türk olmak, Müslüman olmak) ve türler arası (örn. insan olmak) (Oakes ve ark. 1994). Bu soyutlama dizgisine göre, sosyal kimlikler, kişisel kimliklerden daha kapsayıcı, yani daha soyut bir kategorizasyon sürecini gerektirmektedir.

BKK'ye göre, benliğin sosyal kategorizasyonu, 'göreceli erişebilirlik düzeyi' (relative accesibility) ile 'kategori-uyaran gerçekliği uygunluğu' (fit between category

and stimulus reality) arasındaki etkileşime bağlıdır. Göreceli erişebilirlik düzeyi, uyaran, nesne ve olayları belirli bir biçimde kategorize etmemize neden olan geçmiş deneyimler, şimdiki beklentiler, güdüler, değerler, amaçlar ve gereksinimlerle belirlenmektedir. Kategori-uyaran gerçekliği uygunluğu ise, yaptığımız kategorizasyonun, uyaranın gerçekliğine ne kadar denk düştüğü ile ilgilidir. Bir kategorinin gerçekliğe denk düşmesi, karşılaştırmacı denklik (comparative fit) ve normatif denklik (normative fit) olmak üzere iki biçimde belirlenmektedir. Karşılaştırmacı denklik, bir kategori içerisinde algılanan benzerliklerin, o kategoriyle diğer kategoriler arasındaki algılanan benzerlikten büyük olması gerektiğini; bir kategori içerisinde algılanan farklılıkların ise o kategori ile diğer kategoriler arasındaki algılanan farklardan daha küçük olması gerektiğini ileri süren üst-karşıtlık ilkesi (meta-contrast principle) ile açıklanmaktadır. Normatif denklik ise kategorilerin içeriği ile ilgilidir. Yani, benzerlikler ve farklılıklar, kategorinin anlamı hakkındaki normatif inançlarımıza uygun olmalıdır (Turner ve ark., 1987).

Üst-karşıtlık ilkesinin üzerinde durulması gereken sonuçlarından belki de en önemlisi, benlik tanımlamasının bağlamla birlikte değişebilirliğidir. Çünkü bir kategorinin prototipi, karşılaştırma bağlamı değiştiğinde değişmektedir (Turner & Oakes, 1997). Kategori prototipi, iç grubu dış gruptan en iyi şekilde ayıran konum olarak tarif edilebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, prototip, bir kategori ile diğer kategoriler arasındaki algılanan farklılıkları en çoğaltan konum/pozisyondur (Oakes ve ark, 1994). Bu durumda, kendisi de kategorize edilen benliğin değişken bir yapı olması gerekmektedir. Buradaki önemli nokta, karşılaştırma bağlamında kimlerin bulunduğudur. Örneğin, kendimizi Araplarla karşılaştırdığımızda Türk olmak, kendimizi Avrupalılarla karşılaştırdığımız zamanki Türk olmaktan farklı bir şeydir. Dolayısıyla karşılaştırma ortamındaki gruplar değiştikçe, grubun prototipi de değişeceğinden, sosyal kimlikler ortama ve bağlama göre değişmekte, daha doğru bir ifadeyle ortamı ve bağlamı yansıtmaktadır. Bir kişinin kendi grubuyla diğer grubu karşılaştırmasından elde ettiği sonuç, bilişsel işlemler aracılığı ile ulaşılan sosyal dünyanın gerçekliğidir.

Yukarıdaki önermelerden de anlaşıldığı gibi, BKK, benliğin grup üyeliği temelinde tanımlanmasını, esas olarak, mevcut sosyal gerçeklik yapısını yansıtan bilişsel bir süreç olarak açıklamaktadır (Riecher & Hopkins, 2001). Verili bir ortamda, insanlar kendi gruplarını, olumlu benlik görüşüne ulaşabilmek için diğer gruplarla

karşılaştırmakta ve bu karşılaştırmanın sonucunda oluşan zihinsel temsil, sosyal bağlamı, yani gerçekliği yansıtmaktadır (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Tajfel, 1978). Çoğunlukla, gerek alan araştırmalarında gerekse deneysel çalışmalarda, bu varsayımdan yola çıkılarak, katılımcılar, kendi gruplarıyla başka grupları karşılaştırmak durumunda bırakılmakta ve gruplararası ilişkilere yönelik çeşitli tepkileri (içgrup yanlılığı, ayrımcılık, dış grubun küçümsenmesi gibi) ölçülmektedir (örn. bkz. Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000).

Geçtiğimiz yıllarda sosyal kimliklerin verili bağlamın otomatik yansımalarıymış gibi ele alınmasına itirazlar gelmeye başlamıştır. Buna göre, sosyal kimliklerin bu şekilde ele alınışı, aynı gruba üye olan bütün bireylerin, belirli bir bağlamın yapısıyla ilgili zorunlu olarak ortak anlayış geliştirmeleri gerekirmiş gibi yanlış anlamalara neden olmaktadır (Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarthy & Reynolds, 1998). Oysa sosyal kimliklerin bağlam tarafından belirlenir olma özelliği, aynı sosyal grup üyeliğini paylaşan kişilerin, bağlamın yapısı ve ait oldukları grubun normları/değerleri hakkında hemfikir olmalarını gerektirmez. Aslında aynı sosyal kimliği paylaşan bireyler, grupiçi ve gruplararası meselelerle ilgili ortak bir anlayışa veya fikir birliğine varabilmek için aktif bir tartışma süreci içine girmektedirler. Diğer bir deyişle ortak bir içgrup/dışgrup tanımına, içgrubun normları ve değerleriyle ilgili ortak yargılara ulaşılması, bütün grup üyeleri için istendik ve beklenen bir durumdur. Bu sebeple, aynı sosyal kimliği paylaşan kişiler, grup içindeki farklılıklara değil, benzerliklere vurgu yapmaktadırlar. Ne var ki grupla ilgili ortak yargılar geliştirilmesi, paylaşılan sosyal kategorinin doğal ve kendiliğinden oluşan sonucu değildir. Bu istendik ve beklendik durumu sağlayabilmek için grup üyelerinin aktif bir etkileşime ve tartışma sürecinin içine girmeleri gerekmektedir. İşte bu süreç hemfikir oluş süreci (consensualization process) olarak adlandırılmaktadır (Haslam ve ark., 1998).

Reicher ve Hopkins'e göre (2001), grup üyeleri verili bağlamın yapısı ve sosyal kimliklerin anlamı hakkında her ne kadar hemfikir olmayı isteseler de hemfikir oluş süreci, her zaman grup üyelerinin aynı fikri benimsemeleriyle sonuçlanmayabilir. Tersine, bazı durumlarda mevcut bağlamın yapısı hakkında, birbirinden farklı hatta çatışmalı görüşler olabilir. Aynı grubun üyeleri bazen ait oldukları grubun normları ve değerleri hakkında anlaşmazlığa düşebilir; bu anlaşmazlık bölünmeleri de beraberinde getirebilir (Sani & Reicher, 2000). Aslında, özellikle geniş ölçekli sosyal kategoriler

düşünüldüğünde (örn. uluslar), aynı karşılaştırma bağlamı içerisinde bile, aynı insan grubunu tanımlayacak farklı kimlik önerileri olması kaçınılmazdır.

Yine Reicher ve Hopkins'e (2001) göre, gruba ilişkin kalıpyargılarla mevcut gerçeklik arasındaki ilişkinin bu kadar katı bir biçimde konulması, sosyal değişimi anlamayı güçleştirmektedir. Oysa aynı sosyal bağlamın veya ortamın, grup içerisinde farklı biçimlerde okunması veya yorumlanması, grubun geleceğine yönelik farklı kolektif tasarımları yansıtıyor olabilir (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005). Bu görüşe göre, sosyal gerçeklik önceden (apriori) belirlenmiş ve bunun sonucunda da sosyal kategorizasyon yapılıyor değildir. Sosyal kategorilerin belirli bir biçimde tanımlanması, sadece o kategorinin ne olduğunu değil, aynı zamanda o kategorinin ne olması ve başka kategorilerle ilişkisinin nasıl olması gerektiğini de yansıtmaktadır. Bir kategoriyi belirli bir biçimde tanımlama, aynı zamanda o kategoriyi istendik biçimde yeniden yaratma çabalarını da kapsamaktadır. Yani bir sosyal kategorinin tanımı, o kategorinin ne olduğunun basitçe algılanması ve yansıtılması değildir. Sosyal gruplar ve onların aralarındaki ilişkiler, önceden verili değil, tersine, üyeleri tarafından sürekli olarak yeniden-yapılandırılmakta/inşa edilmektedirler.

Sosyal yapıda belirli bir değişiklik yaratmak isteyen insanlar, kendi kolektif tasarılarını hayata geçirebilecek şekilde, o sosyal bağlamı ve kategorileri yeniden tanımlamaktadırlar. Sosyal kategorilerin her tanımı belirli bir amaç gütmektedir. Böylece kategorinin sınırları (gruba kimler dahil, kimler değil) ve kategorinin içeriği (kategoriye ilişkin kalıpyargılar, normlar, değerler), belirli bir gelecek tasarımını hayata geçirecek şekilde, stratejik olarak kurgulanmakta ve sunulmaktadır. Çünkü belirli bir amaca hizmet eden bu tanımlar, grup üyelerinin geri kalanlarını harekete geçirmeye ve istenilen geleceği inşa etmeye yaramaktadır (Turner, 2005).

Özetleyecek olursak, aynı gup içinde, grubun geleceğine ilişkin farklı tasarıları olan kesimler, sosyal ilişkilerde yapısal değişiklikler meydana getirebilmek için grup üyelerinin desteğine ve onların harekete geçirilmesine gereksinim duymakta, bu sebeple de kendi gruplarının sınırlarını, normlarını, değerlerini, çıkarlarını ve gruba yönelik tehditleri amaçlarına uygun olarak yeniden kurgulamakta veya inşa etmektedirler.

Kıbrıs Örneği

İki ev sahibi topluluk, yani Rumlarla Türkler arasında, uzun yıllardır çatışmalı ilişkilere sahne olan Kıbrıs, grup içi süreçlere odaklanarak, gruplararası ilişkilerin anlaşılması için elverişli bir zemin oluşturmaktadır.

Doğu Akdeniz'deki üçüncü büyük ada olan ve Avrupa, Asya ve Afrika'nın kesişme yolu üzerinde stratejik bir konumda bulunan Kıbrıs, tarih boyunca çok sayıda imparatorluk tarafından ele geçirilmiştir. Ada, 1571'de Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun eline geçmiş ve Türkler Anadolu'dan gelerek buraya yerleşmişlerdir. 1878'de Kıbrıs, İngiliz yönetimine geçmiş ve 1960 yılında Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurulana dek İngiliz kontrolünde kalmıştır (An, 1996). Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasından kısa bir süre sonra Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Yunanistan'la birleşmek istemiş; bu da Kıbrıslı Türkler'in, Ada'nın Yunanistan ile Türkiye arasında bölüşülmesi isteğiyle, yani taksim fikriyle karşılık bulmuştur (Kızılyürek, 2005). Dörtyüz yıldır birarada ve karışık yaşayan Rumlar ve Türkler'in arası bu şekilde bozulmuştur.

1960'ların başında, Kıbrıslı Türklerin, Cumhuriyet hükümetinden çekilmek durumunda kalmasıyla ve etnik kamplarda toplanmasıyla sonuçlanan ve 11 yıl sürecek olan şiddet olayları başgöstermiştir. 1974'te, Yunanistan, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Başkanı Makarios'u devirmek ve Kıbrıs'ı tamamiyle Yunanistan'a bağlamak niyetiyle bir darbe girişiminde bulunmuştur (İsmail, 2000). Bu gelişme karşısında, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin 1960 Kuruluş Anayası'nda belirtildiği üzere, İngiltere ve Yunanistan'la birlikte üçüncü garantör gücü olan Türkiye, duruma müdahale etmek için Ada'ya iki kere askeri harekat düzenlemiştir. Türkiye'nin bu askeri harekatı, Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından 'işgal', Kıbrıslı Türkler tarafından ise 'barış operasyonu' olarak adlandırılmıştır. Bu askeri harekatlar sonucunda, Türkleri Ada'nın kuzeyine, Rumları da güneyine toplayacak olan 'yeşil hat' yani sınır çizilmiş; çok sayıda Türk köylerini, evlerini ve işlerini bırakarak güneyde bırakmak zorunda kalmıştır. Benzer şekilde Rumlar da kuzeyden güneye göç etmiştir (Anastasiou, 2002).

1983 yılında Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC) ilan edilmiştir. Öte taraftan aslında sadece Ada'nın güneyine hükmeden Rum yönetimindeki Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ise bütün adanın resmi ve meşru devleti olarak kabul görmüş, son olarak da bu devlet bütün ada adına Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmuştur. Türkiye ise Ada'nın yasal temsilcisi

olduğunu iddia eden Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ni tanımamaktadır. Kıbrıslı Rumların isteği ile, KKTC, kuruluşundan bugüne değin ağır bir ekonomik ambargo ve izolasyonla karşı karşıyadır. Bu ambargonun sonucunda Ada'nın kuzeyi gittikçe yoksullaşmış ve gelişimini sürdürememiştir (Somuncuoğlu, 2003).

1974'ten 2004'e kadar iki topluluğun yeniden birleştirilmesi için sayısız uluslararası görüşme ve anlaşma yapılmış, fakat bu çabaların hepsi sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Bu arada Rumlar, bütün ada adına, Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik başvurusu yapmıştır. 2004 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan tarafından geliştirilen, iki topluluğun 'Kıbrıs' çatısı altında birleşmesine yönelik plan referanduma götürülmüştür. Bu süreç Türk topluluğunun büyük bir çoğunluğunun (%65) birleşmeye 'evet', Rum topluluğunun büyük bir çoğunluğunun ise (76%) 'hayır' demesiyle son bulmuştur.

Kıbrıs'ta, 'Yunanlı', 'Türk', 'Kıbrıslı Rum', 'Kıbrıslı Türk' ve hatta 'Avrupalı' şeklinde çok çeşitli kimlik tanımlamaları mevcuttur (Mavratsas, 1999; Witting, 2005). Her bir kimlik tanımı, Kıbrıs sorunu karşısında farklı duruşları yansıtmaktadır. Örneğin, 'Kıbrıslı Rum' tanımı hem milliyetçi hem de Kıbrıslılık öğelerini barındırmakta ve Kıbırs sorununun çözümüne ilişkin daha az işbirliği yanlısı tutumlara işaret etmektedir (Mavratas, 1999). 'Kıbrıslı Rum' kimliği, Yunanca konuşmak, ortodoks Rum kilisesine bağlı olmak, eski Yunan kültürünün mirasçısı olmak ve Kıbrıslı Türklerden üstün olmak gibi özelliklerle tanımlanmaktadır. Buna karşılık 'Kıbrıslı Türk' kimliği, saf Türklüğün veya saf Rumluğun reddi anlamını taşımaktadır (Witting, 2005).

Witting (2005), 'Kıbrıslılık' kimliğinin Yunan-temelli ve Türk-temelli kimliklere alternatif bir kavram olarak gelişmesine rağmen, bu kavramın her iki topluluk için farklı anlamlar taşıdığına dikkat çekmektedir. Kıbrıslı Rumlar için, Kıbrıslılık kavramı, 'Yunan kimliği'ne işaret etmektedir, çünkü Kıbrıs eski Yunan medeniyetinin parçasıdır, dolayısıyla Yunan'dır. Aynı şekilde, Avrupalı olmak da eski Yunan'a işaret etmektedir çünkü Avrupa uygarlığının temeli de eski Yunan medeniyetidir. Dolayısıyla, Avrupalı olmak, Yunanlı olmakla eşdeğer görülmektedir.

Diğer taraftan, kimliğin 'Türk' olarak tanımlanması Yunan milliyetçiliğine ve baskınlığına karşı Türklük kökenine sarılmak anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat Witting'e göre (2005) 'Kıbrıslı Türklük' tanımını benimseyen Kıbrıslı Türkler, kendi 'Kıbrıslılık'larına vurgu yapmaktadırlar. Yani kendilerini Türkiye'den ve Türk ulusal kimliğinden ayırmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Kıbrıslı Türklerin kendilerini bu şekilde

tanımlamaları, 30 yılı aşkın bir süredir dünyadan dışlanmışlıklarına ve tanınmıyor oluşlarına bağlanmaktadır (Akcakoca, 2005).

Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta Siyasi İklim

Annan Planı'nın referanduma götürüldüğü süreçte Ada'nın hem Rum hem de Türk kesiminde birleşme taraftarları ve karşıtları arasında şiddetli tartışmalar yaşanmıştır. Özellikle Türk kesiminde tartışmalar KKTC'nin tanınmıyor oluşu, 'Birleşik Kıbrıs'ta yaşanacak egemenlik sorunları ve Avrupa Birliği'nin doğası üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır.

Birleşme taraftarları, Ada'nın kuzeyinde yaşayan Türk topluluğunu tanımlarken daha çok 'Kıbrıslı'lığa ve 'Kıbrıslı' kimliğine vurgu yapmışlardır (örn. bkz. Talat, 2003). Birleşme taraftarlarına göre *Kıbrıslı* Türkler'e asıl tehdit, bu topluluğun dünyadaki diğer devletler tarafından tanınmıyor veya dışlanıyor olmalarından gelmektedir. Çünkü bu durum, topluluk üyelerinin ekonomik ve sosyal iyi oluşlarını engellemektedir. Dolayısıyla topluluğun çıkarı 'Birleşik Kıbrıs'ta yatmaktadır. Bu söyleme göre Ada'nın birleşmesi topluluğun geleceği açısından hayati öneme sahiptir. Ayrıca, 'Birleşik Kıbrıs' Avrupa Birliği üyesi olacağından ve Avrupa Birliği insan hakları ve demokrasi değerlerine sahip olduğundan, Türk topluluğunun siyasi ve sosyal haklarının Rumlar tarafından gasp edilmesi de mümkün olmayacaktır.

Öte taraftan birleşme karşıtları, Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan topluluğu Kıbrıslı *Türk* olarak tanımlamış, vurguyu Türklük kimliğine yapmışlardır (örn. bkz. Denktaş, 2004). Bu görüşe göre Kuzey Kıbrıs halkına en büyük tehdit Kıbrıs'ın tamamen 'Yunanlaşması'ndan (Helenizasyon) gelmektedir. Çünkü Kıbrıs'ın Yunanlaşması Ada'daki Türk topluluğunun siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel açıdan yok oluşunu da beraberinde getirecektir. Ayrıca, Avrupa Birliği de Rumların Türk topluluğunu yok etme girişimlerine –eğer destek olmazsa - en azından engel olamayacaktır. Dolayısıyla Ada'daki Türk topluluğunun çıkarı, Rum topluluğuyla her bakımdan (ekonomik, sosyal, siyasi) eşitlik sağlanmadıkça ayrı bir devlet olarak kalmakta yatmaktadır. Rum ve Türk topluluklarının eşit statüsü sağlanmadığı müddetçe ayrı bir devlette ısrar etmek hayati bir önem taşımaktadır.

Araştırmanın Amaçları ve Yapılan Çalışmalar

Bu doktora çalışmasıyla, uzun yıllardır Kıbrıslı Türkler'in ve Rumlar'ın çatışmalı ilişkilerine sahne olan Kıbrıs örneğinden yola çıkılarak, gruplararası ilişkilerin

şekillendiği grupiçi süreçler araştırılmak istenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, üç temel amaca ulaşmak hedeflenmiştir.

Birincisi, Reicher ve Hopkins'in (2001), '*kendi ulusal gruplarına mensup diğerlerinin desteğini kazanabilmek için, 'kimlik girişimcileri' olarak adlandırılan bazı kimseler, ulusal kategorilerin sınırlarını ve içeriğini yeniden ve amaçlı olarak tanımlarlar'* şeklinde özetlenebilecek kuramsal görüşleri Kuzey Kıbrıs ortamında araştırılmak istenmiştir. Bu çalışma, özellikle Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki iki siyasi partinin, bağımsız Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni (KKTC) savunan Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP) ile Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesini savunan Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi'nin (CTP), içerikleri ve sınırlarıyla beraber ulusal/etnik kimlikleri nasıl inşa ettiklerini, bir arşiv çalışmasıyla ortaya koymayı amaçlamıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda sözü geçen partilere ait 2000-2006 yılları arasında yayınlanan resmi belgeler (parti programları, basın açıklamaları, televizyon konuşmaları, broşürler vs.) derlenmiş; araştırmacı tarafından Grup Argümanlarının Yapısal Analizi (GAYA, Reicher & Hopkins, 1998) tekniği ile analiz edilmiştir.

İkincisi, bu çalışma, mülakatların analizi yoluyla, siyasetle etkin olarak uğraşmayan Kuzey Kıbrıslıların ulusal/etnik kimliklerini nasıl inşa ettiklerini ortaya koymayı ve siyasetçilerle siyasetçi olmayanların kimlik inşaları arasındaki bağlantıyı incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Belirtilen amaç doğrultusunda, araştırmacı tarafından Annan Planı referandumunda kullandıkları oya dayanarak birleşme ve ayrılma yanlıları şeklinde sınıflandırılan 19 Kıbrıslı Türk ile mülakat yapılmıştır. Mülakatlar yine GAYA tekniği temelinde niteliksel olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Ve son olarak, bu çalışma ulusal/etnik kimliklerle kolektif tehdit ve çıkarlar arasındaki ilişkinin, Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesine yönelik farklı tutumların açıklanmasında oynadığı rolü incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu son amaca yönelik olarak Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta 206 kişinin katıldığı bir anket çalışması yapılmıştır.

I. Çalışma: Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi'ne Ait Resmi Belgelerin Analizi

Araştırmada, Kasım 2006'da, KKTC'de, Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesi sorunuyla ilgili farklı tutuma sahip iki siyasi partinin kitapçıkları, broşürleri, basın açıklamaları vs. derlenmiştir. Bu belgeler 2000-2006 yılı arasını kapsamaktadır. Bu partiler, Annan Planı referandumu sürecinde 'evet' çağrısı yapan Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) ile

'hayır' çağrısı yapan Ulusal Birlik Partisi'dir (UBP). CTP'nin Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan topluluk için öngördüğü gelecek, 'Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti' çatısı altında Rumların ve Türklerin birlikte yaşamasıdır. UBP ise 'Bağımsız Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti' çözümünü benimsemektedir. Resmi belgelerde yer alan 'Kıbrıs sorununun ne olduğu', 'çözümün ne olması gerektiği', 'iç-dış grup tanımlamaları', 'gruba yönelik algılanan tehdit ve çıkarlar' ve 'Avrupa Birliği' kategorilerindeki bütün argümanlar saptanarak, Grup Argümanlarının Yapısal Analizi (GAYA/Structural Analysis of Grup Arguments, Reicher& Sani, 1998) yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. İlk önce, UBP ve CTP'nin öne sürdüğü argümanların hangilerinin ortak, hangilerinin birbirine karşı ve hangilerinin bir diğerinde değinilmediği, yani argümanlar arasındaki yapısal ilişki saptanmıştır. Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili CTP ve UBP arasında hiçbir ortak argüman bulunmazken, her iki partinin de üçer argümanı birbirine karşıdır.

UBP'ye göre Kıbrıs sorunu, Rumların Türkleri eşit ortak kabul etmemelerinden ve hala ENOSİS (Kıbrıs'ı Yunanistan'a bağlama) idealinden vazgeçmemelerinden; CTP'ye göre ise Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta statükonun, yani Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin (KKTC) Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ile birleşmeyerek ayrı bir devlet olarak varlığını sürdürmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Yine UBP'ye göre sorunun sorumlusu Rumlar ve onların ekmeğine yağ süren (M.A Talat gibi) iç siyasetçilerken; CTP'ye göre Türkiye ile bütünleşme politikaları ve bu politikanın uygulayıcılarıdır (Denktaş ve ekibi). Ayrıca UBP'ye göre Annan Planı ENOSİS hedefine hizmet etmektedir ve Avrupa Birliği de Rumları, bir çözümden önce içlerine alarak bu sorumluluğa ortak olmaktadır. CTP'ye göre ise statükonun sürmesi Kıbrıslı Türkleri ekonomik yıkıma sürüklemiş ve dünya nezdinde onlara itibar kaybettirmiştir. Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüyle ilgili olarak, UBP ve CTP arasında iki ortak argüman bulunmaktadır. Her iki partiye göre de çözüm 'Birleşik Kıbrıs' ve 'Avrupa Birliği üyeliği'dir. Çözüm konusunda bu partilerin birbirine karşı hiçbir argümanı bulunmazken, UBP çözüm için bazı şartlar ileri sürmektedir. Hem UBP'ye hem de CTP'ye göre siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal bakımdan eşitliğe dayanan iki toplumlu bir çözüm gerekmektedir. Ancak UBP'ye göre Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin yaşatılması ve dünya tarafından tanınması, birleşmenin ön koşuludur. Tehdit ve çıkarlarla ilgili iki partinin hiçbir ortak argümanı yokken, birer argümanları karşıtlık oluşturmaktadır. UBP'ye göre şimdiye kadar yapılan çözüm önerilerinde Kıbrıs Türk halkı eritilmek istenmekte, yani grup varlığına tehdit, önerilen

çözümlerden gelmekte; CTP'ye göre ise statükonun sürmesi toplumsal varlığı tehdit etmektedir. Kısaca, UBP'ye göre hem Annan Planı, hem de referandumdan sonra Avrupa Birliği ve Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından ileri sürülen şartlar (örn. Türkiye'nin limanlarını Rumlara açması) Kıbrıslı Türklerin egemenliklerini yitirmesi ve Kıbrıs'ta azınlık durumuna düşmeleri sonucunu getirmekte; CTP'ye göre ise birleşmenin sağlanamaması hem ENOSİS'i kışkırtmakta, hem de Kıbrıslı Türkler arasında Türkiye'yle birleşme fikrini yaymaktadır ki ikisi de Kıbrıslı Türklerin kolektif varlığını tehdit eden gelişmelerdir. Oysa kolektif çıkar 'Birleşik Kıbrıs'ta yatmaktadır. Grup tanımlamaları kategorisinde ise hiçbir ortak ve karşı argüman bulunmazken, UBP içgrubu yani Kıbrıslı Türkleri Türk ulusunun ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görmektedir. CTP'ye göre ise Kıbrıslı Türkler bilinçlidir, sözünün eridir, tembel veya asalak değildir. Yine Avrupa Birliği kategorisinde de hiçbir ortak argüman bulunmamaktadır. CTP'ye göre AB üyeliği ekonomik, demokratik ve siyasi entegrasyonun en ileri noktalara; insan hakları, sosyal adalet, hukukun üstünlüğü ve demokrasi temeline taşındığı bir birliktelikken, UBP'ye göre AB yaptığı uygulamalarla, sayılan bu değerlere ters düşmektedir. UBP'ye göre, AB hem Rumları içlerine almakla hem de referandumdan sonra izolasyonların kaldırılması ile ilgili verdikleri sözleri tutmamakla büyük haksızlık yapmaktadır.

Bulgular, parti belgelerinde savunulan argümanların her birinin, partilerin kendi önerdiği siyasi tasarılarıla mantıksal bakımdan olumlu veya en azından tarafsız bir ilişki içinde olduğunu, fakat diğer partinin siyasi tasarısıyla olumsuz ya da en azından tarafsız bir ilişki içinde olduğunu göstermektedir. Bütün bu bulgular, sosyal kategorilerin, yani grupların sınırlarının (kimleri kapsadığının) ve içeriğinin (değerler, normlar, tehditler vs) nasıl tanımlandığının belirli bir amaca yönelik olarak yapılandırıldığı varsayımını destekler niteliktedir. Buradaki bulgular Reicher ve Hopkins'in (2001), sosyal gruplar, sosyal gerçeklikte değişiklikler meydana getirmek için kasıtlı olarak belirli bir biçimde yapılandırılmaktadır şeklindeki görüşlerine uygunluk göstermektedir.

II. Çalışma: Kuzey Kıbrıslı Türklerle Yapılan Mülakatların Analizi

Bu ikinci çalışma ile siyasetçi olmayan Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik inşaları araştırılmış ve bu inşalarla Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesine karşı tutumlar arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Ayrıca siyasi partilerle siyasetle etkin olarak ilgilenmeyenlerin kimlik inşaları arasında yapısal bir uygunluk olup olmadığı da saptanmıştır. Bu amaç

doğrultusunda, Kasım-Aralık 2006 tarihlerinde19 Kuzey Kıbrıslı Türk ile yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakat yapılmış, yine bu mülakatlar GAYA tekniğinden yararlanılarak analiz edilmiştir.

Sonuçlar, ayrı devlet yanlılarının, gruplarının sınırlarını bütün Türkleri kapsayacak, fakat Rumları dışlayacak şekilde oluşturduklarını, bu tür bir kimlik inşasının ise Annan Planı Referandumu'nda kullandıkları 'hayır' oyuna uygun olduğunu göstermektedir. Gene ayrı devlet yanlılarının kendi gruplarını olumlu terimlerle tarif ettikleri (örn. Biliçli, yardımsever); fakat dışgrubu, yani Rumları olumsuz terimlerle betimledikleri (örn. Yalancı); diğer taraftan Türkiye'den 1974 sonrası gelip adaya yerleşenler hakkında herhangi olumlu veya olumsuz nitelemede bulunmadıkları ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayrı devlet yanlıları, Kıbrıs sorununun Rumların Kıbrıs'ı tamamen bir Rum adası yapma isteklerinden kaynaklandığını, Rumların Kıbrıslı Türkleri hala tehdit ettiğini düşünmektedirler. Ayrıca, Avrupa Birliği'ni de, Rum taraftarı oldukları gerekçesiyle güvenilmez bulmaktadırlar. Kıbrıs sorunu ve kimlik tanımlarına uygun biçimde, çözümün de bağımsız Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni (KKTC) yaşatmak olduğunu savunmaktadırlar. Her kategoride yer alan argümanların tümü ayrı devlet yanlılarının hem referandumda kullandıkları oyla hem de birbirleriyle uyum göstermektedir.

Diğer taraftan, birleşme yanlıları (Annan Planı referandumunda 'evet' oyu kullananlar), kendi gruplarını iki biçimde tanımlamaktadırlar. Birincisi, kendilerini 'Kıbrıslı' olarak tanımlayanlar, adada 'Türk' ve 'Rum' şeklinde iki ayrı topluluk olduğunu kabul etmemekte, Türkleri (Türkiyelileri) dışlamaktadırlar. Rumları tanımlarken üç olumlu (örn. sıcak), bir olumsuz sıfat kullanmakta (örn. olgun değil), fakat 74 sonrası Türkiye'den gelenleri nitelerken tamamen olumsuz terimler (örn. hırsız, cahil) kullanmaktadırlar. Kendilerini 'Kıbrıslı' olarak tanımlayan birleşme yanlıları, Kıbrıs sorununun Türkiye'nin yanlışlarından kaynaklandığını öne sürmektedirler. Buna göre 1974 Kıbrıs Askeri Operasyonu sonrasında Türkiye'nin Anadolu'dan Kıbrıs'a insan yollaması (Kıbrıs'taki kültürel ve demografik yapıyı bozdukları gerekçesi ile) ve Türk birliklerinin adada kalmaya devam etmesi (işgal olarak da nitelendiriliyor) en büyük sorunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu sebeple, adada Türk birliklerinin ve Türklerin sayısının azaltılmasını öngören Annan Planını desteklemek, kendini 'Kıbrıslı' olarak tanımlayan birleşme yanlılarının bütün argümanları ile uyum

göstermektedir. Ayrıca, 'Birleşik Kıbrıs' Avrupa Birliği üyesi olacaktır ve bu da insan hakları, demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü, şeffaflık ve ekonomik kalkınma sağlayacaktır. İkincisi, bazı birleşme yanlıları kendilerini 'Kıbrıslı Türk' olarak tanımlamaktadırlar. Kendi gruplarının sınırlarını çizerken hem Rumları hem de Türkiyelileri dışarıda bırakmaktadırlar. Kendi gruplarını genellikle olumlu terimlerle (örn. Misafirperver), Rumları ve Türkiyelileri olumsuz terimlerle (örn. Rumlar için kinci, Türkiyeliler için pis) nitelemektedirler. Kendini Kıbrıslı Türk olarak tanımlayanlar, bazen birbiriyle mantıksal olarak karşıtlık içeren argümanları aynı anda kullanabilmektedirler. Örneğin, hem Kırbıs sorununun Rumların adayı Rumlaştırma hedeflerinden kaynaklandığını, hem de birleşmenin mutlaka sağlanması gerektiğini söyleyebilmektedirler.

Hem siyasi parti belgelerinde hem de mülakatlarda kullanılan argümanların genel yapısına bakıldığında, argümanlar arasında büyük oranda örtüşme/uyuşma olduğu gözlenmektedir. Özellikle UBP'nin ve ayrı devlet yanlılarının argümanları neredeyse birebir örtüşmektedir. Benzer şekilde, CTP ve birleşme yanlılarının argümanları da büyük oranda eşleşmektedir. Siyasi parti belgeleriyle siyasetçi olmayanların argümanları arasında ortaya çıkan örtüşme, bir kitlesel etkiye işaret eder gibi görünmektedir.

III. Çalışma: Sosyal Kimlikler, Algılanan Kolektif Tehdit/Çıkarlar ve Birleşik Kıbrıs'ın Desteklenmesi

Bu üçüncü ve son çalışma ile, sosyal kimlikler ile algılanan kolektif tehdit/çıkarlar arasındaki ilişkinin Birleşik Kıbrıs'ın desteklenmesinde oynadığı rol araştırılmıştır. Genel beklenti, birleşmenin, sosyal kimlikler için bir fırsat olarak algılandığı durumlarda grup üyeleri tarafından destekleneceği, kimliği tehdit eder şekilde algılandığı durumlarda ise reddedileceği yönündedir. Aynı şekilde, ayrı bir devlet de sosyal kimlikler için fırsat olarak algılandıkları takdirde grup üyeleri tarafından desteklenecek, kimliği tehdit eder şekilde algılandıkları zamansa reddedilecektir. Fakat belirli şekillerde tanımlanan sosyal kimlikler kolektif tehdit ve fırsatların nasıl algılanacağını etkileyecektir. Daha açık ifade etmek gerekirse, eğer grup üyeleri, birleşecekleri diğer grubu (Kıbrıs örneğinde Kıbrıslı Rumları) kendilerini tehdit ediyor şekilde algılarlarsa ve eğer ayrı bir devlet olarak kalmayı (KKTC) kendi kimlikleri açısından bir fırsat olarak

görürlerse ayrı devleti tercih edeceklerdir. Diğer taraftan eğer grup üyeleri birleşmeyi kendi kimlikleri açısından bir fırsat olarak görürlerse ve eğer eğer ayrı bir devlet olarak kalmayı (KKTC) tehdit olarak algılarlarsa birleşmeyi (Birleşik Kıbrıs'ı) tercih edeceklerdir. Fakat kimliklerin belirli biçimlerde tanımlanması (Türk, Kıbrıslı Türk ve Kıbrıslı) bu durumların hangisinin fırsat, hangisinin tehdit olarak algılanacağını etkileyecektir.

Bu varsayımları test etmek amacı ile 206 Kıbrıslı Türk ile bir anket çalışması yapılmıştır. Ankette araştırmacı tarafından geliştirilen Sosyal Kimliklerle Özdeşleşme, Kolektif Tehdit Algıları, Kolektif Çıkar Algıları ölçekleri ile demografik bilgileri içeren soruların yanı sıra, Kıbrıs sorununa çözümü kapsayan (Birleşik Kıbrıs veya bağımsız KKTC) iki soru yer almıştır. Ölçekler, SPSS paket programı kullanılarak faktör analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Sosyal Kimliklerle Özdeşleşme Ölçeğinde yer alan maddeler, Türklük, Kıbrıslı Türklük ve Kıbrıslılık olmak üzere üç faktöre yüklenmiştir (sırasıyla Alpha değerleri .89, .67 ve .92). Kolektif Tehdit Algıları Ölçeğinde yer alan maddeler 'Rumlardan Algılanan Tehdit' ve 'Türklerden Algılanan Tehdit' olmak üzere iki faktöre yüklenmiştir (sırasıyla Alpha değerleri .94 ve .64). Kolektif Çıkar Algıları Ölçeğinde yer alan maddeler 'KKTC'den algılanan çıkarlar' ve 'Birleşmeden algılanan çıkarlar' olmak üzere iki faktöre yüklenmiştir (sırasıyla Alpha değerleri .94 ve .94). Veriler, Yapısal Eşitlik Modeli ile AMOS 5 programı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Belirli kimlik tanımlarının birleşmeye karşı tutumları algılanan tehditler ve çıkarlar aracılığı ile etkilediği şeklindeki yapısal eşitlik modeli, desteklenmiştir. Kendilerini Türk olarak tanımlayanlar Rumlar'ı Kıbrıslı Türklere tehdit olarak algılamış, bağımsız devleti Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarı olarak görmüş ve sonuçta da KKTC çözümünü desteklemişlerdir. Benzer şekilde, kendini Kıbrıslı olarak tanımlayanlar, Türkiye ve Türkleri Kıbrıslı Türklere yönelik tehdit olarak algılamış ve birleşik Kıbrıs'ı tercih etmişlerdir. Veriler, Birleşik Kıbrıs'tan algılanan çıkarların Kıbrıslılık kimliği ile Birleşik Kıbrıs çözümüne aracılık edeceği yönündeki beklentiyi doğrulamamıştır. Yine de Kıbrıslılık kimliği birleşik Kıbrıs'ın Kıbrıslı Türklerin çıkarına olduğunu şeklindeki algıyı etkilemektedir (örn. Ekonomik gelişme). Öte taraftan kendilerini Kıbrıslı Türk olarak tanımlayanlar sadece birleşik Kıbrıs'ı reddetme eğilimi göstermiş, kolektif

çıkar ve tehdit algıları Kıbrıslı Türklerin çözüm tercihlerine aracılık etmemiştir. Buna rağmen, çalışmanın sonuçları, ulusal/etnik kimliklerinin belirli biçimlerde tanımlanmasının kolektif çıkar ve tehdit algılarını etkilediğini ve bunun da kendi gruplarının daha geniş bir grubun parçası haline gelmesini desteklemelerini belirleyeceği şeklindeki modeli büyük oranda desteklemiştir.

Çalışmanın Başlıca Katkıları ve Sınırlılıklar

Bu doktora çalışmasında yer alan araştırmalar, Sosyal Kimlik / Benlik Kategrorizasyonu kuramlarına iki türlü katkı yapmıştır. Birincisi, Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki iki siyasi partinin resmi elgelerinin analiz edildiği ilk araştırmanın bulguları, Reicher ve Hopkins'in (2001), sosyal kimlik süreçlerine yeni sayılabilecek yaklaşımlarına destek sağlamıştır. Reicher ve Hopkins'e (2001) göre, sosyal bağlam önceden verili değildir ve 'kimlik girişimcileri' olarak adlandırılan grup üyeleri tarafından, grubun sınırları ve içeriklerinin stratejik inşası yoluyla etkin biçimde değiştirilmeye çalışılır. UBP ve CTP belgerinin analizi, bu iki partinin aynı grubu (Kıbrıs'ın kuzeyinde yaşayan topluluğu) ve bu grubun diğer gruplarla ilişkilerini (Rumlarla ve Avrupa ile) kendi kolektif tasarılarına (bağımsız KKTC veya Birleşik Kıbrıs) hizmet edecek şekilde stratejik biçimde inşa ettiklerini göstermiştir. Ayrıca, neden bazı insanların kendi gruplarının daha geniş bir grubun parçası (üstdüzey yapı içerisinde) olmasını destekledikleri ve bazılarının desteklemedikleri sorusu gündeme getirilerek cevaplanmaya çalışılmıştır. Birleşik yapıların desteklenmesine ilişkin farklı tutumların oluşmasında algılanan fırsat ve tehditlerin oynadığı rol üçüncü araştırma ile ortaya konmuştur. Sosyal kimlik inşasında, grup üyelerini belirli kolektif tasarıları desteklemeye itecek kavramlar olarak kolektif tehdit ve çıkarlara dikkat çekilmiştir. İkincisi, stratejik kimlik inşasının, istendik geleceği gerçekleştirebilmek için grup üyelerini aktive etmek üzere yapıldığı şeklindeki kuramsal yaklaşıma (Reicher ve ark., 2005; Turner, 2005) destek sağlanmıştır. Bu doktora çalışmasında yer alan ikinci araştırma, desteklerine ihtiyaç duyulan siyasetçi olmayan grup üyelerinin kimlik inşalarına odaklanmış, dolayısıyla kuramda yer alan fakat pek araştırılmayan kesime, yani desteğine ihtiyaç duyulan sıradan grup üyelerine eğilmiştir. Kıbrıs örneğinde, UBP ve CTP

tarafından stratejik olarak inşa edilen sorunların, çözümlerin, tehditlerin ve çıkarların, siyasetçi olmayanların inşalarıyla ne oranda örtüştüğü araştırılmıştır. Sonuçlar, örtüşmenin büyük oranda olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu durum da bir kitlesel etki örneği ile karşı karşıya kaldığımızı düşündürmektedir. Eğer öyle ise, bu etkinin süreçleri ve mekanizmalarının uygun araçlarla araştırılması gereksinimi doğmaktadır. Bu doktora çalışması, Sosyal Kimlik /Benlik Kategorizasyonu kuramlarına yaptığı katkıların yanı sıra, Türkiye'deki sosyal psikoloji çalışmalarına da yöntem bakımından katkıda bulunmaktadır. Hem niteliksel, hem de niceliksel analizlerin bir karması olan Grup Argümanlarının Yapısal Analizi (GAYA, Reicher & Sani, 1998) tekniği Türkiye'deki sosyal bilim araştırmacılarına tanıtılmıştır. Çalışma ayrıca, siyasetçiler için, özellikle de Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgilenenler için pratik değer de taşımaktadır, çünkü Kıbrıs'ın birleşmesine karşı oluşan tutumlarda algılanan tehdit ve çıkarların oynadığı rol aydınlatılmıştır. Çalışmanın yaptığı katkıların yanında bazı sınırlılıkları da mevcuttur. Birincisi, ilk iki çalışma nitelikseldir ve genelleme yapmaya izin vememektedir. Stratejik kimlik inşasının deneysel yöntemlerle de çalışılması gerekmektedir. İkincisi Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı içersinde kitlesel etki kavramının çalışılması için daha uygun yöntemlerin gerektiği ortaya çıkmıştır. Üçüncüsü, özellikle son çalışmanın korelasyonel olduğu düşünüldüğünde, ortaya çıkan sonuçların, dikkatli yorumlanması gerektiğidir. Sosyal kimlikler, algılanan tehdit ve çıkarlar ile kolektif tasarımlar arasındaki ilişkiler boylamsal yöntemlerle çalışılmalıdır.

VITA

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