TURKEY'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (1923-1939)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ABDULLAH TURHAL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FEBRUARY 2026

Approval of the thesis:

TURKEY'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (1923-1939)

submitted by **ABDULLAH TURHAL** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA
Head of Department
Department of International Relations _____

Prof. Dr. Ebru BOYAR
Supervisor
Department of International Relations _____

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Prof. Dr. Ebru BOYAR (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Onur İŞÇİ
Boğaziçi University
Department of Political Science and International Relations _____

Prof. Dr. Zana Ayşe ÇITAK AYTÜRK
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Samuel John HIRST
Bilkent University
Department of International Relations _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Abdullah TURHAL

Signature:

ABSTRACT

TURKEY'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (1923-1939)

Turhal, Abdullah

Ph.D. Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ebru Boyar

February 2026, 430 pages

This thesis examines the military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union between 1923-1939 which were largely overlooked and underappreciated despite forming a significant part of the relations between the two countries. Under the general guidance of Turkish political leadership, the military relations had developed with constant interaction between the two large military bureaucracies. The changing European security environment and urgency felt in Turkey to keeping up to speed with preparations to create a modern Turkish army having deterrence capabilities provided a relatively more stable form of relationship in the military fields in the period under consideration. It can be argued that the contact base was quite significant in the area of military relations compared to other areas when variety of issue areas were taken into consideration. The relations were first established on the military area in terms weapons and ammunition support, promoted by exchange of visits and appointments of senior and prominent military figures for effect and then expanded into various aspects of military areas such as engaging in specialist training programs, weapon and equipment transfers, facilitation in communication and logistics, observations at major military manoeuvres and establishment of mechanisms to address problems on the borders.

Keywords: Military, Bureaucracy, Technology Transfer, Diplomacy, Interwar Period

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ İLE ASKERİ İLİŞKİLERİ

Turhal, Abdullah
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ebru Boyar

Şubat 2026, 430 sayfa

Bu tez, 1923-1939 yılları arasında Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki ilişkilerin önemli bir parçasını oluşturmasına rağmen, büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilmiş ve yeterince ele alınıp üzerinde durulmamış, askeri ilişkileri incelemektedir. Türk siyasi liderliğinin genel hatlarını çizdiği şekliyle askeri ilişkiler iki büyük askeri bürokrasi arasında sürekli bir gelişim göstermiştir. Hızla değişen Avrupa güvenlik ortamı ve Türkiye'nin caydırıcı güce sahip bir ordu oluşturma çabaları bu dönemde askeri alandaki ilişkilerin daha istikrarlı bir seyir izlemesine neden olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, iki ülke arasında ilişki kurulan diğer alanlar içinde, askeri alandaki ilişkilerin ortaya koyduğu çeşitlilik yüzünden, bu alandaki temas yüzeyinin oldukça önemli olduğu ileri sürülebilir. İlk temas silah ve cephane yardımı ile başladığından öncelikle askeri alanda kurulmuştur. Daha sonra ilişkiler karşılıklı ziyaretler ve etki yaratması amacıyla askeri alanda kıdemli veya meşhur komutanların atanması ile sürdürülmüştür. İki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinde anlaşmaya varılan özel eğitim programları, silah ve malzeme transferleri, haberleşme ve lojistik alanlarda yardımlaşma ve önemli askeri tatbikatlara gözlemci olarak davet edilme ile sınırlarda ortaya çıkan sorunlarla ilgilenmek için oluşturulmaya çalışılan mekanizmalar ile de bu dönem içinde gelişimine devam etmiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Ordu, Bürokrasi, Teknoloji Transferi, Diplomasi, İki Savaş Arası Dönem

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the Head of the Examining Committee, Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık, my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ebru Boyar, and the members of the committee, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Onur İşçi, Prof. Dr. Zana Ayşe Çıtak Aytürk and Assist. Prof. Dr. Samuel John Hirst for their time during this process. Pursuing my doctorate program at one of the most important academic institutions, the Middle East Technical University, and at one of its leading departments, the Department of International Relations, under the supervision of leading scholars in the field of IR and History, both as my supervisor and as members of my committee, had been a true blessing. Although the program became more demanding, I wholeheartedly believe that all this hardship was worth experiencing.

I also wish to thank Halil Kamil Tekin from the Department of International Relations for helping me navigate the administrative procedures. During this period, I had the opportunity to bring back my Ottoman and Russian skills, which I had begun to develop almost three decades ago. Although far from perfect, I managed to maintain a level that enabled me to go through primary documents. Where help was needed, I managed to obtain it from an esteemed colleague. Therefore, I would like to thank Hüseyin Baran Pekmen for his kind support in enabling me to understand Ottoman 'rika' texts.

Finally, my thanks to a large number of people who perform largely unseen and unappreciated work but, knowingly or unknowingly, play a critical role in enhancing our understanding of history by preserving material in the form of books, photos, maps, documents, and objects and selling them through auctions or shops. I have been collecting items for many decades and have largely benefited from these items to complement research obtained from auctions, second-hand shops, flea markets, or even from what is called trash markets. Material from this effort complements archival material or collections held by libraries and sometimes gets ahead of them in rare instances.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM iii
ABSTRACT iv
ÖZ vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
LIST OF FIGURES xii
CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Historiographical Discussion 5
1.2. Thesis Outline 21
2. THE TURKISH MILITARY BUREACRACY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD . 27
2.1. Transition into Peacetime 29
2.2. Main Characteristics of the Turkish Military Bureaucracy in the Interwar Period 35
2.3. Conclusion 54
3. THE TURKISH MILITARY'S PERCEPTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET MILITARY POWER 56
3.1. Collecting Information About the Red Army 57
3.2. The Nature of Knowledge on the Red Army 66
3.2.1. Practical Information of the Soviet Union in the Turkish Military Sources 67
3.2.2. A Portrait of the Red Army 71
3.3. A Critical Analysis of the Red Army 87
3.4. Conclusion 102
4. MILITARY DIPLOMACY AND COOPERATION 105
4.1. Military Diplomacy 106
4.1.1. Foundations of Military Diplomatic Relations During the War of Independence 107

4.1.2. Military Diplomacy in Peace Time (1923-1939) 114
4.1.2.1. The Role of Military Attachés 114
4.1.2.2. Mutual Visits and Engagements 119
4.2. Military Cooperation 138
4.2.1. The Turkish Military Mission in Afghanistan 138
4.2.2. The Cooperation in the Field of Aviation 151
4.3. Conclusion 158
5. ENGAGEMENTS AT THE BORDERS AND BEYOND 161
5.1. The Turkish and Soviet Armies in the Borderlands 161
5.2. The Security Environment in the Turkish-Soviet Borderlands 166
5.2.1. The Security Challenges to Turkey in Eastern Anatolia 167
5.2.2. The Turkish and Soviet Perception of Threat from the Third Parties 174
5.3. The Demarcation of the Turkish-Soviet Border 178
5.4. Maintaining Security in the Borderlands 185
5.4.1. Managing the Minor Border Incidents 186
5.4.2. Dealing with the Major Incidents: The Revolts in Anatolia 190
5.4.3. Maritime Borders 200
5.5. Conclusion 201
6. MILITARY ECONOMICS: AID, TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND KNOW-HOW 204
6.1. Centrality of Financial Concerns for the Turkish Military Bureaucracy 205
6.1.1. Meeting Urgent Needs of the National Army 211
6.1.2. Efforts to Find Foreign Partners 212
6.1.3. The Soviet Option 215
6.1.4. Access to Modern Vehicles of War through the Soviets 222
6.2. Transfer of Technology and Know-how from the Soviet Union 229
6.2.1. Structural Factors in the Transfer of Technology 230
6.2.2. The Limited Red Army Influence 235
6.2.2.1. Armour 235
6.2.2.2. Airborne Capabilities 240
6.2.2.3. Defence of the Rear 244
6.2.3. Rapid Shift to Western Models 248
6.3. Conclusion 254

7. SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE 258
7.1. The Place of the Soviet Union in Turkish Intelligence History in the Interwar Period 259
7.2. The Nature of Turkish Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance about the Soviet Union 265
7.2.1. Mechanisms and Conducting Intelligence Gathering 277
7.2.2. The Nature of Data 281
7.3. Conclusion 294
8. MILITARY BUREAUCRACY, THE SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET INFLUENCE 297
8.1. The Turkish Approach to Civil Defence in the Interwar Period 299
8.2. The Soviet Union as a Model for Civil Defence 310
8.3. Conclusion 336
9. CONCLUSION 339
9.1. The Changing Nature of Turkey's Military Relations with the Soviet Union 347
9.2. Conclusion 354
BIBLIOGRAPHY 355
APPENDICES
A. CURRICULUM VITAE 410
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET 413
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU 430

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. The new organisation of the Turkish Army after Lausanne 1923. 33
Figure 2.2. The Turkish General Staff, and the Turkish Ministry of National Defence in Ankara. 36
Figure 3.1. Map of the wargame scenario conducted in the 1927-1928 academic year at the Turkish War Academy. 71
Figure 3.2. The ranking of the Red Army officers' qualities. 92
Figure 3.3. A Turkish military unit in 1937. 96
Figure 3.4. The military ceremony for the visiting Minister of Defence and Navy of Yugoslavia in 1938. 96
Figure 3.5. "Proletarians of all countries, unite" in Russian and Ottoman Turkish 99
Figure 4.1. Turkish-Russian friendship. 106
Figure 4.2. The building used as the embassy building in Ankara by the Soviets after the fire on 13 August 1922. 113
Figure 4.3. A Red Army guard at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara in late 1922. 115
Figure 4.4. Defence Minister General Voroshilov with Prime Minister İsmet Paşa at the Turkish Parliament's entrance in Ankara, October 1933. ... 124
Figure 4.5. The Red Army delegation led by Defence Minister General Voroshilov accompanied by General Budyonny saluting Military College cadets in İstanbul in November 1933. 125
Figure 4.6. The boulevard named after Voroshilov in İzmir, Turkey. 126
Figure 4.7. The Turkish aviators at the May Day Parade in Moscow on 1 May 1934. The bottom right of the picture shows Turkish officers with General Budyonny. 127
Figure 4.8. The Turkish planes returning from Moscow spotted over İstanbul on 18 May 1934. 128
Figure 4.9. Osoaviakhim at Türkkuşu, 1936. 133
Figure 4.10. A cartoon from Turkish satirical journal *Karagöz* 140

Figure 4. 11. King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan. Postcard sent to Turkey dated 27 June 1927 with a note behind from Azmi Bey to his daughter Belkıs Hanım. 142
Figure 4.12. The parachute activities in Ankara, Turkey in the 1930s. 152
Figure 4.13. A woman with a model plane. Photo from 1937. 153
Figure 4.14. President Atatürk with Soviet Ambassador Karakhan and the Soviet pilots, Anokhin and Romanov on the opening day of Türkkuşu in Ankara on 3 May 1935. Fuad Bulca, the head of the Turkish Aeronautical Association, is on the right. 155
Figure 4.15. The Soviet pilot Anokhin describing glider controls to President Atatürk. 155
Figure 4.16. Early trials with planes and parachutes in the 1930s in Turkey. 157
Figure 4.17. Photograph from a model exhibition with two boys examining model planes in 1929. 158
Figure 5.1. The Turkish officers and soldiers on the Soviet border in the rural area of Kars province in March 1929. 164
Figure 5.2. The Turkish-Soviet friendship. 165
Figure 5.3. A cartoon from 1929. 176
Figure 5.4. Turkey's eastern land border with the Soviet Union. 178
Figure 5.5. Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union in 1938. The red lines indicate the mountains and their heights. 181
Figure 5.6. The members of Şark Tahdid-i Hudud Komisyonu (The Commission on the Demarcation of the Eastern Border) in Tbilisi, Georgia on 1 October 1925. Fahri (Belen) is the sixth person from the right, and on his right stands Oto Karklin. 183
Figure 5.7. The Markara Bridge over Aras River. 184
Figure 5.8. The Turkish members of the mixed commission on the final day on 12 November 1933. Staff Major Cevat is second from the left. 188
Figure 5.9. A cartoon from 1930. 193
Figure 6.1. The cover of *Resimli Perşenbe* magazine. 209
Figure 6.2. Turkish officers at Maltepe Military School in 1928 with a French-made Renault tank. 223

Figure 6.3. T-26A model light tank and T-27 tankette. 224
Figure 6.4. The gifts from the Red Army. 224
Figure 6.5. The Soviet armour during the 10th Anniversary of the Republic in Ankara on 29 October 1933. 225
Figure 6.6. A photo collage on the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey. 226
Figure 6.7. The Soviet-made BA-6 armoured cars during a parade in Ankara. 227
Figure 6.8. The Soviet-made ZIS trucks during 1937 military manoeuvres in Saray at Thrace, August 1937. 228
Figure 6.9. Tank markings used by the Red Army until the beginning of World War II 236
Figure 6.10. Tank markings used by the Turkish Army as set out in the tank manual of 1936. 237
Figure 6.11. Two Turkish tanks marked as per the tank manual, based on the Soviet marking system. The detail showing the marking on the tank. 238
Figure 6. 12. A Turkish tankman in coverall during a manoeuvre in April 1937 239
Figure 6.13. Inspection of a tank battalion in 1936. Major Tahsin Yazıcı is on the right. 239
Figure 6.14. A cartoon from 1929. 245
Figure 6.15. A Chart from the 1925 book. 246
Figure 6.16. A chart adapted by the Turkish Army. 247
Figure 6.17. Early alarm network established against air raids by the Soviet Union, as observed by the Turkish delegation in 1934. 248
Figure 6.18. The British military visitors at the Turkish War Academy. 250
Figure 6.19. The French military visitors at the Turkish War Academy. 251
Figure 6.20. The symbol of the tank school established within the Turkish Army in 1943. 253
Figure 6.21. A postcard from 1939. 253
Figure 7.1. Ambassador Aralov in his office in Ankara in late 1922. 264

Figure 7.2. Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), in the centre, on General Voroshilov's right, during Soviet Defence Minister Voroshilov's and General Budyonny's visit to Turkey in 1933. 268
Figure 7.3. The uniforms and insignia used by the Red Army. 277
Figure 7.4. Drawing showing the uniforms and insignias used in the Red Army. 278
Figure 7.5. The Red Army deployment. 279
Figure 7.6. The Red Army stationing of troops along the eastern border of Turkey in the South Caucasus. 279
Figure 7.7. The Red Army stationing of troops along the eastern border of Turkey in South Caucasus. 280
Figure 7.8. The Red Army troop deployment in Central Asia and Siberia. 281
Figure 8.1. A military lesson at Konya High School during the 1927-1928 term. 303
Figure 8.2. The Certificate of competence for completing military courses for secondary and high-school students. 303
Figure 8.3. The threat from the air. 305
Figure 8.4. A poster encouraging citizens to be part of the "Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler Heyeti". 306
Figure 8.5. Conferences for civilians. 307
Figure 8.6. Türk Hava Kurumu leaflet, 1937. 309
Figure 8.7. Civilian youth during shooting sessions. 325
Figure 8.8. Heavy machine gun training for students in the 1936-1937 academic year. 325
Figure 8.9. A certificate issued for the completion of the course on protection against air raids and poisonous gases, 1938. 331
Figure 8.10. A certificate issued for the completion of the course on protection against air raids and poisonous gases, 1938. 332
Figure 8.11. Türkan Pekel's certificate from 1939 on defence against air raids and chemical gases. 333
Figure 8.12. Russia presented as a positive example in preparations against gas attacks. 334

Figure 9.1. An illustration by Münif Fehim before World War II. 349
Figure 9.2. An illustration by Münif Fehim after World War II. 351
Figure 9.3. Officers of the Turkish National Army and the Red Army in the interwar period. 352
Figure 9.4. The visit of the Turkish General Staff to the Soviet Union in 1976. 353

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union between 1923-1939 which were largely overlooked and underappreciated despite forming a significant part of the relations between the two countries. Two main constraints opened the way for establishment of military relations. First, Turkey was left out of the political-security architecture of Europe, and second, Turkey had limited resources and military capabilities to fulfil its policy objectives.

The Turkish political authority determined the form, command structure, and place of its military within the system, as well as its needs, and then identified the duties and tasks expected to be performed. Based on these, the Turkish military bureaucracy embarked on finding ways to accomplish these tasks under the constraints. As an outcast in the international arena with limited resources, Turkey found that only the Soviet Union and the Red Army were willing to cooperate and assist it until the later parts of the interwar period. New Turkey remained outside the political and security structures established by the victors of World War I until the late 1920s, and only after settling outstanding issues, such as the question of Mosul with Great Britain, did it gradually engage with Western structures.[1] The nature of military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union during this period was unprecedented, unique, exceptional, deeper, and more varied than what the currently available literature presents. Therefore, this thesis explores the significance of military relations in the Turkish-Soviet relationship during the interwar period. It

[1]For a general outline of relations with the West see İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: İngiltere'yle İlişkiler," *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980, Vol. 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022), 258; İlhan Uzgel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Uluslararası Güvenli Sorunları ve Türkiye," *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980, Vol. 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022), 310-11 and 313.

seeks to explore how understanding the military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the interwar period could contribute to our understanding of Turkish-Soviet relations, which were starkly different in the interwar period than in the preceding and succeeding periods.

This period corresponded to the time between the two World Wars. Unlike European countries, the end of World War I slipped for several years for these two as Turkey had to fight the War of Independence, which ended only in 1922. Turkey achieved international recognition for its independence by late 1923 with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Soviets had to fight a civil war and a limited local war with their neighbour Poland, ending all hostilities by 1921. By late 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established. Thus, both countries moved out of a war posture by 1923, and both armies stood down, embarking on their routine bureaucratic work in their respective countries.

After centuries of confrontational positioning of the armed forces of both countries, they entered a period characterized by non-aggression and cooperation between them. The period in consideration opened with high hopes and the belief that both the Turkish National Army and the Soviet Red Army shared the same cause, with a similar spirit and identical aims. An influential author of the Ankara government's newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, Hüseyin Ragıp (Baydur), who later served twice as Turkish ambassador to Moscow between 1929-1934 and 1943-1944, noted in his article published in February 1921 that "both armies were born out of the spirit of Asia against the oppression and imperialism of Europe and they are twins in action, method and success." [2] These were formative years for Turkey's National Army and the Red Army. Both were positioned as vanguards of the newly established regimes in their respective countries and regarded as a bulwark against imperial designs from outside and counterrevolutionary attempts from inside. Differing in size and capabilities, both armies sought ways to establish a capable military force, which was clear from the ideological, practical, and mental baggage of their imperial predecessors that they carried.

[2] Hüseyin Ragıp, "Milli Ordu- Kızıl Ordu," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 February 1921, 1: "Tarihin muhtelif devirlerinde birbirine müşabih bir çok vakayı mukadder; fakat Asya'nın ruhundan, Avrupa'nın zulmüne ve emperyalizmine karşı doğan bu iki ordu kadar, emelde usulde ve muvaffakiyette ikizlik arz eden bir hadise daha bulmak cidden müşküldür."

The early contacts of the nationalist forces in Anatolia, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk), with the Bolsheviks, who came to power in 1917, opened the way for political and military cooperation between the two countries. The Bolshevik leadership agreed by late 1919 to support the Anatolian national resistance, as the Bolsheviks perceived this as a fight against the imperial powers and an old regime, the Ottoman imperial government, which was part of the old imperial world. Despite their political, ideological, and cultural differences and differences in their future priorities, both powers engaged in military relations with each other. From Turkey's perspective, this relationship was unique and special, and it continued to be so in the following two decades, as Turkey could not receive any support from a major Western country during this period. From the Soviet perspective, although it managed to establish military cooperation with other countries in Europe and Asia, especially Germany, the military relations established with Turkey proved to be important for Soviet interests. Turkey pursued a non-adversarial policy with the Soviets, providing essential security for the Soviet Union in the south, extending from the Balkans to the Middle East and Asia, including the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

From early on, Turkey established not only political and military relations with the Soviet Union but also contact and cooperation in the cultural, economic, social, and educational spheres. However, under the general guidance of Turkish political leadership, military relations developed with constant interaction between the two large military bureaucracies of the two countries. The changing European security environment and the urgency felt in Turkey to keep up with preparations to create a modern Turkish army with deterrence capabilities provided a relatively more stable form of relationship in the military fields during the period under consideration. It can be argued that the contact base was much larger in the area of military relations compared to other areas when a variety of issue areas were considered, as Turkey was acting rationally to accomplish its aim of modernising its military. Relations in the military area were first established in terms of supplying weapons and ammunition, promoted by the exchange of visits and appointments of senior and prominent military figures for effect, and then expanded into various aspects of military areas, such as engaging in specialist training programs, weapon and

equipment transfers, facilitation in communication and logistics, observations at major military manoeuvres, and establishment of mechanisms to address problems on the borders.

The 1920s and the 1930s were the years when important new military technologies had to be incorporated into the armies, such as motorisation and mechanisation, as big drastic changes were offered by technology and industry to the service of the armies of the time. Armoured warfare, airborne capabilities such as the use of gliders and parachutes, and effective means of communication between units were some of the major areas to be injected into the material and mental fabric of militaries. Access to these new capabilities has been limited and was largely under the control of Western countries. From Turkey's perspective, the Soviet Union could assist Turkey in gaining access to these resources. Republican leaders were right in thinking so, as they managed to obtain these new items from the Soviets for a large part of the period under consideration. From Turkey's perspective, it was a "friendship that endured all sorts of challenges"[3] until the agreed understanding between them was disrupted by the Soviet change of mentality and attitude by positioning itself alongside the aggressor from Turkey's perspective in 1939 with the signing of the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact.[4] From the Soviet perspective, the turn in the course of relations was widely explained by Turkey's ambition to pursue a Western-aligned foreign policy after Mustafa Kemal Paşa's death.[5] With this major change occurring at the political level, the relations in military areas between the two shifted onto an entirely different footing and reverted back to a confrontational one, after which the

[3] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's address at the opening of the Parliament in November 1936. *Atatürk'ün TBMM Açık ve Gizli Oturumlarındaki Konuşmaları II,* ed. Kazım Öztürk (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992), 1114: "Her türlü tecrübeden geçmiş olan dostluğun".

[4] Aptülahat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, Birinci Kısım, 1919'dan Lozan Antlaşmasına Kadar* (İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1964), 89, 93.

[5] Quoting from *Le Monde* on 27 December 1962 which reported about Soviet ambassador Aralov's published memoirs, Turkish diplomat Aptülahat Akşin noted that, Aralov, who served in Ankara as a Soviet ambassador between 1922-1923, pointed out that relations deteriorated slowly after Atatürk's death and this had been the official Soviet view after 1939. See Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, 84. See also, Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2022), 236-38. This interpretation remained prevalent in the official Soviet historiography throughout the Soviet period. See Vladimir Alexandrov, *A Contemporary World History 1917-1945* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 411.

two military bureaucracies shifted to an adversarial stance, leaving the cordial atmosphere and good neighbourly relations in the past. During the Cold War, both regarded each other as military threats and as potential enemies.[6] Despite no actual clash occurring, they were adversaries closely watching each other's moves with a minimum level of military relationship between them.

1.1. Historiographical Discussion

Although Turkey and the Soviet Union interacted for centuries and the Soviet Union was regarded as Turkey's "great neighbour and friend" by Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself, secondary literature examining relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union has been limited.[7] Among other issues, such as language barriers, issues around access to archives, or difficulties in travelling to these areas, the single most important factor that limited academic research has been ideological pressures in the context of the Cold War. [8] The secondary literature in the Cold War years and after the end of it, where new types of studies with specific focus were carried out, largely left these issues out of the field of study. The absence of a general narrative to make sense of the long Turkish-Russian relations is still observed. Studies have focused on various intervals, such as the Ottoman-Russian relations or Turkish-Russian relations during the War of Independence, with a quick leap into examining the relations during World War II, and certainly, the majority deals with the confrontational Cold War era relations. It was never uncommon to see a statement where it was argued that Russian policy of aggression has not changed since the times of the Tsars throughout the Cold War, beginning in the early days.[9] This is synonymous with notions such as expansion, aggression, and imperialism that began almost 500 years ago.

---

[6] Aleksandr Kolesnikov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk- Rus İlişkileri,* trans. İlyas Kamalov (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2010), 20.

[7] Mustafa Kemal Paşa's address to opening of the parliament in November 1930, November 1931 and 1938 (read by Prime Minister Celal Bayar). He referred to the Soviet Union as "büyük komşu ve dostumuz" or "büyük dostumuz". See *Atatürk'ün TBMM Açık ve Gizli Oturumlarındaki Konuşmaları,* 1076, 1083, 1150.

[8] Erel Tellal, *SSCB- Türkiye İlişkileri 1953-1964* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2020), 16.

[9] Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs,* 27/3 (April 1949): 459.

This sequence created a disconnect in explaining why suddenly two nations that fought successive wars, number of which ranged from seven to around a dozen, in the last 250 years[10] became friends in the 1920s, and why did this friendship suddenly disappear by the end of World War II? Therefore, attempts to explain interwar period relations by the narratives of the preceding or succeeding periods usually fell short of offering a satisfactory explanation. For the interwar period, this mainly stemmed from ignoring the military relationship between the two countries, which formed an important part of their relations during this period.

The absence of a general construct on the character of their relations in the interwar period led to various arguments, such as the argument that Turkey and the Soviet Union became enemies due to a misunderstanding or by tales fabricated by the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Selim Sarper, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry General Secretary, Feridun Cemal Erkin, in 1945, at the end of World War II, with the aim of moving Turkey to the American orbit.[11] Another example is a striking argument claiming that the Soviet Union had an intention to invade Turkey. As the argument suggested, based on a misinterpreted article by General Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, the Red Army developed military plans to organize thrusts into neighbouring countries and establish its rule with the help of locals.[12] Although Tukhachevsky wrote the article with its neighbour Poland in mind and this article was an early work on formulating what was to be known as the Soviet "Deep Operation" the absence of a construct enabled the author to make this claim. Similarly, due to the Imperial Russian and Cold War Soviet adversarial interplay, various authors on intelligence history saw no harm in claiming that the Soviets and Russians were the eternal enemies of Turkey, a great nemesis in the field of espionage, and that Russian spies were always engaged in nefarious acts against

[10] Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets,"450 and Girgin, *Ruslarla Kavgadan Derin Ortaklığa*, xv.

[11] Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler 1908-1978 İkinci Kitap* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1987), 302, 307. Although he discusses wider structural external and internal developments, the understanding that Sarper misunderstood Molotov argument became synonymous with Küçük. He clearly noted on page 302 that although these are the case, the reason was more structural and with its class structure and current general and special conditions Turkey wanted to get into the American orbit by that date.

[12] Yıldırım Koç, *SSCB'nin Türkiye'yi İşgal Girişimleri: Eski TKP ve Anti Kemalist Faaliyetler* (Ankara: Pankuş Yayınları, 2024), 34-43.

Turkey. In response, there were others, with their ideological affinity to the left, communism, or Marxism, claiming that Turkey won the War of Independence with Russian help, as it provided weapons and later helped build factories in Turkey. These claims continue to oscillate between the extreme ends, just like a pendulum. Overlooking the Soviet influence in models to be implemented in engaging society in the war preparation efforts and in giving transferrable skills to the youth in peacetime for an approaching war, led scholars to fill this vacuum by drawing far-fetched parallels between Republican Turkey and fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. All these will be addressed and covered in detail in the relevant chapters of the thesis.

In addition to difficulties in studying relations with the Soviet Union, studying military affairs has also proved to be so, as studying strategy, in the sense of using force, in International Relations was not seen as being compatible with the International Relations discipline's original foundations.

After World War II, Turkey chose its side and decided to be on the Western bloc. Having effects far beyond the political domain, this had consequences on all aspects of life in the Republic, from the economy to development plans, from history writing to social practices in the decades to follow. The key principle of adopting Western practices with critical tailoring to the Republic's needs and autonomy to shape its own path gradually disappeared. This was evident in examining the role of the military in the state and in Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, which was positioned as the arch-enemy of the West and its values. Naturally, studying Turkish-Soviet relations in the interwar period, let alone the military aspects of it, was left out of history during the Cold War years, which lasted until recently.

The strong Western-oriented approach, evident in all aspects of modern times, adds an additional layer of complexity to the study of military affairs. In his preface to the edited volume, *The Cambridge History of Warfare,* Geoffrey Parker noted that "for good or ill, over the past two centuries the Western way of war has become dominant all over the world." [13] In addition to this perceived superiority in the way wars were

[13] Geoffrey Parker, "Preface," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare,* ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), vii.

fought, the Western hegemonic position, being on top of the pyramid with its economic, scientific, technological, and cultural supremacy, according to this line of thinking, presented the West with the right to endorse the Western way of studying warfare in academia and beyond. Parker presents a solid framework of what constitutes the Western way of war. For him, the pillars of these were heavy reliance on superior technology over numbers, importance attached to high discipline, remarkable continuity in military theory- from Ancient Greek Hoplites to contemporary American and British troops, aggressive military tradition aiming at total defeat and destruction of the enemy, and unique ability in the export of violence to other geographies. [14] This, in return, provided the West with military and naval superiority for "most part of the 2,500 years" making it immune to suffering invasion by others, and enabling it to control most of the world, reaching 85% of it by 1914, and still giving it levers to retain its capability to control others in the contemporary period.[15]

The reductionist and triumphal approaches persisted in academia and the popular domain for decades, with others issuing works along these lines. [16] After World War I, the study of war or the use of force was already out of fashion, only to gain academic credibility in the 1960s. [17] These studies were built on Quincy Wright's comprehensive empirical analysis in *The Study of War*.[18] Strategic studies in the International Relations discipline have been acknowledged as a subfield. However,

[14] Geoffrey Parker, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10.

[15] Parker, "Introduction," 11.

[16] These works were printed in early 1990s in days of absolute Western feeling of victory over the Soviet world when "history ended" and "liberal world triumphed". See for example John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) and Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009). In his book review for 2003 work of John A. Lynn, Lawrence Freedman noted that in his first two chapters Lynn quickly undermines the notion advanced by authors such as Keegan and Hanson that a distinctive version of Western way of war emerged from Ancient Greece. See John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America*, (Cambridge MA: Westview Press, 2003) and Lawrence D. Freedman, "Book Review," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2003), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2003-11-01/battle-history-combat-and-culture-ancient-greece-modern-america, accessed on 20 May 2023.

[17] Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), 12.

[18] Quincy Wright, *The Study of War* (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1942).

the role of military force has been studied only in general terms, in terms of the use or threat of use of force, and its application rarely descends into issues of tactics and logistics. [19] States needed a strategy because they were vulnerable; they could be created or destroyed by armed force.[20] In a way, they can be made or unmade depending on their plans, preparations, capabilities and actions. Since strategy was about how to win wars and use force, any strategy must begin with an understanding of war itself. [21] Moreover, understanding war cannot be achieved without exploring a full dataset, including the historical practices and experiences of other major armies. The wars of the past need to be studied, as Michael Howard pointed out, "to deduce either immutable principles or lines of development as guides to the efficient conduct of war in the future and so long as the organised use or threatened use of force still remains an instrument in the conduct of international relations".[22] As an advocate of the expansion of such studies, he also suggested that war needs to be studied not only in the framework of political history but also in the framework of economic, social, and cultural history. [23] As Carl von Clausewitz posited in his *On War,* published posthumously in 1832, "war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man's social existence".[24] Given human nature, war was neither an art nor a science but an act of human intercourse, which Michael Handel remarked as what we call today a social science.[25] There is no way to avoid looking closely at the study of war and the organisations tasked with conducting warfare, as it is an inseparable part of human existence and history.

---

[19] Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power," in *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 10.

[20] Freedman, "Strategic Studies," 11.

[21] Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, *Strategic Studies: A Reader* (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

[22] Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), ix.

[23] Howard, *War in European History*, x.

[24] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 149.

[25] Michael Handel, "Who is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz?: A Guide to the Perplexed," in *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 54.

Strategic studies, thriving after the 1960s, maintained their strong Western character and were developed in the most general terms to deal with ways to persuade all that the use of force was unacceptable, while working on ways to find an optimal use of its energy for the West to achieve its objectives by use of force. The powerful suggestion after World War I and during the Cold War that any interest in military studies would be 'militarism' in its derogatory and threatening form undermined interest for a long time by providing strong motivation not to pursue academic research in these areas. Yet, even within its permitted limits, the dominant Western perspective still prevailed, with additional doses of triumph after the 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Minor amendments were offered to the dense Western narrative, such as Parker's explanation in a new edition to acknowledge that his edited work was Eurocentric, but there were factors that would explain why that was the case. John Keegan put part of a section offering an overview of samples from the military experience of indigenous native peoples in some distant parts of the world and others to his work, 90% of which explained the actions of the West.[26] However, the trajectory was now in favour of more work examining military history within a larger context by including others' histories.

Another parallel development contributed to opening the way for examination of military and war in the IR discipline. Historical sociological studies challenged the ahistoricism of IR and highlighted the role of institutions and the usefulness of examining bureaucracy in understanding developments.[27] Nevertheless, it excludes the major parts of non-Western systems. Considering the already difficult relationship between the field of history and the discipline of IR, where the latter usually develops narratives based on selected historical events and develops large frameworks reaching definitive conclusions, the histories of others could not find a place in the field. As George Lawson noted, forms of ahistoricism are forged by the working practices of IR scholarship itself, as mainstream approaches adopt a form of using history as scripture, using history in order to code findings, mine data, or as a

[26] See for example his part on Easter Island Polynesians, Zulus, Mamelukes and Samurais. Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 24-46.

[27] Faruk Yalvaç, "Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Jeopolitik, Kapitalizm ve Devletler Sistemi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler,* 10/38 (2013): 5-6.

source of post-factum explanations, and see it as the if only realm of uncertainty.[28] For much of its disciplinary history, IR has studied the workings of a small part of the world (the West) using a relatively sparse analytical lens.[29] Historical sociology discusses militaries and wars, and opens the way for the inclusion of others' experiences in these areas.[30]

Armies and wars occupy the center stage in historical sociology.[31] The army as an institution cannot be considered in abstract terms to be judged by its actions during war. It plays a role during peacetime and may weigh heavily in the formulation of a country's strategy. The perception of the army regarding its current capabilities and battle worthiness and readiness for the next war may have serious implications for the foreign policy to follow. This illustrates the strength of the perception of the potential implications of war on the fate of a state and its nation. Charles Tilly in his *Coercion, Capital and European States* put it as "war made states and vice-versa".[32] He historically placed the role of wars in state formation and the shaping of a state's internal and external relations. In all its complexity, the predominance of the urge to maintain the country's security was placed above all considerations, being appreciative of the fact that wars would make or break states. War is the most existential of all human experiences, and no other institution has thought so much about a possible conflict as the military, since they consider how to allocate resources, adapt training, and figure out plans.[33] The capabilities of the military bureaucracy can also contribute to averting threats or deterring adversaries preventing wars.

---

[28] George Lawson, "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations,* 18/2 (2021): 205.

[29] *Global Historical Sociology*, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1.

[30] *Global Historical Sociology*, 12.

[31] Tarak Barkawi, "States, Armies, and Wars in Global Context," in *Global Historical Sociology*, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2.

[32] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 1992), 67-91.

[33] This was the case in the past and still valid today as increasingly more senior voices attempt to frame the future where Russia would launch an attack against the West. In that context see Florence Gaub and Andrew Monaghan, "How Russia Sees the Next War," *Engelsberg Ideas,* 28 October 2025, https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/how-russia-sees-the-next-war/, accessed on 24 November 2025.

Although interest in the study of war and military affairs gained status in academia, other factors continued to limit its remit. During the Cold War years, again under a strong but waning, Western-dominant way of understanding, military studies took a path proceeded along two main principles: First, it focused primarily on any army's position in the domestic political system and judged it with regard to its adherence and loyalty to democratic values as desired by the Western values; second, it examined it from the perspective of which Western side they were on or were modelled on. In Turkey's case, this created a major problem in assessing the Turkish military's role in the 1920s and the 1930s, as the former category was inapplicable and, in reality, should not have been relevant, if we consider the fact that every situation was unique and shaped by its own dynamics, priorities, and historical contexts. These factors pushed authors writing on the Turkish military to focus on seeking traces of conflict between key military characters, with politicians, and unearth their fight for power rather than examining the military as an institution with its organisation, mindset, capabilities, needs, and preparations. Regarding the latter point, the authors tried to put forward a framework in which the Turkish Army was portrayed as strictly copying the Prussian/German model until the end of World War II and then shifting to strictly copying the American model. This argument posited that the Prussian/German experience during the Ottoman period continued during the Republican period without a pause, largely ignoring the prevailing spirit in those years that had been seeking ways to introduce the Turkish point of view and acting with a desire for autonomy and the existence of military thinking, exploring others' experiences to come forward with a unique rational model that would work for them. The Turkish military in the interwar period worked hard to introduce Turkish military history into world military history. Republicans wanted a space for 'Turks' in the Western narrative that denied access to others' experiences.

Therefore, affected by these factors and to be in conformity with the limitations set for them, the majority of works developed along these lines of obsessively checking the army's role in democracy, and the model of the Turkish military fit within the Western framework.[34] Such studies have always remained partial and problematic

[34] Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981); Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After

because they ignore the basic scientific principle that calls for the evaluation of available data. However, a significant part of the data about the experience of other cultures was left out, but conclusions were reached to be employed uniformly across all cultures. The views in them were formed retrospectively by not using primary sources but by dwelling on secondary sources modelled along the lines of works noted in the first point above by repeating them. In these repetitions, the prevailing spirit in those years that aimed to reach out to other experiences, develop its own standpoint, and place Turkey in world history is ignored. When the above factors and limitations are combined, they impose another inevitable difficulty in examining relations with another outcast and enemy of Western values, that is, the Soviet Union. Overall, these factors created difficulties in studying Turkey's military relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The works below reflect the problematic situation observed in the secondary literature.

During the Cold War, Turkish academic literature examining Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union began with studies that evaluated these relations as part of general Turkish foreign policy studies. Relations with the Soviets were covered within the context of Turkey's general foreign policy issues and political history, together with other countries or limited to one particular period, such as the War of Independence, or to one particular subject area, such as the Turkish Straits. These studies usually focus on diplomatic relations, details about agreements, protocols signed, and the reactions of these two countries to developments in other parts of the world. The authors were often former Turkish diplomats or academics who trained the diplomatic corps. An early example of such a study is the work of the prominent

1980," in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 137-58; William Hale, "Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective," in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 159-75; George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 177-200; Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: TİMAŞ Yayınları, 2010); Cengiz Sunay, *Türk Siyasetinde Sivil-Asker İlişkileri* (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2010); İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker, "Ordu, Devlet, Güvenlik Siyaseti Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 1-32; Emre Sencer, *Ordu ve Millet* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018); Hıdır Göktaş and Metin Gülbay *Kışladan Anayasaya Ordu: Siyasi Kültürde TSK'nin Yeri* (İstanbul: Siyahbeyaz Metis Güncel, 2004); Hikmet Özdemir, *Rejim ve Asker* (İstanbul: AFA Yayıncılık, 1989) and William Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset, trans. Ahmet Fethi* (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayın, 2014).

Turkish statesman, diplomat, and academic Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. His work, *Yeni Türkiye Devleti'nin Harici Siyaseti* (Foreign Policy of the New Turkish State), has seen several revised reprints since 1934. [35] Turkish diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin's 1968 work *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Turkish-Soviet Relations and the Straits Issue) examined the relations with a particular focus on Russian and Soviet ambitions over the Turkish Straits. [36] Erkin covered relations from the time of 1936 Montreux Conference, and he drafted his work in 1952 and 1953 finally getting it published with amendments in 1968. The most prominent examples of studies evaluating relations as part of general Turkish foreign policy studies are those of Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar. Their work, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası 1919-1938* (Atatürk and Turkey's Foreign Policy 1919-1938) was printed in 1963 and has chapters on the establishment of Turkish-Soviet relations and their development until the death of Atatürk in 1938. [37] Gönlübol and Sar continued this style in an expanded version with the contribution of other scholars in their work titled *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy through Events), which was first printed in 1968 and later expanded in new editions. [38] These works were the main references for studying Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and all other major powers until the late 1990s. In these works, military relations are not mentioned, and the focus remains on the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of relations. These works had the consent of the Turkish establishment, with support from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Kamuran Gürün provided the first volume in 1991, focusing on Turkish-Soviet relations between 1920 and 1953 with his work *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953* (Turkish-Soviet Relations 1920-1953).[39] Another Turkish ambassador and academic Suat Bilge got his work published in 1992 focusing on Turkish Soviet relations between 1920-1964 with his work titled

[35] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1934).

[36] Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Beşnur Matbaası, 1968).

[37] Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar. *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1919- 1938)* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963).

[38] Mehmet Gönlübol, Cem Sar, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Oral Sander, Haluk Ülman, Suat Bilge and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919- 1973* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974).

[39] Kamuran Gürün, *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri 1920- 1953* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010).

Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964 (A Difficult Neighbourhood: Turkey-Soviet Union Relations 1920-1964).[40] He chose to use the term "difficult neighbourhood" in the book title to refer to the difficult aspects of the relationship between the two states as experienced by Turkish diplomats during the Cold War years.

One exceptional work in this category needs to be cited here as it stands out in terms of depth allocated specifically to relations with the Soviet Union. In his *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi* (Atatürk's Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy), the first volume of which was published in 1964 and the second in 1966, retired ambassador Aptülahat Akşin devoted an entire chapter to an in-depth account of Turkey's relations with Russia from 1919 to 1939.[41] Akşin joined the Turkish Foreign Ministry during the War of Independence and served until the late 1950s. He witnessed the beginnings of relations with the Bolsheviks and their later development throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, and certainly the end of their cordial and cooperative characteristics during the Cold War. Akşin examined relations in three periods from mid- 1919 to 16 March 1921 when an agreement was signed in Moscow between Bolsheviks and the Grand National Assembly. The second period is from the signing of this agreement in 1921 to August 1922, when the national forces under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) won a decisive military victory. Akşin noted this was a period of pause on both sides. The last period was from 1923, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, to August 1939, when the German and Soviet foreign ministers signed an agreement. According to Akşin, this final third period was an entirely new chapter in their relations, as it was characterised by mutual trust and equal and good neighbourly relations. During this period, their cooperation served the best interests of both nations. In terms of military relations, Akşin does not go into any details like other works in this category, except for providing details of General Voroshilov's visit to Ankara in 1933. [42] His focus is again on political and diplomatic aspects rather than military ones.

[40] A. Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964* (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992).

[41] Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri,* 56-94.

[42] Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri,* 85.

The Turkish General Staff also published works during the Cold War, focusing on relations with the Soviets. Early examples of those are the books written by Tahsin Berkman with title *Tarihte Türk- Rus Mücadelesi ve Sonuçları* (The Turkish-Russian Struggle in History and Its Results) in 1951 and by A. M. Ataç with title *Rusya Tarihi, Türkler ve Komşuları ile Münasebetleri* (History of Russia, Relations with the Turks and Its Neighbours) in 1952. [43] Berkman's work covers the history of Turkish–Russian relations from the 14th century until the publication date with no reference to the 1920s or 1930s. He claims that the struggle had been ongoing for centuries with "no change in Russian policy, Russian deceitfulness and Russian fraudulence…Throughout its entire history, they knew to choose the weak moment of its adversary". [44] More than two decades later, another work by retired general Muzaffer Erendil was published by the Turkish General Staff in 1975. Erendil based his work on the works of Bayur, Erkin, and other secondary sources. Although it was a small booklet, he shared a long summary of the establishment of relations from the 1920s to the end of World War II, emphasizing the Turkish Straits' importance.[45] Following Berkman's precedence, Erendil also began his work in the early centuries and emphasised centuries of competition to frame the confrontational nature of the two countries' relationship.

In 1965, Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi (Armed Forces Academy) at Yıldız in İstanbul published a study titled *Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri,* (Turkish-Soviet Relations). [46] It was a print copy of the conferences given at the Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi in the 1965-1966 academic year by Pertev Subaşı, who was a director-general at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Subaşı covered the period from Brest-Litovsk in 1918 until the publication of the booklet. He covered the positive aspects of the 1920s and the 1930s in a relatively factual manner. His main observation was that Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union followed the same course as that with Tsarist Russia,

[43] Tahsin Berkman, *Tarihte Türk- Rus Mücadelesi ve Sonuçları* (Ankara: Genelkurmay 1. No Basımevi, 1951) and A. M. Ataç, *Rusya Tarihi, Türkler ve Komşuları ile Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Erkanı Umumi Riyaseti Basımevi, 1952).

[44] Berkman, *Tarihte Türk- Rus Mücadelesi ve Sonuçları*, 52: "Rus hilesinde, Rus sahtekarlığında değişen hiçbir şey yoktur….Rusya bütün tarihi boyunca hasmının zayıf anını seçmesini bilmiştir."

[45] Muzaffer Erendil, *Türk- Rus İlişkileri* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1975).

[46] Pertev Subaşı, *Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi, 1965).

which was essentially defined by Russia's perception of itself, whether powerful or weak, vis-à-vis Turkey. Based on the Russian perception, the tone of the relationship was determined. Subaşı argued that when Russia felt powerful, its approach was tough on Turkey, and during times of weakness, it approached Turkey to establish cooperation.[47] This is a different way of noting what Berkman noted in a blunter manner above, as he emphasised the perceived sinister nature of the Russian attitude in his own style of writing. This is a reflection of the shared assessment expressed on different occasions and platforms by many Turkish political and military bureaucrats, who tend to see the entire initiative as being on the Russian side, as Russia decides the nature of the relationship, and once Russia changes, Turkey has little to change the course. Certainly, the period in which Subaşı delivered his lecture was the post-Stalin years, when there had been a certain level of calm and efforts to signal positive messages in Turkish-Soviet relations, with mutual steps taken toward redeveloping cooperation between the two.

In addition to the above works, which had a more official or semi-official nature, tried to maintain a degree of balance (excluding Berkman's work) and keep a certain academic level, there were works in the Cold War period true to the ideological atmosphere of those years, trying to persuade readers on either the adversarial or friendly nature of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union without much academic concern. On the one hand, there were works that had overwhelmingly anti-Russian and anti-communist tones. These dwell on already abundant material from decades of confrontational relations between Russians and Turks and point to the suffering of ethnic Turks from Crimea deep into Central Asia, who were believed to have been held captive by the Communists. A widely held concern in these circles was that the Russians harboured sinister aims of controlling Turkey. These types of works usually ignored any type of relations between the two in the 1920s and the 1930s. Notable select ones in chronological order were *Türk-Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi* (History of the Turkish-Russian Struggle) in 1949 by Yahya Okçu, *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri* (Turkish-Russian Relations Throughout History) in 1960 by Haluk F. Gürsel and *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi* (History of Turkish-Russian Relations) in 1969 by Ali Kemal Meram and *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Atatürk'ün*

[47] Subaşı, *Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri*, 2.

Sovyet Politikası (Atatürk's Soviet Policy During the War of Independence) by Mehmet Saray in 1984.[48] Okçu's work was printed in 1949, and he signed his introduction with his military rank as 'Major Yahya Okçu.' Although this was not an official military publication, he noted that as he could not find any publication warning about the Russian menace, he embarked on writing this book to warn the Turkish people, as he had grown up with tales of Russian violence from his grandmother.[49]

In contrast, some works positioned themselves on the opposite side and tried to emphasise the friendship and brotherhood that had been established between the two countries in the 1920s and the 1930s, which could have continued had these efforts not been sabotaged or derailed by deliberate attempts. They argued that relations could be repositioned on friendly and cooperative pillars for the benefit of both peoples. Notable works in this category can be listed chronologically as *Türk- Sovyet Halklarının Kardeşliği* (Brotherhood of the Turkish-Soviet Peoples) by Cevdet Alsan in 1976; *Savaş ve Dostluk: Türk Sovyet İlişkileri* (War and Friendship: Turkish-Soviet Relations) by a socialist author and politician İbrahim Sırrı Topçuoğlu in 1979 and *Atatürk Döneminde Sovyet-Türk İlişkileri* (Soviet-Turkish Relations During the Atatürk Era) by Dimitır Vandov in 1982 in Germany in Turkish. [50] Vandov worked for 40 years for the Bulgarian Intelligence Service, during which he spent 15 years in Turkey. [51] In his work covering many aspects of relations during the time of Atatürk, he devoted an entire chapter to military affairs during the 1920s and the 1930s, primarily based on material from the Turkish press of the time as well as on Russian official sources. Vandov's work can be singled out as the first study that provided an

[48] Yahya Okçu, *Türk- Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1949), Haluk F. Gürsel, *Tarih Boyunca Türk- Rus İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1960), Ali Kemal Meram, *Türk- Rus İlişkileri Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi, 1969) and Mehmet Saray, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası* (İstanbul: Veli Yayınları, 1984).

[49] Okçu, *Türk- Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi*, 6-7.

[50] Cevdet Alsan, *Türk- Sovyet Halklarının Kardeşliği* (İstanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 1976), İbrahim Sırrı Topçuoğlu, *Savaş ve Dostluk: Türk Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Bilimsel İş Yayını, 1979) and Dimitır Vandov, *Atatürk Döneminde Sovyet-Türk İlişkileri* (Frankfurt: İnfograph, 1982) which was also reprinted by Kaynak Yayınları in 2014 as Dimitır Vandov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014).

[51] From the biography of Vandov provided by the publisher in the beginning of the 2014 edition of the book. Vandov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 5.

effort into the aspects of military relations. However, he chose to present only the highlights and presented an overly positive picture of military relations by listing visits, material transfers, and positive comments in the press.[52]

Finally, the last group of works produced in the Cold War years focused entirely on the establishment of relations between the National Forces in Anatolia and the Bolsheviks in Russia. The main concern was to understand the Soviet aid to the Turkish Grand National Assembly and examine the state of affairs between them during the Turkish War of Independence. The 1967 PhD dissertation by Halil İbrahim Karal is an early example.[53] Stefanos Yerasimos's book *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (Turkish-Soviet Relations), which examines the establishment of relations and Soviet aid, was published in 1979.[54] Written during the final years of the Cold War that was printed shortly after the Soviet disintegration, in his work *Kurtuluş Savaşına Denizden Gelen Destek: Sovyetler Birliğinden Alınan Yardımlar, Kuva-yı Milliye Donanması* (Naval Support for the War of Independence: Aid Received from the Soviet Union, the National Force's Navy) that was published in 1992, Erol Mütercimler focused on the military aid obtained from the Soviets during the War of Independence.[55] These covered the period from the end of the Tsarist and Ottoman empires to the end of the Turkish War of Independence.

The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on scholars planning to embark on research that would examine various aspects of Turkish-Soviet relations. In the absence of ideological pressure, exchanges and joint academic programs became possible. Academics with command of both languages and access to archival sources created an environment conducive to works that touched upon areas that were not previously covered in the political, economic, or social fields. In this group notable authors could be cited as Erel Tellal and Onur İşçi in bilateral relations and

[52] Vandov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri*, 283-304.

[53] Halil İbrahim Karal, "Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey 1918- 1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution" (PhD Diss., University of California, Los Angeles: 1967).

[54] Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979).

[55] Erol Mütercimler, *Kurtuluş Savaşına Denizden Gelen Destek: Sovyetler Birliği'nden Alınan Yardımlar, Kuva-yı Milliye Donanması* (İstanbul: Yaprak Yayınları, 1992).

diplomatic affairs; Mehmet Perinçek in political affairs and beyond and Samuel J. Hirst and Erdal Bilgiç on economic relations. These authors, having command of the Russian language, accessed archival material in Turkey, Russia, and elsewhere to construct a historical understanding of various aspects of the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union.[56]

Perinçek's 2021 work focused on the military aspects of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the South Caucasus from 1919 to 1922. This study is important because it focuses only on military aspects. As Perinçek noted in his preface, although various aspects of Turkish-Soviet relations have been studied, no study framing this from a military perspective has been done.[57] His work accomplished this within a specific timeframe between 1919-1922 and in a specific geographical area, namely, Turkey's Eastern Front and the Soviet South Caucasus Front. He relied extensively on Soviet and Russian archival sources rather than Turkish archival sources. From the Russian perspective, this gap in the examination of military relations was highlighted by another scholar. In his book chapter, "Industry and the Soviet Army 1928-1941", David R. Stone noted in the "Further Research" section that since the opening of the Soviet archives, unfortunately, relatively little research has been done on the Red Army during this period.[58] He

[56] Erel Tellal, "1923- 1939: SSCB'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'dan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. I (1919- 1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022), 314- 24; Tellal, *SSCB- Türkiye İlişkileri*; Onur İşçi, "Russophobic Neutrality: Turkish Diplomacy, 1936-1945" (PhD Diss., Georgetown University, 2014); Onur İşçi, "The Massigli Affair and its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy After the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact", *Journal of Contemporary History,* 55/2 (2020): 271-96; Onur İşçi, *Turkey and Soviet Union During WWII: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019); Onur İşçi, "Yardstick of Friendship: Soviet-Turkish Relations and the Montreux Convention of 1936," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 21/4 (2020): 733-62; Samuel J. Hirst and Onur İşçi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian- Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development," *Diplomatic History,* 44/5 (2020): 834-59; Samuel J. Hirst, *Against the Liberal Order: The Soviet Union, Turkey and Statist Internationalism 1919-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024); Mehmet Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün Sovyetler'le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007); Mehmet Perinçek, *Türk- Rus Diplomasisinden Gizli Sayfalar* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011); Mehmet Perinçek, *Rus Devlet Arşivlerinden 150 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2012); Mehmet Perinçek, *Kafkasya'da Türk- Sovyet Askeri İşbirliği (1919- 1922)* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2021); Erdal Bilgiç, *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk- Sovyet Ekonomik İlişkileri* (Ankara: Efil Yayınları, 2021) and Erdal Bilgiç, *Sanayi Planları ve Sovyet Kredisi* (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2023).

[57] Perinçek, *Kafkasya'da Türk- Sovyet Askeri İşbirliği*, 15.

[58] David R. Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army 1928- 1941," in *The Military History of the Soviet Union*, ed. Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 77.

noted that "Exceptions are welcome but sparse compared to the work done on other aspects of Soviet history. All facets of the interwar Red Army still await serious archival-based research".[59] In pointing to areas awaiting further research, Stone noted that "Soviet technical and economic cooperation with countries other than Germany is terribly understudied as are the Soviet Union's military relations with governments and political parties in the developing world, particularly China and Turkey".[60]

The above-mentioned new studies largely dwell on archival material combined with a critical re-reading of secondary sources, with authors having command of the language pair. These authors provided academic literature with new works on the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural aspects of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, focusing on the entirety of the timeline of relations in the interwar period or on a specific timeframe. However, none have provided a focused look at military relations between the two countries, either in general or in a limited specific timeframe covering the period from 1923 to 1939. This thesis aims not to follow the traces of military relations retrospectively in the light of perspectives set during the Cold War but rather to dwell mainly on the developments of the period with a strong desire to understand perspectives based on the developments in that period by relying on primary sources and investigating concepts, rhetoric, and narratives of that period. Therefore, understanding the perspective of the Turkish military bureaucracy of the time with its structure, mindset, needs, and constraints and to put forward a clear understanding of how military leadership approached issues back then, would be key in developing such an approach.

1.2. Thesis Outline

This thesis used data derived from both primary and secondary sources. It extensively refers to official publications of the Turkish military bureaucracy, most of which were published in Ottoman Turkish before 1928 and are available through some library collections, including the author's own collection. It also draws on other

[59] Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army," 77.

[60] Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army," 77.

material from the period in the form of photos, documents, maps, charts, newspapers, and journal articles. It benefits from material from various archives and libraries and from critical reading of published secondary literature.

In the chapters of the thesis, key areas of Turkish-Soviet cooperation pertaining to military aspects will be examined. Some chapters address Turkey's needs, while others address Turkey's concerns, which, in any case, were all Turkey's objectives that it tried to achieve rationally by entering into a cooperation with a major power with a technological edge, industrial power, and willingness to provide military support to the Turkish Army. The chapters are thematic and chronologically investigate a specific aspect of military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union during the period. It follows the course of the bureaucracy receiving the tasking from the political authority, setting off priorities and identifying needs, developing an understanding of the corresponding bureaucracy, and engaging with its interlocutor on various key policy areas. Based on this framework, the chapters of this thesis are structured as follows.

Chapter 2 outlines the main characteristics of the Turkish military bureaucracy in the interwar period as it transitioned into peacetime, outlining how the military bureaucracy was positioned within the Turkish state, especially vis-à-vis political authority, and how it identified its needs. Here, I argue that the unique characteristics of the Turkish military bureaucracy in this period made reaching out to the Soviet military possible and these characteristics enabled it to sustain a positive working relationship throughout the period.

Chapter 3 examines the Turkish military's perception and understanding of Soviet military power. For most countries, in the interwar period, the Red Army remained an uncharted territory over which they could not develop a sense of understanding as to what it really was, as exemplified by British Prime Minister Churchill's famous enigma description.[61] The situation was significantly different for the Turkish military. The political steer given to the Turkish military bureaucracy was to develop a sound understanding of the Red Army, as the Soviet Union was the only country

[61] William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Enigma* (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1944), 1.

that seemed like a rational option to enter into an engagement that could help Turkey meet its pressing defence and security needs. Turkish officers developed their understanding by monitoring foreign military publications, intelligence publications, and bilateral engagements during visits to the Soviet Union. Russian language skills within the officer corps and the efforts of the Office of Military Attaché in Moscow greatly facilitated this process. Here, I argue that in the interwar period, these activities and efforts enabled the Turkish military to sketch out an unprecedentedly clear picture of the Red Army, never seen either before or after this period in Turkish history. During this period, the Red Army was not an enigma for the Turkish National Army. This information accumulation enabled Turkish officers to make assessments that would hold until World War II.

Chapter 4 examines military diplomacy and cooperation, focusing on diplomatic engagements between the Turkish and Soviet military bureaucracies and the extent of military cooperation established during the interwar period in an attempt to discover how the Turkish military bureaucracy contributed to the overall Turkish state policy of expanding its relationship with the Soviet Union in support of its foreign policy objectives. The military's representative performance in diplomatic relations and its use as a symbol are considered. In addition to the well-established and functioning institution of the deployment of military attachés, two states that were outcasts in the European political-military architecture and wary of third-party intervention in their relations preferred to utilise military figures, military symbolism, and visits of military vessels to accelerate engagement, prove the importance attached to the relationship, and deliver results overcoming propaganda and misunderstandings instigated by other actors. Regarding military cooperation, both militaries benefited from an understanding achieved to address their transactional and immediate needs, creating an atmosphere of trust and acceptable levels of cooperation, with each relying on the other. In military cooperation, attention was given to acts that required neither heavy investment nor the creation of complicated mechanisms. In such cooperation during peacetime from 1923 to 1939, both benefited from these transactional acts, almost as if they were gestures, and this cooperation eased the way to continue their relationship. Their cooperation was always affected by their interaction with third parties. I argue that both sides employed the use of the military

in their representative performances to speed up engagement and prove the importance attached to their relationship. Through military cooperation, Turkey achieved the means to pursue policies that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish due to its limited resources and its failure to be accepted by major European powers, except for the Soviet Union.

Chapter 5 examines the borderlands between the two countries. Both Turkish and Soviet military bureaucracies, which played a leading role in border management, constantly engaged with each other along the borders and beyond. I demonstrate that despite the existence of potentially confrontational issues, neither state opted to let these issues get out of hand or allowed these issues to escalate to a level that would spiral into a major crisis between the two states, keeping intact the secure border and secure Eastern rear perceptions of the Turkish political-military leadership that had begun during the War of Independence and continued until the eve of World War II.

Chapter 6 examines military economics and the transfer of technology and know-how, where aid and trade in defence provided tangible benefits for Turkey from the Soviet Union. In this chapter I explain that military economics, aid, and trade formed the solid basis and rationale for entering into a successful working relationship and sustaining it all through to the end of the period with the Soviet Union from the Turkish perspective. In addition, largely due to its own structural limitations and lack of necessary resources, although the Soviet Union was not impeding the process, the transfer of technology and know-how in the military sector had not been possible from the Soviet Union to Turkey during the interwar period and remained limited, leaving no traceable legacy.

Chapter 7 examines the surveillance, intelligence, and perception of threats regarding Turkey's efforts to manage risks and keep escalation under control. Monitoring the Soviet military was an integral part of Turkish military activities throughout this period. Here, I show that in the entire spectrum of military activities, where both tried to forge working relationships, only in the intelligence domain, the sides refrained from any interaction in the interwar period. I argue that this was not because of animosity, as often suggested, but due to the inherently adversarial and

deceptive nature of intelligence activities. Both military bureaucracies constantly collected intelligence on each other but remained disengaged from each other. This was a unique area where Turkey did not choose to adapt the Soviet model. Turkish military intelligence produced detailed products that enabled the Turkish system to have a clear understanding of the Red Army and the Soviets. In this difficult domain, both sides refrained from confrontation throughout the interwar years as per directions set by their respective political leaderships, as evidenced by the absence of blunders, scandals, or accidents.

Chapter 8 discusses the military and the role of society in defence of the country. It aims to examine how the Turkish military formulated technical roles to prepare for and implement them in the civilian sector of the country. The perception of the shape of the next war was critical in formulating these actions. Air raids and chemical attacks were the two most important concerns, and the Turkish Army led efforts in the civilian sector to create awareness and implement measures. On the other hand, mental preparation, morale, and keeping the idea of war in the back of people's minds were important factors. Without drafting more people and resorting to large-scale mobilisation, the Turkish Army sought ways to prepare society for war, enable youth to acquire transferable skills, primarily in aviation, and sustain a positive perception of the military. Turkey shared many basic perceptions with the Soviet Union on defence of the rear of the front. I argue that, in this field, Turkey examined models implemented in other European countries but benefited largely from the Soviet formulations in its preparations for creating mechanisms to defend the country against aerial and chemical attacks and from the Soviet way of involving its population, particularly its youth, in its war preparation efforts in the interwar period.

In the long history of interactions between the two countries, the interwar period remained distinctly different from the preceding and succeeding periods. The portrayal of relations in the interwar period fails to offer narratives that enable an understanding of the nature of these relations. Cold War narratives continue to dominate understanding, leading to inconsistencies and conflicting narratives. The thesis proposes to offer a narrative that would enable understanding of the relations by examining and outlining the military relations between the two countries, arguing

that the relationship in this area formed the largest part and could offer a narrative that informs the distinct nature of relations of this period.

CHAPTER 2

THE TURKISH MILITARY BUREACRACY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

In the following chapters of this thesis, various aspects of Turkey's military relations with the Soviet Union are examined. Before embarking on the analysis of these aspects, an understanding of the Turkish military bureaucracy is needed, as the period in question was different from the preceding and succeeding periods. Internal and external factors set the scene and shaped the developments in which the Turkish military bureaucracy operated. First, it was a peacetime period, and there was no mobilisation in the country. Second, the country and its army were not obliged to participate in any bilateral or multilateral alliance system. The relative autonomous character of Turkey has always been emphasised in studies focusing on the interwar period in terms of its political and diplomatic relations.[62] This was also evident in military relations. During this period, the Turkish Army severed ties with the past and took on a new form. It was a new entity in the making with a legacy of military culture and the senior leadership cadres of the past, trying to remain relevant in an entirely new world where science, technology, and industry changed the character of future war and where there was a strong anticipation of a new confrontation. All these factors play a role in explaining the military relations with the Soviet military.

Throughout this thesis, the main focus will be on the examination and analysis of the perceptions, actions, and interactions of the Turkish military bureaucracy. This would be in the framework of the term bureaucracy laid out and conceptualized by Max Weber, denoting both an organisation model and a management model. He presented bureaucracy as a legal authority that employed bureaucratic administrative

[62] Baskın Oran, "1923-1939: Göreli Özerlik-1," *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980, Vol. 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022), 242 and Hüner Tuncer, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi 1920-2002, Cilt 1* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2017), 111-2.

staff whose members were subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations that were organised in a clearly defined sphere of competence, organised in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices, who were in a free contractual relationship, selected on the basis of technical qualifications, and remunerated by fixed salaries.[63] This constituted a career where there was a system of promotion, and the official was entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his/her position, being subjected to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.[64] According to his conceptualization, this rational form of organization and management had superiority as it had a purely technical point of view capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and maintained the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control, making it superior to any other form in terms of precision, stability, stringency of discipline, and reliability.[65] It possessed the required technical knowledge, as bureaucratic administration fundamentally meant exercising control on the basis of knowledge, which was the feature that made it specifically rational according to Weber.[66] It was distinct from political authority and, therefore, as he noted, "the question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery?"[67]

Every political system develops its own course of action to maintain bureaucratic control. This would depend on many factors and would be particularly critical in the case of its military, which is essentially armed and holds a distinct characteristic of the state. Many studies in the literature focus on the efforts to dig out the bureaucracies' activities in this latter field of their relations with the political authority, risking missing the essential dimension of the actual tasking of the bureaucracy. Therefore, examining the relationship based on the perceptions and actions of bureaucracies would provide a sounder basis for understanding the historical dynamics and rationale behind military relations than using statements by

[63] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), 333.

[64] Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 334.

[65] Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 337.

[66] Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 339.

[67] Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 338.

politicians, press coverage, or anecdotal reflections by singular members of the militaries. Military bureaucracy has a primary role to fulfil, and almost all its organisation and work were designed to accomplish this. Deviations from this direction or exceptional instances do not alter this characteristic.

This chapter explores how the Turkish military bureaucracy defined itself, viewed its role, developed its relations with political authority, and generated its knowledge base on military science and military art. The chapter concludes that the unique character of the Turkish military bureaucracy in the interwar period was an important factor in facilitating the establishment of military relations with the Soviet military bureaucracy, and failing to grasp the interwar characteristics of the Turkish Army has always been one of the biggest reasons for missing out on the significance of the Turkish-Soviet military relations.

2.1. Transition into Peacetime

The Turkish government issued a decree on 19 September 1923, ending the mobilisation in the country declared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in September 1921 during the Turkish War of Independence.[68] In its session on 31 October 1923, the Turkish Parliament accepted this, and by 1 November 1923, general mobilisation was over.[69] This marked the end of military combat activity and warfare that began in 1912 with the Balkan Wars, which continued with World War I (1914-1918) and the War of Independence (1919-1922). In essence, some of the leading members of the officer corps had seen warfare without a break since the 1911 Ottoman-Italian War, and a smaller number had fought in the 1897 Ottoman-Greek War. The final major battle against the occupying Greek forces was won in August 1922, and the Turkish military reached İzmir on the Aegean Coast in September 1922. To acknowledge these achievements, diplomatic negotiations began in Lausanne in November 1922. Negotiations were difficult, and İstanbul and Thrace

[68]Devlet Arşivleri, Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Ankara [hereafter BCA], 30-18-1-1-7-34-12, 19 September 1923.

[69] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 153 (July 2023): 315-16 (Document 65 dated 4 November 1923).

were still under occupation. The Turkish Army was on high alert and was working on alternative scenarios, keeping in mind the possibility of resuming warfare, especially when there had been a breakdown in Lausanne negotiations between 4 February 1923 and 23 April 1923. The aim of the Turkish command in such a case was to use Turkish units in Thrace and Anatolia to expel the occupying forces from İstanbul.[70]

By late July 1923, being assured of reaching most of its aims and confident about the signing of the peace treaty, the Turkish Defence Ministry and General Staff initiated work on a gradual transition to a state of peace and the establishment of the new military structure.[71] The first step was the transfer of the General Staff and headquarters of the Western Front from İzmir to Ankara. Commander-in-chief and President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) wrote to the Chief of General Staff and the Commander of the Western Front Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak) on 19 July 1923, asking him to be present in Ankara at the parliamentary sessions, coordinate de-mobilisation, and start transferring the above-noted headquarters to Ankara.[72] On 29 July 1923, the Council of Ministers decided on the immediate speedy discharge of those who had completed their military service.[73] This was something Fevzi Paşa had long been wishing for, as during the breakdown of Lausanne negotiations, on 13 April 1923, he wrote to the General Staff that "from the situation it is understood that our enemies prolong political negotiations using different reasons to force our army to extend its mobilisation period and by this way to undermine our army and our financial strength".[74] Fevzi Paşa suggested that against these tricks and plots they had to be extremely cautious and adjust the size of army in proportion with the financial capabilities so that there

[70] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 133 (July 2014): 40-1 (Document 10 dated 21 December 1922).

[71] Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etütler Arşivi, Ankara [Military History and Strategic Studies Archive, hereafter ATASE], İstiklal Harbi Kataloğu [hereafter ISH], 1804-1, 31 July 1923.

[72] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 153: 1-3 (Document 1 and 1-1 dated 19 July 1923).

[73] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 153: 41-2 (Document 8 dated 29 July 1923).

[74] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 133: 310-12 (Document 43, 43-1 dated 13 April 1923): "Ordumuzu uzun müddet sefer-ber hâlde bulundurmağa mecbûr etmek için düşmanlarımızın muhtelif vesîleler ile müzâkerât-ı siyâsiyyeyi uzatmak ve bu sûretle ordumuzu ve kuvve-i mâliyyemizi za'fa düşürmek istediği ...(?) ahvâlden anlaşılmakdadır."

would not be a heavy burden.[75] He continuously suggested trimming personnel numbers and discharging soldiers to decrease financial pressure on the army.[76] Financial limitations and pressure to meet the army's essential needs were the main limiting factors for military leaders until World War II and beyond.

When more than 10 years of continuous wars were over, the new Republic faced challenges on all fronts. The country diplomatically forced the victors of World War I to recognize its achievements and existence through military force, but these countries treated the new Republic as an outcast, giving it no chance of survival and betting on its eventual failure. There was a considerable decrease in population from 1913 to 1927, the rate of urbanisation decreased, and major changes in demographic characteristics were observed during this period.[77] Within its 1923 borders, the population of 16.3 million in 1914 decreased to 13.6 million in 1927, signifying a 17% decline.[78] Republican leaders had the task of rebuilding the critical infrastructure, which was damaged, ruined, or non-existent.

As a positive development, the control of foreigners over the economy was lifted, economic independence was declared, and it was accepted by Western countries. The Republican regime embarked on establishing an economic regime based on the Western model, replacing foreign elements with national ones.[79] Soon after the conclusion of the War of Independence, improvements in macroeconomic indicators were observed, and Turkey managed to attain steady and fast growth in its national income.[80] There was a 19.8% increase from 1923 to 1924, and this increase was sustained in the following two years, followed by a decrease caused by global economic issues in 1927 and another increase in 1928 and 1929 until the global

[75] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 133: 310-12. (Document 43, 43-1 dated 13 April 1923).

[76] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 133: 342-43. (Document 47-2 dated 21 July 1923).

[77] Yahya S. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 97.

[78] Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, 97.

[79] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin. *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları* (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977), 34.

[80] Tekeli and İlkin. *1929 Dünya Buhranında*, 36.

depression in 1929.[81] Turkey was an agricultural country, with 49% of its national income based on agriculture, 38% on services, and only 13% on industrial production.[82] The industry remained in a rather primitive form during the early years.

The regime's priority was to accelerate the country's industrialisation.[83] As the regime was more concerned about the economy, development and social reforms, the army's share in the central budget gradually decreased in favour of other more vital and pressing civilian needs in peacetime. In the first budget prepared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1920, nominally 53% of resources were allocated to defence and war effort, but this allocation was higher as it did not indicate other resources spared for the war effort.[84] Due to the ongoing war, the central budget was not prepared for 1921, 1922, and 1923. The first budget was presented in 1924. Later, between 1924 and 1928, the share allocated to defence was 37.2%, between 1929-1933 it was 27.3% and between 1934-1938 it was 27.6%.[85] Military leaders had to operate within the constraints of manpower and financial resources.

The Turkish Army embarked on a reorganisation for the peace period. Army Commands were renamed Army Inspectorates, and commanders were now called "Ordu Müfettişi" rather than "Ordu Kumandanı" to reflect the peacetime atmosphere of the period.[86] For example, on 6 June 1919, when explaining the title of Mustafa Kemal Paşa to the British Commander, General Milne at the Ministry of Defence in occupied İstanbul, Kazım Paşa (Karabekir) explained the difference between commander and inspector by noting that "Since it is a peace time organisation the title is "Ordu Müfettişi" instead of "Ordu Kumandanı".[87] Three Army Inspectorates

[81] Tuncer Bulutay, Yahya S. Tezel and Nuri Yıldırım, *Türkiye Milli Geliri (1923- 1948)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), Table 8.2.C.

[82] Tekeli and İlkin. *1929 Dünya Buhranında*, 36.

[83] Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, 154.

[84] Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşının Mali Kaynakları* (Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı, 1974), 331.

[85] *Savunma ve Güvenlik Hizmetleri (1924-1993)* (Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Bütçe ve Mali Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993), 9.

[86] Afet (İnan), *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930), 4.

[87] *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 145 (July 2019): 54-5. (Document 12-1, 12-2, 12-3 dated 6 June 1919): "Ancak hazarî teşkîlât olduğu için ordu kumandanı değil ordu müfettişi ünvânını hâizdir."

were established: the 1st Army Inspectorate was in Ankara, the 2nd in Konya, and the 3rd in Diyarbakır[88] (Figure 2.1). Under these commands, nine corps were established in the army. These were the 1st Corps in Afyonkarahisar, the 2nd Corps in Balıkesir, the 3rd Corps in İstanbul, the 4th Corps in Eskişehir, the 5th Corps in Konya, the 6th Corps in Tokat, the 7th Corps in Diyarbakır, the 8th Corps in Erzincan, and the 9th Corps in Sarıkamış.[89] There were 18 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and three fortified commands. These actions were taken according to the planning made with a project aiming to return to peacetime organisation and to determine the location of commands prepared on 5 August 1923.[90]




Figure 2.1. The new organisation of the Turkish Army after Lausanne 1923.

Source*: Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri, Erkan- Harbiyye-yi Umumiyye Talim ve Terbiye Dairesince Askeri ve Sivil Liselerle Orta Mektebler ve Erkek Muallim Mekteblerinde Tedris Edilmek Üzere Kabul Edilmiştir İkinci Kitap* (İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927), 4.

[88] *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri, Erkan- Harbiyye-yi Umumiyye Talim ve Terbiye Dairesince Askeri ve Sivil Liselerle Orta Mektebler ve Erkek Muallim Mekteblerinde Tedris Edilmek Üzere Kabul Edilmiştir. İkinci Kitap* (İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927), 4.

[89] In some secondary sources there are errors in this type of catalogue information as the main focus lies on the political assessment of military's interest in domestic politics. For example, William Hale noted the number of Army Corps as 10. William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 79. and Brock Millman wrote 11. See Brock Millman, "The Turkish Armed Forces on the Eve of World War II: The British View" *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 20/1 (1996): 43. On the other hand, the correct information was clearly noted in primary sources of the time which are in Ottoman Turkish and are easily accessible. See for example, the Turkish Army's official publications such as *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti Dönemi (23 Nisan 1920–29 Ekim 1923)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1984), 351 and Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2023), 332.

[90] *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti Dönemi*, 351.

In this period, switching to peacetime organisation was essential to reduce manpower, animal numbers, ammunition, and equipment; otherwise, the costs would be unbearable to any country in a period when countries can mobilise significantly high portions of their populations in wartime.[91] According to calculations, many countries had to reduce the size of an infantry company with 200:250 personnel to half its size, and countries with more budgetary constraints had to reduce this even further.[92] In general, the understanding was to reduce peacetime numbers by four to six but also to maintain readiness to return to these numbers quickly when there was a need to do so. Otherwise, there would be serious consequences for the country's defence.[93]

From the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 until the eve of World War II, Turkey aspired to transform and modernise its army. The primary aim was to be prepared to perform national defence tasks in a world where the next war was perceived to be imminent and would be different from the one that was last fought. In addition to keeping the traditional requirements and needs of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units, several areas stood out in the Republic's political and military leaders' minds. First and foremost, there was an urgency to address the mechanization and motorisation of the army. Armoured vehicles and tanks were constantly on their minds, and they needed to be procured. Coastal defence was a major concern. Geographically, the country was a peninsula with shores on four seas, but rather than bringing prosperity and economic advantage, these seas were considered weak spots from where threats might emanate, as Turkey lacked a powerful navy, land, or aerial means to stop threats from these theatres. The officer corps attempted to address the issue of defending large coastal areas with an army with few modern weapons.[94] For countries whose borders were primarily maritime, coastal defence constituted the backbone of national defence.[95]

---

[91] Suat Ener, *Strateji ve Taktikte Ana Kurallar* (İstanbul: Sühulet Matbaası, 1935), 16-17.

[92] Ener, *Strateji ve Taktikte Ana Kurallar*, 17.

[93] Ener, *Strateji ve Taktikte Ana Kurallar*, 18.

[94] Veysel, *Sahil Müdafaası* (İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1935), 1.

[95] Cevat Ozanalp and Muharrem Kanad, *Kıyı Topçusunun Tabiye ve Teknik Bilgileri* (İstanbul: Aydınlık Basımevi, 1939), 3.

The deployment of troops to Thrace was another main concern, and acquiring capabilities and creating plans for this purpose was a requirement. According to calculations, the transportation of a modern army corps with all its staff and equipment required more than 100 ships of various sizes and gross tonnage and transferring several army corps to enemy shores was a gigantic task that not every country could achieve.[96] The creation of air capability by modern planes and systems was also necessary. Finally, defending the rear, industry, and population was important. Acquiring technical capabilities and know-how against enemy air raids and chemical attacks were of absolute importance in the minds of Turkish leaders. The experiences of the time proved that keeping the rear safe would enable an army to fight against the enemy; its collapse would render an army ineffective, causing the collapse of the entire war effort. In addition to these needs of the army, on the actual developments front, Turkey also needed no confrontations around its borders. After more than ten years of warfare and amid major reforms and industrialisation processes, any armed confrontation was deemed undesirable. In a Clausewitzian manner, the country's leadership made a rational decision about when it would wage war. "War could only be waged for clean and high purposes for people's lives, its independence and for the defence of the country and to enter into war there should be big and powerful reasons."[97] This issue was framed this way, and actions have been consistent throughout this period. The actual use of force was exercised only to suppress uprisings like Şeyh Said in 1925, Ağrı in 1930, and Dersim in 1937 within the country. Turkey used demonstration of force and deployed forces during the Hatay question in 1938. However, the desire was not to use force, as it drained the country's resources and hampered the reform and development agenda.

2.2. Main Characteristics of the Turkish Military Bureaucracy in the Interwar Period

The Turkish Army was primarily a land army with limited naval and aerial branches. All the commanders were from either the infantry or artillery classes. The transition

[96] Ener, *Strateji ve Taktikte Ana Kurallar*, 62-3.

[97] Afet (İnan), *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 48-49: "Harp, yalnız ve ancak milletin hayat ve istiklali ve memleketin masuniyeti, yalnız bu necip ve yüksek menfaatler uğrunda ihtiyar olunur."

to a peacetime posture project necessitated major logistical, construction, and relocation activities that were carried out with limited resources. The heart of the military bureaucracy was formed in Ankara by the construction of modern buildings for the National Defence Ministry and the General Staff (Figure 2.2). In the early assessment, it appeared that, faced with material deficiencies and financial limitations, the army had to find ways as it was obvious that, unlike previous years during wartime, the entire resources of the country would not be offered to their use and there would be a gradual decrease in their share from the state budget. However, this did not mean that they would be sidelined, as their role remained highly significant. On 22 February 1924, in his closing speech of the wargames in İzmir, Mustafa Kemal Paşa stated that the Republic of Turkey trusted only two things: the decision of the people and the heroism of its army.[98] The army's task was to take all necessary actions to be prepared, modern, and ready to defend the country against all perceived threats within the budget allocated to them by finding international actors willing to engage in military cooperation with them.



Figure 2.2. The Turkish General Staff, and the Turkish Ministry of National Defence in Ankara.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[98] *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24 February 1924: "Arkadaşlar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yalnız iki şeye güvenir. Biri millet kararı, diğeri en elim ve en müşkül şerait içinde dünyanın takdiratına bihakkın kesbi liyakat eden ordumuzun kahramanlığı, bu iki şeye güvenir."

In terms of manpower, 93% of the Ottoman Empire's general staff officers continued their service in the new Republic.[99] There has been no debate on the continuation of these officer cadres. Similarly, there was no debate on the form of the army with respect to whether to have it in the form of a regular army or to have it based on militia and irregular forces or a mixture of both. A major turning point on this issue had already passed in the early days of the War of Independence. Irregular forces that proved to be useful in the beginning of clashes with occupying Greek forces turned out to be uncontrollable, unreliable, and were totally dismissed. The Turkish Grand National Assembly decided in favour of regular troops under a central command by early 1921. The army would be formed from Turkish citizens in the form of officers and conscripts from all segments of society, and the most important task here was to provide up-to-date manuals for the army and to generate military knowledge.

In addition to material deficiencies, the Turkish military suffered from a lack of manuals or outdated ones. Manuals consistent with the day's scientific and technological developments were needed alongside military literature to educate and train a cadre of modern officer corps. The Turkish Army inherited manuals from the Ottoman period. These manuals were still in use, although many improvisations and commander discretion were observed in real-life situations. Ottoman legacy manuals were mostly translations of Prussian/German manuals. The Ottoman Empire invited and tried to benefit from Prussian/German advisors. Similar to other parts of the world, the Prussian/German experience was admired and seemed to work well in a variety of real-life situations during battle or war planning.

Many different countries with distinct military cultures and even Germany's enemies benefited from various aspects of this German understanding as Germany contributed to theoretical studies, presented practical examples, and had the means to produce weapons to be used in war. On the theoretical side, Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz provided a comprehensive framework for the study of war and its relation to politics based on the dialectical philosophy of science, largely influenced

[99] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Military: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankward A. Rustow (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 388.

by Hegel's writings on war.[100] Over the centuries, his teachings gained universal acceptance moving way beyond to be referred to as Prussian though. On the practical side, the establishment of staff colleges and theoretical and practical methods used in the effective training of officer corps were modelled in many countries based on the Prussian/German model. The use of wargames to prepare the officer corps for real-life issues was largely developed by the Prussian/German officer corps. The use of science and technology in the service of military needs found its best example in the German experience, as German companies created effective weapons using their industrial capabilities. Their disciplined approach to creating military manuals and literature was adopted by many countries.[101]

After World War I, a mechanisation revolution occurred in military affairs.[102] This forced all countries and their political and military leaders to make strategic, operational, tactical, logistical, and fiscal sense of the options for mechanisation in which no one could afford to be left behind.[103] Close followers of technological and industrial developments would have to assess what these new offers would bring to their military capabilities, and which options would be viable for their strategic plans and budgets. The necessity of making changes was evident, but the form these changes would take was unclear. The experimentation and experience of different countries need to be observed. The late 1920s and the 1930s were the years in which lively debates on these new weapons for land and air combat continued. As Gray noted, for new military technologies to effect a radical change in the character and conduct of warfare, there must first be a doctrine suitable for their employment, and furthermore, that doctrine should match or at least be sufficiently adaptable to the tasks laid out by foreign policy upon the military establishment. [104] Turkish sources from this period show that these aspects were frequently debated in military

[100] Faruk Yalvaç, *Hegel'in Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı: Dünya Tini, Devlet ve Savaş* (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2008), 102-3.

[101] Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), xvi.

[102] Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 130.

[103] Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 130.

[104] Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 131.

publications, journals, and newspapers with wide circulation, but fell short of creating a framework that could be presented as a doctrine.[105]

Faced with changes in the world in military technology and limited with financial constraints, the Turkish military sought to expand its knowledge in the sphere of military science. The main character for the Turkish military in this period was to examine the practice and experience of all military systems without limiting itself to one particular one. The senior military leadership was open to this search for military adaptations from all over the world, including the one offered by the Red Army in the Soviet Union, and followed this course of action. However, in the following decades, the study of this aspect became a challenge as one factor closed the way for the possibility of analysing this due to the dominance of the Prussian/German argument in the available secondary literature.

In Turkish historiography, there are academic works focusing on the influence of Prussian/German generals such as Colmar von der Goltz in the reorganisation, training, and activities of the Ottoman Army based on primary sources, as well as an increasing number of works focusing on the influence of Prussian/German understanding of the Ottoman/Turkish military with further uncorroborated elaborations and overstretched interpretations.[106] These range from aiming to argue that the Prussian model was the sole model adapted to confident declarations that the Turkish Army adapted the German doctrine until it accepted the American one later to that Turkish military learnt the way to reach out to its youth to that Turkey learnt the totalitarian character of war from Prussians/Germans and incorporated it into its thinking, which endured even in contemporary time. Certainly, offshoots such as claiming to prove under Prussian/German influence, Turkey's implementation led as models for Nazi Germany, particularly in the Holocaust, are also in circulation. The impact of Clausewitz was also largely ignored, and authors

[105] For example, Fahri, "Türk Ordusuna Tank Lazım mı Değil mi?," *Askeri Mecmua,* 74 (September 1929): 50-7 and Fevzi, "Bize Küçük Fakat Adeden Çok Fırkalar Lazımdır," *Askeri Mecmua,* 93 (June 1934): 344-46.

[106] Salih Kış's work on von der Goltz is a good example of a historical study based on archival sources. See Salih Kış, *Osmanlı Ordusunda Alman Ekolü von der Goltz Paşa (1883-1895)* (Konya: Palet Yayınları, 2017).

framed the impact of Prussian/German influence with references limited to some generals after him.[107]

Prussian general von der Goltz was known for his long service in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire as one of those foreigner paşas in the service of sultans. However, he has been attributed to different aspects over time. The (re)discovery of von der Goltz in Turkish history circles came after an article in *Tarih ve Toplum* magazine in 1999 by Hasan Ünder.[108] This seemed to have begun as an exploratory quest with some enthusiasm, aiming to find similarities between the past and the present, in which Turkey's bid to join the European Union in 1999 gained new momentum and enormous optimism, as joy was widespread among certain circles against limiting the role of the military in politics. He claimed to have found similarities between von der Goltz's works and various early Republican texts. After briefly stating about the rediscovered work of von der Goltz and quiet reception by the rest in line with the political situation then, he doubled down on his argument and in several years' time declared that Goltz provided the "Spartan elements" for Kemalism.[109] Ünder's two articles were then later referenced in almost all works in the following period without much digging into what Goltz actually wrote and what all other available military literature of the interwar period offered. Without questioning, reference to his articles was made as the point aimed was to find some historical roots in the prevailing militarism that traumatised the country since the 1960s.

Gencer Özcan further developed these ideas in his 2009 article, where he examined the Prussian influence on the army in Turkey during the Republican period, which he claimed had been overlooked. He provided an account of Prussian influence from the Ottoman period until modern Turkey, focusing again on von der Goltz and his *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms) book of 1883, concluding that this had a major

[107] See for example Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Yirmibirinci Yüzyılda Savaşı Tartışmak: Clausewitz Yeniden," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 8/29 (Spring 2011): 6-7.

[108] Hasan Ünder, "30'ların Ders Kitaplarından ve Kemalizm'in Kaynaklarından Biri Milleti Müsellaha ve Medeni Bilgiler," *Tarih ve Toplum,* 32/192 (December 1999): 48-6.

[109] Hasan Ünder, "Goltz, Milleti Müsellaha ve Kemalizmdeki Spartan Öğeler," *Tarih ve Toplum,* 35/206 (February 2001): 45-4.

impact on shaping the Turkish Republic's view on the army and society, and could be regarded as one of the traces of the Prussian effect on the formation of the national security state, which began to take shape after the 1960 Military Coup and was strengthened even further by the 1980 Military Coup[110] He continued to use this article in other publications over the years to support his argument.[111] His work became a reference for later articles focusing on the nation-in-arms understanding as the primary hallmark of the Prussian model. Later, Şükrü Hanioğlu, in his well-known biography of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, noted "since 1960, the military has noisily reasserted its Goltzian role as guide and guardian of the state."[112]

Das Volk in Waffen (the nation in arms) as a phrase was actually originally coined by Kaiser Wilhelm I in 1860. Goltz, however, as a prolific author, wrote the book in the shadow of the works of Clausewitz to present the changes in warfare and wrote on the then-current state of war, aiming at an audience outside military circles.[113] Von der Goltz's book was a book written by a German general for the German nation. His primary concern was to create this awareness to make the German people great. [114] His book was within the framework of Clausewitz's work with the addition of new developments from the 1860s to the late 1880s, offering no new concepts or formulations. It was a pre-World War I work and would not be considered to be taken as the sole reference neither by the Republican cadres in the 1920s and the

[110] Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi," *IDEA A Journal of Humanities*, 1/1 (2009): 61. Colmar von der Goltz' *Das Volk in Waffen* was translated and published in Turkish in 1884 and 1888. See Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müselleha*, trans. Mehmed Tahir (İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1884) and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müselleha*, trans. Mehmed Tahir (İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1888). Rather than the content and argument, the catchy title kept many to make references to it since then. Same would be even more true in the case of Ludendorff's *Der Totale Krieg*.

[111] See Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010) and Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Ulusal Strateji Arayışları," in *Strateji Düşüncesi: Kuram, Paradoks ve Uygulama*, ed. Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Ersel Aydınlı (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020), 123-49.

[112] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), 47.

[113] Colmar von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müsellaha (Ordu-Millet)*, ed. İsmet Sarıbal, (İstanbul: Otorite Kitap, 2016), 27.

[114]Von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müsellaha (Ordu-Millet)*, 455.

1930s nor even by his German compatriots who dedicated significant work hours to the study of World War I and what the next war would be after 1918. His role model Clausewitz, has dedicated an entire section to this nation in arms issue that was titled "The People in Arms" in Book 6, Chapter 26 in his *On War*.[115] He noted that war by means of popular uprisings was a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, as:

> The conventional barriers have been swept away in our lifetime by the elemental violence of war. In fact, it is the broadening and intensification of the fermentation process, known as war. The system of requisitioning, and the enormous growth of armies resulting from it and from universal conscription, the employment of militia- all of these run in the same direction when viewed from the standpoint of the older, narrower military system, and that also leads to the calling out of the home guard and arming the people.[116]

He noted that the side that employed these innovations against their opponents gained immense strength and forced their opponents to follow suit.[117] "Any nation that uses the people's war intelligently, will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use" he underlined, calling this a further expansion of the element of war.[118] This type of warfare was new and uncommon at the time. He witnessed its beginnings and analysed its potential for the future.[119] As a disciple, follower, and strong admirer of Clausewitz, von der Goltz simply presented a work with updates on warfare after Clausewitz's death.[120] In any case, in the post-World War I environment, Clausewitz needed another major update, rendering von der Goltz's works outdated.[121]

---

[115] Clausewitz, *On War*, 479-83.

[116] Clausewitz, *On War*, 479.

[117] Clausewitz, *On War*, 479.

[118] Clausewitz, *On War*, 479.

[119] Clausewitz, *On War*, 483.

[120] His opening line in *Das Volk in Waffen* read "Any military author attempting to write on war after Clausewitz would risk being a poet attempting to write Faust after Goethe and Hamlet after Shakespeare". See Colmar von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müsellaha (Ordu-Millet)*, 25. Therefore, he continued noting that he would not bring forward anything new to what Clausewitz had written. His own book would be only about the method of warfare in the current times (1880s). These methods were out of date even after the fast-paced changes since the German victory in 1870.

[121] In a 1940 report by an American military attaché on officially prescribed list of works for officers to read in the German Army the general section included Clausewitz, Schlieffen and Waldemar Erfurth, the historical section included the German official history of World War I and the memoirs of

The second work, often cited by proponents of the Prussian/German argument in Turkish historiography, belonged to another German general, Erich Ludendorff, and was named *Der Totale Krieg* (Total War).[122] His work was published in Turkish in 1936.[123] It was often cited, arguing that this work shaped the understanding of the Republic, beginning with the interwar period. In their book, İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin wrongly argued that Ludendorff was the first to point to the total character of war after World War I and that he had developed the concept of total war.[124] Gencer Özcan also set a milestone in reference to Ludendorff's 1936 Turkish translation of *Der Totale Krieg* to mark the beginning of an understanding in which the entire nation used all its resources to defend the country.[125] Based on this, Ali Karaosmanoğlu noted that the concept of strategy in Turkey developed within the framework of national security, expanding to encompass economic issues, and this conceptual transformation took place by adapting the concept of total war proposed by General Ludendorff. [126]

Exploring the subject, both Ünder and Özcan, with a motivation of discovering historical evidence in a niche area that would resonate well with the circles concerned about the issue of military intervention in politics, created a narrative where they produced arguments on the Prussian model, and marked these two generals with a Turkey connection who had already produced works with catchy titles as the historical roots of the current prevailing problem of the country. Over the years, their claims have become mainstream in an unchallenged way. In strengthening their claims, rather than using primary sources of the time, they used evidence from the other end of the historical spectrum and used contemporary

Seeckt, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, von Hötzendorf and Mackensen. See R. L. DiNardo, "German Armour Doctrine: Correcting the Myths," *War in History,* 3/4, (1996): 386.

[122] General Ludendorff, *Der Totale Krieg* (Münich: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935).

[123] Erich von Ludendorff, *Topyekün Harb*, trans. Hikmet Tuna (İstanbul: Ulus Basımevi, 1936).

[124] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Dış Siyaseti ve Askeri Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 16.

[125] Özcan, "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Ulusal Strateji Arayışları," 126.

[126] Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Strateji Düşüncesinde Yorum ve Tahrifat: Clausewitz Olayı," *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi* 2/1 (2021):73. He asserted that Turkey's understanding of national security had been shaped under the dominance of such a strategy until the end of the Cold War period.

debates to support their claims backwards in time. Even though there had been too many cases of disagreements with Prussian/German officers, even during the Ottoman period, both in peacetime and in wartime, and even stronger arm's length distance against German officers in the Republican period in the interwar period, their narrative was accepted unquestioningly in Turkish and international academic circles.

The claim that Ottomans and Turks used the German model in establishing their relations with their population, and particularly their youth, took unnatural turns and ended up in uncontrolled parallels with the German Nazi and Italian Fascist cases, which will be debated in greater detail in Chapter 8 of the thesis to show that they were wrong as they missed the Turkish military bureaucracy's approach and the existence of the Soviet influence. These works based their entire case on anecdotes of individuals and failed to refine and define contexts and timeframes moving fast in a century-long period and failed to follow chronology and made no use of other abundant primary sources as Turkish academics were primarily concerned with digging out historical evidence for today's 'military question' of Turkey in its democracy and foreign academics were largely concerned with finding accomplices and role model ideas for the German Nazi state for their genocidal blueprints that they put in life later on.[127]

In essence, based on the changing character of war and unprecedented levels of industrialisation of war, Turkey had drawn lessons from World War I and its War of Independence regarding the totality of war long before Ludendorff had his book printed. Ludendorff's book did not propose any conceptual framework or claim to deal with the theoretical aspects of war. His work was essentially part of a major effort seen in the works of other German military thinkers of the time to draw lessons from the failure of World War I, as Ludendorff clearly put forward in the preface. He began his work by stating, "I do not want to write a theory of war. This is alien to me. As I have said many times before, I am an enemy of all theories. War is a reality and the most important reality in the life of a nation".[128] Throughout his book, he

[127] Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide, Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).

[128] Ludendorff, *Topyekün Harb*, 7.

strongly criticises the most famous theorist, Clausewitz, and those obsessed with theories, that is, Clausewitz.

An earlier work of his, in which he anticipated a new world war, was published in 1930, and its Turkish translation was printed in 1931.[129] In this lesser-known work, he articulated that a new world war, more destructive than the previous one, would break in 1932, and against those who would downplay his argument as a prophecy for the next war, he reminded them that he had anticipated the 1914-1918 war years before.[130] He laid down many possible alliance systems and figured out the year using the Cabal.[131] He argued that Jews, Freemasons, and Jesuits plotted for the Fatherland's (Germany's) doom throughout his book. Turkish media also reported his claims in the headlines.[132] Although the reasoning behind his suggestion was not understood, it was noted in *Akşam*'s coverage that Trotsky, who was then residing in İstanbul, sent letters to some newspapers noting that very important developments would occur in 1932 in relation to developments in Germany, and that if fascists managed to come to power, it would be impossible to avoid a war.[133] Ludendorff was among the soldiers with a constant belief that the issues were not settled in the previous war, but his 1930 work is not well known, perhaps because it lacked a catchy title. In essence, he made similar arguments about the totality of war and the impending new one. In this work, he compared the readiness of nations to the new world war in 1932. He noted that Turkey had drawn the necessary lessons from the Great War and once again became a great nation with its successes in Europe and Asia as it relied only on its nation and managed to disrupt all secret organisations operating within the country and disabled Jews to disseminate malicious propaganda. Therefore, he noted that under the command of its great leader Mustafa Kemal Paşa, it would shape its fate with great strength and achieve major outcomes in the new war.[134]

---

[129] General Ludendorff, *1932 Senesinde Yeni Bir Cihan Harbi*, trans. Muallim Mübahat (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1931).

[130] Ludendorff, *1932 Senesinde Yeni Bir Cihan Harbi*, 5.

[131] *The New York Times*, 23 November 1930.

[132] *Akşam*, 11 January 1932.

[133] *Akşam*, 11 January 1932.

[134] Ludendorff, *1932 Senesinde Yeni Bir Cihan Harbi*, 155 and 157.

There had been an undeniable transfer of military knowledge between the Ottoman and German empires in the 19th and 20th centuries, which, as Gerhard Grüsshaber put it, had begun in the 16th century and worked both ways, beginning with the Ottoman transfer to the German states first.[135] He argued that exposure to the German way had a serious impact on the Ottoman and Turkish officer corps, and that this influence continued after 1923. However, it should be understood that the German model was not the only model that influenced the Ottoman/Turkish military.[136]

Academics have retrospectively evaluated the nature of German-Turkish military interactions based on limited rediscovered material. However, how did the Turkish military bureaucracy retrospectively evaluate this interaction? In an official Turkish General Staff publication on Turkish–German relations between 1923-1945 that was published in 1993, their perspective is revealed.[137] In this study, it was noted that visiting German military delegations helped in the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army in the years before World War I, and the army adapted the Prussian military system in terms of organisation, type of education, and system, which stopped by the end of World War I. [138] When diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1924, little or no progress was achieved on the military front, which caused a vacuum in the Turkish Army.[139] Reasons for the absence of military relations included the incapacitation of the German Army by the Versailles Treaty, anger against the German military for drifting the Ottomans into the war, and concern about third-country reactions to the initiation of military relations between the two countries.[140] Then, from 1927 onwards, the Turkish state signed personal contracts with

[135] Gerhard Grüsshaber, *Türk Ordusunda Alman Ruhu Bir Askeri Teknoloji Transferi Tarihi*, trans. Bozkurt Leblebicioğlu (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2022), 10 and 12.

[136] Grüsshaber, *Türk Ordusunda Alman Ruhu*, 31. Although he made this point, on von der Goltz and nation in arms and its enduring effect on Turkish politics and society, he kept the similar narrative referencing Ünder's articles. See Grüsshaber, *Türk Ordusunda Alman Ruhu*, 33.

[137] Yavuz Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1923-1945)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993).

[138] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 63.

[139] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 63.

[140] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 63.

unemployed German officers who were not acting on behalf of their states. These German officers continued to shape the establishment of systems and provide modern training to the Turkish officer corps.[141] By 1933, German official interest in Turkey had achieved new momentum, and the German Propaganda Ministry developed campaigns to strengthen German-Turkish friendship, using historical evidence in abundance with a strong emphasis on German military delegations that had visited the Ottoman Empire, such as Moltke, von der Goltz, and von Sanders.[142] They also arranged visits for delegations and used officers on both sides who had a legacy of relationships from World War I period. In addition, the German state officially advocated visits by German youth organisations to Turkey from 1934 onwards for propaganda purposes.[143] These delegations and senior representatives visited Turkey and met with Turkish officials, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[144] These German-led initiatives to forge military cooperation continued until the beginning of World War II, but the Germans exercised caution as they assessed that Republican Turkey was not the same as the Ottoman Empire, realising the limits of their military influence in persuading Turkey to take military action, and were aware of the possibility that Turkey would even act on the other side, partnering with Britain and France. [145]

An analysis of the primary sources produced by the Turkish military bureaucracy indicates that Turkey relied on its own experiences to create its perspective. The forceful introduction of the template by the proponents of the Prussian/German argument is related to the wider problem of the Western way of war in understanding the full scope of military affairs of non-Western countries, as explained in Chapter 1.[146]

---

[141] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 65.

[142] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 72.

[143] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 73.

[144] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 73 and 93.

[145] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 95-6.

[146] The appeal of using some concepts attributed to some evil masterminds wearing *Pickelhaube* (Pickel helm) aiming to destroy Liberal Western order by their destructive doctrines play a large role which continue in the Western accounts of military history even today. As Citino noted, after the end

Another stumbling block in assessing the army's role in the interwar period is again mostly due to the Western way of thinking that places too much emphasis on the democracy versus dictatorship debate, asserting that any armed force must be out of domestic politics and that soldiers should be under civilian control as desired by liberal democracies. Proponents argue that this ideal form must be achieved by every system, irrespective of its peculiarities, culture, and level of development. The entire analysis focused on this aspect of the issue. However, as Mustafa Türkeş noted, judging the political structure of Kemalist Turkey in those years does not make much headway, as the debate turns around idealised forms of dictatorship and democracy, and the establishment of democracy was not a priority for Kemalists, who had other priorities, such as industrialisation and secular reforms, at the top of their agenda.[147] It might not be categorised as a priority, but the representation and establishment of a diverse political environment was not totally disregarded, as seen in various attempts to set up political parties and expand civil society. These efforts failed, and the priorities remained the same. In addition, there was still a serious expectation of warfare directed against the country's very existence, as in Kemalists' assessment, Europeans could not settle their issues after World War I, and the expectation was that their aggression might directly target Turkey's security in the 1920s. By the 1930s, this assessment turned into a form where Turkey would face potential threats to its security from those countries, but more importantly, it would be more likely to have a major intra-European confrontation that would have spillover effects on Turkey in various geographical regions.

This raises the question of how the issue of addressing the military's role in the new system was settled. During the War of Independence, prominent military figures also served in the Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal Paşa and İsmet Paşa (İnönü) chose to become political figures while Fevzi Paşa preferred to remain in uniform. The others followed either way. Mustafa Kemal Paşa was more concerned about the reform program he had in mind. Therefore, he put his weight heavily on pushing

of World War II, there was an unanimity that Prussia had to be destroyed. On 25 February 1947, Allies issued Decree 46 that stated, "The Prussian state which from early days had been the bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany has de facto ceased to exist". See Citino, *The German Way of War*, 312.

[147] Mustafa Türkeş, "Kemalism Revisited," *METU Studies in Development*, 50 (2023): 15.

forward an agenda of reforms that began with the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate and many other areas. He had no intention of leaving the ground for long debates and suggestions of alternative ways that would slow down the reform program. He used his political power to shape the new army command and made changes by removing some potential rival military figures from their ground. Those expressing discontent or were unaware of the overall big picture in their minds fell onto the opposing side. Kazım Paşa (Karabekir), Ali Fuad Paşa (Cebesoy), Rauf Bey (Orbay), Refet Paşa (Bele) were leading examples of these senior veteran military figures. Mustafa Kemal Paşa used Grand National Assembly to issue laws regarding these changes and his political alliances with other prominent figures within the system. Many works have been published regarding this period with two main motivations: either claiming that the army was taken out of politics in an ideal manner that could not be sustained later, or that the army was used aggressively against the system, making Mustafa Kemal Paşa a dictator who used the army against the opponents.

However, primary sources of the time present a solid framework as to how Mustafa Kemal Paşa positioned the army, envisaged the command of war, and placed armed bureaucracy vis-à-vis politics. In 1930, Afet (İnan)'s *Askerlik Vazifesi* was published. Afet (İnan) presented her notes taught at high schools on military obligations that she compiled, in her words, from old and new sources to Prime Minister İsmet Paşa and Head of General Staff Marshal Fevzi Paşa. Both read, commented on, and offered amendments to the manuscript before publication. In 1931, Mustafa Kemal Paşa wrote to Prime Minister İsmet Paşa to publish these in an expanded version, including many other aspects of state life for the use of students to make them better citizens.[148] She noted that although this and other books in this series were published in her name these were in essence Mustafa Kemal Paşa's views, recommendations and his style.[149] In Afet (İnan)'s work, there is a section on "Command of War and Politics" where it was noted that command of war and politics are one. She noted that "by politics, we do not only aim for foreign politics but also consider domestic

[148] İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, copy of his letter in the beginning of the volume.

[149] İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, 7.

and economic politics. The National Assembly is a political stage for everything and implementation. Execution of all politics is through the government."[150] Afet (İnan) noted that to achieve success in war it was absolutely necessary to have great knowledge of high government affairs and commander must be a politician at the same time.[151] Government personnel commanding politics must have a full understanding of the character of war and its command, and this government personnel must be in the same view and agree with the commander of the war. "If this agreement is missing, difficulties will emerge, and damage will be certain."[152] According to Afet (İnan), it is ideal if the general politics and command of war are unified in one person, as there are historical examples like Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Timur, who were both commander-in-chief and leader of the political power.[153] "Hannibal was not like this. He was the only commander-in-chief of the army. Politics were administered by the Government of Carthage. The policy followed by the political power of Carthage put Hannibal and his army in a difficult position. The result of this was the fall of the state of Carthage."[154] According to her, Mustafa Kemal Paşa was also the commander-in-chief and leader of the political power and suggested that this was how the country was saved.[155] She noted that Germans attributed their failure in the war to opposition in their parliament, which affected their government's agreement with their army's command.[156] "Considering that the German Emperor was in command of the German Army, having the head of state in the role of commander-in-chief was not

[150] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 43: "Siyaset dediğimiz zaman, yalnız harici siyaseti murat etmiyoruz. Bundan başka dahili siyaseti ve iktisadi siyaseti de düşünüyoruz. Her nevi siyaset sahnesi Millet Meclisidir. Her türlü siyasetin tatbik ve icra vasıtası hükümettir."

[151] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 45.

[152] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 45: "Bu anlaşma noksan olursa müşkülat başlar ve Zarar vukuu muhakkak olur."

[153] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 46.

[154] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 46: "Anibal böyle değildi. O, yalnız Başkumandan idi. Siyaseti tedvir eden Kartaca Hükümeti idi. Kartaca Hükümeti takip ettiği siyasetle Anibali ve ordusunu müşkül vaziyette bıraktı. Bıraktı amma bunun neticesi Kartaca Devletinin inkırazı oldu."

[155] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 46.

[156] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 47.

enough to overcome the problems. The issue here is the that the commander-in-chief must the one commanding the army without any intermediaries."[157]

In 1928, the Turkish War Academy published *Ordu Teşkilatı*, written by Hans Ritter, for the 1927–1928 academic year. The lesson on army organisation was taught for the first time that year to Turkish officers attending the War Academy. The relationship between the command of war and politics was covered in detail with reference to French and German experiences and in a framework set out by Clausewitz.[158] As an official publication used in the training of Turkish staff officers, Mustafa Kemal Paşa had a copy in his private library and read it while taking notes.[159] He underlined the sections related to the command of war and the framework of Clausewitz.[160] Within this book in his private library, a 7-page typewritten document with notes and underlined sections summarising the army was also found. In his work, Ritter gave examples from German history where commanders-in-chief and political leaders did not think similarly on the conduct of war, in the case of Ludendorff in the First World War and between Moltke the Elder and Bismarck in the 1870-71 war with France.[161] Both sections were underlined by Mustafa Kemal Paşa.[162] After these examples, Ritter noted that:

> In any case, today we need to adapt a different mentality, and since war is a continuation of politics or one of the tools of execution of politics, then once it begins, war must be conducted in accordance with politics. Clausewitz says that 'It is right to consider the relation between two states come to an end when they issue declaration. In contrast, relations will continue as the war continues. However, its shape would be different. Before the relationship that continued with pen will continue by sword this time'. Therefore, once the war begins, politics continues; for this reason, it is necessary that the council that would lead the war must be headed by politicians. Undoubtedly, those men

[157] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 47.

[158] Hans Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, trans. Nuri Refet (İstanbul: Harb Akademisi Kumandanlığı Matbaası, 1928), 83-6.

[159] *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar*, *Cilt 7* (Ankara: Anıtkabir Derneği Yayınları, 2001), 377-402.

[160] *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar*, 388-91.

[161] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 83-4.

[162] *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar*, 388-89.

> who would lead the army would have the most distinct ownership of the responsibility. But in the end, their task will be limited to counselling.[163]

It has been argued that there is no evidence that Mustafa Kemal Paşa read Clausewitz's work.[164] In the catalogue of his private library, there seems to be no entry regarding any of Clausewitz's works.[165] Clausewitz's 1812 pamphlet *Principles of War* was translated into Turkish in 1899.[166] Earlier, in his *Millet-i Müsellaha*, von der Goltz made extensive references to Clausewitz.[167] Mustafa Kemal Paşa's careful reading of *Ordu Teşkilatı* and his adaption of Clausewitz's definition of war and other elements such as command in war illustrate that he read Clausewitz through sources making clear references to him and valued his teachings. *Askeri Mecmua* (The Military Journal) used quotes from Clausewitz all through the

[163] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 84-5: "Her ne olursa bugün biz işi başka bir zihniyetle düşünmeye mecburuz. Madem ki harb siyasetin bir devamından veya siyasetin vasıta-yı icraiyesinden ibarettir o halde başladıktan sonra da muharebe siyasete göre idare edilmelidir. Klavzeviç diyor ki: 'İki devlet birbirine nota verir vermez aralarındaki münasebetin inkıtanı kabul etmek doğru değildir. Bilakis harb devam ettiği müddetçe de bu münasebet devam eder. Yalnız şekil başka türlüdür, evvelce kalemle devam eden münasebet bu sefer kılınçla idame edilmektedir.' O halde harb başlayınca siyaset münkatı olmamıştır, devam ediyor demektir. Binaen harbi idare edecek heyetin başında siyaset adamlarının bulunması zaruridir. Şüphesiz orduyu idare edecek adamlar bu heyette en ziyade sahib-i selahiyet olacaktır. Fakat en nihayet vazifeleri bir müşavirlikten ibaret kalacaktır." *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1927)* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 11 and Uğur Mumcu, *Kazım Karabekir Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990), 174.

[164] Karaosmanoğlu, "Strateji Düşüncesinde Yorum ve Tahrifat: Clausewitz Olayı," 72.

[165] In his private library held at Çankaya Köşkü and at the Museum of Anıtkabir Mausoleum there were 4,215 items with 4,289 bibliographic different entries in 10,000 volumes. See *Atatürk'ün Özel Kütüphanesinin Kataloğu* (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Genel Müdürlüğü Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1973), VIII.

[166] Carl von Clausewitz [Karl von Klauszovitch], *İdare-i Harbe Dair Kavaid-i Esasiye*, trans. Ahmet Refik [Altınay] (İstanbul: Artin Asaduryan Şirket-i Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1899). Clausewitz's *'On War'* was not translated until very late in Turkey. In late 1960s Turkish officers influenced by the neo-Clausewitzian's in the Anglo-American world attempted an abridged translation published as a supplement to the Armed Forces journal in 1973. See Karl von Clausewitz, *Harp Üzerine I*, trans. Ahmet Sezgin, *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi Eki* (The Armed Forces' Journal) 92, No 246, (June 1973) and Karl von Clausewitz, *Harp Üzerine II-A*, trans. Ahmet Sezgin, *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi Eki* 94, No 248, (December 1973). In the vibrant leftist environment of the 1970s in Turkey, a longer version was attempted due to interest shown by Marx, Engels and Lenin to Clausewitz and his work. Therefore, in 1975 May Yayınları published an abridged edition stating this as the motivation presenting this version to military and civilian readers. See Carl von Clausewitz, *Savaş Üzerine*, trans. Şiar Yalçın (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1975). Translation of its full text began in 1981, and first volume was published in 1984. Carl von Clausewitz, *Harp Üzerine*, trans. H. Fahri Çeliker (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1984). See also *200ncü Doğum Günü Dolayısıyla Carl von Clausewitz Yaşamı, Yapıtı, Yankıları*, trans. Fahri Çeliker (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1980).

[167] Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müselleha*, trans. Mehmed Tahir (İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1884) and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müselleha*, trans. Mehmed Tahir (İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1888).

1930s.[168] Therefore, it is appropriate to argue that Mustafa Kemal Paşa's approach was developed under the strong influence of the Clausewitzian formulation. There are many traces that illustrate that Mustafa Kemal Paşa was directly influenced by his teachings. For example, he used the exact translation of Clausewitz's definition of war. "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" definition of Clausewitz was translated and adapted as "Harp, düşmanı bizim arzumuzu kabule (icraya) icbar için yapılan şedit bir fiildir" by him.[169]

As a political leader, he tried to shape the army by clearing it from generals with whom he might have to confront. He explained this in his *Nutuk* (A Speech) in 1927, explaining why he parted ways with many of his comrades in arms. He said, "Some of my companions who had entered into the national fight with me went over to the opposition according as the limitation of their own mental appreciation led them and their moral courage succumbed in the effort to develop national life, to proclaim the Republic and enact its laws".[170] He needed an army that would engage in their professional duty of making preparations for the defence of the country, perform their duties, and contribute to the training of the modern officer corps. Fevzi Paşa was the person to perform this important task. During peacetime, the Head of the Chief of Staff was in charge of the army.[171] He remained the Head of the Chief of Staff from 1922 to 1944. During his time under Mustafa Kemal Paşa's leadership, he showed no signs of intending to get involved in domestic politics or allowing others under his command to do so. He effectively maintained strict control over the military bureaucracy during his term. Military bureaucracy was maintained in their domain and allowed to operate and contribute only within the limits of this professional world. Duality in the command structure had never been a practice in the Turkish Army, and soldiers were expected not to be involved in politics, but the

[168] See for example *Askeri Mecmua*, no. 79 (January 1931), *Askeri Mecmua*, no. 92 (March 1934), *Askeri Mecmua*, no. 93 (June 1934). In a Turkish General Staff publication which was printed during World War II, a quote from him was used by the German author of the book. See Edgar Hieber, *Kıtalarda Gaza Karşı Korunma Hizmetleri*, vol. 1(İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1941), 3.

[169] Clausewitz, *On War*, 75. and Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 44.

[170] *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927*, 11.

[171] İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, 333.

army was a political institution under the command of the senior political structure, with non-military roles.

As a capable general, surrounded by associates with military backgrounds, and introducing soldierly qualities such as discipline, realism, and a sense of order into his task of national reconstruction and regeneration, Mustafa Kemal Paşa did not seek to establish a military regime but rather a clearly civilian one.[172] Therefore, as outlined in greater detail in Chapter 6, the primary consideration of the Turkish officer corps in the interwar period was not politics but economics as they were fulfilling their tasks.

Real attention must be paid to Clausewitz's impact on the Turkish approach during this period. Clausewitz's approach on many critical areas would be at odds with those of von der Goltz's, Moltke's and Ludendorff's on critical points primarily on the superiority in the command of war. Considering the strong affinity of Marxist thinkers and Soviet leaders, particularly Lenin, with the teachings of Clausewitz on war, military theory, and statecraft, this area of similarity in approach between the Turkish and Soviet systems emerges as a long-neglected area of convergence between their political-military elites observed during the interwar period.[173]

2.3. Conclusion

As Turkey transitioned into peacetime, Turkish political authority defined the military bureaucracy's role in the political system and the tasks expected from them. The army was expected to deliver the task of being ready to defend the country, support the revolutionary agenda of the Republic, and achieve modern weapons and techniques of war as necessitated by the fast developments in science, technology, and industry. All these needed to be accomplished with the budget allocated to the

[172] David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World 1600-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 78.

[173] For the influence of Clausewitz on the Marxists and Soviets see for example Azar Gat, "Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 27/2 (April 1992): 363-82 and Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921," *Military Affairs* (October 1985): 184-91.

military, which would be limited as the peacetime priorities of the Republic would be more inclined toward civilian use.

The country defined its options for going to war and emphasized following a path of not seeking any confrontation around its borders but was in anticipation of one in an environment of unsettled disputes in Europe in the post-World War I atmosphere and also by observing the ambitions of major powers. Therefore, keeping the Turkish Army ready, well-equipped with modern means, and enabling it to advance its understanding of modern military science were priorities of the interwar period.

The Turkish Army enjoyed a period distinct from the preceding and succeeding periods due to several internal and external factors. It was in peacetime, was in the process of forming a new army, and was inward leaning, relying on its own historical accomplishments and experiences, but at the same time, it was open to outside knowledge transfers where it lacked that particular knowledge set on a particular issue. It was not limited by any alliance structures or obligations, enabling it to seek to learn from the experience and knowledge of other armies. The Turkish Army in the interwar period was not under the influence of one particular version of an approach to military science or art and pursued various options to engage with other military bureaucracies. Therefore, to rationally fulfil the task given by the political authority, it was ready to embark on a relationship with other armies.

This special characteristic of the Turkish military bureaucracy in the interwar period was an important factor in facilitating the establishment of military relations with the Soviet military bureaucracy. As outlined in the following chapters, in most cases, it was the Red Army that offered the required return to the requests of the Turkish Army. The Turkish military bureaucracy was the main actor in executing the political authority's task of managing relations with its peers on the Soviet side.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH MILITARY'S PERCEPTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET MILITARY POWER

With the transition into peacetime and in the wake of the proclamation of the Republic in late 1923, the Turkish military bureaucracy's primary task was to prepare to meet the country's pressing defence and security needs. Options were limited. The Soviet Union was the only country that seemed to be a uniquely rational option for engagement. Moreover, the Soviet authorities made it clear from the beginning that they were willing to help Turkey meet its defence and security needs. Therefore, to maintain a solid basis for cooperation, the Turkish military bureaucracy and officers needed to form a professional view of the Red Army. At the end of the interwar period, after almost more than two decades of the Red Army being in presence, during the Soviet campaign in Finland in January 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that the service rendered by Finland to mankind was magnificent, adding that "They have exposed, for all the world to see, the military incapacity of the Red Army and of the Red Air Force. Many illusions about Soviet Russia have been dispelled in these few fierce weeks of fighting in the Arctic Circle*"*.[174] A short while ago, Churchill coined Russia as an enigma, stating it was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."[175] Unlike others, the Turkish military bureaucracy could not afford to have the Red Army remain an "enigma" and needed to develop its understanding of its potential main interlocutor by the early 1920s. This chapter examines the Turkish military's perception and understanding of Soviet military power and how it achieved this knowledge.

[174] Winston Spencer Churchill, "Speeches, 1940: The Finest Hour The War Situation House of Many Mansions", International Churchill Society 20 January 1940, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/the-war-situation-house-of-many-mansions/, accessed on 20 July 2024; Chamberlin, *Russian Enigma*, 1.

[175] Chamberlin, *Russian Enigma*, 1.

In performing this task, two main ways were available to Turkish officers. These were military publications, both open-source and confidential, and person-to-person interactions and firsthand observations. Monitoring military systems of other countries was already ongoing during the interwar period; Turkish political preference had been to follow all countries regarding military science and thinking. No single country or approach was favoured or considered the only source. The Turkish officer corps attempted to identify the competitive superiority of countries in various military fields and tried to acquire that information.

3.1. Collecting Information About the Red Army

In collection of information, in addition to other language skills, Russian language skills were important in having direct access to Soviet publications. The Turkish officer corps, with a legacy from the Ottoman period, had exposure to acquiring Russian language skills. The office of the military attaché at the Ottoman Embassy was also active since the late 19th century in the Imperial Russian capital. For any aspiring young officer, sponsorship to learn Russian from the General Staff was possible, as officer Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) noted in his memoirs, although he had to cancel his course due to the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912. However, as a self-learner, he managed to gain a strong command of Russian afterwards. He was able to interrogate Russian prisoners of war during World War I.[176] While he was in Moscow as military attaché in 1923, he surprised Ambassador Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoğlu)'s Russian language tutor when he was able to make instant translations and write these down in Ottoman Turkish as the tutor was reading Pushkin's biography to him before studying *The Captain's Daughter* showing his degree of proficiency in Russian language.[177] World War I and intensified warfare with Imperial Russia presented another prospect in this sphere, as some officers learned

[176] Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, 1957), 105-106. Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) (1887- 1963) graduated as lieutenant in 1906 from the Military College. He finished the War Academy in 1910. He took part in the Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. In 1921, he was appointed as a military attaché to Bukhara but could not go due to political situation there. Between 1923-1926, he was the Turkish military attaché in Moscow. In 1929, he became instructor at the War Academy until his retirement in 1934 as colonel. He later took part in a delegation visiting Moscow in 1937. He had command of French, English, Russian and German languages.

[177] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 276.

Russian as prisoners of war in Russian camps deep inside Russia. Tahsin İsmail (İybar) was one of those officers.[178] Therefore, there were officers who had command of the Russian language by the time the Republic was proclaimed. Increased relations with their Russian interlocutors also facilitated the acquisition of Russian language skills during peacetime. In their official military biographies, some key commanders included Russian as one of the languages they had command of, although French and German were more common among them. Most notable of these officers who had Russian language skills were Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak)[179], Nurettin Paşa (Sakallı)[180], Kazım Paşa (Karabekir)[181], Şevket Seyfi Paşa (Düzgören)[182] and Ömer Halis Paşa (Bıyıktay)[183]. Lieutenant Colonel Şükrü Ali (Ögel), who was tasked with establishing the first intelligence organisation, Milli Emniyet Riyaseti (MAH), by Fevzi Paşa, was also a Russian speaker.[184] Other officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi, Major Yakup, and Lieutenant Colonel M. Murat translated works from Russian as would be noted below in more detail about these works.

The Turkish military journal, *Askeri Mecmua* (The Military Journal), published since the Ottoman period in 1862, was the main source for military affairs for officers. It

[178] Mahmut İybar, "I. Cihan Savaşında Kafkas Cephesinde Enver Paşa Tutsak Olmaktan Nasıl Kurtuldu?," *Belleten* 43/169 (1979): 222 and Tahsin İybar, *Sibiryadan Serendibe* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950), 37. Tahsin İsmail (İybar) (1888-1971) graduated from the Military College in 1908, fought in the Balkan Wars and World War I. In 1915, he was captured by the Imperial Russian Army during clashes in Eastern Anatolia. He could speak German and French and during captivity in Krasnoyarsk he learned Russian. After the 1917 Revolution, he escaped through Central Asia and arrived in Anatolia via India. Thirty five years after the beginning of World War I, he wrote his memoirs. One of the main reasons for embarking on writing his memoirs was to contribute to Turkish public's understanding of the Russians and Russia as he believed geopolitics then dictated Turkey to live with this neighbour. His memoirs were printed by the Republican People's Party's Halkevleri. See İybar, *Sibiryadan Serendibe*, 6.

[179] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1989), 55.

[180] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan*, 29.

[181] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan*, 177.

[182] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan*, 180.

[183] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan*, 242.

[184] Erdal İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri Riyaseti (M.E.H./ MAH) (1927-1965)* (Ankara: MİT Basım Evi, 2002), 54.

monitored foreign-language military journals and offered articles translated into Turkish. Over time, original works by Turkish officers on the events, developments, and changes observed in other armies were offered to readers. [185] In that respect, Soviet military publications were monitored and translations from the Russian language were made. Turkish officers monitored Soviet military developments, provided updates on the Red Army, and produced articles.

In addition to open-source articles and printed books, restricted print intelligence publications about the Red Army were offered by the General Staff to a limited segment of officers. These publications were largely based on intelligence acquired by military attachés and were presented for restricted use within the army. They were military intelligence products in the form of books with maps, drawings and photos and titled as *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu* (The Soviet Red Army) published in 1924, *Kızıl Ordu* II (The Red Army II) and *Kızıl Ordu* III (The Red Army III) published in 1925 and in 1927 respectively, and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu* (The Soviet Union and the Red Army) published in 1930.[186] Such publications were not limited to the Soviet Union. The Turkish General Staff Intelligence also produced works on other armies of the world to be used by officers. These publications were classified as confidential and restricted. Works on the armies of countries such as Afghanistan[187], Bulgaria[188], Czechoslovakia[189], France[190], India[191], England[192], Iraq and Syria[193], Iran[194], Italy[195],

[185] Over time, editors of the journal gradually shifted from publishing only translations and encouraged original articles written by Turkish officers. By early 1931, editors noted that heavy emphasis was given to the experiences of other countries and there was a need to generate knowledge using own experiences and new developments in the military field would be debated in a way to better serve Turkey's own needs in conformity with its structure. See Binbaşı Nazım, "Askeri Mecmuanın Tarih Kısmı Neşriyatı Münasebetiyle Bir Mütalaa," *Askeri Mecmua* 79 (January 1931): 44. By late 1932, the journal noted that it would not be possible to translate all relevant works in foreign journals due to space limitations and majority of pages were allocated for the views and articles of Turkish officers. See *Askeri Mecmua,* 87 (December 1932): announcements from the editor.

[186] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye,1924); *Kızıl Ordu II* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye,1925); *Kızıl Ordu* III (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927) and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV 1929-1930* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930).

[187] *1341 Senesine Kadar En Son İstihbarata Göre Afganistan Ordusu* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925).

[188] *Bulgar Ordusu Hakkında Malumat* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1924) and *Bulgar Ordusu Hakkında Malumat* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925).

[189] *Çekoslavakya Ordusu* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923).

Germany[196] and Yugoslavia[197] were printed during the interwar period. However, none of these countries and their military bureaucracies were in a position to provide the required support as they lacked capabilities or willingness to meet Turkey's needs. Therefore, the Red Army held a special place in the daily work of the Turkish military bureaucracy. This was evident in the number of similar materials available on the Red Army between 1923 and 1930, as opposed to one or, in some cases, two for each of the countries stated above, there were four on the Red Army during the period, with updates until 1930.[198]

Complementing the print sources, personal interactions between members of both armies contributed to forming an understanding of Soviet military power. Face-to-face meetings contributed to the accumulation of knowledge. Turkish senior commanders participated in Soviet military manoeuvres and interacted with officers at various levels. Invitations for these were not extended to every country, and Turkish officers were among the select minority of those welcomed by the Red Army to see its inner workings. Turkish officers' reports based on their observations further shaped the Turkish military's perspectives on the Red Army.

During this period, military literature based on Soviet works was created. Through translations from Russian, the General Staff presented works on military science to Turkish officers on a wide array of subjects. Some of these were used as the basis for

---

[190] *Fransız Ordusu* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925).

[191] *Hindistan Ordusu* (Ankara: Matbaa-yı Askeriye Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Matbaaları, 1925).

[192] *İngiliz Ordusu* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925).

[193] *Irak ve Suriye Ordusu* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925).

[194] *İran Ordusu* (Ankara: Askeri Matbaa, 1925) and Hüsameddin (Tugaç), *İran ve Ordusu* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa,1927).

[195] *İtalya Ordusu* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Ankara Matbaası, 1925) and *İtalya Ordusu* (İstanbul-Ankara: Büyük Erkân-i Harbiye Reisliği Ankara Matbaaları, 1927–1928).

[196] *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Alman Ordusunda Müstemel İşarat-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul: Erkan-ı Harbiye Matbaası, 1926).

[197] Mahmud Behcet, *Yugoslavya Ordusu* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923).

[198] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*; *Kızıl Ordu II*; *Kızıl Ordu III* and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*.

producing manuals for the Turkish Army, while others were aimed at informing and enriching the knowledge of the fast-developing Turkish officers' capability in modern military science. In addition to the works mentioned earlier in this chapter, the following notable works contributed to the development of capability.

The Turkish Army had closely followed the Soviet experience against aerial and chemical attacks since the late 1920s. The first official manual for implementing preventive measures was issued in draft form in 1928.[199] This draft manual by the Turkish General Staff has been accepted as the beginning of civil defence in Turkey in the literature and official institutional historiography.[200] In the draft edition, Fevzi Paşa ordered all military units to provide feedback on the draft by December, 1930.[201] After this process, the manual was published in 1931 and later in 1932, 1933 and 1934.[202] This 1928 manual was based on a book translated from Russian in 1925, titled *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası* (Defence and Protection of the Rear of the Front).[203] This translation, in relation to its relevance to army's efforts within the society against such threats, will be covered in detail in Chapter 8. The 96-page book contained two folded drawings and was translated by Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi. This aspect of the manual, in terms of its adaption by the Turkish military, will be covered in detail in Chapter 6. The perception of modern war and the way the next war will be fought was identical in this Russian translation used by Turkish military authors in those years. Further, in the September 1929 issue of *Askeri Mecmua,* Turkish officers were given the opportunity to read a comprehensive article

[199] *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1928).

[200] *Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973), 169 and Selim Çapar, "1930- 1946 döneminde Dahiliye Vekaleti" in *T. C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Tarihi 1920-2014*, ed. M. Çelik (Ankara: TİAV Yayınları, 2015), 207-8.

[201] *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı,* 1.

[202] *Halk İçin Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Matbaası, 1931); *Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Mardin: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Vilayet Matbaası, 1932); *Halk İçin Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği İnhisarlar Matbaası, 1933) and *Halk İçin Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Devlet Matbaası, 1934).

[203] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*, trans. Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1925).

translated by Major M. Sadık from Russian on first aid to be delivered to the victims of an aerial chemical attack.[204]

Other works providing insight into Soviet military science, techniques, equipment, and culture were as follows: A manual was printed in 1927 on the use of radio (wireless) with the title Z*amanımız Muhaberatının Muhtelif Safahatında Telsiz Mevkilerinin Meydana Çıkarılması ve Muharebenin Murakebe Usulü* (The Discovery of Radio Positions and the Method of Controlling the Battle at Various Stages of Contemporary Communications) written in Russian by Fedotov and translated by Turkish Major Yakup.[205] The Turkish General Staff translated works into Turkish covering Russian and Soviet operation principles, tactics, weapons, and military history. In 1920, *Mevzi Harbinde bir Rus Fırkasının Taarruz Planı* (The Plan of Attack of a Russian Division in Positional Warfare) was published.[206] Two pamphlets written by a Turkish officer from the Military College on the use of hand grenades and close combat were printed in 1925 as training documents for Turkish cadets. First Lieutenant Nuri examined Turkish, German, French, English, and Russian grenades in these works printed by the Necm-i İstiklal Matbaası in İstanbul. [207]

In some of the works to be translated and offered for the use of Turkish officers, Turkish authorities came accross with Tsarist Russian or Soviet communist propaganda. However, instead of focusing on these aspects, presenting technical military knowledge has been a priority in moving forward. In 1935, the Turkish Navy published Turkish naval officer and historian Major Fevzi Kurtoğlu's work on

[204] A. Savalyef, "Havai Gaz Hücumları Musaplarına Yapılacak İlk Yardım," trans. Binbaşı M. Sadık, *Askeri Mecmua,* 74 (September 1929): 107-37.

[205] *Zamanımız Muhaberatının Muhtelif Safahatında Telsiz Mevkilerinin Meydana Çıkarılması ve Muharebenin Murakebe Usulü* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927).

[206] *Hücum Kıtaatının Talim ve Terbiyesi, Mevzi Harbinde Bir Rus Fırkasının Taarruz Planı, ve Sait Muharebenin Teftişleri*, trans. Sedad (İstanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1920).

[207] *Bomba Talim ve Terbiyesi: Türk, Alman, Fransız, İngiliz, Rus Tüfek Bombalarıyla Saldırma ve Boğuşma Talim ve Terbiyesine Ait Lazım Gelen Malumat-ı Esasiye,* trans. First Lieutenant Nuri (İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1925) and *Bombalar: Türk, Alman, Fransız, İngiliz, Rus Bombalarının En Mühimleri Hakkında Lazım Gelen Malumat-ı Esasiye*, trans. First Lieutenant Nuri (İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1925).

historical information on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Kurtoğlu compiled and translated Myazgovskiy's work.[208] In the preface, Kurtoğlu noted that Myazgovskiy's work from 1912 was one-sided and inclined to exaggerate the Russian Navy's achievements. However, as there was no literature covering Ottoman-Russian naval affairs from 1696 to 1914, he wanted to present this work to the attention of Turkish military readers because of the importance of the Black Sea in the current relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey.[209]

Similar self-confidence in the Turkish officer corps to differentiate technical military knowledge from propaganda can be seen in the work on a Soviet manual on reconnaissance aviation from 1931, which was translated and printed in Turkey in 1935.[210] In addition to technical military instructions, there was a section on political activity during wartime. In Chapter 9 of the manual, the importance of ideology and the role of commissars and communist principles were covered. The role of aviators in preparing society for war and the measures to be taken were presented in detail in this chapter.[211]

---

[208] Mozgfesky, *Rus Karadeniz Filosu Tarihi*, ed. and trans. Fevzi Kurtoğlu (İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1935). Fevzi Kurtoğlu (1890- 1945) was a Turkish naval officer and historian. With support from Marshal Fevzi Çakmak he worked intensively on naval history and published research based on archival sources. See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Fevzi Kurdoğlu," *Belleten* 9/36 (1945): 505-6. The original work on the Russian Black Sea Fleet was by Evgeny Alexandrovich Myazgovskiy in Russian. See *Мязговский Евгений Александрович,* История Черноморского флота 1696-1912 [Myazgovskiy Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, Istoriya Chernomorskogo Flota 1696-1912] (Saint-Petersburg: Тип. Товарищества А.С. Суворина (Tip. Tovarishchestva A.S. Suvorina), 1914). However, there is no information as to whether Kurtoğlu had Russian since in information about him only his command of English and German were noted. Evren Mercan, "Deniz Harp Tarihçisi Bir Bahriyeli: Hüseyin Fevzi Kurtoğlu," *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi,* 2/1 (2021): 21.

[209] Mozgfesky, *Rus Karadeniz Filosu*, 3-5.

[210] *Kızıl Ordu Keşif Tayyareciliği Talimnamesi 1931*, trans. Hüseyin (İstanbul: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği, 1935).

[211] *Kızıl Ordu Keşif Tayyareciliği Talimnamesi,* 62-9. This self-confidence prevailed throughout the period despite strong concern about what Bolshevism or communism were and whether these would penetrate as subversive currents into Turkey. There had been instances to deal with about these concerns, but none escalated to a crisis level until the end of the period. When political atmosphere externally and internally changed this came to an end absurdly as seen in the 1938 case of Nazım Hikmet and some cadets. From 1919 onwards, there had been more serious instances of strong communist infiltration attempts and chance for influence, but all were managed without high profile scandals. In 1938, under external and internal pressures of uncertainties the absurd case of famous poet Nazım Hikmet who identified himself long as a communist erupted as he was accused of influencing cadets at the Military College and later in the Navy and was sentenced to 28 years in prison with all career prospects of cadets ending as well. Very experienced Head of Chief of Staff

On the other hand, the Turkish General Staff was not concerned about publishing works for fear of antagonising the Soviet regime. In 1932, the Turkish General Staff published the work of Imperial Russian Army General Pyotr Nikolayevich Krasnov. This was translated from Russian by Lieutenant Colonel M. Murat with the title *Ordu Ruhiyatı* (Army Spirit).[212] Krasnov served as Lieutenant General in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I and later he fought against Bolsheviks as Ataman of Don Cossacks until he fled to Europe in 1919.[213] His work focusing on army psychology was an important step toward examining this topic at the Russian War Academy. This important pioneering work in the field was presented to Turkish officers. Later, Ahmet Faik, a philosophy and sociology teacher at Maltepe and Kuleli Military High Schools in Turkey, wrote a monograph on psychology in the military in 1933.[214]

In 1939, Turkish naval officer Süruri Alkan translated and compiled the work titled *Cengiz Han'dan Stalin'e* (From Cenghis Khan to Stalin). It was published by the Naval Printing Office in İstanbul.[215] The first part of this work is an abridged translation of French naval officer and military theorist Admiral Castex's 1935 book.[216] Castex examined a strategic problem that persisted for seven centuries, from

---

Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, after many turbulent years, became to be concerned about some movements in the army without any substantial evidence or for any apparent obvious reason. See, Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey 1920-1991* (London: Routledge, 2006), 47; A. Kadir, *1938 Harp Okulu Olayı ve Nazım Hikmet* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1966); Hikmet Çiçek, *Nazım'ın Harp Okulu ve Donanma Davaları Türk Ordusuna İlk Kumpas* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2019); Tolga Şardan, *"Komonist Masası"ndaki Nazım Hikmet* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2019) and Uğur Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990). Nazım Hikmet had always been kept under surveillance since 1921. See Note to Interior Ministry, Türk Diplomatik Arşivi (Turkish Diplomatic Archives), Ankara [hereafter TDA], 571-34966-137843–5, 18 October 1921.

[212] P. N. Krasnof, *Ordu Ruhiyatı: Askeri Ruhiyat Notları*, trans. Lieutenant Colonel M. Murat (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932).

[213] Pyotr Nikolayevich Krasnov (1869-1947) settled in France in 1923 and during World War II he cooperated with Nazi Germany. He was repatriated to the Soviet Union by Britain and hanged in 1947.

[214] Ahmet Faik, *Askerliğin Psikolojisi Hakkında Bir Kalem Tecrübesi* (İstanbul: Milli Mecmua Matbaası, 1933).

[215] Süruri Akalın, *Cengiz Han'dan Stalin'e 1205-1939: 1- Sevkülceyşi Bir Manevranın Teselsül ve Tehavvülü, 2- Komünizim- Faşizm Mücadeleleri* (İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1939).

[216] Raoul Victor Patrice Castex, *De Gengis-Khan a Staline ou les vicissitudes d'une manoeuvre strategique 1205-1935* (Paris: Société d'editions géographiques maritimes et coloniales, 1935).

the time of Cenghis Khan to the time of Stalin, in the sense that both had to address the issue of two widely separated fronts.[217] Castex's main argument was that history once again forced a central Eurasian power to turn to the east without moving onto the west due to a threat in its eastern direction, pointing to the threat the Soviet Union perceived from Japan in the early 1930s. This problem for the Soviet leadership, meaning its vast geography and any undertakings in its eastern sector, was always closely monitored by the Turkish military cadres. In this translation, in addition to Castex's work, Turkish officer Akalın used four other French and American sources to write about the communism-fascism struggle. Akalın stated that the aim of the work was to show the emergence and aims of Bolshevism, in addition to examining developments experienced in world politics, including the rise of Nazi Germany and the beginning of World War II. [218]

The translation of manuals to benefit from Soviet military science and experience continued even after World War II. For instance, a manual on ski training in the Red Army was translated by Colonel Latif Kumuk who was a Russian instructor at the Military College and published as *Kızılorduda Kayakçılık Eğitimi* (Skiing Training in the Red Army) by the Turkish General Staff in 1950, with a secret classification. Another such manual was *Kayakçılık* (Skiing), written by Soviet Major Harlamov and translated by Nevruz Üründül in 1951.[219]

From the early 1950s onwards, a major shift occurred. From those years onwards, for the following decades, the main source of information on the Soviet military came not from Soviet sources or from Turkish officers' own interactions and observations but from Western sources. The Turkish military then began presenting translations of

[217] "Book Review by Lieutenant Commander Charles Moran of US Naval Reserve," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 62/6/400 (June 1936), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1936/june/book-reviews, accessed on 17 July 2024.

[218] Akalın, *Cengiz Han'dan Stalin'e*.

[219] *Kızılorduda Kayakçılık Eğitimi*, trans. Latif Kumuk (İstanbul: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları Askeri Basımevi, 1950) and N. Harlamov, *Kayakçılık*, trans. N. Üründül (İstanbul: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı İstanbul Basımevi, 1951). Early attempts to develop skiing within the military and among the civilian population were first done through translations from German. Although Turkey' geography justified emphasis on promoting and using skiing skills more widely for defence of the country, progress to promote these had been limited. See Herber Riedel, *Kayak Talimatnamesi Tercümesi* (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1936).

American and British works to its officers in an attempt to understand the Soviet Army.[220] The Turkish military received information about the Soviet Army through translations of British and later American sources. This resulted in looking at its neighbour on its doorstep through the lens of a new hegemonic power located on the other side of the world. Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky's 1963 work[221] on Soviet military strategy was translated and published in Turkish in 1966[222]. Turkish officers were presented once again with a work representing Soviet military thinking from within the Red Army ranks, but this time because Sokolovsky's work gained great attention in the West, as it was believed to have opened a window into the closed, secret Soviet military world[223]. In the bipolar years of the Cold War, pro-Soviet leftist circles in Turkey also printed their version of understanding the Soviet military and presented the work on the Soviet Army with a preface from Marshal Voroshilov in 1978.[224]

3.2. The Nature of Knowledge on the Red Army

In forming its understanding of the Soviet military structure and its functioning, the Turkish military collected information on all elements of national power of the Soviet Union, such as geography, demography, economic elements, national resources, and infrastructure. The contribution of these macro elements to the structure and functioning of the Red Army was evaluated. Then, in pure technical military terms, the force structure, deployments, command issues, status, and

[220] Examples for such works are *Sovyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, trans. Ekrem Tetik (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1950) and İvan Kirilov, *Sovyet Genelkurmayında Mesleki Hayatım*, trans. Tavap Tarzi (İstanbul: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı İstanbul Basımevi, 1952) and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Sovyet Askeri Doktrini*, trans. Baha Ataman (Ankara: Erkan-ı Umumiye Basımevi, 1956) and Kenneth R. Whiting, *Dünkü ve Bugünkü Sovyet Askeri Doktrini*, trans. Kani Doyran (Eskişehir: Hava Kuvvetleri Basımevi, 1960).

[221] Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. H. Dinerstein, L. Goure and T. Wolfe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963).

[222] V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Rus Askeri Stratejisi*, trans. Nevruz Üründül (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966).

[223] Turkish officers produced a critical analytical review of this book presented to the use of Turkish military with classified marking. See *"Rus Askeri Stratejisi" İsimli Eserin Üçüncü Baskısının Kritiği* (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1973).

[224] *Sovyet Ordusu: Sovyet Savaş Tarihi, Askerlik Bilimi, Doktrini, Sanatı, Stratejisi*, trans. Nahit Tören (İstanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 1978).

condition of its various branches, such as conventional ones, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and any new ones, such as airborne troops and armoured corps, were examined in detail. From this practical portrait, Turkish officers developed an understanding of the Red Army. This information was disseminated through the usual Turkish military practice founded on levels of clearance and the need-to-know principle within the Turkish bureaucracy.

3.2.1. Practical Information of the Soviet Union in the Turkish Military Sources

As geography and demography constituted the two key defining elements of military power, all Turkish military analyses began with an evaluation of these in the context of the Red Army.[225] The first important aspect to be noted by the Turkish military about the Red Army was the conditions created by the Soviet Union's vast geography and sizeable population. Information on the area and population of the Soviet Union was noted in the introductions of military publications.[226] This vast geography and population were examined in terms of the advantages it would offer from a military perspective in a country where, by law dated 28 September 1922, military service was compulsory for males between the ages of 20 and 40.[227] This manpower capacity was important as, by the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union was assessed to be capable of mustering one million conscripts annually and sustaining a standing army of 1.3 to 1.5 million. With a budget permitting, this could rise to 13

[225] Turkish primary sources and official archival documents first named the Bolshevik military force as "Kırmızı Ordu" which later transformed in time into "Kızıl Ordu" or "Kızılordu". This transition from an ordinary colour indicating "Kırmızı" to a special term *"*Kızıl*"* occurred gradually. This would make no sense in English nor in Russian languages as "red" and "красная" do not offer this difference and are used in the same meaning. Turkish- Russian Military dictionary printed in Moscow in 1940, however, note this nuance indicating "Kırmızı ordu" meant red army in wargames or manoeuvres while "Kızıl Ordu" meant the Red Army indicating the special term character of this naming by Turks. *Военный Турецко-Русский и Русско-Турецкий Словарь* (Moscow, Гос. Издательство Иностранных и Национальных Словарей, 1940), 160 and 162. Turkish military showed its forces or friendly forces in red while the opponent was shown in blue until this was changed with post World War II American and NATO practices, showing friend by blue and enemy by red markings.

[226] Tahsin İsmail (İybar), *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri Estonya, Litvanya, Letonya Orduları* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923), 3; *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 1 and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 30.

[227] Details reported in *Askeri Mecmua,* "Rusya Ordusuna Dair," *Askeri Mecmua*, 45-48 (March 1923): 157 and used in the military intelligence publication, *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 1.

million.[228] Turkish military intelligence reported the total figure under arms as 610,000 in its 1924 publication.[229] In a translation from a German military article from July 1928, the number of peacetime personnel of the Red Army was given as 1,050,000 with the potential to rise to 6,000,000 after mobilisation.[230] These figures were compiled from all available published sources by the officers.

In addition to contributing to the size of the Red Army, population figures were used to understand the ethnic distribution within Soviet geography. The 1930 book titled *Sosyalist Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri İttihadının Muhtasar Etnografisi* (A Concise Ethnography of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics) printed by *Askeri Matbaa* contained nothing about military troops, weapons or military command but only provided a summary of population and dispersal of ethnic groups throughout the vast Soviet geography.[231] In the 1930 military intelligence publication, emphasis was placed on the Turkish population living under Soviet rule, noting it as the second largest ethnic group after Slavs, coming third after Russians and Ukrainians, with 13.5% of the population, or 25 million people.[232] This publication also underlined the Soviet effort to show the number of Turkish populations as less than the actual number.[233] According to the Turkish assessment, since Turks were second in number after Slavs, the Soviets worked hard on the Turkish population to introduce the "new religion of the old Russian state, communism." However, in essence, a small portion of the Turkish population seemed to have accepted communism, while the majority of them rejected this new "economic and social sect."[234] In the section "Komunism Önünde Türk Kavimleri" (Turkish Tribes in the Face of Communism), the Turkish

[228] These figures were compiled by a Turkish colonel from a 1936 study published in France. See Z. Türkmen, "Avrupa Silahlanıyor," *Askeri Mecmua,* 108 (March 1938): 128-9.

[229] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 3.

[230] "Saviyet Rusya'da Kızıl Ordu Zabitleri," trans. Yüzbaşı Ahmet Şevket, *Askeri Mecmua*, 72 (March 1929): 103.

[231] *Sosyalist Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri İttihadının Muhtasar Etnografisi* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930).

[232] The study noted that 12.5% were Muslim and 1% were non-Muslim Turks. *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, v and 30.

[233] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 30-31.

[234] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, v: "Eski Rusya devletinin yeni dini olan Komunism."

authors of this military intelligence publication noted that the current general policy of the Republic of Turkey would not foresee anything other than not going beyond establishing dialogue only with these Turkish populations in a neighbouring country, willing to see them developing within their own borders. The policy adopted in those years did not seek to interfere with various ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. The authors noted that although this was neither ideal nor compatible with preserving the national existence of Turks, the consolation was that Turkish villagers living in the Soviet Union were far more civilised than the Russian villagers, noting that Turks had a superior civilisation than the Russians.[235] This comparison on the basis of cultural development and Turkish sensitivity to being considered underdeveloped was reflected repeatedly in Turkish accounts of the Soviets, especially in the personal encounters of officers. Since Turkey has embarked on major reforms and officers have been spearheading the program in the country, any implication of backwardness, underdevelopment, or incapability was outright rejected, easily prompting a reaction from any Turkish officer witnessing this.

In the 1920s, Turkish officers assessed the backwardness of the Soviet Union and respected its desire to develop, relying on its resources, manpower, industry, and production capabilities to present these for the benefit of its army. In a 1923 publication, the deficiencies in weapons and ammunition of the Red Army were noted.[236] Deterioration of scientific knowledge and a lack of technical professionals were cited as the main reasons. Revolution, atrocities, and battles were believed to have deprived the artillery branch of expert staff of the Imperial Army of the Tsar.[237] Similarly, in the Turkish assessment of the military, aviation suffered since the Revolution, and out of 1,350 planes, only 450 were airworthy.[238] Compared to such assessments in the early 1920s, Turkish officers observed that by the end of the 1930s, the Soviets had invested heavily and managed to develop their military capabilities. In an article published in 1938 and taken from a French military journal,

[235] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, v and z.

[236] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri,* 12-13 and 17.

[237] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*,12-13 and 17.

[238] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 12-13 and 18.

Turkish officers read in *Askeri Mecmua* that from 1927 to 1933, the Soviet defence budget was almost doubled, and two-thirds of this was used for the armament of the Red Army. This budget increased eight-fold in 1935 since 1927, illustrating that the Soviet Union gave great importance to national defence.[239] In 1932, the Turkish Ambassador in London, Mehmet Münir (Ertegün), informed Ankara about a 100% increase in the salaries of all officers and ordinary soldiers in the Red Army. He accessed this information through British press coverage.[240]

The nature of the information acquired on another military bureaucracy and perceptions of its intentions were usually manifest in the wargame scenarios created by complex military bureaucracies. Equipped with information about the Soviet Union and mindful of the political steer, Turkish officers were requested to put their knowledge into action in a wargame showing the Turkish military's expectations of things to come should the Soviet Union decide to act aggressively against Turkey back in the late 1920s. This scenario reflected what senior military officers expected from young officers to simulate and prepare for. *Şark Cephesinde Harb Oyunu Notları* (The Wargame Notes on the Eastern Front) was a compilation of notes and a scenario. It was printed in 1928 in İstanbul by the Turkish War Academy.[241] This wargame taught in the 1927-1928 academic year of the War Academy asked students to work and discuss a scenario where the Red (Turkey) found itself in a crossfire in a major regional war in which the Green (the Soviet Union) waged against the forces of the Yellow (a European power) on multiple fronts in Central Europe and in the south in Syria and Iraq. Although the Red declared neutrality and was not an adversary of the Green, the latter used its military power to overrun and march over the Red's entire territory and paralyzed its capacity to defend itself (Figure 3.1). In a naval wargame scenario in the following year in 1929, Turkish officers simulated a war scenario in the west alongside Turkey's western border against two countries from Thrace (Yellow armies) and the Aegean Sea (Blue armies) while cadets were

[239] Türkmen, "Avrupa," 129.

[240] The Turkish Embassy in London to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35014-138003-10, 9 November 1932.

[241] *Şark Cephesinde Harb Oyunu Notları* (İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1928) and *1927-1928 Tedrisatı Şark Hududunda Harb Oyununa Aid Krokiler* (İstanbul: Harb Akademileri Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1928).

told that as Russia had signed agreements with the Red armies (Turkey), this country was assessed to remain neutral in favour of the Red.[242] The Turkish military bureaucracy simulated a situation in which Turkey would be caught in a crossfire rather than a direct assault by the Red Army or the latter remain neutral in a confrontation in the interwar period. In the following years after World War II, all simulations turned into a form whereby the Soviets would inflict a heavy blow to the entire country directly and swiftly on all theatres.




Figure 3.1. Map of the wargame scenario conducted in the 1927-1928 academic year at the Turkish War Academy.

Source: *1927-28 Tedrisatı Şark Hududunda Harb Oyununa Aid Krokiler* (İstanbul: Harb Akademisi Matbaası, 1928), 27.

3.2.2. A Portrait of the Red Army

Building on the macro-indicators, technical military analyses of the Red Army were made, and these analyses of its combat branches were more detailed, as these aspects were more relevant to officers. At first glance, the Red Army of the 1920s was not significantly different from the Turkish army of the time in the sense that it was

[242] *Deniz Harp Oyunu, Harp Akademisi 1929-1930 Senesi Tedrisatından* (İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1929), 5.

primarily a land army with infantry, cavalry, and artillery as its main combat branches and developing air-naval capabilities.

As the Soviet cavalry branch stood out as the most effective branch in the Red Army, Turkish military sources provided information and made analytical comments about it. The organisation and use of cavalry were examined in all Turkish military intelligence publications from 1924 to 1930 and *Askeri Mecmua* published articles on this matter. Some of these sources suggested adopting certain practices from the Red cavalry. In 1923, Turkish army captain Tahsin İsmail noted that during the war with Poland, the Red cavalry played a major role in bringing about the Soviet victory as the Soviet cavalry crossed the River Dnieper south of Kiev under the command of Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny and forced the Polish forces to abandon Kiev.[243] This was the result of the Bolsheviks' giving great importance to the use of cavalry and working on methods to improve their effectiveness. According to Tahsin İsmail, their main function was to attack enemy flanks when the enemy established a strong centre defended with rifles, machine guns, and artillery guns.[244] Further, he commented that both infantry and artillery of the Bolsheviks lagged behind the effectiveness of the cavalry.[245] In 1925, the Turkish General Staff presented a volume on the most recent campaign of the Red Army waged against Poland. *Rus-Leh Seferi* (The Russian-Polish Campaign) was translated by Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) from Russian further revealing the role the cavalry played in this campaign.[246] In 1930, in *Askeri Mecmua,* Kaymakam (lieutenant colonel) A. Fuat noted that the cavalry constituted the best branch of the army in Russia.[247] Three years later, in March 1933, *Askeri Mecmua* underlined that as cavalry required regular training, it was part of the Soviet professional army. This indicated the elite status of the cavalry, which was mostly stationed close to the borders with Poland and

[243] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri,* 13.

[244] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri,* 16.

[245] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri,* 9 and 17.

[246] *Rus-Leh Seferi*, trans. Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925).

[247] Kaymakam A. Fuat, "1. Vazife: Müstakbel Harplerde Süvariden Azami İstifade İçin Bu Sınıfın Teşkilat ve Teslihatı Nasıl Olmalıdır ve Nasıl İstihdam Edilmelidir?," *Askeri Mecmua,* 75 (January 1930): 9.

Romania.[248] As the Soviet experience in this area was seen as exemplary, in 1926, a Soviet cavalry manual, *Rus Muvakkat Süvari Talimnamesi* (Russian Temporary Cavalry Manual), was translated by Turkish Major Sadık and presented to Turkish officers. [249] Major Sadık noted that even in 1930, the cavalry was the best branch of the army in Russia.[250]

After visiting the Red Army manoeuvres near Kiev in 1934, the Head of Cavalry School of Turkish Army, Colonel Cevdet, wrote a report for the General Staff about his visit. In this report, he noted that the horses, weapons, and equipment of the Red cavalry were perfect.[251] He witnessed large cavalry formations charging through enemy lines, together with mechanised troops. [252] Observing the Red Army cavalry's three-in-a-row formation, he noted that this formation should be adapted by the Turkish cavalry troops, as it would be less complicated and easier and would provide better results in training the Turkish cavalry.[253] For this purpose, in his professional capacity, Colonel Cevdet underlined that necessary changes in the Turkish cavalry manual could be made without any problem. Colonel Cevdet also suggested some technical adjustments to Turkish cavalry equipment and methods used, as he was impressed by the quality and type of Russian equipment and the effectiveness of methods employed by the Russian cavalry.[254] His assessment of the riding skills of the Russian cavalry was very positive, with only some reservations. Based on his observations in the 1934 manoeuvres, he noted that the Russians did not stick to the principle of dispersed movement, which would cause higher casualties, and did not follow their principle of avoiding directly charging head-on the strengthened enemy position, as they needed to target flanks and rear rather than going straight toward the centre.[255] However, Colonel Cevdet noted that these tactical deficiencies could be

[248] *Askeri Mecmua*, 88 (Mart 1933): 1012.

[249] *Rus Muvakkat Süvari Talimnamesi* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1926).

[250] A. Fuat, "1. Vazife," 9.

[251] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 9), 1934.

[252] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 4), 1934.

[253] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 5), 1934.

[254] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (pages 5-7), 1934.

[255] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 8), 1934. He tried to explain this situation as he underlined that these were only manoeuvres, and the judges assumed the defending

easily fixed because, as he observed, the Red Army worked without a break to improve and develop themselves.[256] Another criticism, or rather a difference from the Turkish cavalry training, was pointed out by Colonel Cevdet in the style of using swords by the cavalry. The style and position differed, as no single way was enforced for the Soviet cavalrymen. He noted that this was the Russian acceptance that only the result mattered and that was to slash the target and to destroy the enemy and the way to do this was not prescribed in Russian understanding nor exercised in trainings.[257] However, he concluded that there was no doubt that the Red Army cavalry would be more powerful in the near future.[258]

Turkish military kept an interest in keeping up with technological developments in the military sector as Turkish officers had already clearly assessed importance in having access to these to modernise the Turkish Army and achieve an undisputable deterrence capability against potential adversaries. By the late 1920s and especially the 1930s, the Soviet Union allocated more resources to its army from its general budget. Through developments in science, technology, and industrialisation, the Soviet state began to develop modern weapons. Until that point, the major Western powers had a monopoly on such armaments, and Turkey did not have access to them. Therefore, Turkish officers collected information about the Red Army's mechanisation, development of armoured units, airborne capabilities, advanced understanding of chemical warfare, and air defence. Moreover, there was an interest in understanding Soviet experimentation on the use of these jointly with other conventional branches in developing new operating principles and understanding this warfare.

The development and use of tanks by the Soviet Union became a source of interest for the Turkish military bureaucracy, which had been constantly seeking to increase

---

heavy machine gun units were neutralised as a result of cavalry charge. In essence the 1934 manoeuvres were a Soviet experimentation of thrust action by mechanised units to the enemy centre, cavalry following the lead of these mechanised units from behind.

[256] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 9), 1934.

[257] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 8), 1934.

[258] Report by Colonel Cevdet, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-4, (page 9), 1934.

the technological capabilities of the Turkish Army. In a 1925 military intelligence publication, modest numbers in the Red Army having 50 to 60 armoured cars and 30 to 40 tanks bought from the British and French armies were noted.[259] According to this publication, the Russians began to produce light and heavy tanks in a factory near Moscow.[260] Four years later, in 1929, a rapid increase in Soviet tank production was noted in the issues of *Askeri Mecmua* based on articles translated from Western military journals. According to these articles, the number of Soviet tanks was 200 in 1929 and 400 in 1930. These figures placed the Soviet Union second after France, which traditionally had the highest number of tanks in Europe at the conclusion of World War I.[261] *Askeri Mecmua* maintained its interest in Soviet tanks in the subsequent years. An article translated from a German military journal published in 1934 pointed to improvised Russian point of view with regard to use of tanks.[262] Accordingly, Russians placed importance on the combined use of artillery and tanks and used tanks in three different ways: allocating them directly for use with infantry, covering infantry from a distance, and using them as distant combat groups.[263] This article noted that Russians were critical of the 1929 French tank manual, where all tanks were strictly tied to the infantry, those tanks serving as sappers were not taken into consideration, and no importance was given to the suppression of enemy arms.[264] The Russians viewed these French approaches as mistakes.[265] In 1938, Z. Türkmen underlined the advancement of armoured corps of the Soviet Union which reached to a level where the Red Army was estimated to possess 2,500 vehicles.[266]

---

[259] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 46.

[260] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 47. First tanks produced by the Soviet tank building industry were light tanks built between 1919 and 1921. The first Soviet production tank was developed in 1925-26. These were mass produced at plants in Leningrad and in Perm. See Mikhail Baryatinskiy, Russian Armour *Light Tanks* (Surrey: Ian Allen Publishing, 2006), 3-4.

[261] "Saviyet Rusya'da Kızıl Ordu Zabitleri," 103; "Yabancı Ordular Teşkilatı: Avrupa Devletleri Ordularının Hazari Mevcutları," *Askeri Mecmua*, 76 (Nisan 1930): 13. This was reported as such in the eve of World War II as well. See Türkmen, "Avrupa," 136.

[262] "Tankların Kullanılmasına Dair Rus Noktai Nazarı," *Askeri Mecmua*, 92 (March 1934): 216.

[263] "Tankların Kullanılmasına Dair," 216.

[264] "Tankların Kullanılmasına Dair," 216.

[265] "Tankların Kullanılmasına Dair," 216.

[266] Türkmen, "Avrupa," 129.

On the eve of World War II, compiling information from various sources, Major Celal Alkoç examined various points of view regarding foreign armies' use of mechanised troops. Alkoç, referring to the Red Army's 1936 manual, wrote that the Soviets perceived mechanised units to be used in special tasks as they had the capability of possessing the elements of speed and firepower. Tanks are used in such missions with supporting artillery fire. According to the Russian perspective, tanks would always be used *en masse*, and in addition to covering infantry, they would have the role of making thrusts into enemy lines and destroying their flanks and rear.[267] This principle of swift attacks by the Red Army was explained in another article translated from a Russian military journal in the same issue of the *Askeri Mecmua*. The article underlined that the Russian use of combined arms would lead to a swift attack using artillery, air force, and most importantly, tanks.[268]

The actual practice of this military tactic of thrusting into an enemy line and destroying enemy defence on the entirety of its depth was witnessed by the Turkish military delegation during their visit to the Soviet military manoeuvres in Ukraine in 1934. The main theme of the manoeuvres was to see whether a corps-sized mechanised force could accomplish a task on its own or whether it would be better to use them in smaller battalion or regiment sizes allocated to bigger units such as infantry or cavalry divisions.[269] Tanks and cavalry were used to quickly pass through enemy lines. The Turkish delegation was led by the Turkish cavalry general, Fahrettin Paşa (Altay), accompanied by other leading commanders from the Turkish Army, including Muzaffer Paşa (Ergüder), who penned the official report. Having observed the fast movement of tanks and cavalry against the enemy positions going deeper, leaving the entire enemy infantry and other units in the rear was not an ideal situation according to the Turkish officers. This was noted, and although the intention to test this was legitimate according to Muzaffer Paşa, the Soviet commanders would not get anything out of this as all the commanders were acting on the pre-given orders and were not allowed to use their discretion or command

[267] Celal Alkoç "Yabancı Ordularda Motorleşme: Teşkilat, İstihdam ve Teçhizat," *Askeri Mecmua*, 112 (March 1939): 227-8.

[268] "Seri Taarruzlar," trans. B. Türkmen, *Askeri Mecmua,* 112 (March 1939): 34-6.

[269] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 1), 1934.

skills.[270] Muzaffer Paşa pointed that Soviet over reliance on technological weapons would make them open to make some poor decisions and he asserted that any mechanised corps would need artillery cover in the first instance and tanks could not clear enemy areas after they passed quickly deeper into enemy territory without infantry taking action.[271]

After the 1934 manoeuvres, the head of the Turkish military delegation, Fahrettin Paşa, was content with what he had observed in the manoeuvres and stated afterwards in the best diplomatic manner that the Red Army was perfect, performed well in the manoeuvres, was capable of using tanks *en masse* effectively, and soldiers had a high level of enthusiasm.[272] In this manoeuvre in 1934, the Turkish officers witnessed an impressive early play of a major future war phenomenon. They saw the action of a Soviet mechanised corps with 48 armoured cars, 58 tankettes, 145 amphibious tanks, 127 tanks with one gun, 128 tanks with a gun and a machine gun, and many trucks and other motorised vehicles.[273] This was an impressive scene for Turkish officers, as Turkey had only a few Soviet-donated armoured vehicles at that time.[274]

This was a quick look into what future warfare would bring to humanity, with all its complexities and destruction. The Turkish officers had firsthand early exposure to the developing warfare concept known as "Deep Operation" (Глубокая операция in Russian), developed by the Soviets and mostly associated with military theorists such as Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Kiriakovitch Triandafillov and Georgy Samoilovich Isserson.[275] Developing an understanding of the combat actions

[270] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 27), 1934.

[271] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 28), 1934.

[272] Fahrettin Altay, *On Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası 1912- 1922* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2023), 466.

[273] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 4), 1934.

[274] After Prime Minister İsmet Paşa's (İnönü) 1932 visit to Soviet Union, two tanks and four armoured cars were given by the Soviet Union to Turkey as gifts. The agreement on first major order involving 64 tanks and 43 armoured cars was reached in 1934 with delivery in early 1935. See, Abdullah Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı: T-26 B Seyyar Çelik Kale* (Ankara: FNSS, 2020), 56 and 59.

[275] James J. Schneider, "V. K. Triandafillov, Military Theorist," *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies,* 1:3 (December 2007): 304 and Mary R. Habeck, *Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor*

of large operational formations with newly added elements, such as air and armoured units, was a major issue for militaries at the time. The Red Army and Soviet military theorists had a clear headway in bringing about a model for this, which was not yet present in the portfolios of Western European armies of the time. During the interwar period, Germans were also developing similar theories of shocking and surprisingly swift attacks as thrusts into the enemy's depth. During the Weimar Republic period, from 1919 to the change of power in 1933, the German Army and the Red Army interacted and exchanged ideas. Although they were in physical contact during armour development in these years, due to limitations imposed on them by the victors of World War I, both had their own takeaways in the employment of these in battle.[276] The extent of this cooperation could be overestimated as both sides were experimenting in their own ways, and this cooperation came to an end as they were developing their own paths.[277] In the opening phase of World War II, the German implementation brought quick victories to the Nazi Germany. Famous successful practitioner of these, German general Heinz Guderian, later noted that in the German attack in 1941, "Probably they [the Red Army] were surprised by the sudden and deep panzer thrusts that led to encirclement in the rear, which succeeded once again despite the Polish and French precedents and led to the almost complete annihilation of this group."[278] This impressive display of trials in this new theory was not exclusive to the Turkish delegation. Several years later, based on Stalin's political agenda in his quest for a Franco-Soviet military convention, the Soviet military leadership invited French and British military observers to the manoeuvres in 1936 in the Belorussian Military District, where they tested the "Deep Operation" theory

Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union 1919-1939 (London: Cornell University Press, 2003), xiv and Earl F. Ziemke, *The Red Army 1918-1941 From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 198.

[276] Habeck, *Storm of Steel*, 116 and 158. For discussion of benefits each side acquired see Manfred Zeidler, "The Strange Allies- Red Army and Reichswehr in the Inter-war Period," in *Russian-German Special Relations in the 20th Century, A Closed Chapter?*, ed. Karl Schlögel (New York: Berg, 2006), 190-211.

[277] David R. Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army, 1928-1941," in *The Military History of the Soviet Union*, ed. Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 71.

[278] Heinz Guderian, "Russian Strategy in the War," in *The Red Army*, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), 131. On the Soviet side, Triandafillov died in a plane crash in 1931 and Tukhachevsky, together with other important Red Army generals were already purged by Stalin in 1937-38. But remaining Red Army generals largely benefited from these foundations laid out by them in World War II against the Germans.

with the participation of six infantry, four cavalry divisions, 1,200 tanks, and more than 1,000 aircraft.[279]

Another major area of Soviet superiority was aviation, where the Soviets developed new aircraft and tactics and mobilised the masses to create interest in aviation in their country. In his memoirs, Fahrettin Paşa noted that they had seen the world's biggest airplane, the Tupolev ANT-20, named after Maksim Gorky, at an airport in Moscow, capable of carrying 70 people in 1934. He later observed air shows, parachute jumps, and air drops of large vehicles by parachutes.[280] The Turkish military highly regarded the level of technical capability achieved by the Soviets in aviation during the 1930s. It began from very poor levels in the early 1920s, when Tahsin İsmail noted in 1923 that the most important difficulty after the Bolshevik Revolution was experienced in aviation as the number of aviators decreased drastically, and Bolshevik aviators showed no effect in the war with Poland in 1920.[281] He wrote that when Tukhachevsky's army began its assault in July 1920, 30 to 40 Bolshevik planes were airborne, and as Russians approached Warsaw, none were in the air anymore.[282] With reforms in aviation and the opening of schools to train engineers, pilots, and technical staff, Soviet aviation began to develop from the mid-1920s onwards.

In the 1930 military intelligence report, the importance attached to the Red Army aviation was noted as the Soviets were trying to develop an indigenous aviation industry as well as trying to obtain airplanes and engines from other countries.[283] In 1930, the number of airplanes in Soviet possession was estimated to be 1,400, but given the working capacity of domestic factories and purchases from abroad, this would be higher than this estimate.[284] This publication posited that the Soviets still could not achieve the desired level of producing naval and fighter planes, as they still

[279] Ziemke, *The Red Army*, 200-1.

[280] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 438- 39.

[281] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 18.

[282] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 18.

[283] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 109.

[284] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 109.

purchased them from abroad.[285] In 1934, during a visit to the Soviet Union, the Turkish delegation visited a factory where aircraft were produced, and technical services were provided near Moscow. Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan noted in his report that the conditions, capabilities, and systems they had observed at this factory were incomparable to those in European countries, but they were improving according to their Russian hosts.[286] He observed the importance given by Russians to this facility and their determination to improve their aviation standards. Doğan also observed similarity of Russian production style to that of Germans' and adaptation of German designs to Russian made ones.[287]

The 1930 military intelligence publication also mentioned the voluntary mass popular aviation organisation Osoaviakhim.[288] The Soviets established the Association of Air Fleet and Chemistry, better known by its Russian abbreviation, Aviakhim Society, in May 1925 through the merger of the Society of the Friends of the Air Fleet and Society of the Friends of Chemical Defence and Chemical Industry Dobrokhim.[289] In January 1927, Defence Minister General Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov merged it further with the Society for the Assistance of the Defence, making it known as Aviakhim-OSO, and in the end, it became known as Osoaviakhim.[290]

This mass voluntary Soviet civilian organisation expanded swiftly within society and laid the groundwork for the development of skills and capabilities of the Soviet population in aviation in areas of gliders, parachutes, and model planes. These transferrable skills would be useful in times of war for the defence of the homeland, as work on these skills required a longer period of time to develop before an actual

[285] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 114.

[286] Report by Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-5, (page 1), 1934.

[287] Report by Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-5, (page 1), 1934.

[288] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 109.

[289] William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 83.

[290] Odom, *Soviet Volunteers*, 83-84.

conflict.[291] Therefore, aviation continued to develop in both military and civilian sectors in the Soviet Union until World War II.[292]

In the interwar period, air incursions into enemy territories were perceived as a necessary tactic by every military with the capability. However, the Soviet Union brought an additional dimension to this by improvising the use of troops airdropped deeper into enemy territory from planes. This element was studied and developed by the Soviet military.[293] While in many other countries parachutes were regarded as emergency lifesaving tools, the Soviets turned this into a military tactic to be used in battle.[294] In the Soviet assessment, the impact of these troops on the rear of the enemy lines was seen as critical. The Soviet military carried out the world's first airborne assault in 1930 within its territory at Kluchkovo farmstead near Voronezh.[295] This experimentation proved that parachutes had gone from being a lifesaving invention to a means of conducting a military manoeuvre that had never been seen before, as it would enable delivering forces to the rear of the enemy lines to carry out a surprise attack. This enabled the Red Army to overcome the limitations of positional warfare imposed on conventional armies.[296] In his article examining newly developing Soviet parachute capabilities, Captain Ziya Ünal noted that "a new branch that was regarded as a dream before was about to be born, which was named as airborne infantry by the Soviets". [297] He pointed out that this unit had two tasks: to

[291] The influence of Osoaviakhim in civil aviation training is examined in Chapter 4 as part of military cooperation and its influence in Turkish civil defence in Chapter 8 as part military and the society.

[292] Odom, *Soviet Volunteers*, 143-4.

[293] Saadettin Özoğul, *Paraşütçü ve Havadan İndirme Kıtaları* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1941), 4 and David M. Glantz, *The Soviet Airborne Experience* (Fort Leavenworth: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), 3.

[294] Özoğul, *Paraşütçü ve Havadan İndirme*, 8 and J. N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour Russian History 1812-1992* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 343.

[295] Vladimir Kotelnikov, *Red Assault: Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1941*, trans. Kevin Bridge (Warwick: Helion& Company, 2019), https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=JlAIEAAAQBAJ&pg=GBS.PT9&hl=en_AU, accessed on 5 September 2025. Today, Russia's Airborne Force Day is celebrated on August 2 to mark first airdropping of 12-men paratrooper unit on 2 August 1930 during drills near Voronezh for accomplishing a tactical task. See *TASS*, 2 August 2023.

[296] Kotelnikov, *Red Assault.*

[297] Ziya Ünal, "Cephe Gerisine Paraşüt ve Tayyarelerle Kıta İndirmeleri ve Uçan Piyadenin Gelecek Harplerde Oynayacağı Roller," *Askeri Mecmua*, 103 (December 1936): 821.

land behind the enemy lines and disrupt the functioning of enemy mechanisms, and to serve as a reserve to be used in a time of need as a mobile force.[298] Ünal noted that the Soviets constructed parachute towers in almost all cities for training purposes, and training was not limited only to army personnel but also extended to civilians for both men and women.[299] Russians were the first to consider parachutes as a force in warfare tactics by 1932 and managed to train 250,000 parachuters initially. [300] The first batch of 62 people trained by Osoaviakhim jumped by parachutes on 18 August 1933.[301] Russians tested low opening techniques to avoid defending fire from the ground and tested jumps at night to avoid casualties.[302] In 1936, Russians attempted to occupy an enemy airport using parachute and airborne troops.[303] In the 1934 military manoeuvres near Kiev, the Turkish delegation was promised that an infantry battalion and its heavy weapons would be airdropped by parachutes to the rear of the enemy in the second phase of the manoeuvres, but due to weather conditions, this was not possible.[304] According to the scenario, General Voroshilov wanted to show the special organisation battalion, the parachute battalion, airdropping behind enemy lines to secure the crossing of the mechanised corps coming fast from the north with the cavalry.[305] Doğan, who participated in the Kiev visit in 1934, noted that parachute jumps must be made compulsory in Turkish military air units after observing the situation in Russia.[306]

The Red Army continuously improved its capabilities. In September 1936, the first trials of airdropping heavy equipment were conducted, where, in addition to 1,200

[298] Ünal, "Cephe Gerisine Paraşüt," 821.

[299] Ünal, "Cephe Gerisine Paraşüt," 824.

[300] Adil Alptuna "Paraşüt ve Hava İndirme Kıtalarının Tarihçesi- İçinde Bulunduğumuz Harpte Oynadıkları Roller,", *Askeri Mecmua,* 120 (March 1941): 153-54.

[301] Alptuna "Paraşüt ve Hava İndirme," 155.

[302] Alptuna "Paraşüt ve Hava İndirme," 155.

[303] Alptuna "Paraşüt ve Hava İndirme," 157.

[304] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 19), 1934.

[305] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 14), 1934.

[306] Report by Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-5, (page 3), 1934.

paratroopers jumping by parachutes, 150 machine guns and 18 light guns were airdropped.[307] For the first time, an automobile belonging to the Russian general commanding these troops was airdropped.[308] In 1936, the Soviets released a propaganda film after another major military manoeuvres in Kiev. The parts related to parachute troops were used in this film as well. In this manoeuvre, airborne troops consisting of 1,200 parachute troops and 5,700 soldiers were used.[309] In 1935, in another exercise scenario, 600 Red Army paratroopers were airdropped behind the enemy lines near Kiev, and these troops quickly established a bridgehead, enabling the establishment of an airfield that allowed planes to transport more troops and heavy equipment, giving the Red Army an opportunity to form a strong pocket behind the enemy lines.[310] Civilian organisations such as Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth) and Osoaviakhim were instrumental in providing the necessary manpower for Soviet airborne units as they created a large pool of trained young parachutists with their sport parachuting training.[311] Due to Osoaviakhim's efforts since 1932, by the end of 1936, the number of those with parachute jump experience reached 1,400,000, with 80,000 receiving certificates.[312]

The Turkish Army observed these efforts of the Red Army, and the Turkish military bureaucracy tried to relay this Red Army experience in aviation to the Turkish Army corps. *Kızılordu Keşif Tayyareciliği Talimnamesi 1931* (The Red Army Reconnaissance Planes Manual 1931) was translated into Turkish by Captain Hüseyin, and the General Staff had this printed at the Naval print house in 1935 to

[307] Rocolle, *Havadan Taşınan Kuvvetler Zaferin Anahtarı Mıdır?*, trans. Reşat Arın (Ankara: Genelkurmay 1 No. Basımevi, 1952), 21 and Ziemke, *Red Army*, 200-1 and Glantz, *The Soviet Airborne Experience*, 13.

[308] Rocolle, *Havadan Taşınan Kuvvetler*, 21.

[309] Özoğul, *Paraşütçü ve Havadan İndirme*, 11 and David M. Glantz, *The History of Soviet Airborne Forces* (London: Routledge, 1994), 20.

[310] Rocolle, *Havadan Taşınan Kuvvetler*, 35. This exact tactic was used in the first hours of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022 and failed considerably leading to comments stating this was the primary reason to derail Russian plan to quickly gain upper hand in their campaign forcing Ukraine to yield to Russian control.

[311] Glantz, *History of Soviet Airborne*, 12.

[312] Rocolle, *Havadan Taşınan Kuvvetler*, 14.

present to Turkish aviators.[313] With intense Soviet activity, by 1934, Turkish officers could read that the Red Army had developed its outreach for its air squadron that could keep its primary adversary, that is, Japan, in the Far East at bay. Furthermore, from foreign press summaries, they could read about former Defence Minister Trotsky's comments on the then capability of the Red Army planes, which could fly 1,200 km from their home bases, and the Soviet administration's deployment of 600 planes in the Far East against the growing threat from Japan. Two hundred of these were capable of heavy bombardment and could fly that distance deep into Japanese territory, while Japanese airplanes could barely reach Soviet shores, which were fortified with air defences.[314] Despite being inferior in terms of quality and capability compared to European air systems, considering its starting point after the Imperial Russian Army inherited nothing from it, Turkish officers appreciated progress in aviation and believed Russian aviation would progress, considering their investment, determination, and the importance the Soviets attached to this field. Despite being less advanced than European powers, the Soviets were able to produce their own planes, engines, parachutes, and all other technical materials needed to operate an air force.[315]

During the 1934 manoeuvres, Turkish officers were shown some other achievements of Soviet science and technology as well. In his report, Muzaffer Paşa noted a demonstration of the Red Army troops crossing a river from underwater to an enemy shore without being detected by the enemy troops. General Voroshilov personally observed this crossing with the Turkish delegation, who were told that this had been kept secret from everyone, including most of their troops.[316] Two groups crossed the River Dnieper with respiratory devices on their chests tied to each other, and as they embarked on the shore, they attacked the enemy. Muzaffer Paşa noted:

[313] *Kızılordu Keşif Tayyareciliği*.

[314] "Yabancı Memleketler Neşriyatı Kara Haberleri Sovyet Rusya," *Askeri Mecmua,* 95 (March 1934): 1196: "Troçki son zamanda neşre başladığı Rusya hakkındaki makalelerde Rusyanın bugünkü vaziyetini gayet iyi mütalea etmektedir. Rus Uzak Şark ordusunda bulunan 600 tayyareden 200 adedi 1200 Km. uçabilir ağır bombardıman tayyareleridir. Harp çıkarsa bütün Japonyanın mühim merkezleri hava hücumlarına maruz kalacaktır. Buna mukabil Japonların hava hücumları ancak sınır mıntıkasındaki Rus müstahkem mevkiilerine yetişebilir. Buralarda esasen hava hücumlarına karşı hazırlanmış asri müstahkem mevkiler bulunmaktadır."

[315] Report by Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-5, (page 3), 1934.

[316] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 18), 1934.

> Naturally, soldiers, weapons, everything were wet. Nonetheless, soldiers could breathe during the time they stayed under water. Although they looked very exhausted when they crossed to the other side, the crossing was successful. I believe that they are in the process of testing the invention. Inhaling devices and methods will be developed. Once there is a complete success, tanks that can swim would certainly accompany this action.[317]

He noted that in such a case, the approach to coastal defence would be different, as the advantage of coastal defenders would be undermined by this invention and new technique.[318] Head of the Turkish delegation Fahrettin Paşa also noted this technique in his memoirs as coastal defence was an area where Turkish officers spent time developing solutions against a coastal attack.[319] The Turkish delegation was presented with another national defence issue that was a major concern for the Turkish military cadres of the time. This was air defence and defence against chemicals.[320] This concern emerged due to the enhanced capabilities of airplanes that could reach any part of a country. The Turkish Army assessed the disappearance of conventional linear battle zones that expanded into civilian areas based on their observations of technological developments and experiences since World War I, where civilians suffered more, and the rear of a country became the soft target that could collapse all war efforts of any defending army. Advancements in technology and industry have made wars more lethal and destructive. [321] Based on the changing character of war and unprecedented levels of industrialisation of war, Turkey drew lessons from World War I and its War of Independence regarding the totality of the war.

During the September 1934 manoeuvres, the Turkish delegation was taken to Kiev by General Voroshilov to demonstrate to them what the Red Army had established

[317] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 18), 1934: "Bittabi neferler, silahlar her şey ıslaktı. Fakat neferler su altında kaldıkları müddetçe teneffüs etmişlerdi. Karşıyakaya geçtikleri zeman neferler oldukça yorgun görülmekle beraber geçiş muvaffakiyetle yapılmıştı. Zannederim icatütecrübe devresi geçirmektedir. Teneffüs cihazı ve usulleri tekemmül edecektir. Bunda tam bir muvaffakiyet olunca bu harekete suda yüzen tanklarda bittabi iştirak edecektir."

[318] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 19), 1934.

[319] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 439.

[320] *Hava Tehlikesi* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932), 3-4.

[321] Refik Fenmen, *Modern Orduda Tayyarecilik, Mötörleşme, Muhabere* (Ankara: Akba Kitabevi, 1939), 41.

for the air defence of a major city like Kiev. This was a full demonstration of the measures taken with the participation of all components of the system, including airplanes, military, and civilians. In the report, Muzaffer Paşa first noted the technical measures taken by the Red Army.[322] He noted that an observation post was established on the roof of the tallest hotel in Kiev to determine alarm times. A center for the Air Defense Command was established near the hotel. In this command, there were five branches: External Air Listening Post Stations, Air Listening Posts at various locations, the Central Urban Organisation, and the Air Force tasked with defence and anti-aircraft guns, having their own telephone lines. All information from these five branches would be relayed to the air defence commander, who was selected either from the air or artillery branches on the condition of having received staff officer training. The hall had a central stage and a large chart of the area around the city extending to 120 km from the city centre. Posts scattered on this perimeter were organised to inform earlier about the sightings of enemy airplanes, their direction, speed, altitude, and numbers. Up to 100 km from the city centre were marked as sectors with codes, and all information received through posts was entered on the main chart shown by electric signs tracing enemy planes. The commander would follow this and decide to raise the alarm for intercepting them using planes or order fire to anti-aircraft guns positioned 12 km away from the centre.[323]

The alarm was then raised to demonstrate how the system worked for the Turkish delegation. Officers watched little lights as they approached Kiev, and the commander raised the alarm with air defence alarms heard throughout the city. Muzaffer Paşa noted all transport vehicles were evacuated, citizens headed to ground floors of buildings evacuating all streets, police and firemen and civilians had their gas masks on as bombers appeared in the sky dropping light explosives. [324] It was like a real attack, as smoke to show fire was used in some buildings, with firemen intervening as intercepting planes and anti-aircraft guns firing at bombers. The delegation was then taken to a factory to show measures against a chemical attack

[322] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (pages 20-21),1934.

[323] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (pages 20-21), 1934.

[324] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 22), 1934.

where they observed factory workers' reactions as some wore gas masks and those tasked with first reaction and cleaning wore personal protection suits against gas. Muzaffer Paşa noted all this continued for four hours and had been extremely useful for them.[325] The night session had also been very realistic and useful for the Turkish observers to witness such a complex reaction to one of the primary vulnerabilities of those days for militaries who were concerned about the next war. Impressed by this complex organisation, the Turkish delegation reported that technical experts from Turkey needed to examine all these closely and in detail and recommended finding ways to send several Turkish officers to have hands-on experience by working in this centre in the Soviet Union.[326]

Monitoring Soviet and other European military publications and the production of military intelligence publications, which were complemented by visits, face-to-face engagements, and observations made at military manoeuvres, provided an opportunity to sketch out a detailed and accurate portrait of the Red Army for the Turkish Army during the interwar period.

3.3. A Critical Analysis of the Red Army

Based on the information and intelligence gathered about the Soviet Union and the Red Army, Turkish officers developed their understanding of the Red Army and also developed a critical analysis of it with elements that would be difficult to come to terms with in the Turkish military understanding. In their detailed analysis of the Red Army, Turkish officers identified certain aspects that they were critical of. These were largely the result of actual observations made by Turkish officers in their interactions with the Red Army staff and operations. This firsthand experience enabled Turkish officers to see beyond the superficial level based on impressions disseminated through publications and popular media. These criticisms can be grouped into three issues. These could be categorised as the dominant role of ideology on the military system making it too political, the lack of professionalism

[325] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 22), 1934.

[326] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 23), 1934.

and quality of education, and finally the reflection of this ideological distortion on basic military practices such as seen in the case of implementation of discipline, position on the use of ranks and insignia in uniforms within the Red Army.

Before further elaborating on the above point, it should be noted that Turkish sources on developments in the Soviet Union were not always accurate or timely. For example, in the 1924 publication on the Red Army, it was noted that it was not clear who would lead the Council of Labour and Defence, which was under Lenin's control after his death.[327] In this publication, it was established that Trotsky led the Revolutionary Military Soviet, but it could not be established whether the Commander-in-Chief and General Staff were directly under him or under the Revolutionary Council.[328] The author of the 1924 publication also noted that it was highly likely that the central administration of the war industry was under the Council of Labour and Defence, and this should be confirmed and established by the Turkish defence attaché in Moscow.[329]

One of the major criticisms was about the political and ideological dominance in the Red Army. This was evident for the Turkish side in the cases of the fates of some Soviet civil and military bureaucrats. In all military intelligence publications and private reports, the command structure with key commanders was examined and key individuals were profiled.[330] News about massive purges in the Soviet Union, details about internal plots, and the following court hearings and executions were carefully followed through Turkish Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw, with information passed to the Turkish General Staff by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The execution of key figures Ankara had been engaging with in 1937 shocked Turkish politicians. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was deeply resentful about this as almost all Moscow's notable Turkey experts were purged, imprisoned or executed.[331] He was

[327] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 3.

[328] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 5.

[329] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*, 5.

[330] For example, *Kızıl Ordu II*, 17-20 and 67-72 and Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (pages 44-49), 1934.

[331] Onur İşçi, "Interwar Territoriality and Soviet Turkish Convergence across the Aras River," in *Borders, Boundaries and Belonging in Post-Ottoman Space in the Interwar Period,* ed. Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet (Leiden- Boston: Brill, 2023), 235.

particularly indignant at the brutal execution of Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, the former Deputy Foreign Minister who had formerly served as Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, delivering his letter of confidence to him on 21 August 1934, and according to British reports, with whom he had complete confidence, he "had been admitted to terms of personal intimacy with the President unusual for a foreign ambassador."[332] Karakhan was active in forging the relations between the two countries and their military bureaucracies from the early days. He was last in the opening ceremony of the critical aviation centre Türkkuşu in 1935 with Atatürk and Soviet instructors. On the military side, three of the five Soviet marshals, Tukhachevsky, Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher and Alexander Ilyich Yegorov were lost but two names Turkish General Staff had been working with for a long time, Marshal Voroshilov and Marshal Budyonny were spared in these waves against the Red Army's top echelons. All five marshals of the Soviet Union were present at an event at the Embassy of the Turkish Republic in early April 1936, hosted by Turkish Ambassador Zekai Apaydın.[333] In their trials, Voroshilov was also named as one of the primary targets of these conspirers after Stalin.[334]

Voroshilov, who loved to portray himself as Turkey's great friend, continued to maintain his role in Moscow. During his time, Voroshilov passed complimentary remarks to the Turkish Army at every opportunity and also acted in accordance with those deeds, as he adapted a very positive attitude toward the Turkish Army. The Turkish Foreign Ministry passed his message to the Turkish Army, where he told them they were brothers to the Red Army after the Turkish Ambassador's long meeting with him in 1928.[335] His invitation and hosting of senior delegations during the 1934 manoeuvres was highly noted in Turkish reports afterwards. News of his dismissal from his role reached Ankara in May 1940. The Turkish Ambassador in

[332] Yücel Güçlü, "The Uneasy Relationship: Turkey's Foreign Policy as Regards the Soviet Union at the Outbreak of World War II," *Belleten,* 67/250 (2003): 958.

[333] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35231-138611-166, 3-4 April 1936.

[334] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-3486-137077-34, 21 September 1936, 2,4, 8.

[335] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34477-135759-52, 28 December 1928.

Berlin, Hüsrev Gerede, noted on 10 May 1940, that he was dismissed, and the diplomatic corps in Berlin had the view that Stalin dismissed him as he had influence and popularity within the army. The Ambassador also noted that this would create vulnerability for the Russian army.[336] The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Haydar Aktay, reported to Ankara that the stated reason for his dismissal was the high number of casualties during the war with Finland. In his message to Ankara on 18 May 1940, the ambassador noted that Voroshilov believed he could conclude the Finland campaign within five to six days, with the Red Army occupying Helsinki and setting up a communist government loyal to the Soviets. However, he was held back by the political commissars, whom he deeply resented for undermining military advances. He was dismissed by the Kremlin to calm the public, and it appeared to him that this was an unfortunate event, and he suggested not to look for any other political reasons behind his dismissal.[337]

Voroshilov's successor, Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, with a nod from Stalin, moved to fix weaknesses within the Red Army and tried to strengthen discipline. Backed by this support, he abolished military commissars Voroshilov was complaining about after the Red Army's failure in Finland, as these were considered "prejudicial to the officers' undivided authority and responsibility".[338] Timoshenko also made it compulsory for soldiers to salute officers off-duty, an obligation which had been abolished since the Revolution and put the Red Army through severe realistic manoeuvres approaching as far as possible the conditions of an actual war.[339] Hard realities in real combat dictated these adjustments when the Red Army faced a peer adversary equal to or, in essence, superior to it on the battlefield, as pointed out by the Turkish officers observing the Red Army since the 1920s.

---

[336] The Turkish Embassy in Berlin to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34844-136897-3, 10 May 1940.

[337] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34835-137583-19, 18 May 1940.

[338] Chamberlin, *Russian Enigma*, 229. Timoshenko abolished commissars in Spring 1940 but after the German attack in June 1941, they were reinstituted and were abolished again in October 1942 by Stalin. See Chamberlin, *Russian Enigma*, 234 and Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour*, 345.

[339] Chamberlin, *Russian Enigma*, 229.

This ideological and political dominance in the Red Army, for the Turkish military observers, raised questions about the military qualifications of some of the Soviet officers. Turkish officers remained reserved about the basic aspects of military qualifications, such as the background of officers and the training given to them in the Red Army. In 1923, Tahsin İsmail noted the absence of training and exercises in the Red Army.[340] He argued that peasants were turned into officers and were expected to command the military units. These people were made commanders simply because they were revolutionaries, while professional soldiers from the Imperial Russian Army were dismissed as they were not deemed reliable.[341] Tahsin İsmail regarded Trotsky's efforts important as he was working to address these organisational problems within the newly established Red Army.[342] Trotsky was quoted as stating that they had so far defeated armies during the Civil War and as they would face regular armies afterwards they needed to possess capabilities they lacked and had to raise level of training of the Red Army.[343]

From the perspective of the Turkish military bureaucracy, the lack of professionalism in the Red Army was a major issue to explore further. In a 1924 military intelligence publication, it was noted that the Red Army worked to use communists in the officer corps who lacked military training, and the gap was compensated by giving special importance to training offered to them.[344] This intelligence publication provided information about the composition of the Red Army: The number of cadets at the War College was 4,914, and 52% of them were communists or becoming communists; 16% were Komsomols, and 32% of them were those not having any affiliation. Regarding their background, 34% were workers, 52% were peasants, and 14% were from other backgrounds.[345] The majority of them took part in the

[340] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 9.

[341] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 19.

[342] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 10.

[343] Tahsin İsmail, *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri*, 19.

[344] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 23.

[345] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 23.

Revolution and afterwards and lacked military knowledge to serve as officers.[346] According to the 1924 military intelligence publication, middle-ranking commanders were classified into five groups[347]:

a: Those coming from revolutionary war schools.
b: Civilians accepted during the Revolutionary battles who participated in battles and were former Red commanders.
c: Those trained in the Red Army participated in the Revolutionary battles without formal training.
d: Imperial Army officers joined the Red Army after 1917.
e: Imperial Army officers who had to join the Red Army.

These five groups were ranked according to two criteria: in terms of "respect and influence": b- d – c- a- e and in terms of "knowledge and skills": e- d- a- c- b (Figure 3.2). As illustrated in this categorisation with regard to military knowledge and skill, the source professionally valued former Imperial Russian Army officers more than civilian turned enthusiastic communists. However, this source demonstrated that in the Red Army of 1924, rising in the ranks required being communist and/or being close to influential party figures.




Figure 3.2. The ranking of the Red Army officers' qualities.
Kızıl Ordu II (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye,1925), 24.

Over time, the number of military training schools in the Soviet Union increased, and military training developed. This was noted in the 1930 edition of the *Kızıl Ordu*.[348] By 1930, according to Turkish assessment, 25% of the Red Army officers were former Imperial Army officers, while 75% of them were from peasant and worker

[346] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 23.

[347] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 24.

[348] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 50-8.

backgrounds that were trained in the Red Army.[349] Of the Military Academy graduates, 46.8% were workers and 30.8% were peasants.[350] Due to their worker and peasant backgrounds, the Red Army officers were regarded as inferior to European officers in terms of professional military knowledge, and the capability of the new ones was average.[351] However, even in 1930, the essence of the rise in the Red Army ranks remained unchanged. It was still about showing loyalty to the Revolution and the principles of communism.[352] Military skills in the units of military engineering and technological branches were at European standards, while cavalry and artillery were at a level to fulfil tasks given to them, but the infantry branch lagged behind in training.[353]

Gauging the military skills of Soviet officers and understanding how the army personnel worked remained major issues for Turkish officers. During the 1934 manoeuvres in Kiev while travelling to the area with General Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny in the same car, Fahrettin Paşa wanted to test Budyonny's military skills by asking him to show their current location on the map. When Budyonny showed the exact location, Fahrettin Paşa was surprised, as he noted in his memoirs that "then I realised that contrary to what had been told to us, this person was not that ignorant!".[354] Budyonny had an Imperial Russian Army background, unlike other revolutionary peasant or worker turned military figures. His 1st Cavalry Army, the Red Cavalry, gained important military successes under his command, proving his skills as a commander leading a cavalry army, just like Fahrettin Paşa did during the War of Independence. Fahrettin Paşa must have been likely acting under influence of general prejudice against the Red Army officers prevalent in the Turkish senior command of the time. Fahrettin Paşa tried to discreetly test the Red Army general

[349] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 63.

[350] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 63.

[351] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 63.

[352] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 59.

[353] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 61.

[354] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 439: "Mareşali denemek için şu anda nerede bulunduğumuzu haritada göstermesini rica ettim, Budiyeni haritaya bakarak parmağı ile bulunduğumuz yeri doğru olarak gösterdi. Anladım ki bu kişi söylendiği gibi öyle cahil bir adam değildir…".

himself but against a third country officer, he was more protective of the qualities of the Red Army and its officers. In one instance, he had to defend the Red Army against German Defence Minister, Marshal Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg, during his visit to Berlin shortly after the Kiev manoeuvres, who told him that the Army Commander in these manoeuvres was taking company command training in the German Army a few years back.[355] Fahrettin Paşa realised the intention of the German minister to look down on the Red Army with the aim of mocking its officer corps' qualities.

During the 1934 manoeuvres, Muzaffer Paşa personally heard the complaints of the Red Army officers about the fast rise of some in ranks while others were waiting for promotions for many years. In the section about the Red Army commanders, he noted that before the Revolution, Defence Minister General Voroshilov was a locksmith in a factory in Ukraine.[356] However, he later managed to improve himself. Muzaffer Paşa also noted he could be a strong contender to Stalin having more advantages against Stalin.[357] This assessment might have looked plausible on paper, but certainly, considering the traits of Stalin, his track record in coping with contenders, and the coming of massive waves of purges shortly after the submission of this report, it was certainly too misplaced and a rare example of a projection by Muzaffer Paşa that was considerably wrong.

One of the most criticized aspects of the Red Army was discipline and how this issue was perceived by the senior Red Army command. This issue was discussed in the editions of the Turkish military intelligence publications from 1924 to 1930. In the memoirs of Turkish officers, such discipline issues were reported. In the reports submitted to the government, issues of discipline were noted, as seen in Muzaffer Paşa's report after the 1934 Kiev maneouvres. Turkish officers personally observed the difference in the Red Army's approach to the issue of discipline in the army. This was significantly different as it was shaped by revolutionary principles, making it

[355] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 466.

[356] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 38), 1934.

[357] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 38), 1934.

alien to the generally accepted military conduct. Turkish officers were much concerned about this interpretation and expressed this in their exchanges with their interlocutors and in their reports and memoirs.

In his memoirs, Turkish officer Veysel Ünüvar, who had to be co-located with the Bolsheviks in the South Caucasus against Armenian irregular units in the mid-1920s, noted that his primary concern was to maintain military discipline among his troops who witnessed the Bolshevik version of it, where ordinary soldiers could reject an order or challenge the one given to them by their officers. He gave an example of Russian and Turkish commanders waiting for the driver of the car as the driver went to a meeting and the angry attitude of the driver without concern for his commander.[358] "When we had a flat tyre, he gave the jack to the commander" expecting the commander to help him, he noted. Ünüvar noted, although he did not expect such behaviour from Turkish soldiers, they were influenced by these, and he had experienced instances when ordinary soldiers challenged orders and assumed they were equal with their commanders.[359]

Fahrettin Paşa had been through a similar experience in 1934 in Moscow. He noted that while walking in the city with the Army Commander, they passed by a soldier sitting on a seat. He asked the commander why he was not saluted by the soldier, although he was in uniform. The Soviet general told him that he was off duty, and added that this would change with time, acknowledging the Turkish general's veiled criticism.[360] The Red Army seniors, especially General Voroshilov, wanted to change this during the manoeuvres in Kiev. Muzaffer Paşa noted in his report that Voroshilov benefited from his recent visit to Turkey in increasing his military knowledge and observed best practices first hand.[361] Discipline was an unquestionable concept within the Turkish Army. Irrespective of capabilities,

[358] Veysel Ünüvar, *İstiklal Harbinde Bolşeviklerle Sekiz Ay 1920- 1921* (İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettibiye Basımevi, 1948), 42.

[359] Ünüvar, *İstiklal Harbinde Bolşeviklerle,* 42.

[360] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 438.

[361]. Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 39), 1934. Voroshilov and Budyonny visited Turkey in October 1933.

material in hand, deficiencies, or pressures imposed by difficult circumstances, all, including the most senior generals, had to adhere to and respect this principle at all times, as displayed by a Turkish military unit in a 1937 photo (Figure 3.3). The Red Army practice, supposedly guided by revolutionary principles, therefore surprised Turkish officers every time. The new Republic particularly took extreme care in the presence of foreign civilian or military dignitaries, believing that the impression given by even the smallest contingent would represent the entire army itself. For example, as seen in the care and effort in the photo from Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Asım Gündüz welcoming Minister of Defence and Navy of Yugoslavia General Lubomir Maric in İstanbul on 27 May 1938 (Figure 3.4).



Figure 3.3. A Turkish military unit in 1937.

Source: From the author's private collection.



Figure 3.4. The military ceremony for the visiting Minister of Defence and Navy of Yugoslavia in 1938.

Source: From the author's private collection.

According to Muzaffer Paşa, as soon as he returned home, Voroshilov met with his staff and discussed the lack of discipline in the Red Army and ordered the exercise of maximum discipline. For example, Muzaffer Paşa noted that although it might seem insignificant, after General Voroshilov arrived at the manoeuvres in Kiev in 1934, all Turkish officers were saluted by the Red Army officers and soldiers everywhere, knowing that the Red Army members never showed respect to their superiors when they were off duty and gave salute.[362]

This was not purely a lack of discipline. Although Turkish officers were aware of this, they could not comprehend this happening in an army as they had never witnessed such behaviour. This behavior was rooted in the early revolutionary period. In March 1917, by the February Revolution, the army was granted their charter of personal and political rights with Order No. 1.[363] This Order written by N. D. Sokolov together with soldiers, authorised establishment of elected committees, had responsibility over arms as they were not issued to officers, enjoyed all rights of an ordinary citizen and saluting when off duty was abolished.[364] The Soviets gave importance to discipline but not in the conventional way. The sixth article of this order emphasized this as it read: "On duty and in the performance of service responsibilities, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but when off duty, in their political, civil and private lives, soldiers shall enjoy fully and completely the same rights as all citizens. In particular, standing at attention and compulsory saluting when off duty are abolished."[365]

In relation to this revolutionary spirit, another aspect emerged as an issue for the Turkish officers was the use and display of ranks and insignia on Soviet uniforms. From the beginning, to mark a break from the Imperial Russian Army's past and to demonstrate that they were not following capitalist practices, the Bolsheviks got rid of ranks, uniforms, and insignia in the army. When Veysel Ünüvar, the commander

[362]Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 39), 1934.

[363] John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military- Political History 1918- 1941* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 3.

[364] Erickson, *Soviet High Command*, 3.

[365] John R. Boyd, "The Origins of Order No. I," *Soviet Studies,* 19/3 (1968): 360.

of the Turkish contingent, arrived in Nakhichevan to work with the Bolshevik contingent there in July 1920, he received the order to get rid of officer insignia to avoid offending the Bolsheviks.[366] Turkish officers took off their ranks and had only a star and crescent from red cloth sown to their headgear.[367] The Bolsheviks had red stars on their caps as a distinguishing feature. In his memoirs, the commander of the 15th Corps General Kazım (Karabekir) Paşa noted the Bolsheviks' hatred of officer uniforms and insignia. He noted that despite this, both contingents managed to work as allies as Turkish officers made the necessary adjustments beforehand. Kazım (Karabekir) Paşa noted that he had already made the necessary changes regarding epaulets in his entire army by marking ranks on the arms, solving the issue of the Ottoman legacy entirely.[368] Some Turkish sources noted that news of Mustafa Kemal Paşa resigning from the Ottoman Army and taking off his uniform to wage his struggle in plain clothes was welcomed with enthusiasm by the Bolsheviks.[369]

The Turkish officer Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) had a similar experience when he was serving as the Turkish Defence Attaché in Moscow in the early 1920s. In his memoirs, he noted that the Red Army Corps Commander in Odessa told him, by pointing to the insignia on his uniform, that they did not give importance to such ornaments as they represented luxury and bourgeois pageantry.[370] Hüseyin Rahmi was surprised with this comment as his insignia was no more than two small yellow tin plates and two tin stars showing his rank as a lieutenant colonel. He also noted that the day before he sent his business card to him, he received a handwritten card from the Bolshevik commander, as having printed business cards was regarded as bourgeois extravagance.[371] Hüseyin Rahmi later noted that the Red Army reverted to

[366] Ünüvar, *İstiklal Harbinde Bolşeviklerle*, 39.

[367] Ünüvar, *İstiklal Harbinde Bolşeviklerle*, 39.

[368] Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz* (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1969), 774. When he was questioned on this decision by the Head of Chief of General Staff İsmet Paşa (İnönü), Karabekir wrote back on 27 August 1920 about the justification of this decision in detail noting that was for convenience, cost and easiness of finding material and he underlined he prevented using Bolshevik insignia. Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, 807-8.

[369] Topçuoğlu, *Savaş ve Dostluk*, 16-17.

[370] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın,* 279-80.

[371] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 279.

Tsarist practices and adopted all the extravaganza in uniforms and insignia again in the following period. For him, the hallmark of their character was insincerity and deceitfulness.[372]



Figure 3.5. "Proletarians of all countries, unite" in Russian and Ottoman Turkish.
Source: *Kızıl Ordu III* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927), 19.

The dual command nature of the Red Army, with its political and military components, was not easy for Turkish officers to comprehend. It had been difficult from the start to understand what Bolshevism was about. Although the main principles and slogans were cited in military publications, such as the famous "Proletarians of all countries, unite" in Russian and Ottoman Turkish, for example, in a Turkish military intelligence publication on the Soviet Union printed in 1927 (Figure 3.5.), Bolshevism was never really understood by the Turkish military of the time, and in essence, no due consideration was given as they moved forward with military engagement during the interwar period. Ünüvar pointed to this in his memoirs also pointing that they had political and military ways of action.[373] As noted earlier, the Turkish approach to the use of Soviet material for military science publications did not consider either Tsarist Russian or Soviet communist propaganda in these publications; the focus remained entirely on technical military knowledge.

[372] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 280.

[373] Ünüvar, *İstiklal Harbinde Bolşeviklerle*, 17.

When asked about his view of the Red Army by the German Defence Minister, Fahrettin Paşa stated that he did not have an in-depth understanding of the Bolshevik administration, but he believed that what really happened inside would not be the same as it seemed from the outside. He also added that the Red Army was perfect from a military perspective.[374] For that matter, the political aspects and rationalisation of this in shaping the Red Army had been difficult to comprehend.

In another case of a phenomenon observed that could be mistakenly categorised as a fault due to lack of discipline but actually was not, Turkish observers spotted an important lesson the Red Army commanders derived from the Russian army's past mistakes and adopted in their current action during the 1934 Kiev manoeuvres. This was about developing swift action against the enemy without losing tempo by preserving the momentum and impetus of advance. Muzaffer Paşa observed as he watched different components of the Red Army in 1934. He wrote:

> The old Russian style of attacking the enemy with large cavalry contingents in enemy territory has not changed. In contrast, the Soviets embraced and developed this further. Their aim is to use all contingents, technologically developed or ordinary, in an incursion into enemy territory, and with the help of propaganda, crush their mobilisation physically and psychologically. Russians have drawn lessons from their military history of slow action, ignorance, and laziness of their command, as these caused disasters. First, Voroshilov learned this lesson. Voroshilov adapted Napoleon's "Activité activité vitesse" and considered speed as the main principle in every action, even in minor activities.[375]

Therefore, Muzaffer Paşa noted that even in a ceremonial march, the infantry walked fast, the cavalry galloped, and the artillery moved fast. The Red Army adhered to this principle in small and larger formations. During the 1934 manoeuvres, at the end of

[374] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 466.

[375] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 29), 1934: "Düşman erazisinde büyük süvari kitleleri saldırmak hususundaki eski Rus usuli harbı değişmemiştir. Bil'akis Soviyetler buna kuvvetle sarılmışlar ve daha ziyade takviye etmişlerdir. Maksatları; Fenni ve adi silahlardan mürekkep ve çabuk harekete muktedir kuvvetlere propoganda silahınıda katarak düşman erazisine sokmak ve düşman seferberliğini maddeten ve manen yıkmaktır. Rus harp tarihinde ağır hareketlerin, kumanda hey'etlerinin kayıtsızlık ve tenbelliğinin doğurduğu geci neticelerden Soviyet Rusya bihakkın ibret almıştır. Ve ibret alanların başında da x Varaşilof vardır. Varaşilof: Napolyonun koyduğu (Activité activité vitesse) düsturunu her işte kılavuz yapmış en küçük hareketlerde bile sür'at ve çalakiyi esas tutmuştur".

the ceremonial march, Muzaffer Paşa observed that all units passed quickly in formations with only a few instances of violating the order of the march. For him, this was in total contrast to the way adopted by the Turkish Army, which stipulated marching in silence with strict discipline.[376] The Soviet emphasis on speed and the importance of momentum or impetus of advance extended well beyond the military field to social and political affairs and was part of the Soviet way of war in the following decade, including during World War II.[377] Both Lenin and Stalin, realising the importance of adhering to this principle, advised it, with the latter warning against "a dangerous error called loss of tempo…".[378] Muzaffer Paşa here once again actually reflected what he made of from observing the early phases of the Soviet development of their "Deep Operation" concept but from the narrow perspective of use of speed and pointed to this as a difference from the practice seen in the Turkish Army rather than a reflection of lack of discipline as this haste gave the impression of a chaotic action.

The 1934 manoeuvres in Kiev gave Turkish officers the opportunity to witness advanced Soviet science and technology in mechanization, aviation, air defence, and defence against chemical weapons, but also showed them persisting problems in the quality of officer training, the strong duality of command in the army, and the lack of basic command and manoeuvre skills that should be observed in a modern army. Muzaffer Paşa noted that the Red Army tried to compensate their negative views on the manoeuvre of conventional military units and problems in implementing basic principles of manoeuvre and command by innovations and new techniques.[379] The Turkish officers were raised with the notion that man comes before a weapon or spirit comes before a tool, and they viewed the Soviets'strong reliance on technology and machines as unfounded.[380] However, he still recommended that despite primitive

[376] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 26), 1934.

[377] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), 139.

[378] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 139.

[379] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 19), 1934.

[380] In a Turkish General Staff publication printed before the Allies' landing at Normandy in June 1944, observing the Soviet Army's performance between 1941 and 1944, a Turkish officer noted that "As the saying goes, technical means prepare the battle, but it is the human that win it and it would be

warfare methods, it seemed that the Soviet world gave great importance to developing technology and art in general, and things observed like tank corps, underwater crossing of a river, air defence organisation, transfer of military units by parachutes that they had heard of, and chemical warfare organisation were aspects worth following by the Turkish military.[381] He also flagged the potential risks the Soviets could face by focusing only on technology, ignoring the basic training of soldiers, and enabling the commanding skills of key military commanders, which proved this general right in the Soviet campaign against the Finnish forces in 1940, where these shortcomings resulted in failure.

3.4. Conclusion

For most countries, in the interwar period, the Red Army remained an uncharted territory over which they could not develop a sense of understanding as to what it really was, as exemplified by British Prime Minister Churchill's famous enigma description. Other bureaucracies either developed their own unrealistic perceptions largely shaped by political considerations, which were mere illusions based on their countries' political preference to not engage with the Soviet system, and they totally ignored the Soviets or, on the extreme opposite, totally exaggerated the Red Army's capabilities.

The situation was significantly different for the Turkish military. The political steer given to the Turkish military bureaucracy was to develop a sound understanding of the Red Army, as the Soviet Union was the only country that seemed like a rational option to engage with to help Turkey meet its pressing defence and security needs. To maintain a solid basis on which cooperation could be possible, Turkish officers needed to form a robust, realistic portrait of the Red Army, focusing on all aspects of it: old and new or positive and negative. To this end, Turkish officers developed their

---

appropriate to use this for the Russian resistance in this war" noting the Red Army's emphasis on technological warfare left its place to using enormous manpower and industrial output to win against an army using technology but lacking manpower and means to compensate losses. See, Salih Polatkan, *I. ve II. Cihan Harbinin Hazırlıkları Bakımından Bir Mukayese* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1944), 132.

[381] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 19), 1934.

understanding through monitoring foreign military publications, intelligence publications, and bilateral engagements during visits to the Soviet Union. Russian language skills within the officer corps and the efforts of the office of military attaché in Moscow greatly facilitated this process. During this period, the Red Army was not an enigma for the Turkish National Army. This information accumulation enabled Turkish officers to make assessments that would hold until World War II. In the interwar period, these activities and efforts enabled the Turkish military to sketch out an unprecedented clear picture of the Red Army, which has never been seen either before or after this period in Turkish history.

Turkish officers developed a sense of the Red Army having enormous resources, focusing on technology but lacking basic skills in command and manoeuvre, with its commanders being valued only on the merit of their political loyalty to communism and to key Soviet party leaders, foremost to Stalin himself. Turkish officers preferred to focus only on the military aspect in their interactions without investing time in trying to understand Bolshevism, which they believed was not what it claimed to be. The separation of military command and forcing a military commander to share his command duties with a political figure, with a commissar, was regarded as a problem in the mental world of a Turkish officer, as well as in the Soviet interpretation of discipline shaped by revolutionary principles.

Despite all deficiencies, historical baggage from imperial times, prejudices, and concerns, the Soviet Union was regarded as a country that could share its products and experiences in the military sphere at a time when none of the Western powers were keen to share with Turkey. This country was not regarded as posing a direct threat to Turkey in terms of military action. One piece of evidence for this perception can be seen in the 1928 and 1929 wargame scenarios created by Turkish officers. In the 1928 scenario, aggression was simulated only in relation to its war with a major Western power on a wide theatre of war. Until the early 1940s, the Soviet Union was categorised as a friend in Turkish *Askeri Mecmua* articles. Despite having strong negative feelings stemming from history and strong prejudices against Russians and the communist ideology, which Turkish officers had limited understanding of, the Turkish military acted professionally as a major bureaucratic institution and followed

the steer given to them by political power. The Turkish military bureaucracy concentrated on addressing Turkey's defence needs by cooperating with the Soviet Union in a rational way and developing a sound understanding of the Red Army in general during the interwar period.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY DIPLOMACY AND COOPERATION

Military diplomacy is defined as the role of a military bureaucracy in supporting its country's overall foreign policy objectives without engaging in combat.[382] This involves specific sets of activities performed by resident military attachés and engagement by other military representatives. Military cooperation is an essential component of diplomatic activity. This chapter aims to discover how the Turkish military bureaucracy contributed to the overall Turkish state policy of expanding its relationship with the Soviet Union in support of its foreign policy objectives in an environment where it was left outside of the European security system, having critical concerns about maintaining the necessary tools to defend the country. All these activities aimed to build trust, enhance understanding under potential interventions of third parties, and facilitate cooperation between the Turkish Army and the Red Army.

In this understanding, for Turkish authorities, Turkish-Soviet military cooperation was not directed against a European power or about a war, as reflected in a cartoon from *Karagöz* in 1926. The characters depicting the main European powers, such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy, the narrator, the folk character *Karagöz*, says that their handshake stirred European politicians' [plans], and he cannot imagine [things to happen] if they resorted to [using] their weapons. However, he adds that the friendship between the two powerful armies was not intended for war but peace (Figure 4.1).[383]

---

[382] Erik Pajtinka, "Military Diplomacy and Its Present Functions," *Security Dimensions,* 20 (2016): 181-3.

[383] Caption in Ottoman Turkish: "Türk-Rus dostluğu Avrupa'da Ne Tesir Yaptı? Karagöz- Hay arslanlarım, hay kahramanlarım. Bir el ele vermeniz Avrupa politikacılarını karmakarışık etti. Ya silahlarınızı şakırdatmanız kim bilir ne hale getirecek. Ama onlar bilmezler ki iki kuvvetli silahın dostluğunu harb için değil sulh içindir."



Figure 4.1. Turkish-Russian friendship.

Source: *Karagöz*, 24 January 1926.

4.1. Military Diplomacy

Both the nationalist forces in Anatolia and the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, through their leaders Mustafa Kemal Paşa and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, understood the necessity and urgency of establishing a relationship as they embarked on their struggle in 1919. This understanding at the strategic level had to be worked out carefully at the operational and tactical levels to enable taking tangible steps in developing a relationship amid deep suspicions between the two powers, who initially knew very little about each other. Moreover, propaganda disseminated by the victors of World War I further increased feelings of mistrust and suspicion regarding the intentions of each power. To overcome this and to proceed faster in setting up working relationships, both sides relied on military figures symbolising the importance attached to these characters by their respective administrations. Both parties employed military diplomacy when both armies were on war footing from 1919 to the end of 1923 and even afterwards, when they transitioned to the peacetime period up until the beginning of World War II. One major expected outcome from the employment of the military diplomacy was without doubt to demonstrate to third parties the level of engagement between two countries. In particular, both used

military diplomacy, factoring in their expectations to affect their bilateral relations with other European powers, particularly Britain, in the period concerned.

4.1.1. Foundations of Military Diplomatic Relations During the War of Independence

Ottoman intelligence officer Colonel Hüsameddin (Ertürk) claimed that shortly after arriving in Anatolia in May 1919, Army Inspector Mustafa Kemal Paşa contacted a group of Bolshevik military representatives. In his memoirs published in *Cumhuriyet,* later published in a book form in 1957, the former chief of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Ottoman Special Organisation) Colonel Hüsameddin claimed that Mustafa Kemal Paşa met with Bolshevik military figure, Colonel Budyonny, who later became a marshal, in Havza in 1919.[384] Ertürk claimed that the Bolshevik delegation offered weapons, money and even deployment of a Bolshevik army corps to fight against the common enemy, the Entente powers, with the expectation of them establishing a regime based on the Bolshevik model which forced Mustafa Kemal Paşa to keep Bolsheviks at bay without giving a definitive positive or negative answer.[385] In his 1967 Ph.D. dissertation, Halil İbrahim Karal used this information, which was revealed a few years earlier, and noted that credible Turkish scholars and writers with different political views had accepted the authenticity of this information.[386] However, Stefanos Yerasimos questioned the possibility of this meeting with Budyonny, due to many inconsistencies in the circumstances, the most important being Budyonny himself noting in his memoirs that he was engaged in clashes around Volga area in those days.[387] Yerasimos concluded that, despite inconsistencies, there would be no motive for Ertürk to make up this argument,

[384] Samih Nafiz Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Teşkilat-ı Mahsusasında ve Mütareke Yıllarının M. M: Grubu Başkanlığında Bulunan Emekli Süvari Albayı Başkanı Hüsameddin Ertürk Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınevi, 1964), 338.

[385] Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 339.

[386] Karal noted that Sabahattin Selek, Enver Behnan Şapolyo, Niyazi Berkes and Fethi Tevetoğlu relied on Ertürk. See Halil İbrahim Karal, "Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey 1918-1922. A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution" (PhD diss. University of California, 1967), 98-9.

[387] Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devriminden "Milli Mücadele"ye* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), 108.

possibly indicating a point where contact with a Bolshevik delegation was made in Havza but not with a Soviet delegation.[388] Similarly, agreeing with Yerasimos, Suat Bilge noted that due to Ertürk's role as an intelligence officer, there was credibility that a meeting took place, but he might have been mistaken with the name of the Bolshevik officer.[389] As a senior intelligence figure, Ertürk wrote his memoirs during the Cold War period. From this section about first contacts with Bolsheviks, his reflex to provide evidence against critics trying to accuse Mustafa Kemal Paşa of compromising with communists can easily be detected.[390] He wrote in defence of him during the turbulent Cold War years for a domestic audience.[391] Budyonny only visited Ankara and met Mustafa Kemal Paşa in 1933.

After the Congress of Sivas in early September 1919, in October or November, the Bolsheviks secretly sent the commander of the Bolshevik forces in the Caucasus, Shalva Eliava, to İstanbul, where he met with representatives of the National Movement, promising to support them against the imperialists and declaring that they could provide help.[392] In 1919 and 1920, engagements between the National Forces in Anatolia and the Bolsheviks occurred in a disorganised manner. Individuals and groups claiming to represent either side tried to negotiate. By the mid-1920, Mustafa Kemal Paşa attempted to bring order to these engagements. To achieve tangible and effective results, Ankara informed the Soviet side that it had decided to appoint a respected Turkish general, formerly the commander of the Western Front, Ali Fuad Paşa (Cebesoy), as ambassador to Moscow in November 1920. Ali Fuad Paşa was the first ambassador appointed abroad by the Ankara

[388] Yerasimos, *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri*, 108.

[389] A. Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964* (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992), 26.

[390] Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 339-40.

[391] The criticisms about the mistakes he made in some names and events in the 1957 first edition was corrected in the second one in 1964. In the preface of the second edition, he apologised for these mistakes which were natural due to effect of time and his desire to keep confidentiality. Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, Preface.

[392] Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955), 60. Bolsheviks later considered to send Eliava as an envoy to Ankara in 1920 but due to his illness he could not make it. See Kemal Girgin, *Ruslarla Kavgadan Derin Ortaklığa Son Yüz Senemiz 1914-2014* (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür, 2014), 112.

Government.[393] He arrived in Moscow on 19 February 1921. According to Fahir Armaoğlu, he had four duties. To work for the successful conclusion of an official agreement with the Soviets, to prevent Soviet communism from penetrating into Anatolia, to prevent Unionists and, most importantly, Enver Paşa from coming back to Anatolia, and to manage affairs with the Soviets for as long as possible.[394]

Ali Fuad Paşa's appointment came in the wake of an unsuccessful attack against occupying Greek forces at Gediz on 24 October 1920. Ali Fuad Paşa believed that the mixture of regular and irregular forces could achieve the planned military results. The failure at Gediz proved him wrong, and this gave an opportunity to Mustafa Kemal Paşa, who was suspicious about the merits and usefulness of irregular forces. He was determined to take military affairs under the control of the Grand National Assembly and unify the command and force structure. Moscow had the highest foreign representation for Ankara at the time, and by appointing Ali Fuad Paşa, who was not expecting this, to a high-level post with important tasks, it would alleviate doubts in Ali Fuad Paşa's mind. In his memoirs, Ali Fuad Paşa wrote that in a private conversation Mustafa Kemal Paşa told him that the Turkish delegation in Moscow led by Bekir Sami Bey (Kunduh) had been unsuccessful and would return to Ankara. Due to the urgency of establishing good relations between Turkey and the Soviets, a credible and important figure should be deployed to Moscow. If Mustafa Kemal Paşa had not been the President of the Grand National Assembly and the Head of the Government, he would have accepted the task with pleasure. However, he believed that Ali Fuad Paşa was the right person for the job and asked him to accept this role.[395] Ali Fuad Paşa accepted this important mission and formed a larger than normal embassy staff especially for the military attaché's section as they would deal with weapon and military equipment transfer and to deal with Turkish prisoners of war whose number was around 10,000.[396] He was welcomed with a big ceremony in

[393] Bilal N. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 54.

[394] Fahir Armaoğlu, "Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Turko-Russian Relations during the War of Independence" in *Ali Fuat Cebesoy: A Commemoration (10 January 1994)*, trans. M. Mehdi İlhan (Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 1999), 29.

[395] Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1953), 516.

[396] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 101.

Moscow by senior Bolsheviks and a division of soldiers under sub-freezing temperatures. Ali Fuad Paşa noted that this reception was above and beyond anything protocol or diplomatic requirements dictated[397] Şimşir also emphasized that there could be no such example in history where an ambassador would be greeted by a military force in a size of a division in sub-freezing temperature of minus 27.[398] Shortly after his arrival, a critical agreement between the two governments was signed in March 1921. Ali Fuad Paşa continued his engagement with the Soviet leaders alongside instructions he was given by Ankara and in reflection of complexities of Turkish-Russian relations, he returned from his post with protest in May 1922 after the Soviet secret police Cheka raid against the Turkish military attaché's office and Moscow's failure to apologise or ease the situation. In his memoirs, the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara Aralov claimed that Ali Fuad Paşa employed a Turkish spy and an English agent. These were apprehended in a secret apartment in Moscow as they were transferring documents related with espionage to an English agent. Aralov claimed Ali Fuad Paşa was called back by the Turkish Government because of this.[399]

Following Ali Fuad Paşa's appointment as ambassador to Moscow by Ankara, the Bolsheviks took a similar step and appointed the well-known Bolshevik general Mikhael Frunze as the representative and middle envoy of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to Ankara. Frunze arrived in Ankara in early December 1921. In his report about his mission, Frunze stated that he was tasked with understanding the impact of the recently signed agreement between Turkey and France on the developing relations between the Ankara Government and Soviet Russia, as France was the leading Entente power pursuing anti-Soviet policies, and to see whether they would persuade Turkey to adopt a similar line.[400] He noted that the divisive policy followed by the Entente powers created suspicions in the Soviets, which could have caused

[397] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 128.

[398] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 63.

[399] Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1967), 137.

[400] Mihail Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları,* trans. Ahmet Ekeş (Ankara: Doğubatı, 2022), 134. The Ankara Agreement with France was signed on 20 October 1921 after initiation of talks with the arrival of French representative Franklin Bouillon to Ankara on 9 June 1921.

disturbances in the military order established on the border with Turkey.[401] Frunze noted that during this period, the Entente was provoking both, trying to sever ties between them, and would push them into a war if they had the power.[402] He was appointed under these circumstances. During his visit, he understood that Turks did not perceive him as an envoy of Ukraine but as one of the commanders of the only army of their states, which was the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.[403] Frunze believed that his presence in Ankara and his engagements with the Turkish people and the army gave the necessary assurances that they were friends and that the agreement with France would not change that. Frunze created an impact as a respected Bolshevik commander and met Mustafa Kemal Paşa on 25 December 1921 and 4 January 1922. After his visit, the last chunk of promised Soviet financial aid was delivered, and the transfer of weapons and military equipment from Moscow increased.[404] Frunze was confident that he had gained a thorough understanding of the Turkish Army, which made his knowledge of the Turkish Army on par with his knowledge of the Ukrainian Army.[405] This led some Soviet authors to claim that he took part in planning military manoeuvres, giving Frunze a role in Turkish military victories against the Greek Army.[406] In a Turkish military intelligence publication printed in 1925 on the Red Army, the biography of Frunze, including his successes, was provided without any mention of his visit to Anatolia.[407] It was noted that he was deputizing Trotsky since April 1924, as Trotsky was sick. [408] In this publication, among all other commanders, including Trotsky, Frunze was the only one mentioned

[401] Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları*, 136.

[402] Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları,* 136.

[403] Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları,* 137.

[404] Yavuz Aslan, "Mihail Mihalyeviç Frunze (1885-1925)," *Atatürk Ansiklopedisi*, https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/mihail-vasilyevic-frunze-1885-1925/?pdf=4343 accessed on 12 June 2024.

[405] Aleksandr Kolesnikov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk- Rus İlişkileri,* trans. İlyas Kamalov (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2010), 15.

[406] Nikolay Georgiyeviç Korsun, *Türk- Yunan Savaşı 1919-1922*, trans. Celal Pekşen (İstanbul: Kronik, 2022), 115 and Kolesnikov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk- Rus İlişkileri*, 17-18.

[407] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 67-8.

[408] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 68.

as "*Yoldaş Frunze*" (Comrade Frunze) likely based on the past positive engagement with him.

As Frunze was on his way back from Ankara in January 1922, he met newly appointed Soviet Russia's ambassador Semyon Ivanovich Aralov in Samsun who was on his way to Ankara.[409] In his memoirs, Aralov noted that he was invited to Moscow to meet Foreign Affairs Commissar Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin in November 1921, and he was proposed to go to Ankara as Soviet Russia's ambassador.[410] Chicherin told Aralov that he was selected for this role because he was a soldier and had been a successful envoy in Lithuania.[411] Before leaving for Ankara, Lenin also emphasised Aralov's military background as the reason for being considered for the role. Lenin told him that the Central Committee wanted to send someone in a diplomatic role who understood military affairs.[412] During his time in Anatolia, Aralov worked closely with Turkish political and military leaders. According to Şemsutdinov and Bagirov, Aralov, who had extensive military experience, played an important role in the development of Soviet-Turkish relations.[413]

Overcoming challenges in laying the groundwork for a working relationship was hard at the beginning of relations, as seen in the Cheka raid on 20/21 April 1922 in Moscow against the apartment used by the Turkish military attaché. Aralov was in charge when, shortly after this incident, the building used as the Soviet Embassy in Ankara was burned down completely on 13 August 1922 together with 30 other houses around it. Both incidents were contained, and Aralov found another building in Ankara to use as his new office (Figure 4.2). He was confident of his impact and influence in Ankara. Several decades later, Aralov told prominent journalist Nadir Nadi visiting him in Moscow that Mustafa Kemal Paşa invited him to join the

[409] Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları,* 128.

[410] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının*, 13.

[411] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının*, 14.

[412] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının*, 37.

[413] A. Şemsutdinov and Y. A. Bagirov, *Bir Karagün Dostluğu: Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri*, trans. Kamil Hakverdi (Ankara: Dorlion, 2022), 78.

inspection of troops from time to time pointing to the depth of his relationship and confidence entrusted to him on his military capabilities and understanding.[414] Despite his self-belief in his own image, the Turkish side had a different view of him. Speaking to the members of press on 16 January 1923, Mustafa Kemal Paşa talked about strong pressure from the Soviets and the activities of the ambassadors, especially the current one Aralov's activities in engaging in organisational activities against their authority. [415] According to Stanford Shaw, he was increasingly irritated by the efforts of Aralov and the Turkish communists.[416]Just like Ali Fuad Paşa's ending of his mission in Moscow after a Cheka raid to the Turkish Defence Attaché's office in Moscow, Aralov's mission in Ankara also ended in an unpleasant manner as Ankara asked him to be called back to Moscow.



Figure 4.2. The building used as the embassy building in Ankara by the Soviets after the fire on 13 August 1922.

Source: Photo by Frédéric Gadmer, Collections du Musée Albert-Kahn, Inventory No A37080, https://collections.albert-kahn.hauts-de-seine.fr/document/turquie-angora-ambassade-des-soviets-autre/617a7a43cf8b8968b338015e?q=angora&pos=156&pgn=10, accessed on 26 October 2025.

[414] Nadir Nadi, *İki Sovyet Rusya 1935-1965* (İstanbul: Ararat Yayınevi, 1967), 52.

[415] *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları*, ed. Arı İnan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2023), 47.

[416] Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A Documentary Study*, Volume III, Part 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 1588-589.

Both sides established contact in the early days as they fought against external and internal enemies. To make headway and establish trust to signal their determination, they preferred to use well-known military figures to overcome challenges and cope with propaganda disseminated by third parties to lay the ground for cooperation. Despite all intentions, the occurrence of high-profile incidents proved the persistence of major difficulties ahead in setting up the proper ground between the two political powers, which were under multiple threats that made it difficult even for military figures with a proven track record of higher than normal credibility and capabilities.

4.1.2. Military Diplomacy in Peace Time (1923-1939)

During wartime, both countries used prominent military figures for practical and symbolic reasons. To manage military affairs, figures with military backgrounds and understanding were selected as ambassadors.[417] As both countries shifted from wartime to peacetime, rather than using ambassadors with military backgrounds, military diplomacy was carried out by visits of military delegations and army vessels on an ad hoc basis complemented by visits for military training. In the background, the military bureaucracies continued to perform their essential work and engagement through the established mechanism of military attachés at their respective capitals, which had been active since the Ottoman and Tsarist times.

4.1.2.1. The Role of Military Attachés

Military bureaucracies' core engagement was carried out in a more low-profile, persistent, and stable manner by military attachés. Essentially, core work in military diplomacy was run by these resident military officers in embassies in capitals performing diplomatic activities. These officers, military attachés, were expected to focus on military aspects of the wide agenda of an ambassador and engage officially with the host nation's army. The practice of using military attachés to feed their General Staff with information has been employed effectively since the late 19th century by major European powers. These powers, in the post-Napoleonic European

[417] Mehmet Perinçek argued in appointment to Ankara, one of the main criterions was to have military background and combat experience as exemplified in the cases of Mdivani, Natseranus, Frunze and Aralov between 1920 and 1922. See Perinçek, *Türk-Rus Diplomasisinden Gizli Sayfalar*, 87.

order, agreed to deploy military officers to reside legally in the capitals and engage with interlocutors in uniform in these capitals to send reports about all aspects of relevance to military planning, capability, and intentions through embassies.[418] The Ottoman Empire utilized this method, and the first draft procedures were introduced in 1892 by the Prussian General Colmar von der Goltz, who was in the Ottoman service.[419] Updates to principles were made afterwards in the eve of the Balkan Wars in 1910.[420] The capital of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg was one of the key capitals where Ottoman military attachés were deployed. In 1860, two military attachés were deployed to Russia's capital.[421] This practice continued after the demise of the Ottoman and Tsarist empires. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union deployed military attachés to their embassies in Moscow and Ankara, respectively. In addition to these attachés, a sizable military contingent was deployed from the countries to their embassies for protection during a period when security could not be effectively provided (Figure 4.3).



Figure 4.3. A Red Army guard at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara in late 1922.

Source: Photo by Frédéric Gadmer, Collections du Musée Albert-Kahn, Inventory No A37108S, https://collections.albert-kahn.hauts-de-seine.fr/document/un-garde-de-l-ambassade-de-la-republique-des-soviets-jour-de-la-creation-de-l-urss/617a7a3bcf8b8968b3345064?q=angora&pos=69&pgn=4, accessed on 26 October 2025.

[418] Gültekin Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat 1864-1914* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2019), 29-30.

[419] Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat*, 53-4.

[420] Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat*, 67.

[421] Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat,* 49.

The Turkish government's first ambassador to Moscow, Ali Fuad Paşa, noted that there was a contingent of 30-40 soldiers accompanying the Russian mission in Ankara, and he was escorted to Moscow by 30 strong soldiers from the cavalry company of the Command of the Western Front.[422] The military attaché on his team, İdris Bey (Çora), had command of the Russian language, and his proficiency, as seen in later appointments, proved to open the way for a more successful duty period.[423] In addition to their diplomatic representative functions, the main asset of these military diplomats was their ability to understand the military system of the host country and provide input to the General Staff in Ankara.

Historically, these officers provided the flow of information specified in the official procedure and responded to ad hoc inquiries from the Ottoman Sultan, Grand Vizier, and Foreign Ministry[424]. In addition to obvious military interests, such as army structure, locations, procedures, size, capability, and key commanders, their reports contained almost a universal data set, including all that could be utilised in a total war at the time. Thus, these covered information on population, geography, industry, work force, transportation networks and hubs, conditions, and number of rail tracks, for example, to understand the speed of deployment of troops from one location to another. These encompassed almost everything that might have impacted the war-fighting skills and capabilities of the nation under consideration. These country reports were created in the Ottoman period, but since individual country desks at the General Staff were formed late, they were not widely and thoroughly produced, and the desired level could not be reached by 1914.[425] During the Republican period, this practice continued, and military attachés contributed to products that were distributed for the use of Turkish officers through the Intelligence Department of the General Staff. According to Ahmat Lütfullah's 1929 work on the Turkish diplomatic experience, upon arrival in the capital, a military attaché would be introduced to the Defence Minister, the Head of General Staff and the Foreign Minister of the host

[422] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 101.

[423] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 102.

[424] Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat*, 122.

[425] Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat*, 250.

country by the ambassador.[426] Afterwards, he would be on his own to conduct his engagement with his interlocutors, not obliged to pass his correspondence through the ambassador unless these were related to the political matters of that country.[427]

Turkish military attachés in Moscow effectively worked, but as their area of work was a mixture of diplomacy and intelligence, it always carried the risk of being under more scrutiny and sometimes feeling more vulnerable to oppressive attempts by the host government, although the relations between the countries were good. This inevitable aspect, inherent in the nature of any type of intelligence activity, remained out of sight for most of the period from 1923 to 1939. The most high-profile incident occurred during Ali Fuad Paşa's ambassadorship when an apartment used by the Turkish military attachés was unexpectedly raided by the Cheka, and Turkish officers were harassed, beaten, and detained in April 1922.[428] This major incident was contained, and Mustafa Kemal Paşa told Ali Fuad Paşa that they always needed to try to be good neighbours with Soviet Russia without compromising and falling into their plots.[429]

Shortly after this incident, the Turkish General Staff appointed Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) as military attaché to Moscow in Autumn 1922. He became Turkey's first military attaché in peacetime. He was a prolific writer, and due to his memoirs and other written material he left behind, an understanding of this period could be developed. There is no proper information in the open domain to trace his successors' activities for the remaining years of the interwar period. Hüseyin Rahmi fought against the Imperial Russian Army during World War I. He was initially appointed as a military attaché to Bukhara in 1921, but he could not start that position as conditions had changed. The Bolsheviks turned down this mission when Enver Paşa took command of the insurgency and began attacking Russian soldiers. [430] He already had a high command of the Russian language, which he began to learn

[426] Ahmat Lütfullah, *Sefaret Katipleri ve Ataşemiliterler* vol I, (İstanbul: İlhami Matbaası, 1929), 113.
[427] Lütfullah, *Sefaret Katipleri ve Ataşemiliterler*, 114.

[428] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 329-33.

[429] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 346: "Sovyet Rusya ile daima iyi komşu olmağa gayret etmeliyiz. Fakat ne haklarımızdan en küçük bir şey feda etmeliyiz ve ne de oyunlarına kapılmalıyız."

[430] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 261.

before the Balkan Wars, almost a decade earlier.[431] Upon taking up his role, he toured the Soviet Union and engaged with various officials. He most likely greatly contributed to all General Staff reports, printed as military intelligence publications, during his time until its end in 1926 and even probably after that with the one printed in 1927.[432] He translated two major works from Russian, *Rus-Leh Seferi* in 1925 and *Anadolu'nun Taksimi* (The Partition of Anatolia) in 1926, which provided valuable insights into the Russian military and the Soviet policy related to late Ottoman and early Republican times in Turkey.[433] Particularly the latter one was a Soviet propaganda book to illustrate Tsarist Russia's secret deals with the Entente powers for partition of the Ottoman Empire which served its purpose well in the 1920s in Turkish political and military circles.[434] Hüseyin Rahmi remained as the premier Russia expert within the Turkish military bureaucracy and he also took part in the initial activities undertaken for the establishment of the Turkish intelligence service.[435] He was a translator during Voroshilov's 1933 visit. After his retirement from the army, as a member of parliament, he was part of the delegation of Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras's visit to Moscow in 1937.[436]

The Soviet side also acted carefully to assign high-calibre officers to Ankara as military attachés. In the 1934 army manoeuvres in Kiev, Turkish general Muzaffer Paşa noted about then the Soviet military attaché in Ankara named Kolockha who was with them accompanying Fahrettin Paşa's delegation. According to Muzaffer Paşa, Kolockha excelled in military qualities and was superior to many of the Red Army commanders they had met so far, even being superior to a person carrying the

[431] In his memoirs he noted how he went to the frontline with two volumes of Russian-French dictionary. Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 52.

[432] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*; *Kızıl Ordu II*; *Kızıl Ordu III* and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*.

[433] *Rus-Leh Seferi* and E. E. Adamof, *Anadolu'nun Taksimi*, trans. Babaeskili Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan Matbaası, 1926).

[434] Apak noted that later Stalin regime destroyed this book when they felt strong and worked to create hatred in the Lenin youth against Brest-Litovsk and Kars agreements. See Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 278.

[435] Apak was one of the military officers selected for attending the intelligence course in 1926 held by former German intelligence chief Nicolai. BCA, 30-18-1-1-19-38–8, 8 June 1926.

[436] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 280.

rank of an army commander.[437] He noted that General Voroshilov had sent a most valuable officer of his army to Turkey.[438]

Resident military diplomats at the respective capitals continued their routine duties throughout the interwar period and beyond, as defined by their headquarters and carefully constrained and monitored by the authorities of the host country. The work conducted by these military attachés formed the backbone of military diplomatic activities and largely remained out of sight.

4.1.2.2. Mutual Visits and Engagements

Mutual visits and engagements formed the visible, high-profile aspect of military diplomacy activities conducted between the two states during peacetime in the interwar period. In May 1928, the Commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Mitrofanovich Orlov, visited Turkey. He travelled to Ankara by train.[439] In another document from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, it was noted that he had begun his journey to Ankara.[440] Detailed information about Orlov is available in the military intelligence publication of 1927.[441] His visit preceded that of the British Mediterranean Fleet, led by Commander-in-Chief Admiral Field, to İstanbul in October 1929. The British wanted to use the fleet for diplomatic purposes with a most "spectacular example of showing the flag" as relations remained tense with

[437] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 49), 1934.

[438] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 49), 1934.

[439] TDA, 508-44450-212773-1, 29 May 1928.

[440] TDA, 508-44450-212773-1, 29 May 1928.

[441] "Orlov [Arlof was used in this report] was born in 1895 in Kherson. He was enrolled at Faculty of Law at Leningrad University and was arrested for taking part in student events in 1914 and 1915. In 1916, he was taken under arms and posted to cruiser visiting Japan, China and touring Indian Ocean. He was then posted in the same year to cruiser *Bogatyr*. He joined the Communist Party in 1918 and took part in military commissariats. Recently he was appointed as the chairman of naval schools". *Kızıl Ordu III*, 349-50. Later, Orlov commanded Black Sea Fleet from 1926 to 1930. In 1931 he was appointed as the commander of the Soviet Navy and deputy minister of Defence in 1937. He was one of the victims of the purges of 1937 arrested on 10 July 1937 and executed on 28 July 1938. See "ОРЛОВ Владимир Митрофанович", *Военный энциклопедический словарь*, https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=7754@morfDictionary , accessed on 12 August 2024.

Turkey due to the unsettled issue of Mosul.[442] The British fleet's port call lasted for a week, and Admiral Field visited Ankara and met with Mustafa Kemal Paşa. This visit, according to Turkish press reports, created a positive impact in Turkey for the amelioration of relations with Great Britain.[443] However, according to a former British naval officer, this visit of the British fleet failed as relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union tightened further in the following period.[444] This note from the British side exemplifies the motivation for using military vessels for diplomatic purposes in those years. In this context, the mobilisation of all or part of a naval fleet carried great weight as naval vessels were the most spectacular symbols a country could deploy to another to be sighted by the masses without the risks associated with logistics, transportation, and costs. This has always been the expected outcome. After this visit, then British Ambassador in Ankara noted "whether the effect of the visit is to be lasting depends on the future but for the moment, British stock stands higher in Turkey than it has done any time since the armistice."[445] After this visit, Turkey's Embassy in Washington, DC, informed Ankara about press articles suggesting that this visit proved that Turkey was turning away from the Soviet Union. In response to these claims, Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Aras) wrote back noting that Turkey's policy remained unchanged, and Turkey was determined to continue its friendly relations with Soviet Russia, making all such allegations baseless as the British Admiral's visit was purely a courtesy visit where no political issues were debated, and Tevfik Rüştü told that by the end of December, Karakhan would be in Turkey.[446] Shortly after this visit, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karakhan visited Turkey, and the Soviet naval vessel showed the flag again in December 1929. He arrived on the Soviet destroyer *Dzerzhinsky.* [447] He arrived to sign the renewal of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (Non-Aggression) Pact, signed between the two

[442] *The Mediterranean Fleet 1919-1929*, ed. Paul Halperin (Surrey: Ashgate Navy Records Society, 2011), 463.

[443] *Akşam*, 13 October 1929; *Akşam*, 15 October 1929 and *Milliyet*, 21 October 1929.

[444] *Mediterranean Fleet*, 463.

[445] Confidential note from Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, 23 October 1929 quoted in *The Mediterranean Fleet*, 584.

[446] Note by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 534-37398-150256-14, 28 October 1929.

[447] *Vakit*, 13 December 1929.

countries in 1925. The necessary budget for hosting Soviet marine officers and soldiers and entertainment for them was ordered to be used from what was left from the budget of the British Admiral's visit by a cabinet decision.[448]

In addition to naval port calls, aviation was popular in those years to show the flag. Long-range flights to connect cities were conducted in those years, and the first flight between Turkey and the Soviet Union was made in 1926. In that year, Osoaviakhim organised the first direct flight from Moscow to Ankara.[449] In August 1930, the Turkish government allowed three civilian Soviet planes to conduct a long tour and visit Ankara. These planes would fly from Sevastopol to Ankara, then onwards to Tbilisi, Tehran, Ashgabat, Kabul, Tashkent, and the Turkish General Staff approved their route within Turkey and brought in an aviation expert.[450] The Soviet planes finally arrived in Ankara after a delay on 7 September 1930, bringing letters from Karakhan to Prime Minister İsmet Paşa and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey.[451]

Prime Minister İsmet Paşa officially visited the Soviet Union in 1932. In his memoirs, İsmet Paşa noted the insistence of the Soviets and wrote that the Russians were in a rush, and upon their insistence, he organised his visit to the Soviet Union.[452] His visit focused on political issues and was mainly on economic affairs. His delegation reflected this, and there were no senior military figures in his delegation. However, the importance of this visit from a military diplomacy perspective was two-fold. First, the Soviet Union tasked a Soviet military delegation to accompany İsmet Paşa on his return journey with military equipment gifted to Turkey. Second, the Soviet response to this visit was to arrange a visit the following year for the 10th Anniversary of the Turkish Republic by a Soviet delegation led by

[448] BCA, 30-18-1-2-6-60-10, 11 December 1929.

[449] Sergey Koritskiy, *Yeni Rusya ve Yeni Türkiye İşbirliğinin İlk Adımları 1920-1930'lu Yıllarda Rus-Türk İlişkileri* (Ankara: Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçiliği, 2011), 8.

[450] BCA, 30-18-1-2-13-58-13, 18 August 1930. A Russian expert would travel by sea from Odessa and make necessary preparations for the planes to land in Ankara. From the Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-36207-143261-4, 13 August 1930.

[451] Turkish Foreign Minister to Turkish Prime Minister, TDA, 571-36207-143261-13, 7 September 1930.

[452] İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, ed. Sabahattin Selek (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi: 2009), 507.

the Soviet generals Voroshilov and Budyonny.[453] In Turkish secondary sources, the economic and political aspects of this visit were discussed with no reference to the military aspect. [454] This visit opened a new era of mutual exchange of visits by the militaries for the next seven years until the beginning of World War II and initiated the first flow of modern era warfare capabilities to Turkey from the Soviet Union, which constituted the Turkish military's primary objective of acquiring modern weapons. Modern tanks and armoured vehicles were introduced to the Turkish army, as well as other equipment such as tractors, trucks, and reconnaissance bomber airplanes.

During his time in Moscow, İsmet Paşa attended the May Day parade and told the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that he was impressed by the parade as it looked like a perfect army with its uniforms, discipline, and orderly conduct in the march.[455] Stalin wanted to impress the Turkish Prime Minister to show his intention to keep strong relations with Turkey and İsmet Paşa noted this effort throughout in the part related to his visit in his memoirs. He also noted the strong impact created by Frunze's visit, almost a decade earlier, which he regretted not having the chance to meet him as he was on the Western Front, but always heard of the important positive impact of his visit from the others.[456] He met with Soviet generals, including the defence minister Voroshilov. In Crimea, he was hosted by the commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Admiral M Mojnanov.[457] On his way back, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet's flagship *Parizhskaya Kommuna* dreadnought escorted İsmet Paşa's ship in the Black Sea.[458] A Soviet military delegation, including some generals, led by General Fokin,

[453] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 515-16.

[454] See for example, Temuçin Faik Ertan, "İsmet İnönü'nün Rusya Gezisi," in *Atatürk'ten Soğuk Savaş Dönemine Türk-Rus İlişkileri*, ed. İlyas Kamalov and İrina Svistunova (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2011), 211-22. Exceptions were recent works where authors either focused on the tanks or on military trade from economical perspective. See Perinçek, *Türk-Rus Diplomasisinden Gizli Sayfalar*, 228; Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 56; Bilgiç, Sanayi Planları ve Sovyet Kredisi, 116.

[455] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 515.

[456] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 515-16.

[457] *Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1932.

[458] *Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1932.

joined İsmet Paşa's delegation on his return to Turkey. İsmet Paşa hosted them and offered a dinner at the Pera Palace on the evening of 10 May 1932. The next day, the İstanbul corps commander hosted the delegation for lunch at the Tokatlıyan Hotel, which was attended by İsmet Paşa. Strong positive messages were exchanged in the speeches delivered by both army commanders, with emphasis on the conditions that brought about their existence in their fight against imperial powers and domestic enemies.[459] The military equipment presented by the Soviet Union consisted of two tanks, four tankettes, ten tractors, two trucks, and a bus.[460] These were unloaded from the ship on 11 May 1932.[461] A horse was presented by the Red Army to Mustafa Kemal Paşa, and the gifted horse was taken to Ankara by train by a Turkish officer.[462]

A year later, another Soviet military visit took place in Turkey. On 18 October 1933, a group of naval vessels from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet visited İstanbul.[463] Cruiser *Krasny Kavkaz,* accompanied by two torpedo boats and three submarines had a port call for three days.[464] The fleet commander, Admiral Rall, met with the Turkish naval commander and the governor during this visit.[465] Very shortly after, the Soviet Union returned İsmet Paşa's visit with Defence Minister Voroshilov's visit. He was accompanied by General Budyonny. The Turkish government sent *İzmir* ferry to Sevastopol to transport the Soviet delegation to Turkey on 23 October 1933.[466] The

[459] Turkish general Rüştü Paşa spoke: "Harbi umumiden sonra nasıl ki bizim Türk ordusu memlekete müstevli olan emperyalist ordular, diğer taraftan muhalefet ve irtica unsurlarıile mücadeleye mecbur kaldı ise Kızıl Ordu da kendi cephelerinde ayni şekilde mücadele etti.Bunu müşterek mücadele şekli iki ordunun birbirlerini sevmesine amil olmuştur." *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1932.

[460] *Cumhuriyet*, 9 May 1932.

[461] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1932.

[462] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1932.

[463] *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1933.

[464] For the names of the vessels and commanders of these vessels see *Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1932.

[465] Yuri Fedorovich Rall (1890- 1948) commanded the Black Sea Fleet's cruiser brigade at the time. See *Большой советской энциклопедии, Vol 7,* https://www.hrono.ru/biograf/bio_r/rall_yu.html, accessed on 25 July 2024.

[466] For Soviet delegation's itinerary in Turkey (İstanbul- Ankara- İzmir) see Note by Turkish Foreign Ministry, BCA, 30-10-0-0-198-352-14, 27 October 1933.

Senior Turkish military representative receiving the Soviet delegation was Muzaffer Paşa. Military ceremonies were organised in Sevastopol for the visiting Turkish delegation. In the farewell ceremony, 76 Soviet military planes escorted *İzmir* from Sevastopol. *İzmir* was accompanied to İstanbul by two Soviet cruisers to be met by Turkish destroyers *Zafer* and *Kocatepe* at the Black Sea entrance of the Bosphorus on 26 October.[467] The army corps commander in İstanbul, the commander of the 3rd Corps, Şükrü Naili Paşa (Gökberk), greeted the Soviet generals.[468] On 27 October, they were accepted by Mustafa Kemal Paşa in Ankara, and then they attended ceremonies for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic[469] (Figure 4.4). Voroshilov and Budyonny visited the Military College in İstanbul on 9 November 1933[470] (Figure 4.5). The former Turkish military attaché in Moscow, Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), was with them as he was a fluent Russian speaker. Before the Voroshilov delegation arrived in Turkey, on 23 October 1933 a ferry brought Soviet planes gifted by the Soviet Government to Turkey.[471]



Figure 4.4. Defence Minister General Voroshilov with Prime Minister İsmet Paşa at the Turkish Parliament's entrance in Ankara, October 1933.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[467] *Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1933.

[468] *Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1933.

[469] *Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1933.

[470] *Cumhuriyet*, 10 November 1933.

[471] The number of planes were given as three by *Cumhuriyet* and four by *Akşam*. *Cumhuriyet* 24 October 1933 and *Akşam*, 24 October 1933.



Figure 4.5. The Red Army delegation led by Defence Minister General Voroshilov accompanied by General Budyonny saluting Military College cadets in İstanbul in November 1933.

Source: From the author's private collection.

During this visit, General Voroshilov also visited İzmir. The city of İzmir granted him the honorary citizen title.[472] The city also decided to name one of the new main boulevards after him in 1935.[473] This main artery, named Voroşilof Bulvarı, was a sign of appreciation for his contribution to the relations between the two countries (Figure 4.6).[474]

A group of Soviet aviators, led by General Ilyin, arrived in Turkey with these gifted planes. The delegation was hosted by Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti (The Turkish Aeroplane Association) and met with the governor of İstanbul and the senior commanders in the city at two dinners at Pera Palace before they departed for Ankara.[475] Six pilots brought three planes to Ankara on 28 October and were greeted

[472] *Vakit*, 10 November 1933.

[473] *Yeni Asır*, 21 June 1935.

[474] The name of this boulevard was changed to Plevne Bulvarı in 1951 with the anti-Russia fever at the beginning of the Cold War. The new name was a reference to the legendary defence by the Ottoman forces sieged by the Russian Army at Plevna (Pleven, Bulgaria) in the 1877-1878 Turco-Russian War that lasted 145 days.

[475] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 1933.

with the highest-level military ceremony in Ankara, led by the deputy head of the Chief of the Staff, Asım Paşa (Gündüz).[476] These planes were Soviet-made Polikarkarpov R-5 model reconnaissance bomber aircrafts, and they flew during the celebrations of the 10th Anniversary of the Republic in Ankara.[477] On 9 November 1933, the Soviet cruiser *Chernova Ukraina* made a port call in İstanbul. The commander of the ship visited the İstanbul governorate, and the deputy governor returned the visit the next day.[478] This cruiser left İstanbul to escort *İzmir*, transporting the Soviet military delegation to the Soviet Union.



Figure 4.6. The boulevard named after Voroshilov in İzmir, Turkey.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Turkey decided to reciprocate these military visits by sending a group of aviators to Moscow to attend the May Day celebrations in 1934 and to observe Soviet aviation technology and industry. Turkish aviators left their base in Eskişehir on 20 April 1934, and five planes, via Zonguldak and Sinop, flew over the Black Sea to Sevastopol. The Turkish and Soviet battleships followed as they flew over the Black Sea.[479]

[476] *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1933.

[477] Davud Kapucu and Erdal Korkmaz, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Askeri Hava Seyahatleri 1909-1939* (Ankara: Karakum Yayınevi, 2020), 125.

[478] *Cumhuriyet*, 10 November 1933. The name of the ship was given by *Cumhuriyet* was *Ukranya*, but the name must be Soviet cruiser *Chernova Ukraina* of the Black Sea Fleet.

[479] Kapucu and Korkmaz, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e*, 127.




Figure 4.7. The Turkish aviators at the May Day Parade in Moscow on 1 May 1934. The bottom right of the picture shows Turkish officers with General Budyonny.

Source: *Строим. Журнал* «За индустриализацию». Специальный номер, посвященный дружбе народов СССР и Турции, [Stroim. Zhurnal «Za industrializatsiyu». Spetsial'nyy Nomer, Posvyashchennyy Druzhbe Narodov SSSR i Turtsii], (May 1934), https://www.litfund.ru/auction/502s1/174/, accessed on 1 November 2025.

The group was welcomed in Kharkov by General Ilyin, who flew from Moscow to greet them.[480] On 24 April, they were received by the Red Army commander of Air Forces Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis in Moscow.[481] After various engagements the aviators were received by Defence Commissar Voroshilov in Moscow on 28 April 1934.[482] They also met General Budyonny. They also visited Osoaviakhim and met its head, Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht, on 29 April 1934.[483] Another military delegation sent from Ankara, led by General Emin Paşa (Çolakoğlu), attended the

[480] *Akşam*, 24 April 1934.

[481] *Akşam*, 25 April 1934. Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis (1897-1938) was appointed as the commander of the Red Army Air Forces in 1931. He kept his position until 1937 when he was condemned in the purges of 1937 and was shot in 1938. "Яков Иванович Алкснис", Хронос, https://hrono.ru/biograf/bio_a/alksnis_jak.php, accessed on 27 July 2024.

[482] *Akşam*, 29 April 1934.

[483] *Akşam*, 1 May 1934.

May Day celebrations and conducted visits.[484] He was sent to the Soviet Union to examine and identify military equipment to be purchased with the eight million golden dollar credit extended to Turkey by the Soviet Union.[485] On May Day, the Turkish aviators flew three planes over Moscow.[486] On 10 May, the group left Moscow for Kharkov, escorted by 10 Soviet planes and General Ilyin.[487] During this visit, Turkish military personnel visited several cities, met Red Army officers, visited factories and workshops, and displayed the Turkish flag to the Soviet citizens with a strong display of friendship and cooperation between the two armies (Figure 4.7). After this long tour, the aviators returned to Turkey on 18 May 1934 (Figure 4.8).



Figure 4.8. The Turkish planes returning from Moscow spotted over İstanbul on 18 May 1934.

Source: From the author's private collection.

After this highly successful military visit, the Soviet side extended an invitation to Turkey for a military delegation to attend a major Red Army manoeuvre near Kiev in August-September 1934. Shortly after his arrival in Turkey in March 1934, newly appointed Soviet military attaché Kolockha was visited by newly retired Colonel

[484] *Akşam*, 1 May 1934.

[485] BCA, 30-18-1-2-43-18–13, 5 April 1934.

[486] *Vakit*, 5 May 1934.

[487] *Cumhuriyet*, 11 May 1934.

Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), who had joined the ranks of the Republican People's Party as a member of the general administrative committee. Kolochka told him that he was tasked specially by his Commander-in-Chief to extend services to the Turkish Army, and he proposed some measures to be taken to strengthen Turkey's defence needs, such as procuring Soviet-made 76 mm artillery guns, as Turkey urgently needed infantry guns, and procuring long-range bomber planes from the Soviet Union to be used against a potential Italian aggression.[488] He also advised air patrols over Turkey's seas to prevent an Italian surprise attack. The Soviet military attaché also told him that sending high-ranking officers and officers with certain specialities to Russia to carefully examine the Red Army and identify the needs of the Turkish Army over the summer could be considered. As Hüseyin Rahmi Bey had no information or authority over these issues, he passed notes from this meeting to the Foreign Ministry, which were submitted to Numan Bey (Menemencioğlu).[489] This way, the very high-profile visit of Fahrettin Paşa and his large delegation to manoeuvres near Kiev in late 1934 could be made possible.

In his memoirs, Fahrettin Paşa (Altay) noted the invitation and his selection to lead the Turkish delegation, which comprised 14 officers.[490] This was not his first visit to the Soviet Union. He had visited the Soviet Union in 1928 shortly to accompany the King of Afghanistan Amanullah Khan to Turkey after king's visit to the Soviet Union. He had met the Turkish delegation's main host, General Voroshilov, earlier when Voroshilov visited Turkey in October 1933 for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic. The other leading commander in the delegation was General Muzaffer Paşa who was sent by *İzmir* ferry to Sevastopol to accompany General Voroshilov on 23 October 1933. He spent more time with the Soviet delegation and Voroshilov

[488] Note by Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35231-138611-147, 31 March 1934. He signed this note by his initials as "H.R.". Research in the archives revealed his identity from the file declassified on 8 January 2024. See CHP Tekirdağ MP Hüseyin Rahmi Apak's Personal File, BCA, 490-1-0-0-385-1630-4. Hüseyin Rahmi retired from the Turkish Army as colonel on 10 February 1934 and assigned as "C. H. F. Umumi İdare Heyeti Azası" (member of the general administrative committee) on 7 March 1934. He then served as MP from Tekirdağ, first entering the Parliament in March 1935 and later as an Ambassador to Lisbon and Baghdad. The military attaché delivered a "chest full of books" from Voroshilov to him as he reported to the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

[489] Note by Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35231-138611-147, 31 March 1934.

[490] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 437.

during this journey. The government formed a delegation that represented the entire spectrum of military branches, from cavalry to artillery and air force to army schools.[491] The Turkish delegation arrived in Moscow on 26 August 1934 and was received with a military ceremony. Then they had tea with General Voroshilov, the head of the Chief of Staff General Yegorov and army commander General August Ivanovich Kork.[492]

The Soviet military did everything to demonstrate its military capabilities to the Turkish officers. In one welcoming ceremony attended by Lazar Kaganovich, Fahrettin Paşa began his speech with only word he knew in Russian: "as I said "товарищ" (tovarishch, comrades) there had been a storm of applause and hurrays, and I thanked them for inviting us to this magnificent manoeuvre they have excluded every other foreigner from".[493] Kaganovich also emphasised this exclusive invitation aspect in his speech. However, at certain points, his speech irritated the Turkish delegation. Fahrettin Paşa felt uneasy when Kaganovich claimed that Turkey won its War of Independence with the Soviet support. In his memoirs, Fahrettin Paşa noted that they would never neglect the great help received from the Soviets, but he wrote, "If we had not shed several hundred thousand Turks' blood in Çanakkale and had not prevented the entry of European powers to the Black Sea, what would be the situation now?".[494] Muzaffer Paşa had a longer version of Kaganovich's irritating remarks in his report after the visit. He noted that Kaganovich said that "Turks fought against the entire world in their War of Independence. We did not forsake our support. Now, Indians are fighting to gain their independence like Turks and we are supporters of weak nations etc.".[495] As Muzaffer Paşa's report was confidential, he

[491] BCA, 30-18-1-2-47-56-20, 16 August 1934.

[492] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 437.

[493] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 441: "Yoldaşlar manasına gelen 'Tavariş!' der demez bir alkış ve hurra tufanı koptu. Sözlerime devamla her ecnebiden esirgedikleri bu muazzam manevraya bizi davet ettiklerinden dolayı teşekkürlerimizi…".

[494] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 442-3: "Eğer ki biz Türkler Çanakkale'de birkaç yüz bin Türk'ün kanını akıtmasaydık ve bu suretle Avrupa devletlerinin Karadeniz'e girmelerini engellememiş olsaydık bugün hal acaba ne olurdu?"

[495] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, (page 50), 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, 1934: "Türkler İstiklal mücadelesinde bütün cihana karşı harp ettiler. Muavenetimizi esirgemedik. Şimdi Hintlilerde Türkler gibi İstiklallerini almak için çalışıyorlar. Biz zaten zaif milletlerin yardımcısıyız. İlh…..".

must have felt more at ease in expressing his anger as he noted "Immediately after talking about the Turkish struggle waged in a heroic manner, talking about the weak struggle of Gandhi with loincloth and his supporters and drawing an analogy between these struggles to show our nation among the weak nations was inappropriate".[496] Nevertheless, this displeasure did not lead to a crisis. The visit to the manoeuvres near Kiev and the visits to the Red Army facilities and premises provided invaluable insight to the Turkish delegation.[497] The Turkish officers gained a sound understanding of the Red Army, and their professional judgement turned out to be true during the Soviet Union's initial military engagements during World War II.

While the Turkish military was busy developing military relations with the Soviet Union by organising mutual professional visits, there was an unusual proposal made by the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, Hüseyin Ragıp (Baydur), in early 1934. The ambassador suggested to the General Staff to extend an invitation from Marshal Çakmak to the Soviet head of the Chief of Staff Yegorov and his wife to spend one or two weeks of their summer holiday at the Bosphorus in İstanbul, for example, at the Tokatlıyan Hotel at Tarabya.[498] Yegorov was serving as deputy defence minister and head of chief of staff of the Red Army since 1931.[499] The Turkish Foreign Ministry wrote a positive response to the ambassador, noting that the government supported this idea.[500] However, it appears that this visit never occurred.

On 6 June 1935, the Soviet cruiser *Chernova Ukraina* sailed once again to Turkey. From the Port of Sevastopol, it sailed off, escorted by other naval vessels and a fleet

[496]. Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 50), 1934: "Kahramane cereyan etmiş olan bir Türk mücadelesinden bahsederken onun hemen akebinde peştemallı Gandinin ve onun takipçilerini zaif mücadelesini söylemek ve iki mücadeleyi birbirine benzetmek ve hele Milletimizide zaifler arasında gösterir olmak bence münasibetsiz idi".

[497] See Chapter 3 for the details.

[498] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, TDA, 571-35546-139975-2, 4 April 1934.

[499] He was initially spared in the purges of 1937 but at the end of that year he was arrested and executed in 1939.

[500] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, TDA, 571-35546-139975-2, 4 April 1934.

of planes. It was tasked with carrying the body of Turkish ambassador to Moscow Hüseyin Vasıf Çınar, who died unexpectedly on 2 June 1935.[501] Çınar was in Moscow since 10 September 1934, in his second posting, as he had served as the Ambassador there before, between 24 November 1928 and 26 February 1929.[502] His popularity and contributions to Turkish-Soviet relations resulted in a state ceremony in Moscow on 5 June. Stalin's ceremonial guards attended, and the casket was carried on a gun carriage escorted by a platoon of cavalry.[503] In Sevastopol, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet command organised a ceremony, and he was placed on the deck of *the Chernova Ukraina*, which lowered its flag at half-mast.[504] "The friendly Russian cruiser was met by Turkish *Kocatepe"* and "respect watch by friendly Russian mariners on deck was held" as *Cumhuriyet* reported, with an emphasis on the gesture by this friendly country and its military.[505] The Soviet Vice-Admiral Rall offered his condolences on behalf of the Soviet state to the Turkish delegation embarking on the Soviet cruiser.[506]

The use of host state capabilities to show respect for a deceased ambassador was an expected act of decency. Depending on the course of international events and political agendas, there were times when these went beyond the level of expected norms and turned into a symbolic act of signalling importance and willingness to enhance relationships.[507] This was fully reflected in the late Ambassador Çınar's funeral.

---

[501] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 243.

[502] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 236-7.

[503] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 242.

[504] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 243.

[505] *Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1937: "Dost Rus kruvazöründe hazin merasim yapıldı"; "Cernova Ukrayna kruvazörünün güvertesinde kıymetli Türk diplomatının tabutunu bekliyen dost Rusya bahriyelileri".
[506] *Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1937.

[507] Soviet handling of Çınar's funeral was certainly an example of this. A year before, German state held a similar high-level farewell for Turkish Ambassador in Berlin Kemalettin Sami Paşa who died on 15 April 1934. The ceremony in Berlin was full military ceremony but since he was transported to Turkey by train, it did not have the same impact upon arrival in Turkey. Without doubt, the most important example of such a transfer by a military vessel with full of symbolism and signal for willingness for an enhanced future engagement was around *USS Missouri*'s visit to İstanbul in 1946 carrying the body of the Turkish Ambassador in Washington DC, Münir Ertegün who died there in 1944.

Visits continued between the two on various military activities. In 1935, the Turkish civil aviation flight school Türkkuşu was founded. It was modelled on the one created by the Soviet Osoaviakhim. Turkish officials have been in contact with Osoaviakhim over the years to design a similar structure in Turkey. Soviet instructors were employed in Ankara to train Turkish aviators. Ossoaviakhim invited the head of Türk Hava Kurumu (The Turkish Aeronautical Association) Fuad Bulca to an air show in Moscow in August 1936. In addition to attending the air show, Bulca had extensive talks with aviators and visited airfields, factories, and bases. He presented his report to İnönü in October 1936.[508] In return, the President of Osoaviakhim, General Robert Petrovich Eideman, visited Turkey in October 1936 with a delegation of aviators including the 1935 world record holder Soviet female parachuter Shura (Aleksandra) Nikoleyeva [509] (Figure 4.9). General Eideman was hosted by Fuad Bulca, who also participated in a major military exercise held by Turkish troops practicing covering infantry with artillery fire in İstanbul on 26 October 1936.[510]



Figure 4.9. Osoaviakhim at Türkkuşu, 1936.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[508] From Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, 21 October 1936.

[509] *Cumhuriyet*, 28 October 1936 and *Ulus* 28 October 1936.

[510] *Ulus* 27 and 28 October 1936. General Eideman (1895-1937) held his role as Ossoaviakhim chairman from 1932 to 1937. Before that, he was the commander of the Frunze Military Academy between 1925 and 1932. He was another victim of purges of 1937 and was executed in 1937. "Eideman, Robert Petrovich" https://generals.dk/general/Eideman/Robert_Petrovich/Soviet_Union.html, accessed on 2 August 2024.

By late 1936, the Soviet enthusiasm for developing Turkish-Soviet military relations seemed to diminish. The Soviet Union did not appoint a new military attaché who was in effect responsible for organising military visits and engagements. This was carefully noted by the Turkish authorities. In a telegram to the head of the Chief of Staff Marshal Çakmak on 14 August, 1939, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu noted that the Soviets had no military attaché in Ankara for two and a half years and that necessary work had been undertaken in this period by a lieutenant colonel called Sinchoki. Sinchoki asked Saraçoğlu for permission to attend military manoeuvres in Thrace that year.[511] Around that time, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow reported to Ankara about a speech on the current shape of Turkish-Soviet relations delivered at a regular conference held by Red Army officers as part of the ideological training of officers and workers. The speaker, a Red Army officer, said that there had been some recent developments that negatively affected relations between the two countries. According to him, Turkey's political line adopted at the Montreux Conference on the Straits and anti-Soviet articles published in *Cumhuriyet* created a negative impression that Turkey would be inclined to act with fascist states. However, they later overcame this impression, although they accepted that for economic reasons, Turkey had to be on good terms with the fascist states, and this would have no impact on friendly ties with the Soviets.[512]

The cold reception of the senior Turkish delegation in 1937 was revealed years later through the memoirs of Hüseyin Rahmi Apak. As a member of parliament in 1937, the retired colonel and former military attaché in Moscow, Hüseyin Rahmi Apak, accompanied the Interior Minister and General Secretary of the Republican People's Party, Şükrü Kaya, and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras. Apak noted that their delegation was not received with the same warmth by the Russians as was customary until that time.[513] Although they were told by the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara before their departure that Stalin would receive them, this did not happen.

[511] The Turkish Foreign Minister to the Head Chief of Turkish General Staff, TDA, 571-35546-139976-47, 14 August 1939.

[512] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35231-138611-118, 31 October 1937.

[513] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 280.

"Furthermore, certain attitudes were used outside diplomatic courtesy and principles and in a manner inconsistent with diplomatic manners and decency. It is inappropriate to disclose these attitudes and rudeness, which our government did not disclose at the time and which were specifically directed at me. In fact, these attitudes and rude speeches were directed at me, as I was not a civil servant."[514] This occurred despite his being well-known among Russian interlocutors. Apak noted that, on that occasion, the Turkish government's attempt to improve relations was rejected, and this would be repeated once again in two years in 1939, when Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu visited Moscow with similar sincere intentions.[515]

When Mustafa Kemal Paşa's passing away was announced in November 1938, together with other states, the Soviet Union assembled a high-level delegation with military participation. The Soviet delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Commissar General Potemkin, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Yumashev, and the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara Terentiyev, accompanied by four officers and 100 soldiers.[516] The commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was in the British delegation led by Marshall Lord Birdwood, accompanied by 12 officers, 180 soldiers, and a military band.[517] The Soviet destroyer *Moskva* was sent to show respect at the funeral. France, Greece, Germany, Romania, and Britain sent various naval vessels. *HMS Malaya* was deployed to represent Britain. According to Russian sources, the visiting senior Soviet delegation visited Ankara and met İsmet İnönü, who assured them that Turkey would never take part in any front against the Soviet Union and would do everything in its capacity to prevent an attack targeting the Soviet Union and would not let any aggressor to its borders.[518]

---

[514] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 280: "Ayrıca da diplomasi nezaket ve kaideleri dışında ve diplomasi edep ve terbiyelerine sığmayacak surette bazı tarizlerde bulunuldu. Hükümetimizin o zaman ifşa etmediği ve bilhassa benim şahsıma karşı yapılan bu tarizleri ve kabalıkları burada ifşa etmek uygun değildir. Vakıa, bu tarizler ve kaba konuşmalar devlet memuru olmayan bana karşı tevcih edilmişti."

[515] Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 281.

[516] Raşit Metel, *Atatürk ve Donanma* (İstanbul: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 1966), 172.

[517] Metel, *Atatürk ve Donanma*, 173.

[518] Kolesnikov, *Atatürk Dönemi Türk- Rus*, 37.

During this period, the last visit by a major Soviet naval vessel to Turkey was in October 1939. A Soviet destroyer, *Moskva*, brought Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu from very difficult talks in Moscow back to Turkey.[519] Fast changes in the European system made it increasingly clear that Turkey could not achieve a similar understanding from the Soviet Union on the future of the relations. The visit was held on the invitation of the Soviet side, and the Turkish delegation's primary objective was to negotiate the signing of a mutual assistance pact.[520] The German attack on Poland initiated what would be known as World War II. The Soviet forces also entered Poland. Although Turkey continued to frame Soviet affairs as friendly, relations lost their previous friendly nature. In a note to the press, the Turkish Foreign Ministry wanted to dictate to the agencies that *Moskva* brought back the Turkish Foreign Minister from Russia together with two other accompanying vessels and left Turkey after three days of stay on 23 October 1939.[521] The Foreign Ministry also noted that mariners from "the great neighbour state" were welcomed and had the chance to have close contact with their Turkish counterparts and emphasised that this was an opportunity to illustrate the sincerity and strength of Turkish-Soviet friendship and the unshakable commitment of both countries to this friendship.[522] The Turkish Foreign Ministry asked the Turkish Embassy in Moscow in a note on 24 October 1939, to thank the Soviet government for their hospitality and kindness in allocating a warship and an escorting vessel for the Foreign Minister's journey back to Turkey.[523] The Turkish authorities began to wait for signals from the Soviet side regarding their intentions. In a note on 25 December two months after Saracoğlu's arrival from Moscow, Stalin sent a telegram to Ankara, and the Soviet Ambassador rushed a member of his staff to the Foreign Ministry to offer help translating it. This

[519] Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu visited Russia for 23 days between 25 September to 17 October 1939. As per custom, he was hosted well but a visit yielding no result had been irritating for Saraçoğlu taking to instances of losing his temper by the high talking Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. See Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 442-4.

[520] The Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-68140-298449-3, (page 1), 1 January 1939.

[521] The communication notes to the press agent from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35002-138204-10, 24 October 1939.

[522] The communication notes to the press agent from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35002-138204-10, 24 October 1939.

[523] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-35002-138204-19, 24 October 1939.

made Saraçoğlu think that this act might indicate that the Soviets were eager to approach them, as he noted in a message to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow.[524] In essence, the nature of relations had already taken an entirely different turn by then, as portrayed by the lack of a proper military attaché by the Soviets in Ankara. From that moment on, everything changed, and there was a long pause for almost four decades during the Cold War years. The first-ever Soviet naval fleet visit could only happen in November 1978 with *the Dzerzhinsky* cruiser and *Reshitelny* destroyer from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, with the commander of the fleet, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Khovrin, visiting İstanbul.[525]

Gradual changes in the political domain have impacted the military. This developed gradually and did not become obvious or visible until the end of the period, according to the functioning principles of a bureaucratic institution. Working-level relationships were impeded, as seen in the absence of a Soviet military attaché in Ankara for more than two years and the way Turkey and its army were mentioned in internal Red Army ideological training. Despite this, cordial exchanges continued until the end of the period. The usual rhetoric was maintained, but by deciding not to appoint a military attaché to Ankara, the Red Army and the Soviets tried to make a point as they perceived the ever-growing closeness of Turkey's relations with Britain toward the end of the interwar period.

The Montreux Conference of 1936 was a milestone from the Soviet perspective, as the Soviet authorities expressed concern over Turkey's close working relations with Britain and expressed their discontent with Turkey's behaviour, which they believed complicated their dispute with Britain. They also noted that Turkey conducted very lively behind-the-scenes negotiations with the British side.[526]

---

[524] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-35040-138306-1, 25 December 1939, 2.

[525] *Cumhuriyet*, 18 November 1978 and Topçuoğlu, *Savaş ve Dostluk*, 7.

[526] Минц и. И., Панкратова А. М., Помёмкин В. П., Тарле Е. В., Колчнановский Н. П., *История Дипломатии (1919-1939 гг) Том Третий* [Diplomatic History (1919-1939) Volume Three] (Moscow: Государственное Издательство Политической Литературы, 1945), 570 and Alexandrov, *A Contemporary World History*, 65, 409-11.

4.2. Military Cooperation

In the interwar period, military bureaucracies on both sides entered into military cooperation, which was transactional in essence, meaning that this did not require heavy investment or the creation of new complicated mechanisms. This was a way of addressing emerging ad hoc issues that would provide benefits to both, as well as signalling goodwill that would contribute to the strengthening of trust between the two.

As was the case in the area of military diplomacy given in detail in the first part of this chapter, in the interwar period, as two outcasts in the European security architecture, both relied on each other in extending military cooperation to the other, and the cooperation between the two had always been affected by their interaction with third parties. They assessed cooperation by factoring in the perspectives of third parties, particularly Western powers, especially Britain. Similarly, changes in general European political relations and bilateral relations affected this cooperation, making it gradually more challenging and even disappearing entirely by the end of the period and beyond.

Military cooperation between Turkey and the Soviet Union is examined through two cases that are not directly connected to each other but are important in illustrating how two outcasts tried to pursue wider goals against imperial powers with limited resources, which was especially true in Turkey's case. These include Turkey's engagement with the Soviet Union to offer military assistance to the King of Afghanistan and visits to attend military courses and the deployment of Soviet specialists for civil aviation training activities. As these relations occurred in peacetime, the foreign ministries and diplomatic corps of both countries took the lead in managing cooperation between the two military bureaucracies.

4.2.1. The Turkish Military Mission in Afghanistan

The Turkish Republic was determined to develop its relationship with the Kingdom of Afghanistan, which was almost three thousand kilometres away. In the early days

of the War of Independence, political connections between the two had already been established. After 1923, Mustafa Kemal Paşa established personal relations with King Amanullah Khan and invited him to Ankara. The king's visit in 1928 was the first visit by a head of state to Turkey's new capital, Ankara. There was a huge discrepancy in Turkey's willingness to establish ties with Afghanistan, serve as a model for it, and enable the latter to develop capabilities to survive in the international political competition with Turkey's limited capabilities. Despite lacking the necessary resources, Turkey developed ways to reach out and project its influence. In most instances, this was possible through facilitation by the Soviet Union.

Technically, in this period, practically most of the time, the route to Afghanistan was through the territory of Soviet Union. Other routes were either impractical or undesirable for security concerns: route via Egypt-India due to British control or via Iran for personal security reasons. The only viable option was through the north, the Black Sea, and the Soviet Union. However, in extreme cases, the Turkish Embassy in Afghanistan sought permission for other routes in times of emergency, particularly through India, by obtaining an agreement from the British authorities. Not only did the Soviet Union facilitate Turkish access to Afghanistan, but the first treaty between Ankara and Kabul was also signed on Soviet territory. The Turkish- Afghan Cooperation Agreement was signed in Moscow in March 1921. This was the second bilateral agreement signed by the Ankara government during the War of Independence, contributing to their desire for international recognition. At that time, a Turkish delegation was in Moscow negotiating a Turkish-Soviet agreement with a delegation from Afghanistan that was working on an agreement with the Bolsheviks. Both used this opportunity to have a quick bilateral agreement, which enhanced the reputation of the Ankara Government.[527] The practicality of Moscow from logistical purposes remained in the following years as both Turkey and Afghanistan had similar threat perceptions against imperial powers and were wary of the British subversion and intervention in their affairs and in the wider region, as reflected in a cartoon from the Turkish satirical journal *Karagöz* showing jealousy of their

[527] Bilal N. Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afganistan* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2019), 53-4.

neighbours witnessing the Turkish-Russian friendship. The English on top left complains that, to his amazement, they really became friends. *Karagöz*, one of the main characters in Turkish folk shadow theatre on the bottom left, advises that when they got other Asian nations on their side, the environment would not be suitable for Western powers to continue subversive activities in the region (Figure 4.10).



Figure 4.10. A cartoon from Turkish satirical journal *Karagöz*.

Source: *Karagöz*, 17 October 1926.

In 1928, King Amanullah Khan decided to visit Turkey as part of his long tour of European countries and the Soviet Union. Mustafa Kemal Paşa tasked a very senior Turkish general Fahrettin Paşa to meet him at Sevastopol in the Soviet Union and escort him and his wife Queen Soraya to Turkey.[528] Lieutenant General Naci Paşa (Eldeniz) and his wife were also tasked with accompanying them. The Turkish delegation was greeted with a military ceremony at the Port of Sevastopol, and a big dinner was organised by the Red Army in the evening. In their farewell, Soviet ships and 38 Soviet planes escorted them.[529] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Ministry of National Defence to receive the Russian military delegation accompanying the King.[530] Necessary budgetary arrangements were made for a

[528] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 411.

[529] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 412.

[530] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish National Defence Ministry, TDA, 500-8148-51629–1, 26 May 1928.

dinner to be held in honour of the Red Army officers and soldiers upon their arrival in İstanbul.[531]

Mustafa Kemal Paşa wanted Afghanistan to have resources and capability to follow a similar model he was trying to implement in Turkey against archaic practices and social, religious structures. Therefore, he offered to send Turkish civilian and military bureaucrats to serve Afghan development. Prior to the king's visit, Turkey had already deployed key staff to assist the Afghan government. Their numbers increased after further agreements were signed during the king's visit in 1928. The most prominent early deployment was Turkish diplomat Cevat Açıkalın's secondment to the Afghan Foreign Ministry in May 1926 as a legal adviser.[532] Cavalry Captain İbrahim Azmi Bey was deployed to Afghanistan in 1926. He returned to Turkey in February 1929 because of health problems (Figure 4.11). In his memoirs Fahrettin Paşa wrote that Prime Minister İsmet Paşa offered him to serve as the Head of Chief of Staff of Afghan General Staff, but Fahrettin Paşa turned this down due to his health issues.[533] To reflect the importance Mustafa Kemal Paşa attached to Afghanistan, he appointed his Presidential General Secretary Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur) as the Turkish ambassador to Kabul in 1928.[534]

During the king's visit in May 1928, an agreement was signed between the two countries. The agreement was signed by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey and the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Ghulam Siddiq Han. This was similar to the one signed in 1921. In the 1921 agreement, the Ankara Government pledged to send teachers and officers to Afghanistan.[535] In the 1928 agreement, Ankara committed once again to providing specialists for the development of Afghanistan's national education and army, and both countries agreed to arrange specialised agreements

[531] TDA, 500-8148-51630-1, 27 May 1928.

[532] Yücel Güçlü, *The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın* (Ankara: Grafiker, 2002), 28.

[533] Altay, *On Yıl Savaş*, 411.

[534] Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 322.

[535] İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları 1920-1945* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 26.

later to determine the details and practicalities of this cooperation. [536] Mustafa Kemal Paşa emphasised the importance of a strong and a reliable army to the king.[537]



Figure 4. 11. King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan. Postcard sent to Turkey dated 27 June 1927 with a note behind from Azmi Bey to his daughter Belkıs Hanım.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Turkey pledged to form an Afghan General Staff modelled on the Turkish one and assigned the Head of Chief of Staff and staff for the General Staff. All heads of staff for the established army corps would be officers from these officers.[538] Kazım Paşa (Orbay) was appointed as the Head of Chief of Staff of Afghanistan and he was also the head of the Turkish contingent deployed to Afghanistan.[539] At the time of his appointment, he was the deputy head of the Turkish General Staff, carrying the rank of lieutenant general.[540] By mid-August, the military agreement was signed after the

[536] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal*, 339.

[537] Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afganistan*, 211.

[538] The instructions for the Turkish military delegation to be dispatched to Afghanistan, TDA, 500-8245-54739–3, 1 January1928.

[539] This agreement signed by the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Ankara, TDA, 500-8245-54734-1, 7 October 1928.

[540] In January 1944, Kazım Orbay became the Head of Chief of Staff after long time holder of this position Marshal Çakmak.

necessary amendments were made.[541] It was finalised as "The Agreement regarding the employment of a Turkish military commission in order to reorganise the Afghan Army" on 4 October 1928.[542]

The king's reforms created tensions within Afghan society, leading to sporadic uprisings in various parts of Afghanistan by Autumn 1928. Turkish Ambassador Yusuf Hikmet Bey noted that Mustafa Kemal Paşa had urged caution in implementing reforms when the king was in Turkey, but the king took far more ambitious steps. Moreover, despite seeming to follow the advice of establishing a strong army, he became suspicious and hesitated, undermining the success of a strong Turkish contingent sent to Afghanistan.[543] Due to the difficulties in communication, the news and the details of the uprisings reached Ankara late. By November 1928, a major disturbance began threatening Kabul. On 17 November, the Turkish ambassador in Kabul informed Ankara that the newspapers in India had been reporting signs of uprisings in Afghanistan for three weeks, and events began 15-20 days after these publications. Events in September also began several weeks after their reporting.[544] He asked that telegrams be sent not through India but through Russian wireless from that moment on.[545]

The Turkish Ambassador asked Ankara to deploy Kazım Paşa as soon as possible to take measures against the perceived British military activities.[546] He asked Ankara to instruct him not to get in touch with the Embassy in Kabul upon their arrival.[547] He

[541] The instructions for the Turkish military delegation to be dispatched to Afghanistan, TDA, 500-8245-54739–3, 1 January1928. and the Turkish Foreign Ministry's notes on amendments to the military agreement between Turkey and Afghanistan, TDA, 500- 8245-54734-6, 15 September 1928.

[542] Gündüz Ökçün, *A Guide to Turkish Treaties 1920-1964* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966), 219.

[543] Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afganistan*, 210-12.

[544] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55233-1, 17 November 1928.

[545] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55233-1, 17 November 1928.

[546] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54735-1, 6 October 1928.

[547] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54719-27, 18 October 1928.

offered advice on the route that he could travel to Kabul.[548] The Ambassador continuously pressed Ankara for his immediate dispatch as he believed that those provoking events were trying to do so before he could arrive, and the king continued to remain hesitant to take military action against the rebels.[549] On 20 November, he asked Ankara for instructions on whether the Turkish military contingent would take action against the rebels.[550] Soviet planes were active against rebels on the side of the king's army, conducting reconnaissance missions and sometimes launching attacks against them.[551] After an urgent government meeting in Ankara on 21 November 1928, Mustafa Kemal Paşa's instructions were relayed to the Ambassador, asking Turkish officers to stand by the king as if they were defending their homeland.[552] There was limited manpower under the command of Turkish officers, and the Ambassador noted that they had 400 people under command, including cadets, and would need at least three months to form a division using this group as a core, provided that other factors go on course, such as challenges in command structure, corruption, and desertion.[553] However, the king was more inclined to use other tribes that did not take part in the uprisings against the rebels and was in favour of using these irregular forces rather than the regular army.[554] In his meeting with the king, the Turkish Ambassador insisted on using the 23 Turkish commanders with the soldiers that could be mustered as well as new guns obtained from Italy, but the king was not interested and basically dragged his feet on resorting to this

[548] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54719-25, 27 October 1928.

[549] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54729-1, 22 November 1928.

[550] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54730-3, 20 November 1928.

[551] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55231-1, 20 November 1928.

[552] The Turkish Prime Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Kabul, TDA, 500-8245-54730-1, 22 November 1928 and, Letter from Mustafa Kemal Paşa to Amanullah Khan via Turkish Embassy in Kabul, TDA, 500/ 8245-54730-2, 22 November 1928.

[553] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54727-1, 24 October 1928.

[554] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54728–1, 24 November 1928.

option.[555] However, the Ambassador informed Ankara that if the king was persuaded, there would still be a chance to save Afghanistan. He also relayed intelligence about British Colonel Lawrence leading the rebels as the British were trying to dispatch him to Afghanistan from India.[556] The Ambassador noted that Lawrence wanted to get a visa from Karachi under disguise but failed to come to Afghanistan.[557] The Ambassador noted that the British used several groups in Afghanistan for subversion and triggered disturbances before the arrival of Kazım Paşa, as there would be no match to him in the area.[558] He asked for his immediate arrival but strongly advised against using the route through India and not considering using a disguise as he would be executed in India.[559] He advised Ankara to send him by sea to Batumi and then by plane in coordination with the Soviets and asked once again that telegrams not be sent via India.[560] The Ambassador informed Afghans about Colonel Lawrence, but he wrote to Ankara that the king failed to understand the essence of his involvement, which was also separately confirmed by a Turkish officer.[561]

On 25 November 1928, Kazım Paşa wrote to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the delegation would depart İstanbul via ferry to Egypt, and through Bombay, they were planning to arrive in Kabul on 26 December.[562] On 25 November the king wrote to Mustafa Kemal Paşa stating that everything was under control and that the rebels

[555] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54728–1, 24 November 1928.

[556] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54726-1, 25 November 1928.

[557] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54726-1, 25 November 1928.

[558] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54726-1, 25 November 1928.

[559] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54726-1, 25 November 1928.

[560] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54726-1, 25 November 1928.

[561] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54724-1, 25 November 1928.

[562] Kazım Paşa to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54719-11, 25 November 1928.

belonged to a tribe that was not of grave concern. He stated that he would take measures against them and would resort to military force if needed.[563] Despite the Ambassador's clear warnings regarding Kazım Paşa's route to Afghanistan, the Turkish Foreign Ministry noted that Kazım Paşa left on 2 December and was travelling with the knowledge of India and certainly with the Government of Britain, and this could not be changed.[564] The Ambassador continued to warn Ankara about Colonel Lawrence's activities and warned against any telegrams coming from the previously trusted Afghan figure, the Foreign Minister, Gulam Siddiq Han, who was sending telegrams via India.[565] He shared this concern with the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, who told him that he would not give Colonel Lawrence much chance of success in Afghanistan and added that Kazım Paşa's arrival might contribute to the situation. They continued to provide weapons to Afghanistan for use against the rebels.[566]

Colonel Lawrence, Thomas Edward Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia), played a prominent role in the Turkish Ambassador's reports. He was posted to the Miranshah Fort in Waziristan on the Afghan frontier in June 1928.[567] There is some evidence that he had some intelligence activity during his stay there.[568] However, there was no conclusive account of his activities in response to the hyped press rumours. The works on him noted that he was posted there because he was not getting along well with his superiors, and he arranged his deployment to a distant land where he was merely doing clerical work, typewriting official letters and orders, and had always stayed inside the barracks.[569] Unlike his experience in Arabia, he did not own any

[563] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54724–2, 25 November 1928.

[564] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Kabul, TDA, 500-8245-54722-1, 28 November 1928.

[565] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55220-1, 6 December 1928.

[566] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55220-2, 4 December 1928.

[567] Richard Aldington, *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry* (London: Collins, 1955), 369.

[568] Aldington, *Lawrence of Arabia*, 343.

[569] Aldington, *Lawrence of Arabia*, 369-70.

master espionage accomplishments later on, but the Turkish Ambassador, Turkish officers on the ground, and the Soviet Ambassador were thinking differently and were urging caution.[570] In contrast, the British Ambassador in Kabul was busy. He claimed that the king was unwilling to take any action against the rebels and was believed to be advised by the Turkish and Soviet Ambassadors to fight to the bitter end and continue imposing his reforms after defeating the rebels, but this would be fatal from his perspective.[571] He met the king and told him that he had alienated all segments of the population and that he needed to spend effort to reconcile tribal leaders and localise the uprising to avoid its spreading to other areas.[572] Following this, according to a senior British diplomat, Fraser-Tytler, who was present in Afghanistan during this period, the king sent Foreign Minister Gulam Siddiq Han to Jalalabad to parley with the rebels and arrange a settlement.[573] The British Ambassador also warned the king that the bombing of Afghans by Russian planes could only stiffen resistance and throw additional odium on him.[574] From the British perspective, the events were the result of the king's own incompetence and his ambitious desire to imitate the West and other countries that had successfully reformed, such as Turkey and Persia. His recent tour abroad and the country was unusually quiet despite there being an undercurrent of uneasy expectancy, which was an indication of the calm before the storm, as it was so unnatural and ominous in that normally restless country.[575]

In the face of increasing disturbances in Kabul, the Turkish Embassy sought ways to evacuate Turkish citizens. The ambassador asked Ankara to get in touch with the

[570] In his three-volume work on the History of India, which he wrote afterwards during the beginning of the Cold War (in 1950), then Turkish Ambassador Yusuf Hikmet Bayur allocated a section for Afghanistan. He did not mention about Colonel Lawrence and expresses his views about Britain in a softened version while expressed views about Russia in a much shorter and altered version. See Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), vol. 3, 594-606. His Cold War account differed from his correspondence during the events of 1928.

[571] William Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 214.

[572] Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, 214.

[573] Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, 214.

[574] Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, 214.

[575] Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, 210-11.

Soviet Union to use Russian planes for this purpose.[576] The Turkish Foreign Ministry notified the Embassy in Kabul that the Turkish request for help from the Soviet Foreign Ministry was accepted, and the necessary instructions were passed to the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, informing them that Soviet planes could be used for this evacuation.[577] Meanwhile, the Turkish Ambassador was in despair because of the king's inaction. He wrote to Ankara that the king would not take action and would not consider using Kazım Paşa in real terms, as Afghanistan was not a real state but a union of tribes, and the king wanted the continuation of this.[578] Yusuf Hikmet Bey further claimed that the current difficulties were caused by the king's desire to imitate Turkey as a modern state and form an army under Kazım Paşa and this triggered counter reaction and Britain tasked Colonel Lawrence to create these troubles according to intelligence he received.[579] The Turkish delegation arrived in India, and Ankara then tried to seek British approval for them to stay in Bombay and get a safe passage to Kandahar in Afghanistan.

In mid-December 1928, communication with Kabul was completely lost. Ankara requested the Turkish Embassy in Moscow to get information about Afghanistan from the Soviet Foreign Ministry.[580] Increased clashes in Kabul forced Yusuf Hikmet Bey to destroy the sensitive documents at the Embassy.[581] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul used the telegram network via Odessa to reach Ankara or sent these by Russian planes to Tashkent to be sent from there.[582] By the end of December 1928,

[576] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55213-3, 21 November 1928.

[577] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Kabul, TDA, 500-8125-55204-1, 30 December 1928.

[578] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55219-1, 7 December 1928.

[579] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55219-1, 7 December 1928.

[580] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 500-8125-55216-6, 15 December 1928.

[581] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55217-2, 14 December 1928.

[582] See for example, the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry via Odessa, TDA, 500-8215-53420–13, 26 December 1926 and the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry via Odessa via Tashkent, TDA, 500-8125-55212-1, 23 December 1928.

the Turkish Embassy was still active in Kabul, not seeing any immediate push to evacuate Kabul, but noted that their instruction was to follow the king, and they would follow him.[583] The Soviet Union declared that they would follow a similar course of action, extend all support to the king, and would leave only if he left Kabul.[584] The irregular groups were approaching Kabul, and all embassies were preparing for evacuation. The British Embassy accepted the evacuation of Turkish women and children to India.[585] The Turkish Ambassador informed Ankara that there were in total 66 people.[586] The rebels had a particular hatred of the Turkish Embassy. In a note from the Turkish Embassy in London to the Foreign Ministry, a Turkish officer wrote that he met the Foreign Office Permanent Secretary, who told him that they perceived no threat to foreigners, not for their Embassy, but he knew the rebels were particularly hostile to the Turkish Embassy as they perceived the Turkish role in the encouragement of reforms in Islam.[587]

From the Soviet perspective, the British created these events. After meeting with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karakhan, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Vasıf Çınar, wrote to Ankara that Karakhan believed that the British had planned this much earlier, when the king was touring Europe in early 1928, but could not succeed, and then used his reform trials as a pretext for instigating uprisings.[588] The Turkish military contingent left their families in India and moved to Kandahar by early January 1929. Kazım Paşa together with the Turkish military contingent stayed in

[583] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Tehran, TDA, 500-8125-55190–3, 26 December 1928.

[584] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55216–3, 18 December 1928.

[585] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8215-53420-16, 25 December 1928.

[586] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55213–2, 20 December 1928.

[587] The Turkish Embassy in London to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55203-3, 17 December 1928. The Turkish Ambassador in Kabul had already informed his similar assessment to Ankara when the events had begun. See the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55213-3, 21 November 1928 and the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54729-1, 22 November 1928.

[588] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8125-55216–4, 17 December 1928.

Kandahar and the Afghan government was wary of inviting him to Kabul fearing of more rebel reaction.[589] However, after waiting, they departed for Kabul and arrived on 11 January. Informing Ankara about the arrival of Kazım Paşa and his entourage, Yusuf Hikmet Bey wrote to Ankara that during their time in India, British officers tried to persuade them not to leave for Afghanistan, painting a very dark picture by using lies attributed to the government and to Yusuf Hikmet himself.[590] The military mission could not find an opportunity to take any action, and after several months of waiting, they departed from Afghanistan. The Turkish Foreign Ministry instructed them to travel to Moscow via Soviet planes.[591] Kazım Paşa left on 10 April 1929.[592]They travelled to Moscow and after a short stay there, arrived in İstanbul on 28 April 1929.[593]

Throughout the entire period, Turkish Embassies in Kabul and in Moscow, and the Foreign Ministry in Ankara coordinated with their Soviet counterparts for the Turkish military mission in Afghanistan and benefited from Soviet military capabilities for the Turkish military and diplomatic missions. They shared the same assessment regarding the events. Like Turkey, the Soviet Union regarded the rebellion as instigated by the British using reactionary forces with an archaic mentality.[594]

Turkey developed its own policy priorities regarding Afghanistan and aimed to implement them relying on its own plans, manpower, and capabilities. However, Turkey lacked the necessary tools and means to project its influence, and the odds became higher in times of turbulence in this distant area. Therefore, the Soviet Union

[589] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54715-2, 8 January 1929.

[590] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54711-1, 12 January 1929.

[591] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54701-1, 4 March 1929.

[592] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 500-8245-54696-2, 10 April 1929.

[593] The Turkish Ministry to Turkish General Staff, TDA, 500-8245-54695-1, 24 April 1929.

[594] Alexandrov, *Contemporary World History*, 395.

was the rational party to coordinate some actions as they shared similar assessments regarding third-party outsider subversive influence in the affairs of Afghanistan. Turkey benefitted from Soviet support in ensuring the safety of its military delegation. The overall nature of engagement was in conformity with the overall Turkish-Soviet relations of the interwar years. Both military bureaucracies, with the support of their foreign affairs bureaucracies, reacted effectively to a major developing crisis and cooperated without needing complicated talks or mechanisms.

4.2.2. The Cooperation in the Field of Aviation

Fast-paced developments in aviation technology and the industry in the 1920s and the 1930s were enthusiastically watched all over the world. While in some places it was perceived from civilian or sporting perspectives, its potential for military purposes was attractive to military bureaucracies concentrating on this aspect. For example, in the Soviet Union, aviation and its various applications were seen primarily from a military perspective. Turkey was also appreciative of the military uses and shared a similar understanding with the Soviets. Turkey had been engaged with all major European countries and with the USA in aviation since 1923 achieving partial progress and success with these. Once it developed its own aviation capabilities, the Soviets emerged as the only actor willing to share their expertise in aviation with Turkey.

Aviation capabilities were seen as essential, and extending these specialised skills, which would be valuable transferable skills in the defence of the homeland, to the masses in their societies was desired. This new technology, requiring know-how and high investment, could only be achieved under state sponsorship with support from the people. In 1925, the Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti (Turkish Aeroplane Association) was established, which changed its name to the Türk Hava Kurumu (Turkish Aeronautical Association) in 1935. From the onset, one of the most important missions of the association was to increase the number of people and equipment to be utilised in the country's defense.[595] In 1935, the official journal of Türkkuşu (Turkish civil aviation flight school) noted that the world armament was going at full

[595] Oktay Verel, ed., *İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir* (İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları, 1985), 19.

speed, and all countries were trying hard to build planes and train pilots. Therefore, Turkey should work to develop aviation and have 1,000 planes and 10,000 pilots.[596] In terms of skills, learning to use parachutes, gliders, and constructing model planes were the main areas to be introduced to enthusiastic youth willing to become professional aviators (Figure 4.12). This covered the entire human resource of the country, including women, as observed widely in the Soviet Union (Figure 4.13). The Soviet Union developed means to excel in these areas. Turkey could follow the Soviet experience. During this period, the basic belief was that modelling would spark interest in aviation among the public and those modellers, if they decided to continue, through using gliders and then having the ability to make parachute jumps, would be trained as pilots, who would eventually be utilised as pilots and aviators for the defence of the country. The widely held perception was that every modern nation believed air superiority would bring superiority in war and would end a war.[597] In a compilation of poems printed for the Türkkuşu library in *Gökler ve Gökmenler İçin* (For the Skies and Pilots), İhsan Bekir wrote in his poem "Beni Dinle" (Listen to Me) about this new threat from the sky and the need to counter it.[598] Authorities were trying to get the attention of society and youth, in particular.



Figure 4.12. The parachute activities in Ankara, Turkey in the 1930s.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[596] *Havacılık ve Spor, Türk Havacılık Cemiyetinin Örgenidir*, Türkkuşu Sayısı, 142-43 (15 May 1935): 2322.

[597] "Türk Kuşu'nu açarken Büyük Yönderin Sövlevi," *Havacılık ve Spor, Türk Havacılık Cemiyetinin Örgenidir*, Türkkuşu Sayısı, 142-43 (15 May 1935): 2322.

[598] *Gökler ve Gökmenler İçin*, Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No 7 (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1937), 15.



Figure 4.13. A woman with a model plane. Photo from 1937.

Source: From the author's private collection.

The establishment of a dedicated civilian flight school without creating pressure on the military aviation budget occurred only in 1935. In this venture, Soviet assistance proved to be very effective. In 1935, the Soviet Union sent two specialists to train Turkish civilians at the newly founded Turkish civil aviation flight school, Türkkuşu. These two, Sergey Nikolayevich Anokhin and Misha Romanov were the first parachute instructors in Turkey.[599] Anokhin was a record-breaking glider pilot and a very successful parachuter and test pilot. Between 1935-1940, he taught at Türkkuşu and was called back to the Soviet Union during World War II to command a glider squadron as part of the airborne troops.[600] Romanov returned after two years and was replaced by another instructor B. Gavrish.[601] Through their activities, the foundation of airborne troops and parachuting as a sport was laid in Turkey. The first parachute jumpers in these trainings were Yıldız Uçman and Abdurrahman Türkkuşu.[602] Before them, there had been a very limited number of jumps. According to records, the first

[599] Burhan Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar," in *İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir*, ed. Oktay Verel (İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları, 1985), 717.

[600] "Родился заслуженный лётчик-испытатель СССР, Герой Советского Союза Сергей Николаевич Анохин", Президентская библиотека, https://www.prlib.ru/history/619135, and "Анохин Сергей Николаевич", герои страны, https://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=418, accessed on 16 August 2024.

[601] *Ulus*, 6 September 1938.

[602] Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar," 717.

jump in Turkey was trialled during the military operation in Ağrı in 1930 without any proper training, resulting in the death of the jumper due to an accident.[603] The training conducted by the two Soviet experts proved successful and continued until their departure from Turkey.[604] News about Türkkuşu activities and interviews with those receiving training were published in newspapers to encourage new enthusiasts.[605] For example, Yıldız Uçman shared her experience with the Soviet instructor Anokhin and her ambitions in aviation.[606] In official publications, the professionalism and talent of Soviet instructors were praised.[607]

The first trials of using gliders began in 1931, but achieved a new level with the opening of Türkkuşu with the Soviet experts in 1935.[608] During the opening day ceremonies of Türkkuşu in Ankara on 3 May 1935, these specialists displayed a show with a glider (Figure 4.14) and also showed the use of controls for one to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Figure 4.15). In his speech, President Atatürk thanked the friendly Russian Soviet government and its ambassador Karakhan for extending help to Turkey to accomplish this important task.[609] Prime Minister İnönü said that Soviet experts would act as guides and instructors in the functioning of this institution, and that the high level of achievement of Soviet aviation was appreciated by the whole world, and Türkkuşu would greatly benefit from working with the Soviet experts.[610]

---

[603] Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar," 718.

[604] After World War II, then the general manager of Türkkuşu, Burhan Göksel tried to trace down these two experts while he was on an official visit to Moscow in 1956. He learnt that Romanov was shot down during the war. Anokhin was alive but had lost one eye and served as a test pilot. Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar," 719.

[605] *Ulus,* 14 May 1936, *Servetifünunun (Uyanış),* 28 May 1936 and *Ulus,* 25 June 1937.

[606] *Son Posta,* 26 March 1936 and *Kurun,* 27 March 1936.

[607] Server Ziya Gürev, *Göklerin Kızı*, Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.6 (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1937), 44.

[608] Fikret Arıt, "Planörcülükte Biz de Varız Türkiye'de İlk Planör Çalışmaları," in *İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir*, ed. Oktay Verel (İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları, 1985), 793.

[609] "Türk Kuşu'nu açarken Büyük Yönderin Sövlevi," 2300.

[610] "İsmet İnönünün Sövlevi," *Havacılık ve Spor, Türk Havacılık Cemiyetinin Örgenidir*, Türkkuşu Sayısı, 142-43 (15 May 1935): 2302.



Figure 4.14. President Atatürk with Soviet Ambassador Karakhan and the Soviet pilots, Anokhin and Romanov on the opening day of Türkkuşu in Ankara on 3 May 1935. Fuad Bulca, the head of the Turkish Aeronautical Association, is on the right.

Source: *Havacılık ve Spor, Türk Havacılık Cemiyetinin Örgenidir*, Türkkuşu Sayısı,142-43 (15 May 1935): 2310.



Figure 4.15. The Soviet pilot Anokhin describing glider controls to President Atatürk.

Source: *Havacılık ve Spor, Türk Havacılık Cemiyetinin Örgenidir*, Türkkuşu Sayısı,142-43 (15 May 1935): back cover. See Server Ziya Gürev, *Göklerin Kızı*, Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.6 (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1937), 35 for the account of this inspirational moment for youth.

Soviet instructors trained Turkish students and presented them with certificates. For further training, a select group of students was sent to a professional school in the Soviet Union. In July 1935, the first group of Turkish civilians, including Sabiha

Gökçen, Atatürk's adopted daughter and Turkey's first female military pilot, was sent to the Soviet Union for training.[611] These students received their A-type and B-type glider badges in Turkey from Soviet instructors but to receive C-type badges, they were sent to specialised glider school in Crimea, run by Osoaviakhim. Gökçen and seven others travelled to Köktebel in Crimea (now Planerskoye) in July 1935.[612] The Turkish group received glider training there. Gökçen could not proceed with her motor plane training in Moscow because of her sister's death.[613] She visited the Moscow Central Aero Club and returned to Turkey.[614] The group received training for six months and became trained instructors.[615] After her training in the Soviet Union, Gökçen received motor plane training in Turkey.[616] She was transferred to military service, served as a combat fighter pilot, and attended a military operation shortly thereafter in 1937 in Dersim.[617]

Trials with planes and the use of parachutes continued in these early days (Figure 4.16). While the Turkish group was receiving their training, Türkkuşu officials, together with Anokhin, were looking for suitable areas for glider flights in the Marmara region in Istanbul, Yalova, and Bursa.[618] In February 1936, two gliders flew from Ankara to Eskişehir, travelling 225 km, setting the first record in Turkey by pilots trained in the Soviet Union, including Sabiha Gökçen.[619] The gliders were pulled by two planes commanded by Turkish aviator Vehici Hürkuş and Anokhin.[620]

---

[611] Mustafa Kılıç, *Türkkuşu, Yeniden Uçabilecek mi?* (Ankara: Sonçağ, 2022), 21.

[612] Sabiha Gökçen, *Atatürk'le Bir Ömür* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1994), 98-99.

[613] Gökçen, *Atatürk'le Bir Ömür*, 104.

[614] Koritskiy, *Yeni Rusya ve Yeni Türkiye*, 8.

[615] Semra Pervane, "Türk Göklerinin Ölümsüz Yıldızı Atatürk'ün Gözbebeği Sabiha Gökçen," in *İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir*, ed. Oktay Verel (İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları, 1985), 882.

[616] Pervane, "Türk Göklerinin Ölümsüz Yıldızı Atatürk'ün Gözbebeği Sabiha Gökçen," 882.

[617] Gökçen, *Atatürk'le Bir Ömür*, 119-26.

[618] *Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1935 and *Tan*, 18 July 1935.

[619] *Akşam*, 17 February 1936.

[620] *Akşam*, 17 February 1936.



Figure 4.16. Early trials with planes and parachutes in the 1930s in Turkey.

Source: From the author's private collection.

In creating its first library of publications to be offered to the public, Türkkuşu had to benefit from translations made from books and manuals of other countries. Here again, Türkkuşu largely benefited from those printed in the Soviet Union. These materials, translated from Russian, were used to produce the initial library of Türkkuşu in their training of the masses. Three books on the use of gliders and parachutes have been published. These were *Planörle Uçuş Dersleri* (Glider Flying Lessons) in 1935, *Ameli ve Fenni Planörcülük* (Practical and Technical Gliding) in 1935, and *Paraşütçülük* (Parachuting) in 1936, which were translated from Russian and printed to be distributed to libraries and individuals.[621] On the least expensive side, the introduction to aviation was designed to be through building model planes. One of the slogans of the period was "Little Modeller of the Day, is the Great Aviator of Tomorrow"[622] (Figure 4.17). Similar to Türkkuşu, private initiatives tried to inject knowledge and skill of aviation through wooden flying models by providing catalogues, plans, and materials to build a model plane. This method was successfully employed in the Soviet Union for the introduction of aviation.

[621] V. S. Vasyanin and V. G. Borodin, *Planörle Uçuş Dersleri,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.3 (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935); M. Zabelin, *Paraşütçülük,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No 4 (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1936) and A. M. Mozanof, S. İ. Stoliçki and O. K. Antonof, *İlmi ve Fenni Planörcülük,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.5 (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935). In the eve of World War II, by 1938, Türkkuşu published 11 books including these three titles mentioned here from Russian. Five titles were translations from German and three of them, poems and theatre acts were by Turkish authors.

[622] *Türk Model Uçakevi Katalog No.-101* (İstanbul: Türk Model Uçakevi, 1938), 9. Kartal uçakları was the brand of this İstanbul based company. Some other slogans were "Yurt Havadan Korunur" (Homeland is protected from the sky), "Model Uçak Model Genç Hazırlar" (Model planes prepare the model youth), "Bugün Model Uçak Yap, Yarın Hakiki Uçak Yaparsın" (Build a model plane today, you will build a real plane tomorrow).



Figure 4.17. Photograph from a model exhibition with two boys examining model planes in 1929.

Source: From the author's private collection.

4.3. Conclusion

Military bureaucracies contribute to their country's overall foreign policy objectives without engaging in combat, through military diplomacy, and military cooperation is an essential component of this activity. Military diplomacy between Turkey and the Soviet Union began during the Turkish War of Independence. Turkish leaders tried to engage the Soviets as they embarked on their quest. In reaching out to each other, the first contacts were initiated by military figures during the wartime period, and both states preferred to assign ambassadors with military backgrounds. The understanding at the strategic level had to be worked out carefully at the operational and tactical levels to enable taking tangible steps in developing relationships amid deep suspicions between the two sides, who knew very little about each other. In addition, propaganda disseminated by the victors of World War I further increased feelings of mistrust and suspicion about the intentions of the Turkish national movement and the Bolsheviks. To overcome this and to proceed faster in setting up working relationships, both sides relied on military figures symbolising the importance attached to these characters by their respective administrations.

Both parties employed military diplomacy when the armies were on war footing from 1919 to the end of 1923 and afterwards when they transitioned to peacetime period, up until the beginning of World War II. One major expected outcome of military diplomacy was to demonstrate to others the level of engagement between the two countries. In particular, both used military diplomacy, factoring in their expectations to affect their bilateral relations with Britain during the period concerned. Military diplomacy between Turkey and the Soviet Union from the initial establishment of contact before the War of Independence to the eve of World War II served three main purposes. First, it facilitated the establishment of working relationships between the two military bureaucracies based on professionalism and mutual trust. This has contributed to the continuation of successful overall relationships in politics and other areas. Second, it created channels and opportunities to understand each other, enabling officers to see capabilities and capacities as well as getting to know their counterparts individually. Third, it served to signal other international actors that they were in a sound cooperative military relationship. Military relations formed the largest part of the relations between the two countries, and military bureaucracy contributed greatly to the achievement of Turkey's overall foreign policy objectives in the interwar period.

During the period from 1923 to 1939, both the Turkish Army and the Red Army benefited from an understanding achieved to address their transactional and immediate needs, creating an atmosphere of trust and acceptable levels of cooperation, relying on each other as two outcasts in the European security architecture. In military cooperation, attention was given to acts that required neither heavy investment nor the creation of complicated mechanisms. Foreign ministries and ambassadors played a leading role in facilitating cooperation between the Turkish Army and the Red Army. In the peacetime period from 1923 onwards, both benefited from these transactional acts, which had the effect of gestures, and this cooperation eased the way to continue their relationship. Turkey managed to benefit from Soviet assistance as it pursued its policy in a very remote area of Afghanistan with limited capabilities. Another important example of military cooperation was the Soviet influence and assistance in the emergence and development of civil aviation in Turkey. Both countries shared the same vision regarding aviation, as they

perceived this area to have military significance despite its civilian outlook. The skills obtained in aviation were seen as transferable to be utilised during the defence of the homeland when required. Through this military cooperation, Turkey achieved the means to pursue policies that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish due to its limited resources and its failure to be accepted by major European powers, except for the Soviet Union.

By 1936, a gradual change in military relations was observed in line with changes in the international arena. The first signs of the Soviet reaction to its perceived change in Turkey's relations with the Western powers came not from the political or diplomatic domains but from the area of military relations. After late 1936, the Soviet Union did not deploy a military attaché to Ankara. This subtle turn was not felt widely as the friendly nature of the relationship was emphasised, keeping up with the same rhetoric until the early years of World War II. From 1939 onwards, military diplomacy between the two remained limited to the activities of military attachés in their respective capitals under much stricter constraints. The confrontational relationship that ensued left no space for any of the activities observed in the earlier period, especially during the lively 1930s. Resident military attachés and interactions between intelligence officers were the only types of activities during the long Cold War years between the two countries.

CHAPTER 5

ENGAGEMENTS AT THE BORDERS AND BEYOND

Turkey and the Soviet Union shared a land border in the South Caucasus, with Turkey's Artvin, Kars, Bayazıt, and Karaköse facing the Soviet Socialist Republics of Georgia and Armenia. Both countries also shared a maritime border in the Black Sea. The military bureaucracies of the two countries played a leading role in border management in their respective systems. For this reason, both military bureaucracies constantly engaged with each other along these borders and beyond in a larger area of border management. Demarcation of the borders and managing minor incidents along the borders and major incidents developing along the borders and beyond in a larger area occupied the working agendas of these bureaucracies during the interwar period. The tone and level of reaction to potential issues that emerged had largely been shaped by the strategic-level understanding adapted by the leadership of the two countries, which was non-confrontational, cordial and cooperative. Neither side perceived a major threat from the other during this period but had to operate under the existence of potential issues that carried the risk of escalation that would eventually spiral into a major crisis.

5.1. The Turkish and Soviet Armies in the Borderlands

Engagements along the borders constituted a significant part of engagement between the Turkish and Soviet militaries, as border protection was in their remit and was placed under their responsibility. At the working level, for both military bureaucracies, being a neighbour meant daily constant engagement with one another. Both bureaucracies tasked their units with considering not only the linear borderline but also the areas behind these lines. From Turkey's perspective, after the demise of Imperial Russia, the new emerging situation along its borders in the north and east

meant security with the absence of a threat from that direction. Contrary to the sense of insecurity formed after centuries of continuous Russian threat, with the Bolsheviks, this theatre presented the much-needed sense of security for the nationalist forces during the War of Independence. Resources needed for war were allocated to the western and southern fronts against the occupying powers. This was a priceless contribution to the nationalist forces, and no amount of manpower, weapons, or ammunition could theoretically be estimated if there had been a hostile power simultaneously in those theatres. This was appreciated by the senior officer cadre of the Turkish Army. According to the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Aralov, during one of the meetings with the officers, Mustafa Kemal Paşa told them that "Calm in the rear of the front-in the north and east- was completely due to friendship of Soviet Russia and with its generous support without pursuing any interest. These are the sources of our resilience and power".[623]

In this rather challenging and potentially difficult area, with many local and international actors to be taken into consideration, after the Bolshevik Revolution and defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Bolsheviks and the nationalists combined efforts to control this area, engaged in limited joint military operations, and managed to subdue Georgian and Armenian armed units as well as forcing the British military presence to leave the region. Compared to the other borders of Turkey, the Soviet border remained the least troubled until World War II. Turkey had to devote more attention and care to other contested areas but still maintained engagement with the Soviet Union to settle their common border. Both the Turkish and Soviet militaries worked jointly to solve problems at different levels.

One of the most important characteristics of Turkey's land and maritime borders with the Soviet Union was their being drawn and determined between the two neighbouring states without the intervention or imposition of third parties, the imperial powers. This meant that fewer seeds for future confrontation were laid for

[623] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının*, 101: "Cephe gerisinde- kuzeyde ve doğuda- hüküm süren sükunet, tamamıyla Sovyet Rusya'nın dostluğu ile onun hiçbir çıkar gözetmeden cömertçe yardımlarıyla sağlanmıştır. Bunlar da bizim, dayanıklılık ve güç kaynaklarımızdır". "Sükunet" meaning calm according to *New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary* (İstanbul: Redhouse Yayınevi, 1988), 1038.

the two states, and the current settlement reached had taken into consideration previous engagements and, more importantly, natural geographical features. Certainly, this would not mean that all issues were settled, but at least it provided a much more favourable starting point in managing existing or potential issues regarding the movement of people, trade routes, the use of natural resources, or establishing physical security measures.

Within the Turkish system, security responsibility along Turkey's borders was vested in the Turkish Army through its dedicated border troops. These border troops had the task of preventing illegal passages through all areas except for established border gates, which were out of their remit, and continuously monitoring the other side of the border.[624] They were tasked with preventing individual passages as well as the initial incursion of any foreign organised military force.[625] In terms of organisation, these troops were attached to army corps geographically and were formed mostly at the division size and rarely at the battalion size.[626] In conducting their general public order duties, they worked with the Interior Ministry.[627] By 1937, there were five border commands in the army. Along the northeastern and northern regions corresponding to the Soviet border, there was a border command in Ağrı and another in Van.[628] The army inspectorate headquarters was in Sivas, and there were four army corps commands under it in the wider region located in Sivas, Diyarbakır, Erzincan, and Sarıkamış.[629] Similarly, on the Soviet side, the Red Army was vested with border responsibility.[630] These border troops were formed in division sizes.[631] They were under the command of the military headquarters responsible for that

[624] Fikri Başaran, *Ordu Bilgisi Notu* (Ankara: Harp Okulu Basımevi, 1937), 147.

[625] Başaran, *Ordu Bilgisi Notu*, 147.

[626] Başaran, *Ordu Bilgisi Notu*, 148.

[627] Başaran, *Ordu Bilgisi Notu*, 148.

[628] Başaran, *Ordu Bilgisi Notu*, 148.

[629] Abdülkadir Sadi (Kazancıoğlu), *Yeni Türkiye Memleket Coğrafyası* (İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1931-1932), 6-7 and *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası: Tabii, Zirai, Beşeri, Baytari, Cilt VII* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1938), 109.

[630] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 91.

[631] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 91.

geographical area in military duties and were reporting to the political commissariat they were attached to and to the commissariat in Moscow on political tasks.[632] In the Turkish military intelligence assessment, their commanders could utilise artillery and aircraft when needed, and their presence was stronger on the western borders. Their officers were paid 1.5 times higher than other Red Army officers, and the estimated size of the Red Army border troops numbered 90,000.[633] Along the Turkish border, on the South Caucasus segment of border troops, they were located at Batumi (the 37th), Akhaltsikhe (the 38th), Leninakan (the 39th), and Yerevan (the 40th), and the political commissariat was in Tbilisi.[634]



Figure 5.1. The Turkish officers and soldiers on the Soviet border in the rural area of Kars province in March 1929.

Source: From the author's private collection.

This setup on both sides of the border put the Turkish National Army and the Red Army in constant interaction with each other throughout the interwar period. Since the borders were used daily, they were not sealed off or turned into closed impassable barriers, as witnessed throughout World War II and the Cold War. In the interwar period, both military bureaucracies had to manage daily activities, and develop ways to manage and limit potential escalations under their jurisdictions. Rough terrain and harsh climatic conditions also add to the challenges of smooth

[632] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 91.

[633] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 91.

[634] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 92.

management of these areas. The region has challenging harsh climatic conditions throughout the year, with extreme cold temperatures, heavy snow, and heavy rain, as illustrated in the photo of Turkish officers and soldiers on the Soviet border in the rural area of Kars province in March 1929, when the rest of the country enjoyed mild spring weather (Figure 5.1).

The perception of "calm in the rear" continued throughout the interwar period, Turkey believing the beginning of World War II would not change that as reflected in a cartoon from *Karikatür,* dated 21 September 1939, where characters depicting Turkish and Soviet soldiers exchange a conversation where one tells "This fire would not be extinguished easily" the other asking "The fire of war engulfing Europe?" and getting the answer "No, the fire of love engulfing our hearts" (Figure 5.2).



Figure 5.2. The Turkish-Soviet friendship.

Source: *Karikatür,* 21 September 1939.

Even in a later date in late 1940 when Turkey was viewing the Soviet Union from a different perspective due to the latter's unexpected close alignment with Germany, which was causing great concern for Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Ministry reported the Red Army military attaché's remarks in France that the Soviet Union was content with its unpredictable ally Germany spreading its force all over that would weaken it, and the Soviet Union would remain indifferent if Germans extended further down in the Balkans but would react should they make an attempt on Turkey, on the Turkish Straits. In that case, the Russian military attaché reportedly told them that they would provide maximum aid to Turkey on the condition that it would not join the war, and that the Soviet Union would entirely abandon the Turkish border and take preventive measures in Iran by occupying some Iranian towns.[635]

5.2. The Security Environment in the Turkish-Soviet Borderlands

Although the Turkish authorities did not have a direct threat to its territorial security posed by the Soviet Union or Iran, it did not mean that the eastern part of the country was sound and secure, as the main threat to security was posed by domestic actors.

Both Turkey and the Soviet Union refrained from embarking on any military activity that would cause suspicion, concern, or signal any hostility directed against the other. Therefore, large-scale military demonstrations of force or military manoeuvres that could be of concern to the other side were avoided. The Red Army's routine military manoeuvres throughout its vast geography had been watched closely by Ankara. Understanding the rationale for a military manoeuvre or a build-up was enough for Ankara to put it into a context. Turkey's Embassy in Moscow informed the context in which these manoeuvres occurred and whether there was any additional build-up along the border areas to the Foreign Ministry in Ankara, which, in turn, informed the Turkish General Staff. For example, in 1929, the ambassador in Moscow, Hüseyin Ragıp (Baydur), noted that the August-September manoeuvres were held throughout the Soviet Union, where three divisions and territorial army movements

[635] The Turkish Embassy in Berlin to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 501-31560-124815–163, 21 October 1940.

were observed but no anticipation of an additional build-up of forces. [636] This type of explanation for large-scale military activity calmed potential concerns. On the Turkish side, Turkey had to respond to critical national security threats within its borders, and only during these events did Turkey embark on large-scale military activities. Turkey's motivations were clear, and these activities did not cause any alarm on the Soviet side. Turkey had to deal with domestic security incidents by gradually mobilising more troops during each large-scale incident within its territory.

5.2.1. The Security Challenges to Turkey in Eastern Anatolia

Traditionally, the Turkish military has regarded armed incidents in the country as security incidents that challenge the authority of the state. Individually or in a group, from those having ordinary criminal aspects to the ones having nationalistic tones, all were viewed through these lenses. Counter measures developed against such actions were called as *tedib* and *tenkil*. The general meaning of these terms had always reflected the way Ankara, the central authority, framed any such attempt or incident under its jurisdiction. *Tedib* meant chastening, punishment for a fault, correcting, and teaching polite manners.[637] *Tenkil* meant repression and punishment with the aim of making an example of someone.[638] These were aptly reflecting the Turkish military mentality as anyone individually or in a group, causing disturbance using weapons against the legitimate authority were regarded as *şaki* (singular) *eşkiya* (plural), meaning brigand(s). Rather than spending time on a deep analysis of the components of the groups or their motivations, any unruly behaviour that incorporated violence, be it against a gendarme officer in a village by an individual or against gendarme forces by a group in a region, was categorised as *şekavet* (brigandage).[639] These could be ordinary gangs or gangs with political motivations. This understanding was formed through experiences, and based on these, the Turkish Army tried to adapt to

[636] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34781-137033-3, 4 November 1929 and the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the General Staff, TDA, 571-34780-137023-1, 19 November 1929.

[637] *Redhouse*, 1119.

[638] *Redhouse*, 1142.

[639] *Redhouse*, 1054.

this different type of warfare and develop countermeasures. Several classified manuals based on these experiences reflected the Turkish official framing of acts of disobedience. In 1933, brigadier general Kadri Rüştü's work *Eşkıya Takibi Usulleri* (Methods on Pursuing Bandits) was published.[640] He was a military counsellor to the 1st General Inspectorate, which was set up as an extraordinary administrative body in Diyarbakır in 1927, covering many other surrounding provinces in the east. He noted that there was no manual to train army personnel on the pursuit of bandits, and he wrote this based on his experiences during World War I in Yemen and Hejaz and during his time as a military counsellor with the 1st General Inspectorate. He incorporated the experiences of others, as well as those obtained during the Turkish military's suppression of uprisings until that time. He finished his book in 1931 and retired in September 1931. In trying to adapt to the changes, the Gendarme General Command published a work on tactics to be used in this special type of warfare in 1939.[641] Another example of a bandit-focused military publication came in 1944 with the work of Eyüp Sabri Süsoy.[642] Süsoy's work was intended to place this special type of warfare in Turkish military manuals, which found very little place at the time of writing his book. He wrote extensively based on his experiences as an officer in operations at Zeylan in 1930 and in the Ağrı area from 1930 to 1932. All these works were based on the Turkish army's experiences in this type of warfare at a very early date before World War II, after which the entire approach was shaped by the American one. As argued throughout this thesis, the Turkish military bureaucracy's experience and special characteristics in the interwar period have been largely ignored, and its special characteristics of trying to turn its own experience into knowledge with contributions from the best practices of other world armies have been disregarded.

Ankara engaged in *tedib* and *tenkil* of any disorder within the country, irrespective of location or motivations behind. That was the stated justification and commitment, and *the tedib*s in Konya or Zile were not less important than the one in Ağrı from

[640] Brigadier General Kadri Rüştü, *Eşkıya Takibi Usulleri* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1933).

[641] Brigadier General O. Ozanalp, *Jandarmanın Takip, Tenkil Hareketleri ve Müsademe Tabiyesi* (Ankara: Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1939).

[642] Eyüp Sabri Süsoy, *Eşkiya Muharebeleri ve Mağara Aramaları* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1944).

Ankara's perspective. This was clearly indicated in the work *Taşnak-Hoybun* published in 1931 after the suppression of a major rebellion around Ağrı province that lasted with intervals from 1926 to 1930.[643] This provided the main narrative of the Ankara government for decades to emphasise that these actions were not directly targeting any ethnic or religious group in the country.

The nationalists had to deal with local or wide-scale uprisings during the War of Independence. On 18 October, 1923, the Grand National Assembly accepted the law on the elimination of brigandage.[644] After the proclamation of the Republic, until World War II, according to the Turkish General Staff, the regime had to deal with 18 incidents at different times in various regions, requiring military force.[645] Major ones, all in the east and southeast in proximity to the Soviet border, were the 1925 Şeyh Said Revolt, the 1926, 1927, and 1930 Ağrı revolts, and the 1937 and 1938 Dersim revolts. Ankara always perceived as brigandage fuelled by backwardness, exploited by ethnic and/or religious leaders, supported and encouraged by foreign imperial powers. In practical terms, all revolts were started by bandits and some of those turned into bigger incidents by provocations, support and addition of the tribal forces. In his note to the Head of Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak) after the suppression of the Ağrı Revolt in 1930, Mustafa Kemal Paşa congratulated those who eliminated bandits and rebels aiming to undermine general security and national unity on the eastern borders.[646]

The challenging issue of the central authority dealing with bandits and gangs was not a new phenomenon, as for centuries, the Ottoman Empire had to deal with such acts in the pre-modern and modern eras throughout its vast domains in the Balkans, the

[643] *Taşnak-Hoybun* (Ankara: Türk Ocakları, 1931), 63.

[644] This law No 356 with original title "İzale-i Şekavet Kanunu" was accepted on 18 October 1923 and was published in *Resmi Gazete* on 25 October 1923. See *Resmi Gazete,* 37, 25 October 1339 (1923), 1.

[645] Reşat Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar 1924-1938* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972), 496 and *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Cumhuriyet Devrinde Ayaklanmalar, Ayaklanma Nedenleri ve Çıkarılan Dersler* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1980), 69-70.

[646] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 350: "Doğu sınırlarımızda genel asayişi ve milli birliği bozmak isteyen şaki ve asileri imha edenleri takdir ve tebrik ederim". His message was passed down to the military commands on 16 September 1930.

Arab lands and Anatolia. In general, the primary objective of the Ottoman, and later the Turkish authorities, was to stop the challenge to their authority not going in deeper lengths to understand other motivations of the movements be it religious, cultural, national or social. In essence, in the final analysis, this approach was not unfounded as the primary objective of the bandits was mostly twofold: to show that they did not see themselves bound by the political authority (local, feudal, or central) and they wanted to pursue their traditional way of economic activity irrespective of borders and regulations imposed upon them by the political authority (which meant harassing other political authorities on the other side of the border).[647] Despite all enthusiastic attempts to provide a romantic narrative for these acts, from the perspective of an established political authority and even so from the perspective of a military bureaucracy, the primary objective was to put such rebellions off as quick and as effectively as possible without any search for solving the puzzle of what motivated them. A group trying to continue tribal justice or habits such as plundering goods, livestock or economic resources of a local rival tribe, moving such acts to transcend borders and to eliminate officials of the neighbouring countries seeing them obstacles to their way of traditional way of life certainly would not be tolerated by a central authority responsible for order, security and prosperity of the people over which it claimed legitimacy and expected consent.[648]

Other parts of the system including politicians, ministers, governors, intellectuals and specially appointed representatives such as general inspectors evaluated these events in a wider context trying to offer solutions taking the historical, social, cultural, demographic and economic factors into consideration.[649] The task of the military

[647] In his work Ahmet Özcan examined the other factors surrounding an incident of brigandage trying to analyse other elements in a motivation to rise against the authority. See Ahmet Özcan, *"Ama Eşkiyalık Çağı Kapandı": Modern Türkiye'de Son Kürt Eşkiyalık Çağı 1950-1970* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021).

[648] In his 1932 report, exploring root causes of this phenomenon, The Inspector of the 1st General Inspectorate İbrahim Tali (Öngören) noted that one of the most important reasons of these incidents was the desire to survive and continue their way of living and raids, plunders and attacks on rival tribes were part of life. BCA, 30-10-0-0-110-740-23, 2 January 1932, 4. Regarding raids, plunder and attacks as traditional economic activities see Özcan, "*Ama Eşkiyalık Çağı Kapandı"*, 68-72.

[649] For a comprehensive list of such reports see Doğu Perinçek, "Diğer Şark Raporları", in *Dersim: Jandarma Umum Komutanlığı Raporu 1932* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2021), 12-8. These reports usually analysed all factors strengthened by personal observations and offered recommendations. Şükrü Kaya, who served briefly as the Foreign Minister and for 11 years as the Interior Minister from

bureaucracy on the other hand was straightforward, time sensitive and was focused on neutralisation of the threat posed.[650] Most interwar incidents occurred in the 3rd Army Inspectorate's area of responsibility in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Many acts of brigandage were limited incidents and were handled by local state forces, such as small gendarme units. Only when these incidents reached to a certain level and passed a threshold, the mobilisation of larger military units was required.

In addition to suspicions about foreign interference and outside meddling, the systemic shortcomings of the Turkish military were powerful factors that enabled wider acts of disobedience and rebellion. Starting in 1924, there were major revolts in the region, and by 1930, Turkish officials had underlined several key reasons for their rapid escalation from local to regional levels. Firstly, the military force presence was low in the region. Secondly, the stations in the area were weak and were not sufficiently fitted or manned. Finally, the military units were randomly positioned and dispersed. These were the findings of the First General Inspectorate in the mid-1930.[651] Under these circumstances, when a military contingent attended to a reported security incident, since it was not prepared, the events may suddenly flare up and could spread to a wider geography. Lack of response or ineffective action led to embarrassment for the state authority and encouraged and motivated perpetrators who could easily multiply their numbers with support from their families or tribes and, even worse, might get support from other parts of their kins residing outside Turkey's borders. [652] This main cause was certainly related to the underlying theme argued in this thesis that during the interwar period the main consideration of the

1927-1938 for example believed military intervention alone would not provide a solution as it would not address the root causes of the issues continuing since Ottoman period. For him, measures that would get people's adherence to the Republic would offer a durable solution. See Mustafa Solak, *Atatürk'ün Bakanı Şükrü Kaya* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2018), 259.

[650] In times when there were no incidents, primary activity was to collect weapons and ammunition from the civilians. These weapons in civilian hands constituted a major threat that would create gangs that would challenge government forces. From 1928 onwards, Gendarme was tasked with this delicate issue of collecting weapons caring for sensitivities of the societies, trying to get these off their hands with their consent and with pressure at times. Between 1928-1932, around 23,000 weapons were collected. See Süleyman Tekir, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Jandarma Kuruluş Teşkilat ve Mücadele 1903-1938* (İstanbul: TİMAŞ Yayınları, 2020), 407.

[651] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 274.

[652] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 274.

Turkish military was to be prepared to the tasks under significant financial constraints. Financial constraints and managing resources were the primary concerns of the army and most of the time scarce resources had been the main challenge to be addressed by the military leaders in fulfilling their duties. The army was organised as inspectorates since it was peacetime and was not in mobilisation having concentrated in central locations far from having control all over the large land mass of Turkey. Soldiers and commands were located in central areas where transportation, supply, and living conditions were favourable to sustain their daily routines. Any uprising or attempt was always costly as it required mobilising and transferring troops from other areas, taking them out from these comfortable locations. The logistical needs of the army with limited resources in a very rough terrain and in a geography where climatic considerations further limited the window for manoeuvres were difficult to meet. Harsh winter conditions already shortened the time available for any action. Extreme cold and hot weather imposed similar negative consequences on troops.

After the suppression of the Şeyh Said Revolt in 1925, the inspector (commander) of the 3rd Army, Kazım Paşa (İnanç), wanted to maintain the military posture and force deployments, but Ankara was keen to stop the mobilisation and lift the extraordinary measures taken as it was a huge cost for the country. Prime Minister İsmet Paşa, in his memoirs, mentioned this difference in views, which ultimately necessitated his dismissal from command.[653] Kazım Paşa resigned according to the Turkish General Staff sources on 20 June 1925.[654] He wanted to keep troops in the region in their current formation, stating that there was more to do against the rebels and that sending troops back to the barracks would be wrong. However, İsmet Paşa challenged his concern, stating that from that time on, any issue could be dealt with within the parameters of general public security mechanisms, meaning at a lower scale, referring to gendarme troops.[655] İsmet Paşa's argument was shaped largely with the concern to sustain military contingents all over the region. He noted that the country was out of the war just two years ago and maintaining mobilisation imposed

[653] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 466.

[654] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri*, 125.

[655] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 466.

on citizens would be a heavy burden and wrote that "therefore we had to dismiss him. He remained in the army as we gave him another position and appointed İzzeddin Paşa (Çalışlar) in his place."[656] İzzeddin Paşa was appointed as the inspector of the 3rd Army on 20 June 1925 and remained in this position until November 1933 having to deal with all of the other revolts in the region in this long period including the ones in Ağrı.[657] Economic conditions further deteriorated, especially after the 1929 World Economic Crisis, causing further cuts in the budget allocated to the Turkish military, and intervention in events in Ağrı in 1930 had to be done under these dire conditions.[658] In Spring 1929, when the prospect of a major rebellion was likely due to favourable weather conditions, upon learning government plans to cut troop sizes in the region, the General Inspector of the 1st General Inspectorate İbrahim Tali (Öngören) urged the Interior Ministry not to downsize the personnel number of the 7th Corps in the region also noting he perfectly understood the high of cost of keeping them for the government.[659] His assessment of a likely uprising in Anatolia due to the ongoing Kurdish rebellion on the Iranian side of the border and his request to keep troops in the area were seen as justified, and Interior Minister Şükrü Bey (Kaya) wrote to the Prime Ministry noting that he supported this request and even suggested deploying more troops to the area.[660] Despite all financial and logistical constraints, Turkish political authorities tried to develop mechanisms to address these security concerns and worked together with their neighbours. The Soviet Union, Iraq and Iran had a key role in Turkey's efforts. In this quest, the Soviet perception and attitude were once again in Turkey's favour during the interwar years.

---

[656] İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 466.

[657] *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan*, 221. In 1933 İzzeddin Paşa was appointed as the inspector of the 2nd Army. During the Soviet delegation's visit to İstanbul in October 1933, he accompanied General Voroshilov. After İzzeddin Paşa, Ali Sait Paşa (Akbaytogan) (from November 1933 to August 1935) and (from September 1935 to March 1943) Kazım Orbay, who was head of the Turkish military delegation to Afghanistan in 1928, were appointed as commanders of the 3rd Army. See *Atatürk 3ncü Ordu Bölgesinde* (Erzincan: 3ncü Ordu Komutanlığı Yayını, 1981), 152.

[658] Bilal Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II 1924-1999* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009), 318. In 1930, several infrastructure projects had to be suspended and in addition to Ağrı, resources needed to be used to intervene the Menemen Incident in the west of the country through the end of the year in 1930.

[659] The 1st Inspector to the Interior Ministry, BCA, 30-10-0-0-69-454-16, 9 March 1929.

[660] The Interior Minister to the Prime Ministry, BCA, 30-10-0-0-69-454-16, 11 March 1929.

5.2.2. The Turkish and Soviet Perception of Threat from the Third Parties

In this period both countries were concerned about intervention of the third parties on the borderlands. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union were concerned about the subversive activities of Western powers, particularly British intentions and covert actions in the region. This concern was often reflected in Turkish media, as exemplified in a 1929 cartoon in the Turkish satirical magazine *Yeni Köroğlu*. The caption of this cartoon reads: "British dispatched its Mediterranean Fleet to the ocean." The English says, "I was not able to start a rebellion in Iran, could not pit Russians against the Chinese. I should pull a different trick!". In response, Köroğlu character in the background says, "Do not bother 'John Bull' (*Kikirik Efendi*)[661], no one falls into those tricks anymore!" (Figure 5.3). This concern was another contributing factor to the Turkish-Soviet cooperation in the borderlands. They were watching political movements at the strategic level and activities at the tactical level. Once again, the name of Thomas Edward Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia, which in those days was used synonymously with British covert action, resurfaced in the context of Kurdish and Armenian activities. As detailed in the previous chapter, this time it was closer to home than Afghanistan. Allegations appearing in the international press fuelled this theory of British involvement personified in the name of Colonel Lawrence.[662] In addition to the American press, these allegations appeared in the German and British press, which created a spat between the two.[663] On the other hand, according to a Comintern publication, the allegations about the deployment of Lawrence to the area were leaked through a French newspaper in January 1930, which possibly signified French concerns about a potential British plan to arm Kurds in Syria in French-controlled areas.[664] These sources alleged that Britain aimed to create a Kurdistan as a buffer to serve as a military base to be used

[661] *Redhouse*, 664.

[662] "T. E. Lawrence Linked with Revolt," *The New York Times*, 9 July 1930.

[663] "The Kurdish Revolt- German Suspicions," *The Times*, 14 August 1930; "German Press and the Kurdish Revolt," *The Times*, 18 August 1930. See Alakom, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması*, 89.

[664] M. L. "Zu den Ergeignissen in Kurdistan," *Internationale Presse- Korrespondenz,* 65 (5 August 1930), 1595-6 cited in Doğu Perinçek *Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2020), 554-5.

against the Soviet Union.[665] These allegations even found space in official correspondence as they were reported back to their respective capitals. The British High Commissioner in Tehran, in his report to the Foreign Secretary in London, noted that he was told about these allegations regarding Colonel Lawrence's presence in Kurdistan by an Iranian minister who saw it in the Turkish press.[666] When the Iranian Minister told him that he would be very grateful if he could obtain any news on the subject from Baghdad, the High Commissioner in Tehran wrote that he told the Minister that he was getting rather tired of hearing these stories of his presence [Colonel Lawrence] in various parts of Western and Central Asia and as regards the sympathy of British officials in Iraq with a pan-Kurdish movement, he frankly did not believe it.[667] However, various sources continued their attempts to check Lawrence's whereabouts with British diplomats, asked about rumours, or passed these to them. In a note dated 12 May 1930, based on information he had received from an Iranian official, the British Counsel-General in Trabzon reported to his ambassador that Lawrence was believed to be involved, and according to rumours, he was seen in Karaköse, in the Ağrı area.[668]

Turkish authorities, who had recently been irritated by reports of Lawrence's sightings in Afghanistan in 1928, still remembered him for his subversive role before and during World War I. They were deeply concerned once again about the possibility of his emergence in the area. Turkish Ambassador Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur) in Kabul had repeatedly reported about alleged activities of Lawrence in Afghanistan in 1928 and 1929. On 12 February 1930, he reported to Ankara about such allegations appeared in an Indian newspaper stating that Lawrence had received a Turkish visa with a fake identification card from the Turkish Consulate in Aleppo, came to Mardin, and fled to Iraq escaping Turkish surveillance.[669] Although he did

[665] M. L. "Zu den Ergeignissen in Kurdistan," 1595-6 cited in Perinçek *Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye*, 554.

[666] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 326.

[667] British High Commissioner Sir R. Clive in Tehran to Foreign Secretary Sir F. Humphrys, 16 April 1930 in Bilal Şimşir (ed.), *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu 1924-1938 Şeyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Basımevi, 1975), 151.

[668] Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu*, 178-9.

[669] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 534-36963-148511-4, 12 February 1930.

not dwell much on this information, he wanted to get Ankara's attention that the current British High Commissioner in Iraq was the former British Ambassador in Kabul, who had organised Afghan rebellions with Lawrence.[670]



Figure 5.3. A cartoon from 1929.

Source: *Yeni Köroğlu*, 7 August 1929.

The Turkish Interior Ministry sent a note to the 1st General Inspectorate on 11 March 1929 stating that Lawrence had completed his mission in Afghanistan and returned to Baghdad with the task of instigating uprisings in Iran and Turkey.[671] On 12 March, 1929, Inspector Ibrahim Tali Bey (Öngören) of the 1st General Inspectorate forwarded this note to all governorates urging them to be vigilant and alert to developments and asking them to take all necessary measures.[672] In another note, the Interior Ministry warned about the reactivation of the Kurdish movement from the Ağrı area to Diyarbakır as the weather began to permit with the arrival of spring,

[670] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 534-36963-148511-4, 12 February 1930. Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur), Turkish Ambassador also noted physical description of Lawrence whom he heard as being a short person having light blue eyes to be shared with Turkish officers. Yusuf Hikmet refers to the first British Minister at the British Legation in Afghanistan Sir Francis Henry Humphrys (1879-1971). After serving between 1922-1928 in Kabul, in 1929 he was appointed to Iraq.

[671] Eyüp Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre İngiliz Casusu Lawrence* (Ankara: Zet Akademik Yayıncılık, 2023), 70-1.

[672] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 141.

noting the joint efforts of Hoybun and Dashnaks.[673] The Ministry noted that the epicenter of these activities was Ravanduz in Iran and Mosul in Iraq. It was also noted that "English Captain Lawrence"[674], who commanded the religious reactionary uprisings in Afghanistan from the Indian border, had been in the area for a year and was tasked by the British General Command.[675] Various foreign newspaper articles were translated and passed on to the 1st General Inspectorate officials.[676]

The Turkish Ministry of Interior and Turkish police followed reports about him and issued continuous warnings to the 1st General Inspectorate regarding him and other names associated with him using different disguises. Turkish diplomatic posts abroad and administrations in the country were asked to provide information about his sightings. Once the concern about the possibility of this haunting ghost returning to the damned mission of undermining Turkey appeared, information began to flow to the central authorities in a rather uncorroborated and unfiltered way, burdening the system. Turkish authorities have had to report that a specific allegation was incorrect after assessing and evaluating the claim and have had to note that it was unbased in many instances. In February 1930, Turkish authorities reported that reports about his sighting in Ravanduz and along the Turkish border with Iran were incorrect and that he could have been confused by another British officer.[677] In January 1930, the Gendarme General Command wrote to the General Security Directorate to confirm that he had not been sighted in Turkey or Iran.[678] The Turkish Foreign Ministry reminded the Interior Ministry that on 20 January 1930, the General Inspectorate had been informed that the British and Iraqi Embassies assured them that the person in question was not in Turkey at the time.[679] The 1st General Inspectorate shared this

[673] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 94-5 and 142.

[674] His rank was noted as captain in the original document.

[675] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 94-5 and 142.

[676] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 71-4.

[677] See for example Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 88.

[678] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 88.

[679] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 534-36963-148511-5, 19 February 1930.

information with the governorates of Van, Siirt, Hakkari, Mardin, Urfa, Bayazıt, Al Aziz, and Diyarbakır.[680]

5.3. The Demarcation of the Turkish-Soviet Border



Figure 5.4. Turkey's eastern land border with the Soviet Union.[681]

Source: "Erzurum" map section, Harta Genel Müdürlüğü, 1951. From the author's private collection.

Contradictory information continued to come from various sources, and this traffic continued with no clear or conclusive results other than clogging the communication channels. This attention and concern about Lawrence's alleged activities kept the Turkish security bureaucracy busy until 1934, almost until his death in May 1935.[682]

[680] Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 89.

[681] This map was prepared in 1936 and was updated with revisions after adding new roads, bridges and marking administrative changes in the beginning of the Cold War period in 1951.

[682] See for example notes from 1934 in Şahin, *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre*, 80. Finally, the Turkish Ambassador in London, Fethi Okyar reported about his death to Ankara noting anecdotes about his hypocrisy, the hype around his activities and skills. The Turkish Embassy in London to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 534-37354-150017-13, 23 May 1935. The Turkish Foreign Ministry

These rumours about him, sentimental espionage stories, and attributions contributed to his legend, but they also strengthened and kept alive the perception that Britain had a hand in anything considered subversive in the region, ultimately feeding the perception of the need for a higher-level strategic alignment between two major outcasts on the periphery of imperial European powers, Turkey and the Soviet Union, against threats to their policies from Afghanistan to their very own territories.

During World War I, Imperial Russian forces conducted successful military operations and fought their way to Erzincan province, occupying a large part of Eastern Anatolia. Late Ottoman officials tried to turn these successes in favour of the Ottomans, working with the Bolsheviks, which began with the Erzincan Agreement on 18 December 1917.[683] Gradually, Russian forces withdrew from the area, and the Ottoman delegation, now working with the Germans, reached a position to reclaim territories as far as Batumi at the Brest-Litovsk talks in late 1917 and early 1918. Meanwhile, remnants of the Ottoman Army were fighting against armed gangs of Armenians trying to establish control in areas abandoned by the Imperial Russian Army. Ottoman troops entered Kars on 25 April 1918, and reached the Arpaçay border on 30 April 1918, taking control of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi.[684] The Ottomans compensated for the losses inflicted by the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War and World War I but were then forced to leave these areas after the Mudros Armistice in October 1918. The nationalist forces in Ankara took control of the activities by 1920 and entered into negotiations with the Bolsheviks regarding the borders in the east. The activities of Armenian irregular forces continued to pose trouble for the local population, prompting further military action under Kazım Paşa (Karabekir), who was acting with the Ankara government. The Bolsheviks tried to end Turkish troop movements but had limited control over the Armenian irregular forces or over the Armenian or Georgian political groups. As an interim solution, the Red Army accompanied the Turkish National Army in the region and eventually

shared this with the Turkish General Staff and Interior Ministry ending flow of reports of his alleged sightings in the region. See the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish General Staff and to the Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 534-37354-150017-12, 6 June 1935.

[683] Ömer Erden, *Türkiye'nin Doğu Sınırının Oluşumu Antlaşmalar, Protokoller, Problemler* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2017), 19.

[684] Erden, *Türkiye'nin Doğu Sınırının Oluşumu*, 28.

subdued Armenian and Georgian potential movements that would prompt further Turkish military action. In December 1920, Turkish and Armenian delegations signed the Gyumri Agreement and agreed on the border.[685] The final shape of the border was reached after lengthy negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the national government in Ankara, with the agreement signed in Moscow in March 1921 and with amendments made by the Kars Agreement later in October 1921 with the signature of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.[686] Batumi and Gyumri (Alexandropol) was left under the Bolshevik control and both Red Army troops and Turkish National Army troops coordinated their actions in this dynamic and potentially risky environment to avoid any confrontation.[687] Associated issues were also regulated by separate legal documents signed by the Ankara government starting in 1920 and continuing after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. In March 1920, a convention between the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and Turkey concerning the crossing of the border by inhabitants of border zones was signed in Tbilisi.[688] In March 1922, the convention between the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and Turkey concerning the use by citizens of both countries of pastures lying on the opposite side of the border was signed.[689]

In the north, the land border began from the shores of the Black Sea in the vicinity of Sarp, followed through the valley of Çoruh, passed through Gyumri to the south through the valleys of Arpaçay and Aras rivers, reaching the Iranian territory after passing through the east of Mount Ağrı, and in total, it was 602 km long[690] (Figure 5.4). There were two main ways connecting Soviet South Caucasus with Turkey's east. One was the road from Batumi to Trabzon, and the other was from Batumi to

[685] Erden, *Türkiye'nin Doğu Sınırının Oluşumu*, 27 and 39.

[686] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 26.

[687] Erden, *Türkiye'nin Doğu Sınırının Oluşumu*, 174-9.

[688] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 213.

[689] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 216.

[690] Abdülkadir Sadi (Kazancıoğlu), *Yeni Türkiye Memleket Coğrafyası*, 6-7 and *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası*, 5.

Borçka, and Artvin.[691] From a military perspective, possible routes and directions from the Soviet Union were examined in more detail (Figure. 5.5). The Turkish Army identified at least nine main routes.[692] The first one was Batumi- Hopa- Rize- Trabzon coastline.



Figure 5.5. Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union in 1938. The red lines indicate the mountains and their heights.

Source: *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası: Tabii, Zirai, Beşeri, Baytari,* Cilt VII (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1938), folded map.

This route was not suitable for large troop movements. The second was the Tbilisi- Ahilkelek–Ardahan- Artvin–Çoruh Valley- İspir and Bayburt route. Similarly, due to the high hills and narrow passages, this was not suitable for large troops. The third was the Tbilisi- Ardahan–Göle- Oltu– Tortum- Erzurum route. This route was very suitable for large troop movements, and historically, Imperial Russian forces used

[691] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 39.

[692] Hakkı Tümerdem, *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası: Sevkülceyş, Tabiye ve Harp Tarihi Bakımından Tetkik* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939), 50-5.

this route for large troops. The fourth route was the Tbilisi- Leninakan (formerly Gyumri, Alexandropol)- Kars- Sarıkamış- Köprüköy- Hasankale- Erzurum route. The Turkish military identified this route as the main conduit, and the main part of the Imperial Russian Army used this direction.[693] The fifth route was the one from Tbilisi- Delijan- Yerevan- Kolp- Kagızman- Velibaba Pass- Köprüköy- Hasankale and Erzurum. Aras River cut through this route. The control of Velibaba Pass was enormously important for the Turkish Army, as the loss of it meant losing advantage over the main route from Leninakan- Kars- Sarıkamış in the north. The sixth route was from Yerevan- Iğdır- Bayazıt- Karaköse- Tahir Pass, and Köprüköy. Although it had many physical barriers, such as the Aras River and Mount Ağrı, the control of the Tahir Pass remained important. The seventh route was the Yerevan- Iğdır- Bayazıt-Karaköse-Tutak- Malazgirt- Muş- Kolup- Diyarbakır or Muş- Elazığ road. The eighth one was the Bayazıt- Muradiye- Erciyeş- Ahlat- Bitlis- Diyarbakır route and the final one was from Bayazıt- Muradiye- east of Lake Van to Van.

The exact demarcation of land borders and the actual work on the ground remained a challenging task between Turkey and the Soviet Union. For this purpose, in accordance with the Kars Agreement, the parties agreed to establish a joint commission to work on the ground. The Şark Tahdid-i Hudud Komisyonu (The Commission on the Demarcation of the Eastern Border) was established in July 1924 and conducted its activities from March 1925 to September 1926. This commission comprised initially of an officer from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and a typist led by a military officer.[694] The delegation's members were appointed from the Turkish army's 9th Corps stationed in Sarıkamış in the east.[695] The head of the Turkish delegation was major Fahri (Belen) and the head of the Soviet delegation was Oto Karklin (Figure 5.6). This mixed commission conducted visits and held meetings with Soviet interlocutors in 1925 and 1926.[696] Their first encounter was on 14 March

[693] Tümerdem, *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası*, 51.

[694] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 571-34635-136493-14, 16 November 1924.

[695] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34635-136481-6, 7 March 1925.

[696] BCA, 30-18-1-1-19-35-1, 25 May 1926.

1925 at the bridge crossing on the Aras River called Markara (Margara) Bridge, connecting Iğdır and Margara[697] (Figure 5.7). Through this crossing, they moved onto Yerevan and held their first formal session. Later that year, they held a meeting in Tbilisi.



Figure 5.6. The members of Şark Tahdid-i Hudud Komisyonu (The Commission on the Demarcation of the Eastern Border) in Tbilisi, Georgia on 1 October 1925. Fahri (Belen) is the sixth person from the right, and on his right stands Oto Karklin.

Source: From the author's private collection.

In 1926, based on this commission's work, the parties managed to agree on a border that followed through the mountainous areas in the Black Sea region from the north going down south along the Aras and Arpaçay rivers.[698] On 8 January 1927, an agreement was signed in Kars regarding the use of these rivers forming the boundary between the two countries.[699] This convention between the Soviet Union and Turkey

[697] Stephan Rindlisbacher, "Between Proclamation of Friendship and Concealed Distrust: The Turkish-Soviet Border Commission, 1925-1926," *Journal of Modern European History*, 22/1 (2024): 61.

[698] *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası*, 5.

[699] Subaşı, *Türk- Sovyet Münasebetleri*, 41.

concerning the use of water from border rivers and streams and the protocol was ratified in June 1927 and came into force on 26 June 1928 in Turkey.[700] On 6 August 1928, the parties signed a convention concerning border crossing by inhabitants of border zones and a convention concerning the procedure for consideration and settlement of border disputes in Ankara, the former coming into force in December 1929 and later in September 1929 in Turkey.[701] This convention was denounced by the Soviet Union in 1938. On 6 August 1928, a convention between the Soviet Union and Turkey concerning the procedure for the consideration and settlement of border disputes was signed and was prolonged several times until 1937.[702] In July 1937, a convention between the Soviet Union and Turkey concerning the procedure for considering and settling border incidents and disputes and the protocol for the appointment of border commissioners was signed in Moscow.[703]



Figure 5.7. The Markara Bridge over Aras River.

Source: From the author's private collection.

The Turkish Army had two fortified positions at Kars and Erzurum to defend these routes.[704] The main logistics line for the Turkish Army during mobilisation was the Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan railway line. The Turkish military considered the

[700] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 217.

[701] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 213-4.

[702] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 213-4.

[703] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 215

.

[704] Tümerdem, *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası*, 51.

extension of the railway to Erzurum and Sarıkamış and from Diyarbakır to Muş, Malazgirt, and Karaköse as essential for improving the defence of the eastern part of the country.[705] This was based on lessons learned from the past. Although this plan was set as a priority in the early days of the Republic, difficulties persisted. In September 1924, during his visit to Erzurum, Mustafa Kemal Paşa stated that connecting the east to the rest of the country and the extension of railway up to Erzurum has been an existential issue for the Turkish Republic.[706] Despite this urgency and support, the extension only became fully operational in October 1939.[707] This is yet another example of the major problem the Turkish military encountered in fulfilling its military tasks in the interwar period, which was financial issues. In preparation for the tasks assigned by political power, the most pressing issue had always been finding the necessary resources. The Turkish military always had to operate by factoring in the scarce resources available to them. In general, natural physical barriers, such as rivers, high mountains, lack of roads, and extreme temperatures, seemed to contribute to the defence, but they also made it difficult to mobilise the necessary troops. In terms of one of the most important military concerns of Turkey in the interwar period, which was coastal landing, the Turkish officer corps assessed on the Black Sea coastline, the physical conditions from Batumi up to Akçaşehir to the west were not suitable for coastal landings.[708] Geographical obstacles, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, and harsh climate contributed to the region's potential defence.

5.4. Maintaining Security in the Borderlands

Both countries perceived no threat from each other along the borderlands and managed to complete the demarcation of land borders, the actual work on the ground, which remained a challenging task for Turkey and the Soviet Union. After the completion of this, both countries attended to incidents of various sizes in their management of this borderland.

[705] Tümerdem, *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası*, 57-8.

[706] Efdal As, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ulaşım Politikaları 1923-1960* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013), 113.

[707] As, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ulaşım Politikaları*, 117.

[708] Tümerdem, *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası*, 47.

5.4.1. Managing the Minor Border Incidents

Movements of individuals who were separated by the border between the two countries sometimes resulted in incidents of ordinary nature. To address these incidents and settle them, beginning in 1928, both states began to work on agreements and protocols, as noted earlier.[709] Authorities usually encountered the problem of pursuit of a perpetrator or perpetrators of a crime as they fled to the other side of the border. Attacks against border troops or other civil servants and casualties were considered more serious offences, causing grave concerns for both sides. The Soviet Union expected Turkey to keep the unruly bandits under its control and not let them spill over to the Soviet territory, and Turkey committed to undertaking this. Incidents continued, and Soviet authorities were concerned about individuals committing crimes, violating borders, or attacking Red Army units alongside the border.

After the parties agreed on a border line based on commission work in 1926, the reporting of incidents began alongside this demarcation.[710] Once the physical obstacles, either in the form of a fence, checkpoint, or patrolling soldiers were in place, limitations on the movements of people in the area were introduced, and certainly that meant sporadic occurrence of incidents by those who were knowingly or unknowingly in breach of these recently imposed artificial borders in their lives. These breaches were mainly the result of people individually or in groups trying to move back and forth over the borders or animal herds finding their way to the wrong side of the border, whose owners were denied passage to that side to claim their animals. In more serious instances, pursuing perpetrators of a crime on one side trying to escape to the other side and animal theft in a similar manner were reported. Attacks on border troops or allegations that border troops were committing crimes were serious cases to be dealt with by the Turkish and Soviet authorities. To address all these local criminal issues, from the very early dates, both parties agreed to set up a commission to work on these and worked on protocols and procedures. To address

[709] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 29.

[710] For agreeing on a line see *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası*, 5.

these minor incidents, as was phrased in the convention signed in Ankara on 6 August 1928, procedures to deal with all of these were covered in the agreement.[711] Communication of incidents were to be made through embassies and not through local authorities.[712] In response to the increasing number of incidents, Turkey proposed the establishment of a mixed commission, which the Soviet side accepted.[713] This commission was formed to examine incidents in 1931 and held its first meeting in 1933. The head of the Turkish delegation was again a military officer. Staff Major Cevat led the Turkish side. The parties negotiated to agree on the remit of the commission and on their lists by comparing what they accepted as violations.[714] After five months of work, in the final meeting on 12 November 1933 in Leninakan the signing of three protocols were completed.[715] (Figure 5.8) Despite difficult incidents over the past years and strong language reaching to insults in official correspondence until that time, the last meeting ended with a major feast and strong emphasis on "friendship reaching to brotherhood" between the two countries, and the need to address all incidents in this spirit was made.[716]

During this period, the major concern of both parties was to prevent the escalation of any major or minor border disputes into a serious political and military crisis. In fact, these were incidents that might have caused such crises. From the early days, the opening of fire by border troops on uniformed soldiers of others was reported. In some of these incidents, there were casualties. For instance, after the death of a

[711] Convention on ways and settling of disagreements along the Turkey-USSR border, TDA, 571-35603-140276-18, 6 August 1928.

[712] The Turkish party reminded the Soviet party to pass these through Turkish Embassy in Moscow as whatever reason these minor incidents had, they are considered political. Decision by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-135517-21, 2 July 1929.

[713] The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34941-137985-105, 27 January 1932 and the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish General Staff and Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 571-34941-137985-106, 7 February 1932.

[714] Note by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34834-137510-37, 1 July 1933.

[715] The Turkish Consulate in Leninakan to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-67671-296821-221, 14 November 1933.

[716] The Turkish Consulate in Leninakan to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-67671-296821-221, 14 November 1933.

Turkish soldier by Soviet troops on 6 August 1928. Turkey protested this by sending a note to the Soviet side.[717]



Figure 5.8. The Turkish members of the mixed commission on the final day on 12 November 1933. Staff Major Cevat is second from the left.

Source: TDA, 571-67671-296821-221, 14 November 1933.

However, only by the end of 1938 did these incidents start to become a major concern for Turkey. So that in a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu said he was amazed by the increasing number of incidents, indifference of the Soviet border officials, and killing of a Turkish private by the Soviet troops.[718] However, as Saraçoğlu noted, the numbers were increasing, and the lens through which Turkey viewed these issues differed by the end of the period. After this strong verbal protest, another incident where two border patrols were fired on by the Russians, leaving one dead on 21 August 1938, at Posof, was reported.[719] Two shooting incidents were reported on 30 November 1938, and 17 January 1939, in which one soldier was injured. On 13 February 1939,

[717] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34437-135519-1, 2 February 1929.

[718] The meeting of Turkish Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu with Soviet Ambassador in Ankara Terentiev, TDA, 571-34824-137394-71, 1 August 1938.

[719] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34941-137969-2, 24 August 1938.

another shooting incident in which one Turkish soldier was injured was reported.[720] The Soviet side usually responded by stating that they had a different version of the story in which Turkish soldiers or patrol dogs tried to attack Russian soldiers. Regarding an incident on 13 September 1938, in response to a request for an explanation by the Turkish side on 28 February 1939, the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated that Russian soldiers fired at the dog from the Turkish side but not at the Turkish soldiers. [721] On 3 March 1939, the Turkish Foreign Ministry urged the Turkish Embassy in Moscow to take up these attacks with the Soviet authorities, which had been rising for the last four or five months.[722] In late March 1939, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Zekai Apaydın, reported to the Foreign Ministry that he had sent his counsellor to the Soviet Foreign Ministry to discuss important issues, including the incidents along the border.[723] He wanted his counsellor to relay his message that despite good political relations between their countries, the hostility displayed by [Soviet] border troops against Turkish troops had reached a high level, and if their friendship did not provide security along the border, the work of diplomatic organs would be futile. The counsellor reminded that "as my ambassador told Mr Potemkin lately, our friendship should at least serve the advantage of granting the other security along the Turkish-Soviet border if one of us is engaged in a war. Should it not? And for this reason, to make this possible, soldiers need to see the soldiers of the neighbouring country not as enemies but as friends and brothers-in-arms. This notion needs to be enforced by their seniors."[724] The Ambassador noted that the Soviet official conferred and told his counterpart that they placed great

[720] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34824-137394-21, 22 February 1939.

[721] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 571-34824-137394-21, 22 February 1939.

[722] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow TDA, 571-34824-137394-16, 3 March 1939.

[723] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35230-138605-2, (page 2-3), 21 March 1939.

[724] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35230-138605-2, 21 March 1939, 3: "Sefirimin son mülakatta Mösyö Potemkine dediği gibi bizim dostluğumuz hiç değilse yarın ikimizden biri bir harple meşğul olduğumuz zaman Soviyet-Türk hududunu mütekabilen karşı taraf askerlerine emniyetle bırakması gibi bir faideyi temin etmeli değilmi? Halbuki bunu temin için askerlerin karşılarındaki komşu devlet askerlerini hasım değil dost devlet ordusunda bulunan silah arkadaşları olarak tanıması ve bunu bilmesi için de aid olduğu makamlar tarafından bu zihniyetin onlara yerleştirilmesi lazımdır."

importance on friendship with Turkey, keeping that factor in mind, also noting that they had apologized about the most recent border incident and that necessary action to punish those Soviet officials would be taken.[725] However, these continued to end with Turkish casualties. Believing that the Soviet Union still placed importance on friendship with Turkey, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Zekai Apaydın reported that in the continuing incidents, two soldiers were killed and two were injured.[726] In June 1939, he urged Ankara that some circles, fascists, were expecting a conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union from these border incidents, and to avoid falling into this plot, strict orders must be given to border administrators.[727] These efforts did not yield any results, and violations and attacks by both parties continued until the end of the period.

5.4.2. Dealing with the Major Incidents: The Revolts in Anatolia

While minor border issues were not much discussed in the later historiography of Turkish-Soviet relations, there were major discussions revolving around the alleged Soviet support for the revolts that occurred in Eastern Anatolia in the interwar period. This narrative was closely related to the Cold War context. For instance, Reşat Hallı wrote during the Cold War period in 1980, without much evidence, that there was Soviet support behind such acts within Turkey before World War II.[728] Bilal Şimşir, argued for continuous Russian-Soviet support from the Ottoman to the Republican period.[729] This was largely based on decades of confrontation until the end of World War I and the recommencement of confrontation after World War II. In essence, the situation during the interwar years was completely different. After the Cold War, with access to archives and the disappearance of mental constraints

[725] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-35230-138605-2, (page 3), 21 March 1939.

[726] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34824-137363-104, 17 June 1939.

[727] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34824-137363-104, 17 June 1939.

[728] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 25-6.

[729] Bilal Şimşir, *Kürtçülük I 1787-1923* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007) and Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 207.

imposed by the binary thinking of the Cold War years, historian Mehmet Perinçek produced a catalogue of attitudes within the Soviet Union against these events in the interwar years using Soviet archives and publications of the time.[730] These, in essence, are compatible with the general Soviet attitude of limiting potential foreign interference and the use of subversive acts by imperial powers against countries the Soviets expected to maintain their sovereignty in the south. Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were all seen from this perspective by the Soviet Union in their struggle to free their affairs from imperial powers, mainly Britain.

The British actions around Mosul and Britain's role and use of its military, particularly planes, were of concern to Turkey. The Turkish authorities wanted to understand the Soviet perspective on these events. In a note on 18 September 1924 to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoğlu), Prime Minister İsmet Paşa, after summarising that Turkey had deployed troops to Hakkari to suppress the Nestorian rebels, this action on the border with Mosul attracted violations by the British planes prompting Turkish protest at the League of Nations, he asked since they mobilised significant amount of troops from the Russian border, whether rumours that the Soviet Defence Commissar Trotsky had travelled to the Caucasus to command an operation were credible. [731] İsmet Paşa also reminded ambassador the need and importance of careful observation of the Russian side to detect any signs of opportunism that might develop on the Soviet side.[732] In his reply to this note, on 20 September 1924, the Turkish Ambassador responded that he had read in a newspaper a couple of days earlier that Trotsky was resting and that he had not heard about his departure to the Caucasus, but he would investigate the matter.[733] The Ambassador noted that although Russians would not rule out benefiting from a favourable opportunity in the future, under the current circumstances, they were

[730] Mehmet Perinçek, *Sovyet Devlet Kaynaklarında Kürt İsyanları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011). In his book Bayram Yurtçiçek compiled Soviet reactions to Ağrı rebellion. See Bayram Yurtçiçek, *Kürt İsyanları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2017), 152-62.

[731] The Turkish Prime Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34690-136726-13, 18 September 1924.

[732] The Turkish Prime Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34690-136726-13, 18 September 1924.

[733] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34690-136726-14, 20 September 1924.

trying to establish relations with others, particularly with France, by showing that they were peaceful. The Soviet involvement in internal disturbances in China, the constant alertness due to a border dispute with Poland, and the fact that he would not consider any action to benefit from Turkey's position with regard to Mosul, and moreover the situation in the Caucasus was not in their favour to seek such an adventure. He added that he would work to clarify the situation in greater detail.[734]

In a note dated 1 June 1925, the Turkish military attaché in Moscow, Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), reported back to Ankara about Soviet Defence Commissar Frunze's views on the Şeyh Said Revolt.[735] In the meeting, Frunze expressed his pleasure at the fast repression of the Kurdish uprising and said that he suggested to the Soviet Foreign Ministry to propose to Turkey that he was ready to offer Russian planes to be utilised against the rebels, but the Ministry replied that these were not needed as the rebellion was suppressed quickly.[736] In this meeting, Frunze also underlined that the establishment of an independent Kurdistan and its union with Iran would never be in Russia's interest.[737] This line was maintained by the Soviet Union throughout the period under consideration until the beginning of World War II. These rebellions were regarded as backward and archaic counter-revolutionary movements provoked by imperial powers, and their suppression was in the interest of the Soviet Union. From this perspective, it should be noted that Russian planes were available for use against rebels engaged in an uprising against King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan later in 1928.[738] In the detailed analysis of the Turkish system on such revolts in the work *Taşnak-Hoybun* in 1931, Turkish authorities had also drawn similarities between these separate incidents in Turkey with those witnessed in Afghanistan and

[734] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34690-136726-14, 20 September 1924.

[735] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34695-135212-8, 1 June 1925.

[736] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34695-135212-8, 1 June 1925.

[737] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34695-135212-8, 1 June 1925.

[738] The Turkish Embassy in Kabul to the Turkish Foreign Ministry TDA, 500-8125-55231-1, 20 November 1928.

Iran, as they perceived these as attempts by groups inside acting in treason against reforms and attempts for development, provoked and assisted by imperial powers.[739] As exemplified by a cartoon in *Milliyet* in 1930, Turkey viewed this as a struggle against various phenomena. In the caption of the cartoon, it was noted that the Turkish nation managed to finish (by slaying each serpent) "occupation", "sultanate", "madrasas", "religious reactionism", "Arabic letters" and was now about to finish the "brigandage" once and for all. It was also noted that the armed bandits in Iran were crossing the border to attack Turkey and asked whether Iran had no power to stop these attacks within its own borders. This summed up the regime's perspective on all interwar rebellions and shared a common understanding with the Soviet Union (Figure 5.9).



Figure 5.9. A cartoon from 1930.

Source: *Milliyet*, 3 July 1930.

The Red Army perceived the rebellions similarly to the Turkish National Army. They perceived these as archaic local forces collaborating opportunistically with foreign powers to undermine the rule of the central authority. In the *Great Soviet*

[739] *Taşnak-Hoybun*, 55.

Encyclopedia, published in 1937 and accepted as an official reference work, it was noted that the incident in Ağrı against Turkey was the work of agents of imperialism and counter-revolutionary Dashnaks, who were also against the Soviet Union.[740] Another common point was Iran. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union were concerned with their neighbour Iran, as it facilitated these bandits and was open to the British influence. Both Soviet and Turkish authorities perceived their Iranian counterparts as ignoring the problems caused by these groups along the border concerning for their neighbours. Turkish authorities were careful to keep Iranian authorities informed, but this led to failures. For example, the Turkish General Staff underlined that one of the reasons for not getting a conclusive result during the 1st Ağrı Operation in 1926 was that the Turkish commander informed the commander of the Iranian border troops, thus missing the opportunity of surprise against rebels, implying that the commander passed this information to the rebels.[741] The Turkish side remained suspicious of the Iranian side for lending support to the rebels throughout the period.[742] In both the first and second operations and later in the third, rebels and their leadership fled to Iran and found a safe haven there despite the Turkish Army's actions to prevent them.[743] Although they received support, rebel leaders accused Iran of cooperating with Turkey in explaining their failure.[744] The rebel leader İhsan Nuri and others with their families passed to Iran and stayed there after their failure in 1930.[745]

The rebel leader İhsan Nuri was trained as an Ottoman officer and then joined the War of Independence, fighting on the Eastern Front. As an officer, he reached the rank of captain in the Turkish National Army, serving along the border and for a time as the commander of border troops in Bayazıt on the Soviet border.[746] Turkish

[740] *Большая советская энциклопедия* 13 (Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1937), 533, cited in Rohat Alakom, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması* (İstanbul: Avesta, 2020), 89-90.

[741] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 169.

[742] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 213.

[743] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 172 and 214, 216-8.

[744] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları: Ağrı İsyanı Raporları,* ed. Sedat Ulugana (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2024), 195.

[745] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 54.

[746] In his memoirs İhsan Nuri (1892-1978), claimed he reached to the rank of major in the Turkish National Army in 1924 and after he deserted and rebelled in 1928, he was promoted to the rank of

authorities claimed that he deserted with soldiers in his company to the British side, seeking refuge in British Iraq during the suppression of the Nestorian Revolt of 1924 in Hakkari, and then moved to Ağrı in 1927.[747] He despised the Bolsheviks and considered them the main obstacle to the establishment of an independent Armenia and independent Kurdistan.[748] İhsan Nuri claimed that during 1930 revolt, Russian troops crossed Aras River to suppress them and to help Turkey as Turkey managed to muster Russian and Iranian support by claiming İhsan Nuri was working for the British.[749]

Although Turkey considered these acts brigandage by late 1928, the changing nature of the events in the east was also noticed. Inspector General of the 1st Inspectorate General İbrahim Tali Bey (Öngören) pointed to the joint Armenian-Kurdish efforts in the Ağrı area and presented new preventive measures against them.[750] Based on the fact that the first two military operations in 1926 and 1927 did not yield the required outcomes and were getting signals of a new wave of troubles, the Turkish General Staff took new measures, identified pursuit zones, and set up a new command for pursuit in the area in 1928.[751]

Turkish authorities established that Armenian Dashnaks and some Kurds were brought together under a new organisation named Dashnak-Hoybun, and believed that this was done by the British authorities against Turkey and also against the Soviet Union. After the suppression of the third attempt in Ağrı, Turkish authorities described this organisation as having the foundation and structure from Dashnaks, having its spirit from the British, and the flesh from the Kurds.[752]

---

general. Therefore, sources sympathetic to him refer to him as İhsan Nuri Paşa. *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 22, 47-8. From the Turkish General Staff perspective, he was a captain who deserted and performed an act of treason also reminding that in the past foreign intelligence services presented the title of general to Armenian gang leaders who killed most Kurds when they were rebelling. *Taşnak-Hoybun*, 56 and 69-70.

[747] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the General Staff, TDA, 533-8261 56427–50, 30 November 1927.

[748] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 35.

[749] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 199-201.

[750] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 227.

[751] Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar*, 227-8.

[752] *Taşnak-Hoybun*, 12-13: "Bu suretle temeli ve iskeleti Taşnaklardan ruhu İngilizlerden ve eti Kürtlerden ibaret olan bu cemiyete…".

This organisation was established in 1927 after a series of meetings held in Lebanon between September and October 1927, with the participation of 17 representatives from several Kurdish organisations and tribal chiefs to discuss the political future of the Kurds in Turkey.[753] The goals set included primarily fighting Turkey to create a Kurdish entity and collaborating with Armenians.[754] In October 1927, the Dashnak and Kurdish committee Hoybun signed a treaty of cooperation in Beirut, sealing their collaboration. They agreed to recognize the right to independence of Kurdistan and United Armenia and to work on delimiting the border between them later, depending on the pre-war indigenous Kurdish and Armenian populations, as stipulated in the Treaty of Sèvres.[755]

The leading figures of this organisation openly noted that they were established by Armenians, gaining support and control of resources and manpower in French-controlled areas in Lebanon and Syria, and Hoybun was behind the Ağrı revolts.[756] The organisation had its headquarters in Aleppo, Syria, which was under the French mandate.[757] French authorities believed in the likely benefits of having this organisation under their control and offered them a place and freedom of activity.[758] They were well organised by forming and appointing committees and a supreme military commander. The Dashnaks provided organisational support and ideological back-up to Kurdish propaganda of Hoybun in Western public opinion and at international forums such as the Second Socialist International.[759]

---

[753] Jordi Tejel, "The Last Ottoman Rogues: The Kurdish-Armenian Alliance in Syria and the New State System in the Interwar Middle East," in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires*, ed. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan and Alp Yenen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 364.

[754] Tejel, "The Last Ottoman Rogues," 364.

[755] Tejel, "The Last Ottoman Rogues," 365.

[756] Prens Sureyya Bedirhan, *Kürt Davası ve Hoybun,* trans. Dilara Zirek (İstanbul: Med Yayınları, 1994), 10.

[757] Müzehher Yamaç, *Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ağrı İsyanı 1926-1930* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2019), 60.

[758] Yamaç, *Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ağrı İsyanı*, 109.

[759] Tejel, "The Last Ottoman Rogues," 367.

As the Turkish military pursued brigands in the summer of 1930, Turkish newspapers reported Russian shelling targeting rebels trying to flee from Mount Ararat toward Soviet territory and Soviet border troops preventing their entry.[760] In his memoirs published in newspapers in 1953, a Turkish officer who took part in the military operation from 1929 onwards noted that on 25 June 1930, in a raid by rebels at Aralık in the Iğdır district, the Turkish military contingent had to withdraw to the Aras River in desperation, and the Russian border troops took them to their side to cover them against 500 strong brigands.[761] This was also mentioned in the memoirs of the commander of the brigands, İhsan Nuri, as he noted that the Russians helped the Turks by opening fire on Kurds and prevented the capture of Turkish soldiers who fled to their side (of the Aras River).[762] The Turkish officer also mentioned the Russian border troops sharing information with the Turkish border troops regarding the movements of large groups entering Turkey, asking the Turkish side if they would not intervene, as they posed a significant threat to Soviet settlements in the border area.[763]

In June 1930, the British military attaché in Tehran was approached by an Armenian who claimed to have served as War Minister before the Bolsheviks came to Armenia and came to Tehran on a secret mission wishing to get "British and Persian support for the Turkish Kurds of Ararat".[764] The military attaché passed the readout to the British Ambassador in Tehran, who then shared it with the British Foreign Secretary. The person identified himself as "Reuben Pasha" and among many other things he claimed the Turkish Army had many difficulties in maintaining forces in the region and the Soviets were allowing supplies for the Turkish army to be forwarded on

[760] *Akşam*, 14 July 1930; *Cumhuriyet,* 14 July 1930; *Cumhuriyet*, 17 July 1930.

[761] *Bir Türk Subayının Ağrı İsyanı Hatıraları*, ed. Rohat Alakom (İstanbul: Avesta, 2011), 72 and 87.

[762] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 81.

[763] *Bir Türk Subayının Ağrı İsyanı Hatıraları*, 82. This large group with 400 tents was estimated to have 800 rifles and well known for their fierce fighting intentions. They were running away from Iranian troops as they had clashes. Turkish Gendarme established that they were not intending to fight anymore, and their weapons were collected. After some time, they were resettled in the Thrace of Turkey in the west.

[764] Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu*, 183.

Soviet railways through the Soviet Union.[765] His only request was that the Ararat Kurds be supplied with ammunition by the British from Iraq, unofficially. The military attaché's response was that this request was ridiculous, and he would not even consider mentioning the matter seriously to His Majesty's minister.[766] In his memoirs, İhsan Nuri mentioned his coordination and lobbying with "Rupen Paşa" with the Iranian authorities.[767] This person must be Ruben Ter Minasian (1882-1951) who served as the minister of war in the Bureau-government of Ohanjanian. He played a leading role in the suppression of Bolshevik riots and fought against the Turks. After the Bolsheviks secured their control in Armenia, he fled to Iran and then to France, Egypt, and Lebanon. He finally settled in Paris, France.[768] Turkish authorities noted that "Ropen Paşa" attended a congress in Paris during the establishment of the Dashnak-Hoybun organisation.[769]

However, Turkish official sources noted nothing on active Russian military involvement in the suppression of these incidents in Ağrı. There seems to be active support from the Red Army at the local level. Their support by sealing their border was valuable enough to give Turkish authorities a chance to concentrate more on the rebels on their side and deal with putting pressure on Iran during the process. Due to the urgency of the issue and to get a conclusive action from the Iranian side, Mustafa Kemal Paşa replaced the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran and appointed former military figure Hüsrev Bey (Gerede) as Ambassador to talk about these military affairs. He was quickly dispatched in August 1930.[770] Mustafa Kemal Paşa also personally sent messages to the Shah to force him into action with regard to issues alongside the border. In his memoirs, Hüsrev (Gerede) clearly noted that his unexpected appointment to Tehran while he and his family were making preparations

[765] Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu*, 184.

[766] Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu*, 184.

[767] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 49-50.

[768] *Hairenik*, https://hairenik.com/vfp/rouben-ter-minasian/?srsltid=AfmBOoq-QsSI5FkDS7uYMjDmtTe6oRkF-s8NYzevrRv2pEpze97A_fEv, accessed on 8 November 2024.

[769] *Taşnak-Hoybun*, 13.

[770] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 337.

to move to Warsaw was about to end never-ending incursions by the tribes using the difficulty of the border demarcation to be settled with Iran. He would work on the Iranian side of the matter and the section of Küçük Ağrı that was in the Iranian territory, which was the only available route to escape from Turkey to Iran. This section was the escape route that prevented an effective military encirclement of the bandits/rebels in this area.[771] Hüsrev Bey wrote that for the most challenging part of his journey from Batumi to Baku through Tbilisi in his rush to be in Iran as soon as possible he managed to get Soviet support through facilitation of his friend then Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Yakov Zakharovich Surits.[772] The Soviet Union mobilised its troops on its side of the border to prevent the withdrawal of fleeing rebels from the Turkish military.[773] This was effective enough for Turkey, as its expectation from its neighbours was to protect their side of the border, which was geographically complicated by its rough terrain due to the Ağrı and Küçük Ağrı mountains.

In the rough terrain, being more familiar with the area and with various caves and knowing the escape routes, the brigands held an advantage, but the Turkish military's extensive use of aircraft created a factor that brigands could not counter. Both in the press and in the accounts of the incidents, the effectiveness of the planes was mentioned.[774] In an intelligence note to Prime Minister İsmet Paşa, the Interior Minister wrote that brigands were greatly scared off from the planes, forcing them to move their tents as close to Iranian villages as possible.[775] The planes used by the Turkish military were 17 German-made Junkers from the 3rd Aircraft Battalion in Diyarbakır and 25 French-made Breguet 19/B2's from the 1st Aircraft Battalion in Eskişehir.[776] İhsan Nuri emphasised the role of these planes on the morale of his

[771] Hüsrev Gerede, *Siyasi Hatıralarım I, İran* (İstanbul: Vakit Basımevi, 1952), 23-5.

[772] Gerede, *Siyasi Hatıralarım I, İran*, 26.

[773] Yurtçiçek, *Kürt İsyanları*, 151.

[774] A detailed study of the aerial aspect of Turkish Army's intervention was published later in 1948 by a pilot who took part in these operations. See Fahri Uçantürk, *1930 Yılı Ağrı Harekatına Karaköseden Bir Bakış* (Eskişehir: Hava Okulu Matbaası, 1948).

[775] The Turkish Interior Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, BCA, 30-10-0-0-112-753-14, (annex 96A), 3 September 1929.

[776] Davud Kapucu, "1930 Ağrı İsyanı'nın Bastırılmasında Havacıların Rolü," *Bengi*, 1/2 (2021): 57.

group and gave an unrealistically high number of 100 planes as the Turkish army's high technology and high number weapon.[777] *Cumhuriyet* reported the words of one captured rebel stating that they were only concerned about avalanches in the mountains and now they suffered from planes that suddenly appeared above them.[778] For the first time, the Turkish army benefited from the use of planes in a military operation at this level, and for the first time, a parachute jump in an emergency was attempted, but unfortunately, it resulted in the death of the pilot. Increasing the number of planes in the inventory and the use of modern methods had once again emerged as an important outcome of the long series of operations in Ağrı.[779] The importance attached to aviation proved that it was well-founded, and the Turkish military could only obtain more of these that could bring about a step change from one address in the world, namely, the Soviet Union and its Red Army.

5.4.3. Maritime Borders

On the maritime front, the delimitation of the naval border in the Black Sea was not on the agenda during the interwar period. This became a matter of negotiation beginning with the end of World War II, and through successive negotiations, both sides agreed on the naval border in the 1970s and the 1980s.[780] The most critical issue of transit through the Turkish Straits was covered by multinational treaties, such as the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and the Montreux Convention of 1936. In terms of bilateral regulations, both sides reached an agreement on the naval armament issue as both sides had always watched with great care the investment made in their navies and the activities of ship movements in the Black Sea theatre. The parties signed a protocol concerning naval armament in the Black Sea on 7 March 1931, in Ankara.[781] Sporadic naval incidents involving fishing boats and their harassment by gunboats were recorded during this period. The Interior Ministry

[777] *İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları*, 203-4 and 207.

[778] Kapucu, "1930 Ağrı İsyanı'nın Bastırılmasında Havacıların Rolü," 61.

[779] Rüştü, *Eşkıya Takibi Usulleri*, 26.

[780] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 30.

[781] Ökçün, *Guide to Turkish Treaties*, 226.

informed the Foreign Ministry about a violation by a Soviet boat from Batumi conducting a search in Turkish waters on 19 May 1930.[782] These incidents continued until the end of the period, prompting no serious response from either side, only finding place in diplomatic correspondence.[783]

5.5. Conclusion

The borders between Turkey and the Soviet Union were not drawn by imperial powers. Both parties had long agreed to keep maritime and land border issues to themselves. From the Turkish perspective, after Imperial Russia, under the Bolshevik rule, borders in the east and north meant security, enabling much-needed resources to be transferred to be used in the fight in the west against the occupying forces during the War of Independence. This feature remained until World War II.

Turkish and Soviet military bureaucracies engaged with each other daily along the border to oversee daily operations and manage incidents. The Turkish military bureaucracy played a leading role in establishing and managing the border. Despite the existence of potentially confrontational issues, neither opted to let these issues get out of hand or allowed these to escalate to a level that would spiral into a major crisis between the two states. Both military bureaucracies established joint mechanisms to determine the border, and after agreeing on a borderline, they needed to attend to violations along the border committed by individuals or groups. To address these criminal acts, they held meetings, set up bilateral mechanisms, established commissions, and signed protocols and conventions.

Incidents of various forms and scales were reported throughout the period. Despite difficult incidents and strong language reaching to insults in official correspondence, both continued to make strong emphasis on “friendship reaching to brotherhood” between the two countries and the need to address all incidents in that spirit. All of

[782] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Interior Ministry, TDA, 571-34458-135729-12, 5 June 1930.

[783] For example, another late one in 1938, see the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-34941-137969-9, 9 June 1938.

these were categorised as minor incidents in the texts. From the Turkish perspective, the number of attacks from the Soviet side, particularly against Turkish border troops, increased dramatically by late 1938 and 1939, but still reference to friendship and willingness to solve these through meetings were retained. The effect of the change in the nature of military bureaucracies' relations that began in late 1936 can be traced in these events. Engagement began to be less encompassing, contacts were not followed, and issues were left to drift, left to their own initiative.

During this period, neither side perceived a major military threat from the other, and their focus had been on observing the moves of the other rather than fortifying or deploying more troops to the border areas in the interwar years, unlike the period preceding and succeeding this period. They also refrained from acts that would cause concern, could be understood, or signalled military hostility to the other, although Turkey had to conduct military action in the area due to various forms of unrest in the wider area, and the Soviets had concerns over the actions and intentions of outside Western powers on its larger southern front, particularly in Iran. Large-scale brigandage turning into serious attempts of rebellions forced Turkey to allocate additional resources putting burden on its already difficult economic conditions. Turkey needed to secure support and achieve a working level cooperation with its neighbours and Turkey found Soviets to be responsive on these. The Soviet reaction to Turkey's military activity showcased Soviet leadership's and Red Army leadership's general approach to Turkey during the interwar years, which remained cordial, cooperative, and supportive against the perceived intentions and actions of outside imperial powers.

This continued until major shifts in the European security structure altered Turkey's perceptions of the Soviet Union. However, in the dynamic and unpredictable circumstances, the Red Army relayed a message to Turkey in 1940 that they would side with Turkey in case of a German move on them by abandoning the Turkish border to support Turkish defence against the threat on its West. However, structural factors pushed both sides onto opposite edges, and by the end of World War II, for the next decades until the demise of the Soviet Union, the border was completely fortified and denied any form of normal activity, making the distance between the

two unsurmountable and leaving the Soviet Union as Turkey's most distant neighbour.[784]

[784] See for example, İlhan Selçuk, *Uzak Komşu Rusya'dan Gezi Notları* (İstanbul: Köprü Yayınları, 1967), Aydın Yalçın, *Uzak Komşumuz Sovyetler* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1968).

CHAPTER 6

MILITARY ECONOMICS: AID, TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND KNOW-HOW

The primary task for the Turkish military bureaucracy had been to procure the army's needs and to modernise, to motorise, and build up deterrence in the wake of the War of Independence until the beginning of World War II. At the beginning of the interwar period, Turkey was a country born out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Moving onto peacetime meant a chance to lift the pressure on the country's budget from military spending, but this also brought about challenges in finding ways to address the needs of the army, as this peace period was questionable and the prospect for a new war remained high. The country perceived a confrontation to be likely. The anticipation of a new confrontation in the form of a total war, which would be more devastating than the previous one due to improvements in science, technology, and industrial output and due to unreconciled ambitions and revanchism prevalent in the European system, was real throughout the interwar period.

Although the exact choreography, in the sense of who would be the aggressor or what type of an alliance system would emerge, could not be predicted, the fact that the world was drifting in that direction was unquestionable among senior political and military circles. Therefore, achieving the objective of being prepared and ready was essential. However, this task proved to be very difficult for two reasons. First, there were major constraints in resources, limitations in capabilities, and difficulties in meeting the ends. Second, there was no willing Western country that would enter into a partnership with Turkey to facilitate funds and extend help in building capabilities by offering military products. Rather than providing support, attempts to undermine and impose additional difficulties were observed.

For a country perceiving an existential threat, military aid and trade naturally formed the solid ground and rationale for entering into a successful working relationship. Securing a relationship with a reliable partner was the desired objective. Alignment with a foreign partner in this core sector would bring about alignment on a wider level portfolio. Turkey tried to enter into a defence procurement relationship with all major countries. Turkish authorities first aimed to procure urgent needs and then aimed to develop and produce these locally through technology transfer and know-how. Overall, Turkey was kept at bay by the major European powers in this quest. The only country that signalled it could deliver a real and timely response in the interwar period was another outcast in a similar situation, the Soviet Union.

6.1. Centrality of Financial Concerns for the Turkish Military Bureaucracy

Contrary to widely held popular belief and focus seen even in academic literature[785], rather than heroism, gallantry, or brilliant tactics, issues about economics dominate the daily considerations of a military bureaucracy, especially for one that has entered into successive periods of warfare.[786] The selection and allocation of manpower from the population, equipping and enabling this selected group for the next war, and controlling and using all available resources define the success of a military bureaucracy. Turkish political and military seniors in the early years of the Republic were mostly veterans of successive wars since the beginning of the 20th century for an extended period of more than a decade. Turkish officers had recollections of periods of shortages, missing arms, and ammunitions, and capabilities that went beyond the military domain, causing suffering for the entire country and its

[785] Stephen Morillo and Michael F. Pavkovic, *What is Military History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 1-2.

[786] Military bureaucracies usually are the most sizeable organisations in countries even during peace time with natural increase during war time under mobilisation. Just like others in civil service, they perform daily routine work. Even during war time, only a very small minority in these organisations engage in "heroic" business. For example, if one would consider the last major war in recent history, during World War II, as Duncan Weldon noted, the infantry represented 14% of the British Army's strength and the armoured regiments just 8% and of the 700 or so men in an armoured regiment, less than half of them acted as tank crew while the majority served in the repair workshops, drove lorries for fuel and ammunition and worked as cooks or clerks. Majority of the crew had the function of enabling running of this enormously complex system. But performance of this majority in essence determined the success for the nation. See Duncan Weldon, "Logistics, the Allies' Wonder Weapon," *Engelsberg Ideas* (16 July 2025), https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/logistics-the-allies-wonder-weapon/, accessed on 17 July 2025.

population. The traumatic experiences of the Balkan Wars taught officers the dangers of divisions in the officer corps and poor commandership. World War I taught officers about the problems caused by foreign commanders and decisions taken by another country's general command's strategic, operational, or tactical priorities. These were lessons well taken, and measures regarding these were well implemented in the Republic's roadmap with regard to politics in the army, the issue of command, and relations with the rest of the state bodies as detailed in Chapter 2. However, the lesson learned from the War of Independence regarding resources, the role of economics, and access to suitable weapons, ammunition, and logistics were the most difficult to overcome, as these were based on factors that would be more challenging to manage for the military bureaucracy.

After the proclamation of the Republic, the Turkish military bureaucracy quickly took steps to downsize manpower and concentrated on stationing troops in garrisons to reduce major additional costs. During this peacetime standing, even when large-scale uprisings threatening general security in the country occurred, there was reluctance to channel more funds to support military action for prolonged periods of deployments, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The country's limited resources were planned to be used for civilian infrastructure, industry, urban development, education, and culture. However, this did not mean neglecting the army's needs. Military bureaucracy was given a clear steer with regard to its role within the state system and the tasks it needed to fulfil. The army maintained its centrality in the budget and in securing the future of the state. Officers were expected to deliver results under these constraints. Turkish officers had developed a strong sense and understanding of the economic requirements needed to maintain an effective defence force and reach the level of a modern army dictated by fast-developing technology and its adaptations to the battlefield. At a closed session in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 18 November 1925, Minister of National Defence Recep Bey (Peker) declared that, in the government's understanding, the defence of the country was not only done through its army or its military equipment but also through its economic strength. Keeping this in mind, when asking for funds

from the budget for defence, the government was mindful of not paralyzing the economic strength.[787]

War and economy, the economics of war, *Harb İktisadiyatı*, were central to officers' thinking throughout the interwar period. This was defined in the framework of enabling the military to have access to the necessary resources to perform its military duties in both peacetime and wartime. This mindset was fully incorporated into military training and daily operations, as printed works indicated. For example, Nuri Refet (Korur) compiled a work based on debates in Germany that was published by the Turkish War Academy in 1927.[788] In 1928, the Turkish War Academy introduced the study of army structure into the curriculum, and the book by German instructor Hans Ritter was used.[789] In Ritter's *Ordu Teşkilatı* (Army Organisation), economic factors, that were effective on an army as an institution were covered in detail.[790] Drawing on the experiences of World War I, Ritter noted the change in the conditions of assembling, maintaining, and sustaining an army in the modern era with its links to industry, resources, and capabilities of the countries with examples from Germany, France, and Imperial Russia. The scale and size of the industrial production of weapons and ammunition increased 20 to 30 times compared to the beginning of the war. He also drew attention to the delicate and careful balance to be achieved in determining the number of people to be taken under arms versus the number to be kept as labourers in the production and transportation of the needed arms, ammunition, and supplies to the army.[791] He underlined one undisputable lesson learned in the war: there was no chance left for an army inferior in advanced technical means to fight successfully against an army with modern technological

[787] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları 23 Mart 1923- 23 Ekim 1934*, Volume 4 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 540.

[788] Nuri Refet (Korur), *Türkiye İçin Harb İktisadiyatı* (İstanbul: Askeri Akademiler Kumandanlığı Matbaası, 1927). Nuri Refet Korur (1899-1970) studied chemistry at University of Göttingen in Germany. He translated books of German instructors employed by the Turkish War Academy in the late 1920s.

[789] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*.

[790] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 535-7.

[791] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı,* 56-7.

means.[792] He gave an example to Turkish officers from the battles Germans waged against Russians by noting that a handful of German troops could successfully stand in the way of hordes of Russian troops and destroy them.[793] He noted that at times during World War I, Russians were sent in large groups against German lines without weapons in their hands or with some primitive weapons like spears.[794]

He gave a striking example of the difference between fighting a technologically equal or superior opponent and an inferior one. "In the East, when the Russian artillery began its fire, Germans would not care to take cover or even put aside their pipes in their hands as they would know Russians would very soon be out of ammunition and their targeting would not be accurate due to the guns they used. But in the West, when French artillery began firing, Germans immediately ran for cover".[795] For an army, having modern weapons and means was a must, and this was related to a country's economy and industry. Ritter informed the Turkish officers that "The more favourable the economic conditions and industry of the country, the greater the chances of success in a battle".[796] As specifically for Turkey, he also noted that probably Turkey's borders, population, and geographical organisation would not allow the occurrence of a battle at the scale witnessed in Europe, but in any case, he asked to pay attention to these factors, which were ignored by Germans before the war and were learned the hard way.[797]

Based on his experience and also on the latest available literature available through German experience of World War I as noted above, Mustafa Kemal Paşa's perspective on this critical aspect of army and effect of economics was made available through Afet (İnan)'s 1930 work *Askerlik Vazifesi* (The Military Duty), to

[792] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı,* 57.

[793] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı,* 57.

[794] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı,* 56.

[795] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 58.

[796] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı,* 58.

[797] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 58.

public and especially for Turkish officers.[798] It was posited that the war was not only about the activities of soldiers fighting along the fronts but also about the labour and activity of every citizen in a country.[799] In peacetime, this general activity must be directed toward the common aim of maintaining the protection of independence.[800] Supplying the army with state-of-the-art weapons, equipment, and means was determined by the economic condition of the country. Certainly, the aim should be to meet the needs of the army from within the country, as procurement from outside would not be always possible. Afet (İnan), in essence Mustafa Kemal Paşa, noted that an army lacking advanced technological means had almost no chance against technologically superior army therefore in army establishment modern means and weapons must be taken into consideration.[801]



Figure 6.1. The cover of *Resimli Perşenbe* magazine.

Source: *Resimli Perşenbe*, 10 December 1925.

[798] Afet, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan: Askerlik Vazifesi*, 31-2.

[799] Afet (İnan), *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan*, 32.

[800] Afet (İnan), *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan*, 32.

[801] Afet (İnan), *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan*, 31-2.

Based on this approach, the task of the Turkish military bureaucracy was to sustain the procurement of conventional weapons and equipment for its infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches and, more importantly, gain access to modern weapons and technologies developing rapidly in aviation and armoured forces. This need was publicly expressed. For instance, the cover of *Resimli Perşenbe*, a weekly magazine, published on 10 December 1925, declared, "To insure Turkey's life, we need planes and tanks" (Figure 6.1). At the time, such military technologies were developed exclusively by European powers, who perceived the Turkish Republic as an outcast. This hindered Turkey's chances of obtaining sufficient numbers of these items to build an effective modern army.

Young officers who had not experienced the consecutive wars of the 20th century and the War of Independence were mentally in stark contrast to that generation who had survived those years. The old generation's mentality was entirely different, using every opportunity and resource for the successful completion of a task. For example, in an anecdote in his memoirs, a young officer who graduated from the War College in 1930, Kenan Kocatürk, noted that as per his commander's order, he prepared a study for a conference to other officers about the ways to stop enemy tanks. As Turkey lacked anti-tank weapons in the late 1930s, he prepared his plan around the available artillery pieces and made calculations that would completely destroy the approaching enemy armour. In his feedback, his senior, a veteran colonel, commented that his theoretical scenario was good, but he asked the officers in the audience not to consider it. He advised the audience that since their tank numbers were not sufficient, they should not use weapons in their disposal to destroy them but rather work on plans and tactics enabling them to capture enemy tanks in good working order, which in turn would be used by them against the enemy.[802] This advice from the colonel was given in late 1939, when Turkey had tanks, but they were very limited in number.

As argued in the previous chapters, based on the changing character of war and unprecedented levels of industrialisation of war, Turkey drew lessons from World War I and its War of Independence regarding the totality of war. If total war was

[802] Kenan Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları* (İstanbul: KastaşYayınları, 1999), 209-10.

defined as using all resources of a country for war effort and taking measures to defend and protect a country's living and nonliving assets against enemy destruction, the Turkish political-military leadership's approach and actions throughout the interwar period should be considered a showcase example of this line of thinking. Turkey's approach to the total character of war and the war economy was largely based on its own experiences and understanding of developments. As two outcasts, the Soviet Union pursued an identical path with more headway owing to differences in their size, resources, and capabilities.

6.1.1. Meeting Urgent Needs of the National Army

During the War of Independence, to meet the needs of the nationalist forces, makeshift workshops to repair and modify weapons and produce ammunition for firearms and cannons were established. Officers and civilians worked to meet the needs of the soldiers on the front in the absence of proper industrial means. After the war, efforts to establish a domestic defence industry began in Turkey. Kırıkkale, east of Ankara, was chosen as the main site for establishing various arms and weapons factories.[803] After this decision, in 1924, new factories were established in Kırıkkale province and elsewhere. In Kırıkkale in 1927, a factory for cartridge production, in 1928 a brass factory, in 1931 a factory for steel manufacture and in 1939 factories for gunpowder, artillery and rifles were established.[804] In 1930, a shell factory was established in Kayaş, Ankara.[805] In addition to the majority of state-led initiatives, private entrepreneurs are involved in the defence industry. With the permission of the Turkish General Staff, Şakir Zümre established a factory in Haliç, İstanbul, to produce bombs for the Turkish Army throughout this period.[806]

---

[803] Hüsnü Özlü, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yükselen Gücü Türk Savunma Sanayii 1922-2022* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2023), 2.

[804] Suat Söylerkaya, "Türkiye'de Milli Harp Sanayii," *Türkiye Milli Harp Sanayii Semineri, 2-3-4 Ocak 1975* (Ankara: Türkiye Ticaret Odaları Sanayi Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği Matbaası, 1975), 77.

[805] Söylerkaya, "Türkiye'de Milli Harp Sanayii," 77.

[806] Özlü, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yükselen Gücü*, 51.

With these factories, the basic essential needs of the army, such as cartridges, artillery shells, and bombs, were met, but there was certainly a need for access to modern weapons of war, which were developing rapidly in this period, such as planes and armour. Turkey had to procure these from abroad and had to enter into an agreement with European powers who were the only actors capable of developing these weapons.

6.1.2. Efforts to Find Foreign Partners

Throughout the 1920s, Turkey engaged in talks with European powers to procure new and developed weapons of war but had only limited success. Very few items were purchased from the victors of World War I. Britain, France, and Italy allowed engagement and talks with the Turkish authorities but did not provide the necessary amount of equipment for Turkey's needs. The Turkish leadership was concerned about the prolonged talks without any results by Western powers. Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Bey (Kaya) in 1925 assessed that although Britain was no more an enemy, it still pursued a policy of undermining economic development of Turkey, but more importantly denied Turkey's access to means to develop its defence. He believed that Britain would eventually propose Turkey to supply modern weapons like planes but would only stall the process, whereby Turkey would be unable to obtain these and would lose valuable time.[807]

In the 1920s, Germany, the absolute loser of World War I who had historically strong defence industry, was limited in its capacity to develop and produce advanced weapons. Turkey entered into some partnerships with Germany in the field of aviation and also engaged with northern countries where major German weapon producers transferred their activities. Germany was also secretly engaged with the Soviet Union, using its territory to develop weapons. To avail strong limitations set upon the German military industry by the 1919 Versailles Treaty, Germany entered into contact with the Soviet Union as early as 1921.[808] The German military and

[807] Mustafa Solak, *Şükrü Kaya Atatürk'ün Bakanı* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2018), 65.

[808] Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army, 1928-1941," 70.

various private companies, such as Junkers, Rheinmetall, and Krupp, tried to survive and exist in partnership with the Soviet Union using its vast space and facilitation. Both sides worked together on planes, tanks, and chemical gas under a volatile political situation between their countries, which ended up with mixed outcomes for both.[809]

As an outcast, the Soviet Union also had difficulty meeting its advanced weapon needs from European countries. Russians were also allowed to receive small quantities and pieces of weapons from the West, which did not fully meet their needs. However, their situation was completely different from that of Turkey. After consolidating his power within the system following Lenin's death, Stalin embarked on his work in the economy with drastic changes in agriculture and industry. Between 1929-1931, he embarked on the collectivisation of agriculture with the aim of converting the countryside from independent villages to state-dominated collective state farms. In April 1929, with the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan, a grand plan to transform Soviet industry into a modern industrial powerhouse, began. This plan aimed to accomplish ambitious targets in steel, coal output, and electricity generation. A correspondent of *the New York Evening Post* was sent to observe the Soviet plan, and he reported back in 1931. Visiting various parts of the Soviet Union, he noted that his lasting impression of the entire undertaking was that the Soviet Union was a land at war: "I found an atmosphere of militant struggle, a nation under arms living figuratively but effectively under martial law and subsisting on the short rations of a beleaguered state."[810] He described this as an attempt to industrialise

[809] The German general, Hilmar von Mittelberger was an important figure in German Reichswehr's relationship with the Red Army. Between 1927 and 1932, he visited the Soviet Union ten times in a capacity which was highly 'illegal' according to the conditions of the Versailles Treaty. See Ziemke, *Red Army*, 180. The cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union ended in 1933. In January 1933, he retired from the German Army and signed a contract with the Turkish Army in February 1933. As a senior military instructor at the Turkish War Academy, he served until October 1939 and the Turkish General Staff remained in contact with him even after World War II, using and publishing his works as late as 1951 with reprints in 1969. See Von Mittelberger, *2. Dünya Harbi Işığı Altında Strateji,* trans. Salih Erkuş (Ankara: Genelkurmay 1 No. Basımevi, 1951) and a volume with four different works of General von Şikfus, *Harp Tarihine Methal*, trans. Salih Erkuş, Fon Mittelberger, *Büyük Sevk ve İdare Esasları, Harp Tarihi Notları,* trans. Salih Erkuş, V. Mittelberger, *2. Dünya Harbi Işığı Altında Strateji,* trans. Salih Erkuş (İstanbul: Harb Akademileri Basımevi, 1969). Also, see Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 182 and Resul Alkan, *Türk Ordusunda Son Alman General Hilmar von Mittelberger* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2022), 80 and 103-7.

[810] Hubert Renfro Knickerbocker, *The Soviet Five-Year Plan and Its Effect on World Trade* (London: John Lane the Bodley Head Ltd., 1931), 3.

overnight the most backward land in Europe to make vast Russia a self-contained entity, an impregnable fortress for Communism in which "the officers in the war are the 1,300,000 members of the Communist Party and the soldiers are the entire population" with "specific objectives to double power, oil, coal and steel production, triple metal production, quadruple machine production".[811] The primary objective of the economic policy was to convert the Soviet Union from an essentially agricultural country into an industrially developed one through the development of heavy industry.[812] The Soviet Union embarked on this under extraordinary conditions, reconstructed its industries to pre-war levels, and moved beyond a higher level without the aid of any foreign capital.[813]

Although it did not include specific provisions for defence at first sight, in accordance with the Soviet leadership's approach to the link between economy and military power, the aim was to enable the Soviet Union to have the industrial might to make it a military power.[814] The Red Army Chief of Staff continuously revised its plans to demand more production from developing industrial production. This momentum continued with the Second Five-Year Plan after the end of the first one in 1932. Soviet scientists and technicians, with their abundant essential resources and raw materials, began successfully manufacturing their weapon systems by copying Western designs.

Tank production for the Red Army was a highly successful example of copying Western designs. Earlier, between 1919-1921, based on captured French Renault FT-17s, the Soviets had managed to produce 15 tanks for the Red Army.[815] Trials of engineering tanks continued throughout the 1920s, but the real change in Soviet

[811] Knickerbocker, *The Soviet Five-Year Plan*, 4.

[812] Joseph M. Pavloff, *The Upbuilding of Soviet Russia: Five-year Plan for Industrial Development of the Soviet Union* (New York: AMTORG Trading Corporation, 1929), 33. Амторг, Американская Торговля (Amtorg, American Trade) was the trade representation of the Soviet Union in the US established in 1924.

[813] Pavloff, *The Upbuilding of Soviet Russia: Five-year Plan*, 10.

[814] Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army, 1928-1941," 68.

[815] Mikhail Baryatinsky, *Russian Armour Light Tanks* (Surrey: Allan Publishing, 2006), 2.

production began in the 1930s, when the Soviet Union adopted a plan to procure Western-produced tanks and armoured carriers for Soviet engineers to examine and study with the aim of introducing the best solutions to its domestic tank building.[816] A specialised procurement commission was formed, and the first visit was made to Britain to negotiate with Vickers-Armstrong. The British company refused to sell single models with overall design documentation, which led the Soviet delegation to agree to procure 20 tankettes and 15 tanks.[817] Soviet engineers then visited the US and procured two tanks from Walter Christie and the outcome of all these visits and work on the items procured, they managed to produce their T-27 tankette and T-26 tank which were adopted for service in 1931.[818] The T-27 tankette was based on the British Carden-Lloyd design, the T 26 tank was based on the British Vickers model, and the BT medium tank series was based on the American Water Christie design.[819]

6.1.3. The Soviet Option

Only after this turning point, when the Soviets successfully achieved manufacturing capability, Turkey and some other select countries managed to gain access to Soviet-manufactured armoured and motorised vehicles. The Soviet leadership was keen to provide its partners, including Turkey, with these systems throughout the interwar period. In line with the prevailing approach to totality of war and the undeniable link of it with economics, in addition to extending invitations to Turkish military delegations to visit Soviet defence manufacture enterprises and provide samples in the form of gifts and procurement contracts, the Soviet leadership shared information on the enabler of Soviet success, which was introducing five-year plans and promoting these with the Turkish side.[820] A similar approach with parallels in thinking and Soviet success led Turkey to adopt a similar approach with its

[816] Baryatinsky, *Russian Armour Light Tanks*, 5.

[817] Baryatinsky, *Russian Armour Light Tanks*, 5.

[818] Baryatinsky, *Russian Armour Light Tanks*, 5.

[819] Stone, "Industry and the Soviet Army, 1928-1941," 71.

[820] *SSCİ Halk İktisadiyatı Yapılan İşler ve Rakamlar SSCİ Ticaret Odası Moskova İlinka 6* (İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, [no date but most likely printed circa 1934 in Turkish]).

significantly more modest resources and capabilities, and Turkey became one of the first countries in the world to pursue five-year plans on the Soviet model.[821] Turkey became the first country to introduce five-year plans in the economy, preparing the first one in 1933 and the second in 1936, and began channelling resources to war preparations.[822] Unlike the Soviet experience, Turkey was unable to utilise the plans to achieve direct visible outcomes in the defence sector. It continued to rely on supplies from foreign sources despite the leadership's strong desire to produce all the modern weapons of war needed in the country.

As Turkey was in a rush to modernise and motorise its army throughout the interwar years, various delegations of experts, military officers, and politicians visited foreign countries, including the Soviet Union. During the Soviet visits, they were taken to factories and shown state-of-the-art Soviet weapons. Unlike others, the Soviets did not prolong, stall, or undermine the process or offer or sell outdated technologies. Mustafa Kemal Paşa told he believed unless they could bring new technologies to Turkey, they would not break dependence on foreign countries. He said "One needs to be blind or foolish not to see the cunning of foreign countries trying to bring outdated technologies with offers of incentives…We are founding a new and young Turkey. We do not need outdated technologies from friendly or enemy countries. We either have the newest ones and compete with them or endure and wait to reach a capacity to accomplish these [ourselves]".[823]

In a closed session at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 18 November 1925, Minister of Defence Recep Bey briefed members of the parliament about Turkey's defence needs, explained the difficulties faced by the country, and asked for their

[821] Hirst, *Against the Liberal Order*, 8 and Mehmed Gökhan Polatoğlu, *Türkiye Cumhrıiyeti Devleti'nin İlk Planlı Dönem Sanayileşme Faaliyetleri, 1934-1938* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2020), 56-9.

[822] Bilgiç, *Sanayi Planları ve Sovyet Kredisi*, 17, 51 and 53.

[823] İsmail Yavuz, *Mustafa Kemal'in Uçakları: Türkiye'nin Uçak İmalat Tarihi 1923-2012* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 5: "Eskimiş teknolojileri değil, en yeni teknolojiyi ülkeye getirmediğimiz, getiremediğimiz sürece yabancı ülkelere bağımlı olmaktan kurtulamayız… Eski teknolojileri bize kolaylıklar tanıyarak getiren yabancı devletlerin kurnazlıklarını anlamamak için insanın ya kör ya da aptal olması gerekir…Biz yeni genç bir Türkiye kuruyoruz. Dost düşman ülkelerin geride kalmış teknolojilerini gereksinmemiz yok. Ya en yenisini kurar, onlarla boy ölçüşürüz ya da biraz daha sabreder, bunu yapabilecek güce erişmemizi bekleriz".

support for the new government law allocating funds to meet the urgent needs of the army and establish a defence industry in the country.[824] The minister explained the difficulties for a country like Turkey to meet its defence needs after many years of war without having resources and industry. In his view, war could begin at any time. Turkey's neighbours invested in procuring new arms, and moreover, developed industrial Europeans worked tirelessly to restrict countries like Turkey from having access to weapons without their permission. Despite these increasing attempts against Turkey, he expressed determination to procure Turkey's weapon needs, even if that meant smuggling, to break this isolation and siege.[825] With this law, the Turkish government aimed to establish factories in the country in the first step, and until they were ready to obtain the urgent needs by procuring from abroad, and finally to support air force capability to the desired level.[826]

In November 1925, Colonel Eyüp (Durukan) was tasked with exploring military material in the hands of the Soviet Union and forming a list with a report to indicate items that could be obtained from them. [827] He travelled to Moscow with the Turkish Minister of Agriculture. Minister of National Defence Recep Bey told him that they had asked the Russians to help Turkey in terms of weapons, ammunition, and the defence industry, and they had agreed. Since he was best qualified to determine what they could obtain from them, he was sent on a special assignment to visit Russia.[828] During this visit, he met with senior political and military leaders. He was welcomed by Defence Minister Voroshilov and Head of Chief of Staff Tukhachevsky.[829] The

[824] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 537-48.

[825] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 544-5.

[826] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 542.

[827] Eyüp Durukan (1882-1963) was an artillery officer, who joined the Ottoman Army in 1903. He had visits to Germany, France, Austria and Great Britain on various assignments before World War I. He took part in the Balkan Wars, World War I and the War of Independence. He established an organisation to smuggle weapons from İstanbul to Anatolia during the War of Independence. He led the technical and procurement branch of the National Defence Ministry as a qualified expert of weapons, ammunition and needs of the army. He retired in 1941 as major general.

[828] Eyüp Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI: Cumhuriyet Yürüyor (1923- 1926)*, ed. Murat Uluğtekin (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2021), 456.

[829] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 495 and 499. Due to Bolshevik revolutionary attitude toward military uniforms and partly since his initial inquiry to learn the Red Army ranks was misleading,

Red Army set up a commission to work on items that could be offered to Turkey and assigned officers to show him weapons and ammunition.[830] Tukhachevsky told him that despite the Soviet arsenal was also old, they would still like to help.[831] The former Russian ambassador to Ankara, Aralov, and ambassador Yakov Zakharovich Surits facilitated the process.[832]The Turkish side tried to carry out this process quietly, being concerned about Western scrutiny.[833] In Moscow, the French Ambassador tried to explore and asked the Turkish Ambassador about the visit of the Minister of Agriculture. He became particularly suspicious about the colonel being in the visiting delegation fearing an alliance between Turkey and the Soviet Union.[834] Durukan refrained from attending any visits or programs attended by members of the foreign diplomatic community in Moscow. [835]

In very early date of December 1925, Durukan saw tanks and armoured vehicles on the way from a distance at a depot near Moscow, but his visit was about more conventional and basic needs such as rifles, machine guns, artillery, heavy artillery pieces including ones that could be used for coastal defence and also to learn whether Turkey could get help about chemical gas, defence against gas and also to explore whether the Soviets would be interested in establishment of defence industry in Turkey. His visit lasted for more than two months and upon his return Durukan presented his report to the authorities and also briefed Prime Minister İsmet Paşa, Minister of National Defence Recep Bey and Head of Chief of Staff Fevzi Paşa.[836]

Colonel Eyüp first mistaken Tukhachevsky to be a junior officer. He could only understand he was the highest-ranking officer in the room when he sat on the central seat in the meeting table. He also thought he was looking quite young for that role. Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 498-9.

[830] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 505.

[831] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 499 and 580-1.

[832] Yakov Zakharovich Surits (1882-1952) served as the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara from 1923 to 1934.

[833] Colonel Eyüp tried to hide his identity during his journey. Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 468.

[834] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 502.

[835] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 503 and 508.

[836] Eyüp Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII: İki Genç Cumhuriyet Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği (1926-1928)*, ed. Murat Uluğtekin (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2023),.8-9, 11 and 13.

All were satisfied with his report and observations and approved the commencement of the process of purchasing items selected and recommended by him.[837] The Prime Minister and the Head of Chief of Staff were more impatient and wanted to act fast, contrary to the Minister of National Defence, who, as the manager of the defence budget, wanted to press for more favourable conditions and amendments to the payment.[838] Based on Durukan's observations, Turkey submitted a list of items he was shown by the Soviet authorities. The Turkish Foreign Ministry wrote to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow about the decision to procure specific types of light and heavy artillery guns, coastal defence guns, packed howitzers, tractors to pull guns, and other types of ammunition and equipment.[839] No price was given to the Turkish side for the items, and Turkey relied on the Soviet expression of their earlier promise of a friendly approach to this transaction. The Turkish Embassy in Moscow was asked by Ankara to remind the Soviet government of the promise made by Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin when the embassy submitted the list.[840]

At the Ministry of National Defence, according to the technical evaluation, the consensus was that the inspected weapons and ammunition in the Soviet Union during Durukan's visit were not the weapons of the future and were similar to the current level of the ones Turkey already had. The officials also suggested that, provided the purchase of these would not hinder Turkey's main armament move with higher costs, this material would be useful to back up the current strength of the army.[841] While the officers were discussing his report, another group of officers returned from the Netherlands and debriefed their seniors. In their case, seniors were

[837] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII,* 8 and 10.

[838] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 79.

[839] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA 571-35936-141207-47, 23 February [1924]. There is no date on the original two-page document. TDA officials catalogued these documents with date 23 February 1924 which corresponds to a date earlier than Durukan's departure to Moscow which was in late 1925. Therefore, these documents must be from year 1926 based on his notes. Another document in the TDA has a draft of this letter to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow with date 1 March 1926. See the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-35936-141207-44, 1 March 1926.

[840] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-35936-141207-44, 1 March 1926.

[841] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 11.

not content with what they presented to them, and the officers wanted to defend their case, finally telling them that these were cheaper than junk, to which Durukan responded by noting that "Europeans were searching for junk from us, I said they can take these"[842] Throughout his memoirs, Durukan noted the offering of old technology and hiding of essential specifications while pushing to sell in their biddings by European companies such as German Rheinmetall or the British side.[843]

With the Soviet side offering more favourable conditions, the remaining obstacles were cleared. To complete the actual purchase of the items, Durukan was dispatched again to the Soviet Union, leaving on 2 July 1927, with a delegation this time. The weapons and ammunition purchased arrived in Turkey on different dates on five ships.[844] During his second visit, Durukan continued to adopt a low profile and hid himself from Western officers in Moscow. He noted that he did not attend the farewell meeting of the returning Turkish military attaché at the train station on 16 April 1928, due to his concern of being seen by the Western attachés.[845] Afterwards, as a result of these interactions with Russians, which sometimes proved to be challenging, various pieces of artillery and the required ammunition were supplied.

Various disagreements between the technical or bureaucratic cadres of both sides were resolved by political-military seniors due to the support decision made at the strategic level.[846] In one case, for example, Soviet Defence Minister Voroshilov himself intervened to a point of disagreement on the quality of gunpowder, and he personally provided assurance that they would sell the item in good order, as it was in their interest to see the Turkish Army strong, and their desire was to present the best quality items, as this was his best friend Frunze's legacy and wish. [847] He told

[842] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 8 and 12: "Avrupalılar bizden hurda arıyorlar. Bunları alsınlar' dedim".

[843] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 78 and 190.

[844] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII,* 553-6.

[845] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 476.

[846] For disagreements on technical or trade terms which would normally derail the process but were averted by senior intervention see Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 237-43 and 246. Defence Minister Voroshilov, his deputy and Foreign Minister Chicherin put their weight during the process.

[847] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 254-5 and 512.

Durukan that there were no secrets in their army for the Turkish Army to emphasize their willingness to support.[848] In response to him, Durukan said to Voroshilov that "We soldiers understand each other more quickly when it comes to agreement, and indeed, that is how it has been. As long as we soldiers understand each other, it's natural for nations to love each other."[849] Defence Minister Voroshilov's oversight of the processes was constant, as was Foreign Minister Chicherin's. Turkish ambassadors in Moscow periodically called on them when they faced hurdles at the technical level. In one example, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Tevfik Bey (Bıyıklıoğlu), visited Voroshilov to ask for his help with a payment issue and to speed up the delivery of military material to Sevastopol. After his visit, the Ambassador reported to Ankara that Voroshilov said he was working on the fast delivery of shipments as delays were caused by their effort to provide better items as a sign of their sincere friendship and also added that they had never treated this as a trade affair.[850]

Despite efforts, no progress was achieved in areas of chemical gas, gas masks, planes, armoured cars, tanks, and setting the Russian support in the establishment of factories for defence manufacturing in Turkey. Turkish officers witnessed strong Russian motivation to establish their own defence industry during this period. Efforts to procure more conventional items continued. To supply its sea mine needs, the Turkish Ministry of National Defence wanted to deploy an expert to the Soviet Union to visit their production facilities in April 1929, and this request was accepted by the Soviet side in July 1929.[851] Both sides were aware that Soviet technology and production were not on par with European ones. Soviet Defence Minister Voroshilov openly stated this to Durukan in Moscow, and this continued afterwards as well by

[848] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, .512: "Diyebilirim ki bizim ordumuzda Türk ordusu için mahram yoktur. Yalnız her ordunun kendine mahsus hususi gizli işleri istisna edilirse, Türk ordusu için gizli bir şeyimiz yoktur."

[849] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, .512: "Anlaşma hususunda biz askerler birbirimizi daha çabuk anlarız ve nitekim öyle olmuştur. Biz askerler anlaştıkça milletler birbirine muhabbeti tabiidir."

[850] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-36206-143255-2, 8 April 1928.

[851] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA, 571-36000-142241-5, 17 April 1929 and the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish National Defence Ministry, TDA,-571 36000-142241-1, 5 July 1929.

the mid-1930s during the Turkish delegation's visit to manoeuvres in Kiev in 1934.[852] However, within its current capabilities, the Soviet Union engaged in talks with Turkey to supply more conventional needs, but the real change and flow occurred when the Soviets embarked on their mass production of modern items such as tanks, armoured cars, trucks, tractors, and planes.

6.1.4. Access to Modern Vehicles of War through the Soviets

In the interwar period, in addition to having planes, the ultimate desire for armies to be considered modern was to adapt motorisation and have armoured cars and tanks in their armies. This defined their status as a modern army worldwide. The first tank was used in battle in 1916 by British forces against German forces on the Western Front. The Ottoman Army faced British tanks in Gaza in 1916. Unlike the Germans, reports of their use in Gaza noted no significant surprise or psychological impact on the Ottoman side. The technical problems and special characteristics of using them in open plains like deserts, combined with the Turkish officers' and soldiers' determined nature and character in improvisation and bringing practical solutions to immediate needs, proved to keep their impact to a minimum.[853] A slight modification to use effective artillery pieces from Ottoman allies fixed the issue of tanks trying hard to advance in this case.[854] During the War of Independence, Turkish soldiers and civilians once again encountered tanks in the defence of Antep (modern Gaziantep) and during the Allied occupation of İstanbul when French tanks appeared in the city's central areas. The new Republic had attempted to procure tanks and armoured vehicles earlier but had little success. In 1928, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ordered the procurement of armoured and motorised vehicles for the army.[855] By the end of the 1920s, the Turkish army had only one French Renault FT-17 in its hands,

[852] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 256-7 and the Report by Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Doğan, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-5, (page 1), 1934.

[853] M. Mazlum, "Tanklar, Kudretleri, Muharebe Usulleri, Taarruz ve Müdafaada Bunlara Karşı Tarzı Hareket ve En Müessir Silah," *Aylık Topçu Mecmuası* 6/66 (1930), 47 and Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 32.

[854] Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 31-2.

[855] Metin Okçu, "Zırhlı Birliklerin Tarihçesi ve Kuruluşundan Bugüne Zırhlı Birliklerde Kullanılan Zırhlı Araçlar," *Savunma ve Havacılık,* 53/1 (1996), 70.

but this was used for tactical training of the infantry to get them familiar with these vehicles on the battlefield as reflected in the 1928 training session at Maltepe Military School where officers examined this tank with interest (Figure 6.2). In an article in *Askeri Mecmua*, Colonel Rauf noted that there were no tanks in the army yet, and all training and education activities about the tank were about familiarisation and learning ways of action against them.[856]



Figure 6.2. Turkish officers at Maltepe Military School in 1928 with a French-made Renault tank.

Source: From the author's private collection.

There had been no progress in procuring such vehicles, and this changed with the gifts from the Soviet Union in 1932. On his way back from his visit to the Soviet Union in 1932, as noted in Chapter 4, a Soviet military delegation, led by General Fokin, joined Prime Minister İsmet Paşa's delegation on their return to Turkey with the military equipment presented by the Soviet Union, which consisted of two T-26A tanks, four T-27 tankettes, ten tractors, two trucks, and a bus[857] (Figure 6.3). These

[856] Colonel Rauf, "Tanklar," *Askeri Mecmua*, 73 (June 1929): 59.

[857] *Cumhuriyet*, 9 May 1932.

tanks and tankettes were samples of newly produced armour by the Soviet Union. These were unloaded from the ship on 11 May 1932[858] (Figure 6.4).




Figure 6.3. T-26A model light tank and T-27 tankette.

Source: From the author's private collection.


Hediyeler
Çıkarıldı
Rus heyeti şerefine dün gece ziyafet verildi
Tanklardan biri...

Figure 6.4. The gifts from the Red Army.

Source: *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Haziran 1932.

Various items continued to be transferred to Turkey from the Soviet Union. In 1932, a bus gifted to Ankara Municipality by the Soviets was transferred to military air base in Eskişehir due to its size that prevented it being used in the town centre.[859] In October 1933, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Hüseyin Ragıp informed the Foreign

[858] *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1932.

[859] The Turkish Interior Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, BCA 30-10-0-0-248-677-19, 25 December 1932.

Ministry in Ankara that the Soviet Union wanted to present three military planes and a civilian plane to Turkey. [860]

The 10th Anniversary celebrations in Ankara in October 1933 were a significant milestone as they signified the realisation of an important goal by the Turkish political authority. This demonstrated that despite limited resources and international difficulties, the Turkish Army managed to transform itself into a modern army with a higher level of deterrence capability. The enabler of this transformation was obvious as Voroshilov and Budyonny were present in the ceremony with the Turkish leadership as the Soviet-made equipment rolled in front of them. This marked the highest point in bilateral relations and was widely reported to internal and external audiences. (Figure 6.5).



Figure 6.5. The Soviet armour during the 10th Anniversary of the Republic in Ankara on 29 October 1933.

Source: From the author's private collection.

On 29 October 1933, *Cumhuriyet* printed a collage of photos with caption that read "The Turkish Army which became victorious ten years ago with only its bayonet now is armed with latest weapon systems such as steel helmet, heavy artillery, tank, field radio, air defence batteries. The Republican administration procured all this excellent equipment" (Figure 6.6).

[860] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA 571-34993-138037-6, 16 October 1933.



Figure 6.6. A photo collage on the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.

Source: *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1933.

In anticipation of war, Turkey had already begun channelling resources to the military. Contrary to the misperception that Turkey used all credit from the Soviets for civilian purposes, Erdal Bilgiç showed that the majority of this sum was used for war preparation efforts, as Turkey anticipated a major war.[861] In 1934, a delegation led by Emin Paşa (Çolakoğlu) was sent to the Soviet Union to examine and identify military equipment to be purchased with the 8 million golden dollar credit extended to Turkey by the Soviet Union.[862] In 1934, Turkey placed an order for 64 T-26B type tanks and 43 BA-6 armoured cars from the Soviet Union, which were delivered by early 1935.[863] This purchase marked the beginning of the armoured corps in the Turkish army and the introduction of tanks in Turkish military culture.

Political and military cadres used these tanks in the best possible manner to signal Turkey's deterrence capabilities to outside actors and internally to the domestic audience (Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8). Italian leader Mussolini's photos with tanks, his speech on top of a tank in 1935, the actions of Italian armoured vehicles in their occupation of Ethiopia in 1936, the brutal results they achieved against locals having

[861] Bilgiç, *Sanayi Planları ve Sovyet Kredisi*, 107.

[862] BCA 30-18-1-2-43-18–13, 5 April 1934. Mehmet Emin Çolakoğlu (1878- 1939) retired as brigadier general in 1938 worked in the same National Defence Ministry departments as Durukan who called him 'Kara Emin'. See Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 421.

[863] Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 59.

no means to defend themselves, and news of French forces using armoured cars against locals in Sanjak of Alexandretta in Syria under their rule, created utmost concern in Turkey.[864] Turkish diplomatic efforts in the Sanjak of Alexandretta were largely supported by military power.[865] The Turkish demonstration of its military strength forced France to alter its position, and those military actions spoke louder than words.[866] Turkey used its tanks when Turkish troops entered Sanjak in 1939.[867] The Soviet Union was also content with this case, welcoming the return of Hatay to its mother country and the settlement of the issue between two of its allies during a period of increased German-Italian aggression.[868]



Figure 6.7. The Soviet-made BA-6 armoured cars during a parade in Ankara.

Source: From the author's private collection.

In February 1935, a delegation, which included Turkish chemist Nuri Refet Korur, was sent to the Soviet Union to procure military equipment. However, as the General Staff needed him for a course on chemical gases to be held in Ankara in May 1935, he was called back to Turkey, and another specialist was sent to Russia to test the gas

[864] Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 46-9.

[865] Yücel Güçlü, *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta: A Study in Turkish-French-Syrian Relations* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001), 298.

[866] Güçlü, *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta*, 298.

[867] *Yedigün*, 11 July 1939 and Turhal, *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı*, 49.

[868] Güçlü, *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta*, 302-3.

masks.[869] As explained before, the Turkish army's efforts under Colonel Eyüp (Durukan) during his two visits in 1925 and 1927-1928 to engage in talks against chemical gases and defence against them were not answered by the Soviet side since they were unable to offer solutions with their state of technology back then. Even under these circumstances, the Red Army accepted the deployment of a Turkish expert to work at Soviet chemical factories.[870] Turkey also tried to buy steel and iron needed by military factories, especially in the manufacturing of artillery shells, from the Soviet Union in 1936.[871] The Soviet Union also sent sets of parachutes to be used by Türkkuşu in 1939.[872]



Figure 6.8. The Soviet-made ZIS trucks during 1937 military manoeuvres in Saray at Thrace, August 1937.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Turkey obtained military material from the Soviet Union after it entered the peacetime period. Throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s, Turkey procured various weapons and ammunitions. However, the supply of modern weapons of war, such as

[869] BCA, 30-18-1-2-53-27-3-238-194, 15 April 1935.

[870] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-36206-143255-2, 8 April 1928.

[871] BCA 30-10-0-0-69-89-7, 17 November 1936.

[872] TDA 571-35594-140116-21, 13 August 1939 and the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, TDA 35594-140116-19, 19 August 1939.

armour and motorised vehicles, had a visible impact on uplifting the Turkish Army's deterrence capabilities. Soon after the Soviet Union achieved the capability to introduce these weapons to the Red Army, Turkey became one of the first countries to introduce them for use in its own army. Tanks, tankettes, armoured cars, trucks, and planes were seen as essential components of a modern army that could withstand the challenges of the time. Turkey used these in public parades as part of public diplomacy efforts and during visits by foreign representatives to Turkey in manoeuvres. They were also used in the actual demonstration of force when Turkey pursued its foreign policy objectives. The Soviet supplied armour formed the nucleus of the new Turkish armoured corps in the mid-1930s.

6.2. Transfer of Technology and Know-how from the Soviet Union

Republican Turkey's primary objective was first to meet the urgent needs of the army's conventional weapons and ammunition, followed by gaining access to more advanced weapons of war and equipment, and then moving to a phase whereby these could be produced, manufactured, and presented to the military's use nationally. The latter part of this plan has proven to be a major challenge for the Republic.

The uneven distribution of technological prowess necessitated various forms of technology and know-how transfer from the actors holding this advantage to those who did not. This could take different forms and shapes, but it is necessary to define the term transfer of technology. In his article on the Soviet experience with the transfer of technology from American and European sources, Frederick Turner described technology as "knowledge from one person, group, firm or country to another which will use it in production, or a process whereby innovations in the form of products or know-how obtained in one country were then transferred for use to another".[873] It was a complex process that would not yield the intended results as the receiving country must overcome difficulties such as having an industrial tradition, a skilled labour force, and allocating considerable resources to research and

[873] Frederick C. Turner, "Technology Transfer (TT) and the Soviet Union: Part I," *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies* 1/4 (1988): 514-15.

development.[874] Exposure to a source for a period would also not mean that this transfer of technology and know-how would leave a strong legacy in the receiving end and form a part of their military culture to be transferred to future military cadres. In this part of the chapter, the extent of the Soviet legacy in terms of direct military aid turning into the transfer of technology and know-how is explored. Despite first samples of modern military gear was introduced by the Soviet Union, the question of why the effect of this legacy remained limited is examined.

6.2.1. Structural Factors in the Transfer of Technology

From the onset, Bolshevik leaders were adamant about benefiting from technology transfer from the West. The Soviet Union was a beneficiary and advocate of technology transfer, particularly in the military field, from the earliest times of the Revolution, and there was an ideological basis for this, as depicted by Lenin's statement that the Capitalists would supply them with the materials and technology they needed for their future victorious attacks on their suppliers.[875] After the conclusion of the Civil War and settling of the issue with Poland, once the Red Army switched to peacetime, the Bolshevik military bureaucracy embarked on its search for weapon procurement in the West and a Soviet military delegation visited Germany. Both began to work on a plan to engage in military cooperation that would work for the benefit of the two, despite having different agendas and priorities. By 1923, the German Junkers agreed to build factories in Russia to supply aircrafts. Defence Minister Trotsky stated in 1924 that their aim for the coming five years would be to have their army technically well-equipped.[876] The Red Army officer serving as chief of staff for General Tukhachevsky told in 1931 that "It would be foolish and unreasonable not to take from our class enemies all the newest, all the best, which they have for the equipping of the Red Army. The mechanisation of the army must be done on the basis of a developed large-scale tractor and automotive

[874] Turner, "Technology Transfer (TT) and the Soviet Union: Part I," 515.

[875] Carl Gershman, "Selling them the Rope," *Commentary* (April 1979), https://www.commentary.org/articles/carl-gershman-2/selling-them-the-rope/, accessed on 3 January 2025 and Turner, "Technology Transfer and the Soviet Union: Part I," 517-18.

[876] Turner, "Technology Transfer and the Soviet Union: Part I," 518-19.

production".[877] The Soviet Union had a legacy of industry from its predecessor, worked out and implemented a large-scale industrialisation plan, and had the necessary resources and a skilled workforce and engineering cadres to turn the technology transfer from the West in the military sector. By the early 1930s, the Soviet Union managed to deliver successful results in terms of weapons and equipment production and even bypassed Western military output figures as a country implementing policies mindful of the scope of total war.

When the Turkish army moved to the peacetime period around the same time, the Turkish military bureaucracy followed a very similar course of action. Similarly, having a similar mindset of taking measures to prepare itself for total war, evaluated the major gap in its aviation capabilities. A Turkish aviation delegation travelled to Europe to search for suppliers, understand new aviation technologies and search for suitable aircraft models by late December 1923.[878] The delegation was led by Colonel Muzaffer (Ergüder). They started in France and visited major production factories. Some factories refrained from showing certain projects to the Turkish delegation, citing secrecy.[879] The delegation then visited Italy, Germany, and Britain. The Turkish aviator Vecihi Hürkuş noted that except for Britain, all their interlocutors approached them with a strong merchant attitude, whereas in Britain, it seemed they wanted to show the greatness and development of their air force to them.[880] Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti (The Turkish Aeroplane Association) was established in 1925 and Turkey engaged in a partnership with German company Junkers for production of aircraft in Turkey with an agreement signed in August 1925.[881] Two factories were envisaged to be established for manufacturing in Kayseri and for maintenance in Eskişehir by 1926.[882] On the maritime front, work on naval capabilities inherited from the Ottoman period was examined, and plans were

[877] Turner, "Technology Transfer and the Soviet Union: Part I," 525.

[878] Vecihi Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2023),143.

[879] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*,146.

[880] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*,154.

[881] İsmail Yavuz, *Mustafa Kemal'in Uçakları*, 25.

[882] Yavuz, *Mustafa Kemal'in Uçakları*, 25.

made for the maintenance and upgrading of vessels, as well as the procurement of new vessels from European countries.

In the Soviet Union, due to its ideological nature, all assets and control were in the hands of the state, which meant there was no place for lobbying or acting as middlemen or intermediaries in defence tenders or to facilitate sales. Two bureaucracies communicated with each other in official terms and at official levels. However, the Turkish military bureaucracy was under significant pressure from middlemen, who were former members of its own bureaucracy, in its engagement with the West. Retired generals, some of whom moved on to politics and became members of parliament, acted as representatives of major Western defence suppliers and tried to exert influence on their former colleagues to bring about a decision in their favour. [883] Turkish political leadership had to deal with this challenge from the former members of the military bureaucracy. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu wrote that İsmet Paşa had been fighting against these influencers, middlemen who were labelled as "aferist" based on a French word "affaire" meaning simply affair in a very derogatory and insulting meaning of the term indicating a serious felony.[884] The once national liberation and revolutionary cadres risked transforming into a character of acting like a company looking for acquisitions and profits.[885]

Management problems, lack of experience in business, conflict between individuals, corruption, impact of competition among companies in supply, and strong involvement of retired generals working as middlemen in tenders were some of the immediate visible obstacles in getting sustainable successful outcomes from these quests. Unfavourable macrostructural factors, such as the lack of an industrial legacy, skilled workforce, technical and scientific cadres, resources, and financial strength, have already impeded the process from the start. Therefore, the Turkish defence industry had been unable to make the desired leap from the start and manage to turn itself into a source supplying the needs of the national army.

[883] Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI,* xix, 200, 305-7 and Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*, 53-4, 89 and Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 224.

[884] Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021), 81 and Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, xviii-xix and *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980, Cilt 1*, 246.

[885] Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, 79.

Although the Ottoman legacy provided a limited contribution to the initial period of the War of Independence, fast and drastic changes in technology and modern weaponry necessitated the transfer of technology and production of these inside the country in the interwar period. From the 19th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire built its defence industry by transferring technology and opening factories that provided rifles, cartridges, and artillery's needs for its army. This enabled the Ottoman Army to meet its needs from domestic production in the first 16 months of World War I.[886] They were not at the scale and quality of the likes in Europe and were working on weapons imported and produced them by copying and also provided repair and maintenance of the weapons as the main principle was to meet needs of the army with limited resources.[887] This represented a continuation of the main motivation and limitations to be overcome in the Republican period.

Despite the stated political determination to follow a policy to enable Turkey to set up its own defence capabilities through factories and indigenous production, the system was under constant pressure to accomplish the task solely by relying on purchases from abroad and from sources that were determined by the outcome of the lobbying work of the former service personnel. This approach was an instant and short-term solution that impeded the development of a domestic defence industry. The military bureaucracy resisted in principle, but pressure persisted. In the land, maritime, and air sectors, development work was impeded, and efforts to work on national research and production capabilities were undermined. Difficulties in establishing a local defence capability were observed in cases and accounts of Durukan, Hürkuş, Nuri Demirağ, Şakir Zümre and maritime engineer-ship designer Ata Nutku.[888] From their cases and accounts, a glimpse of a much larger source of uneasiness and concern that prevailed among the advocates of the system that desired to stick to the strategy of forming domestic production and not be completely

[886] Ersoy Zengin, *Tophane-i Amire'den İmalat-ı Harbiye'ye Osmanlı Devleti'nde Harp Sanayii 1861-1923* (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2020), 498.

[887] Zengin, *Tophane-i Amire'den İmalat-ı Harbiye'ye*, 47.

[888] See Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI*, 53, 89; Durukan, *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII*; xviii-xix; Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları;*206-7, 224, 226-7, 252; Emir Öngüner, *Bir Avcı Tayyaresi Yapmaya Karar Verdim: Nuri Demirağ'ın Almanya'da Kaybolan Uçağı Nu.D.40* (Ankara: Tübitak Popüler Bilim Kitapları, 2020), 27 and Aydın Eken, *Ord. Prof. Ata Nutku: Türk Gemi İnşaatı Endüstrisi ve Mühendislik Eğitiminin Önderi* (İstanbul: İTÜ Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 48, 104-6.

dependent on foreign production and supply could be seen. However, the pressures were persistent and gradually eroded the system's resolve and undermined its development.

After the first tour of major European countries in 1924, Hürkuş believed that despite everything, based on what he and his delegation led by Colonel Muzaffer had observed in these major factories, there was not a major gap to close with European producers for Turkey, and they could well succeed in establishing a local aircraft industry in the country if they focused on this idea and channelled all resources and energy onto this ideal.[889] However, this early belief was severely impeded. His criticisms spanned from lack of incentives and creation of obstacles in aircraft manufacturing to barriers imposed on the development of civil aviation activities.[890] A naval engineer and army officer, Ata Nutku, noted general disbelief in national shipbuilding capability and wrote that he was not allowed to work on developing a national submarine.[891] Nevertheless, he insisted on proceeding with his work and achieved partial success by completing the launch of the Turkish Navy's first large-scale steel ship construction. In 1934, work began on the first nationally designed and built Gölcük fuel supply ship. The work was completed in 1935, and she joined the Navy in 1937.[892]

Regarding tanks, Turkish officers realised the need to obtain these modern vehicles for the war of future. In 1929 issue of *Askeri Mecmua* in his article titled "Is Tank Needed for the Turkish Army or not?" Lieutenant Colonel Fahri noted that aircrafts, gases, and tanks became essential components of the war and the Turkish Army needed these; however, he noted that what was more desirable and ideal was the establishment of institutions and structures that would conduct repair, maintenance,

[889] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 157-8.

[890] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 9 and 311.

[891] Eken, *Ord. Prof. Ata Nutku*, 48.

[892] Eken, *Ord. Prof. Ata Nutku*, 103-4. Ata Nutku wrote to then Minister of National Defence Zekai Apaydın who served twice as the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow between 1925-1927 and 1935-1939 authorised this construction and with his support Turkey managed to produce its own ship for the first time since the late Ottoman Empire. He wrote a letter in April 1933 as a young captain to the minister to ask his support for his projects. See Eken, *Ord. Prof. Ata Nutku*, 489-92.

upgrade, and even production of new types of tanks in the country.[893] Although there were no tanks in the army in the late 1920s, officers incorporated tanks into the military curriculum, as it was noted that it would be a mistake not to work on these new features of battle.[894] Regarding the manufacturing of one within Turkey, as logically offered by Lieutenant Colonel Fahri, this was not possible for decades. In 1943, Turkish tankers attempted to produce one by getting the chassis done locally at Kırıkkale and powering it with a Ford engine, but trials did not yield any results because of technological shortcomings.[895]

6.2.2. The Limited Red Army Influence

Interaction with the Red Army was direct, not tied to long or detailed financial processes, and heavyweights on both sides cleared any obstacles that stood in the way of delivery. Moreover, the Red Army did not give the impression that it would offer outdated or irrelevant items to Turkey. They provided modern weapons as they were made available for their own use and acted to show that Turkish officers were welcome to observe them during their visits to manufacturing sites and factories within the Soviet Union. During the interwar period, three key areas of the Red Army know-how were passed on to the Turkish Army. These were in the field of armour, in airborne capabilities such as gliders and parachutes, and finally on defence of the rear against air and chemical attacks.

6.2.2.1. Armour

After acquiring tanks, tankettes, armoured cars, and trucks from the Soviet Union, the Turkish Army adapted instructions on their use. The first tank combat unit in Turkey was established in 1934 at Lüleburgaz in Thrace with equipment bought from the Soviet Union as a tank battalion. In its inventory, this battalion had T-26 tanks,

[893] Lieutenant Colonel Fahri, "Türk Ordusuna Tank Lazım Mı Değil Mi?," *Askeri Mecmua,* 74 (September 1929): 57.

[894] *Manga ve Savaş Kümesinin Yetiştirilmesine Dair Meseleler*, trans. Captain Fuat (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932), 101-2.

[895] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi* (Ankara: Zırhlı Birlikler Okulu Matbaası, 1961), 15.

BA-6 armoured cars known as 'Russian Ford', ZIS trucks, German made NSU motorcycles, and later Stoewer and Tempo cars.[896] The staff had no tank manuals or documents and embarked on producing manuals for the operation of the battalion. The battalion commander, Tahsin Yazıcı, had spent two years as a captain at the French Saumur Cavalry School and had received information on tanks.[897]




Figure 6.9. Tank markings used by the Red Army until the beginning of World War II

Source: "Pre- War Markings" *Tank Archives*, military history blog, 25 June 2021, https://www.tankarchives.ca/2021/06/pre-war-markings.html?m=1&s=09, accessed on 13 May 2023.

The foundation of the Turkish tank manuals began with translations from French publications, which were tailored to the Turkish army's requirements and needs.[898] As the bulk of the tank battalion was from the Soviet Union, a Red Army officer was dispatched to Turkey as an adviser. Captain Vladimir worked with Turkish officers and contributed to the development of the tank battalion by offering his technical

[896] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 2-5.

[897] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 6.

[898] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 6.

knowledge of the formation of armoured corps.[899] The first tank manual was published in 1936. The army adapted the Red Army style in tank and armoured vehicle markings.

These were adapted from the Red Army manual which was in effect until World War II[900] (Figure 6.9). These instructions were incorporated into the Turkish Army manual in 1936[901] (Figure 6. 10).




Figure 6.10. Tank markings used by the Turkish Army as set out in the tank manual of 1936.

Source: *Tank Talimnamesi* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1936), folded chart.

While the Soviets used a rectangular form, the Turkish army used a round form, both using various colours to differentiate between the battalion, company, and platoon. The Turkish Army used this marking system on its armour throughout the interwar period (Figure 6.11).

[899] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 6.

[900] "Pre- War Markings", *Tank Archives*, military history blog via internet, 25 June 2021, https://www.tankarchives.ca/2021/06/pre-war-markings.html?m=1&s=09, accessed on 13 May 2023.

[901] *Tank Talimnamesi* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1936).




Figure 6.11. Two Turkish tanks marked as per the tank manual, based on the Soviet marking system. The detail showing the marking on the tank.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Turkish tankmen used Russian-made Tokarev guns as firearms.[902] In terms of uniform, Turkish tank crew used a coverall similar to those used in the Red Army known as Танковый комбинезон (tankman's coverall). A one-piece dress, with pockets, made from black-colored textile and having a standard integrated suit-alike belt with metallic buckle on pants. This was used by the Red Army from the 1930s to the 1970s. The tankman also has a distinctive Red Army-type helmet and goggles.[903] Turkish tank crews used this outfit, as seen in the photo of an officer during a manoeuvre in April 1937 (Figure 6.12).

[902] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 5.

[903] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 6.



Figure 6. 12. A Turkish tankman in coverall during a manoeuvre in April 1937.

Source: From the author's private collection.

During an inspection of the tank battalion by the commander of the cavalry division in 1936, the commander of the tank battalion Major Tahsin Yazıcı was photographed in this tankman's coverall and headgear adapted from the Red Army (Figure 6.13).



Figure 6.13. Inspection of a tank battalion in 1936. Major Tahsin Yazıcı is on the right.

Source: From the author's private collection.

The maintenance of Russian tanks became a burden by 1939, and the supply of spare parts was a serious challenge for the Turkish Army.[904] The military channel had already slowed down between the two countries after 1936. By 1942, under these difficulties and with the supply of Western tanks, the Turkish army decided to retire

[904] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 10.

all Russian tanks, and the T-26's were dug into fixed defensive lines in the West and East to utilise their guns only.[905] The flow of British, French, American, and German made armour during World War II removed the nascent Russian *tankism*[906] from the Turkish army for the next decades, leaving no traces or legacy. The Soviet Union and other countries continued to use T-26 tanks extensively in the opening years of World War II and thereafter.

6.2.2.2. Airborne Capabilities

A more enduring Soviet influence can be seen in another avant-garde area, in the field of aviation. The Red Army's transfer of know-how in the areas of gliders, parachutes, and airborne troops had a relatively longer-lasting legacy in the Turkish military system. Turkey and the Soviet Union similarly assessed the role of technological change in a potential total war. In the Soviet Union, aviation and its various applications were primarily viewed from a military perspective. Turkey also appreciated its military uses and shared a similar understanding with the Soviets.

Aviation capabilities were seen as essential, and extending these specialised skills, which would be valuable transferable skills in the defence of the homeland, to the masses in their societies was desired. This new technology, requiring know-how and high investment, could only be achieved under state sponsorship with support from the people. Although Turkey and the Soviet Union followed the similar path in development of aviation in their countries by working together with technology and know-how provider, the German Junkers and by establishing aeroplane associations that would organise funding and civilian manpower from the youth capable of aviator skills, Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti in 1925 and the Soviet Osoaviakhim, while the Soviet Union excelled in these fields embarking on their own production and thousands of youth trained in aviation, Turkey would hardly become successful except for buying aircrafts after struggle from European producers. Pioneer aviator Hürkuş noted in his memoirs that the rejection he faced after he produced an aircraft

[905] Armoured cars served several more years to be dug in in the same way at defensive lines in Çatalca in the West and in Erzurum in the East. *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 11.

[906] As per the Russian term, denoting the creation of tank troops in the Soviet style.

in 1925, the change of statute of Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti putting it into a function of a fundraiser only without any flight activity, the failure of TOMTAŞ (Tayyare ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi, the Aircraft and Engine Turkish Joint Stock Company) in 1928, and the difficulties he faced after his successful production and flight test of his aircraft in 1930 were the reasons behind this.[907] According to Hürkuş, disabling of Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, prevented the training of civilians and this caused a 10 year loss of valuable time for Turkey in achieving an edge in the world.[908] He severely criticised some authorities, particularly the person in charge of developing military aviation, General Muzaffer Ergüder.[909] In his memoirs, Ergüder explained the rationale for this decision as a move to protect the development of the military air force and to keep Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti as a financing structure of the military aviation with the aim of keeping every single capable pilot on the military side and not giving it away to the civilian side.[910] Hürkuş managed to establish the first civil aviation school in Turkey on 27 September 1932.[911] With 12 students, he managed to train the first cadre of Turkish civilian pilots, including the first woman aviator; however, his school could not endure more due to financial problems and licencing issues.[912]

Deeply upset with the loss of time and the closure of TOMTAŞ, Hürkuş noted that the Russian example was enough to explain the gravity of Turkey's situation. For him, both entered into relations with German Junkers around the same time, but unlike the case in Turkey, Russia greatly benefited from the transfer of technology from Junkers and used its metal body frame to develop its modern aircraft models,

[907] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları,* 252.

[908] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 207.

[909] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 252.

[910] Muzaffer Ergüder, *Orgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder'in Havacılık Anıları* ed. Halil İbrahim Fırtına (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2018), 87-9. He noted that these measures were necessary to give priority to the military side of the air capability and beginning with 1928 as this had been achieved some release of these measures could be evaluated for the development in the civilian aviation. Ergüder, *Orgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder'in Havacılık Anıları*, 127-8.

[911] Vecihi Hürkuş, *Havada: 1915-1925* (İstanbul: Tayyareci Vecihi Hürkuş Müzesi Derneği Yayınları, 2008), 7.

[912] Hürkuş, *Havada,* 8.

uplifting its aviation from very primitive levels to the current levels, so that they gifted an aircraft to Turkey in 1928, showcasing their pride in how they benefited from the Junkers deal and Turkey could not.[913] Although Hürkuş was complimentary about the Soviet achievements in aviation, Turkey's initial interaction over aviation with the Soviet Union was very limited, if not non-existent.

Turkey had been engaged with all major European countries and the USA in aviation since 1923, achieving partial progress and success. Once it developed its own aviation capabilities, the Soviets emerged as the only actor willing to share their expertise in aviation. Therefore, engagement with them proceeded rapidly, but this was short-lived. Ergüder was in charge of developing the military aviation capabilities of the Turkish Army. He believed aircrafts and air force was responsible mostly for the totality of war of the age.[914] He began to lead delegations to seek achieving these capabilities to many European countries beginning by 1924. He had another tour in 1927. He encountered numerous problems in the supply of aircraft, finance, and instructors during his tours of Britain, Italy, France, and Germany.[915] The Soviet Union was regarded as incomparable to European capabilities, so a visit there was never envisaged. He left the air branch in 1930 and returned to land forces, engaged with the Soviet senior delegations in the 1930s, and accompanied General Fahrettin Altay during his visit to the Soviet Union, seeing the Soviet aerial capabilities and observing the 1934 manoeuvres in Kiev.[916]

Only after the Soviet Union gained technological advantage on par with its Western peers, Turkey managed to get access to this approach. In 1935, the Turkish civil aviation flight school Türkkuşu of Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, which changed its name to Türk Hava Kurumu (The Turkish Aeronautical Association) in 1935, was founded. It was modelled around the one created by the Soviets. Turkish officials have been in contact with Osoaviakhim over the years to design a similar structure in Turkey.

[913] Hürkuş, *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları*, 226-7.

[914] Ergüder, *Orgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder'in Havacılık Anıları*, 162.

[915] Ergüder, *Orgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder'in Havacılık Anıları*, 72-5.

[916] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA, 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, 1934. See the details of this visit in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

Türkkuşu tried to gather funds to be used for training of civilian youth in aviation. In terms of skills, learning to use parachutes, gliders, and constructing model planes were the main areas to be introduced to enthusiastic youth willing to become professional aviators. The Soviet Union developed means to excel in these areas. Turkey could follow the Soviet experience. Osoaviakhim seniors engaged with their Turkish counterparts and mobilised professional instructors to train Turkish youth. In addition to Soviet instructors, Hürkuş was also instructed to join from the beginning as well, as per Atatürk's order.[917]

The extensive use of parachutes for military purposes was new, and only the Soviets used this avant-garde technique in large numbers. A wide-scale initiative to attract Soviet youth to be introduced with this skill, which would instantly be transferred to a valuable support to their country in a potential total war, was waged. In terms of timing, as they developed and worked on this, they almost instantly shared this with Turkey, making it one of the first armies to attain this skill.[918] The transition from civilian training to military service was made possible. The best example to be cited could be the first female military aviator of Turkey, Sabiha Gökçen, after she had completed her training under Russian instructors in Turkey, moving onwards to further glider training in Crimea in the Soviet Union. She then participated in military operations in eastern Turkey. As Turkey did not participate in military operations in World War II, there was no case of the use of this skill, but youth trained by Türkkuşu were called to join military service during World War II. For example, as a young university student, Turkish poet, actor, and film director Orhon Murat Arıburnu left his school and joined the army as he was trained by Türkkuşu.[919] Benefits of having trained voluntary aviators in military mobilisation and in the defence of the country was the primary objective and in a very late date the idea proved to be well placed. The training of the first airborne unit in the Turkish Armed

[917] Hürkuş, *Havada,* 8.

[918] Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar", 717.

[919] His father Colonel Mustafa Murat Arıburnu was the head of Bursa branch of Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti. See Mesut Kara "Buruk Bir Dünya: Orhon Murat Arıburnu," *Evrensel,* 27 March 2016, https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/76292/buruk-bir-dunya-orhon-murat-ariburnu, accessed on 26 January 2025 and Melih Elal "Orhon Murat Arıburnu'nun Bursa Günleri," *Bursa'da Kültür*, https://www.bursadakultur.org/orhon_murat_ariburnu.htm, accessed on 26 January 2025.

Forces was given at Türkkuşu in the 1950s. This paratrooper company constituted the nucleus of the cadres that paved the way for the establishment of the airborne troops that were used in the first proper military operation after its foundation in 1923, during the military operation in Cyprus in 1974.[920]

6.2.2.3. Defence of the Rear

One of Turkey's most important concerns in the interwar period was defence against air raids and the use of bombs and chemical weapons in the rear.[921] Rapid and ever-developing advances in aviation technology, the inability of conventional weapons to counter these threats, and the fact that these would primarily target civilians and critical infrastructure far behind the front line fuelled the sense of urgency in Turkey as well as in the Soviet Union. Both were anticipating an approaching wide-scale confrontation. Turkish seniors believed against any attack coming from land, sea, or air, the last area was the area of most concern, and despite all efforts, Turkey remained vulnerable. This was portrayed by *Yeni Köroğlu* in November 1929 in a cartoon where it was noted that "Today's forces are tenfold more than those of the past" to which *Köroğlu* replied: "To the four corners, seven climates of the world…. Today's war forces are tenfold greater than those before the war. So, you would consider what would happen to world if there would be a new war" (Figure 6. 14).

In his speech at Türk Hava Kurumu on 24 May 1935, Prime Minister İnönü stated that they believed they could hold the enemy and even overpower it in the event of a land attack. Despite not having all the means, they could hold their ground against naval attacks, but when it came to air raids, they needed to do a lot to ensure that all parts of the country remained safe against this fast-developing threat in a situation where the state budget was insufficient.[922] Developing countermeasures in the army

[920] Göksel, "Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Paraşüt'le İlk Atlamalar," 718. Turkey's parachuters and airborne troops enabled Turkish success in the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. For details see Sami Çalık, "Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nda Hava İndirme Birlikleri ve Hava İndirme Harekatı", (Master's Thesis, Erciyes University, 2006), 152.

[921] Other concerns which were largely unspoken of in military historiography were coastal defence and maritime capabilities that would enable Turkish army to deploy troops to Thrace.

[922] *Hava Tehlikesi: Türk Hava Kurumunun Altıncı Kurultayında Başbakan İsmet İnönü'nün Verdikleri Söylev 24 Mayıs 1935* (Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1935), 13-15.

structure against a peer opponent using these remained a work in progress throughout the interwar period, but the real question was to develop a way to bring about a solution for the rest, meaning the entire human and material assets in the rear of the front. In an environment where a country had a large geography, low detection technology and having no idea about the direction of a possible attack, developing a collective response and a model to safeguard assets was essential.



Figure 6.14. A cartoon from 1929.

Source: *Yeni Köroğlu*, 27 November 1929.

Technological advances enabled militaries to reach beyond any location behind the lines of the defending nation. Longer-range planes and chemical weapons were feared to have a major impact on the population and capabilities of any army trying to embark on a mission leaving the rear, where their cities, including their homes, and their population, including their families and loved ones, were left vulnerable against enemy attacks. As noted in Chapter 2, in Turkey, the first official manual for implementing preventive measures was issued in draft form in 1928.[923] The manual was published in 1931 and later in 1932, 1933, and 1934.[924] In developing this draft

[923] *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

[924] *Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği Matbaası, 1931); *Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Mardin: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye

manual, the Turkish General Staff benefited from a work translated from Russian in 1925. This book was translated by Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi and printed in 1925 by Askeri Matbaa with the title *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası* (The Defense and Protection of the Rear Front)[925]. This 96-page book laid the foundation for preparations in Turkey. The chart showing the application of air defence mechanism for a critical location in the rear of the front of the country in the 1928 manual is an exact copy of the one developed by the Soviet defence experts earlier as printed in 1925 (Figure 6. 15 and Figure 6. 16). This was another example of the contribution of the Soviets to Turkish military thinking. The perception of modern war and the way the next war would be fought were identical in this Russian translation used by Turkish military authors in this period.




Figure 6.15. A Chart from the 1925 book.

Source: *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*, trans. Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1925), folded chart.

As detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the 1934 visit of the Turkish military delegation to the Soviet Union as observers of the Red Army manoeuvres in Kiev provided a valuable opportunity to see the approach the Soviets had developed and the methods they implemented in creating a model for the defence of a major city.

Reisliği Vilayet Matbaası, 1932); *Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği İnhisarlar Matbaası, 1933) and *Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86* (Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği Devlet Matbaası, 1934).

[925] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

During the September 1934 manoeuvres, the Turkish delegation was taken to Kiev by General Voroshilov to show them what the Red Army had established for the air defence of Kiev. The Turkish delegation observed a full demonstration of a live exercise with major participation of the Red Army personnel, emergency services, and the public, conducted in the daytime and nighttime. Impressed by this complex organisation, the Turkish delegation reported that technical experts from Turkey needed to examine all these closely and in detail, and recommended finding ways to send several Turkish officers to have hands-on experience by working in this centre in the Soviet Union.[926] The Turkish delegation observed the air alert organisation set by the Red Army against air raids to develop its own alert system. This was a model tailored to Turkey's conditions, and the aim was to implement it with more modest resources and capabilities than the Turkish Army had at the time. The Turkish delegation observed the alarm system used by the Red Army in Kiev and reported this on their return[927] (Figure 6.17). Based on this, the Turkish General Staff worked on developing a tailored model for use in Turkey.




Figure 6.16. A chart adapted by the Turkish Army.

Source: *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1928), folded chart.

[926] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 23), 1934.

[927] Report by Muzaffer Paşa, Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 27), 1934.




Figure 6.17. Early alarm network established against air raids by the Soviet Union, as observed by the Turkish delegation in 1934.

Source: Report by Muzaffer Paşa, BCA 30-10-0-0-46-293-3, (page 27), 1934.

The know-how from the Red Army passing on to the Turkish Army remained limited. Some traces of these were only visible in areas such as armour, airborne capabilities and defence of the rear against air and chemical attacks.

6.2.3. Rapid Shift to Western Models

In the second half of the 1930s, in defence of the rear, for example, the works of French experts were used in addition to others.[928] However, from 1938 onwards, the models shared by the French and British armies and their experts were used to develop a system for Turkish needs, as seen in other areas detailed above for armoured vehicles and aviation.[929] During World War II, the Turkish General Staff used British manuals and experts to deliver conferences on passive defence.[930]

[928] See for example Moynier, *Harp Gazları Zehirli Gazlardan İleri Gelen Afetlerin Seriri Mütaalası Tesemmunlerin Tedavisi*, trans. Şerif Stakan (Ankara: Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936) and Moynier, *Muharebe Gazları, Arıza, Korunma Çareleri ve Tedavileri*, trans. Tarık (İstanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1936).

[929] The Ministry of Interior ordered the translation of a book by Gibrin and L. C. Heckly. See, Commandant Gibrin and L. C. Heckly, *Defense Passive Organisee Personnel et Materiel* (Paris: Dunod, 1936). It was published in 1938. See Binbaşı Gibrin, L. C. Heckiy, *Teşkilatlı Passif Müdafaa Eşhas ve Malzeme* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938).

[930] The Turkish General Staff benefited from British Major Sparrow's notes and distributed them widely and got these published as a book for military staff as well as using him for delivering speeches to public at Halkevleri. See Turkish General Staff correspondence with CHP Party

The challenges to the European system posed by the rise of Germany and Italy, the increased armament race, and fluid political dynamics imposed major unpredictability. Total war was imminently expected since they switched to peacetime stance by early 1920s by the Red Army and Turkish National Army. Against this backdrop, the structural basis of military cooperation had already begun to falter gradually, without being detected and noticed by 1936 and thereafter. There had been important changes in both countries in their political, diplomatic and military cadres and the increased security risk in Europe, new dynamics creating a fluid set of situations for all major actors caused fluctuations in intentions, actions and narratives. Turkey could no longer hope to procure the weapons and ammunition it needed entirely from the Soviet Union. Under increased urgency and with Turkey's leaning more to Britain and France and its attempts to manage the emerging Germany and the Italian factor further distanced Turkey from the Soviet Union in 1938-1939[931], whose military bureaucracies had already initiated their move to distance themselves from each other a little earlier by late 1936.

Beginning in 1939, Turkey had high-level military visitors from both Britain and France to work on a coordinated effort against uncertainty in Europe. Political-level meetings and constant interactions between diplomats were ongoing, but military-to-military engagement to set the ground was important. Until that date, engagements on military aspects were limited despite both sides accelerating their political engagements after 1933, and the British side believed this did not reflect the military field as the Turkish General Staff was keeping a distance from them.[932] However, this changed quickly in the following few years with increased uncertainty that affected security of the Mediterranean basin. The Italian aggression and success in Ethiopian affairs and Turkey's rush to secure the Turkish Straits facilitated this quick change.[933] A military channel with Britain was opened, and there were more visits.

Secretariat from 1944 and the pamphlets of Sparrow in BCA, 490-1-0-0-1136-143-1, 5 March 1951. For Sparrow's published book see *İngiliz Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri Hakkında Binbaşı Sparrow'un Notlarına Ait Broşür* (İzmir: Demiryolları Matbaası, 1945).

[931] İşçi, "Russophobic Neutrality: Turkish Diplomacy," 57.

[932] Ludmila Jivkova, *İngiliz-Türk İlişkileri 1933-1939,* trans. Fevzi Muharrem and F. Erdinç (İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi Yayınları, 1978), 122.

[933] Jivkova, *İngiliz-Türk İlişkileri*, 122.

British General Frederick George Beaumont-Nesbitt, the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, visited Ankara in February 1939. On 22 February 1939, they visited the War Academy and met the commander of the academy Colonel Hamit Doğruer (Figure 6.18). The French general Maxime Weygand, who was recalled for military duty to coordinate French efforts in Levant, visited Ankara in May 1939. On 3 May 1939, he too visited the War Academy and was hosted by Colonel Doğruer (Figure 6. 19). Both aimed to work with the Turkish military bureaucracy to prepare for the approaching confrontation in Europe. These visits opened the way for a fast-paced, unstructured series of meetings that aimed at supplying British and French military weapons, equipment, and finances to cover these, as well as British and French military expertise to advise the Turkish military on how Turkey could defend itself in case of aggression.[934] The beginnings of this engagement were certainly different from that established between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the military field and certainly different from the independent stance developed within the Turkish military bureaucracy since 1923. These were the beginnings of the huge transformative years that lasted for decades and set the ground for Turkey's future political-military positioning, both internationally and internally.



Figure 6.18. The British military visitors at the Turkish War Academy.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[934] Jivkova, *İngiliz-Türk İlişkileri*, 123.



Figure 6.19. The French military visitors at the Turkish War Academy.

Source: From the author's private collection.

From June 1939 to the end of the year, senior-level military visits from both Britain and France continued. After the June 1939 meeting, the British side submitted additional questions, and Turkey's reply was prepared by the General Staff, cleared by the government, and signed by the Head of Chief of Staff Marshal Çakmak. This reply, dated 24 June 1939, informed the British side about the visit program proposed for them to enable them to understand Turkey's defence posture, as Turkey was focused on the expectation of an attack from Thrace and the Mediterranean.[935] Çakmak noted that factories at Kırıkkale, Kayseri, Eskişehir, and the air regiment, a manoeuvre by the armoured brigade at Lüleburgaz, an artillery battery at Çanakkale, British War Graves, Cavalry Riding School in İstanbul, Heybeli Naval School, War College, and Dumlu battery at İzmir would be in their visit itinerary.[936] The Turkish side offered information on all air and naval ports and bases in Western Turkey that could be used by British naval and air forces. The establishment of a factory to produce bombs and ammunition to meet the British army's needs and training to be provided by the British military to a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) in large groups were considered.[937]

[935] ATASE, İkinci Dünya Harbi Kataloğu (World War II) [hereafter İDH], 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

[936] ATASE, İDH, 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

[937] ATASE, İDH, 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

Despite developing military relations with Britain and France, Turkey still wanted to continue to work with the Soviet Union, but these moves further alienated the latter, and Turkey found itself engaged in lengthy talks with Britain, France, and Germany for financial credits for its military needs. This left Turkey with these countries as the sole source of Turkey's military needs, and during this period, an unprecedented, uncontrolled, unchecked reliance began on anything that would come from these countries in terms of military supplies, expertise, support, and moreover, control. The lengthy negotiations between Turkey, Britain, and France were impacted by developments in Europe, the German army's advances, and Turkey's talks with the Soviet Union. On 12 May 1939 a declaration was signed in Ankara and finally on 19 October 1939 the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed. Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu's talks in Moscow yielded no results, and he departed for Turkey on 17 October 1939.[938] As June 1939's reply to Britain proved, before he departed for Moscow, the level of offerings and the level of military expectations were so advanced and high on the Turkish side.

As an annex to the treaty signed between Turkey, Britain, and France, a protocol, a secret agreement on military aspects, a *convention militaire,* detailing support to Turkey was signed.[939] This protocol stipulated a structural roadmap for cooperation between the military bureaucracies of Turkey, Britain, and France that brought a full commitment and opening up of the Turkish system in a full rush, removing Turkey's military bureaucracy from the almost autonomous position it had adopted since moving to a peacetime stance in 1923. By 1939, all technology transfer and the flow of know-how shifted away from the Soviet side and were anchored for the following decades in a way of dependency on the western side. This was even evident in the symbol picked for the tank school established within the Turkish Army in 1943 which depicted the British Mark type tank from World War I and never saw service in the Turkish Army. The school was renamed in 1944 as Zırhlı Birlikler Okulu (The

[938] Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu visited Russia for 23 days between 25 September to 17 October 1939. Turkey could not achieve a similar understanding from the Soviet Union on the future of their relations. The visit was held on the invitation of the Soviet side and Turkish delegation's primary objective was to negotiate signing of a mutual assistance pact. See the report by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA 571-68140-298449-3, 1 January 1939.

[939] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 612-15.

Armoured Forces School) (Figure 6.20). Rather than the Soviet-made T-26B, a vague tank silhouette resembling the French Renault tank was used in materials in popular culture in Turkey as early as 1939 (Figure 6. 21). In 1939, to strengthen its armoured corps, Turkey bought 100 Renault tanks from France and 16 Vickers tanks from Britain, which were delivered before the beginning of World War II.[940]



Figure 6.20. The symbol of the tank school established within the Turkish Army in 1943.

Source: *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi* (Ankara: Zırhlı Birlikler Okulu Matbaası, 1961), front cover.



Figure 6.21. A postcard from 1939.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Turkey's desire to continue working with the Soviet Union continued despite all challenges. With the second Protocol of the Treaty signed in October 1939, it was noted that commitments undertaken by Turkey would in no way put Turkey under an obligation to put Turkey in a position to find itself in an armed confrontation with the

[940] *Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi*, 8.

Soviet Union.[941] Turkey wanted to maintain its loyalty to friendship with the Soviet Union with this move.[942] In his note to Britain, Çakmak noted that there were no commitments between the Turkish government and Russians on the supply of equipment from them; however, he noted that it was not impossible for both sides to extend help to each other due to their friendship.[943] At that point, Turkey was still maintaining the same force posture on its eastern border in line with this friendship, perceiving no threat from the Soviet Union in the form of border troops, fortified positions at Kars and Erzurum, two army corps, and one reserve corps. He added that this might change, subject to political conditions in the future.[944] Turkey's full attention and planning was against meeting potential aggression from Bulgaria in Thrace and Italian aggression from the Mediterranean by 1939.[945] The British influence that began before the war continued throughout World War II, and the British lost their influence over the Turkish military under heavy American influence by the mid-1950s. The British air mission left Turkey in 1952, and land forces missions left in 1954.[946]

6.3. Conclusion

War and economy, the economics of war, *Harb İktisadiyatı*, were central to officers' thinking throughout the interwar period. Republican leadership framed the economics of war differently and uniquely during this period, once again not seen in other preceding or succeeding periods, which was overlooked for reasons argued throughout this thesis. The Turkish military in the interwar period was mostly preoccupied with economics rather than politics in performing its duties as a military

[941] Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları,* 611.

[942] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, *Bu Harbin Kitabı 1939 Harbi: Türkiye-İngiltere İttifakı ve Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğu* (Ankara: Zerbamat Basımevi, 1941), 8.

[943] ATASE, İDH, 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

[944] Marshal Çakmak's reply to the questions from the British side, ATASE, İDH, 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

[945] Marshal Çakmak's reply to the questions from the British side, ATASE, İDH, 3-26-26, 24 June 1939.

[946] Hamza Bilgü, *İngiliz Askeri İstihbarat Raporlarında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 1949-1960* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2024), 116.

bureaucracy. Once again, the special characteristics of the Republican army in these years need to be acknowledged for a better analysis of the history of the Turkish armed forces and to place Turkey's defence procurement relations with other countries in the right context.

In 1923, Turkey emerged from more than a decade of continuous warfare and still felt the Western threat in the unsettled European security architecture and the threat of denial in acquiring means to defend itself in establishing the required economic foundations, infrastructure, and modernising and motorising its army. Political and military cadres who fought in the previous decade never assessed the conflict as over and had already formulated a way of action appreciating the totality of war with the expectation of an even more encompassing and destructive one becoming a possibility in the decade ahead. They sought to engage with anyone in the world, particularly with different Western governments, and private weapons suppliers in their quest to meet the urgent, basic, conventional needs and also moving beyond, to procure more avant-garde ones such as motorised vehicles, planes, tanks and armoured cars. Turkey's economic capabilities at the time were not in favour of accomplishing these tasks smoothly. Turkey could only procure these without political strings attached or large commitments or concessions from the Soviet Union.

The flow of weapons and ammunition began first by transfer of conventional ones like rifles, guns, artillery ammunition and continued with avant-garde and advanced ones such as planes, tanks, armoured cars, motorcycles and parachute gear when the Soviet Union managed to produce these after rebuilding first its economy, industry with five-year plans and benefiting to utilise military uses of this economic-industrial power. Limited by its economic resources, Turkey's purchases were insufficient to transform its entire army. Nevertheless, to build deterrence and signal possession of modern weaponry in its arsenal to adversaries, Turkey amplified their presence in messaging.

Expectations of technology and know-how transfer were not fully realised in this engagement with the Soviets largely due to Turkey's own structural limitations and

lack of necessary resources. As the less than two-decade period was too brief to make a transformative impact in a large bureaucracy such as Turkish military, the Soviet legacy had limited visible traces and legacies which had disappeared entirely before the start of World War II and never making a return due to strong military engagement with the Western style that began even before the war by early-1939.

Although political-military relations were portrayed as good and cordial by both sides until the early years of World War II, the structural basis of military cooperation had begun to falter gradually. Turkey could no longer keep the procurement of needed weapons and ammunition solely from the Soviet Union. Under increased urgency and with Turkey's leaning more to Britain and France and its attempts with managing the emerging renewed Germany and the Italian factor further distanced the Soviet Union. Turkey found itself embroiled in lengthy talks with Britain, France, and Germany for financial credits for its military needs. This left Turkey seeing these countries as the sole sources of Turkey's military needs, and during this period, an unprecedented, uncontrolled reliance began on anything that would come from these countries in terms of military supplies, expertise, and support. This major structural factor, combined with the old problem of middlemen trying to supply all material by buying from European producers that they represented rather than channelling all energy and resources for the establishment of a domestic defence production capability since 1923, put Turkey in a position to depend on purchases and donations from abroad without any say on the types, numbers, or timing of these deliveries. Despite attempts throughout decades after the end of World War II, particularly after Turkey's peace operations to safeguard Cyprus in the 1960s and the 1970s, effective development of indigenous defence production became possible in a world where the bloc system disappeared with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Over time, Turkey struggled to implement national solutions and succeeded in doing so in the following decades.

Early attempts by the Republic to control purchases to be self-sufficient with national production were superseded by the direct purchase of items from the West, imposing a total Western way that erased the acknowledgement of positive examples from the sight of historians during the Cold War years. British influence that began before the

war continued throughout World War II, and the British lost their influence over the Turkish military under heavy American influence by the mid-1950s. The USA became the main provider of Turkey's defence and security needs, and this continued throughout the Cold War. Turkish bureaucracy had always focused on the main provider and were influenced by the culture, working style and requests of the main provider as military economics, aid and trade, formed the solid basis and rationale for entering into a successful working relationship and sustaining it over time with the reliable partner.

CHAPTER 7

SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

The Republican political-military authorities, having learnt from World War I and anticipating the coming of a new war, was mindful of the role intelligence would play in such circumstances and tried to address this emerging area with its limited financial capabilities as an outcast and developed a mechanism that worked for its national interests compatible with their priorities. In the interwar period, with some mixed legacy from their past imperial structures, both Turkey and the Soviet Union were engaged in an effort to set up their new agencies, form new structures, networks, and ways of action in a world where both perceived existential threats and anticipated major confrontation in the unsettled European security order.

Monitoring the Soviet military was an integral part of Turkish military activity throughout the interwar period. Turkey's General Staff relied largely on its Intelligence Department through resident military attachés and were assisted by diplomats from the Turkish Foreign Ministry and through the newly established small embryonic state security organisation, Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti (The Presidency of National Security Service), abbreviated as MAH, throughout this period in performing this task.

In their engagement with each other, both tried to conduct activities that would avoid actions that would spiral into a crisis through a quick escalation. This monitoring activity was performed for a wide array of issues. The Turkish military bureaucracy sought to accumulate intelligence that would contribute to their understanding of the Red Army's structure, capabilities, and intentions. Soviet military deployments, troop movements, and force concentrations in its vast geography were monitored closely. The scope of this activity was not limited to the immediate areas around its

borders with Turkey. It included monitoring its activities in distant areas such as East Asia, the Baltics, and Central Asia. This was an effort to understand whether the Soviet leadership would transfer forces from these far-away areas to areas near Turkey that would have the potential to create a new situation on that theatre for Turkey. Changes in the ranks of the Red Army, especially if these were the result of exceptional reasons such as purges, were monitored closely.

Additionally, subversive activities were monitored. Turkish authorities were wary of communist propaganda and its potential network in the country, while Soviet authorities were wary of potential Turkish propaganda on nationalist or religious bases among its ethnic groups. Turkey also dealt with Soviet protests of White Russian propaganda, especially if there was any attempt against the visiting Soviet military personnel to Turkey. In addition to communist propaganda, Turkey had always been watchful of the activities of Armenian and Kurdish groups in the Soviet Union. Turkey monitored the Soviet role and its reaction to the assembly of Kurdish groups in Armenia and near the Turkish border and the Soviet support for potentially hostile Kurdish groups. Finally, monitoring the espionage activities of Soviets in the border regions and elsewhere was an important task for the Turkish bureaucracy during this period.

In this chapter, I would argue that in the entire spectrum of military activities, where both countries tried to forge working relationships, only in the intelligence domain, sides refrained from any interaction in the interwar period. This was not because of animosity, as often suggested, but was due to the inherently adversarial and deceptive nature of intelligence activities. Both military bureaucracies constantly collected intelligence on each other but remained disengaged from each other. This had been a unique area where Turkey did not choose to adapt the Soviet model in any way.

7.1. The Place of the Soviet Union in Turkish Intelligence History in the Interwar Period

Intelligence had been an indispensable function for military bureaucracies as it had a strong focus on the intentions, capabilities, and actions of their adversaries and

friends alike. It had been roughly framed around 'our spies, their spies, and secrets' until the end of World War II.[947] Subsequently, it gained new layers to focus on state, military, and social activities, expanded into more structured organisations with much higher technical and manpower capabilities utilising advanced formulations, rigid processes, and structured techniques, ending up in a larger bureaucracy engaged solely with this activity.[948] Nevertheless, despite these changes, its nature has remained more or less the same throughout its long history.

During the interwar period, major countries developed intelligence agencies with military intelligence ahead of everything but also with a strong intention to address threats that might arise from within their boundaries, checking on domestic actors and internal dynamics. Turkish and Russian examples were not exceptions to this general approach, but certainly, variations due to size, military-security culture, portfolios, and intentions created differences between the two.

For the Turkish General Staff, intelligence was purely military.[949] This starting point defined the way intelligence activities were to be conducted from the Turkish point of view. Although regarded as a natural part of general military activity, the conduct, scope, and mechanisms of intelligence activities had been greatly different from the general functions of a military bureaucracy, especially when its extension into the non-military domain is considered. Intelligence had been a highly professional, specialised form of activity run by a relatively much smaller group within the bureaucracy. Its nature was entirely different; therefore, setting the context and role of it in the military domain is necessary to understand its interplay in Turkish-Soviet military relations.

There has been progress in intelligence studies as an academic field over the last few decades. Once accepted as the missing dimension of political, diplomatic, and

[947] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9-10.

[948] Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 2.

[949] *Espiyonaj* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1940), 3. This is the first sentence of Walther Nicolai in his book, *Gizli Kuvvetler*, trans. Mehmed Nihad (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925), 1.

military history, intelligence can be studied in this manner.[950] The availability of more archival material and more interest from the academic community has enabled research to shed light on an area that has always been off the attention of serious work, limiting it to works of highly speculative and manipulative fiction. This point was also valid in the course of Turkish–Soviet relations. Due to the secretive nature of intelligence, the manipulative nature of evidence, documents, memoirs, and other material, and the retrospective approach with Cold War attitudes and arguments, activities in this field between the two countries have always been assumed to be characterised as constantly confrontational and eventful throughout their entire histories.

The general approach was to deduce all these activities and interactions merely to hunt down communists and opponents in Turkey and assume that Turkey was entangled in a continuous struggle with Soviet intelligence agencies. This approach has been prevalent even in new academic studies written by capable authors, some of whom were given access to Turkey's intelligence archives and were endorsed by the Turkish agency itself. [951] Others followed suit and, without due consideration, easily framed the Soviets as an eternal nemesis of the Turkish intelligence. However, they did not offer anything other than the vague retrospective perception that took shape during the Cold War, when Soviet intelligence became Turkey's single most important concern due to its standing within the Western Bloc.[952] Examination of Turkish archival and print material from the period brought forward nothing to single

[950] Christopher Andrew and Davis Dilks (ed.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Community in the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave, 1984), 1. Authors argued that this field needed to be subject of academic studies saving it from the widespread popular 'airport bookstall' school of intelligence history written by journalists and based on unreliable memories. These aimed at mass selling of books having lost the concern for historical accuracy particularly with a big boom after World War II. Countless reprints of *İngiliz Kemal* book series based on the deeds of a real Turkish figure, involved in espionage, Ahmet Esat Tomruk (1892-1966) was a good example for this. This genre is also responsible for irrational enmity against the Russian, Soviet system as fear and suspicion against a country's perceived opponent was always taken as a target.

[951] See Polat Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı 1826-2023* (İstanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2023) and Egemen Bezci, *Türk İstihbaratı ve Soğuk Savaş: ABD ve İngiltere Arasında Türk Gizli Servisi,* trans. M. Murtaza Özeren (İstanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2023).

[952] Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 129 and 172-5 and Bezci, *Türk İstihbaratı ve Soğuk Savaş*, 50. In another recent work on Russian intelligence, it was framed in a way that Russia had been the historical rival of Turkey and had always been hostile, tacitly arguing without specifying a timeframe throughout centuries Russian intelligence had been the major nemesis. See Sait Yılmaz, Ali Asker and Erhan Canikoğu (ed.), *Rus İstihbaratı* (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2022), 9-12.

out the Soviets or place them above any other country in terms of the risk they posed in the interwar period.[953]

After the demise of both the Russian and Ottoman empires, both carried on with the past practices and, more importantly, personalities and the culture to the new era. Nationalists in Anatolia fighting against occupying Western powers and Bolsheviks fighting against Western-backed military forces used these legacies in a mixed manner and over time developed a finer mechanism to structure their military intelligence functions. In both countries, political authorities quickly set up these functions to address their needs under strict control and steering. This centralised structure and disciplined approach meant that neither would leave ground to a vague situation or to a condition whereby their agencies would go rogue and act upon their own agenda that might not be approved by the central authority in Ankara or Moscow. This nature of the relationship continued throughout the interwar period.

Therefore, when on the evening of 21 April 1922, the primary Soviet intelligence agency, more aptly the secret police, the Cheka officers, stormed the Turkish military attaché's office in Moscow, neither side showed any intention to escalate this to an uncontrollable level of a crisis.[954] In that incident, the apartment flat allocated to the

[953] As a proof of seamless continuation of threats from the Russian intelligence that had begun in the Tsarist period, continued through the Soviet years and will remain in the time of the Russian Federation, a recent find of the Turkish intelligence community and academia was around the name of Hüsnü Bingöl (1892-1955), who served as MAH chief in then Iğdır district of Kars province from 1932 to 1954. The MİT released a documentary on him. See "Tarihten Yansımalar: Sınırdaki Işık". https://www.mit.gov.tr/husnu_bingol.html. (Not available from this link as it was broken. Watched on Dailymotion, https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x5jfb4f, accessed on 12 October 2025). This documentary was based largely on the investigative work of Mücahit Özden Hun. See Mücahit Özden Hun, *Siyah, Beyaz ve Gri Hüsnü Bingöl* (Ankara: Alter Yayıncılık, 2019), 8-11. In this biographic work based on oral history of interviews with locals, no evidence was offered for the interwar years. In the work, no due care in chronology was offered and almost all anti-Russian anecdotes were from World War II and its afterwards which is quite obvious and understandable. Although, none was offered for the interwar period, it is used as yet another evidence for framing of the never-ending Russian intelligence subversive activity targeting Turkey narrative. Based on this wrong proposition, other works followed. Such as see, İlyas Er, "Kafkasya Bölgesinde Ermeni ve Kürt Ayrılıkçı Hareketleri Üzerine Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya İstihbarat Vakaları (1924-1955)," *Harp Tarihi Dergisi*, 8 (2023): 143-72. Intelligence cases offered in this article were almost entirely dated to the aftermath of the interwar period despite the fact that article title claims to cover dates from 1924 to 1955. The author also was mistaken on the stance adapted by the Soviet Union on the Ağrı Rebellion of 1930. As detailed in Chapter 5, the Soviet Union was against the rebels and helped to suppress the Dashnak-Hoybun alliance.

[954] In his memoirs Ali Fuad Paşa stuck with the name Cheka, which was disbanded in February 1922 as he knew before, not acknowledging the recent change of the name to GPU. In fact, this would be

Turkish Embassy by the Soviet Foreign Ministry was raided when Turkish military attaché Major Ziya (Ekinci), Captain Saim (Önhon), his wife Münire Hanım (Önhon), Captain İdris (Çora) and Captain Emin were in the building. The raiding Cheka detachment was commanded by a senior figure, the deputy head of the Cheka, known by the name Simirnov.[955] The measured response to this potentially explosive issue and efforts shown to contain rather than to escalate the issue meant how intelligence was a function in the hierarchy of both systems even from the very early times. Neither side denied or took a step back from their arguments, but similarly, neither carried this further to a different level. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Ali Fuad Paşa (Cebesoy), returned from his post to Turkey to protest this treatment in May 1922. Soviet Russia's Ambassador in Ankara, Aralov, in his memoirs, insisted that Ali Fuad Paşa employed a Turkish spy and an English agent, who were apprehended in a secret apartment in Moscow as they were transferring documents related to espionage to an English agent. Aralov claimed Ali Fuad Paşa was called back by the Turkish Government for this affair[956] (Figure 7.1).

Aralov was one of the early important characters in the Soviet intelligence history. Largely due to his later efforts, he portrayed an image of a diplomat sympathetic to the Turkish cause and a personal friend of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. Although not a secret, his intelligence hat was largely ignored in historiography. Before his deployment to Ankara as an Ambassador, he was praised by Lenin and Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin for his military successes.[957] Among his military track

visible in the following years as when referring to Soviet secret police Cheka and Chekist would remain in use in official documents. He might have referred to a local deputy as the deputy of head of Cheka was Jozef Unshlicht (1879–1938). Unshlicht was one of the founders of Cheka. In 1921, he was appointed deputy head of Cheka. After disagreement with Dzerzhinsky after 1923, he was transferred to the Red Army, working as chief of supply. In 1925, he became the deputy of Defence Minister Trotsky as well as deputy head of Osoaviakhim. In 1933, he became head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. He was executed during the purges in 1937. Turkish officers engaged with him for defence procurement talks and talks on civil aviation in his roles after Cheka. For Turkish military intelligence biography of him, see *Kızıl Ordu III*, 333. In this section, his birthdate was erroneously given as 1897. He was correctly mentioned to be the deputy head of GPU between 1921-1923 returning to the Red Army afterwards as head of supply. His Polish and Jewish origins were noted twice.

[955] Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 329-31.

[956] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, 137.

[957] Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, 13-14.

records as a Bolshevik, it should be noted that he was accepted as one of the founders of the Russian military intelligence function.[958] He was sent to Ankara at a critical time for his military skills, including his skills in the sphere of military intelligence. His activities were not overlooked during his stay in Ankara. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Paşa expressed his discontent regarding Aralov's activities in Turkey and the Russian raid in Moscow, but he said they found it convenient to allow the matter to be closed then.[959]



Figure 7.1. Ambassador Aralov in his office in Ankara in late 1922.

Source: Photo by Frédéric Gadmer, Collections du Musée Albert-Kahn, Inventory No A37106, https://collections.albert-kahn.hauts-de-seine.fr/document/le-camarade-aralof-ambassadeur-de-la-republique-des-soviets-jour-de-la-creation-de-l-urss/617a7a3bcf8b8968b3345067?q=angora&pos=72&pgn=4, accessed on 26 October 2025.

Similarly, Aralov and the Russian seniors had to control their discontent when their embassy building in Ankara was burned down on 13 August 1922. Aralov believed it was the work of Rauf Bey (Orbay) who was the prime minister at the time having

[958] To commemorate the 100th year of Aralov's mission to Ankara, the Russian Embassy in Ankara's Russian House (Rus Evi) published a catalogue of a painting exhibition. In this catalogue Aralov was introduced as one of the founders of Red Army's intelligence organisation GRU, Main Intelligence Directorate. The Embassy also noted that on the request of Turkey, he was called back to Moscow in April 1923. See, *Aralov 100 Yaşında: S. Aralov'un Diplomatik Misyonunun 100. Yıldönümüne Adanmış Rus Sanatçıların Eserlerinden Oluşan Sergi* (Ankara: Rus Evi, 2022), 1.

[959] İnan, (ed.) *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları*, 47 and Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, 1588-9.

strong anti-Russian attitudes. The French military attaché in Ankara and several other actors were also on the list of suspects, but Turkey and the Soviets decided to move on and work on ways to enhance their relationship in the face of the bigger challenges they needed to address in this period.[960] Aralov's successor in Ankara, Surits, noted about the situation in Ankara as he took office in June 1923, describing that the Soviet diplomatic mission in Ankara was in a form of isolation, being ignored by the Turkish state officials. [961] This could be indicative of irritation from Aralov's activities and the legacy he left behind.

7.2. The Nature of Turkish Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance about the Soviet Union

During his speech at a closed session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 18 November 1925, Minister of National Defence Recep Bey (Peker) stated that surveillance and intelligence activities were being conducted at all of Turkey's neighbours, as even those friendly looking ones, who would turn into enemies at a point and time that could not be predicted. [962] He said that it was quite natural that armies would not compete with the capabilities of the other armies only during wartime and as they conduct these activities in Turkey during peacetime, hence Turkey needed to conduct these surveillance and intelligence activities as well.[963]

---

[960] In addition to these, there are several other incidents where their relations were tested by covert and suspicious acts in the opening chapter of their relationship. Two notable ones were the killing of Mustafa Suphi and his comrades in January 1921, and the killing of the person known as Kahya Yahya who was believed to be the perpetrator of Suphi's murder in July 1922. Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), with several soldiers, were first to arrive to the incident scene when the attack against Kahya Yahya happened in Trabzon. He noted that he believed Bolsheviks got the revenge of Mustafa Suphi with this execution. For him, this attack was planned by the Russian Consulate in Trabzon. He also ruled out possibility of the government involvement in the Mustafa Suphi incident. See Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 262. After Apak's book, 20 years later in 1977, in an interview published by *Günaydın* newspaper, commander of the Presidential Guard, General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe said together with his men, he carried out the attack against Kahya Yahya. *Günaydın*, 4 December 1977. This newspaper series were then collected and published. See İsmail Hakkı Tekçe, *Muhafızı Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor: Emekli General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe'nin Anıları*, ed. Hasan Pulur (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000). See also Uğur Üçüncü, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Trabzon'da İttihatçı bir Sima Kahya Yahya* (Trabzon: Serander, 2015), 374-5.

[961] Gözde Somel, "Soviet Russia's Foreign Affairs with Turkey in 1923 Reports of Ambassador Surits," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 22/2 (2018): 227.

[962] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 541.

[963] *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 541.

In the Republican period, a valuable source for understanding the officer corps' perspective on intelligence is the book published based on a conference given by Kazım Paşa (Karabekir) on 1 December 1923.[964] As the Inspector of the First Army, Kazım Paşa stated that even to find a solution to the smallest tactical issue, they needed to obtain information about the enemy and the terrain, and having superiority on these would be key to victory.[965] He defined intelligence as obtaining accurate information and disseminating false information during peacetime and wartime, exemplifying this as a country with ten army corps creating the eleventh within the territory of the adversary.[966] He underlined the fact that intelligence activity would be carried out against both enemies and friends during both peace and war times.[967] He categorised the type of information as open source and secret sources, and those that needed to be tasked with collecting open sources would be military attachés, whereas secret sources could be obtained by spies.[968]

The Turkish General Staff had the branch tasked with intelligence within its organisation as İkinci Şube (the Second Branch) in the 1920s, continuing the Ottoman legacy. Later, it was renamed the Onüçüncü Şube (the Thirteenth Branch) in the mid-1920s and Onbirinci Şube (the Eleventh Branch) by the 1930s.[969] Military attachés were already deployed in various key capitals, including the Soviet Union. Within the General Staff, there were departments and desks for critical countries. Officers with the required relevant language skills examined publications and translated books, journals, and newspaper clippings sent by military attachés

[964] Kazım (Karabekir), *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat* (İstanbul: Erkan-Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1923).

[965] Karabekir, *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat*, 1.

[966] Karabekir, *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat*, 1.

[967] Karabekir, *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat*, 1.

[968] Karabekir, *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat*, 1-3.

[969] There is unfortunately no clear guide to branch names established within the Turkish General Staff over the years. This information was extracted from the publications printed by the intelligence branches from the 1920s and the 1930s. In his important work on the history of the Turkish General Staff from its beginnings in Ottoman period to the Republican period, Mazlum İşkora provided all details until the end of War of Independence and he noted due to secrecy, he cannot give any information on the organisation within the Turkish General Staff then. See Mazlum İşkora, *Türk Ordusu Kurmaylık, Erkanıharbiye Tarihçesi* (Ankara: Harb Akademisi Matbaası, 1944), 70.

deployed to the target countries. Information acquired from these sources was disseminated within the army according to need. Military attachés were responsible to hold the pen for writing on areas requested by the Intelligence Department. These were then published as print copies and disseminated. From 1924 to 1930, there were four such secret and official use labelled works prepared by the General Staff based on the work of military attachés in Moscow.[970] These were certainly built on each other with amendments as changes occurred over time. The first two of these works, published in 1924 and 1925, corresponded to the time of Turkish officer Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) in Moscow, who was appointed in autumn 1922 and had arrived in Moscow in early 1923, soon after the secret police raided his predecessor's office. He served in Moscow until 1926 and published important translations from Russian for the Turkish Army before and after his time in Moscow[971] (Figure 7.2).

As for setting up an agency for the secret part of the intelligence work Kazım Paşa mentioned above, Turkish political and military authority perceived the need for establishing a separate, dedicated and professional intelligence unit for Turkey. Based on the experiences of World War I and following the examples applied in other major countries, President Mustafa Kemal Paşa told that they were also obliged

[970] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*; *Kızıl Ordu II*; *Kızıl Ordu III* and *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV.*

[971] After Moscow, he was in the delegation dispatched to Germany to attend meetings with the former German intelligence chief Walter Nicolai which opened the way for the Turkish intelligence service MAH in 1926. Self-learner of Russian language from his times in the Balkan Wars in 1912, he served as the premier Red Army and Russia expert in the Turkish Army until his retirement in 1934. He then as a MP continued to work on the Soviet Union. He accompanied high level delegations from the Soviet Union during his military career. He featured in the Soviet documentary *Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara* filmed in 1933 as he was accompanying General Voroshilov coming to Turkey for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic. See Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara (1934) Sansürsüz Kopya HD, *Sinemasal Ankara*, 11:49 and 11:52, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImDt_e4r2Y0&list=WL&index=6, accessed on 25 February 2025. He continued to engage in the Russian affairs as the premier Russia expert in Turkey. He translated the memoirs of Aralov from Russian printed in Moscow in 1960. This draft was edited by Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, a close friend of Apak and who served as Turkish Ambassador in Moscow in 1927-1928. This draft was never published, and the manuscript is being kept in the rare book collection of the Turkish Historical Association's Library in Ankara with catalogue number T/0179. Apak had deep understanding of the country with all its aspects, and he had military skills as an officer who had been in active combat duty since the Balkan Wars and later fighting against Russian forces in World War I. He held no sympathies for Russia in general and in his memoirs later he noted that throughout history possibly the Russians and the British were the two nations that inflicted most harm to Turks because of imperialism. He supported Turkey getting to the Western bloc after World War II. He believed by this way; Turkey obtained enough weapons and capabilities to stand against the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War. See Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 134, 149 and 284.

to set up a modern intelligence like other modern states.[972] With a secret memorandum signed by Head of Chief of Staff Fevzi Paşa dated 6 January 1926, Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti was established. Depending on the use of dots, it is abbreviated as M. E. H. or MAH. The memorandum noted that the intelligence function carried out by the Army Inspectorates until then would be the responsibility of this new agency.[973]



Figure 7.2. Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), in the centre, on General Voroshilov's right, during Soviet Defence Minister Voroshilov's and General Budyonny's visit to Turkey in 1933.

Source: From the author's private collection.

In their search for a model from a Western country and in getting counselling, as in the field of aviation in those years by signing a contract with German Junkers, Turkish decision-makers opted to get support from outcast Germany and got into an agreement with the former chief of Imperial German Army intelligence, Abteilung IIIb, between 1913-1919, Walther Nicolai for consultancy, for sharing his

[972] İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi*, 18.

[973] İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi*, 19.

experience, and for guidance on the establishment of the Turkish one. Contact with him was established in autumn 1925, and his works were translated and published in Turkish for use by Turkish officers in 1925.[974] Nicolai travelled to Ankara in late January 1926, and met the Turkish Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, and Head of Chief of Staff. Turkey expected to benefit from his experience in setting up the foreign branch of this new intelligence agency. Later, a delegation of select officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Şükrü Ali (Ögel) travelled to Germany to meet Nicolai in June 1926.[975] Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), who was in France for training at the time, was also included in this delegation.[976]

After conferences and seminars in Germany and Turkey, the MAH was given an office in Ankara, outside the main General Staff building, and began its activities with a team of ten officers by the end of 1926.[977] It was subordinated to the Prime Ministry on 19 December 1926, and its first chief, Lieutenant Colonel Şükrü Ali, was appointed on 25 December 1926.[978] When he was appointed by the direct order of Fevzi Paşa as the first chief of MAH, he was teaching history of warfare at the Turkish War College. He could speak Russian, just like Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak). There are not many publications to shed light on his perspective on the establishment of MAH, instructions he was given, and the approach he adapted, except for a two-page article in *Türk Kültürü* journal published in 1973.[979] Without many commentaries, attributions, and speculative information, he usefully

[974] [Walther] Nicolai, *Gizli Kuvvetler*, trans. Mehmed Nihad (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925) from the original title *Geheime Mächte; internationale Spionage und ihre Bekämpfung im Weltkrieg und heute* published in 1924 in Leipzig and [Walther] Nicolai, *Büyük Harpte İstihbarat Hizmeti, Matbuat ve Efkâr-i Umumiye*, trans. Mehmed Nihad (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1925) from the original title *Nachrichtdienst, Prese und Wolksstimmung in Weltkrieg* published in 1920 in Berlin. Mehmet Nihad (1886-1928) was known as Bursalı Mehmed Nihad and he was killed in an accidental shooting at a road checkpoint in 1928 when he was at the rank of lieutenant colonel.

[975] Şükrü Ali Ögel, "Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Nasıl Kuruldu?," *Türk Kültürü,* 128 (June 1973): 605.

[976] BCA 30-18-1-1-19-38-8-1, 8 June 1926. From August 1922 to his deployment to Moscow as military attaché in late 1922, he served as head of intelligence section of the 1st Army. See *Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan Alay ve Tugay Komutanlarının Biyografileri*, Vol. II (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2010), 460.

[977] İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi*, 28.

[978] İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi*, 28-31.

[979] Ögel "Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Nasıl Kuruldu?,".

summarised his perspective concisely. He noted that the MAH was tasked with providing security of the state by informing about threats in advance, enabling preventive measures to be taken, identifying and spotting subversive activities inside and outside the country, and keeping the government alert. He emphasized that contrary to what might have been believed, except for surveillance of activities of those working against the country, they, as MAH, were not interested in domestic or foreign policy. He also noted that their focus was, naturally, foreign affairs.[980] He shared one moment he valued in his life when he was asked by Mustafa Kemal Paşa what the aim of intelligence was during a dinner at the presidential residence. His reply was, "The goal of intelligence is to get accurate information and prevent the state to meet surprises".[981] This comprehensive, well-thought-out, plain but effective approach to intelligence was reflected in the introduction of the first-ever book published by MAH in 1928. The work explaining how intelligence was conducted by major countries began with a note that read, "After the Great War, intelligence gained a new form, became a very fine art, a science and technique".[982] Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi wrote a very long article, almost 60 pages, on spies, espionage, and measures to be taken against them in 1925, summarising all these approaches to be introduced to the military audience.[983]

Contrary to what had been tacitly or openly argued throughout the decades, neither the MAH nor the Turkish General Staff Intelligence acted or was utilized by the government solely as actors for hunting down dissidents, communists, or Russian spies within the country during the interwar period. They had clear mandates to contribute to the country's defence and conduct routine bureaucratic work to prepare

[980] Ögel "Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Nasıl Kuruldu?," 605.

[981] Ögel "Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Nasıl Kuruldu?," 606: "İstihbaratta gaye doğru haber almak ve devleti bir sürpriz karşısında bırakmamaktır." He resigned in July 1941 in protest of then Prime Minister Refik Saydam's pressures in his effort to utilise them for his own interests and in domestic politics according to his account.

[982] *Ecnebiler İstihbarat Memuriyetini ve Memurlarını Nasıl Telakki Ederler* (Ankara: Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Neşriyatı, 1928), 1: "Büyük Harbten sonra istihbarat yeni bir şekil almış, çok ince bir sanat, bir ilim ve fen haline gelmiştir". This has been the first book printed by the MAH without any information on the publisher dated 20 August 1928.

[983] Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak), "Zamanımızda Casusluk ve Buna Karşı Mücadele Yolları," *Mecmua-i Askeriye*, 59 (December 1925): 65-124.

and report back on critical information needed for the military and security bureaucracy by political power. They certainly maintained oversight over these actors as part of their work on subversive elements within the country, as Lieutenant Colonel Şükrü Ali noted above. For example, files on individuals associated with communism were transferred from the General Staff to the MAH office after October 1927.[984]

In addition to its domestic activities, the MAH's work in foreign countries was established. According to information recently made available by a MİT Chief-mandated book, the public learned that the MAH had prepared books on target countries after its establishment. These were essentially strategic intelligence products focusing on all aspects of life in the target country, including information on political, economic, financial, military, geographical, and ethnic aspects. In the introduction to the first of the series on Bulgaria, the MAH Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Şükrü Ali, noted that these were prepared exclusively with information gathered by the MAH without any input from sources of any other government department, including the Turkish General Staff.[985] The MAH product on Russia was the *Tenth Book* in the series.[986]

Turkish military seniors were sensitive to how their activities could be perceived by the Soviet Union during the interwar period. As detailed in Chapter 5 on borders, military deployments, manoeuvres, and all other activities were evaluated from the perspective of whether they would be misperceived by the Soviets. The field of intelligence was no exception. In one striking early example, one of the reasons for the Turkish General Staff's severing ties with German military intelligence chief Nicolai was his one-sided tasking of himself to conduct intelligence activities against the Soviet Union, claiming he was mandated by his Turkish contract. This reportedly angered Fevzi Paşa, contributing to the severing of ties with him, in addition to other

[984] İlter, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi*, 37.

[985] Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 157.

[986] Bulgaria seventh, Greece eighth, Yugoslavia ninth, Italy eleventh, Iran-Iraq twelfth and Syria, Egypt and South Arabia were the thirteenth books in this MAH series. See Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 157.

reasons related to performance, delivery, quality, content, and payment issues.[987]

The MAH's interwar work on the Soviet Union also covered its attempts to prevent third-party activities within Turkish territory targeting the Soviet Union. The MAH was aware of Britain's interest and willingness to engage in activities against the Soviet Union through many channels that could penetrate Turkish territory.[988] In addition to trying to understand the nature and character of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, Britain was interested in what it believed to be activities to engage in countering Soviet intelligence activities in Turkey.[989] In those years, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service's principal preoccupation in Turkey was Soviet diplomatic and subversive activity.[990] As usual, İstanbul was the epicentre for these activities, and MAH tried to access networks, such as the émigré White Russian community, that Britain wanted to use against the Soviet Union.[991] The same was true with regard to the Soviet Union, as penetrating European diplomatic missions outside Europe, such as those in China, Persia, and Turkey, was easier.[992]

Regarding Soviet intelligence activity during the interwar years in Turkey and the interplay between the OGPU and the Red Army military intelligence, some information was available through the publication of the first-ever senior defector from the Soviet intelligence, Georges Agabekov.[993] There had been defection of civil

[987] Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 141. After World War II, Nicolai was captured by the Soviet military counterintelligence group SMERSH (СМЕРШ: Смерть шпионам- SMERSH: Death to Spies) and died in prison in Moscow in 1947.

[988] Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 159.

[989] David J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage* (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1956), 14.

[990] Keith Jeffery, *The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949* (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 206.

[991] Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, 161 and Jeffery, *Secret History of MI6*, 204.

[992] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 87.

[993] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)* (Berlin: Издательство Стрела, 1930). Georges Agabekov's (1895-1938) real name was Grigory Sergeyevich Artuyunov. He joined Cheka in 1920 and remained until his defection in 1930. He was assassinated by the OGPU's successor organisation in 1938. His book was translated by Henry W. Bunn from French in 1932. However, this edition

servants from the Soviet system, but he was the first senior one coming from the intelligence machinery, causing considerable stress within the Soviet system.[994] After his various postings in Bukhara, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, he was posted to İstanbul in 1929 and became the head of the OGPU's Eastern Section. From his account, it was revealed that the OGPU used Turkey as a hub to run activities in countries around Turkey with its centre in İstanbul. The presence in İstanbul has been operational since 1925, with qualified personnel, a network, and physical and technical resources.[995] From İstanbul, with these capabilities, the OGPU was able to surveil activities of groups such as anti-communists, Dashnaks, Turanists, or those seeking disturbances in Central Asia or South Caucasus, whom he concurred were not at a level of posing threat to the Soviet Union in those years but yet necessary to be aware of.[996] In terms of surveilling wider military activities in the region, tapping into communication and document flow of foreign embassies such as Japan, Austria, and France in Turkey gave them an understanding of developments in Arabia, Persia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.[997]

Having a regional outreach and also carrying out activities against the diplomatic corps of other countries in Turkey, Agabekov noted that prior to 1930, the OGPU residents in Turkey were ordered to do nothing that might offend the Turkish Government for two reasons. First, the Soviet Government regarded Turkey as a friendly power with which it might exchange information.[998] In fact, Turkish authorities made such cooperation attempts, only to be turned down by the Soviet

---

contains significant differences in text compared to the 1930 Russian original including its title. See Georges Agabekov, *OGPU The Russian Secret Terror*, trans. Henry W. Bunn, (New York: Brentano's, 1932) republished by Tough Hike Publishing in 2024 in Wroclaw Poland. The OGPU tried to discredit his books and disseminated information that they contained many inaccuracies but according to former GRU member and an academic working on intelligence in the United Kingdom, Boris Volodarsky, it can be confirmed without doubt that his books were a mother lode of important information in spite of a few minor errors. See Boris Volodarsky, "Unknown Agabekov," *Intelligence and National Security,* 28/6 (2013): 904.

[994] Volodarsky, "Unknown Agabekov," 890-1.

[995] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 215.

[996] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 215.

[997] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 215-7.

[998] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 218.

intelligence. He also noted that the Chairman of OGPU, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky, rejected the proposal last made in early 1929, citing that the Turks hardly possessed any valuable information, and if they did, they would keep the valuable information for themselves and tell them nonsense.[999] Therefore, it would be pointless to reveal the GPU's methods of work to them. However, in transmitting the refusal, the Soviet Government expressed its readiness, in the event of receiving information about someone's activities to the detriment of Turkish state interests, to hand over the information to the Turkish Government.[1000] In any case, there had been cases of exchange of such friendly information between them.[1001]

The second reason was that the OGPU had the desire to continue to work out of İstanbul in the wider region thus refrained from working against the Turks.[1002] The OGPU believed that if the Turks were not touched, but the work was carried out on the territory of other powers, then the Turks would turn a blind eye to this work. This trade-off, as they saw a sacrifice, had to be made in order to be able to work unhindered in Syria, Palestine, Egypt, etc.[1003] However, he noted that "a friendly attitude towards Turkey, however, did not interfere with the special department of the GPU in Moscow intercepting and deciphering Turkish telegrams".[1004] Examples he gave were particularly about the communication during the events in Afghanistan in 1928 and during the disturbances in Turkey's east along its border with Iran in the late 1920s.

During this time, Turkey was also hosting a special person under watch on the personal request of Stalin. The former strong man of Russia, founder of the Red Army, the Soviet military intelligence and the only remaining big obstacle offering a very strong rival ideological challenge to him, Leon Trotsky, was in Turkey.

[999] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 218. Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky (1874-1934).

[1000] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 218-9.

[1001] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 219.

[1002] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 219.

[1003] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 219.

[1004] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 220.

Initially, the OGPU was tasked with monitoring him and keeping him comfortable by trying to meet his needs.[1005] While he was settled in Prinkipo Island in İstanbul, in addition to being under Turkish surveillance, he was surveilled by OGPU agents. The OGPU used a person as an agent working for one of the Soviet economic institutions in Turkey that Trotsky had known before.[1006] However, Moscow took action against those whom they believed disobeyed instructions and acted under Trotsky's influence. In mid-1928, Yakov Blumkin, who had achieved fame for the murder of the German Ambassador to Moscow Count Mirbach in 1918, was sent to Turkey.[1007] Agabekov noted his status as of something of a celebrity enjoying great influence among the members of the OGPU Collegium coming to İstanbul with colossal powers and the task of organizing an illegal OGPU agency in Syria, Palestine, Hejaz, and Egypt.[1008] Soon, Blumkin was summoned to Moscow and arrested for being in touch with Trotsky in İstanbul. The allegations against him included using the OGPU secret mail system for sending Trotsky's letters to his followers in the Soviet Union, for being entrusted by Trotsky with negotiations with Karl Radek and other Trotskyists.[1009] Blumkin was shot at the OGPU prison in Moscow under Stalin's direct order in 1929.[1010]

Agabekov noted that by late 1929, he was instructed by Moscow to turn attention to Turkey's actions. He noted that "Moscow reported that recently there has been a turn to the West in Turkey's foreign policy, and therefore I need to begin intelligence work against the Turkish Government".[1011] The visit of the British fleet to İstanbul in 1929 must have attracted the attention of the OGPU chiefs in Moscow. As a consistent theme in Agabekov's book, the OGPU consistently failed in its ability to

[1005] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 228.

[1006] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 228.

[1007] Yakov Grigoryevich Blumkin (1900-1929).

[1008] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 220.

[1009] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 225.

[1010] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 226 and Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations*, 155.

[1011] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 240.

capture the wider picture, strategic-level assessment, and was limited to being more skilled and efficient at tactical levels as they misinterpreted Turkey's actions in Afghanistan, against Iran, and its exchanges with the Soviet Union waged through the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Red Army in general. In October 1929, Commander-in-Chief Admiral Field of the British Mediterranean Fleet visited İstanbul, which constituted an important turning point in Turkey's position. This naturally raised concerns regarding Turkey's leaning toward the adversarial West among Soviet circles. However, Soviet diplomatic and military reactions were more tactful than the irritated and alarmed reactions of the OGPU. Preceding the British admiral's visit, Commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet Admiral Orlov visited İstanbul and shortly after the British Admiral's visit, in December 1929 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karakhan visited Turkey and the Soviet naval vessel showed flag giving both sides assurances that their relations were as cordial as ever not impacted by changes in the course against the West. Ironically, he arrived on a vessel named after the Cheka founder, the Soviet destroyer *Dzerzhinsky.* [1012]

Agabekov defected and travelled from İstanbul to France, arriving in Paris on 27 June 1930. His book was printed in 1930 after the extracts were published in the French press. International media took an interest in his remarks as officials in the Turkish system. The Turkish Foreign Ministry shared a translation of his interview with the *Posledniya*[1013] newspaper, published by Russian émigrés in France, with the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, stating that he was the person running the GPU spy ring in Turkey, Iran, Palestine, and Greece.[1014] He provided high-grade intelligence

[1012] *Vakit*, 13 December 1929. The vessel was originally named *Kaliakra* in memory of a naval battle between the Russian fleet led by Admiral Ushakov and the Ottoman fleet in 1791. After Dzerzhinsky's death in 1926, it was named after him.

[1013] *Poslednie Novosti.*

[1014] The Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, TDA 571-34487-135865-6, 11 December 1930. Here again, Turkish bureaucracy would not follow the Cheka-GPU-OGPU order and refer to OGPU as GPU stating GPU is the further shortened version of it. See *Espiyonaj*, 45. Knowing such basic details as the name of the institution, department, section, name, or title within the interlocutor for a bureaucracy has always been considered fundamental. Errors in such fundamentals indicate difficulties in accessing such information if this did not happen from carelessness, and this would be unlikely for the Turkish bureaucracy, known for its disciplined management.

to the British authorities, providing the first-ever top-level account of the OGPU's work, methods, organisation, and personnel.[1015]

7.2.1. Mechanisms and Conducting Intelligence Gathering

From the Turkish military's perspective, the objectives of military intelligence activities were framed as the collection of information kept secret by the interlocutors, which was entirely related to the military field.



Figure 7.3. The uniforms and insignia used by the Red Army.

Source: Kızıl Ordu II (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye,1925), folded plate.

In peacetime, these would cover plans for mobilisation and operation plans of an army; structures of land, air, and naval branches of an army and numbers; structure of an army; level of preparation of an army and people for war; training and readiness; morale; weapons, provisions, and equipment status of an army and military transfer means and their conditions, as well as all relevant information on the structure of the state and its likely form in wartime.[1016] The intelligence products

[1015] Volodarsky, "Unknown Agabekov," 895.

[1016] *Espiyonaj*, 22. It is defined in a similar way by current MİT as "Intelligence that examines the size, organization, strategic and tactical doctrines, combat readiness and capabilities of the armed forces of target or potential target countries ["Hedef veya hedef olması muhtemel ülkelerin silahlı kuvvetlerinin büyüklüğünü, teşkilatını, stratejik ve taktik doktrinlerini, savaşa hazırlık derecelerini ve yeteneklerini inceleyen istihbarat]. See "Military intelligence" (Askeri İstihbarat) entry in *Sözlük* by

of the Turkish General Staff were produced during the peace years of the interwar period from this perspective. These targets were reflected in the products on the Soviet Union and the Red Army as exemplified by below selected exhibits showing details of the Red Army uniforms (Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4). Identification of uniforms, tracking changes, and correct understanding of ranks, order, and insignia were the basic tasks in sketching out another military bureaucracy.




Figure 7.4. Drawing showing the uniforms and insignias used in the Red Army.
Source: *Kızıl Ordu III* (İstanbul, Askeri Matbaa, 1927), folded plate.

Pinpointing troops and their deployment were a primary task of military intelligence. This surveillance activity of the target was a critical task for the military intelligence function, and these records were updated and marked on revised maps for use by the Turkish Army. The Red Army's stationing of its troops in a wider area spanning from north of the Black Sea to the Baltics was examined by Turkish observers (Figure 7.5).

MİT, https://mit.gov.tr/sozluk.html#A, accessed on 8 March 2025. According to MİT it is conducted at strategic, operational and tactical levels which was laid out by the Soviet interwar bureaucracy in a usual manner. See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 262.




Figure 7.5. The Red Army deployment.

Source: Kızıl Ordu II (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye,1925), folded map.




Figure 7.6. The Red Army stationing of troops along the eastern border of Turkey in the South Caucasus.

Source: *Kızıl Ordu III* (İstanbul, Askeri Matbaa, 1927), folded map.

Certainly, the situation in the areas close to Turkey's borders with the Soviet Union was more important as monitoring deployments in these immediate areas and detecting changes in the force structure and movements were more relevant to the Turkish military intelligence.

Therefore, information containing this data was observed and marked on the map (Figure 7.6), and updates were offered in revised editions of military intelligence publications (Figure 7.7).



Figure 7.7. The Red Army stationing of troops along the eastern border of Turkey in South Caucasus.

Source: *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV (1929- 1930)* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930), folded map.

To maintain a wider framework for understanding the overall movements of the Red Army, troop deployments and the actual situation in very distant areas such as Central and East Asia were also monitored and marked on maps (Figure 7.8). Importance was attached to these as they were indicative of the strategic-level intentions and actions of the Soviet Union. Major shifts or transfers would indicate a likely shift in policy and operational plans.



Figure 7.8. The Red Army troop deployment in Central Asia and Siberia.
Source: *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV (1929- 1930)* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930), folded map.

7.2.2. The Nature of Data

The Bolshevik perception of the role of war was different. Lenin noted that although socialists have always condemned war between nations as barbarous and brutal, their attitude towards war was fundamentally different from that of the bourgeois pacifists (supporters and advocates of peace) and from that of the anarchists, in a way they differed from them as they understood the inevitable connection between wars and the class struggle within the country; understanding that war cannot be abolished unless classes were abolished and Socialism was created; and they also differed in that they fully regarded civil wars, i.e., wars waged by the oppressed class against the oppressing class, slaves against slave-owners, serfs against land-owners, and wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as legitimate, progressive and necessary.[1017] He admired the assertion that "War is the continuation of politics by other (i.e., violent)

[1017] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "Socialism and War: The Attitude of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party Towards the War," Marxists.org https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/s-w/ch01.htm, accessed on 15 March 2025.

means" and noted that "this famous aphorism was uttered by one of the profoundest writers on the problems of war, Clausewitz. Marxists have always regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis for views concerning the significance of every given war. It was precisely from this viewpoint that Marx and Engels always regarded different wars". He urged that every socialist would sympathise with the victory of the oppressed, dependent, unequal states against the oppressing, slave-owning, predatory great powers.[1018] From this perspective, the role the Bolsheviks gave to intelligence and their expectations were not different. They wanted the liquidation of all enemies with powerful strikes, regardless of the resources that could be sacrificed to protect the Revolution and prolong it. Therefore, their intelligence bureaucracy took shape along lines compatible with their task and mission objectives. The functions thus were defined as "hunting out and liquidating all counter-revolution and sabotage… handing over all saboteurs and counterrevolutionaries to a Revolutionary Tribunal… carrying out preliminary investigations only."[1019]

In Turkish understanding, determining the actions of an adversary or understanding how the future battle would unfold was difficult, and the best an intelligence agency could achieve in peacetime would be to produce material that would be useful at least in the opening of war, provided that it was well organised.[1020] Unknowns, chances, surprises, and unpredictability were part of the trade. However, the Soviet leadership's approach to intelligence functions was significantly different from that in Turkey, as also observed in their different approach to the army due to strong Marxist foundations. From the founders' perspective, as the only true science, Marxism-Leninism was to be considered the basis for foresight, presuming to tell why and give a more solid basis for foreseeing and predicting the enemy's plans.[1021] The understanding that this genuine science would enable knowing not only how to

[1018] Lenin, "Socialism and War: The Attitude of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party Towards the War".

[1019] Ronald Hingley, *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 119.

[1020] *Espiyonaj*, 22.

[1021] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 253. On this aspect, the highly revered military theorist that Marxists and especially Lenin respected, Prussian Clausewitz was criticised for his assertion about uncertainty and role of chance in war. Turkish thinking was more in line with that of posited by Clausewitz.

see but also to foresee, and not only in war but also in social life, actually in life in general.[1022] This depended on the art of the top political leadership, which was fused with the top military leadership.[1023] From this complex and well-framed starting point, for the Bolshevik leadership, intelligence maintained a broad meaning, including intelligence as a process and institution, as well as reconnaissance, and came to occupy an extraordinarily significant place in Soviet thought and doctrine.[1024] In an unpublished speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the end of the interwar years, in 1937, Stalin exemplified this importance and extraordinary attention placed on intelligence. He said, "In order to win an engagement in time of war, it is necessary to have several corps of the Red Army men. However, to achieve this victory on the front, several spies somewhere on the army staff, or even the divisional staff, capable of stealing the operational plan and giving it to the opponent, is all that is necessary. In order to construct a great railroad bridge, thousands of men are needed, but in order to blow it up, several people are sufficient."[1025]

This strong doctrinal approach, the sheer size, capabilities, and ambitions of the Bolshevik regime, caused the emergence of a much more sophisticated and different intelligence bureaucracy on the Soviet side. Several parallel networks worked simultaneously with different instructions, ignorant of the work of others and usually in competition with other parts of the system. The diplomatic facilities maintained their key place as the most important hub for any intelligence group, but the system was designed in a way where ambassadors were mostly not connected to their activities, and their staff would work on these areas.[1026] The Soviet intelligence bureaucracy that took shape by the early 1920s had the secret police adapting different names over time as they evolved, including military intelligence and Comintern (Communist International) intelligence.

[1022] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 253.

[1023] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 253.

[1024] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 258.

[1025] Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet Intelligence Services," *in The Red Army*, ed. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), 266.

[1026] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 259.

The Cheka, (The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия- ВЧК,) was established in 1917. It was an extraordinary commission to combat counter-revolution, sabotage, and profiteering, serving as a 'strong shield and an avenging sword of the Revolution.[1027] It was succeeded by GPU (State Political Directorate- Государственное политическое управление-ГПУ) on 6 February 1922. Cheka's disbandment and transforming it into GPU and shortly afterwards to OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate, Объединённое государственное политическое управление-ОГПУ) on 15 November 1923 was not simply a change of its name but was a decision taken by the Soviet leadership to adapt to changes. According to Lenin, the gist of the reform was the changed nature of its work to suit the new situation as the Soviet Union moved to peacetime and duties to be set before would gain in complexity.[1028] Lenin was quoted as saying every Communist should make himself a Chekist.[1029] It was a desire to urge all to join the struggle to safeguard the state in the most efficient way. This function was transformed in 1934 once again and became known as NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs- Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел-НКВД) until the end of World War II.[1030] The Turkish system used the name Cheka in statements or official intelligence documents even after it was disbanded, owing to the strong connotations with the image they had created during the Russian Revolution.

The Red Army had a military intelligence function that came to be known later as the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate, Главное разведывательное управление - ГРУ). Throughout the interwar period, this group was known not by this name but as Razvedupr (Разведупр) or the Fourth Department established by Semyon Aralov by the authorization of Red Army Commissar Trotsky.[1031] From 1924 to 1935, it was

[1027] *Felix Dzerzhinsky, A Biography*, trans. Natalia Belskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), 238.

[1028] *Dzerzhinsky, A Biography*, 151.

[1029] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 18.

[1030] Turkish military intelligence noted this name change occurred in1935. See *Espiyonaj*, 45.

[1031] The name GRU achieving prominence later during World War II especially after the Sorge spy ring incident in Japan in 1941. See Garthoff, "The Soviet Intelligence Services," 268. Richard Gustavovich Sorge (1895-1944) under journalist cover established a GRU spy ring in Japan providing

led by Red Army General Yan Karlovich Berzin.[1032] Berzin was involved in the military intelligence section from its inception and became its deputy head in 1921.[1033] The Bolshevik leadership believed that operational military intelligence would be conducted permanently and ceaselessly and that no one form of intelligence could completely replace another.[1034] As the Turkish intelligence bureaucracy, the Soviet intelligence bureaucracy was permanently and ceaselessly engaged in intelligence activities.

From the beginning, there was always rivalry between military intelligence and the foreign intelligence operatives of the secret police within the Soviet system.[1035] The Soviet system never attempted to draw a distinct division line between the functions of these parts of the intelligence bureaucracy as fields of activity had always overlapped and their remits had not been precisely defined intentionally.[1036] Lenin maintained a difficult balance between the requests and ambitions of the Cheka chief Felix Dzerzhinsky and those of the Red Army founder Trotsky.[1037] Cheka and its successors were embroiled in constant competition with Soviet ministries, such as the foreign ministry Narkomindel, the Ministry of Commerce Narkomintorg, and the Red Army intelligence.[1038] Succeeding Trotsky as the Defence Minister, Frunze had the same struggle to keep OGPU interference in the Red Army. According to Trotsky, Frunze went too far in his efforts to protect the army from OGPU's interference.[1039] Dzerzhinsky enjoyed Lenin's full support and continued when Stalin

---

intelligence on Japanese Empire and Nazi Germany to Soviet Union. He was captured and hanged in 1944.

[1032] Yan Karlovich Berzin, real name Kyuzis Peteris (1889-1938). He was shot by the NKVD during the Purges in July 1938.

[1033] Viktor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (New York: Berkley Books, 1986), 227. Suvorov claimed he was the de facto head from the beginning of his days with the military intelligence.

[1034] Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, 261.

[1035] Garthoff, "The Soviet Intelligence Services," 269.

[1036] Dallin, *Soviet Espionage,* 5.

[1037] Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, 10-12.

[1038] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*,19; 23-4; 26-7.

[1039] Hingley, *Russian Secret Police*, 140.

began his work on removing obstacles on his way in the whole system not limited to the Red Army but losing his life shortly after Lenin did in 1926, giving Stalin chance to exercise even more control over the two.[1040]

Stalin also tried to maintain a balance between them and assured they coexisted as they were producing value to the Soviet leadership from two different channels through the interwar years. The chronic feud continued, and Cheka and its successors lobbied for exclusive rights, a monopoly over intelligence, and the Communist Party Central Committee's disbanding of military intelligence with the transfer of all its duties and capabilities to them, without success during the interwar years.[1041] The communist leadership maintained both. The balance worked in favour of the leadership to keep both under control as they checked one another.[1042] This balance was briefly disrupted briefly when purges within the Red Army were initiated through the end of these years between 1936-1938. Military intelligence was also subject to execution in the purges that claimed the lives of many other Red Army officers.[1043] Act OGPU had always maintained its intimidation of Red Army intelligence officers from the early days.[1044] There were also times when both managed to set up special, small, and secretive task groups. In the early 1930s, the Head of the Fourth Department managed to establish a joint OGPU-Fourth Department task unit for signal intelligence within the OGPU Special Department Spets-Otdel for civilian and military signal intelligence.[1045] This unit, remaining in secrecy from their parent organisations, continued to exist for several years until the mid-1930s.[1046] Through this cooperation, the Soviets managed to break British

[1040] Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations*, 108.

[1041] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 26.

[1042] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 26.

[1043] Dallin, *Soviet Espionage*, 6-7.

[1044] In his memoirs, Walter Krivitsky (1899-1941) who defected to US in 1939 noted how he was threatened by the OGPU as he was working for the military intelligence in Moscow in 1926. He also noted after persistent efforts, the OGPU managed in 10 years to get control over the military intelligence by late 1930's. See W. G. Krivitsky, *Ben Stalin'in Ajanıyım*, trans. N. Y. E. (İstanbul: Millet Yayını Ülkü Basımevi, 1947), 113-5.

[1045] Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations*, 173-4.

[1046] Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations*, 174.

diplomatic codes and ciphers, an area where Britain usually had superiority over all other actors in the interwar period.[1047]

In the second book published in 1925, based on information collected and conveyed by the Turkish military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi (Apak) at that time, and printed by the Turkish General Staff Intelligence Department, Cheka was mentioned as part of the report on the Red Army.[1048] There was no section on it in the first book published a year earlier in 1924.[1049] In the second book, it was noted that Cheka troops were organised in regimental and divisional structures and were outside the Red Army structure throughout the country, and information was provided on the deployment of these troops in various locations in the country.[1050] In the 1927 report, it was noted that a unified state political administration was established with a special status to combat, in essence, to work against political, economic, and reactionary espionage and against banditry.[1051]

Turkish military intelligence identified intelligence craft conducted by the Soviet system through various channels. In their expansive monitoring of the Soviet system, the Turkish General Staff spotted Comintern and its role in overall Soviet intelligence activities. According to Turkish military intelligence, despite portraying itself as a scientific institution, the Comintern was organised in all countries to bring about a communist revolution in the way the Soviet Union perceived.[1052] Contrary to their claims of having autonomy, separate budgets, academies, printing offices, and social institutions, all these were, in essence, organs of the Soviet government.[1053] The name of the grouping active in foreign affairs was Moper, which, according to

[1047] Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations*, 181.

[1048] *Kızıl Ordu II*.

[1049] *Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I*.

[1050] *Kızıl Ordu II*, 60-1.

[1051] *Kızıl Ordu III*, 377. The abbreviation used for OGPU was C. *Г. P. O.* in a mixed Latin Cyrillic alphabet version in this version in 1927 written in Arabic script.

[1052] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 8-9.

[1053] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 8.

Turkish military intelligence, was also organised in Turkey three years earlier as its 36th branch.[1054] Moper stood for the Aid Society for International Revolutionaries (Beynelmilel İnkılapçılara Yardım Cemiyeti) that was set up with a separate budget, publishing arms to aid international revolutionaries, to provide financial support to prisoners, to relay their letters to prison and found lawyers to defend them. With these activities, Comintern worked to recruit supporters and turn them to work against their nations and conduct political, economic, and military espionage activities, as well as work to organise within military circles to recruit such people from within the armies.[1055]

Turkish military intelligence identified that, with a legal status and special tasking, the OGPU was entitled to manage the political affairs of the Soviet Union and was organised at different levels in all Soviet republics and autonomous republics and in all administrative bodies, organisations, and structures.[1056] Political administration has organisation and officers in the army, government institutions, public and private factories, and institutions. They conducted internal and external functions and were organised in accordance with the delivery of these tasks.

Internally, they conducted surveillance of those involved in espionage, brigandage, religious fanaticism, foreigners, and suspicious people, engaged in theft for political purposes (like documents), fought against nationalist currents, upheld the Bolshevik regime, maintained public order and security (a task originally for the police), and provided and covered the country's borders against the penetration of foreign propaganda.[1057] To perform these duties, the OGPU had dedicated troops organised as central and provincial organisations throughout the Union, which was estimated to be around 80 thousand to 100 thousand strong and organised in company, battalion, and regiment levels, with no difference from the army.[1058] From the Turkish

[1054] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 8.

[1055] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 8-9.

[1056] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 87.

[1057] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 87.

[1058] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 88.

military's perspective, Political Commissars, who were tasked with acting as deputies to military commanders, were the tools of the OGPU within the Red Army.[1059]

Prisons controlled by the OGPU were also known in the Turkish system as having cells for single persons or a group of prisoners kept underground. Suspects were usually tried by a small number of OGPU officers in their absence.[1060] In pursuit of suspects and against foreigners and political officers, the OGPU may move beyond internationally accepted legal norms, as observed by the Turkish military intelligence.[1061]

The Red Army military intelligence established with the name Razvedupr (Разведупр) was examined in detail in later years by the Turkish authorities, which focused entirely on Cheka and OGPU as the dominant primary Soviet intelligence functions despite the fact that its founder, Semyon Aralov, had been the first Soviet Ambassador to Turkey establishing extensive connections with Turkish political and military seniors. According to GRU defector using the pen name Viktor Suvorov, Aralov was one of the creators of Cheka, moving to become the first chief of military intelligence in October 1918, adapting different roles in intelligence, and becoming deputy chief of military intelligence after 1921 while he worked as an ambassador in Turkey.[1062] The Turkish military intelligence identified Razvedupr as the Red Army General Staff's special intelligence agency, with military attachés as their representatives.[1063] Although members of the diplomatic corps, the consuls conducted work, agents of Razvedupr worked independently, reported directly to the centre, and sometimes could even control Soviet official representatives in foreign

[1059] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 86.

[1060] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 88.

[1061] *Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV*, 87.

[1062] Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, 204.

[1063] *Espiyonaj*, 46. The Turkish General Staff even in a late date as 1956 still knew the Soviet General Military Intelligence as Razvedupr not as GRU. *See Milli Savunma Konferansları I. Haberalma* (Ankara: E.U. Basımevi, 1956), 93. Information referenced in this work is same as the information provided in the 1940 book.

countries.[1064] According to the Turkish General Staff, Razvedupr functioned with its 12 sections.[1065]

1- KRO- Counter-revolution Section

It was tasked with combating counterrevolutionaries and those opposing the Soviet regime within the country. Using agents keeps all hotels, restaurants, entertainment centres, etc., under control and deals with suspicious people.

2- INO- Foreign Section

The key section is further divided into the following branches:

a) Political and economic espionage. It collects information on the political and economic order of every country separately. This branch was also tasked with learning about the weak and faulty aspects of senior administrative officers in foreign countries. This branch took the Comintern aims into consideration and managed communist propaganda and activity in foreign countries.
b) Military espionage: It obtains military information and documents. It is organised into subsections exclusive to each country.
c) Combatting espionage: Special to combat foreign spies within the Soviet borders. Organised into sub sections exclusive to each country.
d) Combatting anti-Soviet organisations: Keeps control over those organisations managed by foreign countries within the Soviet Union's territory in Soviet nations not content with the Soviet administration.

[1064] *Espiyonaj*, 46.

[1065] *Espiyonaj*, 46-7.

e) Combatting with Russian fugitives in foreign countries (Whites), like in the case of Aleksander Pavlovich Kutepov, Yevgeny-Ludvig Karlovich Miller and Nikolai Skoblin.
f) Surveillance of all Soviet officers and subjects outside Soviet territory.

3- ÇO- Special Internal Section

The tasks of this section are as follows:

a) Defence of the Soviet Union's secrets.
b) Deciphering confidential information and documents sent by agents of foreign countries.
c) Preparation of the required codes sent to Soviet diplomats abroad, residencies, and their agents.

This section has laboratories. Prepares forged documents and passports and examines confidential documents. They prepare fake documents that could have a high impact.

4- OO- Special Section

This section ran secret surveillance and reconnaissance within the Red Army, including the Red Navy and aviation. All activities of those opposing the regime fall within the remit of this section.

5- EKO- Economics Section

This section has the following subgroups:

a) Combatting sabotage and treason in the Soviet economy and institutions.
b) Combatting foreign economic espionage in the country.

6- INFO- Intelligence Section

It has two subgroups:

a) It closely watches organisations, clubs, and political currents that were allowed to remain within the Soviet territory.

It also closely watches Soviet senior officers who were able to gather groups around themselves based on ideas.

b) To control domestic and foreign postal services, telegraphs, and publications.

7- IO- Eastern Section

Conducts works on the eastern regions in coordination with the sections listed above. Realisation of political, economic, and propaganda issues are the primary dealings.

8- TO- Transportation Section

Watches the development and successful operation of railways. Maintenance of railways, transportation in seas and along rivers, potential sabotage against these, and treason are the main responsibilities of this section.

9- OPO- Border Section

Oversees all state borders of the Soviet Union. Members of this section are separate from the border troops. They have the following branches:

a) Examination of all stations along the borders and identification of areas that could be used for deserting.

b) Combatting smugglers and those passing through borders illegally.

Members of this section maintain contact with border stations and remain informed of developments at every station.

10- PO- Execution Section

Arrest, pressure, and execution of decisions given by Soviet courts are this section's responsibility. "This section was a nightmare for the Soviet people".

11- AOO- Administrative Organization Section

It deals with new recruits and their education and training. Additionally, it is responsible for financial tasks.

12- SO- Secret Political Section

Monitoring and examination of all the above-listed activities and inspection of all officers and administrators.

Turkish military intelligence analysed its opposite on the Soviet side, placing more emphasis on the Soviet political police line, beginning with Cheka and continuing with adaptations under different names, such as GPU, OGPU, and NKVD, during the interwar period. The Turkish authorities were aware of the Red Army military intelligence Razvedupr, which was not well known worldwide then, and their organisational structure was examined as well.

Through military attachés in Moscow, the Turkish General Staff intelligence produced detailed reports containing basic catalogue information from the military intelligence function perspective. Red Army developments, their structure, deployments, details on their weapons, uniforms, operational procedures, as well as

command structures and commanders were made available to Turkish political and military seniors. These works enhanced Turkish knowledge of the Soviet military throughout the interwar period.

7.3. Conclusion

By nature, the intelligence domain was different. Surveillance and other activities were maintained at all times during peacetime or wartime for both enemies and friends. Manipulative and deceptive nature was inherent in all intelligence activities. This special domain of intelligence was the area where Turkish-Soviet relations throughout the interwar years had the least contact area compared to other engagements in military relations. Authorities on both sides remained hesitant and maintained distance in their engagement in this field as they were forming their own understanding and ways of operation, as well as their respective organisations. This was one of the unique areas where Turkish officials did not seek to learn from the Soviets in any way.

In setting their intelligence priorities, they were guided by the structural conditions they were in and by their strategic objectives, which bore similarities to a certain extent. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union were outcasts from the European security architecture and felt threatened by the West. They anticipated contradictions in the European system that would generate another major war in the form of a total war that was previously unseen. They were also trying to build a system in their countries, trying to strengthen and preserve it with limited resources, and defend their systems against domestic and foreign enemies. In addition, they did not perceive any threat from each other at the strategic level during this period. Therefore, shaped by these factors, their intelligence activity was limited to conducting surveillance on each other and preventing any third-party activity within their jurisdictions that would undermine their relationship.

In this difficult domain, contrary to allegations, widely held misperceptions, and unsubstantiated information abundant in the literature, spies, agents, subversive activities, communist infiltrations, or the hunt for communist agents were not the

main issues between Turkey and the Soviet Union and for their intelligence functions. Turkish military intelligence produced detailed products that enabled the Turkish system to have a clear understanding of the Red Army and the Soviets.

From this perspective, even in the highly adversarial and inherently deceptive area where the aim has always been to win over the enemy or friend at all costs, the interwar period intelligence interactions between Turkey and the Soviet Union served to maintain low tension and manage issues before they escalated into uncontrollable and unpredictable levels. Both countries managed to attain a result and relationship that remained consistent with all areas of affairs covered in the previous chapters.

The transformation in studying intelligence needs to be noted in the context of Turkish-Soviet interactions. Intelligence can now be studied in this manner. Archives are becoming available to researchers and academics, and even powerful intelligence agencies are stepping out from the shadows, establishing partnerships with universities, releasing documents, or mandating their histories written by academics to be shared with the public. It should be noted that its manipulative and deceptive nature is inherent in all its activities. In academic studies, anchoring research on other evidence, particularly in a wider context, would be the only possible way to have some protection against this intelligence penetration into historiography.

The outcome of any document mining at their archives, obtaining a document released by an agency would not necessarily mean the study of the subject would become more revealing, nor cherry-picked data would prove what is stated in that would be the main determining factor of that particular relationship. In his article on the recent release of material from the archives of Britain's security service on the near-mythical Cambridge Five in the United Kingdom, Dan Lomas noted that those documents may provide the minutiae, but the big picture had been known for a long time already.[1066] Therefore, although declassification of selected historical

[1066] Dan Lomas, "The Beginning of the End for the Cambridge Five," *Engelsberg Ideas* (21 February 2025) https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/the-beginning-of-the-end-for-the-cambridge-five/, accessed on 25 February 2025.

documents from the archives of an agency would always be valuable, due care needs to be exercised. It bears certain risks, as without context or keeping up with the overall picture, these would probably serve as an attempt to influence, shape, or manipulate in a certain way in that particular timeframe and agenda. Therefore, in the Turkish- Soviet context for the interwar period, for example, a freshly released document showing Russian OGPU agents looking for ways to conduct surveillance on Trotsky while he was in İstanbul would not contribute to our understanding of the issue, except for feeding the narrative that seeks to establish the situation as Russian spies recklessly working at all times against Turkey to undermine its system.[1067] No such document is necessary to reach this possibility. In essence, since 1930, after Agabekov's revelations in his book, this was already known in Turkey and elsewhere. Unless new evidence pointed to an act turning into an actual attack or into a plan for a kidnapping attempt, the likely interest on him from Stalin was already established in material available for decades, as well as Turkey's preparations to control and counter them. In an area where secrecy is considered essential, such evidence would be highly seductive for many academic and non-academic readers. Nevertheless, these cherry-picked details would only contribute to blurring the actual concerns and undertakings of the intelligence agencies, which, in the end, is a bureaucratic function for the security of the state, serving a much bigger purpose with many more work hours covering many details to be utilised in the defence of the country.

[1067] On 23 February 2025, Turkey's MİT shared a two-page document dated 16 January 1932 from their special archives about the MAH work on a Soviet agent trying to collect information about Trotsky. See *MİT Özel Koleksiyon*, 23 February 2025, https://mit.gov.tr/ozel-koleksiyon-detay_belgeler_2.html#gallery-private-137, accessed on 23 February 2025.

CHAPTER 8

MILITARY BUREAUCRACY, THE SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET INFLUENCE

The Turkish political-military elite that emerged from almost more than a decade of war had derived important lessons as the Republic was established in 1923. In addition to large-scale efforts to build the country, civilian infrastructure, and achieve economic development, the possibility of a large-scale confrontation requiring work in the military domain had always been in the back of the elite's minds. All these activities were carried out in an environment where there was an anticipation of a major confrontation in the form of total war. The Turkish military bureaucracy needed to construct its approach to achieve the best from the country's population and to formulate ways to prepare its citizens for the potential war effort during peacetime without causing extra burden on the budget or causing distraction in the flow of life.

In this attempt, models implemented by other countries need to be examined to adapt them to the Turkish context by tailoring them to the specific conditions and requirements of the country. As Turkey shared many basic perceptions with the Soviet Union, both being outcasts of the European security architecture and striving to establish social order and develop preparedness against internal and external threats under economic constraints, Turkey learnt from and benefited from the Soviet way of involving its population, particularly its youth, in its war preparation efforts in the interwar period. Turkey relied largely on Soviet formulations in its preparations for creating mechanisms to defend the rear of the front against air raids, bombardments, and chemical attacks, which are known as civil defence in today's terms, and enabling its youth to prepare for the potential war effort starting from peacetime by gaining transferrable skills.

Since the available historiography, however, approached the inclusion of the population in any military activity through the lens of traditional militarisation theory, largely shaped by the liberal worldview, supposedly from the lessons derived from the actions of revisionist powers against the international order after the two world wars, the Turkish military's approach in the interwar period was greatly misinterpreted. As argued throughout the thesis, the Cold War's influence on historiography omitted Turkey's military engagement with the Soviet Union and sought in vain to fill the vacuum by looking in other directions, to other role-models, usually ending up with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In reality, neither was feasible or applicable in the Turkish interwar adaptation of a model.

In Turkish official historiography, the 1928 publication of the draft manual by the Turkish General Staff is considered a milestone in the understanding of civil defence, or passive defence, as it was called prior to World War II.[1068] This draft manual, named *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*, offered detailed measures to be taken against the new type of threat from the air. [1069] Despite the critical importance of this manual, the source and model on which this manual is based were omitted in this analysis. This was based on another publication which contained more details on the matter and was printed three year earlier in 1925, by the Turkish General Staff. [1070] This book was a translation from Russian and reflected the Soviet experience in this field, published by the Soviet Aviakhim, the predecessor of Osoaviakhim. This aspect was entirely omitted from Turkish historical writing. For example, in a main study examining the establishment of the understanding of passive defence and the activities in this field between 1935-1945 in Turkey, Bülent Bakar made no reference to the 1925 book, and he only referred to the publication of the 1928 draft manual.[1071] Similarly, in a comprehensive article on preparations against chemical gas attacks in the interwar period in Turkey, Eyüp Talha Kocacık and Emre Dölen made no reference to the 1925 book or articles

[1068] Çapar, "1930- 1946 Döneminde Dahiliye Vekaleti," 207-8.

[1069] *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

[1070] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

[1071] Bülent Bakar, *Hava Taaruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma 1935-1945* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2019), 65.

translated from Russian sources since 1923 on chemical gas in *Askeri Mecmua*, that informed about the Soviet contribution.[1072] No source in the literature has outlined or referred to the role of this Russian book translated in 1925.

This chapter, therefore, is organised to examine how the Turkish Government identified the threat to the country and its people, how it searched for models to adapt in its attempt to include civilians in the defence effort, and came to appreciate the feasibility of the model implemented by the Soviet Union and used it widely on its society throughout the interwar period.

8.1. The Turkish Approach to Civil Defence in the Interwar Period

The traditional militarisation theory has its origins in the concept of militarism, which was seen as the glorification of the military and war as a value and how this was represented aesthetically and socially within that society.[1073] As Julian Schofield stated, this theory argues that as the armed forces increase their influence in the government because of an increase in their capabilities, the state becomes more likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy that can lead to war.[1074] This lens was used throughout the Cold War and beyond.[1075] However, Turkey's approach was different owing to its historical experience and perception of the political and military situation in its surroundings. The assessment was clear, but the challenge was to prepare for a major confrontation with limited resources.

Based on the successive warfare experience that lasted for more than a decade among the leading cadres of Turkish political and military bureaucracies, the approach

[1072] Eyüp Talha Kocacık and Emre Dölen, "İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türkiye'de Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kursları ve Yasal Düzenlemeler," *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları* 21/1 (2020): 1-56.

[1073] Julian Schofield, *Militarization and War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1.

[1074] Schofield, *Militarization and War*, 1.

[1075] See for example, Mustafa Gündüz, "Türk Eğitim Sisteminde Aşırı Militarist Uygulamanın Başlaması 1926-1947," *Erdem Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 71-72 (2016-2017): 69-89 and Günseli Gümüşel, *Milli Güvenlik Dersleri Tarihi 1926-2012* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2020), ix and 14-25.

developed against preparation for an armed confrontation of the country was dictated by rational development of capabilities and an effort to get the best use of all elements of the country's resources. The lessons derived from these wars, particularly from World War I and the War of Independence, shaped Turkey's approach. The Turkish military bureaucracy learned by experience about the disappearance of front lines, the vulnerability of each and every corner of the country, and the role of science and its reflection into far more lethal forms by technology. Turkish officers did not need to learn these from books, as they were confronted with these instantly on the battlefield. First ever dropping of a bomb from an air vessel was against these soldiers fighting against Italians in 1912 in Tripoli, one of the first ever use of tanks and use of chemical gas were employed by the British Army against the Ottoman soldiers in Gaza/Palestine during World War I.

Massive lethal deadlock caused by the use of heavy machine guns and artillery shelling were experienced in the trenches of the Gallipoli defence in 1915-1916. Depletion of economic resources, strong negative impact on the supply of armed units on the frontlines caused by loss of manpower from economic activity, desertion, poor training, and low morale were all experienced. It was clear to the Turkish bureaucracy that this character of war, the new totalitarian way of war, required not only military or economic resources but also the demographic strength of the country. Social participation appeared to be as critical as the obvious elements stated above in war planning or in the actual conduct of warfare.

Inclusion of the population in military activities was ad hoc during the War of Independence and was chaotic, disorderly, and motivated only by the need to defend the land and fight against the occupying foreign forces. Before the proclamation of the Republic, the mobilisation of the Army was finalised as keeping the troops mobilised increased the financial burden. However, the issue of including the population in the war effort never disappeared from the agenda. The New Republic, with its perception of threats, needed to keep the population, especially the youth, in the military effort within its budget, meaning without allocating resources as the country's priority after victory had been development, infrastructure, and social,

economic, and cultural reconstruction. Lessons learned from the impact of war on population and reproduction were assessed during this period.[1076] The Turkish military bureaucracy first framed the approach and presented it in tandem with the military and civilian sectors. The role of individuals in the war effort was taught to the new generation of Turkish officer corps in the 1927-1928 academic year. This course on army organisation was taught for the first time in that year at the Turkish War Academy. [1077] The relationship and dynamic interaction between decisions taken for the use of manpower with regard to mobilisation, services needed in the rear of the front, and economic production were studied in this book, largely based on lessons the Germans derived from their First World War experiences.

The Turkish Republic placed importance on its population and formulated a clear perspective on how an individual would be part of this activity in peacetime and wartime. These were succinctly noted in the book written by Afet (İnan) based on dictations she received from Mustafa Kemal Paşa. Afet (İnan) noted:

> During wartime and especially during peacetime, taking the whole nation under arms would disrupt the general and economic activities of the nation. For this reason, individuals of a certain age form the standing army in peacetime and would engage in military training and education, and other citizens of a certain age are called to arms in times of war. In all likelihood, in addition to the citizens, there should be citizens in the country so that it is possible to maintain the daily life of the State, keep the army active, and enable it to sustain its operation. However, if needed, it is essential that the whole nation would be taken under arms for the sake of the homeland and independence. For this reason, all citizens must learn military training and education by performing military service. To meet this need and not harm the nation's economic activities, the duration of military service has been reduced as much as possible. However, in our time, military service requires many practical and mental skills that are difficult to obtain in the short time spent under arms. For this reason, citizens need to learn and practice certain things that would make military service easier while they are still at school.[1078]

[1076] E. Würzburger, *Umumi Harbin Nüfus Harekatına Tesirleri*, trans. M. Celal (Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1932); Geza Kenedy, *Harp ve Nüfus Artması*, trans. Selim Sabit (Ankara: Devlet Matbaası İstanbul, 1934); Gaston Bouthoul, *Cihanda Nüfus, Tarihi Büyük Vakalar Harp ve Nüfus Nüfusun Müstakbel Vaziyeti*, trans. Nefi Koryürek (Ankara: Köyöğretmeni Basım Evi, 1936) and such translations continued during the war, see Aloys Kovacs, *Harbin Sebep Olduğu Doğum Azlığının Tesirleri*, trans. Ekrem Şahenk (Ankara: Ankara Basımevi, 1943).

[1077] Ritter, *Ordu Teşkilatı*, 53-4.

[1078] İnan, *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan,* 23-4: "Muharebe zamanı ve bilhassa hazarda, bütün milleti silah altına almak, milletin umumi ve iktisadi faaliyetini sekteye uğratır; bu sebeple millet efradından

Early in the new peace period, shortly after the proclamation of the Republic, military lessons were added to the civilian school curriculum by 1926. Students were taught about the character of the war, reasons for their inclusion in this effort, and some basic information and skills. The purpose was to familiarise pupils with the basics of defending the homeland, national power, army structure, and the merits of discipline and comradeship. These were given by military officers, and under the financial difficulties of the period, they were only limited to the introduction of these concepts, aiming to get youth familiarised with them and also to the notion and practice of discipline. For instance, as shown in the photo, students studying at Konya High School took military lessons in the 1927-1928 academic year (Figure 8.1). These involved basic drills for discipline, aimed at teaching the ability to act together and learn to obey commands. As seen in the photo, students were under the supervision of a military officer and needed no special equipment or material that would incur additional costs on the budget. Upon successful completion of these military lessons, students were issued a certificate called "Orta Ehliyetname" (Secondary Certificate of Competence). This was the certificate of competence given to high school students who attended military preparatory courses and training (Figure 8.2). These were part of the high school education, and students were expected to perform well in military lessons for graduation.[1079] This practice continued until the end of the interwar period and was abandoned in August 1939 as the war in Europe was closing in[1080] After that time students were categorised with regard to their diplomas, and missing training was completed in military camps.[1081]

---

muayyen yaşta olanlar hazarda daimi orduyu vücude getirir ve askerlik talimleri ve terbiyesile meşgul olur ve diğer muayyen yaşta bulunan vatandaşlar da sefer olacağı zamanlar silah altına çağırılır. Herhalde harbe vatandaşlardan başka memleket içinde de vatandaşlar kalmalıdır ki Devletin umumi hayatını tutmak orduyu yaşatmak ve idame etmek mümkün olsun. Fakat icabında bütün milletin vatan ve istiklal uğrunda silaha sarılması esas olarak kabul olunmak lazımdır. Bunun için bütün vatandaşların askerlik vazifesini yaparak askerlik talim ve terbiyesini öğrenmesi lazımdır. Hem bu lüzumu temin etmek ve hem de milletin iktisadi faaliyetine halel getirmemek için askerlik müddetleri mümkün olduğu kadar azaltılmıştır. Fakat zamanımızda askerlik maddi fikri o kadar çok kabiliyet istemektedir ki hazarda silah altında geçirilecek az zamanda bunların elde edilmesi güçtür. Bunun için vatandaşların henüz mekteplerde iken askerlik hizmetini kolaylaştıracak birtakım şeyleri öğrenmeleri, idman etmeleri lazımdır".

[1079] *Tan*, 19 May 1935.

[1080] *Tan*, 23 August 1939.

[1081] *Tan*, 23 August 1939.



Figure 8.1. A military lesson at Konya High School during the 1927-1928 term.

Source: From the author's private collection.



Figure 8.2. The Certificate of competence for completing military courses for secondary and high-school students.

Source: From the author's private collection.

In their textbooks for military lessons, students were taught, as was evidenced by Cemal Tahir's *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri* (Preparation Lessons for the Military Service) that:

> Today's wars are people's wars. It is not the army, as it had been in the past, that exclusively engages in wars. Every single member of society, women and men, in accordance with age and capability, has a role to play in war.

> Therefore, every person should be prepared and know how to prepare for and wage war. This is not only for professional soldiers but for everyone. The real duty of soldiers is not to wage war but to act as a school in war and peace time that teaches fighting methods to people and to command and manage the nation gathered in times of war.[1082]

This approach remained relevant throughout the interwar period. However, this was not considered satisfactory compared to perceptions of the potential next war. Leaps in scientific developments and their transformation into more lethal and industrial-level destruction, coupled with Turkey's economic, technological, and social limitations, forced Turkish authorities to look for ways to take more measures.

The threat posed by science and technology was made tangible in the form of airplanes. These vessels, capable of dropping bombs and chemical gases that could destroy any corner of the country and its people, were the visible sources of the pronounced version of the growing fear.[1083] In a speech at the 5th Congress of the Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti (Turkish Aeronautical Association) in 1932, Prime Minister İsmet Paşa emphasised the threat from air to the entire country and the need to develop measures by the state and its people.[1084] He called for exercises to be organised for citizens in a city to get them ready for sudden air raids, to cope with bombs, fire, and gas.[1085] İsmet Paşa told that victory in future wars would be determined by countries' performance in the skies and the result would be achieved by the planes.[1086] He reiterated these points at the 6th Congress in 1935.[1087] The

[1082] Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri* (İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1926), 2: "Harplar artık millet harbı halini aldı. Eskiden olduğu gibi harpları yapan artık yalnız ordu değildir. Kadınlı erkekli milletin her ferdi yaşına, işine göre üzerine harba yarar bir vazife alacaktır. Bunun için harbın nasıl yapıldığını, harp için milletin nasıl hazırlanması neler bilmesi lazım geleceğini yalnız mesleği askerlik olanlar değil, herkesin bilmesi lazımdır. Askerlik mesleğinin yani ordunun asıl vazifesi harbı yapmak değil, seferde, hazarda millete harbın usullerini öğretecek bir mektep vazifesi görmek ve harpta da toplanan milleti sevk ve idare etmektir." This was repeated in the subsequent editions in 1928 and 1934. See Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri* (İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1928) and Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri* (Ankara: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1934).

[1083] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1932), 3-4.

[1084] *Hava Tehlikesi* 5-6.

[1085] *Hava Tehlikesi* 6.

[1086] *Hava Tehlikesi* 8-9.

[1087] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 3-23.

notion that death would come from the skies unless a country was prepared for it remained strong during this period, as visualised by *Cumhuriyet* in 1935 (Figure 8.3).



Figure 8.3. The threat from the air.

Source: *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1935.

İsmet Paşa believed, this way, by creating an awareness in the society, half of the threat would be averted and more than half of the solution would be offered to the problem.[1088] In addition to being prepared for attacks and knowing which measures to take during the attack, the Prime Minister also laid out another expectation from the population: to actively contribute to the capability of the state to fight against planes by intercepting them with the country's own fleet. In 1935, he said that citizens needed to contribute to the enlargement of the country's fleet capacity through their own savings to free burdens on the state budget.[1089] He encouraged citizens to contribute regularly to the Türk Hava Kurumu within their own budget.[1090] He also wanted to formalize this by establishing a body within Türk Hava

[1088] *Hava Tehlikesi*, (1935), 16.

[1089] *Hava Tehlikesi*, (1935), 15-16.

[1090] *Hava Tehlikesi*, (1935), 18.

Kurumu called *Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler Heyeti* (The Committee of Those who were Aware of Threats from the Air) who would agree to make regular annual contributions.[1091] Press was used to inform the public about this new committee, as seen in a poster encouraging citizens to be part of the *Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler Heyeti* to counter threats from the air published in *Akşam* in 1935 (Figure 8.4). The first member of this Committee was the businessman Vehbi Koç from Ankara. He donated a considerable amount of money, and newspapers reported this to encourage the public.[1092]



Figure 8.4. A poster encouraging citizens to be part of the "Hava Tehlikesini Bilenler Heyeti".

Source: *Akşam*, 19 June 1935.

As the government informed the public about the threats, meetings and conferences were also organised for civilians. Under the supervision of military officers, courses were offered to civilians, as exemplified in the photo where chemist Professor Ömer Şevket (Öncel) with a representative from the Turkish General Staff held an event to

[1091] *Hava Tehlikesi*, (1935), 19.

[1092] *Cumhuriyet* 26 May 1935 and *Cumhuriyet* 29 May 1935.

talk about gas attacks and the importance of preparations and the use of gas masks in İstanbul[1093] (Figure 8.5).



Figure 8.5. Conferences for civilians.

Source: *Cumhuriyet*, 5 May 1933.

By the early 1930s, Turkish newspapers and journals had begun to publish articles and news pieces to familiarise the public with the future horrors of war.[1094] Publications on this issue had been limited to military circles before, but by the early 1930s, a number of books targeting civilians to raise their awareness had flourished.[1095] The Turkish General Staff reviewed these civilian drafts and provided

[1093] Ömer Şevket (Öncel) (1880-1950) was a chemist and professor at İstanbul University. In 1934, he went to Afghanistan on invitation from this country and established the first school of pharmacy and also the first modern pharmacy. In 1937, he returned and taught chemistry of poisonous gases in the military school in Turkey. See *Bilim Tarihi*, https://www.bilimtarihi.org/bilimadamlari/biyografiler/biyografiler.htm, accessed on 28 November 2025.

[1094] See for example "Yarının Harpleri", an article in *Yedigün* magazine which had this as the cover story and it stated that the war of the future would be the war of science meaning it would be a war of planes and chemicals, "Yarın Dünyada Harp Olursa," *Yedigün*, 12 December 1934, 9.

[1095] See Nuri Refet (Korur), *Her Kes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?* (İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1934); Veysel Ünüvar, *Hava Korunması Temel Kaideleri* (İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1936); M. Mazhar Tobur, *Zehirli Gazlar ve Korunma Çareleri* (İstanbul:

feedback. Retired Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi Apak was one of the experts who provided feedback on these drafts.[1096]

A mass campaign was launched to create awareness. As per the manpower needed to use these planes, youth, both women and men, had already been invited to join the ranks of Türkkuşu after 1935, reminding them that it was an obligation for the defence of the country and their chance to pay their debt to the country, as no country could survive if they lacked aviation capabilities. Türk Hava Kurumu branches issued leaflets and distributed these among the society as seen in the example of the leaflet distributed by the İzmir Branch in 1937 (Figure 8.6). In an effort to offer an incentive, the government also offered that completing the Türkkuşu training and achieving a high certificate would be considered for six months of compulsory military training.[1097]


In addition to these areas related to aviation, another transferable skill for the youth was assessed to be in achieving skills in skiing. In their evaluation of the lessons from World War I, German officers had already established that during war time it was as essential as trucks and planes in logistics which was accepted by the Turkish

Ülkü Basımevi, 1936); Moynier, *Muharebe Gazları, Arıza, Korunma Çareleri ve Tedavileri*; M. Zihni Gener and S. İ. Yalnız, *Kimya Harbi ve Korunma Yolları Gazlerin Cinsi-Tanınması-Tesiri Maskeler ve Kollektif Korunma Yolları* (İstanbul: M. Babok Basımevi, 1936); Nureddin Münşi Algan, *Gaz Kimyası Zehirli Gazlar ve Kimyevi Savaş* (İstanbul: Yüksek Mühendis Matbaası, 1936); Hikmet Konuralp and Avni Refik Bekman, *Zehirli Gazlerden Korunma Dersleri Ortaokullara Mahsus* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1936); Hikmet Konuralp and Avni Refik Bekman, *Zehirli Gazlerden Korunma Dersleri Ortaokullara Mahsus* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1937); Celal Evin, *Modern Savaş Araçları ve Harp Gazları* (İstanbul: Bozkurt Basımevi, 1937); Hasan Kadri Dirim and İzzet Kemal Erksal, *Hava ve Kimya Harbi Korunması, Hastalıkları, Tedavisi* (İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1937); Hüsamettin Tuğaç, *Hava-Kimya Taarruzlarına Karşı Korunma* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1937), Binbaşı Gibrin and L. C. Heckiy, *Teşkilatlı Passif Müdafaa Eşhas ve Malzeme*; Ömer Şevket Öncel, *Kimya Muharebesi, Vasıtaları Korunma Çareleri* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938); Halit Giray and Nefi Vural, *Halk Zehirli Gazlara Karşı Kendini Nasıl Koruyabilir?* (İzmir: Yeniyol Basımevi, 1939); *Passif Havadan Korunma, Ev veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri* (İstanbul: Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi, 1939); Şefik Özgüler, *Savaşta Ağulu Gaz Saldırmaları, Ulusun Korunma Çareleri* (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1939) and Hamit Bahar, *Pasif Korunmada Çalışacak Vatandaşlara Rehber, Halk için Havadan ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Çareleri* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1940).

[1096] See the folder on the measures to be taken for the protection of the civilians, BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-143-1, 5 March 1951. Apak's feedback on two drafts dated 18 June 1935 are in this folder. He actively took part in such preparations after his retirement in 1934. The Republican People's Party and the General Inspectorates (Umumi Müfettişlikler) benefited from his expertise in organising and implementing courses for civilians.

[1097] *Kurun*, 29 April 1936.

authorities that led them to provide training and education in the Turkish military and civilian circles particularly with the aim of attracting interest from the youth.[1098] Rahmi Apak pointed to the strong connection between what he called as mountain sports including mountaineering, skiing, rock climbing, trekking etc, with defence of the county.[1099]



Türk çocukları;

„Tayyare" artık kasırgaları geride bırakacak bir hız almıştır. Motor kuvveti mesafeleri yutuyor, eritiyor.

Uçmasını, zamanın bu en kudretli ve en korkunç silâhını kullanmasını bilmeyen milletlerin yaşayabilmesi çok güçleşmiş olduğundan bütün dünya milletleri bu uğurda durmadan didiniyor, varını yoğunu sarfederek kanatlanıyor.

Temiz yürekli Türk çocuğu: dünyanın bu hummalı çalışması karşısında kanla yuğrulmuş yurdunu koruyabilmek için her şeyden evel havalarına hakim olmak ve havalarına hakim olabilmek içinde bu günden kanatlan mak mecburiyetinde bulunduğundan ve esasen uçmak, babalarımızın kızıl kanı üzerine düşerek asırlardanberi Türklüğü temsil eden ve edecek olan ay yıldızın göklerde boş kalan yerini tutmak senin ulusal borcun olduğundan (Türkkuşu) seni bu vatanî vazifeni yapacak ve Ulusal borcunu ödeyebilecek bir hale getirmek için kanatları altına çağırıyor.

«Türkkuşu» uçmasını öğrenmek isteyen gençlerden şu vasıfları arıyor:

A — 18 yaşına girmiş ve 35 yaşını doldurmuş bulunmak.

(17 yaşında veya daha küçük olanlardan bedeni kabiliyeti elverişli görülenler ebeveynlerinin izni alınmak suretile öğrenci olarak kayt edilirler ve 18 yaşına basınca uçucu üyeliğe geçerler.)

B — Sıhhati yerinde ve uçuşa elverişli bulunmak (Muayeneler kurum tarafından meccanen yaptırılır.

C — En az Orta tahsili bitirmiş olmak (Lise ve muadili okulların devamlıları ile mezunları tercih edilir.

Ve Orta mekteplerin son sınıflarında bulunanlarda kayt edilir. Yalnız bu gibiler diplomalarını almadan (aşağıda gösterileceği veçhile) yüksek kampa gidemezler.

D — Siyasal ve sosyal haklara malik olmak, uygunsuz hali bulunmamak.

Bu şeraiti haiz kadın ve erkek her Türk genci Türkkuşuna alınacak ve burada gösterilecek dersleri, talimleri muvaffakiyetle başaracak olanlar Temuzda İnönü yüksek uçuş kampına gönderileceklerdir.

Kampa gideceklerin yol, iaşe, iskân ve buna mümasil masrafları kurumumuza ait olacaktır.

Kampta üç ay kalınacak ve üyelere uçuculuk, paraşütçülükten mada askerî öğretmenler tarafından (yüksek ehliyetname alabilecek surette) piyade talim ve terbiyesi de gösterilecektir. Kamp zamanı bitince yapılacak imtihanda muvaffak olacaklara derecelerine göre (A. B. C.) brövleri verilecek ve (C) brövesi alanlardan arzu edenler Türkkuşunun motorlu mektebine de gidebileceklerdir.

İnönü kampında "C„ brövesi alacak mektepli üyelere kurumumuz tarafından temin edilen muafiyet ve imtiyazlar şunlardır.

A — Orta. orta ihtisas ve muadili mekteplerle liselerin birinci devresinden yetişenlerden „C" brövesini alacak olanlar hava gedikli okuluna tercihan ve imtihansız kabul edileceklerdir.

B — Lise ve muadili mektep mezunlarile üniversite ve muadili mektep müdavimlerinden kampta askeri talim ve terbiye görerek muvaffak olacak ve „C" brövesi alacak olanlar evvelce tam ehliyetname alarak kazanmış oldukları dört aya ilaveten hada iki ay kazanarak yüksek ehliyetname alacaklar. Ve askerlik müddetinden altı ay istifade ederek hazırlık kıtalarında çalışmadan doğruca yedek subay okuluna gidecekler ve altı aylık bir tahsil görerek yedek subaylık zamanını hava okulunda geçireceklerdir.

C — Lise ve muadili mektek mezunlarile üniversite ve muadili mektep müdavimlerinden „C" brövesi alacak olanlar harbiye mektebine tercihan ve imtihansız kabul edileceklerdir.

Gençlere çok şerefli bir meslek ve parlak bir istikbalin yolunu gösteren planörcülük ve planörcülükle beraber yürüyen paraşütçülük ayni zamanda en temiz, en zevkli ve masrafsız bir spor olduğundan ve yukarıda zikredilen evsafı haiz gençlerden kadın erkek gerek talebe. gerek memur. ve gerekse işçi gibi her türlü meslek erbabının Türkkuşuna girebilmesini temin için dersler, uçuşlar bunların esas derslerine, vazifelerine mani olmiyacak zamanlara göre tertip edilmiş. üyeleri uçuş meydanına götürecek vesait kurumca hazırlanmış ve görülen rağbet karşısında da kayt ve kabul müddeti 1 Nisan 937 ye kadar uzatılmış bulunnuğundan bu çok müsait fırsrat ve zamandan istifade ederek sizi bekleyen Türkkuşunuu kanatları altına koşunuz.

Türk Hava Kurumu
İzmir Şubesi

Figure 8.6. Türk Hava Kurumu leaflet, 1937.

Source: From the author's private collection.

He noted that this issue had been neglected in the past and that Turkish youth and the military had these skills during World War I, while the Imperial Russian Army could

[1098] Riedel, *Kayak Talimatnamesi Tercümesi*, 2.

[1099] Rahmi Apak, "Türkiye'de Dağ Sporu," *Ülkü Halkevleri Mecmuası,* 5/25 (March 1935): 52.

not advance until Erzincan nor the Greek forces could advance to the gates of Ankara during the War of Independence.[1100] Turkish geography and climate conditions throughout the country proved that this would be needed during the defence of the country. Turkish officers began practicing these trainings, and a manual based on Germany's experiences was published for the military and civilians as a civilian publication in 1936.[1101] Skiing training was offered within the army as the Turkish military showed keen interest in this, with senior commanders leading the training.[1102] However, there seems to be no evidence that this was offered in a wide campaign to civilians, most likely under financial constraints, and in this effort, aviation was given priority by the authorities.[1103]

8.2. The Soviet Union as a Model for Civil Defence

In preparing the country for total war, in addition to making the best use of economic and financial resources, making the best use of the population was crucial. The question remained how and when this would begin and when the masses would be informed about their role and expectations from them in the defence of the country. This was costly and politically sensitive. In addition to taking measures and developing ways using its own methods and resources, the Turkish military bureaucracy looked to learn from the experiences of other countries, as it did in many other fields of military activity. During the interwar period, there were three main models to examine: the position adopted by the victors of the last major war by the liberal European countries; the one developed by the rising revisionist autocratic European countries; and the one implemented by the Soviet regime. For Turkey, the approach to total war in each model determined the implementation as well as the

[1100] Apak, "Türkiye'de Dağ Sporu," 52.

[1101] Riedel, *Kayak Talimatnamesi Tercümesi*.

[1102] Riedel, *Kayak Talimatnamesi Tercümesi*, 2. This included Marshal Çakmak and prominent generals such as Fahrettin Altay as well.

[1103] In his article Apak noted about his view of what would be the best sportive activity for the youth from defence of the country perspective. For him, number 1 in his list would be aviation followed respectively by mountaineering and marine sports. Apak, "Türkiye'de Dağ Sporu," 52. In his 1936 article, he noted that prioritisation in this order had been achieved by the Republic with efforts beginning by 1934. See Rahmi Apak, "Türk Sporunun Yeni Yükümleri," *Ülkü Halkevleri Mecmuası,* 6/35 (1936): 346-7.

shape of the anticipated confrontation and the role these would play in the next war. For Turkey, the next war would be a total one in an unprecedented form, and Turkey would be on the defending side, not having the luxury to deny it as the liberals or to intend to trigger it as the revisionists.

According to the liberal understanding of the European countries that were the absolute victors of the previous world war, they were in complete denial of the war itself. Naturally, this necessitated being in denial of any such effort during peacetime, which was interpreted as a malicious attempt that could only be exercised by revisionist, autocratic, or totalitarian regimes. The liberal Western understanding, which regarded war as a non-option and was in total denial of war, strongly opposed any attempts to use individuals in military affairs.

Under normal conditions, a military bureaucracy aligned to its political leadership in a Clausewitzian manner, in the sense that political leadership would provide the steer, priorities and control and leave it over to military bureaucracy to be ready, they strive to work to integrate the nation's economic, social, governmental, and military capabilities to prepare for and respond to threats effectively. However, this was seen as militarist and not compatible with the liberal world understanding.

Although professional soldiers in other countries, based on lessons they had derived from World War I, reached conclusions similar those to of the Turkish and Soviet military bureaucracies, their views would not be politically correct or applicable in their systems. In his inaugural lecture in the Chair of Military Studies at King's College in London in January 1927, First World War veteran British general, Sir Frederick Maurice, said that "A struggle between nations in which vital interests are involved is not merely the concern of professional soldiers, sailors and airmen but affects directly every citizen and calls for the whole resources of the nation. We have learned that statecraft, economics, the supply of raw material, science and industry are factors which are of prime importance to the issue, and we realise that the tendency is for the importance of the last two to increase…"[1104] In a foreword written

[1104] Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, 198.

by British General Sir Herbert Lawrence to Ludendorff's *Total War*'s English translation, he stated that Ludendorff's views were no different from those expressed by French Marshal Foch when he visited and discussed these with people around him in 1927.[1105] He noted that there could be no question that if we were ever again engaged in a world war, the whole nation would be involved, and that it was an urgent necessity to organise industrial mobilisation in peacetime. He noted:

> Marshal Foch had very strong views on this subject. When he was over here in 1927, he said in conversation with friends that the real pivot of war would, in the future, be not in the field but in industry and in factories. It was there that organisation was required. In fact, it was the country that could produce the largest number of warlike machines in the quickest time that would have the advantage. His cardinal point was that the nation whose industry is organised for war and whose manufacturing system is directed to utilize and co-ordinate its war-like industry would be the victorious nation. Ludendorff sees the problem of war from the same point of view.[1106]

Individual civilian participation, however, was unacceptable and considered a practice of revisionist authoritarian regimes. This strongly held perception was challenged in the West for a brief period when World War II began, and the deficiencies in the ongoing war imposed considerable hardships. In his article, Edwin M. Lemert noted that total war required planning of civilian as well as military activities, but their social control was unstable because of antiquated conceptions regarding individual participation in the war.[1107] Therefore following the above quote, Lawrence suggested that "It might be well if General Ludendorff would turn his mind from the thought of how to prepare for war to the idea of how the world war of the future is to be avoided".[1108] For these reasons, there was nothing that could be offered in terms of a model that Turkey could adapt from these countries. They were uninterested and disengaged anyway, and their interest in Turkey began only in the late-1930s when they woke up to the reality of the coming war.

[1105] General Ludendorff, *The "Total" War* (London: Friends of Europe, 1936), 4.

[1106] Ludendorff, *The "Total" War*, 4.

[1107] Edwin M. Lemert "Social Participation and Totalitarian War," *American Sociological Review,* 8/5 (1943): 531.

[1108] Ludendorff, *The "Total" War*, 4.

Turkish officers followed the models adopted by Germany and Italy, which were regarded as revisionists during the interwar years. These two countries used their national sources of power to prepare for total war. The economic and human resources of their nations were allocated to this preparation in the interwar years. Since they were accepted as revisionist powers, they were expected to pose a challenge to the system enforced by the victors of World War I.

Turkey had a historical engagement with the German military. Delegations from Germany contributed to the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army in the years before World War I and the army adapted Prussian military system in terms of organisation, type of education and system which stopped by the end of World War I.[1109] When diplomatic relations were reestablished by 1924, little or no more progress was achieved on the military front and this caused a vacuum in the Turkish Army.[1110] Reasons for the absence of military relations included the incapacitation of the German Army by the Versailles Treaty, anger against the German military for drifting the Ottomans into the war, and concern about third-country reactions to the initiation of military relations between the two countries.[1111] Then, the Turkish state signed personal contracts with unemployed German officers who were not acting on behalf of their states from 1927 onwards. These German officers continued to shape the establishment of systems and provide modern training to the Turkish officer corps.[1112] By 1933, German official interest in Turkey achieved a new momentum and German Propaganda Ministry developed campaigns to strengthen German-Turkish friendship and used historical evidence in abundance with strong emphasis on German military delegations that had visited Ottoman Empire such as Helmuth von Moltke, Colmar von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders.[1113] They also arranged visits of delegations and used officers on both sides who had a legacy of relationships from the World War I period. From 1934 onwards, the German state

[1109] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri,* 63.

[1110] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 63.

[1111] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 63.

[1112] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 65.

[1113] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 72.

officially advocated visits by German youth organizations to Turkey for propaganda purposes.[1114] These delegations and senior representatives visited Turkey and met with Turkish seniors, including President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[1115] These German-led initiatives to forge military cooperation continued until the beginning of World War II, but the Germans exercised caution as they were assessing that Republican Turkey was not the same as the Ottoman Empire, realising the limits of their military influence in persuading Turkey to take military action, and were aware of the possibility that Turkey would even act on the other side, partnering with Britain and France.[1116]

The German and Italian experiences with the youth, the weaponisation of it foremost against opponents within the country against opponents in a large spectrum were not considered appropriate by the Turkish political leadership. There were clear references to refraining from arming the youth or setting up militias. The Turkish General Staff had already passed through these debates in the early days of the War of Independence, and new gangs did not seem desirable, nor did the distribution of any sort of weapons to civilians, as noted earlier in Chapter 5 of the thesis on borders.

Throughout the interwar period, the Turkish Army and law enforcement waged large-scale campaigns to collect personal arms from society as a safeguard against brigandage. Only permissible interactions with any weapon were instances of shooting to gain familiarity with weapons and the idea of it under the strict supervision of Turkish officers tasked by the Turkish General Staff. Officers at military lessons, on the other hand, worked to introduce awareness and discipline to pupils without extra material that would create costs. As Prime Minister İsmet Paşa indicated, creating awareness was half the solution to the problem. Creating the idea about the probability of a war and if that happens, no part of the country would remain untouched, and everyone would be needed in this effort, remained the ultimate objective.

[1114] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 73.

[1115] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 73 and 93.

[1116] Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 95-6.

Even at the peak of their power as an attractive model in the 1930s, Atatürk turned down suggestions from his inner circle to propose measures imitating the models vigorously enforced in Germany and Italy. A well-known and telling example was his reaction to the proposals of Recep Peker, who was with him for many years, after his trip to Italy in 1935, when he praised the fascist system and proposed a similar form of government in Turkey. Reportedly, Atatürk glanced at his report and handed it back with the remark, "You will do all that after I die".[1117]

There had been military knowledge transfer between the German and Turkish military systems in both the Ottoman and Republican periods. There had been personal exchanges as well as a constructed past brother-in-arms in war rhetoric between them. However, this did not mean that this transfer made them both identical, enabling them to think, act, and behave in the same way or that the Prussian/German model was the only model that influenced Turkey in the interwar period. Republican Turkey has always explored other systems and benefited from sources that could present powerful feasible models for it to benefit from. For political reasons, Nazi Germany tried to inject its youth project, and except for visits and exchange of pleasantries, there was no evidence that Turkey adapted any of those models. After World War I, the German military was experimenting with many different ways and methods, and they were in the process of deriving lessons from the disastrous past and putting together a plan and an understanding that would be useful in the next war. Under severe limitations imposed on Germany by the victors of World War I, German officers were looking for ways as well. It would be fair to say that the German military instructors at the time serving in Turkey were instrumental in relaying the new debates and the latest discussions in world military affairs, which were undergoing a series of major changes. Turkish leadership had already adapted the teachings of Clausewitz and was aware of the works of Ludendorff, who was actively working with the rising Nazi cadres in Germany. Von der Goltz, on the other hand, had already lost his relevance during that period.[1118]

[1117] Lord Kinross, *The Rebirth of a Nation* (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1981), 460 and Bekir Koçlar, *Recep Peker Bir İnkılapçının Hikayesi* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2022), 64.

[1118] These aspects were covered in detail in Chapter 2 to illustrate the unique character and approach of the Turkish Army in the interwar period clearly distinguishable from the two long periods first

Options were not limited to only the two models discussed above and the strong emphasis on the latter in the available literature was unfounded and inaccurate. There was the option presented by the Soviets which was largely overlooked in the literature. The Turkish authorities examined the Soviet practice despite the powerful ideological indoctrination it had for its society and the world. As covered in great detail in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the Turkish Army had been closely following the Red Army experience against air raids, bombardments, and chemical attacks since the early 1920s. The Turkish Army largely benefited from material written in Russian on chemical gases, the defense of the rear of the front, and the protection of cities, critical infrastructure, and civilians against air raids by the enemy.

The book titled, *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* published in 1925 by the Turkish General Staff, provided the concept of the rear of the front and detailed special means to take measures against this threat. [1119] The protection of cities, critical infrastructure, railways, and factories was covered in detail. First, the changed character of war was defined and presented to the reader with details on how the way wars have been fought since ancient times has changed recently.[1120] It was emphasized that this left no room for anyone outside either army to remain indifferent or get away by only paying some sort of tax.[1121] The days when a Russian peasant would tell that it would not reach them when they were warned about advancing enemy troops were over, and such philosophical responses were no longer valid, as the book explained.[1122] The separation of combatants and non-combatants in a confrontation was over as the Great War proved. To support armies reaching millions along the fronts, another army to supply weapons, arms, and other requirements must be assembled.[1123] The entire country should transform into a

---

under French/Prussian/German influence in the preceding period and then under British/American one in the succeeding period of the interwar period.

[1119] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

[1120] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*, 1-2.

[1121] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 2.

[1122] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 2.

[1123] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 3.

single factory with the sole purpose of providing the needs of one and only recipient, which could never get satisfied, and that would be the front.[1124] These were similar to the points İsmet Paşa made in appearance before the public to raise awareness against this type of threat, as detailed at the beginning of this chapter.

Author of this work examined in detail how French supply and logistics were overwhelmed during the Great War, and how supply lines by railways and road transport were insufficient.[1125] It was noted that, to be prepared, any government needed to take all necessary measures in the rear of the front to enable the combatants on the front lines to benefit from all sources at hand.[1126] In addition to these technical preparations, the book noted that morale was also highly important. It was noted that the power and strength of those on the front line would be shaped by the conditions of those in the rear and certainly vice versa.[1127]The author evaluated this issue from the communist perspective and noted the propaganda of the enemy in the rear would aim to target their socialist values and principles aiming to create divisions within the socialist society.[1128] The advanced technology enabling air raids would have serious consequences in future wars, as the author noted, and the success of the land army would be diminished if they knew their cities in the rear were destroyed and women and children were killed, which would force them to seek a swift and hasty peace deal with the enemy to save what was left of them.[1129] The Great War proved that this factor shaped the action on the front lines. The book underlined the greatest threat to the rear of the front as air raids, chemical weapons, and, to a certain extent, propaganda. Therefore, the conclusion of this work was the urgent need to establish a specific organisation to address these threats. "For that reason, every citizen of the Union of Soviet Republics should consider these points and should seriously work toward taking steps…The Society of Aviation and

[1124] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 3.

[1125] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 3-4.

[1126] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 4.

[1127] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 4.

[1128] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 5.

[1129] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 5 and 96.

Chemical Construction, Aviakhim, is the first line of defence in establishing defence for the rear of the front".[1130]

Based on this Soviet book printed in Turkish in 1925, framing the current form of threats for the rear of the front based on French, German and British experiences of World War I in a crystal clear way and offering solid, practical measures, the Turkish General Staff issued first official manual to take preventive measures against these threats in draft form in 1928.[1131] This draft manual by the Turkish General Staff was later accepted as the beginning of civil defence in Turkey.[1132] This book provided a coherent, systematic formulation of this modern threat in Russian and provided guidelines for Turkish political and military cadres in the following years through World War II.

During the opening ceremony of Türk Hava Kurumu's flight school Türkkuşu in 1935, both President Atatürk and Prime Minister İnönü clearly expressed the contribution of the Soviet Union in this field as examined in detail in Chapter 4. In the 6th Congress of the Türk Hava Kurumu on 24 May 1935, the head of the association Fuad Bulca stated that the most powerful organisation in aviation in the world was Turkey's friend, the Soviet Union.[1133] He said that aviation activity in the Soviet Union was second to none in the world and that Osoaviakhim had full responsibility for all these activities.[1134] He pointed to the massive budget of Osoaviakhim, which was separate from the budget of the Soviet state. [1135] Bulca spoke highly of the Soviet contribution, emphasizing that Turkey brought two expert trainers from Russia and the Soviet Union gifted five gliders to teach these skills to Turkish youth.[1136] Bulca visited the Soviet Union in August 1936 to attend the air

[1130] *Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası,* 96.

[1131] *Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası*.

[1132] Çapar, "1930- 1946 döneminde Dahiliye Vekaleti," 207-8.

[1133] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 36.

[1134] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 37.

[1135] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 36.

[1136] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 36.

show and hosted a large Osoaviakhim delegation, led by its president General Eideman, in October 1936, as detailed in Chapter 4.

In expressing his amazement at the dedication to this in the Soviet Union and the methods used by the Osoaviakhim, he said that from seven years onwards, youth were exposed to aviation and gained skills. He showed a model plane to the audience at the congress, saying, "The sample model that you see was assembled by a 10-year-old child in Russia from its pieces".[1137] Bulca noted that these activities were extended to all age groups, including senior citizens.[1138] He provided figures, stating that there were 115 aviation clubs, 300 training stations, and 1,500 gliders under the control of Osoaviakhim.[1139] Modelling for young enthusiasts was also introduced in Turkey around 1929 by Türk Hava Kurumu, and some contests were organised. Efforts to coordinate with the Ministry of National Education to extend these activities to schools were made, but they did not yield any results, and these activities could not become widespread in Turkey.[1140]

The scale of Osoaviakhim and its activities always struck Turkish officers. The number of memberships, their wide range of activities, and the budget they commanded were beyond any Turkish imagination coping with far more limited resources. By 1933, this youth group reached a membership of 12,000,000 people, with divisions of labor in groups organised around defence against air raids, chemical gases, and, in general, the defence of the country.[1141] This organisation tailored to Russia's own specific needs and operated on its own capabilities seemed perfect and complete, as a Turkish officer noted in 1935, making him conclude that Russia had secured the love of military service for its people.[1142] This mass voluntary

[1137] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 37.

[1138] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 36-37.

[1139] *Hava Tehlikesi* (1935), 36.

[1140] Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, (page 4), 21 October 1936.

[1141] Nazım Turunç, *Acun Gençlik Kurumları, Müsellah Unsurlar* (İstanbul: Cemal Azmi Millet Kütüphane ve Matbaası, 1935) 31-2.

[1142] Turunç, *Acun Gençlik Kurumları*, 34

organisation was proclaimed during the First Five-Year Plan in the Soviet Union as a broad mobilisation reserve for the Red Army.[1143] In 1927, Osoaviakhim began forming paramilitary units up to battalion size, and they participated in Red Army district manoeuvres each fall.[1144] Soviet system's creation was more formalised and massive as the Soviet leadership anticipated, in a correct way, that they would be forced to fight the next war with quantity rather than quality of trained troops and civil defence cadres and for that reason Osoaviakhim worked to achieve this quantitative edge. From the Soviet perspective, this was a positive contribution and success.[1145]

There were two main reasons for leaning on Soviet formulations in the creation of its approach to the use of civilian population in the war effort. First was the well-known rejection of European countries to enter into interaction with the new Republic, as witnessed in many other areas in politics, defence, and economics during the early period of the interwar years. The second reason was the difference in approaching the war as a phenomenon between the liberal European victors of the First World War and the rest of the world, including Turkey. For European countries, war was an anomaly in life, and considering military tasks for ordinary civilian citizens during peacetime was not acceptable and was considered against the liberal values advocated by them.[1146]

The Clausewitzian formulation of war and its relation to politics was strongly rejected by them. In contrast, Turkey and the Soviet Union embraced Clausewitz's assertion. Both shared a larger common set of similar experiences, and Clausewitz's writings resonated well with their political-military leaders. Both derived similar lessons from the collapse of their empires, from the wars fought against aggressors, and from civil wars fought with reactionary forces organised, armed, and supported by their European patrons. Based on these, military bureaucracies in both countries

[1143] Odom, *Soviet Volunteers*, 23.

[1144] Odom, *Soviet Volunteers*, 143.

[1145] Odom, *Soviet Volunteers*, 306.

[1146] Hans Kohn, "The Totalitarian Philosophy of War," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 82/1 (February 1940), 57.

anticipated a major confrontation, the next war in a totalitarian character throughout the interwar years, and as the name of the period suggested, they were right in their concern as the interwar years ended with an even greater war, that was to be known as World War II. Regarding the impact on civilians, this was the first modern conflict in which far more civilians were killed than combatants.[1147]

Outside the military domain, the Russian education system has been under observation immediately after the proclamation of the Republic. General education, youth, sports, and science clubs were examined. To this end, throughout the entire interwar period, beginning in 1926, expert delegations were sent to examine the Soviet model in tandem with delegations sent to other European countries. Unlike what is largely argued in the literature, these were not limited to Germany.[1148] First delegation to the Soviet Union was sent in 1926 led by Nafi Atuf (Kansu) and Rıdvan Nafiz (Edgüer) followed by Vildan Aşir (Savaşır) and Cevdet Kerim (İncedayı) in 1933-1934, by Rüştü Uzel in 1936 and by Hüseyin Rahmi Apak in 1937, who served as Turkey's military attaché in Moscow between 1922 and 1926 being the premier Russia expert in the Turkish military in the interwar period.[1149] Later, as a member of parliament, in the late 1930s, he served as the head of the sports and youth bureau formed within the Republican People's Party.[1150] According

[1147] Anthony Beevor, "We Are Still Fighting World War II: The Unsettled Legacy of the Conflict that Shaped Today's Politics," *Foreign Affairs* (7 May 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/world-war-ii-antony-beevor-geopolitics, accessed on 10 June 2025.

[1148] See for example Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Gümüşel, *Milli Güvenlik Dersleri Tarihi*; Sencer, *Ordu ve Millet* and Zeynep Şarlak, *Türkiye'nin Milli Güvenlik Devleti Kökeni, Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2022). Another claim used by those who argued the Turkish government was inspired solely by Nazi Germany's practices was in the case of gymnastic activities for the youth and particularly allegations were created around Selim Sırrı Tarcan. See Yiğit Akın, *"Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar" Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2019). In his work Akın simply followed Ünder's steer and based his entire argument on von der Goltz/Ludendorff assertion from page 139 to 141 and the Carl Diem effect. Although he mentioned interaction with the Soviet practice, he barely elaborated it and just pointed to the Soviet influence in just half a page based on only three secondary sources in English (p. 99). His main focus was to demonstrate that the Nazi model was the sole model adopted by the Republican regime.

[1149] See Cengiz Aslan, "Türk Uzmanların Rus Eğitim Sistemi Hakkındaki Raporları," *OPUS Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 15/26 (2020): 4602.

[1150] BCA, 490-1-0-0-1107-43-1, 18 November 1937. See Erol Akcan, "İki Dünya Arasında Türkiye'de 'Gençlik Teşkilatı' Oluşturmaya Dönük Bazı Tasavvur ve Teşebbüsler," *Belleten* 81/292 (2017): 1009, 1020-22.

to Cengiz Aslan, during this period, 24 special reports by them and other officials were presented to Turkish decision-makers on the Russian education system, encompassing the academic curriculum, facilities, sports, and ideological and moral training.[1151]

In its basic form, the Turkish General Staff continuously encouraged the creation of awareness in society of their role in defence and supported the publication of works that emphasized the role of individual civilians in this quest. Textbooks for military lessons covering these points have been published since 1926. In addition, specialised works emphasizing the role of material, morale, and ordinary people were published. Some of these predated the much-hyped work of Ludendorff, whose Turkish translation was published in 1936[1152]. Lieutenant General Baki (Vandemir)'s *Yurt Müdafaası, Seferde ve Hazarda Zabit ve Zabitlik* (The Defence of the County, The Officer, The Duties of the Officer in Mobilization and in Peace) was published in 1932.[1153] Military history instructor İ. Hakkı (Erdem)'s work *Harp Gücü ve Manevi Güçler* (The War Power and Morale) was published in 1934.[1154] Captain Nazım (Turunç)'s work *Memleket Müdafaasında İdeal Fertler ve Milletler* (Ideal Individuals and Nations in the Defence of the Country) was published in 1934 and follow up work *Acun Gençlik Kurumları, Müsellah Unsurlar* (Universal Youth Institutions, the Armed Elements) was published in 1935.[1155] Later, Director of the Ministry of Culture National Mobilisation Kadri Yaman's work *Yurt Müdafaasında Türk Gençliği* (The Turkish Youth in the Defence of the Country) was published in 1938.[1156] There is no reference in any of these works to the works of the above-mentioned Prussians/Germans. They were largely shaped by Afet İnan's book

[1151] Aslan, "Türk Uzmanların Rus Eğitim Sistemi Hakkındaki Raporları," 4606-7.

[1152] Ludendorff, *Topyekün Harb*.

[1153] Baki (Vandemir), *Yurt Müdafaası, Seferde ve Hazarda Zabit ve Zabitlik* (Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1932).

[1154] İ. Hakkı (Erdem), *Harp Gücü ve Manevi Güçler* (İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1934). This had its second print made in the following year. See İ. Hakkı Erdem, *Harp Gücü ve Manevi Güçler* (İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1935).

[1155] H. Nazım (Turunç), *Memleket Müdafaasında İdeal Fertler ve Milletler* (Ankara: Büyük Erkanıharbiye Reisliği Matbaası, 1934) and Turunç, *Acun Gençlik Kurumları*.

[1156] Kadri Yaman, *Yurt Müdafaasında Türk Gençliği* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1938).

dictated by Mustafa Kemal Paşa who formed his view on the matter from various sources including Clausewitz. In all these studies, society is regarded as an inseparable part of the country's defensive posture. Emphasis was mainly on keeping up the morale and spiritual core of the society, civilian and soldier alike, in the face of the enemy or enemies. Specific tasks defined were around these roles of manpower for mobilisation to be used in warfare in the front and the manpower to be used in the rear in defence and economic-logistic activities.

Society was expected to own the entirety of the war effort by keeping morale high and being watchful for enemy disinformation, propaganda, and subversive activities. As Kazım Paşa (Karabekir) noted, these were as destructive as an enemy gas attack if the population was unaware. He noted that during World War I, they had suffered greatly from these. Therefore, he urged the need to prepare society for this issue.[1157] Activities and calls for implementing these continued throughout the interwar period, and the aim was to turn all these preparatory measures into implementation in case of a war, which was done with the outbreak of World War II.[1158] However, there was no evidence or even an allegation from that time that the prepared youth were organised out of the sight of the political authority or were used as coercion tools against other parts of the civilian society throughout the interwar years. The planned youth associations were not considered to perform as militia, as seen in some other forms in different nations. Turunc, in 1935, noted that the nation did not need a militia organisation and that there was no need to give arms to the youth.[1159] Turkish officers assessed the risks associated with this and were keen to avoid lessons of other countries, implying the examples in Italy and Germany. Shooting was only allowed for aiming and getting familiar under strict Turkish General Staff supervision.[1160] The manual regulating shooting sessions for youth organisations and

[1157] Karabekir, *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat*, 4, 9.

[1158] In Law No 4654 adopted on 7 August 1944 during the war time, which was published in the Official Gazette on 14 August 1944, the obligation of armed defence again enemy within the country was defined. In article 1, it was stated that during extraordinary times and in times of mobilisation male citizens between 16-60 and women citizens between 20-45 within the 15 km perimeter were obliged to wage armed resistance against airborne troops, parachuters, naval landings and infiltration from the borders. See *Resmi Gazete*, 14 August 1944.

[1159] Turunç, *Acun Gençlik Kurumları,* 86-87.

[1160] Turunç, *Acun Gençlik Kurumları*, 87.

shooting clubs was issued and involved all the details for running a session by the Prime Ministry.[1161] It was pointed out that preparations for the defence of the country would not mean a desire for war.[1162] Shooting had always been regarded as one of the key fields of sports activity for the youth for the defence of the country.[1163] Turkish officers were present in these sessions, as seen in the photo from one of the sessions in the early 1930s (Figure 8.7). When visiting Osoaviakhim in the Soviet Union in 1936, Bulca reported that in addition to aviation, Osoaviakhim also mandated clubs in shooting, riding, and swimming, adding that particular attention was paid to shooting activities with a larger organisation and shooting training organised widely at camps around the villages in rural areas.[1164] He visited some of these camps for shooting training purposes.[1165] His overall impression, as he reported to Prime Minister İnönü, was that "After seeing and examining these organizations, I came to the conclusion that Russia is experiencing a period of mobilization. The Ossoaviakhim organisation behind the front lines resembled a training and education centre, working in the army's rear and training airmen, riflemen, sailors, and riders for the army.".[1166]

In addition to shooting practice with rifles, heavier military weapons were introduced to students until the end of the interwar period, as anticipation of a major war increased. For instance, in a photo dated 20 February 1937, military instructor Recep Dereli is seen during heavy machine gun training for students in the 1936-1937 academic year (Figure 8.8).

[1161] *Gençlik ve Atıcılık Kulüpleri ve Guruplarile, Bölge Ajanlıkları Tarafından Tertip Edilecek Atışların İcra Sureti Hakkında Muvakkat Talimat* (Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1940). This was reissued in the following years. See Hakkı Uğan, *Gençlik Kulüpleri Muvakkat Atış Talimatı* (Ankara: Çankaya Matbaası, 1945). Unfortunately, I could not locate or obtain earlier versions of this manual.

[1162] Turunç, *Memleket Müdafaasında İdeal Fertler ve Milletler*, 44.

[1163] Uğan, *Gençlik Kulüpleri Muvakkat Atış Talimatı*, 1.

[1164] Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, (page 3), 21 October 1936.

[1165] Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, (page 3), 21 October 1936.

[1166] Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, 21 October 1936: "Bu teşekkülleri görüp tetkik ettikten sonra şu kanaate vardım ki: Rusya sanki seferberlik günlerini yaşamaktadır. Cephe gerisindeki Ossoaviyahim teşkilatı; ordu gerisinde çalışan ve ordu için havacı, atıcı, denizci, binici yetiştiren bir talim ve terbiye deposu manzarasını gösteriyor."



Figure 8.7. Civilian youth during shooting sessions.

Source: From the author's private collection.



Figure 8.8. Heavy machine gun training for students in the 1936-1937 academic year.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Sophistication in military science and techniques necessitated the preparation of the youth during peacetime, as mastering those skills required time. This was the primary justification for the interest in youth rather than setting up paramilitary pressure shadow armies, as generally accepted by Western liberal or Western fascist accounts of the phenomenon. From the political-military bureaucracies' perspective, every single person would have a role to play. Youth, as the dynamic part of this crowd, would have roles in the country, in potentially occupied parts of the country, and in the rear of the enemy front.[1167] The division of labour taught to youth in

[1167] Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri,* Vol. 2, 37.

military lessons was as follows:[1168] In mobilisation men between 20 and 45 would be taken under arms. Those between 18 and 20 years of age would wait for a call. Youth younger than 18 would stay in their hometowns and continue their education and whatever they were busy with as artisans or farmers. They stood guard to offer useful contributions to the war effort. To accomplish these tasks, during peacetime, to maintain physical strength, youth needed to take part in organisations such as scouts and participate in military training and lessons.[1169]

Within such an environment, examples set forth by extensive, influential, and powerful Soviet mass voluntary civil associations were examined and mirrored in Turkey, especially in aviation. Turkey's approach to the totalitarian character of war and civil defence, largely based on its own experiences, was shared by the Soviet Union. However, the way Turkey followed differed from the one followed by the Soviet Union as Turkey lacked the strong cohesive ideological element and the resources and control that were available to the Soviet bureaucracy. The Turkish experience was modest compared to the Soviet experience. Lenin was famously quoted as saying every communist should make himself a Chekist.[1170] It was a desire to urge all to join the struggle to safeguard the state in the most efficient way. The industrial-level implementation in the Soviet Union did not materialize in Turkey until World War II due to the fundamental differences between the two countries. Turkey managed to introduce aviation training and train civilians, both men and women, against air raids, bombs, and chemical gas attempts during the years leading to the war.

The rationale and assessment behind such activities have always been seen through the lens of militarisation after World War II, and the strong inclination to view these attempts as malicious against Western values has dominated the literature since then. As opposed to the liberal denial of the war as a phenomenon and as if the exercise of military bureaucracy's activities were without a reason other than for exercising and

[1168] Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri,* Vol. 2, 37-41.

[1169] Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri,* Vol. 2, 40.

[1170] Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста)*, 18.

imposing their authority, the perception of the military cadres living in the period was totally ignored.[1171] Primary sources, however, indicate the rationale as realist expectations of the shape of war to come, and financial and resource constraints. However, viewing these mass population organisations as sinister attempts was present in the very early days. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1928, once powerful Tsarist general Yuri Danilov noted that the slogan of the development of Avio-Chemistry furnished the Soviets with an excellent instrument of propaganda both at home and abroad. He noted, "An interesting event has been the creation of the powerful *Aviakhim* which under the pretext of defending the country from a supposed menace really aims to cultivate mistrust and enmity towards the capitalist states. Recent legislation has commissioned the *Aviakhim* and its sister organisation the Society for Military Research to affect the militarisation of the whole civil population and prepare it morally and physically against a supposedly impending war". Danilov believed that the Bolsheviks veiled their real aims and confined their military preparations to the incitement of suspicion and hatred of foreign countries, which were the methods followed by the Third International in Turkey and China.[1172] However, from Turkey's perspective, Turkey needed the model offered by the Soviet Union.

In the case of Turkey, Republican experience proved these inspirations and best practices to advance modern aviation training, skills and capabilities such as becoming glider pilots, parachuting and model planes were taken in their strict technical forms without being perceived as a communist plot to inject ideology into a country which had absolute clarity about such ideological export attempts. In this field, Turkey acquired technical know-how that it could not obtain from any other Western European power.

[1171] The analysis from this limited window almost always ignored military's function as a bureaucracy trying to perform military duties and instead focused entirely on its role as part of the 'institutional architecture of the state among its apparatuses of coercion'. See for example İsmet Akça, "The Military in Turkish Politics: The Centennial Balance Sheet and the Legacy fort the Next Century," in *The Republic of Turkey and its Unresolved Issues*, ed. Pınar Dinç and Olga Selin Hünler (Singapore: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2025), 322.

[1172] Yuri Danilov, "The Red Army", *Foreign Affairs,* 1 October 1928, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1928-10-01/red-army, accessed on 10 December 2023.

Within its capacity, modest progress was achieved in Turkey. A network beginning from provinces, districts, and villages against air raids was established in the interwar period. Male populations between the ages of 16-20 and 46-60 were chosen for this purpose to not hinder the military's requirement for manpower.[1173] Women could also be utilised in this effort. Colonel Kenan Kocatürk stated in his memoirs that during his time at the regiment in Manisa province in 1939, he was tasked as the course instructor to train civilians and the elderly at the military compound, which was a good solidarity of the elderly civilian population with their young children with a high morale contributing to the creation of the spirit of total war.[1174] Prior to World War II, this network was in operation, formed from residents in these urban areas as *Avcı Birlikleri* and *Hava Haber Verme Hizmeti* units, whose members annually went through two-week courses at military units in the area on defence against gases and communication from officers.[1175] Lessons to prepare secondary and high school students and students of teacher schools to defend against chemical gases were introduced, and details were laid out in a pamphlet in 1936.[1176]

In September 1933, a civilian association named "Hava Hücumlarından Koruma Cemiyeti " (The Society for Protection from Air Attacks) was established in İstanbul with permission from the Governorate of İstanbul, led by retired Colonel Mahmut Beliğ.[1177] Beliğ announced the establishment of this society through the press.[1178] The association had its first meeting on 1 April 1934, and announced the publication of the journal *Can Kurtaran* to inform the public about this threat.[1179] This

[1173] See for example, the directive from the Governorate of Ankara dated 25 August 1939, BCA 490-1-0-0/1136-143-1, 5 March 1951.

[1174] Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 206.

[1175] Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 206.

[1176] *Gaz ve Gazden Korunma Dersleri Hakkında Müfredat Programı* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936).

[1177] The correspondence from April 1933 in BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-143-1, 5 March 1951. The name of the society was announced as *Hava Hücumlarından Koruma Cemiyeti* but there are documents where it was referred to as *Hava Hücumlarından Korunma Cemiyeti* including in the own documents of the society.

[1178] *Son Posta*, 29 October 1933.

[1179] *Milliyet*, 2 April 1934 and *Vakit* 2 April 1934. This magazine has only images of its first issue in the state archive where founders were lobbying to get acknowledged and disseminating documents

association also benefited from the Soviet example and used successful works in the Soviet Union as a best-practice example in their efforts to persuade the Turkish Government to support their activities.[1180] In emphasizing the role of women in the defence of the country, best practice cases from other countries were summarised, with special emphasis on the situation in Russia. It was noted that they had passed beyond preparations for the mobilisation of women, as 20% of the members of the Osoaviakhim, reaching 5 million, were women.[1181] After visiting Osoaviakhim facilities in the Soviet Union, Bulca reported that 30% of its members were women.[1182] This emphasis on the role of women was not misplaced, as in the debates since 1927 about admitting women into military service, the Soviet example was used from 1926 onwards.[1183] In October 1933, *Cumhuriyet* used the example set by a Soviet woman platoon commander for women taking part in the defence of the country.[1184]

Despite Mustafa Kemal Paşa's positive views on the role of women in defence, due to objections, particularly due to the objection of Marshal Fevzi (Çakmak), no progress was made.[1185] As the anticipation of war increased, the approach changed. Strong critic of the issue Abidin Daver also changed his view in a world where the possibility of war greatly increased, again using the situation in the Soviet Union as an example. He noted "If Soviet Russia, with a population of 170 million, feels the need to make women soldiers, this need is certainly even more acute for Turkey,

---

and their first issue. See BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1 of the sample pages from its first issue dated February 1934 in the folder on courses and conferences on passive defence and protection from air threats 8 November 1949. It is either they have drafted a sample copy or printed only one and could not continue publishing more issues as there is no entry of a journal under this name in the most exhaustive catalogue of all newspapers and journals from 1831 to 1993. See Mehmet Bayrak, *Türkiye'de Gazeteler ve Dergiler Sözlüğü (1831-1993)* (İstanbul: Küll Yayınları, 1994).

[1180] Correspondence from 1933 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1181] *Can Kurtaran,* 1/1 (1934): 26.

[1182] Fuad Bulca to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, BCA, 30-10-0-0-200-363-1, (page 3), 21 October 1936.

[1183] Fatmagül Demirel, *Cumhuriyet Kadınlarının Askerlik Hayali: Kadın Asker Olur mu?* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2024), 22.

[1184] *Cumhuriyet*, 10 October 1933.

[1185] Demirel, *Cumhuriyet Kadınlarının Askerlik Hayali*, 134-5.

with a population of 16.5 million".[1186] In this atmosphere, to provide basic military training to girls studying at secondary and high schools and universities, military lessons were included. These lessons began in September 1937.[1187] In the curriculum, the primary task indicated for women was their contribution to active and passive measures for local protection from air attacks.[1188]

Despite aiming to maintain traction through publicity and correspondence with senior government institutions and figures, officials remained distanced from this civilian initiative. Both the General Staff and the administration of the Republican People's Party were of the view that such an undertaking would require organisational capability throughout the country and wide resources to perform the task of defence against attacks from the air, which should be performed by an institution with resources and outreach. Moreover, the Republican People's Party believed that they were not consulted, and they learned about this initiative after it was established.[1189] Earlier in 1931, deputy head of chief of staff Asım Paşa (Gündüz) submitted a proposal to the party's General Secretary Recep Bey (Peker) and offered the establishment of "Gazdan Koruma Cemiyeti" (The Society for Protection from Gas). He suggested that to succeed, this association needed to get its power from the Party and must rely on its youth organisation.[1190] On 3 October 1933, he wrote once again to Secretary General Recep Bey, noting that he had learned from the newspapers about the establishment of "Hava Hücumlarından Koruma Cemiyeti" in İstanbul and reminded him that he had shared a proposal with him back in 1931.[1191] Asım Paşa noted that the organisation needed to be based in Ankara and must have resources and outreach for all of Turkey. He also requested information on this civilian initiative. In his response to the General Staff, on 10 December 1933,

[1186] *Cumhuriyet*, 4 November 1936: "170 milyon nüfuslu Sovyet Rusya, kadını asker yapmak ihtiyacını duyarsa, nüfusu 16 buçuk milyon olan Türkiye için bu ihtiyaç elbette daha şiddetle mevcuddur".

[1187] *Cumhuriyet*, 25 September 1937.

[1188] *Cumhuriyet*, 25 September 1937.

[1189] Correspondence from 1933 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1190] Correspondence from 1931 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1191] Correspondence from 1933 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

Recep Bey (Peker) wrote that he concurred that the protection of the population in the rear of the front from aerial attacks was a state business and could not be delegated to a single civilian initiative.[1192] He emphasised that this task was for all state institutions.[1193] The central role of the state was already established in reports prepared by various institutions working on models used in other countries. In a draft procedure prepared by the Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti in 1932, it was noted that organisations established in Europe were under the presidency of their heads of state and that "Aviyahim" (Aviakhim) was operating under Stalin in Russia.[1194] In this report, it was also emphasised that compared to other organisations in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, "Aviyahim" had a more complex organisation and resources.[1195] Ultimately, state institutions maintained their lead in all activities organised for the defence of the rear of the country. It remained under central state control, as in the Soviet Union, with differences in implementation.



Figure 8.9. A certificate issued for the completion of the course on protection against air raids and poisonous gases, 1938.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[1192] Correspondence from 1933 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1193] Correspondence from 1933 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1194] Correspondence from 1932 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

[1195] Correspondence from 1932 in the folder kept at BCA 490-1-0-0-1136-142-1, 8 November 1949.

With limited resources and under an urge to take measures, Turkish bureaucracy extended the courses to wider segments of society. In 1936, the procedure for training courses was published.[1196] The training material was brought from Europe by the Red Crescent Society and distributed to the provincial centers. Courses on protection against air raids and poisonous gases were organised for the masses, and certificates were issued to those who successfully completed these courses (Figure 8.9 and Figure 8.10).



Figure 8.10. A certificate issued for the completion of the course on protection against air raids and poisonous gases, 1938.

Source: From the author's private collection.

Faced with urgency and considering the costs and difficulties of allocating officers from the army all the time, Turkish authorities adapted what is today called 'train the trainers' programs widely utilised in health, safety, and security training in the contemporary world in the industry and in the state bureaucracy. A person enrolled in this version of the program, after successful completion, was qualified to offer

[1196] Quoted in Kocacık and Dölen, "İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türkiye'de Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kursları," 40-7.

training to others, as seen in the document from 1939, which certified that the person was competent enough to lecture and could give conferences on defence against air raids and chemical gases. This, different from the certificates above, was dually signed by the governor of the province and the course instructors with added stamps (Figure 8.11). Türkan Pekel's certificate noted that she was a teacher. This approach, adapted by the government with financial limitations and urgency due to developments, was an effort to find an efficient way to train the trainers to enrol in the program for a wider segment of society without using trained military officers or other experts all the time. Despite government efforts, attendance was an issue, as illustrated by the number of failed trainees surpassing the number of those who successfully finished these training courses. To prevent this, the governorates were asked to secure the attendance of the individuals at the courses and use their powers over them due to the importance of this for the defence of the country.[1197]



Figure 8.11. Türkan Pekel's certificate from 1939 on defence against air raids and chemical gases.

Source: From the author's private collection.

[1197] BCA 30-10-0-0-51-331-4, 20 February 1937 and *Resmi Gazete*, 8 March 1937.

The best practices observed in the case of preparations and organisational capability employed in the Soviet Union were always noted by Turkish observers tasked with the hope of delivering a similar outcome in Turkey. In official correspondence, the example set by the Soviet Union was mentioned, as noted above. This went beyond the correspondence exchanged between public authorities and the military bureaucracy and was shared with the public in training courses. For example, in underlining the importance of preparations against chemical gas attacks, *Cumhuriyet* quoted Prof Ömer Şevket's (Öncel) remark he made at a conference in 1933 as "There are people without a handkerchief in Russia but not one without a gas mask"[1198] (Figure 8.12).


Zehirli gazlerden korunma çareleri

«Rusya'da mendili olmıyan var, fakat maskesi olmıyan yoktur»

Zehirli gazler hakkındaki konferans münasebetile, muhtelif şekilde maske takmış olan kız ve erkek kimya talebesi, or tadaki zat konferans veren müderris Ömer Şev ket Beydir

Figure 8.12. Russia presented as a positive example in preparations against gas attacks.

Source: *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1933.

[1198] *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1933.

In addition to Osoaviakhim, the general, more sophisticated youth organisation of the Communist Party for children aged 4 to 22, the Octoberists, Pioneers, and Komsomols were examined as the political youth groupings in the Soviet Union. The difference between this structure and Osoaviakhim, which has a more military aspect, was also noted.[1199] But still these also had a role to play as Komsomols were obliged to assist the political commissars in the Red Army when asked.[1200] Nevertheless, being aware of the function and utility of the latter group, the model closely examined and referred to was the latter on the Turkish military bureaucracy's side, which would benefit Turkey. The decision to establish a youth organisation in such form as seen in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy was taken at the CHP congress in 1935, but Mustafa Kemal Atatürk prevented its implementation due to the risks he perceived in doing so.[1201] However, advocates of the Prussian/German argument continued to claim that Turkey modelled its approach to youth organisations based solely on the German model.[1202] Turkish political leadership and military bureaucracy pursued an entirely different path throughout the interwar period.

As opposed to the liberal denial of the war as a phenomenon and as if the exercise of military bureaucracy's activities were without a reason other than for exercising and imposing their authority, the perception of the military cadres living in the period was totally ignored. In an interview on the new multipolar power formation in our current time, renowned naval historian Paul Kennedy reverted to the interwar years to make his point and quoted another acclaimed historian, Zara Steiner.[1203] Kennedy told:

[1199] Yaman, *Yurt Müdafaasında Türk Gençliği*, 99-100.

[1200] Yaman, *Yurt Müdafaasında Türk Gençliği*, 100.

[1201] Aslan, "Türk Uzmanların Rus Eğitim Sistemi Hakkındaki Raporları," 4616.

[1202] Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi," 210.

[1203] "Paul Kennedy in Conversation on the Rise of a New Era of Great Power Competition," *Engelsberg Ideas*, 27 March 2025 https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/paul-kennedy-in-conversation-on-the-rise-of-a-new-era-of-great-power-competition/, accessed on 9 April 2025. See Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed, European International History 1919-1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark European International History 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

> I was always caught by a remark made by the distinguished historian, Zara Steiner, who contributed two outstanding volumes to the Oxford History of Modern Europe on interwar diplomacy. Volume One, *The Lights that Failed,* runs from 1919 to 1933. Then volume two, *The Triumph of the Dark,* goes from 1933 to 1939, with just a little appendix for World War II. Zara spent a great deal of time working on that masterly two-volume project. She posed the question of how the observers of the time could know that they were in a pre-Second World War part of history rather than a post-First World War part, their previous reality. At the time, there were assumptions about never going to war again, and different sorts of assumptions, ones about the coming again of a new imperial journey, for instance. Zara's answer was that you never could know. They could not have known whether they were in a pre-Second World War period by 1933 as opposed to being still in the latter stages of the post-First World War period.[1204]

While most European powers were in denial of another war, Turkey and the Soviet Union were surely on the pre-Second World War part of history based on all primary sources from those times. The anticipation of a major confrontation was not paranoia for those living through the interwar period which necessitated embarking on preparations and involving their populations in this effort.

8.3. Conclusion

For a political authority and its bureaucracy, preparing the country's resources and economic strength for war was challenging, but even more challenging was the preparation of its society. There were risks associated with triggering the society into this mindset and encouragement of it into action. There were also risks in terms of when this had to be initiated, how, and within what margins it should be kept.

Existential security concerns have always been strong in Turkey following the end of wars in the early 1920s. Authorities were concerned about the unpredictable and unstable political atmosphere bearing the risk of another confrontation and were in an effort to allocate the country's resources, including its manpower, to strengthen the country's defence capability. The perception of the shape of the next war was critical in formulating an action. Science and technology have enabled the production of more lethal weapons of war. Modern airplanes made the notion of front lines irrelevant as these new aircrafts could reach any part and inflict damage using more

[1204] "Paul Kennedy in conversation on the rise of a new era of great power competition,".

lethal bombs, cause fire and carry chemical gases to the rear of their enemies. New conditions imposed by the totalitarian character of war required every citizen's contribution to the war effort. Advanced weaponry, on the other hand, required longer familiarization periods and training to begin during peacetime. Therefore, society, particularly its dynamic part, the youth, must be taken within the scope of military training and attain skills that could be transferable to be used in combat and be beneficial in the defence of the country. Under financial constraints, these also needed to be done in a way that did not create a burden on the central state budget. To address this pressing problem, Turkish politicians and the military bureaucracy tried to make the best use of all national sources within their reach. The Turkish authorities assessed the threats and identified gaps in their capabilities. They relied on their professional experiences but searched for models that could introduce best practices from the experiences of other nations. Republican Turkey refrained from confining itself to one teaching or school of thought to adhere to the practice of a single model in those years and tried to use any available working model rationally to address its real problems in all areas.

Various models on including population in the defence of a rear of the country were examined. Measures set forth by liberal democratic European countries and those set forth by revisionist autocratic European countries were investigated. While most of the liberal democratic European powers were in denial of another war, Turkey, just like the Soviet Union, was surely on the "pre-Second World War part of" history as evidenced by all primary sources from those times. The anticipation of a major confrontation was not paranoia for those living through the interwar period. The models presented by the German and Italian experiences with their population and youth, the weaponisation of it foremost against opponents within the country against opponents in a large spectrum, however, was not considered appropriate by the Republican leadership. For political reasons, Nazi Germany tried to inject its youth project and organized visits to Turkey. However, there is no evidence that Turkey has adopted any of these models. Even during the peak of the German and Italian regimes as an attractive model in the world in the 1930s, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk turned down suggestions from his inner circle to propose measures imitating the models vigorously enforced in Germany and Italy.

In its search for best practices, Turkey benefited from the Soviet experience. Direct support was provided only by the Soviet Union. The Turkish Army had closely followed the Red Army's experience against air raids, bombardments, and chemical attacks since the late 1920s. The Turkish Army largely benefited from material written in the Soviet Union. The beginnings of civil defence in Turkey can be traced to a translation of such a work in 1925, which enabled the formation of the first draft manual on a comprehensive plan of action for the defence of the rear against aerial and chemical attacks in 1928. Turkey also adopted the Soviet way of involving its population, particularly its youth, in its war preparation efforts, as seen in the cooperation of Türk Hava Kurumu and Osoaviakhim in the area of aviation and various programs offered to the youth, both male and female.

Since there would never be such a thing as being fully prepared for a total war, the pressure mounted on Turkey forced it to look for additional ways to secure its defence by the mid-1930s.[1205] This Soviet influence had ended entirely by early 1939. Turkey then entered under the influence of a singular system, led initially for a very brief period by Britain and then mostly by the Americans throughout the Cold War period, which had a completely different approach to involving society in military affairs to stand against perceived threats in terms of organisation, legality, and activities.

[1205] Mara Karlin "The Return of Total War: Understanding-and Preparing for-a New Era of Comprehensive Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2024), www.foreignaffairs/ukraine/return-total-war-karlin, accessed on 30 November 2024.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to examine Turkey's military relations with the Soviet Union from 1923 to 1939, arguing that the military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were largely overlooked and underappreciated despite forming a significant part of the relations between the two countries. It argued that two main constraints opened the way for this. First, Turkey was left out of the political-security architecture of Europe, and second, Turkey had limited resources and military capabilities to fulfil its policy objectives. It further explored the significance of military relations in the Turkish-Soviet relationship in the interwar period, aiming to explain how understanding the role of military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union between the two world wars could contribute to our understanding of Turkish-Soviet relations, which were starkly different in the interwar period than in the preceding and succeeding periods.

The first chapter, as the introduction, explained the argument, examined the historiographical discussion on Turkish-Soviet relations between 1923-1939 by providing a literature review, and outlined the research method and the structure of the thesis.

The second chapter focused on the characteristics of the Turkish military bureaucracy during the interwar period. It first offered the notion of bureaucracy, then examined the transition of the Turkish military into the peacetime period and the main features of its organisation and its identification of the external environment and its needs. It later explained certain critical limitations imposed by the Western way of war thinking, particularly through one of its reflections in the form of the Prussian/German argument on understanding the interwar characteristics of the Turkish Army.

As explained in the second chapter, the Turkish political authority determined the form, command structure, and place of its military within the system, as well as its needs, and then identified the duties and tasks expected to be performed. Based on these, the Turkish military bureaucracy embarked on finding ways to accomplish these tasks under the constraints. As an outcast in the international arena with limited resources, Turkey found that only the Soviet Union and the Red Army were willing to cooperate and assist it until the later parts of the interwar period. The Turkish Army in the interwar period was not under the influence of one particular version of an approach to military science or art and pursued various options to engage with other military bureaucracies. Therefore, to rationally fulfil the task given by the political authority, it was ready to embark on a relationship with other armies. This chapter argued that the special characteristics of the Turkish military bureaucracy opened the way for reaching out to the Soviet military and enabled it to sustain a positive working relationship throughout the period.

The third chapter focused on the Turkish military's perception and understanding of Soviet military power. First, it provided information on ways to collect information about the Red Army. It later analysed the nature of the knowledge the Turkish Army possessed about the Red Army by reference to the practical information of the Soviet Union in Turkish military sources and a portrait of the Red Army. It then examined the critical analysis of the Red Army made within the Turkish Army based on this information and engagement with it.

As explained in the third chapter, following the steer from the political authority, the Turkish military bureaucracy developed the capacity to examine the Soviet system. Turkish officers developed their understanding through monitoring foreign military publications, intelligence publications, and bilateral engagements during visits to the Soviet Union. Russian language skills within the officer corps and the efforts of the office of military attaché in Moscow greatly facilitated this process. The visits contributed to the formation of this understanding of the Red Army. This chapter concluded that in the interwar period, these activities and efforts enabled the Turkish military to sketch out an unprecedented clear picture of the Red Army, never seen either before or after this period in Turkish history. During this period, the Red Army

was not an enigma for the Turkish National Army. This information accumulation enabled Turkish officers to make assessments that would remain until World War II.

The fourth chapter focused on military diplomacy and cooperation. It first outlined the establishment of first contacts during the War of Independence and later examined the military diplomatic activities in peacetime by detailing the role of the military attachés and the mutual visits and engagements. As per military cooperation, it offered two examples in this field: the first being cooperation regarding the Turkish military mission in Afghanistan and the second being cooperation in the field of aviation.

As explained in the fourth chapter, in reaching out to each other, the first contacts were initiated by military figures during the wartime period, and both states preferred to assign ambassadors with military backgrounds. The understanding at the strategic level had to be worked out carefully at the operational and tactical levels to enable taking tangible steps in developing relationships amid deep suspicions between the two sides, who knew very little about each other. In addition, propaganda disseminated by the victors of World War I further increased feelings of mistrust and suspicion about the intentions of the Turkish national movement and the Bolsheviks. To overcome this and to proceed faster in setting up working relationships, both sides relied on military figures symbolising the importance attached to these characters by their respective administrations. One major expected outcome of military diplomacy was to demonstrate to others the level of engagement between the two countries. During the period from 1923 to 1939, both the Turkish Army and the Red Army benefited from an understanding achieved to address their transactional and immediate needs, creating an atmosphere of trust and acceptable levels of cooperation, relying on each other as two outcasts in the European security architecture. In military cooperation, attention was given to acts that required neither heavy investment nor the creation of complicated mechanisms. Turkey managed to benefit from Soviet assistance as it was pursuing its policy in a very remote area in Afghanistan with limited capabilities and also received Soviet assistance in the development of civil aviation in Turkey. This chapter concluded that the Turkish military bureaucracy contributed to the overall Turkish state policy of expanding its

relationship with the Soviet Union in support of its foreign policy objectives in an environment where it was left outside of the European security system, having critical concerns about maintaining the necessary tools to defend the country with activities aimed at building trust, enhancing understanding under potential interventions of third parties, and facilitating cooperation between the Turkish Army and the Red Army, as well as achieving means to pursue policies that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish due to its limited resources and its failure to be accepted by major European powers, except for the Soviet Union.

The fifth chapter focused on the Turkish Army's engagement with the Red Army at the borders and beyond. First, it offered the role allocated to them in the context of the borderlands. It then examined the security environment in these borderlands, exploring the security challenges to Turkey and the perception of threats from third parties by both Turkey and the Soviet Union. Later, the chapter provided details on the demarcation of the border and outlined efforts to secure these borders with closer attention to managing minor border incidents and dealing with revolts in Anatolia, which were considered major incidents. Finally, the situation of the maritime borders was examined.

As discussed in the fifth chapter, the military bureaucracies of the two countries played a leading role in border management in their respective systems. For this reason, both military bureaucracies constantly engaged with each other along these borders and beyond in the larger area of border management. Demarcation of the borders and managing minor incidents along the borders and major incidents developing along the borders and beyond in a larger area occupied the working agendas of these bureaucracies during the interwar period. During this period, neither side perceived a major military threat from the other, and their focus was on observing the moves of the other rather than fortifying or deploying more troops to the border areas in the interwar years, unlike the period preceding and succeeding this period. They refrained from acts that would cause concern, could be understood, or signalled military hostility to the other party. The revolts in Anatolia forced Turkey to secure support and achieve a working level of cooperation with its neighbours, and Turkey found the Soviets to be the most responsive. The Soviet

reaction to Turkey's military activity during these revolts showcased Soviet leadership's and Red Army leadership's general approach to Turkey during the interwar period, which remained cordial, cooperative, and supportive against the perceived intentions and actions of outside imperial powers. This continued until major shifts in the European security structure altered Turkey's perception of the Soviet Union. From the Turkish perspective, the number of attacks from the Soviet side, particularly against Turkish border troops, increased dramatically in late 1938 and 1939. The chapter demonstrated that despite the existence of potentially confrontational issues, neither side opted to let these issues get out of hand or allowed them to escalate to a level that would spiral into a major crisis between the two states, keeping intact the secure border and secure Eastern rear perceptions of the Turkish political-military leadership that had begun during the War of Independence years and continued until the eve of World War II.

The sixth chapter focused on military economics, aid, trade, and the transfer of technology and know-how. It first established the centrality of financial concerns for the Turkish military bureaucracy by examining the efforts to meet the needs of the national army by reaching out to foreign partners and using the Soviet option to access modern vehicles of war. It then explored the transfer of technology and know-how from the Soviet Union and examined Turkey's structural factors regarding the transfer of technology. Later, it examined the reasons for the limited Red Army influence and identified three areas where this influence was evident. Finally, it discussed the shift to Western models occurring quickly due to changes in the international atmosphere.

As discussed in the sixth chapter, war and economy, the economics of war, *Harb İktisadiyatı*, were central to Turkish officers' thinking throughout the interwar period. Republican leadership framed the economics of war differently and uniquely during this period, once again not seen in other preceding or succeeding periods, which was overlooked for reasons argued throughout this thesis. The Turkish military in the interwar period was mostly preoccupied with economics rather than politics in performing its duties as a military bureaucracy. Political and military cadres who fought in the previous decade never assessed the conflict as over and had

already formulated a way of action appreciating the totality of war with the expectation of an even more encompassing and destructive one becoming a possibility in the decade ahead. They sought to engage with anyone in the world, particularly different Western governments and private weapons suppliers, in their quest to meet their urgent, basic, and conventional needs and also to procure more avant-garde ones, such as motorised vehicles, planes, tanks, and armoured cars. Turkey's economic capabilities at the time were not conducive to accomplishing these tasks smoothly. Turkey's military needs were urgent, real, and costly. Turkey procured these from the Soviet Union. The flow of weapons and ammunition began first by transferring conventional ones like rifles, guns, and artillery ammunition and continued with avant-garde and advanced ones such as planes, tanks, armoured cars, motorcycles, and parachute gear when the Soviet Union managed to produce these after rebuilding its economy and industry with five-year plans and benefiting from the military uses of this economic-industrial power. Limited by its economic resources, Turkey's purchases were insufficient to transform its entire army. Nevertheless, to build deterrence and signal possession of modern weaponry in its arsenal to adversaries, Turkey amplified their presence in messaging.

Expectations of technology and know-how transfer were not fully realised in this engagement with the Soviet Union. Transfer had been limited to copying some applications and practices from the Soviet Union. These were particularly visible as exemplified in the area of operation of newly acquired armoured and motorised vehicles, extending the use of gliders, parachutes, and in general training of civilian youth to be benefited in a total war and finally in getting measures in preparation of the country's human and material resources against devastating blows of enemy aircrafts by the way of bombing and use of chemical agents. This chapter concluded that military economics, aid, and trade formed a solid basis and rationale for entering into a successful working relationship and sustaining it throughout the period with the Soviet Union from the Turkish perspective. Due to its own structural limitations and lack of necessary resources, although the Soviet Union was not impeding the process, the transfer of technology and know-how in the military sector had not been possible from the Soviet Union to Turkey during the interwar period and remained limited, leaving no traceable legacy.

The seventh chapter focused on surveillance and intelligence in the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. After outlining the place of the Soviet Union in Turkish intelligence history during this period, the chapter explained the nature of intelligence gathering about the Soviet Union, focusing on the mechanisms and the nature of data.

As discussed in the seventh chapter, intelligence was the area where Turkish-Soviet relations throughout the interwar period had the least contact compared to other engagements in military relations. Authorities on both sides remained hesitant and maintained distance in their engagement in this field as they were forming their own understanding and ways of operation, as well as their respective organisations. This was one of the unique areas where Turkish officials did not seek to learn from the Soviets in any way. In the interwar period, Turkey and the Soviet Union did not perceive any threat from each other at the strategic level. Therefore, shaped by these factors, their intelligence activity was limited to conducting surveillance on each other and preventing any third-party activity within their jurisdictions that would undermine their relationship. Through military attachés in Moscow, the Turkish General Staff intelligence produced detailed reports containing basic catalogue information from the military intelligence function perspective. Red Army developments, their structure, deployments, details on their weapons, uniforms, operational procedures, as well as command structures and commanders were made available to Turkish political and military seniors. These works enhanced Turkish knowledge of the Soviet military throughout the interwar period. The chapter concluded that in the entire spectrum of military activities, where both tried to forge working relationships only in the intelligence domain, the sides refrained from any interaction in the interwar period. This was not because of animosity as often suggested but due to inherently adversarial and deceptive nature of intelligence activities.

The eighth chapter discussed the military's relations with society in the context of the role the country's population would play in the defence of the country in a world where front lines disappeared and the lethality and outreach of modern weapons increased. It first offered the Turkish approach to civil defence and then overviewed

Turkey's search for models from the world that could be tailored to Turkey's conditions and needs. It then explained, in this quest, Turkey benefited to a greater extent from the model presented and implemented in the Soviet Union.

As discussed in chapter eight, following the developments in science and technology that transformed science into lethal forms to be used by armies of the time and based on its more than decade-old successive warfare experience, Turkey was certain that the totalitarian form of the next war would be destructive in a way that was incomprehensible at the time. The political and military elite were also anticipating a major confrontation in Europe. Aerial and chemical attacks were the two most important concerns, and the Turkish Army took the lead in efforts within the civilian sector to create awareness and implement measures. Coupled with these, mental preparation, morale, and keeping the idea of war in the back of people's minds were also important. Without drafting more people and resorting to large-scale mobilisation, the Turkish Army looked for ways to prepare society for war, enable youth to acquire transferable skills primarily in aviation, and sustain a positive perception of the military. In addressing a real problem, Turkish politicians and the military bureaucracy tried to make the best use of all national sources within their reach. The experience achieved over a decade of warfare and constant monitoring of emerging threats in their world and the best practices of other military bureaucracies became their guide in planning their actions. The practices of these implementations in other major countries were examined, but direct support was given only by the Soviet Union. The beginnings of civil defence in Turkey can be traced to the translation of a book published in 1925 from a Russian book by the Soviet Aviakhim, the predecessor to Osoaviakhim. This enabled the formation of the first draft manual on the topic in Turkey in 1928. The chapter concluded that Turkey learnt from and benefited from the Soviet way of involving its population, particularly its youth, in its war preparation efforts in the interwar period. Turkey relied largely on the Soviet formulations in its preparations for creating mechanisms in defence of the rear against aerial and chemical attacks and enabling its youth to get prepared for the potential war effort. It also demonstrated that pointing to Germany and Italy as the originators of such a model for Turkey in the inclusion of its population, particularly its youth, in the preparation of the country's defence, thus involving them in military

activities, was misplaced and caused by the vacuum created by the overlooking of Turkey's military relations with the Soviet Union in the interwar period.

9.1. The Changing Nature of Turkey's Military Relations with the Soviet Union

The relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union, forged throughout the interwar period, endured many challenges and gradually evolved into a contrast to the end of the period. Although changes at the strategic level were not easily detectable, the importance of friendship was frequently reiterated in political statements, and public messaging reflected cordial relations. Difficulties at the operational and tactical levels began to press harder after the mid-1930s. A notable impact was evident in the military relationship between the two countries. Turkey did not procure any more modern weapons of war after 1936, and the required spare parts were not obtained for the tanks and armoured cars. Working-level relationships were impeded, as seen in the absence of a Soviet military attaché to Ankara for more than two years after 1936 and the way Turkey and its army were mentioned in the internal Red Army ideological training. There was a visible escalation in confrontation at the border between the Soviet Union and Turkey, with increased attacks against Turkish border troops inflicting casualties and indifference from the Soviet state representatives. According to the Turkish archival sources, the number of attacks from the Soviet side, particularly against Turkish border troops, increased dramatically by late 1938 and 1939, but references to friendship and willingness to solve these through meetings were retained. Overall, engagement in the military sector began to be less encompassing, contacts were not followed, and issues were left to drift, left to their own initiative.

The main reason for this gradual change was related to the slowdown and cooling-off in bilateral relations and the change in the status of being an outcast for both countries. As Turkey developed relations with other countries in the European power balance, difficulties in explaining this to the Soviet Union became increasingly apparent. From the start, both had factored in their relations with others in their bilateral relations, and they experienced difficulties as they embarked on improved relations with them. Over time, Turkey's perception of the increased threat from

revisionist powers in Europe in the early 1930s and its strong feeling of vulnerability forced the Turkish political elite to seek to develop channels with actors that increased suspicion in Moscow. The Montreux Conference of 1936 was marked as a milestone. The Soviet authorities expressed concern over Turkey's close working relations with Britain and clearly expressed their discontent with Turkey's behaviour, which they believed complicated their dispute with Britain and also noted that Turkey conducted very lively behind the scenes negotiations with the British side.[1206] These challenges became more severe with sudden and unexpected changes in leadership positions on both sides. Stalin's purges within the Soviet military and diplomatic bureaucracies took away many well-known, familiar and helpful characters from the Turkish perspective. Except for Voroshilov and Budyonny, almost all seniors known to the Turkish side were executed in the Red Army, and the loss of Karakhan and Litvinov on the diplomatic side created distress in Ankara. From the Soviet perspective, losing Atatürk and, with his death, figures close to him, such as Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, caused concern. Soon after Karakhan was recalled to Moscow, Turkey deployed a senior-level delegation to Moscow to address the cooling down in relations that began with issues such as talks on Straits and events during the Montreux Conference.

Turkish ambassador Zekai Apaydın had two postings in Moscow. The difference in his main agenda in these two postings illustrated this change. In his first posting from 1925 to 1927, he worked to overcome trust issues and lay the groundwork for establishing an effective working relationship, especially to conclude military trade deals. After this posting, between 1930-1935, he served as the Turkish Minister of National Defence, knowing the importance of the primary concern of the Turkish military bureaucracy. In his second posting from 1935 to 1939, his main effort was to work on slowing down relations and stop the cooling down of good relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union.[1207]

[1206] Минц и. И., Панкратова А. М., Помёмкин В. П., Тарле Е. В., Колчнановский Н. П., *История Дипломатии (1919-1939 гг) Том Третий* [Diplomatic History (1919-1939) Volume Three] (Moscow: Государственное Издательство Политической Литературы, 1945), 570 and Alexandrov, *Contemporary World History*, 65, 409-411.

[1207] Volkan Marttin, *Devlet ve Millet Hizmetinde Geçen Bir Ömür A. Zekai Apaydın* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2023), 143, 149 and 163.

Turkey's stance was shaped by its threat perception and understanding of its military needs. Throughout the interwar period, just as during the War of Independence, the eastern border was secure, and no threat was expected from that direction. Moreover, Turkey could rely on military support from that direction and procure modern weapons of war to build up deterrence against the perceived threat that would appear from the western direction. As the 1928 wargame mentioned earlier suggested, the Turkish military perceived a threat from the West and wargamed the Soviet threat only in relation to the actions of a Western aggressor and certainly the Soviet response to this aggressor. This changed dramatically after World War II.



Figure 9.1. An illustration by Münif Fehim before World War II.
Source: M. Faruk Gürtunca, *Bu Arslana Dokunmayın* (İstanbul: Ülkü Kitap Yurdu, 1939), 5.

Two illustrations by the well-known Turkish artist Münif Fehim depict this change: His 1939 illustration portrayed a Turkish soldier watching the Mediterranean Sea, showing that Turkey's threat perception until the beginning of World War II was from its south, through the Mediterranean Sea, from a European aggressor, which

was, by implication, Italy.[1208] Turkey first sought to engage with the Soviet Union to overcome the threat posed by Italy from the Mediterranean in the 1930s but this was not possible after 1936.[1209] Turkish soldier was depicted as being alert and on guard (Figure 9.1).

Through to the end of the war in Europe, on 19 March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov summoned Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Selim Sarper, and told him that they would not extend the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (Non-Aggression) Pact.[1210] This was signed in 1925 and extended in 1929, 1931, and 1935. Sarper was summoned again on 7 June 1945, to learn about the new conditions requested by Moscow. After this meeting, Sarper sent a report to the Foreign Ministry in Ankara noting that Molotov told him that "The 1921 agreement was signed at a time when the Soviets were weak and brought about some territorial changes. This issue must be resolved first and foremost".[1211] After this, Molotov moved on to the second issue, which was the Soviet concerns about maintaining its security in the Black Sea.[1212] This meant asking for changes in Turkey's eastern border and its control over the Turkish Straits, which materialised Turkey's concerns about the Soviet Union's post-war intentions. In reflection of this new threat perception, the direction of the Turkish soldier in Münif Fehim's 1946 cartoon was different. He turned north and east with "Rusya" (Russia) and "Karadeniz" (the Black Sea) marked on the map. Turkish soldier faced this direction to defend the country. Unlike the depiction of a relaxed but alert soldier on guard in 1939, this time the soldier was depicted in a more aggravated stance, staying on guard with a rifle and bayonet ready to counter an immediate attack from that direction (Figure 9.2).

[1208] *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı, 1923-1934* (Ankara: T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, 1974), 360.

[1209] *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı,* 360-61.

[1210] Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1945-1960," 501.

[1211] *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları 1939-1946* (Ankara: T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, 1974), vii: "1921 tarihli muahede Sovyetlerin zayıf oldukları bir zamanda aktedilmiş ve bir takım arazi değişiklikleri meydana getirmiştir. Evvelemirde bu meseleyi düzeltmek lazımdır."

[1212] *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları,* 264-5.




Figure 9.2. An illustration by Münif Fehim after World War II.

Source: M. Faruk Gürtunca, *Dokunmayın Bu Vatana II: Moskoflara Cevap* (İstanbul: Ülkü Kitap Yurdu, 1946), 37.

This new era has brought significant changes that would last for decades. Throughout the interwar period, military officers from both sides came together on various occasions as part of their routine bureaucratic work, as seen in the photo of officers from both armies in their service uniforms after a meeting (Figure 9.3).

However, this was not possible after World War II. Both military bureaucracies were adversaries and used only their military attachés in their capitals, and Turkey gained insights into the Soviet Army through an American lens. They completely lost their own means of understanding the other side and were in an effort to make sense of the intentions and attitudes of the other side. This was the case even for veterans. In 1947, during a ceremony in Moscow Turkish ambassador, Faik Zihni Akdur met Marshal Budyonny. Marshal began his conversation with broken Turkish and later, with the help of translation, he told ambassador that he loved Turkish people and respected the Turkish people and Atatürk but said he did not like the policy followed by the Turkish government, as this policy would place Turkey under American hegemony and would install Turkey as a forward base for America to launch an

attack against Russia and ask ambassador whether Turkey would wage war against them.[1213]



Figure 9.3. Officers of the Turkish National Army and the Red Army in the interwar period.

Source: From the author's private collection.

This adversarial stance became stronger in the following years despite the fact that in 1953, the Soviet side assured Turkey that it had no territorial claims and proposed a mutually acceptable settlement of the question of the Straits.[1214] Over the years, steady improvements have been observed in political relations, and this time trade took the lead in expanding relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Visits were exchanged for the first time after World War II by foreign ministers in 1964-1965 and by heads of government in 1965-1966.[1215] Work on the demarcation of the border began once again in 1968 and was finally concluded in 1973.[1216]

[1213] The Turkish Embassy in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, TDA, 571-34993-138022-43, 8 November 1947.

[1214] *A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. V. I. Popov, I. D. Ovsyany and V. P. Nikhamin, trans. David Skvirsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 123 and Tellal, *SSCB-Türkiye İlişkileri*, 19.

[1215] *A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 123.

[1216] Leonid Teplinski, *SSCB ve Güney Komşuları Afganistan, İran, Türkiye* (Moscow: Novosti Yayın Ajansı Yayımevi, 1974), 60-1.

The first developments in the sphere of military relations came later. Improvements in this field were slow as Turkey had committed itself deeply to the Western military organisation NATO since 1952.[1217] Although times of increased tensions with the US, particularly after the crises over Cyprus in the 1960s and the 1970s, led to some military gestures between Turkey and the Soviet Union, these were not strong enough to determine the course and allow meaningful cooperation in the field of military relations.[1218]



Figure 9.4. The visit of the Turkish General Staff to the Soviet Union in 1976.

Source: From the author's private collection.

The first Soviet naval fleet visit only occurred in November 1978, with *the Dzerzhinsky* cruiser and *Reshitelny* destroyer from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, with the commander of the fleet Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Khovrin visiting İstanbul.[1219] Senior Turkish commanders visited the Soviet Union and received their senior Soviet counterparts. The deputy head of the chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, visited the Soviet Union in April 1976[1220] (Figure 9.4). In a return visit, the Soviet head of the

[1217] Tellal, *SSCB-Türkiye İlişkileri*, 27.

[1218] Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1960-1980," *Türk Dış Politikası Vol. 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022), 778-80.

[1219] *Cumhuriyet,* 18 November 1978 and Topçuoğlu, *Savaş ve Dostluk*, 7.

[1220] Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1960-1980," 780.

chief of staff, Marshal Nikolai Vasiliyevch Ogarkov, visited Ankara in April 1978.[1221] Marshal Ogarkov told Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit his wish that "relations should be built on the foundations laid by Atatürk and Lenin and go even further than that time."[1222] This reference to the interwar origins of the relationship has been frequently made both then and now.[1223]

9.2. Conclusion

Turkish military relations with the Soviet Union in the interwar period are an integral, but underrated, part of the two countries' histories, and this thesis contributes to the formation of a new historical narrative by highlighting the role of military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in this period. The absence of sufficient academic research on this topic has led to unsupported arguments presented as facts and heavily ideological interpretations of history under Cold War binary thinking. This thesis, sitting at the crossroads of International Relations and Military History, based on archival research and widely untapped published primary sources, offers a precise and comprehensive explanation of how the new Republic of Turkey positioned its military within its state system and tasked it with fulfilling critical defence and security roles, and examines the set of relationships developed with the Soviet Union from this perspective. It further contributes to theoretical discussions about the institutional role of the military in relation to historical sociological approaches within the IR discipline. Finally, based on the original data and reinterpretation of secondary sources, this thesis attempts to contribute to the construction of a new narrative by highlighting the role of military relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union between the two world wars.

[1221] *Milliyet*, 26 April 1978.

[1222] TDA, 54-1858-12312-206, 26 April 1978: "İlişkilerin Atatürk ve Lenin tarafından atılmış temeller üzerinde ve o zamandan daha da ileri gitmesi"

[1223] See for example *A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 124.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Archives

Devlet Arşivleri, Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Ankara, Turkey (BCA). (Directorate of State Archives Republican Archives, Directorate of State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye.)

Devlet Arşivleri, Türk Diplomatik Arşivi, Ankara, Turkey (TDA). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkish Diplomatic Archives, Directorate of State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye.)

Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Arşivi, Ankara, Turkey (ATASE). (Ministry of National Defence Military History Archives, Directorate of State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye.)

Public and Private Collections

Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı (TÜYEK), Ankara Yazma Eserler Bölge Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Ankara, Turkey. (Presidency of Turkey Manuscripts Institution, Directorate General of Manuscripts Ankara Region, Ministry of Culture and Tourism).

Seyfettin Özege Koleksiyonu, Erzurum Atatürk Üniversitesi, Erzurum, Turkey.

Abdullah Turhal’s Private Collection.

Newspapers and Journals

Akşam
Askeri Mecmua
Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi
Belleten
Bursa'da Kültür
Can Kurtaran
Cumhuriyet
Engelsberg Ideas
Evrensel
Foreign Affairs
Günaydın
Hakimiyet-i Milliye
Havacılık ve Spor
Karagöz
Karikatür
Kurun
Milliyet
Piyade Mecmuası
Resimli Perşembe
Resmi Gazete
Savunma ve Havacılık
Servetifünunun (Uyanış)
Son Posta
Tan
Tarih ve Toplum
TASS
The New York Times
The Times
Topçu Mecmuası
Türk Kültürü
Ulus
Ülkü Halkevleri Mecmuası
Vakit
Vatan
Yedigün
Yeni Asır
Yeni Köroğlu

Published Primary Sources

1341 Senesine Kadar En Son İstihbarata Göre Afganistan Ordusu. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925.

1927-1928 Tedrisatı Şark Hududunda Harb Oyununa Aid Krokiler. İstanbul: Harb Akademileri Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1928.

A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1927). Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981.

[Abalıoğlu], Nadir Nadi. *İki Sovyet Rusya 1935-1965*. İstanbul: Ararat Yayınevi, 1967.

Adamof, E. E. *Anadolu'nun Taksimi*. Translated by Babaeskili Hüseyin Rahmi [Apak]. İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan Matbaası, 1926.

Агабеков, *Г. П. У. (Записки Чекиста).* Berlin: Издательство Стрела, 1930.

Agabekov, Georges. *OGPU The Russian Secret Terror*. Translated by Henry W. Bunn. New York: Brentano's, 1932. Republished by Tough Hike Publishing in 2024 in Wroclaw Poland.

Ahmat Lütfullah. *Sefaret Katipleri ve Ataşemiliterler* vol I. İstanbul: İlhami Matbaası, 1929.

Ahmet Faik. *Askerliğin Psikolojisi Hakkında Bir Kalem Tecrübesi.* İstanbul: Milli Mecmua Matbaası, 1933.

A. Kadir. *1938 Harp Okulu Olayı ve Nazım Hikmet.* İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1966.

Akşin, Aptülahat. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Birinci Kısım) 1919'dan Lozan Antlaşmasına Kadar*. İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1964.

Akşin, Aptülahat. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi.* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Akşin, Aptülahat. *Milletlerarası Müşterek Emniyet Sistemi*. Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1939.

Ali Fuat Paşa'nın Moskova Büyükelçiliği Dönemi Yazışmaları, edited by Çiğdem Aslan and Mustafa Toker. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2015.

Algan, Nureddin Münşi. *Gaz Kimyası Zehirli Gazlar ve Kimyevi Savaş.* İstanbul: Yüksek Mühendis Matbaası, 1936.

Altan, Nazif T. *Askeri Topografya Esasları*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939.

Altay, Fahrettin. *On Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası (1912-1922),* edited by Taylan Sorgun. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2023.

Altuntaş, Mahmut Celalettin and Kemal Süer. *Tabiye Notları, 1937- 1938 Piyade ve Atış Okulu Tedrisatından*. İstanbul: Aydınlık Basımevi, 1938.

Apak, Rahmi. "Türkiye'de Dağ Sporu." *Ülkü Halkevleri Mecmuası,* 5/25 (March 1935): 51-3.

Apak, Rahmi. "Türk Sporunun Yeni Yükümleri." *Ülkü Halkevleri Mecmuası,* 6/35 (1936): 345-48.

Apak, Rahmi. *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları.* Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, 1957.

Aralov, Semyon İvanoviç. *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları*. Translated by Hasan Ali Ediz. İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1967.

Aralov, Semyon İvanoviç. *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları*. Translated by Hasan Ali Ediz. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2022.

Aras, Tevfik Rüştü. *Görüşlerim, İkinci Kitap*. İstanbul: Yörük Matbaası, 1968.

Aras, Tevfik Rüştü. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003.

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, I-III. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar, Ankara: Anıtkabir Derneği Yayınları, 2001.

Atatürk'ün Özel Kütüphanesinin Kataloğu. Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Genel Müdürlüğü Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1973.

Bahar, Hamit. *Pasif Korunmada Çalışacak Vatandaşlara Rehber, Halk için Havadan ve Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Çareleri.* İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1940.

Большая советская энциклопедия 13. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1937.

Başaran, Fikri. *1936-1937 Harp Okulu Ders Senesi Ordu Bilgisi Notu*. Ankara: Harp Okulu Basımevi, 1937.

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. *Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti*. İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1934.

Bir Türk Subayının Ağrı İsyanı Hatıraları, ed. Rohat Alakom. İstanbul: Avesta, 2011.

"Book Review by Lieutenant Commander Charles Moran of US Naval Reserve." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 62/6/400 (June 1936). Accessed July 17, 2024. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1936/june/book-reviews.

Bulgar Ordusu Hakkında Malumat. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1924.

Bulgar Ordusu Hakkında Malumat. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925.

Bombalar: Türk, Alman, Fransız, İngiliz, Rus Bombalarının En Mühimleri Hakkında Lazım Gelen Malumat-ı Esasiye. Translated by First Lieutenant Nuri. İstanbul: Necm-I İstikbal Matbaası, 1925.

Bomba Talim ve Terbiyesi: Türk, Alman, Fransız, İngiliz, Rus Tüfek Bombalarıyla Saldırma ve Boğuşma Talim ve Terbiyesine Ait Lazım Gelen Malumat-ı Esasiye. Translated by First Lieutenant Nuri. İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1925.

Bouthoul, Gaston. *Cihanda Nüfus, Tarihi Büyük Vakalar Harp ve Nüfus Nüfusun Müstakbel Vaziyeti*. Translated by Nefi Koryürek. Ankara: Köyöğretmeni Basım Evi, 1936.

Castex, Raoul Victor Patrice. *De Gengis-Khan a Staline ou les Vicissitudes d'une Manoeuvre Strategique 1205-1935.* Paris: Société d'Editions Géographiques Maritimes et Coloniales, 1935.

[Amiral] Castex, *Cengiz Han'dan Stalin'e veya 1- Sevkulceyşi Bir Manevranın Teselsül ve Tehavvülü 2-Komünizim- Faşizim Mücadeleleri 1205- 1939.* Translated by Staff Major Süruri Akalın. İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1939.

Cebesoy, Ali Fuad. *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1953.

Cebesoy, Ali Fuad. *Moskova Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955.

Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri*. İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1926.

Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri*. İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927.

Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri*. İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1928.

Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri*. Ankara: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1934.

Cephe Gerisinin Havaya Karşı Müdafaa ve Muhafazası, İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1928.

Cephe Gerisinin Müdafaa ve Muhafazası. Translated by Lieutenant Colonel Nazmi. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1925.

Chamberlin, William Henry. *The Russian Enigma.* New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1944.

Churchill, Winston Spencer. "Speeches, 1940: The Finest Hour the War Situation House of Many Mansions." International Churchill Society 20 January 1940, Accessed July 20, 2024. https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/the-war-situation-house-of-many-mansions/.

Çekoslavakya Ordusu. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923.

Deniz Harp Oyunu, Harp Akademisi 1929-1930 Senesi Tedrisatından. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1929.

Dirim, Hasan Kadri and İzzet Kemal Erksal. *Hava ve Kimya Harbi Korunması, Hastalıkları Tedavisi.* İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1937.

Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası: Tabii, Zirai, Beşeri, Baytari, Vol. VII. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1938.

Duran, Faik Sabri. *Bugünkü İtalya*. İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, 1937.

Duran, Faik Sabri. *Bugünkü Rusya.* İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, 1937.

Durukan, Eyüp. *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VI: Cumhuriyet Yürüyor (1923-1926),* edited by Murat Yuluğtekin. İstanbul:Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2021.

Durukan, Eyüp. *Günlüklerde Bir Ömür VII: İki Genç Cumhuriyet: Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği (1926-1928),* edited by Murat Yuluğtekin. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2023.

Ecnebiler İstihbarat Memuriyetini ve Memurlarını Nasıl Telakki Ederler. Ankara: Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Neşriyatı, 1928.

Ener, Suat. *Türkiye'nin Sıradağları: Türkiye'nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Stratejik Bakış.* Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1935.

Ener, Suat. *Strateji ve Taktikte Ana Kurallar*. İstanbul: Sühulet Matbaası, 1935.

[Erdem], İ. Hakkı. *Harp Gücü ve Manevi Güçler.* İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1934.

[Erdem], İ. Hakkı. *Harp Gücü ve Manevi Güçler.* İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1935.

Ergüder, Muzaffer. *Orgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder'in Havacılık Anıları,* edited by Halil İbrahim Fırtına. İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2018.

Erkin, Feridun Cemal. *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*. Ankara: Beşnur Matbaası, 1968.

Erksal, İzzet Kemal and Hasan Kadri Dirim. *Hava ve Kimya Harbi, Korunması Hastalıkları, Tedavisi*. İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettibiye Matbaası, 1937.

Espiyonaj. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1940.

Evin, Celal. *Modern Savaş Araçları ve Harp Gazları.* İstanbul: Bozkurt Basımevi, 1937.

Fenik, Mümtaz Faik. *1939 Harbi: Türkiye İngiltere İttifakı ve Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğu*. Ankara: Zerbamat Basımevi, 1941.

Fenmen, Refik. *Modern Orduda Tayyarecilik, Mötörleşme, Muhabere*. Ankara: Akba Kitabevi, 1939.

Fransız Ordusu. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925.

Frunze, Mihail. *Türkiye Anıları*. Translated by Ahmet Ekeş. Ankara: Doğubatı. 2022.

Gaz ve Gazden Korunma Dersleri Hakkında Müfredat Programı. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936.

Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları, edited by Arı İnan, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2023.

Gençlik ve Atıcılık Kulüpleri ve Guruplarile, Bölge Ajanlıkları Tarafından Tertip Edilecek Atışların İcra Sureti Hakkında Muvakkat Talimat. Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1940.

Gener, M. Zihni and S. İ. Yalnız. *Kimya Harbi ve Korunma Yolları Gazlerin Cinsi-Tanınması-esiri Maskeler ve Kollektif Korunma Yolları.* İstanbul: M. Babok Basımevi, 1936.

Gerede, Hüsrev. *Siyasi Hatıralarım I, İran.* İstanbul: Vakit Basımevi, 1952.

Gibrin and L. C. Heckly. *Defense Passive Organisee Personnel et Materiel*. Paris: Dunod, 1936.

Gibrin, L. C. Heckiy. *Teşkilatlı Passif Müdafaa Eşhas ve Malzeme.* İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938.

Giray, Halit and Nefi Vural. *Halk Zehirli Gazlara Karşı Kendini Nasıl Koruyabilir?.* İzmir: Yeniyol Basımevi, 1939.

Gökçen, Sabiha. *Atatürk'le Bir Ömür*, edited by Oktay Verel. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1994.

Gökler ve Gökmenler İçin, Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No 7. İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1937.

Guderian, Heinz. "Russian Strategy in the War." In *The Red Army,* edited by B. H. Liddell Hart, 127-33. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956.

Guldiman, Werner. *Uçak ve Tank ve Bunların Modern Harbin Sevk ve İdaresine Yaptığı Etkiler*. Translated by İhsan Ağrı. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1948.

Gürev, Server Ziya. *Göklerin Kızı*, Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.6. İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1937.

Gültekin, Hüseyin, ed. *Dersim: Jandarma Umum Komutanlığı Raporu 1932.* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2021.

Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86. Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği Matbaası, 1931.

Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86. Mardin: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği Vilayet Matbaası, 1932.

Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86. Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği İnhisarlar Matbaası, 1933.

Halk için Havaya Karşı Korunma Talimatı D86. Ankara: Büyük Erkan- ı Harbiye Reisliği Devlet Matbaası, 1934.

Harb Oyunlarında Nazar-ı Dikkate Alınacak Esaslara Dair Talimatname. Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Matbaası, 1924.

Harb Oyunlarında Nazar-ı Dikkate Alınacak Esaslara Dair Talimatname. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1926.

Harlamov, N. *Kayakçılık*. Translated by N. Üründül. İstanbul: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı İstanbul Basımevi, 1951.

Hava Tehlikesi. Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932.

Hava Tehlikesi: Türk Hava Kurumunun Altıncı Kurultayında Başbakan İsmet İnönü'nün Verdikleri Söylev 24 Mayıs 1935. Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1935.

Hieber, Edgar. *Kıtalarda Gaza Karşı Korunma Hizmetleri*, Vol. 1. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1941.

Hindistan Ordusu. Ankara: Matbaa-yı Askeriye Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Matbaaları, 1925.

Hücum Kıtaatının Talim ve Terbiyesi, Mevzi Harbinde bir Rus Fırkasının Taarruz Planı, ve Sait Muharebenin Teftişleri. Translated by Sedad. Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1920.

Hürkuş, Vecihi. *Bir Tayyarecinin Anıları.* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2023.

Hürkuş, Vecihi. *Havada: 1915-1925.* İstanbul: Tayyareci Vecihi Hürkuş Müzesi Derneği Yayınları, 2008.

Irak ve Suriye Ordusu. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925.

İhsan Nuri Paşa'nın Anıları: Ağrı İsyanı Raporları, edited by Sedat Ulugana. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2024.

[İnan], Afet. *Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan Askerlik Bilgisi*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930.

İnan, Afet. *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2023.

İngiliz Ordusu. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925.

İngiliz Pasif Korunma Tedbirleri Hakkında Binbaşı Sparrow'un Notlarına Ait Broşür. İzmir: Demiryolları Matbaası, 1945.

İnönü, İsmet. *Hatıralar*. Edited by Sabahattin Selek. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009.

İran Ordusu. Ankara: Askeri Matbaa, 1925.

İşkora, Mazlum. *Türk Ordusu Kurmaylık, Erkanıharbiye Tarihçesi.* Ankara: Harb Akademisi Matbaası, 1944.

İtalya Ordusu. Ankara: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Ankara Matbaası, 1925.

İtalya Ordusu. İstanbul-Ankara: Büyük Erkân-i Harbiye Reisliği Ankara Matbaaları, 1927–928.

[İybar], İsmail, Tahsin. *Kızıl Ordu ve Baltık Cumhuriyetleri Estonya, Litvanya, Letonya Orduları.* İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923.

İybar, Tahsin. *Sibiryadan Serendibe.* Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950.

Kadri Rüştü. *Eşkıya Takibi Usulleri*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1933.

Karabekir, Kazım. *İstiklal Harbimiz.* İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1969.

[Karabekir], Kazım. *Erkan-Harbiye Vezaifinden İstihbarat.* İstanbul: Erkan-Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1923.

Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Politikada 45 Yıl.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021.

[Kazancıoğlu], Abdülkadir Sadi. *Yeni Türkiye Memleket Coğrafyası.* İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1931-1932.

Kenedy, Geza. *Harp ve Nüfus Artması*. Translated by Selim Sabit. Ankara: Devlet Matbaası İstanbul, 1934.

Kızıl Ordu II. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925.

Kızıl Ordu III. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927.

Kızıl Ordu Keşif Tayyareciliği Talimnamesi 1931. Translated by Hüseyin. İstanbul: Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği, 1935.

Kızılorduda Kayakçılık Eğitimi. Translated by Colonel Latif Kumuk. İstanbul: Askeri Basımevi, 1950.

Kirilov, İvan. *Sovyet Genelkurmayında Mesleki Hayatım*. Translated by Tavap Tarzi. İstanbul: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı İstanbul Basımevi, 1952.

Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro. *The Soviet Five-Year Plan and Its Effect on World Trade*.London: John Lane the Bodley Head Ltd., 1931.

Kocatürk, Kenan. *Bir Subayın Anıları, 1909-1999*. İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 1999.

Kohn, Hans. "The Totalitarian Philosophy of War." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* 82/1 (1940): 57-72.

Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye: Kemalist Cumhuriyet, edited by Doğu Perinçek. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999.

Konuralp, Hikmet and Avni Refik Bekman. *Zehirli Gazlerden Korunma Dersleri Ortaokullara Mahsus*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1936.

Konuralp, Hikmet and Avni Refik Bekman. *Zehirli Gazlerden Korunma Dersleri Ortaokullara Mahsus*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1937.

Korsun, Nikolay Georgiyeviç. *Türk- Yunan Savaşı 1919-1922*. Translated by Celal Pekşen. İstanbul: Kronik, 2022.

[Korur] Nuri Refet, *Türkiye İçin Harb İktisadiyatı.* İstanbul: Askeri Akademiler Kumandanlığı Matbaası, 1927.

[Korur], Nuri Refet. *Her Kes Zehirli Gazlar ve Bunlara Karşı Korunmağa Dair Ne Bilmelidir?*. İstanbul: Necmi İstiklal Matbaası, 1934.

Kovacs, Aloys. *Harbin Sebep Olduğu Doğum Azlığının Tesirleri*. Translated by Ekrem Şahenk. Ankara: Ankara Basımevi, 1943.

Krasnof, P. N. *Ordu Ruhiyatı: Askeri Ruhiyat Notları*. Translated by Lieutenant Colonel M. Murat. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932.

Krivitsky, W. G. *Ben Stalin'in Ajanıyım*. Translated by N. Y. E. İstanbul: Millet Yayını Ülkü Basımevi, 1947.

Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın İdeolojisi, Hakimiyet-i Milliye Yazıları. Edited by Hadiye Bolluk and Kurtuluş Güran. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006.

Lemert, Edwin M. "Social Participation and Totalitarian War." *American Sociological Review*, 8/5 (1943): 531-36.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. "Socialism and War: The Attitude of the Russian Social-Democratic

Labour Party Towards the War." Marxists.org. Accessed March 15, 2025. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/s-w/ch01.htm.

Manga ve Savaş Kümesinin Yetiştirilmesine Dair Meseleler. Translated by Captain Fuat. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932.

Masrafsız ve Pratik Model Uçaklar. Ankara: Ulus Basımevi Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi, 1935.

Mehmet, *Sosyalist Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri İttihadının Muhtasar Etnoğrafisi*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930.

Metel, Raşit, ed. *Atatürk'ün Silahlı Kuvvetlerle İlgili Söylev, Demeç, Tamim ve Telgrafları*. İstanbul: T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 1973.

Mozgfesky. *Rus Karadeniz Filosu Tarihi*. Translated by Fevzi Kurtoğlu. İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1935.

Мязговский Евгений Александрович. История Черноморского флота 1696-1912

[Myazgovskiy Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, Istoriya Chernomorskogo Flota 1696-1912]. Saint-Petersburg: Тип. Товарищества А.С. Суворина (Tip. Tovarishchestva A.S. Suvorina), 1914.

Nicolai, [Walther]. *Gizli Kuvvetler*. Translated by Mehmed Nihad. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1925.

Nicolai, [Walther]. *Büyük Harpte İstihbarat Hizmeti, Matbuat ve Efkâr-i Umumiye*. Translated by Mehmed Nihad. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1925.

Mahmud Behcet. *Yugoslavya Ordusu*. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1923.

MİT Özel Koleksiyon. 23 February 2025. Accessed February 23, 2025. https://mit.gov.tr/ozel-koleksiyon-detay_belgeler_2.html#gallery-private-137.

Moynier. *Muharebe Gazları, Arıza, Korunma Çareleri ve Tedavileri*. Translated by Tarık. İstanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1936.

Moynier. *Harp Gazları Zehirli Gazlardan İleri Gelen Afetlerin Seriri Mütaalası Tesemmunlerin Tedavisi*. Translated by Şerif Stakan. Ankara: Askeri Tıbbiye Basımevi, 1936.

Mozanof, A. M., S. İ. Stoliçki and O. K. Antonof, *İlmi ve Fenni Planörcülük,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.5. İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935.

Mozgfesky, *Rus Karadeniz Filosu Tarihi*. Edited by Fevzi Kurtoğlu. İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası,1935.

Nedim, Mahmut. *Askeri Topoğrafya*. Ankara: Harp Okulu Basımevi, 1938.

New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary. İstanbul: Redhouse Yayınevi, 1988.

Nitti, Franceso, *Bolşeviklik, Faşistlik ve Demokrasi*. Translated by Esat Adil. Balıkesir: Savaş Kitapevi, 1934.

Okçu, Yahya. *Türk-Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi*. Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1949.

Ordu Dahili Hizmet Kanunu ve Talimnamesi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1936.

Ordu Dahili Hizmet Kanunu ve Talimnamesi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1937.

Ordu Dahili Hizmet Kanunu ve Talimnamesi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1939.

Ozanalp, Cevat and Muharrem Kanad. *Kıyı Topçusunun Tabiye ve Teknik Bilgileri*. İstanbul: Aydınlık Basımevi, 1939.

Ozanalp, O. *Jandarmanın Takip, Tenkil Hareketleri ve Müsademe Tabiyesi*. Ankara: Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı Matbaası, 1939.

Ökçün, Gündüz. *A Guide to Turkish Treaties (1920- 1964)*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966.

Öncel, Ömer Şevket. *Kimya Muharebesi, Vasıtaları Korunma Çareleri.* İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938.

Özdemir, Behçet. *1938-1939 Yedek Subay Okulu Ordu Bilgisi Notları*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939.

Özgüler, Şefik. *Savaşta Ağulu Gaz Saldırmaları, Ulusun Korunma Çareleri.* İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1939.

Özoğul, Saadettin. *Paraşütçü ve Havadan İndirme Kıtaları.* İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1941.

Özsu, Cevdet, and Necmi Dinmez. *Tank*. İstanbul: Aydınlık Basımevi, 1937.

Öztürk, Kazım, ed. *Atatürk'ün TBMM Açık ve Gizli Oturumlarındaki Konuşmaları II*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992.

Özyıldırım, Etem and İrfan Özkal. *Yedek Subay Okulu Tabiye Notları*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939.

Passif Havadan Korunma, Ev veya Apartman Bekçisi ve Aile İşleri. İstanbul: Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi, 1939.

Минц, И. И., А. М., Панкратова, В. П. Помёмкин, Е. В. Тарле, Н. П. Колчнановский, *История Дипломатии (1919-1939 гг) Том Третий* [Diplomatic History (1919-1939) Volume Three]. Moscow: Государственное Издательство Политической Литературы, 1945.

Pavloff, Joseph M. *The Upbuilding of Soviet Russia: Five-year Plan for Industrial Development of the Soviet Union.* New York: AMTORG Trading Corporation, 1929.

Polatkan, Salih. *I. ve II. Cihan Harbinin Hazırlıkları Bakımından Bir Mukayese*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1944.

Pozner, Vladimir. *Sovyetlereli (U.R.S.S.)*. Translated by Mehmet Fuat. Sinan Matbaası ve Neşriyat Evi, 1932.

Riedel, Herber. *Kayak Talimatnamesi Tercümesi*. Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1936.

Ritter, H. *Ordu Teşkilatı*. Translated by Nuri Rıfat. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Kumandanlığı Matbaası,1928.

Rocolle. *Havadan Taşınan Kuvvetler Zaferin Anahtarı mıdır?*. Translated by Reşat Arın. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1952.

Rorbek. *I. Sınıf Tabiye Dersane Meseleleri*. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı Matbaası,1931.

Rorbek. *I. Sınıf Tabiye Dersane Meseleleri İkinci Kısım*. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı Matbaası,1931.

Rorbek. *I. Sınıf Tabiye Tatbikatı Arazi Meseleleri*. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı Matbaası,1931.

Rus-Leh Seferi. Translated by Hüseyin Rahmi [Apak]. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1925.

Rus Muvakkat Süvari Talimnamesi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1926.

Sayın, Necati. *Üniversite ve Yüksek Okullar Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri Kızlar İçin*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942.

Sedad, Ahmet. *Ordumunuzda Terakki Umdeleri*. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1924.

Sosyalist Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri İttihadının Muhtasar Etnografisi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930.

Sovyet Devlet Arşivi Gizli Belgelerinde Anadolunun Taksimi Planı. Translated by Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Rahmi of Babaeski. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1972.

Sovyetler İttihadı ve Kızıl Ordu IV. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1930.

Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu I. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1924.

Soysal, İsmail, ed. *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (1920-1945)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000.

SSCİ Halk İktisadiyatı Yapılan İşler ve Rakamlar SSCİ Ticaret Odası Moskova İlinka 6. İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası. [no date but most likely printed circa 1934 in Turkish]).

Şahin, Eyüp. *Birinci Umum Müfettişlik Belgelerine Göre İngiliz Casusu Lawrence.* Ankara: Zet Akademik Yayıncılık, 2023.

Şark Cephesinde Harb Oyunu Notları. İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1928.

Şemsutdinov, A. and Y. A. Bagirov. *Bir Karagün Dostluğu: Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri*. Translated by Kamil Hakverdi. Ankara: Dorlion, 2022.

Şimşir, Bilal, ed. *Atatürk ve Yabancı Devlet Başkanları* Vol. IV. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001.

Şimşir, Bilal, ed. *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu 1924-1938 Şeyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları.* Ankara: Dışişleri Basımevi, 1975.

Süsoy, Eyüp Sabri. *Eşkiya Muharebeleri ve Mağara Aramaları*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1944.

Tank Talimnamesi. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1936.

Tank Talimnamesi. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1939.

Tansu, Samih Nafiz, ed. *İki Devrin Perde Arkası, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Teşkilat-I Mahsusasında ve Mütareke Yıllarının M. M: Grubu Başkanlığında Bulunan Emekli Süvari Albayı Başkanı Hüsameddin Ertürk Anlatıyor*. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınevi, 1964.

Taşnak-Hoybun. Ankara: Türk Ocakları, 1931.

TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.

Tekçe, İsmail Hakkı. *Muhafızı Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor: Emekli General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe'nin Anıları*, edited by Hasan Pulur. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000.

Tobur, M. Mazhar. *Zehirli Gazlar ve Korunma Çareleri*. İstanbul: Ülkü Basımevi, 1936.

[Tugaç], Hüsameddin. *İran ve Ordusu.* İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa,1927.

Tuğaç, Hüsamettin. *Hava-Kimya Taarruzlarına Karşı Korunma.* İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1937.

[Turunç], H. Nazım. *Memleket Müdafaasında İdeal Fertler ve Milletler*. Ankara: Büyük Erkanıharbiye Reisliği Matbaası, 1934.

Turunç, Nazım. *Acun Gençlik Kurumları, Müsellah Unsurlar*. İstanbul: Cemal Azmi Millet Kütüphane ve Matbaası, 1935.

Tümerdem, Hakkı. *Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası: Sevkülceyş, Tabiye ve Harp Tarihi Bakımından Tetkik.* İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939.

Türk Model Uçakevi Katalog No.101. İstanbul: Türk Model Uçakevi, 1938.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti Dönemi (23 Nisan 1920–29 Ekim 1923). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1984.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Alman Ordusunda Müstemel İşarat-ı Mahsusa. İstanbul: Erkan-ı Harbiye Matbaası, 1926.

Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı, 1923-1934. Ankara: T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, 1974.

Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları 1939-1946. Ankara: T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, 1974.

Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara (1934) Sansürsüz Kopya HD, *Sinemasal Ankara*. Accessed February 25, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImDt_e4r2Y0&list=WL&index=6.

Türkkaan, A. Şevki. *Yedek Subay Okulu Ordu Bilgisi Notları*. İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1944.

Uçantürk, Fahri. *1930 Yılı Ağrı Harekatına Karaköseden Bir Bakış.* Eskişehir: Hava Okulu Matbaası, 1948.

Uğan, Hakkı. *Gençlik Kulüpleri Muvakkat Atış Talimatı*. Ankara: Çankaya Matbaası, 1945.

Ünüvar, Veysel. *Hava Korunması Temel Kaideleri*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1936.

Ünüvar, Veysel. *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bolşeviklerle Sekiz Ay (1920-1921)*. İstanbul: Şirketi Mürettibiye Basımevi,1948.

Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1947.

Webster, Donald Everett. *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*. Philadelphia: AMS Press, 1939.

Würzburger, E. *Umumi Harbin Nüfus Harekatına Tesirleri*. Translated by M. Celal. Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1932.

[Vandemir], Baki. *Yurt Müdafaası, Seferde ve Hazarda Zabit ve Zabitlik*. Ankara: Köyhocası Matbaası, 1932.

Vasyanin, V. S. and V. G. Borodin. *Planörle Uçuş Dersleri,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No.3. İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935.

Veysel. *Sahil Müdafaası*. İstanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1935.

von Clausewitz, Carl, *On War*, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989.

von Clausewitz, Carl [Karl von Klauszovitch]. *İdare-i Harbe Dair Kavaid-i Esasiye*. Translated by Ahmet Refik [Altınay]. İstanbul: Artin Asaduryan Şirket-i Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1899.

[General], von Klausewitz. *Harb Yönetiminin Ana Kuralları*. Translated by Ahmet Refik Altınay. İstanbul: Harb Akademileri Basımevi, 1970.

von Clausewitz, Karl. *Harp Üzerine I*. Translated by Ahmet Sezgin. *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi Eki* (The Armed Forces' Journal) 92/246, (June 1973): 3-75.

von Clausewitz, Karl. *Harp Üzerine II-A.* Translated by Ahmet Sezgin. *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi Eki* 94/248 (December 1973).

von Clausewitz, Carl. *Savaş Üzerine*. Translated by Şiar Yalçın. İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1975.

von Clausewitz, Carl. *Harp Üzerine*. Translated by H. Fahri Çeliker. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1984.

von der Goltz, Colmar Freiherr. *Millet-i Müselleha*. Translated by Mehmed Tahir. İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1884.

von der Goltz, Colmar Freiherr. *Millet-i Müselleha*. Translated by Mehmed Tahir. İstanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası, 1888.

von der Goltz, Colmar. *Millet-i Müsellaha (Ordu-Millet),* edited by İsmet Sarıbal. İstanbul: Otorite Kitap, 2016.

[General] Ludendorff. *1932 Senesinde Yeni Bir Cihan Harbi*. Translated by Muallim Mübahat. İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1931.

[General] Ludendorff. *Der Totale Krieg.* Münich: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935.

[General] Ludendorff, *The "Total" War.* London: Friends of Europe, 1936.

von Ludendorff, Erich. *Topyekün Harb.* Translated by Hikmet Tuna. İstanbul: Ulus Basımevi, 1936.

von Mittelberger. *2. Dünya Harbi Işığı Altında Strateji.* Translated by Salih Erkuş. Ankara: Genelkurmay 1 No. Basımevi, 1951.

von Şikfus, *Harp Tarihine Methal.* Translated by Salih Erkuş; Fon Mittelberger, *Büyük Sevk ve İdare Esasları*, *Harp Tarihi Notları*. Translated by Salih Erkuş; V. Mittelberger. *2. Dünya Harbi Işığı Altında Strateji*. Translated by Salih Erkuş. İstanbul: Harb Akademileri Basımevi, 1969.

Военный Турецко-Русский и Русско-Турецкий Словарь. Moscow, Гос. Издательство Иностранных и Национальных Словарей, 1940.

Yamaç, Müzehher. *Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ağrı İsyanı 1926-1930*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2019.

Yaman, Kadri. *Yurt Müdafaasında Türk Gençliği*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1938.

Yaşınok, Nazım. *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1937.

Zabelin, M. *Paraşütçülük,* Türkkuşu Kütüphanesi No 4. İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1936.

Zamanımız Muhaberatının Muhtelif Safahatında Telsiz Mevkilerinin Meydana Çıkarılması ve Muharebenin Murakebe Usulü. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927.

Zırhlı Otomobil Talimnamesi. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1940.

Secondary Sources

200ncü Doğum Günü Dolayısıyla Carl von Clausewitz Yaşamı, Yapıtı, Yankıları. Translated by Fahri Çeliker. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1980.

A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. V. I. Popov, I. D. Ovsyany and V. P. Nikhamin Translated by David Skvirsky. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.

"Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler." *Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), Vol. 1,* edited by Baskın Oran, 258-313. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.

Akcan, Erol, "İki Dünya Arasında Türkiye'de 'Gençlik Teşkilatı' Oluşturmaya Dönük Bazı Tasavvur ve Teşebbüsler." *Belleten* 81/292 (2017): 1001-29.

Akça, İsmet and Evren Balta Paker, "Ordu, Devlet, Güvenlik Siyaseti Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." In *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, edited by Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça, 1-32. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Akça, İsmet, "The Military in Turkish Politics: The Centennial Balance Sheet and the Legacy for the Next Century." In *The Republic of Turkey and its Unresolved Issues*, edited by Pınar Dinç and Olga Selin Hünler, 321-43. Singapore: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2025.

Akın, Yiğit. *"Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar" Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2019.

Alakom, Rohat. *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması.* İstanbul: Avesta, 2020.

Aldington, Richard *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry*. London: Collins, 1955.

Alexandrov, Vladimir. *A Contemporary World History 1917-1945*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986.

Alkan, Resul. *Türk Ordusunda Son Alman General: Hilmar von Mittelberger*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2022.

Alsan, Cevdet. *Türk- Sovyet Halklarının Kardeşliği*. İstanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 1976.

Altınay, Ayşe Gül. *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

"Анохин Сергей Николаевич." герои страны, Accessed August 16, 2024. https://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=418.

Andrew, Christopher and Davis Dilks, ed. *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Community in the Twentieth Century*. London: Palgrave, 1984.

Andrew, Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990.

Aralov 100 Yaşında: S. Aralov'un Diplomatik Misyonunun 100. Yıldönümüne Adanmış Rus Sanatçıların Eserlerinden Oluşan Sergi. Ankara: Rus Evi, 2022.

Armaoğlu, Fahir "Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Turko-Russian Relations during the War of Independence." in *Ali Fuat Cebesoy: A Commemoration (10 January 1994)*. Translated by M. Mehdi İlhan, 25-41. Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 1999.

As, Efdal. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ulaşım Politikaları 1923-1960.* Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013.

Aslan, Yavuz. *Mustafa Kemal- M. Frunze Görüşmeleri Türk- Sovyet İlişkilerinde Zirve*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002.

Aslan, Yavuz. "Mihail Mihalyeviç Frunze (1885-1925)." *Atatürk Ansiklopedisi*, Accessed June 12, 2024. https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/mihail-vasilyevic-frunze-1885-1925/?pdf=4343

Aslan, Cengiz. "Türk Uzmanların Rus Eğitim Sistemi Hakkındaki Raporları." *OPUS Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 15/26 (2020): 4602-22.

Ataç, A. M. *Rusya Tarihi, Türkler ve Komşuları ile Münasebetleri.* Ankara: Erkanı Umumi Riyaseti Basımevi, 1952.

Atak, Sadık. *Rusya Siyaseti*. Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1964.

Atatürk'ten Soğuk Savaş Dönemine Türk- Rus İlişkileri, I. Çalıştay Bildirileri. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2011.

Atatürk 3ncü Ordu Bölgesinde. Erzincan: 3ncü Ordu Komutanlığı Yayını, 1981.

Bakar, Bülent. *Hava Taarruzuna Karşı Türkiye'de Pasif Korunma 1935-1945*. İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2019.

Barkawi, Tarak. "States, Armies, and Wars in Global Context." in *Global Historical Sociology*, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson, 58-75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Baryatinskiy, Mikhail. Russian Armour *Light Tanks*. Surrey: Ian Allen Publishing, 2006.

Bayrak, Mehmet. *Türkiye'de Gazeteler ve Dergiler Sözlüğü (1831-1993).* İstanbul: Küll Yayınları, 1994.

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. *Hindistan Tarihi.* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987.

Belen, Fahri. *Atatürk'ün Askeri Kişiliği*. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963.

Berkman, Tahsin. *Tarihte Türk- Rus Mücadelesi ve Sonuçları*. Ankara: Genelkurmay 1. No Basımevi, 1951.

Bezci, Egemen. *Türk İstihbaratı ve Soğuk Savaş: ABD ve İngiltere Arasında Türk Gizli Servisi*. Translated by M. Murtaza Özeren. İstanbul: Kronik, 2023.

Bilge, A. Suat. *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964*. Ankara: İş Bankası KültürYayınları, 1992.

Bilgiç, Erdal. *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk- Sovyet Ekonomik İlişkileri*. Ankara: Efil Yayınları, 2021.

Bilgiç, Erdal. *Sanayi Planları ve Sovyet Kredisi.* İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2023.

Bilgü, Hamza. *İngiliz Askeri İstihbarat Raporlarında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 1949-1960.* İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2024.

Bilim Tarihi. Accessed November 28, 2025. https://www.bilimtarihi.org/bilimadamlari/biyografiler/biyografiler.htm,.

Boyd, John R. "The Origins of Order No. I." *Soviet Studies,* 19/3 (1968): 359-72.

Bulutay, Tuncer, Yahya S. Tezel and Nuri Yıldırım. *Türkiye Milli Geliri (1923-1948).* Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974.

Carr, Edward Hallett. *International Relations Between the Two World Wars: 1919-1939*. London: Macmillan, 1973.

Citino, Robert M. *The German Way of War*. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005.

Çalık, Sami. "Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nda Hava İndirme Birlikleri ve Hava İndirme Harekatı." Master's Thesis, Erciyes University, 2006.

Çapar, Selim, "1930-1946 Döneminde Dahiliye Vekaleti." In *T. C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Tarihi 1920-2014*, ed. M. Çelik, 207-8. Ankara: TİAV Yayınları, 2015.

Çiçek, Hikmet. *Nazım'ın Harp Okulu ve Donanma Davaları Türk Ordusuna İlk Kumpas.*İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2019.

Dallin, David J. *Soviet Espionage.* London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1956.

Demirel, Fatmagül. *Cumhuriyet Kadınlarının Askerlik Hayali: Kadın Asker Olur mu?* İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2024.

DiNardo, R. L. "German Armour Doctrine: Correcting the Myths." *War in History,* 3/4, (1996): 384-97.

"Eideman, Robert Petrovich." Accessed August 2, 2024. https://generals.dk/general/Eideman/Robert_Petrovich/Soviet_Union.html.

Eken, Aydın. *Ord. Prof. Ata Nutku: Türk Gemi İnşaatı Endüstrisi ve Mühendislik Eğitiminin Önderi.* İstanbul: İTÜ Vakfı Yayınları, 2013.

Er, İlyas. "Kafkasya Bölgesinde Ermeni ve Kürt Ayrılıkçı Hareketleri Üzerine Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya İstihbarat Vakaları (1924-1955)." *Harp Tarihi Dergisi,* 8 (2023): 143-72.

Erden, Ömer. *Türkiye'nin Doğu Sınırının Oluşumu Antlaşmalar, Protokoller, Problemler.* Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2017.

Erendil, Muzaffer. *Türk- Rus İlişkileri*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1975.

Erikson, John. *The Soviet High Command: A Military- Political History 1918-1941*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962.

Ertan, Temuçin Faik. "İsmet İnönü'nün Rusya Gezisi." In *Atatürk'ten Soğuk Savaş Dönemine*

Türk-Rus İlişkileri, edited by İlyas Kamalov and İrina Svistunova, 211-22. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2011.

Felix Dzerzhinsky, A Biography. Translated by Natalia Belskaya. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988.

Fraser-Tytler, William Kerr. *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia.* London: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Freedman, Lawrence. "Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power." In *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, 9-21. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Soviet Military Doctrine.* Illinois: The Free Press, RAND Corporation 1953.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Sovyet Askeri Doktrini*. Translated by Baha Ataman. Ankara: Erkan-I Umumiye Basımevi, 1956.

Garthoff, Raymond L. "The Soviet Intelligence Services." In *The Red Army,* ed. Liddell Hart, 265-75. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956.

Gat, Azar. "Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look." *Journal of Contemporary History,* 27/2 (April 1992): 363-82.

Gershman, Carl. "Selling them the Rope." *Commentary* (April 1979). Accessed January 3, 2025. https://www.commentary.org/articles/carl-gershman-2/selling-them-the-rope/.

Getty, J. Arch, and Oleg V. Naumov. *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction of the Bolsheviks 1932- 1939*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

Girgin, Kemal. *Ruslarla Kavgadan Derin Ortaklığa (Son Yüz Senemiz: 1914- 2014).* İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat, 2014.

Glantz, David M. *The Soviet Airborne Experience.* Fort Leavenworth: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984.

Glantz, David M. *The History of Soviet Airborne Forces.* London: Routledge, 1994.

Global Historical Sociology, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Gökay, Bülent. *A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923*. London: Tauris, 1997.

Gökay, Bülent. *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey 1920-1991*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Göktaş, Hıdır and Metin Gülbay. *Kışladan Anayasaya Ordu: Siyasi Kültürde TSK'nin Yeri.* İstanbul: Siyahbeyaz Metis Güncel, 2004.

Gönlübol, Mehmet and Cem Sar. *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1919- 1938).* İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, Cem Sar, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Oral Sander, Haluk Ülman, Suat Bilge and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1973.* Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974.

Gray, Colin S. *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Grüsshaber, Gerhard. *The 'German Spirit' in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A History of Military Knowledge Transfer*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

Grüsshaber, Gerhard. *Türk Ordusunda Alman Ruhu: Bir Askeri Teknoloji Transferi Hikayesi*. Translated by Bozkurt Leblebicioğlu. İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2022.

Güçlü, Yücel. *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta: A Study in Turkish-French-Syrian Relations.* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001.

Güçlü, Yücel. *The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın.* Ankara: Grafiker, 2002.

Gümüşel, Günseli. *Milli Güvenlik Dersleri Tarihi 1926-2012*. Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2020.

Gündüz, Mustafa. "Türk Eğitim Sisteminde Aşırı Militarist Uygulamanın Başlaması 1926-947." *Erdem Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences,* 71-72 (2016-2017): 69-89.

Gürkan, İhsan. *Tank ve Tankçılık 50 Yaşında*. İstanbul: Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı İstanbul Askeri Basımevi, 1967.

Gürsel, Haluk F. *Tarih Boyunca Türk- Rus İlişkileri.* İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1960.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010.

Habeck, Mary R. *Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union 1919-1939*. New York: Cornell University, 2003.

Hagenloh, Paul. *Stalin's Police*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. *Hairenik.* Accessed November 8, 2024.

https://hairenik.com/vfp/rouben-ter-minasian/?srsltid=AfmBOoq-QsSI5FkDS7uYMjDmtTe6oRkF-s8NYzevrRv2pEpze97A_fEv,

Hale, William. "Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective." In *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 159-75. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

Hale, William. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London: Routledge, 1994.

Hale, William. *Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset*. Translated by Ahmet Fethi. İstanbul: Alfa, 2014.

Hallı, Reşat. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar 1924-1938.* Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972.

Handel, Michael. "Who is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz?: A Guide to the Perplexed." In *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, edited by G. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, 53-75. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.

Hanioğlu, Şükrü. *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Hanson, Victor Davis. *The Western Way of War.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009.

Harris, George. "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?." in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 177-200. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

Herman, Michael. *Intelligence Power in Peace and War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Heper, Metin. "Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition". *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* 7/4 (1976): 507-21.

Higham, Robin, and Frederick W. Kagan (eds). *The Military History of the Soviet Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Hingley, Ronald. *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Hirst, Samuel J. and İşçi, Onur. "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian- Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development". *Diplomatic History*. 44/5, (2020): 834-59.

Hirst, Samuel J. *Against the Liberal Order: The Soviet Union, Turkey and Statist Internationalism 1919-1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024.

Howard, Michael *Studies in War and Peace.* New York: The Viking Press, 1970.

Howard, Michael. *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Hun, Mücahit Özden. *Siyah, Beyaz ve Gri Hüsnü Bingöl.* Ankara: Alter Yayıncılık, 2019.

Ihrig, Stefan. *Justifying Genocide, Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016.

İlter, Erdal. *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri Riyaseti (M.E.H./ MAH) (1927-1965).* Ankara: MİT Basım Evi, 2002.

İşçi, Onur. "*Russophobic Neutrality: Turkish Diplomacy, 1936- 1945."* PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2014.

İşçi, Onur. “The Massigli Affair and its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 55/2, (2020): 271- 96.

İşçi, Onur. “Yardstick of Friendship: Soviet- Turkish Relations and the Montreux Convention of 1936”. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. Slavica Publishers, 21/4, (2020): 733-62.

İşçi, Onur. *Turkey and Soviet Union During WWII: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2019.

İşçi, Onur. “Interwar Territoriality and Soviet-Turkish Convergence across the Aras River.” In *Borders, Boundaries and Belonging in Post-Ottoman Space in the Interwar Period* edited by Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, 225- 40. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2023.

İybar, Mahmut. “I. Cihan Savaşında Kafkas Cephesinde Enver Paşa Tutsak Olmaktan Nasıl Kurtuldu?.” *Belleten* 43/169 (1979): 215-26.

Janowitz, Morris. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*. Chicago-London: The Chicago University Press, 1964.

Janowitz, Morris. *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*. Chicago-London: The Chicago University Press, 1964.

Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: The Free Press, 1966.

Jeffery, Keith. *The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949*. New York: Penguin Books, 2010.

Jivkova, Ludmila. *İngiliz- Türk İlişkileri 1933- 1939*. Translated by Fevzi Muharrem and Fahri Erdinç. İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1978.

Kapucu, Davud and Erdal Korkmaz. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Askeri Hava Seyahatleri (1909- 1939)*. Ankara: Karakum Yayınevi, 2020.

Kapucu, Davud. "1930 Ağrı İsyanı'nın Bastırılmasında Havacıların Rolü." *Bengi,* 1/2 (2021): 46-74.

Karal, Halil İbrahim. "*Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey 1918- 1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*." PhD diss., University of California, 1967.

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. "Yirmibirinci Yüzyılda Savaşı Tartışmak: Clausewitz Yeniden." *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 8/29 (Spring 2011): 5-25.

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. "Strateji Düşüncesinde Yorum ve Tahrifat: Clausewitz Olayı." *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi* 2/1 (2021): 63-75.

Karpat, Kemal H. "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980." In *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 137-58. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

Karpat, Kemal H. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset.* İstanbul: TİMAŞ Yayınları, 2010.

Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.

Kılıç, Mustafa. *Türkkuşu Yeniden Uçabilecek Mi?*. Ankara: Son Çağ Yayınları, 2022.

Kış, Salih. *Osmanlı Ordusunda Alman Ekolü von der Goltz Paşa (1883-1895).* Konya: Palet Yayınları, 2017.

Kipp, Jacob W. "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921." *Military Affairs* (October 1985): 184-91.

Kocacık, Eyüp Talha and Emre Dölen. "İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türkiye'de Zehirli Gazlardan Korunma Kursları ve Yasal Düzenlemeler." *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları* 21/1 (2020): 1-56.

Koç, Yıldırım. *SSCB'nin Türkiye'yi İşgal Girişimleri: Eski TKP ve Anti Kemalist Faaliyetler.* Ankara: Pankuş Yayınları, 2024.

Koçak, Cemil. *Türk- Alman İlişkileri (1923- 1939).* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Koçlar, Bekir. *Recep Peker Bir İnkılapçının Hikayesi.* Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2022.

Kolesnikov, Aleksandr. *Atatürk Dönemi Türk Sovyet İlişkileri*. Translated by İlyas Kamalov. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2010.

Koritskiy, Sergey. *Yeni Rusya ve Yeni Türkiye İşbirliğinin İlk Adımları (1920-1930'lu Yıllarda Rus- Türk İlişkileri)*. Ankara: Güzeliş Ofset, 2011.

Kotelnikov, Vladimir. *Red Assault: Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1941*. Translated by Kevin Bridge. Warwick: Helion & Company, 2019. Accessed September 5, 2025. https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=JlAIEAAAQBAJ&pg=GBS.PT9&hl=en_AU.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler 1908-1978 İkinci Kitap.* İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1987.

Lawson, George. "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations,* 18/2 (2021): 203-26.

Lord Kinross. *The Rebirth of a Nation.* Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1981.

Lynn, John A. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America.* Cambridge MA: Westview Press, 2003.

Mahnken, Thomas G. and Joseph A. Maiolo, ed. *Strategic Studies: A Reader.* London and New York: Routledge, 2014.

Mamaş, Turgut Can. *Tarih Boyunca Türk- Rus Münasebetleri*. İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1955.

Marttin, Volkan. *Devlet ve Millet Hizmetinde Geçen Bir Ömür A. Zekai Apaydın.* Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2023.

Meram, Ali Kemal. *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi*. İstanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi, 1969.

Mercan, Evren. "Deniz Harp Tarihçisi Bir Bahriyeli: Hüseyin Fevzi Kurtoğlu." *Türk Savaş Çalışmaları Dergisi,* 2/1 (2021): 17-37.

Metel, Raşit. *Atatürk ve Donanma*. İstanbul: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 1966.

Miewald, Robert D. "Weberian Bureaucracy and the Military Model." *Public Administration Review,* 30/2 (1970): 129-33

Milli Savunma Konferansları I. Haberalma, Ankara: E.U. Basımevi, 1956.

Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973.

Millman, Brock. "The Turkish Armed Forces on the Eve of the Second World War: The British View." *The Turkish Association Bulletin,* 20/1 (1996): 38-55.

Morillo, Stephen and Michael F. Pavkovic. *What is Military History?*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017.

Mumcu, Uğur. *Kazım Karabekir Anlatıyor.* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990.

Mumcu, Uğur. *40'ların Cadı Kazanı.* İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990.

Müderrisoğlu, Alptekin. *Kurtuluş Savaşının Mali Kaynakları.* Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı, 1974.

Mütercimler, Erol. *Kurtuluş Savaşına Denizden Gelen Destek: Sovyetler Birliğin'den Alınan Yardımlar, Kuva-yı Milliye Donanması*. İstanbul: Yaprak Yayınları, 1992.

Odom, William E. *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organisation.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Oran, Baskın, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'dan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I, (1919-1980).* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

"ОРЛОВ Владимир Митрофанович", *Военный энциклопедический словарь*, Accessed August 12, 2024. https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=7754@morfDictionary.

Orr, Andrew, "We Call You to Holy War: Mustafa Kemal, Communism, and Germany in French Intelligence Nightmares, 1919-1923." *The Journal of Military History,* 75/4 (2011): 1095-123.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Cumhuriyet Devrinde Ayaklanmalar, Ayaklanma Nedenleri ve Çıkarılan Dersler. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1980.

Öngüner, Emir. *Bir Avcı Tayyaresi Yapmaya Karar Verdim: Nuri Demirağ'ın Almanya'da Kaybolan Uçağı Nu.D.40.* Ankara: Tübitak Popüler Bilim Kitapları, 2020.

Özcan, Ahmet. *"Ama Eşkiyalık Çağı Kapandı": Modern Türkiye'de Son Kürt Eşkiyalık Çağı 1950-1970.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2021.

Özcan, Gencer, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi." *IDEA: İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi*, 1/1, (2009): 15-69.

Özcan, Gencer. "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi." In *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça, 175-221. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Özcan, Gencer. "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Ulusal Strateji Arayışları." in *Strateji Düşüncesi: Kuram, Paradoks ve Uygulama*, ed. Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Ersel Aydınlı, 123-49. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020.

Özdemir, Hikmet. *Rejim ve Asker*. İstanbul: AFA Yayıncılık, 1989.

Özgüldür, Yavuz. *Türk- Alman İlişkileri (1923-1945)*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993.

Özlü, Hüsnü. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yükselen Gücü Türk Savunma Sanayii 1922-2022*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2023.

Pajtinka, Erik. "Military Diplomacy and Its Present Functions." *Security Dimensions,* 20 (2016): 179-94.

Parker, Geoffrey, ed. *The Cambridge History of Warfare.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

Perinçek, Mehmet. *Atatürk'ün Sovyetler'le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007.

Perinçek, Mehmet. *Türk-Rus Diplomasisinden Gizli Sayfalar*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011.

Perinçek, Mehmet. *Rus Devlet Arşivlerinden 150 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi.* İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2012.

Perinçek, Mehmet. *Kafkasya'da Türk- Sovyet Askeri İşbirliği (1919- 1922).* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2021.

Polatkan, Salih. *I. ve II. Cihan Harbinin Hazırlıkları Bakımından Bir Mukayese.* İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1944.

Polatoğlu, Mehmed Gökhan. *Türkiye Cumhrıiyeti Devleti'nin İlk Planlı Dönem Sanayileşme Faaliyetleri, 1934-1938.* Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2020.

Porter, David. *Soviet Tank Units*. London: Amber Books, 2009.

"Pre- War Markings.", *Tank Archives*, 25 June 2021. Accessed May 13, 2023. https://www.tankarchives.ca/2021/06/pre-war-markings.html?m=1&s=09.

Prens Sureyya Bedirhan, *Kürt Davası ve Hoybun.* Translated by Dilara Zirek. İstanbul: Med Yayınları, 1994.

"Родился заслуженный лётчик-испытатель СССР, Герой Советского Союза Сергей Николаевич Анохин." *Президентская библиотека*. Accessed August 16, 2024. https://www.prlib.ru/history/619135,

Ralston, David B. *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World 1600-1914.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Rindlisbacher, Stephan. "Between Proclamation of Friendship and Concealed Distrust: The Turkish-Soviet Border Commission, 1925-1926." *Journal of Modern European History*, 22/1 (2024): 55-68.

"Rus Askeri Stratejisi" İsimli Eserin Üçüncü Baskısının Kritiği. İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1973.

Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Army and the Founding of Turkish Republic". *World Politics* 11/4 (1959): 513-52.

Rustow, Dankwart A. “Military: Turkey.” In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankward A. Rustow, 352-88. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Safi, Polat. *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (1826-2023)*. İstanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2023.

Saray, Mehmet. *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Atatürk’ün Sovyet Politikası*. İstanbul: Veli Yayınları, 1984.

Savunma ve Güvenlik Hizmetleri (1924-1993). Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Bütçe ve Mali Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993.

Şardan, Tolga. *“Komonist Masası”ndaki Nazım Hikmet.* İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2019.

Şarlak, Zeynep. *Türkiye’nin Milli Güvenlik Devleti Kökeni, Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü*. İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

Schneider, James J. “V. K. Triandafillov, Military Theorist.” *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, 1:3 (December 2007): 287-306.

Schofield, Julian. *Militarization and War.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Selçuk, İlhan. *Uzak Komşu Rusya’dan Gezi Notları.* İstanbul: Köprü Yayınları, 1967.

Sencer, Emre. “*Virtuous Praetorians*: Military Culture and the Defence Press in Germany and Turkey, 1929-1939.*”* PhD Diss., Ohio State University, 2008.

Sencer, Emre. *Ordu ve Millet.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018.

Shaw, Stanford J. *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-923 A Documentary Study,* Volume III, Part 2. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000.

Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich. *Soviet Military Strateg.*, Translated by H. Dinerstein, L. Goure and T. Wolfe. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963.

Sokolovskiy, V. D. *Rus Askeri Stratejisi.* Translated by Nevruz Üründül. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966.

Solak, Mustafa. *Atatürk'ün Bakanı Şükrü Kaya.* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2018.

Somel, Gözde. "Soviet Russia's Foreign Affairs with Turkey in 1923 Reports of Ambassador Surits." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,* 22/2 (2018): 222-39.

Sovyet Ordusu: Sovyet Savaş Tarihi, Askerlik Bilimi, Doktrini, Sanatı, Stratejisi. Translated by Nahit Tören. İstanbul: SorunYayınları, 1978.

Sovyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri. Translated by Ekrem Tetik. İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1950.

Soysal, İsmail. *Türk Dış Politikasi İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz 1919- 1993*. İstanbul: Eren, 1993.

Söylerkaya, Suat. Türkiye'de Milli Harp Sanayii: *Türkiye Milli Harp Sanayii Semineri, 2-3-4 Ocak 1975.* Ankara: Türkiye Ticaret Odaları Sanayi Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği Matbaası, 1975.

Steiner, Zara. *The Lights that Failed, European International History 1919-1933.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Steiner, Zara. *The Triumph of the Dark European International History 1933-1939.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Stone, David R. *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Stone, David R. "Soviet Arms Exports in the 1920s." *Journal of Contemporary History,* 48/1 (2013):57-77.

Stone, David R. "Industry and the Soviet Army 1928-1941." In *The Military History of the Soviet Union,* edited by Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, 65-78. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Sözlük. MİT. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://mit.gov.tr/sozluk.html#A.

Subaşı, Pertev. *Türk- Sovyet Münasebetleri*. İstanbul: Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi, 1965.

Sunay, Cengiz. *Türk Siyasetinde Sivil-Asker İlişkileri.* Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2010.

Suvorov, Viktor. *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence.* New York: Berkley Books, 1986.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Bizim Diplomatlar*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1996.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Kürtçülük I 1787-1923*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Kürtçülük II 1924-1999*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009.

Şimşir, Bilal. *İlk Dönem Türk Diplomasisi Üzerine İncelemeler (1878- 1946)*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2017.

Şimşir, Bilal N. *Atatürk ve Afganistan.* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2019.

Tacibayev, Raşid. *Kızıl Meydan'dan Taksim'e Siyasette, Kültürde, Sanatta Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1924- 1945).* İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2004.

"Tarihten Yansımalar: Sınırdaki Işık.". Accessed October 12, 2025. https://www.mit.gov.tr/husnu_bingol.html. (Not available from this link as it was broken. Watched on Dailymotion, https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x5jfb4f,).

Tejel, Jordi. "The Last Ottoman Rogues: The Kurdish-Armenian Alliance in Syria and the New State System in the Interwar Middle East." in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires*, ed. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan and Alp Yenen, 355-82. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021.

Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin. *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları*. Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977.

Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin. *Dış Siyaseti ve Askeri Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018.

Tekir, Süleyman. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Jandarma Kuruluş Teşkilat ve Mücadele 1903-1938.* İstanbul: TİMAŞ Yayınları, 2020.

Tellal, Erel. *SSCB- Türkiye İlişkileri 1953-1964*. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2020.

Tellal, Erel. "1923-1939: SSCB'yle İlişkiler". In *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'dan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. I, (1919-1980)*, edited by Baskın Oran, 314-24. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

Tellal, Erel. "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1960-1980," In *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'dan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. I, (1919-1980)*, edited by Baskın Oran, 769-83. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

Teplinski, Leonid. *SSCB ve Güney Komşuları Afganistan, İran, Türkiye.* Moscow: Novosti Yayın Ajansı Yayımevi, 1974.

Ter- Matevosyan, Vahram. *Komunizm Gözünden Kemalizm: Türkiye'nin Dönüşümüne Sovyet Yaklaşımları*. Translated by Gözde Yılmaz. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023.

Tezel, Yahya S. *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 1994.

The Mediterranean Fleet 1919-1929, edited by Paul Halperin. Surrey: Ashgate Navy Records Society, 2011.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992.* Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 1992.

Topçuoğlu, İbrahim Sırrı. *Savaş ve Dostluk: Türk Sovyet İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Bilimsel İş Yayını,1979.

Tuncer, Hüner. *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi 1920-2002, Vol. I.* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2017.

Turhal, Abdullah. *Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı: T-26 B Seyyar Çelik Kale*. Ankara: FNSS, 2020.

Turner, Frederick C. "Technology Transfer (TT) and the Soviet Union: Part I." *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies,* 1/4 (1988): 514-34.

Türk Zırhlı Birlikler Tarihi. Ankara: Zırhlı Birlikler Okulu Matbaası, 1961.

Türk İstiklal Harbi'ne Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1989.

Türkeş, Mustafa, "Kemalism Revisited." *METU Studies in Development,* 50 (2023): 1-28.

Türkmen, Zekeriya, ed. *Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılında Türk Ordusu ve Milli Savunma*, İstanbul: Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, 2023.

Uyar, Elif. *Türk- İngiliz Siyasal İlişkileri (1929-1936).* Antalya: Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007.

Uzgel, İlhan and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: İngiltere'yle İlişkiler." In *Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), Vol. 1,* edited by Baskın Oran, 258-77. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

Uzgel, İlhan "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Uluslararası Güvenli Sorunları ve Türkiye." In *Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980), Vol. 1,* edited by Baskın Oran, 307-13. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022.

Üçüncü, Uğur. *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Trabzon'da İttihatçı bir Sima Kahya Yahya.* Trabzon: Serander, 2015.

Üstün, Senem. "Turkey and the Marshall Plan: Strive for Aid." *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,* 27 (1997): 31-52.

Vandov, Dimitır. *Atatürk Döneminde Sovyet-Türk İlişkileri*. Frankfurt: İnfograph, 1982.

Vandov, Dimitır. *Atatürk Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014.

Verel, Oktay, ed. *İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir.* İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu Yayınları, 1985.

Volodarsky, Boris. "Unknown Agabekov." *Intelligence and National Security,* 28/6 (2013):, 890-909.

Weiker, Walter F. *The Modernization of Turkey.* New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981.

Westwood, J. N. *Endurance and Endeavour Russian History 1812-1992.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Whiting, Kenneth R. *Dünkü ve Bugünkü Sovyet Askeri Doktrini.* Translated by Kani Doyran. Eskişehir: Hava Kuvvetleri Basımevi, 1960.

Wright, Quincy. *The Study of War*. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1942.

"Яков Иванович Алкснис", Хронос. Accessed July 27, 2024.https://hrono.ru/biograf/bio_a/alksnis_jak.php,

Yalçın, Aydın. *Uzak Komşumuz Sovyetler.* İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1968.

Yalvaç, Faruk. *Hegel'in Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı: Dünya Tini, Devlet ve Savaş.* Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2008.

Yalvaç, Faruk. "Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Jeopolitik, Kapitalizm ve Devletler Sistemi." *Uluslararası İlişkiler,* 10/38 (2013): 3-28.

Yavuz, İsmail. *Mustafa Kemal'in Uçakları: Türkiye'nin Uçak İmalat Tarihi 1923-2012.* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Yerasimos, Stefanos. *Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979.

Yıldız, Gültekin. *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat 1864-1914.* İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2019.

Yılmaz, Sait, Ali Asker and Erhan Canikoğu, ed. *Rus İstihbaratı.* İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2022.

"Yuri Fedorovich Rall." *Большой советской энциклопедии, Vol 7,* Accessed July 25, 2024. *https://www.hrono.ru/biograf/bio_r/rall_yu.html,*

Yurtçiçek, Bayram. *Kürt İsyanları.* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2017.

Zeidler, Manfred. “The Strange Allies- Red Army and Reichswehr in the Inter-war Period.” In *Russian-German Special Relations in the 20th Century, A Closed Chapter?*, ed. Karl Schlögel, 190-211. New York: Berg, 2006.

Zengin, Ersoy. *Tophane-i Amire’den İmalat-ı Harbiye’ye Osmanlı Devleti’nde Harp Sanayii 1861-1923.* İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2020.

Ziemke, Earl F. *The Red Army 1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally*. London: Frank Cass, 2004.

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION
Surname, Name: Turhal, Abdullah
Nationality: Turkish
Date and Place of Birth: **********
Phone: **********
email: **********

EDUCATION
Master of Philosophy (MPhil) in Russian and East European Studies
Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, UK.
(1996-1997)

Bachelor of Science (BSc) in International Relations
Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara.
(1992-1996)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES
English and Russian.

WORK EXPERIENCE
Senior Policy Adviser, Justice & Home Affairs Section, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, British Embassy Ankara, Turkey (November 2018-today).

Policy and Projects Officer, Justice & Home Affairs Section, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, British Embassy Ankara, Turkey (November 2015-November 2018).

Founder, owner, ALTAR: Military History Studies, Models, Miniature Figures & Wargames (August 2010-June 2015).

Consultant, LPD Strategic Risk London, UK (August 2010-August 2014).

Senior External Affairs Adviser, British Petroleum, BP Exploration, Ankara, Turkey (November 2006-August 2010).

Project Security Manager, BTC Co. (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline) Turkey Section Ankara, Turkey (November 2002-November 2006).

Political & Security Analyst, British Petroleum, BP Ankara, Turkey (July 2000–November 2002).

Business Analyst, BP Amoco Group Ankara, Turkey (January 1999-July 2000).

Business Analyst, British Petroleum, BP Exploration (July 1998-January 1999).

Student Assistant, Centre for Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) Middle East Technical University (METU) Ankara, Turkey (February 1995-November 1995).

PUBLICATIONS

Books
Maket Dünyasına İlk Adım. Ankara: Altar Maket, 2005.

Gök Tonga ve 209. Orta. Ankara: Altar Maket, 2009.

Osmanlı'nın Muhteşem Süvarileri Deliler. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011.

Ankara 1402. Ankara: Altar Maket, 2011.

Türk Ordusunun İlk Tankı: T-26 B Seyyar Çelik Kale: Ankara: FNSS, 2020.

Translated Book
Wells, Herbert George. *Küçük Savaşlar*. Translated by Abdullah Turhal. Ankara: Altar Maket, 2011.

Book Chapters
"Tarihi Canlandırmak: Minyatür Figürler ve Savaş Oyunları ile Tarihin Yeniden Canlandırılmasının Tarih Öğretiminde Kullanılması." In *Yeni Bir Askeri Tarih Özlemi: Savaş, Teknoloji ve Deneysel Çalışmalar*, edited by Kahraman Şakul, 109-22. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013.

With Yalçınkaya, Haldun and Tolga Erdoğan, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Eğitiminde Savaş Oyunları ile Savaşı Öğretmek." In *Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler Eğitimi: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Yeni Yöntemler*, edited by Ebru Canan- Sokullu, 167-89. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018.

"Oyuncak Trenler" and "Model Trenler" entries in *Demiryolu Ansiklopedisi*, edited by Emiroğlu, Kudret and Ümit Uzmay, 271-72; 291. Ankara: TCDD, 2013.

Journal Articles
"Osmanlı'nın Kanatlı Süvarileri: Deliler." *Atlas Tarih Dergisi* (April-May 2012): 46-53.

"Ankara Savaşı." *Atlas Tarih Dergisi* (June-July 2012): 24-33.

"Kurşun Askerler." *Atlas Tarih Dergisi* (December 2012- January 2013): 130-7.

"Almanlar Tankı Önce Hasat Makinesi Sandı." *Atlas Tarih Dergisi* (June-July 2016): 82-3.

"Atatürk and Wells." *H. G. Wells Society Newsletter* (Spring 2012): 6-9.

"Büyülü Evren: Maket." *Oyun Çocuk* (March 2016): 18-19.

"Figür Boyama." *Oyun Çocuk* (April 2016): 18-19.

"Üç Boyutlu Sahne: Diorama." *Oyun Çocuk* (May 2016): 18-19.

"Tarihi Canlandırma Oyunları." *Oyun Çocuk* (June 2016): 18-19.

"Ölçekler." *Oyun Çocuk* (July 2016): 18-19.

"Başkomutan Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Model Figürü." *Oyun Çocuk* (August 2016): 18-19.

"Büyük Hun İmparatoru Mete Han Model Figürü." *Oyun Çocuk* (September 2016): 18-19.

"Hitit Savaşçısı Model Figürü." *Oyun Çocuk* (October 2016): 18-19.

"Barbaros Hayreddin Model Figürü." *Oyun Çocuk* (November 2016): 18-19.

"Timur Model Figürü." *Oyun Çocuk* (December 2016): 18-19.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, 1923-1939 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkilerinin önemli bir parçasını oluşturmasına rağmen, büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilen ve yeterince ele alınıp üzerinde durulmamış, askeri ilişkilerini incelemektedir. Bu dönemdeki askeri ilişkilerin niteliği, mevcut literatürde sunulandan daha özel, daha derin ve daha çeşitlidir ve öncesinde ve sonrasındaki dönemlere göre farklıdır. Bu nedenle, bu tez, iki savaş arası dönemde Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinde askeri ilişkilerin önemini araştırmaktadır. İki savaş arası dönemde Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki askeri ilişkilerin anlaşılmasının, önceki ve sonraki dönemlere göre oldukça farklı olan Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinin anlaşılmasına nasıl katkıda bulunabileceğini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Askeri ilişkilerin iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin önemli bir bölümünü oluşturmasının iki temel sebebi vardır. Birincisi, Türkiye Avrupa'nın siyasi-güvenlik mimarisinin dışında bırakılmış, ikincisi ise politika hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için sınırlı kaynaklara ve askeri kapasiteye sahip olmuştur Bu tezin ikinci bölümünde detaylı bir şekilde tartışıldığı gibi, Türk siyasi gücü, ordunun biçimini, komuta yapısını ve sistem içindeki yerini, ayrıca ihtiyaçlarını belirlemiş ve ardından yerine getirilmesi beklenen görev ve sorumlulukları tanımlamıştır. Bunlara dayanarak, Türk askeri bürokrasisi, bu kısıtlamalar altında, bu görevleri yerine getirmenin yollarını aramaya başlamıştır. Sınırlı kaynaklara sahip uluslararası arenada dışlanmış bir ülke olarak Türkiye, iki savaş arası dönemin sonlarına kadar, genel anlamda ve geniş kapsamda, yalnızca Sovyetler Birliği ve Kızıl Ordu'nun işbirliği yapmaya ve yardım etmeye istekli olduğunu görmüştür. Yeni Türkiye, 1920'lerin sonlarına kadar I. Dünya Savaşı'nın galiplerinin kurduğu siyasi ve güvenlik yapılarının dışında kalmış ve ancak Büyük Britanya ile Musul sorunu gibi çözülmemiş meseleleri hallettikten sonra Batı yapılarıyla kademeli olarak ilişki kurmuştur.

Tezin birinci bölümünde tartışıldığı gibi, Avrupa ülkelerinin aksine, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın sonu bu iki ülke için birkaç yıl gecikmiştir. Türkiye, Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı

vermek zorunda kalmış ve bu savaş ancak 1922'de sona ermiştir. Türkiye, Lozan Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla 1923 sonlarında bağımsızlığı için uluslararası tanınma elde etmiştir. Sovyetler'in durumunda ise iç savaş ve komşuları Polonya ile sınırlı bir bölgesel savaş sonunda 1921'de tüm çatışmalar sona ermiştir. 1922 sonlarında Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği kurulmuştur. Böylece, her iki ülke de 1923 yılına gelindiğinde savaş halinden çıkmış ve orduları da seferberlik halinin sona ermesi ile kendi ülkelerindeki rutin bürokratik işlerine başlamışlardır.

İki ülke arasında yüzyıllarca süregelen savaşların ardından, iki ülke orduları arasında saldırmazlık ve iş birliğine dayalı yeni bir döneme girilmiştir. Söz konusu dönem, Türk Milli Ordusu ve Sovyet Kızıl Ordusu'nun aynı davayı, benzer bir ruhu ve aynı hedefleri paylaştığı inancıyla ve büyük umutlarla başladı. Bu yıllar, Türk Milli Ordusu ve Kızıl Ordu için biçimlendirici yıllardı. Her iki ordu da kendi ülkelerinde yeni kurulan rejimlerin öncüleri olarak konumlandırılmış ve dışarıdan gelen emperyalist emellere ve içeriden gelen karşı devrimci girişimlere karşı birer kale olarak görülmüştür. Boyut ve kapasite bakımından farklılık gösteren her iki ordu da, taşıdıkları imparatorluk seleflerinin ideolojik, pratik ve zihinsel yükünden arınmış, kapasite ve imkanları yüksek birer askeri güç oluşturmanın yollarını arıyorlardı.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) önderliğindeki Anadolu'daki milliyetçi güçlerin, 1917'de iktidara gelen Bolşeviklerle ilk temasları, iki ülke arasında siyasi ve askeri işbirliğinin yolunu açtı. Bolşevik liderliği, 1919 sonlarında Anadolu milli direnişini desteklemeyi kabul etti; çünkü Bolşevikler bunu, eski imparatorluk dünyasının bir parçası olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na ve eski bir rejime karşı bir mücadele olarak algılıyordu. Siyasi, ideolojik ve kültürel farklılıklarına ve gelecek önceliklerindeki farklılıklara rağmen, her iki güç de birbirleriyle askeri ilişkiler kurdu. Türkiye açısından bu ilişki benzersiz ve özeldi ve Türkiye bu dönemde büyük bir Batı ülkesinden tam bir destek alamadığı için sonraki yirmi yılda da böyle olmaya devam etti. Sovyet tarafı, Avrupa ve Asya'daki diğer ülkelerle, özellikle Almanya ile askeri işbirliği kurmayı başarmış olsa da, Türkiye ile kurulan askeri ilişkiler Sovyet çıkarları için de önemliydi. Türkiye, Sovyetlerle çatışmacı olmayan bir politika izleyerek, Balkanlardan Orta Doğu ve Asya'ya, Karadeniz ve Akdeniz de dahil olmak üzere güneyde Sovyetler Birliği için hayati önem taşıyan bir güvenlik ortamı sağladı.

Türkiye, başından itibaren Sovyetler Birliği ile sadece siyasi ve askeri ilişkiler kurmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda kültürel, ekonomik, sosyal ve eğitim alanlarında da temas ve iş birliği geliştirmiştir. Ancak, Türk siyasi liderliğinin genel yönlendirmesi altında, askeri ilişkiler iki ülkenin büyük askeri bürokrasileri arasında sürekli etkileşimle gelişmiştir. Değişen Avrupa güvenlik ortamı ve Türkiye'nin caydırıcılık yeteneğine sahip modern bir Türk ordusu oluşturma aciliyeti, söz konusu dönemde askeri alanlarda nispeten daha istikrarlı bir ilişki biçimi sağlamıştır. Askeri alandaki ilişkiler ilk olarak silah ve mühimmat tedariki temelinde kurulmuş, ziyaretler ve üst düzey ve önde gelen askeri şahsiyetlerin atanmasıyla desteklenmiş ve daha sonra özel eğitim programlarına katılım, silah ve teçhizat transferi, iletişim ve lojistik işbirliği, büyük askeri manevralarda gözlem ve sınır sorunlarını ele almak için mekanizmalar kurulması gibi askeri alanın çeşitli yönlerine doğru genişlemiştir.

1920'ler ve 1930'lar, dünyada motorizasyon ve mekanizasyon gibi önemli yeni askeri teknolojilerin ordu bünyelerine entegre edilmesi gereken yıllardı; çünkü teknoloji ve endüstri, o dönemin ordularının kullanımına önemli ve köklü değişiklikler sunuyordu. Zırhlı birlikler, planör ve paraşüt kullanımı gibi hava indirme yetenekleri ve birlikler arasında etkili iletişim araçları, orduların maddi ve zihinsel yapısına dahil edilmesi gereken başlıca alanlardan bazılarıydı. Bu yeni yeteneklere erişim sınırlıydı ve büyük ölçüde Batı ülkelerinin kontrolü altındaydı. Türkiye açısından bakıldığında, Sovyetler Birliği Türkiye'nin bu kaynaklara erişmesine yardımcı olabilirdi. Türk siyasi otoritesi, ordusunun biçimini, komuta yapısını ve sistem içindeki yerini, ayrıca ihtiyaçlarını belirledi ve ardından yerine getirilmesi beklenen görev ve işleri tanımladı. Bunlara dayanarak, Türk askeri bürokrasisi, kısıtlamalar altında bu görevleri yerine getirmenin yollarını aramaya başladı. Sınırlı kaynaklara sahip uluslararası arenada bir dışlanmış ülke olarak Türkiye, savaşlar arası dönemin sonlarına kadar yalnızca Sovyetler Birliği ve Kızıl Ordu'nun işbirliği yapmaya ve yardım etmeye istekli olduğunu gördü. İki savaş arası dönemde Türk Ordusu, askeri bilim veya askeri sanata ilişkin belirli bir yaklaşımın etkisi altında değildi ve kendini belirli bir ekol veya yaklaşımla sınırlamadan diğer askeri bürokrasilerle temas kurmak için çaba sarfetti. Bu nedenle, siyasi otorite tarafından verilen görevi rasyonel bir şekilde yerine getirmek için diğer ordularla ilişki kurmaya hazırdı. Türk askeri bürokrasisinin iki savaş arasına mahsus bu özel niteliği, Kızıl Ordu'yla

işbirliğini mümkün hale getirerek bu dönem boyunca olumlu bir çalışma ilişkisini sürdürmesini sağladı.

Tezin İkinci bölümünde ise yukarıda ortaya konulan Türkiye'nin askeri ihtiyaçları daha da genişletilerek tartışılmakta ve bu dönemde Türk askeri bürokrasisinin barış dönemine geçişindeki temel özelliklerini, özellikle siyasi otorite karşısında Türk devleti içindeki konumunu ve askeri ihtiyaçları nasıl belirlediğini ele almaktadır. Bu bölümde, iki savaş arası döneminin Türk askeri bürokrasisinin benzersiz özelliklerinin Sovyet ordusuyla işbirliğini mümkün kıldığını ve bu özelliklerin dönem boyunca olumlu bir çalışma ilişkisini sürdürmesini sağladığı savunulmaktadır.

Türk ordusu, önceki ve sonraki dönemlerden farklı bir dönemi, çeşitli iç ve dış faktörler nedeniyle yaşadı. Bu dönem barış zamanıydı, yeni bir ordu kurma süreci devam ediyordu ve kendi tarihsel başarılarına ve deneyimlerine dayanan içe dönük bir yapıya sahipti; ancak aynı zamanda, belirli bir konuda eksik olduğu bilgi birikimini dışarıdan edinmeye de açıktı. Herhangi bir ittifak yapısı veya yükümlülüğüyle sınırlı değildi, bu da diğer orduların deneyim ve bilgilerinden öğrenmeyi mümkün kılıyordu. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türk ordusu, askeri bilim veya sanata ilişkin tek bir yaklaşımın etkisi altında değildi ve diğer askeri bürokrasilerle etkileşim kurmak için çeşitli seçenekler izledi. Bu nedenle, siyasi otorite tarafından verilen görevi rasyonel bir şekilde yerine getirmek için diğer ordularla ilişki kurmaya hazırdı. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türk askeri bürokrasisinin bu özel özelliği, Sovyet askeri bürokrasisiyle askeri ilişkilerin kurulmasını kolaylaştırmada önemli bir faktördü. Sonraki bölümlerde açıklandığı gibi, çoğu durumda Türk Ordusu'nun taleplerine gerekli karşılığı veren Kızıl Ordu olmuştur. Türk askeri bürokrasisi, Sovyet tarafındaki muadilleriyle ilişkileri yönetme konusunda siyasi otoritenin görevini yerine getiren ana aktördü. İki savaş arası dönem için yaygın olarak iddia edilen ordunun tam anlamıyla Prusya/Alman etkisinde olduğu iddialarının rafine edilerek daha özenle tanımlanması gerekmektedir çünkü tezin pek çok ilgili bölümünde savunulduğu üzere bu gerçeği yansıtmamakta ve gün geçtikçe bu iddialara temelsiz bazı unsurların eklenmesiyle bu konu boyut ve seviye kazanmakta ve bir çığ gibi büyümekte ve bu yanlış haliyle yeniden üretilmekte ve alanı işgal etmektedir.

Tezin kalan bölümlerinde askeri alandaki Türk-Sovyet işbirliğinin kilit alanları incelenmiştir. Bazı bölümler Türkiye'nin ihtiyaçlarını ele alırken, diğerleri Türkiye'nin endişelerini ele almaktadır; her halükarda bunlar, Türkiye'nin teknolojik üstünlüğe, sanayi gücüne ve Türk Ordusuna askeri destek sağlama isteğine sahip büyük bir güçle işbirliğine girerek rasyonel bir şekilde ulaşmaya çalıştığı hedefleridir. Bölümler tematik olup, dönem boyunca Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki askeri ilişkilerin belirli bir yönünü kronolojik olarak incelemektedir. Siyasi otoriteden görev alan bürokrasinin, öncelikleri belirleyip ihtiyaçları tespit etmesini, muhatap bürokrasiyi anlayarak hakkında bilgi sahibi olmasını ve muhatabıyla çeşitli kilit politika alanlarında etkileşim kurmasını incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede, tezin bölümleri şu şekilde yapılandırılmıştır.

Üçüncü bölüm, Türk ordusunun Sovyet askeri gücüne ilişkin algısını ve anlayışını incelemektedir. İki savaş arası dönemde çoğu ülke için Kızıl Ordu, İngiliz Başbakanı Churchill'in ünlü "muamma" tanımında da örneklendiği üzere, gerçekte ne olduğunu anlayamadıkları, keşfedilmemiş ve tam olarak anlaşılamayan bir konu olarak kalmıştır. Türk ordusu için durum önemli ölçüde farklıydı. Türk askeri bürokrasisine verilen talimat, Kızıl Ordu hakkında sağlam bir anlayış geliştirmekti; çünkü Sovyetler Birliği, Türkiye'nin acil savunma ve güvenlik ihtiyaçlarını karşılamasına yardımcı olabilecek bir işbirliğine girmek için rasyonel bir seçenek gibi görünen bir ülkeydi. Türk subayları, yabancı askeri yayınlar, istihbarat yayınları ve karşılıklı temas ve ziyaretler yoluyla Sovyetler Birliği ve Kızıl Ordu hakkındaki bilgilerini ve anlayışlarını geliştirdiler. Subay kadrosundaki Rusça dil becerileri ve Moskova'daki ataşemiliterliğin çabaları bu süreci büyük ölçüde katkı sağladı. Burada, iki savaş arası dönemde bu faaliyetlerin ve çabaların Türk ordusunun Kızıl Ordu hakkında, Türk tarihinde, bu dönemden önce veya sonrasında, görülmemiş derecede anlaşılır bir tablo çizmesini sağladığını savunuyorum. Bu dönemde Kızıl Ordu, Türk Milli Ordusu için bir muamma değildi. Bu bilgi birikimi, Türk subaylarının II. Dünya Savaşı'na kadar geçerliliğini koruyacak değerlendirmeler yapmalarını sağladı.

Dördüncü bölümde, Türk ve Sovyet askeri bürokrasileri arasındaki diplomatik ilişkilere ve iki savaş arası dönemde kurulan askeri işbirliğinin kapsamına odaklanarak askeri diplomasi ve işbirliği incelendi. Türk askeri bürokrasisinin, dış

politika hedeflerini desteklemek amacıyla Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkilerini genişletme yönündeki genel Türk devlet politikasına nasıl katkıda bulunduğu ortaya konulmaya çalışıldı. Ordunun diplomatik ilişkilerdeki temsili performansı ve sembol olarak kullanımı ele alındı. Uzun süredir faaliyette olan ve etkili çalışan ataşemiliterliğe ek olarak, Avrupa siyasi-askeri mimarisinden dışlanmış ve ilişkilerine üçüncü tarafların müdahalesinden çekinen iki devlet, askeri figürleri, askeri sembolleri ve askeri gemi ziyaretlerini, ilişkiyi hızlandırmak, ilişkiye verilen önemi kanıtlamak ve diğer aktörler tarafından kışkırtılan propaganda ve yanlış anlamaları aşarak sonuçlar elde etmek için kullanmayı tercih etti.

Birbirleriyle iletişime geçme konusunda ilk temaslar, savaş zamanında askeri yetkililer tarafından başlatıldı ve her iki devlet de askeri geçmişe sahip büyükelçiler atamayı tercih etti. Stratejik düzeydeki anlayışın, birbirleri hakkında çok az şey bilen iki taraf arasındaki derin şüpheler ortamında somut adımlar atılmasını sağlamak için operasyonel ve taktik düzeylerde dikkatlice geliştirilmesi gerekiyordu. Buna ek olarak, I. Dünya Savaşı galiplerinin yaydığı propaganda, Türk milli hareketinin ve Bolşeviklerin niyetleri hakkındaki güvensizlik ve şüphe duygularını daha da artırdı. Bunu aşmak ve çalışma ilişkilerini kurmada daha hızlı ilerlemek için, her iki taraf da kendi yönetimleri tarafından bu karakterlere verilen önemi simgeleyen askeri figürlere güvendi. Askeri diplomasinin beklenen en önemli sonuçlarından biri, iki ülke arasındaki etkileşim düzeyini diğerlerine göstermekti. 1923-1939 yılları arasında, hem Türk Ordusu hem de Kızıl Ordu, Avrupa güvenlik mimarisinde iki dışlanmış olarak birbirlerine güvenerek, karşılıklı ve acil ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için elde edilen bir anlayıştan yararlandı ve kabul edilebilir düzeyde işbirliği ortamı yarattı. Askeri işbirliğinde, ne büyük yatırım ne de karmaşık mekanizmalar gerektiren eylemlere dikkat edildi. Türkiye, Afganistan'da sınırlı imkanlarla çok ücra bir bölgede yürüttüğü politikada Sovyet yardımından faydalanmayı başardı ve ayrıca Türkiye'de sivil havacılığın geliştirilmesinde de Sovyet desteği aldı. Türk askeri bürokrasisi, Avrupa güvenlik sisteminin dışında kaldığı bir ortamda, ülkeyi savunmak için gerekli araçları koruma konusunda kritik endişeler taşıyan, güven inşa etmeyi, üçüncü tarafların olası müdahaleleri karşısında anlayışı artırmayı ve Türk Ordusu ile Kızıl Ordu arasında işbirliğini kolaylaştırmayı amaçlayan faaliyetlerle, Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkilerini genişletme yönündeki genel Türk devlet politikasına

katkıda bulunmuş ve ayrıca sınırlı kaynakları ve Sovyetler Birliği dışında büyük Avrupa güçleri tarafından kabul görmemesi nedeniyle aksi takdirde imkansız olacak politikaları izleme araçları elde etmeyi başarmıştır.

Beşinci bölüm, iki ülke arasındaki sınır bölgelerini odaklanarak bu bölgelerde gözlemlenen ilişkileri ele almaktadır. Sınır yönetiminde öncü rol almaları beklenen Türk ve Sovyet askeri bürokrasileri, sınırlar boyunca ve bu sınırların ötesinde sürekli olarak birbirleriyle etkileşim halinde kalmışlardır. Potansiyel olarak çatışma ile sonuçlanabilecek pek çok sorunun varlığına rağmen, bu iki devlet, bu sorunların kontrolden çıkmasına veya iki devlet arasında büyük bir krize yol açabilecek seviyeye tırmanmasına izin vermediğini, böylece Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında başlayan ve II. Dünya Savaşı'nın başlangıcına kadar süregelen Türk siyasi-askeri liderliğinin güvenli sınır ve güvenli doğu cephesi algısı korunmuştur.

Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği, Güney Kafkasya'da kara sınırı paylaşıyorlardı; Türkiye'nin Artvin, Kars, Bayazıt ve Karaköse yerleşimleri, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri ile karşı karşıyaydı. İki ülke ayrıca Karadeniz'de deniz sınırını da paylaşıyordu. İki ülkenin askeri bürokrasileri, kendi sistemlerinde sınır yönetiminde öncü rol oynuyordu. Bu nedenle, her iki askeri bürokrasi de bu sınırlar boyunca ve daha geniş bir sınır yönetimi alanında sürekli olarak birbirleriyle etkileşim halindeydi. Savaşlar arası dönemde, sınırların belirlenmesi ve sınırlar boyunca meydana gelen küçük olayların ve sınırlar boyunca ve daha geniş bir alanda gelişen büyük olayların yönetimi, bu bürokrasilerin çalışma gündemlerini oluşturuyordu. Ortaya çıkan potansiyel sorunlara verilen tepkinin tonu ve düzeyi, büyük ölçüde iki ülkenin liderliğinin benimsediği, çatışmacı olmayan, samimi ve işbirlikçi stratejik anlayışla şekillenmişti. Bu dönemde hiçbir taraf diğerinden büyük bir tehdit algılamadı, ancak sonunda büyük bir krize dönüşebilecek potansiyel sorunların varlığı altında hareket etmek zorunda kaldı.

İki ülkenin askeri bürokrasileri, kendi sistemlerinde sınır yönetiminde öncü rol oynadı. Bu nedenle, her iki askeri bürokrasi de bu sınırlar boyunca ve daha geniş sınır yönetimi alanında sürekli olarak birbirleriyle etkileşim halindeydi. Sınırların belirlenmesi ve sınırlar boyunca meydana gelen küçük olayların ve sınırlar boyunca

ve daha geniş bir alanda gelişen büyük olayların yönetimi, savaşlar arası dönemde bu bürokrasilerin çalışma gündemlerini meşgul etti. Bu dönemde, hiçbir taraf diğerinden büyük bir askeri tehdit algılamadı ve odak noktaları, bu dönemden önceki ve sonraki dönemlerin aksine, sınır bölgelerine daha fazla asker konuşlandırmak veya tahkimat yapmak yerine, diğer tarafın hareketlerini gözlemlemekti. Endişe yaratacak, yanlış anlaşılabilecek veya diğer tarafa askeri düşmanlık sinyali verebilecek eylemlerden kaçındılar. Anadolu'daki isyanlar, Türkiye'yi komşularından destek almaya ve iş birliği sağlamaya mecbur kılıyordu ve Türkiye, Sovyetlerin bu beklentiye karşı en duyarlı taraf olduğunu gördü. Sovyetlerin bu isyanlar sırasında Türkiye'nin askeri faaliyetlerine verdiği tepki, Sovyet liderliğinin ve Kızıl Ordu liderliğinin iki savaş arası dönemde Türkiye'ye karşı genel yaklaşımını ortaya koydu. Bu yaklaşım, dış emperyalist güçlerin algılanan niyet ve eylemlerine karşı dostane, işbirlikçi ve destekleyiciydi. Bu durum, Avrupa güvenlik yapısındaki büyük değişimler Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği algısını değiştirene kadar devam etti. Türk bakış açısından, Sovyet tarafından, özellikle Türk sınır birliklerine yönelik saldırıların sayısı 1938 sonlarında ve 1939'da önemli bir ölçüde artış gösterdi. Potansiyel olarak çatışma ile sonuçlanabilecek pek çok konunun varlığına rağmen, Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği bu konuların kontrolden çıkmasına veya iki devlet arasında büyük bir krize dönüşecek bir seviyeye tırmanmasına izin vermeyi tercih etmediğini, böylece Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarında başlayan ve II. Dünya Savaşı'nın başlangıç yıllarına kadar devam eden Türk siyasi-askeri liderliğinin güvenli sınır ve güvenli doğu cephesi algılarını koruduğu ortaya konuldu.

Altıncı bölümde, askeri ekonomik ilişkiler, teknoloji ve bilgi birikiminin transferi incelendi. Sovyetler Birliği'nden savunma alanında alınan yardım ve onunla yapılan ticaret, Türkiye'ye somut faydalar sağladı. Bu bölümde, askeri ekonomi, yardım ve ticaretin, Türkiye açısından başarılı bir çalışma ilişkisine girmenin ve bunu Sovyetler Birliği ile dönemin sonuna kadar sürdürmenin sağlam temelini ve gerekçesini oluşturduğunu savunuyorum. Ayrıca, Sovyetler Birliği'nin süreci engellememesine rağmen, büyük ölçüde kendi yapısal sınırlamaları ve gerekli kaynak eksikliği nedeniyle, iki savaş arası dönemde Sovyetler Birliği'nden Türkiye'ye askeri sektörde teknoloji ve bilgi birikiminin aktarımı mümkün olmamış ve sınırlı kalmış. Bu alanda sonraya aktarılabilen bir miras kalmamıştır.

Türk askeri bürokrasisinin başlıca görevi, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan II. Dünya Savaşı'nın başlangıcına kadar ordunun ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak, modernleşmek, motorizasyonu sağlamak ve caydırıcılığını artırmaktı. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemin başında Türkiye, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşünden doğmuş bir ülkeydi. Barış dönemine geçmek, ülkenin bütçesi üzerindeki askeri harcamalar yükünü hafifletme fırsatı anlamına geliyordu, ancak bu aynı zamanda ordunun ihtiyaçlarını karşılamanın yollarını bulmada da zorluklar getiriyordu, çünkü bu barış dönemi şüpheliydi ve yeni bir savaş olasılığı yüksekti. Ülke yöneticileri, sivil ve askeri kadrolar, bir çatışmanın muhtemel olduğunu düşünüyordu. Bilim, teknoloji ve sanayi üretimindeki gelişmeler ve Avrupa sisteminde yaygın olan uzlaşmaz hırslar ve planlar nedeniyle, bir öncekinden daha yıkıcı olacak topyekûn bir savaş şeklinde yeni bir çatışma beklentisi, iki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönem boyunca gerçekliğini müdafaa etti. Saldırganın kim olacağı veya ne tür bir ittifak sisteminin ortaya çıkacağı anlamında kesin bir düzen tahmin edilemese de, dünyanın bu yöne doğru sürüklendiği gerçeği, üst düzey siyasi ve askeri çevreler arasında tartışılmaz biçimde yerini korudu. Bu nedenle, hazırlıklı ve yeterli olma hedefine ulaşmak önem arz ediyordu. Ancak bu görev iki nedenden dolayı çok zordu. Birincisi, kaynaklarda büyük kısıtlamalar, kapasitedeki sınırlamalar ve hedeflere ulaşmada zorluklar vardı. İkincisi, kaynak sağlamak ve askeri ürünler sunarak kapasite geliştirme konusunda yardım etmek için Türkiye ile tam ve anlamlı bir ortaklığa girmeye istekli Batı ülkesi yoktu. Destek sağlamak yerine, baltalama ve ilave zorluklar dayatma girişimleri gözlemlendi.

Varoluşsal bir tehdit algılayan bir ülke için, askeri yardım ve ticaret doğal olarak başarılı bir çalışma ilişkisine girmenin sağlam zeminini ve gerekçesini oluşturdu. Güvenilir bir ortakla ilişki kurmak arzu edilen hedefti. Bu temel alanda yabancı bir ortakla uyum, daha geniş bir düzeyde uyumu sağlayacaktı. Türkiye, tüm büyük ülkelerle savunma tedariği ilişkisine girmeye çalıştı. Türk yetkililer öncelikle acil ihtiyaçları karşılamayı, ardından da teknoloji transferi ve bilgi birikimi yoluyla bunları yerel olarak geliştirmeyi ve üretmeyi hedeflediler. Genel olarak, Türkiye bu arayışta büyük Avrupa güçleri tarafından engellendiğini düşündü. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde gerçek ve zamanında bir yanıt verebileceğini gösteren tek ülke, benzer bir durumda olan bir başka dışarda bırakılmış bir ülke olan Sovyetler Birliği oldu.

Savaş ve ekonomi, savaş ekonomisi yani o dönem kullanıldığı biçimiyle Harb İktisadiyatı, iki savaş arası dönem boyunca Türk subaylarının düşüncesinde esas yere sahipti. Cumhuriyetçi kadrolar, bu dönemde savaşın ekonomisini, önceki veya sonraki dönemlerde görülmeyen, farklı ve benzersiz bir şekilde ele aldı; bu durum, bu tez boyunca savunulan nedenlerle göz ardı edildi. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türk ordusu, askeri bürokrasi olarak görevlerini yerine getirirken çoğunlukla siyasetten ziyade ekonomiyle meşguldü. Önceki on yıl boyunca aralıksız savaşan siyasi ve askeri kadrolar, çatışmanın sona erdiği düşüncesini taşımadılar ve savaşın geniş kapsamının farkında olarak, önlerindeki dönemde daha kapsamlı ve yıkıcı bir savaşın mümkün olabileceği beklentisiyle bir eylem biçimi formüle etmişlerdi. Ordunun acil, temel ve geleneksel ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak ve ayrıca motorlu taşıtlar, uçaklar, tanklar ve zırhlı araçlar gibi daha ileri teknolojiye sahip olanları temin etmek için, özellikle farklı Batı hükümetleri ve özel silah tedarikçileri olmak üzere dünyadaki herkesle ilişki kurmaya çalıştılar. Türkiye'nin o zamanki ekonomik kapasitesi, bu görevleri sorunsuz bir şekilde yerine getirmeye elverişli değildi. Türkiye'nin askeri ihtiyaçları acil, gerçek ve maliyetliydi. Türkiye bunları Sovyetler Birliği'nden temin etti. Silah ve mühimmat akışı, önce tüfek, tabanca ve topçu mühimmatı gibi geleneksel olanların transferiyle başladı ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin beş yıllık planlarla ekonomisini ve sanayisini yeniden inşa ettikten ve bu ekonomik-endüstriyel gücün askeri kullanımından faydalandıktan sonra uçaklar, tanklar, zırhlı araçlar, motosikletler ve paraşüt teçhizatı gibi yeni ve gelişmiş olanlarla devam etti. Ekonomik kaynaklarıyla sınırlı olan Türkiye'nin alımları, ordusunun tamamını dönüştürmek için yetersiz kaldı. Bununla birlikte, caydırıcılık oluşturmak ve rakiplerine elinde modern silahlara sahip olduğunu göstermek için Türkiye tüm imkanlarını seferber etti.

Sovyetler Birliği ile olan bu ilişkide teknoloji ve bilgi birikimi transferine ilişkin beklentiler tam olarak gerçekleşemedi. Teknoloji transferi Sovyetler Birliği'nden bazı uygulamaların ve pratiklerin kopyalanmasıyla sınırlı kaldı. Bu durum, özellikle yeni edinilen zırhlı ve motorlu araçların kullanımı, planör ve paraşüt kullanımının yaygınlaştırılması, genel olarak sivil gençliğin topyekûn bir savaşta faydalanacak şekilde eğitilmesi ve son olarak ülkenin insan ve maddi kaynaklarının düşman uçaklarının bombalama ve kimyasal madde kullanımı yoluyla yıkıcı darbelerine karşı

hazırlanmasına yönelik önlemler alınması alanında açıkça görülmektedir. Askeri ekonomi, yardım ve ticaret, Türkiye açısından Sovyetler Birliği ile başarılı bir işbirliğine girmenin ve bunu tüm dönem boyunca sürdürmenin sağlam bir temeli ve gerekçesini oluşturmuştur. Kendi yapısal sorunları ve gerekli kaynakların eksikliği nedeniyle, Sovyetler Birliği süreci engellemese de iki savaş arası dönemde Sovyetler Birliği'nden Türkiye'ye askeri sektörde teknoloji ve bilgi birikimi transferi tam olarak gerçekleştirilememiş ve sınırlı kalmıştır. Sonraki dönemlerde bu sınırlı izler de yok olmuştur.

Yedinci bölümde Türkiye'nin riskleri yönetme ve güvenlik konularını ve kaygılarını kontrol altında tutma çabalarına yönelik gözetim, istihbarat ve tehdit algısını incelemektedir. Sovyet ordusunun izlenmesi, bu dönem boyunca Türk askeri faaliyetlerinin ayrılmaz bir parçasıydı. Bu bölümde, her iki tarafın da çalışma ilişkileri kurmaya çalıştığı askeri faaliyetlerin tüm yelpazesinde, yalnızca istihbarat alanında, iki savaş arası dönemde tarafların herhangi bir etkileşimden kaçındığı gözlemlenmektedir. Bunun, yaygın bir biçimde öne sürüldüğü gibi iki ülke veya sistem arasındaki düşmanlıktan değil, istihbarat faaliyetlerinin doğasında var olan rekabetçilik ve aldatıcı olma özelliklerinde kaynaklandığını savunuyorum. Her iki askeri bürokrasi de sürekli olarak birbirleri hakkında istihbarat topladı, ancak birbirleriyle temas halinde olmaktan kaçındı. Bu alan, Türkiye'nin Sovyet modelini benimsemeyi tercih etmediği alanlardan biri olarak kaldı. Türk askeri istihbaratı, Türk sisteminin Kızıl Ordu ve Sovyetler hakkında doğru bir anlayışa sahip olmasını sağlayan ayrıntılı ürünler ortaya koydu. Bu zorlu alanda, her iki taraf da kendi siyasi liderliklerinin belirlediği talimatlar doğrultusunda, iki savaş arası dönem boyunca çatışmadan kaçındı. Bu döneme ait ortaya dökülen hataların, skandalların veya kaza olarak nitelendirilebilecek kazaların mevcut olmaması bu yaklaşımı güçlendirici bir husustur.

İki Dünya Savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinde, askeri ilişkilerin diğer alanlarına kıyasla istihbarat en az temas kurulan alandı. Her iki tarafın yetkilileri kendi anlayışlarını ve çalışma yöntemlerini, ayrıca kendi örgütlerini oluştururken bu alanda tereddütlü davrandılar ve aralarında belli mesafe korumayı uygun gördüler. Bu, Türk yetkililerinin Sovyetlerden hiçbir şekilde bir şeyler

öğrenmeye çalışmadığı nadir alanlardan biri olarak kalmıştır. İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği stratejik düzeyde birbirlerinden herhangi bir tehdit algılamadılar. Bu nedenle, bu faktörlerden etkilenen istihbarat faaliyetleri, birbirlerini gözetlemek ve ilişkilerini zedeleyecek üçüncü taraf faaliyetlerini önlemekle sınırlı kaldı. Moskova'daki askeri ataşeler aracılığıyla, Türk Genelkurmay İstihbaratı, askeri istihbarat işlevi perspektifinden temel katalog bilgilerini içeren ayrıntılı raporlar üretti. Kızıl Ordu'nun gelişmeleri, yapısı, konuşlanmaları, silahları, üniformaları, operasyonel prosedürleri, komuta yapıları ve komutanları hakkında bilgiler Türk siyasi ve askeri üst düzey yetkililerine sunuldu. Bu çalışmalar, iki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türk askeri ve sivil yetkililerin, Sovyet ordusu hakkındaki bilgilerini artırdı. Askeri faaliyetlerin tüm yelpazesinde, her iki tarafın da yalnızca istihbarat alanında iş birliği ilişkileri kurmaya çalıştığı durumlarda, iki savaş arası dönemde tarafların herhangi bir etkileşimden kaçındığı alan olarak kaldı. Bunun nedeni, sıklıkla öne sürüldüğü gibi iki ülke veya iki ülkenin istihbarat kurumları arasındaki düşmanlık değil, istihbarat faaliyetlerinin doğası gereği istihbarat faaliyetinin rekabetçi olması ve aldatma ve gizlilik üzerine kurulmasıydı.

Sekizinci bölüm ülkenin savunmasında ordunun ve toplumun rolü ele alınmıştır. Türk ordusunun, ülkenin sivil sektöründe hazırlık yapmak ve uygulamak için teknik rolleri nasıl formüle ettiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bir sonraki savaşın şekline ilişkin algı, bu eylemlerin formüle edilmesinde kritik öneme sahipti. Hava saldırıları ve kimyasal saldırılar en önemli iki endişe kaynağıydı ve Türk Ordusu, sivil sektörde farkındalık yaratmak ve önlemler uygulamak için çabalara öncülük etti. Öte yandan, zihinsel hazırlık, moral ve savaş fikrini insanların zihninde canlı tutmak önemli faktörlerdi. Daha fazla insanı askere almadan ve büyük ölçekli seferberliğe başvurmadan, Türk Ordusu toplumu savaşa hazırlamanın, gençlerin öncelikle havacılık alanında aktarılabilir beceriler edinmelerini sağlamanın ve orduya yönelik olumlu bir algıyı sürdürmenin yollarını aradı. Türkiye, cephe gerisinin savunması konusunda Sovyetler Birliği ile birçok temel yaklaşımı paylaşıyordu. Bu alanda Türkiye'nin diğer Avrupa ülkelerinde uygulanan modelleri incelediğini, ancak özellikle hava ve kimyasal saldırılara karşı ülkenin savunma mekanizmaları oluşturma hazırlıklarında ve iki savaş arası dönemde savaş hazırlık çalışmalarına

özellikle genç nüfusunu dahil etme biçiminde Sovyet formülasyonlarından büyük ölçüde faydalandığını savunuyorum.

Bilim ve teknolojideki gelişmelerin, bilimi o dönemin orduları tarafından kullanılacak ölümcül biçimlere dönüştürmesinin ve on yılı aşkın süredir devam eden savaş deneyiminin ardından Türkiye, bir sonraki savaşın topyekûn biçiminin o zamanlar akıl almaz bir şekilde yıkıcı olacağından emindi. Siyasi ve askeri kadrolar da Avrupa'da büyük bir çatışma bekliyordu. Hava ve kimyasal saldırılar en önemli iki endişe kaynağıydı ve Türk Ordusu, sivil sektörde farkındalık yaratma ve önlemler uygulama çabalarında öncülük etti. Bunlara ek olarak, zihinsel hazırlık, moral ve savaş fikrini insanların zihninde canlı tutmak da önemliydi. Daha fazla insanı askere almadan ve büyük ölçekli seferberliğe başvurmadan, Türk Ordusu toplumu savaşa hazırlamanın, gençlerin öncelikle havacılık alanında aktarılabilir beceriler kazanmasını sağlamanın ve orduya yönelik olumlu bir algıyı sürdürmenin yollarını aradı. Gerçek bir sorunu ele alırken, Türk politikacıları ve askeri bürokrasi, ellerindeki tüm ulusal kaynaklardan en iyi şekilde yararlanmaya çalıştı. On yılı aşkın süredir devam eden savaşlardan elde edilen deneyim, dünyada ortaya çıkan tehditlerin sürekli izlenmesi ve diğer askeri bürokrasilerin en iyi uygulamaları, eylemlerini planlamalarında onlara rehberlik etti. Diğer büyük ülkelerdeki bu uygulamaların yöntemleri incelendi, ancak doğrudan destek yalnızca Sovyetler Birliği tarafından verildi. Türkiye'deki sivil savunmanın başlangıcı, 1925 yılında Sovyet Aviakhim'in (Osoaviakhim'in öncüsü) Rusça bir kitaptan yaptığı çeviriye dayanmaktadır. Bu, 1928'de Türkiye'de konuyla ilgili ilk taslak talimnamenin oluşturulmasını sağladı. Türkiye iki savaş arası dönemde savaşa hazırlık çalışmalarında özellikle gençlerini dahil etme konusunda Sovyet yöntemini öğrendi ve bundan faydalandı. Türkiye, hava ve kimyasal saldırılara karşı cephe gerisinde savunma mekanizmaları oluşturma ve gençlerini olası savaş çabalarına hazırlama konusunda büyük ölçüde Sovyet yöntemlerinden istifade etti. Tez ayrıca, Türkiye'nin özellikle genç nüfusunun ülkenin savunmasına hazırlanmasına dahil edilmesi ve böylece askeri faaliyetlere katılması konusunda Almanya ve İtalya'yı örnek göstermenin yanlış olduğunu ve bunun, savaşlar arası dönemde Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile olan askeri ilişkilerinin göz ardı edilmesinden kaynaklanan bir boşluktan kaynaklandığını ortaya koymuştur.

İki ülke arasındaki uzun ilişkiler tarihinde, iki savaş arası dönem, önceki ve sonraki dönemlerden belirgin şekilde farklı kaldı. İki savaş arası dönemdeki ilişkilerin tasviri, bu ilişkilerin doğasını anlamayı sağlayacak anlatılar sunmakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş anlatıları bu yaklaşımlar üzerinde etkili olmaya devam ederek, tutarsızlıklara ve çelişkili anlatılara yol açmaktadır. Tez, iki ülke arasındaki askeri ilişkileri inceleyerek ve ana hatlarını çizerek, bu alandaki ilişkinin en büyük bölümü oluşturduğunu ve bu dönemin ilişkilerinin kendine özgü doğasını aydınlatacak bir anlatı sunabileceğini savunarak, ilişkilerin anlaşılmasını sağlayacak bir anlatı sunmayı önermektedir.

İki savaş arası dönem boyunca kurulan Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki ilişki birçok zorluğa göğüs germiş ve dönemin sonuna doğru kademeli olarak farklı bir yapıya evrilmiştir. Askeri ilişkilerde meydana gelen değişiklikler kolayca fark edilmemiş ve stratejik düzeyde dostluğun önemi siyasi açıklamalarda sık sık tekrarlanmış ve kamuoyuna yönelik mesajlar samimi ilişkileri yansıtmıştır. Ancak, operasyonel ve taktik düzeydeki zorluklar 1930'ların ortalarından sonra daha da artmaya başlamıştır. Bu durum, iki ülke arasındaki askeri ilişkide belirgin bir etki yaratmıştır. Türkiye, 1936'dan sonra artık modern savaş silahları temin edememiş ve tanklar ile zırhlı araçlar için gerekli yedek parçalar temin edilememiştir. Çalışma düzeyindeki ilişkiler de sekteye uğramıştır. Örnek olarak, 1936'dan sonra iki yıldan fazla bir süre Ankara'da Sovyet askeri ataşesinin bulunmaması ve Kızıl Ordu'nun iç ideolojik eğitiminde Türkiye ve ordusunun ele alınış biçimi gösterilebilir. Sovyetler Birliği ile Türkiye arasındaki sınırda çatışmada gözle görülür bir artış yaşanmıştır ve Türk yetkililer Sovyet makamlarına üst düzeyde dahil olmak üzere Türk sınır birliklerine yönelik saldırıların artmasından duydukları endişeleri aktarmışlardır. Türk yetkililerin endişeleri yaşanan kayıplar ve Sovyet devlet temsilcilerinin kayıtsız kalmaları nedeniyle II. Dünya Savaşı arifene kadar artarak devam etmiştir. Türk arşiv kaynaklarına göre, özellikle Türk sınır birliklerine yönelik Sovyet tarafının saldırılarının sayısı 1938 sonları ve 1939'da önemli ölçüde arttı, ancak dostluk ve bu sorunları toplantılar yoluyla çözme isteğine dair görüşler korunmuştur. Genel olarak, askeri alanda temaslar daha az kapsamlı hale gelmiş, bağlantılar kesintiye uğramış ve sorunlar kendi hallerine ve akışlarına bırakılmışlardır.

Bu kademeli değişimin temel nedeni, ikili ilişkilerdeki yavaşlama ve soğuma ile her iki ülke için de dışlanmış olma durumundaki değişimle ilgiliydi. Türkiye, Avrupa güç dengesindeki diğer ülkelerle ilişkiler geliştirirken, bunu Sovyetler Birliği'ne açıklamakta zorluklar giderek daha belirgin hale geldi. Başlangıçtan itibaren her iki ülke de ikili ilişkilerinde diğer ülkelerle olan ilişkilerini hesaba katmış ve onlarla ilişkilerini geliştirmeye başladıkça zorluklar yaşamıştı. Zamanla, Türkiye'nin 1930'ların başlarında Avrupa'da yükselişe geçen revizyonist güçlere karşı duyduğu endişe ve hissettiği kuvvetli tehdit algısı karşısında geliştirmeye çalıştığı ilişkiler, Türk siyasi kadrolarının Moskova'da şüphe ile izlenmelerine neden olmuştur. 1936 Montrö Konferansı bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edildi. Sovyet yetkilileri, Türkiye'nin İngiltere ile yakın çalışma ilişkilerinden endişe duyduklarını ve Türkiye'nin davranışlarından duydukları hoşnutsuzluğu açıkça dile getirerek bu tutumun İngiltere ile olan anlaşmazlıklarını karmaşıklaştırdığına inandıklarını ve ayrıca Türkiye'nin İngiliz tarafıyla perde arkasında çok canlı müzakereler yürüttüğünü düşündüklerini belirttiler. Bu zorluklar, her iki taraftaki liderlik pozisyonlarında ani ve beklenmedik değişikliklerle daha da şiddetlendi. Stalin'in Sovyet askeri ve diplomatik bürokrasilerindeki tasfiyeleri, Türk bakış açısından birçok tanınmış, tanıdık ve Türkiye'yi tanıyan ve geçen yıllar boyunca ona yardımcı olan ismin ortadan kaldırılması ile neticelendi. Mareşal Voroşilov ve Mareşal Budyoni hariç olmak üzere, Türk tarafının Kızıl Ordu'da ve Sovyet dışişleri bürokrasisinde tanıdığı neredeyse tüm üst düzey yetkililer idam edildi. Karahan ve Litvinov'un kaybı Ankara'da endişe yarattı. Sovyet bakış açısından ise Atatürk'ün ve onun ölümüyle birlikte Dışişleri Bakanı Tevfik Rüştü Aras gibi ona yakın isimlerin kaybı endişeye yol açtı. Karahan'ın Moskova'ya geri çağrılmasından kısa bir süre sonra Türkiye, Boğazlar görüşmeleri ve Montrö Konferansı'ndaki olaylar gibi konularla başlayan ilişkilerdeki soğumayı ele almak üzere Moskova'ya üst düzey bir heyet gönderdi.

Türkiye'nin tutumu, tehdit algısı ve askeri ihtiyaçlarının niteliği ile şekillendi. İki savaş arası dönem boyunca, tıpkı Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında olduğu gibi, doğu sınırı güvenliydi ve o yönden herhangi bir tehdit beklenmiyordu. Dahası, Türkiye o yönden askeri destek alabilir ve batıdan gelebilecek, algılanan tehdide karşı caydırıcılık oluşturmak için modern savaş silahları temin edebilirdi. Türk Harb Akademisi'nde

1928 yılında subayların üzerinde çalıştığı savaş oyunu senaryosunun da gösterdiği gibi, Türk ordusu Batı'dan bir tehdit algılıyordu ve Sovyet tehdidini yalnızca Batılı bir saldırganın eylemleri ve elbette Sovyetlerin bu saldırgana vereceği yanıtla ilgili olarak savaş oyununda ele alıyordu. Bu durum II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra önemli ölçüde değişti. II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra her iki askeri bürokrasi de kendilerini birbirlerine düşman olarak konumlanmış bir düzende buldu. İlişkilerde etkileşim her iki başkentte faaliyet gösteren ataşemiliterlerin çabaları ile sınırlı kaldı. Türk ordusu, iki savaş arası dönemin aksine, Sovyet Ordusu hakkında Amerikan bakış açısıyla bilgi ediniyordu. Türk ve Sovyet askeri kadroları karşı tarafı anlama imkanlarını tamamen kaybettiler ve karşı tarafın niyetlerini ve tutumlarını artık ait oldukları askeri bloklar ve üçüncü taraflar üzerinden anlamaya ve anlamlandırmaya çalışıyorlardı.

Savaştan önce başlayan İngiliz etkisi II. Dünya Savaşı boyunca devam etti ve İngiltere, 1950'lerin başlarında ağır Amerikan etkisi altında Türk ordusu üzerindeki etkisini kaybetti. İngiliz hava ve kara misyonları Türkiye'den ayrıldı. Sovyetler Birliği'nde olduğu gibi, askeri işbirliği, ilgili başkentlerdeki askeri ataşelerin faaliyetleriyle sınırlandırıldı. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Türkiye'nin savunma ve güvenlik ihtiyaçlarının ana tedarikçisi haline geldi ve bu durum Soğuk Savaş boyunca devam etti. Türk bürokrasisi her zaman ana askeri tedarikçiye odaklandı ve askeri ekonomi, yardım ve ticaret gibi konularda ana tedarikçinin kültürü, çalışma tarzı ve taleplerinden etkilendi; bu da başarılı bir çalışma ilişkisine girmenin ve bunu güvenilir bir ortakla zaman içinde sürdürmenin sağlam bir temelini ve gerekçesini oluşturdu. Bu nedenle, Sovyetler ve Kızıl Ordu ile kısa süreli geniş çaplı etkileşim, Türk milli ordusunda ve askeri kültüründe hiçbir iz bırakmadı ve zenginliklerine ve önemlerine rağmen tarihten silindi.

İki savaş arası dönemde, tüm eksikliklerine, imparatorluk döneminden kalma tarihsel yüklere, önyargılara, endişelere ve farklılıklarına rağmen, Sovyetler Birliği, Batı güçlerinin Türkiye ile paylaşmaya istekli olmadığı bir dönemde, askeri alanda ürünlerini ve deneyimlerini paylaşabilecek bir ülke olarak görülüyordu. Tarihten kaynaklanan güçlü olumsuz duygulara ve Ruslara ve komünist ideolojiye karşı güçlü önyargılara rağmen (ki Türk subaylarının bu ideolojiyi anlama çabası ve istekleri

sınırlıydı), Türk ordusu büyük bir bürokratik kurum olarak profesyonelce hareket ederek siyasi otoritenin verdiği talimatları izledi. Türk askeri bürokrasisi, rasyonel bir şekilde, yani ideolojik veya dünya görüşü kısıtlamalarına bağlı kalmadan, Sovyetler Birliği ile işbirliği yaparak Türkiye'nin savunma ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaya odaklandı ve iki savaş arası dönemde Kızıl Ordu hakkında genel olarak sağlam bir anlayış ve işbirliği geliştirdi.

Askeri ilişkilerin analizi, yüzyıllarca süren savaşlardan sonra neden ilişkilerin kurulduğunu, iki savaş arası dönemde neden bu ilişkilerin sürdürülebildiğini ve II. Dünya Savaşı'nda neden sona erdiğini ve geniş bir coğrafi alanda birbirine komşu iki ülke arasında Soğuk Savaş döneminde neden kurulmasının mümkün olmadığını da açıklamaktadır.

İki dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile olan askeri ilişkileri, iki ülkenin tarihinin ayrılmaz ancak yeterince ele alınıp incelenmemiş bir parçasıdır ve bu tez, bu dönemde Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki askeri ilişkilerin rolünü vurgulayarak yeni bir tarihsel anlatının oluşmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu konuda yeterli akademik araştırmanın olmaması, gerçekmiş gibi sunulan dayanaksız argümanlara ve Soğuk Savaş ikili düşüncesi altında tarihin son derece ideolojik yorumlarına yol açmıştır. Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Askeri Tarih'in kesişme noktasında yer alan, arşiv araştırmalarına ve yaygın olarak kullanılmamış yayınlanmış birincil kaynaklara dayanan bu tez, yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ordusunu devlet sistemi içinde nasıl konumlandırdığını ve kritik savunma ve güvenlik rollerini yerine getirmekle nasıl görevlendirdiğini kesin ve ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklamakta ve bu perspektiften Sovyetler Birliği ile geliştirilen ilişkiler kümesini incelemektedir. Ayrıca, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini içindeki tarihsel sosyolojik yaklaşımlarla ilişkili olarak ordunun kurumsal rolü hakkındaki teorik tartışmalara da katkıda bulunmaktadır. Son olarak, bu tez, orijinal veriler ve ikincil kaynakların yeniden yorumlanması temelinde, iki Dünya Savaşı arasındaki dönemde Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki askeri ilişkilerin rolünü vurgulayarak yeni bir anlatının oluşturulmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Turhal
Adı / Name : Abdullah
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): TURKEY'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (1923-1939)

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora** / PhD ☒

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. ***** ☐

***** *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

Yazarın imzası / Signature ..... **Tarih** / Date .....
(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.