

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM
IN AZERBAIJAN (1900-2018)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2022

Approval of the thesis:

**THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM
IN AZERBAIJAN (1900-2018)**

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ABSTRACT

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September 2022, 295 pages

The de- and re-construction of national identity have been accelerated in Azerbaijan since the fall of the Soviet Union thanks to which Azerbaijan emerged as an independent nation-state. Azerbaijanism has been promulgated to be the main backbone of state official ideology since independence, except for a short time of Turkism. Though a quarter of a century has passed since the elites started formulating the national identity, it is still incomplete and there from time to time emerges questions about the proper designation for the ethnically Turkic people. This problem stems from the troubled past of Azerbaijan. The name and the language of Azerbaijani people were changed five times in a century. There has been a century-long war between the ethnic and civic markers of the national identity. So, this study aims to discuss the historical evolution of national identity and nationalism in Azerbaijan. It attempts to answer how national identity has been defined and nationalism has been discussed under different political regimes and governments up to recent times, with a special reference to language policy and national minority questions. This thesis reveals that in spite of the consolidation of Azerbaijani identity

in the society, there is still a misunderstanding related to its “double” meaning: First, it has “civic” meaning functioning as supra-ethnic identity; second, it has “ethnic” meaning, used to designate ethnically dominant Turkic people. This study attempts to clarify this problem through the lens of ethnicity and nationalism theories. It reveals that though all ethnic groups have been integrated under inclusive civic national identity, they will not likely decline their ethnic affiliation. So, it suggests that Azerbaijani identity successfully functions as citizenship identity, but fails in doing so as ethnic identity. More specifically, Azerbaijani identity is a supplement, not a substitution to original identities; they do not contradict, rather complement each other.

Keywords: national identity, civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, Turkism, Azerbaijanism.

ÖZ

AZERBAYCAN’DA MİLLİ KİMLİK VE MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİN GELİŞİMİ (1900-2018)

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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ayça ERGUN ÖZBOLAT

Eylül 2022, 295 sayfa

Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşünden sonra bağımsız bir ulus devlet olarak ortaya çıkan Azerbaycan’da ulusal kimliğin yeniden yapılandırılması ve yeniden inşası hızlanmıştır. Azerbaycancılık, bağımsızlıktan bu yana, kısa bir Türkçülük dönemi dışında, devlet resmi ideolojisinin ana omurgası ilan edilmiştir. Seçkinlerin ulusal kimliği formüle etmeye başlamasının üzerinden çeyrek asır geçmiş olmasına rağmen, kimlik inşası hala tamamlanmamıştır ve zaman zaman etnik olarak baskın Türk milletinin daha doğru tanımlanmasıyla bağlı sorular ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu sorun Azerbaycan’ın sıkıntılı geçmişinden kaynaklanıyor. Azerbaycan halkının adı ve dili bir yüzyılda beş kez değiştirildi. Ulusal kimliğin etnik ve sivil göstergeleri arasında bir asırdır süregelen çatışma var. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışma Azerbaycan’da milli kimliğin ve milliyetçiliğin tarihsel gelişimini tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dil politikasına ve ulusal azınlık sorununa özel atıfta bulunarak, bu tez son zamanlara kadar farklı siyasi rejimler ve hükümetler altında ulusal kimliğin nasıl tanımlandığını ve milliyetçiliğin nasıl tartışıldığını yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu tez, Azerbaycan kimliğinin toplumda pekişmesine rağmen, onun “çifte” anlamından dolayı hala

yanlıř anlařılmalar olduđunu ortaya koymaktadır: Birincisi, daha geniř anlamıyla etnik-üstü kimlik iřlevi görmektedir; ikincisi, etnik çođunluđu oluřturan Türk milletini belirtmek için kullanılan “etnik” anlamına sahiptir. Bu alıřma, bu sorunu etnisite ve milliyetilik teorileri merceđinden geirerek netleřtirmeye alıřmaktadır. Tüm etnik grupların kapsayıcı sivil ulusal kimlik altında bütünleřmiř olsalar da, etnik bađlarını muhtemelen azaltmayacaklarını ortaya koyuyor. Dolayısıyla, bu alıřma Azerbaycanlı kimliđinin bařarılı bir řekilde vatandaşlık kimliđi iřlevi gördüğünü, ancak bunu etnik kimlik olarak yapmada bařarısız olduđunu öne sürüyor. Daha spesifik olarak, Azerbaycanlı kimliđi orijinal kimliklerin ikamesi deđil, tamamlayıcıdır; eliřmezler, aksine birbirlerini tamamlarlar.

Anahtar kelimeler: milli kimlik, sivil milliyetilik, etnik milliyetilik, Türkülük, Azerbaycancılık.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Dr. Ayça ERGUN ÖZBOLAT. I am very grateful to her confidence, support, and patience that encouraged me to complete this dissertation.

I am also very grateful to my thesis committee members, Prof. Dr. Pınar KÖKSAL and Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlker AYTÜRK for their insightful and constructive contributions that were valuable in developing my ideas. I also thank members of jury, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa ŞEN and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Anar VALİYEV for their insightful comments.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude, the support of my friend Saeideh NAZİRZADEH, who kindly lent me a helping hand when I was in dire need. Also, I am thankful to my family members for their motivation and love. They all kept me going, and this dissertation would not have been possible without them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xi
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONALISM	6
2.1. Primordialism <i>versus</i> Instrumentalism	8
2.2. Modernism <i>versus</i> Perennialism	17
2.3. Ethnosymbolism	30
2.4. Clarifying Terminological Conundrum	34
2.5. Multiculturalism	46
3. NATIONAL AWAKENING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURY IN AZERBAIJAN.....	51
3.1. National Movement under Tsarist Russia (1902-1918).....	51
3.2. National Politics of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920)	60
4. FORMING AZERBAIJANI NATION UNDER SOVIET RULE (1920-1991).....	71
4.1. Soviet Nationality Policy	71
4.2. Nation-Building Process in Soviet Azerbaijan	82
4.2.1. 1920-1930s.....	82
4.2.2. 1940-1960s.....	98
4.2.3. 1970-1990s.....	104
5. FORMATION OF THE NATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE: ABULFAZ ELCHIBEY PERIOD (1992-1993)	116
5.1. Nationalist Outlook of Abulfaz Elchibey	121
5.2. Turkey's Influence on Azerbaijani Nationalism	130
5.4. Issue of Ethnic Minorities.....	138

6. RECONSTRUCTING AZERBAIJANI NATION:	
HEYDAR ALIYEV ERA (1993-2003)	148
6.1. Language Policy.....	150
6.1.1. Debates of Defining State Language.....	151
6.1.2. Promotion of Azerbaijani Language	166
6.2. Doctrine of Azerbaijanism.....	171
6.3. National Minority Politics	188
7. NATIONAL POLITICS OF ILHAM ALIYEV (2003-2018)	193
7.1. Language Policy.....	194
7.2. Status of Russian Language.....	199
7.3. Influence of Turkish Language.....	206
7.4. Policy of Multiculturalism and Tolerance	207
7.4.1. Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism.....	208
7.4.2. Tolerance and Inter-Faith Harmony in Azerbaijan	225
8. CONCLUSIONS	241
REFERENCES	248
APPENDICES	
A. CURRICULUM VITAE	267
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	268
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU	295

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
APF	Azerbaijan Popular Front
BIMC	Baku International Multiculturalism Centre
CBM	Caucasus Board of Muslims
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ECRML	European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
ESC	Eurasian Song Contest
FCPN	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
NAP	New Azerbaijan Party
NAR	Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
NK	Nagorno Karabakh
NOCA	National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan
NTC	National Tolerance Center
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
SCWRA	State Committee for Work with Religious Associations
SOCAR	State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Azerbaijani people, the majority of whom are of Turkic origin, used to be called with various names in different periods of history. Situated at the intersection of three main civilizations - Iran, Russia, and Turkey, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan have been influenced by their colonial policies, ideologies, and cultural elements. The territory of Azerbaijan was divided into two parts along the river Araxes as a result of the Turkmenchay treaty signed in 1828 between Russia and Iran. Thus, two Azerbaijanians - Northern (Russian) and Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan emerged. From that time on, Azerbaijani people in the north started to live separately from their ethnic brethren in the south who have incurred different acculturation processes. The Turks of Northern Azerbaijan (from now on only as Azerbaijan) were named as Caucasian Tatars or Muslims in the imperial period and Turks until 1937. In Soviet times they and their language were fixed as "Azerbaijani." To form a *Homo Sovieticus*, Soviet officials produced policies aimed at maiming the national characteristics of the Azerbaijanis. New historiography, which attached the origin of Azerbaijanis to the Medes or Caucasian Albanians, was written to deprive them of their Turkic root. Moreover, the purposeful Russification policy gave priority to the Russian language over the Azerbaijani language in all spheres of public life. Also, due to the persistent anti-religious campaigns in order to form an atheist society, the religious ingredient was rooted out of the national composition of the Azerbaijani people.

Towards the end of the Soviet Union, the national awakening of the Azerbaijani people started to speed up due to the growing hostility towards Russians and Armenians as their main "others". Azerbaijani nationalism aggravated as a response to the colonial policies of the communist regime and territorial claims of Armenians. It expressed itself in the deep emotional attachment of Azerbaijanis to the

motherland - a territory of Azerbaijan. With its incontestable significance, Nagorno Karabakh, for Azerbaijanis, is an inseparable part of the homeland, thus a focus point of rising national sentiment. So, the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh has been perceived as a disastrous threat to Azerbaijani national identity, thanks to which the nation-building is still incomplete.

After the emergence of the independent Azerbaijan Republic, the search for national identity led to the public debate between two mainstream ideologies - Azerbaijanism and Turkism. During the reign of the nationalist Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) government, the majority of Azerbaijani people were defined as Turks and their language as Turkish. Azerbaijani identity was designed to function as citizenship identity to encompass all ethnic groups in the country. However, under the Heydar Aliyev government, the rapid “Azerbaijanization” has taken place in almost all spheres of public life. He redefined the national identity and official language as Azerbaijani to prevent the fragmentation of the multiethnic society of the newly independent nation-state.

After all, though the Azerbaijani identity has widely been accepted by the people, there is still a misunderstanding concerning its nature. So, this work is undertaken with the need of understanding the cause of the problem by researching its historical roots. In this dissertation, I will explore the evolving process of the formation of the national identity and nationalism in Azerbaijan. In particular, I will shed light on the question of how the national identity been defined under different political regimes with special reference to language policy and national minority question. This study was undertaken with the felt need of clarifying the meaning of Azerbaijani identity. The nation, as represented in contemporary Azerbaijani politics, by downgrading the “shared blood” aspect of Azerbaijani identity, provides a very inclusive, civic framework for belonging. In other words, the government presents the country as a welcoming place for all people, without any emphasis on the ethnic aspects of nationality. The research questions are: what is the nature of national identity in Azerbaijan? How has national identity been evolved over a century? What kind of nationalism- civic or ethnic- was pursued? What kind of policies were developed to meet the national minority question? Whether ethnocultural diversity

contributed to the formation of Azerbaijani identity; and if so, to what extent and in which way?

Only a few studies to date have examined the issue of national identity in Azerbaijan. The argument presented in this dissertation has not been systematically treated in the literature on nationalism studies in Azerbaijan. Some history scholars such as Audrey L. Altstadt (1992) discussed the politics, culture, and identity of Azerbaijan in Soviet times; Tadeusz Swietochowski (1995) wrote about the history of Azerbaijan under imperial Russia discussing national identity problem at the beginning of the twentieth century; Brenda Shaffer (2002) examined trends in Azerbaijani collective identity from the period of the Islamic Revolution in Iran through the Soviet breakup and the beginnings of the Republic of Azerbaijan. She analyzed how Azerbaijanis have maintained their identity and how that identity has assumed different forms in the former Soviet Union and Iran. Also, the issue of nationalism and national identity in Azerbaijan since independence has been discussed by some scholars such as Svante Cornell (2011, 2016) Ceylan Tokluoglu (2005), Ayça Ergun (2010), Ceyhun Mahmudlu (2014), and Murad İsmayilov (2012).

However, no previous research has investigated thoroughly the evolution of national identity in Azerbaijan over a century combining it with theoretical discussions. The novelty of this study is that theories of nationalism and ethnicity are re-examined and applied to the context of the national identity problem in Azerbaijan. It tries to shed light on the issue of the nation-making process by analyzing it via conceptual tools. Besides, the originality of this dissertation is that it discusses national identity problem in Azerbaijan by referring mainly to the question of national language and national minority. It takes into attention how different governments symbolized national language as an essential element of the national identity and how they utilized national minority question in the formulation of Azerbaijani identity. In this study, I have sought to investigate how Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) period and Soviet-era national policies affected the nation-building process in the post-independence period. In other words, I attempted to explain that the process of identity construction in independent Azerbaijan has been under the influence of ideas and values borrowed from the pre-independence period. Legacy of the past has well been exemplified in the political discourse about

the essence of the national identity between conflicting views of the ideologists of Azerbaijanism and Turkism. So, in order to perceive fully the re-negotiation process of national identity construction in independent Azerbaijan, in my opinion, it was logical to trace its evolution from the beginning of the twentieth century when the idea of nation started to emerge. Thus, by offering a systematic study, this thesis enables readers to understand fully the essence of the national identity and nationalization problem in Azerbaijan.

This thesis employs a number of data sets to examine the topic. The data includes primary resources such as first-hand books, memoirs, newspaper articles published at the time, as well as information from the national population census, government laws and decrees, news about state policies and public discourses, largely available from official websites, which allowed me to detect change over time. Also, secondary books, articles, reports concerning to the national identity, national language, and minority question of Azerbaijan were collected. All these data were carefully read and analyzed.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. After introduction chapter, Chapter 2 offers a detailed analysis of the concept of nation and nationalism in trying to find an answer what nation and nationalism is and when it was originated. It tries to clarify the terminological complexity, that is, to differentiate the concept of nation from state, people, ethnic group, to understand ethnic/civic dichotomy, to distinguish nationalism from patriotism, and the like. Chapter 3 focuses on the emergence of the idea of nation and the rise of the national movement against Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the XX century Azerbaijan. It discusses the role of national intellectuals in strengthening national consciousness and their struggle for national independence, which culminated in the formation of the first nation-state – Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR). I mainly focus on the ADR government's language and national minority policies in the making of nation. Chapter 4 investigates Soviet nationality policies in order to understand nation-building processes in Soviet Azerbaijan and later to see its legacy during the post-independence period. Chapter 5 examines the nation-making policies under the Elchibey government. In particular, I focus on his views on Turkism, language policy, and his policy concerning ethnic minorities of the country. Chapter 6 concentrates on the period of Heydar Aliyev, who promoted

“Azerbaijanism” as the official ideology with the effort of creating a civic nation-state. Here, I analyse his language policy and national minority politics. Chapter 7 examines national policy of Ilham Aliyev, who remained loyal to Heydar Aliyev’s nation-building policies. Besides, this chapter analyzes Ilham Aliyev’s multiculturalism policy and his promotion of the country as “a land of tolerance”. In conclusion chapter, I offer a brief theoretical analysis of nation-making policies of all four governments - Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Abulfaz Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev, and Ilham Aliyev - on a comparative basis.



CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONALISM

Since the 1970s, there have been increasing scholarly works on the subject of nationality, albeit being articulated through various, sharply contrasting analyses. It means that nations and nationalism still matter *vis-à-vis* ascending trends of globalization and cosmopolitanism. That is to say, on the one hand, we are witnessing the rise of regional organizations such as the European Union; on the other hand, there is at once a boost of sub-state nationalism such as the Scots in Britain, the Catalonians in Spain, the Quebecois in Canada, etc.

In this sense, Craig Calhoun's work *Nations Matter* is enlightening. He argues that there is a strong national basis for an evolving modern society, in contrast to the claims of liberal cosmopolitans whose ethical universalism can find no place for nations and national identities in an ideal world. He can find no evidence that we are entering a "postnational" era. Globalization, which is as old as the modern epoch, and often benefits the dominant groups, may bolster nationalist movements, which in their turn call for equality and a fairer distribution of global wealth. Calhoun cogently warns against the cosmopolitan failure to see how necessary traditional communities and practices are for the disprivileged against the depredations of the elites, especially in the absence of democracy, as occurs in so many non-Western states. In his words: "Nationalism matters because it is a vital part of collective projects that give shape to the modern world, transform the very units of social solidarity, identity, and legal recognition within it, and organise deadly conflicts."¹

Hence, nationalism appears to be a pervasive force with the capacity of shaking the world order and even touching our daily life. It is interesting how opposing ideologies can exist without eliminating the other. Or, how is it possible that parochial identities can turn out to be more appealing than all-embracing citizenship

¹Calhoun, Craig. *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream*. London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 16.

or religious identities? The concerns of Antonsich are not futile in this sense, as he tried to understand the reason why in a night of September 2013 thousands of Catholics from all over the world gathered in St Peter's Square, when Pope John Paul II died, to mourn their pope, weaving their national flags. He writes: "The thousands of people who gathered in St Peter's Square were not there as simply Catholics, but as Colombian-Catholics, Polish-Catholics, Filipino Catholics, etc. Their universal affiliation was articulated, performed, felt, and visually expressed in their national vernaculars."² Indeed, to answer this question clearly and precisely, it requires being knowledgeable about the concept of national identity. Because the definition of the concept of national identity is dependent upon the way we construe the concept of nation, our first task, for this study, is to understand what is and is not a nation.

Proliferation of different approaches to the problem of nationality suggests that nations are kaleidoscopic, that is to say, they are non-static and changeable throughout the time. The writings of Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, Connor Walker, Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm, John Armstrong, John Breuilly, Charles Tilly, Miroslav Hroch, Michael Hechter, Bernard Yack, David Miller and many others are highly valuable contributions to the field of nations and nationalism. In addition to traditional theories of nation and nationalism, new approaches have been developed since the 1990s. In order to have a thorough understanding of the issue of nationality, it is vital to consider all these approaches: primordialism, instrumentalism, perennialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, banal nationalism, personal nationalism, and post-colonial theories. In this study, I will consider grand theories in searching for what and when a nation is.

It should be admitted that it is not an easy task, even may end up in frustration because all these approaches or paradigms, even variations within these paradigms suggest differing, even contrasting views about the historical origins and substantial features of the nation. Each author presents his definition of nation, so, there is a lack of consensus about precise definition of nation. Anthony Smith argues that definitions of the nation range from those that stress "objective" factors, such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely "subjective" factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments. To Smith,

²Antonsich, Marco. "Nations and nationalism." in Agnew, J.A. et al. (eds.) *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography*. Wiley Blackwell, 2015, pp. 297-310.

objections can be made to both, because “objective” definitions exclude some widely accepted cases of nations, sometimes quite intentionally and conversely, “subjective” definitions generally take it too large a catch of cases. The solution generally adopted has been to choose criteria which span the “objective-subjective” spectrum. This strategy has yielded many interesting and useful definitions but no scholarly consensus.³

In this instance, one even may argue that it is a futile effort to try to make an accurate description of nation and to say precisely when it has emerged in history. Hobsbawm’s arguments, in this sense, seem to be reasonable that “there is no way of telling the observer how to distinguish a nation from other entities *a priori*, as we can tell him or her how to recognize a bird or to distinguish a mouse from a lizard. Nation-watching would be simple if it could be like bird-watching.”⁴ Nevertheless, regarding all these paradigms may at least help to see the whole picture as all of them are useful in providing “half-truths” about the issue. They may help us to understand terminological complexities as well, that is, to be able to differentiate “nation” from “ethnicity”, “state”, and “people”.

So, there exist five theoretical approaches or paradigms that stand at the core of the original debate within theories of nationalism: two binary oppositions - 1) Primordialism versus Instrumentalism; and 2) Modernism versus Perennialism; fifth paradigm is Ethnosymbolism, which “arose out of dissatisfaction with the claims of the rival modernist and perennialist paradigms, and the explanatory failure of primordialism.”⁵

2.1. Primordialism versus Instrumentalism

Primordial approach was developed, in the 1950s, by Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils, who introduced notion of primordial attachments and sentiments of an individual to the discourse of nationalism. According to Geertz, by a primordial

³Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism: theory, ideology, history*. Polity Press, 2001, p. 11.

⁴Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge University Press, second edition, 1992, p. 5.

⁵Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 60.

attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” or more precisely, the assumed “givens” of the social existence of humans. “Givenness” is immediate contiguity and kin connection but also being born into a particular community, religion, culture. Geertz argues that the congruities of blood, language, race, beliefs, attitudes, customs are seen by people as ineffable and at times, overpowering in and of themselves.⁶ One is related to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, by the fact that, not only of personal affection, practical importance, common interest, or obligation, but in great part by virtue of some absolute necessity attributed to the very tie itself. The strength and form of primordial attachments can differ from person to person, from society to society, from time to time, but, as Geertz puts it, within each person, each society and at every time there are particular ties, inferred from the feeling of natural, almost spiritual affinity rather than from social interaction. They are non-rational foundations of the human personality. Geertz says that these lifelong ties can, under particular conditions, lead to conflicts with other human loyalties, and especially that they can destroy civic society.⁷ Indeed, there are many examples of ethnic conflicts that arose due to the clash of some “cultural givens” between groups. It can be said that it was essentially religion that led to the partition of India into two independent states – India (Hindu) and Pakistan (Muslim) or the clash between the Irish people (Catholic) and the English people (Protestant); it was essentially language that led to the creation of linguistic border through the territory of Belgium as a result of conflict between French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-speaking Flemish people; it was essentially race that led to the bloody conflicts between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, and etc.

Hence, primordiality acts as unutterable and coercive power upon the adherents of particular community. Individuals are connected to their fellow member, kin,

⁶In this passage, as Anthony Smith argues, the words “assumed” and “are seen to”, and the reference to culture, tell us that for Geertz primordial attachments rest on perceptions and beliefs, and that it is not the intrinsic nature of these attachments that makes them “given” and powerful; rather, it is human beings who see these ties as givens, and attribute to them an overpowering coerciveness... Geertz is claiming that we, as individuals and members of collectivities, feel and believe in the primordiality of our ethnies and nations – their naturalness, longevity and power – and that if we ignore these beliefs and feelings, we evade one of the central problems of explanation in the field of ethnicity and nationalism. Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism: theory, ideology, history*. Polity Press, 2001, p. 53-54.

⁷Geertz, Clifford. “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States.” in C. Geertz (Ed.): *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, Free Press: New York, 1963, pp. 107-113.

neighbor with ineffable attachment that acts beyond their personal choice. In other words, passions, sentiments, natural emotions that can arise because of kinship relations precede any rational choice, and this is in stark contrast to the rational choice theory, as we will later discuss. Moreover, according to Shils, the origin of nations is human primordiality: human attachment to the primary life-givers - the family and the land: “Nations exist because of the sensitivity of human beings to the primordial facts of descent and territorial location.”⁸ Shils’ “collective self-consciousness”, echoing Durkheimian *conscience collective*, is one of the four elements that constitute the nation as a social entity: 1) common territorial location; 2) descent from those residents in that territory; 3) collective consciousness of the common territoriality and descent; and 4) tradition. So, “A nation is constituted by its collective self-consciousness, the referents of which are birth in a specifically bounded territory, residence in that bounded territory or descent from persons resident in that bounded territory.”⁹ Tradition is a core element of the nation for three reasons: (1) because the collective consciousness requires long time to form, as the pattern of mutual obligations that exists among the members of any group is gradual; (2) because, by definition, the nation is an intergenerational entity - a community of descent; and (3) because the nation depends, to a large extent, on the past for the legitimation of the present.¹⁰ Hence, primordial articulation of nation is about ethnic nations, as there is a strong reference to common descent or “myth of origin” and bounded territory. There are many examples of nations such as Japan and Poland, which build their nations on primordial grounds. As a matter of fact, the early 8th-century CE Japanese Chronicles, the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki, assert that the emperor was descended from the sun goddess Amaterasu and that, further, Japan was created by the parents of the Sun goddess; The early 13th century CE Polish chronicle by Wincenty recounts the story about how the body of Bishop Stanislaw, having been dismembered and scattered throughout what was viewed as the territory of Poland, miraculously grew together, just as the nation, once its territory was unified, would be

⁸Shils, Edward. *The Virtue of Civility: Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil Society*. Steven Grosby ed., Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1997, p. 198.

⁹Shils, E. (1997), p. 189, 195.

¹⁰Shils, E. (1997), p. 197.

resurrected. Of course, these myths or beliefs, as Steven Grosby contemplates, have no empirical foundation, but are formulated, in different ways, to build up a connection between historically actual societies to a perceived order of the universe (the act of the gods). The belief in such continuity provides an understanding of the self and its place in the world. By so doing, the uniqueness of the territorial community is justified, thereby distinguishing it from other territorial relations, for example ancient Israel from Egypt, or Poland from Germany.¹¹

As we will see below, these arguments are in a stark contrast with those of modernism. Still, Anthony Smith argues that both Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz showed how “primordial” ties persisted alongside the secular, civil ties, even in industrial societies. Geertz, in particular, contrasted primordial attachments with the civil ties of the rational order of modern polities and society.¹²

Moreover, within primordialism there is a sociobiological approach, developed by Pierre Van den Berghe. Berghe states the role of biological-genetic codes that forms the essential basis for individual’s primordial attachment to his/her community. This approach claims that ethnic groups and races can be traced to the basic genetic reproductive incentives of humans and their use of tactics of “nepotism”, also called *kin selection* and “inclusive fitness” to increase their gene pools:

...genes have an effect on the behaviour of organisms...Whenever cooperation increases individual fitness, organisms are genetically selected to be nepotistic, in the sense of favoring kin over nonkin and close kin over distant kin. The more closely related organisms are, the higher the proportion of the genes they share. Therefore, genes that favor nepotistic behavior in organisms will enhance their own replication more effectively than genes favoring random cooperation.¹³

According to Anthony Smith, there are a number of difficulties with this account. The most obvious is the problem of generalizing from the level of individual reproductive behaviour to that of collective and political action. It is difficult to see how large-scale socio-political developments can be explained by recourse to

¹¹Grosby, Steven. *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 59-60.

¹²Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 52-53.

¹³Pierre L. Van den Berghe. *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 7.

individual or kin behaviour. A second, related difficulty is that myths of origin are rarely correlated with actual biological origins, assuming that these can be traced.¹⁴

Moreover, primordialism¹⁵ is largely criticized due to its quasi-static view of “cultural givens”. As Guibernau puts it, primordialism seems to ignore that language as well as custom and religion are subject to transformation. Even race may be subject to change as a result of the variability of racial definitions and perceptions – as is the case in Brasil – and interbreeding, common not only in modern societies, but also in pre-modern times, when colonizers, merchants, armies and migrants constantly travelled the world.¹⁶ In the similar vein, Jack David Eller and Reed Coughlan wrote the well-known article “The Poverty of Primordialism” in which they critically scrutinized the basic tenets of primordial approach. Even going further, they advocated dropping it from the sociological lexicon on the ground that “the term is unsociological, unanalytical, and vacuous”. According to them, one cannot claim the existence of a set of given facts that have no social source because all concepts that make up any kind of group identity are socially constructed. Ethnicity is born out of social interaction. As a conclusion, they claimed, “primordialism is a bankrupt concept for the analyses and description of ethnicity.”¹⁷

Criticizing Eller and Coughlan, Steven Grosby claimed that they misapprehended the primordialist approach, as there are a set of given values by using those of an individual to participate in history. “The individual participates in these given, a priori bounded patterns. The patterns are the legacy of history; they are tradition. Ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location.”¹⁸ Notably enough, there have been endless debates, discussions, polemics

¹⁴Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 52.

¹⁵For arguments in favour of primordialism, see Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978); “Does Race Matter?” *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 3 (1995); Philippe J. Rushton, “Ethnic Nationalism, Evolutionary Psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory.” *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005).

¹⁶Guibernau, Montserrat. *The Identity of Nations*. Polity Press, 2007, p. 15.

¹⁷See: Eller, Jack D. and Coughlan, Reed M. “The Poverty of Primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, April 1993.

¹⁸Grosby, Steven. “The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie for Primordality- a response to Eller and Coughlan.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1994.

regarding the true nature of ethnicity among scholars that are generally divided into two groups – primordialists and instrumentalists.

Thus, it is mainly instrumentalist approach¹⁹ that is set against primordialism. In contrast to the essentialist view of culture, instrumentalists consider cultures as exceedingly flexible and vulnerable to elite manipulation. By doing so, instrumentalists neglect the ineffability or coerciveness of primordial ties, instead, see them as instrumental or functional for the benefit of community members, especially to the advantage of elites in their competition in acquiring scarce resources. Among instrumentalist scholars, Abner Cohen exemplifies this position in his study of the conscious manipulation of kinship and symbols by political entrepreneurs in urban Africa.²⁰

Instrumentalism is also often referred to as *constructivism*.²¹ Paul Brass presents his constructivist view on ethnicity and nationalism, by drawing examples from a wide variety of situations, especially from South Asia, Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. He argues that there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identity and its transformation into nationalism, rather, the conversions of cultural differences into bases for political differentiation between people arises only under specific circumstances. Thus, ethnicity and nationalism are not “given” but are social and political constructions. Brass considers ethnicity as a variable which is intrinsically related to the specific types of interactions between the leadership of centralizing states and elites from ethnic groups.²² In this regard, Paul Brass analyzed partition of India from instrumentalist point of view. For him, Pakistan was created

¹⁹Instrumentalist approach came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting-pot. This sparked a lively debate through 1970s on the degree to which ethnic groups in the US should be seen as interest or pressure groups behaving instrumentally in the political marketplace. The implication was that ethnic leaders and elites used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes. Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 55.

²⁰Guibernau, Montserrat (2007), p. 16.

²¹Brown, David. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics. London: Routledge, 2000. He identifies “three conceptual languages, which see nationalism as, respectively, an instinct (primordialism), an interest (situationalism) and an ideology (constructivism)”, p. 5.

²²Brass, Paul R. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1991, p. 273-274, 293.

by Muslim elites who manipulated Islamic symbolic resources in order to mobilize the Muslim masses of northwest India, at a time when British policies appeared to turn against Muslim interests.²³

Hence, instrumentalist approach rejects the alleged roles of race, origin, and even language. In this view even primordial attachment to mother tongue cannot be a matter of concern for native speakers. Instrumentalists posit that many people do not display any sensitive affinity to their native tongue; they even do not know the name of their language. In certain circumstances members of various linguistic groups may wittingly and freely decide to adapt their language to that of another group. They may also make a decision to change their language and bring up their children in another language. More generally, as Paul Brass says, many people, if not the majority of them, do not think about their mother tongue and do not feel anything about it.²⁴

Similarly, Barth criticizes primordialism for treating societies with different cultures as separate units that have well-fixed borders, thus, not any interaction and changeability with other groups. To him, cultural values do not give a descriptive meaning to an ethnic group. On the contrary, culture is generated and used by means of the interaction of the ethnic group with its surrounding society. Barth defines the ethnic structures as organizational units interacting with other different groups but not as static cultural entities. In other words, an ethnic group should be defined by its interrelations with others but not by shared values of group members.²⁵

Moreover, an ethnic group can change its borders and behaviors in order to get privileges out of situation. As Oberschall points out, any ethnic integrity does not come into being in normal conditions, but in situations for which individual and social benefit is available.²⁶ Similarly, another instrumentalist Michael Banton argues that ethnic groups evaluate even their names according to their social, economic and political benefits. That is, people give a name for what they demand, not for what

²³Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 55.

²⁴Brass, Paul R. (1991), p. 70.

²⁵Barth, Fredrik. *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları*. (Çev. Ayhan Kaya-Seda Gürkan), İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2001, p. 11, 14-16-18.

²⁶Oberschall, Anthony. "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, (6): 982-1001, 2000.

they really are.²⁷ In this interpretation ethnic groups emerge as political interest groups. Michael Banton and Michael Hechter, who developed “rational choice theory”, argue that individual preferences must not be neglected as it was essentially rational choice for the members of ethnic groups in order to increase their economic advantages and security. According to Hechter, the course of action individuals adopt is selected rationally, that is, in compliance with an assessment of expenses and benefits. “Ethnic groups are salient examples of solidary groups able to confer private rewards and punishments and to control information, as well as sanction criminals and free-riders.”²⁸ Indeed, there can be found empirical evidences for these arguments. For example, one can think of Scottish nationalism, where it has frequently been remarked that there is a correlation between the strength of nationalist feeling and the prospect of extracting substantial quantities of oil from what would become Scottish territorial waters.²⁹

Or take another example, there had been economic factors behind the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s, apart from purely ethnic reasons. Cohen’s study shows that “many Slovenes felt that their economically productive republic (in 1986 it provided 18 per cent of total GNP and 23 per cent of total exports) was contributing an unnecessarily high price for the operation of the federation. Particularly irksome to Slovenes was that each year their republic, with about 8 per cent of Yugoslavia’s population, contributed over 25 per cent of the total federal and between 17 and 19 per cent of the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions.”³⁰

So, instrumentalists’ position can be summarized as follows: it does not matter what my origin is, no matter what my “given” features are, it is my own right to select the group in which I would associate with. In other words, instrumentalist point of

²⁷Banton, Michael. *Ethnic and Racial Consciousness*. 2nd Edition, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, London and New York, 1997, p. 15.

²⁸Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 68-69.

²⁹Miller, David. *On Nationality*. Oxford University Press, 1995, p.115 deepnote.

³⁰Cohen, Lenard J. *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1993, p. 59.

view is subjective in their definition of ethnic group and as such, it recalls the famous Weberian definition:

We shall call “ethnic groups” those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.³¹

Max Weber, who was strongly nationalist in his private life, maintained that any German nation for which it was worth living had to be based on German culture, not on the idea of some Teutonic race. Notably, at sociological congresses in 1910 and 1912, Weber criticized the then prevailing racial theory, warning that there was no evidence of “the decisive importance of completely specific hereditary qualities for particular concrete social phenomena.”³²

All in all, I think that primordial/instrumentalist dichotomy is arbitrary, that is to say, both accounts are important in understanding ethnicity and nation. In this sense, Lange and Westin underscore that both primordial and instrumental approaches “are an example of an unnecessary polarization of inherently complementary aspects of human life.”³³ What makes them to seem so contradictory is that while one overemphasizes this and that aspect, the other deemphasizes them and concentrates upon other aspects. This situation stems from a variety of viewpoints emerging as a result of considering different communities. So, what seems to be true for one community cannot be true for another community.

³¹Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press. ed.by Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, 1978, p. 389.

³²Banton, Michael. “Updating Max Weber on the racial, the ethnic, and the national.” *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 0(0) 1-16, 2013, p. 3.

³³Lange, A. and Westin, C. “The Generative Mode of Explanation in Social Psychological Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations.” *Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnicity*, Report no. 6, 1985, p. 22.

2.2. Modernism versus Perennialism

Modernist paradigm³⁴ holds that nations, nationalism, nation-states are exclusively pertinent to modernity, that is to say, nothing like this existed before. Modernists generally trace the emergence of nations to post-1790 period when French revolution brought force the birth of a new nation. The crux of this new nationalism is well exemplified by Hans Kohn:

In June, 1789, the traditional “Estates General” was reconvened for the first time since 1614. The Estates were transformed under the pressure of the Third Estate into a National Assembly, a body no longer representing the separated estates, but the united nation. In August a further and tremendous step toward the birth of a French nation was taken: all geographic and class barriers fell, and the various classes and castes renounced all the infinite variety of their privileges and historical rights. National unity was for the first time achieved. In the same month, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen established the base of the new order, a nation of free individuals protected by law.³⁵

So, it becomes evident that since that time on, in Kohn’s words, the state ceased to be the king’s state; it became the people’s state, a national state, a fatherland. The nation, no longer the king, felt itself responsible for the country’s destiny. From then on nation and state became identified in Western Europe, as civilization became identified with national civilization.³⁶

According to Anthony Smith, all these developments, for the modernist, are not just chronologically recent, they are also qualitatively novel. “The French Revolution inaugurated not just a new ideology, but a new form of human community, a new kind of collective identity, a new type of polity and, in the end, a new kind of inter-state order.”³⁷ Modernists have largely dealt with specifying modern nature of

³⁴By the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘modernist’ perspective had become the established orthodoxy, all but sweeping away perennialist views from academy. Everywhere, the modernity of nations and nationalism was proclaimed as a self-evident truth. The shock of two World Wars, and the horrors of the Holocaust, undermined both racist and nationalist ideologies, as well as the theoretical naturalism of the ‘perennialist’ understanding of nations. Not only was nationalism condemned along with fascism – the two being often conflated as forms of ‘tribalism’ – it no longer became possible to equate the concept of the nation with that of ‘race’. Already in the 1920s and 1930s, serious scholars of nationalism such as Carlton Hayes and Louis Snyder were emphasising the modern, secular content of nationalist ideologies and their close relationship to rationalism and liberalism. See: Smith, Anthony D. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: a cultural approach*. Routledge, 2009, p. 6, 4.

³⁵Kohn, Hans. *Nationalism: its meaning and history*. D. Van Nostrand Company (Canada), Ltd, 1955, p. 23-24.

³⁶Kohn, H. (1955), p. 15.

³⁷Smith, Anthony D. (2001), p. 46-47.

national phenomena and main conditions that led to the rise of nations and nationalisms. It should be stated that though there are varieties within modernist paradigm such as socioeconomic, sociocultural, political, ideological, and constructionist, as Smith underlines, all share a belief in what one might call “structural modernism”. He states that theirs is no “contingent modernism”, no simple observation of an historical correlation between nationalism and modernity, but a belief in the inherently national, and nationalist, nature of modernity.³⁸ Among modernist scholars, the works of most important scholars such as Ernest Gellner, Elie Kedourie, Tom Nairn, Connor Walker, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly, and Michael Mann are valuable in understanding this account.

Ernest Gellner holds a lion’s share within modernist paradigm. His theory of nationalism is presented as a “new position” on the subject as he rejects most of what has been said by others. Interestingly, his account can destroy even most of our perceptions on what we can think about nation with more ancient roots, since he treats it as purely political and modern phenomenon. In Gellner’s account, modernity and nationalism are intrinsically related. He vigorously describes the emergence of nationalism during the transition from agricultural to industrial society. It is noteworthy that Gellner regards nationalism as a feature of modernizing or industrializing societies. Gellner sees the nation as an objective and essential ingredient of modernity. For him, it is the nation that is the product of nationalism, rather than the other way around. His definition of nationalism implies cultural homogenization within a nation-state: “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”³⁹ Cultural homogenization is to be achieved through the promotion of standardized public education and literacy, which in its turn provide the state with essential infrastructure to consolidate its penetrative capacity over the territory that it controls. In the modern age, man becomes loyal to the nation-state, rather than to a faith. Modern man is no longer a religious man, but a literate man:

³⁸Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 48-49.

³⁹Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p. 1.

Equal access to a scripturalist God paved the way to equal access to high culture. Literacy is no longer a specialism, but a pre-condition of all the specialisms, in a society in which everyone is a specialist. In such a society, one's prime loyalty is to the medium of our literacy, and to its political protector. The equal access of believers to God eventually becomes equal access of unbelievers to education and culture.⁴⁰

Hence, for Gellner, nations and nationalism are to be explained in terms of the needs of modern industrial society for a centralized educational system, or "high culture", which is not meant to be an elite culture, but a public culture. So, "high culture" should be thought of as the product of modernity which cannot be found in pre-modern societies with the many wild, uncultivated "low" cultures. He stressed historical and sociological novelty of nations and nationalism that did not in reality need even to use elements from pre-modern cultures: "The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as well."⁴¹ He defined nation as "anonymous, impersonal society with mutually substitutable atomised individuals held together above all by a shared culture of this kind."⁴²

Thus, Gellner disregards "cultural givens", any primordial attachments, and emotions in his concept of nation. In other words, it is no more mother tongue but state language as an instrumental means of communication that binds individuals, and disseminated through formal system of education. Of course, Gellner's theory is very helpful in understanding the main tenets of modernism and is true for many modern nations in real world, but fall short in apprehending the kind of nationalism that may fuel nationalist feelings of compatriots who can display strong solidarity in any national issue, especially in the face of danger to the motherland, as can be exemplified by "Dreyfus Affair" in France, and "Dunkirk Spirit" in post-war Britain.

It is noteworthy that not all modernists follow Gellner's suit, since even within the modernist camp there was a genuine debate between Gellner and Elie Kedourie regarding the nature of nationalism. For Kedourie, nationalism is a doctrine of the will. For Gellner, it is the cultural form taken by industrialism. For Kedourie, nationalist ideals are powerful in their own right. For Gellner, ideas have no such

⁴⁰Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, second edition, 2006, p. 136.

⁴¹Gellner, E. (1983), p. 56.

⁴²Gellner, E. (1983), p. 57.

power, and the ideology of nationalism merely masks the true workings of industrial culture.⁴³

Kedourie focused on the history of Western nationalism in Europe with its deep philosophical reflections. Kedourie argued that nationalism was a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, more specifically in Germany by Johann Gottlob Fichte in his seminal *Addresses to the German Nation*. For Kedourie, both Immanuel Kant's universalistic principle of self-determination and Herder's dedication to the parochialism - genuine experience of indigenous culture groups - were outputs of the Enlightenment rationalist hunt for moral and intellectual irrevocability. Hence, as he argued, nationalism was a product of disaffection of intellectuals, first in Europe, and later in Asia and Africa. To him, this development was part of the tragic unfolding of modernity in world history.⁴⁴

Like Gellner, Hobsbawm presents constructionist view on the nature of nation and locate the timing of nationalism ('when did nationalism become an influential force?') within the period of nineteenth century industrialization in Western Europe. In his book "Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality", he begins the first chapter by arguing that the nation is a relatively recent phenomenon. He mainly develops chronological approach that traces the birth of nations to the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and makes some speculations about the fate of nationalisms in the twenty first century.⁴⁵

Hobsbawm concedes that there have been actual communities with which human beings have identified over most of history, but "they had or have no *necessary* relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a 'nation' today."⁴⁶ Here, Hobsbawm seems to tautologise Gellner in making political and national unit congruent. Moreover, he coined the term "invented traditions", such as national festivals, ceremonies for the fallen, statuomania, flag rituals and national anthems and the like, to mean "a set of practices

⁴³Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 68.

⁴⁴See: Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*. London, Hutchinson, 1960, p. 151.

⁴⁵See: Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*. Second edition, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

⁴⁶Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992), p. 47.

normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.” It includes ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed, and formally instituted.⁴⁷

“Unlike earlier traditions”, as Anthony Smith puts it, “which adapted to change, the ‘invented’ versions were deliberate and invariant creations of cultural engineers, who forged symbols, rituals, myths and histories to meet the needs of the modern masses, whom industry and democracy were mobilizing and politicizing. In other words, they were deliberate instruments of social control by the ruling classes.”⁴⁸ Reviewing Hobsbawm’s analogy as patently mechanistic, Smith argues that nations are constructs or fabrications of social engineers, like technical inventions. They are planned and put together by elite craftsmen. There is no room for emotion or moral will, not even on the part of the masses. The latter are passive victims of elite social designs, which seek to channel their newly released energies.⁴⁹

Benedict Anderson, with his much-cited famous book *Imagined Community*, published in 1983, introduced new ideas to the modernist thinking of nations and nationalism. Anderson defined nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁵⁰

According to anthropologists Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Ben Anderson, there is a common misperception about Anderson’s work since the word “imagined” in Anderson’s title is often read as “imaginary”. Here, by imaginary, one can imply non-real or non-existent. However, as they write, Anderson “links ‘invention’ not to

⁴⁷Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 1.

⁴⁸Smith, A. D. (2001), p.81.

⁴⁹Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 81-82.

⁵⁰Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Revised edition, Verso, 1983, p. 6.

fabrication and falsity, but to imagining and creation.”⁵¹ Anderson saw a nation as imagined, because its members will never meet and they have to imagine each-other. At this point, one might ask if there is not face-to-face contact, how one can be informative about the existence of his/her fellow members. As an answer, Anderson drives attention to the role of language and linguistics. He introduced the idea of print capitalism, to show that how this specific form of capitalist enterprise paved the way for the birth of national consciousness in three ways. Elliot Green summarized it well:

- 1) It created simple means of discourse and communication between members of a given ‘language-field’ thereby creating awareness of such fields as actual communities; (2) it standardized languages and thereby allowed future members of the language-field to identify with the past; and (3) it elevated certain languages to print form and not others, thereby prioritizing certain language fields.⁵²

So, standardization of vernacular languages eased the communication among people in the particular language-field and made them aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions of fellow-members via print and paper. “These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.”⁵³ Hence, Anderson placed special emphasis on the role of a newspaper, and media as a form of communication in molding national identity in an effort to accentuate modernist origins of nationalism. Moreover, the nation is imagined as ‘limited’, because it has finite boundaries that separate it from other nations and it is also ‘sovereign’, a concept emerged in the century “in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.”⁵⁴ Obviously, Anderson’s nationalism is a social construction, since its roots are not embedded in ethnic origin, instead in the decline of sacred languages and proliferation of vernacular languages. He explains that “everywhere, in fact, as literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses

⁵¹Breuilly, John. “Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities: A symposium.” *Nations and Nationalism* 22(4): 625–659, 2016, p.628. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12236>

⁵²Elliot Green in Breuilly, John (2016), p. 645.

⁵³Anderson, B. (1983), p. 44.

⁵⁴Anderson, B. (1983), p. 7.

discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along.”⁵⁵

Anthony Smith criticized Anderson’s excessive emphasis on the idea of the nation as a narrative of the imagination, and called such definition as “individualistic and voluntarist”. Smith rightly points out that Anderson singles out language as the main criterion of the nation, thus, leaves no room for other criteria like ethnicity, religion, or color.⁵⁶ Indeed, as we also saw in the account of Gellner, language is taken to be almost the sole basis of modern nations. Similar view was supported by Hans Kohn as he indicated:

The French Revolution established the first comprehensive system of national education to raise new generations of virtuous and patriotic citizens. Education was for the first time regarded as a duty and chief interest of the nation. Only a common education, it was felt, could realize the unity of the fatherland and the union of its citizens...Before the Revolution higher education in France stressed Latin more than French, classical authors more than French writers. The new nationalism changed that.⁵⁷

Similarly, another modernist thinker Tom Nairn, himself a Scottish nationalist, in his iconic work *The Break-up of Britain* (1977), drew attention to the role of vernacular languages in mobilizing mass sentiments as he stated: “The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood.”⁵⁸ Here, he embarked upon the analysis of “neo-nationalism” in Scotland. Also, there are chapters regarding culture and politics in Wales; the impasse in Northern Ireland; Enoch Powell’s nationalism; European integration; and the decline of the British state.

In the UK context, as Nairn concludes, nation rather than class was the primary vector of historical change. He saw nationalism as the “principal factor

⁵⁵Anderson, B. (1983), p. 80.

⁵⁶Smith, A. D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*. Routledge, 1998, p. 138.

⁵⁷Kohn, Hans (1955), p. 26.

⁵⁸Nairn, Tom. *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*. London: New Left Books, 1977, p. 340.

making for a revolution of some sort.”⁵⁹ As such, to him, “the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure.”⁶⁰ He writes:

The arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes. Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably populist in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political life. In its most typical version, this assumed the shape of a restless middle-class and intellectual leadership trying to sit up and channel popular class energies into support for the new states.⁶¹

Nairn longed for the break-up of Britain, and thus favored sub-state nationalisms, particularly Scottish nationalism. For him, the ideology of Britishness was a form of Gramscian hegemony that produced an “occluded multi-nationalism”.⁶² Consequently, he made the case for a new world order in which much greater room to be allowed for small nation-states functioning autonomously within larger regional structures like the European Union.⁶³

Nationalism, for John Breuilly, is ideally viewed as a modern and political movement; and politics is about control of the state in the modern world. So, he presents nationalism as a movement for seizing and retaining that control. As Breuilly puts it:

A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: 1) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; 2) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; 3) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires the attainment of at least political sovereignty.⁶⁴

Connor Walker, like other modernists, believed that nations could not exist before the era of nationalism and the latter was quite a recent phenomenon, as he stated that “a nation existed prior to the late nineteenth century should be treated with

⁵⁹Nairn, T. (1977), p. 89.

⁶⁰Nairn, Tom “The Modern Janus”, seen in Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities*, p. 3. Anderson states that it would be more exact to say that nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted.

⁶¹Nairn, T. (1977), p. 41.

⁶²Nairn, Tom. *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*. London: Verso, 1998, p. 212.

⁶³Nairn, T. (1998), p. 63.

⁶⁴Breuilly, John. *Nationalism and the State*. second edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 2.

caution.”⁶⁵ He points to the process of modernization, especially to the role of instruments of mass communications, from 1789 onwards, which have increasingly brought peoples into contact amplifying their demands for self-government and independence.⁶⁶ However, by identifying the ethnic essence that lies at the core of nationalism, he developed the concept of ethnonationalism and elegantly disrupted the modernization paradigm with its one-dimensional view of development.⁶⁷ For Connor, nationalism is first and foremost love of an ethno-nation, and as such can never be simply a rational pursuit of collective goods, as opposed to patriotism, which means loyalty to the territorial state. Unlike the civic nationalism favored by modernists, which is really just patriotism and a rational kind of loyalty and can be rationally explained, Connor claims that ethno-nationalism, which is the only nationalism, can never be rationally explained. It can only be analyzed and invoked. Because of this very nature of nationalism, nationalist leaders well understood that “at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it.”⁶⁸ Consequently, Connor defined nation as “a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related. It is the largest grouping that shares such a belief.”⁶⁹ So, the nation is ultimately based upon felt kinship ties, and as such, it is the fully extended family. The essence of a nation, for Connor, is “a psychological bond” that unites its members and differentiates it from all other people.⁷⁰

Here, it should be noted that Connor clearly differentiates nationalism from patriotism, and by accepting *ethnonationalism* as the only nationalism, he dismantles the chaos of kinds of nationalism, especially the famous “Kohn dichotomy”, which will be discussed below. Yet, Connor’s nation is subjective formation as it is

⁶⁵Walker, Connor. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 224.

⁶⁶Walker, C. (1994), p. 170-74.

⁶⁷See: Walker, Connor. “Nation-building or Nation-destroying?” *World Politics* 24 (3): 319-355, 1972; Walker, Connor. “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, is an Ethnic Group Is a...” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (4): 377-400, 1978.

⁶⁸Walker, C. (1994), p.197.

⁶⁹Walker, C. (1994), p. 212.

⁷⁰Walker, C. (1994), p. 202, 92.

understood from his words – “believe” about ethnic origin and “felt” kinship ties. To put it differently, what members of an ethnic group personally believe and feel themselves to be does not need to be in conformity with objective blood relationship. Thus, Connor differentiates the myth of ethnic descent from real biological descent. In this sense, Connor’s concept of nation is Weberian, which is completely different from Berghe’s sociobiological version of primordialism and Gobineau’s biological nationalism.⁷¹

All in all, in Connor, there exists an ethnic basis of the nation, that is to say, a nation grows out of an ethnic group. To him, an ethnic group is other-defined, easily discernible by any outsider. If an ethnic group becomes self-defined, it evolves into a nation: “An ethnic group may be readily discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but until the members are themselves aware of the group’s uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation. While an ethnic group *may*, therefore, be other-defined, a nation *must* be self-defined.”⁷²

Accordingly, Connor identified ethnic groups as “prenational groups” or “potential nations” that have not attained a national-political level of integration or identity but have the cultural raw materials to do so.⁷³ So, Connor’s emphasis on ethnicity and ethnic groups puts him apart from “structural” modernists like Ernest Gellner. In this sense, Anthony Smith rightly puts it that “Connor’s perspective turns out to be a radical variety of modernism, albeit of a rather special kind.”⁷⁴

All in all, I found modernist paradigm limited and restricted to politics though it is analytically convincing and empirically observable. Interestingly enough, modernist approach to nations and nationalism is overwhelmingly embraced by most

⁷¹Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) first systematized the new biological nationalism in his *Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines* (1853-1855). According to him “blood” was of supreme importance; the human races were unequal in creative ability; civilization could not be communicated and, therefore, backward races could not reach a higher level. “The chosen” people was the Teutonic or German race; as racial ability depended upon “purity of blood”, intermarriage was detrimental to civilization. See: Kohn, Hans. *Nationalism: its meaning and history*. D. Van Nostrand Company (Canada), Ltd, 1955, p. 74.

⁷²Walker, C. (1994), p. 103.

⁷³Eller, Jack D. *Cultural Anthropology: Global Forces, Local Lives*. Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2009, p. 326.

⁷⁴Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 71.

scholars and it remains the dominant orthodoxy in the field.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, many criticisms also levelled against this approach. For Anthony Smith, modernists have largely relegated, or omitted, ethnic phenomena from their accounts of nations and nationalism. While Gellner omitted all mention of ethnicity, and accorded it only a secondary position in his later theory, Hobsbawm dismissed it as either too restrictive if it signified descent or too vague if it was extended to include other elements of culture. For Anderson, it is language rather than ethnicity that forms the starting point of his analysis. Smith claims that part of the reason for this neglect has to do with the modernists' periodization of history, their insistence on the absolute chronological modernity of nations and nationalism. Modernists are not unaware of the problem, but for the most part, they marginalize ethnicity.⁷⁶

Also, modernism has been mainly opposed by *perennialism*. To see the major point of contradiction, it should be stated that while modernists date the formation of nations to the rise of modernity, perennialists see them as enduring, inveterate, century-long, even millennial phenomena, certainly predating modernity.⁷⁷ Perennialism is the belief that some nations were found in the middle ages or even antiquity, and were resuscitated at a later time. One may confuse perennialism with primordialism, but as Anthony Smith warns us to retain the distinction because perennialists “do not have to regard nations as natural, organic or primordial; indeed, they may, and often do, reject such ahistorical accounts.”⁷⁸ Also, to see the distinction one should keep in mind that perennialism refers to nations and is set against modernism, but primordialism refers to ethnic groups and is set against instrumentalism.

Smith proposes two versions of perennialism, at the same time admitting that the lines separating them are not clear: the first version is *continuous perennialism*, which sees the roots of modern nations stretching back several centuries into the

⁷⁵Smith, A. D. (1998), p. xii.

⁷⁶Smith, A. D. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: a cultural approach*. Routledge, 2009, p. 17.

⁷⁷Kaufman, Eric and Conversi, Daniele. “Ethnic and Nationalist Mobilization.” in *The Study of Ethnicity and Politics: Recent Analytical Developments*. by Adrian Guelke and Jean Tournon (eds), Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2012, p. 53.

⁷⁸Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 50.

distant past, pointing to cultural continuities and identities; the second version is recurrent perennialism, which refers to those who regard the nation as “a category of human association that can be found everywhere throughout history.”⁷⁹ Perennialist point of view can be best understood through the writings of Adrian Hastings. He describes ethnicity as “a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations.” Hastings defines the nation as a “far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory.”⁸⁰ Here, we can easily observe the distinction between ethnicity and nation: all ethnic groups are less self-conscious, have common culture and spoken language (not necessarily written language) with an ability of preserving itself as a group due to loyalty of its members; however, nations are more self-conscious, grow out of ethnicities, must have written language to the degree that to produce its own literature, have a self-governing body, and a territory.

Strongly challenging modernism’s claim that nations did not exist before the French revolution, Hastings put forward that English national identity can be dated back at least to 1066, and therefore “England presents the prototype of both a nation and nation-state in the fullest sense.” Because the word “nation” was frequently and consistently in usage from 14th century onwards, “Englishmen felt themselves to be a nation.”⁸¹ In the similar vein, Hugh Seton-Watson claimed that we could distinguish the “old, continuous nations” from later examples that were deliberately created; the former included France, England, Scotland, and Spain, and their longevity lent historical substance to the population’s sense of immemorial nationhood.⁸²

⁷⁹Özkırımlı, Umut. *Theories of nationalism: a critical introduction*. Second edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 58.

⁸⁰Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 3.

⁸¹Hastings, A. (1997), p. 4, 15.

⁸²Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 50.

In support of perennialist view, David Miller points to three constituent elements of modern nations that can also be discovered in pre-modern cultures, for instance in the Greek and Roman periods: 1) the idea that peoples are marked off from another by distinct characteristics, so that a line can be drawn between compatriots and foreigners; 2) the idea that each people has its own homeland, for which they rightly feel a special affection; and 3) the idea that the nation is a fitting object of loyalty, and service to it is a virtue. In fact, he states that “we find Scottish writers of the sixteenth century listing the distinctive national traits of the Scots and the English as grounds for resisting the Union of the Crowns.”⁸³

Moreover, Steven Grosby’s study shows that in pre-modern societies, one observes expressions of a community of territorial kinship. There is a self-understanding, a collective self-consciousness, which is spatially oriented, territorially bounded, and temporally deep, as conveyed by the very existence of the respective, written histories of each of these pre-modern societies.⁸⁴ Grosby argues that all nations have historical antecedents, whether tribe, city-state, or kingdom. These historically earlier societies are important components in the formation of nations. For example, the English nation emerged out of the historically earlier societies of the Saxons, Angles, and Normans. For him, then, nations come into being over time as the result of numerous historical processes. Therefore, he concludes that it is a futile endeavour to try to locate an exact point in time when a particular nation came into being, as if it was a product designed by an engineer.⁸⁵ At this point, one may rightly ask, how can two opposing paradigms be true at the same time? I think that David Miller’s response is convincing here:

It seems then, that those who see nationality as an exclusively modern phenomenon and those who see it as the continuation of ancient tribalism are both half right. There was no sudden conceptual break, no invention of a radically new way of thinking about human communities. Ideas of national character and so forth were of long-standing. What was new was the belief that nations could be regarded as active political agents, the bearers of the ultimate powers of sovereignty.⁸⁶

⁸³Miller, D. (1995), p. 30.

⁸⁴Grosby, Steven. *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 63-64.

⁸⁵Grosby, S. (2005), p. 7-8.

⁸⁶Miller, D. (1995), p. 30-31.

Hence, instead of siding with either paradigm, I think, it would be more appropriate to think of the idea of nation and nationality as something that has been evolved through history and has got a new meaning in modernity – “the idea of a body of people capable of acting collectively and in particular of conferring authority on political institutions.”⁸⁷ Still, if there is a need to indicate the difference, it would be more accurate to call them as modern and pre-modern nations.

2.3. Ethnosymbolism

Anthony Smith is accepted as a leading figure in the study of nationalism. By introducing *ethnosymbolism*, Anthony Smith, largely influenced by Walker Connor’s *ethnonationalism*, seems to position himself in the middle of all these approaches as he does not completely reject the arguments of modernists, instrumentalists, perennialists and primordialists. Smith concludes:

So, even if we concede, as I think we must, that there are powerful subjective elements in nations and nationalism, that people sometimes “think with their blood” and in Connor’s words, “do not voluntarily die for things that are rational”, it does not follow that these phenomena are non-rational and cannot be explained in structural and cultural terms. Because modernists such as Gellner and Hechter pay little attention to social psychological variables, does not mean that we have to embrace a psychological (and hence “non-rational”?) position in order to analyze nations and nationalism and forgo historical and sociological explanations. On the contrary: the nature of the subject matter makes it all the more important that we do so, provided that our understanding of “explanation” is such as to include the various cultural, social and social psychological elements of emotion, will, symbol, memory and felt kinship that Walker Connor rightly emphasizes and that the instrumentalists tend to ignore and disallow.⁸⁸

Indeed, Anthony Smith rightly points to the nature of the subject matter that it seems to be impossible to take side either with social psychological variables or historical and sociological explanations. Thus, he accepts both of them in the explanation of nations and nationalism. Both Smith and Connor relate the nation inextricably to ethnicity, but they fail to accord on the definition and the timing of nationalism. While Smith argues that modern nations trace their roots back to ancestral times, Connor accepts nation to be a particularly modern phenomenon. Also, opposing to especially Gellner’s modernist account, Smith argues that

⁸⁷Miller, D. (1995), p. 30.

⁸⁸Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 73.

industrialization is not a prerequisite for nationalism, as there are instances of nationalist movements emerging well before its advent. He mentions the cases of Finland, Serbia, Ireland, Mexico, Japan and many others, including post-revolutionary France and pre-Bismarckian Germany.⁸⁹

As Smith explains, in contrast to the modernist, perennialist and primordialist paradigms of ethnicity and nationalism, historical ethno-symbolism shifts the focus of analysis away from purely external political and economic, or sociobiological, factors and focuses especially on the subjective elements in the persistence of *ethnies*, the formation of nations, and the impact of nationalism. This does not mean that it takes “objective” factors as given or excludes them from its analysis, but only that it gives more weight to the subjective elements of memory, value, feeling, myth, and symbol, thereby attempting to enter and understand the “inner worlds” of ethnicity and nationalism.⁹⁰

Thus, Smith’s ethnosymbolic approach focuses on the ways in which earlier and often pre-modern ethnic ties and *ethnies* influenced, and in some cases formed the basis for, later nations and nationalisms. Although nations are forged in part by political institutions, they require long-term ethno-cultural resources to create a community of solidarity, largely because of the crucial importance of subjective dimensions to a sense of national identity. This is also the reason why nations cannot simply be seen as elite projects.⁹¹ As John Hutchinson puts it,

In spite of significant differences between premodern and modern societies, long established cultural repertoires (myths, symbols and memories) are “carried” into the modern era by powerful institutions (states, armies, churches) and are revived and redeveloped because populations are periodically faced with similar challenges to their physical and symbolic survival.⁹²

For ethno-symbolists like John Hutchinson, John Armstrong, and Anthony Smith, the formation of nations encompasses a number of social processes that entail investigation over the long period. “There is nothing inexorable, unilinear or

⁸⁹Smith, A. D. *Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*. London, Routledge, 1998, p. 36 ff.

⁹⁰Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 57, 59.

⁹¹Smith, A. D. (2009), Routledge, p. 21.

⁹²Hutchinson, John. “Ethnicity and modern nations.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, 4: 651-69, 2000, p.661.

irreversible about the formation of nations, nor can we trace a determinate sequence of steps in their creation, from ‘ethnie to nation’.”⁹³ At this point, it is essential to see the difference in this account between the definitions of *ethnie* and nation. Smith defines *ethnie* as “a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata”; and proposes to define the nation in “ideal typical manner” as “a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardized laws.”⁹⁴ Evidently, the two definitions are overlapped in respect both of naming and self-definition and of the cultivation of shared symbols, myths, values and traditions. This, for sure, indicates the close relationship between ethnic community and nation. In other words, nations often emerge out of ethnic groups. But, crucial differences, namely political dimensions, occur when ethnic groups turn into a nation: “a link” to territory in ethnic groups indicates that ethnic groups have certain linkage to their homelands, but do not necessarily occupy it, while it is a must for a nation to “inhabit” historic territories, that is, to form its own state or acquire some sort of autonomy; public culture⁹⁵ and standardized laws are crucial aspects of modern nation-states, which ethnic groups do not need to possess. It is noteworthy that this stated definition of nation is somewhat a revised version of his classical definition of nation as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”⁹⁶

⁹³Smith, A. D. (2009), p. 58.

⁹⁴Smith, A. D. (2009), p. 27, 29.

⁹⁵Following David Miller, a public culture may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together. This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or the rule of law... social norms such as honesty in filling in your tax return or queuing...certain cultural ideals for instance religious beliefs.... Its range will vary from case to case, but it will leave room for different private cultures within the nation. See: Miller, David (1995), p. 26.

⁹⁶Smith, A. D. National Identity. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1991, p. 14.

All in all, Smith's nation implies that nations can be ethnic as well as civic in nature, as such, he himself wanted to differentiate the category of nation, which will, as far as possible, be free of ethno-centrism and arbitrary restriction, from other related categories. Still, "myth-symbol complex", to use Armstrong's phrase, is crucial for the existence of nations:

Even where a nation-to-be could boast no ethnic antecedents of importance and where any ethnic ties were shadowy or fabricated, the need to forge out of whatever cultural components were available a coherent mythology and symbolism of a community of history and culture became everywhere paramount as a condition of national survival and unity. Without some ethnic lineage the nation-to-be could fall apart.⁹⁷

In this regard, Daniele Conversi rightly pointed out that "ethno-symbolism underlines the continuity between premodern and modern forms of social cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols. Although Smith does not systematically focus on the intellectuals, he acknowledges their pivotal role as the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas."⁹⁸ This approach has thus come to the fore to fill the gap, but as Smith admits, ethno-symbolism does not offer a theory in the scientific sense, although it does attempt to provide some conceptual tools for an alternative approach and research program for the study of nations and nationalism.⁹⁹

It is more likely that because of its all-embracing methodology, ethnosymbolism remains to a great extent unchallenged to this day. Still, it is not devoid of any criticism at all. For example, Connor Walker counter-argues that Smith's definition is far too inclusive to be effective, confusing nationhood with citizenship (and nation with state).¹⁰⁰ In the similar vein, Montserrat Guibernau claims that Smith fails to establish a clear-cut distinction between the concept of

⁹⁷Smith, A. D. (1991), p. 42.

⁹⁸Conversi, Daniele cited in *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*. edited by Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, p. 21-22.

⁹⁹Smith, A. D. (2009), p. 13.

¹⁰⁰Connor Walker cited by Daniele Conversi in *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*. Edited by Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, p. 24.

nation and state, since he attributes to the nation some of the features of the state, for instance the sharing of legal rights and duties among all its members. In addition, Smith's definition neglects the existence of nations without states.¹⁰¹

2.4. Clarifying Terminological Conundrum

After regarding main tenets of the theoretical approaches, which were helpful in understanding the nature of nation and ethnicity from different perspectives, we still need further discussions to clarify terminological conundrum for the purpose of this study. We need to distinguish nationality from ethnicity, nation from state, and national identity from citizenship, nation from people, nationalism from patriotism, and ethnic nationalism from civic nationalism.

Nationality versus ethnicity: to differentiate nationality from ethnicity is a difficult task, but still there is an utmost need to do so in order to alleviate the confusion of these two concepts. David Miller so ably comments that

Both nations and ethnic groups are bodies of people bound together by common cultural characteristics and mutual recognition; moreover, there is no sharp dividing line between them....an ethnic group is a community formed by common descent and sharing cultural features (language, religion, etc.) that mark it off from neighbouring communities. Typically, though not always, a nation emerges from an ethnic community that furnishes it with its distinct identity.... even nations that originally had an exclusive ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a multitude of different ethnicities. The clearest example of this is the American nation, originally ethnically Anglo-Saxon, but now incorporating Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and many other such hyphenated groups.¹⁰²

Nation versus people: Many tend to use the words “nation” and “people” interchangeably both in ordinary and scholarly language.¹⁰³ Therefore, admitting the

¹⁰¹Guibernau, Montserrat. “Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment.” Nations and Nationalism 10 (1/2), 2004, pp. 125-141.

¹⁰²Miller, D. (1995), p. 19-20.

¹⁰³According to Calhoun, American and French revolutionary ideas of “the people” depended in turn on the growth of ideas about non-political social organization. Whether expressed as “nation” or “people”, reference to some recognizably bounded and internally integrated population was integral to modern notions of popular will and public opinion. In other words, it was important that “the people” be (or at least be seen as) socially integrated, not dispersed like so many grains of sand or divided into smaller communities and families. Politics depended in new ways upon culture and society. See: Calhoun, Craig. Nationalism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, p. 71.

difficulty of disentangling these two “imagined communities”, Bernard Yack offers to make the distinction conceptually, rather than linguistically in nature:

National community, I suggest, is an image of community *over time*. What binds us into national communities is our image of a shared heritage that is passed, in modified form, from one generation to another... The people, in contrast, presents an image of community *over space*. It portrays all individuals within the given boundaries of a state as members of a community from which the state derives its legitimate authority... A nation needs time and effort to establish a legacy of memories and symbols salient enough to link one generation to another... The people, in contrast, need no nurturing. It is available as soon as individuals accept the principles of legitimacy that assert its existence... The nation is a relatively old form of community... The people, in contrast, is relatively new or modern; it was invented to solve certain problems of political legitimacy in the modern state.”¹⁰⁴

Here, then, “nation” is understood as a cultural community with ancient roots. In contrast, “people” is understood as a political community belonging to modernity. The people, whose existence depends on the principles of legitimacy, are seen as the source of legitimate authority. Therefore, the use of the term “nation” in civic terms can be seen as a deviation from its original meaning, which is the same as its use in “ethnic” terms. Indeed, if there are no kinship relations and no cultural heritage between generations in the formation of a nation, it is futile to speak of the existence of a nation at all. Rather, it is proper to use the term “people” to refer to a socially and politically integrated population made up of different nationalities that come together because of their allegiance to a set of political principles that make them part of a common citizenship. In fact, in the case of America, for example, it is the case that people there bear so-called hyphenated or “nested” identities such as Irish-Americans, Jewish-Americans, African-Americans and so on. This clearly shows that members of nations will not give up their original identities to take up American citizenship.

Nation versus state: In everyday language it is common to use “nation” and “state” synonymously. As a prime example, we can say that although it is called United Nations, it actually embodies sovereign states. However, this is conceptually incorrect. David Miller rightly points out the difference: “nation” must refer to a community of people who can claim to be politically self-determining, and “state” must refer to the set of political institutions that they can claim to possess.¹⁰⁵ The

¹⁰⁴Yack, Bernard. “Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism.” *Political Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Aug, 2001), pp. 517-536, p. 520-521.

¹⁰⁵Miller, D. (1995), p. 19.

most commonly used definition of state belongs to Weber, “as a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.”¹⁰⁶

The most common use of nation and state is hyphenated: nation-state, meaning that the boundaries of a political domain and a cultural entity coincide. According to Hastings, a nation-state is a state which “identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as subjects of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs.”¹⁰⁷ In practice, however, Walker Connor drew attention to the remarkable incongruity between ethnic and political boundaries. As he notes, out of a total of 132 independent states, only 12 (9.1%) can be described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic point of view.¹⁰⁸ In this context, Israeli sociologist Yael Tamir wrote: “The era of the homogeneous and viable nation-states is over (or rather the era of the illusion that homogeneous and viable nation-states are possible is over, since such states never existed) and the national vision must be redefined.”¹⁰⁹ It follows that most states in the world are multinational, that is, states exercise dominion over several different nations, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, and the like.

National identity versus Citizenship: The meaning of the question, “Of what nationality are you?” is ambiguous. It is to be interpreted as “of what state are you a citizen?” rather than “of what nation are you a member?” This arises from the fact that in English, as in French, the noun “state” has no accepted adjective; “national” is used instead.¹¹⁰ Interestingly enough, in *nüfus cüzdanı* (identity card) of Turkish citizens under the *uyruğu*/nationality section it is stated T.C. /TUR, which designates *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (Turkish Republic). So, here, nationality is implied to be

¹⁰⁶Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. 1918. Retrieved from <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf>

¹⁰⁷Hastings, Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸Walker, Connor. “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, April 1972: 319-55, p. 320.

¹⁰⁹Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 3.

¹¹⁰Coakley, John. Nationalism, Ethnicity, and the State: making and breaking nations. SAGE, 2012, p. 10-11.

citizenship. This situation is well explained by Saskia Sassen who equates nationality with citizenship:

Today the terms citizenship and nationality both refer to the national state. In a technical legal sense, while essentially the same concept, each term reflects a different legal framework. Both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership. But citizenship is largely confined to the national dimension, while nationality refers to the international legal dimension in the context of an interstate system.¹¹¹

However, David Miller sees national identity not only in legal terms, but also in cultural terms: “A national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are, where we have come from, what we have done. It must then involve an essentially historical understanding in which the present generation is seen as heirs to a tradition which they then pass on to their successors.”¹¹²

National identity, however, is qualitatively different from citizenship. In its narrowest definition, citizenship describes the legal relationship between the individual and the state. Domestic laws about who is a citizen vary considerably from state to state, as do definitions of what it means to be a citizen.¹¹³ National identity, as defined by Guibernau, is a “collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations.”¹¹⁴ For Anthony Smith, national identity is “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements.”¹¹⁵ So we can conclude that one can become a citizen of any state by fulfilling the requirements of its citizenship law, such as passing official language tests, learning its history, and the like. However, national identity cannot be possessed in a short period of time once one has obtained citizenship. For that one must at least share the collective sense of belonging

¹¹¹Sassen, Saskia. “Towards Post-National and De-Nationalized Citizenship.” SISIN17.QXD, 277-291, 2002, p. 278.

¹¹²Miller, D. (1995), p. 175.

¹¹³Sassen, S. (2002), p. 278.

¹¹⁴Guibernau, Montserrat. *The Identity of Nations*. Polity Press, 2007, p. 11.

¹¹⁵Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 18.

to a nation and at best have some cultural elements or national attributes within oneself.

Nationalism versus Patriotism: Although they are used interchangeably, there is a crucial difference between them. Patriotism is generally perceived as positive, good, passive, and peaceful, whereas nationalism is perceived as negative, evil, aggressive, and militaristic. Another interpretation is that nationalism is merely a more complex form of patriotism. Thus, patriotism is commitment - a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation - while nationalism is commitment plus exclusion of others, a willingness to sacrifice that is reinforced by hostility toward others.¹¹⁶ American journalist Sydney J. Harris stated: “The difference between patriotism and nationalism is that the patriot is proud of his country for what it does, and the nationalist is proud of his country no matter what it does; the first attitude creates a feeling of responsibility while the second a feeling of blind arrogance that leads to a war.”¹¹⁷

Similarly, George Orwell, in his “Notes on Nationalism” explained the contrast rather well:

By patriotism, I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, *not* for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.¹¹⁸

Therefore, all the definitions made to distinguish nationalism from patriotism introduce a kind of nationalism - ethnonationalism, to use the term of Walker Connor. This is the way perennialists and ethno-symbolists see nationalism. In fact, nationalism for Adrian Hastings means two things: a theory and a practice. As a political theory - that each “nation” should have its own “state” - it derives from the nineteenth century. However, this general principle motivates few nationalists. In practice, nationalism is strong only in particularistic terms and springs from the conviction that one’s own ethnic or national tradition is especially valuable and must

¹¹⁶Druckman, Daniel. “Nationalism, patriotism, and group loyalty: A social psychological perspective.” *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38, pp. 43-68, 1994, p. 47-48.

¹¹⁷Marsh, Carole. *The Daily Patriot*, Gallopade International, 2003, p. 224.

¹¹⁸http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat

be defended at almost any cost by creating or expanding one's own nation-state. It arises primarily where and when a particular ethnic group or nation feels its distinctiveness, extension, or importance threatened, either by an external attack or by the state system of which it has hitherto been a part.¹¹⁹ For Smith, nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation.”¹²⁰ Indeed, the anti-colonial struggles in Asia and Africa, the sub-state nationalisms in the West (both Western Europe and America), and the nationalist movements in the East and Central Europe in the 19th century, and even the recent referenda of the Scots and Catalans for their national independence, albeit unsuccessful, clearly testify to the ethnic source of nationalism in every continent and in all periods since the emergence of nationalism.

Nevertheless, a distinction is made between nationalism that declares the supremacy of a particular nation and nationalism that recognises the equal rights of all nations to preserve their distinct cultures and pursue their interests. The former is referred to as ethnic nationalism/illiberal nationalism and the other as civic nationalism/liberal nationalism/multicultural nationalism. And again, following Stephen Nathanson, a distinction is made between “moderate patriotism”, which involves the recognition of moral limitations in the pursuit of national goals, and “extreme patriotism”, which involves exclusive concern for one's own country, the desire that it should dominate others.¹²¹ Hence, it is understood that against the “negative” view of nationalism, there can emerge “positive” nationalism; similarly, against the “positive” view of patriotism there can emerge “negative” patriotism.

Ethnic Nationalism versus Civic Nationalism: The origin of the debate between the two types of nationalism – “ethnic/organic” and “civic/voluntarist” - goes back to the protracted antagonism between Staatsnation French and Kulturnation German, the distinction originally made by Friedrich Meinecke in 1908. Ernest Renan, a French scholar, in his famous lecture “Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?” (What is a

¹¹⁹Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 3-4.

¹²⁰Smith, A. D. (1991), p. 73.

¹²¹See: Stephen Nathanson, cited in Miller, D. (1995), p. 9-10.

Nation?) at the Sorbonne, on March 11, 1882, marked the beginning of this debate, which took place in an effort to criticize Treitschke's theory justifying the German annexation of French Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 on ethnic grounds.¹²² Here Renan, himself influenced by the traditions of French liberalism, presented the concept of nation in more abstract terms as a moral and spiritual principle, free from objective criteria such as race, language, religion, geography, and community interests. As such, he valued consent, expressed desires and needs for common life, "solidarity", and "daily plebiscite" as essential to a nation's existence. As such, he pits the "civic nation" against the "ethnic nation" defined by common ancestry, such that members of culturally differentiated groups cannot acquire citizenship regardless of how long they have been in the country. It is noteworthy that the civil/ethnic dichotomy has left its mark on citizenship laws, each based on *jus soli* (right of soil), which emphasizes place of birth, and *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), which is based on parental citizenship by descent. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the former became the hallmark of French citizenship, made more inclusive by the addition of *jus sanguinis*;

¹²²The Germans based their claim upon Alsace-Lorraine on historical rights and ethnic solidarity. They rejected the principle of self-determination. "These provinces are ours by the right of the sword," German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) wrote: "and we will rule them in virtue of a higher right, in virtue of the right of the German nation to prevent the permanent estrangement from the German Empire of her lost children. We desire, even against their will, to restore them to themselves." Kohn, H. (1955), p. 61.

As a response, Ernest Renan (1823-1890) wrote: "In our day one commits a serious error: one confounds nation and race, and one attributes to ethnographical or rather linguistic groups a sovereignty analogous to that of real peoples....Since the end of the Roman Empire, or rather since the dissolution of the empire of Charlemagne, Western Europe seems to be divided into nations....Nations in this sense are something new in history....What characterizes these various nations is the fusion of the populations which compose them. Nothing similar exists in Turkey, where the Turk, the Slav, the Greek, the Armenian, the Arab, the Syrian, the Kurd, are today as distinct as they were on the day of the conquest... Even by the tenth century all the inhabitants of France are French. The idea of a difference of races in the population of France has completely disappeared with the French writers and poets after Hugues Capet. The distinction between the noble and the serf is highly emphasized, but this distinction is in no way an ethnic distinction...These great laws of the history of Western Europe become obvious if we contrast them with the events in Eastern Europe. Under the crown of St. Stephan, the Magyars and the Slavs have remained as distinct today as they were 800 years ago. In Bohemia, the Czech and the German elements are superimposed as water and oil in a glass." p. 136-137, "Will the Germans, who have raised the banner of ethnography so high, not see one day the Slavs analyze the names of the villages of Saxony and of Lusatia, seek the traces of populations long dead, and ask for an account of the massacres and the mass enslavement to which the Germans under their Ottonian emperors subjected their ancestors?" Kohn, H. (1955), p. 138.

the latter became the sole determinant of a more exclusionary German citizenship at birth.¹²³

One may object that Renan's rejection of objective criteria in formulating nation and his definition of nation only in civic terms are exaggerated, but it may be true at least for some communities and political entities that meet objective criteria but still do not constitute a nation. Indeed, Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine against the will of its people, who wanted to remain within the borders of France despite ethnic kinship with the German people. Max Weber, himself a German nationalist, also came to a similar conclusion when he pointed to the role of historical memory and political will: "The reason for the Alsatians not feeling themselves as belonging to the German nation has to be sought in their memories. Their political destiny has taken its course outside the German sphere for too long; for their heroes are the heroes of French history."¹²⁴

Nevertheless, Renan certainly exaggerated when he claimed that there was no ethnic distinction in France in the tenth century and that all its inhabitants were French. This claim is in stark contrast to what happened in reality. The classic example would be the speech of Clermont-Tonnerre in the French Assembly in 1790: "To the Jew as individual we give everything, to the Jew as Jew nothing."¹²⁵ This means that there were recognizably distinct cultures, but French Republic treated all individuals as equal citizens and did not recognize the rights of minority groups. In other words, the decision was made for cultural homogenization by making ethnic minorities give up their original culture in favor of a higher culture. In this context, John Stuart Mill's position on minority cultures is instructive:

Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of highly civilized and cultivated people - to be a member of the French nationality, admitted

¹²³Bertolette, William F. (2012) British identity and the German other. LSU Doctoral Dissertations, 2726, 2012, p. 45. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2726
For more information see also Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Harvard University Press, 1992. In this book, Brubaker shows how the difference between the territorial basis of the French citizenry and the German emphasis on blood descent was moulded and maintained by sharply divergent perceptions of nationhood, rooted in distinctive French and German paths to nation-statehood.

¹²⁴Max Weber cited in Smith, Anthony D. (2001), p. 37-38.

¹²⁵Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 41.

on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power – than to sulk on its own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.¹²⁶

Thus, to be a member of the French nationality, citizens had to learn the French language, history, and literature, observe French traditions, and assent to French laws, political symbols, and institutions. For the Jews, Basques, and Bretons, this meant assimilating into the dominant culture. This is “a procedure applied by liberal civic nationalism to minorities in many national states to this day.”¹²⁷

Correspondingly, the same procedure is valid for the civic nationalism of United States as well. As Will Kymlicka explains,

The American government forcibly incorporated Indian tribes, native Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans into the American state, and then attempted to coercively assimilate each group into the common American culture. They banned the speaking of Indian languages in school, and forced Puerto Rican and Hawaiian schools to use English not Spanish or Hawaiian. The explicit aim was to make these groups see themselves as members of the American nation, not as members of a separate and self-governing nation.¹²⁸

Moreover, this kind of distinction has become almost a *cliché* in academic literature. Hans Kohn, in his 1944 book *The Idea of Nationalism*, presented more impressive articulation of civic-ethnic dichotomy, also known as the “Kohn dichotomy”, as he developed this distinction by building binary oppositions between the “civic Western” and the “ethnic Eastern” types of nationalisms. He made a comparative analysis of the UK, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States in the West, Germany, Italy, and Russia in the East. The differences between the two nationalisms were:

- Nationalism in the West: was a political phenomenon that preceded or coincided with the onset of nation-building; was associated with individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism; membership in the nation was equated with citizenship, and the nation was thus a rational, voluntary association of

¹²⁶John Stuart Mill. *Representative Government*. 1861. Batoche books, Kitchener, 2001, p. 185.

¹²⁷Smith, A. D. (2001), p. 41.

¹²⁸Kymlicka, Will. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 247.

individuals living on a common territory under the same government and laws.

- Nationalism in the East: arose later, in conflict with the existing order of multinational states and within the cultural domain; was inherently violent and problematic in redrawing political boundaries; based on historical myths and legends and collectivist ties of ethnic kinship.¹²⁹

Moreover, the most cited distinction between “ethnic” nationalism and “civic” nationalism is made by Michael Ignatieff, in his famous book *Blood and Belonging*, as well as by William Pfaff, in his book *The Wrath of Nations*. Ignatieff writes:

civic nationalism, maintains that the nation should be composed of all those - regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity - who subscribe to the nation's political creed ... it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. This nationalism is necessarily democratic, since it vests sovereignty in all of the people ... what holds a society together is not common roots but law...national belonging can be a form of rational attachment...Ethnic nationalism claims, by contrast, that an individual's deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community which defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community. This psychology of belonging may have greater depth than civic nationalism's...ethnic nationalist regimes are more authoritarian than democratic.”¹³⁰

Moreover, Ignatieff cites Britain (with its attachment to the crown, parliament, and the rule of law), Revolutionary France, and the United States as primary examples of civic nation from which civic nationalism spread throughout the world. Yet he confines civic nationalism mainly to the West - Western nation-states in which nationhood is defined by shared citizenship rather than shared ethnicity, with one prominent exception - Germany. But ethnic nationalism is characteristic of the East - Eastern Europe, such as Serbia and Croatia, Baltic states, Asian republics and the like.¹³¹

Sharing similar views with Ignatieff, Pfaff argues: “The modern western nation... provides defence, civil order, a system of justice... it demands solidarity among citizens, which means their willingness to accept the moral and legal norms of

¹²⁹Hans Kohn (1944) seen in Kuzio, Taras. “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 25 No. 1 January 2002, pp. 20-39.

¹³⁰Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York, 1994, pp. 6-8.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

the collectivity, to pay taxes...and to come to the common defence.”¹³² And also, “...nationalism, “ethnic” or religious and historical in origin, undermined international peace, producing internecine war in what had been Yugoslavia, and in parts of the former Soviet Union, and threatening it elsewhere.”¹³³ Hence, “civic” nation emerges to be Western, political, patriotic, inclusive, democratic, liberal, voluntaristic and rational in contrast to “ethnic” nation which is Eastern, cultural, nationalist, exclusive, authoritarian, illiberal, ascriptive and irrational.

However, though ethnic/civic dichotomy has been found useful in providing framework in understanding types of nationalisms, it came under sharp scrutiny of many scholars such as Anthony Smith, Will Kymlicka, Taras Kuzio, Bernard Yack, Stephen Shulman, David Brown and others. In this regard, Anthony Smith writes: “No nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or other of these elements predominate in the ensemble of components of national identity.”¹³⁴

Using survey data from 15 countries, Stephen Shulman argues that the standard view greatly exaggerates the current differences in national identity between the West and East. Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and Eastern ethnic nations are more civic. Furthermore, on some measurements, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are more civic and less ethnic than Western countries.¹³⁵

Similarly, according to Taras Kuzio, Kohn’s distinction is idealized and does not match up to historical or theoretical scrutiny. Pure civic or ethnic states only exist in theory. All civic states, whether in the West or East, are based on ethno-cultural

¹³²Pfaff, William. *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*. Touchstone. Published by Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 23.

¹³³Pfaff, W. (1994), p. 33.

¹³⁴Smith, A. D. *The Nation in History*. *Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 25.

¹³⁵Shulman, Stephen. “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism.” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 3.5 No. 5, June 2002, pp. 554-585.

core(s). Each nationalism and nation has elements and dimensions that include both types of nationalism elaborated by Kohn (“organic, ethnic” and “voluntary, civic”).¹³⁶

Bernard Yack is sceptical about the contrast between civic and ethnic nationalism. He writes:

It all seems a little too good to be true, a little too close to what we would like to believe about the world... The myth of the civic nation... suggests that your national identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political principles you share with other like-minded individuals... But this idea misrepresents political reality as surely as the ethnonationalist myths it is designed to combat. And propagating a new political myth, it seems to me, is an especially inappropriate way of defending the legacy of Enlightenment liberalism from the dangers posed by the growth of nationalist political passions.¹³⁷

David Brown, in his turn, critically examined the arguments about the liberal and intrinsically illiberal connotations attributed to civic and cultural nationalisms, respectively. He puts forward that the liberalism or illiberalism of nationalism might not be related to its cultural or civic basis, but might depend both upon whether the class articulating the nationalism is marginalized or upwardly mobile; and upon whether the wider society becomes focused upon resentment in relation to threatening others, or on developing a self-generated identity.¹³⁸ Moreover, Will Kymlicka criticizes Pfaff and Ignatieff for overlooking the fact that “civic nationalism” has a cultural component. They say that membership in a civic nation is not based on ancestry or culture, but on allegiance to certain political principles of democracy and freedom. For the 92 percent of native-born Americans, this is patently false, because their citizenship has nothing to do with their political beliefs. Moreover, according to Kymlicka, both Pfaff and Ignatieff treat nationalism as a matter of either political principle (civic nationalism) or ethnic ancestry (ethnic nationalism). Both misunderstand the nature of nationalist conflict. They argue that ethnic nationalism is the cause of nationalist conflict because of its ethnic exclusivity. In fact, nationalist

¹³⁶Kuzio, Taras. “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for Understanding Nationalism.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 25, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 20-39.

¹³⁷Yack, Bernard. “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” in *Theorizing Nationalism*. ed.by Ronald Beiner, State University of New York Press, 1998, p. 105, 107.

¹³⁸Brown, David. “Are there good and bad nationalisms?” *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (2), 1999, pp. 281-302.

conflicts often stem from attempts by civic nationalists to forcibly incorporate national minorities.¹³⁹

All of these ideas show that civic nation is not formed merely by “consent” or “expressed desires” of individuals, as Renan claims, but in almost all cases by cultural assimilation and the extermination of minorities. It turns out that civic nationalism is not qualitatively different from ethnic nationalism, in the sense that both seek “nation-building”, but by different means - the former through cultural assimilation, the latter through cultural exclusion. The finest goal of both seems to achieve cultural homogenization.

2.5. Multiculturalism

The term “multiculturalism” has been widely used in recent decades in both public and academic discourse. Multiculturalism is understood differently depending on the context. For some, multiculturalism can mean an ideology; for others, a social issue or a political programme. As a result, there are many definitions of multiculturalism. Therefore, we cannot speak of one type of multiculturalism, but of multiculturalisms. Pnina Werbner argues: “There are as many multiculturalisms as there are political arenas for collective action... Multiculturalism is always a specific negotiated order and no amount of abstract philosophical or legal reasoning can prescribe a single ‘just’ model.”¹⁴⁰

The term “multicultural” literally means “many cultures”. It thus indicates the existence of many cultures in a given society or a culturally heterogeneous society. A society may be multicultural, but we cannot speak of multiculturalism if there is no special recognition of the differences of various groups and communities such as ethno-cultural groups, religious denominations and the like. This distinction is well explained by Stuart Hall as he claims that the term ‘multi-cultural’ (as an adjective) “... describes the social characteristics and problems of governance posed by any

¹³⁹Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 244, 247.

¹⁴⁰Werbner, Pnina. “Afterword: Writing Multiculturalism and Politics in the New Europe.” in *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community*, edited by T. Modood, and P. Werbner. London: Zed Books, 1997, p. 263.

society in which different cultural communities live together and attempt to build a common life while retaining some of their original identity.” Building on this, he defines the term “multiculturalism” (as a noun) to be “the strategies and policies adopted to govern and manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity which multicultural societies throw up.”¹⁴¹ As such, it is closely related to “the politics of difference”, “the politics of recognition”, and “the politics of identity”, all of which consider the proper recognition of cultural diversity as an essential step in reassessing dishonored identities and changing dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain groups.¹⁴² Therefore, it is the responsibility of government policy to effectively address the problems of different groups in order to achieve social cohesion and integration in society.

Indeed, leading political philosophers of multiculturalism such as Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Joseph Raz and Iris Young evaluate the term positively and advocate it as a policy of integration through recognition of cultural diversity. They find fault with the fact that since the eighteenth century, the majority of civic states in the West pursued a forced policy of homogenization until the 1960s. As Iris Young, who stands for radical multiculturalism, puts it,

This norm of the homogeneous public is oppressive. Not only does it put unassimilated persons and groups at a severe disadvantage in the competition for scarce positions and resources, but it requires that persons transform their sense of identity in order to assimilate. Self-annihilation is an unreasonable and unjust requirement of citizenship... A just polity must embrace the ideal of a heterogeneous public. Group differences of gender, age and sexuality should not be ignored, but publicly acknowledged and accepted... In the twentieth century the ideal state is composed of a plurality of nations or cultural groups.¹⁴³

Similarly, Joseph Raz, who stands for liberal multiculturalism, affirms that “in the circumstances of contemporary industrial or post-industrial societies, a political attitude of fostering and encouraging the prosperity, cultural and material, of cultural groups within a society, and respecting their identity is justified by considerations of

¹⁴¹Hall, Stuart. “Conclusion: The Multi-cultural Question.” in *Un/settled Multiculturalism*, edited by B. Hesse. London: Zed Books, 2000, p. 209.

¹⁴²Colombo, Enzo. “Multiculturalisms.” *Sociopedia.isa*, 2014. DOI: 10.1177/2056846014xx, p.1.

¹⁴³Young, Iris M. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 179-180.

freedom and human dignity.”¹⁴⁴ Likewise, Charles Taylor examines the historically emergent need for the recognition of identity. Following Rousseau, he posits the idea of *equal respect*, which is one of the main tenets of multiculturalism. He writes:

...in the intercultural context, a stronger demand has recently arisen: that one accord equal respect to actually evolved cultures. Critiques of European or white domination, to the effect that they have not only suppressed but failed to appreciate other cultures, consider these depreciatory judgments not only factually mistaken but somehow morally wrong... The possibility that the Zulus, while having the same potential for culture formation as anyone else, might nevertheless have come up with a culture that is less valuable than others is ruled out from the start. Even to entertain this possibility is to deny human equality.¹⁴⁵

Since the 1970s, Western democracies began to prioritize multiculturalism over civic nationalism. In other words: We can observe a radical shift from state-directed cultural homogenization to state-directed promotion of cultural heterogeneity. In fact, as Kymlicka writes, the first country to officially adopt such a “multiculturalism” policy at the national level was Canada in 1971, but it has since been adopted in many other countries, from Australia and New Zealand to Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands. Although the United States does not have an official multiculturalism policy at the federal level, it too has implicitly adopted such an approach.¹⁴⁶ Particularly, Kymlicka points to three major immigrant countries in the West – the United States, Australia, and Canada, which have been successful on their historical record in integrating immigrants. He writes:

Until the 1960s, all three of the major immigrant countries adopted an ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of immigration. That is, immigrants were expected to assimilate to existing cultural norms, and, over time, become indistinguishable from native-born citizens in their speech, dress, leisure activities, cuisine, family size, identities, and so on. This strongly assimilationist policy was seen as necessary to ensure that immigrants become loyal and productive members of society, and was further rationalized through ethnocentric denigration of other cultures. Indeed, some groups were denied entry if they were seen as inassimilable (e.g. restrictions on Chinese immigrants in Canada and the United States; the ‘whites-only’ immigration policy in Australia). However, beginning in the 1970s, under pressure from immigrant groups, all three countries rejected the assimilationist model and adopted more tolerant and pluralistic policies that allow and indeed support immigrants to maintain various aspects of their ethnic heritage. This is no longer seen as unpatriotic or ‘un-

¹⁴⁴Raz, Joseph. “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective.” 1994, seen in Miller, David (1995), p. 131, deepnote

¹⁴⁵Taylor, Charles. The Politics of Recognition, 1994. Retrieved from https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/sai/SOSANT2210/v15/pensumliste/taylor_the_politics_of_recognition.pdf, p. 42.

¹⁴⁶Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 154.

American'. Moreover, public institutions are being instructed to modify their rules, practices, and symbols to accommodate the beliefs and practices of immigrant groups.¹⁴⁷

It is important to note that we should distinguish between immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism, although both involve the recognition of minority rights. In this sense, Kymlicka develops a typology of different groups and different types of rights for each. It offers the strongest form of self-government rights to indigenous peoples and national minorities because they were forcibly incorporated into the larger state. He writes that national minorities such as Quebecois, Puerto Ricans, Catalans, and Flemings have resisted integration and fought to preserve or rebuild their own *societal culture*¹⁴⁸. Kymlicka briefly describes the historical experience of the Québécois on their struggle for essential powers regarding language, education, government employment and immigration. To ensure that they are not deprived of their self-government, Quebecois have insisted that the boundaries of their province and the powers it exercises be constitutionally guaranteed so that the majority cannot unilaterally curtail their powers of self-government.¹⁴⁹ By contrast, he viewed immigrants as *voluntary* migrants, since they choose to migrate, they willingly leave their native culture to join a host society, to become part of it in order to pursue a better life. So, immigrant multiculturalism, what he calls “polyethnic rights”, is perceived as a demand for fairer terms of integration

¹⁴⁷Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 153-154.

¹⁴⁸Kymlicka writes: “By a societal culture, I mean a territorially-concentrated culture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life. I call it a *societal* culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles. Societal cultures within a modern liberal democracy are inevitably pluralistic, containing Christians as well as Muslims, Jews, and atheists; heterosexuals as well as gays; urban professionals and rural farmers; conservatives as well as socialists.” Here, societal culture is distinguished from the term culture, “which is defined in a very thick, ethnographic sense, referring to the sharing of specific folk-customs, habits, and rituals. Citizens of a modern liberal state do not share a common culture in such a thick, ethnographic sense – indeed, the lack of a common thick ethnographic culture is part of the very definition of a liberal society. But it is equally essential to modern liberal forms of governance that citizens share a common culture in a very different, and thinner, sense, focusing on a common language and societal institutions.” Ibid. p. 25, deepnote

¹⁴⁹Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 157-158.

into the mainstream society via granting of exemptions and accommodations, not a rejection of integration or demand for collective self-determination.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, for a multicultural society to function smoothly there is an utmost need for *toleration*. The term *toleration* itself has both negative and positive implications. Generally speaking, it is about the acceptance of cultural differences, more precisely, “the acceptance of ideas, values and also practices, which may not be in agreement with the majority culture. This may be the tolerance of religious values - or religions - which are different from the majority religion, or of social and cultural practices which are different.”¹⁵¹ At first sight, this might seem very positive attitude, especially from the side of the members of majority culture who do not discriminate minority groups on the basis of their distinct cultural or religious views. However, in practice, it does not work so, as tolerance has its own limits. A person or a group can tolerate other person’s or group’s behavior stemmed from their distinct culture up to a certain degree but not more, if that behavior clashes sharply with the cultural values and traditions of the former, and also with the principles of human rights and gender equality guaranteed in the state constitution. For example, many citizens of Western democracies do not tolerate other groups’ practices such as performing *clitorectomies* on young girls, compulsorily arranged marriages or *talaq* divorces and indeed none of them is allowed in most Western countries.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 113-115.

¹⁵¹Nye, Malory. “The Challenges of Multiculturalism.” *Culture and Religion*, Vol.8, No.2, July 2007, pp. 109-123, p. 114.

¹⁵²Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 172.

CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL AWAKENING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURY IN AZERBAIJAN

This chapter aims to discuss the role of national elites in the making of the nation, emergence of nationalist movement, and establishment of the first nation-state at the beginning of the twentieth century in Azerbaijan.

At the beginning of the XX century Azerbaijani national intellectuals such as Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Nasib Bey Yusifbeyli, Alimardan Bey Topchubashov, Mirza Bala Memmedzade, Ali Bey Huseynzade, Ahmed Bey Aghaoglu, Jalil Mammadguluzade and others played crucial role in the formulation of national ideology, and development of freedom movement, which led to the establishment of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918. They struggled against the Tsarist national policies and supported the rights of Muslim population of Russia by forming various organizations, societies, and publishing newspapers. Almost all these intellectuals put forward three issues - language, nation and land – as essential elements of the national idea.

3.1. National Movement under Tsarist Russia (1902-1918)

Among the organizations functioning in this period was *Müsəlman Gənclik Təşkilatı* (Muslim Youth Party) established by Mehmet Emin Resulzade in 1902. Fighting against the Russian colonialism, the organization published the journal *Himmet* (Endeavor). Later, the organization operated secretly under the name of “Muslim Democratic Musavat Society”. Their activities included: to motivate national feelings of members of the association; to enlighten the Turkic people of Tsarist Russia who were not taught in Russian schools, to read works of local writers, to memorize the poems written against the Tsarism; to spread the ideas of freedom

and revolution among the workers.¹⁵³ Moreover, Resulzade published his works in different newspapers such as *Təkamül (Evolution)*, *İrşad (Guidance)* and *Iqbal (Prosperity)* in those years.¹⁵⁴

As a result of the weakening of Tsarist Russia after Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and 1905-1907 revolution, the rise of national spirit and national awakening became common in every part of Azerbaijan. The stream of revolution hit Caucasia hard as the inter-communal violence broke out first in Baku, on February 6, 1905. It was the first inter-ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijani Turks. Those events were not unpredictable as the antagonism between the two communities had developed into a complex, multifaceted problem in the region. Most historians agree that apart from the perception of the Armenians as a privileged group under Russian rule, there were economic and social factors at play.¹⁵⁵ This conflict was a crucial factor that strengthened national self-identification of Azerbaijani people. A reason for the beginning of the conflict was the killing of two Azerbaijanis by Armenians. The clashes started in Baku and spread to other cities such as Irevan, Nakhchivan, Ganja, Shusha, and Jebrayil, as a result of which thousands of people died in both sides. The Tsar government called for the opening of the Armenian-Muslim peace assembly in the face of deepening and severing of the conflict on February 20, 1906, in Tiflis. But the assembly could not prevent the clashes.¹⁵⁶

Moreover, during the revolution, Azerbaijan national movement demanded education and press in national language, and equal rights to Muslims with Christians. However, the revolution was defeated by the Tsarist regime and the masses could not achieve their aims. In spite of being defeated, it had positive effect in the enhancement of national self-identification. In Resulzade's words,

¹⁵³Yaqublu, Nəsiman Q. Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə Ensiklopediyası. Bakı, 2013, p. 47.

¹⁵⁴Yaqublu, N. Q. (2013), p. 164-165.

¹⁵⁵Swietochowski, Tadeusz. Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 38-39.

¹⁵⁶Əmrahov, Mais. XX Əsrdə Azərbaycanda Milli-Azadlıq Hərəkatı, Ali Məktəblər üçün dərslik, Bakı, ADPU nəşr. 2009, p. 74.

“Azerbaijanis started to feel themselves as a social body, a society carrying special cultural seeds, in other words, a different nation from the Russians.”¹⁵⁷

In those years, periodical publications that highly contributed to the promotion of national language multiplied in Azerbaijan. They called for the national awakening of the Muslim population. It should be added that the showing up of the Azerbaijani Turkish language press dates back to the end of the 19th century. The first newspaper of this kind was *Əkinçi* (The Sower) edited by Hasan Bey Zardabi in 1875. It became the medium for the discussion and dissemination of a broad spectrum of ideas. After *Əkinçi* was closed in 1877, three other Turkish language periodicals appeared between 1879 and 1891. They also were banned until 1904.¹⁵⁸ It was self-evident that Tsarist government was afraid of the fact that these newspapers using colloquial Azerbaijani Turkish would serve as a catalyst in the nationalization of its Muslim inhabitants. So, the only Azerbaijani press was the Russian language daily *Kaspi* (Caspi), edited by Alimardan Bey Topchubashov in 1898, which increasingly attracted national intellectuals. Though in Russian, the issue of nationalism started to be seen on its pages. Topchubashov defended the rights of Russian Muslims in the *Kaspi*, *Həyat*, and other newspapers. He also participated in the project “Desire for National Right” (1905), which demanded Turkish people the same political, cultural, and religious rights as Russians. In addition, Topchubashov, the head of the Muslim Fraction in the State Duma, actively participated in the formation of the “Union of Russian Muslims” Party, which had existed during 1905-1907 years, and personally prepared its charter and program.¹⁵⁹

After all, national intellectuals and the leaders of the national liberation movement started to form their organizations to defend Muslim people against both the Tsarist regime and Armenian attacks. For instance, in 1906, Ahmet Aghaoglu established the organization *Difai* (Defense) in Ganja (the second large city of Azerbaijan after Baku) to actively engage in the protection of Russian Muslims. According to the declaration of the organization:

¹⁵⁷Əmrahov, M. (2009), p. 60-61.

¹⁵⁸Altstadt, Audrey L. The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p. 52.

¹⁵⁹Baykara, Hüseyin. Azərbaycan İstiqlal Mübarizəsi Tarixi. Bakı: “Azər nəşr”, 1992, p. 113-114.

It has already been two years that Caucasus Muslims have faced the troubles that more and more endanger their existence. Those troubles are: Armenian-Muslim collisions; second, backwardness and ignorance of our people; at last, third, deepening social-moral degradation of Muslims. It is futile to rely on the government and prankish national leaders.¹⁶⁰

The party stated to struggle by all means against Dashnaktsutyun party, an Armenian nationalist and socialist political party. In addition, several other nationalist parties such as *Müdafiə* (Defense), *Qeyrət* (Honour) and “The Revolution Committee of Turkish Socialist Federalists” were established in the city of Ganja, as a result of which became the center of national-freedom movement in Azerbaijan.¹⁶¹

Furthermore, Resulzade, and his close friends in Baku (industrial center and capital of Azerbaijan), raised their voices against the despotism and imperial politics of Tsarist Russia through the organization *Musavat* (Equality), formed in 1911. For example, in the period of its initial operations, the organization spread declarations in support of the position of Turkey in Balkan Wars and strived for the defeat of Tsarist Russia. Resulzade wrote: “Our lawsuit is the claim of Azerbaijan: it is a historical and national lawsuit.”¹⁶² It should be stated that, in those years, the self-identification of Azerbaijan people was very vague. Admitting the identity crisis of the people Resulzade explains: “Due to the primitive influence of Islam, we call ourselves Muslims, and were satisfied with the name Muslim, thus did not pay attention to the Turkishness, which is the name of our true nationality... Others have called us Tatars and Persians and have not objected to it either. It was entirely the outcome that we did not truly recognize ourselves.”¹⁶³

It is also notable that the first program of *Musavat* party (initial name of the party was *Müsəlman Demokratik Partiyası - Musavat* (Muslim Democratic Party - Musavat) was in Islamic character, as it said: 1) To unify all Muslims without distinguishing nationality and religious sect; 2) To work for the regaining of independence of Muslim countries that lost their sovereignty; 3) To lend material and moral help to all Muslim counties that try to protect and restore their freedom; 4) To aid Muslim nations and countries to increase their defense and attack forces; 5) To

¹⁶⁰Yaqublu, N. Q. *Müsavat Partiyasının Tarixi*. Bakı: “Adiloğlu”, 2012, p. 32-33.

¹⁶¹Əmrahov, M. (2009), p. 43.

¹⁶²Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 6-8.

¹⁶³Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. *Əsərləri* (1909-1914). II c., II cildə, Bakı: Şirvanəşr, 2001, p. 469.

annihilate all obstacles that prevent the spread of these ideas; 6) To make contact with all groups that strive for the unification and development of Muslims; 7) To make contact with foreign parties that strive for the happiness and development of the universe and to exchange opinions at the required level; 8) To work for the strengthening of means for the struggle of life, trade, industrial and general economic life of Muslims.¹⁶⁴

However, the publishing of the newspaper *Açıq Söz* (The Frank Word), on October 2, 1915, as a body of Musavat Party, opened a new page in the life of Azerbaijani people, as it first dared to make a shift from religious identity to national identity.¹⁶⁵ M. B. Mammadzade wrote: “For the first time, *Açıq Söz* began to change the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘Tatar’ with the word ‘Turk’, addressed to the nation “you are Turk!” and to the Russian government “we are Turks” and announced it to be a “Daily Turkish Newspaper”. In this way, Mehmet Emin Resulzade officially closed the period of *Ümmət və Ümmətçilik* (Ummah), proclaimed the beginning of period of *millətçi* (nationalist) and *Türk millətçiliyi* (Turkish nationalism).¹⁶⁶

Resulzade was against confusing “nation” with “religion”. He stated: “Language is national and religion is international. Because we are Turks, the language of our nationality is Turkish. Because we are Muslims, our internationality is Islam.”¹⁶⁷ To him, language is an essential element in the formulation of the nation: “Language comprises ninety percent of the nation.” Resulzade stresses the importance of the alphabet for the development and survival of the language. In this sense, he regretted of not possessing a national alphabet.¹⁶⁸ He complains that when asked from our bearded scholars and intelligentsia with a hat on their head “what is your nationality”- they would answer “Muslim religion”. Once, Resulzade heard the right answer in the exam hall of Russian-Muslim schools: “They asked a girl ‘what is your nation?’ - ‘I am a Turk’ - she said. To the question ‘what is your religion?’ she

¹⁶⁴Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 38.

¹⁶⁵Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 46.

¹⁶⁶Yaqublu, N. Q. (2001) Azərbaycan Milli İstiqlal Mübarizəsi və Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə, p. 6.

¹⁶⁷Rəsulzadə M. Ə. Əsərləri (1909-1914), p. 287.

¹⁶⁸Rəsulzadə M. Ə. Əsərləri (1909-1914), p. 260-261.

answered ‘Muslim’. Exams finished. Our hearts were filled with pride and joy. We can now be sure of the future. Because our national work finds its right way.”¹⁶⁹

In this context, Mammadzade highly praised the service of Ali Bey Huseynzade for Turkism and Turanism that played important role in the formulation of the *Musavat*.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, Huseynzade saw the way to the political freedom of all Turkic peoples in their union. For him, the main issue here was to know the necessity of maintaining the unity of language and religion. Because only by this way, Turks, wherever they live, would know and love one another and would help each other in the route of civilization and development. But, in those days, it was a heavy task to realize the idea of “Turkish Unity” among Turkic peoples who lived unaware and estranged of one another. So, Huseynzade thought: “above all, they have to be introduced their identity, and notified that they are linguistically, genealogically, and culturally close to one another.”¹⁷¹ In this sense, his work “*Türklər kimdir və kimlərdən ibarətdir*” (Who are Turks and of whom do they consist), published in the newspaper *Həyat*, was remarkable in the history of Turkism. In this article, Ali Bey underlines that the unique Turkish language and unique Turkish nation will be the result of investigating the questions of who Turks are, where they came from, how many tribes they have been divided, and where they live with which names.¹⁷²

It is noteworthy that newspaper *Həyat* itself had the essential role in spreading ideas of Turkism and Islamism at the beginning of the XX century. But, it could survive only a year (1905-6). The secret clerk of the Caucasus Censorship Committee, A. P. Gakkel, demanded that the newspaper be closed down by describing it as an expression of theories of Turkism and Islamism in a secret essay sent to the governor-general of the Caucasus Viceroyalty, Vorontsov-Dashkov. On the basis of this essay, Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote: “It is necessary to change the title of *Həyat* and to replace the word *Türk* with the word *Azərbaycan*. The propaganda of

¹⁶⁹Rəsulzadə M. Ə. Əsərləri (1909-1914), p. 181.

¹⁷⁰Məmmədzadə, M. B. Milli Azərbaycan Hərəkatı. Bakı: “Nicat,” 1992, p. 47.

¹⁷¹Uygur, Erdoğan. “Azerbaycan Metbuatında Fuyuzat Dergisi.” *Modern Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt 7, Say 2 (Haziran 2010), 150-176 DOI: 10.1501/MTAD.7.2010.2.29, p. 154.

¹⁷²Uygur, E. (2010), p. 154.

Panislamism in the newspaper is unbearable.” In 1906, the newspaper was closed down due to its “harmful direction”.¹⁷³

Moreover, after *Həyat* had been closed down, in 1906-7 years, Ali Bey published journal *Füyuzat*, which instigated Turkism among intellectuals. Also, it created a literary, political school called *Füyuzatçılıq* in Azerbaijan in the first decade of the twentieth century. The chief purpose of this ideology was to form a shared and literate language policy among Turkic peoples.¹⁷⁴ In this sense, Ali Bey wrote that by reforming and unifying various dialects and accents, it was possible to form a civilized and literate general Turkish language. Even going further, he supposed that Turkish could become a common language for the whole of Asia.¹⁷⁵ According to the opinion of Ali Bey as well as other members of *Füyuzatçılıq*, such as Muhammed Hadi, Ahmad Kamal, Iskender Malikov, the literate language cannot be massive; it is only for well-educated people. So, it is not necessary to work simplifying the literary language; the harder and heavier the literary language, the more profound it is. So, as a shared literate language for all Turkic peoples, they proposed Istanbul accent of Turkey. However, during that period and even later, their proposal of “Ottoman Turkish” was criticized by some Azerbaijani intellectuals. Among their contemporaries, especially, *Mollanəsrəddinçilər* - Jalil Mammadguluzade, Omar Faik Nemanzadeh, Firudun Bey Kocharli, and Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev thought that it was unnecessary to complicate this language. They preferred to simplify it, that is to say, to make it easier for the broad masses to understand. Because, in their view, literate language is the language of the people; this language is for everyone; everyone should read and write; participate in the development of society.¹⁷⁶

So, though Ali Bey’s proposal on common language was criticized, his “triad” - “Turkification, Islamization and Modernization” was appreciated. It comprised the essence of Azerbaijan’s national ideology, which would later be enshrined in the three-color flag of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Huseynzade, in this

¹⁷³Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə. Seçilmiş Əsərləri. 2008, p. 21.

¹⁷⁴Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə (2008), p. 22-23.

¹⁷⁵Uygur, E. (2010), p. 160.

¹⁷⁶Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 90-91.

theoretical doctrine that put forward against Russification and Persianization trends in the life of the Turkic people, presented Turkification as a fundamental principle of Turkism ideology. He wrote: “Only the nation who learn his language, religion, history, habits and morals can find salvation.”¹⁷⁷ In this doctrine, Islamization is the spiritual principle of the Turkishness. In this way, Ali Bey demanded the study of the universal moral and ethical values of Islam. He, first of all, wanted the spread of Kurani-Kerim by translating it into the language of all Muslim nations. “The nation that recognizes God will also grasp the national unity.” For the first time, with the Europeanization idea, Ali Bey brings the Western-Oriental synthesis to the public and literary thinking. He called for being vigilant and not allowing extremism while demanding the study of the scientific-technological achievements and social structures of Europe. He stressed: “We want their brains and palates to enter Islamic country, not their throat and stomach. We would like that our country digests their brains, not digested in their stomachs.”¹⁷⁸

According to Azer Turan, Huseynzade was the first ideologist of Azerbaijan in its modern history. In 1906, in his article called “The Deputies of Baku Province,” Huseynzade wrote his opinions and proposals to Azerbaijani deputies elected to the State Duma. He suggested the deputies demand human rights, equality, autonomy, land for homeless peasants and reformation, conscious freedom for the Muslims, and doing their best to alleviate all obstacles in developing the Turkish language in the Duma. Through these demands Huseynzade brought up the political voice of Azerbaijan to the agenda. Thus, as Azer Turan claims, his political aspiration and freedom concept laid the ground for the manifestation of the ideological political morality of Azerbaijan in the form of idea and movement.¹⁷⁹ In this sense, Tadeusz Swietochowski stated: “At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was one person who taught Turkic peoples their identity. He was Ali Bey Huseynzade.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə (2008), p.11.

¹⁷⁸Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə (2008), p. 11.

¹⁷⁹Turan, Azər. Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə. Moskva “SALAM” press, 2008, p. 35.

¹⁸⁰Əli Bəy Hüseynzadə (2008), p. 5.

Moreover, during the collapse of the Russian Empire the role of *Türk Ədəmi Mərkəziyyət Firqəsi* (Turkish Federalists Party), found in Ganja, in 1917, was important in the strengthening of national consciousness in Azerbaijan. In its first meeting, the slogans of “Live, Democratic Republic!”, and “Live, Azerbaijan sovereignty!” were shouted. One of the founding members of the party was Nasib Bey Yusifbeyli. His worldview was to a great extent shaped by the ideas of Turkism as a result of his contact with Ismail Gaspirali, who was a famous ideologist of Turkish world and an author of the well-known motto “Unity in the language, idea, and work.”¹⁸¹ Looking at the Declaration of the Party, published in May in the newspaper of *Kaspi*, it becomes evident that its aim was not restricted to the Turks of Azerbaijan only, but to all Turkish people of Russia. It says that its purpose is to protect the economic-class and national-cultural interests of Turkish working masses. Moreover, the party demanded: 1) Democratic Republic must be established based on national territory in Russia; 2) Azerbaijan, Turkistan, Kirgizstan, and Bashgirdistan must be provided with territories; 3) National autonomies must be given to Volga and Crimean Tatars as well as to all Turkish nations.¹⁸²

The closeness of the positions of both Musavat and Turkish Federalists parties paved the way for their unification in June 1917. The Unified Musavat Party became a strong political party as almost all national intellectuals in Azerbaijan joined their forces. In its turn, this meant wide popular support, which found its clear expression in the October 22, 1917 parliamentary elections: “Musavat won 10,000 from 25,000 voters or 40 percent of all voters. However, Bolsheviks were able to collect 4,000 votes in the elections held in favorable conditions for them.”¹⁸³

So, the activities of the Musavat Party during the 1915-1918 years were patriotic as it struggled for the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. The party engaged in spreading Turkism ideas and quitting the slogan of “Autonomy to Azerbaijan”, it started propagating the “Independent Azerbaijan” idea. It is remarkable that in such a policy shift, the 1918 March genocide of Azerbaijani Turks was crucial. More than

¹⁸¹Nəsib bəy Yusifbəyli – Milli İstiqlal və Dövlətçilik Mücahidi, Bakı, “Ziya”, 2013, p. 30.

¹⁸²Nəsib bəy Yusifbəyli (2013), p. 32-33.

¹⁸³Həsənov, Cəmil. Azərbaycan Beynəlxalq Münasibətlər Sistemində (1918-1920). Bakı: “Azərənşr,” 1993, p. 31.

12,000 Turks lost their lives during the three-day (18-21 March) massacre (March 30 - April 1, by the current calendar) by Bolshevik-Dashnak troops in Baku. The slaughtering continued in Shamakhi, Salyan, Guba, Lankaran, Kurdemir and other regions.¹⁸⁴ Resulzade remembered how Bolshevik's newspaper "Bakinski Rabochi" had responded to the issue of autonomy: "The Autonomy of Azerbaijan is the autonomy of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Neither the Russian bourgeoisie nor the Russian democracy is satisfied with this autonomy. Musavatists who want the autonomy of Azerbaijan will, in the end, find the hell."¹⁸⁵

So, the hostility of both Russians and Armenians was a crucial factor in the consolidation of the national consciousness of most national intellectuals to join their forces under the umbrella of pan-Turkism and spread the ideas of Turkism among people. As a result, ethnic identification of the Muslim community strengthened as they began openly to call themselves Turks. This process would end up with the formation of the national state headed by the nationalist leader.

3.2. National Politics of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920)

After hundred years of life under Russian yoke, on May 28, 1918, Azerbaijan emerged as a national unit out of the ruins of Russian Imperialism collapsed due to WW1. The formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) was the culmination of the nationalization process of Azerbaijani Turks since the end of the nineteenth century. According to the "Declaration of Independence" adopted by the National Congress:

1. Starting from now on, Azerbaijan embracing the area of the South-Eastern Transcaucasia shall exist as an independent state enjoying all rights and realizing the right of the people of Azerbaijan to have a government.
2. The Democratic Republic should constitute the form of government in independent Azerbaijan.

¹⁸⁴Qafarov, Vasif. Türkiyə-Rusiya Münasibətlərində Azərbaycan Məsələsi (1917-1922). Bakı: "Azərənşr," 2011, p. 84.

¹⁸⁵Qafarov, V. (2011), p. 81.

3. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan intends to establish friendly relationships with all nations, particularly the neighboring nations and states.
4. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees civil rights to all citizens residing within its borders irrespective of nationality, religious confession, class affiliation, estate, and sex.
5. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan creates broad possibilities of independent development for all ethnic groups residing within its territory.
6. Unless the Constituent Assembly is convened, Azerbaijan shall be governed by the National Council elected by the people and the Provisional Government answerable to the National Council.¹⁸⁶

Mehmet Emin Resulzade, the chairman of the National Council of Azerbaijan, in a statement on the first anniversary of the establishment of the ADR, stressed: “Because the Republic is based upon the national culture and established on the basis of national democratic Turkish statehood, Azerbaijan is the first Turkish State and the first Muslim Republic.”¹⁸⁷ In addition, the ADR was the first Turkish state formed on the secular basis in comparison to all Turkic states that were generally established upon the religious ground.¹⁸⁸

In 1925, Resulzade expressed the importance of this event as such: “To cause others to call the Muslims under Russian administration ‘Turk’ is an acquired case today. Not only has the term ‘Turk’, but also the name ‘Azerbaijan’ been acquired.”¹⁸⁹ Moreover, in the document sent to the representatives of states participated in the Versailles Peace Conference on the occasion of the anniversary of independence on May 28, 1919, it was stated that the majority of the population residing in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic are Azerbaijani Turks, who speak

¹⁸⁶Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti Hökumət Qanun və Binagüzarlıqları Məcmuəsi, 1919, №1, p. 5-7
http://axc.preslib.az/en_b1.html

¹⁸⁷Mehmetov, İsmail. Türk Kafkası’nda Siyasi ve Etnik Yapı. Eski Çağlardan Günümüze Azerbaycan Tarihi. İstanbul, Ötüken, 2009, p. 588.

¹⁸⁸Həsənov, C. (1993), p. 87.

¹⁸⁹Mehmetov, İ. (2009), p. 590.

in their special Azerbaijani dialect.¹⁹⁰ In this context, Tadeusz Swietochowski writes: “So far, the name of a geographical country, Azerbaijan is now the name of a two million state. The people called by different names, such as Tatars, Transcaucasian Muslims and Caucasian Turks, have officially been Azerbaijanis.”¹⁹¹

Notably, the state name was debatable because it did not reflect Turkish identity. Turkish intellectuals and bourgeois proposed to call the state *South Caucasus Turkish Republic*. In their turn, the founders of the new state explained the name Azerbaijan for three reasons: 1) the name of the land in the northwest of Iran where Turks live is Azerbaijan; 2) Turks living in the Southeast Caucasus and Turks living in the northwest of Iran are the same (in the language, religion, ethnic, cultural and social characteristics); 3) the geography of the Southeast Caucasus where Turks live carries the name Azerbaijan as well.¹⁹² Hence, the name Azerbaijan is strongly related to Turkishness, because it is the land where Turks live. Accordingly, the national identity of the people of this newly emerged nation-state became Azerbaijani Turk to differentiate them from other Turks who established their nation-states.

Besides, Resulzade thought that the idea of “national and independent Azerbaijan” could combine not only the Musavatists, who had been fighting for Turkism, but also socialists, Islamists, and others. In other words, “Azerbaijani ideology” did not express only Turkism, but also turned into the fundamental doctrine of all political forces including national minorities residing in the country. In his speech at the 2nd meeting of the parliament on December 10, 1918, Resulzade stated: “Today, the great goal for our group, which is the defender of Azerbaijan ideology, has been ensued. The reason is that now both the left and the right no longer denies, but confirms Azerbaijan with all their efforts. The reason is that there is no disagreement among Muslim groups on the idea of Azerbaijan. The reason is that the idea of independent Azerbaijan has occupied the mind of our society. The reason is that the triumphant three-color flag has now politically united all of us.”¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 87.

¹⁹¹Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 68.

¹⁹²Mehmetov, İ. (2009), p. 590.

¹⁹³Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918-1920). Parlament (stenoqrafiq hesabatlar). I cild, Bakı, 1998, p. 27-28.

In this regard, Aslan Bey Safikurdlu, a Socialist, in one of his speeches in the parliament, stated: “Today a small Turkish parliament has been opened. Our parliament is like a web in the eyes. Many imperialists do not even want to see it. We called our Republic, not the Turkish Republic, but the Republic of Azerbaijan to make it a common homeland for all citizens.”¹⁹⁴ Probably, ADR elites did not want to restrict the new state to ethnic Turks only, so, included non-Turks also. So, the name Azerbaijan has attained a broader meaning that entails civic nationalism - more inclusive, all-embracing, and patriotic - in contrast to any name that designates Turkishness, which might be perceived as ethnic nationalism - parochial, exclusive. One might see it as a strategic move or a politico-ideological approach, due to the fact that before the establishment of the ADR, its founding members had fought for ethno-nationalism - Turkism. Indeed, Resulzade noted that though this Republic was called Azerbaijan, it is virtually a Turkish government or a small Turkey.¹⁹⁵

Meantime, official Iranian circles were anxious about the choice of the name for the new state. Because they suspected the Azerbaijan Republic would reclaim South Azerbaijan with the help of Turkey. The signing of a friendship treaty between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Empire on June 4, 1918, increased these doubts. To put an end to the anxiety of Iran, the Azerbaijani government used the definition Caucasus Azerbaijan in external correspondence.¹⁹⁶

Moreover, the national flag of the new state reflected the meaning of Turkism as well. The Azerbaijani flag depicting a white crescent and an octagonal star on the red piece, adopted on June 21, was almost similar to the flag of the present Republic of Turkey. On September 9, a blue, red, and green flag with a white crescent and an octagonal star replaced this flag. The three colors of the state flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan represented “Turkish national culture, modern European democracy, and

¹⁹⁴Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918-1920). Parlament (stenoqrafiik hesabatlar). I cild Bakı, 1998, p. 25.

¹⁹⁵Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti. Bakı: “Elm,” 1990, p. 10.

¹⁹⁶Həsənov, C. (1993), p. 93.

Islamic civilization.”¹⁹⁷ Resulzade’s famous motto was “*Bir kərə yüksələn bayraq bir daha enməz!*” (The flag once raised will never fall!)

The territory of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was 113.9 thousand sq. km. However, 16.6 thousand sq. km of Azerbaijan’s lands (Borchali, Garayazi, Sığhnax, Sharur-Derelayaz, New Bayazid, etc.) were considered controversial territory with Georgia and Armenia. So, 97.3 sq. km territories were indisputable.¹⁹⁸ Azerbaijan government tried to solve the border questions with the neighboring countries through peaceful negotiations. On May 29, considering the possibility of confederation with Armenia, Azerbaijan National Council voted recognizing the city of Irevan (Erevan) as the center of the Armenian (Ararat) Republic. However, both Armenia and Georgia preferred to use force to capture their claimed lands.¹⁹⁹

At that time, the total number of people living in the incontestable territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan (97.3 thousand sq. km) was 2,861.862 people. Muslims (mainly Azerbaijani Turks) accounted for 68.2% (1,952.250) of the population, Armenians 21.4% (622,006), Georgians 0.6% (14,794), Russians 7.5% (214,930) and other peoples 2.3% (57,882). The total population of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (113.9 thousand sq. km) in 1918 was more than 3,3 million.²⁰⁰ It is noticeable that the percentage of minorities (32%) is high enough to regard the newly established state as multi-ethnic rather than homogenous. The multi-ethnic composition of the population reflected itself in the distribution of chairs in the Parliament of the new republic. Namely, all peoples living in the territory of Azerbaijan, including minorities, were represented in parliament by their deputies (Turkish-Muslim population - 80, Armenians - 21, Russians - 10, Germans - 1, Jews - 1, Georgians - 1, Baku Trade Unions - 3, Baku Oil Industry Union - 2).²⁰¹ So, it was intended to elect 120 deputies to the first Azerbaijan Parliament. However, it was

¹⁹⁷ Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920. Bakı, Elm, 1998, p. 108.

¹⁹⁸ Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası I Cild, Baş Redaktor Yaqub Mahmudov, Bakı: Lider Nəşriyyat, 2004, p. 12.

¹⁹⁹ Nəşibzadə, Nəşib. Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası. Bakı: “Elm” nəşriyyatı, 1990, p. 45-48.

²⁰⁰ Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası I Cild, 2004, p. 15-16.

²⁰¹ Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası I Cild, 2004, p. 11.

impossible to provide this number and ended up with 85 deputies (Armenians-10, Russians-5, other nations-5, Turkish Muslims-65).²⁰²

It becomes clear that the government remained loyal to the fourth and fifth provisions of the Declaration of Independence. In this sense, according to Resulzade, “The National Parliament represented all the class and nationalities of the country. It completely ruled the fate of the state. There was no command, no cost, no war, and no reconciliation in its absence. The government stayed when it got its confidence and fell when the government lost it. There was no mediation post in the middle. The Parliament was the absolute judge. The real Democratic Republic was founded with no equivalence in Europe.”²⁰³

In the same vein, the government passed, on September 7, 1918, the Law “On the Education of Peoples of National Minorities in their Mother Tongue.” The law stipulated that if the local population constituted a majority, secondary education must be conducted in that language. In addition, it emphasized that education must be conducted in their language if there were more than 40 minority students in one school. On October 1, 1919, there were established special inspections in the Armenian schools of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Regulation including 13 articles, based on the self-determination of Armenians in the field of culture and education, was approved as well.²⁰⁴ Additionally, in August 1919, the Law on Citizenship introduced *jus soli* norm, which extended Azerbaijani citizenship to all the subjects born on the territory of the ADR.²⁰⁵ Hence, all these developments attest that the ADR government did not pursue chauvinism and racism but pursued progressive Azerbaijanism, that is to say, a civic nationalism that included all national minorities on an equal footing with the dominant Turkish group.

Meanwhile, it is important to examine what Resulzade understood from the term “nation”, as it is a vague concept. Resulzade distinguished the term *milliyyət* (nationality) from that of *millət* (nation). To him, the former expressed ethnic

²⁰²Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 79.

²⁰³Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Əsrimizin Səyavuşu, Çağdaş Azərbaycan ədəbiyyatı, Çağdaş Azərbaycan tarixi. Bakı: “Gənclik,” 1991, p. 41.

²⁰⁴Niftiyev, Niyaz (2015), p. 63-64.

²⁰⁵Агамалиева, Н. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика, Баку: “Елм”, 1998, p. 313.

community emerged as a result of the impact of language, religious, racial, tribal, historical, geographical, economic, and political factors. The latter explained general willpower rising in this community. He wrote: “Nationality has ethnic meaning, while, nation has political meaning.” In other words, “nationality is static entity originated in consequence of certain conditions and events, while nation is a conscious dynamic form of this static being.”²⁰⁶ “The term ‘patriot’ in European understanding has the same meaning as the word *millətçi*. It is a completely different thing from the *milliyyətçilik* that Europeans call *nationalism*. *Nationalism*, in the meaning of Western European democracy, is the backward movement, and violator, which refuses to go on the path of common progress. However, patriotism is the movement that a nation takes command of its self-determination and forms its unique nation-state. In addition, it is a democratic movement and part of the development movement that embraces the whole world.”²⁰⁷

So, Rəsulzadə preferred using terms *millətçi* (patriot) and *millətçilik* (patriotism) to the terms *milliyyətçi* (nationalist) and *milliyyətçilik* (nationalism). More specifically, Rəsulzadə opted for patriotism and civic nationalism in his nation-building project. One might argue that he pursued a rational strategy in the face of large numbers of minorities because he refrained from the dangers of ethnic nationalism capable of threatening individual freedom, democracy, and the integrity of the society.

Still, the Turkish language - the language of the majority Azerbaijani Turks - was officially made the dominant language in the country. The decree of the Council of Ministers, on 27 June 1918, stated: “The state language is Turkish. Those in charge of their duties in all judicial, administrative, and other state bodies can use the Russian language until they become knowledgeable of this language.”²⁰⁸ Within two years, the work of the state bodies was supposed to be fully in the mother tongue. Nationalization of other areas of social life also took the start.

²⁰⁶Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Milli Birlik, Bakı: “Çıraq,” 2009, p. 20-21.

²⁰⁷Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (2009), p. 21-22.

²⁰⁸Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası: Azərbaycan hökuməti 1918-1920. Bakı: “Gənclik,” 1990, p. 6.

In this respect, the ADR government, which paid particular attention to the development of science and education in the country, made a special effort to accelerate cultivating professional national cadres who command the perfect Turkish language. For this purpose, on July 23, 1918, the government decided to ask teaching staff from Turkey to the country's educational institutions.²⁰⁹ It is noteworthy that this decision was related to Resulzade's language policy because he opposed cultivating the local Turkish languages (namely, Azerbaijani Turkish dialect) and defended the common Turkish language. Indeed, the common Turkish language based on Turkish grammar started taught in incomplete higher schools and universities. In addition, the program adopted at the second congress of the Musavat Party (1919), with the proposal of Resulzade, demanded common Turkish union and common Turkish language, namely, "teaching the lessons of Istanbul dialect at secondary schools and teaching lessons at universities through common literary Istanbul dialect."²¹⁰

Furthermore, it required the education system reconstructed on a national basis. On August 28, 1918, the government issued a decree on the nationalization of schools. Thanks to the significant efforts of Nasib Bey Yusifbeyli, an Education Minister, at the beginning of 1919, 637 elementary and 23 secondary education schools functioned at the expense of the state.²¹¹ Also, on September 1, 1919, together with the decree on the establishment of Baku State University, the Azerbaijani Parliament adopted a bill on sending 100 young people to foreign countries for education at the expense of the government.²¹²

Moreover, the Azerbaijan State Theater started to operate in Baku under the leadership of Huseyn Arablinsky, who brought about the brightening of cultural life in the country. In addition to the works of prominent national playwrights such as Mirza Fatali Akhundzadeh, Nariman Narimanov, Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, Najaf Bey Vazirov, Jalil Mammadguluzadeh, Huseyn Javid, Jafar Jabbarli, and

²⁰⁹Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası, II cildə, I Cild, 2004, p. 80.

²¹⁰Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Kafkasya Türkləri. İstanbul, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993, p. 61.

²¹¹Nəsib Bəy Yusifbəyli – Milli İstiqlal və Dövlətçilik Mücahidi. Bakı: "Ziya," 2013, p. 49.

²¹²Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası, II cildə, I Cild, 2004, p. 81.

others, the works of the world classics was staged as well.²¹³ Moreover, the first grand library - the National Library in the national language - was created. The activities of societies, organizations, and unions such as “Türk Ocağı” (Turkish Hearth), “Nəsir-Maarif”, “Mədəni-maarif”, which promote and disseminate education and national culture, were vastly expanded.²¹⁴ The activity of the center “Türk Ocağı” was more important, for the chief purpose of the society was to develop cultural relations between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Turks, as well as the Turkic-speaking peoples living in the territory of the former Russian Empire.²¹⁵

Furthermore, the names of historical places, cities, and other settlements were restored within the framework of the revival of national self-consciousness (which was one of the main directions of the Azerbaijani government’s activity). With the government’s decision of June 30, 1918, Yelizavetpol was renamed Ganja. Karyagin district was named Jabrail. By national characteristics, cities, streets were named after prominent personalities, writers, and poets.²¹⁶

At last, on January 11, 1920, the achievement of the de-facto recognition of Azerbaijan as an independent state by the Supreme Council of the Versailles Conference was the result of the eight-month tense and fruitful activity of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Paris. In their speech at the meeting, the head of the delegation, Topchubashov, and the mission’s adviser, Maharram Maharramov, stated that “the Republic of Azerbaijan can maintain its state independence and become a developed country in a short time if European countries provide certain military-economic assistance.”²¹⁷

However, the effort of making Azerbaijan a developed and democratic country was suspended on April 27, 1920, as Soviet Russia, in an attempt to restore its 1914 borders, put an end to the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, thus preventing Azerbaijani people from consolidating as a nation. The

²¹³Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası, II cildə, I Cild, 2004, p. 98.

²¹⁴Nəcəfov, Bəxtiyar. Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası (daxili və xarici siyasət). Bakı: “Bilik,” 1992, p. 32.

²¹⁵Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası, II cildə, I Cild, 2004, p. 83.

²¹⁶Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920, Bakı, Elm, 1998, p. 174.

²¹⁷Azərbaycan Paris Sülh Konfransında (1919 -1920), Bakı: “Ozan,” 2008, p. 10.

ADR government was obliged to hand the government to Bolsheviks as conditions dictated to do so.²¹⁸ Resulzade wrote: “The bloody Tsarist tyranny was replaced by a bloodier Bolshevik tyranny. Thus, our freedom and independence were bent under the feet of the Red Army invaders.”²¹⁹ Not agreeing with the occupation, Musavatists formed *Gizli Musavat* Party (Secret Musavat Party) and continued their national struggle secretly starting from the night of April 27, 1920.²²⁰ Though it could exist only 23 months, ADR was able to realize some historical work. In his meeting with Resulzade, Stalin asked: “What could you give to the people during this one-and-a-half-year rule? In response to the question, Resulzade said: “We could not give a lot ... But we explained what national freedom is. And, we had them taste a little bit national independence.”²²¹

It is noteworthy that the republic functioned during the most tumultuous period of local history in the XX century. Ethnic conflicts and bloody clashes with Armenia were in progress in the region, exacerbated by civil wars in Russia, communist coups, and the effects of the First World War. As a result, the newborn independent country was weak enough to succumb to invading Bolshevik forces that crushed it in its cradle. Thus, on April 28, 1920, the ADR stopped existing as a consequence of which historical evolution of Azerbaijani nationalism, which would resurface in the late 1980s, was halted. The ADR as a secular democratic state would be a point of reference for the establishment of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan.

To sum up, at the beginning of the XX century, Azerbaijani national intellectuals played a crucial role as creators, inventors, and producers of ideas in enhancing national self-identification that culminated in nation formation. They were successful in transforming religious identity into a national identity built upon common ancient roots. As a result, for the first time, the Muslim people of Tsarist Russia started to be named “Turk.” The intellectuals paid much attention to the

²¹⁸Yaqublu, N. (1991) Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə. Bakı: “Gənclik,” p. 146-147.

²¹⁹Yaqublu, N. (1991), p. 302.

²²⁰Yaqublu, N. (2012), p. 110.

²²¹Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası: Azərbaycan hökuməti 1918-1920, Bakı, “Gənclik” 1990, p. 8-9.

development of the Turkish language as an essential element of the national identity. Thus, they directed the nationalizing project towards empowering the core nation. However, it would be wrong to characterize the nation-building policy of the ADR government as ethnic nationalism, because it did not exclude non-Turkic communities. Rather, national elites promoted collective Azerbaijani identity to encompass all ethnic, religious minorities and other political groups such as leftists and Islamists by granting common citizenship based on *the jus soli* principle in order to achieve integrity of the society. At the same time, they established the state on the basis of democratic principles. In fact, it was honorable for them to state that Azerbaijan became the first democratic state in the Muslim East. So, it is reasonable to argue that ADR elites pursued civic nationhood, which entails inclusion, liberalism, voluntarism, and patriotism.

CHAPTER 4

FORMING AZERBAIJANI NATION UNDER SOVIET RULE (1920-1991)

This chapter discusses the issues of nationalism and national identity of Azerbaijan in Soviet times. In order to have a better understanding of the period there is a need to revise the Soviet nationality policies first.

4.1. Soviet Nationality Policy

In the starting years of the Soviet Union, Stalin and Lenin tried to establish a state where there lived over 130 nationalities. It was a very difficult task to merge all these nationalities into a single whole. Taking the lesson from the experiences of Tsarist Russia, which pursued assimilation policy toward non-Russian nationalities, Lenin and Stalin started to formulate their unique nationalities policy, which is called affirmative action policy. Lenin argued that only the right to self-determination could overcome that distrust.²²²

The Soviet nationalities policy realized the formation of national territories. According to the 1923 nationalities policy program, a pyramid of national soviets containing plenty of nationalities such as Union Republics, Autonomous Oblasts, Autonomous Okrugs, bounded to the central authority represented by the Communist Party, were established.²²³ In this sense, Martin stated: “it seemed that the territorialization of ethnicity had been accomplished.”²²⁴ It may seem paradoxical, but Stalin and Lenin accepted the unavoidability of nationalism under socialism. Lenin

²²²Martin, Terry. *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*. Cornell University Press, New York, 2001, p. 3.

²²³Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. “The Russian Central State in Crisis.” in *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 108.

²²⁴Martin, T. (2001), p. 31.

thought it was possible to achieve fusion of nations via the transitional phase of total freedom of all oppressed nations. In his turn, Stalin explained this paradox as follows: “We are undertaking the maximum development of national culture so that it can exhaust itself completely and thereby create the base for the organization of international socialist culture.”²²⁵

Hence, capitalist society was to be replaced by a socialist nation, the basis of which would be “an alliance between the working class and the working peasants”, while a crucial factor for nation-building would be the formation of a socialist economy.²²⁶ Notably, Stalin’s definition of a nation set the direction for the Soviet nationalities policy. To him, “a nation is a historically evolved, stable community based on a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.”²²⁷ So, he viewed the nation as a community beyond primordiality, which is devoid of a racial, tribal, and ethnic character.

Thus, in this project, the development of national cultures was just a transitional phase. The long-term goal was that in the atmosphere of respect to national identities, nationals would exhaust all national components, as a result of which their grip on ethnic bonds would weaken. This process would end up with the formation of a socialist man. However, contrary to their anticipation, national culture did not exhaust itself; in contrast, ethnic nationalism took a stronghold in the national territories. As a result, Stalin took strict measures to curb local nationalisms by force. In this sense, we can roughly define two phases during Stalin’s reign in this process: The first phase (1920–mid-1930) was marked with pro-nationalities policies, while the second phase (mid-1930–1953) was remarkable with anti-nationalist policies.

During the first phase, nationalities policy concentrated upon “nativization” (*korenizatsiia*, sometimes translated as “indigenization”). Soviet authority created roots (*kornii*) within the native peoples, recruiting members of titular nation to party posts within their regions. It encouraged national cultures, developing local

²²⁵Martin, T. (2001), p. 5.

²²⁶Wierzbicki, A. “Ethnicity and Power in the Soviet Union.” *Post-Soviet Issues* 4(3): 240-255, 2017, p. 241. DOI: 10.24975/2313-8920-2017-4-3-240-255

²²⁷Slezkine, Yuri. “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism.” *Slavic Review* 53 (2): 413-52, 1994, p. 415-416.

languages, and publishing in those languages.²²⁸ So, native peoples were happy living within their community, speaking and getting education in their mother tongue, and enjoying national development. The reason why Stalin promoted native languages can be found in his March 1929 article: “Why (schools, administrative apparatus, and cultural institutions working) in the native languages? – it may be asked. Because only in their native, national languages can the vast masses of the people be successful in cultural, political, and economic development.”²²⁹

In this direction, at the beginning of the 1920s, the Soviet government initiated the Latinization campaign, as there was an urgent need for rapid linguistic reform to conduct all education and government work in native languages. This “involved either changing the alphabet of a language from a script such as Arabic or Cyrillic to the Latin script or creating a new written language using the Latin script for previously exclusively oral languages.”²³⁰ In Islamic regions, Latinization emerged as a movement, because for reforming elites, the Arabic script had technical deficiencies, and the Cyrillic alphabet was related to the Tsarist missionary efforts.²³¹

Stalin put forward the concept that culture under socialism would be “proletarian in its content, national in its form.”²³² Indeed, though instruction language in local schools was national, the content of the education program, decided by the central authority, was proletarian. It would bring up not national-minded, rather socialist-minded people. Still, the national identity was consolidated through the internal passport system. In the passports, some spaces were filled with the national origin of a citizen. As Brubaker puts it, ethnic nationalism (*natsionalnost*) was “an obligatory and mainly ascriptive legal category, a key element of an individual’s legal status. As such, it was registered in internal passports and other personal documents, transmitted by descent, and recorded in almost all bureaucratic

²²⁸ Mavdsley, Evan. *The Stalin Years: The Soviet Union 1929-1953*. Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 65.

²²⁹ Mavdsley, E. (2003), p. 65.

²³⁰ Martin, T. (2001), p. 185.

²³¹ Martin, T. (2001), p. 185.

²³² Mavdsley, E. (2003), p. 65.

encounters and official transactions.”²³³ This institutionalization of nationality made members of titular nation live and work within the limits of their national territories. For example,

An Uzbek living in the Uzbek SSR both had the right to express his personal nationality (within the limits prescribed by Soviet policy) and was provided with an environment (through policies supporting the Uzbek language and culture) within which he could express it. An Uzbek living outside Uzbekistan, however, lacked this environment, and Soviet policy opposed the establishment of extraterritorial organizations to provide that environment.²³⁴

Moreover, all nations were regarded to be equal. In this regard, Slezkine argues that though all nations were not equal in their size (small nations *versus* large nations or “great-power” nations), in their development (“backward” nations *versus* “civilized” nations), in their economic (hence class, hence moral) personae (“oppressor nations” *versus* “oppressed nations”), all nations were equal because they were equally sovereign, that is, they all had the same rights.²³⁵ Yet, Russians were in an unequal position *vis-à-vis* non-Russian. For example, majority Russian territory was assigned to non-Russian republics; Russians were asked to learn non-Russian languages; and traditional Russian culture was stigmatized as a culture of oppression. Also, strict state policy was directed against great-power (or sometimes Great Russian) chauvinism as it was a greater danger than local nationalism. Paradoxically, parallel to this, Soviet terror campaigns were held against “bourgeois nationalists” in three successive major waves (1928-1930, 1932-1933, and 1937-1938), which frustrated national communists who understood that it was undermining *korenizatsiia*.²³⁶

All things considered, many scholars of Soviet nationality policies agree that as a result of nativization policies, national consciousness and national identity were consolidated throughout the Soviet Union. For example, according to Ronald Suny, “identification with nationality was for most non-Russians a far more palpable

²³³Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 31.

²³⁴Martin, T. (2001), p. 33.

²³⁵Slezkine, Y. (1994), p. 416.

²³⁶Martin, Terry (2001), p.17, 7, 23.

touchstone than the eroded loyalty to social class.”²³⁷ Brubaker stressed that “the regime had no systematic policy of “nation-destroying”. It might have abolished national republics and ethnoterritorial federalism; ... it might have ruthlessly russified the Soviet educational system... It did none of the above.”²³⁸ Or, Slezkine indicated that “it was Stalin who became the true “father of nations” (albeit not all nations and not all the time). The “Great Transformation” of 1928-1932 turned into the most extravagant celebration of ethnic diversity that any state had ever financed.”²³⁹ It is reasonable to assume the resurrection of local nationalisms throughout the Soviet space, at the end of the 1980s, was due to the effect of nativization policies. Hence, regardless of its assimilationist policies in the following decades, the Soviet apparatus was incapable of abolishing ethnic identities.

All these developments, of course, frightened the central authority, especially Stalin, who saw the reverse effects of his nationalities policies. So, starting from the middle of the 1930s, Stalin eventually softened the indigenization policy but didn't abolish it. It was time to create a supra-national identity – an atheist Soviet man that would comprise all nations based on dominant Russian culture. According to Slezkine, the “Great Retreat” of mid-1930s reduced the field of “blossoming nationalities” but called for an ever more intensive cultivation of those that bore fruit.²⁴⁰ Indeed, equality of all nations declined because the Russian people started to be viewed “first among equals” as Stalin himself praised them as the forerunner of proletarian internationalism. In the official communist party newspaper *Pravda*, it is stated:

All the peoples of the USSR, participants in the great socialist construction, can take pride in the results of their work. All of them from the smallest to the largest are equal Soviet patriots. But the first among equal is the Russian people, the Russian worker, the Russian toilers, whose role in the entire Great Proletarian Revolution, from the first victor to today's brilliant period of its development, has been exclusively great.²⁴¹

²³⁷Suny, Ronald. *The Revenge of the Past*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 121.

²³⁸Brubaker, R. (1996), p. 37.

²³⁹Slezkine, Y. (1994), p. 414.

²⁴⁰Slezkine, Y. (1994), p. 414.

²⁴¹Martin, T. (2001), p. 452.

In this context, “a greater danger” Russian nationalism started to be rehabilitated. First and foremost, Russification policy started to be employed in full sway: Cyrillic alphabet was introduced to replace Latin scripts in 1937; Russian subject became obligatory in all national schools as a result of which Russian-laden words made their way to the local dictionaries; Russian language was given priority in state organizations and official writings. In order to be able to get promotion in career ladder, local nationals started to learn Russian language.²⁴² So, to evolve to the unitary socialist state, the role of the Russian language as a means of connection was crucial in the development of cooperation among different nations of the Union. Thus, the central authority promoted the Russian language as opposed to the development of national languages.

Moreover, internal migration policies were held to change demographic composition of national territories in favor of ethnic Russians. This process was intensified during the period of industrialization, as many Russians migrated to other republics. In this sense, the Kazakhstan SSR was a special case. The ethnic Russian population there rose from 20 per cent to 40 per cent between 1926 and 1939. ²⁴³ Also, the process of collectivization affected negatively the local people as they protested to the forceful collection of their agricultural lands, products, animals, etc. In this process, people were left to starvation as a result of which millions died.²⁴⁴

In addition, during the years of Stalin’s great purges, national intellectuals such as poets, writers, and others who devoted themselves to the national cause, were purged, either killed or sent to prisons. During the Second World War years, eight nationalities – Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Karachais, Kalmyks, Ingush, Balkars, Chechens - were deported from their historic homelands to

²⁴²Martin, T. (2001), p. 344-393.

²⁴³Mavdsley, E. (2003), p. 66.

²⁴⁴The situation was worse in Kazakhstan where the percentage of Kazakh nation decreased to comprise near the half of the population. In fact, according to the data of the Soviet census, Kazakh population had dropped sharply from 3.6 million (3,637,612) in 1926 to 2.1 million (2,181,520) in 1937. See: Dave, Bhavna. Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 56.

Siberia or the Central Asia either on the charge of treasury by collaborating with Fascist Germany or because of security concerns.²⁴⁵

The death of Stalin, in 1953, brought a new era that marked certain changes in almost all spheres of life in the Union. The relaxation of Soviet totalitarianism and the advent of liberalism, albeit with restrictions, were characteristic of the mid-1950s thanks to the major reforms of Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964). In the 20th Congress, crimes of the Stalin period were made public; the rehabilitation process started; and victims of Stalin deportations, but not all of them, returned to ordinary living conditions.²⁴⁶ Moreover, the rights of Union Republics in planning their economies and running their cultural life were, to certain extent, expanded. This process became known as the “Khrushchev thaw.”²⁴⁷

In the mid-1950's, national revivalisms in the allied republics, including the Azerbaijan SSR, disturbed the center, which in its turn severely resisted them. Particularly, due to the disturbances in Poland and Hungary that shook the communist world by the end of 1956, Khrushchev slowed down and then rolled back much of his new policy. Gradually the emphasis shifted from *rastsvet* (blossoming) to promoting the eventual *sliyanie*, or fusion of the Soviet nationalities, the supreme fulfillment of a communist ideal.²⁴⁸

In this direction, Russification and antireligious policies were accelerated. Accepting Russian as the language of interethnic communication, Khrushchev contributed highly to the Russification policy. The school reform of 1958-59 was notable in this sense, as Russian was introduced as the language of instruction in the general elementary and secondary schools of the non-Russian Union Republics. This

²⁴⁵Kreindler, Isabelle. “The Soviet Deported Nationalities: A Summary and an Update.” *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1986, pp. 387-405.

²⁴⁶Referring to the deportations, Khrushchev stated that “no Marxist-Leninist and no sensible human being can understand how anyone can hold an entire people ... responsible for hostile activities, to inflict mass reprisals on them, and to expose them to hardship and misery for the subversive actions of individuals or small groups.” Khrushchev mentioned by name the Karachai, Balkars, Chechens, and Ingush, and the national republics of these peoples and of the Kalmyks were reinstated in January 1957. Yet Crimean Tatars, Germans, and Meskhetian Turks were not mentioned and were not rehabilitated. Cornell (2002) *Autonomy and Conflict*, p. 84.

²⁴⁷Hasanli, Jamil. *Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959*. USA, Lexington Books, 2015, p. x.

²⁴⁸Swietochowski, T. (1995), p. 176.

resulted in strengthening the position of Russian *vis-à-vis* the indigenous republican languages.²⁴⁹ In a similar vein, the Communist Party adopted a resolution that gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. But, in practice, in many regions, parents were strongly encouraged by local authorities to choose Russian language instruction for their children.²⁵⁰ As a result, signs of linguistic assimilation became observable as Russian language started to be highly valued by urban dwellers because of their career goals. As early as 1959, 18.2 percent of urbanized non-Russians considered Russian to be their native language, versus only 3.5 percent of the rural non-Russians. Such an outcome is also related to the elimination of urban native language schools in many autonomous republics of the RSFSR, eastern and southern Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.²⁵¹

It is noteworthy that though Soviet policies made Russian *lingua franca* in all Union, it was not the official language of the USSR, which had no official language at all, according to the constitution. It seems that giving any language official status would mean the violation of the perfect socialist content of the Soviet constitution, which guaranteed the equality of citizen's rights before the law, "without distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type and nature of occupation, domicile, or other status. The equal rights of citizens of the USSR are guaranteed in all fields of economic, political, social, and cultural life (Article 34)." And also, "Any direct or indirect limitation of the rights of citizens or establishment of direct or indirect privileges on grounds of race or nationality, and any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility, or contempt, are punishable by law (Article 36)."²⁵²

Moreover, ethnic reidentification among some non-Russians started observed as well. As the study of Anderson and Silver shows, there are extensive shifts to

²⁴⁹Bilinsky, Yaroslav. "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958–9 and Soviet Nationality Policy." *Soviet Studies*, 14:2, 138-157, 1962. DOI: 10.1080/09668136208410313

²⁵⁰Bilinsky, Yaroslav. "Education of the non-Russian Peoples in the USSR, 1917-1967, an Essay." *Slavic Review* 27 (3): 411-37, 1968.

²⁵¹Silver, Brian. "Methods of Deriving Data on Bilingualism from the 1970 Soviet Census." *Soviet Studies* 27 (4): 574-97, 1975, p. 96.

²⁵²<https://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons02.html>

Russian ethnic identity between the 1959 and 1970 censuses at an aggregate level among several non-Russian ethnic groups. The groups with the identity shift are mainly the nationalities of Autonomous Republics with official homelands in the RSFSR and with an Orthodox Christian faith. Specifically, these shifts happened among the children of intermarried couples who prioritized Russian as their ethnic identity. However, the overall rate of ethnic identity changes for non-Russians during this period was only about one percent.²⁵³ Following Barth, it can be inferred that ethnic structures as organizational units are not static cultural entities, and they do not have well-fixed borders. Rather, it is generated and used by means of the interaction of the ethnic group with its surrounding society.

After the resignation of Khrushchev, his followers continued to pursue a policy of further drawing of nationalities together (*sblizhenie*). These developments led Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) to perceive the process of forming a unified Soviet nation to be completed. As it is published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1972 and 1974:

The Soviet nation is not some new nation but an historical community of people that is much more than a nation, as it covers all USSR nations. The Soviet nation is a term that reflects a thorough change of the nature and character of Soviet nations. It expresses how close and international they have become. Still, all socialist nations form one soviet nation, being at the same time its national components.²⁵⁴

At this point, one may ask to what extent it is possible to change the nature and character, that is, “cultural givens” of a nation. To put it differently, is it possible for members of a nation to give up their primordial attachments, “myth-symbol complex”, that is, disregard their original identities for the sake of the constructed artificial identity? One might assume the difficulty of this task for a member of any ethnic group. Indeed, the national elites in titular republics and other USSR entities were afraid that the new socialist nation would be created as a result of the de-ethnicisation of nations. That is why they seemed to be content with the official

²⁵³Anderson, Barbara A. and Silver, Brian D. “Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity among non-Russians in the USSR,” *Demography* 20 (4): 461-89, 1983, p. 475.

²⁵⁴Wierzbicki, Andrzej. “Ethnicity and Power in the Soviet Union” *Post-Soviet Issues* 4 (3) 240-255, 2017, p.252. DOI: 10.24975/2313-8920-2017-4-3-240-255

wording “multinational Soviet nation” (emphasized in the Central Committee report for the 13th Party Congress held in 1966).²⁵⁵

It is important to note that if de-ethnicisation was not the common case, linguistic assimilation was a general fact throughout the Soviet space. Surveys conducted in Soviet times found out that many people preferred to use Russian both in public and private realms even though in census reports they indicated the language of their ethnic group as native language. For example, in the capital city of Armenian SSR, Erevan, one of the most homogenous non-Russian cities of the USSR, 20 percent of Armenians surveyed in 1979-81 stated that their command of Russian was better than Armenian, while 11 percent said they mainly spoke Russian at home.²⁵⁶ Yet, linguistic assimilation does not necessarily mean ethnic assimilation. The preference for Russian language can be understood through “rational choice theory”, which posits that individual preferences must be taken into account as it was mainly rational choice of the members of ethnic groups to boost their economic profits and security.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the Communist Party in 1985, he launched *perestroika* (restructuring), *glasnost* (openness to criticism and dissent), and *demokratizatsiya* (democratization) to restructure Soviet economic and political policy.²⁵⁷ As a result of his reforms that brought economic decentralization and democratization, Gorbachev faced the upsurge of ethnic nationalism in this atmosphere of freedom in all Union Republics, including Russia. He was victimized in the re-opening of Pandora’s Box as the escalation of ethnic conflicts between “brother” nations made maintaining the integrity of the Soviet Union almost impossible.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵Wierzbicki, A. (2017), p. 252.

²⁵⁶Galstian, A. P. “Nekotorye aspekty armiano-russkogo dvuiazychiia,” *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* (#6): 81-91, 1987, p. 81-83.

²⁵⁷Elliott, John E. “Gorbachev’s Perestroika.” *Contemporary Policy Issues*, Vol. VII, January 1989, pp. 35-52.

²⁵⁸For more information see: Smith, Graham. “Gorbachev’s greatest challenge: perestroika and the national question.” *Political Geography Quarterly*, Volume 8, Issue 1, January 1989, pp.7-20.

The drive for political independence among the Soviet republics started in the Baltics, and the Balts were pivotal in keeping up the momentum of the independence struggle throughout the *perestroika* period.²⁵⁹ According to the calculation of Beissinger, in the Baltic republics, the number of participants in separatist demonstrations, in 1987-1992s, ranged from 1.2 million in Estonia to 4.4 million in Lithuania. By contrast, mobilisational figures for the Central Asian republics ranged from 96,000 in Tajikistan to zero in Turkmenistan. Ukraine, Moldova, and the three Transcaucian republics were also in Beissinger's coding mobilisational successes.²⁶⁰ As Pal Kolsto puts it, "the sources of mass support seemed to stem from an urge to regain national dignity, rectify historical injustices, and save the national language and culture from extinction. No doubt such cultural concerns were central to the independence struggle, not only in the Baltics but in many other Soviet republics as well."²⁶¹

At the same time, aside from purely ethnic reasons, socio-economic factors were also crucial in fuelling ethnic nationalism. In fact, in titular republics, Russians enjoyed considerable advantages by holding political and economic power in their hands. They were generally represented in higher echelons, occupied better-paying jobs, and had more say in all spheres of social life. In this context, Karklins writes:

Perceptions of unequal access to socio-economic and occupational status play a role not only on the macro level of group relations, but on the micro level as well... Job dissatisfaction tends to be transposed into more negative ethnic views, which is bound to be even more pronounced when direct ethnic competition at work is involved. Several sources note that this is especially true for professionals and white-collar personnel, who in addition also tend to be the strata most concerned about the flourishing of native cultures.²⁶²

After all, to conclude, Soviet leaders could not hold dozens of various ethnic groups together, which was one of the crucial factors leading to the disintegration of the USSR. More specifically, the efforts of social engineers of the "Soviet nation"

²⁵⁹Kolsto, Pal. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Job Competition: Non-Russian Collective Action in the USSR under Perestroika." *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (1), 151-169, 2008, p. 151-2.

²⁶⁰Beissinger, Mark R. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 210-211.

²⁶¹Kolsto, P. (2008), p. 152.

²⁶²Karklins, Rasma. *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: the Perspective from Below*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986, p. 220.

failed in the face of ascending ethnic nationalism. The attempt to create a Soviet nation was unsuccessful since, following ethnosymbolists, without some ethnic root the nation-to-be is bound to fall apart. The same was also valid with Yugoslavia, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires as after their collapse the nation-states based on the ethnocultural core(s) have come into existence. It implies that it became impossible to create an artificial nation out of different ethnic groups through diminishing their “cultural givens.”

Indeed, it is noteworthy that once getting independence, almost all national elites reversed Soviet nationality policies in their historic territories. They started to revitalize the “myth-symbol complex” in the nation-building process. Still, it must be admitted that though more than a quarter of a century passed, this process has yet to be accomplished. It seems that it is difficult for nationalizing elites to get rid of the deep imprints of the Soviet nationality policies, which have to a great extent altered the linguistic, cultural, and demographic structure of non-Russian peoples. And also, as the inheritor of the Soviet Union, Russia, being a regional power, still strives to maintain its influence in these territories, using the Russian language as a tool.

4.2. Nation-Building Process in Soviet Azerbaijan

4.2.1. 1920-1930s

On April 28, 1920, the government of the ADR fell as the result of Bolshevik military intrusion, giving way to the government of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR). In 1921, Azerbaijan SSR formed the Transcaucasian Federation together with the Armenian SSR and the Georgian SSR. In December 1922, Azerbaijan legally joined the Soviet Union as an independent government under international treaty.²⁶³ It had “the right to freely secede the union” according to Article 4 of the organization law of the Soviet Union, adopted on June 6, 1923.²⁶⁴ Thus, all union republics of the USSR were nominally equal: at least, in theory, the

²⁶³Bayramova, Rəna. Azərbaycan Rəhbərliyində İxtilaf və Daxili Siyasi Çəkişmələr (1920-1925-ci illər). Bakı: “Elm,” 2007, p. 34, 40.

²⁶⁴Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Bolşeviklərin Şərq Siyasəti. Bakı: “Sabah,” 1994, p. 27.

Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was on an equal footing with other constituent republics, including Russia.²⁶⁵

Yet, for the “right to secede”, according to Bolshevik scholars and lawyers, this right is “dreamy independence”, “has no legal importance”, and “from the revolutionary communism point of view, it is an act born out of nationalism and anti-revolution.”²⁶⁶ In this respect, showing the intention of Bolsheviks, Rəsulzadə stated: “Seemingly, there was the rebellion of workers who decided to join Soviet Russia in Azerbaijan and Georgia. And, Moscow Bolsheviks acted without breaking the principle of nationality.”²⁶⁷

During the years 1920-1937, Secret Musavat Party issued declarations, which expressed objection to communist and Russian occupation, and distributed them secretly to people. The declaration of 27 April, 1923 says:

Comrades, Co-nationals! Today three years pass after 27 April. Three years ago, the Russian army intruded on our motherland with the slogan of ‘revolution’ and ‘communism.’ They entered the country with the help of agents who were local Azerbaijani Turks. Today it is obvious that the 27 April tragedy was not the revolution of Azerbaijani peasants and workers, as communists shouted everywhere. It is the barbaric occupation of the simple Russian army. Hundred years ago, tsarist Russia occupied and annexed Azerbaijani khanates with the same brutality. At that time, Azerbaijani Turks were groaning under the dirty boots of Sisianovs. With the 27 April tragedy, Azerbaijan, for the second time, came under the authority of the new Sisianov of the Russian army – Orjonikidze. The result in both cases was the same.”²⁶⁸

Such kind declarations caused disturbances and enthusiasms in the society, thus intensified the heavy attacks of the Soviet apparatus against Musavatists. The bolshevik lexicon called all patriots in Azerbaijan as Musavatist. Musavatism was the synonym for patriotism. According to the decision of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (ACP) assembly, convened in 1932, it had to struggle against the Musavat Party not only inside, but also abroad.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁵Svante E. Cornell, Halil Karaveli, Boris Ajeganov. *Azerbaijan’s Formula: Secular Governance and Civic Nationhood*. Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program - A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2016, p. 38.

²⁶⁶Rəsulzadə, M.Ə. (1994), p. 27.

²⁶⁷Rəsulzadə, M.Ə. (1994), p. 25.

²⁶⁸Yaqublu, N. Q. (2012), p. 118-121.

²⁶⁹Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 93.

Indeed, looking at the dialogue between Stalin and Resulzade, it becomes clear that the nationalism movement was very effective in those years: Stalin told Resulzade: “You have made a government in Azerbaijan for a short of time. But you have left a deep footprint. We are still fighting this footprint. It is required to work hard and more to eliminate the effects of the idea you represent. Especially intellectuals have been infused with the spirit of nationalism,” and then personally turning to Resulzade, he asked: “What do you think is the main factor of this nationalism?”, “What is called nationalism is not something apart from protecting the existence of another human association. As it is natural and legal for the self-protection of individuals, it is also a natural phenomenon for the national collective to defend their peculiarities,” Resulzade answered.²⁷⁰

In response to the Russian Army’s occupation and killing, an armed rebellion took place in various cities of the country such as Ganja, Tartar, Agdam, Shusha, and Zagatala, from May 26 to June 20, 1920. However, these riots and several others took part in other regions of Azerbaijan were severely crushed by the Russian Army. Studies show that in the mid-1920, though the resistance movement was weakened, occasional protests continued in various places. As Stalin claimed, Bolsheviks worked hard that only from April 28, 1920, to August 1921, 48 thousand people became victims of red terror in Azerbaijan.²⁷¹

Defining the Soviet system as centralism under the guise of federalism, Resulzade indicated that in all republics, the communist parties were by name “national.” However, the situation of these parties was not different from the status of one of the provincial committees of the Communist Party of Russia. They received their instructions from Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party.²⁷² He argued: “The history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan is the history of the cleansing of the party’s rows from *milli sapıntıçılıq* (national deviationism). National deviationism means the actions of local communists that intend to protect the party and the Soviet administrations from the extreme interference of Moscow. *Sapıntıçılık*

²⁷⁰Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 47.

²⁷¹Bayramova, R. (2007), p. 14.

²⁷²Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1994), p. 32.

(deviationism) is Russian *uklonist*. *Uklon* means deviation from the right path. Those who disagree with the basic beliefs of communism and do not adhere to party discipline were called by this name.”²⁷³ In fact, in 1924, the ACP Secretary-General, Ayub Khanbudagov, was called deviationist because of his views. He demanded: “1. From now on, Moscow will not interfere in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan; 2. Labor unions, enterprises and co-operatives will be Turkified not nominally but actually. 3. The settlement policy of the Soviet government, which wants to set up Azerbaijan with displaced Russians, will end.”²⁷⁴ As a result, Khanbudagov was exiled from Azerbaijan. Henceforth, to the Secretary General of the ACP was sent foreign secretaries appointed by Moscow.²⁷⁵ In this regard, I. Vatssek in the Transcaucasian Communist Party’s First Congress (February 1922) proudly said:

The annihilation of inter-party conflicts is not the service of the Caucasian Bureau and any other party committees, it is the result of the party’s purification... In Azerbaijan, we have swept all the nationalists... After the party is swept and cleaned with the iron broom, the conversation can be carried out in a more businesslike manner.²⁷⁶

As a result, of the 2164 party members in Baku, 760 people (or 35 per cent of all communists) were expelled from the party.²⁷⁷ Bolshevik emissaries sent from Moscow to Baku - Pankratov, G. K. Kaminsky, S. Orjonikidze, Lominadze, S. M. Kirov, L. Mirzoyan, Sarkis, A. Mikoyan and others fought against all kinds of nationality in Azerbaijan, and pursued a policy of repression against national intellectuals.²⁷⁸

Taking everything into account, the Soviet regime encouraged both local narrow-mindedness and forceful Russification in Azerbaijan. The operation in this two direction aimed at cutting off the relationships with the past and intensifying the integration of Azerbaijan into the Soviet system. Such an attitude of the central government against the “independence” of Azerbaijan led to the emergence of

²⁷³Rəsulzadə M. Ə. (1991), p. 95.

²⁷⁴Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 95.

²⁷⁵Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 95.

²⁷⁶Bayramova, R (2007), p. 18-19.

²⁷⁷Bayramova, R (2007), p.19.

²⁷⁸Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 208.

national issue in the country. And there were two opposing forces – “leftists” and “rightists” in relation to the national cause. Local communists Samed Agamalioglu, Ruhulla Akhundov, Mirza Davud Huseynov, Aliheydar Garayev and others represented “leftists” that were prone to the Center. They offered the implementation of Russia’s experience in Azerbaijan by force, ignoring national traditions, not trusting national cadres. At the same time, they thought that Azerbaijan must not be independent and be united with Russia. In contrast to them, “rightists” such as Nariman Narimanov, Ayub Khanbudagov, Mahmud Khanbudagov and others were regarded to be nationalists. They argued that Russia’s experience should not be blindly applied, i.e local conditions, and national traditions should be taken into account. They thought that Azerbaijan SSR had to be independent and the national cadres should be represented by Azerbaijani Turks. In short, they opposed to the centralist-internationalist politics of Soviet Russia.²⁷⁹

It is notable that Nariman Narimanov, the chief of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, initially believed in Bolshevik Party and social democracy when it was the main theory and acted fiercely for the sake of this belief.²⁸⁰ Indeed, the head of the National Economic Council, N. Solovyov, wrote in his report entitled “Our policy in Azerbaijan within three months after the coup” that even among Azerbaijani elites before the coup, there were some who favored the Soviet power.²⁸¹

In this context, Narimanov wrote about their belief in the sincerity of the calls about the freedom of nations. But when that party was consolidated in the power and the theory turned into practice, this belief also went upside down. Narimanov became sure that no party represented Azerbaijan and would not be one until the Mirzoyans gave up their dirty policies of impersonalizing Azerbaijan.²⁸² In his letter to Lenin, he wrote: “Dear Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, did not independent Azerbaijan come from your tongue? After all, on this basis, we were able to destroy the mischievousness of Musavat. Now the situation gets such a picture: Armenia, which has always protected

²⁷⁹Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 208-213.

²⁸⁰Əfəndiyev, E. İ. Nəriman Nərimanov - Şəxsiyyəti və Fəaliyyəti. Bakı: “Azərneşr,” 1997, p. 9.

²⁸¹Bayramova, R. (2007), p. 14.

²⁸²Əfəndiyev, E. İ. (1997), p. 9.

Denikin, has gained independence, even more than that, it has taken the territory of Azerbaijan. Georgia, which has so far pursued dual politics, gained independence. Being the first of three republics, Azerbaijan was thrown into the arms of Soviet Russia, lost its territory and independence.”²⁸³ Indeed, after being occupied by the Russian Army, Azerbaijan lost 29.338,2 sq. km territories to Armenia and Georgia.²⁸⁴

At the beginning of the 1920s, Narimanov struggled fiercely against the “leftists”. In his letter to Stalin, Narimanov complained about the deeds of the “leftists” who intended to diminish the number of the Turkish language lessons and wrote mischievous articles about the nationalist tendency. In his article called “A response to some comrades!” in the newspaper “Bakinski Rabochi”, he wrote: “Turkish language has been announced to be the state language in Azerbaijan, so, the laws and priorities of this language must be fully used in Azerbaijan. No one can abolish it... Azerbaijan cannot abstain from his mother tongue and cannot allow anyone to diminish the role and the meaning of this language in Azerbaijan.”²⁸⁵

In this regard, Resulzade stated that the attempts against the Turkish nationality should have been so advanced that even Nariman himself was obliged to write articles against it on newspaper columns. In his article published in the Russian “Bakinski Rabochi” and Turkish “Komunist” newspapers Narimanov said: “The workers and peasants of Azerbaijan can surrender their political rights, all of their properties and economic benefits but shall not sacrifice their language.” To criticize Narimanov, Resulzade stated: “But can a nation protect his language and nationality if he remains indifferent to his land and the economics that constitute the essence of life? If not anyone, Marxists should know that it is impossible.”²⁸⁶

According to Resulzade, the Russification policy of the Russian bolshevik authority in Azerbaijan exposed in two ways: Centralization in the economy; Russification in the field of culture. The economic centralism consisted of subordinating the country to the economic plans of Moscow. For this purpose, the oil

²⁸³Nərimanov, N. Seçilmiş Əsərləri. Bakı: “Lider nəşriyyatı”, 2004, p. 466.

²⁸⁴Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 14.

²⁸⁵Əfəndiyev E. İ. (1997), p. 7.

²⁸⁶Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti. Bakı: “Elm,” 1990, p. 70.

industry of Azerbaijan was administered directly from Moscow. Azerbaijan became the second cotton-growing region after Turkistan for the common interests of the Soviet Union industry. The Russification of the culture was a real tragedy of Azerbaijan. In the early years of Sovietization, this policy was masked by the Bolshevik formula “national in form and socialist in content.” But then, Soviet cultural figures attempted to break away the Azerbaijani literature from its civilized and historical roots and bring it and the entire system of people’s culture to the new Soviet way. The forces loyal to Azerbaijan’s national traditions resisted this policy. As a result of this confrontation, a sharp struggle began in Azerbaijan between two hostile currents: on the one hand, the partisans of the Sovietization, i.e., of Russian politics, and the supporters of the continuation and development of national and Turkic characteristics of the culture.²⁸⁷

Apart from the national cause, Bolsheviks attacked the religion and the religious men starting from the first days. Bolsheviks claimed that religious leaders hindered the cultural development and progress of the masses. The lands of the religious leaders were taken away from them, and the state medressehs were closed. Also, mullahs were forbidden to engage in family-marital affairs. The anti-religious propaganda was very active in 1923-1924. On January 8, 1924, at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, the issue of “anti-religious propaganda” was discussed and a commission was set up to organize the combat against the religion. In this regard, in 1924, with the establishment of *Allahsızlar Cəmiyyəti* (The Society of the Godless) in Baku, the struggle against religion was further strengthened. The Bolshevik press wrote that the main task of the Society of the Godless is to unite all conscious workers and peasants under a struggle of atheism, to estrange workers from the religious prejudices, and to form a materialist outlook on them. In 1929, this society was transformed into the *Mübariz Allahsızlar İttifaqı* (The Union of the Fighting Godless) to strengthen their struggle against the religion.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 98-99.

²⁸⁸Bayramova, R. (2007), p. 43.

According to Musteqil Aghayev, many people, either voluntarily or contrary to their will, joined atheist organizations to ensure their safety. He writes that the propaganda of atheism took on all areas of activity. Historians and philosophers took first place in this work. It did not matter whether they understood the essence of the religion or not, a great number of philosophers went to the atheism front and devoted all their efforts and abilities to this area.²⁸⁹ Moreover, massive closure of mosques, churches, and synagogues began in Azerbaijan. The Koran was forbidden as a malicious book. Almost all mosques in the districts of Azerbaijan either were destroyed or turned into warehouses, clubs, and libraries. In general, in 1929, 120 mosques were seized in the districts of Azerbaijan and started to operate as schools. In addition, 400 mosques were closed during the election campaign in the same year. Furthermore, the communist newspaper wrote it was necessary to annul the national and religious holidays of Azerbaijan and replace them with revolutionary holidays. Novruz holiday, which was rooted in the people's mind in those years, was also banned under the curtain of religion.²⁹⁰ In addition, national traditions, national outfit, musical instruments, and national art were under attack. In 1920s, in the cultural rallies held by the young people, especially by Komsomols, the slogans such as “Get off the chadra (headscarf)!”, “Get off the papag (hat)!”, “Get off the chokha (a Caucasian male coat)!”, “Get rid of the tar (musical instrument)!”, “Get rid of the kamancha (musical instrument)!” were put forward.²⁹¹

To the opinion of Gazanfaroglu, in general, there were dual view of religion in Azerbaijan during the USSR: 1) the moderators (N. Narimanov, S. M. Efendiyev and others); 2) the radicals (S. Agamalioglu, R. Akhundov, A. Garayev and others). He writes: “True, both of them aimed at the destruction of the Islamic religion. Simply, the difference was that the former preferred evolution and not using force, while the latter intended to destroy the religion of Islam immediately and violently.”²⁹²

²⁸⁹Ağayev, M. B. XX Əsr Azərbaycan İctimai və Fəlsəfi Fikrində Din Problemi. Bakı: “Nurlan,” 2008, p. 98.

²⁹⁰Azərbaycan Tarixi: aprel 1920-iyun 1941. VII cildə, VI cild, Bakı: “Elm,” 2008, p. 292-293.

²⁹¹Memmedov, Ç. İ. Azərbaycanın Siyasi Tarixi (XIX-XX əsrlər). Bakı: “Avropa,” 2006, p. 244.

²⁹²Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 283.

Indeed, Narimanov's speech at the second congress of the Azerbaijan Communist Party is proof that he was against the strict measures: "We have such Muslim communists that immediately after entering the village, push the people out of the mosque and give orders to close the mosques. It is a fact. Such communists are proud of their deeds and think they are doing a great job. They think that they are expanding and strengthening our revolution. I call them anti-revolutionist, because they corrupt our work."²⁹³ According to M. S. Ordubadi, Narimanov was in favor of the idea of reconciling communism with Islam.²⁹⁴ In their turn, "leftists" like S. Agamalioglu, R. Akhundov, S. Efendiyev, A. Garayev and others came together in "Materialist Club", in 1923, and claimed that praying, going to pilgrimage and other Islamic rites were strange to the physical and spiritual development of the working people. They advocated scientific communism and atheism among the people, and argued against not only religious prejudice, but against Islam as a whole.²⁹⁵

However, Narimanov was accused of being both "rightist", that is to say, nationalist and a protector of Islam. It should be stated that his novel *Bahadır və Sona* (Bahadır and Sona), which is one of the best works of democratic realist Azerbaijani literature at the end of XIX century, is a proof that he was internationalist. In this sense, Narimanov stated that for the first time in this novel he had spoken about the separation of the state and church 20 years ago, called for the destruction of nations and the reunion of Armenian Sona with Turkish Bahadır. He wrote: "I confirm that my novel *Bahadır və Sona* had already been successful when comrade Mikoyan was Dashnak. Then, after 20 years why should I become nationalist and comrade Mikoyan internationalist?"²⁹⁶

Hence, due to the operations of the "leftists", "rightists" such as Narimanov, Khanbudagov were taken away from the administration of Azerbaijan, but the destiny of the first group ended up worse than that of the second group. In this respect, Efendiyev writes: "These men (i.e. the leftists – N.G) were politicians who created

²⁹³ Azərbaycan Tarixi: aprel 1920-iyun 1941, p. 292.

²⁹⁴ Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 17.

²⁹⁵ Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 283.

²⁹⁶ Nərimanov, N. Seçilmiş Əsərləri, p. 429-430.

the system and served fervently to that system, and the great lawfulness of this system was that those people themselves were shot down by the system itself.”²⁹⁷ Though there are different views on the activities of Narimanov, some writers evaluate his positive role for the country and nation. For instance, Efendiyev thinks that if there had not been the activity of Narimanov after the establishment of the Soviet authority in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan’s future national development would have stagnated.²⁹⁸ Moreover, F. Ahmadova in her dissertation titled “The Political Activity of N. Narimanov (1920-1921 years)” concluded that “Narimanov is the reality of his time. To pull him off his period and environment is historical, scientific, and political mistake.”²⁹⁹

In this context, Resulzade stated that when he was in Berlin, in 1942-1943, he witnessed one negative and one positive thing. He learned the features of the new generation of Azerbaijan at the meeting with Azerbaijani prisoners. For the negative thing, it was noteworthy that the Azerbaijani prisoners were completely illiterate in religious matters. A new generation in Azerbaijan was neutral against the religion. They did not even know the simplest things of religious ceremonies and worships. Mosques were closed in the country. Neither Ramadan nor Kurban holiday was known to the Soviet youth. Nowruz holiday, which was of great importance in the old days, had also fallen in fashion. Azerbaijan celebrated only the political holidays of the October Revolution and the day of its Sovietization. For the older generation, it was a tragedy, but the youth, with few exceptions, did not feel this tragedy.³⁰⁰ For the positive thing, Resulzade indicated that the new generation could read and write in their language. Resulzade asked the prisoners: “Do you have a few hundred university graduates in Azerbaijan to meet the administrative and economic needs of the country?” My interviewees answered nervously: “What do you say, speak about the thousands, not the hundreds... We are in a state of self-control!” Moreover, along

²⁹⁷Əfəndiyev, E. İ. (1997), p. 7.

²⁹⁸Əfəndiyev, E. İ. (1997), p. 19.

²⁹⁹Əmrahov, M. (2009), p. 17.

³⁰⁰Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 104.

with the mother tongue, prisoners also knew Russian, but very weak, as there was opposition against the Russian language in the Caucasus.³⁰¹

Indeed, the education level of Azerbaijanis started to increase in those years. High schools focused on increasing the number of representatives of the local population. 171 (32%) out of the 535 students, in the 1928/29 academic year and 1147 (73.6%) out of the 1559 students of the Medical Institute, in 1932, were Azerbaijanis. Of the 2792 applicants admitted to higher educational institutions in the 1930/31 academic year, 1567 (56.1 percent) were Azerbaijanis. In general, percent of Azerbaijani students in all higher education institutions rose from 27.3 to 50.5 in 1925. The number of Azerbaijani student girls rose from 149 to 838. At the same time, a number of Azerbaijani students were sent to higher educational institutions in Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg). In 1925, 120 Azerbaijani students were sent to the universities of the RSFSR and other Soviet republics.³⁰²

All these developments can be explained by the *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) policies of the central state that initiated the development of national languages in each respective national territory and the training of national cadres to the administrative positions. According to Swietochowski, these policies saw their immediate results in Azerbaijan SSR. Turkification was carried on by increasing the proportion of Azerbaijani Turks in the university. By 1930, they accounted for about 70 percent of students and about 75 percent of instructors.³⁰³ It should be stated that one of the most important measures of the Soviet government to eliminate illiteracy was to move from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet. On June 27, 1924, the Latin alphabet began to be used officially by the administration of the Azerbaijani SSR. When in February 1926, the First Soviet Turcology Congress met in Baku, the question of the new alphabet for all the Soviet Turkic nationalities was on the top of the agenda. With the introduction of the Latin-based alphabets, Soviet Turkic peoples

³⁰¹Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 103-105.

³⁰²Azərbaycan Tarixi: aprel 1920-iyun 1941, p. 206.

³⁰³Swietochowski, T. (1995), p. 112.

accelerated the growth of their distinct literary languages, the basis for the formation of their national identities.³⁰⁴

On July 21, 1928, a decision was made on the “Compulsory and Final Application of the New Turkish Alphabet in Azerbaijan.” The Government’s appeal to “all the workers and peasants of Azerbaijan” stated that the application of the new alphabet would greatly facilitate the elimination of illiteracy and the great interest in raising the education level of the masses. But, the representatives of Musavat, Ittihad, some religious figures, and intellectuals opposed the new alphabet. Musavatists residing in Turkey actively defended the supporters of the Arabic alphabet in Azerbaijan through the “Yeni Kavkasiya” newspaper published in Istanbul.³⁰⁵

However, the movement of the new alphabet began in Turkey as well. At the beginning of 1928, the “Ash-Shura” newspaper reported that a conference of Turkish public representatives in Istanbul had decided “the Turkish language should use the Latin alphabet.” In the autumn of that year, Turkey passed into the Latin alphabet.³⁰⁶ Terry Martin argues that there seem to have two reasons for adopting the Latin script by the Turkic elites: Cultural Revolution and pan-Turkism. “The genius of Latinization was to advance pan-Turkic sentiments through a purely cultural and symbolic movement that officially served the orthodox Bolshevik goal of overcoming eastern cultural-backwardness... The Turkish Republic’s adoption of the Latin script in 1928 was a major triumph for the pan-Turkic component of the Latinization campaign.”³⁰⁷

However, this situation changed from the mid-1930s, when Stalin curbed his indigenization policies and precipitated Russification policies. As a result, in Azerbaijan, especially in Baku, the network of Russian schools was widened. Since 1926, the Russian language started to be taught in non-Russian elementary schools beginning from the third class. In March 1938, a special decision was made to learn

³⁰⁴Swietochowski, T. (1995), p. 113.

³⁰⁵Azərbaycan Tarixi: aprel 1920-iyun 1941, p. 284-285.

³⁰⁶Azərbaycan Tarixi: aprel 1920-iyun 1941, p. 285.

³⁰⁷Martin, T. (2001), p. 189-192.

the Russian language compulsory in non-Russian schools.³⁰⁸ The scope of the Russian language expanded after the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR adopted the law on the replacement of the Latin alphabet with the Cyrillic in July 1939 (this law came into force on January 1, 1940). So, in a short time, the alphabet changed twice in Azerbaijan. In this respect, Gazanfaroglu explains that the Soviet regime and its ideologists found it hard to depart Azerbaijan from Turkey when the Republic of Turkey was formed and the name of the nation and the language was accepted to be Turk. So, first of all, the transition from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet was put forward. As Turkey followed the same move, Soviet ideologists decided to attack the Turkism of Azerbaijan altogether. First of all, in 1937, the concept of “Turk” was removed from the name of the language and the nation of Azerbaijan. Then, in 1940, the Latin alphabet was replaced by Cyrillic. Thus, there remained almost no sign of official expression of Turkishness in Azerbaijan.³⁰⁹

It is noteworthy that in a very short period of time Azerbaijan together with other Turkic-speaking countries was to suffer from not owing its own national alphabet³¹⁰ contrary to his next-door neighbours Georgia and Armenia, as Cornell puts it:

Before the 1920s, the alphabet used locally had been the Arabic one; the switch to the Latin alphabet had left many people unable to read or write, and this was repeated with the redirection to Cyrillic. Only the Georgians and Armenians with their distinct alphabets, and later the three Baltic republics when they were incorporated into the Soviet Union, were exempted from this switch to Cyrillic.³¹¹

Moreover, the Soviet authority, to infuse its numerous ethnocultural communities into a single whole, embarked hierarchical system of central and

³⁰⁸Memmedov, Ç. İ. (2006), p. 244.

³⁰⁹Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 543.

³¹⁰According to famous Azerbaijani professor of linguistics Firudin Aghasioglu, up to XIX century Turkish people (Bulgars, Gagauzes, Sekells, Magyars, Cossacks, Karaims and others) used Turkish Runic scripts along with Arabic, Latin and Cyrillic. He thinks that there is no doubt that the Turks (Etruscan Turks) were one of the founders of this alphabet, now called the Latin alphabet. In other words, the ancient Runic alphabet of the Turks had a serious influence on the formation of the Latin alphabet, with the direct participation of the Etrusks. In this sense, the Latin script, comes from the same source as the Turkish Runic alphabet. The same words can be said about the Cyrillic alphabet created by the synthesis of Latin and Runic alphabets, because Turkish Runic alphabet played an important role in the creation of the Cyrillic alphabet. Ağasıoğlu, F. *Azərbaycan Türklərinin İslamaqədər Tarixi. I Bitik: Tarixi qaynaqlar*. Bakı, “Ağrıdağ,” 2014, p. 138, 151, 140.

³¹¹Cornell, Svante. *Autonomy and Conflict, Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus - Cases in Georgia*. Uppsala University, PhD thesis, 2002, p. 79.

regional academic institutions to rewrite the ancient histories of these groups. For its Muslim communities, the overwhelming majority of which were Turkic peoples, with no developed national historiographical traditions of their own, the Soviet Oriental Studies program created history textbooks and produced narratives within the framework of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, to re-formulate collective memories and national identities. It must have been a difficult task for those scholars to create Azerbaijani history and culture, which is part of the Islamic and Turkic world while operating very carefully in order not to be accused of “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism”.³¹²

In this respect, Soviet historiography was mobilized in this direction with the order of Stalin to Babacan Gafurov, a Tajik scholar, while appointing him to the directorate of the Institute of Oriental Studies (Academy of the Sciences of USSR): “I appoint you there as a director. You must prove that there does not live a Turk in the USSR”. They followed the order by doing their best to prove that Turks did not historically exist in South Azerbaijan and Iran, and Azerbaijanis are the Persian people, which were Turkified during the Seljuks. Iranian institutes and scholars joined them in this task as well.³¹³ So, the history books denied the Turkic origin of Azerbaijanis. They claimed the Turkification took place in the XI century with the influx of Seljuk Turks. According to Soviet historiography, the origin of Azerbaijani people traces to the Medians, an Indo-European people who had settled in the eastern parts of present-day Iran, around Hamadan and Isfahan in the 9th century BC, and subsequently formed a state.³¹⁴ However, it is noteworthy that this thesis of official Soviet history was refuted by the anti-thesis “Turks of Azerbaijan live here from ancient times” of national historians such as Y. Yusifov, S. Aliyarli, G. Geybullayev, and K. Aliyev during the weakening period of the Soviet Union. In 1983, these historians, for the first time in the history of Azerbaijani Soviet Historiography, presented their notifications in the meeting called “Ethnogenesis of Azerbaijani people” held in the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan.

³¹²Garagozov, R. (2012), p. 136-137.

³¹³Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 31-32.

³¹⁴Geukjian, Ohannes. *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, p. 26.

The common point of their papers was that Azerbaijani Turks did not come to this region with Seljuk Turks in the XI-XII century, they used to live here, and Azerbaijani Turkish has been a language used in this land since ancient times.³¹⁵

Yilmaz argues that as ethnonym Turk started to have a narrow meaning as the name of the titular nation in Turkey, in the 1930s, it created a problem for Azerbaijani Turkic identity. So, a possible solution would have been to remove it from the designation of Azerbaijani identity to avoid confusion. Correspondingly, in those years, the nation-making policy of Reza Shah in Iran made Turks of South Azerbaijan an inseparable part of the new Iranian national identity. According to the official line, all Iranians, including Azerbaijani Turks, were of one race (Aryan). Before Turkification, the original language of Azerbaijan was a local Iranian language, *Azari*, which was related to Persian.³¹⁶

So, both Soviet and Iran history-telling deprived the people of historical Azerbaijan of their Turkic roots. As a matter of fact, in 1936, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan were registered as “Azerbaijanis”, whereas in the 1926 census the name of the people was defined as “Turks”. Its essence was the ascendance of parochial, ethnic, and secular nationalism, hostile to any broader vision such as Turkism and indifferent to the mirage of Azerbaijani unity. The regime promoted Azerbaijani particularism and intensified Russification, which seems at odds with each other. This two-pronged operation aimed to cut the links to the past and ensure Azerbaijan’s integration into the Soviet system.³¹⁷

In this regard, it should be stressed that the plan of changing the name of this nation was first promulgated at the beginning of the 19th century. Griboyedov, a famous personality of Russia, who was an ambassador to Tehran, in his report to Peterburg, wrote that this nation was unique and called Turk. He proposed that we either must occupy the whole of Azerbaijan or by dismantling it we must call the people living in the north of the Araxes River “Oghuz” or “Tatar” to separate them. In

³¹⁵Ağayev, Elnur. “Azerbaycan’ın Etnik Yapısı”, *Yeni Türkiye* 53/2013, p. 1035.

³¹⁶Yilmaz, Harun. *National Identities in Soviet Historiography: The Rise of Nations under Stalin*. Taylor and Francis Inc., 2015, p. 24-26.

³¹⁷Swietochowski, T. (1995), p. 127-128.

another report, it was proposed that it would be more accurate (that is to say, more favorable for the aims of the Empire) to call them “Azerbaijani” in tune with the name of the country.³¹⁸

Hence, the designation “Azerbaijani” started to have “double meaning”, that is, to perform as an “ethnic name” for ethnically Turkic people only, as well as a citizenship identity for non-Turkic minorities of Azerbaijan. As Elnur Aghayev puts it,

1. The definition “Azerbaijanis” will be perceived as the identity of Azerbaijani Turks that comprise the majority of the population. The reason is that while the names of most other ethnicities will be preserved in the censuses, the name of Azerbaijan Turks will not be included and they will register themselves to the Azerbaijani “nation” 2. While some of the other ethnicities who are citizens of Azerbaijan do not see their names in the censuses, will prefer to choose the name Azerbaijani, and some will be obliged to choose the name Azerbaijani expressed as more united and belonging to the homeland presented in addition to their ethnic identities.³¹⁹

The symbol of this period was Mir Jafar Baghirov, who in 1933 became the head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan SSR and ruled the country for twenty years. He contributed to the campaign with attacks on Azerbaijan’s history. As a result, rewriting history placed great emphasis on the primacy of the Russian “elder brother”, the “superiority of Russian culture”, and the Russian conquest as an “absolute good”.³²⁰ In order to accelerate Russification for the Soviet apparatus, it was essential to perish the national intelligentsia who stood for the national cause. Indeed, the murderous 1937 purges across the Union destroyed valuable national intellectuals labeled as “public enemies”. Most of them either were shot down or sent to exile. In Azerbaijan, the situation was terrifying as well. Bunyadov Ziya, in his book “Red Terror”, wrote that during 1936-1938 years almost 70-80 thousand Azerbaijani intellectuals – scholar, writer, artist, teacher, young, religious person, the party office employee, serviceman, in one word – all thinking brains were destructed. They were killing even those that knew one foreign language. The machine of death and penalty was working without stopping. In addition, the number of the family

³¹⁸Elçibəy, Ə. Bütöv Azərbaycan Yolunda. Bakı: “Nurlar,” 2004, p. 12-13.

³¹⁹Ağayev, Elnur. “Azərbaycan’ın Etnik Yapısı.” Yeni Türkiyə 53/2013, p. 1034.

³²⁰Altstadt, A. L. The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p. 159.

members of the “public enemies” sent to the special exiles is unknown. Moreover, the repression against the nation continued in the 1940-50s as well. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to count the number of thousands of people killed by those who administered Soviet Azerbaijan.³²¹ It should be added that even those “leftists” such as Ruhulla Akhundov, Aliheydar Garayev, Sultan Majid Efendizade, and others, who fought fiercely against panturanism and panturkism, became the victims of Stalin repression. They were charged with being the representative of panturkism, agent of Musavat Party, and international fascism.³²²

4.2.2. 1940-1960s

The 1941-1945 period entered the history of the USSR as the Great Patriotic War. The german-Soviet war started with the attack of Germany. In the occupation plans of Germany, Azerbaijan, especially, oil-rich Baku had strategical and geopolitical importance. The Soviet authority mobilized the population, especially the people of national republics against the enemy. The administrative system of Azerbaijan was consolidated under the leadership of Mirjafar Baghirov. From the first days of the war, more than 50 thousand men and women gave petitions to go to the front. In total, from Azerbaijan to the Soviet army 575 thousand men and 10 thousand women were mobilized and sent to the front. 83,604 of them died in the war, and 123,213 of them were lost (total 206,817 people). 368,183 people came back from the war. Moreover, in 1941, 23.5-million-ton petroleum, which was the highest volume in Azerbaijan history, was produced. It is, in turn, comprised 71.4 percent of the petroleum produced in the Union.³²³

With the beginning of the war, Stalin softened his nationality policy to be able to make a call to his non-Russian people to fight against invaders on the ground of love to the homeland. Several measures such as the abolishment of the assaults against “nationalists”, lifting the ban of traditional literature, including dastans or

³²¹Bünyadov, Ziya. *Qırmızı Terror*, Bakı: “Qanun,” 2017, p. 6-7.

³²²Rəsulzadə, M. Ə. (1991), p. 101-102.

³²³Memmedov, Ç. İ. (2006), p. 246-247.

heroic epics with “wrong” historical connotations, and popular songs were undertaken. Even mosques were reopened, and one of the newly founded four union-wide spiritual directorates was instituted in Azerbaijan.³²⁴ Yet, the milieu of tolerance came to an end in no time after the war had been over. It should be noted that during war years the spirit of national freedom among the youth was powerful. In 1942, with the initiative of Gulhuseyn Abdullayev, three students of Azerbaijan State University formed an anti-Soviet organization called *İldırım* (Lightning). Later, some others joined the organization, the goal of which was to fight for independent Azerbaijan. But the organization could function until 1946, and all of its members were imprisoned in 1948.³²⁵

The death of Stalin ushered a liberal atmosphere in the Union, with Nikita Khrushchev at the head of the Soviet apparatus. The so-called “Khrushchev thaw” was visible in every part of the Union, as well as in Azerbaijan. At the XX Congress of the ACP, in February 1954, Imam Mustafayev, a professor of biology, was elected to the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Sadykh Rahimov was appointed the head of the Council of Ministers. Mirza Ibrahimov, a writer, was appointed the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. The new government worked hard for the betterment of people’s life. Apart from their services in other sectors, they made a significant contribution to the national cause of Azerbaijan. In the new atmosphere, they strived to promote national-moral values and national culture, cultivate the national cadres in the economic-public life of the capital, etc.³²⁶ Their most notable achievement was the inclusion of the article on enforcing the Azerbaijani language’s status as the state language to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR in August 1956. As Jamil Hasanli puts forward, due to the wide and universal application of the Azerbaijani language in state institutions, national self-consciousness and national sentiments of Azerbaijanis were promoted.³²⁷ The rewriting of history in the 1950s and 1960s was a struggle to

³²⁴Bolukbasi, S. *Azerbaijan: A Political History*. London, New York. I. B. Tauris, 2011, p. 122.

³²⁵Memmedov, Ç. İ. (2006), p. 257.

³²⁶Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, 2008, p. 114.

³²⁷Hasanli, Jamil (2015), p. x.

recover the past, the cornerstone to identity. Authors resisted Russian claims to cultural superiority and political domination but could not escape the “elder brother” and “new Soviet man” rhetoric of the regime. Writers could express love for the homeland, not the “socialist homeland” but Azerbaijan.³²⁸

Moreover, hundreds of state bureaucrats, literary, and art figures labeled as “public enemy” such as Ruhulla Akhundov, Huseyn Javid, Ahmed Javad, Mikayil Mushfig, Yusif Vazir Çemenzeminli, and others were justified. *Kitabi-Dede Gorgud*, a valuable monumental epic in terms of history, language, folklore, and ethnography of Azerbaijani people, together with some written monuments were freed. Also, works of acquitted poets and writers were re-published. New poems that critically analyzed the social-political events were written as well. Bakhtiyar Vahabzade’s poem *Gülüstan* was most notable of them.³²⁹ In those years, Vahabzade became very popular, and his works written in the spirit of national liberty were read and discussed both in public and in secret.³³⁰ His work *Gülüstan* is about the 1813 Gulustan Treaty, which describes the tragedy of two brothers who became separated as a result of this treaty, allegorically referring to the separation of Azerbaijan into two parts.³³¹ The author asserts that Iran and Russia had no right to divide up the land they do not own, as “after all, this land has its owners!”³³² It should be added that two-thirds of Azerbaijani Turks still reside in the Northern provinces of Iran (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil), called Southern Azerbaijanis, “a well integrated linguistic minority”³³³ within Iran’s frontiers. Thus, Azerbaijani Turks have so far been bereft

³²⁸ Altstadt, A. (1992), p. 174.

³²⁹ Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər. 2008, p. 115.

³³⁰ Cəfərov, Nizami. Bəxtiyar Vahabzadə. Bakı, “Azərbaycan,” 1996, p. 21.

³³¹ With Gulustan (1813) and Turkmençay (1828) treaty between Russia and Iran, the territory of Azerbaijan was separated along the river Araxes, the north of it, that is Northern Azerbaijan fell under the control of Russia, and the south of it, that is the Southern Azerbaijan was occupied by Iran

³³² Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 73.

³³³ Higgins, P. J. “Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran.” *Iranian Studies* 17 (1): 37–71, 1984, p. 59.

of “the benefits of territorial-ethnic unity, a fact that would be seen as an impediment for their evolution into a nation.”³³⁴

Besides, thousands of political fighters, innocent victims, and the emigrants of 1920-1930s forced to go abroad due to their struggle for independence were not justified. The ban on lots of works about Turkish people’s history and unity such as Huseyn Javid’s *Topal Teymur* and *Peygamber* (The Prophet) was not lifted. Attempts to study the history of Azerbaijan objectively were prevented by the center and evaluated as an act of “nationalism”.³³⁵ A new law proposed transforming the status of native languages in Russian schools of the non-Russian Republics from obligatory to optional. Fearing that this change would to a great extent reduce the number of native speakers in such schools, Mustafayev objected to the realization of the law.³³⁶ In connection with it, the leadership of the Azerbaijani SSR was accused of pursuing a nationalist policy. In July 1959, Mustafayev was dismissed at the XI plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.³³⁷

Veli Akhundov, a medical scientist, was elected to the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan during the 1959-1969 period. Anar, a famous poet, stated that in hard times he struggled for the protection of moral values and culture of Azerbaijan. In his political activity, he worked for the unity, farewell, and free-thinking of his people. In this sense, his services in the formulation of the national ideology are undeniable.³³⁸ Indeed, in his period, in 1966, the name of the city Kirovobad was changed to be Ganja³³⁹ and the poem *Haydarbabaya Salam* (Hello to Haydarbaba) by the great Azerbaijani poet Seyid Mohammad Hussein Shahriyar, living in Iran, was published in Baku. In 1967, the magazine *Ulduz* (Star) was published for the promising creative youth. In the literature, new national motives and

³³⁴Swietochowski, T. (1995), p. 6-7.

³³⁵Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər. 2008, p.116.

³³⁶Bolukbasi, S. (2011), p. 51-52.

³³⁷Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 117-118.

³³⁸Xalq qəzeti, 2016, 3 iyun.

³³⁹Eyyubov, I. Ə. (2011), p. 298.

critical spirit were strengthened. Most notably, the Nowruz holiday started to be officially celebrated as the spring holiday.³⁴⁰

Meantime, the spirit of national freedom was growing among the new generation. *Milli Azərbaycan Qərargahı* (The Headquarters of National Azerbaijan) was organized at a secret meeting attended by 95 people on December 17, 1962. Most members of the organization were officials. The main purpose was to serve the national revival, work for having Azerbaijanis in leading positions, the resolution of allocating funds to the republican budget, not in Moscow, but Baku. They were able to make Azerbaijani cadres appointed to several important positions.³⁴¹ In addition, in the early 1960s, a group of liberal students of the Azerbaijan State University started a secret political struggle led by Abulfaz Aliyev (Elchibey). They organized secret societies and educated students in a struggle for freedom. Elchibey said: “Every human’s greatest honor is to serve humanity and the human race. But anyone who is not free will be unable to serve even himself, let alone the humanity. We must first release ourselves and our people.” He thought: “We are all slaves. Yes, in the true sense of the word, Slave! Slave! More precisely, lower than slaves. Why did I teach my students that we were lower than slaves? Because a slave was sold to money, but there was no one to pay a black penny for us.”³⁴²

Besides, Elchibey’s great wish and longing was the unification of South and North Azerbaijan. He wrote: “Many can assume that it is not a wish but a fantasy. Yes, let it be, I am fantastic and fanatic. Then?! But, regardless of what they say, I am a realist.” Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, he propagated the ideas about the integrity of Azerbaijan.³⁴³ Moreover, he was a panturkist and a follower of the Musavatism. The program of Elchibey’s organization was drafted based on the 2nd (1936 year) declaration of the Musavat Party. But in those years, Elchibey was obliged to hide the program and then burned it with all the secret documents as he was chased by the

³⁴⁰Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 119.

³⁴¹Qaffarov, T. B. Azərbaycan Tarixi (1920-1991). Bakı: “Mütərcim”, 1999, p. 157.

³⁴²Elçibəy, Ə. Bütöv Azərbaycan Yolunda. Bakı, “Nurlar,” 2004, p. 217, 198-199.

³⁴³Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 219.

State Security Committee (SSC), and there were rumors about his imprisonment.³⁴⁴ While being imprisoned, in his statement dated 28/01/1975, Elchibey wrote: “1) Azerbaijan is not independent, it is necessary to separate it from Russia, and 2) to create a single state. After the establishment of an independent state in Azerbaijan, 3) it is necessary to unite the Turkic-speaking peoples and form a single Turan state.”³⁴⁵

Indeed, there was the reason for the anxiety of the SSC, because, in Elchibey's words “from 1965 to 1975, we were able to collect up to 200 like-minded patriots around the program”. In the 1970s and 1975s, Elchibey and his associates built a contact with the national intellectuals such as Ziya Bunyadov, Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, Khudu Mammadov, Suleyman Aliyarov in an attempt to bring these people together and make them leaders to the organization. However, as Elchibey writes: “It was very disappointing that we could not achieve it at that time. Our activity could hardly exit from the circle of the national-political education.”³⁴⁶ Meanwhile, some of those national intellectuals such as Z. Bunyadov, and S. Aliyarov were among the scholars who had already started to raise their voices against colonialism. They opposed the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Azerbaijan's entry into Russia as a “holiday”. They were present at the scientific council of the History faculty of the Azerbaijan State University in March 1969, and noted that Azerbaijan did not unite in the early 19th century, but it was occupied by Tsarist Russia. As a result, they were persecuted for some time.³⁴⁷

So, the national movement of 1960-1970s can be regarded as the first current in the development of national consciousness and the struggle for national liberation in the history of Azerbaijan SSR. But it failed. It was to a great extent curbed by the strict measures of Soviet security organs. According to Elchibey, “the greatest disaster of it was the fear of the people from the Soviet empire, in the belief in its “mighty and everlasting” myth and the disbelief of the people in their near future. Our youths believed that we could be free. But their living conditions were so heavy that

³⁴⁴Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 208-209, 215.

³⁴⁵Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 218.

³⁴⁶Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 214-215.

³⁴⁷Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 120.

they struggled more for their living, rather than for freedom. Yet, the essence of the issue was that the idea of freedom did not dominate the souls.”³⁴⁸

4.2.3. 1970-1990s

At the state level, the role of Heydar Aliyev was influential in the social-cultural development and national awakening of the Azerbaijani people after he was appointed to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1969. His most notable service was his role in the adoption of “The Constitution of Azerbaijan SSR”, on April 21, 1978, in which Azerbaijani language preserved the status of the state language in the republic.³⁴⁹ Moreover, his reign was notable for the relaxation of pressure on the intelligentsia, which led to the rebirth of patriotic literature. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a trend toward intensified expressions of Azerbaijani national identity appeared in Soviet Azerbaijan, and intellectuals explored the nature of Azerbaijani identity.³⁵⁰

Many historical novels, particularly about the reign of Shah Ismail I, were published to address the question of Azerbaijani identity such as Azize Jafarzada’s *Bakı-1501* (1981), Alisa Nijat’s *Qızılbaşlar* (1983), and Farman Karimzade’s *Xudafərin Körpüsü* (1983). The Safavid dynasty in Iran, founded by Shah Ismail I, is viewed as an Azerbaijani dynasty in Azerbaijani historiography. Furthermore, there was a growing interest in the Azerbaijani language so that some new grammars and dictionaries, which replaced Russian words with words of Turkic origin, were published. In these linguistic texts, the language spoken in the republic was usually referred to as the “Azerbaijani language” and not as Azerbaijani Turkish.³⁵¹

In this sense, even Elchibey, who initially criticized Heydar Aliyev in his speeches, valued his role in the promotion of national language and his contribution to the national cause. Elchibey wrote: “For the first time, he had several linguists

³⁴⁸Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 214-215.

³⁴⁹Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 144.

³⁵⁰Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 109.

³⁵¹Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 111.

together awarded a state prize. The awarding of this prize meant that the influence of Azerbaijani linguists was rising and they became inviolable, as the linguists began to develop the nation's thinking. In this regard, the prize was very useful. After the awards were given, the use of our language began to expand. This was the service of Heydar Aliyev.”³⁵² Indeed, H. Aliyev highly valued the national language, and in every opportunity spoke his mother tongue, though the *lingua franca* was Russian. He would later recall the impact of his speech in his mother tongue during the 50th anniversaries of Baku State University, as he said:

It was perceived as a great sensation. It was surprising that the head of the republic spoke in Azerbaijani and spoke in no way badly in that language. Some people congratulated me on this occasion and expressed their gratitude. People, who love their language and live in a spirit of nationality, have perceived this as a great event. I told them that there is no distinctiveness here, and you are surprised in vain, it's my mother tongue, and it's not great heroism to speak in the native language. But, unappreciation and ignorance of your mother tongue is undoubtedly a big mistake in front of the people.³⁵³

Furthermore, thanks to the initiatives of H. Aliyev, the number of national cadres increased in the party and state bodies. Thousands of Azerbaijani youth were sent to the leading educational and scientific centers of the USSR. Great attention was paid to the preparation of national military personnel. In 1971, the republican secondary military boarding school was organized. More than 2000 Azerbaijani officers were trained in various military specialties in USSR military schools during the 1970-80s. Also, the remnants of Huseyn Javid's body, once marked as “panturkist”, were taken from Irkutsk province in 1982 and buried in Nakhchivan.³⁵⁴ More strikingly, H. Aliyev emphasized his hope for the unification of Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. Thus, Aliyev's nationalist policies were, in Cornell's words, “a return to the early policies of korenizatsiia”. Yet, as he argues, the official rhetoric of Heydar Aliyev remained loyal to the Marxist-Leninist ideology and stressed the intellectual character of the Russian language, the knowledge of which provides easier access to scientific and technical education. This might affect the linguistic Russification and thus, the emergence of “double culture” - with the native language

³⁵²Elçibəy, Əbülfəz. Deyirdim ki, Bu Quruluş Dağılacaq. Bakı: “Gənclik,” 1992, p. 37, 42.

³⁵³Sadıqlı, Ayşən Ə. Ümummilli Lider Heydər Əliyev və Azərbaycan dili. Bakı: “Mütərcim,” 2011, p. 22.

³⁵⁴Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 146.

confined to the private domain and the Russian language preferred in the public realm - especially in Baku.³⁵⁵

After all, Moscow's continued emphasis on the *sblizhenie* "drawing closer" of peoples, bore its fruits in the 1970 census: more than one-third of urban Azerbaijani men and nearly one-quarter of urban women claimed Russian as a second language. Among the rural population, fewer than 10 percent knew Russian. By contrast, about 10 percent of the Russians and Armenians in the republic claimed to use Turkish as the second language, though most of them were born in Azerbaijan.³⁵⁶

The second current of the national awakening of Azerbaijanis took place in 1987, in an atmosphere of Gorbachev's era of *détente* and democracy, in response to the demands of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) to unite with the Republic of Armenia. On February 19, 1988, in Erevan, there was an anti-Turk meeting, where the nationalist slogans "Armenia must be cleaned off Turks", "Armenia belongs to Armenians", and the like shouted. The first victims of the national intrigue were Azerbaijani Turks, who were subject to the massacre and massive deportation from their ancestral lands in Armenia. The first refugees were from the Gafan and Migri regions of Armenia in 1986. They mainly settled in the city of Sumgait and its suburbs.³⁵⁷

In Azerbaijan, the Karabakh issue was the catalyst for the emergence of a mass national movement. Vociferous Armenian demands, which found sympathetic echoes in some Russian and Western media, evoked an Azerbaijani response.³⁵⁸ Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis developed ethnohistories and myths of ethnogenesis to justify their territorial claims to the homeland of which Karabakh was an inseparable part.³⁵⁹ The starting point of the conflict between the two nations was the interview of Abel Aganbegyan, chief economic advisor to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, to the press "Humanite" in November 1987, when he was in Paris: "I would like that

³⁵⁵Cornell, S. E. (2011), p. 44-45.

³⁵⁶Altstadt, A. L. (1992), p. 187.

³⁵⁷Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 10.

³⁵⁸Herzig, E. (1999), p. 11.

³⁵⁹Geukjian, O. (2012), p. 29.

Karabakh situated in the north-east of the Republic to be Armenia. According to my analysis from the economic point of view, Karabakh is closer to Armenia rather than to Azerbaijan. I have put forward a proposal in this direction. I do believe that this issue will be resolved in the condition of the reconstruction and democracy.”³⁶⁰

On January 15, 1988, a Professor Ziya Bunyadov’s article was published in the newspaper “Literature and Art”, where he defended F. Mammadova who proved that Karabakh is the land of Azerbaijan based on science, and condemned Aganbekyan for his seditious action. As a result, the article made great resonance in the country.³⁶¹ As a result, Azerbaijani people overreacted to the cause of Karabakh, as Elchibey witnessed: “Within a few months, a nation of 7 million people stood up saying “Ka-ra-bakh!” Not only the imagination of Moscow, but that of the whole world was upside down. An Azerbaijani phenomenon appeared. For the first time in our history, newspapers and radio-TV workers, democrats, consuls, ambassadors, and others flowed to Azerbaijan from around the world.”³⁶²

In February 1988, terror events in the city of Sumgait took place as a result of which 32 people were killed, including 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis, and over four hundred people were wounded. Aslan Ismayilov, a public prosecutor appointed to the inquiry of the Sumgait case, claims that it was organized by Armenian terrorist groups who set fire on houses, killed people including those from their Armenian nationality. He argues: “The only goal here is, of course, to demonstrate the Azerbaijani people unjustly as the criminal of Sumgait events. In other words, the predecessors of those who spoil the history will put forward these archive materials and present to the world community in the future the so-called “genocide” allegations that “poor Armenian people” were exposed this time in Sumgait.” The main basis of this claim is that there was also an Armenian named Edvard Grigoryan among the people who made the pogrom.³⁶³ As a result of Sumgait events, the anti-Turk movement in Armenia widened. After all, during the 1988-1991s, 230.000

³⁶⁰Tahirzadə, Ə. (1997), p. 15-16.

³⁶¹Tahirzadə, Ə. (1997), p. 17.

³⁶²Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 186.

³⁶³<https://web.archive.org/web/20140203001249/http://www.1news.com.tr/roportajveyorumlar/20120302095602698.html>

Azerbaijanis were deported and 225 people were killed, 1154 were wounded, hundreds were tortured.³⁶⁴

Thus, increased intensification of the events caused spontaneous rallies in Baku. The people demanded that the government take decisive action, “because during Soviet times treacherous state leaders dispersed Azerbaijan’s lands to that one and this one, people did not believe that this time they would not give this beautiful part of Azerbaijan to Armenians.”³⁶⁵ The first protest meeting took place on February 19, 1988, by 250-300 University students in Baku. When they entered the *Azadlıq* (Freedom) square, their number passed 5000 for the sake of the people, who attended. Tantekin indicated that everyone looked at this demonstration as a revival of the people and congratulated each other with a special joy.³⁶⁶ The slogans were “We are always ready to defend Karabakh!”, “Long live old land of Azerbaijan - Karabakh!”, “Shame on Armenian chauvinists!” and the like.³⁶⁷ Speakers mainly objected to the massive changing of place names of Azerbaijani origin. It was demanded that the name of Avakyan Street and other street names to the honor of Armenians must be changed. There were calls for the punishment of the reactionary intellectuals such as Aganbekyan and Zori Balayan, who set up a clamor in Karabakh.³⁶⁸

Meanwhile, different rallies and speeches that took place “for the defense of Karabakh” gradually entered the phase of institutionalization. Since the summer of 1988, informal groups began to function. These include *Varlıq* (Existence), *Çənlibel*, *Yurd* (Motherland), *Bakı Alimlər Klubu* (Baku Scientists Club), the initiative group of Azerbaijan People’s Front (APF) and other small groups.³⁶⁹ They were politically educating people via organizing conferences, seminars, where they were discussing the reasons of the people’s tragedy and the ways out of it.³⁷⁰ The second meeting was

³⁶⁴Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 12-14.

³⁶⁵Tantekin, Hətəmi. Acı Həqiqətlər. Bakı: “Şirvanəşr,” 1998, p. 18.

³⁶⁶Tantekin, H. (1998), p. 18.

³⁶⁷Tahirzadə, Ə. (1997), p. 19.

³⁶⁸Tahirzadə, Ə. (1997), p. 21.

³⁶⁹Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 333-334.

³⁷⁰Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 19.

on May 16, 1988, organized by *Çənlibel* under the leadership of Hatemi Tantekin to protest against the burning of Turkish houses in Armenia. Tantekin writes that as if people gathered not for protesting Armenians, but for revolting against the cruel Soviet regime. In the meeting, a young woman named Konul in his speech shouted slogans in favor of Turkey and Islam. She was loudly applauded by the people. But she was taken away by Russophile and pro-state intellectuals in front of the eyes of the people.³⁷¹ Two days later, on May 18, the largest meeting ever seen in Baku was held by Tantekin and poet Khalil Rza in the *Azadlıq* square. Everywhere was full of people like ants. All institutions stopped functioning. The slogans were “Long live Azerbaijan nation”, “I will die if the motherland is lost”, “Stop kidding with Azerbaijani people” and the like. The people gathered was so wrathful that even when the most favored poet Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, who was brought to the tribune on the hands of the masses, wanted to pacify them by saying “we must be clever, do not abide by emotions... it is necessary to finish the meeting and quietly break up”, he was immediately driven away from the tribune by the masses. After the 18 May rally, when any gathering and strike took place in Baku, as a rule, it started in the regions as well.³⁷²

Moreover, on June 9, in the rally in *Azadlıq* square, the demands were: the restoration of the order in Nagorno Karabakh (NK); the repatriation of Azerbaijanis deported from Armenia SSR and the provision of their security; the recognition of the right of self-governance to the Azerbaijanis in Armenia: if Armenia SSR will not agree with this, the autonomous right of NK must be abolished; the restoration of the place names of Azerbaijani origin in NK and Armenia SSR; the use of Azerbaijani language in all bodies and institutions of the republic without exception; the restoration of the name “Turk” of our people; the transition to either Arab or Latin alphabet, etc.³⁷³ Meanwhile, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR agreed to accept the NKAO under the auspices of Armenia on June 15, 1988. But, the Supreme

³⁷¹Tantekin, H. (1998), p. 25-27.

³⁷²Tantekin, H. (1998), p. 29-30.

³⁷³Tantekin, H. (1998), p. 31-32.

Council of the Azerbaijan SSR condemned the decision of the NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies on February 20, 1988, as an unlawful act.³⁷⁴

The developments in Karabakh were fuelling the Azerbaijani people. The highest peak of the 1988-1989 national movement in Azerbaijan was *Meydan Hərəkəti* (Square Movement), which took place on November 17 - December 5, 1988. The number of rioters was over a million. The words “sovereignty” and “freedom” were pronounced. The three-color flag of the ADR period was also shown up. The rioters insisted that until their demands were met, they would not leave the square. In the nights, thousands of people stayed there sitting around the fires.³⁷⁵ Rallies and demonstrations were held in Ganja, Sheki, Mingechevir, other cities and regions as well.³⁷⁶ In this context, Elchibey stressed: “On November 25-27, 1988, in the *Azadlıq* Square of Baku, when Nemat Panahov said that with our national movement, the liberation movements would occupy the whole USSR; many people had valued it as an exaggeration. Indeed, it did not take long that the movements took over the USSR. Moscow lost itself. In the late months of 1989, the second rise of the popular movement began. Moscow scared. The USSR would collapse if the pro-democracy movement was not drawn ahead of time.”³⁷⁷

On December 5, *Azadlıq* Square was cleared off rioters by Russian soldiers. 500 people were injured in the “cleaning operation”, and one was killed. This was the first martyr of the Azerbaijani people on the path of the freedom. A group of leaders of the movement were arrested. Relative quietness appeared in the republic after the “Meydan events”. Though repressed, the movement played an important role in the raising of the leaders of the national liberation movement of Azerbaijan.³⁷⁸ But, “Meydan” taught people the capacity to unify for the cause of the nation. So, people perceived that the state leaders appointed by Moscow did not protect their interests. In order to establish order, the Supreme Soviet Presidium of USSR issued decree, on January 12, 1989, “On the implementation of Special Administration Form in the

³⁷⁴Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 198.

³⁷⁵Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 20-21.

³⁷⁶Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 334.

³⁷⁷Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 186.

³⁷⁸Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 334.

NKAO of Azerbaijan SSR.” Thus, the Special Administration Committee (SAC) under the direct control of Moscow was established under the leadership of A. Volski. But, instead of restoring order in the region, the SAC created conditions for the complete disruption of economic relations with Azerbaijan, deportation of Azerbaijanis, armament of Armenians and etc.³⁷⁹

Azerbaijani people started to unify around the Azerbaijan People’s Front (APF), the program goal of which was to struggle for the economic and cultural sovereignty, civil society and state of law within the USSR. The APF was formed on June 16, 1989, and Abulfaz Elchibey became the chairman.³⁸⁰ Following meetings were organized by the leadership of the APF, held under three-color and moon-star flag, started and finished with the overture of Uzeyir Hajibeyov’s opera *Koroğlu* that called for unity and victory. Furthermore, toward the end of 1989, the APF activity concentrated on the issue of connections and unity with the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Local APF activists gathering along the frontier, with residents of Nakhchivan, between the Soviet Union and Iran, called for the unity of Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. On December 31, the violent actions took place on the border. Expressing solidarity with the protestors, more than 150,000 protesters, who demanded the opening of the border, gathered in Baku, on January 4, 1990. After three days a meeting was permitted to be held between “the friends and relatives” from Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan.³⁸¹ This event showed that collective memory about their ethnic-brethren in both parts of historical Azerbaijan has not declined since almost two centuries passed after the separation. A song *Ayrılıq* (Separation) that is dedicated to the above-told events has been very popular among Azerbaijani people.

The APF demanded the abolishment of the state of emergency in Baku and other regions to resolve the issue of the annulment of the SAC in the NKAO, official recognition of the party, and democratic demands. When Abdurrahman Vazirov, the First Secretary of the ACP did not accept the demands, massive meetings and general strikes were organized starting from 29 July 1989, first in Baku and then almost in all cities of the country. On September 6, the rioters added the demand for the

³⁷⁹Qaffarov, T. B. (2005), p. 29-30.

³⁸⁰Qaffarov, T. B. (1999), p. 238-239.

³⁸¹Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 137-139.

resignation of the leadership of the country. The talks started between the APF and the Central Committee of the ACP, as a result of which the agreement was signed and the demands started to be met. These achievements were influential in forming the mood of victory among people and increased their hope in unity and the APF.³⁸²

However, dual government emerged in the country. But as the APF was a massive movement, the difference of opinions led to the deepening of the cleavage between its two wings - radicals and liberals. In its turn, Moscow tried to break up the APF and weaken the national movement by using the crisis within the APF. However, when Moscow failed in doing so, it decided to stifle the movement by employing force.³⁸³ The Soviet government sent troops to Baku on the night of January 19-20. The occupying Russian troops committed a terrible massacre in Baku. According to official reports, 131 people, including 117 Azerbaijanis, 6 Russians, 3 Jewish, 3 Tatars were killed, 744 were wounded, 400 were arrested, and 4 were missing. In addition, 160 homes, public and personal transports, urban economy, and citizens suffered huge material damage.³⁸⁴ This massacre entered the history of Azerbaijan as “Bloody January”. People staged a 40-day strike as a sign of protest and hatred against the Soviet Empire. All in all, after “Bloody January”, the national movement was to a great extent stagnated and weakened because of the fact that most of its leaders were imprisoned, some of them emigrated, and the state of emergency was declared in the big cities of the country.³⁸⁵

After the 20 January tragedy, sharp disagreement emerged between the APF and the leadership of the country. Foreseeing the dangerous results of the situation a group of intellectuals signed “The Declaration of 75s” in order to call both sides into the dialogue. As a result, the Advisory Board was established. In its first meeting, on May 17, the agreement was achieved on the formation of the post of the presidency and the election of the president in the Supreme Soviet. Two days later in the session

³⁸²Qaffarov, T. B. (1999), p. 240-241.

³⁸³Əmrahov, M. İ. (2009), p. 336.

³⁸⁴Azərbaycan Tarixi: 1941-2002-ci illər, p. 212.

³⁸⁵Əmrahov, M. (2009), p. 337.

of the Supreme Soviet, Ayaz Mutellibov was “elected” president.³⁸⁶ In his turn, Mutellibov’s attempts to drag the Azerbaijani people into the referendum on the preservation of the USSR caused a wave of rallies and strikes in the country. People’s objection to the referendum was the manifestation of the independence movement. The APF boycotted the referendum as well. The Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, under the leadership of Heydar Aliyev, refused to participate in the referendum. As a result of the fraud elections, held on March 17, 1991, 93.3 percent of the people voted for the preservation of the Union.³⁸⁷ Yet, regardless of Moscow’s initiatives to restore order and prevent the collapse of the USSR by all means ended in failure. Azerbaijan joined the so-called “The Parade of Sovereignty”: on September 14, Azerbaijan Communist Party was abolished; on 18 October, the Constitution Act “on the Independence of Azerbaijan” was adopted; on 29 December, 95 percent of people with voting rights participated in the referendum and unanimously voted for the independence of Azerbaijan.³⁸⁸

Thus, the independent Azerbaijan Republic was established in the period of the ongoing war with Armenia, the loss of territories, the influx of refugees, economic hardships, and domestic conflicts. During this sensitive period, the pro-Soviet policies of Mutallibov were unpopular. Hence, his efforts to restore the Communist Party’s control in the country failed as furious people made him resign on March 6, 1992, mainly due to the tragic events in Khojaly. On February 25 and 26, 1992, the small Azerbaijani-populated town of Khojaly in NK was overrun by Armenian forces, supported by the Russian army’s 366th Infantry Regiment. More than 600 civilians lost lives, and several hundred more went missing.³⁸⁹ In this respect, Laçiner argues that the main purpose of the Armenian forces is not only to occupy the land but to torture and torment a people just because they are Turks. Armenians think that they “revenge” in this massacre.³⁹⁰ Here, by the term “revenge”,

³⁸⁶Qaffarov, T. B. (1999), p. 253.

³⁸⁷Qaffarov, T. B. (2005), p. 60-61.

³⁸⁸Eyyubov, I. Ə. (2011), p. 300-301.

³⁸⁹Cornell, S. (2011), p. 62.

³⁹⁰Laçiner, S. (2005), p. 327.

Laçiner points to the Armenians' accusations against Turkey on the occasion of the Great Calamity, which Turkey has to this day decisively rejected. In this sense, Kaplan stresses that "Azeri Turks, perhaps the world's most secular Shi'ite Moslems, see their cultural identity not in terms of religion but in terms of their Turkic race. The Armenians, likewise, fight the Azeris not because the latter are Moslems, but because they are Turks, related to the same Turks who massacred Armenians in 1915."³⁹¹

Moreover, Serzh Sargsyan, a former president of Armenia, who at that time was one of the field commanders that attacked Khojaly, said: "Before Khojaly, the Azerbaijanis thought that it would be possible to joke with us, they thought that Armenians were not capable of raising their arms against the civilian population. We were able to destroy this stereotype. That is what happened."³⁹² By these words, Sargsyan confirms the crime - the act of genocide against Azerbaijani people and seems very proud of it. It should be noted that this tragedy has since been occupying greater share in the bloody memory of Azerbaijanis and intensifying their hatred against Armenians, thus, as a result consolidates their national consciousness. This situation is common with all ethnic conflicts in the world. In this respect, Ignatieff says with regard to the civil war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia that "enemies need each other to remind themselves of who they really are. A Croat, thus, is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is someone who is not a Croat. Without hatred of the other, there would be no clearly defined national self to worship and adore."³⁹³ Parallel to this, it can be said that it was and continues to be essentially the Khojaly tragedy that made Azerbaijani national identity sharply set against Armenian national identity. The fall of the Khojaly was a strategic gain for the Armenians and the first significant loss for the Azerbaijanis.³⁹⁴ "The Khojaly massacres" further intensified Azerbaijani nationalism as thousands of people gathered in front of the building of

³⁹¹Kaplan, Robert D. *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy*. Random House, 1997, p. 270.

³⁹²Garagozov, Rauf. "The Khojaly Tragedy as a Collective Trauma and Factor of Collective Memory." *Azerbaijan in the World*, Volume III, 2010, 105-110, p. 106.

³⁹³Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. London, Chatto and Windus, 1993, p. 14.

³⁹⁴Croissant, Michael (1998), p. 78.

the Supreme Soviet and demanded the resignation of Ayaz Mutellibov, on March 5-6, 1992.³⁹⁵

To sum up, seventy years of Soviet rule, which left deep imprints in people's lives and memories, came to an end in Azerbaijan. Soviet nation makers were to a great extent able to shape national characteristics and the perception of the national identity of Azerbaijanis: ethnic and religious ingredients of the national identity were eliminated; symbols, myths, values, and traditions were molded to be consonant with the Marxist-Leninist system of ideas; the influence of the Russian language and culture made the society be-linguistic and be-cultural, the situation that persists to this day. Thus, following the instrumentalist approach, it can be argued that cultures are exceedingly flexible and vulnerable to elite manipulation. To abolish all these Soviet legacies and build up a nation on its ancient roots, Abulfaz Elchibey government employed the nationalization (Turkification) project that intended total break-up from the Soviet past. In this way, Elchibey got the support of the Azerbaijani people, who opted for the ideas of Turkism. Following Smith's ethno-symbolic approach, it would not be wrong to say that premodern ethnic ties and ethnies have affected form the basis for the consequent nation and nationalism in Azerbaijan.

³⁹⁵Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 52.

CHAPTER 5

FORMATION OF THE NATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE: ABULFAZ ELCHIBEY PERIOD (1992-1993)

This chapter aims to analyze the national policies of Abulfaz Elchibey during his short-lived presidency in 1992-1993. It will essentially concentrate upon his language policy, minority policy, and ideas of a Whole Azerbaijan.

On June 7, 1992, the elections of the presidency of the Azerbaijan Republic were held, and the leader of the APF, Abulfaz Elchibey won the elections and became the second president of the country.³⁹⁶ He got 59.4 percent of the votes and formed the first national-democratic government after independence.³⁹⁷ Freedom House puts it: “In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the nationalist opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front, was elected president in a generally free and fair vote.”³⁹⁸ With regard to his both nationalization and democratization project, Elchibey’s period can be seen as a complete break-up from the totalitarian Soviet regime. Ayça Ergun puts this point well:

The regime defined itself in opposition to and ruptures with the Soviet past. Anything associated with the Soviet rule had been discredited. The name of national identity had changed from Azerbaijani to Turk. The formation of a multi-party system had been encouraged. In terms of foreign policy orientation, the Front government was characterized as pro-Turkey, pro-West, anti-Iran and anti-Russia.³⁹⁹

In his book, *Bütöv Azərbaycan Yolunda* (In the Way of a Whole Azerbaijan), Elchibey clearly explained his reasons for displaying very firm position against Russia and Iran. Elchibey called Russian and Persian chauvinism as the most atrocious enemy of Turks. He wrote:

³⁹⁶Qaffarov, T. B. (1997), p. 55.

³⁹⁷Tahirzadə, Ə. Elçi Bəy. Bakı: “Cümhuriyyət,” 1999, p. 82, 106.

³⁹⁸<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/azerbaijan>

³⁹⁹Ergun, Ayça. “Post-Soviet Political Transformation in Azerbaijan: Political Elite, Civil Society and the Trials of Democratization.” *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 7, No 26 (Summer 2010), p. 73-74.

The Turks of Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia must know once and for all that Russian and Persian chauvinism is the cruelest and ruthless enemy of Turks, and we must fight against them! At the same time, we must know with certainty that pan-Farsiism and pan-Iranism are two wings of Persian chauvinism, one is the opposite of the other, and those exposed in pan-Farsi are hiding in pan-Iranism. Persian chauvinism is the most vicious and inferior chauvinism in the world! It is easier to get rid of Persian chauvinism, which is a small model of Russian chauvinism, old and disgusting than to get rid of Russian chauvinism if similar measures against the Soviet Union are taken today against Iran - Persian chauvinism!⁴⁰⁰

It should be remembered that Elchibey was teaching, propagating, and forming latent organizations against the Soviet regime in order to achieve freedom of his nation. For him, it was very hard to accept the situation of being a suppressed, colonized and a slave nation in the hands of Russian rulers. He was very angry that his motherland and nation had been violently fragmented by Russian empire with its “divide and rule” policy. He argues:

Russian Empire forbade us to use the names ‘South Azerbaijan’, ‘North Azerbaijan’. I asked myself: - Who are they? What right do they have to divide us? We were told that separate peoples lived in the south and north of Azerbaijan; those in the south are Turks and their language is Turkish, those in the north are Azerbaijanis and their language is Azerbaijani language! It became clear to me then that this was a game to divide the same nation, a game built by the empire, but the masses do not fully understand the essence of this game. Some intellectuals understand, but neither Persian chauvinism nor Russian chauvinism allows us to tell the truth. What should we do, where should we start? I thought that, if possible, we should slowly convey the truth to the people through articles and speeches. It has been a long time. Today, the Russian Empire has already collapsed, and it is clear to everyone that the Russian Empire has divided Azerbaijan by doing historical injustice. Now this Russian empire does not exist. Naturally, historical justice must be restored and Azerbaijan must be united.⁴⁰¹

So, Elchibey stresses that their main civic duty since the 1960s was, to the utmost of their powers, to wage a scientific and ideological struggle against the regimes and people that act compatible with the orders of “these chauvinists”, to awaken the masses and prevent them from being deceived. “These days have revealed the truth that we took the right path, that is, Russian chauvinism has failed, it is living its last moments, and Persian chauvinism, I hope, will fail!”⁴⁰²

In this sense, Elchibey thought that Iran is an empire-type country like Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, all of which

⁴⁰⁰Elçibəy, Ə. Bütöv Azərbaycan Yolunda. Bakı: “Nurlar,” 2004, p. 87, 73-74.

⁴⁰¹Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 353-354.

⁴⁰²Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 231-232.

collapsed. Thus, based on these historical facts Elchibey estimated that Iran would inevitably fall apart as the era of empires had passed, in spite of Iran's efforts to prevent this collapse by force. According to him, instead of recognizing the rights of the people living in Iran, protecting their human rights, or recognizing the national self-determination of a small or large number of peoples who have realized their national identity; terrorism, murder, torture, arrests, and death of politicians are taking place in southern Azerbaijan. He writes:

Iran is governed by old methods and cannot survive in the new era. It will disintegrate, and when it disintegrates, we will be the first people to gain freedom. We will solve the problem. After us, other nations will gain their independence. Let the Persians build their own independent state. No one will stop it. Thus, Azerbaijani Turks, Turkmen, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and other peoples will get rid of the domination of Persian chauvinism. Of course, the democratic world will not go against it.⁴⁰³

At this point, it should be made clear that as a result of the collapse of those empires, new nation-states based on ethno-cultural core(s) have come to existence. Accordingly, when Elchibey envisages the inevitability of the collapse of Iran due to the fact that there are many ethnic groups that aspire for their own nation-state, he points to the real force of *ethnie*, “myth-symbol complex” as a base of a nation.

Elchibey always stated his position openly, either “yes”, or “no”. He thought that it is a crime to remain silent when it comes to the fate of the nation. He supported any speech for the sake of national freedom, self-awareness, language and homeland in the south of Azerbaijan. He prioritized the issue of the South together with Nagorno Karabakh problem to be national interests of the state. He indicated:

I do not separate myself from the south of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Maragha, Marand is my homeland. Iran says we are interfering in its internal affairs. On the contrary, it interferes with our internal affairs. Tabriz is our internal affair, not Iran's internal affair. We are people who stood up fighting for freedom and we are moving forward on this path.⁴⁰⁴

Accordingly, Elchibey was sometimes criticized of being in a hurry in including the issue of the south and making Iran enemy. However, Elchibey found such accusations unacceptable as he claimed: “We do not make Iran or Russia our enemies, we demand our rights from Iran and Russia. If Iran is hostile to us when we

⁴⁰³Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 312, 363, 364.

⁴⁰⁴Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 327-329.

want our rights, we will stand against it, and if Russia does not make it possible for us when we demand our rights, yes, we have stood and will stand against Russia. We want our rights, and we will fight those who do not give us our rights.”⁴⁰⁵ Also, he claimed that the Iranian regime would never be in friendly relations with Azerbaijan, because always it was the Russian Empire and the Iranian regime that brought disaster to Azerbaijan. “Now Russia is dealing with its own problems, and the Iranian regime, on the contrary, intends to intervene in the north of Azerbaijan - carrying out thousand provocations to undermine the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. How could we call it “friend” and agree to its provocation?” Furthermore, he puts forward:

If the Iranian regime fully protects Armenia that has occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands and expelled more than a million Azerbaijani Turks from their homeland, if the Iranian regime does not agree with the independence of 30 million Azerbaijani Turks, if it does not recognize their rights, if it does not allow them to speak their own language..., no one can expect us to be friend with Iran, because it is hostile to us. Our opponents with effort tried to portray Iran’s hostility against us as the result of the allegedly wrong policy that we were pursuing. I told them that Iran has always been hostile to us, no matter who is in charge of the Azerbaijani state, and that Iran will continue to be hostile to us until it moves away his mentality of Turkic hostility.⁴⁰⁶

So, Elchibey conditioned that official Tehran could be friend with Azerbaijan only if the south of Azerbaijan became independent. “If 30 million Azerbaijanis (South) want independence and official Tehran keeps them in captivity, what kind of friendship can be spoken about?” Because of Elchibey’s firm stance against Iran in the issue of the south it was common to accuse Elchibey of deteriorating relations with Iran, as he indicated: “After we were removed from power, in newspapers, parliaments, and in other places in Azerbaijan it was said that Elchibey’s inappropriate speeches and accusations against Iran violated our friendship, and we will be friends and brothers from now on. All this was a lie, because at the root of this issue stands historical hostility - Tehran views the freedom of Azerbaijan as an enemy.”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁵Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 314.

⁴⁰⁶Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 346.

⁴⁰⁷Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 323.

After all, it becomes clear that as a historian, Elchibey perceived Iran and Russia as countries that have always been hostile and made historical injustice to Azerbaijan. It might be argued that this was main reason behind his radical anti-Russia and anti-Iran policies. In this regard, after coming to power, Elchibey was quick in removing Russian army from the country, as he stated: “A great step has been taken in the field of nation-building. Azerbaijan is the only republic in the former Soviet Union where there are no more troops of the totalitarian Red Empire. This means that Azerbaijan can be considered the first republic to gain independence.”⁴⁰⁸

Also, Elchibey dismantled up to 90 S-300 missiles, situated in Mingchevir, 45 of which was programmed to attack Turkey’s largest cities, and another 45 programmed to hit the attacking Turkish aircrafts. After a coup against him, which occurred in connection with the removal of Russian soldiers from the country, Elchibey stated:

I knew I would be overthrown. On the day when I took the Russian soldiers out of Azerbaijan, I said to my friends that I did not believe I could stay in power any longer. The Russian KGB destroyed us. Russian and Iranian intelligence worked jointly, with budgets of \$100 million. I succeeded in expelling Russian soldiers from Azerbaijan... The major task of the Russian soldiers guarding the border in Nakhichevan was spying in Turkey. They were performing operations and doing all kinds of works in Anatolia. By sending Russian troops we also saved Turkey.⁴⁰⁹

Furthermore, Elchibey left the Commonwealth of Independent States, headed by Russia. Also, he dealt a blow to previously high status of Russian language by highly valuing his mother tongue and making it national language of the state. His language policies will be discussed in detail below.

⁴⁰⁸Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 304.

⁴⁰⁹Özdemir, Burcu. Tarihçi ve Aydın Kimliği ile Ebulfez Elçibey. Marmara Üniversitesi. Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012, p. 31-32.

5.1. Nationalist Outlook of Abulfaz Elchibey

It was essentially the ideas of Turkism that brought Abulfaz Elchibey to the presidency. He said: “The nation will begin to solve its national problems after only understanding its Turkishness.”⁴¹⁰ It should be added that even before the independence, signs of identifying with Turks started to predominate in the society. It was mainly due to the outcry of nationals against Armenians and Russians as “others” that stipulated ethnic homogenization. Most of the major political organizations active in this period, such as the *Yeni Musavat* Party, formally stressed the identity of the Azerbaijanis as Turks. Some scholarly works that highlighted the Turkic roots of the Azerbaijanis appeared in this period as well.⁴¹¹

Thus, Elchibey’s national project was designed to build the nation upon its ethnic Turkic roots. His ultimate goal was the implementation of the ideas of Mehmet Emin Resulzade and in this way to use the methods of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.⁴¹² In this respect, Elchibey said:

Resulzade is our great leader and great founder. The great leader maintained an ideal formed in the 19th century, both in Azerbaijan and in Anatolia. This ideal is first of all Turkishness. Secondly, it is to bring this ideal of Turkishness to the world on a contemporary level and to build a modern democratic republic. Third, it is to build Islamic civilization.⁴¹³

Thus, by embracing the three main lines of Musavatism – Turkism, Modernism and Islamism, Elchibey made this new nation-state the inheritor of the ADR. Additionally, Elchibey brought a new goal to the political arena - the idea of integrity. As Rahimoglu indicates, “this innovation led to the development of the old Musavat ideology and its transformation into modern Musavatism and the beginning of a new stage - the Elchibey stage.”⁴¹⁴ Indeed, Elchibey’s great ideal was to build up a Whole Azerbaijan by unifying two parts of Azerbaijan - northern part that has

⁴¹⁰Tahirzadə, Ə. Savalanda Görüşənədək, Bəy! (Əbülfəz Elçibəy haqqında xatirələr). Bakı: “Kür,” 2000, p. 93.

⁴¹¹Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 130-132.

⁴¹²Tahirzadə, Ə. (1999), p. 112.

⁴¹³Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 39.

⁴¹⁴Rəhimoglu, A. (2016), p. 54.

become independent from the Soviet rule with southern part that is still part of Iran's territory. In his book *Bütöv Azərbaycan Yolunda* (In the Way of a Whole Azerbaijan), Elchibey wrote all his views, desires and goals about his project of the united Azerbaijan. In this book he describes his motherland to be a Whole Azerbaijan, sets his agenda how to achieve the freedom of the South and calls himself a soldier in this path. He stated:

There is only one way: the establishment of Azerbaijani state in the south! We are one nation together with the south and the north! The integrity of Azerbaijan is an idea, an ideology. Tabriz is my land, Ardabil, Gazvin is my land. The freedom of the south is my ideal. If part of our people lives under a colony, we cannot consider ourselves free and independent.⁴¹⁵

Elchibey regarded the concept of country to be spiritual rather than material. To him, spirituality is not material, it cannot be divided. It is impossible to create a homeland by the rule of empires and states. He underscored: "Azerbaijani Turks have never been spiritually separated; the idea of a united homeland has never been forgotten or changed... The spiritual sources of the integrity of our country, people, and language were not elsewhere, but in our national literature, history, and culture."⁴¹⁶ In this sense, he seemed very confident that the project of united Azerbaijan would be realized sooner or later and, in this way, he mainly trusted the power of people, Azerbaijani Turks, as he stressed:

Millions of Turks are gathering on the path of the Whole of Azerbaijan. I also consider myself a soldier of this path... With one fist of Tabriz, Iran will be destroyed, because Iran is not a Soviet empire, but a small empire growing under its rule. There are more than 30 million Turks in the south of Azerbaijan, and Iran cannot stand in front of these 30 million Turks. The Iranian empire is too small for this power... Today, politically conscious people from Tabriz, Urmia and Zanjan say we will liberate Karabakh soon. Today people from Baku, Nakhchivan, Ganja, who opened his eyes to the world, say that one day the tricolor, moon-star flag of Azerbaijan will fly in Tabriz and Azerbaijan will be completely independent. There are thousands of men on both sides of the Araxes who can sacrifice their lives for Karabakh, for the unity and independence of Azerbaijan. This means coming to a unity in opinion. What should be the result of the unity in this opinion? - FREEDOM OF THE COUNTRY! What should we do? We must tell the whole world that 40 million Azerbaijani Turks will be free and will create a WHOLE and INDEPENDENT AZERBAIJAN in a democratic environment. In this way, we must start a serious struggle and thus resolve the issue.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 322.

⁴¹⁶Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 237, 244, 259.

⁴¹⁷Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 270, 274, 275.

Also, looking at some historical events as a historian, Elchibey was sure that unification of Azerbaijan would be realized. He pointed out:

Russian Empire divided Germany, Korea, Vietnam, Yemen, Finland, Poland, and Romania (Moldova). The Germans, one of the most chivalrous peoples in Europe, looked back on their divided homeland for more than forty years. Romanians are still afraid to call Moldova their homeland. Listen, gentlemen, listen, gentlemen, as Russia weakened, partitioned countries such as Vietnam, Germany, and Yemen have been united, countries and peoples have become free, some of us are already free, and if it weakens a little (it is inevitable), we will all be free and unite!⁴¹⁸

However, Elchibey considered the armed struggle to be the last resort, preferring to resolve the issue of the Whole Azerbaijan through political means. Even during Soviet times, he stated that in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR (the Basic Law), taking the right of a republic to leave the Union at any time as the basis, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan must secede from the USSR, become an independent state, bring the issue of the whole Azerbaijan to the attention of the United Nations, and resolve the issue through the United Nations. He suggested that Azerbaijan in order to realize its wishes and demands should join the cooperation with divided countries such as Germany, Korea, Yemen, Vietnam and others. He thought that the people of Azerbaijan could raise this issue before the OSCE, the Islamic Conference [Organization] and other international organizations. “All political ways must be pursued, and if the goal is not achieved, as a last resort, Azerbaijan must be united, and integrated by armed struggle!”⁴¹⁹ After achieving this ideal, he envisaged the union of Turkic states, as Rahimoglu writes:

In the nationalization strategy of the Elchibey’s thinking system the goal of integration is chosen separately. This integration is aimed at both Turan and Azerbaijan. According to Elchibey, Turan problem is not a problem of the present, but a problem of the future, and in order to solve this problem tomorrow, it is necessary to unite Azerbaijan today. Elchibey’s system of thought, which focuses more on the problem of Azerbaijan, sees forty million Azerbaijani Turks as a single nation and considers the need for this united nation to build a single, independent, democratic Azerbaijani state the most important issue.⁴²⁰

So, it can be said that Elchibey remained loyal to his thinking system since the Soviet times when he was fiercely struggling for the independence, freedom and union of two parts of Azerbaijan. In other words, though became president, Elchibey did not

⁴¹⁸Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 234.

⁴¹⁹Elçibəy, Ə.(2004), p. 259, 260.

⁴²⁰Rəhimoglu, A. (2016), p. 54.

give up his ideas of Turanism and pan-Azerbaijanism - unified Azerbaijan, as he said in an interview: “Being the state of Azerbaijan we will transform the Caspian Sea into a huge basin... Time will come when all the Turan gates will be opened to Europe through the Caspian.”⁴²¹ For him, between the East and the West of the Turkish world Azerbaijan can play the role of the bridge.⁴²²

Moreover, in November 1992, speaking at Ankara Summit of the Turkic States, attended by five Turkic republics and Turkey, Elchibey described the meeting as a historical opportunity for the Turkic world. He stated that there was a basis for the economic and political unity, and this summit was the work of centuries-old sufferings and expectations. He said the following: “Language is the most important problem among the Turkic republics. There should be such a language that the Turks in China and the Turks in Uzbekistan can understand. There must be language unity. 200 million Turks should be able to speak the same language wherever they want.”⁴²³ Elchibey suggested the establishment of a center of experts to solve this problem. In this regard, according to Mutlu, what was interesting was that he openly supported the Turkic project even as the head of state like a man of ideas and a doctrinist as it was in old days. Some writers criticized his attitude and accused Elchibey of being imaginary and not seeing the facts. However, Elchibey argued that it was important to express these ideas first and foremost, and criticized the lack of coverage of issues related to the Turkic world in the media and public in Turkey, and said that brainwashing policies were also effective in Turkey. He also said that he did not expect miracles, and talked about the long-term brotherhood project by relying on a common origin, history, culture, and geography.⁴²⁴ In this sense, it can be said that the seeds of this project started to be sown in Elchibey’s home country. So, the coming to power of the nationalist became evident in every aspect of the state life. For instance, in the official state newspaper *Həyat*, an article of academician Afat Gurbanov on the necessity of establishing the common Turkish literary language, and

⁴²¹Tahirzadə, Ə. (1999), p. 90.

⁴²²Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 156.

⁴²³Mutlu, Nilüfer. “Bağımsızlığa Giden Yolda: Ebülfez Elçibey.” *Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, C. 20, S. 36, 2019, s. 37-57. DOI: 10.21550/sosbilder.435263, p. 51.

⁴²⁴Mutlu, N. (2019), p. 51-52.

the common Turkic alphabet, and the news about the creation of the *Çağdaş* (Contemporary) Turan Party were already published on June 20.⁴²⁵ However, Elchibey's ideas of Turkism were to a great extent seen to be imaginary, idealist or romantic, which is meant to be unrealistic, non-pragmatic, and irrational. At this point, it can be said that one who sees the world through the lens of rationalism cannot perceive Elchibey's perspective. It can clearly be understood through the lens of primordialism. Elchibey's primordial attachment to his nation, that is, his ineffable and overpowering feelings derived from natural and spiritual affinity with his kinsmen, cannot be explained rationally.

Moreover, in Ankara, visiting the Mausoleum, Elchibey laid a wreath at the tomb of Atatürk and remembered his memory with a minute of silence. He wrote the following in the book of memoirs: "There is nothing else to say. You said all of them - our great father. We are happy to visit you. How happy is the one who says I am a Turk. Your Soldier, Abulfaz Elchibey."⁴²⁶ In this sense, Nasib Nasibli writes:

Elchibey was a rare leader who advocated the national ideal with his body and soul, and sometimes in extreme form. He was a confident Turkist. To say 'I am Atatürk's soldier' demanded great love for the Turkishness. He proudly uttered the word 'nationalist' that no leader spoke of, and he preferred the national interest in his political life to other interests (party, personal).⁴²⁷

It should be added that Elchibey's admiration to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk started when he was a third-year student as he read about the leaders of the Turkic world. He came to conclusion that Atatürk is the greatest figure the Turkish world has cultivated in the last two centuries. Mostly because of the fact that, Elchibey thought, Atatürk laid the foundation of a new, modern, contemporary state. When he was a professor at Baku State University in Soviet times, he did not hesitate to explain the advantages of the modern Turkish Republic founded by Mustafa Kemal over the Soviet regime with historical, political, social and economic arguments. He was saying that while Lenin's state would not last long, Atatürk's concept of state would be a model for Asian societies in the near future. For him, in the republic founded by

⁴²⁵Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 26.

⁴²⁶Tahirzadə, Ə. (1999), p. 158.

⁴²⁷Tahirzadə, Ə. (2000), p. 93.

Atatürk, the government unconditionally belongs to nation and is built on this foundation. Elchibey stressed:

Mustafa Kemal was not a dictator, or rather, he did not want it and said that the only alternative to democracy is democracy; you will not put anything in its place, because the best thing is democracy again. To establish good relations with all the neighbors, to make peace with yesterday's enemies, to renounce the caliphate, to separate religion from the state. He wanted to see the future, he wanted agility in politics, and Atatürk's genius came from his ability seeing coming years in advance.⁴²⁸

Thus, Elchibey highly valued Atatürk because of his employment of democracy, secularism, modernism, and Turkism in his state. In the light of these values, Elchibey stated: "We now want to build the second democratic Turkish state with his own consciousness, language and culture in Azerbaijan."⁴²⁹ According to him, people of Azerbaijan must build a united Azerbaijani state on their lands based on the unity of these three lines that make up a whole system. "This state must be a civil, secular, democratic state governed by the rule of law. There is no other way. If we follow this path, we will achieve great success and rise as a nation; if we do not go, we will fall into the abyss of God and fall into deeper abysses."⁴³⁰

Indeed, Elchibey preferred democracy to any political regime in the modern world. According to him, as democracy that is one of the most important values of modernity, is practiced in countries like Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and so on, people in these countries live in better conditions. So, he came to conclusion that then it was necessary to follow the path of democracy. He wrote: "Democracy is a blessing from God for modern Turks. We have to take this path, come to work with elections and ballot boxes. Otherwise, a dictator will come out of the country and issue a fatwa that it is not allowed to listen or speak; he will hang the one who utter a word, will cut off the one who speaks."⁴³¹

At this point, it would be crucial to state that Elchibey was very successful in blending nationalism with democracy. In other words, Elchibey was not merely a

⁴²⁸Türker, Özgür. "Elçibeyin Düşünce ve Eylemlerinde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Etkisi." in *Azerbaycan Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşunun 100. Yılında Er Kişi Ebulfez Elçibey'e Armağan*. Ankara, 2018, p. 384, 385, 387.

⁴²⁹Türker, Ö. (2018), p. 387.

⁴³⁰Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 357.

⁴³¹Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 356.

nationalist, rather “a nationalist democrat” as he proudly called himself. He stated: “Democracy is based on national unity and national integrity. If the national integrity and national spirit of Azerbaijani Turks are at the root of the national movement, then democracy will be established in Azerbaijan, in other words, democracy can exist only on the basis of the national spirit.”⁴³² Against those who could easily criticize Elchibey to be racist or shovinst because of his ardent nationalistic views, he would answer:

Let them take it and look at the program of our party. It is built on democratic principles from the very beginning. There is no single nationalist principle. We have repeatedly said that we are not nationalists, we are nationalist democrats. The issue is very clear. Our principle is Musavatism. Musavatism means national democracy.⁴³³

Elchibey thought that the idea of Turkism will not take a chauvinist and racist line that hinders democracy, because in the milieu of a multi-party regime and freedoms, the rule of law will eliminate this danger.⁴³⁴ It should be stated that Elchibey came to conclusion of employing democracy in every field of society not when he acquired power, but in Soviet times when he was seeking for the freedom of his nation. He was saying that they would resolve national relations through the model of Switzerland because it is widely recognized and accepted in the world as an example in the solution of national relations.⁴³⁵

Accordingly, when he fully supported national liberation movements in the south of Azerbaijan, his main concern was the emancipation of his compatriots from the claws of anti-democratic regime in Iran. He stated that the Iranian ruling circles must understand that governing the state with the methods of the past, with violence and dictatorship had come to an end. The country must be adapted to modern democracy. Otherwise, great contradictions would arise. He underscored:

The world community is not indifferent to the most egregious violations of human rights and freedoms, lawlessness and terrorism in Iran that is one of the largest “prison of nations” after the Soviet Union. The mass arrests of people for their political beliefs and views, persecution and torture, terror and killings, the policy of discrimination against the various peoples living in Iran and their deprivation of any national and cultural rights, violently suppression of national liberation movements

⁴³²Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 363.

⁴³³Özdemir, B. (2012), p. 76.

⁴³⁴Mutlu, N. (2019), p. 52.

⁴³⁵Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 217-218.

are characteristic features of the policy pursued by the Iranian authorities against people and nations, especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.⁴³⁶

Elchibey indicated that the north of Azerbaijan gained its independence and joined the ranks of free countries of the world. However, a large part of Azerbaijan, called the South, home to more than 30 million Turks is still under the control of the Iranian Empire, torn apart, divided into provinces, its national and spiritual treasures plundered, the nation's intellectuals and fighters imprisoned and killed, national traditions are banned, language is banned, dignity is insulted, and endless misfortunes are inflicted on them.⁴³⁷ In this sense, he stated:

I am an activist. I always protect human rights. I demand the human rights of 30 million Turks living in the southern Azerbaijan be protected. We want for them a school, cultural freedoms, and cultural autonomy. My dear, if 140 thousand Armenians want a state in Karabakh and if the world defends it, is it a tragedy for 30 million Turks living in Iran to ask for cultural autonomy?" (Turkish newspaper, June 26, 1992).⁴³⁸

Notably, Elchibey seemed confident that two parts of Azerbaijan would be united and the United Azerbaijani state would be created sooner or later. "Greater Azerbaijan historically started in the north from Derbent and extended from the center of Hamadan to the Gulf of Basra. In fact, the outskirts of Hamadan province stood entirely in the Gulf of Basra. In the west, the border began around Agri and in the east rested on the Caspian Sea. Our Motherland - Greater Azerbaijan is within these geographical boundaries." He even thought about the name of this state to be called as the Federal Republic of Azerbaijan, the United Republic of Azerbaijan, (i.e, as in the United States of America), etc.⁴³⁹ In this sense, former state advisor Arif Hajiyev indicated that Abulfaz Elchibey had no presidential decree No.1, because when he was running for presidency, he said that his decree No.1 would be about joining North and South Azerbaijan. Naturally, it was impossible to make such a decree when he was a president, and without hurrying to sign it, Elchibey issued directly decree No.2.⁴⁴⁰ At this point, primordialist paradigm helps us to understand his ideal of "a

⁴³⁶Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 306, 307, 294, 295.

⁴³⁷Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 290-291.

⁴³⁸Tahirzadə, Ə. (1999), p. 90.

⁴³⁹Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 275, 283, 295.

⁴⁴⁰Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 29.

Whole Azerbaijan”. It becomes clear that referring to common territoriality, descent and tradition, Elchibey possessed “collective self-consciousness” (Shils’ term) with regard to his kinsmen in South Azerbaijan.

After all, Elchibey was not able to accomplish his ideals as he was obliged to leave the presidency in the face of foreign and domestic threats against him in the situation of civil war and still on-going war in Nagorno Karabakh in June 1993. As for the reasons why Elchibey was not able to hold to the power, some commentators might indicate the very hardships, even impossibility of the direct transition from totalitarian regime to democracy. Indeed, there was staged a *coup d'état* against Elchibey who invited Heydar Aliyev to lend his hand in solving the situation. In his turn, Heydar Aliyev took the control of the country, as a result of which Elchibey fled to his hometown Kalaki, in Nakhichevan where he was made to stay until 1997. In this respect, Kaplan indicated: “In the Caucasus, as in Rwanda, as in Sudan in the late 1980s, as occasionally in Nigeria and other places, democracy has often institutionalized ethnic and regional divisions. In the Caucasus, it required a Soviet era dictator - Heydar Aliyev – who overthrew the democrat Elchibey in Azerbaijan – to move toward peace with Armenia.”⁴⁴¹

Another question is that why people, who could stand against Soviet regime, supported APF and brought Elchibey to presidency in more difficult times, did not stand behind him in this *coup d'état* period. This question is answered by Ali Karimli, current president of APF, as he stated:

People’s expectations from Elchibey were very high. The solution to problems was demanded in a very short time. But these problems could not be solved in such a short time. This was one of the reasons. Another was the shortcomings in the staff of Elchibey. The People’s Front was a coalition, not a fully organized force. This weakened the Elchibey government.⁴⁴²

Nonetheless, though only a year in government, Elchibey not only worked for restoring the ethnic identification of majority Azerbaijani Turks, but also sought to build a nation-state on the basis of democratic principles. As Cornell puts it, “the 1992–93 experience of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) was a unique instance of

⁴⁴¹Kaplan, Robert D. (1997), p. 267.

⁴⁴²Ozdemir, B. (2012), p. 35.

true democrats taking control of a post-Soviet Muslim state.”⁴⁴³ Likewise, Margaret Thatcher wrote in his letter to Elchibey, whom he called “the biggest democrat in the Caucasus,” as follows: “I want to express my admiration for the efforts you have personally made for the sake of free and democratic Azerbaijan.”⁴⁴⁴

5.2. Turkey’s Influence on Azerbaijani Nationalism

The impact of Turkey has an undeniable effect on the Turkification process of Azerbaijanis. Apart from anything else, Turkey’s foreign policy against Armenia boosted the pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijani people and their growing sympathy to the Turkish people.

Azerbaijanis highly valued the support of Turkey, especially during Armenian militants’ attack to Nakhchivan, an autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan bordering Turkey, which threatened Armenia and thus its main ally Russia with possible military intervention. As a result, Armenian forces, which were advancing in the occupation of Karabakh, could not occupy Nakhchivan and stepped back in May 1992. However, any intervention was not made because of the reciprocal threat of the Commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Armed Forces Marshal Shaposhnikov as he said: “Turkey’s intervention could create a Third World War.”⁴⁴⁵ Recognizing Russia as a regional power, Turkey abstained from military intervention in the conflict. Still, this event increased Turkey’s influence and further promoted Turkish nationalism in Azerbaijan.

In addition, since April 1993, the Turkish-Armenian border has been closed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh question, as Turkey officially objected to the Armenian invasion of 20 percent of Azerbaijan territory. This situation has had adverse economic effects upon Armenia that is largely dependent on foreign trade. Turkey conditioned that the only way to open the borders is that Armenia releases the

⁴⁴³Cornell, S. (2011), p. 60.

⁴⁴⁴Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 112.

⁴⁴⁵Taşcıoğlu, Ö. L. “Armenian Politics of Russia and the Effects of these Politics on the Turkish-Russian Relations.” *The Journal of Academic Social Science* Yıl: 5, Sayı: 61, Aralık 2017, s. 289-308, p. 296.

occupied lands. Azerbaijani people have been appreciating such a firm stand of Turkey, generally seen as the only reliable friend in the international arena.

So, the pro-Turkish stance of Azerbaijani people can at best be explained by growing anti-Armenian and anti-Russian hostility, which made them seek for help and protection from the Turkish government and moral support from the Turkish people with whom they share common ethnic, linguistic, and cultural values. In this respect, “Azeris feel more being with Turkey than we feel being with them”, “Also, Azeris are more for Pan-Turkism than we are” said Yusuf Kanli, editor of the *Turkish Daily News*. Moreover, when Alparslan Türkeş, the founder and head of the Nationalist Movement Party in Turkey, arrived in Baku in September 1992, he was surrounded by enthusiastic crowds. Among those greeting him was Elchibey.⁴⁴⁶ In his turn, Elchibey valued Turkey as the best ally and an ultimate friend of Azerbaijan.

Finally, to revive linguistic affinity with the Azerbaijani neighbours, the Turkish government began beaming television programs in Azerbaijan (and Central Asian republics farther east) in late April 1992. This has proved popular in Azerbaijan and has begun subtly to change spoken local language. Ankara claimed that in due course there would be two-way television traffic between Turkey and eastern neighbors.⁴⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, Turkification process picked up the pace with the broadcasting of Turkey’s television programs, as Azerbaijanis started to use Turkish-loaded words. In this sense, Shaffer predicts: “It seems that if these broadcasts continue, the languages will become even more similar.”⁴⁴⁸ It can be added that through television programs, Turkey not only exports its language, but also its culture. So, in near future, together with linguistic affinity, cultural similarity between the two societies will become reality.

⁴⁴⁶Dilip, Hiro “The question of Azerbaijan”, in *The Nation*, September 14, 1992, p. 243.

⁴⁴⁷Dilip, H. (1992), p. 243.

⁴⁴⁸Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 163.

5.3. Language Policy

Language is generally accepted to be an essential component of national identity, and that is why it plays a major role in the construction of the nation. The promotion of local languages by post-Soviet elites is generally observed to be the main tenet of the ethnification process in their nation-building project. This should be seen as a reaction to its lower and disrespectful position during the Soviet era.

Indeed, the Turkification of the Azerbaijani people was further intensified with the language policies of the Elchibey government. From the beginning of his presidency, Elchibey demanded that mother tongue be used in all areas of public life and that all other languages should be treated as foreign languages. As Tahirzade writes:

The state-level protection of Elchibey's mother tongue led to the unprecedented speed of implementation of this language in all state organs and enterprises of the country. Our Russian-speaking compatriots now understand the inevitability of learning the national language, they either hire tutors or learn the state language (as well as the Latin alphabet) in many language courses. The personal example of the president and his team encouraged the smallest officer to respect this language. It was not possible to find advertisements, conversations in other languages in the streets of any major city including the capital city of the country, and correspondence in state offices in other language - this was evaluated as an insult to our independence.⁴⁴⁹

It should also be added that the alphabet change took place shortly after the country regained independence in 1991. There were fervent public debates over the national alphabet in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this respect, Kamil Veli Narimanoglu, a former professor of linguistics at Baku State University, stated:

Those intellectuals who had connections with Iran wanted to use the Arabic alphabet. Others wanted to stick to the Cyrillic alphabet. But the overwhelming majority of the country - the youth, the state and the democratic intelligentsia - wanted to return to the Latin alphabet. They saw historical reasons for that. It was a political issue. It was not related to linguistics or Turkic studies. It was, first of all, a political choice.⁴⁵⁰

Notably, the Cyrillic alphabet was considered to be an alien alphabet to the culture and civilization of Azerbaijan, adopted to break Azerbaijan off its roots. So, decay of this alphabet would symbolize a political and cultural break from the Soviet

⁴⁴⁹Tahirzade, Ə. (1999), p. 98.

⁴⁵⁰<https://www.rferl.org/a/1097070.html>

heritage. In contrast to Cyrillic, the Latin alphabet was described as a national alphabet. Because in 1923, it was believed that the Azerbaijani people (in fact, Azerbaijani intellectuals) accepted this alphabet voluntarily, at their own will, through reaching an agreement on its suitability to the Azerbaijani language.⁴⁵¹ To that end, the discussions over whether to adopt Arabic scripts, Cyrillic or Latin alphabet were resolved in favor of the official adoption of the Latin alphabet on December 25, 1991.⁴⁵² At first sight, the script change - from Cyrillic to Latin, could be regarded as a major accomplishment of the newly independent state, as it would facilitate the country's rapprochement to Turkey and the West, but if to think about its effect on older people who for decades used to read and write in the former alphabet and the young generation who started to learn Cyrillic and after a year were introduced a new alphabet, the result must have been confusing. Yet, the full transition to Latin scripts would be implemented in 2001.

Cyrillic alphabet was immediately rejected in the transition period as anti-Russian feelings of Azerbaijani people dictated to do so. Indeed, Kamil Veli Narimanoglu indicated that because of the link in people's minds between Cyrillic and the Soviet Union, the shift to Latin was necessary: "For us, the Cyrillic alphabet was perceived as a symbol of Russia, a symbol of Soviet statehood. In order to get rid of the Soviet and Russian psychology, we had to adopt a new alphabet or, rather, to restore [the Latin alphabet]."⁴⁵³

In his turn, Elchibey was among those who backed the Latinization campaign. When he was told by an Iranian clergyman that acceptance of the Latin alphabet amounted to acceptance of Christianity, and that Azerbaijanis ought to return Arabic, "the alphabet of Islam", Elchibey, himself an orientalist and Arabic scholar, replied: "Arabic is a stepchild of Aramaic and Hebrew, and goes all the way back to Phoenician, and can in no sense be described as an inherently holy or Islamic

⁴⁵¹Ergun, Ayça. "Azerbaycan'da Bir Ulusal Kimlik Meselesi Olarak Alfabe Değişiklikleri." *Bilig*, 54, 139-160, 2010, p. 153.

⁴⁵²Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 161.

⁴⁵³<https://www.rferl.org/a/1097070.html>

alphabet.”⁴⁵⁴ Interestingly enough, Elchibey did not back Arabic script as he did not associate it with Islamic civilization.

Thus, all these developments in the initial years of the independence attest to the fact that Azerbaijani people were in desperate quest for their ‘lost’ identity. In this regard, Mostafa Khalili writes that

With changing the script three times, from traditional Arabic to Latin, from Latin to Cyrillic, and going back to Latin again, reflects an identity crisis caused by the changing social and political situation in the country. Each of these changes was applied either voluntarily or under political pressure to shape the national identity of the country closer to the neighboring states.⁴⁵⁵

Furthermore, in his foreign visits, Elchibey propagated his nationalist views, particularly attempted to specify his preference to the mother tongue. For instance, On July 6, he made a live broadcast on the Ostankino TV program. For the first time in history, the head of Azerbaijan spoke with Russian audiences in his mother tongue -Turkish. Additionally, Elchibey, who signed the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Summit about Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on 7 July, made his speech at the High Assembly in the native language. After that, on August 23, he told Azerbaijani citizens on television:

It has been spoken for the first time in Azerbaijani language in such a large international organization, in the international community. For the first time, the representative of Azerbaijan made a speech in Helsinki in the Turkish language. This is a great progress. It means to raise the Azerbaijani language to the height ... For the first time we wrote a letter to this organization. Six countries signed and requested that the Azerbaijani language, Turkish language become the working language of this organization... The UN session will be opened on September 23... The Azerbaijani President will make a speech there for the first time, and surely I will speak in our language again. I will do my best to have the Turkish language spoken by 200 million Turks become into a working language of the UN like English, Spanish, Russian, Arabic.⁴⁵⁶

According to Tahirzadeh, this was really a very important moral and psychological factor in showing that Azerbaijan broke the national slavery chains without refraining from nothing and nobody else.⁴⁵⁷ In fact, the post of presidency

⁴⁵⁴Dilip, Hiro (1992), p. 243.

⁴⁵⁵Khalili, Mostafa. “A Comparative Study of Ethnic Identity among Azerbaijani Speakers in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan.” *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* Volume 34, 2015-2016, p. 168.

⁴⁵⁶Tahirzadeh, Ə. (1999), p. 97-98.

⁴⁵⁷Tahirzadeh, Ə. (1999), p. 98.

gave Elchibey great opportunity to carry out his ideals. So, Elchibey rolled up his sleeves to restore the national-moral values of Azerbaijani people. He attempted to return the name “Turkish language”, which Stalin banned and replaced it with the name “Azerbaijani language” in 1937. Opposing to it, Elchibey argued that there was no such thing as an Azerbaijani language; it was simply *Türk* (Turkic languages do not have the distinction between Turkish and Turkic that also exist in Russian as *Turetskiy* and *Tyurkskiy*). Similarly, he defined the nation as “Azerbaijani Turk”, not as “Azerbaijani”.⁴⁵⁸ Elchibey explained:

Our dear readers, our respected linguists, the Azerbaijani language is Turkish, and its name as ‘Azerbaijani’ is not the result of science, but of policy. This policy was pursued by the Russian Empire, and its purpose was to realize ‘separate!’ (divide and rule!) policy. Therefore, to understand the true nature of the issue and to give a proper scientific assessment it is inevitable to examine and evaluate the 19th century policies of Russia and Britain, especially their Middle East policy.⁴⁵⁹

Thus, it becomes clear that Elchibey to a great extent rejected the name “Azerbaijani language” in order to curb the century-old Russian imperial politics.⁴⁶⁰ In this sense, he highly appreciated the national policies of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) that was built upon Turkic values. He underscored that when the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was established in 1918, the name of the people and language was returned to himself. The terms “Tatar” and “Azerbaijani language” were not used again. Even though the words “Azerbaijani” and “Azerbaijani language” were offered during the Turkmenchay agreement, it was Stalin, the most ardent follower of imperial politics that implemented the offer in the Soviet Union.

⁴⁵⁸Cornell, S. (2016), p. 44.

⁴⁵⁹Elçibey, Ə. (2004), p. 60.

⁴⁶⁰As early as the beginning of the 19th century, officials of the Russian Empire in Tabriz, Baku, Ganja and other regions of Azerbaijan wrote to the heads of empires that we should either occupy Azerbaijan and separate it from the Persians, or change the name of the nation north of Araxes. They openly wrote that this nation is a Turkic nation, those living in the whole territory of Azerbaijan are Turks, and we must separate them from each other. And in order to completely separate Azerbaijan from each other, to shake the nation spiritually and morally, they proposed to call those in the south of Araxes Turks and those in the north Oghuz. Then it was suggested that those in the north of Araxes be called Azerbaijanis, and those in the south be called Turks, thus proving that these Azerbaijanis are separate from those Turks. All this is imperial policy. Thus, the empire separated our language from each other, changed its name, called it “Oghuz language”, “Azerbaijani language”, “Albanian language”, “Azeri language” and so on. He wanted to confuse our nation and divide our country by giving names, and, unfortunately, he achieved this goal. See: Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 272.

By his order our language was called Azerbaijani language.⁴⁶¹ In this regard, Rahimoglu writes:

Elchibey did not accept the recognition of our national identity only on the basis of geographical factors and the naming of our nation as Azerbaijani... the naming of a nation with five names prevents it from gathering around a single national name, and therefore from a single national identity. Therefore, in naming the nation, Elchibey based on our historical tradition - not on the geographical factor, but on the ethnic factor, and accepted that our nation is Turkish. The only way to restore this historical tradition, which still lives in the south of Azerbaijan, is to remember that ninety percent of our nation of 40 million is directly Turkic. If there is a need to differentiate it from other Turkic communities, it is possible to call our nation Azerbaijani Turk, that is, to combine ethnic and geographical factors in naming.⁴⁶²

In this context, Özdemir concludes that for Elchibey, gathering the people of a country under a general name (Azerbaijani) may be beneficial to some extent. He considered the principle of Azerbaijanism necessary in this sense. However, he emphasized that this is a logical way in terms of the statism principle, but may pose a serious danger in terms of national interests. In other words, he did not approve of a national definition based on geographical name.⁴⁶³ After all, such an ethno-cultural perception of national identity found its expression in the parliamentary decision of December 22, 1992, “Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the State Language in the Republic of Azerbaijan”, to call the official language of the republic *Türk dili* (Turkish language). In this matter Elchibey seemed to be very decisive as he countered any public debate and asserted that the name of language is a matter of science, not politics.⁴⁶⁴ Article 1 of the Law states:

The state language of the Republic of Azerbaijan is the Turkish language. All governmental establishments run their work in the Turkish language. The Turkish language as the state language of the Republic is used in all spheres of political, economic, public, scientific and cultural life and functions for international communication on the territory of the republic. The learning of the Turkish language by the representatives of other nationalities is appreciated and they get support for it.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶¹Elçibey, Ə. (2004), p. 71-72.

⁴⁶²Rəhimov, A. (2016), p. 55.

⁴⁶³Özdemir, B. (2012), p. 81.

⁴⁶⁴Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 161.

⁴⁶⁵Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, “Language”, p. 16. http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_dil.pdf

So, the Turkish language not only got an official status, but also gained primacy in all spheres of life. However, there were deficiencies in its realization as Tahirzade regretfully notes that before and after the adoption of the law its propaganda was not properly arranged, the historical facts on “Turkish language” were not clarified to the people. So, many understood that they were getting the language from Turkey, “be Ottomanized” and so on. And because of its incompetence, the Law also did not officially encompass the name of the nation “Turkish”.⁴⁶⁶

Indeed, it can be argued that people’s misunderstanding of the language issue stemmed from the fact that due to the de-ethnification policies of the Soviet apparatus, many Azerbaijanis were unaware of the fact that their national language was officially designated as *Türk* until 1937. As Cornell puts it, “this decision did not sit well even with many of the Azerbaijani Turks, who, of course, had been educated in an environment that stressed the indigenous roots of the Azerbaijani nation, separate from any Turks to the east or west”⁴⁶⁷, let alone the Russophone “ethnic” Azerbaijanis who even could not speak his/her own native language. So, the people’s reaction to the language law can at best be described as a surprise, not as a social resistance. Yet, there were some opposition voices, which particularly came from the members of ethnic minority groups, arguing that such a move would give unequal weight to “ethnic” Azerbaijanis *vis-à-vis* the members of ethnic minorities, who probably felt to be left out. They asserted that the term Azerbaijani, which in this period officially described all the citizens of Azerbaijan, should be used instead.⁴⁶⁸ As a result, APF government stepped down and referred to the national language as “Azerbaijani Turkish”, a designation both emphasizing the relation of Turkish to Azerbaijani and maintaining distance between the two languages.⁴⁶⁹ In addition, the project of making national citizen on ethnic grounds would seem to be incomplete as long as the people continue to carry Russian surnames. So, on February 2, 1992, the

⁴⁶⁶Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 192.

⁴⁶⁷Cornell, S. (2016), p. 44-45.

⁴⁶⁸Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 162.

⁴⁶⁹Marquardt, K. L. “Framing Language Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Political Symbolism and Interethnic Harmony.” *Central Asian Survey*, 30:2, 2011, 181-196, p. 183.

Parliament issued a decree on “Adjusting the surnames of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the state language”. The Elchibey government tried to get rid of the Russian endings of surnames (-ev/-yev).⁴⁷⁰

Now we might think that if it had not been curbed, Elchibey’s nation project would have ended up with the formation of nation with majority’s strong ethnic identification as a *Türk*, love and respect for the mother tongue. This would have brought an end to the prestigious status of Russian language and led to eventual elimination of be-linguistic/be-cultural nature of Azerbaijani society.

5.4. Issue of Ethnic Minorities

Azerbaijan is regarded to be a multiethnic society as there are multiple ethnic groups residing in the country. According to the population census data (total population 8,922,4), last updated in 2009, of State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan Republic, the ethnic composition of Azerbaijan is as follows: 91,6 % (8172,8) are Azerbaijanis, 2 % (180,3) are Lezgins, 1,3 % (120,300) are Armenians, 1,3 % (119,300) are Russians, 1,3 % (112,0) are Talyshs, 0,6 % (49,800) are Avars, 0,4 % (38,000) are Turks, 0,3 % (25,900) are Tatars, 0,3 % (25,200) are Tats, 0,3 % (21,500) Ukrainians, 0,1% (12,300) are Sakhurs, 0,1% (9,900) are Georgians, 0,1% (9,100) are Jews, 0,1% (6,100) are Kurds, (0,04%) (4,400) are Kryzs, 0,04 % (3,800) are Udins, 0,02 % (2,200) are Khynalygs and 0,1 % (9,500) are other nationalities.⁴⁷¹ So, the state committee indicated the names of 18 ethnic groups in total. In this census, by designation “Turks”, who comprise 0,4 % of the population, it is meant Ahiskha Turks.⁴⁷²

Here, it is important to note that “Azerbaijani” designation for the ethnic origin of dominant ethnic group (Turks) is very problematic and, thus, as we will see below in this study, causes misunderstanding. Also, experts who study ethnicity and nationalism in Azerbaijan can find the designation “Azerbaijani” to stand for ethnicity

⁴⁷⁰Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 214.

⁴⁷¹ <https://www.stat.gov.az/source/demography/>

⁴⁷² For more information about Ahiskha Turks and other ethnic groups in Azerbaijan see: Ağayev, Elnur. “Azerbaycan’ın etnik yapısı”, *Yeni Türkiye* 53/2013.

to be inaccurate. For example, Selma Akyıldız finds it interesting that although the census data provides information about all of the ethnic groups in Azerbaijan, those who define themselves as Azerbaijani Turks are counted as Azerbaijanis, whereas other ethnic groups are counted according to their ethnicity.⁴⁷³

In addition, the minorities united under the name of Other Nations are: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Moldovans, Estonians, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens, Abkhazians, Agullari, Buryatians, Ingushes, Kabardians, Komis, Kymiks, Maris, Chechens, Chuvashs, Circassians, Gagauzs, Arabs, Afghans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Greeks, Vietnamese, Koreans, Germans, Persians, Poles, Uighurs and etc.⁴⁷⁴

It can be deduced from these numbers that though there are multiple ethnic communities, they comprise only 8,4 % of the society in the face of 91,6 % Azerbaijani Turks. Since 1989, when the percentage of Azerbaijani Turks was 82,7 %, the number of the titular nation *vis-à-vis* that of ethnic minorities has notably increased. This is mainly due to some factors such as the influx of refugees from the Azerbaijani-populated regions of Armenia in the late 1980's and early 1990's, departure of a considerable size of Russians and other Russian-speaking urban minorities as well as out-migration of Armenians from Baku, following the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.⁴⁷⁵

Yet, Elchibey, in spite of being a Turkish nationalist, highly contributed to the development of institutions enhancing the cultural rights of ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan. For Cornell, “the main issue is that he viewed them as exactly that – minorities – and therefore, by definition, not as members of the majority population.”⁴⁷⁶ But, it should be made clear that he did not intend any discrimination in the society. In other words, he did not give preference to Turkic majority over non-Turkic minority. Rather, he sought for social equality and social justice. In fact, with

⁴⁷³Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 7.

⁴⁷⁴Ağayev, E. (2013), p. 1046.

⁴⁷⁵Ludmilla A'Beckett, Theodorus du Plessis. In Pursuit of Societal Harmony: reviewing the experiences and approaches in officially monolingual and officially multilingual countries. SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein, 2017, p. 110.

⁴⁷⁶Cornell, S. (2016), p. 44.

the Article 3 of the 1992 Law, Elchibey guaranteed ethnic minorities the right to get instruction in their own language:

The citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan are guaranteed the right to choose the language for education. Nationalities and ethnic minorities, living on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan have the right by means of governmental bodies of the republic to organize the pre-schools, secondary schools or separate classes, groups in their native language. In the educational establishments with the study on any other language, the learning of the Turkic language which is the state language, as necessary subject is provided.⁴⁷⁷

Article 15 stated: “On the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic and in the mass media, besides the state language other languages can be used.”⁴⁷⁸

In addition, he issued a decree “On the Protection of Rights and Freedoms and on State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Numerically Small Peoples, and Ethnic Groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan” on September 16, 1992. In this state document, the Council of Ministers, the Ministries of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Academy of Sciences, and the local executive power bodies were assigned a duty to address socio-cultural problems of national minorities, peoples and ethnic groups, preserve their material and spiritual cultures, languages, religions, customs, and traditions. The opening of the departments teaching the history and culture of numerically small peoples in the universities; the acceptance of the members of numerically small peoples to the high and secondary schools with concessions; the organization of radio programs in their languages; the opening of cultural centers for numerically small groups and the creation of job conditions for them in relevant regions; a strict struggle against the national suppression towards the numerically small peoples and other issues have been enshrined in the decree.⁴⁷⁹

It should be stated that Elchibey approached the question of national minority not only as a national issue, but also as a purely social issue. He said: “We have given cultural rights to small nations. We published newspapers in Kurdish, Talysh, Lezgi... We allocated money to those newspapers.”⁴⁸⁰ Also, in the beginning of 1993,

⁴⁷⁷ Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, “Language”, p.16. http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_dil.pdf

⁴⁷⁸ http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_dil.pdf p. 17

⁴⁷⁹ Cavadov, Qəmərşah (2000), p. 17-18.

⁴⁸⁰ Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p.106

the Ministry of Education speedily prepared and presented books for the first classrooms in Lezgi, Udi, Kurdish, Talysh and other languages. Elchibey underscored:

You can imagine that no state in the former Soviet Union has done it. Neither Russia, nor Ukraine, nor Latvia, nor Lithuania, and nor Estonia has done this. This is one of the crucial factors of social relations among nations and peoples. For example, Kurds think that, in the document, I will write myself as Kurd, read my newspaper in Kurdish, and open a Kurdish cultural center. There may have been small and great national feelings within society, we have tried to overcome this inequality in order to prevent people from attacking one another, and be in harmony. This is a condition of social justice.⁴⁸¹

Furthermore, Elchibey stated that it is a requirement of democracy that all citizens living in the country have equal rights and laws. He said that the application of the second-class treatment against minorities would be a move away from democracy and act against the demands of the modern world. The main goal of Elchibey was to establish tolerant relations between national minorities and communities of different religions, as well as the existence of free press, the presence of a large number of political parties, and the creation of independent courts. As Özdemir argues, this is the clearest indication of the importance he attaches to democracy, because these institutions are imperative for the existence of a free and democratic society.⁴⁸²

However, one might easily find Elchibey's national democracy paradoxical, even dangerous to his Turkist stance. For example, Mutlu writes that interestingly, he did not consider the granting of all kinds of cultural rights to ethnic minorities to be threatening, arguing that ethnic memberships (Lezgi, Kurd, Talish, etc.) should be recorded in the identity of minorities in Azerbaijan.⁴⁸³ By contrast, Elchibey clinged to democracy as a solution to any division in the society, as Özdemir points out:

In this way, Elchibey tried to prevent a division among Azerbaijani people against the accusations that the Azerbaijan People Movement that he directed was Panturkist. By targeting democracy, he wanted to unite these people for a common purpose. He argued that the economic exploitation in the country and the perception of despotic management require democracy, therefore, he supported the idea that it is

⁴⁸¹Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 107-108.

⁴⁸²Özdemir, B. (2012), p. 77.

⁴⁸³Mutlu, N. (2019), p. 52.

not nationalism, but democracy that will gather the Azerbaijani people in a common goal.⁴⁸⁴

So, it can be said that Elchibey's policies to solve minority question via granting minority rights look like the policies that have been undertaken in Western democracies, as a liberal writer Will Kymlicka, who put forward viewing minority rights as a defensive response to state nation-building, argues:

Many of these minority rights claims are, I believe, legitimate. That is, the minority rights being claimed really do serve to protect minorities from real or potential injustices that would otherwise arise as a result of state nation-building. And indeed, we can see a clear trend throughout the Western democracies towards accepting more of these claims. We see a shift towards a more 'multicultural' form of integration for immigrants. We also see a greater acceptance of language rights and self-government claims for national minorities and indigenous peoples. There is growing recognition that such rights are needed to ensure justice in diverse societies.⁴⁸⁵

It is important to note that it was at that time when minority rights started to be seen as matters of fundamental rights and basic justice. Pressures were made to internationalize them to make the treatment of minorities a matter, not only of domestic politics, but also of legitimate international concern, and perhaps even international intervention. For example, the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) adopted principles regarding the rights of national minorities in 1991, and established a High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1993. The Council of Europe adopted a treaty on minority language rights in 1992 (the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages), and a Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities in 1995.⁴⁸⁶

Thus, it becomes obvious that Elchibey was very sensitive to the issue of national minorities as he respected rights of all nations living in the modern world. He thought that all people must open schools in their own language, write and create in their own language. In this sense, because Elchibey recognized minority rights in his country, he wanted the same happen for his compatriots in South Azerbaijan. He hoped that one day Iranian ruling circles would have to think about it. He stated:

⁴⁸⁴Özdemir, B. (2012), p. 77.

⁴⁸⁵Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 2.

⁴⁸⁶Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 6.

Today, all ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan have cultural autonomy. They publish newspapers; open cultural centers, and even can open schools in their own language if they wish. The government provides them with all possible assistance. I would like it to be the same in the south of Azerbaijan - to publish newspapers in Turkish, to open schools in Turkish, to create cultural centers, because the rise of a nation is directly related to its language.⁴⁸⁷

It should be pointed out that though Elchibey's nationalism was directed against Persian chauvinism, Russian chauvinism and "their pawns" Armenia because of the fact that these forces opposed to the unification of Azerbaijan, he respected the rights of Persians and Armenians as people. Elchibey protested against those who claimed that "Iran belongs to the Turks and the power should belong to the Turks," which does not take into account the existence of different peoples in Iran. Elchibey indicated:

Do we want to be masters over them? No! We have seen what chauvinism is. Chauvinism leads that nation to tragedy... We want our own freedom, our own independence. We are against Persian chauvinism, not Persians... Armenians fear that when Azerbaijan unites, they will be surrounded by Turks on all sides and will not have access to the world. But we do not think so. If the Armenians return our lands to us, we prefer to live in peace and harmony with them.⁴⁸⁸

Furthermore, Elchibey stated:

Today is a time of self-awareness of the nations of the world. However, a state itself must be sensitive to the rights of different nationalities living in the country. For example, we have Jews and other ethnic minorities. We must protect their rights ourselves. In Iran, the issue must be resolved in this way. Armenians also live in Iran. This does not mean that Iran should remain indifferent to their rights as citizens. However, Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan should have been condemned by the official state along with Turkish students. Unfortunately, only Turkish students came out and raised their voices.⁴⁸⁹

Thus, because Elchibey was a nationalist democrat, his nationalism did not include racism and chauvinism. Particularly, it can be said that his mind was democratic. His adoption of the 1992 Law about the national minorities is proof of it. Remarkably, the Law was accepted at a time when there was political chaos, economic instability, and the ongoing war in Nagorno Karabakh. Nevertheless, Elchibey's minority policies would come under sharp criticism, particularly during

⁴⁸⁷Elçibey, Ə. (2004), p. 309-310.

⁴⁸⁸Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 368, 365.

⁴⁸⁹Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 306.

the Aliyev (both father and son) reign, of many politicians and scholars who valued them as wrong policies that damaged the integrity and sovereignty of the country. As Khudiyev puts it,

By granting independence to ethnic minorities, Elchibey government, in fact, dealt a great blow not only to the unity of Azerbaijani people, but also to the position that Azerbaijani language has gained over decades, and even to those minorities themselves. It created such an idea that the concept of people of Azerbaijan are groundless as that of the Soviet people, this land (Azerbaijan) is inhabited by different peoples, ethnics, and their ethnic and national rights have, so to say, been violated by their obligatory concentration... It was a big political mistake from the part of the state to make a special decision that paved the way to separatism at a time when Armenia's territorial claims to Azerbaijan reached a culmination point.⁴⁹⁰

Of course, the anxiety of critics against Elchibey's minority policies might have a real ground in those years, because "one of the most common objections to granting minority rights is that it would lead us down a "slippery slope", in which more and more groups will demand more and more rights, leading to the eventual disintegration of the society."⁴⁹¹ However, there were also some commentators, who found the 1992 decree insufficient, as it is not regarded to be a holistic national framework for minority rights protection. European experts have criticized it for not containing the legislation to deal with the anti-discrimination issues. Still, the decree continues to serve as the national legislative framework for the rights and freedoms of national minorities to this day.⁴⁹²

Interestingly enough, Elchibey has been said to instigate the secessionist movements in Azerbaijan because of his recognition of minority rights, which is in stark contrast with the national policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992) in Georgia under the motto "Georgia for Georgians". His vision of a united Georgia was based on a primordial understanding of the nation, in which minorities were seen to be a threat to Georgia's national unity and sovereignty. In such a climate, the official ideology of the "purity of the nation" and the growing popularity of the ethnonational discourses stimulated the growth of separatist ideas and movements.⁴⁹³ So, the

⁴⁹⁰Xudiyev, Nizami. "Heydər Əliyev və Azərbaycan dili." Seçilmiş Əsərləri. X cild, Bakı: "Elm və Təhsil," 2014, p. 21-22.

⁴⁹¹Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 59.

⁴⁹²Cornell, S. (2016), p. 54.

⁴⁹³Abbasov, I., Delihuseyinoglu, H., Pipia, M., Rumyansev, S., & Sanamyan, E. (2016), p. 9. Moreover, Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia after their war with

question emerges how can two contradicting policies (Elchibey's inclusion of minorities and Gamsakhurdia's exclusion of minorities) yield the same result? With this in mind, then, and taking into consideration the "Kohn dichotomy", it would be wrong to define Elchibey's nationalism as "ethnic nationalism", which entails the exclusion of minority groups; rather it would be more proper to see it as a civic nationalism, which entails inclusion of minority groups. More specifically, Elchibey accepted members of ethnocultural groups as full members of the nation. That is to say, he defined membership in terms of participation in a common culture; open to all, rather than on the basis of an ethnic descent. So, because Elchibey accepted ethnicity to be a core of national identity, namely, defined the ethnically dominant group of people as *Türk*, does not necessarily mean that he discriminated against other groups. Here, Elchibey's nationalism is *ethnonationalism* in Connor Walker's term, rather than *ethnic nationalism* in Kohn's dichotomy. Or, it can be seen either as a cultural nationalism, which "defines the nation in terms of a common culture, and the aim of the nationalist movement is to protect the survival of that culture"⁴⁹⁴ or as a civic nationalism that contains cultural component, not based on purely political principle. Also, it might be argued that his nationalism contains elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism. Thus, it would be easy to differentiate Elchibey's "ethnic" nationalism that contains civic elements (inclusive, liberal) from Gamsakhurdia's ethnic nationalism which is consonant with Ignatieff's conceptualization of "ethnic nationalism", which is irrational, illiberal, exclusive and xenophobic.

Furthermore, it should be made clear that Elchibey's nationalism did not target any ethnic group living in Azerbaijan. Rather, he saw national minorities as equal citizens who deserve special rights. To put it differently, Elchibey mainly targeted Russian chauvinism, Persian chauvinism, and Armenians who have historically had enmity with Azerbaijani Turks rather than local ethnic groups. In order to understand better Elchibey's nationalistic stance regarding with both

Georgia during the 1991-1993 years. The central government was unable to keep control over the regions, which to date operate as independent countries despite they remain *de jure* within the Georgian state. Also, both of these regimes have been vastly supported by Russia.

⁴⁹⁴ Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 244.

minority groups and those chauvinisms, it is advisable to read his following speech at a meeting with APF activists. Kalaki, December 26, 1995:

Happy Solidarity Day, Azerbaijani Turks! December 31 is the Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis. I sincerely congratulate 40 million Azerbaijani Turks on this solidarity! My word and appeal are to 40 million Azerbaijani Turks! (It seems in advance that such a question will be asked: why only the Azerbaijani Turks? Are not other minorities, ethnic tribes and others living in Azerbaijan citizens of this country? We answer such provocative questions that the forces dividing Azerbaijan have never purported to destroy any people, or any ethnic composition, but only to separate and break into pieces Azerbaijani Turks. One of the main goals of the Russian Empire, its successor, the Soviet Empire and its henchmen, was to divide the world of Turks, make them slaves and take possession of their lands.⁴⁹⁵

Moreover, “The Law on Freedom of Religion”, enacted by Elchibey on August 20 and promulgated on September 19, ensured the protection of tolerance at the state level in Azerbaijan. Taking into consideration that there have been various religions and confessions, although the leading religion is Islam, Elchibey wanted to diminish inter-religious resistance, if any, and achieve inter-faith harmony in the society. For this purpose, as a president, he visited the mosque, the church and the synagogue and met with their clergy and ordinary people who worshiped there. He underscored:

I was interested with their needs and the needs of the homes of the God. I did not spare my help to those who spoke to me about their problems. I explained to them that I have respect and affection for you and your religion. I allocated 1 million rubles to the Masjid and 1 million rubles to the Church from the President fund. The Jews have two synagogues here because they have two branches. I also deducted them 1 million rubles. And I said that because you are two, I would divide the money into two places. So, I gave 500 thousand rubles to each, so that they do not be offended by each other. And I went to visit both of them. I showed my concern for all religions in our country and proved that no religious discrimination would be tolerated in Azerbaijan.⁴⁹⁶

It is remarkable that in all of his foreign trips, Elchibey took the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the leader of the Orthodox Church, and the leader of the synagogue with himself. In this context, he stated: “We Azerbaijani Turks have historically supported the brotherhood of religions, preferring religious tolerance towards members of other religions. We have never demolished churches, synagogues, rather considered them all the house of God. This is our view of religion, our understanding of religion.” Elchibey suggested learning the true religion of Islam, not following fanaticism. More

⁴⁹⁵Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 278.

⁴⁹⁶Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 108-109.

specifically, he was against learning Islam in the form claimed and applied by Persian chauvinism and the Iranian ruling circles, but in a realistic and modern spirit, far from fanaticism. “Religion is our place of belief. We must not turn it into an instrument of politics. Religion must be separated from the state and politics should not interfere.”

497

In conclusion, as Elchibey was a determined nationalist in struggling for the independence and integration of his motherland, he positioned himself openly against Russia and Iran, both of which he regarded as historical enemies. After coming to power, his primary aim was to reject the legacy of the colonizer, rebuild the nation on the basis of ancient roots, and restore national pride. In this respect, Elchibey gave symbolic meaning to national language as an essential element of national identity, as he restored its ethnic name. So, it would not be wrong if one argues that Elchibey’s ethnonationalism directed towards strengthening the core nation. However, his primordial attachment to his ethnic group did not make him take chauvinistic attitude towards other ethnoreligious groups in the newly established state. Rather, he was in favor of solving national minority questions within the framework of democratic principles, as he recognized their special rights. In the view of his national policies, Elchibey should be valued not only as a nationalist but a democrat, who wanted to solve everything through civilized methods. As such, his ultimate goal was to transform real democracy into a lifestyle of the society and directed all potential of the state towards its realization.

⁴⁹⁷Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 356.

CHAPTER 6

RECONSTRUCTING AZERBAIJANI NATION: HEYDAR ALIYEV ERA (1993-2003)

This chapter is to analyze the nation-building policy of Heydar Aliyev during 1993-2003. It will particularly shed light on his role in defining the name of the nation and language, ideology of Azerbaijanism, and his national minority policy.

In the October 1993 presidential elections, Heydar Aliyev reportedly received almost 99 percent of the vote.⁴⁹⁸ Once in power he rolled back Elchibey's national policies. The debate between Azerbaijanism and Turkism resurfaced, with the triumph of the former under Heydar Aliyev government. His Soviet-era accomplishments in the country assured that the population of Azerbaijan would view him as a national leader. In this sense, Ayça Ergun writes that

Heydar Aliyev who was then the Chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan presented a paramount example of the strong man who yielded more than enough popular support and prestige. There was no question about his leadership skills; his staff composed of his loyal cadres and protégés were already present. The invitation of Aliyev to Baku by President Elchibey offered a perfect opportunity for the return of the new, albeit old alternative.⁴⁹⁹

H. Aliyev launched an inclusive, civic-based national project that is the opposite that of Elchibey's ethnic, Turkic-based one. In this sense, it would not be wrong to say that he continued the Soviet-era line of Azerbaijani identity. In this context, academic Dashdemirov, for the first time in the country, researched the proportion between the ethnic and civic nation based on the realities in Azerbaijan. He argued that while from the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s Azerbaijanis

⁴⁹⁸<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/azerbaijan>

⁴⁹⁹Ergun, Ayça. "Post-Soviet Political Transformation in Azerbaijan: Political Elite, Civil Society and the Trials of Democratization." *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 7, No 26 (Summer 2010), pp. 67-85, p. 74.

were accepted as an ethnic nation, they have transformed into a civic nation under the influence and pressure of the sociopolitical processes in the country.⁵⁰⁰

At this point, it is important to take a glance at those sociopolitical processes that made such a policy shift inevitable in a short period. Namely, when H. Aliyev became the president on October 3, 1993, the separatist movements were rocketing and threatening the independence of the new republic. The activities of the Talysh separatist movement had culminated in the formation of the Talysh-Mugham Republic, which would function as a nation-state for the Talysh ethnic group inhabited in the south of the country near the border of Iran. H. Aliyev immediately suppressed the movement and choked the new state in its cradle.⁵⁰¹ Moreover, Lezgin population divided between Azerbaijan and Dagestan (Russia) established a political organization *Sadval* (Unity) in 1990 that was active during 1993-1996. Its main political objective was to unite all Lezgins either in a sovereign state of Lezgins, or as an entity within the Russian Federation or Azerbaijan.⁵⁰² Aliyev also took measures to pacify the activities of this organization, thus, preventing further disintegration of the country. He tended to emphasize: “Azerbaijan is the homeland of all those living in Azerbaijan regardless of their nationality, religion, language, and origin; including Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh.”⁵⁰³ Thus, in the face of these threats, H. Aliyev rejected to define the national identity in ethnic terms, instead, envisaged supra-ethnic citizenship identity to unite all citizens of Azerbaijan.

Indeed, from President H. Aliyev’s speech delivered at the First Congress of World Azerbaijanis in 2001, which is considered the foundation of the concept of Azerbaijanism, it becomes clear that he defines national identity by not referring to “myth of ethnic origin” or “shared blood”, rather to the criteria of public culture, as he put it:

We, Azerbaijanis are united by our national identity, historical roots, national and spiritual values, by our national culture – literature, arts, music, poetry, songs, customs, and traditions of our people. [...] All these factors unite us. The idea of Azerbaijaniness unites us. [...] Azerbaijaniness means maintaining our national

⁵⁰⁰Ağayev, I. *Müasir Şəraitdə Azərbaycan Milli-etnik Proseslər*. Bakı: “MBM,” 2006, p. 32-33.

⁵⁰¹Cornell, S. (2011), p. 84.

⁵⁰²Matveeva A. and McCartney C. “Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan.” *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 5: 213-251, 1998, p. 232.

⁵⁰³Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 166.

identity, preserving the national and spiritual values, and at the same time enriching them through synthesis and integration with universal values, and ensuring the development of every individual.⁵⁰⁴

H. Aliyev's another major accomplishment was that the ceasefire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, on May 11, 1994, as a result of which the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict (NKC) has been labeled as "frozen conflict", though sporadic shooting has continued. The NK issue has been set up as the top agenda of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. H. Aliyev, in all his foreign visits, called both Western and Islamic countries as well as international organizations to condemn the violation of Azerbaijan's sovereignty by Armenia on the ground of the Resolutions of United Nations Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884), adopted in 1993, condemning Armenia's aggression and calling for its withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In the process of peace talks, Azerbaijan has had ongoing contacts with international bodies, such as the UN, the OSCE-Minsk Group, and the Council of Europe, alongside major world and regional powers. However, the inefficiency and reluctance of international actors to resolve the NK problem were condemned by the Azerbaijani government and opposition.⁵⁰⁵ Yet, Islamic Conference adopted decisions decrying Armenia's aggression and asking Islamic countries to help Azerbaijan.⁵⁰⁶ Thus, the NK problem has since kept anti-Armenian and anti-Russian feelings alive contributing to the consolidation of Azerbaijani nationalism.

6.1. Language Policy

H. Aliyev's language policy could be predicted from his opinions about the issue when he was the chairman of the Supreme Assembly of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (AR).⁵⁰⁷ On November 24, 1991, in the meeting of the

⁵⁰⁴Aliyev's speech, seen in Abbasov, I. et al (2016). Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in the South Caucasus and Turkey. The Caucasus Edition – Journal of Conflict Transformations, p.14.

⁵⁰⁵Ergun, Ayça. "XIII. International Challenges and Domestic Preferences in the Post-Soviet Political Transition of Azerbaijan." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Volume 2, issue 3-4; Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, p. 649.

⁵⁰⁶Azərbaycan Diasporu, 2005, p. 27.

⁵⁰⁷During the 1969-1982s, Heydar Aliyev became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. In December 1982, Heydar Aliyev

Supreme Soviet, he answered those who proposed to call the state language *Türk Dili*, as follows: “I also think that we are Turks. But now if we write in the constitution that the state language of Nakhchivan AR is Turkish, it would be a hasty decision.”⁵⁰⁸ From his statements it can be inferred that H. Aliyev was not content with such a decision. Though he acknowledged that Azerbaijani people are ethnically Turks, he suggested being very careful in making the Turkish language as the state language.

6.1.1. Debates of Defining State Language

Though three years passed after the 1992 Language Law, there were still debates concerning to the name of the language, first of all, just because of the fact that there emerged difficulties in distinguishing between Azerbaijani Turkish and Turkey’s Turkish. According to Khudiyev, one of the factors influencing the socio-political, ideological position of the Azerbaijani language at the end of the 80s and early 90s was the revival of Turkist thinking. The Azerbaijani people, and the national-social consciousness felt the impact of emotion more than the logic of Turkism, and they were either overwhelmingly satisfied, or against it. Hence, there were two opposing forces and this created the problem of the name of the mother tongue.⁵⁰⁹

Notably, in those days, some people thought that these two languages are the same, and used many Turkish words in Azerbaijani, while others thought that they are different languages. For example, according to some scholars, there emerged significant differences between these languages at the end of the XVII-XVIII centuries. At the beginning of the XX century, even though there were great attempts

was promoted to the post of the First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR. Heydar Aliyev resigned from his position in 1987. Arriving in Azerbaijan in July 1990, during the 1991-1993 years Heydar Aliyev served as the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and also Deputy-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nakhchivan AR (the only area that borders Turkey) is the birth place of Heydar Aliyev.

⁵⁰⁸Cəfərov, N. *Azərbaycançılıq İdeologiyasının Etnoqrafik Əsasları*. Bakı: “Elm və Təhsil,” 2016, p. 82.

⁵⁰⁹Xudiyev, N. “Heydər Əliyev və Azərbaycan dili.” *Seçilmiş Əsərləri*, X cild, 2014, p. 22.

to resolve those differences, it did not produce any results.⁵¹⁰ “It is exactly this double situation of common roots, hence closeness, but distinct historical development, that makes it so difficult for the Turks of Azerbaijan to determine their national linguistic identity.”⁵¹¹ When the question “How should the mother tongue be?” came up, the following approaches emerged:

- Moscow (Stalin) changed the name of the language by force, without taking into consideration the will of the people, and the name “Turkish” was repressed;

- “Azerbaijan” is a native name for the people of Azerbaijan - it is the name of the country; the people and it is completely natural to make it the name of the language as well.⁵¹²

So, to put it down in the 1995 constitution, H. Aliyev led to open up a two-day discussion of scholars and intellectuals over the final status of the state language on 31 October - 1 November 1995. The discussions were held on the basis of three variants: “Azerbaijani language”, “Turkish language”, and “Azerbaijani Turkish language”.⁵¹³

The crucial point here is that the status of Russian language was not even subject of discussion, because Azerbaijani Turks as a titular nation comprised the dominant majority in the country. The situation is comparable to that of, for example, Kazakstan, where due to the equal preponderance of the two largest *ethnies*, Kazakh and Russian, bilingualism was an accepted fact of life, with a preferential standing for Russian.⁵¹⁴ In addition, though Azerbaijani society, frequently reminded of being multiethnic, the promotion of the language of ethnic minorities to the status of state language was not a subject of discussion either.

⁵¹⁰See also: Cəfərov, N. *Azərbaycan Türkcəsinin Milliləşməsi Tarixi*. Bakı, Azərbaycan Dövlət Kitab Palatası, 1995, p. 27-30. and Xudiyev N. *Azərbaycan Ədəbi Dili Tarixi*. Bakı: “Maarif,” 1995.

⁵¹¹Jacob M. Landau, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele. *Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States*. Hurst and Company, London, 2001, p. 152.

⁵¹²Xudiyev, N. (2014), p. 22.

⁵¹³Cəfərov, N., (2016), p. 83-84.

⁵¹⁴Jacob M. Landau, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele (2001) *Politics of Language in the ex-Soviet Muslim States*, p. 83. Official figures in Kazakhstan, dating from 1995, confirmed that among the Russians, a mere 2% were fluent in Kazakh, another 5,1% used some of it at work, while 92% had no knowledge whatsoever of the language. In comparison, at the same time, about 79% of the smaller *ethnies* had no knowledge (or very little) of Kazakh, while 95,3% of the Kazakhs themselves had at least a basic knowledge of their native tongue. Ibid. p. 84-85.

As for the results of the discussions, Jafarov writes:

Interestingly enough, though paradoxical, the least defensive option in the debate was Turkish language. In our opinion, the main reason for this was that the decision (1992 Language Law – N.G) accepted without a broad discussion, was not supported by the society, and the ensuing problems were obvious. Above all, because the referendum was not held and the public was not consulted, the Azerbaijani society was rightly dissatisfied with that decision coming from above and the decision-making process, in general, in the most sensitive period.⁵¹⁵

However, whether the debates were held in an independent atmosphere or not, in other words, whether H. Aliyev, who guided the debates, had any influence upon the thoughts of the intellectuals or not should be questioned. From the following speech of H. Aliyev during the debates, it becomes evident that he had a certain influence in reaching the solution. As a matter of fact, he said: "... We have already occupied our place in the world as an independent state. That is why, regardless of making whatever decision, this should not touch our national self, our national pride... The words of Nizami are dear to us, as well as those of Jalil Mammadguluzade, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, and Sabir - all of them are dear for us. But there is today's reality..." In addition, he later said, "I have heard they say that there are about a million Azeris in Turkey... You know that though all of them are Turks, anyway it is distinguished that these are Azeris" ("Azerbaijan", November 11, 1995).⁵¹⁶ From his words, it becomes evident that he underscores the difference between the Azerbaijani language and the Turkish language, because Azeris are distinguished as an ethnocultural community in Turkey. Also, it is not clear why it should touch the national self and national pride whatever the decision is. Also, it is not understood what he meant by today's reality.

Above all, for the participant intellectuals it was evident that the debates took a start in order to change the 1992 Law. Probably, H. Aliyev himself was not satisfied with the Law as he said: "At that time I was not living in Baku, I was in Nakhchivan. As far as I knew, I felt that this decision was met unequivocally in the republic. There were those who were very dissatisfied with this decision, and there were those who liked it." ('Azerbaijan' newspaper, November 2, 1995) and later added: "I investigated it for myself and it became clear that, as you know, arbitrariness and voluntarism were allowed here." And also, "I said it before (during the debate on 31

⁵¹⁵Cəfərov, N. (2016), p. 84.

⁵¹⁶Xudiyev, N. (2014), p. 44-45; 31-32.

October) that in our schools, and textbooks, and in the textbooks of first-class pupils the mother tongue is written as Turkish language, not as Azerbaijani language. But, nevertheless, I do not feel that the people, the community, say somewhere that our mother tongue, our state language is Turkish. It means that it has no legal power from the point of view of the legislation and the constitution and that it has not been adopted by the people.” (“Azerbaijan” Newspaper, November 11, 1995). In addition, as H. Aliyev was the author of a separate article on the Azerbaijani language as the state language in the Constitution of the Azerbaijani SSR in 1978, and to him it was “at that time a great event in the history of our republic, and in our country in general”⁵¹⁷ as he underscored in his speech during the debate, it seemed likely that he would continue his tradition of renaming the state language as Azerbaijani.

So, Jafarov’s argument that “the least defensive option in the debate was Turkish language” does not seem to be convincing. The advocates of the Turkish language, in these conditions, had to come to the common point with the line of H. Aliyev. Thus, merging the name of the geography with that of the nation, they proposed the variant of Azerbaijani Turkish.

At this point, it should be stated that H. Aliyev was against the variant of Azerbaijani Turkish as well. He argued on the ground that there are multiple Turkic-speaking peoples and they have their specific name for their language such as Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Tatar, Turkmen languages, etc. Then, he asked: “Why is Azerbaijani Turkish? What is our nation? Azerbaijani Turk. Why should there be two names for this nation? Why does Uzbek not call himself Uzbek Turk? And why does Tatar not say that I am a Tatarstan Turk.”⁵¹⁸

Finally, at the end of the discussions, H. Aliyev made such a proposal that Article 21 of the state language in the draft of the first constitution of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan should be submitted into the referendum separately. That article in the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which was adopted by referendum on November 12, 1995, and came into force on November 27, 1995, was determined as follows:

⁵¹⁷Xudiyev, N. (2014), p. 24, 36, 15.

⁵¹⁸Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p. 40.

I. The official language of the Republic of Azerbaijan is Azerbaijani Language. The Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees the development of Azerbaijani Language.

II. The Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees free use and development of other languages spoken by the population.⁵¹⁹

As a result, H. Aliyev must have seen himself as a long-standing protector of Azerbaijani identity that the name of the nation was reaffirmed as *Azərbaycanlı* (Azerbaijani) and the official language of the country was restated as *Azərbaycan Dili* or *Azərbaycanca* (Azerbaijani) in the 1995 Azerbaijani Constitution.⁵²⁰ In this regard, Salahaddin Khalilov writes: “The rash, unpopular, unfounded, and populist decision made on the name of our mother tongue during the short-term APF ruling was eliminated by the initiative and active participation of President Heydar Aliyev. The legal right of notion ‘Azerbaijani language’, which has historically gained citizenship rights and spread across the world, was returned.”⁵²¹ However, Elchibey seemed to be disappointed with the change as he stated: “Today, in front of our eyes, the government of Heydar Aliyev in the north of Azerbaijan is trying to call the Turkish language as Azerbaijani language again. Since Stalin’s time, in order to separate the Turks from each other, the language of the Turks living in the north of Azerbaijan was changed to Azerbaijani language. Sometimes it is blamed on Stalin, but in fact it is an old policy of the Russian Empire, even if it was implemented by Stalin.”⁵²²

Thus, it seems most likely that by renaming national language as “Azerbaijani language”, H. Aliyev remained loyal to the old policy of Russian Empire, the aim of which was to separate Turks of Azerbaijan. But just as important was probably the fact that H. Aliyev regarded newly independent Azerbaijani Republic to be an heir to ADR, as he said: “Our people, which restored our state independence in 1991, used rich traditions of short-term activities of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and created

⁵¹⁹Cəfərov, N. (2016), p. 84.

⁵²⁰Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 184.

⁵²¹Xəlilov, S. (2002), p. 21-22.

⁵²²Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 272.

an independent Azerbaijan state on this historical heritage.”⁵²³ Indeed, independent Azerbaijan Republic inherited the state symbols - flag, emblem and the state anthem - from ADR. It should be pointed out that it was H. Aliyev who initiated the adoption of three colored flag as an official state symbol of Azerbaijan, when he was the chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. That is, under his leadership, the flag was approved as the national flag of Nakhchivan AR. He later said:

I think that the decisions taken by the Supreme Assembly of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic had a great impact on the work of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani leadership was forced to adopt a number of this kind of decisions. In the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic this flag flew on November 17, 1990, while in Azerbaijan Republic it flew on February 5, 1991.⁵²⁴

However, in the 1995 Constitution, in Article 23, titled as “Azerbaijan state symbols”, there is no reference to the ideologies associated with the colors of the Azerbaijan flag. This article describes only the colors and shape of the Azerbaijan flag:

II. The Flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan shall consist of three wide stripes. The upper stripe shall be of blue color, the middle stripe shall be red and the lower one shall be green. There shall be a white crescent and eight-pointed star in the middle of the red stripe on both sides of the Flag. The proportion of the width to the length shall be 1 by 2.

I would remind that the blue color of the national flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan has the meaning of Turkic origin of the Azerbaijani people; red color reflects the desire to establish a modern society, and develop democracy; the green color shows belonging to Islamic civilization.⁵²⁵ And also, the official state language of ADR was designated as “Turkish”. It becomes clear that H. Aliyev declined to accept any Turkism in his project of a nation. Then, it can be asked to what extent Azerbaijan Republic can become an inheritor of ADR. In these circumstances, the real inheritor of ADR seems to be Elchibey government, who followed the traditions of ADR government, by making Turkism the main tenet of the state ideology.

⁵²³ Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918-1920). Parlament (Stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild, Azərbaycan nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 1998, p. 3.

⁵²⁴ <https://en.president.az/azerbaijan/symbols>

⁵²⁵ <https://en.president.az/azerbaijan/symbols>

However, Tahirzade writes that it was not difficult for H. Aliyev to abolish the 1992 Law, as he did not face the irresistible stand of the people.⁵²⁶ Indeed, Azerbaijani people did not reject this change either, as they could not fully absorb the 1992 Law in a very short period. In this respect, Alekperov claims that after 70 years of Soviet empire, the consciousness of the Azerbaijani people is based on more Soviet thinking. To him, this is natural, because at least one generation is the generation of the Soviet era. The minds of those people have already been changed in the 1950s.⁵²⁷

Although H. Aliyev achieved this change by formally getting public support through holding academic discussions and the constitutional referendum, to what extent both the discussions and elections were democratic can be questioned. Academic discussions cannot be accepted as democratic, just because H. Aliyev himself took the lead in the discussions, and thus, influenced the thoughts of the scholars. The referendum as well as parliamentary election, held on November 12, 1995, was not accepted democratic either. According to the report of the OSCE/UN Joint Electoral Observation Mission in Azerbaijan, the election campaign, the voting, and the counting of ballots did not correspond to internationally accepted norms in many respects.⁵²⁸ In addition, according to Freedom House, Azerbaijan's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections, held in November 1995, saw five leading opposition parties and some 600 independent candidates barred from the vote in which H. Aliyev's *Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası (YAP)* (New Azerbaijan Party) won a commanding majority of seats in *Milli Məclis* (National Parliament).⁵²⁹

Thus, as a result of H. Aliyev's initiatives, the name "Azerbaijani" was triumphed over the name "Turkish" to define the national language of Azerbaijani people. Yet, one might ask to what extent it is scientific and rational to call the state language not with the name of the ethnic people but with the name of the country. In relation to this, Jafarov underscores three reasons why to call the national language

⁵²⁶Tahirzadə, Ə. (2001), p. 192.

⁵²⁷Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 18.

⁵²⁸<https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/14291?download=true>

⁵²⁹<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/azerbaijan>

“Azerbaijani” was preferential over “Turkish” after the public and professional debates:

1) The two names of the two independent Turkic languages are not justified by the same name, and in practice it becomes necessary to call them in separate names (Azerbaijani Turkish – Turkey’s Turkish);

2) Ethnic communities of non-Turkic origin are probably disturbed by the fact that the “Azerbaijani language” is called “Turkish language”, while some forces use it to provoke “minor nationalism”;

3) The name “Azerbaijani language” has been successfully used for many decades and completely resolved in the national public opinion.⁵³⁰

In response to the first reason, it should be stated that there are plenty of independent states that share the same language. For example, the official language of almost all Arab states (UNESCO identifies 22 Arab states⁵³¹) is Arabic, though they use different dialects; Portuguese is the official language of Portugal, Brazil, Macau, some African countries, and a few island territories. But Portuguese spoken in Brazil is noticeably different from that spoken in Portugal. Also, English, which has American English and British English versions, is the official language of many states. Accordingly, Turkish can also be accepted as the official language of other Turkic states including Azerbaijan. It would not be a problem to call them in separate names like Azerbaijani Turkish and Turkey’s Turkish.

As for the second reason, it might be said in reply that the role of external forces in instigating minor nationalisms was more pervasive than the disturbance of non-Turkic ethnic groups. What’s more, non-Turkic ethnic groups comprise only less than 9 percent of the population. So, it seems unlikely that their disturbance could create a real threat to territorial integrity. Looking at the ethnic structure of some countries such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey, we observe that they have had a larger percentage of ethnic minorities than that of Azerbaijan, still named state language consonant with the name of the dominant ethnic group. Thus, the influence of ethnic minorities in naming the national language in Azerbaijan can be exaggerated. Akyıldız writes:

The majority of the interviewees emphasized that there is a harmony between Azerbaijani Turks and the national minorities. This harmony derives from the peaceful coexistence of these various groups since time immemorial. Their traditions, cultural values, cuisine, way of life and so on are intertwined. However, the external

⁵³⁰Cəfərov, N., Sərdarov V., Cəfərov A. (2016), p. 85.

⁵³¹<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/worldwide/arab-states/>

enemies of Azerbaijan have tried to provoke the national minorities in order to damage the national integrity of the country. In this regard, some respondents accused Armenia, Russia, and Iran for provoking the national minorities in Azerbaijani society against Azerbaijan. When the reactions of ethnic minorities regarding the laws on language were asked, the majority of the interviewees claimed that there was no reaction from them. One participant especially mentioned that it was an artificial problem which was incited and manipulated by external powers.⁵³²

As for the third reason stated by Jafarov, it can be argued that if the name “Azerbaijani language” could resolve in the public opinion during Soviet years, so could be with the name “Turkish language” in the progress of time. One might reasonably ask, then, to what extent these reasons were real in enforcing the government to issue a law on re-naming national language. Whether real or not, here, what matters more is that the three reasons provided the base to ensure justification for re-adopting “Azerbaijani language”, through which the distinctiveness of national language, and thus, national identity would be confirmed. In this relation, some scholars even went further to argue that these two languages are not the same, even not different dialects of the same language. As Khudiyev puts it,

The insistence on the sameness of Azerbaijani Turkish with Turkey’s Turkish, and the insistence on being different dialects of the same language justify neither the scientific-historical nor modern political ideological point of view. Because Turkey’s Turks themselves distinguish Azeris (Azerbaijani Turks) within the country... it is the result of national-moral differences between these peoples.⁵³³

In contrast to Khudiyev’s arguments, Azerbaijani and Turkish languages are mutually intelligible languages and belong to the same West Oghuz group of Southwestern or Oghuz branch of Turkic languages, even though there are some differences.⁵³⁴ Demirezen and Mehmet Abi point out that since Turkic languages

⁵³²Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 70.

⁵³³Xudiyev, N. (2014), p. 32-33.

⁵³⁴Turkic languages are group of closely related languages that form a subfamily of the Altaic languages. The Turkic languages show close similarities to each other in phonology, morphology, and syntax... The Turkic languages may be classified, using linguistic, historical, and geographic criteria, into a southwestern (SW), a northwestern (NW), a southeastern (SE), and a northeastern (NE) branch. Chuvash and Khalaj form separate branches. The southwestern, or Oghuz, branch comprises three groups. The West Oghuz group (SW^w) consists of Turkish (spoken in Turkey, Cyprus, the Balkans, western Europe, and so on); Azerbaijani (Azerbaijani; Azerbaijan, Iran); and Gagauz (Moldova, Bulgaria, and so on). The East Oghuz group (SW^e) consists of Turkmen (Turkmenistan and adjacent countries) and Khorāsān Turkic (northeastern Iran). A southern group (SW^s) is formed by Afshar and related dialects in Iran and Afghanistan.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Turkic-languages>

belong to same categorization typologically, it is difficult to define them as whether they are different languages or dialects or accents of the same language. To them, the problem is the naming the Turkic languages. This classification problem brings about some transfer problems together with it. There are several classification models such as Family Tree Model, Wave Model and so on: In Family Tree Model, Turkish can be counted as parental language whereas Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Azerbaijani are as daughter languages. In this model, changes in the parental language should be manifested in daughter languages; Wave model helps to understand the dialect change. In this respect, some divergences between Turkish and Azerbaijani or other Turkic languages may be due to areal contact.⁵³⁵

In this regard, a linguist Robert Lindsay chooses 90% intelligibility to draw a line between a dialect and a language. He writes that above 90% intelligibility we are dealing with dialects of a single tongue, and below 90 % intelligibility, we are dealing with separate languages. For example, because there is 94 % mutual intelligibility (MI) between Valencian and Catalan, the overwhelming scholarly consensus is that Valencian is not a separate language but instead is simply a Catalan dialect. Or, Meankeli is split from Finnish on the basis of an 80 % MI with Finnish.⁵³⁶

As for the MI among the Turkic languages, he claims that MI in Turkic is much less than proclaimed. In his classification, Lindsay put Azerbaijani and Turkish to different groups of Seljuk languages:

It is important to objectively define the boundaries of Western and Southern Seljuk which are frequently blurred. Western Seljuk should be only one group – Ottoman Turkish and related languages – in effect, Turkish, the Gagauzes, and Urum. Yet another group is Southern Seljuk, encompassing Azeri and related languages. Many classifications put Turkish and Azeri into the same group, but I feel that this is in error. Azeri, Qashqai, Sonqori, Afshar and Khorasani Turkic are closer to each other than they are to Turkish, Gagauz, etc.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵Demirezen Mehmet, Mehmet Abi. “The Effect of Typological Factors on Learning Turkish as a Foreign Language.” *ZfWT*. Vol. 9, No. 3, 2017, 25-42, p. 28-29.

⁵³⁶Lindsay, Robert. “Mutual Intelligibility among the Turkic Languages.” 2010, p. 3. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/4068771/Mutual_Intelligibility_Among_the_Turkic_Languages

⁵³⁷Lindsay, R. (2010), p. 90.

Here, it is notable that “Azeri” designation is used instead of Azerbaijani. According to Lindsay, Azeri is a language spoken in two dialects – North Azeri which is spoken in Azerbaijan and South Azeri which is spoken in Iran. He writes:

Three intelligibility studies have been conducted on Turkish-North Azeri MI. The first found 49% intelligibility, rather low (Fraenkel 1962). Two other studies were done, one showing 66% and the other showing 92% (Roos et al 2009). The average for all three studies was 69%. The wide range implies that there may be some bilingual learning or other external factor involved which complicates MI calculations.⁵³⁸

So, he concludes that Turkish-North Azeri intelligibility is overrated. However, on the one hand, upon viewing these results, especially two studies done by Roos et al in the same year with the results that show wide gap (66 % versus 92 %), one can easily question the trustworthiness of MI calculations. On the other hand, if we take the result into consideration, then Azerbaijani and Turkish languages appear to be separate languages rather than dialects, because 69 % MI is below 90%. But he seems to be right in his arguments about the reason why North Azeri and Turkish are not completely intelligible with each other:

Many of the neologisms that went into Turkish following Atatürk’s Ozturkche language reforms are not intelligible to North Azeri speakers. In addition, North Azeri retains many of the Persian and Arabic loans that were stripped from the language during the reforms, so North Azeri speakers can nearly understand Ottoman Turkish better than Modern Turkish.⁵³⁹

In a similar vein, the study done by Sağın-Şimşek and König purported to investigate to what extent Turkish and Azerbaijani languages are mutually intelligible, especially on the part of Turkish speakers based on the assumption that speakers of these two languages of Turkic origin can comprehend each other without much difficulty. The results of the study, in which 30 Turkish participants took part, show that even though Turkish and Azerbaijani are typologically similar languages, on the part of Turkish speakers the intelligibility is not as high as it is estimated.⁵⁴⁰ Yet, insofar as Azerbaijanis started to use Turkish loan words as well, in their

⁵³⁸Lindsay, R. (2010), p. 98.

⁵³⁹Lindsay, R. (2010), p. 98.

⁵⁴⁰Sağın-Şimşek, Çiğdem; König, Wolf. “Receptive multilingualism and language understanding: Intelligibility of Azerbaijani to Turkish speakers.” *International Journal of Bilingualism*. Sep. 2012, Vol. 16 Issue 3, pp.315-331, p. 17.

contacts with Turks they are likely to adjust their speech to use Turkish words, and thus can communicate easily.

Moreover, in this respect, Marquardt observes that the adoption of Latin script made Azerbaijani greatly resemble the Turkish language due to the close lexical and grammatical relationship between the languages. However, as ‘Q’, ‘X’, and ‘Ə’ are the only letters contained in the Azerbaijani alphabet and not the Turkish alphabet, the Aliyev government accentuates these differences in their official propaganda. For example, both on propaganda posters and the five *manat* bill (which features the Azerbaijani alphabet) ‘Ə’ is the most prominent letter. So, the government makes it clear that Azerbaijan had adopted its own Latin alphabet. Yet, such language policy causes confusion as Heydar Aliyev himself asserted that Turkey’s extreme 1920 language reforms were a great mistake as they served to further divide the Turkish and Azerbaijani languages.⁵⁴¹

Of course, Marquardt’s observation about the three letters is valuable in understanding H. Aliyev’s efforts of creating a unique national language through increasing differences between the Azerbaijani language and the Turkish language. But it seems most likely that the addition of these letters does not make much difference. In this regard, in the study of Akyıldız, who made field research on the issue of national identity in Azerbaijan, the majority of the interviewees stated that these different letters do not indicate the uniqueness of Azerbaijani language but partially differentiate Azerbaijani from Turkish. Also, some participants claimed that only three letters do not differentiate languages since the essence of the Azerbaijani language is Turkic.⁵⁴²

Furthermore, Aliyev’s policy of distinguishing culturally and linguistically Azerbaijani people from Turkish people contradicts his following assessments: “There is a special place for Turkey in the hearts of Azerbaijanis ...”; “Turkey is a fraternal and friendly country for Azerbaijan ...”; “Our history is one, our tongue is one, our religion is one.”; “... Our peoples are of the same stock ... Even if we were

⁵⁴¹Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p.185-186, 191.

⁵⁴²Akyıldız, Selma. Reflections of Nationalism and the Role of Language Policies in National Identity formation in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Middle East Technical University, Eurasian Studies, Master Thesis, 2019, p. 63.

departed in the last period, this has not taken hold of our unity. Now we have all the opportunities to continue this unity” and his most famous slogan is “We are one nation, two states.”⁵⁴³ It becomes obvious that H. Aliyev purported to construct a “unique” nation with its distinctive national language that would boost national self and national pride. In other words, his aim was to develop a standardized official language for a new independent state in order to be a fully legitimate nation. It is noteworthy to state that such a situation does not pertain to Azerbaijan only, but almost all new nation-states.⁵⁴⁴

Here, following modernist approach, it can be argued that the nation-building project in the case of Azerbaijan shows that nations are constructions and they are created by political elites. National identity turns out to be a “top-down” idea, which is continuously reshaped, redefined, de/re-constructed and manipulated by the state. In this respect, Anthony Smith is right in his arguments:

Today, we are particularly aware of how the components of national identities change, but this is a process that occurs in every generation, as external events and internal realignments of groups and power encourage new understandings of collective traditions. This process of “ethno-symbolic reconstruction” involves the reselection, recombination and recodification of previously existing values, symbols, memories and the like, as well as the addition of new cultural elements by each generation.⁵⁴⁵

Hence, H. Aliyev also followed the same suit of modern nations in constructing the nation, in re-defining its cultural elements to make it distinct from other nations, even distinct from the nations that come from the same ethnic stock. In

⁵⁴³Cəfərov N., Çobanov M., Q. Paşayeva. Azərbaycanşünaslığın Əsasları. Bakı: “AzAtaM,” 2013, p. 139-140.

⁵⁴⁴“The felt need for a single national language has extended beyond Europe to relatively new nations, who themselves have felt that if such an obvious national language does not already exist, it needs to be constructed for their nation to be thought of as fully legitimate. Some of the most prominent recently constructed national languages are Hindi, Bhasa Indonesia, Modern Hebrew and Modern Standard Arabic...The official standardized language in Yugoslavia was Serbo-Croatian, with Serbian written in Cyrillic characters and Croatian in Roman characters. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992, the successor states – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia all developed standardized official languages... “Montenegrin” is fully mutually intelligible with Serbian. Indeed, Montenegro was part of Serbia until its declared independence in 2007. The nation’s new constitution declared Montenegrin as the official language of the new nation, recognizing Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. The Montenegrins established a Council for the Codification of the Montenegrin language, which is still wrangling over the official letters for the Montenegrin alphabet and many other features of the official language See: Beeman, William O. “Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.” in Östman, Jan-Ola and Jef Verschueren, Eds. Handbook of Pragmatics 21, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2018, pp. 81-110, p. 88, 89, 90.

⁵⁴⁵Smith, A. (2001), p. 20.

the following speech made, on June 1, 1996, to the representatives of Azerbaijan Peoples Federation in Germany, he stated:

In the last years in Azerbaijan some people say that we are Turks and our language is Turkish. We are from the common stock, but several branches came out of this stock. Those living in Anatolia, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan are Turks. Uyghurs living in China are Turks as well. But each of them is a branch of one stock. We should not lose that branch. Namely, we should not paint them in the same color... In the Republic, we asserted that we are Azerbaijanis. There are plenty of nations from the same stock. More colorful it is, more powerful it will be. One should always protect that common stock. Because our stock, language, religion, national traditions bind us together and must do it. But if you melt a language inside of another language, the outcome will be hotchpotch. And hotchpotch can yield nothing... Try to consolidate your Azerbaijanism more from now on.⁵⁴⁶

Thus, according to H. Aliyev, Azerbaijanis share mainly common stock with Turks, and they are natives, but to have a distinct national identity and language of its own is more important than to be melt inside of a larger Turkish identity and language. At the same time, it can be argued that “Aliyev’s return to the former name of the state language was widely understood as a move not only intended to highlight independence, but also to satisfy the Russian neighbor and to distance himself from the Republic of Turkey.”⁵⁴⁷ In this sense, it seems likely that the concern for the re-adoption of the Azerbaijani language is more political than linguistic.

In this context, Akyıldız indicates that according to her respondents it is well-known that Azerbaijani language is one of the dialects of the Turkic language. Thus, there was no need for overemphasizing Turkishness since it may cause further cleavages in the Azerbaijani society. Still, the majority of the respondents in her field research believe that Azerbaijani Turkish is the most appropriate naming in terms of linguistics. Others, on the other hand, think that although naming this language as Azerbaijani is not linguistically correct, it was an accurate political decision for the nation building process. Another concern mentioned was the translation problems if the language was called Turkish, especially for foreigners.⁵⁴⁸

In addition, it can be said that not only internal dynamics but also regional dynamics played a crucial role in the refusal of naming national language as “Turk”

⁵⁴⁶ Azərbaycan Diasporu. 2005, p. 40.

⁵⁴⁷ Jacob M. Landau, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele (2001), p. 152.

⁵⁴⁸ Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 90.

and re-acceptance of it as “Azerbaijani”. That is, one might easily assume that Russia is satisfied because this change is in accordance with its old imperial policy of “divide and rule.” Iran also seems to be contented because this change will maintain the separation of its Turkic people in Northern Iran from their ethnic brethren in Azerbaijan. Namely, for Iran, it would mean those Azerbaijanis are separate from these Turks. As I have already mentioned, Iran saw Elchibey’s Turkification and united Azerbaijan project as a threat to its territorial integrity. However, Iran seems to be satisfied with H. Aliyev’s project, as he, in contrast to Elchibey, declined the name “Turk” and did not challenge Iran’s territorial integrity by claiming historical rights to South Azerbaijan. In this regard, Elchibey writes:

There is a member of the Iranian parliament named Fatma. When he met with Heydar Aliyev, she said that God forbid that a leader like Elchibey comes to power again. She was also very kind. Less than 3-4 months later, she addressed the parliament in Tehran and said, “How can the Republic of Azerbaijan be independent?” It is the territory of Iran; we must seize it and return it to Iran. How do you think Azerbaijan should look at people who look at Azerbaijan with that eye? What that woman said was the opinion of Iran that the Azerbaijani government should be a slave to Iran and live by Iran’s word. It is not possible. Therefore, diplomatic relations between Iran and Azerbaijan will be tense. As the national liberation movement intensifies in the south, Tehran will intensify its hostility to the North.⁵⁴⁹

Accordingly, the following question always interested and disturbed Elchibey as he asked: “Why is it that when we call ourselves Turks, or when someone calls us Turks, no one is bothered, gets angered, or spends billions to separate us from our Turkism, and each other - except for Russian and Persian chauvinism.”⁵⁵⁰ Thus, it can be concluded that aside from internal factors it was to a major extent external factors that were effective in defining the name of the national language in Azerbaijan. It could reasonably be claimed that because naming language and nation has significantly been problematized, it provides an initial and essential part of the formation of national identity in Azerbaijan.

⁵⁴⁹Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 324.

⁵⁵⁰Elçibəy, Ə. (2004), p. 231.

6.1.2. Promotion of Azerbaijani Language

As an “author” of the Azerbaijani language, H. Aliyev highly contributed to the development of the national language in the country. First of all, it should be noted that although H. Aliyev studied in Soviet times and worked in high positions, thus, spoke perfect Russian, at the same time he was very fluent in his mother tongue.

In this respect, H. Aliyev said: “It is the language that cherishes and develops the national and spiritual values of every nation”, “Our language is very rich and harmonious, has deep historical roots. Personally, I love my mother tongue and I am proud of speaking in this language.” Moreover, in his advice to young people, he stated: “We need to internalize our mother tongue, Azerbaijani, we need to speak well in this language, and we need to hear it as mother tongue, and love this language; a person who does not know his own language and who does not love his own language cannot know his own history”; “I want an Azerbaijani youth to read Shakespeare in English, read Pushkin in Russian, and read Nizami, Fuzuli, and Nasimi in Azerbaijani.”⁵⁵¹ In addition, according to him, “the first confirmation of the nationalness of the nation is its language. Living, strengthening, and developing Azerbaijani as a state language is also one of our greatest achievements. It is not only a matter of language but also a question of Azerbaijanism.”⁵⁵²

Indeed, it is not disputable that his persistent stress on the importance of the national language and his love to mother tongue was manifested in his language policy. Azerbaijani language has acquired prominence through education policy as to work in Azerbaijan now requires the knowledge of Azerbaijani. In this direction, during his reign, he issued several decrees to strengthen the position of Azerbaijani language:

June 18, 2001 – A decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan was issued “On the improvement of the use of the state language”. This document aimed to address the problems that arise in the development and application of the language. The decree also envisaged the creation of the State Language Committee under the President of Azerbaijan.

⁵⁵¹Cəfərov N., Çobanov M., Q.Paşayeva (2013), p. 75, 118-119.

⁵⁵²Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p.14.

August 9, 2001- A decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Setting Up the Day of Azerbaijani language and Azerbaijani Alphabet”. This document stimulated the implementation of the language application at a better level and accelerated the transition to the Azerbaijani alphabet with Latin graphics. After that, all written documents in the republic started to be written with this graphic without any exception. Notably, the Azerbaijani alphabet of Latin graphics was adopted in 1991 but could not work with all its strength. With this decree, H. Aliyev solved this problem once and for all.

September 30, 2002 – A law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On the Official Language in the Republic of Azerbaijan”. This law requires the knowledge of the Azerbaijani language for every citizen of Azerbaijan.

January 2, 2003 – A decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan was issued on the implementation of the law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On the State Language in the Republic of Azerbaijan”. This law clearly outlined the main responsibilities of the state in the sphere of the care to mother tongue. The law put forward the preparation of the state language development program and the financing of the implementation of this program at the expense of funds allocated from the state budget as one of the main tasks of the government.⁵⁵³ Evaluating these decrees as his achievements, H. Aliyev said that not only in the state and the government bodies but also in the spheres of education, health, business, and everywhere state language, mother tongue, Azerbaijani language must be dominant.⁵⁵⁴

It is notable that such an official language policy has been observed not only in Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet countries from the start of their independence, but also in former colonies, as stated by Hobsbawm:

This system of one official language per country became part of everyone’s aspiration to become a nation-state... Colonies winning their independence after World War II automatically thought in terms of some home-grown national language as the base of national education and culture- Urdu in Pakistan, Hindi in India, Sinhala in Sri Lanka, Arabic in Algeria.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵³Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p. 16-17.

⁵⁵⁴Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p. 20.

⁵⁵⁵Hobsbawm, Eric. “Language, Culture, and National Identity.” Social Research, Volume 63, No. 4, Winter 1996, pp. 1066-1080, p. 1071.

Even in western liberal democracies, as Kymlicka stated: “In most democratic states, governments have typically adopted the majority’s language as the one “official language” - i.e., as the language of government, bureaucracy, courts, schools, and so on. All citizens are then forced to learn this language in school, and fluency in it is required to work for, or deal with, government.” Also, for him, a common language has been seen as essential to democracy, as he asked how “the people” can govern together if they cannot understand one another.⁵⁵⁶

Furthermore, it is true that it should be due to the separately adopted implementation strategy that H. Aliyev generally achieved the actual fulfilment of the formulated policies, as Garibova puts it,

Presidential decrees, orders or instructions, given to lower instances (ministries, committees) in follow-up to the adoption of a Law, State program or various kinds of legal acts, facilitate actual implementation as they set concrete deadlines, formulate measurable goals and describe more direct steps related to funding and delegation of authorities. An example of how this mechanism works is the above-mentioned 2001 Presidential Decree on the State language, which ensured the actual shift to the Latin-based alphabet, as it contained direct instructions to the relevant ministries.⁵⁵⁷

However, in some cases, a high degree of formality was observed in language policy and planning initiatives. For example, the activity of the Language Committee established in 2001, was rather formal, and it was not sufficiently active in solving language issues. Reports indicate that the committee is not even active today. According to Prof. Ismayil Mammadov, a member of the committee, who is also affiliated with the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, admits that the committee has not held any meeting for a long time. He states that language issues are rather brought up at Scientific or Academic Councils of Universities, or the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan.⁵⁵⁸

As for the role of Russian, it should be stated that though H. Aliyev did all his best to promote the Azerbaijani language, he did not curb the status of Russian

⁵⁵⁶Kymlicka, Will. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 78, 26.

⁵⁵⁷Garibova, Jale. “Linguistic Landscape in Azerbaijan: Policy, attitudes and choices.” in Ludmilla A’Beckett, Theodorus du Plessis, *In Pursuit of Societal Harmony: reviewing the experiences and approaches in officially monolingual and officially multilingual countries*. SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein, 2017, p. 131.

⁵⁵⁸Garibova, J. (2017), p. 132.

language. In one of his speeches, H. Aliyev said, “You should know that Azerbaijan’s development in the twentieth century is associated with Russia. European science and civilization came to Azerbaijan from Russia.”⁵⁵⁹ The government-affiliated officials point out that the APF government was needlessly antagonistic towards Russia and Russophones. In this respect, Marquardt argues that while the government has symbolically distanced itself from Russia through policies such as changing its script and not affording the Russian language an official status (for example, as an official state language), Russian-language education has encountered little (if any) government interference (though students are expected to learn Azerbaijani to enter into Azerbaijani universities).⁵⁶⁰

Furthermore, as Luscombe and Kazdal argue, with the re-adoption of Azerbaijani in the educational system as well as in all formal and public functions, Russian has been demoted to Russian-medium sectors within Azerbaijani-medium schools, and in many schools, it has been relegated to an elective, as English has become a required foreign language. Their study puts forward:

As a result of post-Soviet nation building, Azerbaijani has become a language associated with national, social, and cultural identity as the West, and by association, English has become associated with modernity and progress. In focus groups for this study, students repeatedly associated English with access to jobs and education opportunities overseas. Russian was still perceived as the language of elites and the intelligentsia... Moreover, Azerbaijani is not yet the language of access to knowledge and jobs. Academic resources are predominantly available in either Russian or English... In the data on linguistic identity, we see an institutional influence on identification with Azerbaijani, especially among students in Azerbaijani-medium schools.⁵⁶¹

So, these studies show that as a result of H. Aliyev’s language policy Azerbaijani language started to gain a dominant position in the society, though the Russian language was still there as a language of elites. The growing importance of the English language as a world language cannot be underestimated either. These developments can be evaluated as change and continuity after independence in the

⁵⁵⁹Tokluoglu, Ceylan. “Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 28 No. 4 July 2005 pp. 722- 758, p. 750.

⁵⁶⁰Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 187.

⁵⁶¹Luscombe, L.D and Kazdal, V. “Language and identity in a post-Soviet world: language of education and linguistic identity among Azerbaijani students.” *Nationalities Papers*, 2014 Vol. 42, No. 6, 1015–1033, p. 1019.

country. This situation is well described in the words of H. Aliyev, on December 30, 1997, during his speech to the Azerbaijani writers, as he put it:

If we have already reunited the world and joined the World Union, our people should know a few languages - English, Russian, and French as well. It should not be forbidden; it need not be prevented. But they first must know their mother tongue. Yes, there are people in Azerbaijan now, mostly speak in Russian and not speak Azerbaijani. There are also such kinds of people in our state agencies. I have repeatedly warned them that if they do not learn Azerbaijani, I will dismiss them.⁵⁶²

Finally, it becomes clear that H. Aliyev was very firm in his policy of promoting Azerbaijani language in all spheres of society. It is not only because of the fact that he valued the national language as one of the main elements determining the national existence of Azerbaijani people, but also as a driving force of his doctrine of Azerbaijanism.

However, one might argue that Azerbaijanism was adopted to guarantee the gradual assimilation of the national minority into the majority group. "There is strong evidence that languages cannot survive for long in the modern world unless they are used in public life, and so government decisions about official languages are, in effect, decisions about which languages will thrive, and which will die out."⁵⁶³ Indeed, the consolidation of the dominant language as the only official language is surely detrimental to the development of national minority languages. At the same time, it also seems to be inefficient and impractical for the functionality of the state to give equal official status to other languages. Hobsbawm argues that "the case for the privileged use of any language as the only language of education and culture in a country is, thus, political and ideological or, at best, pragmatic. Except in one respect, it is not educational."⁵⁶⁴ But, a state can support minority languages to be preserved in a private realm by providing their members with language rights. So, in this instance, practically it is observed that members of minorities generally become bilingual, that is, speak both state language and native language.

Though Azerbaijani language is the language of dominant ethnic core, it does not designate ethnic name. Rather, it designates the name of the country, with the function of making it the language of all. In other words, it is specifically designed to

⁵⁶²Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p. 25.

⁵⁶³Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 78.

⁵⁶⁴Hobsbawm, E. (1996), p. 1072.

make it easily acceptable by all other groups. In this sense, promotion of Azerbaijani language as dominant language should not be seen as “cultural hegemony” or “ethnocentric prejudice”, rather as an integrating force to create a common membership, solidarity, social equality, and political cohesion through the standardized public education in a common language. It brings about equal opportunity and equal access for all citizens to mainstream institutions operating in the dominant language.

6.2. Doctrine of Azerbaijanism

It has already been stated that H. Aliyev developed the doctrine of Azerbaijanism as a response to series of problems in both domestic and foreign policy. In domestic policy, it has been thought to be a key solution to any ethnic separatism that can divide the country along the ethnic lines. In foreign policy, it has been pursued to prevent external forces (especially, Iran and Russia) to support minor nationalisms (especially, Lezgin, Talysh, and Kurdish) in the country and also, to unite all Azerbaijanis around the world.

With the first book titled “The Ideology of Azerbaijan” (1996) written about the national ideology in Azerbaijan, the foundation of the theory of Azerbaijanism was laid. In this respect, the application of Azerbaijanism to statehood is connected with the name of H. Aliyev. For the first time, he confirmed Azerbaijanism as the national state ideology of Azerbaijan at the First Congress of World Azerbaijanis in 2001, as he said:

For every human being, national affiliation is his source of pride. I have always been proud, and today I am proud that I am an Azerbaijani. The main idea of the independent Azerbaijan state is Azerbaijanism. Every Azerbaijani should be proud of its national identity and we must keep Azerbaijanism - Azerbaijani language, culture, national-moral values, customs and traditions alive.⁵⁶⁵

Moreover, H. Aliyev tended to emphasize: “Azerbaijan is the homeland of all those living in Azerbaijan regardless of their nationality, religion, language, and origin; including Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabagh.”⁵⁶⁶ Apparently, the

⁵⁶⁵Şəmsizadə, N. Azərbaycançılıq. Bakı: “Nurlar,” 2006, p. 3-4.

⁵⁶⁶Shaffer, B. (2002), p. 166.

ideology of Azerbaijanism is a civic-weighted concept and rejects any ethnic nationalist idea. That is to say, it rejects Turkism as well as minor nationalisms. Its goal is to unite all large or small ethnic groups around the united Azerbaijan. It comprises two main ideas - “statehood” and “patriotism”. H. Aliyev highlighted: “It is our treasure and privilege that Azerbaijan is a multiethnic and tolerant country... Azerbaijan is the common motherland of all nations and peoples living in its territory... the word Azerbaijan has always united us.”⁵⁶⁷ So, his policy of Azerbaijanism, which “foresees a civic state model where only citizenship is of consequence to the state, while religious affiliation, ethnicity and native language is not”⁵⁶⁸, has widely been accepted by Azerbaijani people.

Correspondingly, citizenship policy of the state is based upon mixed citizenship regimes which contains both elements of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship is granted upon birth from the parents who are citizens) and *jus soli* (citizenship is automatically granted upon birth within the country)⁵⁶⁹ as indicated in the Constitution, Article 52 about the citizenship rights,

A person belonging to the Azerbaijani state, having political and legal affiliation, as well as mutual rights and duties with him, is a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan. A person born in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan or from citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan is a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic. If one of the parents of a person is a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan, he is a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic.

According to the research result of Tokluoglu, many believe that the emphasis on Turkism creates and will continue to create ethnic tensions in Azerbaijan. As the minority groups such as the Talysh and Lezgins came to be perceived as a problem, “it was at this point that Aliyev developed the term Azerbaijani.” The government’s ideology of Azerbaijanism emphasizes a pluralistic identity inclusive of various ethnic groups of Azerbaijan. Many agree that this “Azerbaijanism better fits the present conditions and it is through this ideology that Azerbaijan can develop itself.”⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁷Niftiyev, N. *Azərbaycanda Birgəyaşayış və Multikulturalizm*, BBMM, 2015, p. 9.

⁵⁶⁸Cornell, S. (2016), p. 47.

⁵⁶⁹By comparison, Japan is a country with full *jus sanguinis* law, and United states is a country with full *jus soli* law

⁵⁷⁰Tokluoglu, C. (2005), p. 737.

Moreover, H. Aliyev's Azerbaijanism did not limit itself to the people of the Azerbaijan Republic only but extended to the world Azerbaijanis as well. In this sense, H. Aliyev paid special attention to the development of the national diaspora. The life of the Azerbaijani diaspora has been revitalized since the independence. In his almost all visits to foreign countries, H. Aliyev used to speak to the Azerbaijani diaspora and instilling the idea of Azerbaijanism in them. It is very common among Azerbaijanis to congratulate each other on both New Year and the Day of Solidarity on 31 December. H. Aliyev signed the historical decision of the Parliament of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic "About the Day of Solidarity and Unity of World Azerbaijanis" on December 16, 1991. The celebration of 31 December - the Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis as a holiday has been essential in the formation of the national diaspora, and in the development of the Azerbaijani lobby. Since that time on, H. Aliyev every year on December 31 made a speech to Azerbaijani people. In one of his speeches, he said:

The independent Azerbaijani Republic is the strong protector and base of the solidarity of world Azerbaijanis. Ideas of Azerbaijanism and Azerbaijani statehood developed since the creation of our independent state, have taken a stronghold in the consciousnesses and transformed into the national ideology uniting our co-nationals. The holding of the First Congress of World Azerbaijanis in November 2001, the establishment of the State Committee on the Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, and other steps taken in the direction of consolidation of the unity and solidarity of our co-nationals started to yield positive results.⁵⁷¹

All in all, H. Aliyev's national policy was primarily directed towards strengthening the perception and reception of Azerbaijani identity with strong reference to statehood and patriotism. Even, the national anthem of the country, which has a powerful effect on the formation of national identity, serves to enhance patriotic senses, as Azerbaijani people can frequently hear it in their everyday life. It should be stressed that though the state anthem was adopted before the reign of H. Aliyev, on May 27, 1992, it seems that it perfectly serves his doctrine of Azerbaijanism. The lyrics of the state anthem, "Azerbaijani March", composed by Uzeyir Hajibeyli and written by poet Ahmad Javad is as follows:

Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan!

You are the country of heroes!

⁵⁷¹Azərbaycan Diasporu. 2005, p.11,13, 21.

We will die so that you might be alive!
We will shed our blood to defend you!
Long live your three-colored banner!
Thousands of people sacrificed their lives
You have become the field of battles.
Every soldier fighting for you,
Has become a hero.
We pray for your prosperity,
We make sacrifice our lives to you
Our sincere love to you,
Comes from the bottom of our hearts.
To defend your honor,
To hoist your banner,
All the young people are ready.
Glorious motherland,
Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan.

As it is seen, the anthem refers only to the land of Azerbaijan and is about heroism, patriotism, and sacrifices to defend the motherland. In other words, there is not any reference to ethnicity or primordial attachment of the titular nation. In this sense, hailing the peculiarities of the anthem, national leader H. Aliyev said: “We must love our state anthem and our flag as much as we love ourselves because this is a symbol of loyalty, love, and affection to our homeland, our nation, and our state.”⁵⁷²

In this sense, it is notable that since Azerbaijanism triumphed over Turkism on the state level, some scholars started to evaluate the opinions about the implementation of the Turkism idea to the life of Azerbaijan as romanticism as opposed to the Azerbaijanism idea to be real and practical. For example, Ramiz Mehdiyev puts it: “What constitutes the base and the main tenet of the national idea is not dreamy ideas and romantic wishes, but the creation of the national statehood conforming to the historical traditions, the experience of the previous generations and

⁵⁷²<https://en.president.az/azerbaijan/symbols>

the spirit of the epoch.”⁵⁷³ He writes in his article titled “Azerbaijanism - a perfect example of national ideology” that the concept of “Azerbaijanism”, used recently in the national political discourse, has come up with the idea of integrating all the ethnic groups and nations living in the country based on the interests and values of common statehood, in particular in the fight against the widespread chauvinist and separatist mood in 1992-1993. The new concept has been widely supported by the public (Newspaper ‘Azerbaijan’, November 9, 2007).⁵⁷⁴ In this regard, he says that in the beginning years of the independence ethnic identification as a form of collective identification gained priority. As a response to the denial of ethnicity during seventy years, this component received a strong boost in a short time and reached extreme levels. He argues:

But, not all of the nations living in the republic were the carriers of Turkish ethnicity. So the decisive choice of this form of identification had a negative impact on the integrity of the society. The prevalence of Turkism in debates on ethnic and religious identity of the Azerbaijanis weakened the stability of the society and dragged it towards the fragmentation on the grounds of ethnicity. Only the fact that Heydar Aliyev, who has chosen Azerbaijanism as the priority of the statehood of citizenship over ethnicity, intervened in this process on time to eliminate the acute problem. At the same time, the name of the nation identical to the name of the state was preserved.⁵⁷⁵

Thus, Ramiz Mehdiyev accepts the reality of strong Turkish ethnic identity in the country that is seen to be challenging minority ethnic groups. In other words, he confirms the existence of salient ethnic distinction while attesting to the fragmentation of the society on ethnic grounds. However, somewhat paradoxically, Mehdiyev declares that the Azerbaijani nation has been formed as a boiling pot that reflects the unity of the historical paths of all ethnic groups living in the country. For him, “in addition to the strong Turkic foundation, Iran, Arab origin, Albanian layer, and other ancient ethnicities existed here throughout the centuries, naturally assimilated as a united nation, having unique national lines and components pertinent to national identification of Azerbaijanis.” He compares this period of the formation

⁵⁷³Yusifov, M. *Azərbaycançılıq*. Bakı: “Elm və təhsil,” 2010, p. 12.

⁵⁷⁴Mehdiyev, Ramiz (2007) “Azərbaycançılıq - Milli İdeologiyanın Kamil Nümunəsi.” Niftiyev, Niyaz. *Azərbaycanda Birgəyaşayış və Multikulturalizm*, Bakı Beynəlxalq Multikulturalizm Mərkəzi, 2015, p. 50.

⁵⁷⁵Ramiz Mehdiyev’s interview to the newspaper “Bakinskiy Rabochiy”, November 2011, seen in Niftiyev, Niyaz (2015), p. 68-69.

of an independent Azerbaijani state with the period of national idea formation in France. He writes that after the French Revolution of 1789, a new approach to the concept of nation - the determination to live together and, as a consequence, the unity and indivisibility of the nation and state - was formed.⁵⁷⁶ Thus, it can be implied that Azerbaijani nation emerges to be very like a French nation. It is also noteworthy that Mehdiyev's arguments about the formation of a new Azerbaijani nation out of the melting pot of all ethnic groups is very similar with Ernest Renan's "What is a nation" speech in which he argues that there is no ethnic distinction in France and all people are French (about it I discussed in detail in the Chapter 2).

In this context, Afrand Dashdemirov argues that the motives of love for Turks have always been native to the national consciousness, national feelings of Azerbaijanis. In his opinion, it is not accidental that Azerbaijanis looked for its manifestation in Turkey, its people, culture, and language. He wrote:

Therefore, the Turkish solidarity, the ideas of friendship and brotherhood with the Turkish people have fallen on the fertile ground and have played a decisive role in confrontation with the Armenians, in the struggle for statehood and independence. However, the idea of "one nation - two states" was not widely defended in Azerbaijani society. In an attempt to replace the motives of love for Turks manifested itself in the replacement of one name with the other, with the serious efforts of the APF ideologists, the name "Azerbaijanis" was simply replaced by the name "Turks".

Here, Dashdemirov is certainly wrong in his assessment that the idea of "one nation-two states" was not defended by people. By contrast, that slogan was widely accepted in Azerbaijan. Also, it is well known in Turkey. Furthermore, he indicated:

The stable location of the "Azerbaijani" ethnonym in the mass consciousness can be considered to be linked to secularization processes in the Soviet era and, in a sense, to the atheistic lifestyle of local people in ethnic sense... as a result it is not important how and why this and other ethnonym has been spread and established, the important issue is the acceptance or rejection of this ethnonym by the majority of the people. From this point of view, ethnonym "Azerbaijani" has strongly entered the minds of the Azerbaijani ethnos, the psychology of the demographic society irrespective of the political intentions of its 'authors'. And the attempts to change the real ethnic situation are nothing more than violence over human beings, their mentality, and their moral self-control.⁵⁷⁷

In short, Dashdemirov strongly advocates the ethnonym "Azerbaijani" instead of "Turk", and argues that in spite of people's powerful Turkish feelings they identify

⁵⁷⁶Ibid, p. 68-69.

⁵⁷⁷Daşdemirov, Əfrand F. Millət və Cəmiyyət Tarixin Sərt Dönəmlərində. Bakı: "Elm," 2008, p. 139-141.

themselves as “Azerbaijani”. It is notable that Dashdemirov opts for the continuation of Soviet era “nation project”, that is to say, the denial of ethnicity - ancient Turkic roots for Azerbaijanis.

In the similar vein, the argument of Alikram Tagiyev is valuable to catch up the essence of Azerbaijanism, and its relation to Turkism, as he said:

While Turkism is general, and somewhat romantic, Azerbaijanism appears to be more realistic and practical, more acceptable and attractive to indigenous peoples, especially to smaller nations. Unlike ethnic Turkism, Azerbaijanism is a political-geographical nationalism and plays an integrative role for all peoples and citizens of the republic. Therefore, Azerbaijanism is a target, a means of strengthening the statehood. It requires the fulfillment of the tasks of forming the feeling of belongingness to the Azerbaijani nation, and developing the united civil political culture in the country. People should not turn their polyethnic diversity into political variations... Azerbaijanism is supported everywhere because it is in line with the interests of all citizens of the country. Azerbaijanism must play the role of Ottomanism in Azerbaijan, as it historically did so in Turkey. It is a very successful political idea that has been set up to preserve the unity of the country and its peoples during the transitional period.⁵⁷⁸

Similarly, Niyaz Niftiyev writes that “it is exactly the idea of Azerbaijanism that lied at the basis of the successes of the great politician Heydar Aliyev, who had rescued the Azerbaijani state from disintegration in 1993. He restored and consolidated the destructed state and damaged national unity with the help of Azerbaijanism.”⁵⁷⁹ Salahaddin Khalilov, in his book “Heydar Aliyev and Azerbaijanism Ideology”, defined components of Azerbaijanism as an ideology: 1) national-ethnic reality of Azerbaijan; 2) language (Azerbaijani language); 3) religion (Islam); 4) ethnography; 5) toponymy; 6) archaeology; 7) culture. He argues that all these elements of our modern reality must be taken in integrity with historical facts for the sake of the completeness of the ethnogenesis as training. First of all, we must find an answer to the question “Who are we?”:

To remain intact, to maintain its relative independence, it is not enough to justify self-esteem only in the emotional level. For that, at the theoretical and ideological level, rational clarity should be determined. A complete strategy should be developed. Education and media should be ready for action in this direction. That is why the concept of Azerbaijanism is also needed.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁸525-ci qəzet.- 2013.- 18 may.- p. 22.

⁵⁷⁹Niftiyev, N. (2015), p. 53.

⁵⁸⁰Xəlilov, S. (2002), p. 28-33.

So, it becomes evident that ideology of Azerbaijanism is fostered as a rational and political program that has a binding function to unite all ethnic groups under supra-ethnic Azerbaijani identity. In Khalilov's words, Azerbaijani nation is a civic nation formed by the "collective will" of indigenous people to join the dominant culture.

Ethnic groups are becoming a nation by joining with any large-scale ethnos that is morally close to them within the framework of their own wish, will, and determination. The language of this great ethnos also becomes a common and connecting language. Often the name of the nation is the same as the name of this great ethnos. Sometimes, another neutral name is chosen. Even though German, Russian and Georgian, who are latecomers in Azerbaijan, could not join the unique Azerbaijani culture, local ethnic groups living in a single cultural-moral space for several hundred years are equally involved in the formation of a common national culture and are equally proud of its achievements.⁵⁸¹

Khalilov justifies his argument by referring to the German philosopher Kurt Huebner, for whom the nation is generally formed by combining several ethnicities. "If the nation-state, which unites many nations, is able to form a single culture that is equal to all regardless of its national-ethnic diversity, people can consider themselves equal." He warns that Azerbaijanis should not be understood from the point of view of syncretism, as an eclectic system, as some people do, rather there exists unique language, unique religion, and unique culture that bind Azerbaijanis.⁵⁸²

So, all of the scholars who support H. Aliyev's Azerbaijanism doctrine such as Ramiz Mehdiyev, Afrand Dashdemirov, Salahaddin Khalilov, Niyaz Niftiyev, Nizami Khudiyev, Nizami Jafarov, who can be called Azerbaijanists or civic nationalists, posit Azerbaijanism against Turkism. All of them criticized Turkism as chauvinistic and racist ideology, something that is pertinent to the past and incompatible with reality. All of them criticized Elchibey's policy of naming state language as "Turk" and highly praised H. Aliyev for his deeds of renaming it as "Azerbaijani". They advocate Azerbaijani nation to be a civic nation without ethnic basis. In other words, ethnicity is excluded from the definition of national identity.

However, the other side of the coin tells the opposite. In this case, individuals are seen as simply social and political entities that do not have any national idea (in the ethnic sense). The goal here is to create a political nation without referring to any

⁵⁸¹Xəlilov, S. (2002), p. 42-43.

⁵⁸²Xəlilov, S. (2002), p. 44.

ethnic roots. Is that possible that minor ethnic groups feel equal *vis-à-vis* the dormant ethnic group? Can people leave their ethnic identification or put it in the background and simply make the identity of their citizenship a priority? In other words, does not the ideology of Azerbaijanism roughly mean to assimilate minor ethnic groups into the mainstream societal culture? Does not it also mean the denial of ethnicity to the majority of Turkic people? In this sense, does not it resemble the nationality policies of the Soviet era to form a Soviet Man? Following the arguments of Alikram Tagiyev it comes out that Azerbaijani identity is the same as Ottoman identity. Then, another question emerges: Were not there ethnic nationalisms that fiercely confronted both Soviet and Ottoman identities?

Consequently, the answer to the question “Who is Azerbaijani?” will be as follows: Azerbaijanis, with more than 55 million in the world, combine ethnographic and cultural peculiarities such as language, religion, morality. More than 90% of Azerbaijanis live in their historical homeland (Azerbaijan, South Azerbaijan - Iran, Derbent, Borchali), and less than 10% live in different foreign countries. The essence of the concept of “Azerbaijani” consists of:

- Azerbaijani Turks (Azerbaijanis after 1937);
- Caucasian and Persian-speaking minorities (Ingiloys, Talyshs, Tats and etc.);
- Everyone who considers himself Azerbaijani.⁵⁸³

Thus, the designation “Azerbaijani” carries a “double” meaning. It functions both as a civic name or citizenship identity for all the citizens of Azerbaijan Republic and as the “ethnic” name for the majority Turkic people. As a “civic” name, it is acceptable for all ethnic groups since it is plausible to use Azerbaijani as a citizenship identity alongside with original identity.

The question, then, is: what is the difference between being Turk, Jew, Talysh, Lezgin, Kurd, on the one hand, and being Azerbaijani on the other? The simple answer is that they can be both, that is, being Azerbaijani is a kind of citizenship identity, and being Lezgin, or Jew, or Turk is an ethnic identity. Thus, the existence of these identities is not contradictory, in some sense, rather complementary. Yet, sometimes they can be seen as alternatives in different situations, especially when people feel bound to choose one or prioritize one over the other. Following David

⁵⁸³Cəfərov, N., (2013), p. 122.

Miller, I use the term “nested national identities”, referring to the idea that “people can identify equally strongly with a larger nation-state and with a smaller national community inside it.” Miller contends that in societies that are increasingly culturally plural there can, nevertheless, be “a shared public culture which defines the national identity... alongside a plurality of private cultures which help define people’s identities as members of sectional groups.”⁵⁸⁴ Here, Azerbaijani identity appears to be similar to US-style or UK-style collective identity. Indeed, in parallel to British Indians, American Jews it is possible to speak about Azerbaijani Turks, Azerbaijani Kurds, and the like.

However, it is essentially this second meaning that causes ambiguity. For example, it is common to come across various designations in scholarly works, in daily life, both by locals and by foreigners to refer to the majority Turkic people such as “Azeris” or “ethnic Azeris”, “ethnic Azerbaijanis”, “real Azerbaijanis”, and “Azeri Turks”. The members of this majority group sometimes feel obliged to choose between “Azerbaijani” and “Turk” in order to indicate their ethnic identity. From time to time this situation can bring about even public debate, which suggests that, as Cornell puts it, “it does not mean that the definition of the Azerbaijani nation is settled; just as in any other modern nation-state, there is a continuing tug of war between civic and ethnic markers of identity.”⁵⁸⁵

As a matter of fact, in 2017, a public debate over the question of national identity soared after the deputy of Azerbaijan National Parliament, Arif Rehimzade, had given an interview to the Russian KM.ru news site. To the question of a journalist “We have always heard that Azerbaijanis and Turks are the same nation,” the deputy responded: “This is wrong! We Azerbaijanis have common stocks with Turks, but we are completely different nations... Our haplessness is that in Russia we are considered to be Turks...”⁵⁸⁶ Such an explanation caused public outcries as well as astonishment and proved that identity crisis has yet to be resolved. By following the debates in social networks, it comes out that opinions are divided: some say we are

⁵⁸⁴John Ahier, John Beck, Rob Moore. *Graduate Citizens? Issues of Citizenship and Higher Education*. Routledge Falmer, Taylor and Francis Group, 2003, p. 54.

⁵⁸⁵Cornell, S. (2016), p. 46.

⁵⁸⁶<https://www.azadliq.az/xeber/131121/azərbaycanlilar-turk-deyil-deputat-arif-rəhimzadə/>

Azerbaijanis; others claim to be Turk; while many say to be Azerbaijani Turk; members of ethnic minorities point both its citizenship and ethnic identity. The debate re-brought to the fore the conflict between two contrasting ideologies - Azerbaijanism and Turkism, which “not only reflect the relations between various ethnic groups in Azerbaijan but also create new tensions based on ethnicity.”⁵⁸⁷

Similarly, the same sort of debate occurred in November 2015, when Araz Alizadeh, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (ASDP), with his interview to the local press, caused serious dissatisfaction among many historians and anthropologists. Particularly, he was seriously protested by the fact that denying the Turkic origin of Azerbaijani nation, he claimed that Azerbaijanis belonged to the Indian-European race. Araz Alizadeh argued that the anthropological science confirmed his views. He claimed that we have nothing to do with Turks; we are just Turkic-speaking. In response to Alizadeh, a historian Faig Gazanfaroglu Alekberov stated:

At present, there are scientists in our country who stress that the Azerbaijani people are not Turkic origin. These historians are the followers of those ideologues that existed during Soviet times. Those historians try to prove that the Azerbaijani people are not from a Turkic tribe. Araz Alizadeh is one of those experts. He is trying to prove that the Azerbaijani people originated from non-Turkic tribe called *Azer*.⁵⁸⁸

Similarly, historian Dilaver Azimli stated that “Most of these people serve ideology. Azerbaijan has always been a Turkish homeland and there has not existed the word ‘azeri’ and people in this name. History proves that the Azerbaijani people are a Turkic people.” Also, another historian Karam Mammadov commented: “If we were a Hindu-European nation, then we should speak either English or Persian.”⁵⁸⁹

In short, it can be concluded that in relation to the designation “Azerbaijani”, the worries of ethnically Turkic majority are more evident rather than non-Turkic group. It seems that ethnic minorities are satisfied to the detriment of Turkic majority. The arguments of Turkic people are as follows, as it is stated in the study of Akyıldız:

⁵⁸⁷Tokluoglu, C. (2005), p. 728.

⁵⁸⁸<http://femida.az/az/news/12310>

⁵⁸⁹<http://femida.az/az/news/12310>

...vast majority of the citizens are Turk, and that they were called as Turk in all of the official documents until 1937. After 1937, the term of Azerbaijani was fabricated by Stalin to uproot Turks from their ethnic roots as a result of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. Thus, they demand that this historical injustice towards Turks should be repaired by bringing the term Turk back rather than Azerbaijani since the term Azerbaijani cannot be the definition of their ethnic identity. The term Azerbaijani is rather the answer to the question where you are from. In other words, this term refers to geography, not ethnicity. They also criticize the idea that although non-Turkic ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan can ethnically define their identity and language, Turks as the titular nation cannot define themselves by their ethnicity fearing that it may cause resentment among other ethnic minorities... As a middle way, some people suggest the use of the term Azerbaijani Turk for the sake of emphasizing the distinctiveness of Azerbaijani Turks from Turks in Turkey.⁵⁹⁰

Evidently, Azerbaijani Turks feel necessity to stress their ethnic identity as “Turk” rather than “Azerbaijani”. Interestingly enough, such a need rises especially as a reaction to the disturbance of national minorities to the designation “Turk”. In short, the question that Turkic people pose is like: “If national minorities can freely utter their ethnic identity, why cannot we do the same?”

So, it can be concluded that H. Aliyev government sought to achieve cultural homogenization by satisfying the desires of ethnic minorities. That is, because members of ethnic minorities do not welcome the name “Turk” to stand for the language and nation, the government changed it in order to appease them. Interestingly enough, those people highly welcome “Azerbaijani language” regardless of the fact that the essence of the language is Turkish. In fact, in the booklet “Language” in the Presidential Library it is indicated: “Genealogically, the Azerbaijani language belongs to the Turkic group of languages and together with closely associated Turkish, Turkmen and Gagauz languages, forms the southwestern group of Turkic languages.”⁵⁹¹ So, whether it is called “Azerbaijani” or “Turkish”, it is still the language of majority Turkic people, not the language of one of the ethnic communities (Talysh or Lezgin).

So, at this point, it can be inferred that the Aliyev government projected “Azerbaijani identity” as a political strategy, the end goal of which is cultural homogenization. That is, through this supra-ethnic collective identity all smaller communities would easily integrate into the mainstream society. It can be said that

⁵⁹⁰ Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 54.

⁵⁹¹ http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_dil.pdf, p. 2.

Aliyev's project of civic nation is more of a "political myth", to use Bernard Yack's phrase, rather than reality. It might be argued that through this "political myth" created by virtue of de-ethnification/-Turkification of Azerbaijani Turkic people, the Aliyev government has succeeded in achieving integration and/or cultural homogenization, but it is more likely that it will continue to cause a dilemma in the society insofar as it does not take into account "the *strength* of ethnic identity as an aspect of one's total identity." The peculiar importance of ethnic identity lies in its emotional bonds with ancestry and progeny, primarily through the "family", or any symbolic notion of "kith and kin".⁵⁹²

At this point, it is essential to review the arguments of the ideologues of Turkism, who sharply criticize some aspects of H. Aliyev's doctrine of Azerbaijanism. In contrast to the so-called Azerbaijanists, Turkists accept ideas of both Azerbaijanism and Turkism in integrity. They firmly affirm the Turkic base of Azerbaijani nation. In this regard, Nizameddin Shemsizade writes that at the basis of his theory lies Turkism: "Azerbaijanism is the understanding of Turkism on the basis of homeland morality." In his book "Azerbaijanism", he stated: "I am from the Turkish nation, from the Islamic Ummah, from the country of Azerbaijan!"⁵⁹³

In the similar vein, a prominent philosopher Asif Ata stated:

There are no multinational people. There is a multinational country. People mean to be nation. Many nations live in Azerbaijan. The main people of Azerbaijan are Azerbaijani Turks. The main people are not the lord people. In all multinational countries there are main people. Many peoples live in America, but America's main people are Anglo-Saxons. Many people live in France, but the main people of France are French, i.e., francs. You do not need to be afraid of the word main people. We should not talk embarrassingly about our Turkishness. Other peoples living in our country should learn, know and respect our Turkishness.⁵⁹⁴

A well-known Turkist, a poet, Sabir Rustamkhanli says:

Turkism and Azerbaijanism confuse most of the people. I do not see any contradiction between Turkism and Azerbaijanism... Because we accept the Turkish word as the historical name of the Azerbaijani nation, Turkism and Azerbaijanism are united. Azerbaijanism, Turkism, Turanism is a view to the same issue with different

⁵⁹²Peter Weinreich, Viera Bacova, and Nathalie Roguer. "Basic Primordialism in Ethnic and National Identity." in *Analysing Identity: Cross-Cultural, Societal and Clinical Contexts*. ed. By Peter Weinreich and Wendy Saunderson. Routledge, 2003, p. 116.

⁵⁹³Ödəbiyyat qəzeti. - 2018.- 20 yanvar. - p. 2.

⁵⁹⁴Asif Ata. "Azərbaycançılıq-Türkçülük Birliyi", *Azərbaycanın Türkçülük və Azərbaycançılıq problemləri*, Azərbaycan Araşdırmaları Vəqfi, Ay-Ulduz nəşr, Bakı, 1998, p. 44.

dimensions and from different aspects. In my opinion, our state ideology is Azerbaijanism, our national ideology is Turkism, spiritual-strategic ideology is Turanism and Islamism, and therefore they are indivisible.⁵⁹⁵

Also, Faig Gazanfaroglu Alekberov criticizes the ideas of A. Dashdamirov and R. Mehdiyev who “consider that today “triad” (Turkism, Modernism, and Islamism) is not necessary as it was at the beginning of the last century; in this sense, it would be wrong to return to the “triad” and to adopt it as a national ideology because the demands and possibilities of the present period are quite different from the conditions of that time.” Gazanfaroglu claims that it is not right to nominate the “triad”, especially Turkism and Azerbaijanism as totally different ideas. On the contrary, there is no contradiction between them and that they should complement one another.⁵⁹⁶ He discredits the idea of Azerbaijanism alone as de-ideologization aiming to create “citizenship society” and instead proposes the formula of the “triad+Azerbaijanism” as the national idea of Azerbaijan Republic. He thinks that the main issue here is not to prevent the individual development of the Azerbaijani people (in the sense of sovereignty and statehood), on the contrary, to make Azerbaijanism more convincing and reliable on the basis of the “triad”, including Turkism. Turkism is a national identity, national self-consciousness and national self-determination for the people of Azerbaijan. If it is impossible to realize these ideas in the new era, it is absolutely necessary to maintain their inheritance in some way in the proposed idea or ideology. Otherwise, it would be meaningless for us to be spiritual-moral and political-legal inheritor of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.⁵⁹⁷

Likewise, historian Nasib Nasibzade thinks the idea that “Turkism can divide Azerbaijan” is unfounded. Also, he rejects the idea that “Turkism is against democracy”, reasoning that one of the main principles of democracy itself is the rule of the majority (Turks, who make up about 90% of the country’s population), and the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities. He claims that Turkism and

⁵⁹⁵Rüstəmxanlı, Sabir. “İdeologiyamızın Təməli Tarixdədir.” *Azərbaycanın Türkcülük və Azərbaycançılıq problemləri*, 1998, p. 85-86.

⁵⁹⁶Ələkbərov, F. Q. (2014), p. 30-31.

⁵⁹⁷Ekspress.-2014.- 17-19 may.- p. 17.

Azerbaijanism have historically been defensive movements against Russianism and Persianism. For him, these two ideologies complete each other. He writes:

Turkism has for a long time been a movement struggling for: the research of national history (ethnogenesis) and dissemination of this knowledge; raising national consciousness; development of national culture; nationalization of the education system; formalization of the names “Turkish language” and “Turkish nation”; purification and development of the national language (Turkish); raising the national language to the level of the state language and expanding its functional scope accordingly; establishment of close relations among the Turkic states and peoples; adoption of a single alphabet of the Turkic peoples; the emergence (restoration) of the all-Turkic literary language, and etc. However, Azerbaijanism, which completes Turkism, considered: national statehood of Azerbaijan; indivisible integrity of the country; protection of the rights of ethnic and national minorities living in the country, etc.⁵⁹⁸

Furthermore, Yasemen Garagoyunlu, a scientist in the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, thinks that Azerbaijanism is the ideology of Azerbaijani Turks to establish their national state and develop their culture in the historical ethnographic and ethnocultural geography of Azerbaijan. The source of the idea of Azerbaijanism is the outlook and philosophical spirit of the Turkish national culture.⁵⁹⁹ By criticizing national identity politics of the Aliyev government, she sees it as a threat to the unification process of two parts of Azerbaijan. She stresses:

The official identity policy in Northern Azerbaijan causes great damage to the national struggle and understanding of the national identity of South Azerbaijan. The renaming of the Turkish language to the Azerbaijani language and the removal of Turkishness from the name of the nation, and the adoption of the Stalinist Azerbaijani concept of identity, created a crisis of identity in the north. If there is an identity crisis in the North itself, of course, it will have an impact on the South Azerbaijan movement. This deepens the gap between the south and the north.⁶⁰⁰

Hence, Garagoyunlu argues that the language policy in northern Azerbaijan creates an identity crisis in Southern Azerbaijan. South Azerbaijanis do not know whether to call themselves Azerbaijani or Turk. To her, Azerbaijani government officially pursue a wrong policy, because they present Azerbaijanism and Turkism as alternative ideologies. They even exaggerate Azerbaijanism, and completely deny Turkism. They promote Azerbaijan as a multinational country, as a multicultural,

⁵⁹⁸Nəsibzadə, Nəsib. “Türkçülük və Azərbaycançılıq Haqqında.” in Azərbaycanın Türkçülük və Azərbaycançılıq problemləri. Azərbaycan Araşdırmaları Vəqfi. Ay-Ulduz nəşr. Bakı, 1998, p. 5-7.

⁵⁹⁹Qaraqoyunlu, Yasəmə. “Azərbaycançılıq haqqında düşüncələr.” 2009, <https://www.gunaz.tv/az/meqaleler/azerbaycanciliq-haqqinda-dusunceler-yasemen-qaraqoyunlu-m10944>

⁶⁰⁰<https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/yasemen-qaraqoyunlu/3359077.html>

multi-ethnic country. But there is one nation in northern Azerbaijan, the nation in the majority is the Turkish nation. The Azerbaijani state is based on this nation, the Azerbaijani state was founded by this Turkish nation. She claims:

According to the census, 91 percent are Turks and 9 percent are national minorities. Azerbaijan is not a multi-ethnic country, it is a single-ethnic country, and there are small national minorities. I have to say the truth. It can be said that presenting Northern Azerbaijan as a multi-ethnic country, will bring great troubles to Azerbaijan in the future.⁶⁰¹

In addition, speaking to the *Amerikanın Səsi* (Voice of America), in June, 2016, Garagoyunlu also complained about the oppression against Turkists. She stated:

Intellectuals who call themselves Turks are being persecuted in their job places in Azerbaijan. There are pressures on them. Yadigar Turkel was recently fired from the Academy of Sciences. The reason was that he officially protested in the press against the removal of the name of the Turkish language and Turkish identity. We are also being threatened a lot these days due to this reason... Everyone is trying to restore the Turkish name, he or she is immediately being threatened of violating the constitution.⁶⁰²

As a result, it would not be wrong to argue that despite strong official support to Azerbaijanism by the Aliyev government since 1993, Turkism is still there and its supporters are growing. It might be argued that Azerbaijani identity as an umbrella identity has been successfully accepted by all segments of society, but it seems more likely that it failed in the effort of substituting and/or subordinating original identities. More specifically, though Azerbaijani identity, aside from being an umbrella identity for all ethnic groups, has been presented as an original identity of ethnically Turkic people, it has been mostly rejected as such. In this respect, Akyıldız concludes:

...even though Elchibey's ideology of Turkism is criticized with reference to separatist movements among certain non-Turkic groups in Azerbaijan, Turkism is still a powerful source of identity. This can be traced when the name of their mother tongue is asked to Azerbaijanis. During my fieldwork although the respondents defined their language as Turkic language or Azerbaijani Turkish or Azerbaijani, the following sentence mostly was, "well, it's Turkish, a branch of Turkic language, the name of our language is Azerbaijani but we all know it's Turkish". Hence, although the terms Azerbaijanism and Azerbaijani identity were not criticized explicitly by the majority of the respondents, they all felt the need to add that their language had a Turkic origin. This can be considered as an indirect way of pointing to their Turkic identity.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰¹<http://www.haray.net/?p=7390>

⁶⁰²<https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/yasemen-qaragoyunlu/3359077.html>

⁶⁰³Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 6-7.

So, it can be argued that the adherents of Turkism are growing, self-identification as a “Turk” becomes important mostly due to the fact that, following the primordialist account, “congruities of blood, language, race, beliefs, attitudes, customs” have unutterable and coercive power and also, “because the nation depends, to a large extent, on the past for the legitimation of the present”. In addition, as all ethnic groups cling to their original identities apart from national identities attest to the fact that “primordial ties persist alongside secular, civil ties of rational order”⁶⁰⁴ (asserted by Geertz and Shils) in the case of Azerbaijan.

Finally, it can be concluded that there are two models of national identity presented in Azerbaijan since independence. Both of these models take their root from pre-independence period. One model is the ethnic nation-state model that takes majority Turkic ethnic group and Turkish language as a base. This model was promoted by Abulfaz Elchibey following the footsteps of the founders of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This model is still highly supported by the followers of Turkism. The other model is civic nation-state model that does not give weight to any ethnic group, including the dominant Turkic ethnic group, thus, removes the ethnic designation from the name of the nation and language. This model was promoted by H. Aliyev who, by doing so, continued the Soviet legacy, or more precisely the Stalinist national policy. This model is officially backed by strong emphasis on the ideology of Azerbaijanism. The followers of Azerbaijanism posit themselves against any idea of Turkism. Hence, these two models are contradicting each other. As a result, the debate between Azerbaijanism and Turkism is still ongoing process. The resurgence of public debates over which designation - Azerbaijani or Turk - represent the national identity more correctly still indicates that people are experiencing an identity crisis. Non-agreement means the construction of the nation has yet to be completed.

⁶⁰⁴See Chapter 2 of this study.

6.3. National Minority Politics

Heydar Aliyev's policy on the issue of national minorities should be evaluated within the framework of his doctrine of Azerbaijanism. He highly praised the existence of multiple ethno-religious communities in the country and saw the richness of the country in their unity. As such, he viewed them as citizens of the country with equal rights. In fact, during his meetings with the representatives of minorities, H. Aliyev repeatedly reminded that "I would not like to call my meetings with you as the meeting with representatives of national minorities. This is a meeting with representatives of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani people."⁶⁰⁵

It is true that H. Aliyev above all, promoted the unity of the people, thus, viewed all members of the society as equal citizens before the law. In fact, Article 5 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic, adopted in 1995, states the unity of the people as the basis of the state:

I. The people of Azerbaijan are united.

II. The unity of the Azerbaijani people is the basis of the Azerbaijani state. The Republic of Azerbaijan is a common and indivisible motherland for all citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In addition, according to Article 25, the state guarantees equality and respect of rights and freedoms for all persons regardless race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic origin, conviction or other distinctions. Restriction of rights and freedoms of citizens based on racial, religious, ethnic discrimination or of ethnic, political and social origin is strongly prohibited. At the same time, he praised the cultural diversity of the country as treasure and was in favour of its preservation. He said that the Constitution would create democratic conditions for all peoples and minority ethnic groups in Azerbaijan.⁶⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, there are some articles and provisions in the Constitution and other legislations that are separately dedicated to the issue of minority rights. For example, Article 11 of the Constitution provides for the development and preservation of the culture of the minorities. Article 44 states that

⁶⁰⁵Cavadov, Q. (2000), p. 14-15.

⁶⁰⁶Ömərov, V. "Milli Azlıqların Hüquqları." Səs, 3 October, 2015.

everyone possesses the right to maintain his or her national identity. No one can be forced to change his or her national identity. According to the Article 21.2, the Azerbaijani state provides free use and development of other languages, on which the population of republic speak. And also, Article 45 sets out the right of everyone to use the mother tongue, and to get brought up, educated and engaged in creative activity in any language he or she wants. And, nobody can be deprived of the right to use the mother tongue. According to Article 127, legal proceedings in the Azerbaijan Republic shall be conducted in the official language of the Azerbaijan Republic or in the language of the population which constitute the majority in the area concerned. The persons being participant of the cause, who do not know the language in which legal proceedings are held, shall be guaranteed via the interpreter the right to get fully familiarized with the materials of the case, participate in legislative enactments and speak in the native language in the court.⁶⁰⁷

Furthermore, during this period, almost all legislative acts, where language use is discussed, do contain provisions concerning minority languages, existing on the territory of Azerbaijan Republic. The main focus of these provisions is ensuring non-discrimination of these languages and their speakers. In regions, densely inhabited by indigenous or other minorities, legal and administrative procedures are conducted in Azerbaijani and/or the regional language. Translation and interpreting are guaranteed for minorities who do not speak or understand the Azerbaijani language, to communicate and understand communication in certain instances such as court, notary public, etc.

For example, The Law on the State Language (2002) ensures the rights of minorities to use their languages in certain official settings, such as courts, legal-administrative proceedings and notary offices. Article 127 (X) of the Law indicates:

In the Azerbaijan Republic legal proceedings are carried out in the State Language of Azerbaijan Republic or in a language of majority of population in a specific area. Persons-participants of legal proceedings not knowing the language of proceedings have the right to be acquainted with materials of proceedings, to take part in legal proceedings using interpreter, to make statements in the law court in their native language.⁶⁰⁸

Furthermore, Article 11.9 of the Law states:

⁶⁰⁷http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_a.pdf

⁶⁰⁸Garibova, J. (2017), p. 122.

If, according to the provisions of the Law on Notary Service, a person applying to notary service does not know the State language, or requests that the procedures be taken in a different language, the notary officials are allowed to produce the texts in the language desired by the applicant, or to have the texts translated into such desired language.⁶⁰⁹

Besides, the decree “On the Protection of Rights and Freedoms and on State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Numerically Small Peoples, and Ethnic Groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan” issued by Elchibey government, on September 16, 1992, has preserved its validity during H. Aliyev government.⁶¹⁰

Moreover, H. Aliyev issued decrees to join the international conventions on the protection of human rights and freedoms as well as the rights of ethnic minorities. So, along with the legal provisions of domestic legislation, the provisions of international documents, such as the UN Convention “On Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, the UN Convention “On Prevention of Apartheid and its Punishment” and the UN Convention “On Prevention of Genocide and its Punishment”, which Azerbaijan joined on May 31, 1996, have also been applied. Also, Azerbaijan is a State Party to the “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” since 2000. The level of implementation of the provisions contained in this international treaty were assessed by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on the basis of the State Report submitted by the authorities of Azerbaijan (4 June 2002) and other sources as well as on the basis of information gathered during a visit to the country on 30 March to 3 April 2003. In addition, Azerbaijan signed the “European Charter for Regional or Minority languages” in 2001.⁶¹¹

Apart from legislations and decrees, various programs were held with the initiative of Azerbaijani government and international organizations. In this context, by the decision of the United Nations, the implementation of the program of 10 years of minority peoples of Azerbaijan was announced for the period of 1995-2005. The program included the development of languages and cultures of minorities living in

⁶⁰⁹Garibova, J. (2017), p. 123.

⁶¹⁰See Chapter 5.4 for the details of the 16 September, 1992 State Law.

⁶¹¹<http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/content/114>

Azerbaijan, the publication of periodicals called “Peoples of Azerbaijan”, creation of scientific centers for researching history and languages of minorities, publishing books and literature in languages of national minorities, transforming some of the specific villages into museums, making scientific-mass films, holding scientific conferences, thematic nights and festivals.⁶¹² In 2003, the Ministry of Education started a joint project, entitled “Education Policy and National Minorities”, in cooperation with the Council of Europe. The purpose of the project was to assist Azerbaijan in designing legislation regarding the education of national minorities and to prepare recommendations concerning the minority education policy.⁶¹³

Moreover, within the framework of the European Commission-funded “South Caucasus Partnership and Civil Solidarity” project, the country’s media monitoring was conducted from December 1 to December 31, 2002 and from January 15 to February 15, 2003, regarding the number and substance of publications on national minorities. During the monitoring it became clear that in the newspapers apart from general-theoretical and historical materials, information on the current state of ethnic and religious communities, activities of public organizations and other issues were published. Azerbaijani media focused on some of the major ethnic problems in their materials. There was frequent information about Kurds, Lezgins, Jews, Talyshs. There were 1-2 articles about Avars, Tats, Sakhurs, Ingiloy, Georgians, Germans and others. The rapporteur of the Council of Europe on Azerbaijan, Martinez Cassan, said at a press conference: “During my meetings, I was convinced that the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan regard themselves as a full-fledged citizen of the country and are happy with their situation, and the Udi who cooperate with the government of Azerbaijan in their cultural heritage are a good example. The Azerbaijani government allocated funds for the development of their culture.”⁶¹⁴

So, the national minority politics of H. Aliyev should be seen not as the assimilation of different ethnic groups in the face of his strong emphasis on Azerbaijanism, rather as the integration of these groups by keeping their distinct cultures. In other words, it is the policy of keeping a balance between the

⁶¹²Cavadov, Q. (2000), p. 27.

⁶¹³Garibova, J. (2017), p. 129.

⁶¹⁴Xalq Cəbhəsi - 2016.- 28 dekabr. - p. 13.

consolidation of the unity of Azerbaijani people through cultural and linguistic homogenization and the maintenance of ethno-religious diversity. To be precise, in spite of giving precedence to uniting people under citizenship identity, H. Aliyev at the same time contributed to the maintenance and promotion of the cultures of national minorities. In this sense, it seems that there is not so much difference between the policies of H. Aliyev and those of Elchibey regarding the minority issues.



CHAPTER 7

NATIONAL POLITICS OF ILHAM ALIYEV (2003-2018)

This chapter aims to discuss Ilham Aliyev's nationalizing project from 2003 to 2018. It will concentrate upon his state policy with regard to national language, ideology of Azerbaijanism, multiculturalism and tolerance.

Ilham Aliyev took over the power after Heydar Aliyev's death and proclaimed to remain loyal to his father's policies. Such a transition of power made newly independent Azerbaijan strongly deviate from the path of democracy, as Ayça Ergun puts it,

In 2003, the transfer of power from Heydar Aliyev to his son, Ilham Aliyev raised questions not only about the further degradation in the democratic transition but also about the risk of an oil rich country becoming a monarchical rule in the age of democracy promotion. Ilham Aliyev inherited his father's discourse as well as his loyal administrative cadres and ensured that his rule would not be challenged by power rivalries.⁶¹⁵

During Heydar Aliyev's reign Ilham Aliyev held positions such as the vice president of State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), deputy of the *Milli Məclis* (National Parliament), the president of the National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan (NOCA), the head of the delegation of the Parliament of Azerbaijan in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). He got a reputation as the president of the NOCA, especially after the 2000 Olympics, during which Azerbaijan won three medals, including two gold ones. The Olympics, hosting big games, and receiving as many medals as possible have fostered national pride, thus, strongly influenced Azerbaijani nationalism.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹⁵Ergun, Ayça. "Post-Soviet Political Transformation in Azerbaijan: Political Elite, Civil Society and the Trials of Democratization." *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 7, No 26 (Summer 2010), pp. 67-85, p.69.

⁶¹⁶Hirose, Yoko. "The Complexity of Nationalism in Azerbaijan", *International Journal of Social Science Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2016, p. 140.

7.1. Language Policy

Under Ilham Aliyev government, the Azerbaijani language continues to be promoted as a unifying force in the society including members of ethnic minorities and even Russophones “with the expectation of eventual linguistic integration”.⁶¹⁷ In fact, Ilham Aliyev issued following decrees in order to consolidate the position of Azerbaijani language in the country:

- The presidential decree, on January 12, 2004, “On the Implementation of Mass Publications with the Latin alphabet in Azerbaijani language” and “On the preparation of the National Encyclopedia of Azerbaijan” was issued. According to the document, a list of works was prepared to press in the Azerbaijani language in Latin in 2004. The publishing of the most valuable examples of Azerbaijani national encyclopedia, science, culture and literature in Latin script was taken into account.⁶¹⁸
- “The Program for Providing Information and Communication Technologies for Secondary Schools in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2005-2007)”, approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, on August 21, 2004. In accordance with 2.2 of the Program, development and dissemination of modern e-learning materials, electronic textbooks, electronic libraries and digital teaching resources used in the teaching process in Azerbaijani language in order to achieve the goals set out in this program and to ensure efficient use of the unified information environment and it was deemed necessary to prepare and translate the terminology in the field of information and communication technologies into the scientific circulation in the education and scientific-methodical publications in Azerbaijani language.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁷Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 188.

⁶¹⁸Sadıqlı, A. (2011), p. 17.

⁶¹⁹Xalq Cəbhəsi. - 2016.- 28 dekabr. - p. 13.

- The 2010 State Program for developing communication and information technologies has indicated as one of the expected results “formation of national information resources, broad application of Azerbaijani language in the national electronic information space, and the use of ICT for the preservation and promotion of material and cultural heritage.”⁶²⁰
- The 2013 Presidential decree “On the Adoption of a State Program on the Use of the Azerbaijani Language, in conformity with the requirements of Globalisation and on the Development of the Linguistics in Azerbaijan” has indicated its main objectives as follows: Developing Azerbaijani language in accordance with the requirements of the time, its wider use in cyber space and the establishment of the mechanism of promoting linguistics in the country; improving the training of highly qualified personnel in the field of linguistic; ensuring the participation of linguists in creation of modern information and communication technologies; Systematization of dictionary content and grammatical norms of Azerbaijani language, and etc. It envisages implementation of the necessary measures in this direction for 2013-2020.⁶²¹
- The Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Strengthening the Material and Technical Capacities of the Institute of Linguistics named after Nasimi of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan” dated May 29, 2012 is an important activity document for the successful implementation of language policy in the country.⁶²²

Moreover, the Terminological Commission was established to develop technical terms for a variety of fields as well as disseminating the new terms online

⁶²⁰State Program 2010, <https://president.az/articles/564>

⁶²¹State Program 2013, <https://president.az/articles/7744>

⁶²²<https://president.az/articles/7744>

and via the publication of dictionaries.⁶²³ In order to protect, safeguard and develop the Azerbaijani language, in 2011, the Commission published explicit dictionaries covering various areas such as construction, banking, finance, law, sports, military and media.⁶²⁴

On November 13, 2014, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree “On the Approval of the New Composition of the State Language Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan”. The decree states that the rapid adoption of technological innovations by the people in the modern world, and the increased opportunities for unobservable information exchange create some difficulties in the proper use of the potential of the mother tongue. The current conditions require the preservation of purity of the state language and the proper use of literary language in the light of the national idea - the ideology of Azerbaijanism.⁶²⁵

According to Isa Habibbeyli, the vice-president of the Academy of National Sciences of Azerbaijan, this decree has had great importance in pursuing successful language policy in the country. He said that in the light of this decree, the scale of the measures implemented in the direction of research and promotion of the Azerbaijani language in the academy will be expanded. The efforts of linguists and specialists have been combined to create the “Orthography Dictionary of the Azerbaijani Language”. This will be the new dictionary of Azerbaijani language during independence. Additionally, the preparation of multi-volume “The Grammar of Contemporary Azerbaijani language” has been started in the Academy. As of 2017, work has been done to prepare the orthoepical dictionary. The establishment of the National Terminology Fund is one of the main tasks ahead. Moreover, the competition titled “Our language - our national existence” was held for the first time in the history of the academy. This competition demonstrated the love and great

⁶²³Garibova, J. and Asgarova, M. “Language Policy and Legislation in post-Soviet Azerbaijan.” *Language Problems & Language Planning*, 33 (3), 191–217, 2009, p. 199.

⁶²⁴Azərbaycan Elmlər Akademiyası Terminologiya Komissiyası. *Terminologiya Məsələləri №1*, Bakı: “Elm,” 2012, p. 5-6.

⁶²⁵<http://medeniyyet.az/page/news/41455/Dovlet-Dil-Komissiyasinin-yeni-terkibi-tesdiqlenib.html>

interest of the new generation to study the native language. The contest is planned to be held every year-round and countrywide.⁶²⁶

After all, I. Aliyev's language policy seems to bear its fruits. In fact, according to the 2009 census, 98.6% of the population aged 3 and above are proficient in the Azerbaijani language including virtually all ethnic Azerbaijanis. Among the ethnic minorities nearly all Talyshes (99.9%) and Lezgins (97%) speak Azerbaijani, whereas only 0.2% of Armenians speak Azerbaijani. 43% of Russians and 43% of Jews speak Azerbaijani, while only 22.7% of Tatars and 5.6% of Ukrainians speak the language. Azerbaijani is freely spoken by other ethnic minorities with the exception of Georgians (only 8 out of 10 reported to be proficient).⁶²⁷

Moreover, the study of Garibova in the villages where minority groups reside reveals that people here live in a bilingual environment, that is, they communicate both in native language and Azerbaijani. She writes:

During interviews with several families the parents noted that they speak both the native language and Azerbaijani, so that the child could understand and speak Azerbaijani by the time he/she begins school. The conversation with children of pre-school age, in many regions, reveals their competence as being sufficient in Azerbaijani to start school. They have sufficient vocabulary and stable structure in Azerbaijani, although their Azerbaijani competence cannot naturally compete with their native language competence, unless their parents have completely switched to Azerbaijani at home.⁶²⁸

Indeed, the government seems to be keen on promoting the learning of the state language by all citizens of the country regardless of their ethnic-cultural background. The project "*Azərbaycan Dilini Öyrənirik*" (We are learning Azerbaijani language), took start in 2015, with the initiative of the State Adviser on Inter-ethnic, Multicultural and Religious Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, has been carried out by the Foundation *Bilik* (Knowledge) under the President of Azerbaijan. It is notable that the Baku-Azerbaijan Eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church also participates in the project to support the course of Azerbaijani language in the Russian Orthodox Churches.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁶Azərbaycan.- 2017.-17 noyabr.- p. 5.

⁶²⁷Avdeev, A. (2015), p. 59.

⁶²⁸Garibova, J. (2017), p. 136.

⁶²⁹Niftiyev, N. (2015), p. 48.

In addition, government's certain decisions such as imposing state-regulated procedure for assigning names for children by their parents and making changes in the last names also should be seen as part of nationalizing project that give precedence to Azerbaijani language and culture. In 2011, the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS) and the Government of Azerbaijan adopted *the traffic light principle*, considering the list of credible and proscribed names for children that parents can select. Based on this principle: the names in the *green list* are related to the national, cultural, and ideological values of Azerbaijan and can be chosen without any limitations; names in the *yellow list* are neither desirable nor advisable, as they can have improper meaning in other languages; the names in the *red list* are not permissible, as they include the names of those who committed a crime against Azerbaijani people and have abusive meaning in the Azerbaijani language. The red list involves Armenian names (such as Andranik, Arsen, and Armin) as well as Russian names (such as Dmitri, Maria, Ekaterina, and Alya).⁶³⁰

Also, a special commission of ANAS approved a law draft imposing changes in the last names where endings with -ov and -ev would be replaced by their Turkicized variants of -lu, -li, -beyli, etc.⁶³¹ It is noteworthy to state that all these measures are clearly intended to bring about cultural homogenization of the society. Asked about the effect of this law on the national minorities of Azerbaijan, Nizami Jafarov, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Parliamentary Committee on Cultural Issues, answered: "The question on the agenda is as follows; every person who considers himself/herself Azerbaijani - and most of the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan have merged with the Azerbaijani people and consider themselves Azerbaijani - will have to change his/her last name."⁶³²

So, it becomes clear that Ilham Aliyev has highly contributed to strengthening Azerbaijani language in the country and as such is successfully following the language policy of Heydar Aliyev and thus, supporting the ideology of Azerbaijanism, which boosts the process of integration of the society.

⁶³⁰Adibekyan, A., Elibegova A. Armenophobia in Azerbaijan. Yerevan: "Information and Public Relations Center" of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Armenia, 2015, p. 45-46.

⁶³¹Adibekyan, A., Elibegova A. (2015), p. 46

⁶³²Adibekyan, A., Elibegova A. (2015), p. 46.

7.2. Status of Russian Language

Parallel to the growing importance of Azerbaijani language, recent years show the increasing status of Russian language in the society. Indeed, it is still common to hear Russian-speaking people in Baku streets.

Even though the Russian language does not have an official status in the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, it seems like that it has a second official language position according to its usage level and implementation in social life. Even, sometimes it is winning over Azerbaijani... Such reputable dominance of the Russian language is being observed in all aspects of social and educational life.⁶³³

There is a group of people, the post-Soviet generation of Bakuviens, who prefer to speak Russian rather than Azerbaijani, symbolizing the Soviet legacy of prestige and elitism. They are used to downgrade latecomers to Baku, especially those who use the national language with regional dialect and speak inferior Russian. In this regard, Gasimov writes:

A cosmopolitan community of Bakuviens appeared paradoxically as a result of World War II and the large-scale Soviet internal migration process. Bakuviens consisted of ethnic Azerbaijanis, Russians, Armenians, Jews and other nationalities and used Russian when communicated within their own ethnic community and with other Bakuviens. In the 1970-1980s, the Bakuviens became a supra-national and supra-confessional identity with a setting of identity-building folklore such as anecdotes, songs praising Bakuviens and Baku and even a specific Baku accent of Russian... Those Azerbaijanis... from the provinces of Azerbaijan who moved to Baku but spoke Russian badly were pejoratively called *chushki* by the Bakuviens. *Chushki* is originally a Russianised plural form of *chushka*, an Azerbaijani word for “piglet”. In the Baku context, however, *chushki* was a label of backwardness and boorishness.⁶³⁴

Moreover, together with English, the Russian language is required while seeking a job in the country. There are several reasons why the Russian language is still there in spite of the fact that the efforts of the Aliyev government are undeniable in enhancing the social, cultural, and legal position of the Azerbaijani language. First of all, there are still Russian-medium schools that seem to have an influence in keeping Azerbaijani society bi-linguistic/bi-cultural. In addition, the effect of Russian

⁶³³Şirvani, Ədilli. Milli İdeologiyamız: Türklük, Çağdaşlıq, İslam. Bakı: “Elm və Təhsil,” 2013, p. 162.

⁶³⁴Gasimov, Zaur. “The Languages of Caucasian Cosmopolitanism: Twentieth-Century Baku at the Crossroads.” in *Cosmopolitanism in Conflict: Imperial encounters from the seven Years’ War to the Cold War*. ed.by Dina Guseynova, UK, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 2018, p. 266; 253.

educated governing elite, especially the Aliyev family, cannot be underestimated in the preservation of the status of the Russian language. In this respect, a prominent opposition figure argues that “under the Aliyev administration the Russian language received a new breath in Azerbaijan... the social language of the president and his friends is Russian.”⁶³⁵ Indeed, in comparison with H. Aliyev who spoke very fluent and eloquent Azerbaijani, younger Aliyev at the beginning of his presidency could hardly speak Azerbaijani.

As a result, in recent Azerbaijani society, different tendencies are unfolding. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani language has gained prominent status as the state language and is respected by many Azerbaijanis, especially the young generation; on the other hand, the Russian language is regaining its former position as it was during the Soviet period. This tendency can be well observed in the emerging Russophone youth who can smoothly switch to Azerbaijani and at the same time be fluent in Russian in contrast to older generations of Russophones who could barely utter any Azerbaijani word, as Marquardt puts it:

There is a definite perception that it is time for Russophones (or at least Russophone youth) to learn Azerbaijani, and indeed many politicians argue that although older generations of Russophones may not do so, their children are either developing a sense of Azerbaijani pride-of-citizenship and therefore learning Azerbaijani, or at least are adapting to the new necessity of learning Azerbaijani to find work.⁶³⁶

In this context, according to the survey of Luscombe and Kazdal, Azerbaijani youth identify more with being Azerbaijani than with being Russian. The authors argue that the generation of 14- to 25-year-olds, primarily among Azerbaijani-medium students, claimed to possess a powerful Azerbaijani identity. Interestingly enough, the authors observed identity shift in the majority of Russian-medium students, as they: identify with a bilingual Azerbaijani-Russian identity; show low interest in social groups of Russian speakers; see low socioeconomic benefit of being a Russian-speaking Azerbaijani; show more pride in the Azerbaijani-speaking group. The authors conclude that this low self-image could reflect a loss of identity with the

⁶³⁵Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 187.

⁶³⁶Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 188.

Russian language. They relate the research result to the effect of the policy of Azerbaijanism on identity formation among Azerbaijani youth.⁶³⁷

Yet, though some nationalists argue that the functioning of Russian schools is a threat to national security, and their closure is necessary for full nationalization of the society, Russian-language education has encountered little government interference. In this sense, the study of Marquardt reveals that politicians unanimously approve of the continued use of the Russian language in Azerbaijan, or at least its continued teaching for the maintenance of ethnic harmony and access to the Russian market and Russian culture.⁶³⁸ Indeed, their concern may in great part be related to the existence of numerous Azerbaijani migrant workers in Russia. As Hohmann puts it, “the Republic of Azerbaijan, a state rich in oil and hydrocarbons production, and yet not fulfilling its role of social state able of ensuring social protection to its people, and to satisfy the demand of the internal job market.”⁶³⁹ Notably, due to this and other reasons, I. Aliyev government, much like his father H. Aliyev, seems to be careful not to endanger the relations with Russia and thus, avoids employing excessive measures against Russian language. As a matter of fact, the official of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Education noted that even students in Russian-language schools now have every opportunity to learn Azerbaijani, thus, more extreme methods of forcing language use would be unethical.⁶⁴⁰

It should be stated that Azerbaijan has 300 secondary schools, 18 high schools and 38 vocational schools providing education in Russian, including the Baku Slavic University founded in 2000 and the Baku branch of the Lomonosov Moscow State University that opened in 2009.⁶⁴¹ In addition, on October 11, 2018, Russia’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mikhail Bocharnikov, stated that branches of three

⁶³⁷Luscombe, Kazdal (2014), p. 1031.

⁶³⁸Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 188.

⁶³⁹Hohmann, S. “Labour Migration, Vulnerability, and Social Change in Southern Caucasus: The Case of Azerbaijan.” EU FP7 CASCADE project, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, France, 2016, p. 4-5.

⁶⁴⁰Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 190.

⁶⁴¹Avdeev, A. Population Situation Analysis: Beyond the Demographic Transition in Azerbaijan, Baku, UNFPA/UNDP, 2015, p. 59.

additional Russian universities - the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Higher School of Economics and Moscow State University of Humanities and Economics - would be set up in Azerbaijan.⁶⁴²

However, though the government has not interfered with Russian schools to curb Russian language, almost all domestic television broadcasts are to be in Azerbaijani after government implemented a law banning foreign companies from broadcasting on national frequencies in January, 2006. Taking into consideration that television and radio are the most influential media in Azerbaijan, this law has to a great extent affected Russophones, as Russian TV channels were restricted. Though foreign broadcasting is still available on shortwave and via the Internet and cable services, there were about 1.5 million Internet users at the end of 2008, about 17 percent of the total population.⁶⁴³ While the government argues the ban is designed to increase consumption of domestic media, others have argued that it was the result of a trade dispute with Russia and/or an attempt to remove political opinions divergent from those of the Azerbaijani government from the airwaves.⁶⁴⁴ So, it comes out that the ban was not specifically directed towards diminishing the use of Russian language though it has had negative influence. If it had been so then the broadcasting would have been eliminated altogether in local TV stations as well. However, the volume of Russian-language broadcasts on “Lider”, “Azad Azerbaijan” and “Space” private channels is 25-30% of all programs broadcast throughout the country. On regional TV channels (10 regional channels), the volume of Russian language broadcasts comprises 25-40%.⁶⁴⁵

It is important to stress that the status of Russian language seems more likely to increase after the latest visit of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to Azerbaijan, on September 27, 2018. Putin mentioned that he and his Azerbaijani

⁶⁴²https://jamestown.org/program/rising-profile-of-russian-language-schooling-in-azerbaijan-inferiority-opportunity-or-challenge/?fbclid=IwAR2_WyT7b89gniCuJZ0YKGwtLCZTDDEA7fsy0fX8OYLxV-gltkZY_Bncvxw

⁶⁴³Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, ed by Lisa Mootz, p. 94.

⁶⁴⁴Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 188.

⁶⁴⁵Xalq Cəbhəsi.- 2016.- 28 dekabr.- p. 13.

counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, had discussed “interest in the Russian language” on September 1, in Sochi. Notably, amidst Putin’s visit, Azerbaijani Minister of Education Jeyhun Bayramov issued a directive to continue the intensified teaching of the Russian language in 50 elementary and secondary schools in the country, where the language of instruction is Azerbaijani. The initial implementation of this project had commenced in 2017.⁶⁴⁶

Interestingly enough, these developments in Azerbaijan go in a stark contrast to those of some post-Soviet countries such as in the Baltic countries and Ukraine, where Russian language and culture is in decline. In fact, over the past ten years, the number of schools with non-Estonian (mostly Russian) language of instruction in Tallinn has decreased four times. However, this happened due to the merger of Russian schools with Estonian. Since then, the situation has not changed much - mixed and Russian schools together in Tallinn are slightly more than 30. Approximately the same thing happened at the national level: there are fewer Russian schools, more mixed ones. Together they are 84. No abrupt changes with the increase or decrease of Russian schools after the arrival of the centrists happened. But, the slogan “Estonian Estonia” is becoming more and more popular, ultra-right politicians here are louder and louder speaking for the assimilation of Russians.⁶⁴⁷ So, the Estonian state purports to make its nation built upon on ethnic heritage, thus excluding others, especially its Russian-speaking minority.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁶https://jamestown.org/program/rising-profile-of-russian-language-schooling-in-azerbaijan-inferiority-opportunity-or-challenge/?fbclid=IwAR2_WyT7b89gniCuJZ0YKGwtLCZTDDEA7fsy0fX8OYLxV-gktkZY_Bncvxxw

⁶⁴⁷https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-47360042?ocid=socialflow_facebook&fbclid=IwAR1ARXCUIRO8o8FkaK66UW-y6FbalSXIK-8HoygL8DdxBmMSzOOQPTLSV_uU

⁶⁴⁸Estonia’s citizenship policy evolved in tandem with the restoration of the independent Estonian state. Estonian statehood is founded on the legal principle of restorationism, which interprets the Soviet era as a period of illegal occupation. Restorationist independence guaranteed citizenship only to those citizens of restored pre-Soviet Estonia (and their descendants), not all Soviet citizens living on Estonian territory. The country’s citizenship policy also prioritized the legal principle of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship based on blood, ancestry, or birthright) over *jus soli* (citizenship based on soil or place of birth), while also denying dual citizenship. Estonian citizenship policy produced a large Russian-speaking stateless population, which today remains the tenth largest in the world by state. See: David.J. Trimbach, “Nationality is Ethnicity:” Estonia’s problematic citizenship policy. *Baltic Bulletin*, March 7, 2017. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/nationality-ethnicity-estonias-problematic-citizenship-policy/>

Also, recently, President of Latvia Raymond Vejonis approved amendments to the law on universities, according to which private universities are forbidden to teach in Russian. “It was decided not to pass the amendments for reconsideration, since uniform use of the language at all levels of education is necessary,” the president said.⁶⁴⁹ And also, making comparisons between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, a Russian writer Aleksandr Prokhanov wrote:

You know, I am still impressed by the current events in Ukraine, and I am horrified and I am sorry that Ukrainians build their new state on Russophobia. However, it does nothing good and causes new disasters. In contrast, Azerbaijan builds its new state by trying to find a harmony without destroying the Russian and Soviet presence. Azerbaijan seeks to preserve all the bright, important and cultivated between Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union... I see how Russian schools function in Azerbaijan and how the Russian language is protected.⁶⁵⁰

This growing importance of the Russian language in Azerbaijan is highly condemned by nationalist intellectuals of Azerbaijan. Adilli Shirvani thinks that, first of all, the absence of a national policy in this area creates conditions for this cultural aggression against the nation. He wrote:

This kind of privileged position of the Russian language in our country, first of all, negatively affects our national consciousness, creates dissatisfaction in our language and our people. Our citizens have such a wrong idea that the science and culture language is exactly Russian. With this misconception, they put their children in the Russian section of the schools, and thus the nation is exposed to assimilation, away from national feelings and national struggle. This serves our enemies, who are fighting against our nationality, to achieve their goals.⁶⁵¹

Likewise, according to Sabir Rustamkhanli, the head of the Azerbaijani Language Union, MP, Azerbaijani community has lost interest in their native language. Parents are paying special attention to their children’s foreign language knowledge and the children’s native language knowledge is not of interest to anyone. The native language is getting less popular and the teachers at schools are not qualified enough, they are not interested in the teaching of the language. “We give an alarm signal that language can not be taught this way. The love for the tongue must not not be killed in this way. Today, the youth are eagerly learning Russian and

⁶⁴⁹https://www.currenttime.tv/a/29338643.html?fbclid=IwAR0b5z8Rl_JPiYZHezOp7yayUn958a6Slx_FddY_A94e5yOt1XFLGVf8RIoo

⁶⁵⁰https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/politics/23812/?fbclid=IwAR1cv9f1w0jo0kl0U0gMXafFrYz5nPI0M_NesYlmRVDLz8PnKtUA-mZr1Uww

⁶⁵¹Şirvani, Ə. (2013), p. 162, 164.

English, as if one day those languages will become main language of our nation. Such a psychological situation has been created.” Rustamkhanli considers that the main instigators of such reality are the parents, the schools and society. For him, everyone should fulfill their duties. It is parents’ duty to teach and have their children love mother tongue at home. It is the teachers’ duty to decently teach the language at school. It is society’s responsibility to respect the law. It is our official language and that must be respected. After following all of these, everything will get set accordingly.⁶⁵²

As a matter of fact, according to the 2009 census, the second most commonly used language in Azerbaijan is Russian, which is spoken by about 8% of the population aged 3 and above. Proficiency in Russian is above the national average level among Udiys (71%), Lezgins (23.7%), Georgians (21.4%), Jews (19.3%), Avars (18.1%) and Tatars (12.1%). Only 6.7% of Azerbaijanis speak Russian.⁶⁵³

So, instrumentalist assertion becomes true in the case of Azerbaijan, as there are many Azerbaijanis who prefer Russian language over their mother tongue. They make a decision to change their language and bring up their children in Russian language. Following Paul Brass, it can be said that Russian speaking Azerbaijanis do not display sensitive affinity to their native tongue as they in certain circumstances wittingly decide to adapt their language to that of another group - in this case, Russians. It can be concluded that if state’s back-up or even non-intervention to the functioning of Russian language sections in public schools in Azerbaijan continues, this will definitely lead to further strengthen the role of Russian language and hence, continue to keep the society bi-cultural/be-linguistic and throw the nationalizing project of the country into question.

⁶⁵²Virtual Azerbaijan 2014, The Disgracing Numbers for the Nation, 2014.
<https://virtualaz.org/medeniyyet/26924>

⁶⁵³Avdeev, A. (2015), p. 59.

7.3. Influence of Turkish Language

The appearance of Turcophone people and identification with Turkishness is another emerging trend in the Azerbaijani society, especially among the young generation. However, the concept of a “Turkish-speaking Azerbaijani” does not exist, given the closeness of the two languages, in contrast to the existence of that of “Russian-speaking Azerbaijani”. Turcophones, in their speech, tend to use many Turkish words and expressions. In general, this group of people connect themselves strongly to the lifestyle and culture of modern Turkey, including in their appearances, such as their clothes and hair. According to historian Altay Goyushov, a former professor at Baku State University, young Azerbaijanis find Turkey, another Muslim country with secular values, especially attractive. Turkey’s youth appear simultaneously close in spirit and yet more free than those in their own homeland. He said: “In the 1990s, the influence of Turkish culture helped many people move away from Soviet patterns, to start thinking in a different way. And the young people who left to study in Turkish universities returned not only with a good education, but also with progressive thinking.”⁶⁵⁴ It is remarkable that Azerbaijani students prefer to study in Turkey. In fact, fifteen thousand Azerbaijani students are studying in Turkey. “Azerbaijanis constitute the majority of foreign students in Turkey,” said Abdulgafur Büyükfirat, the educational adviser at the Turkish Embassy in Azerbaijan. There were a total of 170,740 students in Azerbaijani universities from 2016 to 2017. It turns out that approximately every twelfth student that begins university in Azerbaijan leaves to study in Turkey.⁶⁵⁵

As the study of Luscombe and Kazdal shows: “Despite the fact that 95% of students in Azerbaijani-medium schools indicated that Azerbaijani was their first language, only 40% said they strongly identify with people who speak the language; however, combined with Azerbaijani-Turk, the percentage increases to nearly 70%. Here we see that identity with Turkish language and culture persists among this generation of students whose language of instruction is Azerbaijani.”⁶⁵⁶ However, the

⁶⁵⁴<http://oc-media.org/two-states-one-nation-the-mixed-blessings-of-turkish-influence-in-azerbaijan/>

⁶⁵⁵<https://jam-news.net/?p=74918>

⁶⁵⁶Luscombe, Kazdal (2014), p. 1026.

ban on foreign broadcasting is likely to affect negatively the new emerging Turcophone youth who can fluently speak Turkish, by learning mainly through television cartoons, TV shows and films, if they cannot get an access through cable services or Internet, which means to pay money for them. Turkish-language programs on Azerbaijani channels started to be translated into Azerbaijani on the ground that in spite of similarities, Azerbaijani and Turkish are not legally the same languages. Though some politicians and cultural figures argued that dubbing Turkish would be “absurd”, the government did not step back.⁶⁵⁷

So, the efforts of the Azerbaijani government to maintain the distinctiveness of the Azerbaijani language against the Turkish language seems to be unnecessary, as the growing political, economical, and cultural rapprochement between the countries makes linguistic rapprochement inevitable. In addition, inter-marriage between Azerbaijanis and Turks is increasing, and now it is common to see newborn or little ethnic Azerbaijani children be called with Turkish names. So, against the worries of some people who can see the linguistic Turkification of Azerbaijani youths as a challenge to the national identity, it can be argued that Azerbaijanis could preserve their distinct national culture and language in the face of the perseverance of the Russian language and culture over them along time. In other words, the growing ascendance of Turcophones and Turkish elements in the daily life of the people should be seen as one of the features of social reality emerged due to the intersection between peoples and cultures. The same is true for the influence of the English language and Western culture in the globalizing world.

7.4. Policy of Multiculturalism and Tolerance

Though Heydar Aliyev used to praise the multicultural and tolerant environment of Azerbaijan and promoted its development, it was essentially Ilham Aliyev who declared multiculturalism as a state strategy. He aims at the preservation of the traditions of multiculturalism, its further development and propagation in the country. “I think that if we unite our efforts – and today the representatives of the

⁶⁵⁷Marquardt, K. L. (2011), p. 186.

absolute majority of the international community are here - we can demonstrate and prove that multiculturalism is alive and there is no alternative to that,” said Ilham Aliyev as he addressed the opening ceremony of the 4th World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue. “The alternative is xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, racism, discrimination. Multiculturalism is not only a trend, but also it is the only way how to make the world safer.”⁶⁵⁸

Moreover, his government is introducing multiculturalism of Azerbaijan as a model. It is argued that even in the developed European countries multiculturalism has failed,⁶⁵⁹ however, “Azerbaijan’s possession of rich cultural-moral heritage and the traditions of tolerance is one of the truths admitted in the international community.”⁶⁶⁰ According to Garibova, this policy has undoubtedly impacted the language, the education policy and planning. She writes: “Language policy, concerning minority languages, has been gradually shifting from tolerance to promotion and development.”⁶⁶¹ Indeed, such development creates favorable conditions leading to the formation of a democratic environment in the country. Yet, it is still debatable whether or not it is appropriate to apply the policy of multiculturalism in the unitary state where the main nation comprises an overwhelming majority and there is not any problem of immigrants.

7.4.1. Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism

Ilham Aliyev government considers the cause of protection of national minorities within the framework of its multiculturalism policy. Under the model of multiculturalism, it is understood peaceful co-existence within borders of one state of various ethnocultural communities having the right to officially express, protect and preserve the cultural features and lifestyle.⁶⁶² In this direction, he issued various

⁶⁵⁸http://azertag.az/en/xeber/Azerbaijani_President_Multiculturalism_is_the_only_way_how_to_make_the_world_safer-1057448

⁶⁵⁹Niftiyev, N. (2015), p. 33.

⁶⁶⁰<http://www.aznews.az/news/cemiyet/81206.html>

⁶⁶¹Garibova, J. (2017), p. 126.

⁶⁶²http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a1.html

decrees and implemented projects, which is proof that he is keen on presenting Azerbaijani model of multiculturalism to the international community as a “unique” case.

In this regard, the government enacted decrees and legislations in almost all spheres of social life, which include provisions dedicated to the rights of national minorities in the country. For example, in the sphere of media, on September 28, 2004, the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting” was adopted. According to Article 12.3 of the Law, public broadcasts include programs in the languages of national minorities living in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan; Article 13.1 stipulates that the programs should reflect the national-moral values, national customs and traditions, the full range of culture and art; Article 13.2 states that public broadcaster should take into consideration the political beliefs, religious views, public opinion and the various trends of the opinion, as well as the equality of the country’s citizens while preparing programs to implement the goals set out in this Law; in Article 7.0.7, non-broadcasting of programs promoting religious and racial discrimination has been defined as the task of public broadcaster.⁶⁶³

It is notable that the Azerbaijani State Radio broadcasts the following broadcasts in national minority languages: during a month 1 hour 20 minutes in Talysh language, 1 hour 20 minutes in Kurdish language, 1 hour 20 minutes in Lezgi language, 2 hours 40 minutes in Georgian language, 1 hour 30 minutes in Armenian language, and 15 hours of Russian language broadcasts programs. In addition, in the regions where local minorities live compactly local TV stations are operating. For example, In Khachmaz, “Khachmaz TV”, in Guba “Khayal TV” and “Gutb TV”, “South TV” in Lankaran, and “Aygün TV” in Zagatala. Through the local radio the programs are being broadcasted in Balakan region in Avar language and in Khachmaz region in Lezgi and Tat languages.⁶⁶⁴

Furthermore, there are also various cultural centers belonging to ethnic communities in the country. For example, the Talysh Cultural Center, the Kurdish Cultural Center, the Lezgi Cultural Center, the Tsakhur Cultural Center, the Avar

⁶⁶³ <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/5546>

⁶⁶⁴ Xalq Cəbhəsi.- 2016.- 28 dekabr. - p. 13.

Association named after Shaikh Shamil, Orayin Udin Cultural Center, the Azeri Tat Cultural Center, the Slavic Cultural center, the Russian Community Association, the Society of European Jews of Azerbaijan, the German National-Cultural Association, the International Judaic Center, the Motherland Society of Meskhethi Turks and etc. The government allocates funds for establishing such centers and does not charge for the facilities used for these purposes.⁶⁶⁵

It should be stated that all the legislations and projects have been put into action in the regions where compact groups live. For example, in accordance with the requirements of the provision “The right to choose the language of instruction is accordingly provided by way of opening classes, groups and creating conditions for their activity” established by the “Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Education”⁶⁶⁶, issued on September 5, 2009, to facilitate the minority community’s ability to choose native language instruction for their children, preparatory classes are offered at regional secondary schools where children receive native language instruction. 595 preparatory groups have been established in relevant regions where 8,539 children receive native language instruction.⁶⁶⁷

In this respect, teaching at the comprehensive secondary schools of the country is carried out in Azerbaijani, Russian, Georgian, and Armenian (in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Republic) languages. Accordingly, curricula for schools with three languages of teaching were approved. In 248 preschool educational institutions of 1.764, acting in the education system of the republic, 8.347 children receive education and are brought up in the Russian language. In 7 preschool educational institutions more than 300 children get the education and are brought up in the Georgian language.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, Talysh, Avar, Udi, Tat, Tsakhur, Khinalug, and Kurdish are taught for the first four years of primary school, and Lezgin for nine years in those regions where these national minorities are settled. But there are no higher education institutions in any minority

⁶⁶⁵Garibova, J. (2017), p. 131.

⁶⁶⁶Xalq Cəbhəsi. - 2016.- 24 dekabr. - p. 13.

⁶⁶⁷Garibova, J. (2017), p. 126.

⁶⁶⁸http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a6.html

language in the country, with the exception of a BA program in the Talysh language at Lenkoran State University.⁶⁶⁹

Moreover, in the sphere of art, the special attention is given to the development of the folklore of the national minorities and ethnic groups. In this sense, Culture and Tourism Ministry has been organizing festivals of the art of the minority peoples under the motto “Azerbaijan - Native Land” in Baku since 2006. The festivals held in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2014 were remembered as an important event in the socio-cultural life of the republic. Within the framework of the festival, publications devoted to Azerbaijan’s ethnic music were prepared, scientific conferences were held on preservation of the cultural heritage of the peoples and ethnic groups with the participation of prominent scholars, and photo exhibitions reflecting their life and living style were organized.⁶⁷⁰

In addition, after joining the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005, “On the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” in 2009, the purposeful work in this direction has been increased.⁶⁷¹ For example, in 2012, the Department of Folklore of Small Peoples at the Institute of Folklore of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan was created. The establishment of this department is of very great importance to preserve and transfer to the future generations the samples of folklore of the small peoples living in Azerbaijan.⁶⁷²

In this sense, as Garibova puts it, “Azerbaijan’s profile as one of the best models of multiculturalism and diversity management is growing. This is due to the state policy, which regards linguistic and cultural diversity as an asset rather than as a problem for Azerbaijan.”⁶⁷³ Yet, it is also noticeable that this cultural diversity is presented as part of the Azerbaijani culture.

Furthermore, the following measures have been done for further improving the level of multiculturalism in the country:

⁶⁶⁹Cornell (2016), p. 62.

⁶⁷⁰<http://medeniyyet.az/page/news/36130/-Azerbaycan--dogma-diyar-.html>

⁶⁷¹http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a5.html

⁶⁷²http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a5.html

⁶⁷³Garibova, J. (2017), p. 139.

1. 28 February 2014. Service of the State Counselor for Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan was established by the Order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan;

2. 15 May 2014. Baku International Multiculturalism Centre (BIMC) was established by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan;

3. 11 January 2016. The year 2016 was declared as the year of multiculturalism in Azerbaijan by the Order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan;

4. 11 March 2016. An action plan was adopted which announced the year 2016 as “The Year of Multiculturalism in the Republic of Azerbaijan” by the Order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.⁶⁷⁴

Paragraph 2.1 of the Charter of the BIMC defines that the main goal of the center is to provide the maintenance of tolerance and cultural, religious, linguistic diversity in accordance with the ideology of Azerbaijanism as well as introduce Azerbaijan as the centre of multiculturalism in the world, and study and foster the existing multicultural models. Also, one of the main obligations of the center is to define and realize the ways for the cultural-ethnographic diversity in Azerbaijan to serve the development of Azerbaijanism.⁶⁷⁵ So, it comes out that the center’s policy of multiculturalism is not about promoting the independent proliferation of different cultures, rather maintaining the cultural-ethnographic diversity without damaging the unity and integrity of the society. In other words, the center gives precedence to the development of Azerbaijanism, the main tenet of which is the integrity of the society. Thus, in some sense, it limits the free enhancement of ethnocultural and religious groups. In this sense, though sounding theoretically paradoxical, in practice both multiculturalism and Azerbaijanism are projected to serve the same end – the integration. It can be argued that one of the reasons for putting high emphasis on multiculturalism is to look more liberal and democratic to attract the world’s attention to Azerbaijan as the center of multiculturalism. It can also be claimed that though multiculturalism is designed to further integration in the society, it might end up

⁶⁷⁴ Fourth Periodic Report of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (10.01.2017)
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1421450/1226_1515589618_4th-sr-azerbaijan-en-docx.pdf

⁶⁷⁵<http://multikulturalizm.gov.az/regulations-baku-nternational-centre-multiculturalism/>

dividing society along ethnic lines. In this respect, in the study of Akyıldız, it is stated that the policy of multiculturalism actually contradicts the ideology of Azerbaijanism. The ideology of Azerbaijanism aims to unite all Azerbaijanis under a civic-based identity in order to prevent the disintegration of the country instead of emphasizing their ethnic identities. However, the policy of multiculturalism reveals the ethnic identities of various ethnic groups in Azerbaijan. Hence, it is harmful to the development of Azerbaijani identity since it deepens the ethnic differences within the society.⁶⁷⁶

Furthermore, the initial accomplishments of the BIMC has been the creation of the subjects on “the Introduction to Multiculturalism” and “Azerbaijani Multiculturalism”.⁶⁷⁷ On February 24, 2015, the department of “Azerbaijani Multiculturalism” was established at the Baku Slavic University. One of the major reasons for that was the elaboration of scientific and practical recommendations for further improving the multicultural environment in the country. Another direction of the department’s activity is training for specialists involved in teaching “Introduction to Multiculturalism” and “Azerbaijani Multiculturalism”. At present, within the framework of the project of BIMC on teaching “Azerbaijani Multiculturalism” at national and foreign universities, the mentioned course is being taught at 28 universities of the country and 13 prestigious universities of the world. The Centre has now official branches in Germany, Portugal, Russia, Kazakhstan, Italy, Israel, and Moldova.⁶⁷⁸

As for the Service of the State Counselor for Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, its main objective is to preserve ethno-cultural diversity of the society, provide the state support to rights and freedoms of national minorities, and implement the state policy for national minorities. The Service of State Counselor attaches great importance to close

⁶⁷⁶Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 65.

⁶⁷⁷<http://www.aznews.az/news/cemiyyet/81206.html>

⁶⁷⁸<http://multikulturalizm.gov.az/first-step-framework-project-terror-multiculturalism-nternational-roundtable-armenian-terror-azerbaijani-multiculturalism/>

cooperation with BIMC in order to reach this objective.⁶⁷⁹ In this respect, Azerbaijani delegation headed by the State Adviser on Inter-ethnic, Multicultural and Religious Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including high-ranking state delegates of the Caucasian Muslim Boards, the SCWRA, the BIMC, and the Embassy of Azerbaijan together with the leaders of different religious communities in Azerbaijan have been holding conferences in European countries to discuss their experience of multiculturalism and inter-religious tolerance in Azerbaijan. For example, one of such conferences was held in Finland, on April 28, 2017, and Azerbaijani delegation presented it “as a rather unique case as it witnesses a great consensus on the idea of a civic nation, which is shared by the political leadership, religious representatives, and civil society at large”.⁶⁸⁰

In the presidential decree on the promulgation of the year 2016 as the “Year of Multiculturalism” in the Republic of Azerbaijan, I. Aliyev says:

Situated in the Historical Silk way, Azerbaijan as a place meeting various civilizations has been known as the realm in which, for centuries, the environment of ethnic-cultural colorfulness has been formed and the representatives of different nations and confessions have been living in the condition of peace, mutual understanding and dialogue. In our country, multiculturalism has already been transformed into the mode of life that has no alternative.⁶⁸¹

Also, he states that the decision to host the 7th Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations of the UN in Baku, in 2016, is a real expression of the world’s attitude to the multicultural environment in Azerbaijan.⁶⁸²

In this sense, it is notable that in the official website of the BIMC, <http://multikulturalizm.gov.az/en/>, there are numerous events, projects, and publications dedicated to the promotion of multiculturalism in Azerbaijan. For example, there are regular international summer and winter schools of multiculturalism; subsequent intensive training was organized for the pedagogues who will teach the course “Azerbaijani Multiculturalism” on scientific bases; the book titled “The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on the

⁶⁷⁹Fourth periodic report (2017) https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1421450/1226_1515589618_4th-sr-azerbaijan-en-docx.pdf

⁶⁸⁰http://azertag.az/en/xeber/Multiculturalism_and_Inter_Religious_Tolerance_The_Experience_of_Azerbaijan_and_its_Significance_for_Europe_conference_held_in_Finland-1055227

⁶⁸¹<https://www.president.az/articles/17437>

⁶⁸²<https://www.president.az/articles/17437>

Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism” was presented. Furthermore, I. Aliyev is used to praise Azerbaijani multiculturalism in comparison to some other states that ended up in failure with their policy of multiculturalism, as he stated:

Today Azerbaijan is already one of the recognized world centers of multiculturalism. And we focus on these issues, because there are different approaches to the subject. Unfortunately, there is a view that, in some countries, multiculturalism suffered a fiasco and did not work, and it is a very alarming statement and trend. If this is the case, then it is a topic for serious discussion. In Azerbaijan, we, I believe, prove with our policy and the state of society that multiculturalism is alive. It lives, gets stronger, has deep roots and is the only way for the development of mankind in the future.”⁶⁸³

It is noteworthy that Azerbaijan does not have immigrant problem. To put it differently, Azerbaijan has not been encountered with the flow of immigrants as it is the case in the Western countries. Azerbaijan has had ethno-cultural groups or indigenous groups who have for centuries settled in these lands and already well integrated with the larger society while maintaining their distinct features. State policy of multiculturalism is directed towards the maintenance of this historical experience.

Azerbaijan, located at the crossroads of various civilizations throughout many centuries has become famous as a country where was formed the atmosphere of national cultural diversity, where representatives of various nationalities and faiths live in the atmosphere of peace and welfare, mutual understanding and dialogue. The multiculturalism and tolerance historically inherent in the life of Azerbaijanis today became an integral feature of everyday life of each citizen of the Azerbaijani state, irrespective of national identity, language and religion... Today, the state policy, which is successfully pursued in the Republic of Azerbaijan and aimed at preserving this cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, necessitates an environment of special care and enrichment of the historical experience in the sphere of multiculturalism, strengthening of promotion of the unique success achieved in the Azerbaijani society in this direction which is saved up for centuries on the international arena.⁶⁸⁴

So, due to the existence of different contexts, according to which multiculturalism is developed differently in a particular country, it becomes difficult to make a comparative analysis among them, especially, between the Western countries and Azerbaijan. So, it can reasonably be claimed that it is a wrong judgement to state that multiculturalism in Europe has failed while Azerbaijan has proved to be successful. In this respect, based on her field research, Akyıldız claims the Azerbaijani society with its many different ethnic groups and languages is not comparable to European societies since these various ethnic groups in Azerbaijan

⁶⁸³ <https://en.president.az/articles/10086>

⁶⁸⁴ http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a1.html

with their own languages are not immigrants or “strangers”. Rather, they have a long-shared history and deep-rooted common cultural traits in various aspects. Hence, the policy of multiculturalism is actually unfamiliar for Azerbaijanis.⁶⁸⁵

It is also notable that while upgrading Azerbaijan’s multiculturalism, Azerbaijani leadership criticizes Armenia of being monocultural and extremist. As a matter of fact, in his speech at the opening of 72nd opening session of UN General Assembly, I. Aliyev emphasized:

Unlike Armenia where there are almost no national minorities, which is a mono-ethnic country and where xenophobia is a state policy, Azerbaijan is a multi-ethnic country. Cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of our society is our big asset. Armenia, where Islamophobia reached its peak, committed many acts of vandalism destroying our mosques on the occupied territories.⁶⁸⁶

Indeed, among the former Soviet republics, Armenia has always been the most ethnically homogeneous. Between the 1989 and 2001 censuses, the share of national minorities dropped from 6.7 percent to 2.2 percent (of the total population) leading to a near-total ethnic Armenian majority in present-day Armenia: almost 98 percent of the total population of 3.2 million is ethnically Armenian. Currently, the most numerous minority remaining in Armenia is the Yezidi minority representing 73 percent of the non-Armenian population.⁶⁸⁷

Accordingly, with 91,6 percent of ethnic Azerbaijani Turks comprising majority of population, it seems to be not appropriate to consider Azerbaijan as a multi-ethnic country, rather its indicators point to its homogeneity. In this regard, the study of Fearon dictates to come to this conclusion, as he states: “About 70 percent of the countries in the world have an ethnic group that forms an absolute majority of the population, although the average population share of such groups is only 65 percent and only 21 percent of countries are “homogenous” in the weak sense of having a group that claims 9 out of 10 residents.”⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵Akyıldız, S. (2019), p. 66-67.

⁶⁸⁶<https://en.president.az/articles/25289>

⁶⁸⁷Ulasiuk, Iryna. “National Minorities and Migration in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.” CARIM-East Research Report 2013/33, 2013, p. 3.

⁶⁸⁸Fearon, James D. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8, 195-222, 2003, p. 205.

Moreover, even though “multiculturalism as a state policy and life style in Azerbaijan” has attained high emphasis in the political discourse and has been welcomed by many Azerbaijanis, there are still deficiencies in its implementation mechanism. Azerbaijan ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPN) in 2000, and signed but had not yet ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), in 2001. As it was noted in the Report of 2010 of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the PACE, the lack of funds from the State Budget is a major problem, due to which Azerbaijan does not consider itself ready to ratify ECRML (Report of PACE 2010:10).⁶⁸⁹ Regarding the FCPN, Azerbaijan has made the following declaration:

The Republic of Azerbaijan, confirming its adherence to the universal values and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, declares that the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and implementation of its provisions do not imply any right to engage in any activity violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty, or internal and international security of the Republic of Azerbaijan.⁶⁹⁰

In connection with ECRML, Azerbaijan has made the following declaration: “The Republic of Azerbaijan declares that it is unable to guarantee the application of the provisions of the charter in the territories occupied by the Republic of Armenia until these territories are liberated from that occupation.”⁶⁹¹ Thus, it becomes clear that the leadership of Azerbaijan has had certain fears about the possibility of any act of separatism threatening the integrity of the country.

Moreover, there is also lack of institutions that is in charge of dealing with national minority-related issues. In fact, the institutions operating in the past, such as the State Committee for Work with National Minorities and the Consultative Council for National Minorities, no longer function. Azerbaijan has then no institutional structure to deal specifically and regularly with national minority issues.⁶⁹² In spite of repeated calls by the Advisory Committee on the FCNM to establish a single body

⁶⁸⁹Garibova, J. (2017), p. 125-126.

⁶⁹⁰Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 157 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/157/declarations?p_auth=hilfbY8U

⁶⁹¹Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 148 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148/declarations?p_auth=szMW8BwQ

⁶⁹²Ulasjuk, I. (2013), p. 18.

that would deal specifically with integration issues and minorities, no such institution has been established. Instead, the Ministry of National Security effectively became the most prominent state institution to handle minority issues - while by design, its main concerns are threats to the state, including secessionist tendencies.⁶⁹³

This seems to be due to the claim of Azerbaijani authorities that there is no national minority question in the country and with such a point of view, if there is no problem, then there is no need to institutions. In fact, in their first report under the FCNM, it is stated: “In Azerbaijan various national minorities have lived together with Azerbaijanis for centuries in peace and harmony. It may be stated that this ethnic multiplicity has been preserved in Azerbaijan to the present day. At no time in the history of Azerbaijan have there been recorded cases of intolerance or discrimination on ethnic, religious, language and cultural grounds.”⁶⁹⁴

However, there were national minority questions in the beginning of the independence years. It was especially the case with Lezgin and Talysh people, which are larger communities in the country (180,300 and 112,000, respectively, in 2009 census). In this regard, Popjanevski writes:

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has had a hampering effect on state efforts as regards minority protection and has complicated the relationship between the state and national minority groups. As a consequence of Lezgin minority representatives refusing to join the Azerbaijani army in Karabakh, tensions between ethnic Azeris and Lezgins escalated in 1992-1994. In 1993, the regime also faced controversies with the Talysh minority, as a separatist movement unsuccessfully attempted to proclaim a Talysh Republic within the territory of Azerbaijan.⁶⁹⁵

Indeed, as Gerber argues, the Nagorno-Karabakh war has deeply affected inter-ethnic relations in Azerbaijan. The government, fearing further secessionist forces, is wary of recognizing any level of ethnic demands. It is widely believed that if emerging secessionist tendencies had been suppressed from the beginning, it might have been possible to prevent separatism in Karabakh. The Azerbaijani authorities

⁶⁹³Cornell, S. (2016), p. 56.

⁶⁹⁴Report submitted by Azerbaijan, pursuant to article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/SR (2002)001, Received on 4 June 2002, p.15 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4254e99d4.html>

⁶⁹⁵Popjanevski, Johanna. Minorities and the State in the South Caucasus: Assessing the Protection of National Minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006, p. 59.

adopted the position that the Karabakh situation must be resolved before other minority issues can be tackled.⁶⁹⁶

In this respect, according to a political scientist Hikmet Hajizade, “this kind of attitude of the government to national minorities can be regarded as a fear of separatism - Talyshs several times tried to establish their own state in periods when they existed”. He calls this incident a “dreadful night of the government” and does not consider this fear unfounded: “That region has already been influenced by Iranian Shiism, and therefore the fear of the government can be understood. If something happens, Russia, Iran, and Armenia can try to use Talyshs for their own interests.”⁶⁹⁷

Furthermore, the study of Gerber reveals that the government exerts pressure against the ethnic minorities, especially the Lezgin and Talysh communities in Azerbaijan. He claims that in some regions they faced serious restrictions on their work from the official side. In Baku, before their trip to the Lezgin-populated north of Azerbaijan, they were warned that they might put into danger the people they would interview, as the state practices a policy of strong repression against the Lezgin. And also, in Lenkeran, where Talysh people live compactly, they did not get permission by the local authorities to go to schools or any other official institution. During his study he classified two groups of people: on the one hand Talysh activists who usually went very far in their statements and claims; on the other hand people who were completely disinterested in Talysh issues and usually answered inconsistently to the question whether they are Talysh or Azeri and whether their mother tongue is Talysh or Azerbaijani.⁶⁹⁸

Hilal Mammadov, a representative of the Talysh community in Azerbaijan and the editor of the *Talisho Sado* (the voice of Talyshs) newspaper, which was closed by the government in 2011, says that they continue their struggle for cultural autonomy and the right to education in their own language. To his words, those who act on these requirements and who are actively engaged in this struggle are either

⁶⁹⁶ Gerber, Lea. “Minorities in Azerbaijan. The Sociolinguistic Situation of Lezgis, Udis, Georgians (Ingiloyes) and Talyshs in Azerbaijan- with a Particular Focus on Education”, CIMERA, 2007, p. 13. http://www.talish.org/engels/Minorities_in_Azerbaijan.pdf

⁶⁹⁷ <https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/opinion/22222/>

⁶⁹⁸ Gerber, L. (2007), p. 7, 14-15, 18.

arrested or subjected to various pressures by the state. He states that all problems related to the Azerbaijani society also concern Talyshs. “Generally speaking, it is regrettable that there are big problems with human rights in Azerbaijan. Of course, among these problems there are problems related to the rights of national minorities.” H. Mammadov reminds that in 2000, Azerbaijan committed itself to the adoption of a law on national minorities for two years while addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. However, no law has been adopted so far.⁶⁹⁹ Also, as H. Mammadov claims, under the program of the Ministry of Education, in the regions where the Talyshs are densely populated, lessons in Talysh language should be conducted from the first grade to the fourth grade. However, this is not realised in practice. Classes are either held formally or are replaced by less important lessons like “labor”. There is also a Talysh cultural center in the country, but it is a formal state organization, it does not function practically.⁷⁰⁰

Yet, both Lezgin and Talysh people are well-integrated ethnic communities in the society and do not have problems with other ethnic groups. In this respect, an original survey conducted by Siroky and Mahmudlu among Lezgin and Talysh minorities in the four largest minority areas of Azerbaijan- Lankaran, Astara, Khachmaz, and Gusar is very valuable to understand the micro-level determinants of civic nationalism. Their study reveals that individuals (ethnic Talysh and Lezgin) with more interethnic networks in Azerbaijan (i.e., more ethnic Azeri contacts) were much more likely to identify with the nation-state (over their own group). Similarly, more religious individuals (both predominantly Sunni Lezgin and largely Shia Talysh) were much more likely to identify with the nation-state than with their own ethnic group. Against their expectations, however, they find that group solidarity did not diminish, and education did not enhance an individual’s degree of attachment to civic identity.⁷⁰¹ They write:

Individuals with more interethnic networks and stronger Islamic identity were more likely to identify with the state-promoted civic nationalism. Interethnic networks influence an individual’s access to information about the other groups,

⁶⁹⁹<https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/opinion/22222/>

⁷⁰⁰<https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/opinion/22222/>

⁷⁰¹David S. Siroky & Ceyhun Mahmudlu. “E Pluribus Unum?”, Problems of Post-Communism, 63:2, 94-107, 2016, p. 95. DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1082124

which facilitates a stronger sense of civic nationalism and reduces the propensity of more insular attitudes associated with ethnic nationalism. Talysh and Lezgin share the Islamic faith with ethnic Azeris, and their belief in the trans-ethnic umma in Islam translates into more civic nationalism and less ethnic nationalism.⁷⁰²

Thus, the result of their study shows that due to interethnic networks and common Muslim identity, Lezgin and Talysh people easily integrate to the society and accept all-inclusive state identity. It comes out that they are not excluded or discriminated by the main ethnos, which is essential in their easy access to the group. Also, religion plays important role in achieving social order and harmony, which enables all related groups to act as an integrative whole. Interestingly enough, as the study reveals, this order has been achieved not through education, that is, top-down manner or state-promoted way, rather through inter-group connections.

Moreover, the study of Matveeva and McCartney on Lezgin community in Azerbaijan reveals:

There is no apparent history of interethnic tension between Lezgins and other groups that live in the traditionally Lezgin areas on either side of the border, and no discriminatory policies have been introduced against Lezgins in Azerbaijan. Moreover, the cultural and historical identities of peoples in the border region have a great deal in common. There is a high degree of inter-marriage between Lezgins and Azeris, and relations between the two groups in general remain stable. Moreover, most Lezgins in Azerbaijan have a good command over the Azeri language.⁷⁰³

The instrumentalist account helps us to understand this inter-ethnic harmony and creation of common culture between ethno-cultural groups in Azerbaijan. Following Barth, it can be inferred that ethnic structures as organizational units are not static cultural entities, and they do not have well-fixed borders. Rather it is generated and used by means of the interaction of the ethnic group with its surrounding society.⁷⁰⁴

Then, a question emerges: why do the state still perceive them as threatening to the integrity of the state? Or, if these ethnic communities are already well-integrated through inter-ethnic connections and sharing common religious identity, why is there

⁷⁰²David S. Siroky & Ceyhun Mahmudlu (2016), p. 102.

⁷⁰³Matveeva A., McCartney C. "Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan." *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 5: 213-251, 1998, Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands, p. 227.

⁷⁰⁴See: Chapter 2 of this study.

any need for the state to pursue multicultural policy? In this regard, a political scientist Zardusht Alizadeh believes that separatism will remain in the absence of a mechanism for democratic solution of the social-economic problems of the population. “The high unemployment rate, unfair courts, absence of social elevators and restricting national cultures are the main sources of separatism. As long as these negative factors exist, there will also be a danger that any external force will be able to use the destructive power of separatism.” He also believes that the attempts of separatism are not so frustrating as long as there is the powerful administration of the state. To him, this matter can always be maintained under a limited scope of ideological and political discussions, and this is necessary. But in no case can these discussions be forbidden. This can create a danger of “forbidden fruit”.⁷⁰⁵ It is also noticeable that minority issues are not a subject of public debate in Azerbaijan since they are regarded as potentially contentious topics. It is also problematic for the mass media to publish widely on the subject of minorities.⁷⁰⁶ Following Michael Hechter, one might assume that if there is strong state mechanism to suppress minority nationalisms, then there is little, if any, chance for their secession from the host state.⁷⁰⁷ This is called “hegemonic control”, a method employed by imperial and authoritarian regimes to regulate ethnic or nationalist conflict, and has been the most common means of stabilising plural societies in world history. These states use their control over security and policing system to suppress “latent divisions between ethnic communities which might otherwise have been manifested, especially in conditions of economic modernisation.” Control is “hegemonic” if it makes “an overtly violent

⁷⁰⁵ <https://www.meydan.tv/az/site/opinion/22222/>

⁷⁰⁶ Matveeva A., McCartney C. (1998), p. 238-239.

⁷⁰⁷ Secession is usually a risky course of action, and only private incentives, such as the prospect of jobs, can convince the middle classes to join such a cause; and even then, the possibility of secession will depend on perceptions of the strength of the host state. As for nationalist violence, this is usually a function of state repression of oppositional groups, and is therefore carefully estimated: “There is ample evidence that nationalist groups employ violence strategically as a means to produce their joint goods, among which sovereignty looms large.” For Hechter, the case of Northern Ireland shows that nationalist violence is limited, because a weak solidaristic nationalist group is confronted by a strong state apparatus able to repress secession. Violence will escalate only where a weakened state faces a highly solidaristic nationalism. See: Hechter, Michael. “The dynamics of secession.” *Acta Sociologica* 35: 267-83, 1992; Hechter, Michael. “Explaining nationalist violence.” *Nations and Nationalism* 1, 1: 53-68, 1995.

ethnic contest for state power either “unthinkable” or “unworkable” on the part of the subordinated communities.”⁷⁰⁸

Additionally, it should be pointed out that the threat of secession has become pertinent not only to the countries of the Second and Third World, but also to prosperous liberal democratic countries of the West. Consider recent events in Great Britain or Spain, in which national minorities - Scots and Catalans, respectively - have displayed strong independence movements. In this regard, Will Kymlicka writes:

The prevalence of secessionist movements suggests that contemporary states have not developed effective means for accommodating national minorities. Whether or not we recognize a right to secede, the fact is that secession will remain an ever-present threat in many countries unless we learn to accommodate this sort of ethnocultural diversity. As long as national minorities feel that their interests cannot be accommodated within existing states, they will contemplate secession.⁷⁰⁹

Kymlicka argues that one of the most commonly cited mechanisms for accommodating national minorities is federalism, which respects the desire of national groups to remain autonomous, and to retain their cultural distinctiveness. He also admits that these groups are not self-contained and isolated, but rather are increasingly and inextricably bound to each other in relations of economic and political interdependence. In fact, multination federations like Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium have been successful in accommodating minority nationalisms. They have not only managed the conflicts arising from their competing national identities in a peaceful and democratic way, but have also secured a high degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizens. For example, under the federal division of powers in Canada, the province of Quebec (which is 80 percent francophone) has extensive jurisdiction over issues that are crucial to the survival of the francophone society, including control over education, language, culture, as well as significant input into immigration policy.⁷¹⁰ In the similar vein, Guibernau also

⁷⁰⁸McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan. “The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict.” in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* edited by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. London: Routledge, 1993, p. 23.

See also John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary; and Richard Simeon. “Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation.” in *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?* Edited by Sujit Choudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

⁷⁰⁹Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 92.

⁷¹⁰Kymlicka, W. (2001), p. 92, 95.

cites federalism as the best mechanism to accommodate stateless nations and prevent secessionism by justifying his claims comparing three cases - Britain, Canada, and Spain.⁷¹¹

Thus, it becomes clear that federalism appears to be a feasible alternative to secession and western democracies have been to a great extent successful in accommodating their national minorities. But it should be reminded that Azerbaijan is a unitary state, which rejects to recognize self-governance for its national minorities in the territories, where they live compactly and where they can make decisions concerning specifically to their cultural group. In these circumstances, without employing federal mechanism, it becomes almost impossible to fully satisfy the national interests and demands of national minorities and accommodate them in a peaceful and democratic way. In other words, demands of national minorities in Azerbaijan are constrained in such a way that it could not destroy the integrity of the country. That is to say, any demand for secession or autonomy is suppressed by the government forces. So, these groups can maintain their cultural distinctiveness only in the private realm, within their local network, but, in public, they must see themselves as a part of a larger society and common public culture, and work in public institutions that operate in the dominant language.

It comes out that the government policy of multiculturalism is mainly directed towards apolitical ethno-religious communities, which are numerically fewer and do not bear any threat to national security. But it is very cautious when it comes to larger communities with any potential centrifugal tendencies. In this regard, Cornell argues that Azerbaijan has adopted a hybrid model, in which civic nationhood and multiculturalism cohabit uneasily. On the one hand, the state rhetorically promotes diversity and the identity of national minorities; but on the other, it also promotes an

⁷¹¹Guibernau argues that political decentralization, when accompanied by a substantial degree of autonomy, the constitution of regional institutions and access to significant resources, promotes the emergence of dual identities – regional and national – without necessarily diminishing the latter. Besides, political decentralization does not tend to foster secession, that is, devolution does not usually challenge the integrity of the nation-state's boundaries. He justifies his claims by comparing Britain, Canada, and Spain as three cases which so far prove that decentralization – including political autonomy and federalism – tames secessionism both by offering significant power and resources to the national minorities it seeks to accommodate and by enticing regional political elites with the power, prestige and perks of devolution. See: Guibernau, Montserrat. *The Identity of Nations*. Polity Press, 2007, Chapter 2

inclusive, civic understanding of the nation – as seen in the elimination of references to ethnic origin in census data, passports, and official statistics.⁷¹²

So, Azerbaijani multiculturalism is not about supporting ethno-cultural diversification that can inevitably fuel ethnic separatism. Rather, it is about multicultural integration and multicultural equation. It can be said that it is only political rhetoric that has changed, but integrationist state politics is still there.

7.4.2. Tolerance and Inter-Faith Harmony in Azerbaijan

According to the Constitution, the Republic of Azerbaijan is a secular state (Article 7); state and religion are separate, all religions are equal before the law, and the education system is secular (Article 18); religious men cannot be elected deputies of *Milli Məclis* (National Parliament) of Azerbaijan Republic (Article 85). Also, Article 48 states that everyone has the right: to independently define his/her attitude to the religion; solely or collectively to believe or not to believe in a religion; to express and spread his/her views about the religion; to implement religious ceremonies that do not violate the social rule and are not contradictory to the social morality.

The separation of politics and religion is also fixed by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom of Religious Belief. According to Article 5, religion and religious institutions shall be separate from the state in the Republic of Azerbaijan; the government shall not commission on the religious institutions with any work related to it and shall not intervene in their activity; religious institutions shall not participate in the activity of political parties and provide them financial aid. At the same time, the article states that all religions and religious institutions shall be equal in relation to the law.⁷¹³ In this regard, in the Joint Opinion by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR it is stated that the Venice Commission is aware of the current religious situation in Azerbaijan. It appreciates that the authorities endorse the principle of the freedom of religion. However, that cannot absolve the Venice

⁷¹²Cornell (2016), p. 52.

⁷¹³Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan of Freedom of Religious Belief.
legislationline.org/documents/id/20258

Commission from examining the specific provisions in the light of international human rights standards.⁷¹⁴

Thus, Azerbaijani government officially pursues secular policy in the country where the majority of the population is Muslim (95%). Notably, there is not any clause stating an official religion in the Constitution. Yet, the green color in the national flag of Azerbaijan symbolizes Islamic civilization. It can be observed that despite being an overwhelmingly Muslim country, Azerbaijan does not look like an Islamic country. It is probably due to the country's atheist Soviet past, and due to the lack of the manifestation of Islam at the state level. Indeed, it is obvious that political leaders of independent Azerbaijan do not own religious background, and do not observe Islamic rules (at least, late president H. Aliyev and current president I. Aliyev and his family have not been seen to attend Friday prayers). Rather, they wear fashionable outfits and pursue a modern lifestyle. Yet, both presidents made a pilgrimage to the sacred lands and emphasized Islamic value as an essential part of national identity. Addressing the constituent assembly of the All-Russian Congress of Azerbaijanis on June 22, 2000, President Heydar Aliyev said:

Our ancestors adopted Islam in the 7th century. Islam has been the spiritual foundation of our people for many centuries. We can not worship another religion or accept it. By the way, most people are surprised that three religions (he refers to Islam, Christianity and Judaism – N.G) are functioning so friendly in Azerbaijan. We are such people, I repeat, we tolerate other religions, but at the same time, we should not forget our religion, which is one of the most important sources of our national traditions and national ceremonies.⁷¹⁵

All in all, it seems to be difficult to employ secular policies in the overwhelmingly Muslim country. In order to cope with it, Azerbaijani government has accepted Turkey's secular societal model founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a role model. Heydar Aliyev stated:

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's greatness is that he has lived under the influence of Islam and established a new state, i.e., a worldly state where Islam was dominant. [...] This is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's geniusness and he has demonstrated to all Islamic worlds that without abolishing Islam and considering this religion as moral values of people we may establish a worldly state.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹⁴Joint Opinion on the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Venice Commission and the OSCE /ODIHR adopted by the Venice Commission at its 92nd Plenary Session (12-13 October, 2012), p. 4. legislationline.org/documents/id/17635

⁷¹⁵Azərbaycan Diasporu. Bakı, 2005, p. 64-65.

⁷¹⁶Nazarli, Safarli. Heydar Aliyev about Ataturk. Baku: AzAtaM, 2004 (Translated from Azerbaijan into English by Ilaha Abdullayeva)
<http://lankaran.cls.az/front/files/libraries/2113/books/477811446794784.pdf>

Hence, following Turkey, Azerbaijan embraces the French model of *laïcité*, which considers the state regulation of religious organizations in the face of a threat to the state from organized religion rather than Anglo-Saxon model of secularism, which considers maintaining religious freedom, without any state intervention.

In accordance with Article 48 of the Constitution, H. Aliyev issued decree, on June 21, 2001, “On the Establishment of the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations” with the purpose of “the creation of appropriate conditions for compliance with laws relating to freedom of religion and for the state registration and oversight of religious institutions.” The third provision of the decree puts out that the committee may interfere with the activities of religious organizations in the forms considered by the law in order to ensure compliance with the requirements of the legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic on religious freedom. The fourth provision states that the organization neither interfere with the religious beliefs of the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the work of the religious organizations united by them without any ground, nor does it provide any financial assistance to religious organizations.⁷¹⁷

So, with the creation of this committee, the activities of religious groupings in the country have been put under state control. Moreover, the other institution, through which the state exerts its strong control over religious activities, is the Caucasus Board of Muslims (CBM), established in Soviet times and led by Allahshukur Pashazade (since 1980), appoints clerics, monitors sermons, and organizes pilgrimages to Mecca.⁷¹⁸ The CBM is tasked with regulating all Muslim congregations in society, and projects a model of Islam that is moderate, inclusive, and tolerant. The State Security Service intervenes specifically in cases where religious groups pose a national security threat. Cornell writes:

Thus, in the religious sphere, Azerbaijani authorities have created complementary institutions with comprehensive mandates. Indeed, over time, legislation has been passed that has increased the regulatory power of these institutions, particularly as the state has worked to minimize the influence of foreign

⁷¹⁷<http://scwra.gov.az/upload/Files/5.doc>

⁷¹⁸Europe Report N191, Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State, International Crisis Group, 25 March, 2008, p. 1.

religious actors. These institutions have sought to exert control over religious literature, education and training, as well as to supervise the contents and delivery of sermons, pilgrimages, and any activities and finances of religious associations.⁷¹⁹

So, it comes out that contrary to Article 18 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief, there is no full separation between the state and religion. However, in official parlance, Azerbaijani leadership continues to present Azerbaijan as uniquely “a land of tolerance” where all confessional groups live in peace and harmony. Ilham Aliyev stated:

Azerbaijan has always been a country where representatives of different religions and nationalities live in an atmosphere of brotherhood. In all periods of history, the Azerbaijani people showed the world an example of tolerance. The equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their religion and language, enshrined in the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, is also a strong indication of tolerance in the country.⁷²⁰

In this direction, Azerbaijan hosted numerous international events aiming at strengthening inter-religious dialogue. For example, the 7th global forum of UN Alliance of Civilizations, World’s Religious Leaders’ Forum, four times International Forum on Inter-Cultural dialogue, five times Baku International Humanitarian Forum, and other important events.⁷²¹ Moreover, with Azerbaijan situated at the crossroads of different cultures and civilizations, I. Aliyev initiated the “Baku Process”, in partnership with the Council of Europe, for the promotion of intercultural dialogue in 2008, on the theme of “Intercultural dialogue as a basis for peace and sustainable development in Europe and its neighboring regions.” The main goal of the Baku Process is to strengthen dialogue, partnership, and cooperation between the Muslim world and Europe.⁷²²

Accordingly, I. Aliyev is concerned with all confessional groups in the country equally. The government has focused its efforts on the construction and rehabilitation of not only mosques and holy Muslim places, but also churches and synagogues. A new synagogue of the Mountain Jews was built in downtown Baku and opened for service on April 5, 2011. Also, Chotari Albanian-Udi Church, situated

⁷¹⁹Cornell, S. (2016), p. 8-9.

⁷²⁰“Ilham Aliyev attended the opening of the Orthodox Religious-Cultural Centre of the Baku and Azerbaijan Diocese” (15 November 2013), <<http://en.president.az/articles/10086>>

⁷²¹<https://en.president.az/articles/25289>

⁷²²<http://bakuprocess.az/baku-process/about-process/>

in the Nij settlement of Gabala district, largely populated by the Udi community, was reconstructed. Besides, the Orthodox Church Religious-Cultural Centre of Baku and Azerbaijan Eparchy were built at state expense.⁷²³

In addition, in conformity with relevant decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in 2011 and 2013, 800 000 AZN were allocated from a special reserve fund of the state budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan to meet the religious demands of non-Islamic religious organizations through establishing favorable conditions for them. Furthermore, on 27 November 2014, followed by the decree of President Ilham Aliyev, the Government assigned 2 500 000 AZN from the President's Reserve Fund to the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) for projects raising religious awareness via the country's religious institutions supporting and encouraging national and moral values. 400 000 AZN of the assigned amount were allocated to non-Islamic religious communities of the country.⁷²⁴ According to Mubariz Gurbanli, head of the SCWRA, this step will undoubtedly play a positive role in preventing religious communities from falling into the sphere of influence of foreign powers; create conditions for them in promoting broad propaganda campaigns against modern calamities such as religious radicalism, extremism, sectarian discrimination, and drug addiction.⁷²⁵ However, it should be stated that allocating money to religious organizations is contrary to the fourth provision of the charter of SCWRA, as it states that the organization does not provide any financial assistance to religious organizations.⁷²⁶

In its turn, the SCWRA, established in order to regulate the state-religion relations, observance of legislative acts on freedom of religion, has lately increased the attention to the quality of education. It is holding series of religious conferences, seminars, and roundtables with public and religious people in matters of relevance to religious issues in all regions of the country. Awareness-raising activities are also

⁷²³Fourth periodic report of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (10.01.2017)
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1421450/1226_1515589618_4th-sr-azerbaijan-en-docx.pdf

⁷²⁴Fourth periodic report, p. 7.

⁷²⁵Xalq Cəbhəsi.- 2016.- 19 oktyabr.- p. 9.

⁷²⁶<http://scwra.gov.az/upload/Files/5.doc>

carried out through electronic media, press organs and electronic publications prepared by the State Committee, as Gurbanli states: “For this purpose, various literatures are published and distributed to religious communities, including “Heydar Aliyev Politics: Tolerance”, “Ilham Aliyev: Azerbaijan is an Example of Tolerance”, “Tolerance: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, “Homeland and State Love in Islam” and other books.”⁷²⁷

On May 29, 2013, the National Tolerance Center (NTC) was established within the second World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue in Baku. The main aim of the Center is to support and promote tolerance, and maintain mutual respect in the society.⁷²⁸ According to the Fourth Report (2017), the NTC has paid special attention to the encouragement of cooperation among different religious creeds. It has been closely involved in the process of their integration into the society and participation in the life of the country. The National Tolerance Centre’s “Unite for Respect” project for religious communities provides a good example of it. Within the framework of this project, social projects are jointly implemented by at least three different religious communities representing different national minorities in the field of helping disabled teenagers to meet their needs for education with further access to higher education, providing rehabilitation of prisoners, facilitating their integration to the society, and strengthening family and family values.⁷²⁹ It is notable that in his visit to Baku (October 2016), Pope Francis praised Azerbaijan as a place of religious tolerance after meeting with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and after a private meeting with Sheikh ul-Islam, the region’s grand mufti. The pope held an interreligious meeting at the country’s largest mosque with Orthodox Christian, Muslim and Jewish leaders.⁷³⁰

Indeed, Azerbaijan is regarded to be the most tolerant country among the Muslim countries. In fact, according to the query called “World Muslims: unity and

⁷²⁷Xalq Cəbhəsi.- 2016.- 19 oktyabr.- p. 9.

⁷²⁸www.azernews.az/nation/54615.html

⁷²⁹Fourth periodic report (2017) https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1421450/1226_1515589618_4th-sr-azerbaijan-en-docx.pdf, p. 11-12.

⁷³⁰<http://unpo.org/article/19736>

difference” results of the international research organization “Pew Research Center” held in 2012, Azerbaijan occupies the first place among Muslim countries for the interdenominational tolerance. The ratio of those who regard and disregard Shiites as Muslim is 97/2% and those who regard and disregard Sunnis as Muslim is 91/7% - this result is the highest positive indicator showing interdenominational relation in comparison to other 22 Muslim countries participated in the interrogation.⁷³¹

At this point, it is notable to emphasize that before the independence Azerbaijanis had no real understanding of conceptual differences between the Shia and Sunni branches. Recently, an anticipated 60 % of the population identifies as primarily Muslim (not specifically Shi’a or Sunni), while only around 35 % identify as specifically Shi’a or Sunni – with the remaining 5 % containing adherents of other religions.⁷³² According to Goyushov and Balci, “in general, mainstream Azeris until recently had little connection to the age-old Sunni-Shiite rivalry, and viewed the simple public pronunciation of the words “Shiite” and “Sunni” at least as impolite.”⁷³³ So, being a Muslim for Azerbaijanis has been seen as a cultural marker, part of the national identity, rather than belonging to the Islamic belief system.

However, after the independence with the advent of Islam to the country, the religiosity of Azerbaijani people started to soar. This trend is clearly visible in the changing profile of the country, as one can frequently come across with women wearing hijabs and the bearded men, and crowded people in front of the mosques during the *Jumu’ah* (Friday) prayer even in “cosmopolitan” Baku. In fact, according to the 2012 statistics of Gallup religiosity index, only 44% of Azerbaijani population regarded themselves to be religious. It shows two-fold increase in comparison to the last survey in 2007-2008, which listed Azerbaijan as one of the least religious countries with only 21% considering themselves religious.⁷³⁴

⁷³¹Əzizova, Elnurə. “Dini Düzümlülük, yoxsa Fərqliliklərin Vəhdəti: Azərbaycanın Tolerantlıq Modelinin Əsas Göstəriciləri.” *Azərbaycanda Tolerantlıq Ənənəsi*. Bakı: “Nurlar” Nəşriyyat-Poliqrafiya Mərkəzi, 2015, p. 32.

⁷³²Cornell, S. (2016), p. 74.

⁷³³Bedford, Sophie. “Islamic Opposition in Azerbaijan: Discursive Conflicts and Beyond.” 117-143, in *Religion, Politics and Nation-building in Post-Communist Countries* edited by Greg Simons, David Westerlund, published by Routledge, 2016, p. 126.

⁷³⁴Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism-2012, Win-Gallup International, Press Release, p. 25.

It is notably due to the perceived threat of foreign radical religious influences that the government keeps strict control over the religious life in the country. In fact, with 2013 amendment to the law on religion, the government imposed restrictions on the sales of religious materials. Now, religious books, video and audiotapes, and discs can only be sold provided that they carry a special marking ensuring they are permitted for sale in the country. Also, the selling of religious materials is limited to a few specially designated stores.⁷³⁵ Moreover, the government takes strict measures against the activity of radical Islamist groups in the country to crush them in their cradle, if there is any challenge to the state secular policy. As a matter of fact, violent clashes erupted, on November 26, 2015, between the local residents and special police troops in Nardaran – a town of around 8000 people, located 40 km away from Baku, which is a traditional stronghold of Azerbaijani Shiism. As a result, 7 people were killed (including 2 police officers) and 14 local residents, including Haji Taleh Baghirzade, a leader of the Muslim Unity Movement that is established in January 2015, were detained as part of an investigation into an alleged plot to overthrow the ruling government. Following the clashes, police cordoned off Nardaran, preventing residents from leaving the town and cut off power, phone, Internet and other communications. A joint statement released by the Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor-General's Office on Saturday says Baghirzade and his movement for Muslim Unity aimed to overthrow the constitutional order and establish “a religious state under Shari'a law.”⁷³⁶ Azerbaijani officials accuse Iran of fomenting the unrest, which arose due to the discontents related to social, political and economic problems in Nardaran, apart from their demands on lifting the ban on hijab.⁷³⁷

So, instead of negotiating with Nardaran people to develop a mechanism in solving their problems, I. Aliyev chose to employ force, which is likely not to

<http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/14/file/14.pdf>; Steve Crabtree and Brett Pelham, “What Alabamians and Iranians Have in Common”, Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/114211/alabamians-iranians-common.aspx>

⁷³⁵RFE/RL (2013) “Azerbaijani Parliament Limits Sales of Religious Materials,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 February, available at <http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijanlimits-religious-materials/24909902.html>.

⁷³⁶<https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/society/9731/>

⁷³⁷<https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/society/10084/>

eradicate the source of the matter but instead radicalize it further. The answer to Aliyev's radical measures lies in his following statement: "Our country is that if we are not strict, the bearded will start walking around and every side will explode."⁷³⁸ Thus, I. Aliyev obviously regards the existence of radical religious groups in the country as a threat to Azerbaijani society; especially it is true for Islamic groups rather than those of other religions. Such worry was also uttered by Rafik Aliyev, a former head of the SCWRA:

Previously Muslims were Sunni and Shia who lived in peace and many of them did not know to what current they belonged. Now there are ten Muslim currents in Azerbaijan... The committee is working with them: we do our best for maintenance of public order and observance of tolerance principles. Yet we enjoy some harmony. But nobody can guarantee the reign of everlasting harmony, and that the state will have to take measures to restore the order, as it used to do it before.⁷³⁹

So, the government of Azerbaijan maintains a non-sectarian and unified religious policy, which serves to develop the notion of "Unique Azerbaijani Islam." The president addresses his speech during the religious holidays to all religious Muslims together and does not differentiate between sects and schools. Although the head of the Spiritual Board of the Caucasian Muslim Haji Allah Shukur Pashazade is Shia, Sunni clerics also take part in the board of *gazis*.⁷⁴⁰ According to Haji Salman Musayev, "you cannot say from looking at them who is Sunni and who is Shiite – they look the same and they pray in the same mosque."⁷⁴¹

At this point, it should be stressed that I. Aliyev seems to be keen on preventing any tendency of inter-sectarian conflict or any threat of dividing the country along Sunni and Shia lines. In this sense, as part of the year of Multiculturalism, on January 15, 2016, "A Prayer for Unity" was jointly performed by Muslims belonging to various denominations of Islam for the first time in the world. Since that time on Sunnis and Shiites have been praying together in the Heydar Mosque. The official Sunni and Shiite imams of the mosque take turns in

⁷³⁸<http://bastainfo.com/az/2017/04/12/ilham-aliyev-mehriban-aliyevani-qasdən-birinci-vitse-prezident-təyin-etdim/>

⁷³⁹Bedford, S. (2016), p. 126.

⁷⁴⁰Siroky D, Mahmudlu C. "E Pluribus Unum?" Ethnicity, Islam and the Construction of Identity in Azerbaijan. presented at the IV International Congress held in Baku, Azerbaijan, on May 2-4, 2014, p. 12.

⁷⁴¹Bedford, S. (2016), p. 126.

leading the *Jumu'ah* prayers on a weekly basis.⁷⁴² According to the Head of the Heydar Mosque, Haji Sabir, the prayer will further increase the authority of Azerbaijan as a center of tolerance.⁷⁴³ So, all things considered, it is reasonable to think that Ilham Aliyev wants to nullify religious divisions or sectarian divisions, because “in societies divided sharply by social class or religious confession, there is an obvious tension between the solidarity that a common nationality requires and the antagonism provoked by these divisions.”⁷⁴⁴

Moreover, as for the non-Muslim small communities, according to the query called “Islam in Azerbaijan” results of the Religious Research Center, held in 2014, the attitude of Azerbaijani people towards the Jews and Christians living in the country has traditionally been positive. The statistics show that 89.9% of the respondents possess positive opinions about the Christians, and 88.5% of them do so about the Jews.⁷⁴⁵ It is also remarkable that the Jews and Christians in the country are content with the attitude of Azerbaijanis towards them as well. Azerbaijan celebrated its first Interfaith Harmony Week in 2017, based on the resolution of UN A/65/PV.34 World Interfaith Harmony Week, which is the first week of February of every year (01.02 – 07.02) and is aimed at achieving harmony between all people, regardless of their faith. In the event, the Deputy Chairman of the Community of the European Jews (Ashkenazi) – Yevgeniy Brenneysen briefly talked about the history of European Jews in Azerbaijan and mentioned that the Jews here have never been oppressed, but have always been fairly treated by the government and the people. Jews have two synagogues (one for Mountain Jews, and the second for Ashkenazi), and two schools in Azerbaijan. And the spokesman for the Baku-Azerbaijan Eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church – Archpriest Konstantin Pominov started his speech with the words: “It is raining outside right now. It is raining on Jews and Christians,

⁷⁴²<http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/Unity-Prayer-held-in-Baku%E2%80%99s-Heydar-Mosque.html>

⁷⁴³<https://www.azernews.az/nation/91709.html>

⁷⁴⁴Miller, D. (1995), p. 159.

⁷⁴⁵Özizova, E. (2015), p. 32.

and Muslims equally. We are all human beings, and even more than that – we are all the children of the same father. We are the children of Adam’’.⁷⁴⁶

Heydar Aliyev Foundation, the head of which is Mehriban Aliyeva (Ilham Aliyev’s wife), the First Vice-President of Azerbaijan Republic, takes especially active part in presenting Azerbaijan to the world as a tolerant country. For example, the project “Azerbaijan – the Address of Tolerance”, realized in 2013 October-November, included an exhibition that was shown in Moscow, the UNESCO headquarters in Paris and at the UN headquarters in New York in order to display religious tolerance in Azerbaijan.⁷⁴⁷ And also, a documentary entitled “Under the Single Sun”, the chief producer of which is Arzu Aliyeva (Ilham Aliyev’s daughter), was produced by the Baku Media Centre with the support of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation. On December 5, 2016, the presentation of the film took place. The basic message the film conveys to the audience is that a tolerant environment dominates in Azerbaijan and here, all people are living equally, regardless of their language, religion and culture.⁷⁴⁸

So, it seems most likely that by promoting secularism and tolerance, the Aliyev government de-emphasizes and downplays Islam as a component of the national identity and amplifies those cultural features that are commonly shared with other groups in order to achieve unity. It turns out that if Islamic element is diminished, it is, then, can not be accepted as an essential part of the national identity. In this regard, it sounds alike with the arguments of David Miller:

Suppose that we are members of a national community forming the dominant group in the territory we aspire to control, but that we share it with a minority group who have much in common with us, but who differ in one respect – religion, say. Unless our religion is crucial to our identity... we have good reason to de-emphasize this feature, and to stress instead, as a basis of unity, those cultural traits that we already share with the minority. To the extent that we succeed in doing so, we can form a territorial community in whose self-determination all can share. From this springs mutual trust.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁶<http://worldinterfaithharmonyweek.com/wp-content/plugins/event-reports/docs/681/62a4774ae88eb516bbf6bbbd25ffe9a61c74e9d6.pdf>

⁷⁴⁷<https://heydar-aliyev-foundation.org/en/content/blog/139/Azer%ADbaijan-%E2%80%93-the-address-of-tolerance>

⁷⁴⁸<https://heydar-aliyev-foundation.org/en/content/view/139/4423/Documentary> - “Under-The-Single-Sun”

⁷⁴⁹Miller, D. (1995), p. 92.

Furthermore, Mehriban Aliyeva personally seems to appear much more tolerant that she even desired the end of enmity and the rapprochement of Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. After the meeting with the First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva, famous Russian writer Alexander Prokhanov, who gave a statement to the correspondent of Virtual az.org, in July, 2017, said: “Mrs. Aliyeva said that she would never let the Azerbaijani people form an enemy image in the face of Armenians. There was a time when these peoples lived together, drank their wine at a table. That time must come back.” The disclosure was a topic of debate on social networks.⁷⁵⁰ That statement of Mehriban Aliyeva caused public resentment especially after a targeted attack on Alkhanli village in Fuzuli district by Armenia with 82- and 120-mm mortars and grenade launchers, on July 4, 2017, killed 2 civilians – 2 years old Zahra Guliyeva and her grandmother.⁷⁵¹

It should be stressed that one of the most remarkable works of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation at that time was the well-known books on Khojaly tragedy in English, Russian and other languages. They spread it all over the world. So, M. Aliyeva’s statement of giving messages of friendship with Armenian people contradicts with her foundation’s initiative of spreading the information about the Armenian aggression in Khojaly to the international community.

However, I. Aliyev, contrary to his wife, appears to be intolerant on this issue as he in every occasion calls the Republic of Armenia as an aggressor and violator of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, in his speech at the 72nd opening session of UN General Assembly, he stressed:

For more than 25 years, Armenia occupies 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 other regions of our country... More than one million of Azerbaijanis became refugees and internally displaced persons. Armenia conducted the policy of ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis... Armenia committed genocide against Azerbaijanis in Khojaly. Khojaly genocide is already officially recognized by more than 10 countries... Leading international organizations adopted resolutions demanding withdrawal of Armenian troops from the territory of Azerbaijan. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted 4 resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884 –N. G) demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from the territory of Azerbaijan... Armenia for 24 years ignores the UN Security Council resolutions and unfortunately is not punished for that. In some cases, the UN Security Council resolutions are implemented within days. In our case it

⁷⁵⁰<http://qaynarxett.az/index.php?newsid=16404>

⁷⁵¹<https://en.president.az/articles/25289>

has already been 24 years that resolutions are not implemented. This is a double standards approach. This approach is unacceptable. International sanctions must be imposed on Armenia. One of the important reforms of the United Nations must be the creation of the mechanism of implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council.⁷⁵²

In this sense, according to a survey conducted by Baku-based Sociological Monitoring Center PULS, the public supports the government's non-compromise position: approximately 60% of respondents were against any kind of compromise in the conflict.⁷⁵³ Though I. Aliyev always emphasizes the priority of peaceful negotiations in the solution of Nagorno Karabakh problem, he also stresses the possibility of using force pointing to the mighty of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. In fact, he could display the power of the national army when so-called four-day war in Nagorno Karabakh escalated, on April 2, 2016. Azerbaijani forces seized settlements and strategic heights along the front. At least 50 people were killed. As Economist puts out, "the government boasted of newfound military superiority, the result of the oil-rich state's expansion of defense spending (from \$177m in 2003 to \$3 billion in 2015)."⁷⁵⁴ Successes of Azerbaijani army in the battlefield demoralized Armenians. "This is about bringing Armenia to the negotiating table," says Zaur Shiriyeu. Therefore, when the mission was concluded, by April 3, Baku declared a unilateral truce.⁷⁵⁵

Azerbaijanis united in support of the military offensive, which showed that collective memory about NK has not waned, instead deepened. They demanded furthering military operations, because they believed that they can get back the occupied territories by force. Indeed, the so-called "four-day war" "created euphoria," "the people are hungry for victories," says Anar Valiyev, a Baku-based analyst.⁷⁵⁶ It should be noted that since the ceasefire achieved in 1994 between the parties there

⁷⁵²<https://en.president.az/articles/25289>

⁷⁵³International crises group, Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Europe Report N°187 – 14 November, 2007, <http://ebookbrowse.com/187-nagorno-karabakh-risking-war-pdf-d253643882>.

⁷⁵⁴<https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/04/09/a-frozen-conflict-explodes>

⁷⁵⁵Zaur Shiriyeu, May 2nd, 2016, The CACI Analyst The "Four-Day War": new momentum for Nagorno-Karabakh resolution? <https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13356-the-four-day-war-new-momentum-for-nagorno-karabakh-resolution>

⁷⁵⁶<https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/04/09/a-frozen-conflict-explodes>

was not a war in such a scale, except for sporadic shootings. Against the expectations, the diplomatic negotiations to thaw the “frozen conflict” have not yielded any result.⁷⁵⁷

At this point, it is notable that in spite of the state of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there are still Armenians living in the country, majority of which reside in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the Institute of Geography of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, there are 20,000 Armenians (the majority of whom are spouses of Azerbaijanis – N.G) living in Baku today, with a total of 120,000 living in the country.⁷⁵⁸

Nevertheless, by holding various international events, I. Aliyev manages to brand Azerbaijan – “A land of Fire” in the world as multicultural and tolerant country. For example, firstly, hosting the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) in Baku created vast opportunities to present multicultural and tolerant Azerbaijan to the wide international audience. It is also true that, Azerbaijan’s participation in the ESC since 2008 has had potential impact upon the process of nation-building and national identity formation. While Azerbaijani government strives for using ESC as an effective platform to externalize its indigenous culture such as featuring Mugham, an archetypically Azerbaijani traditional music genre, and Azerbaijani national instrument *tar*, in its participation of 2008 and 2009 song contest respectively, the competitive logics by which the ESC is guided has had an impact in the reverse direction – to westernize and de-nationalize the country.⁷⁵⁹ Indeed, it has influenced to a great extent to the development of Western sense of self among Azerbaijanis. Also, it created positive thoughts and feelings about their country and especially the capital Baku that boosted national pride of many Azerbaijanis. In this sense, Krebs writes:

In Baku itself, the branding, projecting an image of the city enjoyed by visitors from all over the world was so successful that even elderly people who would

⁷⁵⁷The Second Karabakh War, an all-out war escalated on September 27, 2020 between Azerbaijani and Armenian armies, lasted 44 days, ended up with the victory of Azerbaijani army that re-gained control of the Nagorno Karabakh. This war has had an enormous effect in the boosting of nationalism and national unity in Azerbaijan. The discussion of this war can be subject of another study.

⁷⁵⁸<http://www.1news.az/news/obnarodovano-chislo-prozhivayuschih-v-azerbaydzhane-armyan>

⁷⁵⁹Ismayilov, M. “State, Identity, and the Politics of Music: Eurovision and Nation-building in Azerbaijan.” *Nationalities Papers*, 40:6, 833-851, 2012. DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2012.742990, p. 840.

usually complain about the government and glorify the Soviet era suddenly began praising the president for his wonderful work in Baku and for the city's regained international standing.⁷⁶⁰

In addition, Azerbaijan became the first host country for the European Olympic Games, with 6000 European athletes competing in 20 sports, took place in Baku, in 2015. The motivation behind multi-billion-dollar effort of Azerbaijan's government for the realization of the event was its intent "to put the country on the map".⁷⁶¹ Azerbaijan paid a high cost, including covering the travel and accommodation costs for all the athletes. Since that event, Baku is more likely to transform into a symbolic capital of Europeanization with hundreds of London cabs bought especially for the Games.

Meanwhile, apart from prioritizing Western values, the Azerbaijani government aims to preserve its eastern values as a Muslim country, situated "at the crossroads of East and West". It should be stated that I. Aliyev announced 2017 as a "Year of Islamic Solidarity". In May 2017, Baku hosted the 4th Islamic Solidarity Games, where 3,000 athletes from 54 Muslim countries competed.⁷⁶² Ilham Aliyev said:

Azerbaijan is a country that links the Muslim world with the West. Just imagine: one country and one city hosted European and Islamic Games in the course of just two years. More than 100 countries participate in these Games. No other country can boast of such an achievement. We are justifiably proud to have been able to do this. Our country is known as a reliable partner, a friendly and powerful state both in the western and the Muslim world.⁷⁶³

So, it becomes evident that by holding such international events, Azerbaijani leadership wants to give important messages to the world that Islam is a religion of peace and solidarity. Hosting both European and Islamic games in a two-year time is an indicative of country's attempt to play the role of a bridge between civilizations

⁷⁶⁰Krebs, M. "From Cosmopolitan Baku to Tolerant Azerbaijan - Branding 'The Land of Fire'", Identity Studies, Ilia State University, 2015, p.114.
<http://ojs.iliauni.edu.ge/index.php/identitystudies/article/view/228/138>

⁷⁶¹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32977924>

⁷⁶²https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Teltower_Stadtblatt_newspaper_4th_Islamic_Solidarity_Games_saw_record_number_of_participants-1069389

⁷⁶³https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyev_attended_meeting_with_Azerbaijani_athletes_who_won_4th_Islamic_SolidarityGames_their_coaches_representatives_of_Azerbaijans_sports_community-VIDEO-1063770

and encourage intercultural dialogue in the world.⁷⁶⁴ Yet, following Krebs, it can be said that the main goal is,

to brand Azerbaijan as a modern and well-off country with a multicultural history and a hospitable and tolerant population in order to attract tourists and foreign investors, as well as create an international environment of sympathy for a country that lost parts of its territory to neighbouring Armenia after the war over Karabakh in 1994.⁷⁶⁵

As a result, Azerbaijani people, especially the young generation, seem to be proud of Azerbaijani tolerance. The general accepted view is that “tolerance is part of Azerbaijani national character”.⁷⁶⁶ It can be concluded that with the policy of “tolerance”, the ultimate goal of I. Aliyev government is to prevent any religious or sectarian conflict, and thus preserve peace and stability in the country. Also, it is reasonable to think that such a religious policy has made Islamic component of the national identity less effective in order to integrate other confessional groups. To put it differently, by downplaying religious element, the national identity has been thinned to make it acceptable for all non-Islamic groups.

⁷⁶⁴https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Teltower_Stadtblatt_newspaper_4th_Islamic_Solidarity_Games_saw_record_number_of_participants-1069389

⁷⁶⁵Krebs, M. (2015), p. 110.

⁷⁶⁶Krebs, M. (2015), p. 122.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of the XX century Azerbaijan, national intellectuals led the national liberation movement against Tsarist imperialism, struggled against Armenian and Russian hostility, and intensified the ideas of Turkism that promoted national identification of the people as a Turk. The national movement ended up with the formation of the first national state, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), headed by the nationalist leader, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, on May 28, 1918. It promoted the principles of Musavatism – Turkification, Modernization, and Islamisation as the state ideology. Though ADR could exist only 23 months before being invaded by Bolshevik military forces, it could realize some historical work: accomplishing a shift from religious identity to national identity, it formed a nation out of the Muslim subjects of Tsarist Russia; contributed to the development of national culture and nationalization of the education system; formalized the names “Turkish language” and “Turkish nation”; promoted ideas of Azerbaijanism, secularism, and democracy together with the ideas of Turkism.

The same phenomenon began to appear in the late XX century in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Again, especially with the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian forces backed by Russia, anti-Russian and anti-Armenian feelings strengthened the Turkism movement and people’s identification as a Turk. The national liberation movement was culminated with the re-establishment of the nation- state - Azerbaijan Republic and coming to power the nationalist party and nationalist leader - Azerbaijan People’s Front and Abulfaz Elchibey in 1991. He followed the footsteps of the ADR government by adopting the principles of Musavatism. In this respect, Elchibey brought back the ethnic name of Azerbaijani Turks that was valid until 1937, when it was changed from Turk to Azerbaijani with

the decision of Stalin. In Soviet times, in an effort of creating a supra-ethnic identity - *Homo Sovieticus*, Soviet leaders adopted the Cyrillic alphabet to ease the Russification of national languages, eliminated religious component, denied Turkishness to Azerbaijanis as well as other Turkic states. Thus, following the instrumentalist approach, it can be inferred that cultures are exceedingly flexible and vulnerable to elite manipulation.

Hence, both Resulzade and Elchibey defined the name of the nation and the language as Turkish, and thus, people's feelings of going back to ethnic roots and identifying as a Turk were strengthened. They also enhanced the idea of Azerbaijanism that is about: national statehood of Azerbaijan; the indivisible integrity of the country; the protection of the rights of ethnic and national minorities living in the country. So, in their nation project, Azerbaijani identity was designed to function only as citizenship identity to encompass all ethnocultural groups in the country, not as the ethnic identity for the majority Azerbaijani Turks. In this respect, both Resulzade and Elchibey granted cultural rights to minority groups in the country, which had no equivalence at that time in the Western countries, and in post-Soviet space, respectively. Both of them defined citizenship policy on *the jus soli* principle. Hence, though both of them pursued ethnonationalism, in Connor's term, that is, made Turkishness base of the national identity, they did not exclude minority groups, rather developed a civic nationalist policy to include all of them. Then, theoretically, it would be wrong to call it "ethnic nationalism", as it entails exclusion. So, we can conclude that their nationalism policies contained elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism.

However, after coming to power of Heydar Aliyev century-long problem of an identity crisis, especially the conflict between Azerbaijanism and Turkism, has been resolved in favor of the former. Azerbaijanism, which envisages the unity of all ethnic and national groups under supra-ethnic identity, is a civic-weighted doctrine. During Heydar Aliyev's reign, it has been elevated to the status of the state ideology. As a result, the rapid "Azerbaijanization" has taken place in almost all spheres of public life. He redefined the national identity and official language as "Azerbaijani" to prevent the fragmentation of the multiethnic society of the newly independent

nation-state. Turkism started to be evaluated as a dangerous force that fosters the disintegration of society.

Theoretically speaking, while Elchibey's Turkism can be explained by primordialism, H. Aliyev's Azerbaijanism can be explained by modernist account. Primordialist paradigm helps us to understand Elchibey's emotional attachment to his nation. That is, his ineffable and overpowering feelings derived from natural and spiritual affinity with his ethnic brethren and kinsmen cannot be explained rationally. More specifically, thanks to this account, one can clearly understand Elchibey's ideal of "a Whole Azerbaijan" and a Turkic Union. It becomes clear that referring to common territoriality, descent and culture, Elchibey possessed "collective self-consciousness" (Shils' term) concerning his kinsmen in South Azerbaijan, and in the Turkish world; by contrast, following Gellner's modernist account it can be inferred that H. Aliyev's Azerbaijanism ideology "is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." It implies cultural homogenization, which is to be achieved through the promotion of standardized public education and literacy within a nation-state.

Hence, due to H. Aliyev's initiatives, Azerbaijani identity has widely been accepted by the people. Still, it must be accepted that 70 years of Soviet national politics has already changed the mind of the people. Moreover, the official propaganda stressing the equality of all citizens of Azerbaijanis regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural differences has gained dominance. Presently, the essence of the idea of "Azerbaijanism" is the realization of an ideal of independent, unitary, and unified Azerbaijan.

So, Elchibey's efforts to define the national identity of Azerbaijanis as Turk failed. The historical evolution of national identity in Azerbaijan has been culminated in the formation of Azerbaijani identity, functioning not only as citizenship identity but also as an ethnic identity for the majority of Azerbaijanis. So, it can be said that H. Aliyev re-institutionalized Azerbaijani identity, which is the Soviet legacy, in his nation-building project. However, while it is valid to use Azerbaijani identity as citizenship identity, conceptually it is wrong to regard "Azerbaijani" identity as ethnic identity since ethnicity refers to "common stock", "myth of origin". In other words, when we talk about ethnic groups, we mean a group of people that is

“ancestrally related” and connected with “kith and kin” relations. Simply because of the fact that the “Azerbaijani” designation has identified Azerbaijani Turks since 1937, it lacks ancient roots. That is why; it is not adequate to substitute the ethnic name “Turk” for the majority of Turkic people with the name of “Azerbaijani”. This situation creates a problem for dominant Turkic people. It is well manifested in public debates where people argue about choosing between “Turk” and “Azerbaijani” as an ethnic identity. Notably, this situation does not create any discomfort for non-Turkic people, as they easily combine their original identity with citizenship identity. For example, they indicate that “I am Azerbaijani, but ethnically I am Lezgin, Talysh, or Kurd.” The same can be applicable for Turkic people in order to avoid confusion. In other words, instead of choosing to be either “Azerbaijani” or “Turk”, it is more valid to say “Azerbaijani Turk”, the designation that merges both national and ethnic identity. So, Azerbaijani identity as a citizenship identity is a supplement, not a substitution to original identities; they do not contradict, rather complement each other.

It might be argued that Azerbaijani identity has a unifying force that binds all with the ideas of statism and patriotism, but it seems more likely that H. Aliyev’s attempt to create a unified Azerbaijani identity failed in the face of all ethnic groups’ cling to their original identity. Indeed, this is probably due to the fact that though H. Aliyev highly contributed to the promotion of the Azerbaijani language to cement the society, he recognized minority rights that have been manifested in the Constitution and other legislation. His national policy was based upon the equality of all, that is to say, not any ethnic group was prioritized, even the majority ethnic group. In short, ethnicity does not provide the basis for national identity.

In this sense, Azerbaijani identity emerges to be a purely political principle, a civic project. It is noteworthy that though it uses some cultural elements of dominant Turkic people, the idea of Turkism is eliminated here. This civic project is largely opposed by the ideologists of Turkism, who condemn it as de-ethnification/ de-Turkification of the national identity. They put forward that the idea of Azerbaijanism must not be devoid of Turkism, as they are complementary rather than contradictory. In this sense, it would not be valid to state that, as Heydar Aliyev alleged, Republic of Azerbaijan is a heir to the ADR, because his doctrine of Azerbaijanism de-

emphasizes the main tenet of the national ideology of ADR - Turkism. One of the reasons for declining the name “Turk” is said to be the disconformity of national minorities with that name. Another reason is that because Turkish is the national language of Turkey, there will be a need to differentiate between Azerbaijani Turkish and Turkey’s Turkish not to confuse them. To this end, H. Aliyev’s concern is not linguistic but political. At the same time, despite H. Aliyev recognized minority rights through the Constitution and legislation, in meetings with members of ethnic communities, he preferred to call them representatives of Azerbaijan. It can be seen as his effort of instilling the idea of union and common citizenship. Hence, we can assume that his nation-building project is a “political myth”, aimed at bridging ethnic divisions to boost the social integration of diverse communities.

Therefore, conceptually it would be more accurate to use the term “people” rather than “nation” for a population that is bounded not by common descent, culture, religion but by allegiances to some set of political principles. As politics depends upon culture and society, I think that in the context of Azerbaijan, the use of the majority’s language as a state language can be evaluated in political terms, rather than cultural, to be able to see the function of language simply as a tool of communication to cement the society. To put it differently, official state language does not function as a cultural component, rather as a political tool to make distinct ethnic groups join the public culture since it is easy to govern internally integrated people. So, we might assume that the concern here is not the language itself, but its function as an instrument.

Ilham Aliyev has been following the national politics of Heydar Aliyev in promoting the doctrine of Azerbaijanism and strengthening the Azerbaijani language as an integrative force. However, the persistence and growing importance of the Russian language in the country threaten the dignity of the national language. As a result, it adversely affects the nationalizing project of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Many nationalists see it as the cultural violence of Russia that aspires to cultural assimilation. They condemn the existence of public Russian-language schools responsible for making the society bi/linguistic and bi/cultural. The instrumentalist approach helps us to understand this situation. In this view, even primordial attachment to the native language cannot be a matter of concern for native speakers.

Instrumentalists posit that many people do not show any emotional relationship to their mother tongue. In certain conditions, they may freely and deliberately decide to adapt their language to another group.

In addition, Ilham Aliyev declared multiculturalism a state policy of Azerbaijan, emphasizing it to be the continuation of Azerbaijanism. By proclaiming multiculturalism, the government publicly affirms and recognizes cultural distinctiveness of minorities, but sets some limits or constrains their development within common institutions. Indeed, though multiculturalism policy is about the “recognition of difference”, that is to say, the promotion of different cultures, in the context of Azerbaijan it is mainly aimed to serve the policy of Azerbaijanism. The cultures of different minorities are presented as part of Azerbaijani culture and evaluated as the richness of the state. In other words, it is about fostering the unity of diversity, rather than furthering societal diversification.

Because the major principle of Azerbaijani state policy is to preserve territorial integrity and security of the country, the implementation of the treaties on the maintenance of minority rights must not challenge this principle. Azerbaijan as a unitary state cannot allow the centrifugal tendencies to threaten the centralized power. The best mechanism for accommodating minority nationalisms is largely accepted to be federalism, which is about decentralization and recognizing self-determination rights of national minorities. Also, Azerbaijan does not encounter with the flow of immigrants, as it is the case with well-off Western countries that seek to achieve immigrant incorporation by employing multiculturalism policies. Thus, it comes out that the policy of multiculturalism of Azerbaijani government is projected to change poor democratic profile of the country for the better in front of the international community, rather than tackling with real national minority questions.

Moreover, multiculturalism policy shapes the national identity. More specifically, multiculturalism and nationality can be reconciled by weakening or thinning the national identity to the extent that it ceases to present a strong ethnic element that would clash with other ethno-cultural identities. This can be an answer to why Azerbaijani government downgrades the Turkishness of the dominant ethnic group. In a similar vein, it seems very likely that by promoting secularism and tolerance, the government wants to abolish any discord that might arise from a clash

between religious and national identities of its citizens. To put it in other words, by diminishing religious component from national identity, the government aims to build up coordination among various ethnic and religious groups and to bring about stability in the country.

Hence, by excluding ethnic and religious components, Azerbaijani national identity is thinned to the degree that it has become inclusive to all ethno-cultural and religious identities. At first sight, two paradoxical ideas - Azerbaijanism and Multiculturalism - the former indicating union, and the latter meaning diversity, can turn out to be complementary and reconciled, if national identity ceases to carry strong ingredients of core ethnic group and act simply as a political identity that requires allegiance to a set of institutions and their underlying principles.

To conclude, in spite of major differences in nation-making policies of all four governments - Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Abulfaz Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev - they shared some common points. That is, all of them pursued an inclusive civic nationhood project by embracing unifying idea of Azerbaijanism and *de jure* recognizing cultural rights of national minorities. Also, they proclaimed their adherence to the principles of democracy and secularism, ensuring the protection of tolerance at the state level and aimed to achieve inter-faith harmony in the Muslim dominant society.

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B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

ounluęu Trk kkenli olan Azerbaycan halkı, farklı dnemlerde farklı isimlerle anılırdı.  ana medeniyetin - İran, Rusya ve Trkiye - kesişme noktasında yer alan Azerbaycan halkı, smrge politikalarından, ideolojilerinden ve kltrel ęelerinden etkilenmiştir. Azerbaycan arazisi, Rusya ile İran arasında 1828’de imzalanan Trkmenay antlaşması sonucunda Aras nehri boyunca ikiye blnd. Bylece iki Azerbaycan - Kuzey (Rus) ve Gney (İran) Azerbaycan ortaya çıktı. O zamandan beri kuzeydeki Azerbaycan halkı, tamamen farklı bir kltrleşme sreci geiren gneydeki etnik kardeşlerinden ayrı yaşamaya başladı. Kuzey Azerbaycan Trkleri (bundan byle sadece Azerbaycan olarak) Rus İmparatorluęu dneminde Kafkas Tatarları veya Mslmanlar, 1937’ye kadar da Trkler olarak adlandırıldı. Sovyet dneminde onlar “Azerbaycanlı” ve dilleri “Azerbaycan dili” olarak sabitlendi. Sovyet yetkilileri, bir *Homo Sovieticus* oluşturma çabasıyla, Azerbaycanlıların ulusal zelliklerini bozmaya ynelik politikalar rettiler. zellikle, Azerbaycanlıların kkenini Midyalılara veya Kafkas Albanlarına baęlayan yeni tarihyazımı, onları Trk kkenlerinden mahrum bırakmayı amalamıştır. Dahası, maksatlı Ruslaştırma politikası kamu hayatının her alanında ncelięi Azerbaycan diline deęil, Rus diline tanımıştır. Ayrıca, ateist bir toplum oluşturmak iin ısrarlı din karşıtı kampanyalar nedeniyle, Azerbaycan halkının ulusal terkibinden dini ierik ıkartılmıştır.

Sovyetler Birlięi’nin sonlarına doęru Azerbaycan halkının ulusal uyanışı, başlıca “tekiler” olan Ruslara ve Ermenilere karşı artan dşmanlık nedeniyle hızlanmaya başladı. Azerbaycan milliyetilięi, komnist rejimin smrge politikalarına ve Ermenilerin toprak taleplerine yanıt olarak şiddetlendi. Bu durum Azerbaycanlıların anayurda - Azerbaycan topraklarına olan derin duygusal baęlılıęında kendini ifade etti. Azerbaycanlılar iin tartışılmaz nemi ile Daęlık Karabaę, anavatanın ayrılmaz bir parçası, dolayısıyla ykselen ulusal duyarlılıęın odak noktasıdır. Daęlık Karabaę’ın

Ermeni işgali Azerbaycan milli kimliđi için feci bir tehdit olarak algılanmıřtır ve bu yüzden ulus inřası hala tamamlanmamıřtır.

Bađımsız Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin ortaya çıkıřından sonra, ulusal kimlik arayıřı iki ana akım ideoloji - Azerbaycancılık ve Türkçölük arasında kamuoyunda tartıřmaya yol açtı. Milliyetçi Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi (AHC) hükümeti döneminde Azerbaycan halkının çođunluđu Türk ve dilleri Türkçe olarak tanımlandı. Azerbaycan kimliđi, ülkedeki tüm etnik grupları kapsayacak řekilde vatandaşlık kimliđi işlevi görecek řekilde tasarlandı. Ancak Haydar Aliyev hükümeti döneminde, kamu hayatının hemen hemen tüm alanlarında hızlı “Azerbaycanlařma” yařandı. Yeni bađımsızlıđına kavuřan ulus-devletin çok ırklı toplumunun parçalanmasını önlemek için ulusal kimliđi ve resmi dili Azerbaycan olarak yeniden tanımladı.

Azerbaycan kimliđi halk tarafından geniř kabul görse de, dođası ile ilgili hala yanlıř anlařılmalar var. Dolayısıyla bu çalıřma, sorunun nedenini tarihsel kökenleri arařtırılarak anlama ihtiyacı ile yapılmaktadır. Bu tezde, ben Azerbaycan'da milli kimliđin ve milliyetçiliđin oluřumunun geliřen sürecini inceleyeceđim. Özellikle, dil politikasına ve ulusal azınlık sorununa özel atıfta bulunarak, ulusal kimliđin farklı siyasi rejimler altında nasıl tanımlandıđı sorusuna ıřık tutacađım. Bu çalıřma Azerbaycan kimliđinin anlamını açıklama geređi hissedilerek yapılmıřtır. Millet, çağdař Azerbaycan siyasetinde temsil edildiđi řekliyle Azerbaycan kimliđinin “kan bađı” yönünü düřürerek aidiyet için çok kapsayıcı, sivil bir çerçeve sađlamaktadır. Bařka bir deyiřle, hükümet, milliyetin etnik yönlerine vurgu yapmaksızın ülkeyi tüm insanlar için bir karřılama yeri olarak sunmaktadır. Arařtırma soruları řunlardır: Azerbaycan'da milli kimliđin dođası nedir? Ulusal kimlik, bir yüzyıl boyunca nasıl geliřti? Ne tür milliyetçilikler - sivil ya da etnik - peřinde kořuldu? Ulusal azınlık sorununu karřılamak için ne tür politikalar geliřtirildi? Etno-kültürel çeřitliliđin Azerbaycan kimliđinin oluřumuna katkıda bulunup bulunmadıđı; ve eđer öyleyse, ne ölçüde ve ne řekilde?

Azerbaycan'da bugüne kadar sadece birkaç çalıřma milli kimlik meselesini inceledi. Bu tezde sunulan argüman, Azerbaycan'daki milliyetçilik çalıřmaları literatüründe sistematik olarak ele alınmamıřtır. Audrey L.

Altstadt gibi bazı tarih bilimcileri, Sovyet döneminde Azerbaycan'ın siyasetini, kültürünü ve kimliğini tartıştı; Tadeusz Swietochowski, yirminci yüzyılın başında ulusal kimlik sorununu tartışan imparatorluk Rusya'sında Azerbaycan tarihi hakkında yazdı; Brenda Shaffer, İran'daki İslam Devrimi döneminden Sovyet parçalanmasına ve Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin başlangıcına kadar Azerbaycan'ın kolektif kimliğindeki eğilimleri inceledi. Azerbaycanlıların kimliklerini nasıl koruduklarını ve bu kimliğin eski Sovyetler Birliği ve İran'da nasıl farklı biçimlere büründüğünü analiz etti. Ayrıca, Azerbaycan'da bağımsızlıktan bu yana milliyetçilik ve milli kimlik meselesi Svante Cornell (2011, 2016), Ceylan Tokluoğlu (2005), Ayça Ergun (2010), Ceyhun Mahmudlu (2014) ve Murad İsmayilov (2012) gibi bir dizi bilim insanı tarafından tartışıldı.

Bununla birlikte, daha önceki hiçbir çalışma Azerbaycan'da bir yüzyıldan fazla bir süreyi kapsayan milli kimliğin evrimini teorik tartışmalarla birleştirerek kapsamlı bir şekilde araştırmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın yeniliği, milliyetçilik ve etnisite teorilerinin yeniden incelenmesi ve Azerbaycan'daki ulusal kimlik sorunları bağlamında uygulanmasıdır. Bu çalışma ulus oluşturma süreci konusunu kavramsal araçlarla analiz ederek aydınlatmaya çalışıyor. Ayrıca, bu tezin özgünlüğü, Azerbaycan'daki ulusal kimlik sorununu, esas olarak ulusal dil ve ulusal azınlık sorununa atıfta bulunarak tartışmasıdır. Bu çalışma farklı hükümetlerin ulusal kimliğin temel bir unsuru olarak ulusal dili nasıl sembolize ettikleri ve Azerbaycan kimliğinin formülasyonunda ulusal azınlık sorununu nasıl kullandıklarına dikkat çekiyor. Bu çalışmada Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti (ADR) döneminin ve Sovyet dönemi ulusal politikalarının bağımsızlık sonrası dönemde ulus inşa sürecine etkileri araştırılmış. Başka bir deyişle, bağımsız Azerbaycan'da kimlik oluşturma sürecinin bağımsızlık öncesi dönemden alınan fikir ve değerlerin etkisi altında olduğu tartışılmış. Geçmişin mirası, Azerbaycan ve Türkçülük ideologlarının çelişkili görüşleri arasındaki ulusal kimliğin özüne ilişkin siyasi söylemde iyi bir şekilde örneklenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bağımsız Azerbaycan'da ulusal kimlik inşasının yeniden müzakere sürecini tam olarak algılayabilmek için, ulus fikrinin ortaya çıkmaya başladığı yirminci yüzyılın

başından itibaren onun evriminin izini sürmek mantıklıydı. Böylelikle bu tez sistematik bir çalışma sunarak okuyucuların Azerbaycan'daki milli kimlik ve millileştirme sorununun özünü tam olarak anlamasını sağlar.

Bu tez, konuyu incelemek için bir dizi veri seti kullanır. Veriler, ilk elden kitaplar, anılar, o sırada yayınlanan gazete makaleleri gibi birincil kaynakları ve ayrıca ulusal nüfus sayımı, hükümet kanunları ve kararnameleri, devlet politikaları hakkında haberler ve büyük ölçüde resmi web sitelerinden erişilebilen kamusal söylemler gibi birincil kaynakları içerir. Bu da zamanla değişimi tespit etmeme olanak tanıdı. Ayrıca, Azerbaycan'ın milli kimliği, milli dili ve azınlık sorunuyla ilgili ikincil kitaplar, makaleler, raporlar toplandı. Tüm bu veriler dikkatlice okundu ve analiz edildi.

Bu tez sekiz bölüme ayrılmıştır. Giriş bölümünden sonra, Bölüm 2, ulus ve milliyetçiliğin ne olduğu ve ne zaman ortaya çıktığı konusunda bir yanıt bulmaya çalışırken ulus ve milliyetçilik kavramının ayrıntılı bir analizini sunmaktadır. Terminolojik karmaşıklığı açıklığa kavuşturmaya, yani ulus kavramını devletten, halktan, etnik gruptan ayırmaya, etnik / sivil ikilemi anlamaya, milliyetçiliği vatanseverlikten ayırmaya çalışır. Bölüm 3, 20. yüzyılın başında Azerbaycan'da ulus fikrinin ortaya çıkışına ve Çarlık Rusya'sına karşı ulusal hareketin yükselişine odaklanmaktadır. Ulusal aydınların ulusal bilinci güçlendirmedeki rolünü ve ilk ulus devletin - Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'nin (ADR) oluşumuyla sonuçlanan ulusal bağımsızlık mücadelesini tartışıyor. Burada esas odak noktası ADR hükümetinin ulus oluşumunda dil ve milli azınlık politikalarıdır. Bölüm 4, Sovyet Azerbaycan'ında ulus inşası süreçlerini anlamak ve daha sonra bağımsızlık sonrası dönemdeki mirasını görmek için Sovyet milliyet politikalarını araştırıyor. Bölüm 5, Ebulfez Elçibey yönetimi altında ulus yapma politikalarını incelemektedir. Özellikle Türkçülük, dil politikası ve ülkenin etnik azınlıklarına ilişkin politikası hakkındaki görüşlerine odaklanıyorum. Bölüm 6, yurttaşlığa dayalı bir ulus devlet yaratma çabasıyla "Azerbaycancılığı" resmi ideoloji olarak tanıtan Haydar Aliyev dönemine odaklanıyor. Burada Haydar Aliyev'in dil politikasını ve ulusal azınlık politikasını analiz ediyorum. Bölüm 7, Haydar Aliyev'in ulus kurma

politikalarına sadık kalan İlham Aliyev'in ulusal politikasını incelemektedir. Ayrıca bu bölüm İlham Aliyev'in çokkültürlülük politikasını ve ülkeyi "hoşgörü ülkesi" olarak tanıtmalarını incelemektedir. Sonuç bölümünde, dört hükümetin - Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Abulfaz Elçibey, Haydar Aliyev ve İlham Aliyev'in - ulus kurma politikalarının karşılaştırmalı olarak kısa bir teorik analizi sunulmaktadır.

Teorik ve Kavramsal Çerçeve

1970'lerden beri, çeşitli, keskin zıt analizlerle ifade edilmesine rağmen, milliyet konusunda bilimsel çalışmalar artmaktadır. Bu, artan küreselleşme ve kozmopolitlik eğilimler karşısında ulusların ve milliyetçiliğin hala önemli olduğu anlamına gelir. Bu anlamda, Craig Calhoun'un "Milletler Önemlidir" adlı çalışmasında öne sürdüğü, etik evrenselliği uluslar ve ulusal kimlikler için ideal dünyada bir yer bulamayan liberal kozmopolitlerin iddialarının aksine, gelişen modern bir toplum için güçlü bir ulusal temel olduğu argümanı aydınlatıcıdır. Calhoun "ulus ötesi" bir döneme girdiğimize dair hiçbir kanıt bulamıyor. Modern çağ kadar eski olan ve çoğu zaman egemen gruplara fayda sağlayan küreselleşme, aslında eşitlik ve küresel refahın daha adil dağılımını gerektiren milliyetçi hareketleri destekleyebilir.

Milliyet sorununa yönelik farklı yaklaşımların çoğalması, ulusların kaleydoskopik olduğunu, yani durağan olmadıklarını ve zaman içinde değişken olduklarını göstermektedir. Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, Connor Walker, Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm, John Armstrong, John Breuilly, Charles Tilly, Miroslav Hroch, Michael Hechter, Bernard Yack, David Miller ve diğerleri çalışmalarıyla milletler ve milliyetçilik alanına oldukça yüksek değerli katkılarda bulunmuşlardır. Milliyetçilik teorileri içinde orijinal tartışmanın merkezinde duran beş teorik yaklaşım veya paradigma vardır: Primordializm (İlkelcilik), Enstrumentalizm (Araçsalcılık), Modernizm (Çağcılık), Perennializm (Daimicilik) ve Etnosembolizm.

İlkelcilik yaklaşımı 1950’lerde bir bireyin ilkel bağları ve duyguları kavramını milliyetçilik söylemine dahil eden Clifford Geertz ve Edward Shils tarafından geliştirildi. Geertz’e göre, ilkel bir bağlanma ile kastedilen birisi, “givens” (verilenler) den veya daha doğrusu, insanların sosyal varoluşunun varsayılan verilenlerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. “Givenness” (Verimlilik), dolaysız yakınlık ve akrabalık bağlantısı olmakla beraber aynı zamanda belirli bir topluluk, din ve kültürde doğmaktır. Geertz, kan, dil, ırk, inançlar, tavırlar ve geleneklerin benzerliklerinin insanlar tarafından tanımlanamaz ve bazen kendi içlerinde baskın olarak görüldüğünü savunuyor. İlkel bağların gücü ve biçimi, kişiden kişiye, toplumdan topluma, zaman zaman farklılık gösterebilir, ancak Geertz’in de belirttiği gibi, her bireyin içinde, her toplumda ve her zaman belirli bağlar vardır ki, bu sosyal etkileşimden ziyade, doğal duygudan ve neredeyse ruhsal yakınlıktan anlaşılır. Bunlar insan kişiliğinin rasyonel olmayan temelleridir. Buna ek olarak, Shils’e göre, ulusların kökeni insan ilkeliliğidir: insanın birincil hayat verenlere - aileye ve toprağa bağlılığı: “Milletler, insanların köken ve bölgesel konumun ilkel gerçeklerine duyarlılığı nedeniyle vardır.” Ayrıca, ilkelcilik içinde Pierre Van den Berghe tarafından geliştirilen sosyobiolojik bir yaklaşım vardır. Berghe, bireyin kendi topluluğuna ilkel bağlılığının temelini oluşturan biyolojik-genetik kodların rolünü belirtir. Bu yaklaşım, etnik grupların ve ırkların, insanların temel genetik üreme teşviklerine ve gen havuzlarını artırmak için akrabalık seçimi ve “kapsayıcı uygunluk” olarak da adlandırılan “nepotizm” taktiklerini kullanmalarına kadar izlenebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, ilkellik, belirli bir topluluğun taraftarları üzerinde anlatılamaz ve zorlayıcı bir güç olarak hareket eder. Bireyler, kişisel seçimlerinin ötesinde hareket eden tarif edilemez bir bağlılıkla diğer üyelerine, akrabalarına ve komşusuna bağlanır. Başka bir deyişle, akrabalık ilişkileri nedeniyle ortaya çıkabilecek tutkular, doğal duygular, herhangi bir rasyonel seçimden önce gelir ve bu, rasyonel seçim teorisine tam bir tezat oluşturur.

Fakat, ilkelcilik, “kültürel verilenler”e dair yarı-statik bakış açısı nedeniyle büyük ölçüde eleştirilir. Guibernau’nun dediği gibi, ilkelcilik dilin yanı sıra gelenek ve dinin de dönüşüme tabi olduğunu görmezden geliyor gibi

görünüyor. Hatta, ırk tanımlarının ve algılarının değişkenliğinin bir sonucu olarak ırk bile değişebilir. İkelcilğe karşı koyulan esas olarak araçsalcı yaklaşımdır. Kültürün özcü görüşünün aksine, araçsalcılar kültürleri son derece esnek ve elit manipölasyona karşı savunmasız olarak görürler. Bunu yaparak, araçsalcılar ilkel bağların etkisizliğini veya zorlayıcılığını ihmal ederler, bunun yerine, onları topluluk üyelerinin yararına, özellikle de kıt kaynakları edinme konusundaki rekabetlerinde elitlerin yararına, araçsal veya işlevsel olarak görürler. Paul Brass, etnik kimliğin yükselişi ve milliyetçiliğe dönüşmesinde kaçınılmaz bir şey olmadığını, bunun yerine kültürel farklılıkların insanlar arasındaki siyasi farklılaşma için temellere dönüştürülmesinin yalnızca belirli koşullar altında ortaya çıktığını savunuyor. Dolayısıyla, etnisite ve milliyetçilik “verily” değil, sosyal ve politik yapılarıdır. Brass, etnisiteyi, merkezileşen devletlerin liderliği ile etnik gruplardan seçkinler arasındaki belirli etkileşim türleri ile içsel olarak ilişkili bir değişken olarak görür. Dolayısıyla, araçsalcı yaklaşım ırk, köken ve hatta dil gibi iddia edilen rolleri reddeder. Bu görüşe göre, anadile ilkel bağlanma bile anadili konuşanlar için bir endişe konusu olamaz. Araçsalcılar, birçok insanın anadillerine duyarlılık göstermediğini varsayar; dillerinin adını bile bilmiyorlar. Bazı durumlarda, çeşitli dil gruplarının üyeleri, kendi dillerini başka bir grubun diline uyarlamaya karar verebilirler. Dillerini değiştirmeye ve çocuklarını başka bir dilde büyötmeye de karar verebilirler. Daha genel olarak, Paul Brass’ın dediğı gibi, çoğı insan ana dilini düşünmez ve bu konuda hiçbir şey hissetmez. Barth, farklı kültürlere sahip toplumlara sınırları iyi belirlenmiş, dolayısıyla diğler gruplarla herhangi bir etkileşimi ve değiştirebilirliği olmayan ayrı birimler olarak davranmakla ikelcilği eleştirir. Ona göre kültürel değler bir etnik gruba tanımlayıcı bir anlam vermez. Aksine kültür, etnik grubun çevresindeki toplumla etkileşimi yoluyla üretilir ve kullanılır. Barth, etnik yapıları, statik kültürel varlıklar olarak değil, diğler farklı gruplarla etkileşime giren örgötsel birimler olarak tanımlar. Başka bir deyişle, bir etnik grup, grup üyelerinin ortak değleriyle değil, diğleriyle olan karşılıklı ilişkileriyle tanımlanmalıdır. Benzer şekilde, bir başka araçsalcı Michael Banton, etnik grupların isimlerini bile sosyal, ekonomik ve politik

faidalarına göre deęerlendirdiklerini savunuyor. Yani insanlar gerçekte oldukları için deęil, talep ettikleri şey için bir isim verirler. Bu yorumda etnik gruplar siyasi çıkar grupları olarak ortaya çıkar. “Rasyonel seçim teorisi”ni geliřtiren Michael Banton ve Michael Hechter, ekonomik avantajlarını ve güvenliklerini artırmak için etnik grupların üyeleri için esasen rasyonel bir seçim olduęu için bireysel tercihlerin ihmal edilmemesi gerektięini savunuyorlar. Hechter’e göre, bireylerin benimseyeceęi eylem rotası rasyonel bir şekilde, yani bir maliyet ve fayda hesaplamasına göre seçilir.

Sonuç olarak, ilkelci/araçsalci ikileminin keyfi olduęunu, yani her iki açıklamanın da etnisite ve milleti anlamada önemli olduęunu düşünüyorum. Bu anlamda, Lange ve Westin, hem ilkel hem de araçsal yaklaşımların “insan yaşamının doğası gereęi tamamlayıcı yönlerinin gereksiz kutuplaşmasının bir örneęi” olduęunun altını çiziyor. Onları bu kadar çeliřkili kılan şey, biri bunu ve bu yönü aşırı vurgularken, dięerinin onları önemsememesi ve dięer yönlere yoğunlaşmasıdır. Bu durum, farklı toplulukları dikkate almanın bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan çeřitli bakış açılarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Yani, bir topluluk için doğru gibi görünen şey başka bir topluluk için doğru olmayabilir.

Modernist yaklaşım, ulusların, milliyetçilięin, ulus-devletlerin yalnızca moderniteyle ilgili olduęunu, yani daha önce buna benzer hiçbir şeyin olmadıęını savunur. Modernistler, ulusların ortaya çıkışını genellikle Fransız devriminin yeni bir ulusun doğuşunu getirdięi 1790 sonrası dönemi izler. Modernist yaklaşımçı Ernest Gellner’in hesabına göre, modernite ve milliyetçilik özünde ilişkilidir. Gellner’in milliyetçilięi toplumları modernleřtiren veya sanayileřtiren bir özellik olarak görmesi dikkate deęerdir. Gellner, ulusu modernitenin nesnel ve temel bir bileřeni olarak görüyor. Ona göre milliyetçilięin ürünü olan millettir, tersi deęil. Milliyetçilik tanımı, bir ulus-devlet içinde kültürel homojenleřmeyi ima eder: “Milliyetçilik, öncelikle politik ve ulusal birimin uyumlu olması gerektięini savunan politik bir ilkedir.” Kültürel homojenleřtirme, standartlařtırılmış halk eęitiminin ve okuryazarlıęın teřvik edilmesi yoluyla saęlanacak ve bu da devlete, kontrol ettięi topraklar üzerindeki nüfuz etme kapasitesini pekiřtirmek için gerekli

altyapıyı sağlayacaktır. Modern çağda insan, bir inanca değil, ulus-devlete sadık hale gelir. Modern insan artık dindar değil, okuryazar bir adamdır. Bu nedenle Gellner, ulus kavramında “kültürel veriler” i, her türlü ilkel bağları ve duyguları göz ardı eder. Başka bir deyişle, artık anadil değil, bireyleri birbirine bağlayan ve resmi eğitim sistemi aracılığıyla yayılan araçsal bir iletişim aracı olarak devlet dilidir. Elbette, Gellner’in teorisi modernizmin ana ilkelerini anlamada çok yardımcıdır ve gerçek dünyadaki birçok modern ülke için doğrudur, ancak herhangi bir ulusal ülkede güçlü dayanışma gösterebilen yurttaşların milliyetçi duygularını körükleyebilecek milliyetçiliği kavramakta yetersiz kalır. John Breuilly için milliyetçilik ideal olarak modern ve politik bir hareket olarak görülüyor; ve siyaset, modern dünyada devletin kontrolü ile ilgilidir. Dolayısıyla Breuilly milliyetçiliği bu denetimi ele geçirmek ve elinde tutmak için bir hareket olarak sunuyor. Breuilly’nin belirttiği gibi: milliyetçi bir argüman, üç iddia üzerine inşa edilmiş bir politik doktrindir: 1) Belirgin ve özgün bir karaktere sahip bir ulus vardır; 2) Bu milletin çıkarları ve değerleri diğer tüm çıkar ve değerlerin önüne geçer; 3) Ulus mümkün olduğu kadar bağımsız olmalıdır. Bu genellikle en azından siyasi egemenliğe sahip olmayı gerektirir.

Connor Walker, diğer modernistler gibi, ulusların milliyetçilik çağından önce var olamayacağına ve ikincisinin oldukça yeni bir olgu olduğuna inanıyordu. Connor, modernleşme sürecine, özellikle 1789’dan itibaren, halkları kendi kendini yönetme ve bağımsızlık taleplerini artırarak giderek daha fazla temasa geçiren kitle iletişim araçlarının rolüne işaret ediyor. Bununla birlikte, milliyetçiliğin özünde yatan etnik özü tanımlayarak, etnonasyonalizm terimini geliştirdi ve tek boyutlu kalkınma görüşü ve devlet önderliğindeki “ulus inşası” na olan sağlam inancıyla modernleşme paradigmasını zarif bir şekilde bozdu. Connor’a göre milliyetçilik, her şeyden önce bir etno-ulus sevgisidir ve bu nedenle, bölgesel devlete sadakat olan vatanseverliğin aksine asla kolektif mallar için rasyonel bir arayış olamaz.

Modernizme esas olarak daimicilik (perennializm) karşı çıktı. Çelişkinin ana noktasını görmek için, modernistlerin ulusların oluşumunu modernitenin yükselişine tarihlendirirken, daimiciler onları kalıcı, köklü,

yüzyıllık, hatta bin yıllık fenomenler olarak gördüklerini ve kesinlikle moderniteden önce geldiğini belirtmek gerekir. Daimicilik, bazı ulusların orta çağlarda ve hatta antik çağlarda bulunduğu ve daha sonra yeniden hayata döndürüldüğü inancıdır. Daimicilik ile ilkelcilik birbirine karıştırılabilir, ancak Anthony Smith'in bizi bu ayrımı sürdürmemiz gerektiği konusunda uyarıyor. Çünkü daimiciler ulusları doğal, organik veya ilkel olarak görmek zorunda değildir; aslında, bu tür tarih dışı hesapları reddedebilirler ve çoğu zaman da reddederler.

Anthony Smith'e göre, modernist, daimi ve ilkelci etnisite ve milliyetçilik paradigmalarının aksine, tarihsel etno-sembolizm, analizin odağını tamamen dış politik ve ekonomik veya sosyobiolojik faktörlerden uzaklaştırır ve özellikle etnisitelerin sürekliliğinde, ulusların oluşumu ve milliyetçiliğin etkisinde öznel unsurlara odaklanır. Bu, “nesnel” faktörleri verili kabul ettiği veya onları analizin kapsamından dışladığı anlamına gelmez; sadece hafızanın öznel unsurları, değer, duygu, mit ve sembol öğelerine daha fazla ağırlık verdiğini ve bu nedenle etnisite ve milliyetçiliğin “iç dünyalarına” girip anlamaya çalıştığını söylüyor. Bu nedenle, Smith'in etno-sembolik yaklaşımı, önceki ve çoğu zaman modern öncesi, etnik bağların ve etnilerin, sonraki ulusları ve milliyetçilikleri etkileme şekline odaklandı ve bazı durumlarda, sonraki uluslar ve milliyetçiliklerin temelini oluşturdu. Uluslar kısmen siyasi kurumlar tarafından şekillendirilmiş olsalar da, uzun vadede, esas olarak öznel boyutlara sahip bir ulusal kimlik duygusunun kritik önemi nedeniyle, bir dayanışma topluluğu oluşturmak için etno-kültürel kaynaklara ihtiyaç duyarlar. Ulusların basitçe elit projeler olarak görülememesinin nedeni de budur.

İçerik Özeti

XX yüzyılın başlarında Azerbaycan milli entelektüelleri, ulusal öz tanımlamanın güçlendirilmesinde ve ulusun oluşumunda çok önemli bir rol oynadılar. Dini kimliği, ortak kökler üzerine inşa edilmiş ulusal kimliğe dönüştürmede başarılı oldular. 1918 yılı 28 Mayıs'da Azerbaycan halkının ilk

milli devleti Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyetini (ADR) kurdular. arlık Rusyası'nın Mslman tebaalarını resmi olarak "Trk" adlandırdılar. ADR yneticileri, milli kimlięin temel bir unsuru olarak Trk dilinin geliřimine byk nem verdiler. Dolayısıyla millileřtirme projesinin ekirdek ulusu glendirmeye ynelik olduęu sylenebilir. Ancak ADR hkmetinin ulus kurma politikasını Trk olmayan toplulukları dıřlamadıęı iin etnik milliyetilik olarak nitelendirmek yanlıř olur. Aksine, ulusal sekinler, toplumun btnlęn saęlamak iin *jus soli* ilkesine dayalı ortak vatandaşlık vererek, tm etnik, dini azınlıkları, solcular ve İslamcılar gibi dięer siyasi grupları kapsayacak řekilde kapsayıcı Azerbaycanlı kimlięini teřvik ettiler. Aynı zamanda gen devleti demokratik ilkeler temelinde kurdular. Aslında Azerbaycan'ın Mslman Doęu'daki ilk demokratik devlet olduęunu sylemek onlar iin qururvericiydi. Bu nedenle, ADR elitlerinin kapsayıcılık, liberalizm, gnlllk ve vatanseverlięi ieren sivil ulus olma peřinde olduklarını iddia etmek mantıklıdır.

Cumhuriyetin XX. yzyılda yerel tarihin en alkantılı dneminde faaliyet gstermesi dikkat ekiciydi. Blgede, Rusya'daki i savařlar, komnist darbeler ve Birinci Dnya Savařı'nın etkileriyle řiddetlenen Ermenistan ile etnik atıřmalar yařanıyordu. Sonu olarak, yeni doęmuř baęımsız lke, kendisini beřięinde ezen iřgalci Bolřevik glere boyun eęmek zorunda kaldı. Azerbaycan milliyetilięinin tarihsel evrimi durduruldu. Bylece, 28 Nisan 1920'de, ADR'nin varlıęı sona erdi ve yerinde Azerbaycan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti (Azerbaycan SSR) kuruldu. Laik demokratik bir devlet olarak ADR, 1991'de baęımsız Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması iin bir referans noktası olacaktır.

Yetmiř yıllık Sovyet ynetimi, insanların yařamlarında ve anılarında derin izler bıraktı. Sovyet ulus yapıcıları byk lde Azerbaycanlıların milli niteliklerini ve dolayısıyla milli kimlik algılarını řekillendirmeyi bařardılar. Daha spesifik olarak, ulusal kimlięin etnik ve dini bileřenlerini ortadan kaldırdılar; semboller, mitler, deęerler ve gelenekleri, Marksist-Leninist fikir sistemiyle uyumlu olacak řekilde biimlendirdiler. Ayrıca, Rus dilinin ve kltrnn etkisi, bugne kadar devam eden durum olarak toplumu iki yapılı

hale getirdi. Dolayısıyla, araçsalcı yaklaşımı takiben, kültürlerin son derece esnek ve elit manipölasyona karşı savunmasız olduđu tartışılabilir. Tüm bu Sovyet mirasını ortadan kaldırmak ve eski kökleri üzerine bir ulus inşa etmek için, Ebulföz Elçibey hükümeti, Sovyet geçmişinden tamamen kopmayı amaçlayan tam bir millileştirme (Türkleştirme) projesini kullandı. Bu sayede Elçibey, Türkçölük fikrini tercih eden Azerbaycan halkının desteğini aldı. Smith'in etno-sembolik yaklaşımını takiben, Azerbaycan örneğinde “önceki ve çođu zaman modern öncesi etnik bağlar ve etniler, sonraki milletleri ve milliyetçilikleri etkiledi ve bazı durumlarda bunun temelini oluşturdu” demek yanlış olmayacaktır.

7 Haziran 1992'de Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri yapıldı, Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi (AHC) lideri Ebulföz Elçibey seçimleri kazandı ve ülkenin ikinci cumhurbaşkanı oldu. Oyların yüzde 59,4'ünü aldı ve bağımsızlıktan sonra ilk ulusal demokratik hükümeti kurdu. Elçibey'in ulusal projesi, ulusu etnik Türk kökenleri üzerine inşa etmek için tasarlandı. Onun nihai hedefi, Mehmet Emin Resulzade'nin fikirlerini hayata geçirmek ve bu yolda Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün yöntemlerini kullanmaktı. Elçibey Musavatçılığın üç ana çizgisini - Türkçölük, Modernizm ve İslamcılığı kucaklayarak, bu yeni ulus-devleti ADR'nin mirasçısı yaptı. Ek olarak, Elçibey siyasi arenaya yeni bir hedef getirdi - bütönlük fikri. Elçibey'in büyük ideali, Azerbaycan'ın iki parçasını - Sovyet yönetiminden bağımsız hale gelen kuzey bölümü ile hala İran topraklarının bir parçası olan güney bölümü - birleştirerek bir Bütö Azerbaycan inşa etmektir. Elçibey “Bütö Azerbaycan Yolunda” adlı kitabında, birleşik Azerbaycan projesi ile ilgili tüm görüşlerini, isteklerini ve hedeflerini yazmaktadır. Bu kitapta anayurdunun Bütö Azerbaycan olduğunu anlatıyor, güneyin özgürlüğünü nasıl sağlayacağını gündemini belirliyor ve bu yolda kendisine asker diyor.

Elçibey, demokratik, laik, modern ve Türkçü devlet kurması nedeniyle Atatürk'e çok değer veriyordu. Bu değerler ışığında Elçibey, “Şimdi Azerbaycan'da ikinci demokratik Türk devletini kendi bilinci, dili ve kültürü ile inşa etmek istiyoruz” dedi. Ona göre Azerbaycan halkı, bütö bir sistemi oluşturan bu üç hattın birliğine dayalı olarak topraklarında birleşik bir

Azerbaycan devleti kurmalıdır. Bu devlet, hukukun üstünlüğü ile yönetilen medeni, laik, demokratik bir devlet olmalıdır. Gerçekten de Elçibey, modern dünyadaki herhangi bir siyasi rejime demokrasiyi tercih etti. Ona göre modernitenin en önemli değerlerinden biri olan demokrasi İsveç, Norveç, Hollanda gibi ülkelerde uygulandığı için bu ülkelerdeki insanlar daha iyi koşullarda yaşıyorlar. Böylece, o zaman demokrasi yolunu izlemenin gerekli olduğu sonucuna vardı.

Bu noktada Elçibey'in milliyetçiliği demokrasiyle harmanlama konusunda çok başarılı olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Diğer bir deyişle, Elçibey sadece milliyetçi değil, kendini gururla adlandırdığı şekliyle “milliyetçi demokrat” idi. “Demokrasi, ulusal birliğe ve ulusal bütünlüğe dayanır. Azerbaycan Türklerinin milli bütünlüğü ve milli ruhu milli hareketin temelinde yer alırsa, Azerbaycan’da demokrasi kurulur, yani demokrasi ancak milli ruh temelinde olabilir.” Elçibey, Türkçülük fikrinin demokrasiyi engelleyen şovenist ve ırkçı bir çizgi almayacağını, çünkü çok partili rejim ve özgürlükler yolunda hukukun üstünlüğünün bu tehlikeyi ortadan kaldıracağını düşünüyordu.

Elçibey’e göre, Azerbaycan’ın güneyindeki ulusal kurtuluş hareketlerini tam olarak desteklediğinde, asıl kaygısı yurttaşlarının İran’daki anti-demokratik rejimin pençelerinden kurtuluşuydu. İran yönetici çevrelerinin, devleti geçmişin yöntemleriyle, şiddet ve diktatörlükle yönetmenin sona erdiğini anlamaları gerektiğini belirtti. Ülke modern demokrasiye adapte edilmelidir. Aksi takdirde büyük çelişkiler ortaya çıkar diyordu. Elçibey, Azerbaycan’ın kuzeyinin bağımsızlığını kazandığını ve dünyanın özgür ülkeleri arasına katıldığını belirtti. Bununla birlikte, 30 milyondan fazla Türk’ün yaşadığı Güney olarak adlandırılan Azerbaycan’ın büyük bir kısmı halen İran İmparatorluğu’nun kontrolünde, parçalanmış, vilayetlere bölünmüş, milli ve manevi hazineleri yağmalanmış, milletin aydınları ve savaşçıları hapsedilmiş ve öldürülmüş, ulusal gelenekleri ve ana dilleri yasaklanmıştır. Bu anlamda şunları söyledi: “Ben bir aktivistim. Ben her zaman insan haklarını korurum. Güney Azerbaycan’da yaşayan 30 milyon Türk’ün insan haklarının korunmasını talep ediyorum. Onlar için bir okul,

kültürel özgürlükler ve kültürel özerklik istiyoruz.” Bu noktada ilkelci paradigma, onun “Bütün Azerbaycan” idealini anlamamıza yardımcı oluyor. Ortak bölgecilik, soy ve geleneğe atıfta bulunarak, Elçibey’in Güney Azerbaycan’daki akrabalarına ilişkin “kolektif özbilince” (Shils’in terimi) sahip olduğu açıkça ortaya çıkıyor.

Dil, genel olarak ulusal kimliğin temel bir bileşeni olarak kabul edilir ve bu nedenle ulusun inşasında önemli bir rol oynar. Yerel dillerin Sovyet sonrası seçkinler tarafından desteklenmesi, ulus inşa projelerinde genellikle etnileştirme sürecinin ana ilkesi olarak görülmektedir. Bu, yerel dillerin Sovyet dönemindeki daha aşağı ve saygısız konumuna bir tepki olarak görülmelidir. Nitekim Azerbaycan halkının Türkleştirilmesi Elçibey hükümetinin dil politikaları ile daha da yoğunlaştırılmıştır. Elçibey, başkanlığının en başından itibaren kamusal yaşamın her alanında ana dilin kullanılmasını ve diğer tüm dillerin yabancı dil olarak ele alınmasını talep etti. Aslında, cumhurbaşkanlığı görevi Elçibey’e ideallerini gerçekleştirmesi için büyük bir fırsat verdi. Böylece Elçibey, Azerbaycan halkının milli-ahlaki değerlerini eski haline getirmek için kolları sıvadı. 1937’de Stalin’in yasakladığı ve yerine “Azerbaycan dili” adını verdiği “Türk dili” adını iade etmeye çalıştı. Buna karşı Elçibey, Azerbaycan dili diye bir şey olmadığını, dilin adının sadece Türk dili olduğunu savundu. Aynı şekilde milleti de “Azerbaycanlı” olarak değil, “Azerbaycan Türkü” olarak tanımladı.

Böylelikle Elçibey’in asırlık Rus imparatorluk siyasetini engellemek için “Azerbaycan dili” adını büyük ölçüde reddettiği ortaya çıkıyor. Bu anlamda Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti’nin (ADR) Türk değerleri üzerine inşa edilen ulusal politikalarını çok takdir etti. 1918 yılında ADR kurulduğunda halkın adının ve dilinin kendisine iade edildiğinin altını çizdi. Bu bağlamda Özdemir, Elçibey için bir ülkenin halkını genel bir isim (Azerbaycan) altında toplamanın bir ölçüde faydalı olabileceği sonucuna varıyor. Azerbaycancılık ilkesini bu anlamda gerekli gördü. Bunun devletçilik ilkesi açısından mantıklı bir yol olduğunu, ancak ulusal çıkarlar açısından ciddi bir tehlike oluşturabileceğini vurguladı. Başka bir deyişle, coğrafi isme dayalı bir ulusal tanımlı onaylamadı. Elçibey’in böyle bir etnik-kültürel ulusal

kimlik algısı ifadesini 22 Aralık 1992 tarihli parlamento kararında, “Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Devlet Diline Dair Kanun” un cumhuriyetin resmî dilini “Türk dili” isimlendirmek suretiyle bulmuştur. Bu konuda Elçibey, herhangi bir kamusal tartışmaya karşı çıktığı ve bir dilin adının siyaset değil bilim meselesi olduğunu iddia ettiği için çok kararlı görünüyordu. Şimdi, Elçibey’in ulus projesi engellenmemiş olsaydı, çoğunluğun etnik kimliğini kuvvetli bir şekilde Türk olarak belirleyen, anadili sevgisi ve saygısı güçlü olan bir ulus oluşumuyla sonuçlanacağını düşünebilirdik. Bu, Rus dilinin prestijli statüsüne son verecek ve böylece Azerbaycan toplumunun dilsel/kültürel ikili doğasının nihai olarak ortadan kaldırılmasına yol açacaktı.

Yine de Elçibey, bir Türk milliyetçisi olmasına rağmen, Azerbaycan’daki etnik azınlıkların kültürel haklarını geliştiren kurumların gelişmesine büyük katkı sağlamıştır. Cornell’e göre, asıl mesele, onları tam olarak öyle - azınlıklar olarak görmesi - ve dolayısıyla tanım gereği çoğunluk nüfusun üyeleri olarak görmemesidir. Ancak toplumda herhangi bir ayrımcılık niyetinde olmadığı açıklığa kavuşturulmalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, Elçibey Türk olmayan azınlık üzerinde Türk çoğunluğa üstünlük tanımadı. Aksine, sosyal eşitlik ve sosyal adalet aradı. Nitekim 1992 Yasasının 3. Maddesi ile Elçibey, etnik azınlıklara kendi dillerinde eğitim alma hakkını garanti altına aldı. Ayrıca, 16 Eylül 1992’de “Hakların ve Özgürlüklerin Korunması ve Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti’nde Yaşayan Milli Azınlıkların, Sayısal Olarak Küçük Halkların ve Etnik Grupların Dillerinin ve Kültürlerinin Teşvik Edilmesi İçin Devlet Desteğine Dair” bir kararname çıkardı. Bu devlet belgesinde, Bakanlar Kurulu, Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Bakanlıkları, Bilimler Akademisi ve yerel yürütme gücü organları, ulusal azınlıkların, halkların ve etnik grupların sosyo-kültürel sorunlarını ele alma, onların maddi ve manevi kültürlerini, dil, din, gelenek ve göreneklerini korumakla görevlendirildi.

Elçibey’in ulusal azınlık sorununa sadece ulusal bir mesele olarak değil, aynı zamanda tamamen sosyal bir mesele olarak yaklaştığı belirtilmelidir. “Küçük uluslara kültürel haklar verdik. Kürt, Talış, Lezgi vb. dillerde gazeteler çıkardık. O gazetelere para ayırdık.” Ayrıca, 1993 yılının başında Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Lezgi, Udi, Kürt, Talış ve diğer dillerdeki

birinci sınıflar için hızlı bir şekilde kitaplar hazırladı ve sundu. Elçibey, Eski Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki hiçbir devletin bunu yapmadığını vurguladı. Bunu ne Rusya, ne Ukrayna, ne Letonya, ne Litvanya ne de Estonya yaptı. Bu, uluslar ve halklar arasındaki sosyal ilişkilerin en önemli faktörlerinden biridir. Ona göre toplumda küçük ve büyük ulusal duygular olmuş olabilir. İnsanların birbirine saldırmalarını önlemek ve uyum içinde olmak için bu eşitsizliği aşmaya çalıştıklarını ve bunun bir sosyal adalet koşulu olduğunu söyledi. Bunlar göz önüne alındığında Elçibey'in milliyetçiliğinin Azerbaycan'da yaşayan herhangi bir azınlık etnik grubu hedef almadığı, aksine, azınlık üyelerinin özel hakları hak eden eşit vatandaşlar olarak gördüğü açıklığa kavuşmuş oluyor. Asıl mesele şu ki, Elçibey yerel etnik gruplardan ziyade tarihsel olarak Azerbaycan Türkleri ile düşmanlığı olan Rus şovenizmini, İran şovenizmini ve Ermenileri hedef aldı.

Ayrıca Elçibey, ülkede yaşayan tüm vatandaşların eşit haklara ve yasalara sahip olmasının demokrasinin bir gereği olduğunu belirtti. Azınlıklara uygulanacak ikinci sınıf muamelenin demokrasiden uzaklaşmak ve modern dünyanın taleplerine karşı hareket etmek olacağını söyledi. Elçibey'in temel amacı, ulusal azınlıklar ve farklı dinlerden topluluklar arasında hoşgörü ilişkiler kurmanın yanı sıra, özgür basının varlığı, çok sayıda siyasi partinin varlığı ve bağımsız mahkemelerin oluşturulmasıydı. "Kohn ikilemi" göz önüne alındığında, Elçibey'in milliyetçiliğini, azınlık gruplarının dışlanmasını gerektiren "etnik milliyetçilik" olarak tanımlamak yanlış olur; daha ziyade, onu azınlık gruplarının dahil edilmesini gerektiren sivil milliyetçilik olarak görmek daha doğru olacaktır. Daha spesifik olarak, Elçibey etno-kültürel grupların üyelerini ulusun tam üyeleri olarak kabul etti, yani üyeliği etnik köken yerine herkese açık, ortak bir kültüre katılım açısından tanımladı; Dolayısıyla, Elçibeyin etnisiteyi - Türklüğü ulusal kimliğin özü olarak kabul etmesi, Türk olmayan diğer gruplara karşı ayrımcılık yaptığı anlamına gelmez. Burada, Elçibey'in milliyetçiliği, Connor Walker'ın terimiyle, Kohn ikilemindeki etnik milliyetçilikten ziyade etno-milliyetçiliktir. Ya da, salt politik ilkeye dayanmayan, kültürel bileşen içeren

bir yurttaşlık milliyetçiliği olarak görülebilir. Ayrıca milliyetçiliğinin hem etnik hem de sivil milliyetçiliğin unsurlarını içerdiği iddia edilebilir.

Elçibey, hükümette sadece bir yıl olmasına rağmen, sadece çoğunluk Azerbaycan Türklerinin etnik kimliğini yeniden tesis etmek için çalışmakla kalmadı, aynı zamanda demokratik ilkeler temelinde bir ulus-devlet kurmaya çalıştı. Cornell'in belirttiği gibi, "Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi'nin 1992-1993 deneyimi, gerçek demokratların Sovyet sonrası bir Müslüman devletin kontrolünü ele geçirmesinin benzersiz bir örneğiydi." Aynı şekilde Margaret Thatcher, "Kafkasya'nın en büyük demokrati" olarak nitelendirdiği Elçibey'e yazdığı mektubunda şöyle dedi: "Özgür ve demokratik Azerbaycan adına kişisel olarak gösterdiğiniz çabalara hayranlığımı ifade etmek istiyorum."

Ekim 1993 cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde Haydar Aliyev'in oyların neredeyse yüzde 99'unu aldığı bildirildi. İktidara geldiğinde Elçibey'in ulusal politikalarını değiştirdi. Azerbaycanlılık ve Türkçülük arasındaki tartışma, Haydar Aliyev yönetimi altında birincinin zaferiyle yeniden su yüzüne çıktı. Ülkedeki Sovyet dönemi başarıları, Azerbaycan halkının onu ulusal bir lider olarak görmesini sağladı. H. Aliyev, Elçibey'in etnik, Türk temelli projesinin tam tersi, kapsayıcı, sivil temelli bir ulusal proje başlattı. Bu anlamda Azerbaycan kimliğinin Sovyet dönemi çizgisini sürdürdüğünü söylemek yanlış olmaz. Bu bağlamda akademisyen Dashdemirov, ülkede ilk kez Azerbaycan'daki gerçeklerden yola çıkarak etnik ve sivil millet arasındaki oranı araştırdı. 1980'lerin sonundan 1990'ların başına kadar Azerbaycanlıların etnik millet olarak kabul edilirken, ülkedeki sosyopolitik süreçlerin etkisi ve baskısı altında sivil millete dönüştüklerini savundu. Nitekim, H. Aliyev, hem iç hem de dış politikadaki bir dizi soruna yanıt olarak Azerbaycancılık doktrinini geliştirdi. Bu doktrinle: iç politikada ülkeyi etnik sınırlara göre bölebilecek herhangi bir etnik ayrılıkçılığa kilit bir çözüm olacağı düşünülüyordu; dış politikada, dış güçlerin (özellikle İran ve Rusya'nın) ülkedeki küçük milliyetçiliği (özellikle Lezgi, Talış ve Kürt) desteklemesini engellemek ve ayrıca tüm Azerbaycanlıları dünya çapında birleştirmek amaçlanmıştır. H. Aliyev şunu vurgulardı: "Azerbaycan, milliyetleri, dinleri,

dilleri ve kökenleri ne olursa olsun Azerbaycan’da yaşayan herkesin anavatanıdır; Dağlık Karabağ’da yaşayan Ermeniler dahil.”

Görünüşe göre, Azerbaycancılık ideolojisi sivil ağırlıklı bir kavramdır ve her türlü etnik milliyetçi fikri reddeder. Yani küçük milliyetçilikleri olduğu kadar Türkçülüğü de reddediyor. Amacı, büyük veya küçük tüm etnik grupları birleşik Azerbaycan etrafında birleştirmektir, bu nedenle iki ana fikirden oluşur - “devletçilik” ve “vatanseverlik”. H. Aliyev şöyle derdi: “Azerbaycan’ın çok ırklı ve hoşgörülü bir ülke olması bizim hazinemiz ve ayrıcalığımızdır...Azerbaycan, topraklarında yaşayan tüm milletlerin ve halkların ortak vatanıdır...Azerbaycan kelimesi bizi her zaman birleştirmiştir.” Dolayısıyla, “sadece vatandaşlığın devlete bağlı olduğu, dini mensubluğun, etnisitenin olmadığı bir sivil devlet modeli öngören” Azerbaycancılık politikası, Azerbaycan halkı tarafından geniş ölçüde kabul görmüştür.

H. Aliyev kendisini Azerbaycan kimliğinin uzun süredir koruyucusu olarak görmesi gerekir ki, milletin adı Azərbaycanlı (Azerbaycan) olarak yeniden teyit edilmiş ve ülkenin resmi dili 1995 Azerbaycan Anayasasında *Azərbaycan dili* veya *Azərbaycanca* olarak yeniden belirlenmiştir. Bu konuda Salahaddin Halilov şunları yazıyor: “Kısa süreli AHC yönetiminde anadilimiz adına verilen aceleci, popüler olmayan, asılsız ve popülist karar, Cumhurbaşkanı Haydar Aliyev’in girişimi ve aktif katılımıyla ortadan kaldırıldı. Tarihsel olarak vatandaşlık hakkı kazanan ve tüm dünyaya yayılan Azerbaycan dili’nin hukuki hakkı iade edildi.” H. Aliyev’in kendine özgü ulusal dili ile ulusal benlik ve milli gururu artıracak “eşsiz” bir ulus inşa etme iddiasında olduğu aşikar hale gelir. Bu nedenle, H. Aliyev’e göre, Azerbaycanlılar, Türklerle büyük ölçüde ortak kökene sahibidirler, ancak ayrı bir ulusal kimliğe ve kendi diline sahip olmak, daha geniş Türk kimliği ve dili içinde erimekten daha önemlidir. Nitekim, ulusal dilin önemi üzerindeki ısrarlı vurgusu ve anadile olan sevgisinin dil politikasında tezahür etmesi tartışılmaz değildir. Azerbaycan dili eğitim politikası ile önem kazanmıştır ve Azerbaycan’da çalışmak artık Azerbaycan dili bilgisine ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Bu doğrultuda, H. Aliyev yönetimi döneminde Azerbaycan dilinin konumunu güçlendirmek için çeşitli kararnameler çıkardı.

Dahası, “Aliyev’in devlet dilinin eski adına dönüşünün, yalnızca bağımsızlığı vurgulamak için değil, aynı zamanda Rus komşusunu tatmin etmek ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nden uzaklaşmak için bir hamle olarak anlaşıldığı söylenebilir.” Azerbaycan dili etnik adı belirtmez, bunun yerine onu herkesin dili yapma amacını taşıyan ülkenin adını belirtir. Başka bir deyişle, diğer tüm gruplar tarafından kolayca kabul edilebilir hale getirmek için özel olarak tasarlanmıştır. Bu anlamda, Azerbaycan dilinin baskın dil olarak tanıtımı, “kültürel hegemonya” ya da “etnosentrik önyargı” olarak görülmemeli, daha çok, tüm vatandaşlara egemen dilde faaliyet gösteren ana akım kurumlara eşit fırsat ve eşit erişim sağlayan, standartlaştırılmış halk eğitimi yoluyla ortak bir üyelik, dayanışma, sosyal eşitlik ve siyasi uyum yaratmak için bütünleştirici bir güç olarak görülmelidir. Bu anlamda, Azerbaycan dilinin yeniden benimsenmesi endişesinin dilbilimsel olmaktan çok siyasi olması muhtemel görünüyor. Başka bir deyişle amacı, tamamen meşru bir ulus olmak için yeni bir bağımsız devlet için standartlaştırılmış resmi dil geliştirmektir. Böyle bir durumun sadece Azerbaycan’a değil, hemen hemen tüm yeni ulus-devletlere ait olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Burada, modernist yaklaşımı takiben, Azerbaycan örneğindeki ulus inşası projesinin milletlerin bir yapı olduğu ve siyasi elitler tarafından yaratıldığını gösterdiği söylenebilir. Ulusal kimlik, devlet tarafından sürekli olarak yeniden şekillendirilen, yeniden tanımlanan, tasfiye edilen / yeniden inşa edilen ve manipüle edilen “yukarıdan aşağıya” bir fikir olarak ortaya çıkıyor. Dolayısıyla, H. Aliyev, ulusu yeniden inşa ederken ve kültürel unsurlarını yeniden tanımlarken diğer milletlerden, hatta aynı etnik soydan gelen milletlerden bile farklı kılmak için modern ulusların yolunu izledi.

Haydar Aliyev’in ulusal azınlıklar konusundaki politikası Azerbaycancılık doktrini çerçevesinde değerlendirilmelidir. Ülkedeki çok sayıda etnik-dini toplulukların varlığını çok övdü ve ülkenin zenginliğini onların birliklerinde gördü. Böylelikle onları eşit haklara sahip ülke vatandaşı olarak kabul etti. Anayasanın Azerbaycan’daki tüm halklar ve azınlık etnik

gruplar için demokratik koşullar yaratacağını söyledi. Nitekim Anayasa ve diğer mevzuatta azınlık hakları konusuna ayrı ayrı yazılmış bazı madde ve hükümler bulunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, H. Aliyev'in ulusal azınlık siyaseti, Azerbaycancılığa yaptığı güçlü vurgu karşısında farklı etnik grupların asimilasyonu olarak değil, bu grupların farklı kültürlerini koruyarak bütünleşmesi olarak görülmelidir. Diğer bir deyişle, Azerbaycan halkının birliğinin kültürel ve dilsel homojenleştirme yoluyla pekiştirilmesi ile etnik-dinsel çeşitliliğin sürdürülmesi arasındaki dengeyi koruma politikasıdır. Kesin olmak gerekirse, insanları vatandaşlık kimliği altında birleştirmeye öncelik vermesine rağmen, H. Aliyev aynı zamanda ulusal azınlıkların kültürlerinin korunmasına ve desteklenmesine katkıda bulundu. Bu anlamda H. Aliyev'in azınlık meselelerine ilişkin politikaları ile Elçibey'in politikaları arasında çok fazla fark olmadığı görülmektedir.

İlham Aliyev, Haydar Aliyev'in ölümünden sonra iktidarı ele geçirdi ve babasının politikalarına sadık kaldığını ilan etti. Böylesi bir iktidar geçişi, bağımsızlığını yeni kazanan Azerbaycan'ı demokrasi yolundan büyük ölçüde saptırdı. İlham Aliyev hükümeti altında Azerbaycan dili, etnik azınlık mensupları ve hatta Rusça konuşanları da içeren “nihai dil entegrasyonu beklentisiyle” toplumda birleştirici bir güç olarak desteklenmeye devam ediyor. İlham Aliyev, Azerbaycan dilinin ülkedeki konumunu pekiştirmek için bir çok kararnameler yayınladı. Ancak Azerbaycan dilinin artan önemine paralel olarak, son yıllarda toplumda Rus dilinin artan statüsü görünmektedir. Nitekim Bakü sokaklarında Rusça konuşan insanları duymak hâlâ yaygındır. Bazı milliyetçiler, Rus okullarının işleyişinin ulusal güvenlik için bir tehdit olduğunu ve toplumun tam olarak millileştirilmesi için kapatılmasının gerekli olduğunu iddia etseler de, Rusça eğitimi çok az hükümet müdahalesiyle karşılaştı. Bu anlamda, Marquardt'ın çalışması, siyasetçilerin, Azerbaycan'da Rus dilinin kullanılmaya devam edilmesini veya en azından etnik uyumun ve Rus pazarına ve Rus kültürüne erişimin sürdürülmesi için öğretilmesinin devam ettirilmesini oybirliğiyle onayladıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Araşsalıcı yaklaşıma dayanarak çok sayıda Azerbaycanlıların anadilleri yerine kasıtlı

olarak Rusça'yı tercih etmesi, hatta dillerini değiştirmeye ve çocuklarını Rusça yetiştirmeye karar verme nedenleri anlaşılabilir.

Haydar Aliyev, Azerbaycan'ın çok kültürlü ve hoşgörülü ortamını övmüş ve gelişmesini teşvik etmiş olsa da, çokkültürlülüğü (multikulturalizm) bir devlet stratejisi olarak ilan eden İlham Aliyev'di. Ona göre, çokkültürlülük sadece bir trend değil, aynı zamanda dünyayı daha güvenli hale getirmenin tek yoludur. Bu yüzden, I. Aliyev çokkültürlülük geleneklerinin korunmasını, daha fazla gelişmesini ve ülkede yayılmasını hedefliyor. Dahası, hükümeti Azerbaycan'ın çokkültürlülüğünü dünyaya model olarak tanıtıyor. Gelişmiş Avrupa ülkelerinde bile çokkültürlülüğün başarısız olduğu iddia ediliyor, ancak "Azerbaycan'ın zengin kültürel-ahlaki mirasa ve hoşgörü geleneklerine sahip olması uluslararası toplumda kabul edilen gerçeklerden biridir." İlham Aliyev hükümeti, ulusal azınlıkların korunması sorununu çokkültürlülük politikası çerçevesinde değerlendiriyor. Çokkültürlülük modeli altında, kültürel özellikleri ve yaşam tarzını resmi olarak ifade etme, koruma ve muhafaza etme hakkına sahip çeşitli etno-kültürel toplulukların bir devletin sınırları içinde barış içinde birlikte yaşadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, Azerbaycan'ın çokkültürlülük modelini uluslararası topluma "benzersiz" bir vaka olarak sunmaya istekli olduğunun bir kanıtı olan çeşitli kararnameler yayımlandı ve projeleri hayata geçirdi.

Yine de, çokkültürlülük politikasını ana milletin ezici çoğunluğu oluşturduğu ve herhangi bir göçmen sorununun olmadığı üniter devlette uygulamanın uygun olup olmadığı hala tartışmalıdır. Ayrıca, hükümetin esas devlet ideolojisi Azerbaycancılık olduğunu dikkate alırsak, çokkültürlülük politikası farklı kültürlerin bağımsız olarak çoğalmasını teşvik etmekle ilgili değil, toplumun birliğine ve bütünlüğüne zarar vermeden kültürel-etnografik çeşitliliği sürdürmek olarak görülebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, hükümet, temel ilkesi toplumun bütünlüğü olan Azerbaycancılığın gelişmesine öncelik vermekte, dolayısıyla bir anlamda etno-kültürel ve dini grupların özgürce çoğalmasını sınırlamaktadır. Bu anlamda, teorik olarak paradoksal görünse de, pratikte hem çokkültürlülüğün hem de Azerbaycancılığın aynı amaca, entegrasyona hizmet edeceği öngörülmektedir. Çokkültürlülüğe yüksek vurgu

yapmanın nedenlerinden birinin, dünyanın dikkatini Azerbaycan'a çekmek için daha liberal ve demokratik görünmek olduğu söylenebilir.

Bununla birlikte, çokkültürlülüğün toplumda daha fazla bütünleşme için tasarlanmasına rağmen, toplumu etnik hatlara göre bölebileceği iddia edilebilir. Bu açıdan Akyıldız'ın çalışmasında çokkültürlülük politikasının aslında Azerbaycancılık ideolojisi ile çeliştiği belirtilmektedir. Azerbaycancılık ideolojisi, etnik kimliklerini vurgulamak yerine ülkenin parçalanmasını önlemek için tüm Azerbaycanlıları sivil temelli bir kimlik altında birleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ancak çokkültürlülük politikası Azerbaycan'daki çeşitli etnik grupların etnik kimliklerini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Dolayısıyla toplumdaki etnik farklılıkları derinleştirdiği için Azerbaycan kimliğinin gelişmesine zararlıdır.

Ayrıca, "hoşgörü" (tolerans) politikası ile I. Aliyev hükümetinin nihai hedefi, herhangi bir dini veya mezhep çatışmasını önlemek ve böylece ülkede barış ve istikrarı korumaktır. Ayrıca, böyle bir dini politikanın, diğer mezhep gruplarını entegre etmek için ulusal kimliğin İslami unsurunu daha az etkili hale getirdiğini düşünmek mantıklıdır. Başka bir deyişle, dini unsurun önemini azaltarak, ulusal kimlik inceltilerek İslami olmayan tüm gruplar için kabul edilebilir hale getirildi.

Sonuç

XX yüzyılın başında Azerbaycan'da, Ermeni ve Rus düşmanlığı da dahil olmak üzere Rus emperyalizmine karşı ulusal kurtuluş hareketine liderlik eden ulusal aydınlar, halkın Türk olarak ulusal kimliğini teşvik eden Türkçülük fikirlerini yoğunlaştırdı. Milli hareket, 28 Mayıs 1918'de milliyetçi lider Mehmet Emin Resulzade'nin başkanlık ettiği ilk ulusal devletin - Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'nin (ADR) - kurulmasıyla sonuçlandı. Devlet ideolojisi olarak Müsavatçılığı - Türkleştirme, Modernleşme ve İslamlaştırma ilkelerini teşvik etti. ADR, Bolşevik askeri güçler tarafından işgal edilmeden sadece 23 ay önce var olabildi. Bu süreçte bazı tarihsel çalışmaları gerçekleştirebildi: dini kimlikten ulusal kimliğe geçişi

tamamlayarak, arlık Rusya’sının Mslman tebaasından bir ulus oluřturdu; milli kltrn geliřmesine ve eēitim sisteminin millileřtirilmesine katkıda bulundu; “Trk dili” ve “Trk milleti” isimlerini resmileřtirdi; Trklk fikirleriyle birlikte Azerbaycancılık, laiklik ve demokrasi fikirlerini destekledi.

Aynı fenomen, XX yzyılın sonlarında Sovyetler Birliēi’nin daēılması sırasında ortaya ıkmaya bařladı. Yine zellikle Daēlık Karabaē’ın Rusya destekli Ermeni gleri tarafından iřgal edilmesiyle, Rusya karřıtı ve Ermeni karřıtı duygular Trklk hareketini ve halkın Trk kimliēini glendirdi. Milli kurtuluř hareketi, 1991 yılında ulus devlet - Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti’nin yeniden kurulması ve milliyeti parti ve milliyeti lider - Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi ve Ebulfaz Elibey’in iktidara gelmesi ile doruk noktasına ulařtı. Elibey Musavatılık ilkelerini benimseyerek ADR hkmetinin izinden gitti. Bu baēlamda Elibey, 1937 yılına kadar geerli olan Azerbaycan Trklerinin etnik ismini geri getirdi. Sovyet dneminde, etnik-st kimlik oluřturma abasıyla Sovyet liderleri ulusal dillerin Ruslařtırılmasını kolaylařtırmak iin Kiril alfabesini kabul ettiler, dini bileřeni ortadan kaldırdılar, Azerbaycanlılara ve diēer Trk devletlerine etnik kimliklerini - Trklē yasakladılar. Arasalcı yaklařımı takiben, kltrlerin son derece esnek ve elit maniplasyona aık olduēu sonucuna varılabilir.

Bylelikle, hem Resulzade hem de Elibey milletin adını ve dilini Trke olarak tanımlamıř ve bylece Azerbaycan’da halkın etnik kkene dnme ve Trk olarak zdeřleřme duyguları glenmiřtir. Ayrıca, milli devlet olma, lkenin blnmez btnlē, lkede yařayan etnik ve ulusal azınlıkların haklarının korunması ile ilgili olan Azerbaycancılık fikrini de geliřtirdiler. Dolayısıyla, ulus projelerinde, Azerbaycan kimliēi, oēunluk Azerbaycan Trkleri iin etnik kimlik olarak deēil, lkedeki tm etno-kltrel grupları kapsayacak bir vatandaşlık kimliēi olarak iřlev grmek zere tasarlandı. Bu baēlamda, hem Resulzade hem de Elibey lkedeki azınlık gruplarına kltrel haklar verdiler. Her ikisi de vatandaşlık politikasını *jus soli* ilkesine gre tanımladılar. Dolayısıyla her ikisi de Connor’ın deyimiyle etno-milliyetilik peřinde kořsa, yani Trklē ulusal kimliēin temelinde oturtsalar

da, azınlık gruplarını dışlamadılar, daha çok hepsini içerecek şekilde sivil milliyetçi politika geliştirdiler. Bu bağlamda, teorik olarak buna dışlamayı gerektiren etnik milliyetçilik demek yanlış olur. Daha doğrusu, her ikisinin milliyetçilik politikalarının hem etnik hem de sivil milliyetçilik unsurlarını içerdiği sonucuna varabiliriz.

Ancak Haydar Aliyev'in iktidara gelmesinden sonra Azerbaycan'da asırlık kimlik krizi sorunu, özellikle Azerbaycanlılık ile Türkçülük arasındaki çatışma birinci lehine çözülmüştür. Tüm etnik ve ulusal grupların etnik-üstü kimlik altında birliğini öngören Azerbaycancılık, sivil ağırlıklı bir doktrindir. Haydar Aliyev döneminde devlet ideolojisi statüsüne yükseltildi. Sonuç olarak, kamusal yaşamın hemen hemen tüm alanlarında hızlı "Azerbaycanlaşma" yaşandı. Yeni bağımsızlığına kavuşan ulus-devletin çok ırklı toplumunun parçalanmasını önlemek için ulusal kimliği "Azerbaycanlı" ve resmi dili "Azerbaycan dili" olarak yeniden tanımladı. Türkçülük, toplumun parçalanmasını besleyen tehlikeli bir güç olarak değerlendirilmeye başlandı. Dolayısıyla Elçibey'in Azerbaycanlıların ulusal kimliğini Türk olarak tanımlama çabaları başarısız oldu. Azerbaycan'da ulusal kimliğin tarihsel evrimi, Azerbaycan kimliğinin, sadece vatandaşlık kimliği olarak değil, aynı zamanda Azerbaycanlıların çoğunluğu için etnik kimlik olarak oluşmasıyla sonuçlandı. Dolayısıyla, H. Aliyev'in ulus inşa projesinde Sovyet mirası olan Azerbaycanlı kimliğini yeniden kurumlaştırdığı söylenebilir. Ancak Azerbaycan kimliğini vatandaşlık kimliği olarak kullanmak geçerliken, kavramsal olarak "Azerbaycanlı" kimliğini etnik kimlik olarak görmek yanlıştır. Çünkü etnisite, "ortak köken", "menşe efsanesi" anlamına gelir. Başka bir deyişle, etnik gruptan bahsederken, "soyla ilişkili" ve akraba ilişkileriyle bağlantılı bir grup insanı kastediyoruz. "Azerbaycanlı" sıfatının Azerbaycan Türklerini 1937'den itibaren tanımlamaya başlaması nedeniyle eski köklerden yoksundur. Bu yüzden etnik milleti ifade eden "Türk" adının coğrafi bölgeyi ifade eden "Azerbaycan" adıyla ikame edilmesi uygun değildir. Bu durum, baskın Türk halkı için sorun yaratmaktadır ve bu durum, halkın etnik kimlik olarak "Türk" ve "Azerbaycanlı" arasında seçim yapmasına neden olan kamusal tartışmalarda açıkça görülmektedir.

Teorik olarak, Elçibey'in Türkçülüğü ilkelcilikle açıklanabilirken, H. Aliyev'in Azerbaycancılığı modernist yaklaşımla açıklanabilir: İlkelci yaklaşım Elçibey'in ulusuna olan duygusal bağlılığını anlamamıza yardımcı olur. Yani, onun etnik kardeşleri ve akrabalarıyla doğal ve manevi yakınlığından kaynaklanan anlatılamaz ve ezici duyguları rasyonel bir şekilde açıklanamaz. Daha spesifik olarak, bu yaklaşım sayesinde Elçibey'in "Bütün Azerbaycan" ve Türk Birliği idealini net bir şekilde anlamak mümkün. Ortak bölgecilik, soy ve kültüre atıfta bulunarak, Elçibey'in Güney Azerbaycan ve Türk dünyasındaki akrabalarına karşı "kolektif özbilinc" e (Shils'in terimi) sahip olduğu anlaşıyor; Aksine, Gellner'in modernist açıklamasını takiben, H. Aliyev'in Azerbaycancılık ideolojisinin "öncelikle siyasi ve ulusal birimin uyumlu olması gerektiğini savunan politik bir ilke olduğu" çıkarılabilir. Bir ulus devlet içinde standartlaştırılmış halk eğitimi ve okuryazarlığın teşvik edilmesi yoluyla elde edilecek kültürel homojenleşmeyi ifade eder. Bu durumda Azerbaycanlı kimliğinin herkesi devletçilik ve vatanseverlik fikirlerine bağlayan birleştirici bir güce sahip olduğu iddia edilebilir. Ancak H. Aliyev'in birleşik bir Azerbaycan kimliği yaratma girişiminin tüm etnik grupların orijinal kimliklerine bağlılığı karşısında başarısız olması daha muhtemel görünüyor.

Azerbaycan kimliği tamamen siyasi bir ilke, bir yurttaşlık projesi olarak ortaya çıkıyor. Çoğunlukta olan Türk etnik grubunun bazı kültürel unsurlarını kullanmasına rağmen, Türkçülük fikrinin burada ortadan kaldırılması dikkat çekicidir. Bu yurttaşlık projesine büyük ölçüde Türkçülük ideologları karşı çıkıyor ve onu ulusal kimliğin etnik kökeninden/Türklükten arındırılması olarak nitelendiriyorlar. Azerbaycancılık fikrinin çelişkili değil, tamamlayıcı olduğu için Türkçülükten yoksun olmaması gerektiğini ileri sürüyorlar. Bu anlamda, Haydar Aliyev'in iddia ettiği gibi, Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin ADR'nin mirasçısı olduğunu söylemek doğru olmayacaktır, çünkü onun Azerbaycancılık doktrini, ADR'nin milli ideolojisinin ana ilkesi olan Türkçülük vurgusunu ortadan kaldırmaktadır.

İlham Aliyev, Azerbaycancılık doktrinini teşvik etmek ve Azerbaycan dilini bütünleştirici bir güç olarak güçlendirmek için Haydar Aliyev'in ulusal

politikasını takip ediyor. Ancak ülkede Rus dilinin artan önemi ulusal dilin itibarını tehdit etmekte, dolayısıyla Sovyet sonrası Azerbaycan'ın millileştirme projesini olumsuz etkilemektedir. Bu, birçok milliyetçi tarafından kültürel asimilasyonu hedefleyen Rusya'nın kültürel tecavüzü olarak görülüyor.

Ayrıca İlham Aliyev çokkültürlülüğü Azerbaycan'ın devlet politikası olarak ilan etti ve Azerbaycancılığın devamı olduğuna vurgu yaptı. Hükümet, çokkültürlülüğü ilan ederek, azınlıkların kültürel farklılığını onaylıyor ve kabul ediyor, ancak ortak kurumlar içinde bazı sınırlar koyuyor veya gelişmelerini kısıtlıyor. Nitekim çokkültürlülük politikası “farklılığın tanınması”, yani farklı kültürlerin teşviki ile ilgili olmakla birlikte, Azerbaycan bağlamında esas olarak Azerbaycancılık politikasına hizmet etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Aslında farklı azınlıkların kültürleri Azerbaycan kültürünün bir parçası olarak sunulmakta ve devletin zenginliği olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, toplumsal çeşitliliği ilerletmek yerine çeşitliliğin birliğini teşvik etmekle ilgilidir. Azerbaycan devlet politikasının ana ilkesi ülkenin toprak bütünlüğünü ve güvenliğini korumak olduğundan, azınlık haklarının korunmasına ilişkin antlaşmaların uygulanması bu ilkeyi tehdit etmemelidir. Azerbaycan, üniter bir devlet olarak merkezkaç eğilimlerin merkezileşmiş gücü tehdit etmesine izin veremez. Azınlık milliyetçiliklerini bağdaştırmak için en iyi mekanizma, büyük ölçüde, yerelleştirme ve ulusal azınlıkların kendi kaderini tayin haklarını tanıma ile ilgili olan federalizm olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ayrıca, çokkültürlülük politikaları uygulayarak göçmenlerin topluma entegrasyonunu sağlamaya çalışan zengin Batı ülkelerinde olduğu gibi, Azerbaycan göçmen akışıyla karşılaşmamaktadır.

Dahası, çokkültürlülük politikası ulusal kimliği şekillendirir. Daha spesifik olarak, çokkültürlülük ve milliyet, ulusal kimliği, diğer etno-kültürel kimliklerle çatışacak güçlü etnik unsurları sunmayı bırakacak kadar zayıflatarak veya incelterek uzlaştırılabilir. Bu, Azerbaycan hükümetinin baskın etnik grubun Türklüğünü neden önemsizleştirdiğinin bir cevabı olabilir. Benzer şekilde, hükümetin, laikliği ve hoşgörüyü teşvik ederek,

vatandaşlarının dini ve ulusal kimlikleri arasındaki çatışmadan doğabilecek her türlü anlaşmazlığı ortadan kaldırmak istemesi çok muhtemel görünüyor. Başka bir deyişle, ulusal kimlikten dini bileşeni azaltarak hükümet, çeşitli etnik ve dini gruplar arasında koordinasyon oluşturmayı ve ülkede istikrar sağlamayı hedefliyor.

Dolayısıyla, etnik ve dini unsurları dışlayarak, Azerbaycan milli kimliği tüm etno-kültürel ve dini kimlikleri kapsayacak derecede inceltilmektedir. İlk bakışta iki paradoksal fikir - Azerbaycancılık ve Çokkültürlülük - ilki birliği belirten ve ikincisi çeşitliliği ifade eden, ulusal kimlik çekirdek etnik grubun güçlü bileşenlerini taşımayı bırakırsa ve sadece bir dizi kuruma ve bunların temel ilkelerine bağlılık gerektiren siyasi kimlik gibi davranırsa, tamamlayıcı ve uzlaştırıcı olabilir.

Sonuç olarak, dört hükümetin - Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Ebulfez Elçibey, Haydar Aliyev ve İlham Aliyev - ulus kurma politikalarındaki büyük farklılıklara rağmen bazı ortak noktaları paylaştılar. Yani, hepsi birleştirici Azerbaycancılık fikrini benimseyerek ve ulusal azınlıkların kültürel haklarını hukuken tanıyarak kapsayıcı bir yurttaşlık projesi yürüttüler. Ayrıca demokrasi ve laiklik ilkelerine bağlılıklarını ilan ederek devlet düzeyinde hoşgörünün korunmasını sağladılar ve Müslüman egemen toplumda inançlar arası uyumu sağlamayı hedeflediler.

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THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM IN AZERBAIJAN (1900-2018)

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