THE ROLE OF EFFICACY, HOPE, URGENCY AND SUBJECTIVE POLITICAL OPENNESS IN BYSTANDER SUPPORT FOR CONFRONTATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF EFFICACY, HOPE, URGENCY AND SUBJECTIVE POLITICAL OPENNESS IN BYSTANDER SUPPORT FOR CONFRONTATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION

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This study examined the factors that influence bystander support for confrontational collective action, a crucial tactic in addressing the climate crisis. While the literature on motivations to join confrontational actions is growing, bystander perceptions remain underexplored. Accordingly, this thesis investigated the role of efficacy, hope, subjective political openness (SPO), and urgency in bystander support for confrontational environmental activism. First, I developed a new multi-item measure to thoroughly assess bystander support. Then, I experimentally manipulated efficacy to determine its impact on support and measured other variables via self-report. The findings revealed that bystander support for confrontational actions was positively related to the perceived urgency of the problem and the efficacy of these tactics and negatively related to the perception of the political context's openness to activism. Additionally, efficacy significantly moderated the relationship between urgency and support, with a stronger positive relationship between urgency and support for individuals in the low efficacy condition. Critically, because manipulation checks indicated that half of the participants did not correctly interpret the core message in

manipulation texts, efficacy manipulation did not consistently achieve its intended effect. Nevertheless, these findings held consistently both when efficacy was defined by experimental group assignment for the 228 participants who understood and agreed with the manipulation and by self-reported efficacy for the full sample of 689 participants, except for a nonsignificant moderation in the latter analysis. Ultimately, this study provides important insights into mobilizing bystander support for confrontational environmental activism tactics and especially highlights the role of context-related factors.

Keywords: *confrontational action, bystander, support, efficacy*

ÖZ

YÜZLEŞMECİ İKLİM EYLEMİNE İZLEYİCİ DESTEĞİNDE YETERLİK, UMUT, ACİLİYET VE ÖZNEL SİYASİ AÇIKLIĞIN ROLÜ

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Bu çalışma, iklim krizinin ele alınmasında önemli bir taktik olan çatışmacı kolektif eylemlere yönelik seyirci desteğini etkileyen faktörleri incelemiştir. Çatışmacı eylemlere katılma motivasyonlarına ilişkin literatür giderek genişlerken, seyircilerin algıları henüz yeterince araştırılmamıştır. Bu nedenle, bu tez, çatışmacı çevre aktivizmine yönelik seyirci desteğinde algılanan yeterlik, umut, öznel siyasi açıklık (SPO) ve aciliyetin rolünü araştırmıştır. İlk olarak, seyirci desteğini kapsamlı bir şekilde değerlendirmek için yeni bir çok maddelik ölçek geliştirilmiştir. Ardından, yeterliğin destek üzerindeki etkisini belirlemek için yeterlik deneysel olarak manipüle edilirken diğer değişkenler öz bildirim yoluyla ölçüldü. Bulgular, çatışmacı eylemlere yönelik seyirci desteğinin, sorunun algılanan aciliyeti ve bu taktiklerin yeterliği ile pozitif, siyasi bağlamın aktivizme açıklığına dair algıları ile negatif ilişkili olduğunu ortaya koydu. Ayrıca sonuçlar yeterliğin, aciliyet ve destek arasındaki ilişkide düzenleyici rol oynadığı ortaya koydu; yeterlik düzeyi düşük olan bireylerde aciliyet ve destek arasında daha güçlü bir pozitif ilişki gözlendi. Ne yazık ki manipülasyon kontrolleri katılımcıların yarısının manipülasyon metinlerindeki ana mesajı doğru yorumlamadığını gösterdiğinden, yeterlik manipülasyonu amaçlanan etkiyi tutarlı bir şekilde sağlamadı. Yine de analizler yeterliğin manipülasyonu anlayan ve kabul eden

228 katılımcı için deneysel grup atamasıyla ve 689 katılımcının tamamı için kendi bildirdikleri yeterlikle tanımlandığı iki durumda da tutarlı tutarlı bulgular gösterdi. Yalnızca tüm katılımcıların dahil olduğu analizlerde yeterliğin düzenleyici etkisi istatistiksel olarak anlamsız bulundu. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, çatışmacı çevre aktivizmi taktikleri için seyirci desteğini harekete geçirme konusunda önemli içgörüler sağlamış ve özellikle bağlamla ilgili faktörlerin rolünü vurgulamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Yüzleşmeci eylem, izleyici, destek, yeterlik*

To those who meet in defiance

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
EFA	Exploratory Factor Analysis
HSEC	Human Subjects Ethics Committee
KMO	Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin
SPO	Subjective Political Openness
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We are confronted with a new "wake-up call" related to climate change each day. From rapidly plunging global wildlife populations (WWF, 2024) to trees and land absorbing almost zero CO2 last year (Ke et al., 2023), the planet has lost its balance. This unpredictable deterioration creates significant risks, especially for those who are from poorer, geographically more vulnerable, and politically dismissive countries (Ngcamu, 2023). Faced with the growing challenges, climate change movements around the globe adopt diverse strategies to mitigate these effects by facilitating action from volunteers, experts, businesses, and government bodies. Particularly, various climate movement organizations implement *confrontational* tactics such as civil disobedience or disruptive and sometimes violent actions to create radical change (de Moor et al., 2020). *Confrontational collective action* is an overarching concept that can accurately describe the interactive and challenging nature of actions diversely categorized as radical, non-normative or violent in literature. These actions are confrontational in the way that they involve direct challenging of the authority or opposing forces, such as police, and carry the risk of escalation in the face of an intervention (Uysal et al., 2024). Although participating in a confrontational collective action may be costly, which makes it harder to recruit new activists to broaden the scope of the movement (DiGrazia, 2013), the strength of such actions comes from the fact that they are conspicuous enough to attract a great portion of public attention. In other words, these provocative actions seek to galvanize public interest and awareness of climate change, encouraging further information-seeking on this issue by drawing bystanders' attention (Sisco et al., 2021). However, greater public awareness also comes with a greater controversy around the morality, necessity, or effectiveness of adopted tactics (Feinberg et al., 2020; Simpson et al, 2018). Since gaining support from the public has

long been recognized as an essential condition for social movements to be successful (Olsen, 1968; Passini & Morselli, 2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), any movement that takes up confrontational tactics faces the task of creating a provoking effect without giving up on attracting support.

Therefore, a key question for such publicly loud actions that aim for radical shifts is how to garner support from the bystanders - the majority who do not join the actions but witness the events and often comment from the sidelines (Neville & Reicher, 2018). Even though the social psychology literature has a rich body of collective action research, the primary focus has been on the motivators of participating in collective action, and the work on bystander support has been relatively scarce. Nevertheless, a growing body of research investigating the participation in confrontational collective action hints at the role of efficacy and hope, arguing that low perceived efficacy of traditional strategies coupled with low hope for a change (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) as well as the high perceived efficacy of confrontational ones (Saab et al., 2016; Uysal et al., 2025) may facilitate participation intentions and the perceived legitimacy of these tactics. Moreover, issue-specific factors, such as how urgent individuals perceive the problem at hand and the broader political context (Uysal et al., 2025), may also be key factors garnering the support of the bystanders. Although previous research often explored the public's varying reactions to (Feinberg et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014) or willingness to participate in (Becker& Tausch, 2015; Jimenez-Moya et al., 2015) collective actions with different tactics, the role played by the specific elements in eliciting these reactions has not been thoroughly investigated. In other words, facilitating bystanders' support by targeting specific setbacks has been an overlooked matter. In this regard, this thesis tests the impact of perceived efficacy and explores the role of hope and urgency related to climate change in bystanders' support for a confrontational collective action. Moreover, factoring in the reflection of the political context of Türkiye on the individuals' beliefs and attitudes, as it is often encouraged in social movement literature (e.g. Smith & Fetner, 2010), the thesis also seeks to explore individuals in Türkiye perceive the government's openness and tolerance to political actions of citizens, i.e, political openness (Saavedra & Drury, 2019b).

1.1. Collective Action Tactics and Bystander Support

1.1.1. Collective Action Tactics

From traditional forms of collective action encompassing peaceful marches and demonstrations to confrontational forms that include riots, sit-ins, and even violence such as vandalism or armed resistance (Wright, 2009), people resort to different methods to make their voices heard. Collective action literature covers this variety of tactics and forms of action to understand the effects or motivations behind the fluctuating strategies people employ. Accordingly, previous work in this area has focused on understanding the psychological factors that may motivate individuals or groups to alter their strategies to be more non-normative (Zúñiga et al., 2023), violent (Orazani & Leidner, 2019), or radical (Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015). A notable work in this area has been done by Tausch and colleagues (2011), who found that individuals' intention to join non-normative collective action was positively related to contempt, whereas it was negatively related to efficacy beliefs. The researchers explained this by suggesting that individuals resort to these tactics when they exhaust other alternatives. Similarly, exploring the difference between these forms of actions and investigating the varying "success" of each has also been an important area of work (Wasow, 2020; Wouters & Walgrave, 2017). For example, Shuman and colleagues (2020) reviewed the different impacts of normative, non-normative non-violent, and non-normative violent actions on individuals' support for certain policies. They have found that non-normative actions can be a powerful tool for social change, particularly when targeting more resistant individuals.

Nevertheless, identifying any collective action as one or another concept is not always straightforward, especially with the abundance of overlapping categories in literature. For example, some studies analyze these tactics under the term "non-normative" and distinguish them as actions that violate the norms of the existing social system (Becker & Tausch, 2015), while others prefer drawing the line at whether the tactic involves violence or not (Orazani et al., 2021). However, the term "non-normative" is difficult to define in different contexts and interactions due to dynamic political norms (Stott & Drury, 2000). Similarly, the violent or radical actions that the activists adopt may not always be preplanned but may have been a last resort or a strategic alternative in

the face of a built-up conflict between the police force and the protestors (Day et al., 2018). Moreover, even the most peaceful demonstration can escalate quickly in politically repressive countries, which forces activists to be ready for any confrontation. In other words, due to the volatility of collective action (Louis et al., 2020), an action could move from one extreme to the other on the continuum from non-violent to violent or from normative to non-normative with changing external factors, given that protestors take the possibility into account. Reflecting on these nuances, Uysal and colleagues (2024) coined the term confrontational collective action to represent the "potential escalation of the intergroup conflict" (p.1386) in various forms of collective actions involving direct, physical oppositions where protestors are aware of the possible physical clash with the police and legal consequences. In this thesis, I am utilizing this conceptual framework to investigate determinants of bystander support for confrontational climate actions.

By publicizing the devastating effects of the climate crisis and concerns about the future, climate change activists aim to raise awareness and pressure all stakeholders to take action (Fabel et al., 2022). In the face of these critical objectives, diverse repertoires of tactics and strategies are being employed, including confrontational ones. Indeed, the new wave of climate action (Kesgin, 2022) initiated by popular figures such as Greta Thunberg and groups such as The Last Generation, Extinction Rebellion, and Stay Grounded, frequently resort to such actions in different contexts, pointing to an emerging trend in the fight against the climate crisis (Moor et al., 2020). Therefore, a significant amount of work in the past few years has been directed toward understanding the effectiveness, motivations, and long-term consequences of such actions for the climate movement. For example, Simpson and colleagues (2022) investigated the effect of the presence of radical factions in the climate change movement on the public's opinion of the movement in general. They have found that when individuals read about the radical actions of any faction, their support of the factions with moderate actions increases, even if those factions' agendas are more radical. This finding supported the positive radical flank effect (Haines, 2013) in the climate change movement, where an extreme wing benefits the movement by leading the audience to support more moderate groups within it. Moreover, the existence of a radical faction was not found to decrease individuals' support for policies related to

climate change (Simpson et al., 2022). Bugden (2020) also suggested that this tactical diversity in collective actions has an advantage when communicating with different political groups to raise awareness about climate change. On the other hand, groups such as Fridays for Future (Amelang, 2023) denounce these confrontational tactics and argue that they decrease the legitimacy of the climate movement. Similarly, some scholars evaluate the radicalization in the climate movement as problematic, risky, conflict-inducing, or potentially diminishing trust among the public (e.g., Molinario et al., 2024; Vuong et al., 2024).

1.1.2. The Significance of Bystander Support

At the heart of these debates and divisions is the significant role of the bystanders' support for the movement. Crowd actions such as protests and marches often occur in public spaces and tell a story to others to argue for a cause or an ideal (Neville & Reicher, 2018). These acts, which are designed to be experienced by an audience (Blee & McDowell, 2012), often prompt the crowd that watches the actions from afar to pick a side while observing (Lipsky, 1968). According to the tripolar model proposed by Mugny (1982), the way for minority groups to promote social change is to validate the problem in the eyes of the societal audience, which holds the power to prevent the authority from preserving the status quo. Turner and Killian (1987) specified this audience as "bystander public" (p. 217), whose flow of daily life is altered by the disorder created by any demonstration or prolonged conflict they become aware of. Bystanders are not directly involved in the grievances of the mobilized activists but are within the reach of their ripple effects. The authors similarly underlined the crucial position these bystanders hold in determining the success of a movement's action and suggested that they shape a consensus on how the demands of the movement should be addressed. Especially with the increasing use of social media as a space for activism, the public can turn into bystanders; easily receive updates about collective actions, watch them repeatedly, and indirectly experience the protests by sharing their personal comments in reaction to these actions (Tufekci, 2017). Since the reactions of the bystanders shape public opinion, they may affect public policies and politicians' campaigns (Burstein, 2003). Likewise, swaying them to one side may also decrease the opposition, prejudice, or indifference toward important issues among the public by

putting it on the agenda (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, as movements build political power, the reaction of the bystanders is one of the central factors that can fuel or inhibit this process (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Similarly, political solidarity theory (Subasic et al., 2008) suggests that the process of social change requires a psychological change in the perception of the majority, where they start regarding the dissenting minority as the ingroup and the protectors of the system, i.e., authority, as the outgroup. This change is possible through a process of persuasion and influencing the social actors in public to facilitate cooperation between them and the minority. There are two aspects to this process of change: first, the majority will begin to support the minority, and second, the majority will actively participate in the struggle against authority and the status quo. Nevertheless, these aspects are interdependent since bystanders who endorse an action have the potential to join the movement in the long run (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). This idea aligns with the elaborated social identity model of collective action (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000), which proposes that social identity may emerge or strengthen as a consequence of one's interaction with a collective action. Although they are not present during the action itself, being involved in the discussions and curating an opinion on the related matters creates a psychological proximity to the issue for bystanders (Thomas et al., 2014), which can trigger the first steps of this identification process. Moreover, getting validation from others during the interaction allows the transition from bystanders to active participants and builds a solid foundation for the movement to grow (Smith et al., 2014; Thomas et al., 2022).

For confrontational tactics, bystander support has a particularly indispensable role (Turner & Killian, 1987). Most of the time, confrontational actions are carried out with more risks (Anwar et al., 2018) and, hence, by small groups of people (Doosje et al., 2024). This makes having a broad impact depend on attracting the support of a wide audience that can provide necessary resources, maintain momentum, and ensure the sustainability of these often demanding actions. Moreover, because of the disruptive effects of these tactics, they can quickly attract the attention of the public and gain bystanders. Some research has begun to explore the links between the specific collective action tactics and bystanders' support. A large portion of the studies

investigating bystander support as a function of action tactics tend to show that non-normative, extreme, or radical actions are not preferred by the bystanders compared to normative ones (Glover & Ozden, 2022). For example, Feinberg and colleagues (2020) showed that bystanders viewed extreme protests as immoral and lowered their identification with and support for the cause. The researchers discussed these findings as indicating a critical dilemma for activists since, along with the risk of losing public support, these actions also have the advantage of raising awareness of the problem quickly and persuading the institutions directly (see Andrews & Caren, 2010). In another study, Simpson and colleagues (2018) found that the use of violent tactics in the collective actions of an anti-racist group was perceived as irrational by the bystanders and reduced their support for the movement while simultaneously increasing their support for a white nationalist group that the movement opposed.

Still, some studies challenge the consistent findings that imply a negative relationship between confrontational tactics and bystander support. There is historical and empirical evidence that, in some contexts, confrontational tactics galvanized support from the public (e.g., Ünal et al., 2022) and helped the expansion of movements (e.g., Enos et al., 2019). For example, Shani and colleagues (2025) found that in the context of animal welfare, non-normative nonviolent tactics, which may be classified as confrontational tactics, garner support from especially resistant bystanders by increasing their constructive disruption perceptions. Ünal and colleagues (2022) found that support for the Kurdish movement's violent collective action may depend on contextual characteristics, such as the position of the observer's group within the specific conflict and how efficient the movement's actions seem. Similarly, Feinberg and colleagues (2020) also conclude their study by highlighting that certain aspects of the action and the political context determine why and when extreme actions are (or are not) supported. Moreover, although there is meta-analytic evidence for the advantage of non-violent actions in garnering support (Orazani et al., 2021), the found effect was small, and there was a significant moderating effect of the context. The researchers also noted that the studies in meta-analyses mostly did not have a control condition, had varying research designs, and all sampled WEIRD populations.

Such inconsistencies strengthen the idea that protest features are not constant characteristics that are interpreted by each person in the public in the same way. Rather, in line with the Framing Theory, bystanders evaluate collective actions using the particular schemas and beliefs that resonate with them among those presented by social movements (Snow et al., 1986). In other words, bystander support is shaped not solely by which tactic is used and how, but also by individuals' perception of the context, activist repertoires, and the problem at hand (Goffman, 1974). Therefore, exploring which beliefs and appraisals influence support for confrontational actions may enable a more holistic framework to approach bystander support.

Another possible reason for this inconsistency may be the lack of systematization in literature when it comes to examining the manifestations of support, which yields an incomplete understanding of its role and the relationship between different tactics. While some scholars approached this concept assuming that it indicates a behavior or behavioral intention, such as participating in collective action for the same cause (e.g., Gutting, 2020; Shuman et al., 2024), others measured it only at the attitudinal level, such as approving violent actions towards police (e.g., Saavedra & Drury, 2019c) or legitimizing the protest (e.g., Jiménez-Moya et al., 2018). These different ways of support may not be displayed simultaneously; thus, measuring support with only one or two questions might not capture its significance. For instance, one may support collective action tactics by expressing approval for the protestors but not necessarily see themselves joining the movement (Feinberg et al., 2020), which may necessitate evaluating participation intentions and more indirect ways of support separately. Therefore, without a framework that clearly defines and examines different forms of support, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between these variables.

These differences in measurements, designs, context, and conceptualizations make drawing a univocal conclusion difficult. Thus, adopting a broader view of the concept of 'support' and studying the individual's perceptions and appraisals that may influence the support of a confrontational tactic by third parties has the potential to add a new dimension to the literature in this field, moving away from the reductionism of only asking "Which activist tactic is the best one?"

1.2. Psychological Factors Influencing Bystander Support

Despite the above-mentioned potential for the beginning of one's activist journey as well as the success of collective action, the focus has been less directed toward understanding the dynamics of bystander support (Andrews et al., 2016; Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019). Instead, collective action participation behavior has become a more popular way for social psychology literature to address and research social change over the last decade. Classical collective action theories have been established and refined to combine different social-psychological perspectives to explain participation with testable models (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Mummendey et al., 1999; Subasic et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2018). From this integrative work, the core antecedents of participation in collective action were identified as politicized identity, group efficacy, and perceived injustices (Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008), which were tested in many studies to predict the intention of joining an action (e.g., Klavina & van Zomeren, 2018; Louis et al., 2019; Saab et al., 2016). It has been repeatedly demonstrated that identifying with a disadvantaged group or a social movement, recognizing the injustices and experiencing emotional reactions to them, and believing in the efficacy of collective action to raise one's voice will motivate people to hit the streets. Within this line of work there is also a rich body of literature related to the action motivations of allies from advantaged groups (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2011). It has been suggested that apart from a strong politicized identity, feeling anger towards the injustices and believing in the effectiveness of their action; having moral motivations are also crucial for allies to act (Radke et al., 2020). Although closely related to bystander support, this line of work distinguishes from it since allyship involves commitment to the social justice efforts with an action orientation (Craig et al., 2020), while bystanders are usually third parties that do not have a strong stance in the issue at hand.

Nevertheless, since bystanders' active participation is the most powerful and concrete form of support, and one of the ultimate goals for activists who address the public (Stern et al., 1999), this vast body of literature potentially provides valuable insights on the topic of support as well. Therefore, while some factors relevant to active participation, such as politicized identification with a movement, might not directly

apply to bystanders, others, like the role of emotions and efficacy, are worth investigating for understanding support. Indeed, the few studies investigating support for collective action in the literature have linked variables like perceived efficacy (Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014) and hope (Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019) to support for collective action. However, the scope of these studies does not extend to examining contextual factors that may influence the public's reactions, especially when it comes to confrontational actions (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Furthermore, almost all investigations into the public support of confrontational collective action assume that the strategic choice of the activists themselves is the primary determinant of support, rather than exploring the conditions under which different strategies gain or lose it.

In light of the extensive theory and research on collective action participation and political solidarity and the few exceptional studies that have examined the antecedents of bystander support, this thesis suggests perceived efficacy, hope, urgency, and subjective political openness as potentially important factors in people's evaluation of collective actions. Thus, it explores the role of these constructs in bystander support for confrontational climate action.

1.2.1. Perceived Efficacy of Confrontational Actions

In collective action literature, collective efficacy refers to the belief in the possibility that a group's joint efforts can overthrow the status quo (Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; Leach & Spears, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Going beyond the objective evaluation of what can be done, this subjective appraisal of the potential success of the action is said to determine individuals' decision to act collectively (Klandermans, 1984). Indeed, studies show that individuals are more likely to engage in collective efforts when they believe in their actions' ability to effectively fulfill the desired change (van Zomeren et al., 2010). Accordingly, efficacy beliefs are one of the pillars of most models of collective action (Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

While its role in motivating action has been extensively studied, the influence of bystanders' perception of collective efficacy on their support has not received much attention. Nevertheless, Bliuc and Chidley (2022) suggest that collective empowering

narratives that emphasize the efficacy of collective actions are able to facilitate support from both activists and non-activist outsiders. Moreover, following the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001), since individuals seek to be consistent in their thinking, witnessing an action being successfully organized must increase their positive attitudes toward it. In other words, perceptions of high political efficacy potentially foster positive attitudes of individuals towards collective actions by rendering the acts politically legitimate. Testing this claim, Jiménez-Moya and colleagues (2018) showed that the efficacy beliefs of Chilean bystanders about ongoing protests carried out by various movements positively predicted the legitimacy they ascribed to those movements. Similarly, when perceived as efficacious, marches prompted bystanders to join the climate change movement (Swim et al., 2019).

In particular, efficacy beliefs are shown to have an important role in influencing individuals' preferences for different collective action tactics. For example, low general efficacy leads individuals to engage in non-normative tactics (Becker & Tausch, 2015). The researchers proposed that since general efficacy represents the efficacy of normative tactics, individuals with low efficacy beliefs might be expected to prefer confrontational tactics if they view these alternatives as more likely to achieve goals. Indeed, Saab and colleagues (2016) tested this hypothesis by conducting two studies to see the influence of efficacy perceptions on individuals' preference for peaceful and aggressive collective actions. They found that when individuals perceive aggressive tactics as effective, they favor aggressive actions over nonviolent ones, even when nonviolent actions' efficacy also seems high. Notably, efficacy is not a one-dimensional concept. Individuals may judge the effectiveness of an action based on its potential to achieve positive political results, to provide a channel to express shared politicized values and aims or they may evaluate it based on the extent to which it strengthens the group's solidarity and cohesion (Hornsey et al., 2006). While the definition and function of efficacy perception can vary, particularly for favoring confrontational actions, previous studies indicate the significant role of political efficacy which is the belief in collective action's ability to achieve intended political goals. For example, Zlobina and Gonzalez's (2018) study showed that citizens perceived non-normative tactics as more effective for protests related to the Spanish socio-economic crisis, which predicted their willingness to participate in these actions.

Similarly, during Occupy Central protests, which was a large-scale civil disobedience in Hong Kong, effectiveness of tactics to reach primary goals of the movement predicted willingness to participate in the protests for the Hong Kong residents (Chan, 2015). These findings highlight the potentially crucial role of political efficacy beliefs in influencing bystanders' views of confrontational tactics. Moreover, they point to the possibility that people may approve or participate in these actions due to diverse motivations, not merely because they see no other viable option.

1.2.2. Issue-Specific Appraisals: Hope and Urgency

The diversity of the problems targeted by confrontational actions leads to diversity in the contextual factors affecting support for these actions. In the case of climate change, while the objective reality of the environmental crisis is undeniable, individuals' subjective appraisals of the issue may play a role in shaping their attitudes toward political struggles targeting climate change. According to the Conversion Theory (Moscovici, 1980), influencing the social majority is a process of creating a cognitive shift through consistent presentation of the arguments. Minority groups that aim this shift are said to fuel social change by leading to "careful processing of issue-related information" (Erb & Bohner, 2007, p. 11). Therefore, contextualized evaluations regarding climate change may be one way for the public to validate the endeavors of this minority group that takes action and to support them. Particularly, the urgency people attribute to the issue of climate change and how hopeful they are about the situation may influence their perspective on the actions taken.

Actors seeking to draw attention to climate change are increasingly framing the situation as a "crisis," an "emergency," or an "urgency" (Wilson & Orlove, 2021). This choice is intended to raise awareness of the risks and time pressure and motivate people to act, expecting a positive relationship between urgency perceptions and demanding or carrying out action (Rooney-Varga et al., 2018). However, the relationship between urgency and climate-oriented action is a complex one (Brügger et al., 2015). Specifically, there is evidence that by making climate change a more proximal issue and facilitating the feeling of potential personal vulnerability, individuals' willingness to change their routine or act upon an issue may be increased (e.g., Reser et al., 2014; Spence et al., 2011). In fact, activists have even put urgency

forward as the motive for undertaking extreme measures (Benford, 1993). On the other hand, studies also found that when the perception of urgency is excessive, individuals may become confused, fearful, and demotivated to act (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Moreover, perceiving climate change as an urgent threat potentially comes with the pressuring feeling that too much sacrifice is needed for individuals to cope with the issue in their personal lives, which may backfire (Gifford, 2011). Nevertheless, because collective actions achieve more impactful outcomes by mobilizing a large number of individuals, they may have higher inherent efficacy compared to individual action (Bushell et al., 2017), and the discomfort that comes with high urgency perception may be alleviated by engaging with this issue on a collective level. Indeed, when individuals face fear-inducing messages that lead them to evaluate a problem with high severity, their collective action intention increases higher than individual action intentions do (Patterson, 2022). Here, by offering a channel for directly demanding immediate action, confrontational collective action may provide an outlet for individuals feeling pressured by the urgency of the environmental crisis. Given the relief this pathway can offer against the pressure of time, individuals might be expected to provide support for action to contribute to collective efforts.

How hopeful one is regarding a movement's intended change may also influence their support for a confrontational action. Hope is defined as a discrete positive emotion that comes with the image of attaining a specific important goal in the future (Bryant & Cvengros, 2004). In the intergroup context, hope plays a significant role. For instance, feeling hopeful about a change in intergroup conflict is suggested to improve one's contact intentions with the outgroup (Halperin et al., 2012). Similarly, Greenaway and colleagues (2014) found that hope positively predicts advantaged groups' support for social change among different intergroup settings, such as native-Dutch participants' willingness to support equality between native-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch groups. For disadvantaged group members, it is closely related to the anticipation of an improved future for one's ingroup as well as the motivation to achieve it (Wright et al., 1990). In their study on the Arab Spring, Pearlman (2013) underlines hope's overlooked role in motivating activists. Likewise, according to Wlodarczyk and colleagues' study (2016), hope for a change in the current political environment amplifies the effects of

efficacy, injustice, and identity on individuals' participation in the 15-M movement in Spain.

Nonetheless, hope can also immobilize individuals, allowing them to emotionally cope with the unwanted situation instead of urging an active struggle (van Zomeren et al., 2019). For example, Hasan-Aslih and colleagues (2018) found that when disadvantaged group members feel hopeful for better intergroup relationships, their collective action intentions decrease. They propose that hope is a complex emotion with both facilitative and inhibitory effects. Studies on climate change action support these claims. For example, optimistic messages that induce hope decrease the risks that individuals associate with climate change (Hornsey & Fielding, 2016). This further reduces discomfort, which is critical for taking action. Similarly, van Zomeren and colleagues (2019) tested hope's function in a climate change context and found that hope for a better future helped individuals emotionally regulate themselves and did not prompt action intention. These findings are parallel to the Coping Theory (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), which suggests that individuals manage stress by adopting problem-focused or emotion-focused cognitive appraisals that either lead them to take action or regulate their emotional response, respectively. In this regard, according to Lazarus (1993), hope is one of these appraisals that has an emotional coping function and may be utilized especially in stress-inducing situations that are resistant to change. Given that climate change is a broad issue with multiple stakeholders, people can get overwhelmed by its scale and utilize hope to regulate themselves.

In contrast, when individuals are in desperate times where a change or improvement seems remote, the emotional experience may motivate them to approve and even take riskier measures (Saab et al., 2016). For example, Wright and colleagues (1990) demonstrated that when disadvantaged group members were convinced that their chance to be included by the advantaged group was low, they strongly preferred non-normative collective action to a normative one. However, despite the extensive literature on hope, the relationship between hope and confrontational tactics is scarcely investigated. The few existing studies provide the first hints of this association. For instance, while investigating political hopelessness, Long (1978) has suggested that

this concept is closely related to violence justification as a means of achieving radical change when individuals find the system lacking. In a more recent study, Shuman and colleagues (2016) looked at the relationship between belief in incremental theories about the world and groups and the intention to participate in collective action. They found that hope, which stemmed from beliefs in incremental theories about the world, positively predicted normative action but not non-normative action. Another exceptional study by Bird and colleagues (2022) found that hope is a context-dependent emotion where, in one subject, hope negatively predicts all kinds of collective action, and in another, it negatively predicts intentions to participate in radical collective action. In the context of climate change, they found that higher levels of hope predicted increased intentions for conventional actions, while the relationship between hope and radical action intentions was not significant. Nevertheless, feelings of despair predicted higher intentions for both kinds of action. Regarding hope's influence on support for confrontational action, literature does not have much to offer. However, studies investigating minority group members' sympathy towards violent radicalization or extremism propose that depressive symptoms act as a mediator between discrimination experience and their sympathy (Rousseau et al., 2019; Emmelkamp et al., 2020). Given that the important role of hopelessness in the beginning and progression of depression is supported by research and theory (Liu et al., 2015), we can interpret that low hope may lead individuals to embrace more confrontational actions. While the limited number of existing studies prevents drawing firm conclusions, what kind of role hope has for bystanders and whether low levels of it increase support for confrontational collective action are important questions to explore empirically.

1.2.3. Political Context

The dynamics of collective action are known to be substantially impacted by sociocontextual factors (Uluğ et al., 2022). The nature of the conflict (Ünal et al., 2022), recent updates (Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020), and the government's responses to the action have been suggested to change both the motivation (Aytaç et al., 2018; Uysal et al., 2022) and the chosen strategies to act (Li et al., 2023; Vollhardt et al., 2020). Previous research particularly highlighted governments' constraints and

aggression towards collective action as a salient factor influencing resistance (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Honari et al., 2018; Uysal et al., 2022). It has been demonstrated that limited opportunities for dissent, violent responses, and heightened risks of action may escalate people's willingness to seek alternative, confrontational strategies (Reicher et al., 2004; White, 1989). For example, investigating participation in a Chilean national movement, Zúñiga and colleagues (2023) suggested that under strong repression, protestors expanded their repertoire to include non-normative strategies and perceived them as self-defense. Similarly, in their recent study, Li and colleagues (2023) found that facing police violence led protestors to moralize non-normative tactics more and perceive them as a strategic choice to achieve their goals.

The social and political landscape in which collective action unfolds influences how the action is perceived and judged from the sidelines as well (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a). Indeed, it is argued that the erasure of these details of the historical or political context from the narrative of the protest makes it difficult for the protest to gain public legitimacy (Harlow & Bachmann, 2023). Accordingly, previous studies have demonstrated potential influences of the political landscape on bystander support (Feinberg et al., 2020; Orazani et al., 2021; Ünal et al., 2022). Particularly for confrontational actions, the role of political context was illustrated by Drury and Reicher's (2018) interviews with protesters of an anti-roadbuilding campaign in London. Their ethnographic study showed that violent responses by police or security officials towards people render protesters' violence acceptable, even for people who had previously argued that violence was unacceptable. Similarly, Earl and colleagues (2003) suggested that observers may sympathize with the protesters if their violent acts are seen to be inflicted by police. Apart from the police's reactions, support for confrontational action was shown to be influenced by perceptions about governments. For example, Thomas and Louis's (2014) study on bystander support for strategically non-violent and strategically violent collective action tactics found that perceived corruption levels of the government lead to higher support for strategically violent tactics. Likewise, in their interviews with British students with no activist experience, Saavedra and Drury (2019a) have demonstrated that when individuals perceive governments' sanctions and restrictions against a protest, they evaluate violent tactics as a legitimate political strategy or even a survival act. Together, these findings show

how third parties' support for confrontational tactics might change due to the dynamics that emerge from political contexts and the authorities' stance in the face of actions.

1.2.4. Legitimacy of the Issue and Activist Identity as Control Variables

Lastly, there are two control variables that this study considers. First, since my aim is to focus on the support for a confrontational action from bystanders from the general population instead of individuals who are already invested in activism, activist identity levels are included as one of the control variables. The literature suggests that, regardless of the activism domain (Louis et al., 2016), individuals with higher activist identity develop a more critical perception of social structure, broader skill sets, and a higher sense of efficacy than the general population, potentially creating a different perspective on social movements and various strategies (Hartley et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2014). Especially since the study focuses on confrontational tactics, which are increasingly used in environmental activism, related ingroup norms may be activated by increasing the identity salience of activists (Blackwood & Louis, 2012). Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the support is not coming from an already high level of willingness due to the individual's activism.

Secondly, an individual's perceived legitimacy of climate change as a problem is a foundational prerequisite for their support for any form of climate action. Prior research shows that climate change denial is a prevalent problem, even in many Global North countries (Painter & Ashe, 2012). It has been suggested that when individuals do not evaluate climate change as a serious problem, additional barriers to individual and collective action are created, which may lead them to discredit any efforts in this direction (Stoll-Kleemann & O'Riordan, 2020). Moreover, the worldview associated with delegitimizing climate change is claimed to create a "reactionary resistance" (Saad, 2018, p. 2), which necessitates considering it as a control variable to accurately assess the role of hypothesized factors.

1.3. The Present Thesis

This thesis aims to address the gap in collective action literature by looking into the factors influencing bystanders' support for confrontational tactics. Importantly, it goes beyond the question of which tactics are more supported and instead highlights the

factors that may impact the bystanders' support for different tactics. Unlike the prevalent stigmatization in the literature implying that confrontational tactics are illegitimate activist choices (e.g., Moskelanko & McCauley, 2009), these tactics are scrutinized in this thesis as important political strategies that may resonate with the public in certain contexts, under certain conditions. I explore individual-level appraisals and beliefs to determine which aspects of an action resonate with bystanders when it comes to confrontational actions and elicit their support. With this approach, the present thesis also goes beyond the existing single-item measures of support and offers a multifaceted conceptualization for this overlooked variable.

Four factors, efficacy, urgency, hope, and subjective political openness are identified as potentially underlying bystanders' support for confrontational action. Based on efficacy's often supported role in motivating collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2009) and recent studies underlying efficacy as a key parameter that determines which tactic to choose (Saab et al., 2016), I expect bystanders' support for confrontational actions to be higher among individuals with higher perceived efficacy of confrontational actions (Hypothesis 1). To test this, individuals' perception of efficacy is experimentally manipulated across three groups: low efficacy, high efficacy, and a control group. Secondly, since perceived urgency about climate change may lead people to resort to direct and assertive measures (Benford, 1993), I expect greater perceived urgency to predict higher bystanders' support (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, due to the "nothing to lose" mentality fueled by low hope (Saab et al., 2016) and hope's emotional coping function (Lazarus, 1993) explained above, I expect a negative relationship between hope and support (Hypothesis 3). Additionally, based on the underlined impact of political context on public support for confrontational tactics (Earl et al., 2003; Feinberg et al., 2020), I expect subjective political openness, which refers to the perception of authority's tolerance for collective action, to predict support for confrontational action negatively (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, based on the idea that the perception of a group's ability to effectively address a problem may influence one's evaluation of a situation as a threat to avoid or a challenge to overcome (Fritsche et al., 2018; Scheepers, 2017), I expect efficacy to moderate the relationship between the other independent variables and support (Hypothesis 5). Accordingly, I expect perceived efficacy to enhance the relationships between urgency and support, such that

the relationship between urgency and support is stronger when efficacy is high (also see Fritsche et al., 2013) (Hypothesis 5a). Moreover, I expect the negative relationship between hope and support to be amplified by perceived efficacy (Hypothesis 5b). Lastly, I expect the negative relationship between SPO and support to hold, especially in situations where individuals perceive their actions as highly efficacious (Hypothesis 5c).

CHAPTER 2

PILOT STUDY

Although the role of third-party support for collective action is recognized (Gulliver et al., 2023; Muñoz & Anduiza, 2019; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Wouters, 2018), there is no agreed definition and measurement of support in previous studies (see Orazani et al., 2021) and no conceptualization that takes into account the multifaceted nature of support. Existing studies tend to rely on single-item measures asking whether participants support the mentioned action (e.g., Brown & Mourão, 2022; Feinberg et al., 2020), which fail to capture the complexity of support (see Pollmanns & Asbrock, 2023). Thus, a comprehensive and reliable measure of bystander support was required. To address this gap, support for a collective action scale is developed through three steps: item generation, theoretical analysis, and psychometric analysis (Morgado et al., 2018).

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants and Procedure

First, to ensure the scale's ability to capture all dimensions of support, items were generated based on semi-structured interviews with 8 volunteers recruited with convenience sampling from my immediate social and academic network. It was a diverse group of university students and older professionals that are from various socio-economic backgrounds. The interviews aimed to identify different ways individuals show their support for certain collective actions. This inductive step was supplemented by reviewing the questions asked by the previous studies researching support (e.g., Kenward & Cameron, 2023; Munoz & Anduiza, 2019; Pollmanns & Asbrock, 2023; Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020). A pool of 11 items was then created from the participants' statements and related literature. To ensure content validity and

confirm that the initial item pool appropriately represented the intended variable (Arias et al., 2014), a qualitative review of the decided items was conducted by seeking input from an expert in the field for theoretical alignment and clarity, which resulted in minor item revisions. Next, an online survey was conducted to ensure the psychometric properties of the items. In this study, participants were first given a list of past well-known collective actions and asked to choose the one they felt the most familiar with. Then, they answered 11 questions measuring their past support for their chosen collective action and 2 questions regarding their participation in it. On average, the survey was completed in 10 minutes.

In total, 116 individuals (59.1% women, 40.9% men; Mage = 36.4) participated in the online study. 43.1% of participants stated they held a bachelor's degree. The mean political orientation of the sample (from a possible range of 1 = left-wing and 7 = right-wing) was 3.04 (*SD* = 1.90), indicating that, on average, participants endorsed a left-leaning political orientation. The majority of the participants chose and reflected on the Gezi Protests (63.8%), followed by Ceasefire Demonstrations for Palestine (15.5%).

2.1.2. Materials

2.1.2.1. Demographic Information Form

Separate questions were asked about participants' age, gender, political orientation, and education.

2.1.2.2. Support for Collective Action

Participants selected one of 10 national (e.g., Gezi Protests, Polonez Workers' Strike) and international (e.g., Ceasefire Demonstrations for Palestine, Yellow Vests Protest) collective action examples (see Appendix B for the full items) provided and then stated their past attitudes and behaviors related to that action using the established 11 items. All items were answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

2.1.2.3. Participation in Collective Action

Two questions were asked to understand individuals' participation in their selected collective action. The items were "I participated in this collective action" and "I contributed to the organization of this collective action" ($r = .54$, $p < .001$), rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 *(strongly disagree*) to 6 *(strongly agree*).

2.2. Results and Discussion

Two I first conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the 11 items using oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .948, indicating that the sample was adequate for factor analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($\chi 2$ (55) = 2578, p <.001), supporting the appropriateness of factor analysis by demonstrating significant correlations between the variables. Principal axis analysis was used for factor extraction, employing Kaiser's criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1. The analysis revealed a one-factor solution that accounted for 83.3% of the total variance (Table 1). The items formed a reliable scale, as shown by excellent Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .98$) and McDonald's omega ($\omega = .98$) values.

Subsequently, reflecting on the limitations of Kaiser's criterion (see Zwick & Velicer, 1986), I also conducted the same analysis by employing parallel analysis for a more rigorous assessment, which interestingly suggested two factors. The first factor included items related to attitudinal support and expressing support, with factor loadings ranging from 0.806 to 1.032. The second factor had items with loadings ranging from .503 to .988 and included items related to behavioral support as well as the item "I supported this collective action". However, the initial eigenvalue for the second factor was only 0.5, and the two-factor solution accounted for a minimal 6.5% of additional variance. Moreover, I observed cross-loadings in two items that made it difficult to identify the second factor. Therefore, by also considering the scree plot that clearly presents a one-factor solution, I concluded that the one-factor solution is the most robust and straightforward representation of the data.

Table 1.

Factor Loadings for Support for Collective Action Scale

	Factor	
	1	**Uniqueness**
1. I find this action justified. (Bu eylemi haklı buluyorum.)	0.951	0.0963
2. I find this action reasonable. (Bu eylemi makul buluyorum.)	0.959	0.0805
3. I find this action meaningful. (Bu eylemi anlamlı buluyorum.)	0.964	0.0704
4. I find this action necessary. (Bu eylemi gerekli buluyorum.)	0.955	0.0880
5. I find this action legitimate. (Bu eylemi meşru buluyorum.)	0.922	0.1497
6. When this action was on the agenda, I expressed my support when it was brought up. (Bu eylem gündemdeyken konusu açıldığı zaman desteğimi belirttim.)	0.964	0.0714
7. When this action was on the agenda, I posted about it on social media. (Bu eylem gündemdeyken sosyal medyada konu hakkında paylaşım yaptım.)	0.829	0.3123
8. When this action was on the agenda, I told people around me about it. (Bu eylem gündemdeyken çevremdeki kişilere bu konuyu anlattım.)	0.918	0.1578
9. While this action was on the agenda, I changed my daily habits and preferences (e.g. boycotting a brand or person). (Bu eylem gündemdeyken günlük hayattaki alışkanlıklarımı ve tercihlerimi değiştirdim.)	0.804	0.3541
10. When this action was on the agenda, I followed the activist groups on social media. (Bu eylem gündemdeyken eylemci grupları sosyal medya üzerinden takip ettim.)	0.817	0.3326
11. When this action was on the agenda, I supported it. (Bu eylem gündemdeyken destekledim.)	0.934	0.1274

Note. 'Principal axis factoring' extraction method was used in combination with an 'Oblimin' rotation.

Next, upon calculating the overall scores of participants on the support scale, I checked the correlations between support, participation experience, and demographic variables. The results are presented in Table 2. The correlations revealed significant relationships between support and participation, gender, and age, where being younger, being a woman, and having participated in the collective action were positively related to support for the action. The correlation coefficient of .49 between support of and participation in the selected collective action demonstrates a moderate effect size, as expected. Overall, the measure accurately and consistently assessed bystander support.

Table 2.

Variable means, standard deviations, normality, and Pearson's correlation coefficients among variables

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Support					
2. Participation	.494***				
3. Political orientation	-.069	-.008			
4. Gender	-.286**	-.136	.062		
5. Age	-.202*	-.126	.051	.091	
M	3.84	2.40	3.04	1.41	36.4
SD	1.89	1.49	1.90	0.49	11.0
Skewness	-0.359	0.988	0.698	-0.376	0.698
Kurtosis	-1.50	-0.062	-0.533	-1.89	-0.585

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

CHAPTER 3

MAIN STUDY

3.1 Method

3.1.1. Participants

I conducted a priori power analysis using G*Power software to determine the required sample size. To detect a small-sized moderation effect ($f^2 = .05$) with .90 power at $\alpha = .05$, 288 participants were required. Nevertheless, a larger sample was recruited to account for potential attrition and exclusion due to failure to meet manipulation check criteria. Participants were recruited using a convenience sampling method via WhatsApp, Facebook groups, and face-to-face by distributing QR codes to individuals and directing them to the survey. I also employed the university research participant pool management system (SONA) to recruit students enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Participants were required to be at least 18 years of age and reside in Türkiye. Initially, a total of 791 individuals participated in the study and were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions equally. However, data from participants who did not view the experimental manipulation (n=85) and those who did not answer any questions (n=8) were excluded. Additionally, 9 participants identified as multivariate outliers with Mahalanobis Distance (Aggarwal 2017) were removed, resulting in a final sample of 689 participants for analysis. The final distribution across conditions was 225 participants in the high-efficacy condition, 233 in the low-efficacy condition, and 231 in the control condition. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 70 ($M = 27.7$, $SD = 10.4$). Participants were primarily women (69.3%) and men (29.4%). Of the 8 participants who selected "other," responses included "genderless" (n=2), "Non-binary" (n=1), "do not define their gender" (n=1), and "do not want to explain" (n=1). The majority of participants were students

(65.5%). The mean political orientation of the sample was 2.84 (*SD* = 1.44) on a scale of 1 (*left*) to 7 (*right*), indicating that, on average, participants demonstrated a left-leaning political orientation. Furthermore, the mean socio-economic status of the sample was close to the midpoint of the 7-point scale (*M* = 3.97, *SD* = 1.20).

3.1.2. Procedure

The ethical approval of the study was obtained from the HSEC at the Middle East Technical University. Besides the newly constructed support for collective action scale (see chapter 4), all the other scales and questions were translated into Turkish for this study. The data collection process was held online via the Qualtrics survey tool from February 2025 to April 2025. After clicking on the study link, participants were directed to an informed consent form. Those who provided consent moved on to the questions measuring legitimacy, hope, subjective political openness, and urgency in the given order. Then, they were randomly assigned to high-efficacy, low-efficacy, or control conditions where they read excerpts describing and evaluating the efficacy of confrontation collective actions. Following the efficacy manipulation and the manipulation check questions, participants moved on to read a fictitious scenario about a planned collective action in Türkiye organized by a climate activist network (see Appendix B), and they filled out the support questionnaire. Lastly, demographic questions were presented alongside the activist identity questions.

3.1.3. Materials

3.1.3.1. Demographics and Activist Identity

Separate questions were asked about participants' age, gender, and the cities they lived in and where they spent most of their lives. Two additional questions were given to measure activist identity. The questions were "How often have you participated in any collective action in the last 2 years?" and "Do you identify yourself as an activist?" ($r = .48$, $p < .001$) rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*definitely no*) to 5 (*definitely yes*).

3.1.3.2. Legitimacy of Climate Change Activism

The perceived legitimacy of climate activism was measured by three questions adapted from Teixeira and colleagues' (2020) study. The questions were “Do you believe that engaging in a political struggle against climate change and global warming is a legitimate/reasonable/justified endeavor?”, rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*definitely no*) to 7 (*definitely yes*). Cronbach’s alpha (α = .82) and McDonald’s omega (ω = .84) indicated good internal consistency.

3.1.3.3. Urgency

Participants answered three questions to report the urgency they associate with the climate change problem. Since there was no previously established urgency scale in the literature at the time, these three questions were created by utilizing a few studies measuring this concept (Bayuk & Patrick, 2021; Brügger, 2020). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each item on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). An example item was “Climate change is the most important problem we face right now.” Cronbach's alpha (α = .78) and McDonald's omega (ω = .83) were found to be in the good range, suggesting acceptable internal consistency.

3.1.3.4. Hope

Hope was measured using the Turkish translation of the 7-item scale developed by van Zomeren and colleagues (2019). An example item was “I don’t expect ever to see climate change addressed. (reversed)”. Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 *(strongly disagree)* to 7 *(strongly agree)*. Cronbach’s alpha (α = .72) and McDonald’s omega (ω = .72) indicated acceptable internal consistency.

3.1.3.5. Subjective Political Openness

To measure participants’ perceptions about the political context’s tolerance and acceptance of collective actions in Türkiye, the Subjective Political Openness scale (Saavedra & Drury, 2019b) was utilized. This scale has two dimensions, government openness and police repression, and consists of 8 items. Although the authors

encouraged adapting the original SPO scale in more repressive climates, the political atmosphere in Türkiye, with frequent detentions (e.g., Buyuk, 2025), may induce caution in expressing dissenting opinions about the government, even in an anonymous survey. Particularly, direct translations of some reversed items raised concerns that respondents may find it risky to indicate how much they agree with some statements and therefore may not give honest answers. Hence, to minimize potential participant apprehension, a few modifications were made to the wording of the items. Especially the original scale items that directly mentioned the "current government" were replaced with more general phrasing to mitigate potential concerns and obtain more honest opinions. An example item from the scale was "In our country, those who participate in protests are labeled as criminals (reversed)". All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *never* (1) to *always* (7). The internal reliability was excellent, indicated by Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .94$) and McDonald's omega ($\omega = .95$). To test the two-factor model of the original scale, I conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis using principal axis factoring. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.82, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($\chi^2(28) = 125.43$, $p < .001$). Contrary to the original scale, a single-factor solution was revealed and explained 52.9% of the variance.

3.1.3.6. Efficacy

Efficacy was manipulated by giving paragraphs describing confrontational collective actions and their use, especially in the context of climate change, and providing information about their efficacy. All groups read an excerpt describing a confrontational collective action related to climate change. The excerpts were identical in their initial description of confrontation collective action but differed in their portrayal of its effectiveness. The high-efficacy group read an excerpt emphasizing the positive outcomes and impact of the action, while the low-efficacy group read an excerpt emphasizing the negative outcomes and lack of impact. For the control group, this part indicated that it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of these actions. The full text of the excerpts is available in Appendix B.

3.1.3.7. Support for Collective Action

Bystander support was measured using the novel, 10-item scale, as outlined in the pilot study section. The ninth item in the original scale was omitted since, in this context, there was no call or need to change habits in daily life, which would make the item irrelevant for the collective action. For this study, bystander support refers to the positive orientation towards and the intention to provide advocacy for the collective action by individuals who are not directly involved. While the positive orientation includes holding favorable attitudes and beliefs about the action, recognizing its legitimacy, and agreeing with its goals, intentions of advocacy encompass behavioral forms of support such as publicly defending activists or expressing solidarity online. An example item from the scale was "I would express my support whenever this action is brought up." All items were on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The items showed a reliable internal consistency indicated by excellent Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .94$) and McDonald's omega ($\omega = .95$) values. Moreover, I conducted EFA with principal axis factoring and Oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .945, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant, $\chi 2\ (45) = 5197$, $p < .001$. One factor solution was offered again based on Kaiser's criterion of eigenvalues, which explained 64.5% of the variance.

3.1.3.8. Manipulation Checks

Two manipulation check questions were included in the study. One question was to make sure that the participants understood the given paragraph, and the other was to see whether they agreed with the information provided to them. The questions were: "According to the text you have just read, what can be said about the efficacy of Confrontational Collective Action?" and "What do you think about the efficacy of Confrontational Collective Action?". The following three response options were presented: "Confrontational collective action has a high/low potential to bring about a positive outcome," and "It is not possible to say anything clear about the potential of confrontational collective action to bring about a positive outcome."

3.2. Results

To understand the roles of efficacy, hope, urgency, and SPO as predictors of support for a confrontational collective action, four sets of analyses were utilized. First, I conducted preliminary analyses to provide an initial overview of the data. These analyses included manipulation checks, descriptive statistics, and correlations between the continuous variables. Then, I conducted a One-Way ANOVA for differences in support for collective action across the low, high, and control efficacy conditions to test Hypothesis 1. To test the remaining hypotheses, I conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with legitimacy and activist identity as control variables and efficacy as the moderator. Lastly, exploratory analyses were employed and reported at the end.

3.2.1. Preliminary Analyses

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3. Bivariate correlations revealed a pattern of positive relationships among legitimacy, activist identity, hope, urgency, and support for collective action. Conversely, subjective political openness (SPO) exhibited negative correlations with all of these variables except hope, indicating that higher levels of SPO were associated with lower levels of legitimacy, activist identity, urgency, and support. The normality assumption was met for all continuous variables except legitimacy, indicated by kurtosis and skewness values falling between -1.5 and +1.5, a criterion recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). However, given the large sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and considering that broader kurtosis acceptance criteria are cited in the literature (e.g., Brown, 2006; Kline, 2010), the legitimacy variable was also deemed sufficiently normal.

Next, I checked if efficacy was successfully manipulated. To check whether the manipulation was understood correctly by the participants, their ability to correctly identify the main argument in the text they read was examined. Overall, a substantial portion of the participants (52.2%, 322 out of 617) failed this first attention check. Then, to examine whether the rate of manipulation failure changed among different efficacy conditions, a chi-square test of independence was conducted. The results

revealed a statistically significant association between the efficacy conditions and the ability to pass the manipulation check, $\chi 2(2) = 20.4$, $p < .001$.

Table 3.

Variable means, standard deviations, normality, and Pearson's correlation coefficients among variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Legitimacy						
2. Activist Identity	.160***					
3. Hope	.223***	.096*				
4. Urgency	.392***	.091*	.217***			
5. SPO	-.257***	-.209***	.020	-.192***		
6. Support	.342***	.350***	.158***	.430***	-.436***	
Possible range	1 - 5	1 - 5	1 - 5	1 - 5	1 - 5	1 - 5
M	4.17	2.06	3.46	3.98	1.95	3.65
SD	0.79	0.88	0.58	0.72	0.69	0.84
Skewness	-1.12	-0.120	0.858	-0.600	-0.509	-0.545
Kurtosis	1.80	0.289	0.601	0.369	0.305	0.340

Note. $*p < .05$. $**p < .01$. $***p < .001$

A notable pattern emerged where the incorrect answers among participants in the low efficacy condition were higher (41.57%) than in the high efficacy (30.07%) and control conditions (28.16%). Next, their answers to the second manipulation check, where they were asked to report their perceived efficacy, were checked to see if they matched their allocated conditions. The results showed that only 36.9% of participants' answers matched their manipulation condition, whereas for most of the participants, the manipulation condition did not match their perceived efficacy. Therefore, in all subsequent analyses involving the manipulated efficacy variable, participants who

failed these manipulation questions were excluded to mitigate potential confounding effects.

3.2.2. Main Analysis

Following this exclusion, I conducted a One-Way ANOVA analysis to determine the differences in support for collective action across different perceived efficacy levels among 228 participants who correctly identified the main argument of their assigned text (efficacy) and who agreed with it. The results revealed a significant main effect of efficacy condition on support for collective action, $F(2, 218) = 17.6$, $p < .001$. Post hoc test using Bonferroni correction indicated that there is a significant difference in support between the Low Efficacy condition ($M = 3.18$, $SD = 0.929$) and the High Efficacy ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 0.658$), $t(218) = 5.88$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.996$, and Control conditions ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 0.852$), $t(218) = -3.95$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.671$. However, the difference between the latter two conditions was not significant, $t(218) = 2.05$, $p = .126$. Overall, the analysis demonstrated that perceiving the efficacy of confrontational collective action to be low leads to decreased support for the action for bystanders, compared to when its efficacy was perceived as high or uncertain. This finding provides the initial support for Hypothesis 1.

Subsequently, to test the independent and interactive effects of efficacy, hope, subjective political openness (SPO), and urgency on support for collective action, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Findings are presented in Table 4. Since efficacy had three categories, I first created two dummy variables by choosing the low efficacy condition as my reference group. In the first model, control variables, legitimacy and activist identity were entered into the analysis. The model was significant, $F(2, 215) = 19.5$, $p < .001$, and explained 14.6% of the variance in support (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.146$). Both legitimacy, $b = 0.292$, $SE = 0.072$, $\beta = 0.254$, $t(215) = 4.01$, $p < .001$, and activist identity, $b = 0.269$, $SE = 0.064$, $\beta = 0.266$, $t(215) = 4.20$, $p < .001$, significantly and positively predicted support for collective action. In the second step, the main effects of hope, urgency, SPO, and efficacy were added to the model after centering each variable to prevent multicollinearity in the third step. Including these variables significantly improved the model fit, $\Delta R^2 = 0.224$, $F(5, 210) = 15.08$, $p < .001$. This model was significant, $F(7, 210) = 18.2$, $p < .001$, and explained

35.6% of the variance in support (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.356$). In the second model, urgency ($b = 0.355$, $SE = 0.077$, $\beta = 0.289$, $t(210) = 4.64$, $p < .001$) and SPO ($b = -0.329$, $SE = 0.073$, $\beta = -0.26$, $t(210) = -4.52$, $p < .001$) significantly and positively predicted support for collective action. Moreover, it was shown that both high efficacy ($b = 0.501$, $SE = 0.129$, $\beta = 0.279$, $t(210) = 3.88$, $p < .001$) and control conditions ($b = 0.429$, $SE = 0.122$, $\beta = 0.238$, $t(210) = 3.53$, $p < .001$) predicted higher levels of support compared to low efficacy conditions. Activist identity also remained a significant predictor ($b = 0.136$, $SE = 0.059$, $\beta = 0.135$, $t(210) = 2.29$, $p = .023$). However, legitimacy ($p = .234$) and hope ($p = .332$) yield nonsignificant results in this model. Results from this step supported Hypotheses 1,3, and 5.

Finally, in the third step, the interaction terms between efficacy and the other predictor variables were added to the model. This addition resulted in a small but significant improvement in model fit, $\Delta R^2 = 0.023$, $F(3, 207) = 2.66$, $p = .049$. The third model was significant, $F(10, 207) = 13.8$, $p < .001$, and explained 37.1% of the variance in support (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.371$). Among the interaction terms, only the interaction between high efficacy (vs. low) and urgency significantly predicted support for collective action ($b = -0.380$, $SE = 0.159$, $\beta = -0.149$, $t(207) = -2.39$, $p = .018$). However, contrary to Hypothesis 2a, the direction of the interaction effect was negative, suggesting that the positive effect of urgency on support for collective action was weaker in the high efficacy condition compared to the low efficacy condition. Moreover, the interactions between high efficacy and SPO and high efficacy and hope did not significantly predict support for collective action and failed to provide support for Hypotheses 2b and 2c.

3.2.3. Exploratory Analysis

A supplementary analysis was conducted using participants' self-reported perceived efficacy, which was used as a manipulation check. Although more than half of the participants failed this test and were removed from the main analyses, their answers to the manipulation check still represent their efficacy perceptions. Therefore, analyzing the relationship between efficacy and support by employing an approach that reflects participants' initial subjective beliefs will provide an alternative perspective.

Table 4.

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis on Support

		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients					
Model	Variable	*b*	*SE*	*β*	*p*	*Adj. R²*	*ΔR²*	*F*	*p*
1						0.146		19.5	< .001
	Legitimacy	0.292	0.072	0.254	< .001				
	Activist Identity	0.269	0.064	0.266	< .001				
2						0.356	0.224	15.8	< .001
	Legitimacy	0.085	0.071	0.074	.234				
	Activist Identity	0.136	0.059	0.135	.023				
	Urgency	0.355	0.077	0.289	< .001				
	Hope	0.083	0.086	0.056	.332				
	SPO	-0.329	0.073	-0.26	< .001				
	Efficacy_High	0.501	0.129	0.279	< .001				
	Efficacy_Control	0.429	0.122	0.238	< .001				
3						0.371	0.023	2.66	< .049
	Legitimacy	0.087	0.071	0.076	.221				
	Activist Identity	0.143	0.059	0.142	.016				
	Urgency	0.313	0.078	0.253	<.001				
	Hope	0.065	0.086	0.044	.450				
	SPO	-0.301	0.073	-0.237	<.001				
	Efficacy_High	0.560	0.130	0.313	<.001				
	Efficacy_Control	0.425	0.121	0.236	<.001				
	Urgency*Efficacy_High	-0.380	0.159	-0.149	.018				
	Hope*Efficacy_High	-0.068	0.185	-0.022	.713				
	SPO*Efficacy_High	0.175	0.151	0.067	.249				

Note. Low Efficacy was the reference group for the dummy-coded variables Efficacy_High and Efficacy_Control. Hope, Subjective Political Openness, Urgency, Efficacy_High and Efficacy_Control were mean centred prior to analysis.

Accordingly, a hierarchical regression was conducted following the same three-step procedure outlined earlier (Table 5). In this analysis, self-reported perceived efficacy, rather than manipulated efficacy, was entered as a predictor after dummy coding the levels. The first model, where legitimacy and activist identity were entered as predictors, was significant, $F(2, 585) = 76.0$, $p < .001$, and explained 20.4% of the variance in support (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.204$). Both legitimacy ($b = 0.322$, $SE = 0.041$, $\beta = 0.322$, $t(585) = 7.90$, $p < .001$) and activist identity ($b = 0.287$, $SE = 0.036$, $\beta = 0.287$, $t(585) = 8.08$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted support. In the second model, urgency, hope, SPO, and efficacy, represented by two dummy-coded variables, were entered into the analysis. This addition significantly improved the model fit, $\Delta R^2 = 0.201$, $F(5, 580) = 39.41$, $p < .001$. The second model was significant, $F(7, 580) = 57.0$, $p < .001$, and explained 40% of the variance in support (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.40$). In the second model, SPO ($b = -0.362$, $SE = 0.041$, $\beta = -0.362$, $t(580) = -8.841$, $p < .001$) and urgency ($b = 0.332$, $SE = 0.042$, $\beta = 0.332$, $t(580) = 7.940$, $p < .001$) significantly and positively predicted support. Moreover, support for collective action was significantly higher among participants reporting perceived efficacy both as high ($b = 0.308$, $SE = 0.075$, $\beta = 0.308$, $t(580) = 4.097$, $p < .001$) and ambiguous ($b = 0.216$, SE = 0.070, $\beta = 0.216$, $t(580) = 3.093$, $p = .002$) compared to those reported having low perceived efficacy. Nevertheless, hope was not a significant predictor in this model either, $p = 0.319$.

The third step with interaction terms was significant, $F(10, 577) = 40.1$, $p < .001$, although it did not significantly improve the model fit, $\Delta R^2 = 0.002$, $F(3, 577) = 0.795$, $p = .497$. All predictors that were significant in previous steps remained significant in this final model, while none of the interaction terms significantly predicted support.

Table 5.

Results of Exploratory Hierarchical Regression Analysis on Support

		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients					
Model	Variable	b	*SE*	*β*	*p*	*Adj. R²*	*ΔR²*	*F*	*p*
1						0.202		76.2	< .001
	Legitimacy	0.322	0.041	0.295	< .001				
	Activist Identity	0.287	0.036	0.302	< .001				
2						0.400	0.201	39.41	< .001
	Legitimacy	0.103	0.040	0.094	.010				
	Activist Identity	0.202	0.032	0.212	< .001				
	Urgency	0.332	0.042	0.283	< .001				
	Hope	0.050	0.050	0.034	.319				
	SPO	-0.362	0.041	-0.302	< .001				
	Efficacy_High	0.308	0.075	0.174	< .001				
	Efficacy_Ambiguous	0.216	0.070	0.126	.002				
3						0.400	0.002	0.79	.497
	Legitimacy	0.109	0.040	0.099	.007				
	Activist Identity	0.205	0.032	0.215	<.001				
	Urgency	0.332	0.042	0.283	<.001				
	Hope	0.052	0.050	0.035	.305				
	SPO	-0.354	0.042	-0.296	<.001				
	Efficacy_High	0.302	0.076	0.172	<.001				
	Efficacy_Control	0.214	0.070	0.125	.002				
	Urgency*Efficacy_High	-0.086	0.088	0.035	.330				
	Hope*Efficacy_High	0.012	0.105	0.004	.991				
	SPO*Efficacy_High	0.111	0.090	0.044	.219				

Note. Low Efficacy was the reference group for the dummy-coded variables Efficacy_High and Efficacy_ Ambiguous. Hope, Subjective Political Openness, Urgency, Efficacy_High and Efficacy_ Ambiguous were mean-centred prior to analysis.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

A notable trend in recent years in climate activism has been the escalation of confrontational tactics, such as blocking roads and airports ("Protesters block Farnborough Airport over expansion plans" 2025), disrupting exhibition openings (Sutton, 2014), and raiding natural heritage sites ("Stonehenge covered in powder paint by Just Stop Oil protesters", 2024). This phenomenon has prompted a growing body of work in the social psychology literature on the motivations behind such tactics and their consequences. While some scholars argued that different underlying mechanisms play a role in motivating confrontational activism (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), others pointed out that the confrontational tactics belong to a wide array of strategic decisions that work hand in hand with other actions taken by the activist and hence, have similar psychosocial bases. Nevertheless, whatever the motivations behind resorting to these tactics, it is evident that they elicit certain, often intense, reactions in the audience witnessing the collective actions (Andrews & Caren, 2010). Understanding how these tactics generate reactions and in which cases they are able to gain the support of the audience is a relatively under-researched topic that this thesis aimed to address. With this aim, this thesis moved beyond the question of which tactic will attract more support, arguing that bystanders' schemas and perceptions related to the issues, political contexts, and efficacy of the solution can determine the extent to which a specific tactic is supported. In this regard, an initial pilot study was conducted to develop and validate the support scale. Then, the role of efficacy, hope, urgency, and subjective political openness (SPO) in bystander support was investigated in the main study. I particularly manipulated the efficacy perceptions of the participants based on the idea that confrontational tactics are strategic choices that are legitimized and moralized when they have the potential to work in favor of the movement (Uysal et al., 2025). In contrast, the other variables were measured via self-report.

Firstly, the novel support scale emerged as a reliable and valid single-factor measure. A robust conceptualization of support for collective action was limited in literature, therefore, this new measure provides an important resource for further studies in this field. Although few previous studies have investigated support by distinguishing active vs. passive (Paul, 2010) or attitudinal vs behavioral (Pollmanns & Asbrock, 2023), my analyses in both the pilot and main study yielded a single-factor structure for support. This divergence could be attributed to the lack of empirical studies that directly examine whether these categories differ in each context. Similarly, it could also be explained by the differences in the demographic characteristics of the participants or to the specific operationalization of support in this scale development process. For example, unlike this measurement, past studies have included the intention to participate in collective action as a behavioral support (e.g., Pollmanns & Asbrock, 2023). Notably, however, in the pilot study, although a considerable positive relationship between support and participation in collective action was evident, the fact that the correlation does not approach values that would indicate that the two measurements address the same construct indicates that we are not relabeling and measuring action but rather capturing a distinct concept.

Regarding the effect of efficacy, my manipulation did not achieve its intended effect across all participants. Half of the participants failed to correctly identify the efficacy framing conveyed in the text corresponding to their assigned condition. One reason for the high rate of incorrect responses may be due to the length of and the detail included in the information presented. Since manipulation was implemented through texts that define confrontational actions and mention their potential to reach specific goals, participants may have experienced information overload. While there are previous studies that have successfully experimentally measured the role of efficacy using text-based manipulations of similar length (e.g., Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; Jugert et al., 2016), the fact that this study was specifically targeted at the general public and that topics such as activism or confrontational tactics may be less familiar to them may have led them to read a text on this topic less carefully. To ensure the validity of further analyses involving efficacy, I excluded people who could not correctly identify the content of the manipulation text and/or disagreed with the idea of efficacy given in the text. Although this strategy reduced the sample size, it enabled

a more thorough assessment of the role of efficacy in support among participants who understood and agreed with the message.

After excluding these individuals, different efficacy conditions were examined to assess whether there were differentiated effects on support for collective action. While the high efficacy condition did not significantly differ from the control condition in terms of support, the low efficacy condition resulted in significantly less support compared to both the high efficacy and control conditions. This finding suggests that the manipulation was effective in reducing support for collective action for participants who understood the tactics were not efficacious. Notably, the fact that the only difference in support is when the efficacy is perceived as low and there is a lack of distinction between the high efficacy and control groups indicates that the high efficacy text may not have sufficiently increased efficacy perceptions beyond a neutral baseline or what the control conditions' ambiguous text implied. Alternatively, introducing and giving examples about confrontational tactics may have been perceived as promoting them and led people to recognize but underestimate the evidence that these tactics were not efficacious. Since people are prone to confirmation bias, where they avoid ambiguous information and are more likely to focus on one alternative hypothesis at a time (Nickerson, 1998), it is possible that the control condition did not operate as intended. The presence of similar experiments in the literature, where control and high efficacy conditions do not significantly differentiate (e.g., Urbiola et al., 2025), suggests that confirmation bias may indeed pose a systematic threat to the interpretation of control in such experimental designs.

Nevertheless, low efficacy perceptions leading to lower support for the action provide initial support for the first hypothesis by demonstrating that as long as they are aware of the potential of confrontational actions to achieve certain goals successfully, individuals support them. This finding complements the established models of collective action, which highlight efficacy beliefs as a key motivator for people to participate in collective action (e.g., Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2010). It also further supports the previous studies that suggest efficacy beliefs as an important factor in determining people's attitudes towards confrontational action (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Saab et al., 2016; Zlobina & Gonzalez, 2018). The observed differences

in support intentions among low and high efficacy conditions strengthen the idea that confrontational tactics are perceived and employed as a deliberate, strategic choice that is favored based on their own efficacy by activists (see Uysal et al, 2025), a principle that appears to extend to bystanders observing these actions as well.

After examining the experimental manipulation of efficacy and its immediate consequences, subsequent analyses sought to address the roles of hope, urgency, and political context, alongside efficacy, in shaping support for collective action. According to the Conversion Theory (Moscovici, 1980), society's perspectives on subject-related matters influence their stance on social change efforts. Following this notion, for the support of confrontational climate action, how urgent a problem they see climate change to be and how hopeful they are for a better future in terms of climate change were examined as two relevant appraisals. The results revealed that urgency positively predicts support for confrontational collective action, which aligns with Hypothesis 2. Given that the urgency of the threat has been a prominent motivational factor for activists using confrontational tactics (Benford, 1993) and a deliberate framing choice to present their strategies to the public (Hulsman, 2022), this finding indicates a shared underlying logic where bystanders, like activists, view urgency of the threat as a valid basis for adopting confrontational approaches.

In contrast, the results revealed that hope did not significantly predict support despite a significant positive correlation between these variables; hence, I could not find support for Hypothesis 3. Moreover, the direction of the initial relationship was contrary to my expectations. This finding necessitates a further evaluation of the role of hope in supporting confrontational collective action. My initial hypothesis was grounded in the Coping Theory (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), which underlies its emotional coping function, where individuals manage stress-inducing events by feeling hopeful about the trajectory or the consequences of a situation. Therefore, I expected this psychological buffer effect of higher hope to enable individuals to manage distress by focusing on potential positive outcomes and lead to lower levels of perceived need to resort to confrontational strategies. Although this aspect of hope is evidenced by studies investigating its role in participating in collective actions for climate change as well (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2019), my results do not point to such

a straightforward relationship. The non-significant regression results indicate that hope does not independently have a predictive role in support, but instead, the positive relationship observed in the correlations is likely to be explained by the joint effects of other variables included in the analysis. For example, since hope was significantly and positively related to urgency, once urgency's significant, hope's unique contribution may have vanished in the regression analysis.

The lack of evidence for a significant direct relationship between hope and support for a confrontational action suggests that the function of hope is complex and requires a more fine-tuned investigation. Indeed, there is growing evidence on hope having a conditional effect on action, which may similarly operate for eliciting support as well (e.g., Marlon et al., 2019; Ojala, 2023). For example, Bury and colleagues (2020) found that in the context of climate change, hope acts as a motivational source for action when an improvement is seen as probable but not when it is perceived as likely. Moreover, this facilitating role of hope only holds for those who are more invested in the problem of climate change, but not with individuals who have low personal investment. Adding another layer, Wenzel and colleagues (2024) pointed out a possible shift in hope's content and function according to the temporal distance. The researchers found that in situations where a positive outcome is imagined in the near future, hope is related to the perceived likelihood of achieving a positive outcome, whereas for more distant futures, the desirability and significance of that outcome becomes central. This means that a general measure of hope that does not differentiate specific components of perceived likelihood or desirability of the outcome might not consistently predict immediate action or support for specific tactics. For example, for a long-term issue such as climate change, if participants harbor hope for the near future by evaluating a solution as likely without recognizing the necessities of a desirable distant future, this hope may not translate into support for collective action. The conflicting results in the literature on the role of hope and the few other studies that did not find a relationship between hope and action (e.g., Simpson et al., 2021) support these arguments and imply the need for specificity in measures of hope as well as considering interaction effects when investigating this issue.

Another possibility that is worth considering is that hope may not be the most prominent factor in determining support, particularly for confrontational collective action. Although in some previous studies, lower hope was associated with higher intentions to participate in climate action (van Zomeren et al., 2019) and was found to predict approval of riskier measures (Saab et al., 2016); despair, instead of hope may be more suitable concept to capture this effect of apprehension. Different from hope, despair can be characterized by uncertainty, frustration, and not being able to imagine a positive future (Sällfors et al., 2003) and it is suggested to "flatten political possibilities and generate political withdrawal" but "also sometimes wrenches open new political horizons, alternative visions of what is to be done and how to do it" (Gould, 2024, p. 88). One noteworthy study that empirically tests despair's role in motivating confrontational action found that inducing despair in individuals leads them to endorse radical actions more by reducing hesitations toward these tactics (Bird et al., 2024). From this perspective, despair may drive support for confrontational tactics while low levels of hope might not be associated with a preference for these tactics.

Concerning the role of SPO, first of all, the study demonstrated that SPO, which was developed quite recently (Saavedra & van Zomeren, 2019b), is an appropriate measure for measuring political repression in the Turkish context. The findings are consistent with the recent literature suggesting that collective action strategies may vary in response to the political context, in particular to the attitude of the police and governments towards citizens' mobilization (Drury & Reicher, 2018). The significant negative relationship between SPO and support for a collective action supported the Hypothesis 4 and may be explained by the prevailing rationale in prior research, which posits confrontational tactics as morally justified and strategically necessary in the face of repression and state violence (Li et al., 2023; Zúñiga et al., 2023). The fact that support for confrontational tactics increases with people's recognition of political repression suggests that the mutual radicalization that is likely to result from the government's prohibitionist and violent stance (Moghaddam, 2018) does not create public antipathy towards activist groups. Moreover, SPO being the strongest predictor of support in the exploratory analysis reflects its foundational role in redrawing the boundaries of what is legitimate and acceptable in the eyes of the bystanders.

Beyond the direct effects of issue-specific appraisals, political context, and efficacy on support for confrontational collective action, I also hypothesized three interaction effects. I expected efficacy to moderate the relationships of hope, urgency, and SPO with support by enhancing each variable's influence on support in the same direction. However, none of the interaction effects were found to be statistically significant in the expected direction, meaning that there is no evidence supporting Hypothesis 5. Only the interaction effect between urgency and high efficacy condition was significant, but unlike expected, the positive effect of urgency on support for collective action was smaller in the high efficacy condition compared to the low efficacy condition. This finding is surprising given that efficacy is consistently suggested to have an amplifier role for the effect of risk appraisals on action in previous studies (Marlon et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2013). For example, in their meta-analysis, Peters and colleagues (2013) found that when individuals recognize that they are facing a threat, they will act upon it only when they also perceive high efficacy in their action. Researchers explained this effect by highlighting the anxiety or stress that heightened urgency creates and suggested that perceiving a potential in their actions to make a difference serves as a relief. Following on that point, one explanation for the contrasting results I have found may be the fact that the perception of the urgency of bystanders does not elicit the same anxiety or stress for bystanders since they have already been informed that some groups are taking on this action. Supporting this idea, for example, Shepherd and Kay (2014) showed that when individuals view governments to be highly competent about a crisis such as climate change, their interest in the issue lowers. In contrast, especially for the participants in the low efficacy condition, urgency may have been a compensatory factor that overrides the doubts related to the efficacy or risks of these actions due to the threat they perceive. This indicates a complex interaction between risk appraisals, such as urgency, with specific tactical efficacy beliefs to shape support of bystanders instead of a simple additive relationship. Nevertheless, interpreting these results requires caution because this interaction effect between urgency and efficacy was only evident in the main analysis. In the following exploratory analyses, where self-reported efficacy was examined, this relationship was not significant, although the power was higher.

Furthermore, as the other interaction relationships were not significant, efficacy did not seem to enhance or buffer the effect of hope and SPO on individuals' willingness to support confrontational collective action. While there are studies in the literature that found a significant interaction effect between hope and efficacy (Cohen-Cohen & van Zomeren, 2018; Troy et al., 2024) and political repression and efficacy (Acar & Uluğ, 2022, Study 2; Messange & Nzekaih, 2022) on collective action intentions, the fact that this dissertation explores bystander support may have led to differing results. For example, a low SPO may require a belief in the ability of an action to have an impact in a political context with such risks and pressures, whereas supporting an action by others may be a moral imperative rather than a personal cost-benefit assessment. For hope specifically, the fact that we did not find an independent effect of hope, and the potential underlying reasons for this, as discussed above, may have prevented finding an interaction effect with efficacy.

4.1. Strengths and Significance of the Study

In summary, the contributions of this dissertation are threefold. Firstly, by diving deeper into the construct of bystander support, it contributes to a relatively overlooked area in political psychology literature. For social change to take place, activists' efforts must reach out to the general public and create a cognitive shift (Moscovici, 1980). Therefore, for a social movement or faction to succeed, they must secure the support of bystanders who watch their actions from the sidelines (Subašić et al., 2008). While some of the previous studies recognized this necessity (e.g., Selvanathan & Jetten, 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014), the content of support has never been explored in depth before. Through a process of combining deductive and inductive approaches as advised (see Morgado et al., 2018), this dissertation established a new measure that captures both the theoretical background and the public's understanding of the concept. Although my main focus was on support for confrontational collective action, since the measure of support was developed without a sharp distinction between confrontational and non-confrontational collective action, it is possible to draw a general conclusion about the concept of support from the results of this study. The theoretical approach underpinning this decision is that different tactics are not mutually exclusive, but rather exist within a strategic continuum (Uysal et al., 2025).

Theoretically, this study defined support as a distinct construct separate from participation intention, and underlined support as a single, unified construct rather than embodying conceptually distinct types as sometimes suggested in the literature (see Paul, 2010). Therefore, this dissertation took the first steps to clarify and expand the literature on a vital but understudied concept.

Secondly, the conclusion that support is structurally different from intention to participate is followed by the possibility that some of the factors and mechanisms that affect intention to participate may not apply to bystander support. In fact, in this study, not only did no relationship emerge between hope and support, but I also found that the urgency-efficacy interaction effect on support was in the opposite direction to its effect on participation intention. Moreover, unlike prior studies investigating the relationship between political repression and action intentions, which have yielded conflicting results (Adra et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2024) and reported only small direct effects (Ayanian et al., 2021), our study found a moderate to high direct relationship between SPO and support. Perhaps this may be because the risk-taking assessment may elicit different emotions and inconsistent motivations for the participants (see Honari & Muis, 2021), while such an assessment is not relevant for bystanders. Nevertheless, perceived efficacy, a critical factor that predicts participation intentions (van Zomeren et al, 2010), arose as a prominent motivator for support as well. These findings point to the need for an approach to studying the antecedents of support that goes beyond the frameworks proposed by collective action participation theories. As one of the very few empirical studies to date, this study provides crucial early evidence for this framework by contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the contextual and psychological conditions that motivate support for collective action.

Lastly, although previous studies suggested certain protest characteristics as motivating or hindering public support (Feinberg et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014), by adopting a contextualized approach, my findings demonstrate that protest attributes, especially the tactics used, aren't judged in isolation. Results indicate that perceived necessity, usefulness, and legitimacy of different tactics are profoundly influenced by individuals' perception of efficacy and their appraisal of the broader contextual or issue-specific factors. For instance, an individual acutely aware of climate change's

urgency, who believes in the efficacy of confrontational tactics, and recognizes the state repression in their country, will likely give different levels of support for such actions compared to someone perceving lower urgency in the issue, having skepticism about these tactics, and believing they live in a highly democratic environment. Therefore, premises about the existence of a universal disfavor towards confrontational tactics among the public that prevail in the few studies in this field (e.g., Orazani et al., 2021; Thomas & Louis, 2014) did not hold up. Instead, this dissertation challenged this view and complicated the public receptivity to diverse strategies of collective action.

4.2. Limitations and Directions for Further Studies

Nevertheless, this dissertation is not without limitations. Firstly, the main study represents a specific climate change action in Türkiye that may limit how broadly we can apply the findings to other collective action settings. Specifically, since climate change action does not inherently involve intergroup conflict, as struggles over ethnicity, social class, or gender do, it may not require the same criteria as other social movements when seeking bystander support. Especially in intergroup settings, since most of the bystander group is likely to consist of members of the advantaged group, tactics that have a large impact, such as confrontational ones, may be perceived as more threatening by this group (Selvanathan, 2019; Teixeira et al., 2020). Therefore, the specific mechanisms proposed in this study may operate differently or depend on additional contextual factors when applied to collective action for direct intergroup conflicts. Further research may explore these by evaluating new factors related to the intergroup context in combination with the factors proposed in this thesis, and can test and enhance the generalizability of these dynamics.

Secondly, the collective action plan that was presented to the participants posed another limitation. The fictitious nature of the collective scenario led to an assessment of people's estimation of their support for future action. This prevented me from measuring the extent to which they supported an action they naturally witnessed, relying on their self-reported willingness instead. This limits the scope of this dissertation by not allowing potential effective factors, such as how the action is presented in the media (Garg & Rai, 2023), to organically determine bystander

support. Therefore, ecological validity is compromised. However, it is also possible that bystanders do not approach the scenario as a blank slate when evaluating a possible new action plan. Rather, their estimates of support may be shaped by the biases created by the media frames and narratives to which they are constantly exposed during prior protests (see Arpan et al., 2006; Proust & Saldana, 2022). Additionally, the use of this fictitious protest may have led to similar disconnections in other measurements too. For example, regarding SPO, I collected people's opinions on the general response to protests in the country, rather than their perceptions of the response of the police and government during a specific protest they had experienced. While a general perception of political openness is inherently contextual at the micro-level since individuals' understanding of government and police tolerance towards protests is shaped by their direct and indirect observations of real-world events and societal narratives, a direct assessment of their perceptions within the context of this specific protest was not the exclusive focus in this study. Therefore, for future research, capturing bystanders' organic reactions, observations and support right after the collective action takes place would be one of the promising avenues to contribute to this area.

Another critical limitation of this thesis is related to the comprehension of efficacy manipulation. Since efficacy was a central variable for the study, the fact that more than half of the participants could not identify the message of the manipulation text given to them is problematic. This failure may be because the text seems long or the topic seems complex and difficult to understand. In addition, since some of the participants came from the university SONA system, they may not have felt accountable to follow the study attentively as they completed the study in return for a bonus point. My approach to carry out related analyses by excluding the participants who failed to determine the efficacy idea in the texts risks limiting the generalizability of the findings to individuals who can accurately process such experimental cues or who are willing to do so. Future studies could avert this risk by making manipulation more engaging and effective by using videos and photos for efficacy manipulation. Studies may also prefer to conduct this experiment in a lab environment instead of carrying it out as an online study, which may reach fewer participants but would also help people focus better and increase participant retention. Additionally, the

manipulation focused on influencing individuals' perceptions about the tactics' potential to effectively reach certain success, in other words, political efficacy. Therefore, conclusions to be drawn from the results of this study about the relationship between efficacy and support for confrontational action are limited to this scope.

Moreover, since the role of SPO and urgency was tested cross-sectionally, I cannot conclude directional causality based on the findings. For example, although I suggest the perceptions of SPO and urgency as two important antecedents of support, it may be possible to hypothesize that these perceptions may have increased due to an initial predisposition to support among bystanders. It is therefore necessary to test and consolidate the insights provided by this thesis using longitudinal designs or experimental manipulations of these variables.

Lastly, although this study underlines aforementioned variables in determining bystander support theoretically, it is crucial to acknowledge that the selected variables did not fully account for the variance in support. This suggests that there are further possible factors to integrate into the model to fully capture the bystander support. For example, system justification tendencies, which motivate people to internalize, uphold, and defend the existing social and political structure (Jost et al., 2004), may be one reason for people not to support specifically a confrontational collective action. System Justification Theory suggests that individuals hold on to the status quo since it fulfills their need for order, predictability, and safety (Jost et al., 2017). Therefore, activist groups that try to raise their voice to change this very system are likely to evoke disapproval from the public (Diekman & Goodfriend, 2007). For example, in a study conducted in Germany and the US, participants with lower system justification were found to give higher support for social change, while their political ideology only influenced the content of this social change (Liekefett & Becker, 2022). Particularly, since confrontational actions operate by disrupting the existing order, and they carry the potential to escalate (Uysal et al., 2024), they must be even less desirable for the bystanders with higher system justification tendencies. For example, Jost and colleagues (2011) found system justification to have a stronger negative association with willingness to join a disruptive collective action than a non-disruptive one. By

investigating whether this effect is also present in bystanders' motivations for support, future studies could expand our understanding of antecedents of bystander support.

4.3. Practical Implications

The results propose several practical implications for authorities, activists, and policymakers. First, for authorities, the results indicate that suppressing dissent with harsh measures may increase audience support for the confrontational actions intended to be prevented and create a cycle that fuels tension instead of alleviating it. Moreover, following the Framing Perspective (Snow et al., 1986), which suggests the necessity of signaling resonances between the meaning behind the actions and the bystanders' understandings by facilitating certain schemas, the results offer important aspects to highlight that may enhance support when it comes to confrontational actions. For example, regarding political repression, the results show that the state's prohibitive stance does not discredit activists' confrontational strategies in the eyes of the public; on the contrary, it encourages them to give support. This underscores that for activists in repressive political environments, communicating the repression they experience to the public is a strategy that can be utilized to build strong support when resorting to confrontational tactics. In light of these findings, it is also important for campaigners, activists, and media outlets supporting social movements to emphasize high efficacy and high urgency when presenting confrontational strategies to the public in order to garner support. Of course, when the audience learns about these strategies from biased media outlets, it may be difficult to communicate a high sense of efficacy (Klandermans, 2014). In these cases, they should shape their campaigns in light of our results, highlighting that urgency will have a much more critical impact for those with low perceptions of efficacy. Lastly, building on the results showing the differentiation between support and intention to participate, the message to bystanders that they can also participate in social change by providing support from the margins, and that this is a desired and critical resource for activists, can make this motivation more salient and reduce the passivity of those with low intention to participate. bystander support.

4.4. Conclusion

Collective action literature is rich with many models and theories that explain the participation of individuals in collective action. These models are also increasingly applied to explain the preference of different tactics. However, the fact that confrontational tactics, especially in environmental activism, have become a hot topic of public debate has raised the question of when bystanders will show support for these tactics. To answer this understudied question, I first developed a new measure with multiple items to assess bystander support thoroughly. Then, I examined the role of 4 variables, namely efficacy, hope, urgency and SPO. The findings contributed to the emerging literature on bystander support by showing that their willingness to support confrontational collective action was associated with a perception of high urgency, strong belief in the tactic's efficacy, and perception of a less open political context for activism.

Throughout this thesis I have challenged the idea that the use of a particular tactic will have a uniform effect on bystander support. The findings suggested that contextual and issue-specific appraisals as well as subjective beliefs related to the action may indeed shape what is acceptable, legitimate and necessary in the eyes of the public and may motivate them to show support accordingly. This contextual framework that was adopted herein for examining bystander support lay down the marker for future research. Especially studies conducted in different collective action contexts and those with longitudinal designs will enhance our understanding of the mechanism underlying bystander support. Importantly, studies along these lines will prevent confrontational tactics from being treated as a taboo to be avoided in all situations and will allow us to examine how these tactics are strategically used by social movements to achieve success without stigmatizing them.

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
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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE



UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
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21 OCAK 2025

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Banu Cingöz Ulu

Danışmanlığını yürüttüğünüz Ece Sezen Bağcı'nın ***"Bystander Support for Confrontational Climate Activism: The Role of Hopeand the Perception of Urgency, Efficacy and Political Openness"*** başlıklı araştırmanız İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek **0070-ODTUİAEK-2025** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır
Bilgilerinize saygılarmla sunarım

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN
Başkan

İZİNLİ
Prof.Dr. İ. Semih AKÇOMAK
Üye

Doç. Dr. Ali Emre Turgut
Üye

Doç AKIR

Dr. ge GÜNDÜZ
Üye

B. MATERIALS

Pilot Study Collective Action Examples

Kolektif eylem insanların bir değişim yaratmak amacıyla bir araya gelerek taleplerini duyurmak veya kamuoyunu bilinçlendirmek için gerçekleştirdikleri çeşitli faaliyetleri kapsar. Protesto, yürüyüş, grev, imza kampanyaları kolektif eylemlerden en sık karşımıza çıkanlardır.

Aşağıda Türkiye'de veya dünyada gerçekleştirilen bazı kolektif eylemler verilmiştir. Lütfen bu seçeneklerin içinden aşina olduğunuz bir tanesini seçiniz. Bir sonraki soruyu seçtiğiniz eylemi baz alarak cevaplamanız gerekmektedir. Bu seçenekler tanıdık gelmiyorsa veya daha önemli bulduğunuz bir kolektif eylem varsa kendi örneğinizi de yazabilirsiniz.

- Gezi Parkı Eylemleri (Türkiye)
- Black Lives Matter Eylemleri (ABD)
- Polonez Direnişi (Türkiye)
- 8 Mart Feminist Gece Yürüyüşü (Türkiye)
- Sarı Yelekliler Protestosu (Fransa)
- Fridays For Future İklim Değişikliği Protestoları (Almanya başta olmak üzere Avrupa)
- Kayyum Protestoları (Türkiye)
- Filistin için Ateşkes Protestoları (Dünya Geneli)
- Çayırhan Maden İşçileri Grevi (Türkiye)

Pilot Study Support Scale and Participation Questions

1. Bu eylemi haklı buluyorum.
2. Bu eylemi makul buluyorum.
3. Bu eylemi anlamlı buluyorum.
4. Bu eylemi gerekli buluyorum.
5. Bu eylemi meşru buluyorum.
6. Bu eylem gündemdeyken konusu açıldığı zaman desteğimi belirttim.
7. Bu eylem gündemdeyken sosyal medyada bu eylem hakkında paylaşım yaptım.
8. Bu eylem gündemdeyken çevremdeki kişilere bu eylemi anlattım.
9. Bu eylem gündemdeyken günlük hayattaki alışkanlıklarımı ve tercihlerimi değiştirdim. (Örneğin, bir markayı veya kişiyi boykot etmek.)
10. Bu eylem gündemdeyken eylemci grubu sosyal medya üzerinden takip ettim.
11. Bu eylem gündemdeyken desteklerim.
12. Bu eyleme katıldım.
13. Bu eylemi organize edenler arasındaydım.

Demographic Information Form and Activist Identity Questions

Yaşınız: _____

Cinsiyetiniz: o Kadın o Erkek o Diğer /Kendim tanımlamak istiyorum

Yaşamınızın büyük bölümünü nerede geçirdiniz?
o Köy/ Kasaba o İlçe o İl o Büyükşehir

Öğrenci misiniz?
o Evet
o Hayır

Öğrenciyseniz şu anda devam etmekte olduğunuz eğitim düzeyi nedir?
o Ön Lisans

o Lisans
o Yüksek Lisans
o Doktora

Öğrenci değilseniz en son tamamladığınız eğitim düzeyi nedir?
o İlköğretim
o Ortaoğretim
o Lise
o Ön Lisans
o Lisans
o Yüksek Lisans
o Doktora

Annenizin eğitim seviyesi nedir?
o Okuma yazma bilmiyor
o Okuma yazma biliyor fakat eğitim almadı
o İlkokul mezunu
o Ortaokul mezunu
o Lise Mezunu
o Meslek yüksekokulu mezunu (2 yıllık)
o Lisans mezunu (4 yıllık)
o Lisansüstü mezunu

Babanızın eğitim seviyesi nedir?
o Okuma yazma bilmiyor
o Okuma yazma biliyor fakat eğitim almadı
o İlkokul mezunu
o Ortaokul mezunu
o Lise Mezunu
o Meslek yüksekokulu mezunu (2 yıllık)
o Lisans mezunu (4 yıllık)
o Lisansüstü mezunu

Lütfen politik olarak yakın olduğunuz yeri aşağıda belirtilen aralıkta bir sayıyı işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sol						Sağ

Gelir seviyenizi nerede görüyorsunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Çok düşük					Çok Yüksek	

Kendinizi ne kadar muhafazakar olarak tanımlarsınız?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Oldukça az					Oldukça	Fazla

Kendinizi ne kadar inançlı olarak tanımlarsınız?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Oldukça az					Oldukça	Fazla

Son 2 yıl içerisinde ne sıklıkta herhangi bir kolektif eyleme (yürüyüş, bildiri okuması, oturma eylemi vs.) katıldınız?

1	2	3	4	5
Hiç	Nadiren	Bazen	Sık sık	Çok sık

Kendinizi aktivist olarak tanımlar mısınız?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle Hayır						Kesinlikle Evet

Legitimacy Questions

(Teixeira et al., 2023)

Aşağıdaki ifadeler iklim krizi ile ilgili yürütülen politik mücadele ile ilgili düşüncelerinizi ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen her bir maddeyi dikkatlice okuyup

1’den (Kesinlikle Hayır) 5’e (Kesinlikle Evet) kadar derecelendirilmiş ölçek üzerinde ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

1. İklim değişikliği ve küresel ısınmaya karşı politik bir mücadele yürütmenin meşru bir çaba olduğuna inanıyor musunuz?
2. İklim değişikliği ve küresel ısınmaya karşı politik bir mücadele yürütmenin makul bir çaba olduğuna inanıyor musunuz?
3. İklim değişikliği ve küresel ısınmaya karşı politik bir mücadele yürütmenin haklı bir çaba olduğuna inanıyor musunuz?

Efficacy Manipulation

Text Body

Günümüzde birçok kişi, dünyadaki adaletsizlikler ve sorunlarla mücadele için protesto, grev, yürüyüş gibi kolektif eylemlere başvuruyor. Bazıları, dikkat çekmek için alışılmışın dışında taktikler de kullanabiliyor. **Dikkat toplamak amacıyla günlük hayatın akışını bozacak şekilde yapılan radikal ve çarpıcı protesto taktiklere Yüzleşmeci Kolektif Eylemler denir.**

Özellikle iklim değişikliği konusunda yapılan eylemlerde bu taktikler sıklıkla kullanılıyor. Örneğin, eylemciler uçakların karbon etkisine dikkat çekmek için uçuşların gecikmesine sebep olacak şekilde havaalanında oturma eylemi yapabiliyorlar. Ya da bir fabrikaya izinsiz giriş yaparak duvarlarına yazdıkları sloganlarla işleyişi yavaşlatan organizasyonlar düzenleyebiliyorlar. Bu tür eylemlerde aktivistler polis ile karşı karşıya kalabiliyor, gözaltına alınabiliyor veya gruplar arasında arbede yaşanabiliyor.

High Efficacy Condition

Son çalışmalar bu tür taktiklerin, kolektif eylemlerin daha geniş kitlelere ulaşmasını ve sosyal medya kanallarında gündem olmasını sağlayabildiğini gösteriyor. Bu sayede

çevre ve iklim krizi ile ilgili önemli meselelerde yetkililerin kararlarını etkileyebilecek bir kamuoyu yaratılabiliyor. Örneğin 2019 yılında İngiltere'de çevreci bir grup, sanat müzesi Tate'in bir petrol firması olan BP ile olan kurumsal sponsorluğuna son vermesi için serginin açılışını basarak ses getiren bir protesto yaptı. Bu izinsiz düzenlenen protesto sayesinde şirketin sponsorluğunun kaldırılması sağlandı. Eylem kamuoyunda büyük yankı uyandırdı ve kısa sürede sonuç verdi. Özetle bu tür dikkat çekici eylemler, klasik yöntemlerin ötesine geçerek daha fazla insanı etkileyebilir ve çevre sorunlarına çözüm bulunmasına yardımcı olabilir.

Low Efficacy Condition

Günümüzde sık görmeye başladığımız yüzleşmeci taktikler sosyal medyada ses getirse de, sosyal hareketler için yeterli ve net bir pozitif etki sağlayamadıkları görülüyor. Güncel çalışmalar yüzleşmeci eylemlerin kamuoyunun dikkatini çekse de uzun vadede toplumsal bir yarılmaya neden olabileceğine ve toplumda tepkilere yol açabileceğine işaret ediyor. Örneğin, bazı eylemlerde yüzleşmeci taktikler kullanıldığında, sosyal medyada sadece olayın kendisi konuşuluyor, eylemin esas amacı olan iklim değişikliği gündemden düşüyor. Özetle, son dönemlerde yüzleşmeci taktiklerin kullanıldığı eylemleri inceleyen çalışmalar, bunların toplumsal hareketler adına net bir pozitif etkisinin olmadığına işaret ediyor. Aksine sosyal hareketlerin amacına ve toplumdaki imajına zarar verebilecek kutuplaşmalar yaratabiliyorlar.

Control Condition

Yüzleşmeci eylemler, günümüzde birçok ülkede çeşitli sosyal hareketlerde sıklıkla görülmekte. Örneğin İngiltere'de Extinction Rebellion (Yok Oluş İsyanı) adlı küresel çevre hareketinin, 2019 yılında köprüleri işgal ettiği protestosu sonrasında bu taktikler gündemde yer aldı. Bu protestoda aktivistler köprülerin üzerine oturarak trafiği durdurmuş ve geçişleri engellemişti. Gösterinin amacı ulaşım sektöründeki karbon salınımına dikkat çekmek ve hükümeti fosil yakıtlar konusunda harekete geçmeye zorlamak idi. Bu tür eylemlerin işe yarayıp yaramadığı konusundaki tartışmalarsa henüz bir sonuca ulaşılabilmiş değil. Zira, eylemlerin gerçekleştiği bağlam, kullanılan taktikler, hedef kitle, sosyal medyanın rolü gibi birçok faktör sonuçları etkileyebiliyor. Bu nedenle, yüzleşmeci eylemlerin etkililiği konusunda net bir yargıya varmak zor.

Hope Scale

(van Zomeren et al., 2019)

Aşağıda iklim değişikliği ve olası çözümleriyle ile ilgili birtakım ifadeler verilmiştir. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyup 1'den (Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum) 5'e (Kesinlikle Katılıyorum) kadar derecelendirilmiş ölçek üzerinde her bir ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

1. Çevreye faydalı olacak politikalar konusunda umutluyum.
2. Belirli şartların oluşması ve tüm temel meselelerin çözüme kavuşturulması halinde, iklim değişikliğinin başarılı bir şekilde ele alınabileceğini düşünüyorum.
3. İklim değişikliğine yönelik politikaları hayata geçirme çabalarının umutsuz olduğu çok açık.
4. Çevreyi iyileştirmeye çalışmaktan vazgeçmeliyiz, çünkü bu imkansızdır.
5. İşler kasvetli görünse de, iklim değişikliğiyle mücadele konusunda umudumu kaybetmiyorum.
6. Çevre politikalarının yürütülmesinde umudun gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorum.
7. İklim değişikliğinin çözüme kavuşturulduğunu görmeyi hiç beklemiyorum.

Subjective Political Openness Scale

(Saavedra & Drury, 2019)

Lütfen aşağıda verilen ifadeleri ülkemizin mevcut durumunu düşünerek 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz.

1 2 3 4 5

Hiçbir Zaman Her zaman

1. Ülkemizde vatandaşların protesto yoluyla siyasi görüşlerini ifade etmesi desteklenir.
2. Ülkemizde yürüyüş ve eylemlere katılım engellenir.
3. Ülkemizde insanların gösterilere katılarak hoşnutsuzluklarını dile getirmeleri desteklenir.
4. Ülkemizde protestolara katılanlar suçlu olarak damgalanmaktadır.
5. Ülkemizde eylemcilere kim olduğu fark etmeksizin şiddet uygulanmaktadır.
6. Ülkemizde protesto düzenlemek zordur çünkü gösteriler anında polis saldırısına uğrar.
7. Ülkemizde yapılan protesto ve yürüyüşlerde polis eyleme katılanların demokratik haklarını korur.
8. Ülkemizde bir protestoyu dağıtmak için polis şiddete başvurur.

Urgency Questions

Aşağıdaki ifadeler iklim krizini ne ölçüde acil bir sorun olarak gördüğünüzü ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyup 1'den (Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum) 5'e (Kesinlikle Katılıyorum) kadar derecelendirilmiş ölçek üzerinde her bir ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

1. İklim değişikliği şu anda karşı karşıya olduğumuz en önemli sorundur.
2. İklim değişikliği konusunda hiç vakit kaybetmeden harekete geçilmesi gerekiyor.
3. İklim değişikliği oldukça acil bir problemdir.

Confrontational Collective Action Scenario and Support Scale

Anadolu Nefesi İklim Ağı, Türkiye'deki termik santral, hidroelektrik santral (HES) ve maden projelerinin olumsuz etkilerine dikkat çekmek ve projelere karşı çıkmak için haziran ayında ülke genelinde eş zamanlı protesto eylemleri düzenlemeyi planlıyor.

Grup, projelerin uygulandığı bölgelerde ve bu bölgelere giden yollarda toplu nöbet eylemleri yaparak çevredeki tüm trafiği durdurmayı hedefliyor. Aynı zamanda alanda çadırlar kurarak bu alanların yaşam alanı olduğunu hatırlatmayı amaçlıyor. Alanda çalışan tüm iş makinelerini durduracaklarını ve alanlara giriş çıkışları engelleyeceklerini de belirten eylemci grup olası polis müdahalesi ve gözaltına karşı hukuki destek alacaklarını, bu tür durumlara hazırlıklı olduklarını da duyurdu.

Yapılması planlanan bu eyleme dair düşüncelerinizi anlamak istiyoruz. Lütfen detaylarını okuduğunuz eylem planını düşünerek her bir maddeye ne ölçüde katıldığınızı 1 (Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum) ile 5 (Kesinlikle Katılıyorum) arasında bir sayıyla belirtiniz.

14. Bu eylemi haklı buluyorum.
15. Bu eylemi makul buluyorum.
16. Bu eylemi anlamlı buluyorum.
17. Bu eylemi gerekli buluyorum.
18. Bu eylemi meşru buluyorum.
19. Bu eylemin konusu açıldığı zaman desteğimi belirtirim.
20. Sosyal medyada bu eylem hakkında paylaşım yaparım.
21. Çevremdeki kişilere bu eylemi anlatırım.
22. Eylemci grubu sosyal medya üzerinden takip ederim.
23. Bu eylemi desteklerim.

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Kolektif Eylem Taktikleri

Her gün iklim değişikliğiyle ilgili yeni bir "uyarı" ile karşı karşıyayız. Küresel yaban hayatı popülasyonlarının hızla azalmasından (WWF, 2024) geçen yıllarda ağaçların ve toprağın neredeyse sıfır CO2 emmesine kadar (Ke et al., 2023), gezegenimiz dengesini kaybetmiştir. İklim değişikliği aktivistleri, iklim krizinin yıkıcı etkilerini ve geleceğe dair endişeleri kamuoyuna duyurarak, farkındalığı artırmayı ve tüm paydaşları harekete geçmeye zorlamayı amaçlamaktadır (Fabel ve ark., 2022). Bu kritik hedefler karşısında, sivil itaatsizlik ve bazen şiddet içeren eylemler gibi yüzleşmeci olanlar da dahil olmak üzere çeşitli taktik ve stratejiler kullanılmaktadır (de Moor ve ark., 2020). Yüzleşmeci, literatürde radikal, norm dışı veya şiddet içeren olarak çeşitli şekillerde sınıflandırılan eylemlerin etkileşimli ve zorlu doğasını doğru bir şekilde tanımlayabilen genel bir kavramdır. Yüzleşmeci, literatürde radikal, norm dışı veya şiddet içeren olarak çeşitli şekillerde sınıflandırılan eylemlerin etkileşimli ve zorlayıcı doğasını doğru bir şekilde tanımlayabilen genel bir kavramdır. Bu eylemler, otoriteye veya polis gibi karşıt güçlere doğrudan meydan okuma içermesi ve müdahale karşısında tırmanma riski taşıması bakımından yüzleşmeci niteliktedir (Uysal ve ark., 2024). Nitekim, Greta Thunberg gibi popüler figürler ve The Last Generation, Extinction Rebellion ve Stay Grounded gibi gruplar tarafından başlatılan yeni iklim eylemi dalgası (Kesgin, 2022), farklı bağlamlarda sıklıkla bu tür eylemlere başvurarak iklim kriziyle mücadelede ortaya çıkan yeni bir eğilime işaret etmektedir (de Moor ve ark., 2020). Bu kışkırtıcı eylemler, iklim değişikliğine ilişkin kamuoyunun ilgisini ve farkındalığını artırmayı ve seyircilerin dikkatini çekerek bu konu hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinilmesini teşvik etmeyi amaçlamaktadır (Sisco ve ark., 2021). Ancak, kamuoyunun farkındalığının artması, benimsenen taktiklerin meşruluğu, gerekliliği veya etkinliği konusunda daha büyük tartışmalara da yol açmaktadır (Feinberg ve ark., 2020; Simpson ve ark., 2018). Bu nedenle, son birkaç yılda, bu tür eylemlerin iklim hareketindeki rolü, motivasyonları ve uzun vadeli sonuçlarını anlamaya yönelik önemli miktarda çalışma yapılmıştır. Örneğin, Bugden (2020), kolektif eylemlerdeki

bu taktiksel çeşitliliğin, iklim değişikliği konusunda farkındalık yaratmak için farklı siyasi gruplarla iletişim kurarken bir avantaj sağladığını öne sürmüştür. Öte yandan, Fridays for Future (Amelang, 2023) gibi gruplar bu yüzleşmeci taktikleri kınamakta ve bunların iklim hareketinin meşruiyetini azalttığını savunmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, bazı akademisyenler iklim hareketindeki radikalleşmeyi sorunlu, riskli, çatışmaya yol açan veya halkın güvenini azaltma potansiyeli olan bir durum olarak değerlendirmektedir (ör. Molinario ve ark., 2024; Vuong ve ark., 2024).

Seyirci Desteği

Bu tartışmaların ve bölünmelerin merkezinde, seyircilerin harekete verdikleri desteğin önemli rolü yer almaktadır. Protestolar ve yürüyüşler gibi kitlesel eylemler genellikle kamusal alanlarda gerçekleşir ve bir amaç veya ideal için başkalarına bir hikaye anlatır (Neville & Reicher, 2018). Bir izleyici kitlesi tarafından deneyimlenmek üzere tasarlanan bu eylemler (Blee & McDowell, 2012), genellikle eylemleri uzaktan izleyen kalabalığın gözlemlerken bir taraf seçmesine neden olur (Lipsky, 1968). Mugny (1982) tarafından önerilen üç kutuplu modele göre, azınlık gruplarının sosyal değişimi teşvik etme yolu, otoritenin statükoyu korumasına engel olma gücüne sahip olan toplumsal izleyicinin gözünde sorunu geçerli kılmaktır. Seyircilerin tepkileri kamuoyunu şekillendirdiğinden, kamu politikalarını ve politikacıların kampanyalarını etkileyebilirler (Burstein, 2003). Bu nedenle, hareketler siyasi güç oluştururken, seyircilerin tepkisi bu süreci besleyen veya engelleyen merkezi faktörlerden biridir (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Bununla birlikte, bir eylemi destekleyen seyirciler uzun vadede harekete katılma potansiyeline sahiptir (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).

Yüzleşmeci taktikler için seyircilerin desteği özellikle vazgeçilmez bir role sahiptir (Turner & Killian, 1987). Çoğu zaman, yüzleşmeci eylemler daha fazla risk taşır (Anwar et al., 2018) ve bu nedenle küçük gruplar tarafından gerçekleştirilir (Doosje et al., 2024). Bu da, geniş bir etki yaratmanın, gerekli kaynakları sağlayabilecek, ivmeyi sürdürebilecek ve bu genellikle zorlu eylemlerin sürdürülebilirliğini sağlayabilecek geniş bir kitlenin desteğini çekmeye bağlı olmasını sağlar. Eylem taktiklerinin bir işlevi olarak seyirci desteğini inceleyen çalışmaların büyük bir kısmı, norm dışı, aşırı veya radikal eylemlerin, normatif eylemlere kıyasla seyirciler tarafından tercih edilmediğini göstermektedir (Glover & Ozden, 2022). Örneğin, Feinberg ve

meslektaşları (2020), seyircilerin aşırı protestoları ahlaka aykırı bulduklarını ve bu nedenle davaya olan bağlılıklarını ve desteklerini azalttıklarını göstermiştir. Araştırmacılar, bu bulguların aktivistler için kritik bir ikilem olduğunu, çünkü bu eylemlerin kamu desteğini kaybetme riskinin yanı sıra, soruna ilişkin farkındalığı hızla artırma ve kurumları doğrudan ikna etme avantajı da olduğunu belirtmişlerdir (bkz. Andrews & Caren, 2010).

Yine de, bazı çalışmalar, çatışmacı taktikler ile seyirci desteği arasında olumsuz bir ilişki olduğunu ima eden tutarlı bulguları sorgulamaktadır. Tarihsel ve ampirik kanıtlar, bazı bağlamlarda çatışmacı taktiklerin halkın desteğini harekete geçirdiğini (örneğin, Ünal ve ark., 2022) ve hareketlerin genişlemesine yardımcı olduğunu (örneğin, Enos ve ark., 2019) göstermektedir. Örneğin, Shani ve meslektaşları (2025), hayvan refahı bağlamında, norm dışı ve şiddet içermeyen taktiklerin, özellikle dirençli seyircilerin desteğini kazandığını bulmuştur. Ünal ve meslektaşları (2022), Kürt hareketinin şiddet içeren kolektif eylemine verilen desteğin, gözlemcinin grubunun belirli bir çatışma içindeki konumu ve hareketin eylemlerinin ne kadar etkili göründüğü gibi bağlamsal özelliklere bağlı olabileceğini bulmuştur. Benzer şekilde, Feinberg ve meslektaşları (2020) da çalışmalarını, eylemin belirli yönlerinin ve siyasi bağlamın, aşırı eylemlerin neden ve ne zaman desteklendiğini (veya desteklenmediğini) belirlediğini vurgulayarak sonlandırmaktadır.

Bu tür tutarsızlıklar, protesto özelliklerinin kamuoyundaki her kişi tarafından aynı şekilde yorumlanan sabit özellikler olmadığı fikrini güçlendirmektedir. Aksine, seyircilerin desteği yalnızca hangi taktiğin nasıl kullanıldığıyla değil, aynı zamanda bireylerin bağlam, aktivist repertuarları ve söz konusu sorun hakkındaki algılarıyla da şekillenir (Goffman, 1974). Bu nedenle, yüzleşmeci eylemlere verilen desteği etkileyen inanç ve değerlendirmelerin hangileri olduğunu araştırmak, seyircilerin desteğine daha bütüncül bir çerçeveyle yaklaşmayı sağlayabilir.

Bu tutarsızlığın bir başka olası nedeni, destek tezahürlerini inceleme konusunda literatürde sistematik bir yaklaşımın olmaması olabilir. Bu durum, desteğin rolü ve farklı taktikler arasındaki ilişkinin tam olarak anlaşılmamasına yol açmaktadır. Bazı akademisyenler bu kavramı, aynı amaç için kolektif eyleme katılmak gibi bir davranış veya davranış niyetini ifade ettiğini varsayarak ele alırken (ör. Gutting, 2020; Shuman

ve ark., 2024), diğerleri ise bunu yalnızca tutum düzeyinde ölçmüştür, örneğin polise yönelik şiddet eylemlerini onaylamak (ör. Saavedra & Drury, 2019c) veya protestoyu meşrulaştırmak (ör. Jiménez-Moya ve ark., 2018) gibi. Bu farklı destek biçimleri aynı anda ortaya çıkmayabilir; bu nedenle, desteği yalnızca bir veya iki soruyla ölçmek, onun önemini tam olarak yansıtmayabilir (Feinberg ve ark., 2020), bu da katılım niyetlerini ve daha dolaylı destek biçimlerini ayrı ayrı değerlendirmeyi gerektirebilir. Bu nedenle, farklı destek biçimlerini açıkça tanımlayan ve inceleyen bir çerçeve olmadan, bu değişkenler arasındaki ilişki hakkında sonuçlara varmak zordur.

Ölçümler, tasarımlar, bağlam ve kavramsallaştırmalardaki bu farklılıklar, tek bir sonuca varmayı zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle, "destek" kavramına daha geniş bir bakış açısı benimsemek ve üçüncü tarafların yüzleşmeci taktiklere verdiği desteği etkileyebilecek bireysel düzeydeki algı ve değerlendirmelerini incelemek, bu alandaki literatüre yeni bir boyut katma potansiyeline sahiptir ve "Hangi aktivist taktiği en iyisidir?" sorusunu sormaktan ibaret olan indirgemecilikten uzaklaşır.

Seyirci Desteğinde Rol Oynayan Faktörler

Yukarıda bahsedilen kolektif eylemin başarısındaki potansiyel rolüne rağmen, odak noktası seyirci desteğini anlamaya yönelik olmamıştır (Andrews ve ark., 2016; Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019). Bunun yerine, kolektif eyleme katılım davranışı, son on yılda sosyal psikoloji literatüründe sosyal değişimi ele almak ve araştırmak için daha popüler bir yol haline gelmiştir. Dezavantajlı bir grupla veya sosyal bir hareketle özdeşleşmek, adaletsizlikleri fark etmek ve bunlara karşı duygusal tepkiler vermek, ve sesini duyurmak için kolektif eylemin yeterliğine inanmak, insanları sokağa çıkmaya motive edeceği defalarca kanıtlanmıştır (örneğin, Klavina & van Zomeren, 2018; Louis ve ark., 2019). Avantajlı gruplardan gelen müttefiklerin eylem motivasyonlarıyla ilgili de güçlü bir politik kimliğin yanı sıra, adaletsizliklere karşı öfke duymak ve eylemlerinin yeterliğine inanmak dışında, ahlaki motivasyonların da müttefiklerin harekete geçmesi için çok önemli olduğu öne sürülmüştür (Radke ve ark., 2020). Seyirci desteği ile yakından ilişkili olmasına rağmen, bu çalışma alanı ondan ayrılır, çünkü müttefiklik, eylem odaklı sosyal adalet çabalarına bağlılık içerirken (Craig ve ark., 2020), seyirciler genellikle söz konusu konuda güçlü bir tutumu olmayan üçüncü taraflardır.

Yine de, seyircilerin aktif katılımı en güçlü ve somut destek biçimi ve halka hitap eden aktivistlerin nihai hedeflerinden biri olduğundan (Stern ve ark., 1999), bu geniş literatür destek konusuna da değerli bilgiler sağlayabilir. Bu nedenle, bir hareketle politik olarak özdeşleşme gibi aktif katılımla ilgili bazı faktörler seyircilere doğrudan uygulanamayabilirken, duyguların ve yeterliğin rolü gibi diğer faktörler desteği anlamak için araştırmaya değer. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, çatışmacı iklim eylemine seyirci desteğinde algılanan yeterlik, umut, aciliyet ve öznel siyasi açıklığın rolünü incelemektedir.

Algılanan Yeterlik

Yeterlik algısı, çoğu kolektif eylem modelinin temel taşlarından biridir (Thomas ve ark., 2012; van Zomeren ve ark., 2008). Ancak seyircilerin kolektif yeterlik algısının destekleri üzerindeki etkisi fazla dikkat çekmemiştir. Bununla birlikte, Bliuc ve Chidley (2022), kolektif eylemlerin yeterliğini vurgulayan kolektif güçlendirici anlatıların hem aktivistlerin hem de aktivist olmayan dışardan gelenlerin desteğini kolaylaştırabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Ayrıca, Algısal Meşruiyet Teorisi'ne (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) göre, bireyler düşüncelerinde tutarlı olmaya çalıştıkları için, başarılı bir şekilde organize edilen bir eylemi görmek, o eyleme karşı olumlu tutumlarını artırmalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, yüksek siyasi yeterlik algısı, eylemleri siyasi olarak meşru hale getirerek bireylerin kolektif eylemlere karşı olumlu tutumlarını potansiyel olarak teşvik eder.

Özellikle, yeterlik algılarının, bireylerin farklı kolektif eylem taktikleri tercihlerini etkilemede önemli bir role sahip olduğu gösterilmiştir. Örneğin, düşük genel yeterlik, bireylerin norm dışı taktiklere başvurmasına neden olur (Becker & Tausch, 2015). Araştırmacılar, genel yeterlik normatif taktiklerin yeterliğini temsil ettiğinden, yeterlik inancı düşük olan bireylerin, bu alternatiflerin hedeflerine ulaşma olasılığının daha yüksek olduğunu düşünürlerse yüzleşmeci taktikleri tercih etmelerinin beklenebileceğini öne sürmüşlerdir. Özellikle, yeterlik tek boyutlu bir kavram değildir (Hornsey ve ark., 2006). Yeterlik algısının tanımı ve işlevi, özellikle yüzleşmeci eylemleri desteklemek için değişkenlik gösterebilse de, önceki çalışmalar, amaçlanan siyasi hedeflere ulaşmak için toplu eylemin yeteneğine olan inancı ifade eden siyasi yeterliğin önemli rolünü göstermektedir (örn., Zlobina & Gonzalez, 2018). Bu

bulgular, seyircilerin yüzleşmeci taktiklere ilişkin görüşlerini etkilemede siyasi yeterlik inançlarının potansiyel olarak önemli rolünü vurgulamaktadır.

Soruna Özgü Değerlendirmeler

Yüzleşmeci eylemlerin hedef aldığı sorunların çeşitliliği, bu eylemlere verilen desteği etkileyen bağlamsal faktörlerin çeşitliliğine yol açmaktadır. İklim değişikliği durumunda, iklim değişikliği ile ilgili bağlamsal değerlendirmeler, halkın aktivistlerin çabalarını doğrulaması ve onları desteklemesi için bir yol olabilir. Özellikle, insanların iklim değişikliği sorununa atfettikleri aciliyet ve durum hakkında ne kadar umutlu oldukları, alınan önlemlere bakış açılarını etkileyebilir.

Aciliyetin artırılmasının, bireylerin rutinlerini değiştirme veya bir konu hakkında harekete geçme istekliliğini artırabileceğine dair kanıtlar bulunmaktadır (örneğin, Reser ve ark., 2014; Spence ve ark., 2011). Hatta aktivistler, aşırı önlemler almaya iten neden olarak aciliyeti öne sürmüşlerdir (Benford, 1993). Öte yandan, araştırmalar, aciliyet algısının aşırı olduğu durumlarda bireylerin kafalarının karışabileceğini, korkuya kapılabileceğini ve harekete geçme motivasyonlarını kaybedebileceğini de ortaya koymuştur (Lorenzoni ve ark., 2007). Bununla birlikte, toplu eylemler çok sayıda kişiyi harekete geçirerek daha etkili sonuçlar elde ettiğinden, bireysel eylemlere kıyasla daha yüksek bir içsel etkinliğe sahip olabilirler (Bushell ve ark., 2017) ve yüksek aciliyet algısının getirdiği rahatsızlık, bu konuyla toplu düzeyde ilgilenerek hafifletilebilir. Burada, doğrudan acil eylem talep etmek için bir kanal sunarak, yüzleşmeci kolektif eylem, çevre krizinin aciliyetinden baskı hisseden bireylere bir çıkış yolu sağlayabilir. Bu yolun zaman baskısına karşı sağlayabileceği rahatlama göz önüne alındığında, bireylerin kolektif çabalara katkıda bulunmak için eylemlere destek vermesi beklenebilir.

Umut, sosyal hareketlerde karmaşık bir rol oynar. Değişime destek sağlamaya motive edebilir ve gruplar arası iletişimi iyileştirebilir (Bryant & Cvengros, 2004; Halperin et al., 2012; Greenaway et al., 2014; Wright et al., 1990; Pearlman, 2013; Wlodarczyk et al., 2016). Ancak umut, bireyleri hareketsiz hale getirerek eyleme geçmek yerine duygusal başa çıkma yöntemlerine yönelmelerine neden olabilir (van Zomeren ve ark., 2019; Hasan-Aslih ve ark., 2018; Hornsey & Fielding, 2016). Bu, stresli durumlarda

umudun duygusal bir değerlendirme işlevi gördüğü Başa Çıkma Teorisi ile uyumludur (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1993). Tersine, çaresiz zamanlar daha riskli eylemlere yönlendirebilir (Saab ve ark., 2016; Wright ve ark., 1990). Umut ve yüzleşmeci taktikler arasındaki bağlantı yeterince araştırılmamış olsa da, bazı çalışmalar düşük umut ile şiddeti haklı gösterme veya norm dışı eylemlere sıcak bakma arasında bir ilişki olabileceğini öne sürmektedir (Long, 1978; Shuman ve ark., 2016; Bird ve ark., 2022). Azınlık gruplarının üyelerinin şiddet içeren radikalleşme veya aşırılıkçılığa karşı duydukları sempatiyi inceleyen araştırmalar, depresif belirtilerin ayrımcılık deneyimi ile bu sempati arasında bir aracı rolü oynadığını öne sürmektedir (Rousseau ve ark., 2019; Emmelkamp ve ark., 2020). Depresyonun başlangıcında ve ilerlemesinde umutsuzluğun önemli rolünün araştırma ve teorilerle desteklendiği göz önüne alındığında (Liu ve ark., 2015), düşük umut düzeyinin bireyleri daha yüzleşmeci davranışlara yöneltebileceğini yorumlayabiliriz.

Politik Bağlam

Sosyopolitik faktörler, kolektif eylem dinamiklerini büyük ölçüde etkiler (Uluğ ve ark., 2022) ve hem motivasyonu hem de stratejileri değiştirebilir (Aytaç ve ark., 2018; Vollhardt ve ark., 2020). Bir ülkede muhalefet fırsatlarının sınırlılığı veya vatandaşların politik eylemliliklerine karşı hükümetin saldırganlığı, kendini savunma olarak algılanan yüzleşmeci stratejileri benimseme istekliliğini artırabilir (Uysal ve ark., 2022; Reicher ve ark., 2004; White, 1989; Zúñiga ve ark., 2023; Li ve ark., 2023). Sosyal ve siyasi manzara, seyircilerin kolektif eylemi nasıl algıladıklarını da şekillendirir (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a); bu doğrultuda, önceki çalışmalar siyasi ortamın seyirci desteği üzerinde potansiyel etkileri olduğunu göstermiştir (Feinberg ve ark., 2020; Orazani ve ark., 2021; Ünal ve ark., 2022). Yüzleşmeci eylemler için, polis veya güvenlik güçlerinin tutumu ve toleransı seyircilerin desteğini etkileme potansiyeline sahiptir. Yüzleşmeci eylemlerde, polis veya güvenlik güçlerinin şiddet uygulaması, protestocuların şiddetini gözlemcilerin gözünde kabul edilebilir hale getirebilir (Drury & Reicher, 2018; Earl ve ark., 2003). Hükümetin yolsuzluk yaptığına dair algılar da şiddet içeren taktiklere verilen desteği artırır (Thomas & Louis, 2014). Hükümetler yaptırım uyguladığında, şiddet içeren taktikler meşru, hatta hayatta kalmak için gerekli eylemler olarak görülebilir (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a). Bu

bulgular, siyasi bağlamın ve yetkililerin tutumunun, üçüncü tarafların yüzleşmeci taktiklere verdiği desteği değiştirebileceğine işaret etmektedir.

Bu tez, kolektif eylem literatüründeki bir boşluğu ele alarak, seyircilerin yüzleşmeci taktiklere verdikleri desteği etkileyen faktörleri araştırmakta ve basit destek düzeylerinin ötesine geçerek bağlamsal etkileri incelemektedir. Yüzleşmeci taktikleri meşru siyasi stratejiler olarak incelemekte ve seyircilerin ilgisini çeken bireysel düzeydeki değerlendirmeleri ve inançları mercek altına almaktadır. Tez, tek maddelik ölçümlerden uzaklaşarak desteğin çok yönlü bir kavramsallaştırmasını sunmaktadır. Seyircilerin yüzleşmeci eylemlere desteğini potansiyel olarak etkileyen dört faktör belirlenmiştir: yeterlik, aciliyet, umut ve öznel siyasi açıklık (SPO).

Bu doğrultuda çalışmanın hipotezleri şöyledir:

H1: Yeterlik ve Destek: Seyircilerin yüzleşmeci eylemlere desteği, yüzleşmeci eylemlerin algılanan yeterliğinin daha yüksek olduğu bireyler arasında daha yüksek olacaktır. Bu, algılanan yeterliği deneysel olarak manipüle ederek (düşük, yüksek, kontrol grupları) test edilecektir.

H2: Aciliyet ve Destek: Daha fazla algılanan aciliyet (iklim değişikliği gibi konularla ilgili), seyircilerin daha fazla destek vereceğini öngörür.

H3: Umut ve Destek: Düşük umut ve umudun duygusal başa çıkma işlevinin beslediği "kaybedecek bir şey yok" zihniyeti nedeniyle, umut ile yüzleşmeci eylemlere verilen destek arasında negatif bir ilişki olacaktır (Saab ve ark., 2016; Lazarus, 1993).

H4: Öznel Siyasi Açıklık (SPO) ve Destek: Öznel siyasi açıklık (kolektif eyleme karşı otoritenin hoşgörülü olduğu algısı) yüzleşmeci eylemlere verilen desteği olumsuz yönde etkileyecektir (Earl ve ark., 2003; Feinberg ve ark., 2020).

H5: Moderatör Olarak Yeterlik: Algılanan yeterlik, diğer bağımsız değişkenler (aciliyet, umut, SPO) ile destek arasındaki ilişkileri moderatör olarak etkileyecektir.

H5a: Yeterlik, Aciliyet-Desteği Moderatör Olarak Etkiler: Algılanan yeterlik, aciliyet ile destek arasındaki ilişkiyi güçlendirecek ve yeterlik yüksek olduğunda bu ilişki daha da güçlenecektir (Fritsche ve ark., 2013, 2018; Scheepers, 2017).

H5b: Yeterlik Umut-Destek ilişkisini moderatör olarak etkiler: Umut ve destek arasındaki negatif ilişki, algılanan yeterlik tarafından güçlendirilecektir.

H5c: Yeterlik SPO-Destek ilişkisini moderatör olarak etkiler: SPO ve destek arasındaki negatif ilişki, özellikle bireyler eylemlerini oldukça yeterli olarak algıladıklarında devam edecektir.

Pilot Çalışma

Önceki araştırmalarda, kolektif eylem için üçüncü taraf desteğinin evrensel olarak kabul edilmiş bir tanımı ve ölçümü bulunmamakta olup, genellikle bu konunun karmaşıklığını yansıtamayan tek maddelik ölçümler kullanılmaktadır (Orazani ve ark., 2021; Brown & Mourão, 2022; Feinberg ve ark., 2020; Pollmanns & Asbrock, 2023). Bu bağlamda bu pilot çalışmayla, madde oluşturma, teorik analiz ve psikometrik analiz yoluyla kapsamlı ve güvenilir bir Kolektif Eyleme Verilen Destek ölçümü geliştirilmiştir (Morgado ve ark., 2018).

Yöntem

Sosyal ve akademik ağlardan gelen 8 farklı gönüllü ile yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler ve mevcut literatürün incelenmesi (ör. Kenward & Cameron, 2023; Munoz & Anduiza, 2019) sonucunda 11 maddelik bir soru havuzu oluşturuldu. Uzman incelemesi ile içerik geçerliliği sağlandı. Ardından, çevrimiçi bir anketle 116 kişiden (kadınlar %59.1, erkekler %40.9; ortalama yaş = 36.4, SD = 10.9) veri toplandı. Katılımcılar, tanıdık bir geçmiş kolektif eylemi seçerek (örneğin, Gezi Protestoları - %63.8, Filistin için Ateşkes Gösterileri - %15.5) 11 adet destek sorusu ile 2 adet katılıma dair soru yanıtladılar. Örneklem siyasi olarak sola eğilimliydi (1-7 ölçeğinde ortalama = 3.04). Materyaller için EK-A'ya bakınız.

Sonuçlar

11 madde (Tablo 1) üzerinde yapılan keşifsel faktör analizi (oblimin rotasyonu) yüksek örneklem yeterliliği (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .948) ve anlamlı korelasyonlar (Bartlett testi: $\chi 2(55)=2578$, $p<.001$) göstermiştir. Kaiser kriteri (özdeğerler > 1) ile yapılan ana eksen analizi, toplam varyansın %83,3'ünü açıklayan ve yüksek

güvenilirliğe sahip (α=.98, ω=.98) tek faktörlü bir çözüm ortaya koydu. Scree grafiğinde gösterilen açık tek faktörlü çözüm de göz önüne alındığında, tek faktörlü çözüm verilerin en sağlam ve anlaşılır temsili olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Ana Çalışma

Yöntem

İlk olarak 791 kişilik bir havuzdan yapılan eleme sonrasında toplam 689 katılımcı analiz edildi. Güç analizi, α=.05 düzeyinde %90 güçle küçük ölçekli bir moderasyon etkisini (f2 =.05) tespit etmek için 288 katılımcıya ihtiyaç olduğunu gösterdi. Katılımcılar, kolaylık örneklemesi (WhatsApp, Facebook, QR kodları) ve üniversitenin SONA sistemi aracılığıyla seçildi. Nihai örneklem %69,3 kadın, %29,4 erkek (Myaş = 27,7, SD = 10,4) olup, sol eğilimli siyasi yönelime (M = 2,84, SD = 1,44) ve 7 puanlık bir ölçekte ortalama 3,97 puan ile (SD = 1,20) orta sosyoekonomik statüye sahipti. Katılımcılar rastgele yüksek yeterlik (n=225), düşük yeterlik (n=233) veya kontrol (n=231) koşullarına atandılar.

Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi'nden etik onay alındı. Çalışma, Şubat-Nisan 2025 tarihleri arasında Qualtrics aracılığıyla çevrimiçi olarak yürütüldü. Katılımcılar önce meşruiyet, umut, öznel siyasi açıklık (SPO) ve aciliyet ölçümlerini tamamladılar. Ardından rastgele bir şekilde yeterliğin deneysel manipülasyonunu okumak üzere gruplara ayrıldılar. Manipülasyon kontrolünden sonra, Türkiye'deki bir iklim aktivisti eylemiyle ilgili kurgusal bir senaryoyu okudular ve destek anketini doldurdular, ardından demografik ve aktivist kimlik soruları yanıtladılar (Materyaller için EK-B'ye bakınız).

Sonuçlar

Ön Analizler

Katılımcıların önemli bir kısmı (%52,2) ilk dikkat kontrolünden geçemedi. Katılımcıların algılanan yeterliliklerini ölçen ikinci manipülasyon kontrolü de, yanıtların yalnızca %36,9'unun kendilerine atanan koşullara uyduğunu gösterdi. Sonuç

olarak, bu kontrolleri geçemeyen katılımcılar, yeterlilik manipülasyonunun geçerliliğini sağlamak için sonraki ana analizlerden çıkarıldı.

Korelasyonlar, meşruiyet, aktivist kimliği, umut, aciliyet ve destek arasında pozitif ilişkiler olduğunu gösterdi. Öznel Siyasi Açıklık (SPO), umut hariç tüm bu değişkenlerle negatif korelasyon gösterdi.

Ana Analiz

Hipotez 1 (Yeterlilik ve Destek): Manipülasyon kontrollerinden geçen 228 katılımcı üzerinde yapılan Tek Yönlü ANOVA, yeterlilik koşulunun destek üzerinde önemli bir ana etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koydu ($F(2,218)=17.6$, $p <.001$). Post-hoc testleri, düşük yeterlilik koşulundaki katılımcıların, yüksek yeterlilik ($M = 3.98$) ve kontrol ($M = 3.72$) koşullarına kıyasla önemli ölçüde daha az destek ($M = 3.18$) sağladığını göstermiştir. Yüksek yeterlilik ve kontrol koşulları arasındaki fark önemli değildir. Bu, H1 için ilk desteği sağlamaktadır.

Hiyerarşik Regresyon Analizi: Meşruiyet ve aktivist kimliği kontrol değişkenleri olarak kullanılarak hiyerarşik regresyon analizi yapılmıştır.

Model 1 (Kontroller): Meşruiyet ve aktivist kimliği, kolektif eyleme verilen desteği önemli ölçüde ve pozitif yönde yordamış ve varyansın %14,6'sını açıklamıştır.

Model 2 (Ana Etkiler): Aciliyet, umut, SPO ve yeterlilik için ana etkilerin eklenmesi modeli önemli ölçüde iyileştirdi ($\Delta R2 =0,224$). Bu model istatistiksel olarak anlamlıydı ve varyansın %35,6'sını açıkladı.

Aciliyet ve SPO önemli değişkenlerdi, aciliyet desteği olumlu yönde tahmin ederken, SPO desteği negatif yönde yordadı. Yüksek yeterlilik ve kontrol koşulları, düşük yeterlilik koşuluna kıyasla daha yüksek desteği yordamıştır, bu da H1'i desteklemektedir. Umut, bu modelde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir değişken değildi, bu nedenle H3 desteklenmemiştir.

Model 3 (Etkileşim Etkileri): Etkileşim terimlerinin eklenmesi, model uyumunda küçük ama önemli bir iyileşme sağladı ($\Delta R2=0,023$). Yüksek yeterlilik ve aciliyet arasındaki etkileşim anlamlıydı, ancak hipotezin tersi yöndeydi. Aciliyetin destek

üzerindeki olumlu etkisi, yüksek yeterlilik koşulunda düşük yeterlilik koşuluna göre daha zayıftı. Diğer etkileşimler anlamlı değildi ve kalan moderasyon hipotezlerini (H5b ve H5c) desteklemedi.

Keşifsel Analiz

Deneysel manipülasyon yerine katılımcıların kendi bildirdikleri yeterlilik (manipülasyon kontrolünden) kullanılarak ek bir hiyerarşik regresyon gerçekleştirildi. Bu analiz de SPO ve aciliyetin desteğin anlamlı yordayıcıları olduğunu gösterdi. Algılanan yeterlilik de anlamlı bir yordayıcıydı: yüksek veya belirsiz yeterlilik bildiren katılımcılar, düşük yeterlilik bildirenlere göre daha fazla destek aldılar. Umut, bu modelde de yine anlamlı bir yordayıcı değildi. Bu keşifsel modelde hiçbir etkileşim terimi anlamlı değildi.

Tartışma

Bu tez, yüzleşmeci taktiklere yönelik seyirci desteğini etkileyen faktörleri araştırmış ve desteğin ikili bir seçimden ziyade, soruna ilişkin algılar, siyasi bağlam ve algılanan yeterlik tarafından belirlendiğini savunmuştur. Bir pilot çalışma, desteği ölçmek için yeni ve güvenilir bir tek faktörlü ölçek geliştirmiştir. Bu, literatürde standart bir ölçümün bulunmaması nedeniyle önemli bir katkıdır. Bu ölçek, desteği katılımdan ayırarak benzersiz bir kavramı ele almaktadır.

Ana çalışmadaki yeterlilik manipülasyonu tam olarak başarılı olamamış, katılımcıların yarısı manipülasyon kontrolünden geçememiştir. Bu durum, bilgi yüklemesi veya genel halkın aktivizmle yeterince aşina olmaması nedeniyle olabilir. Sonraki analiz, kontrolü geçen katılımcılara odaklanmış ve düşük algılanan yeterliliğin, yüksek yeterlilik ve kontrol koşullarına kıyasla çatışmacı eylemlere verilen desteği önemli ölçüde azalttığını ortaya koymuştur. Bu bulgu, Hipotez 1'i desteklemektedir ve yeterliliği kolektif eylemin temel motivasyon kaynağı olarak gören mevcut modellerle uyumludur. Yüksek yeterlilik ve kontrol grupları arasında önemli bir fark olmaması, katılımcıların belirsiz kontrol metnini daha olumlu yorumladıkları potansiyel bir doğrulama önyargısını akla getirmektedir; bu, diğer çalışmalarda da görülen bir örüntüdür (ör. Urbiola ve ark. 2025).

Çalışma, aciliyetin yüzleşmeci taktiklere verilen desteği pozitif yönde yordadığını ortaya koyarak Hipotez 2'yi desteklemiştir. Bu, aktivistler gibi seyircilerin de tehdidin aciliyetini, yüzleşmeci stratejiler benimsemek için meşru bir neden olarak gördüklerini göstermektedir.

Beklentilerin aksine (Hipotez 3), umut, pozitif bir korelasyon olmasına rağmen, yüzleşmeci eylemlere verilen desteği anlamlı bir şekilde yordamamıştır. Bu, umudun karmaşık ve koşullu rolünü vurgulamakta olabilir. Bu rol, kişilerin olumlu bir sonuca ulaşma ile ilgili algıladıkları olasılığına veya ölçülen umudun spesifikliğine bağlı olabilir.

Çalışma, Öznel Siyasi Açıklık (SPO) kavramının desteğin güçlü bir negatif yordayıcısı olduğunu doğrulamakta ve Hipotez 4 ile uyumlu bulunmaktadır. Bu, siyasi olarak baskıcı bağlamlarda, seyircilerin yüzleşmeci taktikleri daha meşru ve gerekli gördüklerini ve karşılıklı radikalleşmenin mutlaka aktivistlere karşı kamuoyunda antipatiye yol açmayacağı fikrini desteklemektedir.

Yeterliğin umut, aciliyet ve SPO'nun etkilerini düzenleyeceğini öneren Hipotez 5, büyük ölçüde desteklenmedi. Sadece aciliyet ve yüksek yeterlilik arasındaki etkileşim anlamlıydı, ancak bu etkileşim ters yöndeydi: aciliyetin destek üzerindeki olumlu etkisi, yüksek yeterlilik koşullarında daha zayıftı. Bu beklenmedik bulgu, yeterliliğin tehdit değerlendirmelerinin etkisini artırdığına dair yerleşik modellerle çelişmektedir. Seyirciler için, başkalarının harekete geçmesi, aciliyetle ilişkili kaygıyı azaltabilir ve bu faktörler arasında basit bir eklemeli ilişkiden ziyade karmaşık bir ilişki ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Bu tez, literatüre üç önemli katkı sağlamaktadır. İlk olarak, önemli ancak yeterince araştırılmamış bir kavram olan seyirci desteğini ölçmek için yeni, güvenilir, tek faktörlü bir ölçek geliştirerek politik psikolojideki bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır. Bu yeni ölçek, desteğin katılım niyetinden farklı, özgün bir kavram olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. İkinci olarak, bulgular katılımı etkileyen faktör ve mekanizmaların seyirci desteğine uygulanamayabileceğini göstermektedir. Umudun önemli bir yordayıcı olmadığı ve aciliyet ile yeterliliğin destek üzerindeki etkileşim etkisinin, katılım niyetleri için tipik olarak bulunanın tersi yönde olduğu bulunmuştur. Üçüncü

olarak, çalışma, yüzleşmeci taktiklerin kamuoyu tarafından evrensel olarak hoş karşılanmadığı görüşüne itiraz etmektedir. Bunun yerine, bu taktiklere verilen desteğin, bireylerin yeterlilik algıları, sorunun aciliyeti ve daha geniş siyasi bağlamdan derinden etkilendiğini ve bu durumun kamuoyunun çeşitli kolektif eylem stratejilerine karşı duyarlılığını karmaşıklaştırdığını göstermektedir.

Bu güçlü yönlerine rağmen, tezin bazı sınırlılıkları bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'deki bir iklim değişikliği eylemine odaklanılması, bulguların diğer sosyal hareketlere, özellikle gruplar arası çatışmaların olduğu hareketlere genellenebilirliğini sınırlamaktadır. Kolektif eylem planı için kurgusal bir senaryo kullanılması da ekolojik geçerliliği tehlikeye atmaktadır, çünkü bu, doğal olarak meydana gelen olaylara verilen desteğin ve medya çerçevelemesi gibi faktörlerin etkisinin ölçülmesini engellemektedir. Metin üzerinden gerçekleştirilen yeterlilik manipülasyonunun anlaşılmasındaki yüksek hata oranı, bulguların genelleştirilebilirliğini yalnızca bu tür bilgilere dikkat edenlerle sınırlayabilecek başka bir önemli sorundur. Gelecekteki çalışmalar, bunu iyileştirmek için videolar veya laboratuvar ortamları gibi daha ilgi çekici yöntemler kullanabilir. Ek olarak, çalışmanın kesitsel doğası, SPO ve aciliyet ve destek gibi değişkenler arasında nedensellik sonucuna varılmasını engellemekte ve ileride yapılacak boylamsal çalışmalara ihtiyacı vurgulamaktadır.

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