SOCIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTI-DRUG POLICIES IN MEXICO: THE CASE OF FELIPE CALDERÓN'S DRUG WAR

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ZEYNEP ERKOÇ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF LATIN AND NORTH AMERICAN STUDIES

OCTOBER 2023

Approval of the thesis:

SOCIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTI-DRUG POLICIES IN MEXICO: THE CASE OF FELIPE CALDERÓN'S DRUG WAR

submitted by **ZEYNEP ERKOÇ** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in Latin and North American Studies, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin TOPAL
Head of Department
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin TOPAL
Supervisor
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bahar GÜRSEL (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of History _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin TOPAL (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Esra AKGEMCİ
Selçuk University
Department of International Relations _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Zeynep ERKOÇ

Signature:

ABSTRACT

SOCIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTI-DRUG POLICIES IN MEXICO: THE CASE OF FELIPE CALDERÓN'S DRUG WAR

ERKOÇ, Zeynep

M.S., The Department of Latin and North American Studies

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin TOPAL

October 2023, 199 pages

This thesis explores the interwoven relationship between the notion of institutionalization, the discourse of failed state, and the concepts of social exclusion and subculture particularly within the context of Mexico's escalating fragility debates. Through an examination of Calderón's drug war through a socio-political analysis, this study underscores the significance of understanding the sociological dimensions of political and social institutionalization processes of nation-states. Furthermore, by highlighting the role of institutionalization in state failures and emphasizing the need to consider social context alongside political and economic aspects, the study reveals the impact of subcultural patterns within the scope of social exclusion on the instability of nation-states. Hence, the study concludes that the narco-trafficking subculture in Mexico can complement societal shortcomings, leading to a 'hidden state' phenomenon. Moreover, the political analysis conducted in this study reveals that the primary failure of the Mexican state lies in its neglect of the social sphere and its misinterpretation of the interconnected relationship between DTOs (Drug Trafficking Organizations) and the state. Therefore, the conclusion of this thesis advocates for recognizing the interplay between DTOs and the state, grounded in sociological

foundations, and underscores the importance of fieldwork to unravel the complexities of Mexican DTOs' intertwined relationship with the state and society.

Keywords: Mexico, Drug War, Calderón Administration, Failed State, Social Exclusion.

ÖZ

MEKSİKA'DAKİ UYUŞTURUCU KARŞITI POLİTİKALARIN SOSYO-POLİTİK ANALİZİ: FELİPE CALDERÓN'UN UYUŞTURUCU SAVAŞI ÖRNEĞİ

ERKOÇ, Zeynep
Yüksek Lisans, Latin ve Kuzey Amerika Çalışmaları Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Aylin TOPAL

Ekim 2023, 199 sayfa

Bu tez, Meksika devletinin artan başarısızlık tartışmalarına istinaden, enstitüleşme kavramı, failed state tartışmaları ve sosyal dışlanma ve alt kütür kavramları arasındaki iç içe geçmiş ilişkiyi keşfetmektedir. Bu çalışma, Calderón'un uyuşturucu savaşını sosyo-politik bir analizle inceleyerek, ulus-devletlerin politik ve sosyal enstitüleşme süreçlerinin sosyolojik boyutlarını anlamanın önemini vurgulamaktadır. Ek olarak, bu çalışma, enstitüleşmenin devlet hatalarındaki rolünü öne çıkararak ve siyasi ve ekonomik yönlerin yanı sıra sosyal bağlamın da göz önünde bulundurulması gerekliliğine vurgu yaparak, sosyal dışlanma kapsamındaki alt kültürel kalıpların ulus-devletlerin istikrarsızlığına olan etkisini ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu araştırma, Meksika'daki uyuşturucu madde ticareti alt kültürünün toplumsal eksiklikleri tamamlayarak ‘derin devlet’ olgusuna yol açtığı sonucuna ulaşmıştır. Dahası, bu çalışmada gerçekleştirilen politik analiz, Meksika devletinin temel başarısızlığının toplumsal alanın ihmal edilmesinde ve DTO'lar (Uyuşturucu Kaçakçılığı Örgütleri) ile devlet arasındaki bağlantının yanlış yorumlanmasında yattığını ortaya koymaktadır. Buna binaen, bu tezin sonucunda, DTO'lar ile devlet arasındaki etkileşimin sosyolojik temellere dayandığının tanınması ve Meksika'daki

DTO'ların devlet ve toplumla iç içe geçmiş ilişkisinin karmaşıklığını çözmek için alan çalışmalarının öneminin vurgulanması savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Meksika, Uyuşturucu Savaşı, Calderón Yönetimi, Çökmüş Devlet, Sosyal Dışlanma.

To my family and friends

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my esteemed supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin Topal, who provided me with encouragement and unwavering support throughout the writing process, even when I hesitated to delve into less explored and occasionally challenging academic topics. She not only significantly guided my work with her academic wisdom but also created a space for me to freely explore my ideas and hypotheses. Furthermore, I would like to sincerely thank Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, who helped me lay the foundations for several conceptual frameworks pursued in this study and bolstered my enthusiasm for the field.

I wish to express my gratitude to my committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bahar Gürsel and Assist. Prof. Dr. Esra Akgemci, for their valuable contributions both during and after my thesis defense. Their insights have not only laid a strong foundation for potential future research fields I could explore but have also encouraged me to pursue an academic career.

Throughout my years as a student at METU, my dance instructors, Dr. Yeti Ziya Gürbüz and Dr. Melis Özateş Gürbüz, coached and enabled me to discover my potential in every aspect of my life. They are among the most cherished individuals METU has brought into my life, and I am thankful for all the encouragement and knowledge they shared.

I want to extend my heartfelt thanks to my parents and my sisters, who never hesitated to help me manage my stress, and never withhold their support during my thesis preparation. I love you all and am grateful for your presence in my life. I am also grateful to my dear friends, Umutcan Şahin, Pınar İper, Aysu Melis Gündüz, Deniz Cansu Oğul, and Mohammad Anas Siddiqui, who shared this journey with me, listened to me in all my difficulties, and provided me with comfort. Your unconditional support was invaluable in helping me overcome this challenging period.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIDE	Economic Research and Teaching Center
CONEVAL	National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFS	Federal Security Directorate
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
FCF	Federal Civil Jurisdiction
FSI	Fragile/Failed State Index by Fund for Peace Organization
INEGI	National Institute of Statistics and Geography
JOE	Joint Operating Environment
MUD	Moral Underclass Discourse by Levitas, 1998
NEET	Not in Employment, Education, or Training
PAN	National Action Party
PFP	Prevental Federal Police
PFP	Federal Police
PGR	Attorney General of the Republic
PPD	The Drug Policy Program
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
RED	Redistributionist Discourse by Levitas, 1998
SCT	Secretariat of Communications and Transportation
SEDENA	Secretariat of National Defense
SEIDO	Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime
SEMAR	Secretariat of the Mexican Navy
SHCP	Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit
SID	Social Integrationist Discourse by Levitas, 1998

SNSP	National System of Secretariat of Public Security
SSP	Ministry of Public Security
SSPF	Secretariat of Federal Public Safety
the U.S.	The United States
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Latin American countries have been both ‘young and old’, ‘tumultuous and stable’, ‘independent and dependent’, ‘autonomous and subordinate’, and eventually ‘prosperous and poor’ (Skidmore & Smith, 2005: 3-5). Emerging from this contradicting environment, the study of Mexico is also full of contrasts. Despite its treasure of natural resources, Mexico has been under the contradiction of wealth and poverty, and thus, a “chronic instability” of political life (Skidmore & Smith, 2005: 254). Being one of the developing countries of the 20th century, Mexico has been suffering from unstable economic, social, and political affairs.

Within this unstable environment, some of the countries in the region have been in serious trouble with drug trafficking, and Mexico has been an important country in this trafficking. Organized crime, which is quite powerful in all of the domains within the country, has become one of the significant issues that needs to be solved immediately for both the nation’s and its neighbors’ sake. However, it should be noted that Mexico has also been one of the most affected countries in terms of drug policies; to the extent that the situation was so harmful to the nation and its neighbors.

The "Drug War," initiated during the presidency of Felipe Calderón in 2006, remains an unsolved issue in Mexico, with significant details on state capacity often omitted from broader discussions. The harsh anti-drug policies of Calderón have led to many violent outcomes in the country, making the conflict both between the state and Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), as well as between DTOs more violent and complex, mainly resulting in its society’s being lost in the shuffle and getting harmed. According to Morton (2012), the uprising violence and insecurity in the country cause harm to the trust of its citizens towards the Mexican state, which seems as one of the reasons why Mexico is discussed as a ‘failed state’ in literacy and politics. In this context, the fact that the working class has been politically and economically

excluded, and the popular sector is controlled under authoritarian regimes has a significant influence on the failure of the state. “In Latin America, urban poverty is a very present reality, and resulting patterns of geographical, racial, economic, and educational exclusion can be witnessed across the major cities” (Gonzales et al., 2017: 470). Hence it should not be underestimated that the ongoing social exclusion and poverty of its regions have affected the outcomes of the drug war in Mexico because it lacked effective subsidiary social policies.

1.1. Research Significance

There have been many studies on the failure of Calderón’s drug policy mainly in the context of United States (the U.S.)-Mexico bilateral relations, however, few have been focused on the intranational dynamics in terms of social policies. Social policies cannot and should not be considered separately, especially, in the case of Mexico due to the major social deprivation of its cities and as a result social exclusion within the cities. Hence, this study describes the environment of drug trafficking and addresses the existing gaps in the field of study. In their book “Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in the Americas Today”, Bagley and Rosen (2015) have explained the reasons, the pathways, and the outcomes of drug trafficking. They emphasize the importance of the fact that starting a drug war just for arresting and punishing the people in DTOs does not mean it will end drug trafficking, and in fact, most likely “it will drive both [drug trafficking and organized crime] further underground in Mexico while pushing many smuggling activities and criminal network operations into neighboring countries such as Guatemala and Honduras and back to Colombia and the Andes” (Bagley and Rosen, 2015: 6). The main reason for this likely outcome is the social, economic, and political relation of DTOs towards Latin American society (Duncan, 2014). Duncan (2014) also argues the fact that the Mexican state can be seen as an oligopoly of coercion in which the state has not disappeared from power relations, but the power relations are diverse between the state and DTOs, in the Mexican case.

The insufficient attention to the connection between Mexican society and drug-related offenses, and the resulting misconception that labeled Mexico as a failed state, prompted this study to address the shortcomings of social emphasis during Calderón's

administration in the context of the drug war. Hence, the aim is to offer a fresh viewpoint to the ongoing discourse on failed state categorizations and to contribute to the literature by filling the sociological gap in drug-related policies. This study will explain the nature of drug policy in Mexico from a socio-political point of view, as well as the failures of Calderón's Drug War.

The power and territory conflict among the biggest DTOs of Mexico caused social, political, and economic wreckage within several states of Mexico, such as Michoacán or Guerrero, for decades. Despite the damage they have caused to the citizens, DTOs provide support for social and economic deprivation due to the combination of lack of government services and high poverty levels. By meeting the demand for the resources that either the state or the church is supposed to be providing, and securing the discipline adolescent children need, DTOs are important for social and economic security in the eyes of the citizens (Flanigan, 2014). However, the social influence of the DTOs should not be overlooked under the emphasis on the political and economic predicaments they create for the state of Mexico. For instance, despite its effects on tearing several DTOs down, the war on drugs that Calderón started, involving 7.600 troops, caused an extreme increase in violence, and 60.000 deaths all over the country, and thus the growth of vigilante organizations as an outburst of the power conflict in Michoacán (Dursun, 2020; Herrera, 2021; Tauchnitz, 2022). One of the main reasons for the rise in violence was the underestimation of the social sphere. The political agenda that considers only the damage analysis rather than the examination of the social existence of DTOs, and their relationship with the citizens induced increasing violence and distrust of the citizens toward the state. As a result, the analysis of the drug policy within the scope of this study involves the analysis of the social sphere and the social outcomes of Calderón's drug war. In this context, the study of the social sphere will proceed in two directions: social exclusion, and subculture.

The results of this research can inspire new research agendas for social policy studies. The findings may also provide insights to policymakers, helping them avoid repeating the failures of past drug-war strategies. While Mexico is not the only Latin American country to face the drug war period, there are specific patterns and perspectives concerning the resolution of drug trafficking. However, it is crucial not to underestimate the social, economic, and political factors that sustain organized

crime. In summary, this thesis endeavors to provide a sociological perspective on the issue and contribute to the reduction of drug-related crime and violence in the country.

1.2. Research Question

The research question of this thesis will be how the socio-political sphere of Mexico had an impact on the anti-drug policy outcomes of Calderón's Drug War, on a narrow scale, and the instability and fragility of the Mexican state, on a broad scale. The question will be dealt with through the aim of a new description of the reasons and dynamics of a 'failed state'. Hence, to have a comprehensive understanding, several sub-questions will be examined in different sections of this thesis. On this basis, the sub-questions of this paper are:

- How have the foundational dynamics and historical contextual factors affected the institutionalization process of the Mexican state?
- Through which strategies were the anti-drug policies in Mexico implemented, causing the underestimation of the social and economic context of drug trafficking organizations?
- What are the failures of Calderón's drug war?
- What are the patterns of social exclusion in several regions in Mexico and the narco-trafficking subculture, affecting the realm of drug trafficking organizations?
- What is the extent of such patterns on the relationship between the state and drug trafficking organizations?
- What are the effects of the social patterns in Mexico and the political institutionalization on the fragility of the Mexican state?

The first three questions will be held in the section on policy analysis of the thesis. The evaluation of the institutionalization will be utilized in explaining the omitted nature of anti-drug policies implemented in Mexico, and the failures of the Calderón administration. Furthermore, the next two questions on social exclusion and subcultural patterns, as well as their influence, will be addressed within the social analysis chapter of the thesis. In the sequel of the results of the analysis, the effects of the socially excluded and subcultural pattern on drug trafficking will be scrutinized. Finally, the last question will be examined at the end of the social analysis.

1.3. Main Argument of the Thesis

The starting point of this thesis is the evaluation of the concept of the failed state. The discussion of failed state in the literature is restricted under the scope of the International Relations discipline, and the debate requires a more socio-political, cultural, and historical approach within its studies. Thence, more interdisciplinary approaches, and studies are needed. This study intends to fill the gap between sociological and political debate and aims for interdisciplinary research.

As a result, through a socio-political analysis, Mexico, especially under Calderón's administration, will be put under the scope. At this point, a literature review for historicization will be introduced concerning the anti-drug policies implemented from the 1910s to 2006 before the public policy analysis of Calderón's war on drugs. The historicization will be beneficial for the patterns of institutionalization of the Mexican state, and the structure of governmental organs. Furthermore, regarding the social analysis, the pattern of social exclusion in certain states of Mexico, which are also under various attacks of both drug-related organizations, and the military operations launched during the drug war, will be examined through secondary data analysis. Additionally, prior to the analyses of the social patterns, a historical overview of drug use and the emergence of DTOs will be presented.

The selection of several reports and statistical databases from varied sub-governmental organizations are utilized, and the data will be analyzed through comparative analysis. The point of view in the study of social exclusion will be on the emphasis on deprivation of access to governmental services, and certain political rights. Thereafter, to provide a sociological foundation, the concept of subcultural studies will be focused as well, and whether there is a cultural indicator formed against or under the dominant culture will be evaluated through thematic analysis to extract a subcultural pattern, and its place within social exclusion. Finally, the pattern extracted around social exclusion and subculture will be compared with the initial public policy analysis results. In this regard, this study hypothesizes that specific subcultural pattern due to social exclusions affects both the nature of drug trafficking and thus the outcome of the anti-drug policies implemented in the country.

To sum up, through an internal study, this thesis intends to reveal the reasons why anti-drug policies in Mexico did not address the necessary sociocultural and

socio-political aspects and why the Calderón era drug war resulted in serious violence. The subcultural pattern of drug-related crimes emanates from social exclusion; hence it can be considered as a coping mechanism for socially excluded communities. The reason for the inadequacy of Mexico's anti-drug policies, along with its contribution to the escalation of violence in the country and the proliferation of drug-related crimes, stems from the deficiency in the state's societal mechanism.

Consequently, the failure of the Mexican state emanates from the deficiency in its social inclusiveness. A resilient state can only be achieved through parallel institutionalization of state and societal relations. When the state remains disconnected from societal norms and organization, its policies inevitably yield failure. Hence, the debate about the 'failed state' falls short in examining the relationship between the state and society.




Figure 1 *The suggested study area of the state fragility with the relational pattern*

The concept of 'fragile state' discusses the stability of the nation-states based on external factors and effects, which reflect only the political arena. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, the discussion should be concerned with the governability of the nation-states based on the relation between the state and the society, which brings the social aspect of the indicated nation-states besides the political domain. While under the political domain, the formation of the state structure could be studied, the social domain spawns the analysis of societal norms and organizations. Both the political and social aspect through their investigation areas, results in the institutionalization of the state organs, which can directly affect the governability of the nation-states.

1.4. Conceptual Framework

This thesis will be determined by four complementary concepts from diverse social disciplines: 'institutionalization', 'failed state', 'social exclusion', and 'subculture'. The concept of institutionalization constitutes the main framework of the analyses. The concept is crucial for the understanding of state development and international dissemination, as well as the influence of social affairs, and it will be utilized in the examination of how the Mexican state has evolved.

Subsequently, the concept of failed state examines state relations within the framework of compliance with globalized standards, referring to the lack of institutionalization of the nation-states. The concept is mainly articulated in reference to the political domain, and it will be utilized as the starting point of this thesis. Within this context of social domains, two research fields having an impact on the fragility of a state should be intervened.

The concepts of social exclusion and subculture provide a deeper understanding of the internal social sphere of Mexico. Hereof, while the concept of social exclusion focuses on civil rights and state responsibilities from mostly a political point of view, the concept of subculture explores the relationship between dominant and suppressed cultures; put differently, the state and DTOs. The social examination will be utilized to contribute to the pattern of the institutionalization process of Mexico, and thus, to offer a sociological point of view within the discussions of failed states. These concepts, although studied separately, are interrelated, and thus, this study aims to investigate their impact on Mexico's socio-political relations through qualitative research.

The Sociological Concept of Institutionalization

The section on institutionalization explores the development of the concept and approaches toward institutional studies. It discusses the relationship between culture, institution, and structure, and how actions become institutionalized in society. The institutionalization process is analyzed through the phases of habitualisation, objectivation, externalization, and internalization. Moreover, various studies are discussed to highlight the role of social establishments in the institutionalization of

political and cultural spheres. Consequently, the comprehensiveness of sociocultural analysis towards political institutionalization, whether on the micro-level or global social sphere will be emphasized.

The concept of institutionalization has gained prominence in comparative politics, particularly in the study of political development, and in this context, not only Mexico but most of the Latin American countries have been put under the scope regarding their level of institutionalization specifically after the third wave of democratization. Hence the challenges and the inabilities of the aforementioned nation-states have been discussed thoroughly in the literature. Nonetheless, the transformation in Mexico faced several challenges in consolidating democracy mainly due to its historical derivation of legitimacy and power, ideological conflict, hierarchical structures, and institutional constraints. The historical legacy of colonialism, class-based inequality, and conflicts between liberalism and conservatism contribute to Mexico's institutional development challenges. Thence, it is crucial for the emergence of a sociocultural approach to understanding political processes in Mexico, with an emphasis on the unevenness of global processes.

The International Relations Concept of Failed State

The Failed State section explores the concept of failed states, which refers to a state's inability to provide political goods and services and losing the trust of its citizens. The section displays an in-depth examination of the roots and the criteria of this concept and discusses its global impact, with the emphasis that failed states are discussed as a pose of significant threat to the international system. The indicators of state fragility and offers for various policy recommendations for preventing state failure and rebuilding order in failed states will be mentioned as well. It will be also discussed that certain critiques have been made over the concept of failed states, including the notion that it assumes a Western-centric perspective and overlooks the historical impacts of colonialism and exploitation. Overall, a conceptual framework for discussing Mexico on a global level will be provided, by highlighting the significance of historical and socio-cultural aspects for states to understand each other and their situations.

Mexico is considered fragile due to its issues with drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption. These issues have led to a growth in criminal violence, which is an indicator of state failure. As the authority of the state weakens, DTOs take over the power of the streets, making it difficult for police forces to protect citizens. The ongoing attacks and pressure from criminal organizations and DTOs on certain institutions, including the government, politicians, police, and judiciary, could have severe adverse consequences for the stability of the nation in the near future. The Failed State Index has categorized Mexico as a 'High Alert State,' with the capacity of the state being assessed as 'Moderate' overall, but 'Weak' for the indicators of 'Police' and 'Judiciary.' Additionally, a 2008 report by the United States Joint Forces Command identified Mexico as a country that tends to experience a rapid and unexpected collapse.

The Political Concept of Social Exclusion

The social exclusion section of the conceptual framework explores the historical and conceptual background of the term, highlighting its emergence in the mid-1980s and its relation to poverty and marginalization. Furthermore, different perspectives on social exclusion, such as the Republican and the Liberal will be provided, and their multidimensional and dynamic nature, which involves being excluded from various institutions and benefits will be discussed. The differentiation between social exclusion and poverty will be addressed, and their relational characteristic, showing that it is less about the victims and more about the processes that cause exclusion will be emphasized. Finally, the section will present different discourses to resolve social exclusion, which diverge when drawing a framework and thus demonstrate various issues of the area.

The Sociological Concept of Subculture

The aim of the subculture section is the exploration of the roots and development of subcultural theories under different disciplines, such as sociology and cultural studies. Hence, how subculture studies have shifted their focus from social control and social coherence to the matter of working-class youth and the concept of

the 'underclass' associated with social exclusion will be discussed. Furthermore, through the examination of how subcultures are maintained through style and rituals, the socio-economic, racial, and historical influences shaping their development will be highlighted. Lastly, it will be concluded that subcultures are flexible collectivities that demonstrate diversity, even among devoted members, with an emphasis on identity, commitment, coherence, and autonomy. In conclusion, it is indicated that the final suggestion in the field of subculture studies is the need for a folk model that is bottom-up and driven by the youth to understand subculture theories better.

1.5. Research Design

In terms of methodological approach, this paper will be based on Qualitative Research Methodology. Qualitative research seeks specific interpretations shaped within a distinct context and provides a deeper understanding of the subject. The ideology that the social realm is constructed through individuals' interaction with both each other and the environment around them can be considered the starting point of the qualitative approach (Merriam, 2002). "The world, or reality, is not fixed, single, agreed upon, or measurable phenomenon that it is assumed to be in positivist, quantitative research" (Merriam, 2002: 3). In this context, qualitative research takes an interest in the specific interpretations of individuals that are shaped within a distinct context at a distinct time, definitions of social circumstances although the focus and the discipline framing the research changes (Merriam, 2002; Fossey et al., 2002). Instead of explicit hypotheses, qualitative research begins with broad inquiries that evolve and become more focused as information and data are gathered, and provides a more in-depth grasp of the studied subject (Fossey et al., 2002).

This thesis will be articulated through an interpretivist approach, which focuses on the construction of the social realm through individuals' interactions within their environment. The interpretivist approach sees social reality as fluid, emphasizes contextual information, and emphasizes the understanding of social life and the construction of social meaning. Being one of the major paradigms in qualitative research, the interpretivist approach, mainly originated from hermeneutic and symbolic interactionist theories, sees social reality as constructed and fluid, highlights contextual information, and thus focuses on the understanding of social life and how

social meaning is constructed (Fossey et al., 2002). Through the emphasis on the individual, this approach considers values as a subsidiary part of social life and finds its evidence in the context of flexible social relations (Fossey et al., 2002).

Moreover, Della Porta and Keating (2008) explain interpretivism as the entanglement of objective and subjective meanings. According to interpretivist epistemology, reality can be known, however, it cannot be seen separately from the human experience. Moreover, this framework tends to see human beings as meaningful actors. In this sense, subjective meaning is at the center of knowledge for this perspective. “It is therefore impossible to understand historical events or social phenomena without looking at the perceptions individuals have of the world outside” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008: 25).

The research employs primarily a case study research method to explain the failure of Calderón's drug war in Mexico. The case study constitutes the framework for the methods within this research. “The comparative advantages of case study methods include identifying new or omitted variables and hypotheses,…, developing historical explanations of particular cases, attaining high levels of construct validity, and using contingent generalizations to model complex relationships such as path dependency and multiple interactions effects” (Bennett, 2004: 27).

Sulaiman, Noralfishah, and Baldry claim that case study is considered “as an umbrella term for a family of research methods”, and they state the importance of multiple data analysis methods on the comprehensiveness of research (Sulaiman et al., 2008: 1). Since the case study manages specific situations in which many variables of interest rather than sole data points occur, multiple sources of evidence provide a more holistic perspective and thus benefit the case study researcher to keep control of the multifarious variables (Sulaiman et al., 2008).

Della Porta and Keating divide case studies into five types; the descriptive case study, the interpretive case study, the hypothesis-generating and refining case study, the deviant case study, and finally theory-evaluating case studies (Della Porta & Keating, 2008: 13). Through a holistic perspective, the interpretivist approach considers cases as complex units, and especially when combined with process tracing, this approach provides an in-depth review of the interaction and interrelation of significant variables under the complexity of the causal mechanisms (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).

This research aims for the interpretive case study since it uses subcultural theories for the explanation of the failure of Calderón's drug war in Mexico, and thus, for the epistemological framework, it will be following the interpretivist approach. Understanding the diversity of cultures and the meanings attributed to events and everyday practices is crucial. As a result, the interpretivist approach would be quite relatable to the research question and helpful in the data analysis process.

1.5.1. The Case Selection

After becoming one of the most dangerous places in Latin America regarding drug-related crimes, the drug war started in Colombia via Andrés Pastrana's adoption of Plan Colombia in 2000. However, even though it reduced drug-related crimes, it did not end organized crime, and most importantly, it resulted in the regional shift of drug trafficking from Colombia to Mexico. The quasi-good outcomes of Plan Colombia have triggered the USA to put pressure on Mexico for it to start a drug war (Bagley and Rosen, 2015).

Nonetheless, the drug war initiated in Mexico has not only failed to reduce drug-related crimes but has also led to profoundly destructive consequences across the country, especially including, increased violence in general, and violent activities of the drug trafficking organizations, in particular, increased torture of the public control agencies, and increased homicide rates. In this regard, since the president who started the drug war was Felipe Calderón in 2006, this paper will focus on the presidency period of Calderón which is from 2006 to 2012.

In this context, to have background information, the first phase of the research will be on the case analysis of the anti-drug policies implemented in Mexico until 2012. Since the main argument of this thesis is to draw attention to the lack of historical analysis and social perspective in the failed state discussions, the second stage of the research intends to reveal the socially excluded structure of several states. Additionally, through the analysis of subculture, the outcomes of the second stage will be utilized and discussed. Finally, in the conclusion section, a comparative analysis between the policy outcomes and the social pattern of drug-related crimes will be completed.

1.5.2. Data Collection and Analysis

The research will be based on secondary data analysis with several data analysis methods. Secondary data analysis, which can be considered as the reevaluation of the previously collected and analyzed data, has been utilized as a data collection method widely among researchers, and it can be quite beneficial for studies within limitations (Chivaka, 2018). Therefore, due to the limitations in terms of economic circumstances, and the limited availability of the data, this research will be mainly supported by secondary data analysis in the context of data collection.

Regarding the political analysis of the anti-drug policies of Calderón's administration, the data will be collected from the governmental datasets and the reports of the Drug Policy Program (PPD in its Spanish acronym) of the Economic Research and Teaching Center (CIDE in its Spanish acronym); the governmental dataset of Justice in Mexico, a Mexican research initiative; and the dataset of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI in its Spanish acronym) of Mexico, besides the data collected from the literature review. The data will be further validated through the help of newspaper articles from the 'Proceso', one of the leftist Mexican newspaper agencies.

Concerning the social analysis of the research, formerly, for the analysis of the patterns of social exclusion, the datasets of the several national surveys published under PPD, and the reports of the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL in its Spanish acronym) will be utilized. Latterly, for the analysis of the patterns of subculture, the data source will be primarily based on the literature review, mostly in which narco-messages between 2006 and 2012, and narco-corrido which is a subgenre of the regional Mexican narrative ballad referring to narcotics are studied.

All the data utilized in the research have been selected following the principles of thematic analysis. In this context, several keywords, such as homicide rates or military seizures, were made use of in the compilation of the data. Furthermore, in terms of temporal selection, the data within the years 2006 and 2012 has been selected.

Regarding data preparation, for the policy analysis, certain data have been presented as merged for the display of a more comprehensive picture and the exposure

of general trends since some of the data were categorized within their datasets, such as seizures, and assigned soldiers. Furthermore, to present increased trends, several raw data have been displayed under a specific formulation. For example, the data on the comparison of total budget and expanses of drug policy have been formulated as "(Year 2 - Year 1) / Year 1". However, such merging processes and formulations of the data may have resulted in information loss during the categorizations, potentially leading to the loss of certain analytical details. For the analysis of social exclusion patterns, the means of the data have been calculated, and the data were visualized based on their positions relative to the mean. Additionally, a scatter plot visualization was employed to facilitate comparisons. Furthermore, the database of the national surveys has been tabularized in terms of the answers given by the interviewees.

In reference to the analysis methods for the gathered data, multiple data analysis methods are employed to ensure the case study's comprehensiveness and control of variables. The data analysis method that will be used for the anti-drug policies is public policy document analysis. In the scope of policy analysis via the data collected through various sources, the public policy tool offered by Bayırbağ (2013) will be utilized. Bayırbağ (2013) suggests that the components of the public policy process consist of seven interrelational stages; policy agenda, institutional area of the policy package, the process of converting the policy package into legal texts, policy implementation process, policy outcomes, consequences of the policy, emerging issues, and policy mobilization. In this regard, the suggested questions by Bayırbağ (2013) will be adapted in terms of Calderón's war on drugs, and the policy evaluation will be conducted in reference to the adjusted categorization.

For the evaluation of social exclusion, comparative analysis will be beneficial. "Comparative research design allows the study of variation in variables that are controlled in the case of a particular society" (Pickvance, 2001: 14). With an emphasis on finding the patterns of similarity or difference, the main purpose of comparative analysis is to explain the causal relationship between more than one variable (Pickvance, 2001). Being one of the four types of comparative analysis, "encompassing comparison" locates distinct occurrences within the scope of a unified system, and elucidates specific traits of such occurrences by examining how they relate to the system (Pickvance, 2001: 16). The data will be analyzed if there is a specific correlation between the variables that occurred at the regional level and the national

level through quantitative comparison. However, it should be noted that these results do not refer to statistical analysis. According to Hancock et al. (2009), several circumstances require a quantitative examination of the qualitative data, such as the count of certain topics or themes emerging in the data, or presentation of the data in tables and figures for a more enlightening data display. Within this framework, the variables of social exclusion will be selected according to Reimer's (2004) two forms of exclusion based on interrelated social relations; market relations and bureaucratic relations, in which the structure of the individuals' connections to accomplish their objectives and build their establishments can lead to the incorporation or exclusion of individuals from different elements of society, such as resource allocation or relationship formation. Market interactions influence the availability of tradable products and services, impacting income levels, employment opportunities, and access to essential public services like education and healthcare; whereas, bureaucratic interactions pertain to civic rights involving legal regulations and hierarchical structure.

For the data that have been collected through the literature review regarding the analysis of subculture, thematic analysis will be utilized. Since the epistemological framework of this paper is interpretivism, the thematic analysis would be helpful in revealing the cultural assets of Mexico. "In many interpretivist orientations, thematic analysis can emphasize the social, cultural, and structural contexts that influence individual experiences, enabling the development of knowledge that is constructed through interactions between the researcher and the research participants, revealing the meanings that are socially constructed" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, as cited in Kiger & Varpio, 2020: 2).

By conducting this research, the writer aims to explain the environment in which drug trafficking takes place and to fill in the lack of relations in the field of study. The expected contribution of this study to the literature is to fill the sociological gap in terms of drug-related policies. By starting with the public policy analysis with different stages of policy creation, implementation, and conclusion, the aim is to create background political information on how drug-related issues have been handled in Mexico during the Calderón administration. Through the examination of the patterns regarding social exclusion, via encompassing comparative analysis, the purpose of this research is to bring into the open the importance of social exclusion in drug-related

crime and violence. The lack of a sociological perspective is further aimed to be fulfilled through secondary data analysis in which the data are derived from the literature. The connection between social deprivation and subculture needs to be researched more comprehensively and further. By revealing the relation between social exclusion and subculture, the lack of empirical data, especially for the Mexican case, can be reduced.

This research can feed new research agendas in terms of suggestive social policy research. The outcomes of the study may also be helpful for policymakers not to keep the same failures of the drug-war agenda. Since Mexico was not the only Latin American country or the first one that encountered the drug war period, it can be said that there is a specific pattern and perspective in relation to the ending process of drug trafficking. However, the social, economic, and political domains that continue to feed organized crime should not be underestimated. Through its findings, the research aspires to bring a sociological point of view to the issue and help reduce drug-related crime and violence in the country.

1.6. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis starts with an introductory section for the study in which the main research problem of the study, the importance of the research, the introduction to the subject of the research, and the methodology of the research are explained. In the methodology section, how the research will be conducted around the conceptual framework created in the previous section will be explained, and thus the research proposal will be acquainted. In this direction, the research will proceed with the qualitative methodology approach and correspondingly, create its case through the case study method. Furthermore, the study will be conducted through three analyses; the first one will deal with the policy analysis, and the second and third analyses will touch on the social dimension, in connection with social exclusion on the one hand, and subculture, on the other.

In the second chapter of the thesis, a conceptual framework is created, and in this regard, four differentiated concepts studied under different disciplines will be introduced. Moreover, the historical developments of these concepts and different perspectives within the concepts are presented, and as a result of the combination of

the aforementioned concepts, the conceptual framework of the research is established. Herein, the main argument of the research is that the concepts in question are related to each other, no matter how separately they are studied.

The political analysis will be presented in the subsequent chapter of the thesis. The first section of the third chapter will be on the policy response toward drug-related crimes on behalf of the institutionalization concept. Moreover, a policy analysis of Calderón's Drug War will be conducted. Finally, the results of the analysis will be concluded concerning the institutionalization process of Mexico.

The following chapter includes social analyses. Firstly, the historicization of drug use and drug trafficking within the country will be introduced to draw a historical pattern. Secondly, the analysis of the patterns of social exclusion in several states of the country will be examined. Thirdly, the social analysis will continue with the analysis of subculture patterns regarding DTOs. Furthermore, the relationship between the two patterns explored will be evaluated. Finally, through the summations and concluding remarks of all the analyses in a reintegrative way, the intention of the explanation of the connection of public policy analysis results with the subcultural pattern formed as a result of social exclusion will be fulfilled.

The last chapter represents the conclusion of the study. In this regard, the place of the concluding remarks of the research in the interdisciplinary plane will be examined and the main purpose, at this point, will reveal the connection of the four concepts which have been studied differently to each other. As a result, the previously summarized socio-political analysis will be concluded through the relation of the analysis results within the argument of Mexico's state fragility under the conceptual framework. Finally, the angles that can be studied in the future will be also suggested. In this regard, the implication of this research for future research agenda will be explored within the context of multiple crises that the contemporary world has been going through. Hence, further research questions concering the scope of 'failure' of the nation-states will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The thesis will revolve around four correlated, although have been studied under separate cover, concepts from different disciplines; ‘institutionalization’, ‘failed state’, ‘social exclusion’, and ‘subculture’. The concept of institutionalization, which emerged under the discipline of sociology and was developed with the discipline of politics, is important to see the development of the internal state structure and the dissemination of the concept of the state on an international level. After the introduction of the dynamics of the nation-state foundations, the concept of failed state will be scrutinized. Primarily developed and studied under the discipline of international relations, the concept of failed states examines the relations of states with one another within the framework of the compliance of nation-states with globalized standards and the work that can be done in this context.

The first two concepts to be introduced in the thesis, while creating a conceptual framework for how Mexico is discussed on a global level, also show how important historical and socio-cultural aspects are for states to understand each other and the situations around them. Therefore, two other concepts that will help to study these two angles in-depth and a narrower approach, the concept of social exclusion and the concept of subculture, have been added to the conceptual framework of the thesis. The concept of social exclusion, which is mostly studied and developed under the disciplines of politics and public administration, focuses on the relationship between the basic civil rights in the formation of nation-states and the responsibilities of the state within this framework and its deceptions. The concept of subculture, which emerged under the discipline of sociology and developed under cultural studies, focuses on the study of the dominant culture and its benefits, such as socially accepted values, judgment, and taste, as well as cultures that are suppressed or formed in opposition.

Although these concepts are studied from various perspectives under different disciplines, this study aims to explore the relation among them. Therefore, it proposes to indicate the importance of how the inner socio-political relations of a country affect the exterior debate. Lastly, the intention is to investigate these four concepts, which are considered different from each other, under the same roof through the qualitative research to be conducted based on the country of Mexico in the following part of the thesis.

2.1. Institutionalization

The institutionalization process has been a matter of concern since the very beginning of the emergence of sociology as a discipline. In this section, the development of the concept and the approaches toward institutional studies will be covered. Furthermore, the differentiation of culture, institution, and structure will be held through an explanation of their relations with one another.

The very first understanding of the discipline of sociology has been the explanation of the 'social' and the 'social system'. "The basic functional classification underlying the whole scheme involves the discrimination of four primary categories: pattern-maintenance, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation, placed in that order in the series of control-relations" (Parsons, 1961: 30). However, Parsons (1961) also notes that it is important to differentiate the structural elements of systems, which are made up of established cultural norms that are separated into functional units. These structural components can be classified based on key concepts such as system values, institutionalized norms, collectivities, and roles. Hence, the attempt to understand how the social system works led to the explanation of how actions have been institutionalized in society. In this regard, the classification of social relations and the institutionalization of action in sociology, starting from the "matter of characterizing the very coherence of different societies -of contrasting sections of it if such there be and of specifying roles available to specific individuals", could be found under the categorizations of; community and society; status and role; solidarity; social organization; and order and authority (Naegele, 1961: 183).

According to Parsons (1961), institutionalization involves a value orientation on a social-system level, in which it requires moral commitments from actors involved

in social-integrative actions, hence, it can be seen as “a mode of the organization of the system of action” (Parsons, 1951/1991: 32). The social system is, thus, a network of interactive relationships, and the most important institutions are those that define the statuses and roles of the parties involved in the interactive process (Parsons, 1951/1991).

In the same manner, in their study of the social reality, Berger and Luckmann (1966), explain how the institutionalization process occurs socially, and in the scope of institutionalization, they discuss the prior four phases of the process; habitualization, objectivation, externalization, and finally, internalization. They discuss the concept of institutionalization and how human behavior becomes habitualized and institutionalized over time. Habitualization implies that a particular action becomes cast into a pattern and can be performed with ease in the future.

According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), institutionalization occurs when habitualized actions are reciprocally typified by types of actors, which create institutions. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones, built up over time, and are subject to social control. Institutionalization is present in the nucleus when a collection of reciprocally typified actions emerges, habitualized for each in roles. With the acquisition of historicity, these formations also acquire another crucial quality: objectivity. An institutional world is experienced as an objective reality, has a history that antedates the individual's birth, and is not accessible to his biographical recollection while the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. The objectivation of the habitualized and institutionalized actions paves the way for the externalization stage for the individual.

The formation of which actors behave in which way under which circumstances create the formation of knowledge, which will be transmitted to further generations, and thus, the institutionalized system, which was originally shaped by human interaction, is then starting to appear to human beings as an external system which they ought to be obeyed. In the end, the individual accepts the institutionalized social system without questioning how the system was created and why specific actions are done by specific actors in specific circumstances which indicates the final phase of the institutionalization process, internalization (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

Subsequent to the sociological prologue, the perspectives of institutionalization vary across different disciplines within the field of social sciences. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that the study of institutions is gaining renewed interest in the social sciences as a reaction to the behavioral revolution, which saw institutions as just the sum of individual properties. Neglecting social context and the durability of social institutions has come at a high cost, especially as institutions have become more complex and important to collective life. The new institutionalist approach, also known as neo-institutionalism, emerged under organizational studies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The New Institutionalism is a research approach that looks at a variety of organizations beyond for-profit businesses, including nonprofit institutions. This approach analyzes these organizations in the context of the social and institutional influences that they are embedded in, such as political, cultural, and economic factors. The New Institutionalism also recognizes that organizations are important social structures that have an impact on society and are influenced by external factors like professions and world polity (Senge, 2013). Especially, new-institutionalist economics, emphasizes that economic organizations are influenced not only by their resource environment but also by the broader social and institutional context that they are a part of (Senge, 2013).

The new institutionalist approach gave rise to three main perspectives, that are historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalism looks at the institutionalization process from a temporal point of view (Thelen, 1999). “Pace and stability, two temporal dimensions of institutionalization, depend on the mechanism used by agents to support the institutionalization process” (Lawrence et al., 2001: 624). Historical institutionalists highlight the role of former institutionalization in the creation of new actors, interests, and incentives (Voeten, 2019).

As opposed to historical institutionalization theory and its focus on particular contextual conditions, rational-choice institutionalism, which is under political discipline explains institutions with an emphasis on them being a coordination mechanism to generate or maintain the status quo (Thelen, 1999). The typical approach of rational choice theory is to look for patterns in political behavior that are operable across different situations and are based on the incentives that individuals have (Thelen, 1999). According to Voeten one of the main issues of rational functionalism

is the issue of rational design, under the international relations discipline, which puts an emphasis on the fact that "states design institutions to efficiently resolve the strategic problems that prevent mutually beneficial cooperation" (Voeten, 2019: 150). In contrast to the rational choice approach and its emphasis on the utility-maximizing political actors and institutions, sociological institutionalism highlights the institutional environment in which institutions emerge and are shaped (von Billerbeck, 2020). According to this perspective, institutions are the focal point of providing material resources and legitimacy. "Within this tradition, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the role of norms, rules, and culture in not only shaping behavior but also constituting the identities and self-images of actors" (von Billerbeck, 2020: 1).

"New institutionalism (NI) may no longer qualify as being 'new'" since in the sequel of three major approaches of new institutionalism, the newest approaches towards institutionalism have emerged; discursive, constructivist, and feminist perspectives (Mackay et al., 2010: 573). First of all, discursive institutionalism helps to understand how ideas and communication impact politics by providing a less stationary perspective towards institutional change, and offers a more flexible way of analyzing how institutions evolve over time (Schmidt, 2008). Secondly, constructivist institutionalism puts the agency at the center of institutional studies (Bell, 2011). The constructivist approach brings back the emphasis on the relationship between interest and identity formation claiming that the interests of the state occur through the interaction with structures (Sterling-Folker, 2000). Finally, feminist institutionalism aims to explore the relationship between gender and political institutions and uses new institutionalist concepts and tools to address key questions of concern to feminist political scientists by acknowledging the limitations of existing paradigms (Mackay et al., 2010). According to Mackay et al. (2010), feminist institutionalism provides important insights into power inequalities in public and political life and institutional continuity and change with the combination of new institutionalist studies.

To sum up, while sociological studies have started the understanding of the institutionalization process based on the importance of interaction, the emergence of the neo-institutionalist perspective gave rise to the importance of rationality and economics in institutional studies. However, recently emerging approaches towards institutionalism bring back the cruciality of culture having an emphasis on "the symbolic character of historically constituted, institutionally-anchored systems of

meaning based on traditions and "paths" rather than instrumental rationality" (Senge, 2013: 89). Based on the articulations of different approaches in institutionalization studies, the argumentation in this thesis will be come into existence from a symbolic perspective, giving importance on the socio-cultural sphere of how institutions have risen and maintained. The preferences and choices made by individuals, as well as fundamental concepts such as "the individual," "the self," and "the state," are shaped by society (Senge, 2013). They are not seen as solely the product of individual decisions or natural laws, in the context of the institutionalization process, as institutional rules.

In this regard, the interrelation of culture, institution, and structure cannot be underestimated. Culture involves all the aspects of human life, such as beliefs and myths, that are acquired and passed down through symbols (Allardt, 1972). It could be seen as "a system of symbols, values, practices, and interests of a group" which is formed by the world outside of such group and their relation to it (Kang et al., 2017: 62). Institution, meanwhile, refers to organized and repeated patterns of behavior, and could be seen as a category between culture and structure (Allardt, 1972). Jepperson (1991) states that while the role of culture in institutionalization is crucial, one should not intermingle the two concepts since culture is not the only factor involved in the creation of institutions. This is because any social structure can be more or less institutionalized, and 'culture' can also be more or less institutionalized depending on its social coordinating effects.

All institutions have social rationales, but this does not mean that institutions should be identified solely with the class of rationales. This confusion may occur since in modern nation-states, institutionalization is often carried out by cultural rules. Therefore, it is better to see institutionalization as an abstract property that can apply to many forms of social coordination. Social structures are shaped by the interaction of culture and institutions (Kang et al., 2017). "Institutional theory and structuration theory both contend that institutions and actions are inextricably linked, and that institutionalization is best understood as a dynamic, ongoing process" (Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 93). Hence, both culture and institution are considered as dynamic in the literature, structure, on the other hand, is related to stability (Sewell, 1992). The structural explanations "all imply that stable patterns of interaction between the members of a society constitute its social structure" (Allardt, 1972: 58). In his critique

of the ambiguity and the abstractness of the term ‘structure’, Sewell (1992) highlights the dual understanding of Giddens explanation of the term as “both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems” (Giddens, 1981: 27, as cited in Sewell, 1992: 4).

Hence while forming societies’ practices, the structure is formed by the common practices as well (Sewell, 1992). Social structures involve socially constructed categories, known as culture, and the rules in which those categories are reflected in the behavioral pattern, known as institutions. Moreover, they play a crucial role in shaping identity and individualistic experiences (Kang et al., 2017). In conclusion, the terms ‘culture’, ‘institution’, and ‘structure’ should be evaluated under the awareness of how they reciprocatively influence one another. The next chapter, in this sense, will highlight the sociocultural perspective of political institutionalization.

2.1.1. The Institutionalization of the Political Sphere:

Within the scope of institutionalization, firstly, the institutionalization of the political sphere will be introduced, and secondly, the institutionalization of the Mexican political realm will be explained.

To begin with, the intention is to make a clear conceptualization of several political themes, such as Empires, nation-states, and democracy, with their relevance to social spheres. In his article “Institutionalization and Change” Eisenstadt (1964), based on the structuralization of the political system and the traditional Empires, constitutes his arguments on how institutionalization serves to change society. He discusses the establishment of empires and how they were initiated by rulers or elites who had political goals and were influenced by the social structures of their respective societies. According to him, these rulers aimed to create a centralized and unified polity in which they could set political goals without being bound by traditional aristocratic, tribal, or patrician groups. The establishment of such systems depended on the existence of specific conditions within the broader society, including a certain level of differentiation in all major institutional spheres (Eisenstadt, 1964).

The arguments of Eisenstadt show the influential role of social establishments at the very beginning of the institutionalization of the political sphere. Furthermore, Meyer et al. (1997) study the institutionalization of the nation-state around four

aspects; properties of the nation-state, the influence of rationalistic world culture, characteristics of world society, and dynamic features of world culture and society. The aspects of nation-state institutionalization, Meyer et al. (1997) clarify, show the importance of culture on the formation of nation-state ideology in contrast to rationalized identities and goals, however, the culture they highlight is the worldwide cultural alteration rather than a contextual micro-based culture of such states. "We see such transnational forces at work throughout Western history, but we argue that particular features and processes characteristic of world society since World War II have greatly enhanced the impact of world-institutional development on nation-states" (Meyer et al., 1997: 148). One can argue that powerful individuals have a significant impact on shaping global culture. However, it's not accurate to claim that institutionalization and change only happen through the intentional actions of these influential actors. This idea relies on the cultural belief that humans are the only ones responsible for driving change in the world, which is not entirely valid. In reality, contemporary global culture is not static and passive, but constantly evolving on its own (Meyer et al., 1997).

Lastly, democracy is a widely popular political movement that is admired by many since it grants freedom to all citizens to participate in government, and its goal is for people to have sovereignty and participate in any political process, however, this is only possible for those who have political awareness (Kambo, 2017). While it is suggested that the institutionalization of democracy is a natural result of a complex and diverse social structure, the critical role of political elites and their ability to persuade society to accept democracy should not be overlooked, therefore, the institutionalization could be reached only after the introduction to democratization (Cirtautas & Mokrzycki, 1993). In their comparative study of the emergence of democracy in the U.S. against its emergence in Poland, Cirtautas and Mokrzycki (1993) concluded that the economic and social order of a country is quite important for the rising and maintenance of an idea. In America, people were willing to fight for their rights and then establish and maintain democracy, whereas, in Poland, the end of communism and the advocacy of natural rights made it difficult for liberal democracy to come and be accepted (Cirtautas & Mokrzycki, 1993). "In the West European and American experience, democracy was both proclaimed and institutionalized by the same social groups. However, in Eastern Europe -most vividly demonstrated in

Poland- the social groups that articulated democracy are the very groups threatened by the institutionalization of democracy in its liberal capitalist form" (Cirtautas & Mokrzycki, 1993: 788). Finally, in their study of the change in environmental protection and nation-states' responses as well as the international organizations towards the protection of the environment, Frank et al. (2000: 99) concluded that "nation-states are enactors of wider world cultural institutions" rather than the unification in the literature for the autonomy of nation-states based on rational interests. In conclusion, various studies illustrate the comprehensiveness of socio-cultural analysis towards political institutionalization, whether this analysis puts an emphasis on the micro-level contexts or the worldwide social sphere.

2.1.2. The Socio-Cultural Analyses of the Mexican Political Realm:

Recently, the concept of institutionalization has gained prominence in the field of comparative politics, especially in the study of political development (Ben-Dor, 1975). More specifically, Latin American countries have been put under the scope of the level of institutionalization after "the third wave of democratization" (cf. Huntington, 1991). "In contemporary Latin America, the euphoria that accompanied initial democratization has now been transformed into concern about whether these democracies can truly be 'consolidated'" (Norden, 2006: 179). As a result, Latin American countries have been considered for their weakening democracies, their deinstitutionalization, and their several cases of total collapse of their party systems. Party systems in Latin America have been agnominated as unstable and fluid, and they have been characterized by a lack of institutionalization (Boulding & Holzner, 2021). In their book, "Building Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America", published in 1995, Mainwaring and Scully claim that comprehending the political parties and party systems of the region involves recognizing their dual role as both influencing social behavior and being influenced by societal changes (cf. Myers, 1996). "Without coherent parties and an institutionalized party system responsive capability remains low and the prospects of democracy are bleak" (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995: 474, as cited in Myers, 1996: 925). Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that having institutionalized parties and party systems does not ensure the establishment of democracy (Myers, 1996).

Modernization is not a smooth or balanced process, but a revolutionary one that undermines existing institutions. Successful institutionalization of change depends on the society's capacity for internal transformation, and not on the revolutionary act itself (Eisenstadt, 1965). The process of establishing new institutions and bringing about change requires an internal transformation within the societies or groups involved. This capacity for transformation is seen in the structural frameworks or cultural symbols that allow groups to mobilize new resources without completely destroying the existing structure. In modern societies, internal transformation is especially important for adapting to changing conditions and problems. In this regard, O'Donnell (1996) examines the concept of 'lack of institutionalization', mainly referring to Latin American countries, and criticizes the literature arguing the fact that 'incomplete' democracies are failing to become consolidated or institutionalized. He states that defining and measuring democratic consolidation or institutionalization, particularly in cases where there is a gap between formal rules and actual behavior is quite challenging, and he suggests that rather than the negative emphasis in the literature, a more positive-driven analysis would be more helpful for the popularly referred lack of institutionalizations. The positive-driven analysis could be possible after a historicization of nation-states.

The deficiency in institutionalization in Latin American countries extends its concerns to Mexico as well. In this regard, modernization debates in the context of Mexico provides a significant accumulation for the understanding of the lack of institutionalization within the country. Hence, just as in the case of the broader Latin American region, it is crucial to examine the formation of the political structure in the context of Mexico as well since "Mexico's challenges toward consolidating democracy can be traced back to how the state derived its legitimacy and power" (Acevedo, 2013: 521). Ideological conflict, hierarchical structure, and institutional constraints serve as crucial insights into the issues the Mexican state faces today (Acevedo, 2013). While individual explanations such as education and income levels could help the clarification of political participation, the larger picture requires an analysis of institutional mechanisms that enable or inhibit participation at the local, state, and national levels (Acevedo, 2013). The historical and ongoing conflict between liberalism and conservatism in Mexico during the revolution and beyond manifested in political and social upheavals (Beezley & MacLachlan, 2009). The

hierarchical structure, which was determined by race and socioeconomic status, and which reinforced unequal power distribution during Spanish colonial rule in Mexico, remains a characteristic of Mexico today (Acevedo, 2013). Moreover, the history of colonialism and class-based inequality raised difficulties in Mexico's institutional development (Acevedo, 2013).

In conclusion, despite the common arguments on Mexican political fragility in the literature, the counter-emphasis on the socio-cultural study remains. "… It is both possible and desirable to give greater priority to the unevenness of global processes, in terms of the object of analysis as well as the gents of knowledge" (Slater, 1998: 669).

2.2. Failed State

The roots and the historical development of the concept of failed state could be summarized in three interconnected aspects: the theoretical root, the conceptual root, and the circumstantial root. The theoretical root is related to certain theories that shaped the debate of failed states while the conceptual root refers to the trends and perceptions of the literature towards failed states. Finally, the aspect of circumstantial root revolves around the incidents that either started or gave rise to the 'weak', 'failed', and 'fragile' states. Chronologically, the earlier stages of the failed state debate were based on the Darwinian principles of emerging states which could be deduced from Lord Salisbury's 'Dying Nations speech' in 1898 (Morton, 2005). In that period, the perspective against 'weak nations' or 'dying nations' was around the fear of threat against Britain, and thus, the discussion of state failure was a concern of a "novel development" (Couch, 2013: 154). Later, the case of Somalia ushered the analysis of 'state failure' from the point of the fear of threat against post-Cold-War order in the early 1990s. The 'domino theory' of the Cold War resurged within the axis of state failure, and the significance of failed state discussion became a humanitarian issue. "Strong Societies and Weak States" by Joel Migdal (1988), in which he analyzed the abilities of states to perform their necessary tasks and evaluated the capabilities of third-world states concerning these tasks, is an important work in the early development of the failed states thesis (Solomon, 2013). This study could be seen as pivotal in terms of determining the indicators of state failure and understanding the

relationship between state capabilities and the tasks required of them. Finally, the fact that "the attacks of September 11th brought 'failed states' into the top tier of US security interests" (Call, 2008: 1493) transformed the failed state discussion into a matter of the fear of global terrorism and instability, and academically, the theoretical concern "has shifted to the risk of 'transnational spill-overs' with associated security implications" (Couch, 2013: 154). A summarized explanation of the route of the concept of 'failed state' in terms of its theoretical, conceptual and circumstantial development can be observed in Table 1.

Table 1 *The Rotation of the Failed State Debate*

(Source: Morton, 2005; Call, 2008; Couch, 2013.)

Theoretically	Conceptually	Circumstantially
Darwinian principles of emerging states	the matter of a novel development	1898 'Dying Nations' Speech of Lord Salisbury (British Prime Minister)
'Domino Theory' of the Cold War Era	the matter of a humanitarian issue	The early 1990s The case of Somalia
A risk of transnational spill-overs with security implications	the matter of a global threat	2001 The Attacks of September 11th

Dursun (2020) summarizes Bueger and Bethke's (2014) academic division of the concept failed state; while the concept started as a general mention in the 1980s, it became wider in the 1990s. Later on, "it was globalized and securitized in the early 2000s; and a double trend of homogenization through quantification and heterogenization through criticism" started afterward (Dursun, 2020: 18). Finally, after the lexical critiques on the concept 'failed', the concept was changed to 'fragile', especially by the Fund for Peace Institution which is known for its Failed State Index (FSI) since 2005, and both the academic and the indexical usage of the concept started to be mentioned as 'fragile state' starting on 2014 (Hendry, 2014).

"States exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to the citizens living within its designated territory" (Solomon, 2013: 221). States' being weak, fragile, failing, failed, or even collapsed is assumed when they fail

to deliver those political goods "such as security, education, health services, and economic opportunity; a legal framework of order; a judicial system to administer it; and basic infrastructure requirements", and lose the trust of their citizens (Couch, 2013: 156; Solomon, 2013). In this regard, the continuum of states' health could be evaluated as while strong states have control over their territories and provide a range of high-quality political goods and security, weak states struggle with internal conflicts, poor management, and inter-communal tensions, leading to a decrease in their ability to provide political goods and security. Failed states, beyond that, are characterized by deep conflict, danger, and warring factions, making them unstable and contested (Couch, 2013). The final stage in the continuum for a state is the category of 'collapsed state', which could be seen as "a total vacuum of authority" (Couch, 2013: 154).

Even though the emergence and decline of nation-states is not a recent phenomenon, in the present era where national states are the fundamental units of global governance, the violent collapse and obvious fragility of certain African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states pose a significant threat to the basic framework of the international system (Rotberg, 2004). Hereof, the common assumption of the failed state discussion revolves around the fact that the presence of yesterday's 'weak states', today's 'fragile states' poses a difficulty for the global governance system.

The effectiveness of the international system relies on the presence of powerful states that have the capability to provide essential services to their citizens, represent them, regulate activities within their borders, and maintain international standards, agreements, and treaties (Morton, 2012). On the other hand, "weak and failing state provide a breeding ground for international crime, harbour terrorists and threaten the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals with the spread of HIV/AIDS, refugee flows and poverty" (Benn, 2004, as cited in Morton, 2005: 372).

For the analysis of state fragility, a deepened version of the indicators according to Call (2008: 1495) could be listed below:

- Civil wars characterized by enduring violence,
- Disharmony between communities,
- Loss of control over peripheral regions to out-groups,
- Growth of criminal violence, including gangs, and trafficking of arms and guns,
- Cessation of functioning legislatures and judiciaries,
- Informal privatization of education, health, and other social services,

- Loss of legitimacy,
- Declining per capita GDP, with associated soaring smuggling and the supplanting of the national currency with external money,
- Pressures deriving from high population density,
- History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices,
- Institutionalised political exclusion,
- A drop in GNP,
- The appearance of private militias or guerrillas or
- Higher poverty rates for some ethnic groups

Failed state symptoms on the other hand, according to Western understanding, are instances of deviancy, aberration, and breakdown, as well as crime and corruption (Morton, 2005; Couch, 2013). Alongside the indicators of a failed state, according to Morton (2005), the disintegration of state structures in post-colonial states, which will be discussed further, results in; state failure, degeneration, chaos, and anarchy. In light of these indicators, the Fragile (Failed) State Index (FSI) by the Fund for Peace, as mentioned above, could be seen as the most recognizable annual state fragility report.

The five main indicators of the Fragile State Index (The Fund for Peace, 2022) are Cohesion, Economic, Political, Social, and Cross-Cutting Indicators with their sub-dimensions, being as varied as brain drain, increased corruption, human rights violations, etc. (Solomon, 2013). From among those dimensions, the fragility of the nation-states is measured and reported. However, "it is according to their performances—according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed ones" (Rotberg, 2004: 2).

2.2.1. Failed State Debate in the Literature:

"Weak and failing states will remain a condition of the global environment over the next quarter of a century" (JOE, 2008: 35). As stated, according to the 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) report by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), fragile countries present serious challenges to planners due to the large-scale human suffering that often spreads throughout the region and even has the potential to affect the entire globalized world. The report gives quite an emphasis on globalization, especially for a 'peaceful cooperative world', and in this regard, the possibility of certain countries' being left behind by globalization is considered to be

one of the reasons for state failure, and thus, the report recognizes the possible need for an 'international array of economic, diplomatic, and military resources to establish or sustain stability' (JOE, 2008: 14). Along the same line, Kassab and Rosen (2019) argue that in a globalized world, insecurity in one state can quickly spread to neighboring states and beyond, becoming a global problem. It posits that the weakest units of the international system have a significant impact on its overall health. If a weak state fails to address threats like terrorism or organized crime, it can easily spread beyond its borders. Therefore, they suggest that states must work together to address threats to their mutual sovereignty (Kassab & Rosen, 2019).

Moreover, the book "When States Fail: Causes and Consequences" by Robert I. Rotberg (2004) could be considered a pioneering work for the concept of failed state due to its deep analysis and comprehensive explanations. Before offering policy recommendations for preventing state failure and rebuilding order in failed states, Rotberg (2004) examines the causes of state failure, including poverty, corruption, and violent conflict, and explores the consequences of state failure both regional and global, including the spread of disease, the rise of terrorism and organized crime, and the displacement of populations. The main argument of the book is that state failure is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, caused by a combination of political, economic, and social factors that interact with each other creating symptoms of state failure (Rotberg, 2004).

As mentioned above, fragile states are seen as a global threat to the international system, also being mainly a threat to stable nation-states, and various policy studies, and thus suggestions have been made by both strong states with the supranational organizations and the academia. The concern about how to understand the nature of state fragility and how to overcome the threat fragile states pose to the global system is still a widespread topic in the literature. However, there are diversified disagreements on the prevalent acknowledgment of the failed state concept, and how to cope with the issue in the literature.

Before getting into the common discussion, Adam Morton's study of "The 'Failed State' of International Relations" should be covered considering this thesis will be articulated mainly around his arguments. The article explores the concept of failed states and its implications for international relations theory. The main argument of Morton (2005) is that the concept reflects a specific Western view of statehood that is

often applied to postcolonial states, which could be traced back to colonialism and imperialism. Western concerns about 'failed states' are based on a flawed perspective that sees postcolonial states as abnormal and in a state of breakdown. This view is also prevalent in the field of International Relations (IR) theory, where many states are labeled as 'quasi-' or 'failed states' as a courtesy, despite not meeting the strict definition of a state. As he begins by explaining the origin of the concept from the late 1890s, he states that "imperialism was seen as a biological process that, according to the laws of nature," would lead to the 'curing or cutting up' of weak states, equated with failing 'patients' ready for autopsy" (Morton, 2005: 371).

Similarly, coming to the present debate of the concept, Morton (2005) asserts that the discussion surrounding failed states is based on presumed expectations about the limited capacity of postcolonial states which make them weak, and failed states are often viewed as the omen of global instability and terrorism. He further argues that the failed state concept perpetuates a myth of state failure that is not supported by empirical evidence and that obscures the complex social, economic, and political processes that underlie state formation and development. Additionally, he critiques the way the "failed states" discourse has been used to justify Western intervention in the affairs of other states in the way that it reinforces colonial notions of superiority and inferiority and serves as a pretext for the justification considering the fact that "postcolonial states are still seen pathologically as the main sources of instability and disorder that threaten the security concerns of the West" (Morton, 2005: 377).

Morton suggests that the "failed state" discourse reflects a deeply problematic and paternalistic attitude toward postcolonial states and that the concept should be abandoned. He argues that international relations theory needs to take a more nuanced and historically grounded approach to the study of statehood and state failure, one that recognizes the diversity of state forms and the complex social dynamics that shape them because of its role in shaping policy decisions and perpetuating global inequality. "In a nutshell, a thorough historicization of state formation processes in the postcolonial world is required that is cognisant of the political economy within which such states exist" (Morton, 2005: 372). In the historicization process he suggests, Morton argues that one should analyze different historical processes of state formation, and he explains the dynamic linkage between state formation and its affiliated form of sovereignty, which refers to the political analysis, and conditions of capital

accumulation, which refers to the economic analysis since the former has occurred enclosed by a global division of labor that was formed by the latter. Conditions of capital accumulation, "within which different processes of production were combined in colonial territories", involves the process of uneven and combined development, a concept suggested by Ernest Mandel, primitive accumulation, capitalist-precapitalist-semicapitalist relations, and extraversion concept suggested by Jean-François Bayart (Morton, 2005: 375).

Through the acknowledgment of the fact that capitalism is grounded by primitive accumulation in the West, one can realize that there have been different forms of primitive accumulation that have taken place in colonial and semi-colonial territories within the framework of an emerging capitalist mode of production. This understanding of different characteristics of capital accumulation according to different regions could finally lead to a distinctive analysis between ongoing processes of capital accumulation in advanced capitalist states and ongoing primitive accumulation in postcolonial states that face different development conditions. To summarize his arguments, it is a matter of concern to redirect attention away from pathologies of deviancy, abnormalities, and breakdowns when examining failed states, "in order better to appreciate the centrality of strategies of primitive accumulation, redistribution and political legitimacy that unfold in the uneven and combined conditions of development that shape postcolonial state sovereignty" (Morton, 2005: 376).

Moving on to the general disagreements of the concept of failed state in the literature after Adam Morton, the first critique about the concept is the notion and the definition of it. The common discussion is on the name 'fail' in the concept that paved the way for the change as 'fragile', which appears insufficient in addressing the core issue. The name leads to an aggregation of state functionings and expectations regardless of different nation-state formations (Solomon, 2013). It is not appropriate to apply the indicators of failed states and their solutions indiscriminately to each nation-state that has been categorized as 'failed', 'failing', or 'fragile' considering different political, social, and economic realms (Call, 2008). The reason for deficient concern of diverse statehood realms brings the second critique on the failed state concept which is paternalism. Morton (2012) suggests that the concept of 'failed states' assumes that achieving statehood is a universal process, based on Western

ideals of development and sovereignty. It is quite difficult to overlook the teleological presumption and the Western-centric bias inherent in the discourse surrounding ‘failed states’ (Call, 2008). The notion of a state based on values creates an opportunity for condescension and a superior attitude, in essence paving the way for a patronizing approach (Solomon, 2013). "…States are 'bad' because they have failed some externally defined test" (Call, 2008: 1499).

The third critique is the incompetency of the analyses as well as the ambiguity of the explanations and thus, the inflexibility of the potential proposals which are also other outcomes of the Western-based suppositions. “Precisely what the differences in the failed state thesis are between quasi, weak, collapsed and failed states remains unclear and represents an important ambiguity within the failed state thesis” (Solomon, 2013: 232). The concept of failed states can hinder and misdirect objective analysis as it incorporates culturally biased assumptions regarding the characteristics of a successful state hence it categorizes dissimilar states with diverse challenges, resulting in misdirected, simplistic policy recommendations that are internally focused (Solomon, 2013).

More specifically, according to Call (2008), there is a recurrent discussion of specific concepts aimed at addressing state failure, without a critical evaluation of whether these concepts have demonstrated efficacy in the context of those states. Some concepts that illustrate his argument include establishing, improving, and maintaining order, notwithstanding the current order being inequitable or malfunctioning; dodging democracy and democratization without raising any queries or challenges to the prevailing regime; the persistent amalgamation of the concepts of peace and states, despite that they may not relate to one another in each case; lastly, the intention to create stronger military or to develop police capacity (Call, 2008). "It is not clear how a stronger military or police capacity … will ensure a rise in GNP, less corruption, more equity among ethnic groups, less subordination to ruling elites, or improved human rights performance" (Call, 2008: 1497).

The last critique is West’s role in states’ fragility. By being paternalistic, the label of ‘failed states’ ignores the West's historical role in the condition of these states. This labeling omits the effects of colonialism and exploitation on the governance and poverty of societies currently considered fragile or failing (Call, 2008). The fact that the current impoverished and poorly governed states labeled as fragile or failing are

the product of the historical impacts of colonialism and exploitation unveils the importance of understanding the post-colonial statehood formation and the economic sphere of post-colonial countries.

After the evaluation of the critiques, the suggestions for handling the failures of the failed state theory should be discussed as well. To begin with, the issue of inadequate consideration of various state formations both in the assessment of the failed state concept and the consummation of the feasible policies could be overcome by the historicization process, that has been covered previously, Morton (2005) suggests. By utilizing several aspects of Morton's (2005) work as a starting point, Call (2008) develops specific categorizations for nation-states based on their socio-political realm and proposes alternative concepts that could be employed instead of the term 'failed state' for each respective country.

Four categories as alternatives for ‘failed state’ include; collapsed states, weak states, war-torn states, and lastly authoritarian states/regimes. Firstly, collapsed states refer to countries that are not internationally recognized in the global system. Secondly, based on power relations, the concept of weak states reflects the countries harboring non-state actors or organizations as opposed to the state’s overall power. Thirdly, war-torn states, as implied by the name, indicate the countries that struggle with any internal or external chaos that turns into war. Lastly, authoritarian states/regimes imply the countries in which the regimes that gained power through violence tend to establish strong control that limits opposition through repression, resulting in low levels of political or criminal violence.

2.2.2. Discussion of Mexico’s State Fragility:

Mexico is a country that has tremendous potential as it has a large population, vast territory, and access to two oceans. Yet this country has been plagued by drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption (Kassab & Rosen, 2019: 105). According to Rotberg (2004), the growth of criminal violence is one of the indicators of state failure since while the authority of the state and law enforcement weakens, the criminal gangs take over the power of the streets. Hence the police forces become crippled for the protection of the streets and the citizen. “For protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords and other strong figures who express or activate ethnic or clan solidarity, thus

offering the possibility of security at a time when all else, including the state itself, is crumbling" (Rotberg, 2004: 6).

Moreover, West (2006: 8) argues that organized crime should be considered as an indicator of state failure by looking at the issue from a different angle. "Organized crime also serves as a proximate cause of state failure by feeding on some of its symptoms and key grievances: poverty and insecurity". In 2012, Mexico was considered to be under 'High Alert States' with a score of 73.6 (The Fund for Peace, 2012). While overall, the capacity of the state is under the status of 'Moderate', for the indicators of 'Police' and 'Judiciary', the state seems under the status of 'Weak' (The Fund for Peace, 2012). As a result, the outcome the of FSI Report appears to spur Rotberg's arguments.

Additionally, according to the 2008 JOE report by USJFCOM, Pakistan, and Mexico are considered countries that tend to experience rapid and unexpected collapse. Even though the possibility of Mexico's collapse may seem less likely, the ongoing attacks and pressure from criminal organizations and DTOs on certain institutions, including the government, politicians, police, and judiciary, could have severely adverse consequences for the stability of the nation in the near future (JOE, 2008). The fact that as the fragility of a nation-state rises, the international threat of such nation-state in the global sense, and thus the responsibility of stable states' intervention upsurges concordantly has been covered in the previous part of this section. The same principle is valid for the case of Mexico as well. In this regard, the Joint Operating Environment report emphasizes the damage of criminal gangs and DTOs on Latin America's growth. Notably, the increase in capabilities of criminal organizations in terms of the political and economic sphere may create a national security threat for the Western Hemisphere. In particular, the increasing attacks by DTOs on the Mexican government in recent years imply that an unstable Mexico could pose a significant homeland security issue for the United States. "Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone" (JOE, 2008: 36).

Figure 2 demonstrates the rates of Mexico according to the FSI within several indicators, chosen in accordance with the research subject, between the years 2006 and 2012. The selected indicators are security apparatus, group grievance, economic

inequality, state legitimacy, public services, and human rights. The total rate of the country is also presented as a line in the figure as well. As illustrated from the figure, the fragility rate of Mexico decreased from 2006 to 2008, during the first two years of the drug war, and rose from 2008 to 2010, until the decline was observed again after 2010. The reasoning behind the indicators is based on the appearance of anti-state factors. For example, some of the questions in the 'security apparatus' indicator includes the existence of the paramilitas, or if certain territories were controlled by guerillas (The Fund for Peace, 2017). The highest rate in all the years can be observed in the field of 'economic inequality'. Furthermore, the indicators of 'security apparatus', and 'human rights' have only risen after 2009, yet 'human rights' have been relatively low despite the high level of human rights violations during the drug war widely discussed in the research papers.




Figure 2 *The Rates of Mexico in Several Indicators according to FSI between 2006 and 2012*

(Source: The dataset of Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace.)

Although most of the military operations, which were conducted on behalf of the drug war, and initiated mostly in the first three years of Calderón's administration, both the low levels of 'security apparatus', and 'human rights', and the decline of the total rate of the country indicates that either the data collected in the scope of the index is temporally lagging or the index overlooks the effects of the internal incidents. As

opposed to the studies and reports stating that the Mexican state is fragile and on the edge of becoming failed due to its criminal atmosphere and judicial issues, it is possible to observe certain arguments indicating the unlikeliness of such a poor transition of Mexico and the underestimated aspects of the study of state failure in terms of Mexican context.

To begin with, there is a debate revolving around the fact that whether an increase in criminal and violent incidents in a country is supposed to be considered a cause or a symptom of a failed state. According to Couch (2013), corruption and crime are alleged to be analyzed as effects of state failure rather than the origins of it.

In addition, counter to the JOE report (2008), he cultivates his argument with the examples of how China, Italy, Japan, and Russia have not been considered as possible failed states even though the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob led to excessive violence and corruption in their countries for centuries (Couch, 2013). He also reminds the criminal sphere involving corruption in the U.S. itself. "Organized crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems, and police forces ran their own 'rackets' rather than enforcing the law. Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure" (Couch, 2013: 155). Secondly, the historical understanding of the informal institutions and how they interact with formal institutions both within certain regions and throughout the country and a comprehensive distinction between the two should be analyzed carefully. Call (2008) indicates that the crucial distinction among states should be on how much the informal institutions hold power against formal institutions rather than them being 'failing', 'failed', or 'successful'. For Mexico's circumstance, the fact that the Mexican state faces the risk of losing its control over certain areas mainly due to the expanded activities of DTOs puts Mexico at the risk of 'failed cities' (Couch, 2013).

However, in certain states, the power of informal institutions such as tribes, patron-client networks, or ethnically based networks is equal to formal state institutions (Call, 2008). Using the term "weak states" could be appropriate where those informal institutions defeat the formal institutions in terms of providing services to citizens, however, the former could be solely holding power in several regions or for several groups instead of the whole country in some states, and thus, it would be incorrect to categorize such states as 'failing' (Call, 2008).

Furthermore, Morton (2012) claims that there is an argument suggesting that the "anti-state forces", as it is implied in the literature, often function akin to states in the areas they control. They provide welfare services and establish rudimentary justice systems while simultaneously engaging in criminal enterprises. According to reports, the Sinaloa cartel is involved in a mixture of organized criminal activities including drug trafficking, cargo theft, prostitution, and even avocado cultivation as part of their business interests (Morton, 2012). In addition to the relation of power and spatiality, Call adds an essential perspective to his statement: “The problem of low state capacity generally reflects long colonial histories more than sudden crises, although factors such as economic shocks, terms of trade, and corrupt or incompetent rule make a difference” (Call, 2008: 1502). He claims that in this perspective, it is crucial to understand if the formal institutional capacity has ever existed in a nation-state and if its capacity could be effectively utilized after a crisis.

The aforementioned viewpoint leads to the third critique against the lack of analysis in Mexico's state failure discussion; the significance of historicization including the analysis of social construction, in the first place, and the spatiality, in the second. Morton argues that the state fragility in Mexico could be neither studied nor understood without “the underlying historical patterns of development, isolated from the political economy and the social relations constituting Mexican society” (Morton, 2012: 1632). Through his statement, Morton (2012) highlights the socially constructed aspect of statehood by pointing out its dynamic nature in relation to countries’ geographical formation.

Likewise, while criticizing the ineffective policy implementation in the Mexican Drug War, Couch (2013) claims that even though there are several efforts to reform the judicial system in Mexico, the implementation and the cultural shifts create challenges. An example of his statement could be the policy implementation against corruption. According to Kassab and Rosen (2019), the process of reforming institutions is a challenging task that requires significant effort and political will. While countries in Central America and Mexico face several challenges regarding the fragility of their state institutions and while the citizens have little trust in institutions and corrupt politicians, there is still an ongoing benefit gained from maintaining the status quo. Without combating corruption, impunity, and inequality, organized crime is likely to continue to flourish in these countries (Kassab & Rosen, 2019).

In the second place, Morton (2012) discusses the contradictions of state space in Mexico, which can be understood through an entwining of spatial scales that are nested within territorial spaces, and linked to geopolitical factors such as the restructuring of the cocaine commodity chain and the neoliberal restructuring accompanied by the death of the PRI state.

Along the same line, Couch (2013) explores the ostensible causes of state failure in Mexico due to corruption and transnational organized crime, including DTOs. He questions the 2008 JOE Report's speculation that Mexico was in danger of becoming a collapsed state and argues that there are threats to Mexico's aspiration to become a legitimate democratic state. The focus on a body count in measuring success or failure is deemed inappropriate, and he highlights the complexity of the DTOs' situation in Mexico compared to Colombia. Mexican involvement in the drug trade has a long history, and DTOs' power has grown since the dismantling of the Colombian cartels. Mexico is struggling to establish the rule of law and democracy in the face of widespread corruption and drug-related commerce. He also claims that the issues Mexico is struggling with are a matter of national threat rather than an international one as opposed to the aforementioned report (Couch, 2013).

The fact that Mexico's problematic atmosphere with DTOs is unlikely to be solved in the same way as Colombia's demonstrates the importance of both spatial and the al analysis in understanding and solving the problem. The last critique includes the economic growth of Mexico. Kassab and Rosen (2019) state that the fact that Mexico holds the 15th largest GDP in the world displays the falsity of considering Mexico as a failed state. Moreover, they argue that during a specific period, Mexico was even achieving higher standards than the economy in the U.S.. "The National Statistics Institute, or Inegi, said Thursday that first-quarter gross domestic product grew 4.6% from the first-quarter of 2011, with industrial production up 4.5%, services up 5%, and agricultural production 6.8% higher. The increase was above the 4.3% median estimate of 14 economists polled by Dow Jones Newswires" (Harrup, 2012, as cited in Kassab & Rosen, 2019: 122).

To sum up, the ambiguity of whether criminal activities and violence are a cause or not, the lack of emphasis on the power relations between informal and formal institutions, the underestimation of historicization, and the neglect of economic growth pave the way for inadequate understanding and narrowed policy implementations

towards the fragility of the Mexican state. A deeper analysis including a closer look at several selection of indicators will be conducted on Mexico's fragility in the forthcoming sections.

2.3. Social Exclusion

The emergence of nation-states and thus the supranational organizations, especially the European Union, paved the way for the study of 'social exclusion'. The concepts of marginalization, poverty, and exclusion, though there is little attribution to exclusion, have been on the agenda in developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which could be because these concepts have emerged from the 'less-industrialized' world (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997; Peace, 2001; Daly & Silver, 2008). However, its mistaken and narrow usage to describe several issues related to poverty, deprivation, and difficulty makes social exclusion a challenging term in the literature (Peace, 2001). "… Originally developed in France by sociologists", the concept has been taken into account in the academic discourse as well as in the European Union agenda in the mid-1980s and has become widespread in the literature after the 1990s (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997: 414; Peace, 2001). Hence, the European Union Poverty Programmes led to the emergence of the concept mainly because when European policymakers needed a term for a new social policy that did not carry negative connotations like 'poverty' and 'deprivation', and an exclusive approach, they settled on 'social exclusion' (Peace, 2001). Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) divide the root of the concept of 'social exclusion' into two ideologies: the Republican and the Liberal perspective. The fact that the French Republican perspective viewed social exclusion in strong reference to solidarity in which the role of the state is crucially linked to the implication of social exclusion to the failure of the Republican State.

Whereas according to the Liberal paradigm, the exclusion stems from choices made by individuals, their interests, agreements between parties, or problems within the system, such as discrimination, market inefficiencies, and ignored rights since the view is based on the assumption that society is a large group of individuals who compete with each other in the sphere of the market (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). In conclusion, while the Republican paradigm establishes the understanding of exclusion around the relation of the individual and society based on the political realm, the latter

considers exclusion from the individual relational point of view based on the economic realm. Moving towards the present day, one could encounter two versions of the concept of social exclusion according to Peace (2001); the explanation that examines exclusion within economic relationships, originating from income poverty, and a broader framework that views exclusion as a process and attributes its causes to various factors such as multiple deficiency, broken family and social ties, and loss of identity and purpose. The latter explanation emphasizes the multiple levels and dimensions of exclusion while the former is more narrowed (Peace, 2001). "Paradoxically it seemed that the policies deriving from the new discourse of "social exclusion" were capable of ensuring that some groups and individuals were being excluded even from the discourse of exclusion" (Peace, 2001: 19). However currently, social exclusion is understood and studied in relevance to its multifaceted uniqueness (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997; Shucksmith & Chapman, 1998; Peace, 2001; Reimer, 2004).

Social exclusion implies a crucial "division in society as one between an included majority and an excluded minority" (Levitas, 1998: 7). More specifically, according to Reimer (2004), social exclusion is a complex concept that involves being excluded from various institutions, social groups, specific benefits, or events. He sees the attributes of social exclusion as "multidimensional, dynamic, multileveled, and relational" (Reimer, 2004: 76). It is a multi-dimensional and dynamic concept that refers to a breakdown or malfunctioning of the major societal systems that should guarantee the social integration of the individual or household which includes the democratic and legal system, promoting civic integration; the labor market, promoting economic integration; the welfare state system, promoting social integration; and the family and community system, promoting interpersonal integration, as well as it is dependent on the time, place, and circumstances since inclusion is often based on a history of acceptable behavior of varying criteria of different settings (Shucksmith & Chapman, 1998; Reimer, 2004). It can also occur at multiple levels, where inclusion in one group may imply exclusion from a larger group. As a result, it is important to understand that social exclusion is not an isolated condition of individuals but is rather intertwined with the relationships they have with others, showing its relational characteristic (Reimer, 2004).

Before moving on to the explanations of the dimensions of social exclusion, the fact that it is related to distributional and relational factors makes it closer to the

notion of poverty, and marginalization in terms of their study areas (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). Hence, a differentiation among the notions of 'social exclusion', 'poverty', and 'marginalization' should be made. To begin with, poverty is an "outcome, denoting an inability to share in the everyday lifestyles of the majority because of a lack of resources" (Shucksmith & Chapman, 1998: 230, as cited in Madanipour et al., 2015: 724-725). According to Room (1995), social exclusion is distinct from poverty in several ways. Firstly, social exclusion is a more expansive notion than poverty. The European Union adopted the term social exclusion for both political and conceptual reasons, as the concept of poverty was considered insufficient. Welfare states in Europe provide a minimum income and basic services, rendering an income-based notion of poverty too inflexible and limited to address social issues effectively (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). Secondly, it is a matter of relationships, pertaining to participation, power, and integration, rather than being solely a matter of finances since it extends beyond individuals to encompass families, households, and neighborhoods (Room, 1995). Unlike the notion of poverty, which is predominantly concerned with the distribution of resources, social exclusion centers on relational matters, such as disconnection from the labor market, low levels of participation, and social isolation, and thus, the idea of social exclusion encompasses but surpasses factors like income levels or access to services like education, health, and housing (Madanipour et al., 2015). "It is less about the 'victims' and more about the processes which cause exclusion" (Madanipour et al., 2015: 725).

Furthermore, the social aspect of social exclusion studies could lead up to confusion with the concept of 'marginalization'. In his article, Singh (2010) discusses the three categories of citizenship rights identified by Marshall: civil, political, and social rights, nonetheless, he states that while citizenship is meant to ensure that everyone is treated equally and fully participates in society, marginalization can occur based on factors such as race, caste, sex, or religion. Welfare states secure the sense of full membership and participation in society for all individuals by ensuring their civil, political, and social rights. The withholding or violation of any of such rights leads to the marginalization of people and their inability to engage in the socio-political activities of society, which would end up in social exclusion (Singh, 2010). Moreover, as will be discussed in detail further in this section, Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) study marginalization under the social aspect of exclusion. Lastly, Daly and Silver (2008:

539) claim that social exclusion is studied as an expansion of the marginalization area, although the former "is concerned with full participation in all aspects of social life as an end in itself".

In his study of the relational aspect of society and economics in order to understand economic transformation, Polanyi (2001) lays an emphasis on reciprocity and redistribution. According to him, by ensuring the efficient production and distribution of goods without relying on economic institutions, the principles of reciprocity and redistribution operate within social contexts and are supported by institutional patterns. Reciprocity is mainly applicable to family and kinship relationships, while redistribution is effective in territorial contexts where people are under a common chief. Economic behavior is shaped by social organization, and the orderly functioning of the economic system relies on a variety of individual motives disciplined by general principles of behavior, where profit is not the most important motive (Polanyi, 2001). Based on Polanyi's reciprocal and redistributional explanation, Reimer suggests that "social exclusion can be best understood as a feature of four fundamental types of social relations: market, bureaucratic, associative, and communal" (Reimer, 2004: 78). He suggests that these four aspects in which people organize their relationships to achieve their goals and establish their institutions can result in both inclusion and exclusion of people from various aspects of society, such as the distribution of resources or the formation of relationships. Firstly, for Reimer (2004), market relations involve the exchange of goods and services through a free and information-rich context, and it is most effective when all actors have control over resources, information is plentiful, and trust is high, nonetheless, integration into market relations requires access to tradeable goods or services, good negotiation skills, and mobility.

In addition to Reimer's approach, Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) claim that the economic approach to exclusion focuses on how some people are excluded from income, employment, and basic needs such as housing, health, and education. Secondly, bureaucratic relations are based on formal rules and regulations and involve a hierarchical structure, and distribution in these relations is based on the allocation of rights and entitlements through legal documents, and integration requires deference to others based on their position. Bureaucratic relations are resistant to change and can exclude individuals and groups through the formulation of objectives and

organizational structures, as well as requiring individuals and groups to meet the conditions of formal structures (Reimer, 2004). Likewise, Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) state the influence of the institutional context in which society-based circumstances occur when studying social exclusion. Thirdly, associative relations are based on shared interests and objectives, which can be formal or informal and can take various forms, often addressing long-term goals. The distribution of resources is based on acceptance of the group objectives, and social exclusion can occur due to limited information about others' interests or insufficient contribution to the group goals. Lastly, communal relations are based on shared identity and provide equal treatment to all members based on inherent characteristics. Obligations in communal relationships are complex and long-term, with goods and services distributed based on need, age-gender status, or personal loyalties. Social exclusion in communal relations arises when there is reduced personal trust or challenges to identity, and trust is crucial to these relationships. The failure to reciprocate can undermine trust, and changes in communication and mobility are important for maintaining these relationships. To sum up, all of the relations have internal consistency and are reinforced by norms, values, and laws. They are not isolated from each other and may operate together in a specific situation. However, there can be conflicts between the demands of different types of relations, such as between associative and bureaucratic relations or between market and associative relations (Reimer, 2004).

Finally, once the understanding of social exclusion is achieved in the literature, the resolution phase begins. In this regard, Levitas asserts that there are three discourses in the study of social exclusion, diverging from one another when drawing a framework, and thus demonstrating various issues of the area: “a redistributionist discourse (RED) …, whose prime concern is with poverty; a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which centers on the moral and behavioral delinquency of the excluded themselves; and a social integrationist discourse (SID) whose central focus is on paid work” (Levitas, 1998: 7). Firstly, even though it underlines the concept of poverty, and thus economic realm, RED includes social, cultural, and political aspects into the process of inequality (Levitas, 1998). Hence, the suggestions for inclusion, according to RED, refer to the reduction of poverty through a redistribution of resources and an augmentation in benefit levels. On the other hand, MUD, while underestimating the inequalities in different fields of society, considers the process of

inequality from the point of view of the underclass through a behavioralistic approach (Levitas, 1998). Thereupon, MUD notices the problematical outcome of benefit enhancement since it could lead to the maintenance of dependency of its receivers. Lastly, SID, through its Durkheimian roots, highlights the economic inactivity in the realm of social exclusion and suggests moral integration as a solution to exclusion, and thus it values paid employment as the primary or only acceptable way of integrating working-age individuals into society, however, it overlooks the unpaid work, and the possibility of exclusion even in the economically active community. As a result, according to Levitas (1998: 27), although these three discourses assume that paid work is a crucial determinant for the level of social integration, "they differ in what the excluded are seen as lacking; …in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals", and thus their resolution for social exclusion is in accordance with the deficiencies they propose.

Before moving on the next section, an outstanding study of Sarah Bracking (2005) on the political integration of the poor and their exclusion due to their chronic poverty should be mentioned. In her socio-political study of the poor in urban Zimbabwe, through the examination of how political liberalism's portrayal of those who live in poverty results in the underestimation of their agency, and thus inadequate poverty-reduction measures, Bracking offers an alternative approach to social policy improvement that focuses on the evolutional subjectivity of "the politics of everyday life" (Bracking, 2005: 1011).

2.3.1. Study of Social Exclusion in the Nation-States:

The understanding of the relation between exclusion and nation-state requires a clarification of state-building under a nationalist perspective. Early in the literature, the emergence of the state started to be explained through 'social contract' theories. The pioneers of this theory, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacque Rousseau, claimed "that it was the consent of the people to be organized into society for collective security", although their construction of the social contract differed by the notions and aspects they focused (Ibrahim & Nurudeen, 2022: 136). The common agreement of the social contract theory is that the formation of contemporary nations and communities resulted from a consensus or contract made among individuals to live

together and promote fairness, legal system, organization, and effective administration, based on equal rights and social equity (Ibrahim & Nurudeen, 2022). Even though the state is considered the product of a mutual contract between the right holders, naming the political arena, and the right givers, naming the community, the starting point of the contract has been claimed as a product of a state of nature, which, in the course of political studies towards the state, led literature to overlook the constructive realm of the nation-state (Chowdhry & Rai, 2009).

In this regard, in the liberal orthodoxy, as Marx (2002) puts it, the presence of self-aware and uniform groups of loyalty is assumed as a prerequisite for the formation of states. The social cohesion in the states, then, is mainly based on a shared ethnicity or language, which paves the way that in such unity, diversity continued its existence, threatening political cohesion (Marx, 2002). Conversely, rather than regarding the state as a naturally given unit, Anderson (1983/2006) characterizes the concept of the nation as a product of the culture that has its own unique history connected to the decline of monarchies and empires, as well as to specific developments in literacy, technology, and capitalism. For him, a nation "is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1983/2006: 6). In a nutshell, the nation is imagined as a limited entity by being finite boundaries unable to encompass all of humanity; as a sovereign entity through being independent from external rule; and finally, as a communal entity with the strong sense of fellowship despite the reality of inequality and exploitation (Anderson, 1983/2006). "Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson, 1983/2006: 7). Such fraternity could be assured through citizenship since it is considered as the inclusive basis for the equality of the political sphere (Stratton, 2011; Grotenhuis, 2016). For the sake of its citizens, the state is supposed to assure; an inclusive space for political participation, security, justice for the equal and fair social sphere, fundamental social services, and a fair economic life (Grotenhuis, 2016). Škifi (2013) emphasizes the close link between citizenship and identity, especially in the sense that citizenship is a significant indicator of different types of identities, and claims that citizenship could be seen as a means of exclusion, since it primarily prevents individuals who lack citizenship from engaging in the objective functions it enables, such as exercising certain rights and fulfilling certain responsibilities.

Along the same line, Somers (2008: 21) posits citizenship as a mechanism for inclusion and exclusion, and divides the literature for citizenship studies into two: the one based on geopolitics, as she puts the "inside/outside" perspective, and the one focusing on the inclusiveness of the individuals who already possess citizenship, "inside/ interior" perspective. Moreover, according to Bhambra (2015), the common understanding of citizenship as inclusive leads scholars to overlook its origins as an exclusive institution, which is not just a coincidence while commonly those who are excluded are often blamed for their own exclusion and seen as lacking modernity. By making citizenship performative, scholars miss the fact that it is the political sphere that creates the positive form of citizenship and that this political sphere is always interwoven with institutions of privilege (Bhambra, 2015). Such unperceived aspects could lead to the underestimation of marginalized people, and as Shaw (2002: 61) puts it, "indigenous peoples will always remain marginal, and the only political terrain this offers to them is one of negotiating the conditions of their marginality".

One could conclude that states emerged and maintained through the relationship of inclusion and exclusion since its main uniting method is 'citizenship'. "States have often codified or encouraged nationalism selectively, demarcating by specified categories who is included and who is excluded" (Marx, 2002: 103). In this regard, Marx (2002) proposes a new framework for nationalism, focusing on how dominant structures, exclusion, and prior conflict shape it, and challenging the assumption that nationalism is an imagined community of inclusion or an institutionalized process towards inclusion propelled by economic development and modernization. According to him, nationalism is often purposefully exclusive and can exclude people based on race, gender, religion, and class, through forced homogenization, and while citizenship rules are a significant indicator of exclusion, not all forms of exclusion are legally encoded. He underlines the ethnic diversity in the state process although the unity is considered homogenous, in this respect, "citizenship rights have often been allocated selectively, not universally" (Marx, 2002: 107). Such selective inclusion is encouraged to heal past or threatened disunity among those included as the core constituency. Institutions can solidify identities that are based on culture and influence the groups that strive to pursue their interests within those institutions, causing polarization or exclusion, and nationhood is one such

institution, which is formalized in rules that range from tolerating discrimination to the selective allocation of rights to mandatory assimilation or expulsion (Marx, 2002).

In the exclusive context of the nation-state, the process of social policy-making gains close attention. According to de Haan (2007), it is not simply a matter of technical expertise or dependent on a country's level of economic development. It is, indeed, influenced by the national traditions that have shaped the institutions, ideas, and practices of the country, and several research on both state-building and developmental policy implementations display how the aspect of exclusion is understudied (de Haan, 2007). In her study of dam displacement in India, which aims for rehabilitation, Reddy (2008) focuses on the fact that how these displacement projects re-exclude the marginalized communities of the nation. She argues that the welfare state is ignoring the marginalized sections and re-excluding them as dam-displaced people without proper rehabilitation, and the result of social re-exclusion leads to resistance against the state. She concludes, then, that the state should provide proper rehabilitation facilities for the full-fledged inclusion of the displaced people since the displacement caused by large dams has resulted in the shift of resources from weaker sections of society to more privileged ones and has aggravated existing social inequalities. Moreover, Stratton (2011) examines how Australia has transformed from an inclusive nation-state to one based on exclusion under the influence of neoliberal ideology. For instance, The Electoral Integrity Act in Australia was introduced to prevent voting fraud and increase citizens' trust in the electoral system, however, it created “difficulties for those more marginalized citizens such as Aborigines living on outstations or people with low English skills” (Stratton, 2011: 304).

The centrality of ‘ethnicity’ on both the assumption that it is a core instrument for national unity and the explanation of certain political and social issues leads to an overlook of the historical context. Budrytė (2017) highlights the problematic trend in Central and Eastern Europe, where many social and political issues are framed using ethnic language, which reinforces exclusionary nationalistic attitudes. For him, the institutional focus spurs the assumption of rational choices of actors while the historical memory is also quite important as it shapes the patterns of exclusion (Budrytė, 2017). Furthermore, in his historical study of Tanzania’s state process, Aminzade (2013) reveals the influential role of the struggle between the accumulation of wealth on a global scale and the acceptance of political power within a single nation

on the notion of citizenship and exclusion in the post-colonial era in Africa. According to him, such struggle led to conflicts within Tanzania's political leaders regarding public policies that determined who was included or excluded from the community, and what rights were given to citizens and non-citizens. Finally, he states that the importance of ethnicity in the literature suppresses "the central role of colonialism and imperialism in the creation of modern nation-states" (Aminzade, 2013: 336).

2.4. Subculture

Under the study of 'deviance' in sociology, 'subcultural theories' have started with a functionalist root, and developed through an interactionist approach. By the time of progress, theorists associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have explored the roots of subcultures within the social class system while also post-subculturalist perspectives have examined and assessed various subculture theory lines (Perasović et al., 2023). In respect of subject areas, the research on subculture, which initially began under the concepts of social control and social coherence, eventually shifted its focus to the matter of working-class youth. Afterward, the concept of the 'underclass', which later became associated with social exclusion, emerged. Recently, however, by focusing on trends within the youth population, the concept of subculture has been primarily examined in a broader sense, as Bennett and Kahn-Harris put it, dominating "the study of youth, style, music, and leisure in the related fields of sociology and cultural studies since the mid-1970s" (Bennett & Kahn-Harris, 2004).

The pioneers of the functionalist wave of "subculture" are Robert Merton, Albert Cohen, Richard Cloward, and Lloyd Ohlin. To begin with, for the cultural explanation of the deviant behavior Merton stated that the two most important elements of social and cultural structure are the goals and modes of achieving these goals, as he specifically put, the 'culture goals' and the 'institutional norms' (Merton, 1938: 673). The culture goals referred to the proclaimed and accepted actions or status through the achievement of success, and the institutional norms were related to the legitimate paths that could be chosen by the individuals for such success attained by the dominant culture. According to these elements, then, Merton (1938) suggested that there were four types of categories as responses within the scope of the adoption of

them, though he claimed that transmission between the categories could be possible and such categories would not implicate the individual's entire personality.

The four categories included; conformity, in which individuals both internalize the cultural goals and adopt the institutionalized means; innovation, in which although individuals internalize the goals, they reject the means; ritualism, in which the goals are rejected even though the means are adopted; the retreatism, in which neither the goals nor the means were adopted; and finally the rebellion, in which both the goals and the means neither accepted nor rejected. Since it would be quite difficult to manage to study all the aspects of society, he focused on mainly the economic sphere in a broad sense including "the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of goods and services in our competitive society, wherein wealth has taken on a highly symbolic cast" (Merton, 1938: 677). According to him, while adaptation I; conformists, is the most common in society, adaptation IV, retreatests, is the least occurred. However, his main focus was on adaptation II, III, and V; innovationists, ritualists, and rebellions, since these responses emerged through a deficiency of access to the effective institutional methods to achieve the desired success.

The specific outcome depends on the individual's personality and cultural background. Inadequate socialization can give rise to the innovation response, where they abandon institutional means but continue aspiring for success. Excessive conformity to institutional demands can lead to ritualism, where the goal is considered unattainable but adherence to social norms persists. Rebellion occurs when individuals, fueled by frustration or alternative viewpoints, strive to create a new social order by challenging existing standards. The current social structure, for Merton, creates a tendency towards disintegration. As a result, cultural stigmatization results in a strain on innovational practices (Merton, 1938: 678).

Along the same line as Merton, Cohen (1955) emphasize the role of the structural context on individual choices and thus, behaviors. His starting point is that all human action, including delinquency, can be seen as an ongoing effort to solve problems. These problems create tension and a sense of imbalance, leading individuals to make choices and take actions although not every course of action leads to a successful resolution because certain decisions can bring further problems or unresolved issues. According to him, problems and circumstances are perceived subjectively by each person, depending on their perspective and frame of reference.

Rather than being allocated randomly among social roles, problems are molded by social variables and the frames of reference that society provides. Depending on one's social standing and goals, many opportunities for power and prestige exist.

Hence, according to Cohen "… opportunities for the achievement of power and prestige are not the same for people who start out at different positions in the class system" (Cohen, 1955: 55). As a result, he focuses on group dynamics, based on class, and the emergence of subcultures in an effort to address underappreciated concerns surrounding delinquency. His study concludes with the stress on the frustration of the working-class youth under the dominant middle-class values. In his article "The Sociology of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond", Cohen (1965) continues the emphasis on the importance of the social and cultural factors that influence deviant behavior. Additionally, he highlights how socialization and identity formation influence deviant conduct. To comprehend how society will react to deviance, according to Cohen (1965), it is essential to grasp its social and cultural background.

Developing Cohen's arguments, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) studied the delinquent subcultures of the lower class of the urban and tried to explain how they arose. The rules of society entail interactions that are governed by norms that have varied degrees of significance to the dominant groups in society. Minor transgressions, such as using "poor manners", usually do not materially harm the interests of these groups. A distinct situation arises, however, if an action conflicts with the general welfare as understood by the dominant interest groups. It is believed that rules that save society, its assets, and contractual commitments are crucial for preserving the stability of the current social order. In addition to endangering particular people or groups, breaking these norms is seen as a threat to the validity of society's core institutions. Hence, "delinquent acts, in contrast to other violations of social rules, constitute an actual or a potential threat to the legitimacy and security of these basic institutions in the judgment of officials representing the agencies of criminal justice", and thus, it could be concluded that a delinquent act involves such behaviors that violate fundamental society norms, which are considered to be broken by the criminal justice agents (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960: 3).

As a result of their work, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) offered three variations of delinquent subcultures: the criminal, the conflict and the retreatist. The criminal subcultures, as the name implies, burst within locations with high levels of organized

adult crime, where young individuals could learn how to commit crimes from the criminal role models and move up the professional criminal ladder with a financial motive by committing more crimes. Conflict subcultures, on the other hand, burst in places with low levels of organized crime, in which young individuals gain status via gang violence. Finally, retreatist subcultures include the outsiders of the first two groups which have been refused due to their failure.

The interactionist perspective of subcultural studies has evolved around the 'labeling theory', which was introduced by Lemert (1951). Lemert examines deviance in two phases and emphasizes the significance of labels. The primary deviance, for Lemert (1951) occurs due to sociocultural and psychological factors, leading to the application of a deviant label to the individual from the society. Even if the person does not perceive themselves as directly deviant, when others label them as deviant, they may adopt the same behavior, thereby internalizing the label and behaving accordingly. This process leads to the emergence of the secondary phase, where the individual begins to engage in subsequent deviant behavior, thinking, "If I am already labeled as deviant, then I should act accordingly". However, "from a narrower sociological viewpoint the deviations are not significant until they are organized subjectively and transformed into active roles and become the social criteria for assigning status", which indicates that until the recognition of the label by the individual, the deviant act is considered under the primary stage (Lemert, 1951: 75).

Utilizing the 'labeling theory', Becker (1963) states that the labels we attach to actions significantly influence the identity formation of individuals, especially outsiders. Hence, for Becker (1963), second deviance is increasingly based on an individual's characteristics. His starting point is the query of actions or patterns that we label as crime or deviant, and assuming that crime is a product of attributions. For him, deviance is not inherent in the act itself, but rather a product of social construction. To put it simply, social groups establish rules that define deviance, and they, then, apply those rules to individuals, labeling them as outsiders. Becker (1963), thus, examines two levels of deviant behaviors with four types and explores the relationships that contribute to the emergence of such behaviors and the selected norms that make these actions deviant within their context.

The four types of deviant behaviors include the falsely accused, who are perceived as deviant despite their obedient behavior; the conforming, with no

perception of deviancy with their obedient behavior; the pure deviant; who are considered as deviant through their rule-breaking behavior; and secret deviants; who are remained as obedient despite their rule-breaking behavior (Becker, 1963: 21). Furthermore, Becker (1963) argues that the same behavior could have different meanings and evaluations in different contexts. For instance, killing someone during wartime might be rewarded and not considered as a crime, whereas in ordinary circumstances, it is assessed as a crime, subjected to punishment. As a result, Becker states that when studying deviance, it is important to recognize that the category of those labeled deviant may not include all those who have actually broken a rule, and adds that the interactionist approach "question[s] the monopoly on the truth and the 'whole story' claimed by those in positions of power and authority" (Becker, 1963: 207).

By the 1970s, Subcultural studies proceeded through youth subculture with different aspects of it, in the same vein as Cohen, Cloward, and Ohlin. In their book 'Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain', Hall and Jefferson start by explaining that rather than being homogenous, the notion of 'culture' is composed of the combination of multiple cultures, "containing different traces from the past, as well as emergent elements in the present" (Hall & Jefferson, 1976: 12). In this regard, they examine subculture from two perspectives; the relationship between the subculture and the culture it occurs within, which they refer as the "parent culture.", and the relationship between the emerging subculture and the dominant culture, emphasizing its connection to class and hegemony (Hall & Jefferson, 1976: 13). Regarding class, they build upon Cohen's subculture research, but they argue for the need to address class and hegemony more directly and emphatically. They also emphasize that the subcultures described by Cohen became more intense and subjected to change in the 1970s. Furthermore, they argue that subculture is maintained through style and rituals. In other words, subculture is not only ideological but also sustained through specific actions. Concordantly, the style allows those within the subculture to express their commitments, while rituals provide a concrete manifestation of these commitments.

Another work on the study of 'style' is "Subculture: The Meaning of Style" by Dick Hebdige. Hebdige (1979) notices that subcultures follow a similar path, however, they demonstrate clear stylistic variances. He highlights the socioeconomic, racial, and

historical influences that have shaped the development of each subculture. Hebdige also asserts that subcultures first emerge as a kind of resistance to the dominant society, which frequently perceives them as radical and reacts with apprehension and mistrust. In that sense, he emphasizes how oppressive the dominant culture is and characterizes subcultures as cultural noise that shows society's problems and unfulfilled demands. Like Becker, Hebdige concludes that to comprehend style, one must take the context into account.

To continue with the youth subculture discussion, by taking a post-modernist perspective, Hodkinson (2002) focuses on Goth culture and makes a reference to Becker to emphasize the effect of labeling. Through combining post-modernist theories with subculture theories, Hodkinson suggests that subcultures have been increasingly studied and portrayed as anti-society over time, and "that lifestyles and groupings characterized by considerable fluidity and multiplicity are increasingly prevalent throughout consumption-oriented Western societies" (Hodkinson, 2002: 195). Subcultures should be considered as flexible collectivities, changing according to the level of substance they possess, and thus, recognized that even the most significant subcultures demonstrate diversity, with some people embracing aspects without a strong commitment and even devoted members having other interests and concerns. With acknowledging the mobility, he concludes that subcultures are more defined by their substance than their ephemerality, putting a particular emphasis on identity, commitment, coherence, and autonomy.

Moreover, Bennett and Kahn-Harris (2004) argue that given the complexity of the cultural landscape, the relevance of subculture, which implies cultural and spatial coherence, becomes a pressing question, and suggest that instead of an analytical approach, with a top-down model, the scholars of 'subculture' theory need a folk model which is driven from the hand of youth. Lastly, Abrams et al. (2007) make a clear explanation of the emergence of the deviant groups as well as the deviant behavior, especially occurring inside of the deviant sub-groups, and open a new window in the deviancy debate. According to them, being the target of discrimination increases one's identification with and attachment to that group, and even though the deviants of the deviant group might be rejected from the group since it displays a threat against the coherence of the group, allowing them in can improve the group's performance because deviants have the power to start societal change and shift the

majority's position for the better. Shared taste is quite crucial for the membership of subcultures, however, “this can simultaneously increase an individual’s inclusion within their chosen social group, whilst increasingly setting them apart from mainstream society” (Abrams et al., 2007: 176).

2.4.1. The Concept of ‘Underclass’ in Social Exclusion:

The concept of ‘underclass’ became widespread in the US in the early 1980s although it has been mainly attributed to Charles Murray, and since then, it has been substantially based on the discussions around ‘labor force’ (Lister, 1996). Based on these roots, the ‘underclass’ debate made ground in the discussions of ‘social exclusion’, mainly poverty-based, as well. Byrne (2005) summarizes the three perspectives of cultural studies of the poor; the ones accusing the poor, the one that states the formation of the new deviant culture of the poor has resulted from the combined impacts of socio-spatial segregation and deindustrialization, and the one claiming that social exclusion and dispossession are the causes of the poor's cultural forms.

The beginning of the ‘underclass’ is situated in a hierarchical structure of economic-based objective positions, while the behavioral approach flips the category and presents an evaluation of individual actions that go against the moral standards that middle-class society has established (Wacquant, 2022). “The underclass debate touches on a range of issues that are central to debates over exclusion, poverty, and social divisions” (Mann, 1999: 149). However, according to Murray (1999), underclass refers to neither solely the poor nor the disadvantaged soever it is closely related. Rather, it is more about the community living in the outskirts of society, not in a geographical manner, but as a matter of advantage, and the main criteria revolve around social disorganization, poverty of social networks and values, individualism, and isolation (Murray, 1999: 2).

In his reverberant book “Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980” Murray (1984) focused on the effectiveness of the welfare state policies and criticized the ineffectiveness of the social assistance programs since they create incentives for short-sighted behavior that is not conducive to long-term poverty eradication. “But if

the behaviors of members of the underclass are founded on a rational appreciation of the rules of the game, and as long as the rules encourage dysfunctional values and behaviors, the future cannot look bright" (Murray, 1984: 220).

Nevertheless, as he proceeded with his arguments with underclass discussions, Murray interpolated the primary importance of illegitimacy in his underclass studies. In his further articles, Murray also claimed that there were three indicators for the formation of the underclass; criminality, drop-out from the labor force among low-income young males, and illegitimacy among low-income young women (Murray, 1999: 2-3). Likewise, Lister (1996) states that the existence of crime sheds light on the existence of an underclass since people who often commit crimes are a prime illustration of those who belong to the underclass since they rely on society without actively contributing to it. Considering illegitimate births as the main sign of an underclass and violent crime as a gauge of its growth, according to Lister (1996), the clearest sign that an underclass is forming is when a sizable portion of young, healthy, low-income males decide against looking for work. As it was roughly explained in the earlier section, the moral underclass discourse (MUD) of the social exclusion debate was closely knitted with Murray's understanding of the underclass. MUD, which is the extension of the gang debates or the detrimental class studies, utilizes social exclusion to describe the underclass rather than poverty or unemployment (Levitas, 2004). MUD considers the excluded "as deviants from the moral and cultural norms of society" (Levitas, 1999, as cited in Shucksmith, 2004: 44).

Moreover, the underclass debate is varied according to each perspective's emphasis, involving poverty, family structures, access to employment opportunities, reliance on welfare support, and spatial exclusion (Mohan, 2000: 292; Shucksmith, 2004; Byrne, 2005). Wilson (1987) divides the underclass debate in policy critiques as the liberal approach and the conservative approach, and he claims that since the liberal approach remains either silent or hesitant towards the underclass debate, the conservative perspective, through its acrimonious viewpoint, has become more widespread. Since he also agrees that although "long-term welfare families and street criminals are distinct groups,… they live and interact in the same depressed community and they are part of the population that has, with the exodus of the more stable working- and middle-class segments, becomes increasingly isolated socially from mainstream patterns and norms of behavior", he suggests that instead of

abandoning the usage of the concept ‘underclass’, as liberals encourage, more comprehensive studies towards the underclass issue should be developed (Wilson, 1987: 8).

Nevertheless, neither Murray’s further claim nor Wilson’s liberal comprehensive approach pulls the concept of ‘underclass’ from heavy critique. “It is hardly surprising that the response to claims that an inter-generational class of welfare dependents was being promoted by generous public welfare provisions that encouraged 'illegitimacy', long-term unemployment and crime was simply dismissive” (Mann, 1999: 149). In a nutshell, the underclass debate is perceived as both inadequate and reluctant since it is used like a puppet in the political sphere, creates a missed approach for solving crime and disorder, and gives an impression of ‘blaming the victim’ (Mohan, 2000; Pantazis & Gordon, 2000; Byrne, 2005; Madanipour et al., 2015).

According to Madanipour et al. (2015), social exclusion frequently results from an outbreak of social stability, which causes public anxiety and attention to be directed toward excluded places and groups, however, state organizations mostly face criticism due to leaving vulnerable populations to fight for themselves. Especially the gentrification process is one of the reasons for critique since it is the consequence of the state’s target towards the excluded place, and it gives “the impression that the problem has been solved, but also displacement and dispersal, rather than providing a solution to the problems of the socially excluded” (Madanipour et al., 2015: 736). Moreover, they claim that even though they coexist with members of the dominant culture, marginalized groups have a set of shared beliefs, values, and conventions that may oppose those of the dominant society or serve as a means of survival (Madanipour et al., 2015).

Furthermore, Bayón (2017) contends that institutions like the state, the market, and the family foster opportunities that result in inequality between people and groups, which in turn causes poverty and social exclusion. These results are a product of society's structure rather than a result of a person's decisions or actions (Bayón, 2017). Hence, according to Bayón (2017) how poverty spreads and how inequality grows over time should be studied by looking at the experiences of those who are less fortunate in life. For instance, in their study of the ‘not in employment, education, or training’ (NEET) youth in Latin America, Kiss et al. (2022) argue the evocation of the

youth NEET to the delinquency, violence, and further, organized crime, and they accentuate the unfavorable situation of the Latin American youth. Moreover, they state that "policies that aim to overcome social exclusion and marginalization of youth need to focus on systemic drivers of the NEET condition among vulnerable subgroups of young people" (Kiss et al., 2022: 1386). Therefore, it could be concluded that there is a tendency in the literature when culturally studying the poor, the marginalized, and the excluded, to have a more bottom-to-top perspective, focusing on the vulnerability of the sub-groups.

2.5. Concluding Remarks on the Conceptual Framework

The concept of 'failed state' is often based on a flawed perspective that sees postcolonial states as abnormal and in a state of breakdown without a comprehensive inquiry into states' internal contexts and conflicts. In this regard, following Morton's (2005) emphasis on the cruciality of historicization within failed state studies, 'institutionalization', 'social exclusion', and 'subculture' concepts are quite helpful for a socio-political analysis.

The historical development of the failed state concept could be summarized as occurring as a global threat, first, against strong states, mainly the UK; second, against the global order after the Cold War period; and third, against the security of both itself and the stable states. In a nutshell, it is accepted that when the state cannot deliver its goods and services equally, it becomes fragile and unstable due to the distrust of its citizens, increased insecurity, and escalated economic and political conflict. Moreover, Mexico is considered a fragile state because of high levels of drug trafficking, criminal violence, and corruption, and viewed as a threat to the security of the US. However, the concept has been heavily discussed adversely in the literature through its problematic nomenclature, its Western bias, its ambiguous analyses, and its insistence on the maintenance of the current system which might not even be institutionalized accurately in the beginning.

States' inability, which leads them for being unstable and fragile, could be explained through the institutionalization process. An accurate institutionalization process based on the historical and socio-cultural context of each country could provide less state fragility. The institutionalization process emerges as being based on the intention of understanding social systems in sociology, and spreads to other

disciplines, such as political science, economics, and international relations, under new-institutionalist perspectives.

To summarize, the historical perspective focuses on spatiality and temporality and emphasizes the role of pre-established institutions; the rational-choice perspective concentrates on rationality and utility maximization of the institutions; the sociological approach emphasizes the importance of culture and context through a focus on the identity formations of actors; being one of the recent trends, the discursive perspective emphasizes the flexibility of institutions; the constructivist perspective restores the importance of agency within institutionalization debate; lastly, the feminist perspective intensifies on gender-based power inequalities. The nation-state shapes, affects, and controls, by definition of its institutionalization process, the democratic and legal system, labor market, welfare system, and family and community system, and it ensures its control over those major societal systems via its institutions. Any kind of failure of these institutions in the way of providing individuals or households with the integration and participation opportunities they need, these individuals or households become socially excluded.

As a result, social exclusion is a result of the breakdown or malfunctioning of the institutions, and more broadly, of the improper institutionalization process of such nation-states. Likewise, the correlative context that takes place between social exclusion and institutionalization also develops between institutionalization and subculture to a certain extent since subcultures can emerge within institutions, and thus institutionalization can heavily influence the formation of subcultures.

State fragility paves the way for the occurrence of social exclusion through governments' inability to provide basic services which can lead to economic and political exclusion of certain groups, such as the poor or marginalized communities. Additionally, failed states may be more likely to experience violence and conflict, which can exacerbate social exclusion. In this regard, the social exclusion debate is directly related to social policy studies. We can fundamentally divide the social exclusion studies in the literature into three those that focus on its formation, those that focus on its relational dimension, and those that operate under social policy recommendations. Constitutionally, social exclusion is studied through, firstly, its sole relation to poverty, and secondly, its broad, complex, and multidimensional features. Relationally, it is taken into account, first, from the point of view of state and

individual correlation, and second, from the individual aspect only. Finally, in order to understand its location under the social policy and give recommendations, social exclusion has been examined from the economic perspective (RED), focusing on the notion of poverty; from the cultural perspective (MUD), emphasizing the notion of the underclass; and from the social perspective (SID), concentrating on the integration through working life. Moreover, the literature on the relationship between social exclusion and the nation-state achieves a consensus that the institutionalization process of the nation-state is, indeed, what creates the emergence of social exclusion, from the beginning of the social contract debate to its final citizenship integration. Consequently, understanding social exclusion under nation-state building requires a closer study of how dominant structures, exclusion, and prior conflict shape nationalism, institutions, and citizenship rights.

Subculture theories have emerged on the basis of social cohesion and social control under the crime and deviance sub-branch of the discipline of sociology, and are studied in relation to the study areas of criminology and social policy. The primary theories developed under the scope of the functionalist perspective, aiming for firstly, the explanation of deviant behavior and secondly, the examination of social control. In the course of discussions, on the one side, the interactionist approach occurred, targeting the deviant behavior from an individualistic point of view, and focusing on the labeling process, on the other side, the concept of youth delinquency gained importance, concentrating on the subculture among youth. Simultaneously, the concept of underclass became widespread among scholars who study subculture within the scope of social policy, nevertheless, these studies have been harshly criticized since the underclass approach proceeded in the way of 'blaming the victim'. Until cross-cultural approaches, however, deviancy has been considered a threat to social cohesion. Cross-cultural studies have focused on a broader sense of youth subcultures, and over time, the subcultural studies took a turn towards a bottom-to-top approach, emphasizing the inner relations and styles of the youth subcultures. Such a turn could be viewed in Bracking's (2005) offer of a new political approach focusing on the everyday life of the poor. As a result, this thesis intends to conclude along the same vein as Bracking's approach to the drug-related and socially excluded community in the country.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-DRUG POLICIES IN MEXICO

The main reason behind the fragility of the Mexican state relies on the drug trafficking issue that includes not one but several major drug cartels both violently and professionally carrying on their business in the transnational arena. The fact that these cartels run their business mainly in the North of the continent (Astorga, 1999), and especially in the United States, causes officials and academics to consider Mexico as a threat to global security.

However, the emergence and the development of drug trafficking is closely linked to the sociopolitical conjuncture of the country. In this regard, the historical roots of drug trafficking could give a crucial insight on understanding of the issue that the country is struggling with today.

3.1. Historical Conjuncture and Policy Response Toward Drug Trafficking Until Calderón Administration

The historical conjuncture of Mexican drug trafficking within the context of Mexico's political situation lies behind the institutionalization process, including the state formation of the country, the institutionalized violence, and the institutionalization of economic development.

To begin with, the post-colonial era of Mexico was marked by both economic and political instabilities (Skidmore & Smith, 2005). While the ideological separation was between the conservatives and the liberals, the political power was divided between the military and the church (Skidmore & Smith, 2005) hence from the beginning of the nation-state building, political instabilities were overcome through the hegemony of the military.

Shortly after the independence and its consequences on the political instability, several historical events, such as the North American Invasion, fueled the continual conflict between the conservatives and the liberals, and following a liberalist military invasion, Porfirio Díaz assumed power in Mexico (Skidmore & Smith, 2005).[1] The era of his dictatorship was characterized by centralization movements for political power (Topal, 2014), and considering the context of the polarization within the country, his stance was not unexpected. However, in a nation yet to complete its state formation, the dictatorship of Díaz had devastating consequences for the political stability and democratization process of the country.

As the population became economically weakened during the Díaz dictatorship, his further elitist approach paved the way for the Mexican Revolution (Skidmore & Smith, 2005). While the process of centralization and military usage in the revolution against his rule resembled Díaz's methods, central authority, political stability, and economic growth were achieved through regional hegemonies under the subsequent leadership of Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles. Nevertheless, over time, regional authoritarianism began to undermine the country's central state-building process. In this context, in 1934, when Lázaro Cárdenas came to power, he initiated a process of centralization of Mexico's political system with a corporatist approach in order to regain state power (Topal, 2014).

As a result, firstly, the centralist, and secondly, the corporatist approach within the political structure of the country has led to the presidents and dominant political parties maintaining control over all aspects of Mexico's socio-political and economic progress. Moreover, the dominance of military use even from the beginning of the nation-state building paved the way for institutionalized violence within the country.

In regard to the violent history of Mexico, the roots of the institutionalized and internalized violence extend towards the period of post-colonialization. “The lack of land distribution to the landless indigenous due to resilient power of the landed aristocracy, the lack of development of trade with Europe, and the damage to local industry due to production of cheap goods in Europe caused many Latin American countries to experience violence, dictatorship, political and economic instability between 1820 and 1870” (Dursun, 2020: 44). Furthermore, due to the loss of its power

[1] In contrast to the liberalist trend in the country, Diaz maintained a close relationship with the church (Skidmore & Smith, 2005).

of despotism, the dispersed authority fueled the reproduction of violence that occurred after the independence era in Mexico (Dursun, 2020). The violence that started during the colonization process and was fueled in the post-independence era by political instability began to evolve into an institutionalized issue during the Mexican Revolution.

Huntington (1968: 258) also explores the dynamics of political institution building and the establishment of the political order in changing societies while giving examples from different countries that have experienced nationwide revolutions, and he associates Mexico with Turkey as they "are two noteworthy examples where parties came out of the womb of the army, political generals created a political party, and the political party put an end to political generals. According to him, not only the fact that the notable leaders of the revolution were military authorities paved the way for the centralized location of the military within the process of political institution building of Mexico, but also the establishment of the National Revolutionary Party beneath the generals of the revolution ushered the institutionalization of the revolution in the country. Moreover, the creation of institutions under military authorities secured the cohesion of the political system against possible schismatical forces (Huntington, 1968). In this context, the beginning of the 19th century was characterized by military coups in Mexico, which continued until the 1930s and resulted in building the tolerance of the people to the military forces (Huntington, 1968).

The harsh policies and interventions on Latin American countries implemented by the U.S. during and after the Cold War against the issues of insecurity that communism might bring (Dursun, 2020) is another period that has been effective in increasing violence after the coup process in Mexico. Finally, the violent suppression of the working-class protests in cities and guerilla movements formed by peasants in villages in the 1950s and 1960s, and the increase of violence against opposition groups towards the end of the 1960s put Mexico under the consideration of being among the countries of Latin America that have undergone an era of 'Dirty War' (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021). Ruben and Ağkaya (2021) state that from time to time it was also observed that the state cooperated with paramilitary groups in repressive movements, and claim that the army and the Federal Security Directorate (DFS in its Spanish acronym) were widely using dirty war tactics in their anti-drug operations. Therefore, according to them, dirty war tactics ingrained in certain institutions of the state play

an important role in the balance sheet of the drug traffic conflicts, which have reached extreme dimensions, and continue in Mexico also today.

Moreover, the tolerance of the Mexican public towards the military through his various violent interventions brings both an immunity to the violent environment and an internalized tolerance of violence. In a nutshell, the hierarchical power conflict arising from the bourgeoisie's effort for economic and political supremacy (Dursun, 2020), the legacy of conflict left to the country by the Spaniards after colonization (Grillo, 2011; Dursun, 2020), the centrally rooted military institutions in the state building process (Huntington, 1968) and their violent repression operations (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021). These institutionalization issues had ramifications in dealing with the problem-oriented domestic policies and foreign policies conducted by the US in Mexico, as well as the fueling of paramilitary formations (Grillo, 2011; Morris, 2012; Dursun, 2020), which have all embittered drug cartels and exacerbated their violent actions.

Lastly, Dursun (2020) highlights the importance of the historical institutionalization of economic development in Mexico. First of all, she states that the consequences of colonialism in Mexico and the political system it spawned had an impact on the dynamics of its capitalist system and its dependent socioeconomic structure, which led to the emergence of drug trafficking (Dursun, 2020). Secondly, she argues that concentrated land ownership and the poverty of the working class, which ensued via Mexico’s integration into the global capitalist scheme after its independence, have not been hurdled with agricultural reforms through neoliberal restructuring promised after the Mexican Revolution, and thus, neoliberal policies ended up providing advantages to corruption and drug trafficking in the country (Dursun, 2020).

The Socio-Political Conjuncture

The political system, in the course of the nation-state building, and specifically in the following era of PRI, was dependent on utilizing corrupt practices in order to maintain operational efficiency (Astorga, 1999; Riding, 1984/2000; Grillo, 2011). Since the beginning of that drug trafficking turned into a problematic issue for the Mexican state, some of the interrogations about it have been pertinent to certain

politicians, hence the involvement of politics in the drug trafficking issue is not something that occurred later (Astorga, 1999). In the explanatory studies of how the political system had an impact on the drug trade, how the general population perpetuates significant aspects of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI in its Spanish acronym) culture, including the glorification of leaders, the prevalence of impunity, and the significance of informal networks and relationships are emphasized (Aranda, 2013).

Since Cárdenas, presidents are the most powerful actors in the Mexican state, which operated through the state party system, and every business venture, back then, was considered an opportunity for gaining liberty and legislative power, thus giving wing to the emergence of drug trafficking, and becoming a part of it were reasonable for the political authorities of that era (Astorga, 1999). Put differently, the place of drug trafficking in politics started as a new business door rather than a maliciously beneficial reason causing corruption.

Moreover, drug trafficking organizations were not considered as a separate social group, they were also regulated directly by politicians and government agencies as long as they had no direct place and impact in politics (Astorga, 1999). Consequently, drug trafficking organizations were afforded a form of protection in a manner, however, it was not in the sense of concealing wrongdoing, but rather in the capacity of safeguarding a sector of commerce through regulation and oversight which was inherently organic and intrinsic (Astorga, 1999). The prohibition policies of the U.S. on both drug and alcohol use paved the way for the demand for drugs and alcohol that was met by the Mexican drug trade, which was able to thrive due to the lack of regulation and law enforcement in Mexico. “The smuggling syndicate based in Ciudad Juárez was not only the first narco syndicate run by a woman, Ignacia ‘la Nacha’ Jasso, but also was among the first to trade in heroin to the United States, after the market for supplying America with alcohol, during Prohibition, came to an end in 1933.” (Vulliamy, 2010: 18).

Consequently, the narco-trafficking from Mexico to the United States started during the period 1910-1930 (Recio, 2002). The narco-trafficking, continuing thenceforth, has deepened with the opium demand of the United States after the medical needs in the post-war era of World War II (Vulliamy, 2010). Soon after, the police and the military began to take an active part in the war on the drug trade in 1947

and deconstructed the direct connections between the traffickers and the politicians, however, the role of the control agents were unable to end drug trafficking (Astorga, 1999). The main reason was that in the beginning, the control agents were only trying to prevent the traffickers from becoming completely autonomous and exceeding the level of violence the country could tolerate (Astorga, 1999). Consequently, while these control agents who got into a direct relationship with the traffickers were interfering with the strengthening of the trafficking organizations, and with the possibility of not receiving a share from the business going on the one hand, they were also protecting their politicians in any case of accusation on the other because, in such case of accusation, the scelerate would be the actors on the field, not the politicians (Astorga, 1999). "As long as the outlaws were politically controlled, federal agents could get a piece of the cake, not so big as to become autonomous themselves, and certainly not without sharing profits with their superiors in the political structure. That was the rule in order to secure impunity" (Astorga, 1999: 15).

The contradiction of the political sphere of Mexico lay in corruption since it, in fact, functioned as a cohesive force in the political machine rather than a decay (Grillo, 2011). All the parties complied as long as they obtained a portion of the allocation as the bribery structure would go from the organizations to the small-town caciques, to governors, and finally, to the president (Grillo, 2011). Moreover, since the trade of drugs was relatively small-scale, it was not perceived as a major issue (Grillo, 2011) threatening both the internal structure of the country and the international cohesion. Indeed, "it was a misdemeanor, the way many people today view pirated music" (Grillo, 2011: 38). Although the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 1985 paved the way for the belief that traffickers would overpower the control agencies who were assumably keeping a tight rein on, Astorga (1999) states that the political sphere was still holding the power as traffickers were dependent on political protection for their success and traffickers were obligated to pay a form of 'tax' enforced by politicians to keep their business going.

The corrupted nature of Mexican politics has been considered one of the key features of drug-related crime. Morris (2012) states that one of the major factors that encouraged the prosperity of drug trafficking in Mexico is corruption. The pervasive corruption, which has been operated through bribery for the protection and free operation of the drug trafficking organizations, helped organized crime to flourish as

well as challenged the law enforcement and judicial system to operate properly against drug smuggling (Morris, 2012).[2] Additionally, the fact that bribery has exceeded from particular agencies and actors to the government itself exacerbated the challenges for controlling the drug trade and complicated the process of the war against trafficking (Morris, 2012). In the current climate, instead of engaging in conflicts with drug traffickers, Mexico's federal law enforcement agencies are eminent for their associations with criminal components (Weisman, 2002).

Additionally, the institutionalization process becomes crucial not only for the historical conjuncture but also for the socio-political sphere. Institutionalization of the socio-political realm involves law enforcement, the judicial system, inadequacy of state organs, and the socially institutionalized violent history of the country, which could be considered the third key point leading up to the formation and development of Mexico's drug trafficking organizations. The descriptive studies identifying the "breakdown of the priista regime" in the literature also brought the assumption that the constitutional inadequacy of Mexico's legal system is what lies behind the emergence and increase of trafficking (Aranda, 2013: 44). According to Bagley and Rosen (2015), weak, ineffective, and corrupt institutions have a crucial impact on the drug trade. They state that nation-states composed of weak institutions and democracies are susceptible to corruption and bribery, as they lead to the proliferation of organized criminal networks and their illicit activities, consequently, coping with organized crime becomes highly challenging, if not close to impossible due to the absence of robust institutions and a properly functioning judicial system (Bagley & Rosen, 2015).

This consideration also brings the emphasis on insecurity, instability, and ungovernability issues of the Mexican government and Mexican society (Cockroft, 2010). In this regard, Grillo (2011) refers to a more fundamental challenge besides the complex issue of corruption, which is drug law enforcement. Arresting one trafficker inadvertently ends up being beneficial for their rival, and thus, reinforcing violence

[2] In his article in which he explains his ethnographic field trip to the Sierra Madre, Alan Weisman (2002) displays the ordinary perspective of how corruption is perceived by the locals as quite natural, just as an everyday issue in Mexico through a skippet of his conversation with his escorts. One of his gatekeepers relieves Weisman about the new federal attorneys; "These are fresh from the police academy. It takes a few months before the narcotraficantes contaminate them". When he asks about what happens after they get contaminated, Weisman is responded; "'I get rid of them and bring in another batch" (Weisman, 2002:738).

instead of subduing it (Grillo, 2011).[3] The main impact of the lack of drug law enforcement manifests itself in the system of bribery, which is one of the most crucial apparatuses for drug trafficking organizations on the way to achieving their success, functioning under corruption. Bribery is utilized in drug smuggling, targeting "legal areas such as the US Customs Agencies, Border Patrol Officers, elected prosecutors, and the judiciary in line with their own benefits" (Dursun, 2020: 73). The bribes are distributed in cash to the individuals, political authorities, or law officers who have been engaged in the drug network as it would be arduous to preserve the cash profit escaping any form of punishment (Lauderdale, 2013 as cited in Dursun, 2020).

One of the areas where bribery occurs the most is the media. Although the media has a crucial role in auditing drug traffickers in general, especially in a more favorable light compared to other institutions such as the police or politicians, it should be noted that some journalists have been engaged in corrupt practices (Grillo, 2011).[4]

Consequently, as Grillo (2011) states, the Mexican drug war is, in fact, not a random outbreak of violence, but rather a struggle with observable causes and actual individuals who have controlled armies, profited financially from the fight, or pursued unsuccessful policies from high up in the government, and in this regard, the consolidation of the institutionalized violence, that has emerged and shaped through several historical incidents and military-based state formation of the country, with the political and economic dynamics of drug trafficking organizations have increased the violent outcome of both the drug-related crime and the war against it. "The manner in which illicit drug trafficking came into being in Mexico, namely as an economic activity subsequently penalized and subordinated to political power, also determined its development, the impunity of the protectors, or at least those best placed in the hierarchy of power, and the nature of the violence generated in this area" (Astorga, 2002: 427).

[3] For instance, "when the federal police stormed Zetas safe houses, they were scoring victories for Sinaloans, whether they liked it or not" (Grillo, 2011:116). Another example of inadvertent judicial consequence is exemplified through the fact that Felix Gallardo, who, despite being imprisoned for trafficking and murdering DEA agent Enrique Camarena, organized a meeting in Acapulco to redefine territorial control among his men (Cántu Garza, 2016:20). Consequently, the conviction of the leader of the Guadalajara Cartel did not ensure exterminating drug trafficking.

[4] "In return [for bribe], they [journalists] keep gangsters' names out of their paper, put their rivals' names in, or give special attention to narco propaganda" (Grillo, 2011:82).

Policy Response Toward Drug Trafficking

Since drug use was restricted in the world through the consideration of drugs as an addiction at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the usage of drugs was also restricted in the 20th century in Mexico, and certain anti-drug policies have been implemented since then. Consequently, before the political analysis of the anti-drug policies of the Calderón administration, the historical explanation of the anti-drug movements in Mexico before the Calderón era is important for a comprehensive analysis of the policies implemented during his presidency.

Astorga (2002) divides the Mexican anti-drug policy process into three periods, and he regards the 1900s' prohibitionist movements as the first period, in which such movements did not create a violent situation since sanctions under the implementation of prohibitionist policies could only have resulted from the friction of interests within the powerful groups which was not the situation in that period as the political authorities were still directly linked to and benefited from the activities of drug traffickers. The first control policies toward drug use in Mexico began after the repercussion of the Hague International Opium Convention in 1912, which was also quite impactful on the anti-drug policies implemented in many other nation-states, and immediately after the convention, trade of the primary illicit drugs, such as opium and cocaine, were prohibited by the Mexican government (Chabat, 2002; UNODC, 2008). In the earlier 1900s, Mexico's prohibitionist approach was based on controlling the plantation of illicit substances, especially marijuana, and the government held this stance until the 1980s (Hernández, 2011). Also, after the General Public Health Board was established in 1917, "production, commerce, and use [of such substances were] made illegal" (Hernández, 2011: 61). Astorga (2002) points out the effects of such policy movements in terms of the social structure of that period. The constraints on firstly the import of illicit drugs in 1923 and the export of such drugs in 1927 fueled the drug trafficking between the borders of Mexico and the U.S. unanticipatedly (Hernández, 2011).[5]

[5] One of the crucial key points of the period of the 1930s was the fact that the political edge of drug trafficking activities started to be doubted, for instance, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Carlos Riva Palacio, tendered his resignation in 1931 (Chabat, 2002).

Another important facet of this era is the involvement of the army in anti-drug operations. First involved in the destruction of marijuana plantations in Sonora in 1938, the influence of the Mexican army in anti-drug operations has increased over time although, until the mid-1940s, their involvement was based on the judgment and decisions of high-ranked generals (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021). Moreover, while the Federal Regulation on Drug Addiction in 1931 (Hernández, 2011) broke down the cultural perception of drug use[6], 1940 Federal Criminal Code, proposing the drug user as a patient in need of cure instead of a criminal facing a penalty (Hernández, 2011), has softened the perspective towards users. Nonetheless, from 1978 onwards, an evident transformation occurred whereby the utilization of drugs was officially deemed to be a punishable offense within the confines of criminal law, even if they were in small quantities for personal purposes (Hernández, 2011).

Another turning point of the anti-drug policy implementations in Mexico is the establishment of the DFS in 1947 (Hernández, 2011; Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021). Astorga (2002) considers the establishment of DFS as the second core period in Mexican drug policy as it ostensibly decomposed the direct relation of the political authorities with drug-related crime by becoming a mediating structure. However, being a police force for the elite groups, DFS consisted of individuals with low educational attainment, working with low salaries, which paved the way for the DFS to become the most corrupt institution of the government (Michaud, 2011) and "the main instrument for the political policing undertaken by administrations of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)" (López Macedonio, 2018: 73, as cited in Hernandez, 2020: 5-6). Furthermore, the fact that the Ministry of Health took control of drug policy during the same period (Astorga, 2002), in the sequel of the Federal Criminal Code of 1940 led to the issue of drug criminality being dealt with under the scope of 'crimes against health' and to the increase of the control of charges against drug-related crimes with the support of DFS (Chabat, 2002; Hernández, 2011). Additionally, the political emphasis on the control of the illicit substance plantations increasingly continued after that the Great Campaign in 1948 (Hernández, 2011) put in order the annihilation of such plantations within the framework of legal regulations, however, although the

[6] Cocaine, marijuana, and especially opium use were culturally recognized as a medical condition rather than addiction in the Mexican peasantry.

cooperation of the Mexican army has been quite impactful and deepened through time, such as the rise of employed military teams (Ağkaya, 2021), it did not have direct supervision on the law prosecution (Chabat, 2002).

The 1950s and 1960s represent periods in which Mexico conspicuously conformed to the anti-drug policy agenda of the United States, to illustrate the consonance of its security structure with the security interests of the US.[7] The pressure from the U.S. on controlling drug trafficking became apparent after the 1960s, mainly due to the prohibitionist approach during the administration of Richard Nixon (Grillo, 2011; Boyce et al., 2015; Hernandez, 2020). One of the most prominent presidents of the U.S. on the policy of narcotics, Richard Nixon, after his declaration of the War on Drugs, established the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to enhance the pressure on foreign governments, and Mexico was monumentally affected by his resolute actions, which also shaped the American narcotics policy for the following four decades (Grillo, 2011). In this regard, the closure of the U.S. borders with Mexico within the scope of Operation Intercept in order to reduce illicit substances imported from Mexico (Hernandez, 2020) can be seen as the first intervention made directly by the U.S. to the anti-drug movements in Mexico.

Consequently, due to the straightforward prohibitionist strategies of the U.S. on Mexico, and thus the expeditious increase in violence in Mexico, Astorga (2002) identifies the period after the 1960s as a momentous change in the politics of narcotics in Mexico leading to the third critical turning point. “The 1960s and 1970s saw a conjunction of external and internal factors that began to modify to a marked extent the structure of the international drug market and the balance of power between the principal social forces engaged in the trade and those engaged in the legal struggle against it” (Astorga, 2002: 428).

With respect to this statement of Astorga, Operation Condor, which was carried out between 1975 and 1978 during Nixon's presidency in the northwest regions of Mexico, particularly Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango (Astorga, 2002; Chabat, 2002; Astorga, 2004), through the mobilization of Mexican forces (Boyce et al., 2015), represents a critical milestone for Mexico in terms of key developments that occurred both during the operation and in the aftermath. Although the operation appeared to be

[7] For instance, the adoption of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Hernandez, 2020), and the Cooperación in 1969 (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021).

principally motivated by corruption within the drug trade (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021), its main purpose was to reduce drug use in the United States and prevent the spread of communism in Latin America by dint of the "counterinsurgency strategy" (Hernandez, 2020: 6-7).

The fact that the operation primarily targeted communities involved in illicit plantations located mostly in mountainous areas was eminently devastating for the social sphere as the civilian population emerged as the most adversely affected by this operation rather than the leaders of drug trafficking organizations due to forced migrations and human rights violations. (Astorga, 2002; Astorga, 2004; Boyce et al., 2015; Hernandez, 2020). Moreover, the influence of the operation on the military strategy on the border between the U.S. and Mexico also exerted an impact on Mexico's Dirty War (Hernandez, 2020).

Another disadvantageous outcome of the operation was the "balloon effect" (Durán-Martínez, 2018: 9, as cited in Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021: 434) in Mexico, which illustrates that the intense pressure on certain districts for drug trafficking not only underperforms in termination of drug trade activities but also induces for the expansion of such activities in a larger region (Astorga, 2002; Astorga, 2004; Boyce et al., 2015).[8] Finally, besides its injurious social and socio-political repercussions, Operation Condor paved the way for the increase in pressure on Mexico from the U.S. (Chabat, 2002).

The problem of drug trafficking began to gain serious importance in the 1980s (Chabat, 2002), so much so that the movements that began in the 1940s primarily against drug manufacturing continued to a greater extent in the 1980s with Mexico's view of the drug problem as a national issue.[9] The main reason for such perspective change started due to the shift in the route and dominance of drug trade from Colombia to Mexico as the U.S. anti-drug efforts on the Medellín Cartel of Colombia brought to a successful conclusion (Chabat, 2002; Boyce et al., 2015), and the rapid increase in the impact of the drug trade on the labor force and financial income in the country.

[8] More specifically, the activities of drug trafficking mainly located in Sinaloa were transferred to Guadalajara (Astorga, 2004; Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021).

[9] For instance, charges against criminal drug activities increased even more, and anti-drug policies were advanced aimed at ending drug trafficking and drug trade rather than just individual drug use and drug production (Hernández, 2011).

Camarena's murder in 1985 had inevitable consequences for the Mexican state. First of all, with the return of the U.S. to its harsh restrictive strategy in 1969, the DFS, which contributed to one-party dominance and caused drug trafficking to continue, was disbanded, and Mexico was obliged to officially declare the drug problem as a national issue (Ruben & Ağkaya, 2021). In addition, the dissolution of the DFS, which served as a buffer zone, first, became the cause of drug violence in the country, which would later increase drastically since the drug organizations were aware that with the dissolution of the DFS, they would not receive the old support from the state (Astorga, 2002), and secondly, affected the PRI, the state party of the period, the most owing to the fact that the PRI maintained control over both the community and drug organizations through the practices of DFS (Hernandez, 2020).

In this respect, the murder of Camarena has become the third turning point of Mexican drug policies for Astorga (2002). Moreover, the compliance of the Mexican State with the resolutions of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988 and the National Drug Control Strategy of the U.S. in 1989 had an impact on the internal anti-drug agenda. The resolutions of the United Nations Convention sought to strengthen global collaboration in the fight against illegal drug trafficking on the high seas and emphasized the need for intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fight against illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse as well (UNODC, 1988). Moreover, along the same vein of the United Nations Convention, the foreign policy initiatives of the National Drug Control Strategy emphasized global collaboration, especially with the assistance of law enforcement, and prioritized the U.S.-Mexico coordination through the share of strategic information (NCJRS, 1989). These Acts began to manifest their influence in the policy reforms of the 1990s and subsequently continued later on. Since the 1990s, the Mexican state has implemented considerable institutional and legal reforms to strengthen its ability to combat drugs, as well as made substantial financial investments, progressively increasing the amount each year (Chabat, 2002).

To begin with, starting from 1990, money laundering was defined as a criminal offense, followed by the establishment of the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs in 1993, which aimed to control drug trafficking while in the same year, reforms to the criminal code and federal financial law extended penalties and detention periods for drug traffickers, facilitated government access to information through the seizure

of assets of the traffickers, and sought to prevent money laundering (Chabat, 2002). Secondly, the 1994 reform of the Federal Criminal Code led to separate consideration of offenses related to illicit substances, such as production, use, transportation, and trade, instead of addressing them under a single article, for instance, offenses related to transport, trafficking, commerce, or supply were increased, while those related to cultivation or personal use were reduced (Hernández, 2011). Thirdly, in 1996, the Federal Organized Crime Law was enacted to strengthen penalties, and the Special Units Against Organized Crime and Money Laundering for its enforcement were established (Chabat, 2002; Hernández, 2011). Additionally, the arrest of the director of the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs in 1997 led to the dismantlement of the institute, and the establishment of the special attorney for Crimes Against Health, and subsequently, the National Crusade Against Crime was established to modernize the fight against drugs in 1998 before the establishment of the federal preventive police force to maintain control over fragmented police forces (Chabat, 2002). Finally, in 1999, Operation Sealing the Border was implemented to prevent drug trafficking across the Mexico border (Chabat, 2002).

By the arrival of the 2000s, a significant development took place with the election of Vicente Fox from the National Action Party (PAN in its Spanish acronym) as president, marking the first time a non-PRI candidate assumed the presidency. This event created a favorable situation both for the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs in Mexico and for the United States which could be regarded as the last pivotal moment in Mexico's anti-drug policy process, preceding Calderón's declaration of the Drug War. His agenda mainly involved collaboration with the U.S. and strengthening the control agencies towards drug trafficking (Cantú Garza, 2016), and in this regard, he started a campaign, Operación México Seguro, in Nuevo Laredo (Grillo, 2011). The accelerated arrests started in the 1990s advanced during his administration as well, so much so that one of his agenda topics covered the extradition of detainees (Cantú Garza, 2016).

Despite the development of the Safe Mexico strategy in 2004 after the escalation of inter-cartel conflicts and the strengthening of armed forces to be sent to the regions with the most security problems in line with this strategy, that is, to the U.S. border, violence throughout the country has not decelerated, on the contrary, operations aimed at ending the cartel conflict have become the main cause of violence,

as well as decoupling drug-related violence throughout the country (Cantú Garza, 2016). The spread of violence throughout the country after the condensed violent operations of specific regions could be regarded similarly to the 'balloon effect' in the results caused by Operation Condor.

In a nutshell, the influence of the United States cannot be overlooked in the process Mexico experienced during the 20th century. Ergo, the impact of pressure from America and Mexico's acquiescence to American strategies is evident in many turning points of the Mexican anti-drug policies. Nevertheless, the pressures applied by the U.S. in line with different strategies in the process of drug control agenda, far from solving the drug problem in Mexico, have caused the problem to spread throughout the country, as well as serious violence across the nation.

According to Carpenter, the prohibitionist strategy implemented by the US itself and the pressure on Mexico to take drastic measures in line with this strategy serve no purpose other than driving drugs into the "black market" (Carpenter, 2005: 7). Moreover, he states that this situation has yielded similar outcomes for Colombia, however, due to their shared border, the consequences in Mexico will be more dangerous for the US. Likewise, Chabat (2002) claims that the pressure from the U.S. has created a very aggressive drug control policy in Mexico and the fact that it lacks adjustability and flexibility in the face of bad results owing to its inadequacy in the institutionalization of its bureaucratic structure puts Mexico's democratic progress in danger.

3.2. Political Analysis of Calderón's Drug War: 2006-2012

The political analysis of Calderón's Drug War will be assessed in line with the suggestions made by Bayırbağ (2013) for policy analysis. In this regard, the war on drugs Calderón officially declared soon after he took over the presidency will be evaluated in three categories: the historical and internal conjuncture, the agenda of his war on drug-related issues, the implementation process, and the outcomes of his drug war. The objective of the analysis of the first category will provide a comprehensive understanding of what led him to his decision to launch a war against drug trafficking organizations as well as the motives behind it and why he chose to conduct his war through the military. The second category aims to give an assessment of his main purpose within the implementation of the drug war, as well as the linguistic

introduction of his decision and the politicization of his introduction. The last category will, firstly, be divided into sub-initiatives of the operations, reforms, and agreements launched during the drug war.

Thereafter, the sub-initiatives will be analyzed regarding, firstly, their objectives if applicable, as well as the consistency of the organizations that took part in them with the legal regulations, secondly, the evaluation procedures, and finally, the outcomes of the initiatives. In this regard, the sub-initiatives are categorized according to their valuable impact in terms of consequences and the considerations of the literature, and thus; firstly, the Merida Initiative; secondly, the military operations; and lastly, the legal reforms, most importantly the reform of Ley de Narcomenudeo, will be analyzed.

Before starting the analysis, it is important to present a summary of the important initiatives carried out during the Calderón-era drug war process. To begin with, shortly after Calderón declared war, military deployments were conducted in several regions such as Michoacán, Guerrero, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juárez. Moreover, until the war gradually receded from his political agenda towards the end of his presidency, numerous conflicts between military units and illicit trafficking organizations took place.

Another important initiative of this period is the Merida Initiative agreement between Mexico and the United States. The agreement holds valuable implications in the context of Mexico-U.S. relations and the U.S. support for the drug war. In addition, Calderón has drawn attention to the corruption since the first days he took over the presidency as it has been widespread in state bodies and civil servants and had a significant impact on the drug problem in Mexico. In this sense, his most crucial initiative was Operation Limpieza, through which serious investigations and documentation were carried out within the police forces.

As mentioned above, towards the end of his presidency, Calderón shifted his war policy to a relatively less prominent position and turned his attention towards drug use and rehabilitation reforms. In this regard, the 2009 'ley de narcomenudeo' reform, through which small-scale drug consumption was exempt from punitive measures within a defined framework, holds significant importance in analyzing Calderón's trajectory of drug policies.

3.2.1. The Historical Context of the Drug War:

"Mexico has borne a disproportionate burden of drug-related harms, including an epidemic of drug cartel-initiated violence, a burgeoning prison population, and mounting syndemics related to substance use and infectious diseases" (Mackey et al., 2014: 2). Considering Mexico's long-standing issue with drug problems, it becomes inevitable for an incoming president to prioritize this matter in the political agenda. However, accumulated violent history, challenges in the country's democratization process, widespread corruption, and deficiencies in the institutionalization of the state organs, coupled with the pressure from the United States on drug trafficking, led to insufficient anti-drug policies in curbing drug use and, especially, drug trafficking within the country.

The institutionalization and the internalized tolerance of violence in the country do not imply only the tolerance of criminal violence but also the violent structuring of the control agencies, such as the police force or the military, as well as the naturalization of the presence of the army in the forefront. However, when, the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón took the chair, drug trafficking organizations had increased the commission of crimes such as human trafficking and murder addition to drug trafficking (Cantú Garza, 2016), which exceeded the public tolerance of criminal violence, and thus expanded the consideration of public insecurity within citizens. Moreover, the lang surrounding corruption surpassed its impact on the state agencies and cash flow to violent incidents and instability of the regions (Morris, 2012). This internal conjuncture led Calderón to officially declare war against drug trafficking.

It is also essential to address the impact of corruption on democratization and the practical delays in the country's democratization process. Soon after gaining its independence in the early 19th century, Mexico had to face being governed by a dictatorship from the end of the same century until the Mexican Revolution. Subsequently, after Miguel Alemán Valdés from PRI assumed the presidency in 1946, Mexico endured approximately 60 years of PRI dominance until the election of Vicente Fox, a candidate from PAN, in 2000. Therefore, until Fox's election, Mexico cannot be considered to have experienced genuine democracy, despite all the Latin American countries' transitioning to democracy by the end of the 20th century (Michaud, 2011). Consequently, Mexico encountered dictatorship shortly after the devastating War of Independence, and after the equally tumultuous Mexican

Revolution, it fell under the dominance of a one-party system without commencing a democratization process. PRI preserved its authority by continually bringing its ties to the Revolution to attention, enhancing its advocacy, and indulging in electoral fraud (Klesner, 2007). Although Fox's presidency represented a significant turning point in Mexico's democratization process, the 2006 elections were still seen as a critical examination of the country's transition from an authoritarian one-party system to a multi-party democracy, as the process of democratization continued (Erikson, 2005; Klesner, 2007). Consequently, the results of the election represented whether Mexico could maintain its modernization through its democratic transition or encounter new difficulties, as well as instability (Erikson, 2005).

The aftermath of the 2006 election was marked by substantial polarization and discord in conjunction with accusations of electoral fraud and the defeated candidate's refusal to accept the election results (Klesner, 2007). Furthermore, Michaud (2011) draws attention to the inhibitive effect of democratization on presidential power and states that the use of the military in his drug war was essential for Calderón to gain power. Nonetheless, it should be also taken into consideration that what restricts presidential power is the governmental system through democratization besides the decentralization reforms made by the 1990s rather than democracy itself. Being “a federalist republic by adoption” (Prieto, 1955: 920) could be seen as one of the reasons for presidential limitations as well. In this context, Calderón's ascendancy to power was crucial for the gain of legitimacy (Laurell, 2015), and for the stability of his government.

With respect to the issue of corruption, it would be misleading to regard corruption in the country as a problem stuck on the state agencies, and government itself adventitiously. On the contrary, as it has been thoroughly examined in the previous sections, the issue of corruption resided both from the colonial era and within the conglomeration of the one-party dominance of PRI. Thus, corruption has been quite inveterate in the formation of the Mexican state. Although Vicente Fox, who came to power after the corrupt one-party system, stated that he would fight corruption, there were no serious breakthroughs (Garibian, 2007). Furthermore, the reason why Calderón, who referred to corruption as "cancer" and emphasized his commitment to addressing it (Morris, 2012: 30), implemented a war on drugs where the control mechanism that the police should have assumed was provided by the military was

mainly due to corruption (Michaud, 2011). During his tenure, Calderón particularly moved towards limiting the power of state police officers.

Finally, the institutionalization process of the country presents a valuable overview of the deficiency of anti-drug policies that have been implemented in the country. Domínguez and Poiré (1999) state that the institutionalization process of Mexico was marked by the convergence of two diverging developments: slow democratization on the one hand, and active participation of Mexican voters in advocating for political reforms on the other. Until the Zedillo administration led to a process of change and deinstitutionalization since certain initiatives taken to liberalize politics paved the way for the destruction of old institutions without creating new ones, the nation's political system had historically been centralized, with the President of Mexico wielding considerable authority and frequently resorting to electoral fraud and misuse of power to retain control (Domínguez & Poiré, 1999).

As a consequence, amidst the ongoing process of institutionalization, which has not been settled accurately, deficient actions in modernizing the government structure, coupled with the neglect of the incoming governments toward the proper operation of state institutions, have resulted in the weakening of Mexico's institutions, and ineffective law enforcement dealing with drug-related crimes. Weak institutions, as previously stated, have a great tendency to suffer from corruption. Given the defectiveness of the state institutions, it becomes evident that within the context of the drug issue, the unavoidable outcome occurs for corruption in conjunction with the problem itself, rather than for it to be arising later. In this regard, the institutional vulnerability has been composed of the scarcity of resources and expertise, along with widespread police corruption, which has led to a lack of public trust in both local and federal law enforcement agencies (Michaud, 2011). Although the lack of public trust, resultant of the insufficient institutions, and the corruption, led to Calderón's decision to military use, the complexity of the state structure makes a comprehensive superintendence of anti-drug policies quite challenging. Since the counter-drug strategy is de-centralized[10], while the complexity of the system is attributed to the vast bureaucracy involved in implementing and enforcing legislation, which affects the

[10] The responsibility is diversified not only at different levels as federal, state, and municipal but also among several organizations, such as the Ministry of Public Security (SSP in its Spanish acronym), or the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR in its Spanish acronym) (Hernández, 2011).

prison situation (Hernández, 2011: 61), the drug legislation itself becomes problematic.

In a nutshell, Calderón launched a war on drugs due to firstly, the complex and diversified crimes of drug trafficking organizations during his presidency, and secondly, an attempt to gain authoritarian power owing to the difficulties Mexico has been experiencing in the democratization process. On the other part, the motivations behind the fact that he conducted the drug war primarily with the military rather than the police forces are the widespread corruption in state organizations and civil servants, with the country's lack of institutionalization. Nevertheless, such justifications did not appear only during the Calderón period, to the contrary, they have always existed in the history of Mexico. Therefore, it cannot be considered an unexpected consequence that a person who becomes the president of Mexico takes an authoritarian attitude and experiences violent clashes with drug trafficking ever so often, usually through US influence.

Military operations have been conducted intermittently, such as Operation Condor which happened in the 1970s, and especially the operations during the Fox era, prove that Calderón was not the only president who experienced conflicts in conjunction with the army activity. Grillo (2011) also states that the drug war did not start during the Calderón era, on the contrary, this war has its roots in the history of Mexico, for instance, the Dirty War, which took place between the 1960s and 1980s, and the breakdown of the country's power system after the demise of the PRI, and continued his argument with the fact that such war existed under the administration of Vicente Fox, however, Calderón's sharp strategy severely increased violence, especially crime-related violence, and incidences of disappearance, and this issue will maintain after Calderón as well.

Moreover, Madrazo and Barreto (2018), by acknowledging the military use in the Zedillo administration, claim that militarization during the 1990s remained informal and limited to appointing military personnel, often retired, to lead civil institutions. However, the main reason that makes Calderón's sharp strategy and the policies implemented during his presidency different from those of previous presidents is the high increase in human rights violations, which will be examined in detail in the ‘Policy Outcomes’ section of the analysis.

The fact that Calderón officially declared war against drug trafficking legalized both the use of the military in operations during his anti-drug policy and the use of unethical force by the military in conflicts. The common use of force in anti-drug policies is "zero tolerance policing", an attitude that although officially began to be implemented in New York in the 1990s, its origin is rooted in history, and the "crackdown" strategy that emerged within this attitude (Morales et al., 2020).

Despite the fact that "narcotic crackdown<" has been a long-accepted strategy in studies and conferences of the United Nations, especially along with the effect of the restrictive strategy, the opposing approaches that have emerged recently have argued that this strategy will damage public health by creating new actors in the drug market and causing the nonsterile injections with no supervision (Morales, et al., 2020). Although after 2010, this strategy was abandoned in the developed regions of Mexico together with the rehabilitation-based perspective with the "ley de narcomenudeo" reform, according to the research of Morales et al. (2020) the internalized culture of this strategy persists among policy implementers on the field, such as the police force, in Tijuana.

3.2.2. The Agenda of the Drug War:

During his candidacy period, Calderón expressed his sensitivity towards poverty and inequality issues through various statements (Abatir la Pobreza y Desigualdad, 2006), so much so that in his 'Mexico 20-30' plan, he emphasized the importance of access to quality education in reducing inequality across the country (México 20-30: Proyecto de Gran Visión, 2006). Accordingly, when he assumed office, Calderón announced that his main areas of focus would be public security, poverty, and job creation, however, shortly after taking office, his actions showed that public security was the top priority on his agenda (Meyer, 2007). In this context, he launched a military operation in Michoacán soon after becoming president, followed by operations in Tijuana and Guerrero, and the announcement that these operations would extend throughout the country, primarily to Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, and Baja California, in his presentation of anti-drug initiatives in National Palace in early 2007 (Fuerte Operativo Federal, 2006; Megaoperativo Federal, 2007; Los Megaoperativos, 2007; Presenta Calderón plan, 2007; Megaoperativo en Guerrero,

2007). Moreover, Calderón initiated the 'First Employment Program', which aimed at creating two million new job opportunities for young people with no work experience (el Programa por la Generación del Primer Empleo, 2007), for reducing inequalities and poverty in the country.

According to Atuesta Becerra (2015), Calderón's anti-drug policies progressed in three main areas: public security, health, and social development. Referring to public security and justice, it was aimed to enhance areas like human resources and crime reporting, with also the goal of reducing illegal cultivation by 70%, while regarding the health sector, the focus was only on drug use control and reduction, and regarding social development, the aim was to reduce inequality and increase access to healthcare and education (Atuesta Becerra, 2015: 13-14). However, as detailed in the subsequent analysis, Calderón's initiatives predominantly focused on enhancing security, while innovations in the health sector were not well-coordinated with fieldworkers, and efforts to reduce inequality fell short.

Alongside domestic initiatives, Calderón also kept seeking increased cooperation with the United States in his agenda:

> Calderón Hinojosa stated that he will demand a much greater commitment from the United States in reducing drug consumption, under the premise that Mexico cannot alone reduce the drug trafficking supply if the demand in the United States is not reduced in parallel (Exigirá Calderón, 2006).

Holding the aforementioned perspective, throughout his presidency, Calderón continued to emphasize the necessity of enhancing cooperation with the United States and changing the perception of Mexican government figures (Cantú Garza, 2016: 24) and further continued calling for a reduction in demand for drugs in the U.S. (Reducir la Demanda de Drogas en EU, 2007). In this context, aside from the ‘Merida Initiative’ in 2007, there were repeated suggestions from the U.S. to take stronger action against cartels (Boyce, et al., 2015). Despite Beith's (2010) claim that in the literature, statements show that the influence of the U.S. on Calderón's decision to war on drugs was minimal and that it was mainly to cover election fraud, it is evident that the U.S. officially supported Calderón's decision, with the Bush administration praising his operation's success (Elogia Washington, 2007; Bush felicita a Calderón, 2007). Consequently, Calderón's decisions and militarization during the drug war were supported by the U.S. (Boyce, et al., 2015).

During Calderón's tenure, there is a significant lack of documentation regarding both the introduction and the implementation of the policies. Madrazo and Barreto (2018) mention the lack of clear documentation regarding the necessity, main objectives, and planned initiatives of the drug war. Similarly, Atuesta Becerra (2015) pointed out the insufficiency of the relationship between the applied strategies and established objectives, the lack of periodic controls during the policy implementation process, and the inconsistency between the goals of the policy agenda and the actual actions taken.[11]

Concerning his linguistic penchant for his introduction to 'war' and his reference to drug trafficking organizations, Calderón, by declaring a 'war on drugs', ushered for a different orientation towards drug trafficking organizations, and individuals taking part in them. In numerous official statements, Calderón has asserted that the crimes committed within the context of drug trafficking pose a threat to the integrity of the public, and he has emphasized that he will not back down in the war he initiated against it, as well as he claimed that "criminals will be persecuted in his government, those who do not want to live in peace with society" and deprives the citizens of their right to live in safety (No Se Permitirá Ningún Chantaje, 2007; Mi Gobierno Será Intransigente, 2008).

Declaring an official war gives rise to interrelated offsets of considerations; the first one is the legitimization of militarization, the second one is the perception of drug dealers as an enemy and the legitimization of national unity against them, and the last one is the justification of uncontrolled confrontation and judgment. To begin with, militarization induces the loss of reputation and weakening of the police forces. Thus, the use of military for the criminal control within the borders of the country, as well as for criminal confrontations results in the fact that "police forces are fading away and their place is being taken by members of the military" (Trevino-Rangel et al.,

[11] Contingent on the militarization strategy of Calderón, the governmental organizations primarily assigned to take part in the war on drugs are;

- Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA in its Spanish acronym),
- Secretariat of the Mexican Navy (SEMAR in its Spanish acronym),
- Secretariat of Federal Public Safety (SSPF in its Spanish acronym),
- Secretariat of Public Security (SSP in its Spanish acronym),
- Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT in its Spanish acronym),
- Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit (SHCP in its Spanish acronym), and
- Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR in its Spanish acronym) (CICAD, 2010:28; Hernández, 2011:61).

2022: 569). In this context, Trevino-Rangel et al. (2022: 569) refer to the use of the military as the "militarization of public security".

Second of all, the assertion of war signifies that there is an 'enemy' threatening the cohesion of the nation, and thus exclusion of the drug trafficking organization, in essence, drug traffickers, from the nation-state. In this regard, Madrazo Lajous (2016) interprets the recognition of drug traffickers as an enemy rather than a criminal within the political context as dehumanizing them, positioning them outside of the political and social community. Madrazo Lajous (2016) also emphasizes that this perception generates an underestimation and a cover for the intertwined nature of drug-related crimes and the role of the state within them, such as corruption, as violence is acknowledged as an integral aspect of the drug trafficker's lifestyle and is frequently linked to corruption in the popular political imagination, and therefore, crimes of drug trafficking are considered as a personal matter rather than a clear threat to political power.

On a different note, Boyce, et al. (2015), by approaching from a different terminology, highlight how the use of 'cartel' creates a territorialization of drug trafficking organizations as if they are an entity outside of the state itself, which also leads to the blurriness of the relationship between them. While the criminal is a part of the community to some extent, the enemy is located outside of the national unity, yet the interwoven of the two separate terminologies may lead the communal imagination to confusion, the lines between law and confrontation into blurriness in the conceptualization of "who belongs to the "us" (the political community, which in principle, includes criminals) and who belongs to the "them" (the enemies)", and thus, a potential civil war (Madrazo Lajous, 2016: 56). This potential civil war has been impeded by national unity. It is a prevalent phenomenon that a president of a nation-state requires national unity, however, in Calderón's war on drugs, the appeal has been made against drug trafficking organizations, in which the Mexican citizens took part. Calderón has repeatedly called for national unity toward drug trafficking either in the way of participation for denouncement or in the context of demonstrating it as an internal enemy (Pide Calderón Unidad para Descubrir, 2007; Pide Calderón Unidad para Vencer, 2010).

Lastly, while the fact that drug trafficking organizations are seen as opposed to the state and civil society includes the justification for specific forms of state

intervention, the dehumanizing aspect of them as an enemy brings along the unsupervised operations and judgments (Mandolessi & Olalde, 2022; Boyce, et al., 2015). Although a declaration against the nation's undefeated enemy brings about a vindication of a government, "such a declaration would have given the military and police free reign to conduct operations with little or no oversight" (Boyce, et al., 2015: 447).

Concisely, by emphasizing the issue of public security in his candidacy, although he stated his intention was also to focus on areas such as inequality and poverty, Calderón's initiation of the war on drugs and several military operations shortly after assuming the presidency demonstrated that public security was the top priority on his agenda, and revealed the approach he would take in countering the drug issue during his tenure. However, the declaration of war, justifying the use of the military on the one hand, led to the dehumanizing of the drug traffickers, who are also Mexican citizens on the other, and thus, caused an uncontrolled operational process with currently legitimized military use.

3.2.3. The Implementation Process and the Outcomes:

Within this section of the political analysis, firstly, an introduction to the Merida Initiative will be made, proceeding with the outcomes of the initiative, secondly, drug decriminalization reform, Ley de Narcomenudeo will be examined deeply with its objectives and consequences, through the help of the statistical data on federal sentences from INEGI, and lastly, the military operations, which were the most criticized dimension of Calderón's drug war will be evaluated with the analysis of statistical outcomes from different organizations.

After official appreciation from the U.S. side of the drug war and the operations that began immediately after the declaration of war, the Mérida Initiative was signed by Calderón and former U.S. President Bush in 2007 (Michaud, 2011; Vorobyeva, 2015; Lozano-Vázquez & Rebolledo Flores, 2015) owing to that Mexican drug trafficking organizations were also adversely affecting the U.S., and it was sustained by Barack Obama, who took the chair in 2009 and supported Calderón's war on drugs, as well (Cantú Garza, 2016). It was a multiyear "security cooperation initiative with Mexico and the countries of Central America in order to combat the threats of drug

trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere", that would be beneficial for both of the countries, namely the U.S., and Mexico (Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative, 2007, as cited in Vorobyeva, 2015: 55; Lozano-Vázquez & Rebolledo Flores, 2015).

Although the treaty has been widely evaluated in the literature as the "Colombianization of Mexico" (Michaud, 2011: 8), the most important feature that distinguished the Merida Initiative from Plan Colombia was that the United States provided support to the Mexican army in the areas of training and equipment, rather than providing military personnel for confrontation to the drug war in Mexico. The main framework of the initiative was that the U.S. was going to provide annual financial support to the Mexican government in combatting drug trafficking as long as the initiatives that the U.S. was supporting were taken, and resulted in success (Michaud, 2011). Pursuant to the initiative, the United States was to provide financial assistance of US$1.4 billion, spread over three years (Lozano-Vázquez & Rebolledo Flores, 2015). On the other hand, the main request of Calderón was to get the U.S. support in the areas of "intelligence, technology, and training" (Torre, 2013: 1623, as cited in Boyce, et al., 2015: 454).[12] The practices advocated by the U.S. were the dismantling of drug trafficking organizations, enhancement of the legal regulations, assurance of a pliable society, and improvement of the borders (Boyce, et al., 2015).

In this context, the US government also took responsibility for Calderón's call for reducing the demand, recognizing that the treaty has a bilateral responsibility (Vorobyeva, 2015). According to the report released by the Government Accountability Office of the U.S., although the U.S. agencies provided the main equipment mentioned in the initiative, such as five "Bell helicopters, X-ray inspection devices, law enforcement canines, and training for more than 4,000 police officers to the Mexican government", such favorable outcomes had several adverse conclusions because insufficient staffing to manage programs and ensure smooth equipment delivery, slow negotiations, and contract disbursement, and changes in governments and funding availability all hindered the effective implementation of the Merida Initiative (Abu-Hamdeh, 2011: 40). On the other hand, even though within the scope

[12] In this context, in 2010, a pilot program was initiated along the same line as Calderón's requests in border cities, such as Ciudad Juárez and El Paso (Barradas, 2015).

of the initiative, financial assistance was provided to the military operation launched against the most important cartels of Mexico in 2008, this military operation, far from reducing the dominance of cartels, seriously increased the security problem on the US-Mexico border (Bagley, 2015).

Moreover, in terms of the evaluation process, despite the Bilateral Implementation Office (BIO) being established in Mexico City in 2010 as part of the policy evaluation and recommendation (Merida Initiative Bilateral Implementation Office Opens, 2010), there were no reporting documents within the scope of anti-drug policies. The outcomes of the initiative, as summed up by Lozano-Vázquez and Rebolledo Flores (2015: 245-246), were higher levels of information sharing, strengthened supervision at the border, as well as the transborder flows of money, ensured training for the federal police, judicial officials, and prison employees, and the enhancement of the instrumental capacity of the Mexican army forces.

One of the most significant operations conducted during the drug war and the sole major endeavor against corruption was the Operación Limpieza (Operation Clean-up), which was carried out through the coordination of organizations of the PGR and DEA. After the scandals emerged from the Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (SEIDO in its Spanish acronym), Calderón made a commitment to conduct an epuration within the police force, thus initiating the first presentation of the Operación Limpieza (Promete Calderón Depuración Policíaca, 2008). This endeavor, targeting top-ranked officials (Boyce, et al., 2015), was initiated to dismantle public officials, as well as officials within the police forces who were corrupted (Grayson, 2011; Michaud, 2011) through the objective of cleansing and professionalizing Mexico's police forces (Grayson, 2011). The 2007 estimation of "$2.6 billion" of cash transfer regarding bribery (Grayson, 2011: 132), and the claim that "the former director of SEIDO, reportedly received $450,000 per month for his services to the cartel's leaders" (Morris, 2012: 30) illustrate the magnitude of cash transfer regarding corruption in terms of drug-related trafficking.

Within the scope of Operación Limpieza, fifteen high-ranking government officials, including former Secretary of Public Security of the federal government Genaro García Luna, Prevental Federal Police (PFP in its Spanish acronym) chief Víctor Gerardo Garay Cadena, and SIEDO deputy coordinator Fernando Rivera

Hernández, were arrested (García Luna: Incriminado, 2008; Grayson, 2011). Although the initiative brought success especially in the beginning through arrests of high-level officials (Boyce, et al., 2015), it was insufficient in terms of addressing the roots of the corruption (Beith, 2010; Grayson, 2011) as although high-ranked officials were put under the scope, the main arrests were from PFP or SEIDO. On the other hand, the army officials remained inadequately interrogated despite that there were clear allegations against army officials, such as them being accused of providing weapons to opposed criminal groups (Oficiales del Ejército Vendían Armas, 2008). The newspaper article from Proceso also emphasizes the doubts about Calderón's Operación Limpieza:

> It is no novelty that drug trafficking has infiltrated high levels of power. The novelty would be if Felipe Calderón's government moved from the media noise of accusations in the Operation Clean-up to solid charges against the recently high officials of the PGR allegedly involved in drug trafficking. However, Calderón is already covering himself in case it all ends up being a mere show (Operación Limpieza, 2008).

Moreover, while low-level success in combatting drug trafficking has built up the hopes of the public, it also gave a glimpse into how corruption has been spread within governmental organizations. "The results were both promising and disheartening" (Beith, 2010: 118). Consequently, being the only internal noteworthy initiative against corruption, Operación Limpieza has resulted in insufficient interrogations and arrestments considering the widespread corruption, having a solid foundation within the state, in the country.

The data used in the remainder of the analysis were primarily obtained from INEGI and publicly available databases under the PPD, which was established within CIDE. A substantial portion of the data regarding outcomes of the drug war era were sourced from the PPD. Consequently, while the statistical data deficiency during the Calderón era's drug war was obviated through the utilization of the PPD for this research, the absence of evaluation data and reports for that period has also been critiqued by PPD researchers.[13]

[13] For instance, Atuesta Becerra (2015: 14) emphasizes "a lack of correlation between the proposed objectives and actions, together with a shortage in measurement instruments". Moreover, according to another report on PPD, an extensive database on homicide rate during the drug war has not been published until 2012 by PGR (Atuesta et al., 2019).

In light of apprehensions regarding the limited efficacy of historical emphasis on the criminalization of drug-related activities, such as usage, and enforcement, there had been a notable shift in international drug policies, paving the way for a pursuit by various countries in the way of partial deregulations of personal drug use (Mackey, et al., 2014: 1). In this regard, in 2009, an advanced legal regulation, Ley de Narcomenudeo (the law against small-scale drug dealing) on the separation of small-scale and large-scale drug-related crimes under the Federal Criminal Code, with the General Health Law was put into effect (Hernández, 2011: 61). The main objective of the legal reform was to preserve the efforts of the federal control agencies through, firstly, directing the efforts of control agencies towards the large-scale drug traffickers, instead of them being disrupted by small-scale drug-related activities, and secondly, making an implementational switch from the federal level to the state level (Mackey, et al., 2014; Arredondo et al., 2018). The secondary aim was to enhance drug treatment, from a health-based political perspective (Morales et al., 2020).

Under the decree, the amount, of which civilians could carry with them, of the illegal substances was standardized, and individuals carrying illegal substances under the regulated amounts were excused from confinement, yet they were subjected to criminal treatment, to put it differently, they were still taken into custody. "Based on these amounts, a distinction is made between large-scale drug traffickers ('*narcomayorista*') and small-scale, street-level dealers ('*narcomenudista*')" (Hernández, 2011: 62). During the detainment, the goal was to ascertain, firstly, whether they were solely users or addicts, secondly, whether they were engaged in illicit cultivation or street-level dealing of such substances, and lastly, whether the subject had a possibility of being a large-scale dealer. Individuals possessing a certain amount and number of illicit substances over the regulated standards, however, were determined as small-scale dealers, and convicted according to such category. Furthermore, there was "a three strikes system" (Mackey, et al., 2014: 4). In a way, being caught had a limitation, that the third time was dealt with under conviction. In this context, Ley de Narcomenudeo could be defined as an amalgamation of both decriminalization and restriction of drug usage.

One of the main reasons leading to such judicial reform is, as mentioned previously, the spreading of discussions on the legalization of drug-based substances in terms of personal usage, which have been defined under the illegal category. The

debate on the decriminalization of drug use and possession, in terms of beneficial effects on public health and public safety, suggested that such legal conversion could engender a reduction of arrestments, a minimization of possible social exclusions, and an increase in healthier drug treatments (DPA, 2015).[14] The reform of Ley de Narcomenudeo is quite crucial in terms that it indicates the decrease in Calderón's harsh pro-war policy, as well as his strict prohibitionist strategy as it is also possible to observe a decline in detrimental military operations after the reform.

The reform was beneficial for the cultural heritage of drug use, which is quite common in the country, nonetheless, it was insufficient in terms of drug trafficking, since, primarily, the control agencies were distracted by the small-scale apprehensions that usually do not pose a threat against the state unity (Arredondo, et al., 2018), even though the official aim was quite the opposite, and secondly, placing reliance on the government actors was an unfortunate strategy considering the widespread corruption among them (Hernández, 2011).

Providing evidence of the distraction of the police, studies reveal that there was an increase in drug-related arrests, specifically with the increase in the percentage of arrests of people who use drugs among criminal charges to 86.6% in 2013 (Gaines et al., 2017; Morales, et al., 2020: 3). Another adverse outcome in terms of institutionalization was the continuation of the limitation of the police forces. As mentioned earlier, Calderón already undervalued the control mechanism of the police force by declaring a war on drugs, thus justifying the use of military force in combatting drug trafficking, which was also due to widespread corruption. In addition to that, by assigning the police force for only small-scale trafficking while making the military force superior in combatting large-scale trafficking within the scope of the reform, the police force was dismissed from one of his primary missions.

Moreover, although the aim was to clearly make a distinction between the users, addicts, and traffickers, the separation between the user and the addict was still ambiguous due to insufficient framing in both indicators and implementations (Hernández, 2011). Another disadvantageous outcome of the reform is the increase in social exclusion. The study of Hernández (2011) on the prison situation in Mexico

[14] Moreover, there were many countries legalizing the possession of drugs in standardized amounts either in the late 1990s, such as the Czech Republic, or during the 2000s, like the Netherlands, Portugal, or Argentina (DPA, 2015).

points out the fact that most of the imprisoned individuals were either poor or marginalized with household deprivations, as well as low educational access.

Furthermore, another study by PPD scholars highlights that specific regions, mostly dealing with poverty and lack of public security, were concentrated by the police force (Gaines et al., 2014). As a result, the initiative of legalization remained incomplete due to the ignorance of the coordination of prior prejudice, leading to an incompatibility between priorities of the public health and the practices of the police (Arredondo, et al., 2018; Morales, et al., 2020). Finally, several studies indicate that there were inadequate training efforts, on one part, regarding the police force, which was mainly responsible for the implementation process, and on the other, regarding the public enlightenment about the reform. One study on civil individuals reveals that most of the interviewees were not elucidated on the amounts of possession (Beletsky et al., 2016), while another one on the policemen concludes that most of them were not acknowledged the sub-regulations of the reform (Arredondo et al., 2017).

Regarding, the change in trends of federal sentences between 2006 and 2012, the database of INEGI is utilized, however, since the database changed in 2008, certain categories have been replaced or added after 2008. In this context, Figure 3 illustrates criminal sentences in ‘illegal acts with weapons’, ‘regarding narcotics’, and regarding criminal groupings, although until 2008, they were categorized as ‘criminal associations’, and as ‘criminal organizations’ after 2008, the groupings were taken into account as the same sentence code.

To begin with, the number of federal sentences in the category of ‘regarding narcotics’ remained steady until 2009, however, from 2009 to 2010, there was a drastic rise in the number of sentences, and the high figures continued until 2012 as well, which was mainly due to the reform of Ley de Narcomenudeo. When the severe increase in figures from 2009 to 2010 is compared to the previous research outcomes, as mentioned earlier in the literature review of the reform Ley de Narcomenudeo, it is evident that instead of focusing on the enhancement of public health, the pro-detention strategy has continued within the implementation agencies, the police force.

Moreover, under the category of ‘illegal acts with weapons’, no sentence proceeded in the first three years since the category was not specified until 2009, however, the figures of sentences were very close between the two categories in 2009. On the other hand, the category of ‘criminal associations’ until 2009 continues as

'criminal organizations' along a similar line, however, it should be noted that there is a high possibility that the former includes also small-scale groupings of crime, such as street gangs. Such consideration also clarifies the decrease from 2008 to 2009. After the reform of Ley de narcomenudeo, small-scale drug trafficking has been legally separated from large-scale drug trafficking, as a result, the federal sentences due to criminal organization, after 2009, include only large-scale drug traffickers.




Figure 3 *Number of Federal Sentences between 2006 and 2012*

(Source: "Delitos de los Delicuentes Sentenciados: 1997-2008", "Delitos de los Delicuentes Sentenciados: 2009-2012" from the database of INEGI.)

Furthermore, another reason for the decline was the Constitutional Reform for Organized Crime and Oral Hearings (Atuesta Becerra, 2015), which inheld the "presumption of innocence until proven guilty" through oral plea with more adjust trials (Seelke, 2013: I). Nevertheless, it is crucial not to overlook the fact that in contradistinction to both the high numbers of federal sentences and a drastic increase in sentences from 2009 to 2010 in the category of 'regarding narcotics', the numbers, and the increase within the same years in the category of 'criminal organizations' dramatically lagged behind.

Furthermore, the statistical evidence demonstrates the discussion of how the aim of Ley de Narcomenudeo for enhancing the efforts of federal control mechanisms toward dealing with drug trafficking organizations.

Regarding military operations, the first military operation, which was named 'Operación Conjunta Michoacán'[15] and conducted both on land and from the air with over 5000 soldiers, was launched in December 2006, only after eleven days Calderón took the chair (Fuerte Operativo Federal, 2006; Meyer, 2007; Boyce, et al., 2015).

Soon after, as stated at the beginning of the section, the operations expanded to other states as well (Boyce, et al., 2015), and in the end, it is reported that annually 50.000 soldiers involved in street guarding (Trevino-Rangel et al., 2022). "Each of these moves generated a spike in violence and alleged human rights violations, including kidnappings, murder, torture, beheadings, disappearances, public shootouts and civilian massacres" (Boyce, et al., 2015: 454).

Prior to the analysis of the outcomes of the operations, the data of agreements and initiatives within the federal state and federal entities during the period from 2007 to 2021 under PPD should be covered. From the publicly open database (Inventario Nacional de lo Militarizado, 2021), it can be observed that the only accepted agreement among initiatives from federal entities between 2007 and 2012 was related to granting full authority to the Armed Forces to ensure public security. However, proposals for the Armed Forces to provide assistance to civilian populations when needed or to aid in suppressing uprisings within states were rejected. This indicates that during the Calderón era, the efforts of the Armed Forces were primarily directed toward combating drug-related issues and safeguarding public security with full authority. Furthermore, permissions for disempowering the Armed Forces in Federative Entities, granting authority to combat organized crime, and enabling SEDENA to collaborate with Federative Entities in this context were all rejected. This demonstrates that one of Calderón's measures against corruption was to retain the authority for the drug war at the federal level rather than delegating it to federative entities, possibly due to prevalent corruption among police forces. Lastly, the agreement to grant SEDENA the authority to oversee military detentions in 2010 was also rejected, leading to the lack of supervision in military detentions.

[15] However, a few days later after the operation, inconsistencies in the number of arrests have come to light according to a Proceso article (Dudas Razonables, 2006), and the low number of arrests was criticized by PRI deputy Eugenio Torres Moreno: "It is not possible that, in 21 days of operation, with more than seven thousand police and military elements that practically besieged the entity, only 81 people have been arrested, some of them already free" (los Grandes Capos, Libres, 2007).

Table 2 demonstrates the remarkable operations initiated during the war on drugs between the years 2006 and 2009.

Table 2 *Major Operations Conducted during Drug War between 2006-2009*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author, from Table 7.4 in "Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?" by Grayson, published in 2011, on pages 165-171.)

Operation	Year of the Operation	Primary Objectives of the Operation						Organizations Taken Part in the Operation				
		Eradication of Cultivations	Combatting DTOs	Ensuring Public Security	Preventing Drug Trafficking	Preventing Cash Transfer	Regarding Corruption	Police Force	Military	PGR	DEA	Other International Agencies
Michoacán I	2006	X	X					X	X			
Tijuana	2007			X				X	X			
Guerrero	2007			X				X	X			
Nuevo León I	2007		X						X			
Golden Triangle	2007	X	X						X			
Tabasco	2007			X				X	X			
Veracruz	2007			X				X	X			
Michoacán II	2007		X					X	X			
Operation Dragon	2007					X				X	X	
Sonora	**2007**		**X**					**X**	**X**			
Michoacán III	2007		X					X	X			
Nuevo León II	2008		X						X			
Joint Chihuahua Operation I	2008		X					X	X			
Northeast Operation	2008			X					X			
Manzanillo	2008				X				X			
Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Culiacán	2008		X					X	X			
Sothern Clean-up	2008				X				X			
Culiacán	2008		X					X	X			
Manzanillo	2008					X		X	X			
Michoacán IV	2008		X					X	X			
Operation Clean-up	2008						X			X	X	
Mapache	2008				X					X		
Tabasco	2008		X					X	X			
Joint Chihuahua Operation II	2008		X						X			
Michoacán V	2008			X				X	X			
Project Reckoning	2008				X	X						Italian Authorities and the U.S. Agencies
Joint Chihuahua Operation III	2009		X						X			
Michoacán VI	2009		X					X				
Operation Summer	2009			X				X				
Operation Xcellerator	2009						X				X	
Michoacán VII	2009		X					X	X			

As it is illustrated, out of thirty-one considerable operations, only seven of the operations were primarily in consideration of ensuring public security, while sixteen operations were primarily addressed combatting drug trafficking organizations. Moreover, only one of the operations regarding public security was conducted through solely the police force. The operations were concentrated in the regions struggling with criminal activities and the rivalries of the drug trafficking organizations in the expected manner.

The residual examination of policy consequences will be classified as the distribution of state resources, vulnific outcomes of the combats, the change in penalty trends at the federal level, and finally, the distribution by years of the seized items.

As Figure 4 demonstrates, the number of appointed soldiers of SEDENA in combatting drug trafficking was already significantly high in 2006 and continued to experience substantial increases annually until 2009, while in 2010, the number of assigned soldiers to SEDENA remained stable, which implies that there was no additional assignation has been made in 2009.




Figure 4 *Total Number of Soldiers Assigned to SEDENA for Combatting Drug Trafficking between 2006 and 2012*

(Source: "Número de militares adscritos a la Sedena entre 2006-2018 desagregados por rango" from the Database of PPD.)

Furthermore, after 2010, the rate of increase, although it still proceeded, slightly decelerated. One possible explanation for this change is the decline in Calderón's stringency towards the drug war in the later stages of the war, in this regard, especially the legal reform of Ley de Narcomenudeo in 2009. As it will be discussed further in the subsequent segments of this section, several changes in the judicial perception of drug use and possession within the scope of the reform of Ley de

Narcomenudeo had an impact on the military confrontations, as well as the focus of the police force towards drug trafficking issues. Hence, while the concentration of the public force shifted towards small-scale drug trafficking, the number of military operations also declined due to the harsh outcomes.

From the point of view of economic sources, as Figure 5 illustrates, although the increase in expenses on drug policy remained under the increase in total budget in 2007 and 2009, there is a drastic rise on the side of drug policy while the total budget shows a steady rise in 2008. The radical change from 2007 to 2008 could be a result of the financial aid, which amounted to $400 million, from the U.S. within the scope of the Merida Initiative (Abu-Hamdeh, 2011), and the radical fall in 2009, even though Mexico received its second financial aid from the U.S. in the amount of $300 million (Abu-Hamdeh, 2011), could be due to the global financial crisis in 2008 (Villarreal, 2010).




Figure 5 *Increase in the Total Budget of the State and Increase in Total Expenses on Drug Policy throughout the years from 2006 to 2012*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author, from Table 2 in "Drug Policy in Mexico, 2006-2012: Analysis and Results of a Prohibitionist Policy" by Atuesta Becerra, published in 2015, on page 26.)

Furthermore, Mexico was provided the lowest and the last financial aid from the U.S., $210.9 million, in 2010 as part of the Merida Initiative (Abu-Hamdeh, 2011), notwithstanding, the escalation in drug policy expenditures has consistently outpaced the overall budgetary growth since 2010. Lastly, according to Atuesta Becerra (2015), the distribution of the expenses within the drug policy from 2006 to 2012 was largely reserved for the area of law and order, and it was observed that there was merely a

2,91% rise in the areas of prevention, treatment, and human rights. In this context, for instance, while the increase of expenses in public safety in terms of prevention, treatment, and human rights was only 4%, the of the same field within law and order was 20% (Atuesta Becerra, 2015: 27). Thus, the results indicate the main focus of Calderón's strategy in anti-drug policies.

To sum up, it could be concluded that from 2006 to 2012, with the expenditure on drug policy showing an increase and at times even surpassing the overall budgetary growth, the primary allocation within this context has been directed towards the judiciary rather than prevention, and in terms of human resources, a noticeable increase in soldier numbers eventuated, formerly in a remarkable trend until 2009, and latterly, in a more modest rise until 2012.

In the context of vulnific consequences, Table 3 illustrates the comparison of the numbers of violent suffering, in categories of murdered and injured, among criminals, civilians, and soldiers from 2007 to 2012 according to the database of Federal Police (PF in its Spanish acronym) and Federal Civil Jurisdiction (FCF in its Spanish acronym). To begin with, there is a considerable difference between the numbers of PF and FCF; across the data, FCF reports remained higher than the reports of PF except for the number of injured military personnel in 2010.

Although there are two more areas where FDF data remains under PF data, it could be a result of misreporting since the differences are 1 and 2. The greatest differentiation is observed in the domain of detained criminals throughout the years, and murdered criminals, especially after 2011, meanwhile, the least disparity is noticed in the field of murdered military personnel. In the areas of injured criminals, civilians, and military personnel, as well as injured civilians, however, the differentiation between the numbers remains minimal.

Within the scope of this observation, the most crucial point to be taken into account is the significant discrepancy in the number of detentions. Based on the findings from the literature, it is evident that numerous civilian citizens have been unjustly detained (Trevino-Rangel et al., 2022). Furthermore, for instance, according to a report by Proceso, Fernando Martínez, a commercial vehicle operator residing in Michoacán, was unlawfully apprehended, and held in custody by PGR officials under the scope of 'Grupo Escorpión', a drug smuggling operation (Michoacán: Operativo

de Terror, 2007). As a result, there is a high possibility of underreporting on the end of the Federal Police.

Table 3 *Number of People Murdered and Injured between 2007 and 2012 according to Federal Civil Jurisdiction (FCF) and Federal Police (PF)*

(Source: "Civiles muertos, heridos y detenidos en enfrentamientos en los que ha participado la Policía Federal entre 2007 y 2018" and "Militares Sentenciados en el Fuero Civil Federal 2006-2017" from the database of PPD.)

Categories \ Year		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of Criminals Murdered	FCF	6	55	36	86	183	179
	PF	0	3	8	18	29	32
Number of Criminals Injured	FCF	0	18	18	41	31	14
	PF	2	3	6	10	4	9
Number of Criminals Detained	FCF	29	251	117	235	229	138
	PF	4	19	22	72	70	24
Number of Civilians Murdered	FCF	0	13	5	22	5	3
	PF	0	1	0	0	0	0
Number of Civilians Injured	FCF	0	39	11	19	10	10
	PF	0	0	2	4	0	2
Number of Military Personnel Murdered	FCF	0	27	13	20	17	16
	PF	0	8	11	21	2	4
Number of Military Personnel Injured	FCF	3	36	76	68	72	72
	PF	0	7	47	94	21	27

Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 reveals the comparison of the increase of murdered and injured aggressors and military personnel between 2007 and 2008 according to SEDENA records. From the comparison of murdered aggressors and military personnel, a dramatic increase in murdered aggressors from 2007 to 2008 can be concluded. Additionally, although there was a minor decrease from 2008 to 2009, the rise remained in 2010, and only after 2010, a drastic change could be observed.

On the other hand, increasingly stabilized until 2009, the soldier fatalities experienced a notable surge from 2009 to 2010, followed by a similar significant

decline until 2011. However, when examining the overall trends, military forces have encountered a pronounced pattern of killings in the engaged conflicts. In this context, the most injurious periods of the drug war can be considered to span from 2007 to 2010. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the decline in aggressive deaths with a minor increase after 2008 followed by a decrease after 2010 could be perceived as another reflection of Calderón's gradual departure from his aggressive war policies.




Figure 6.1
Comparison of Increase Between Aggressors and Military Personnel Murdered Between 2007 and 2012




Figure 6.2
Comparison of Increase Between Aggressors Murdered and Injured between 2007 and 2012

(Source: "Eventos violentos entre miembros de la Sedena y posibles agresores entre 2006 y 2019" from the database of PPD.)

Another observation pertains to the response of drug trafficking organizations, which will be elaborated in detail in the social analysis section of the research. Drug trafficking organizations that suffered significant losses until 2009 substantially increased their killing trend in 2009, but reversed this trend within a year due to a decline in fatalities on their own side during the combats. Similarly, in the examination of the rise in murdered and injured aggressors as depicted in Figure 6.2, the killing trend within the military personnel becomes evident. While the increase in murdered aggressors showed an upward trajectory, the rise in injured aggressors exhibited a milder progression, even experiencing a decrease in 2009, while the increase in slain aggressors continued. Consequently, it can be inferred that military

personnel were inclined toward killing rather than wounding in the conflicts they engage in.

Although the databases of the Federal Police and the Federal Civic Jurisdiction separated the murder and injury numbers within the categories of criminal, military personnel, and civilian, the database of SEDENA does not involve such categorization. According to PPD reports, the 'aggressor' category also involves the civilians who were murdered or injured during the combats through the comparison of the database of several governmental organizations with the requested data collected by the researchers (Trevino-Rangel, et al., 2022).

"This is not to say that all 'aggressors' are innocent victims. But there is abundant evidence showing that many people who were executed or illegally detained by the military in Mexico were not members of cartels nor delinquents, but ordinary citizens" (Trevino-Rangel, et al., 2022). Furthermore, their results also indicate that firstly, the military's fatalities of alleged aggressors exceed the number of injuries inflicted each year, secondly, the military demonstrates a considerably higher lethality compared to their adversaries, thirdly, the military's fatalities surpass or equal the number of detentions made in the majority of years, and lastly, instances of abuse by the military are frequent when deadly force is employed (Trevino-Rangel, 2022: 577-578).

According to the data made public under the PPD database with the name "Combates", regulated in Table 4, a total of 3337 combats took place from 2007 to 2011.

Table 4 *List of the Number of Combats of Armed Forces and Police Forces towards Opposing Civilians between 2007 and 2011*

(Source: "Combates" from the database of PPD.)

Year	Corporation Involved in Combats			Combats Initiated by		Grand Total
	Armed forces	Police Force	Both	Public Force	Opposed Civilians	
2007	39	39	2	62	18	80
2008	70	229	50	302	47	349
2009	157	259	19	347	89	436
2010	630	365	34	854	175	1029
2011	935	446	57	1231	212	1443
Grand Total	1831	1338	162	2796	541	3337

In this context, although the number of combats in which the police forces were involved was slightly higher than the number of combats in the armed forces, the number of combats in the army was much higher at the end of the five-year period. However, the most significant result given by Table 4 is on the parties that initiated the conflicts.

Although the number of combats initiated by opposing citizens has increased significantly after 2008, the number of conflicts initiated by public forces has become much higher each year. In conclusion, during the 5-year period, a total of 541 combats were initiated by opposing citizens, while 2796 combats were initiated by public forces. The results presented in Figure 6.1 are further corroborated by Table 4. The observation emerges that drug trafficking organizations do not engage in a dominance struggle against the state's control forces unless they experience severe repercussions.

Furthermore, another PPD report on the combats reveals that several states, such as Michoacán, Sinaloa, Yucatan, and Zacatecas, experienced more combats between the public sources and opposed groups than the confrontation between the opposed groups (Atuesta et al., 2019: 1781, Figure 7). Additionally, their investigation also revealed that from 2008 to 2011, both the confrontations between the public force and the organized groups and between the organized groups increased in most of the states (Atuesta, et al., 2019).




Figure 7 *Comparison of the Number of Homicide Incidents Investigated by SNSP and Registered under INEGI between 2006 and 2008*

(Source: "Intentional Homicides in Mexico by Municipality from 1990 to 2015 (by INEGI)", and "Intentional Homicide Investigations in Mexico by Municipality 2011-2016 (by SNSP)" from the database of Justice in Mexico.)

One of the widely discussed and criticized aspects in the literature regarding Calderón's drug war is the increasing number of homicides in the country. In this context, Figure 7 illustrates the homicide increase between 2006 and 2008 based on data from different governmental institutions. According to the registered homicides data by INEGI and investigated homicides data by National System of Secretariat of Public Security (SNSP in its Spanish acronym) under the Mexican research initiative called "Justice in Mexico" database, especially in 2006 and 2007, the number of homicides investigated by SNSP was slightly higher than the number of homicides recorded under INEGI. This suggests that INEGI has been deficient in reporting homicide incidents until 2008.

Another detrimental outcome of the drug war that needs closer attention is the increase in disappearances during the drug war. Mandolessi and Olalde (2022: 4) emphasize the high levels of disappearance incidents, which are also closely related to human rights violations, besides the incidents of homicide, referring to the outcomes of the Calderón period as “a crisis of disappearances”. They also make an association with the dirty war period. According to them, the rule of law and public safety have significantly deteriorated as a result of the militarization of the military and police forces, through a lack of accountability, leading to disappearances, homicides, and forced flees of thousands of people (Mandolessi & Olalde, 2022). Finally, their study reveals that disappearances are committed by both state agents and organized crime groups, either acting independently or in collusion with the motives of exploitation, human trafficking, forced labor, suppression of social movements, and power struggles between criminal organizations (Mandolessi & Olalde, 2022).

Furthermore, according to the annual AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL reports, there was either no progress or little progress regarding human rights from 2006 to 2012, as well as little progress in the criminal justice system (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). The reports also revealed several cases in which arbitrary detention, torture, and unlawful killings by military personnel were exemplified (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2010;2011;2012). Despite the ongoing human rights abuses by military and police personnel, including enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention, the civilian justice system routinely refused to investigate alleged abuses before transferring cases to the military justice system (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

2011). Finally, in the 2012 report of the organization, it was stated that prison conditions were overcrowded and unsafe, leading to the deaths of more than 200 inmates, primarily due to gang violence.

Additionally, Table 5 illustrates total homicide investigations and homicide incidents related to crime groups by SNSP in 2007 and 2008, during which homicide rates showed a mediocre increase.

Table 5 *Numbers of Total Homicide Investigations and DTO-related Homicides in 2007 and 2008*

(Source: "Intentional Homicides in Mexico by Year 1990-2016" from the database of Justice in Mexico.)

Year	Total Homicide Investigation	Related to Organized Crime Groups
2007	10.253	2.826
2008	13.155	6.837

It can be observed that a quite small amount of homicide incidents was related to crime groups within a great level of homicide incidents. Within the scope of this study, due to the discrepancies in state-acquired data in terms of data categories and coverage of years, substantial reliance on PPD reports is expected to be made in explaining the homicide incidents in the country.

Regarding the final dimension of the outcomes of operations, Figure 8 exhibits seized items, involving arms, and drugs, between 2006 and 2011 according to SEDENA records. According to the figures, drug seizures, which hold a significant place in the realm of drug-related crime, experienced a decline between 2006 and 2007. Subsequently, a slight increase was observed until 2009, followed by a renewed decrease after 2009. Moreover, although an initial rise in weapon confiscations was observed, even that experienced a decrease in 2010.

In this context, in spite of modest success in the seizure of weapons, no notable success in drug apprehensions could be attributed to the Calderón era. Finally, in terms of eradicated areas, "from 2007 to 2009, eradicated hectares dropped from 30,000 to 15,000, while from 2004 to 2006, average eradication was at more than 30,000 hectares" (Atuesta Becerra, 2015: 22). As the research of Atuesta Becerra (2015) reveals that the area of marijuana eradication during Calderón's administration was

lower compared to the final years of Fox's administration, the eradication of the Calderón era followed a similar pattern with the seizures in drugs.




Figure 8 *Number of Seized Arms, and Drugs between 2006 and 2011 by SEDENA*

(Source: "Armas incautadas por SEDENA (2000-2014).", "Vehículos decomisados por SEDENA (2009-2014).", and "Incautaciones de droga realizadas por SEDENA (2000-2014)." from the database of PPD.)

In conclusion of the numerous military operations from 2006, the role of the military in the maintenance of public order, especially in combatting drug trafficking organizations raised concerns for both the sustainability of public security and the leap of corruption within military force (Meyer, 2007). Moreover, a unidirectional strategy towards the multilayered issue of drug trafficking, which resulted in combatting drug-related crime mostly through military operations brought only short-term remedies, thus, the remainder entails the need for numerous legal arrangements to be made (Meyer, 2007).

After all, the police force, purportedly bearing the responsibility of public order, was devalued, and the attempt against corruption could not succeed. Additionally, the use of the military also sparked concerns about the fragility of democracy and governmental organizations (Withers et al., 2010). In the end, "police are trained to use the minimum force necessary to enforce the community's laws" while "military personnel are trained to use overwhelming lethal force to fight and win wars" (Withers et al., 2010: 3).

Moreover, the violence of the drug trafficking organizations escalated and started to target high-level governmental actors besides the military personnel and the police on the one hand (Morris, 2012; Cantú Garza, 2016), while the militarization also resulted in outrageous violence within the country, human rights violations, and

the fragmentation of drug trafficking organizations on the other (Laurell, 2015; Boyce et al., 2015; Giménez & Correa, 2021).

3.3. Concluding Remarks on the Policy Analysis

Regarding anti-drug policies implemented in the state, the historical point of view yields that anti-drug policies, as anticipated, have progressed in line with decisions made at the international level. Nevertheless, the cultural and economic significance of drugs and DTOs continues to be consistently overlooked. In consideration of these factors, the anti-drug policies in Mexico, starting from the 1910s began with the prohibitionist strategy toward the use, production, and trade of illicit substances, along with the development of specific policies aimed at eradicating production, however, the main concern during the 1910s is to keep DTO activities under control rather than putting an end to trafficking.

Moreover, by the 1930s, it is possible to observe the first use of the military in the operations of eradication, and the initial suspicions of corruption. Accordingly, the state-DTO direct relationship was disrupted through the shift of drug-related problems under health issues with DFS, which was established in 1947. On the one hand, this situation led politicians to evade suspicions of corruption, while it resulted in the division of presidential authority on the other. This, in turn, emerges as a significant factor contributing to the adoption of an authoritarian stance by heads of state.

As drug trafficking increased over time in the region and Mexico acquired dominance over Colombian-based illicit drugs and Colombian drug smuggling routes and due to the consequences of the drug war in Colombia, the drug problem in Mexico has reached a serious problematic atmosphere. Especially after the drug control pressure from the U.S., it has been addressed as a national problem, and the role of the army in anti-drug movements has been increased concordantly, nonetheless, such U.S.-driven military operations did not yield a significant reduction in drug trafficking in the country. For instance, the Operation Condor in the 1970s, the spatial-based strategy caused the spread of trafficking through different regions, whereas the violent operations resulted in adverse effects on the Mexican citizens.

Furthermore, after the murder of Camarena in 1985, at one juncture, the DTOs have started to be perceived as a national threat, while at another juncture, the

suspicions of corruption have raised once again, leading the DFS to be put under the scope, and thus, to be dismantled. Put differently, although the corruption suspicions that started in the 1930s were tried to be covered up with the establishment of the DFS, the proliferating corruption ultimately led to the downfall of the DFS itself. Consequently, the authority of the PRI began to undergo a significant erosion. Additionally, the institutionalization process, which came to the fore with the international Drug Control agenda, such as the increase of law enforcement and the creation of different bureaucratic units for the fight against drugs, started in the 1980s and continued during the Fox period as well, nevertheless, they were not sufficient in decreasing the widespread corruption and trafficking in the country.

Although the presidency of Fox in 2000 sparked hopes for the cessation of corruption and the reduction of DTO influence, the insufficiency of a thorough consideration of such interlinked issues, which are already deeply intertwined with the state, remained. For instance, the military initiative of Operation Mexico Seguro yielded several results along the same line as Operation Condor. Finally, it can be concluded that the military operations initiated in the 1930s for eradication, which persisted through Operation Condor in the 1970s, resurfaced during the Fox era, nonetheless, their impact remained limited. This underscores the notion that military employment did not emerge initially during the Calderón administration, on the contrary, it had antecedents.

The examination of the political institutionalization of Mexico evinces that a nation-state formation emerging from a recent period of exploitation encounters numerous societal challenges. This circumstance contributes to the arduous nature of the democratization process and fosters a perception of insecurity rooted in internalized violence, both within the societal framework and governmental entities. Primarily, the fact that within the state formation after the revolution, the person holding full authority was the president and therefore the party to which he was affiliated resulted in the long-lasting one-party system of the PRI, which caused the transition to democratization to continue until the Calderón era, even though Fox was elected from the PAN in 2000. The democratic system, which is not fully established, makes it necessary for heads of state and their parties to gain legitimacy in different ways. Thence, in the sequence of the historical consideration, the fact that Calderón placed a strong emphasis on matters related to drugs, notably trafficking, and

employed the military, was to be expected. Furthermore, the challenges of the democratization process, as observed during the elections and in the subsequent events occurred after the elections; the need to cleanse remnants of the PRI, both in terms of corruption and authority; the limitations federal system, and the division of power within the state structure on presidential power; and the growing discussions of the state fragility of Mexico in the international arena required Calderón's assertion of authority and establishment of the legitimacy of his presidency.

From a historical point of view, it can be concluded that violence, which is primarily considered under DTO issues, has been internalized both within society and in the scope of the process of institutionalization of state bodies. Hence, when internalized violence is combined with an inadequate legal system, drug law enforcement also remains inadequate and thus, emerges as the source of the insecurity discussions that have developed. Hence, alongside his authoritative strategy, the engagement of DTOs in diverse criminal activities beyond drug trafficking, and the escalation of violence to an intolerable threshold for the population during Calderón's presidency, led Calderón to conduct a combatant campaign.

Additionally, the fact that the connection of DTOs with politicians is mainly based on corruption illustrates that corruption should be addressed not as an issue that developed later, but as an issue that occurs in parallel within the framework of the DTO-state relationship. As a result, the pervasive corruption induced Calderón to rely less on police forces, particularly those within federal entities, and consequently, to conduct the drug war through military means. In a nutshell, Calderón's declaration of war against DTOs fundamentally aimed to portray an authoritarian strategy, asserting control over the nation, and to fortify relations with the United States.

While his political agenda ostensibly encompasses poverty and inequality focus besides public security, Calderón's primary maneuvers took place within the realm of public security. Within the framework of his drug policy agenda, although his concerns revolved around the categories of security, health, and social development, his initiatives tend to lean more heavily toward security concerns. His most significant reform in the realm of health was embodied in the Ley de Narcomenudeo, yet the initiative failed to achieve its primary objectives. Regarding his security strategies, Calderón legitimized the use of the military, including the use of disproportionate force against aggressors, by designating DTOs as enemies, which

concluded in the dehumanization of the drug traffickers who are Mexican citizens, and thus a part of both social and the political domain. Furthermore, the Merida Initiative, allied with the U.S., which was primarily based on financial aid from the U.S., as well as the assistance of training and equipment, fulfilled Calderón's main desires, yet the resultant operations fell short in reducing trafficking. Concerning efforts against corruption, Operation Limpieza portrayed an apparent resolution without effectively eradicating or substantially reducing corruption at its core. While the military was fundamentally employed for combat purposes against DTOs, its role in ensuring security was rejected, although the use of security police force similarly remained inadequate as well. Together with these findings, the research outcome on the army's propensity for excessive use of force in combat situations indicates that public security is predominantly perceived within an anti-DTO context. Finally, the fact that DTO-initiated attacks were directed more towards intra-DTO conflicts rather than against the public force further underscores that DTOs did not adopt a confrontational stance against the government during the Calderón era as well.

Viewed from precisely this vantage point, it is evident that the DTOs, which emerged due to the cultural heritage, the negative effects of neoliberal reforms on the citizens, especially in the agricultural regions, and the global demand, were considered a new business gateway by the PRI, the party of the period in which DTOs have been developed, through the concern of gaining economic legitimacy. Therefore, the formation of the DTO should be evaluated as a newly formed economic gain, regulated, and controlled by politicians, rather than as an entity against the state.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL ANALYSIS ON THE PATTERNS OF THE NATURE OF DRUG-RELATED CRIMES

There have been several policy attempts and reforms from the early 20th century in Mexico, formerly started to control drug plantations and drug use, and continued to control and decrease drug smuggling, nonetheless, drug smuggling did not diminish nor finish in the long run despite the short-term positive effects of such policies. Practically, neither drug plantation nor drug use were unfamiliar to the early Mexican and indigenous communities although the terms were not related to intoxicating substances. Therefore, it was not surprising for drug smuggling and thus, drug trafficking organizations to arise and develop in Mexico due to the international demand in the given context.

Consequently, before the review of the sociological patterns and the results of Calderón's drug war in Mexico, the historical conjuncture of drug use and drug trafficking in Mexico needs to be introduced. The agricultural history, legacy of several social incidents and conflicts including increasing poverty and exclusion, the violent history, the demand from the U.S., and finally, the collapse of the Colombian drug trafficking organizations all paved the way for Mexico's drug trafficking organizations and had significant effects on their formation and development.

4.1. Drug Usage and Drug Trafficking in Mexico

The first aspect that should be covered is the poppy culture of the Mexican rural regions since the 19th century, and the common medical usage of marijuana, cocaine, and especially, opiates since then should not be underestimated (Astorga, 1999). After all, drug trafficking is closely related to the part of profound processes of agrarian transformation (Aranda, 2013). The opium poppy, which is a blossom

containing quite efficacious qualities, is one of the ancient medications of human beings, and the raw material of opium contains medicinal properties[16] insomuch that it has been known and sold as "God's own medicine" in the U.S.. (Grillo, 2011: 25).[17] Evidence on the fact that hunter-gatherers in Europe had been extracting gum from the plant for around four thousand years prior to the birth of Jesus Christ shows that ancient humans had already recognized the potency of opium long before Sinaloan gummers began producing heroin (Grillo, 2011).

Although there were some doubts by the authorities about the quality of the products with the raw material of poppy seeds, opium was easily available for sale by prescription, and the users were considered patients rather than criminals (Astorga, 1999). However, as the Chinese revealed the negative consequences of the blossom after the increase of addiction towards the end of the 18th century, the first act of narcotics prohibition occurred in 1810 with the Qing Dynasty, claiming that opium was a poisonous substance that undermined their societal customs and morality (Grillo, 2011).

Along the same vein, since 1870, the production and distribution of opium have been tried to be controlled in Mexico, and since the beginning of the 1900s, these substances began to be considered harmful to health and the cause of increasing deaths (Astorga, 1999). Nonetheless, such attempts and concerns of Mexico have not been utterly successful (Astorga, 1999), as it did not succeed in the world because the ban of the Qing Dynasty inadvertently gave rise to the first drug smugglers, who were none other than sophisticated, pipe-smoking gentlemen from the British Empire, and thus, by recognizing a lucrative opportunity, British merchants started to transport massive quantities of opium from India into China, capitalizing on the situation (Grillo, 2011).

The marijuana culture and trade were banned finally in 1920, and subsequently, the poppy culture and trade were banned in 1926 in Mexico although such bans were criticized by Mexican authorities forasmuch as it was a way of assimilation from the Western drug abuser culture, and it was actually different from substance consumers in Mexico (Astorga, 1999). Thereby, the drug smuggling business of Mexico started

[16] The opium "has been called 'magical' and 'godly,' as well as 'poisonous' and 'evil'" (Grillo, 2011:25).

[17] By removing the sprout of the plant through a knife, a light brown substance, known as gum, is release, and it has been recognized as one of the most potent anesthetics (Grillo, 2011).

through the opium demand of the U.S., mainly forming the business in the direction from the South, namely Mexico, to the North, namely the U.S.. (Astorga, 1999). As a result, as Grillo (2011) states although drug prohibition is perceived as an ancient and unquestionable ban generally, research has demonstrated that it is a relatively recent policy that has always been associated with several conflicts, differing opinions, and misinformation.

Another dynamic having an influence on drug trafficking in Mexico is the effects of DTOs in the social sphere. Drug trafficking organizations should not be dealt with as an unmanned structure, rather one should be concerned with the humane aspect of such organizations as what constitutes them as organizations are the people involved, such as traffickers themselves, the control agencies, or even the citizens supporting the business although not having a direct engagement.

In this regard, one of the utmost effects of the social structure is the widespread poverty in the country. In their book, "The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, and Politics", Joseph and Henderson (2002) discuss the Zapatista Movement, and narrate 34 demands of EZNL (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*) in which one of their demand has been dedicated for the request of a better economic situation of mainly the indigenous farmers. The demand is displayed as follows:

> Eighteenth. We want to have decent jobs with fair salaries for all rural and urban workers throughout the Mexican republic so that our brothers and sisters don't have to work at bad things, like drug trafficking, delinquency, and prostitution, to be able to survive. The federal Labor Law shall be applied to rural and urban workers, complete with bonuses, benefits, vacations, and the real right to strike (Joseph & Henderson, 2002: 642).

Drug trafficking organizations not only provide employment opportunities especially for regions facing economic hardship due to poverty and unemployment but also the profits such organizations generate may extend into various other sectors (Grillo, 2011).[18] The economic impact[19] of such illicit activity is concentrated in

[18] For instance, hospitality, livestock farming, horse racing, music labels, sports teams, and film production (Grillo, 2011).

[19] It is concluded that the revenue from the drug trade contributes to almost one-third of Mexico's GDP since the estimations show that it is between $6 billion and $15 billion annually, and also the number of individuals involved in drug trafficking is believed to be thousands of people (Chabat, 2002).

certain areas of Central and Northern Mexico, especially in the states of Michoacán, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua (Chabat, 2002).

Concordantly, regardless of the resistance of the army generals and the Mexican state in abiding by the recommendations of the U.S., and launching a drug war as it would tarnish the sovereignty of the country, the intense consequences of drug trafficking in the region were increasing (Boyce et al., 2015).

Consequently, the fact that the drug trade is recognized as one of the most prominent industries of Mexico is mainly due to its immense productivity insomuch that its impact on stabilizing currency valuation equals that made by oil exports (Grillo, 2011). The fundamental reason behind the fact that the peso crisis in 1994 was profitable for drug trafficking organizations is the population of slums who either became unemployed (Grillo, 2011) or were excluded from the formal workforce (Bagley & Rosen, 2015).

Drug trade might be considered a "parallel system" for such communities since poverty that emerges out of social exclusion creates vulnerable groups (Bagley & Rosen, 2015: 356). Hence, it might be concluded that the combination of drug demand from the U.S. with Mexico's lack of drug law enforcement agencies has led such vulnerable segments of the population to see drug trafficking as a means of economic survival (Morris, 2012). As a consequence of his interview with a former drug gang member, Grillo sums up the life of the former trafficker as follows:

> He had smoked crack cocaine and drunk whiskey every day, had enjoyed power in a country where the poor are so powerless, had a latest-model truck and could pay for houses in cash, had four wives and children scattered all over … had no God (Grillo, 2011: 1).

Grillo's interview nicely illustrates how the situation, which originally began as an economic survival strategy for such individuals, can evolve into a power gauge through complex power dynamics. Apart from their damage to the Mexican state, drug trafficking organizations have been known for their devastation of the social sphere through their wide range of criminal activities (Reina, 2022; The Economist, 2023).[20]

[20] For instance, extortion, human trafficking, the illicit trade of weapons, public shootings, massacres, unauthorized mining activities, or even displaying bodies on bridges and dumping victims in public areas (Reina, 2022; The Economist, 2023).

They are even responsible for the abandonment of several towns (Reina, 2022). Yet, there is the other side of the coin; along with their criminal activities, drug trafficking organizations might become the heroes of their neighborhoods, especially for the proletariat (Duncan, 2014). One of the most renowned drug leaders in this field is Pablo Escobar; the leader of the Medellín Cartel in Colombia is still glorified by the impoverished areas of Medellín and revered by the illicit section of the city (Duncan, 2014).

Similar to Escobar's case, several drug smugglers and the leaders of drug trafficking organizations had reputable dignity within their region and surroundings in the Mexican case. Besides his informal contribution to the economic development of his region, El Chapo stands out as a figurehead via his embodiment of resilience for the community frequently lacking governmental support, and prioritizing self-preservation instead of conformity to legal norms (Beith, 2010).[21] Moreover, during his visit to a poppy farm in Sierra Madre, Grillo quotes the words of a farm worker which indicates the glorification of the drug smugglers: "This is a village of valientes or brave ones—the term mountain folk use for drug traffickers, the men who pulled this community out of poverty" (Grillo, 2011: 19).

Furthermore, the appeal of wealth and danger resonating within the macho culture, the sense of nationalistic resentment towards the United States, and, a long-standing tradition of idolizing bandits and rebels who fought against corrupt government agencies had an impact on the transformation of smugglers into revered figures and heroes in Mexico (Joseph & Henderson, 2002).

Finally, external factors, especially the intense demand from the US and the globe, and the collapse of Colombian cartels, had a great influence on the drug trafficking organizations of Mexico. "There are, perhaps, no two bordering nations that are more immersed in the drug campaign than the U.S. and Mexico" (Finckenauer et al., 2007: 1). As stated in the previous chapter, the illicit alcohol and drug demand

[21] According to an anecdote by Beith (2010), when the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera, known as "El Chapo", wanted to have supper in a restaurant, his armed men would enter before him, instruct the diners to remain seated and refrain from using their mobile phones, and promise on his behalf that their expenses would be covered. "Chapo, according to one witness, shook hands with each person, introducing himself and uttering the traditional Mexican greeting, 'A sus ordenes' (At your service)… Free to go, the diners found that their bills had been taken care of. Chapo had been true to his word" (Beith, 2010:151).

started after the prohibition policies in the U.S.. (Recio, 2002; Carpenter, 2005; Vulliamy, 2010), and continued after World War II (Vulliamy, 2010).

Small-scale regional drug trafficking which initially started as a supply of poppy seeds, and thus, Mexican mud heroin, has cartelized and turned into a large-scale supply due to both increasing demand from the U.S., and the globalized interest in illicit drugs (Vulliamy, 2010). Such demand transformed drug producers in Mexico from several Sinaloan peasants to a national organization pervaded in many states (Grillo, 2011). Eventually, the majority of the drug consumption in the U.S. became supplied by Mexican drug traffickers (Finckenauer et al., 2007) on the one hand, and the globalization of drug consumption led Mexican drug traffickers to expand their business of heroin supply to the world along with Colombia and Afghanistan on the other (Bagley & Rosen, 2015).

Additionally, the collapse of the drug cartels in Colombia, especially after Plan Colombia, which was conceived in 1999, fueled the transformation of Mexican cartels in acquiring influence and power. Primordially, the Mexican drug trafficking organizations were the suppliers of heroin in the U.S.., while the Colombian drug traffickers were in charge of the cocaine supply, and until the 1980s, the Mexicans were only the intermediaries for the Colombian cocaine smugglings (Finckenauer et al., 2007). After their resistance to their payment and several incidents in the U.S., the Colombian and the Mexican cartels shared the territory equally (Finckenauer et al., 2007), and finally as an unforeseen result of the war on narcotics in Colombia which was U.S.-supported, the majority of narcotrafficking activities have transitioned from Colombia to Mexico (Bagley & Rosen, 2015). On the one hand, Bagley and Rosen denominate such shifts as “the balloon effect” in which the agricultural production is outthrusted from one country with the result that it resurfaces in others, and Carpenter considers this shift as the “Colombianization” of Mexico (Carpenter, 2005: 2; Bagley & Rosen, 2015: 7).

In conclusion, the ground for the development of drug trafficking originating within the framework of power relations has been fostered by the power of the presidential administration, the subservience of both the deputies and judiciaries to the administration, the dominance of the state party, and the inadequacy of coordinated political opposition (Astorga, 1999). Moreover, coming to today’s reasons for drug trafficking, Bagley and Rosen sum up eight trends, that represent not only the trends

in the region of Latin America in the broad sense but also in Mexico more specifically; "the globalization of drug consumption; the limited or "partial victories" and unintended consequences of the U.S.-led war on drugs; the proliferation of areas of drug cultivation and of drug-smuggling routes throughout the hemisphere; the dispersal and fragmentation of organized criminal groups or networks within countries and across subregions; deinstitutionalization effects; regulatory failures; demand-control failures; legalization debate" (Bagley & Rosen, 2015: 1).

4.2. Analysis of the Patterns of Social Exclusion

As previously mentioned in the 'Social Exclusion' section of the chapter on 'Conceptual Framework', social exclusion according to Reimer (2004) is a multidimensional issue, in which the dimensions are interrelated with also a possibility of contradictions. In this context, he states that the four dimensions of social exclusion incidents refer to the relations of economic, bureaucratic, associative, and communal.[22] Concerning the analysis of social exclusion, primarily, market relations will be evaluated as poverty, and deprivation from public access, and afterward, bureaucratic relations will be examined regarding the exclusion of civil rights. Furthermore, the dataset from the "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL (2012) will be utilized in terms of the social figures of the states, and the results of the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers, 2012" by Pérez Correa et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE (2016) will be examined regarding the perspective of drug trafficking offenders.[23] Within the scope of this study, the questions concerning the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, family background during childhood, and elements of their judicial process will be focused.

[22] Market relations bear on the access to tradeable goods and services, in which the level of income, chances of employment, and access to basic needs, such as education, or health services are of great importance. Bureaucratic relations, on the other hand, refer to the civic rights in which legal regulations, and hierarchical structure play a crucial role. Finally, while associative relations point to shared interests and objectives, communal relations refer to a shared identity (Reimer, 2004).

[23] The survey, which was conducted between the 18th of June and the 9th of July in 2012, was aimed at gaining information about the inmates in Mexico in the following areas: "demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, family background during childhood and current circumstances, living conditions, type and aspects of the offense, and elements of the judicial process" (Methodology, Perez Correa, et al., 2016:1).

4.2.1. Deprivation from Public Access:

Social exclusion, which is commonly linked to the potential risks of poverty and marginalization, includes several issues that have significant importance from multiple perspectives, encompassing sociological and economic aspects within any societal context (Morese & Palermo, 2019). One of the main responsibilities of a nation-state is to establish a labor market leading to the economic integration of its citizens within which all citizens have equal rights to trade their abilities. The equality of the citizens, however, can be pursued solely through equal access to public services. In this context, the analysis of integration into market relations requires the study of poverty and social deprivation, thus, the poverty report of CONEVAL bears importance due to their comprehensive study of poverty, as well as social deprivation within the federal entities in Mexico.

According to the poverty report of CONEVAL (2012), 75% of the population was deprived of at least one public access in 2010, mostly in rural regions. Most of the deprivation was observed in the field of social security, and subsequently, in the field of health services. The least access gap, after the quality and spaces of the housing, was observed in education, although the percentage was still quite high considering "one out of five people had an educational gap" (CONEVAL, 2012: 15). Moreover, the majority of the municipalities involving high levels of population under poverty were Indigenous, whereas only less than 10% of the municipalities with low levels of poverty were Indigenous.

Prior to the examination, it should be emphasized that several states will be scrutinized in terms of the research subject. The states where major military operations leading to violent consequences have occurred are; Michoacán, with a total of seven different operations; Chihuahua, with a total of five; Nuevo León, Baja California, and Sinaloa, with a total of two; Durango, and Guerrero, with only one. Consequently, these states will be examined closely in the analysis.

To begin with, the poverty classification of CONEVAL (2012) is identified through income levels and social deprivations. Within this context, while individuals with economic incomes under the well-being line, and less than three social deprivations are classified under the category of moderate poverty, citizens with low economic income and three or more social deprivations are classified under the category of extreme poverty (CONEVAL, 2012). In this manner, the cartographic

distribution of the percentage of the population living in moderate poverty in the federal entities of Mexico is illustrated in Figure 9.




Figure 9 *Percentage of the Population Living in Moderate Poverty in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 1.4. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on pages 30-31.)

Although Michoacán, with 41.3%, and Durango, with 41%, represent higher levels of moderately poor population than the average of the country, which is 34.9%, any type of social exclusion of the states could not be observed since the percentages in the majority of the states illustrate high numbers.

Concerning the population living in extreme poverty, on the other hand, as Figure 10 illustrates in the form of a scatter graph, Guerrero stands out with its high level of percentage, 31.6%, besides Chiapas and Oaxaca, whereas most of the states are scattered between the levels of 1.9% and 19.3%. As a result, it could be concluded that Guerrero is one of the socially excluded states in terms of extreme poverty. In terms of depth and intensity, the registered average of social deprivations of the people living in extreme poverty is four in Guerrero (CONEVAL, 2012). Considering "the more deprivations an individual has, the farther the income of the individual is from the wellbeing line", it is highly unlikely for the citizens of Guerrero to have an income over the well-being line (CONEVAL, 2012: 38). Furthermore, the levels of percentage in Durango, with 41%, and Michoacán, with 41.3% are also higher than the average, which is 34.9%. In conclusion, while most of the population suffers from at least one social deprivation with a lower income than the well-being line, most of the citizens

in Guerrero deal with more than three social deprivations, besides low income, rather than the other federal entities of Mexico.




Figure 10 *Percentage of the Population Living in Extreme Poverty in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 1.4. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on pages 30-31.)

Consequently, it is unlikely to expect the population especially those living in Guerrero, Michoacán, and Durango to have equal integration within the labor market considering their high levels of percentage. As a matter of fact, having one of the highest population rates living in extreme poverty, Guerrero represents the challenges its population is facing with more than three social deprivations.

In terms of vulnerability, a "person is vulnerable due to income when he/she does not have any social deprivations, but his/her income is below the wellbeing line" while a "person is vulnerable due to social deprivations if he/she has an income above the wellbeing line but has one or more social deprivations" (CONEVAL, 2012: 14). In this regard, formerly, Figure 11 represents the percentage of vulnerable populations due to income in the form of a scatter graph.

Chihuahua stands out with its high level of percentage, 12.60%, besides Coahuila, which illustrates that Chihuahua is one of the socially excluded states in terms of the income-related vulnerable population. Additionally, Durango, with 8.80%, Nuevo León, with 8.10%, Sinaloa, with 7.6%, and Baja California, with 6.1%, represent higher levels of percentages than the average, which is 5.7%.




Figure 11 *Percentage of the Vulnerable Population due to Income in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 1.4. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on pages 30-31.)

Secondly, Figure 12 illustrates the percentage of vulnerable populations due to social deprivation in the form of a cartographic distribution. Once again, none of the federal entities stand out as socially excluded. However, while the average is 28.8% throughout the country, Baja California, with 39.3%, Sinaloa, with 33.8%, Nueva León, with 33%, and Michoacán with 28.9% demonstrate notable disparity through their higher percentages. On the other hand, although the percentage of the population in Guerrero is below the average of the country, regarding the depth of the deprivation, Guerrero, in addition to Michoacán, holds one of the highest deprivations according to the registered numbers between 2.2 and 2.5, which is 1.9 in the average of the country (CONEVAL, 2012: 41).

In conclusion, in terms of poverty and vulnerability, all federal entities, that had to struggle with devastating outcomes of the military combats against drug-trafficking organizations due to their high levels of drug-related crimes, stand out with their extensive percentages of poor and vulnerable populations. The states located in the southern and central parts of the country show notable levels of poor population such as Guerrero, Michoacán, and Durango. In fact, the population living in extreme poverty in Guerrero emerges distinctively, which illustrates that it is socially excluded. It can be concluded that in these states, the majority of the population holds an income below the poverty threshold, as well as struggling with more than one social deprivation.




Figure 12 *The Percentage of the Vulnerable Population due to Social Deprivation in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 1.4. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on pages 30-31.)

On the contrary, the states located in the northern part of Mexico such as Baja California, Sinaloa, Nuevo León, and Chihuahua stand out with their higher percentages of vulnerable populations, either due to income or deprivation. Furthermore, Chihuahua evidently displays a marked difference with its vulnerable population due to income. Consequently, it can be observed that from the aforementioned states, although the ones on the northern side have more access to public services, and mostly have higher levels of income, the gap between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable population is higher than in the other states of Mexico.

Moving on to the areas of social deprivation, the distribution of the educational gap serves as a major indicator in evaluating the integration of the population into the labor market. After all, it is unfeasible for an individual with an educational gap to equally find a job, and exchange one's labor within equal trading rights, and amounts. Figure 13 represents the cartographic distribution of the population having an educational gap.

None of the federal entities is observed as socially excluded, nonetheless, after Chiapas and Oaxaca, Michoacán, with 30.4%, and Guerrero, with 28.3%, stand out with their higher percentages than the average of the country, which is 20.48%. This estimation indicates that the high poverty rates in Guerrero and Michoacán could be the result of the educational gap in their population even though it is not the only reason.




Figure 13 *Percentage of the Population Having an Educational Gap in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 4.2. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2010, on page 86.)

On the other hand, although Durango has a higher percentage of the population in poverty, the percentage of the population with an educational gap is under the average of the country, 18.6%, which demonstrates that rather than access to education, the population living in Durango may have a struggle with unequal rights regarding the labor market.

From the perspective of the sentenced individuals, Table 6 illustrates the questions regarding the education levels of the inmates and the reasons why they did not continue their studies, as well as the percentage of the responses given by the interviewees. However, not all the answers to the reasons were attached to the table since there were 25 of them, thus, the most selected and/or significant options are presented in the table. According to the results of the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers", only 2% of the inmates were university graduates or higher while 86% of the inmates had not graduated from high school, in which 10% of them were from Michoacán and Guerrero. Furthermore, 88% of the inmates from Michoacán, and 78% of the inmates from Guerrero were not completed high school education.

Concerning the reasons for not continuing their studies, 57% of the inmates responded that they needed to work, in which 11% of them were from Michoacán and Guerrero. The inmates responding that they engaged with delinquency, on the other hand, were only 2%.

Table 6 *Percentage of the Education Levels of the Offenders*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Questions	Answers	Percentage of the Responses
Education Level of the Sentenced Interviewees	None	5%
	Incomplete primary education	17%
	Complete primary education	18%
	Incomplete secondary education	14%
	Complete secondary education	20%
	Incomplete high school / technical school	12%
	Complete high school / technical school	8%
	Incomplete university education	4%
	University education or higher	2%
The Reasons for Not Continuing their Studies	The family withdrew me	4%
	Need to work	57%
	Disliked school	10%
	Because I went to prison	2%
	Lack of interest	7%
	Got married	7%
	No schools / closed	4%
	Engaging in idleness/delinquency	2%

As a result, although the data does not give a notable difference among the states in question in terms of the research, it is evident that the educational gap plays a crucial role in the attempts of criminal actions. Furthermore, considering the educational gap is coupled with economic challenges in terms of criminal behaviors, it is evident that criminal issues, specifically the institutionalization of preventing criminal practices should be considered not only regarding legal regulations, such as penalties but also within the context of social deprivations.

Furthermore, table 7 illustrates the questions on if the respondents were engaged in any robbery or selling drugs and the reasons for their attempts, as well as the options and the percentages of the answers by the respondents. As demonstrated in the table, only 6% of the inmates responded that they attempted robbery or selling drugs, in which 52% of them stated that they wanted to get money to buy what they wanted, and 20% of them stated that it was for bringing money home. Consequently, it can be concluded that there is less tendency for the attempt of criminal practices, moreover, the majority of the responses indicate that such attempts are derived from economic motives.

Table 7 *Attempts of Robbery or Selling Drugs of the Offenders When Minor, and their Reasons*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Questions	Answers	Percentage of the Responses
Any attempt of Robbery or Selling Drugs as a Minor	Yes	6%
	No	94%
The Reason for Such Attempt	To get money to buy what I wanted	52%
	To bring money home	20%
	To gain a reputation among my acquaintances	11%
	For the thrill	4%
	Because my family forced me	0%
	Because my friends did it	4%
	Because I was bored	2%
	Because I wasn't afraid of the police	0%
	For revenge	4%
	To get prostitutes	2%
	To get drugs	0%

On the other hand, although the percentages are quite low, the inmates, stating that it was for gaining a reputation and for the thrill, indicates the machismo culture which will be discussed thoroughly in the analysis of subculture. Additionally, the fact that none of the respondents chose the option of buying drugs indicates that it is unlikely for a drug-related crime to arise from drug use.

Turning to the dataset of the poverty report of CONEVAL regarding the lack of access to public services, Figure 14 represents the lack of access to Social Security in the form of cartographic distribution within the federal entities of Mexico. "The right to social security refers to the set of mechanisms designed to ensure the means of subsistence of people and their families in case of contingencies such as accidents or illnesses, or under circumstances socially acknowledged, such as old age and pregnancy" (CONEVAL, 2012: 93).

The institutionalization of the labor market is most evident in the regulations governing social security since it performs as a mechanism to address the disparities arising from economic inequality among citizens. However, once again, with 78.4%,

Guerrero, and, with 72%, Michoacán stand out through their higher levels of percentages of their population having lack of access to social security, although the average of the country is also quite high, with 59.9%.




Figure 14 *Percentage of the People Having Lack of Access to Social Security in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 4.6. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on page 94.)

In conclusion, the majority of the Mexican citizens struggle with having a lack of access to social security, nonetheless, the lack of fulfillment of the social security regulations affects the populations in Guerrero, and Michoacán at a greater level due to their higher economic gap.

An individual, who is not entitled to any form of public or private organization in order to receive health services, is classified under the incidence of deprivation of access to health services (CONEVAL, 2012). As Figure 15 demonstrates, the lack of access to health services is higher in the southern region of the country, however, Baja California, and Durango, although not so higher than the average of 28.8%, attract attention by having the only higher percentages, which is 35.2%, and 29.1%.

Additionally, the percentage of the population having a lack of access to health services is quite notable in Guerrero and Michoacán. After Puebla, with 41.8%, and Oaxaca, with 39.9%, Guerrero comes the third state. 39.6% of its population has a deprivation of health services. Following Guerrero, Michoacán, with a percentage of 39.4%, ranks fourth.




Figure 15 *Percentage of the Population Having Lack of Access to Health Services in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 4.4. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on page 90.)

The security of the food, which is identified by the Mexican Food Security Scale, is separated into three levels; mild, moderate, and severe, and the lack of access to food is measured based on these levels (CONEVAL, 2012: 107). In this context, individuals of households having moderate and severe levels of diet are considered under the category of deprivation from access to food. Concerning the lack of access to food, as illustrated in Figure 16 in the form of a scatter distribution of the federal entities, Guerrero emerges as socially excluded. While all the states are distributed between 13.8% and 33.3%, the percentage of the population having a lack of access to food in Guerrero is 42.6%.

Furthermore, having a lack of access to basic services in dwelling includes "electricity, sewage service, potable water and, if the cooking fuel is wood or charcoal and the stove used for cooking does not have a chimney" (CONEVAL, 2012: 102). In this context, Figure 17 illustrates the percentage of the population having a lack of access to basic services in the dwelling within the federal entities of Mexico in 2010. Besides Chiapas, with 60.7%, and Oaxaca, with 58.7%, Guerrero emerges as one of the socially excluded states since 56.1% of its population struggles with having lack of access to basic services in their households whereas all the other federal entities are distributed between 3.2% and 40.4%. Moreover, 26.8% of the population is deprived of access to household services in Michoacán, which is once again, higher than the average of the country, 22.5%.




Figure 16 *Percentage of the Population Having Lack of Access to Food in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 4.12. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on page 108.)

In summary, Guerrero appears to be socially excluded in the domains of poverty, and social deprivations of food and housing services, still, it represents higher population percentages than the average of the country in the other social deprivation fields, educational gap, social security, and health services.

Following closely, Michoacán also ranks above the average percentile of the country in poverty, and all deprivation domains except for food. Regarding northern states; Durango, Sinaloa, Nuevo León, and Baja California all excel with their higher percentiles in terms of their vulnerable population due to income, whereas Chihuahua stands out by having one of the highest percentages, so much so that the sharpness of the state among dispersions indicates that it is one of the socially excluded states.

The vulnerable population due to deprivation is also high in Baja California, Sinaloa, and Nuevo León. Finally, it can be concluded that the majority of the population in the southern states in which most of the military operations occurred during the drug war, face difficulties in both economic integrity and access to public services in many domains, meanwhile most of the population in the northern states do not have a challenge of the combination of economic inequality and social deprivation.




Figure 17 *Percentage of the Population Having Lack of Access to Basic Services in the Dwelling in the Federal Entities of Mexico in 2010*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Chart 4.8.. in "Report of Poverty in Mexico: The Country, Its Federal Entities and Its Municipalities" by CONEVAL, published in 2012, on page 98.)

However, the high percentile of the vulnerable population cannot be underestimated within the northern federal entities. Furthermore, considering the parallel relationship between economic and social deprivations, and criminal behaviors, it is not unlikely to observe most of the drug-related issues are intensified within these federal entities. In contradiction to this, Calderón, who initiated a war against drug-based criminals by turning them into enemies, instead of focusing on social issues, has also deprived the already disadvantaged community of their political rights with his strategy.

4.2.2. Exclusion from Civil Rights:

The widely acknowledged categories of human rights on a global level are political rights, social and economic rights, and the protection of individual well-being and dignity (Bollen, 1986: 567). The political rights of the citizens are established through the democratic and legal system in the nation-state, under which the civic integration of each citizen is also secured. Alternatively, bureaucratic relations, which Reimer examines under the domains of relational social exclusion, involve the distribution of resources "based on the allocation of rights and entitlements through formal charter or legal document" (Reimer, 2004: 79). Defined objectives, and the institutionalization of the state organs according to such objectives are operated

through bureaucratic relations, and thus the integration of the individuals in terms of their political rights is straightforwardly affected by the formulation of bureaucratic relations (Reimer, 2004). To a degree, bureaucratic relations are related to the protection of civic rights under human rights.

The civil and political rights of the citizens have been discussed scrupulously under the scope of the United Nations, and the binding principles in protecting the political rights of the citizens in an equal manner have been grounded in several conventions as well. In this regard, according to the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" entered into force on 23 March 1976 by the United Nations, which was ratified by Mexico;

- No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7).
- All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person (Article 10, Paragraph 1).
- Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 16).

Nonetheless, Calderón's linguistic strategy and its outcomes, as already discussed thoroughly under the political analysis, have resulted in the exposure of drug traffickers to violations of the fundamental rights stipulated in the UN Convention. Furthermore, the scope of torture is determined under the "Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", which was taken effect on 26 June 1987, and was also ratified by the state of Mexico.

Hereunder, 'torture' refers to any intentional act by a public official that causes severe physical or mental pain or suffering to a person for various purposes, such as obtaining information or a confession from the person, as well as punishing the person for an act they or someone else has committed or are suspected of having committed (Article 1). Also, the remaining decisions are as follows:

- No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture (Article 2, Paragraph 2).
- An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture (Article 2, Paragraph 3).

In this context, to discern the outcomes from the perspective of offenders, the questions directed to interviewees regarding their judicial processes under the scope of the 'Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers' will be examined. Table 8 involves the questions and the percentages of the answers given by the offenders concerning the treatments against them during their detentions. 65% of the respondents stated that they were not treated with respect, and specifically, 65% claimed that they were insulted or humiliated during their detention, 57% asserted that they were physically assaulted, and 54% of the offenders alleged that they were threatened. Although the majority of the respondents reported not being threatened with false charges, the significant proportion of 49% who claimed otherwise emphasizes potential disparities in equal treatment within the judicial process.

Table 8 *Treatments Against the Offenders during their Detention*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Questions	During Detention, if They Were									
	Treated with Respect		Threatened		Threatened with False Charges		Insulted or Humiliated		Physically Assaulted	
Answers	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Percentage	35%	65%	54%	46%	49%	51%	65%	35%	57%	43%

Moreover, Table 9 demonstrates the question of fairness of the sentences of the offenders, and the majority of the respondents claim that their judicial process did not fairly proceed. Only 7% of the offenders responded that their trial was very fair, and only 15% of the respondents claimed that their trial was somewhat fair, while 64% of the offenders responded that their trial was not fair at all. The opinions concerning the fairness of the trials are not surprising considering that the majority of the offenders were subjected to inhumane treatment.

The results of the survey evince that offenders of drug-related crimes are excluded from their civic rights to a fair respected trial through the justification of a state of war between the government and drug trafficking organizations. Additionally, the increasing rates of murdered aggressors and criminals by the military, and the incidents of torture perpetrated by members of the control mechanism such as the

police, and the military force, as reported to Amnesty International, suggest human rights violations during the drug war period. Furthermore, considering the results of homicide rates, the number of murdered aggressors throughout the drug war, and the linguistic introduction of the war, the lives of the suspected drug criminals, who are, in fact, citizens of the Mexican state, did not quite matter to important decision-makers (Tauchnitz, 2022). "… It seems that the state's security personnel are not willing to risk their own lives for the sake of a drug criminals' life – trying to arrest a potentially heavily armed drug criminal is much riskier than shooting him from a more or less safe distance" (Tauchnitz, 2022: 17).

Table 9 *Fairness of the Sentences of the Offenders*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Question	Answers	Percentage
The Fairness of Their Sentence	Very fair	7%
	Somewhat fair	15%
	Not very fair	14%
	Not fair at all	64%

Additionally, the analysis of Wolfesberger (2017) focuses on another aspect of human rights violations of the militarized combat against drug trafficking, in which the connection between the marginalized population and the state reinforced the subordination status of the former. He interprets the outcome of the drug war as the fact that "the 'citizen' is reduced to a 'human being' who can fight for justice on the basis of moral, liberal rights but not of legal, democratic ones" (Wolfesberger, 2017: 104). He also states that the rivalry between the public forces such as the navy, military, or police force, competing for territorial dominance, combined with the implementation of practices such as patrimonialism, clientelism, and caciquismo, adds to the emergence of conflicts and the exertion of pressure (Wolfesberger, 2017).

4.3. Analysis of the Patterns of Subculture

"The narcotrafficking subculture emerges when the exercise of some criminal activity related to drug trafficking becomes a crucial attribute for the status of

individuals in a social space" (Duncan, 2014: 21). Inability to adapt to modern life with a lack of choices under the newly emerged social system leads local communities to create a substitute of social norms and hierarchy as opposed to the dominant stratification, and thus, crime appears as an alternative option for social integration especially, for those having a gap in education, social networks, and financial resources (Duncan, 2014). The examination of the narco-trafficking subculture will be carried out within three nexuses; the reasons why so many citizens are drawn into drug trafficking organizations, the power dynamics of DTOs, and finally, the relationship between DTOs and the Mexican state.

To begin with, the perception of drugs as highly natural due to the historical roots of drug use and drug trafficking; social exclusion, and the internalized feeling of lack of opportunities, stemming from poverty and marginalization; and the repercussions of the machismo culture have all contributed to the decision-making of the citizens to be bound up with DTOs. States such as Michoacán[24], Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas, which have been the target of numerous military operations under Calderón's administration, had to face high levels of poverty and social exclusion due to the impact of neoliberal reforms, hence resulting in the emergence of these regions as focal points for DTO operations when combined with their abundant agricultural productions (Aranda, 2013; Chomczyński & Clark, 2022). Additionally, Aranda (2013) claims that social and political exclusion had a crucial role in making the community of Michoacán susceptible to the exploitation of the DTOs.

In this context, Chomczyński and Clark's (2022: 8) field research conducted in these areas revealed that the youth in these regions are exposed to high levels of social integration to DTOs from a very young age and are caught in a paradox of being torn between "going to prison or dying on the street". Such socialization becomes quite important considering that individuals of vulnerable communities, particularly young males are quite beneficial for a criminal profession since their tendency to take risks for disobeying the law, using violence, and endangering their lives become higher (Duncan, 2014). Furthermore, the prevailing communal perception of crime within the

[24] For instance, Caballero (2015: 169) perceives Michoacán as "a land open to all conquests, with a chronic lack of protection for those who would like to present themselves as the new owners", and states that DTOs have been skillfully exploiting the shortcomings of the region by creating a community belonging and adopting a wary persona.

prison system has contributed to the criminal careers of incarcerated individuals, combined with a lack of trust in the judicial process and law enforcement agencies, hindering their disengagement from the influence of DTOs (Chomczyński & Clark, 2022). In this context, Table 10 demonstrates the opinions of the offenders regarding avoiding legal punishment, and the findings show that the majority of the respondents believe that having enough money to bribe, or influence the decisions of the actors of public forces is adequate for avoiding prison during their apprehension. The results evince the arguments of Chomczyński and Clark (2022).

Table 10 *The Opinions of the Offenders Regarding Avoiding Prison If Available*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Questions	If they think they could avoid prison if having influence or money to bribe someone		At which stage it would have been easier to avoid		
Answers	Yes	No	When they were apprehended	At the Public Ministry Agency	In the Court
Percentage	58%	42%	69%	26%	5%

Additionally, the intense social pressure and the community's perception within the DTO have also prevented individuals from breaking free from the influence of DTOs, as evident in the statement, "When you work for them [the DTO], you have no private life. If one of them has a problem, you have a problem automatically" (Chomczyński & Clark, 2022: 12). Despite the outcomes of intense pressure in DTOs, through their collective experiences, such pressure also allures the disadvantaged communities in pursuit of an attachment to a social group (Madrazo Lajous, 2016; Chomczyński et al., 2023). For instance, Aranda (2014) draws attention to 'La Familia Michoacána', and states that the employment of the term serves as a depiction of the cartel as a local organization working to defend the community from outside influences. He argues that such strategy creates a "forced solidarity" among the community, in which, the inherent limitations of living within a shared space where contradictory lifestyles coexist, often resulting in violence, are evaluated (Aranda, 2014: 164).

Additionally, although according to the Life Course theory, employment is considered one of the significant factors that facilitate individuals' disengagement from

their criminal careers, the research findings of Chomczyński and Clark (2022) reveal that in states that have become a central business region to DTOs, the connection to employment has not allowed for such disengagement. Finding viable employment solely in legal or DTO-free economic sectors can become quite challenging for citizens since they either fail to generate adequate income or have some association with the drug-trafficking industry (Chomczyński & Clark, 2022). Since the combination of economic crises, the halt of state support, and decreased agricultural investment in southern Michoacán contributed to worsening social conditions, the region witnessed an influx of illicit funds via money laundering, as well as a rise in drug cultivation in the hills and sierras, as rural inhabitants sought alternative income streams (Aranda, 2013).

Another aspect having an impact on citizens being drawn into drug-related crimes is the widespread 'machismo' culture among Latin American countries, especially in Mexico. Machismo is a form of masculinity with excessively independent, and dominant characteristics of the Mexican man, which has emerged through the ideology of a powerful warrior within the national identity formation (Haas & González, 2019). Although it is usually considered through significant use of violence, Stevens (1965) interprets the nature of machismo as an obstinacy. "Each man is convinced that there is only one right way of doing things: his way. If his way is challenged by someone else, he may, of course, have to resort to violence to impose his criterion" (Stevens, 1965: 859). Hence, even though violence holds a notable place as an outcome of machismo, especially for gaining power (Haas & González, 2019), it emerges more as a means rather than an end within the machismo culture.

Furthermore, while it represents the "traditional ideals of virility, power, and authority" from one end, it also involves a considerable responsibility for and engagement with the family on the other (Haas & González, 2019: 13). As a result, the cultural expectation of gaining power and authority to become a real man appears to be quite crucial for the Mexican citizens, especially for disadvantaged individuals, and the glorified profits of organized crime such as economic wealth, and the gain of dominium attract recruits (Chomczyński et al., 2023).

In conclusion, being born into the drug culture due to the regional conditions, the historical evolution, becoming vulnerable due to social exclusion, and the pursuit of wealth and power have an impact on Mexican citizens for joining DTOs. In this

regard, such motives can also be observed in the narcocorridos, a sub-genre of corridos, referred to as Spanish romances, which include the misbehaviors of narcos as well as the glorification of them (Jaramillo, 2014). Narcocorridos are of significance due to their journalistic nature (Wald, 2002), as they contain everyday life elements related to DTOs, and give a glimpse from the inside of their cultural persona (Jaramillo, 2014; Madrazo Lajous, 2016). Furthermore, they present an alternative viewpoint to that which is presented in the public discussion on the drug trade (Madrazo Lajous, 2016). According to different research conducted on narcocorridos, the common themes appear to be individual hopelessness due to mainly poverty, a sense of vengeance, the glorification of the drug trade, the socialization within the drug culture, the naturality of the drugs, especially marijuana, and the effects of machismo, especially in the justification of the use of violence (Wald, 2002; Edberg, 2004; Madrazo Lajous, 2016). The economic vulnerability of the citizens of several communities having explained as one of the reasons why people choose to be involved in drug crime is demonstrated in narcocorridos as well (Wald, 2002; Edberg, 2004). For instance, the lyrics of El As de la Sierra (José Heredia) summarize the feeling of hopelessness individuals suffer from:

> Rancho del Cañon, where I was born,
> Fuenquillo San Marcos, that is where I grew up,
> I wandered the Sierra, in those ravines,
> In search of a future which never arrived (Wald, 2002: 106).

The role of poverty discourse is significant in forming the cultural identities of citizens, and regarding narcocorridos, stratification encompasses a symbolic form of socially classifying individuals and is expressed and challenged through everyday behaviors and embodiment (Edberg, 2004). Furthermore, individual despair is embodied by a sense of vengeance. Madrazo Lajous (2016: 18) interprets such vengeance, especially against adversaries as “self-sacrifice”, which is objectified in collaborative efforts aimed at tackling the crisis of the community. While self-sacrifice is related to taking risks of endangering themselves from one end, it also demonstrates the ruthless persona of the individuals to another (Wald, 2002).

Additionally, the glorification aspect of the narcocorridos is crucial in determining the decisions of the marginalized community looking for revenge. Switching to a criminal life is considered a means to gain wealth (Madrazo Lajous,

2016), become a heroic figure (Wald, 2002), and transform into a social outlaw resisting the struggles of the social system such as poverty or racism (Edberg, 2004). In this context, the glamorization of the narcocorridos has a crucial role in shaping the perceptions of marginalized communities against drug trafficking. Moreover, socialization in the drug culture and the strong communal ties are portrayed in the narcocorridos (Madrazo Lajous, 2016), as well as the natural aspect of drugs, specifically marijuana (Wald, 2002). An example of social integration could be found in the lyrics of Jenni Rivera, the "First Lady of the Corrido" (Wald, 2002: 173):

> I am wanted for being chacalosa, I am a trafficker's daughter,
> I know all the moves, I grew up around the top mafia,
> My father taught me how to sell the best mechandise (Wald, 2002: 174).

Finally, it is possible to find the effects of machismo in the narcocorridos, especially in the legitimization of violence, and the fearless persona of the traffickers (Wald, 2002). The three aspects of the narcocorridos in terms of their inclusion of violence are the "celebratory" dimension in which the violent actions are glorified, the "regulatory" dimension which refers to the moral aspects of the stories embedded within narcocorridos, and the "therapeutic" dimension which is related to the perspective of the cohesion of the narco-communities (Jaramillo, 2014: 1592). Furthermore, in their digital ethnographic research of the Netflix series 'Narcos: Mexico', Haas and González (2019: 36) suggest the appearance of "narco-masculinity" as an extent of the machismo culture. According to their findings, the pursuit of power and dominance is centralized in narco-masculinity through an effort to adopt physical strength, economic affluence, social status, and honor in order to maintain their power as opposed to legal limitations. "To be able to exist outside the law you must work to gain immunity" (Haas & González, 2019: 36).

The second nexus covers the powerful aspect of the DTOs. The public services they provide to their community, their violent actions, and the existence of widespread corruption lead DTOs to achieve political power within their regions. The fact that DTOs, especially La Familia Michoacána/Knights Templar, provide several public services to their community has been discussed in several studies in the literature. Such services include the support of local businesses, construction of public buildings such as schools (Lantz, 2016), cash transfers to poor neighborhoods (Duncan, 2014), low-interest loans, food and medicine support, and regulation of agricultural prices

(Flanigan, 2014). Ensuring several public services, which should be provided by the state organs and actors, have a considerably large impact on the power they acquire within their regions. First of all, it leads the legal civil community to look up to the DTOs, considering them as social heroes (Duncan, 2014), as described in the narcocorridos as well. Furthermore, Duncan (2014) argues that although such social providing increases their risk of attack by the state, they acquire prestige within the social order which helps them to gain social integration. For instance, the depiction of protection of La Familia Michoacána, which has been mentioned in the first nexus of the analysis, is accomplished through public services (Aranda, 2014).

Secondly, Flanigan (2014) states that the vulnerable community becomes dependent on the provision of DTOs, and thus, dependent on the existence of DTOs. Overall, the employment of such strategy serves as a means to secure political backing from the community by fostering dependency, generating goodwill, and gradually gaining acceptance (Flanigan, 2014). Another profit from service provision is the tolerance it creates within the community towards the violent actions of DTOs (Flanigan, 2014; Lantz, 2016). "By carrying out these practices, cartels supplement the use of violent means with those that work toward the development and control of a public, a public the government also works to interpellate and control" (Lantz, 2016: 258). In this context, their violent actions also serve as a means of social order, thus helping them to acquire political power such as a type of governance (Pansters, 2018).

The use of violence, particularly as a display of murdered bodies, and narco-messages for the warning, is discussed under the term 'narco-propaganda' in the literature. Lantz (2016) focuses on the narco-messages, serving as a tool for the DTOs to assert dominance over the narrative of violence, and strengthen their control over a particular community, which eventually allows them to effectively communicate their authority through the victims they target, serving as a deterrent to local criminal activities, whereas, Campbell (2014) states that narco-propaganda, operating as a new mode of political communication, strengthens the notion that these criminal organizations warrant analytical consideration as political entities. However, besides the political discourse on the use of violence, it should not be underestimated that violence also serves as a means for the divine system created by and within the DTOs, as the evaluation of narcocorridos illustrates. Furthermore, Reguillo's in-depth interview with a former trafficker also summarizes the rooted nature of violence within

the narco-community: “Really, we’re not like the bad people. Here only those who deserve it are punished” (Reguillo, 2011: 26).

As a result, while their judgment system facilitates the maintenance of social order within their communities, it also justifies the use of violence from their point of view, and civil society eventuates in either being silenced by the combination of violence and social provision or having lack of choice due to the inadequacy of the state organs.

Another aspect contributing to the political power of the DTOs is the existence of widespread corruption and high levels of state involvement in criminal activities by one means or another. Since the control of drug trafficking has been regulated by the state through its occurrence and sprawling, the involvement of the state has a fundamental effect on the political power of DTOs (Duncan, 2014). Furthermore, Pansters (2018) states that for a large portion of Mexico's 20th century, the connection between crime and governance was intricately linked to informal structures, integrated into the socioeconomic and governance systems of local communities, however, when substantial changes disrupted these entrenched arrangements, it gave rise to fully established criminal sovereignties.

Additionally, the functioning of DTOs by the alliance of public force consolidates their association with the state (Campbell, 2014). While one facet of the state-DTO relation refers to the benefits provided by the state to DTOs, the other suggests the advantages facilitated by the DTOs to the governance. One example of the latter facet could be the high influence of the DTOs over the local communities, so much so that there are several incidents in which the members of the organizations have helped the police in capturing burglars (Duncan, 2014). Moreover, DTOs play a crucial role in shaping the recruitment of young individuals with criminal tendencies, directing their frustrations towards more profitable and complex drug-related activities as their presence prevents the proliferation of lower-profit offenses often seen in the absence of adult criminal organizations (Duncan, 2014).

Lastly, the relationship based on self-interest between the Calderón Administration and the Sinaloa Cartel in combatting other cartels such as the Zetas or the Gulf Cartel is mentioned by the local community in Grillo’s (2011) interviews. In his book, Grillo makes a direct quotation from one of his conversations with the local citizens: “Indeed, I can confirm that there have been joint operations in the sense that

soldiers and police officers together with cartel gunmen carry out some operations against the other cartels; we have detected that here" (Grillo, 2011: 55-56).

Besides the closely united relationship between DTOs and the state, a more particular however quite influential issue of corruption should not be overlooked. Following the historical prevalence of corruption in drug trafficking, in order to comprehend the current extent of corruption, responses obtained from offenders under the category of 'Authority Associations' in the 2012 survey conducted by PPD scholars will be evaluated.

Table 11 *Association of the Authorities Regarding the Crimes of the Offenders*

(Source: This table is adapted by the author from the "Survey of Internal Population in Federal Social Rehabilitation Centers" by Catalina Pérez Correa, et al., under the investigation of PPD, CIDE, published in 2016.)

Questions	Answers	Percentage of the Responses
Any Authority Involved in the Crime	Yes	11%
	No	89%
From Which Organization The Associated Authority	Federal Police	49%
	Local Police	18%
	Judge	0%
	Prosecutor	6%
	Military / Soldier	14%
	Marine	0%
	Government official	8%
	Private airport security	1%
	Custodians	3%
	Bank security	1%
The Terms of the Association Of the Authority	Receive money and provide protection	42%
	Receive money and provide information	12%
	Organize	28%
	Receive money and not investigate	16%
	Guard the cargo	3%
If the Authority was Arrested	Yes	33%
	No	67%

In this regard, Table 11 illustrates the questions regarding the authority associations in the crimes the offenders were sentenced for, and the percentages of the answers of the respondents. 11% of the offenders claimed that a public official was involved in the crime they were penalized for, and among them, 49% of the offenders

stated that they were from the Federal Police. Furthermore, it is concluded that most of the associated authorities were receiving money by providing protection. Finally, the majority of the authorities remained undetained, although it is ambiguous if their fault was not uncovered, or overlooked.

According to Grillo's (2011) in-depth interviews with the local community, it is believed among the civilians that the economic circulation of the drug trade and the political connections have remained untouched, and thus the trust in the political authorities, which was not fully achieved at the beginning of the state formation, have been decreased. The anecdote of one of Grillo's conversations illustrates that within the economic and political sphere of drug trafficking, how the incidents and privileges, which are widely known and blatantly evident to the public, are being disregarded by the government:

> We live here. We're from Sinaloa. We know how the iguana chews its food. We know how drug money moves here. In fact, we know which businesses the drug mafias own, and there are many more we don't know about. And we know which politicians are in on this (Grillo, 2011: 54).

Observing similar perspectives within the context of Michoacán is also conceivable. The dual-sided outcomes of the failure of the drug war in Michoacán involve the integration of the drug trade with local politics and corruption, including talks of illicit funding for local campaigns the trigger of the rise of armed actors, both lawful and unlawful, vying for dominance in the drug trade, impacting the region's security and violence dynamics (Aranda, 2013). Furthermore, it is also possible to observe the questioning of corruption, and thus critiques of the hypocrisy of the state officials among narcocorridos. Encounters embodied in narcocorridos are typically attributed to individual choices (such as betrayal) and contingent upon particular situations or particular groups taking advantage of the economic exploitations (Madrazo Lajous, 2016). Overall, the political power of the DTOs is constituted through providing public services to make the vulnerable community rely on them, and the use of violence for their submissiveness on the one hand, and enhanced with the association of state authority, and the utilization of corruption on the other.

Another discussion that needs to be covered is the main objective of the DTOs for gaining their political power. As most of the narcocorridos, and studies conducted

in terms of the increasing recruits of drug trafficking organizations suggest, the main objective of DTOs is economic gain. Since the historicization of state interventions and capital investment paved the way for the emergence of drug trafficking organizations, as an illegal formation by its very nature, financial profit could be only pursued through strong cohesive social groups (Malkin, 2001). Hence, it can be concluded that DTOs do not operate through a political agenda despite their political power confronting the one of the Mexican states. DTOs are primarily driven by an illicit monetary pursuit, with their resort to violence primarily aimed at intimidation and, potentially, reducing competition, yet their application of violence is not typically motivated by political factors; criminal factions seek to avoid state interference, with their central focus primarily centered on financial gains (Phillips, 2015).

Finally, with respect to the relationship between the state and DTOs, primarily, the research on narco-messages, which became a term after the repetitive adoption by the DTOs as a tactic for the social order, by Atuesta (2017) will be evaluated. In her study, Atuesta categorized the themes of the narco-messages found in varied forms and situations from 2007 to 2011. The messages were divided into five categories: messages to the government, messages against informants, messages conveying their judgment system, messages to the rival DTOs, and lastly, messages referring to their territorial controls.

In this context, Figure 18 illustrates the distribution of the number of narco-messages according to the categorization made by Atuesta (2017) between the years 2007 and 2011. To begin with, the low percentage of messages against the state stands out in all the years, while the rivalry menace is the most common theme in the messages throughout the years. The fact that vigilante messages are ranked second, especially after 2008, is in fact a quite expected outcome considering that DTOs maintain their power through their judgmental violence. The relationship between communication and violence is intertwined, where increased utilization of violence as a means reduces the necessity for individuals to engage in efforts to establish their reputation; therefore, the act of cartels conveying messages through particularly gruesome executions might serve as a tactic to cultivate respect and reputation both within competing groups and the broader society (Atuesta, 2017). Another remarkable outcome of the figure is the significant increase in narco-messages within the years, indicating that these narco-propagandas, which DTOs employ as a means to keep the

public under submission, have gained momentum in the drug war process. Additionally, "the five states with the greatest number of narcomessages were Guerrero (429), Sinaloa (285), Chihuahua (272), the state of Mexico (259), and Michoacán (186)", which were also highly affected by the military operations and DTO violence during Calderón administration (Atuesta, 2017: 104).




Figure 18 *The Number of Messages in Different Categories between 2007 and 2011*

(Source: This figure is adapted by the author from Table 3. in "Narcomessages as a Way to Analyse the Evolution of Organised Crime in Mexico" by Atuesta, published in 2017, on page 107.)

Atuesta (2017) also emphasizes the differentiation of the messages such as the grammar used in the messages or the methods of their conveyance, and adds the intentional differences and intricacies embedded within some of the messages in order to misguide the investigations in terms of the obscure of the responsible organization. Her arguments serve to demonstrate that organizations were engaged in conflict with each other rather than with the state even during the drug war era.

Along the same vein, the results of the research of Madrazo Lajous (2016) on narcocorridos illustrate that the drug trafficking organizations were actually considering themselves as a part of the political domain, rather than standing against it. Betrayal plays a prominent role as a recurring motif in Narcocorridos, suggesting a hierarchical relationship where law enforcement authorities betray drug traffickers due

to their prior allegiance, hence the depiction of the dynamic between drug trafficking and authorities in Narcocorridos is multifaceted, encompassing elements of corruption, treachery, and portrayal (Madrazo Lajous, 2016).

Furthermore, most of the contradictions narcocorridos suggest involving the active communal operation against economic inequalities and the U.S., rather than the Mexican state itself (Wald, 2002). Additionally, while the initial narcocorridos captured the interest of individuals by portraying a form of opposition to societal hierarchy, worldwide capitalism, and the division between the United States and Mexico, the portrayal of the identity of the narcotraffickers conveys them as a figure who corrects injustices and confronts the oppressive social class structure in Mexico (Edberg, 2004).

As a result, considering their multifold connections with the political sphere, narcocorridos should not be regarded as separate entities from the political community, and drug trafficking should not be seen as a central threat to the security of the Mexican nation (Madrazo Lajous, 2016). On the contrary, narcocorridos present merely the way of life for a select group of experienced individuals engaging in risky endeavors, and they embody the realm of familial affiliations, an avenue away from destitution, retribution for betrayals, and the glorification of masculinity (Madrazo Lajous, 2016). Nonetheless, Madrazo Lajous (2016) also emphasizes the increasing appearance of political attribution in the narcocorridos of the newer generation. This could be due to their portrayal of the 'enemy' in the political context of the Calderón administration. Still, it is worth considering that not until they were excluded from the political domain, drug traffickers did not display major state contradiction. After all, the opposing narrative presented by narcocorridos does not perceive the criminal as an agent of politics or a menace to the country's security (Madrazo Lajous, 2016).

Finally, the political power of the DTOs should also be discussed regarding their relations with the state. "We are facing the unprecedented phenomenon in which the Mexican government is being challenged by a multitude of groups and actors among whom boundaries between legal and illegal are rather blurry" (Aranda, 2014: 154). Hence such blurriness along with the communal and regional power brings along the discussion of parallel domination of the DTOs to the government (Grayson, 2010), and consideration of "a facade state", where illegality and violence are controlled based on dominant agendas (Aranda, 2014: 155).

In conclusion, the foremost three reasons behind both the possession of such political power by DTOs and their continuing ability to attract individuals into their ranks are the historical context of Mexico, social exclusion due to mainly poverty and marginalization, and close affiliation with the government. However, it is crucial to differentiate these politically engaged DTOs, which may seem external to the state apparatus but are, in fact, closely intertwined with it, from terrorist organizations or political structures.

Firstly, DTOs exhibit significantly different core objectives compared to political organizations, and secondly, DTOs do not perceive themselves in opposition to the nation or political specialization. The historical fabric of the country and the impact of social exclusion provide strong evidence in this regard. Unlike political formations, DTOs lack a political agenda; rather, their primary aims center around economic power and, notably, social integration forged through prestige. In this context, the accrued political power serves as a means to attain the fundamental objectives of DTOs. The social assistance rendered in the pursuit of gaining political influence, the establishment of their illicit divine frameworks, and the escalating violence stemming from the fulfillment of the first two aspects all include elements of social exclusion.

The prevalent perception of strong community bonds is a consequence of the essential bond formed within a group standing in contrast to legality. Moreover, their close relationship with the government should not be considered as a later development; on the contrary, the government has played a central role in the emergence of these organizations, both in terms of financial flows and the perception of community, and even nation. Therefore, it would be misleading to categorize DTOs as separate entities from the government, on the contrary, they should be understood within the framework of the deep state concept rather than as external entities threatening the government.

4.4. Concluding Remarks on the Social Analysis

The examination conducted in two nexuses as the acquisition of new members by DTOs and the empowerment of DTOs forms the foundation of the third nexus that emerges as a result within the scope of the DTO-state relationship. To begin with, the

widespread poppy culture in agricultural communities demonstrates that drug use in Mexico, especially within the indigenous communities, is not a phenomenon that evolved at a later stage. Thence, the fact that suppressing such substances found at the core of the culture through prohibitionist strategies due to the political and international impacts leads to a conflict throughout the country. Besides the historical prevalence of narcotics, the greatest effects on the emergence of DTOs are external influences. Formerly, the global demand, especially from the U.S., and latterly, the territorial vacuum resulting from the dismantling of cartels in Colombia have paved the way for the evolution of DTOs in Mexico.

Furthermore, a contributing factor to the continued growth and strengthening of DTOs is their perceived benefits within the populace, such as the provision of public services. While their primary goal is to establish authority over the population, the resulting delivery of public services generates a level of tolerance among the public toward the illegal motives of DTOs, and in some cases even leads to the glorification of these entities as heroes. The main reason that such benefits gained acceptance and recognition from the community is the social exclusion, including the deprivation from public access and equal labor market, within most of the territories harboring DTOs.




Figure 19 *The Summary of the Vulnerable and Deprived Federal Entities in Mexico*

As illustrated in Figure 19 above, the summarized outcomes of the deprivation and vulnerability nexus highlight that the federal entities that were severely affected by both DTO activities and the military operations during the Calderón era are also having challenges in public access and sufficient income levels. Additionally, the analysis of social exclusion evinces a noticeable disparity between Mexico's southern and northern states, yet despite this discrepancy, the fact that regions hosting significant DTO activities in the northern areas exhibit distinct vulnerabilities and deprivations is also observed.

From the southern states, Guerrero and Michoacán stand out in most of the exclusion domains; both exceeding average figures across not only in poverty dimension but also various domains on public access, furthermore, Guerrero is detected as either the only one federal entity or one of the federal entities that are socially excluded in several domains.

Therefore, although a distinct social exclusion pattern is not readily apparent across all dimensions in regions heavily influenced by DTOs, an overall lack of access is observable within the broader context. Additionally, it has been observed that the educational gap holds a significant impact on individuals' deviant behaviors, with the underlying reasons for this gap largely tied to economic disparities. In this context, the engagement in drug trafficking, due to its potential economic gains for the population, constitutes a noteworthy factor contributing to the ongoing increase in new member recruitment by DTOs. Particularly in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms, where a substantial portion of the populace has been deprived of adequate economic opportunities within the legal labor market, involvement in drug trafficking emerges as a substantial gain.

In addition to historical factors and social exclusion, the prevalent machismo culture in Mexico is a significant driver not only for attracting new members to DTOs but also through their empowerment as an illicit formation within the scope of the social sphere. For the scope of the political domain, beyond the gains from corruption, one of the foremost reasons for the empowerment of DTOs is the political power they acquire through the formation and perpetuation of these illegal and enduring structures, aimed at maintaining their internal cohesion and ensuring stable economic gains. In this context, while the public is deprived of essential services through one avenue, it is simultaneously subjected to violent rituals that suppress and subsequently

foster the dominion of DTOs over the populace. The nexus of outcomes further illustrates that while certain strategies of the state play a crucial role in the genesis and development of DTOs, the subsequent oversight of the state-DTO relationship and the emergence of territorialist and prohibitionist strategies contribute to the political empowerment and proliferation of DTOs.

The political influence of DTOs within society unveils a pattern of a 'hidden state'. This finding in political analysis is likewise corroborated in social analysis; DTOs do not merely arise in opposition to the state but rather in conjunction with it. However, over time, the political power gained by DTOs also exposes their state-like dimensions. In this context, the emergence of the narco-trafficking subculture underscores that the Mexican state is not characterized by contrast alone, but rather is squarely confronted with a subculture. Finally, the outcomes revealed in political analysis, indicating the dehumanization not only of traffickers but also of all citizens potentially associated with trafficking, are similarly discernible in social analysis. Consequently, communities already deprived of public access are further stripped of certain civic rights in the aftermath of the drug war.

4.5. The Fragility of the Mexican State

During its phase of nation-state formation, through a rational-choice perspective, Mexico followed several political trends, such as democratization or neo-liberalism, which were temporally and contextually incongruent with its own societal structure and insufficient for internalization. Nonetheless, as a country emerging in a post-colonialist period, and with socially embraced exploitation, such an effort of the Mexican state resulted in a lack of institutionalization. Furthermore, the neo-liberalist reforms under the influence of international motives led to the emergence and strengthening of drug trafficking. Along the same line, the U.S.-led anti-drug policies paved the way for territorial distribution and fragmentation of DTOs, rather than reducing drug trafficking. In this regard, it can be inferred that decisions made under the rational-choice intention may not align with historical and sociological contexts. In essence, the historical, social, and rational contexts are intertwined, exerting a significant impact on both the emergence and outcomes of domestic political reforms within the country.

The institutionalization of political affairs includes two significant processes: the formation of a nation-state and the transition of democracy. According to the results of the institutionalization concept, the institutionalization of the political domain could succeed through the parallel transitions and embracement of both the political and social spheres. Put differently, the achievement of a particular political reform could only progress with the acceptance of the social structure. Although it is inherently challenging to imagine these transitions as smooth, Mexico's journey towards democracy proved notably arduous, with the attainment of a complete democracy remaining elusive over an extended duration. In this context, one can identify the absence of democratic institutionalization in Mexico firstly, under the rule of the Díaz dictatorship and subsequently within the single-party system. Nevertheless, the crux lies in the underlying causes and contexts that led to these shortcomings. Thence, political institutionalization processes that align with a society's culture facilitate the transition, however, Mexico's historical assimilation of colonial culture signifies an unsuitable context for such transition.

Moreover, the remaining two concepts, failed state and social exclusion, are, indeed, the symptoms of the lack of institutionalization of a nation-state. Social exclusion emerges in instances where the state fails to achieve equal redistribution of resources due to deficient institutionalization, which is also a condition that is inherently encompassed within the criteria of a failed state. Escalating inequality erodes citizens' trust in their governments, spurring dissident formations against the state and ultimately undermining its authority and territorial power, thereby giving rise to discussions on fragility.

The Mexican state has been appearing as internationally unstable due to the increasing pressure from DTOs for quite some time, and it is evaluated within the tendency of fragility trends. However, the discourse on Mexico's fragility presents a degree of ambiguity both in the literature and in published index reports. For instance, during periods marked by extensive military operations and societal impact, the insecurity ranking has been observed to decrease. Consequently, it is possible to deduce that discussions concerning fragile states often focus on whether a country poses an international threat, rather than solely on internal harm or context. Furthermore, the human rights aspect follows a similar trajectory. In the analysis and

application of the concept of human rights within fragile state discussions, the assessment may fall short in adequately capturing the comprehensiveness of the concept. Therefore, judging Mexico's fragility based on specific Western paradigms of thought, which indeed holds for all Latin American countries, can be misleading since institutionalization finds its proper grounding when aligned with historical and social contexts. Additionally, the elucidation of the relationship between crime and the state remains incomplete and unclear, particularly within the examination of whether crime is a cause or a symptom. In this context, it is essential to initially discern what drives or results from the escalating crime. For instance, in the case of Mexico, drug-related crime impacts state fragility, primarily on the internal rather than the international level, while also evolving within the state's process of institutionalization.

Finally, when considering the aforementioned interplay between social and political affairs within the process of internalization, social exclusion studies assume significant importance within the context of state fragility. The concept of social exclusion is also examined under both political and social domains, with the explanations within the social domain necessitating sub-cultural investigations. Thus, the socio-political analysis within this study also demonstrates that the phenomena considered most crucial in influencing the fragility of the Mexican state, namely DTOs, do not, in fact, pose a direct threat to the state and its territory. Yet, the effects of DTOs on power dynamics should not be disregarded.

In conclusion, even though social symptoms such as poverty and inequality, which signify the state's deficiencies, find their place within the fragile state index, the comprehensive understanding of these phenomena has remained incomplete during the examination phase. Ultimately, the comprehension of these social symptoms and their manifestations, both in opposition to the state and in relation to the state, can be achieved not solely through statistical figures but also through extensive ethnographic studies and historical foundations. As a result, the fragility of a nation-state must be expounded upon through the lenses of both the social and historical domains.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Latin American countries have evolved into significant areas of research due to their tumultuous history and their current state of conflict. Particularly, Mexico, which shares a border with the United States and serves as a substantial global source of drug supply, has gained prominence, especially within the context of escalating fragility debates. However, the lack of sociological context within the discourse of failed states, particularly the deficiency in addressing issues of institutionalization and consequently, the underestimation of social context, has propelled this study. Accordingly, this thesis has selected Calderón's drug war as a case study, focusing on socio-political processes and outcomes.

The sociological notion of 'institutionalization' can be conceptualized as behavioral patterns that become a structured mechanism for individuals over time. Such patterns encompass not only societal or governmental organizations but also state formation. As societies become more complex, the process of institutionalization has likewise grown in complexity; however, the trajectory of its initial focus of explanation remains. Therefore, to consider the institutionalism process separately from specific historical contexts and the current context within which the society exists would be misleading. This intricate societal structure also involves the influence of international motives, and particularly, the impact of political trends that have gained emphasis in the Western world having an influence in Mexico is indicative of Mexico aligning with these very trends. This is driven by factors such as globalization, rational choice, and several efforts to manage bilateral relations. As a result, all the areas examined under the umbrella of neo-institutionalism, from various perspectives, hold significance in understanding a country's process of institutionalization.

Being one of the symptoms of inadequate institutionalization of nation-states, the concept of 'failed state' has primarily progressed under the international perspective, with its main objective being to explain and examine the stability of

nation-states in the international realm. The primary focus of the concept concerns the loss of central power and legitimacy of the nation-states, however, critiques against such focus have centered on the lack of importance of historicization and the inclusiveness of examinations.

In addition, the other symptom of lack of institutionalization is the concept of ‘social exclusion’, which initially emerged by addressing the issue of poverty in less industrialized regions. Originating in Europe, this notion aimed to move beyond the linguistic negativity associated with 'poverty' and sought to facilitate a comprehensive examination of the welfare state. Although primarily rooted in the reference to poverty and at times confused with the concepts of poverty referring to economic context and marginalization referring to social context, the multileveled and multilayered nature of the social exclusion concept, and thus its interrelated contextual focus, should not be underestimated.

With the evolution of the notion of nation-state, social exclusion studies have been explored through the emphasis on redistribution, and thus, the social analysis of this study examines the relationship of various domains of the Mexican country on the basis of redistribution. At this juncture, it is imperative not to overlook the socially constructed nature of the concept of ‘nation-state’. While the formation of the nation-state is politically explained based on the notion of the social contract, its social perspective is examined under the concept of imagined communities. In essence, the notion of the nation-state encompasses individuals within a specific territory who share a common cultural heritage, and mostly ethnicity, entrusting the state with the redistribution and adjudication of their fundamental rights. Subsequently, the social order and cohesion within aforementioned nation-state are sustained by citizens' abstract allegiances. Within this context, social exclusion generated by the formation of the nation-state can be categorized into two points. Formerly, external-based social exclusion arises when the nation-state, during its formation, excludes individuals who do not meet the previously mentioned criteria, and latterly, internal-based social exclusion encompasses citizens or communities lacking the necessary abstract allegiance essential for the social cohesion established following the formation of the nation-state.

Thence, this study primarily focuses on internal social exclusion, and in this regard, the study investigates market and bureaucratic relations under the analysis of

social exclusion, while associative and communal relations are addressed under the subculture category.

Consequently, this study advocates for the exploration of sub-culture theories in connection with social exclusion. The subculture theory, originating within the discipline of sociology and subsequently explored under the field of cross-cultural studies, seeks to elucidate cultures that emerge in opposition to the fundamentally state-based dominant culture within a society. This endeavor has led to the development of the delinquency concept. Primarily, explanations of individual behavior have emerged within the framework of cultural goals and legitimate means. According to these explanations, when specific goals established under the dominant culture and the legal means to achieve such goals are not internalized by individuals for any reason, delinquency ensues. This situation effectively brings forth individuals or communities within the dominant culture who have not undergone full socialization. However, socialization is a requisite in an individual's life in some form or another. In this context, the sub-culture assumption emerges under the structural context reference, and since the socialization process begins at a young age, delinquency studies generally focus on youth. Another pivotal concept within the framework of delinquency is the "labeling" concept, which posits that being labeled in any way, such as being labeled as a criminal, rebel, or drug addict, causes an individual to further internalize their identity in relation to the dominant culture and repeat their actions.

The last significant area of the subcultural studies pertains to the substantial influence of the socio-economic level on the socialization process, particularly within poor communities. However, the fact that the 'underclass' concept primarily arising from the working class within strong societies elucidates an alt-culture that develops solely based on an individual's socio-economic status led sub-cultural studies to be criticized more in terms of 'blaming the victim'. Hence, while subcultural theories might appear to emphasize the direct impact of socio-economic level on an individual's delinquency due to their central focus on the influence of dominant culture on social order, the subculture explanation within the discipline of sociology is fundamentally rooted in the socialization process. The primary aim of subcultural studies is to examine the influence of structure on individuals' delinquent behaviors. Although subculture studies have largely shifted towards addressing style and rituals within

youth subcultures, and their prominence within sociology may have diminished over time, this study demonstrates that subculture remains an important phenomenon that continues to impact the state in various degrees.

In conclusion, this study concludes that the concepts examined under different disciplines with varying focuses are in fact closely interconnected. Therefore, within the context of the failed state examination, the primary focus should be directed toward the examination of institutionalization as the core factor since the political and social institutionalization process reveals where the state truly fails. Additionally, understanding the social aspect of social exclusion alongside its political and economic dimensions should be examined through the subculture concept. This study demonstrates that subculture should not be comprehended as solely a formation arising in opposition to the dominant culture, threatening social cohesion. On the contrary, the analysis of the narco-trafficking subculture in Mexico indicates that DTOs actually complement areas where the state falls short from a social perspective, although this is not their primary objective.

Emerging as a response to social exclusion created by certain political and economic spheres during the state's institutionalization process, the narco-trafficking subculture leads to a hidden state development for DTOs due to their political power. While certain ideological patterns against the U.S. and capitalist exploitation are observable within this subculture, no pattern opposing the Mexican state is identified internally. Hence, as the subculture becomes more complex within the political process, a re-examination of it within the context of social exclusion and under sociological foundations is necessary. Additionally, instead of approaching cultural assets from the perspective that they sustain social order and cultures outside these assets harm cohesion, it is important to address the contexts in which these subcultures arise, how they are influenced by the dominant culture, and how they in turn affect the dominant culture.

As a result, the fragility of the Mexican state is essentially observed as the manifestation of deficiencies in social institutionalization within the political domain. Hence, the threat posed by DTOs against the state, discussed within the framework of failed state discourse, requires reevaluation. While it is concluded within the scope of this study that the Mexican state has failed, the central question is what the core failure entails because, within the prolonged conflict context with DTOs, the state's main

failure lies in neglecting the social domain. Consequently, the main contention of this study is that research pertaining to DTOs, whether within the discourse on fragile states or anti-drug policies, should recognize DTOs as a 'hidden state' and uphold the DTO-state relationship without oversight. Furthermore, the social sphere related to Mexican DTOs, and their intertwined relationship with both the Mexican state and the Mexican society needs to be studied under the fieldwork methodology for a comprehensive understanding of the everyday rituals and practices.

While this thesis has attempted to explain the state and DTO relationship in the context of Mexico and the political orientations examined within Calderón's drug war, the institutionalization of the political and social realm in the broader context within the present-day continues to raise questions for further research.

Calderón, who used the military in Mexico's political stability, is neither the first nor the last president to do so. Mexico's current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, may have come to power with a populist approach, offering hope for marginalized communities in the country, and motivated by the idea of revitalizing local hegemony. However, his steps to strengthen the military forces during his presidency are indicative that authoritarian trends still prevail in the country. Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic, inadequately implemented measures were covered up with authoritarian attitudes. This demonstrates that political trends are being used by states as a means to deal with crises and inadequacies. Mexican state leaders, even today, tend to suppress the consequences of their failure, lack of institutionalization, and disregard for social reality with certain political approaches. In this context, how are political actors using authoritarianism, especially when states are faced with multiple crises simultaneously? What is the place of the populist approach in this context?

On the other hand, in the face of authoritarian structures of the political domain, the social realm continues to manifest itself and persist against dehumanizing policies such as mano dura, a common harsh policy against criminal communities in Central America. The fact that DTOs have not weakened but rather branched out and fragmented in response to Calderón's war strategy serves as a clear illustration of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the continued influence of the Church as another institution that has wielded political power alongside the military since Mexico's independence, and its ongoing central role in the organization and social cohesion of

DTOs today, holds significance for future research agenda. In this regard, how is social organization progressing in daily life within this political context, and what is the role of religion in relation to politics? Ultimately, while political approaches, actors, and institutions undergo periodic setbacks and changes, social organization always continues to remain.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Meksika, uyuşturucu kartellerinin aktivitelerinden en çok etkilenen ülkelerden biridir. Bu bağlamda Meksika'daki kartellerin ilişkisel çalışmalarının kapsamı, genellikle ülkenin siyasi ve ekonomik etkileri etrafında dönmektedir, ancak kartellerin sosyal bağlam ile ilişkisi ve sosyal yönleri kapsamlı bir şekilde incelenmemiştir. Özellikle başarısız devlet tartışmalarında, ampirik analizin eksikliği, bu tezin oluşmasına yol açmıştır. Bu nedenle bu tezin başlangıç noktası, Meksika'nın devletin kırılganlığı üzerine devam eden tartışmasıdır ve ana amacı, uyuşturucu politikaları ile ilgili süregelen tartışmalarda, sosyolojik boşluğu doldurmaktır. Meksika'nın sosyo-politik sahasının, Calderón'un Uyuşturucu Savaşı'nın uyuşturucu politikası sonuçları ve dolayısıyla Meksika devletinin istikrarsızlığı ve kırılganlığı üzerinde nasıl bir etkisinin olduğu, bu tezin temel araştırma sorusudur. Ayrıca, tezin ikincil soruları aşağıdaki gibidir:

- Meksika devletinin temel dinamikleri ve ülkenin tarihsel ve bağlamsal faktörleri, devletin kurumsallaşma sürecini nasıl etkilemiştir?
- Meksika'da uygulanan ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütlerinin sosyal ve ekonomik bağlamını küçümsemeye yol açan uyuşturucu politikaları hangi stratejilerle hayata geçirilmiştir?
- Calderón'un uyuşturucu savaşındaki başarısızlıkları nelerdir?
- Meksika'nın çeşitli bölgelerindeki sosyal dışlanmanın ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı etrafında gelişen alt kültürün örüntüleri nasıldır ve bu örüntüler uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütlerinin alanını nasıl etkilemektedir?
- Bu tür örüntülerin devlet ile uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütleri arasındaki ilişki üzerindeki etkisi nedir?
- Meksika'daki sosyal örüntülerin ve siyasi kurumsallaşmanın, Meksika devletinin kırılganlığı üzerindeki etkileri nelerdir?

Yukarıdaki ilk üç soru, tezin politika analizi bölümünde ele alınmıştır. Meksika'da uygulanan uyuşturucu politikalarının göz ardı edilen yapısını ve Calderón yönetiminin başarısızlıklarını açıklamak amacıyla kurumsallaşma değerlendirilmiştir. Ayrıca, tezin sosyal analiz bölümünde, sosyal dışlanma ve alt kültür örüntüleri ile ilgili soruların yanı sıra bu örüntülerin ülkenin sosyo-politik yapısı üzerindeki etkileri de ele alınmıştır. Analizin sonuçlarının devamında, sosyal ve kamusal açıdan dışlanmış ve belirli bir alt kültüre sahip topluluğun, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiş ve son olarak, elde edilen sonuç Meksika'nın devlet kırılganlığı bağlamında tartışılmıştır.

Bu tezde, disiplinlerarası bir araştırma hedeflenmekte olup, veri toplama sürecinde ise ikincil veri analizi kullanılmıştır. Araştırmanın verileri, çoğunlukla literatürden, Meksika Ulusal İstatistik ve Coğrafya Enstitüsü (INEGI) gibi Meksika Hükümeti kuruluşlarından ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar ve Eğitim Merkezi (CIDE) gibi hükümet projelerinden toplanmıştır. Tezin üçüncü bölümünü oluşturan politika analizindeki hedef, hem uyuşturucu kartellerinin ortaya çıkışının, hem de Meksika hükümeti tarafından uyuşturucu kullanımı ve kaçakçılığına karşı başlatılan politik tepkilerin tarihsel açıdan incelenmesi ile Calderón dönemi Uyuşturucu Savaşı'nın politika analizini kapsamlı bir şekilde tartışmaktır. Buna ek olarak, tezin dördüncü bölümündeki hedef ise, Meksika toplumunun toplumsal örüntülerini, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı çerçevesinde incelemektir. Sonuç olarak, ortaya çıkan analiz sonuçları ile, sosyal ve politik alan arasındaki ilişkiyi, özellikle de uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütlerinin Meksika sınırları içerisindeki sosyo-politik yerini anlamlandırmak amaçlanmıştır.

Tezin temel iddiası, Meksika'daki uyuşturucu karşıtı politikalarının ülke içerisindeki gerekli sosyokültürel ve sosyopolitik yönleri ele almada eksik kalmış olması ve Calderón dönemi uyuşturucu savaşının şiddete yönelik ağır sonuçlar doğurmasındaki yeridir. Dahası, Meksika'nın uyuşturucu karşıtı politikalarındaki yetersizliğinin nedeni, devletin toplumsal mekanizmasındaki eksiklikten kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Meksika devletinin başarısızlığı, toplumsal kapsayıcılığının eksikliğinden ileri gelir. Sonuç olarak, 'başarısız devlet' tartışması, devlet ile toplum arasındaki ilişkiyi merkezde tutarak, ulus-devletlerin yönetilebilirliği ile ilgilenmelidir. Söz konusu yaklaşım değişikliği ise ancak belirtilen ulus-devletlerin politik alanın ötesindeki sosyal yönünü öne çıkarmakla mümkün olabilir.

Tezin kuramsal çerevesi farklı disiplinlerde ortaya çıkan dört farklı kavramdan oluşmaktadır. İlk kavram, ‘kurumsallaşma’ konseptidir. Sosyoloji disiplini içerisinde gelişen kurumsallaşma kavramı, bireylerin davranış kalıplarının, zaman içinde, kademeli olarak, hem toplumsal hem de resmi kuruluşları kapsayan, yapılandırılmış bir mekanizmaya dönüşmesini tartışır. Toplum, zamanla daha karmaşık hale geldikçe, kurumsallaşma süreci de karmaşıklaşarak büyümüş, ulus devletlerin oluşumuna ve demokrasinin ortaya çıkışına zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu bağlamda neo-kurumsalcı bakış açısı ortaya çıkmıştır. Her ne kadar neo-kurumsalcı perspektif; tarihsel, sosyolojik veya rasyonel seçim gibi alt yaklaşımlara ayrılmış olsa da, bu tez, bir ulus devletin kurumsallaşma sürecinin tam olarak anlaşılabilmesi için, tüm yönlerin incelenmesi gerektiğini öne sürmektedir.

Ulus-devletlerin yükselişi ve bileşik yapısı, kurumsallaşma eksikliğinin belirtileri olarak da görülebilecek iki farklı araştırma alanının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu kavramlardan birincisi, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininden ileri gelen ‘başarısız devlet’ tartışmasıdır. Başarısız devlet konseptine göre; bir ulus-devlet, toprakları ve vatandaşları üzerindeki merkezi gücünü ve meşruiyetini kaybettiğinde 'kırılgan' kabul edilir. Tartışma, aynı zamanda, ‘Fund for Peace’ (Barış Fonu) Organizasyonu tarafından hazırlanan ve suç niteliğindeki şiddetin artması veya daha yüksek yoksulluk oranları gibi çeşitli göstergeleri içeren, uluslararası bağlamda kabul görmüş, ‘Failed State’ (Kırılgan Devlet) Endeksi'nin ortaya çıkmasına da yol açmıştır. Ancak kavram, Batı yanlısı tutumu, paternalist yapısı ve eleştirel değerlendirmelerin eksikliği gibi nedenler ile eleştirilmiştir. Dahası, ulus devletlerin kırılganlıklarının değerlendirilmesi noktasında gereken kapsamlı tarihselleştirme önerileri sonucunda, bu tez içerisinde yer alan Meksika devleti kırılganlığı tartışması, Meksika'nın tarihi ve sosyal yönlerine dayanmaktadır.

Kurumsallaşma eksikliğinin bir diğer belirtisi ise, ulus devletlerde yaşanan sosyal ve kamusal dışlanma tartışmasıdır. Temel olarak, sosyal dışlanma kavramı, ulus devletlerin topraklarındaki belirli bölgelerin veya cemaatlerin, yoksulluğu ve kamu hizmetlerinden yoksunluğu ile ilgilidir. Ulus-devletlerin oluşumundan kaynaklanan sosyal dışlanma, gerek uluslararası bağlama, gerekse ülkelerin yetki alanı içerisine odaklanılarak, literatürde yaygın olarak tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası boyuta odaklanan birinci bakış açısı (içeri/dışarı), jeopolitiği temel alırken, bu tezin de ana odak noktası olan ulus-devletlerin dahili alanına vurgu yapan ikinci bakış açısı

(içeri/iç), bir ulus-devletin, hâlihazırda vatandaşlığına sahip olan bireyler üzerindeki kapsayıcılığına odaklanmaktadır.

Tezin kuramsal çerçevesinde ele alınan son kavram ise, sosyoloji disiplini temelli alt kültür kavramıdır. Alt kültür kavramı, her ne kadar toplum içerisinde ağırlıklı olarak devlet temelli hakim kültüre karşı gelişen kültürleri açıklama çabası olarak ortaya çıkmış olsa da, suç ve sapma sosyolojisine ilişkin çalışmaların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, 'mağdurun suçlanması'na ortam oluşturmak nedeniyle yoğun bir şekilde eleştirilmiştir. Ancak bu tür eleştirilerin temel nedeni, alt kültür çalışmalarının, başlangıçta başladığı şekliyle, öncelikli olarak sosyolojik yapıyı açıklamayı amaçlamaktan ziyade, zamanla sosyoekonomik açıdan dezavantajlı mahallelere veya gruplara odaklanmış olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, alt kültür teorilerinin ilk zamanlarındaki çalışma alanına dönmesini destekleyerek, Meksika'daki uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı alt kültürü çalışmasına vurgu yapmaktadır.

Politika analizi içerisinde ele alından tarihsel inceleme, Meksika'daki uyuşturucuyla mücadele politikalarına dair çeşitli örüntüler ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Öncelikle, ülkedeki uyuşturucu kültürünün ve uyuşturucu kartellerinin, sosyal ve ekonomik önemi, devamli olarak küçümsenmiştir. Oysa ki, literatür taraması sonuçları, uyuşturucunun, Meksika toplumunda tarımsal bir yaygınlığa sahip olduğunu ve bu durumun uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı organizasyonlarının ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırladığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığının yaygınlaşmaya başladığı dönemin egemen partisi Kurumsal Devrimci Parti (PRI), bu organizasyonlarının oluşumunu ekonomik kazanç kapısı olarak görmüş ve bu durumu meşruiyetini ve merkezi egemenliğini güçlendirmek için kullanmıştır. İkinci olarak, devletin, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı organizasyonları ile olan yakın bağlantısı göz ardı edilmiştir. Bir önceki çıkarım ile de bağlantılı olarak, uyuşturucu kartellerinin ortaya çıkışı siyasi bağlamla yakından ilişkilidir ve bu ilişki zaman içerisinde, yolsuzluk ile devam etmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu faktör, Meksika'da uygulanan uyuşturucuyla mücadele politikalarını önemli ölçüde zorlaştırmaktadır. Üçüncü faktör ise ABD kaynaklı, ülkeye zarar veren girişimlerdir. 1970'lerdeki Condor Operasyonu ve Fox yönetimi sırasındaki Güvenli Meksika Operasyonu gibi, özellikle orduların kullanıldığı önemli operasyonların çoğunda, ABD güdümlü hedeflerden oldukça etkilenilmiş ve operasyon sürecinde ise ABD'nin onayı beklenmiştir. Ancak bu tür girişimler, uyuşturucu kartellerinin sona erdirilmesi bir yana, kartel faaliyetlerinin bölgesel olarak

yayılmasına ve ülkede daha şiddetli bir atmosferin oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Bir diğer husus ise, uluslararası alanın etkisinin yüksek olmasıdır. Meksika'daki kartel faaliyetleri, ABD'deki yüksek talep seviyesi veya Kolombiya Planı sonrasında uyuşturucu ticaretindeki hegemonyanın boşalmadı gibi uluslararası olay veya eğilimlerden oldukça etkilenmiştir. Bu tür eğilimler, ülkede kartel sayısının artmasına neden olmuştur. Ayrıca uluslararası anlaşma ve uygulamaların, sadece uyuşturucu kartellerinin artışında değil, siyasi tepkilerde ve uyuşturucu ile mücadele politikalarında da önemli bir etkisinin olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu sonuç neo-kurumsalcı perspektiften rasyonel seçim yaklaşımı ile bağlantılı olarak açıklanabilse de, özellikle Meksika toplumunda uyuşturucu kullanımının tarımsal yeri dikkate alınarak uygulanabilirliği tartışılmalıdır. Son olarak, uyuşturucu ticareti eylemlerinde, şiddetin, hem toplum hem de devlet kurumları nezdinde kurumsallaşmış olması önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Kurumsallaşma sürecinin temel etkilerini ülkede yaygınlaşan şiddette görmek mümkündür. Üstelik, yalnızca kartellerin silahlanması açısından değil, aynı zamanda hükümetin verdiği politik tepkiler açısından da yaygınlaşmış şiddet gözlemlenmektedir.

Meksika'da, 1900'lü yılların başından itibaren uyuşturucu karşıtı politika gündemleri kapsamında birçok sert ve katı girişimler hayata geçirilmiş olsa da, Uyuşturucu Savaşı, 2006 yılında Felipe Calderon yönetimi altında resmen başlatılmış ve toplum üzerinde ciddi etkiler yaratmıştır. Bu nedenle Calderon'un başkanlığı sırasındaki uyuşturucu karşıtı politikalar bu araştırmanın vaka çalışması olarak seçilmiştir. Bu bağlamda Uyuşturucu Savaşı; savaşın tarihsel ve iç konjonktürü, Calderon'un uyuşturucu savaşının gündemi ve uyuşturucu savaşının sonuçlarıyla birlikte incelenmiş olan uygulama süreci olarak üç açıdan incelenmiştir. Öncelikle, Calderon'ın uyuşturucuya karşı bir savaş başlatmasındaki nedenlerden ilki, başkanlığı döneminde, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütlerinin, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığının yanında çeşitli birçok suça girişmeye başlamış olmasıdır. İkincisi, Meksika'nın, demokratikleşme sürecinde yaşadığı zorluklar nedeniyle, otoriter bir güç elde etme çabasıdır. Ülkenin demokratikleşme sürecinde yaşanan fiili gecikmeler, hemen hemen bütün Meksika başkanlarının otoriter bir tavır almasını gerektirmiştir. Özellikle seçim sonrası döneminde, Calderon'un başkan olarak meşruiyet kazanması gerekmiş ve Calderon bunu, ülkenin uzun süredir devam eden uyuşturucu sorununa son verecek güçlü bir lider rolü ile başarmaya çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamda bir diğer neden ise,

Meksika devletinin kırılganlık tartışmalarından kaynaklanmıştır. Son olarak, ülkede, özellikle devlet memurlarında ve politik figürlerde yaygın olan yolsuzluk, Calderon'un savaş kararında oldukça etkili olmuştur.

Calderon'un kararının, sözel açıdan sonuçlarına bakıldığında ise, savaş ilanının; aşırı silah kullanımı ve dolayısıyla şiddeti meşrulaştırdığı, uyuşturucu kaçakçılarını kişiliksizleştirerek politik dünyadan, bir diğer deyişle, birtakım vatandaşlık haklarından mahrum ettiği ve milli birliği meşrulaştırarak başkan olarak meşruiyet kazanmasının önünü açtığı gözlemlenmiştir. Calderon'un uyuşturucu savaşı sonucunda ise, birçok başarısızlık göze çarpmaktadır. Öncelikle, yolsuzluk ortadan kaldırılamamıştır. Uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı örgütleri ile devlet arasındaki ilişkide yolsuzluğun köklü rolü göz önüne alındığında, bu ilişkinin sona ermesi öngörülemeyen bir sonuç olmaya devam etmektedir ancak azaltma çabalarında dahi Calderon dönemindeki politikalar başarılı olamamıştır. Özellikle, Temizleme Operasyonu (Operation Clean-Up) gibi önemli girişimlerde bile odak noktası öncelikli olarak üst düzey politikacılar üzerinde kalmış ve yolsuzluğun en yaygın olduğu saha çalışanlarına odaklanılamamıştır.

İkinci olarak, imha ve ele geçirmelerde, önceki yıllara göre azalma görülmüştür. Calderon döneminde, askeri temelli operasyonlar uyuşturucuyla mücadele politikasında daha belirgin bir rol üstlenmiş ve bu da uyuşturucunun ortadan kaldırılması veya ele geçirilmesine verilen önemin azalmasına neden olmuştur. Calderon dönemindeki asıl amaç, önemli uyuşturucu baronlarını yakalamakla sınırlı kalmıştır. Bir diğer başarısızlık ise, kontrol mekanizmalarının kontrolsüz ve orantısız güç kullanmasının meşrulaştırılmasıdır. Özellikle, yürütülen operasyonlarda, yıllar geçtikçe, çoğunluğu askeri personel tarafından öldürülen ve yaralanan saldırganların sayısının artması, kamu güçlerinin ölümcül eylemlere yönelme eğiliminin arttığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, orantısız güç kullanımının, yalnızca suçlu olarak sınıflandırılan kişilere değil, aynı zamanda suçlu olarak algılanabilecek kişilere de uygulandığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Son olarak, askeri çatışmalar sonucunda, tedirgin olan uyuşturucu kartellerinin misillemeleri, daha şiddetli bir şekilde artmaya başlamıştır. Yıllar geçtikçe cinayet ve kaybolma oranlarında artış yaşanmış, siyasi figürlere yönelik saldırılarda da artış görülmüştür. Bunun temel nedeni, devlet organları tarafından yeterince araştırılmayan, kontrolsüz ve düzensiz yolsuzluklardır. Kartellere

sağlanan bilgi ve silah akışının engellenememesi nedeniyle, kamu mensupları, karteller karşısında dezavantajlı bir konuma düşürülmüştür.

Sonuç olarak Calderon'u uyuşturucu kartellerine karşı savaş başlatmaya iten temel nedenler ve hedefler gerçekleşmemiştir. Öte yandan, Meksika'nın Kırılgan Devlet Endeksi'ndeki sıralamasındaki hafif düşüşten, uyuşturucu savaşının kısmen başarılı olarak değerlendirildiği sonucuna varılabilir. Ancak, bu noktadaki önemli soru, uyuşturucu savaşının, uluslararası arenada mı yoksa ülke içinde mi başarılı olduğudur.

Sosyal analizin ilk kısmını oluşturan sosyal dışlanma, toplumsal ilişkilerin iç içe geçtiği çok boyutlu bir sorundur ve bu bağlamda; ekonomik, bürokratik, birliksel ve komünal ilişkiler olmak üzere dört başlıkta incelenmelidir. Ekonomik ilişkiler, ticarete konu olan mal ve hizmetlere erişimle ilgilidir. Bürokratik ilişkiler ise, yasal düzenlemelerin ve hiyerarşik yapının önemli rol oynadığı vatandaşlık haklarını ifade etmektedir. Son olarak, birliksel ilişkiler, ortak çıkarlara ve hedeflere işaret ederken, komünal ilişkiler ortak bir kimliğe işaret eder. Bu araştırmada sosyal dışlanmanın analizine ilişkin olarak ekonomik ilişkiler yoksulluk ve kamusal erişimden yoksunluk olarak değerlendirilmiş, bürokratik ilişkiler ise sivil hakların dışlanması açısından incelenmiştir. Sosyal dışlanma analizinde kullanılan veri seti, esas olarak CONEVAL'in yoksulluk raporuna dayanmaktadır. Uyuşturucu savaşı sırasında, en çok hedef alınan federal kuruluşlar, kuzeyde; Baja California, Sinaloa, Durango, Nuevo Leon ve Chihuahua ile güneyde; Michoacan ve Guerrero olduğu için, analiz bu federal eyaletler temel alınarak yapılmıştır.

Veri sonuçlarına göre, ülke genelinde, kuzey ve güney eyaletleri arasında belirgin bir fark olmasına rağmen, yukarıda adı geçen federal birimlerin, hem yoksunluk hem de düşük gelir düzeyleri açısından, daha yüksek oranda savunmasız nüfusa sahip olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Guerrero ve Michoacan eyaletlerinin sonuçları ise, sosyal hizmetlerin neredeyse her boyutunda daha yüksek düzeyde yoksun ve ekonomik anlamda yoksul nüfus göstermiştir. Daha spesifik olarak, aşırı yoksulluk, yiyecek ve barınma hizmetlerine erişim gibi çeşitli hususların sonuçları, Guerrero'nun sosyal olarak dışlanmış olduğunu göstermiştir. Sosyal dışlanma analizi içerisinde, Uyuşturucu Politikası Programı (Drug Policy Program) altında yürütülen bir araştırmanın veri setinden yararlanılarak ulaşılan sonuca göre ise, eğitim açığı ve bu açığın bireylerin sapkın davranışları ile bağlantısı ile, söz konusu eğitim açığının ve

sapkın davranışların altında yatan nedenlerin büyük ölçüde ekonomik eşitsizliklere bağlı olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

Sivil haklardan dışlanma hususunda, savaş ilan etmenin sözel sonuçlarına ilişkin politika analizinin sonuçları, hüküm giymiş uyuşturucu kaçakçılarına yönelik araştırmadan elde edilen sonuçlar ile de desteklenmiştir. Anketin analizi göstermektedir ki, uyuşturucu ticareti suçluları, kamu görevlileri tarafından, adil yargılanma ve insani muamele öğrelerini içeren sivil haklarının dışında bir muameleye tabi tutulmuştur. Sonuç olarak, halihazırda kamu servisine erişim anlamında dezavantajlı durumda olan ve hatta bu erişimden mahrum kalan halk, uyuşturucu savaşının ardından bazı yurttaşlık haklarından da mahrum kalmıştır.

Sosyal analizin ikinci kısmını oluşturan, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığının alt-kültür kapsamındaki örüntü analizi, üç bağlantı noktasında ilerlemiştir; kartellerin yeni üye alımı ve güçlenmesi olmak üzere incelenen iki bağlantı, Kuyuşturucu karteli ve devlet ilişkisi bağlamında ortaya çıkan üçüncü bağlantının temelini oluşturmaktadır.
Tarihsel faktörler ve sosyal dışlanmanın yanı sıra, Meksika'da yaygın olan maço (machismo) kültürü de kartellere yeni üye çekmede önemli bir faktördür. İkinci bağlantı noktasında ise, kartellerin, yolsuzluktan elde edilen kazanımlarının yanı sıra, çoğunlukla kendi mahallelerindeki vatandaşlara sundukları kamu hizmetleri, ciddi oranda şiddet kullanmaya eğilimli olmaları ve otorite arayışları, onlara toplumda bir nevi siyasi güç kazandırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, kartellerin güçlenmesine katkı sağlayan en önemli faktörlerden biri, yasadışı ancak devam eden bir oluşum içerisinde, iç bütünlüklerini korumak ve ekonomik kazanımlarını sürdürmek amacıyla elde ettikleri siyasi güçtür. Bu bağlamda bir yandan kamu hizmetlerinin sunumu yoluyla halk, uyuşturucu kartellerine esir bırakılırken, diğer yandan, kartellerin şiddet içeren ritüelleri ile baskı altına alınmaktadır. Bu durum ise kartellerin nüfus üzerindeki tahakkümünün gelişmesine neden olmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak ortaya çıkan bağlantı göstermektedir ki, devlet, belirli stratejiler yoluyla, kartellerin oluşumunda ve gelişiminde önemli bir rol oynarken, özellikle uyuşturucu karşıtı politika uygulamalarında devlet ve kartel ilişkisini sıklıkla göz ardı ederek hareket etmektedir. Bu durum ise kartelleri daha da güçlendiren ve çoğaltan, bölgeci ve yasakçı stratejilere yol açmaktadır. Meksika'da yaygın olan halk ezgilerinin (corridos) bir alt türü olan ve uyuşturucu tüccarlarının kötü davranışlarının yanı sıra, yüceltilmesini de içeren, İspanyol aşkları olarak adlandırılan 'narcocorridos' üzerine

yapılan literatür taraması ve uyuşturucu savaşı döneminde başlayan kartel mesajları üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, kartellerin alt kültür örüntülerinin, öncelikle yoksulluk temaları etrafında döndüğünü ve asıl amaçlarının ekonomik refah ve rakiplerine karşı bölgesel hegemonya elde etmek olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Siyasi iktidara sahip olmalarına rağmen asıl amaçları, siyasi bir gündeme sahip olmaktan ziyade, yasa dışı ekonomik faaliyetlerini sürdürmektir.

Haliyle, uyuşturucu kartelleri, siyasi örgütler ile karşılaştırıldığında, önemli ölçüde farklı hedefler sergilemekte ve kendilerini ulusa karşı veya herhangi bir siyasi özelleşme içerisinde görmemektedirler. Dolayısıyla toplumdaki siyasi iktidarları, bir 'derin devlet' modelinin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmaktadır. Politika analizinde varılan sonuç, sosyal analizde de ortaya çıkmıştır; uyuşturucu kartelleri, sadece devlete karşı oluşturulmuş bir oluşum değil, devletle birlikte ortaya çıkan bir oluşumdur ancak zamanla kazandıkları siyasi güç, kartellerin devletçi boyutunu da ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, ortaya çıkan uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı alt kültürü, Meksika devletinin, yalnızca karşıtlıklarla karakterize edilemeyeceğini, aslında alternatif bir kültür ile karşı karşıya olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Neticede, kurumsallaşma bu tezin temelini oluşturmaktadır ve çalışmanın çıkış noktasını oluşturan başarısız devlet kavramı, toplumsal analizin temelini oluşturan sosyal dışlanmanın yanı sıra, devletin kurumsallaşamamasının bir belirtisi olarak görülebilir. Bu bağlamda, bu araştırmanın sonuçları Meksika'nın siyasi gelişimi ile sosyal yapısı arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiye işaret ederek, demokratikleşme ve neoliberalizm gibi rasyonel seçime dayalı siyasi eğilimlerin, Meksika'nın toplumsal bağlamıyla nasıl uyum sağlayamadığını ve kurumsallaşma eksikliğiyle sonuçlandığını ortaya koymaktadır. Zamanla, Meksika'daki kartel ve devlet ilişkisini göz ardı eden politika tepkileri, yalnızca DTO faaliyetlerini ortadan kaldırmakta başarısız olmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda her girişimde giderek daha parçalı ve şiddet içeren kartel yapılarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Meksika devletinin kırılganlığı, siyasi alanda sosyal kurumsallaşmadaki eksikliklerin tezahürü olarak anlaşılabilir. Araştırma sonucunda, Meksika devletinin başarısız olduğu kabul edilse de asıl soru temel başarısızlığın belirlenmesi etrafında dönmelidir çünkü bu araştırma, devletin birincil başarısızlığının, karteller ile uzun süreli çatışmanın ortasında, sosyal alanın ihmalinde yattığını öne sürmektedir. Bu nedenle başarısız devletler söyleminde tartışıldığı gibi kartellerin devlete yönelik oluşturduğu tehdidin yeniden incelenmesi gerekmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, siyasi ve sosyal kurumsallaşma süreçlerinin, özellikle başarısız devlet tartışmalarında paralel ve uyumlu olması gerekmektedir. Ayrıca, özellikle güç dinamiklerini etkileyen ancak devlete ve topraklarına doğrudan tehdit oluşturmayan uyuşturucu kartelleri dikkate alındığında, devletin kırılganlığını anlamada sosyal ve tarihsel bağlamları dikkate almanın önemi göz ardı edilmemelidir. Dolayısıyla devletin kırılganlığının kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılması, hem sosyal hem de tarihsel alanları dikkate alarak, istatistiksel veri analizinin yanı sıra etnografik çalışmaları ve tarihsel temelleri de gerektirir.

Ayrıca alt kültür kavramının kullanılması ile toplumsal dışlanma kavramının politik ve ekonomik boyutunun yanı sıra sosyal boyutunun anlaşılması da kolaylaştırılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu araştırma, alt kültürün yalnızca egemen kültüre karşıt olarak ortaya çıkan ve toplumsal uyumu tehdit eden bir oluşum olmadığını göstermektedir. Aksine, Meksika'daki uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı alt kültürü, her ne kadar birincil hedefi olmasa da aslında devletin sosyal açıdan yetersiz kaldığı alanları tamamlamaktadır. Meksika'daki bu alt kültür, devletin kurumsallaşma sürecinde yaratılan belirli siyasi ve ekonomik atmosferlerden kaynaklanan sosyal dışlanmayla baş etme mekanizması olarak hizmet etmektedir. Bu alt kültürde, ABD'ye ve kapitalist sömürüye karşıt kalıplar tespit edilirken, Meksika devletine karşıt bir kalıp gözlemlenmemiştir. Sonuç olarak alt kültürün, politik süreç karmaşıklaştıkça, sosyal dışlanma bağlamında ve sosyolojik temeller altında yeniden incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Ek olarak, belirli kültürel varlıkları sosyal düzeni sürdüren varlıklar olarak ve bu varlıkların dışındaki kültürleri uyum açısından zararlı olarak görmek yerine, bu alt kültürlerin ortaya çıktığı bağlamları, baskın kültürden nasıl etkilendiklerini ve sonrasında baskın kültürü nasıl etkilediklerini araştırmak esastır.

Bu çalışmada, her ne kadar Meksika bağlamında devlet ve uyuşturucu karteli ilişkisi ve Calderon'un uyuşturucu savaşı kapsamında incelenen siyasi yönelimleri açıklanmaya çalışılsa da, günümüzde siyasi ve toplumsal alanın daha geniş bağlamda kurumsallaşması daha ileri düzeyde araştırma soruları doğurmaya devam etmektedir.

Meksika'nın siyasi istikrarı için orduyu kullanan Calderon, bunu yapan ne ilk ne de son başkandır. Meksika'nın şu anki başkanı Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popülist bir yaklaşımla iktidara gelmiş, ülkedeki ötekileştirilmiş topluluklara umut sunmuş ve yerel hegemonyayı yeniden canlandırma motivasyonu ile göreve başlamış olmasına rağmen, başkanlığı döneminde askeri güçleri güçlendirme yönünde attığı

adımlar ile ülkede otoriter eğilimlerin hâlâ devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Üstelik Covid-19 salgını sırasında, yetersiz uygulanan tedbirlerin üzerini otoriter yaklaşımlarla örtbas etmiştir. Bu durum siyasi eğilimlerin devletler tarafından krizlerle ve yetersizliklerle baş etme aracı olarak kullanıldığını ortaya koymaktadır. Meksika devlet liderleri, bugün bile bazı siyasi yaklaşımlarla, başarısızlıklarının, kurumsallaşamamalarının ve toplumsal gerçekliği gös ardı etmelerinin sonuçlarını bastırma eğilimindedirler. Bu bağlamda, özellikle devletlerin aynı anda birden fazla krizle karşı karşıya olduğu bir ortamda, siyasi figürler, otoriterliği nasıl kullanmaktadır? Özellikle, bu durumda popülist yaklaşımın yeri nedir?

Öte yandan, siyasi alanın otoriter yapıları karşısında, toplumsal alan, Orta Amerika'daki suçlu topluluklara karşı yaygın bir sert politika olan mano dura gibi politikalara karşı kendini göstermeye ve bu tutumlarla baş etmeye devam etmektedir. Calderon'un savaş stratejisine yanıt olarak DTO'ların zayıflamadığı, aksine parçalara bölündüğü gerçeği, bu olgunun açık bir örneğini teşkil etmektedir. Ayrıca, Meksika'nın bağımsızlığından bu yana ordunun yanı sıra siyasi gücü barındıran bir diğer kurum olarak kilisenin devam eden etkisi ve halen kartellerin organizasyonu ve sosyal uyumundaki merkezi rolü, gelecekteki araştırma gündemi için önem taşımaktadır. Dolayısıyla toplumsal örgütlenme bu siyasal bağlam içerisinde, günlük yaşamda nasıl ilerlemektedir ve dinin siyaset ile ilişkisindeki rolü nedir? En nihayetinde, siyasi yaklaşımlar, aktörler ve kurumlar dönemsel olarak gerileme ve değişim ile karşılaşırken, toplumsal örgütlenme daima varlığını sürdürmektedir.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ERKOÇ
Adı / Name : Zeynep
Bölümü / Department : Latin ve Kuzey Amerika Çalışmaları / Latin and North American Studies

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): Sociopolitical Analysis of Anti-Drug Policies in Mexico: The Case of Felipe Calderón's Drug War

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☒ **Doktora** / PhD ☐

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