THE SAʿŪDĪ-WAHHĀBĪS (1744-1902): A STUDY ON WAHHĀBĪSM AND ITS POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

THE SAʿŪDĪ-WAHHĀBĪS (1744-1902):
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The work in hand follows the one and a half century development and change process of the Wahhābī movement from its beginning. Originating from Inner Arabia, the Wahhābis engaged in a struggle with many political and cultural structures that they considered foreign and infidel during this time. Every encounter with the outsiders triggered interaction and change as well as ideological conflict. Wahhābism, which can be considered as a puritanical state-making movement, has followed a policy of expansionism by leaving Inner Arabia since its partnership with the Saʿūdīs in 1744. The capture of the Ḥijāz at the beginning of the nineteenth century, made the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis a challenger to the Ottoman domination. Having redefined the Sunnī understanding of Islam in their own way, the Wahhābis regarded anyone outside of this definition as blasphemous. With the military intervention of Egypt, however, the first political organization they established in Najd was destroyed in 1818. Yet it was also possible for a religious movement, which defined itself as the only and genuine Muslim, to survive the political turmoil and to continue its existence in the isolated geography of inner Arabia. Therefore, Wahhābism in the nineteenth century is relatively more introverted and represents both religious routinization and a bridge that carries the dynasty to the twentieth century. On the other hand, the political situation

they faced at the end of the nineteenth century was not at all encouraging, and it tested the power of existence of both the ulama and the dynasty in Arabia.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism, Jihad, Najd

ÖZ

SUUDİ-VEHHABİLER (1744-1902):
VEHHABİLİK VE SİYASETİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Eldeki çalışma başlangıcından itibaren Vehhâbî hareketinin bir buçuk asırlık gelişim ve değişim sürecini izlemektedir. İç Arabistan kökenli hareket, bu zaman zarfı içinde yabancı ve kafir saydığı pek çok siyasi ve kültürel yapıyla mücadeleye girişmiştir. Dolayısıyla her karşılaşma ideolojik çatışmanın yanı sıra aynı zamanda etkileşimi ve değişimi de tetiklemiştir. 1744'te Suûdlarla ortaklık kurmasından itibaren İç Arabistan'dan çıkarak yayılmacı bir siyaset takip etmiş olan Vehhâbîlik aslen tasfiyeci bir devlet inşası hareketi olarak da görülebilir. Dolayısıyla, on dokuzuncu asır başında Hicaz'ı ele geçirmeleriyle Suûdî-Vehhâbîler artık Osmanlı hakimiyetine meydan okur hale gelmişlerdir. Vehhâbîler, Sünnî İslam anlayışını kendilerince yeniden tanımlamışlar, bu tanımın dışında kalanlarıysa din dışı saymışlardır. Bununla birlikte, Necid'de kurdukları ilk siyasi örgütlenme Mısır'ın askeri müdahalesiyle 1818'de yıkılmıştır. Ancak özü itibariyle kendisini yegâne ve gerçek Müslüman olarak tanımlayan dini bir hareketin, siyasi çalkantılardan sıyrılarak varlığını İç Arabistan'ın izole coğrafyası içinde sürdürmesi de mümkün olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Vehhâbîliği nispeten daha içe kapalıdır ve dini manada rutinleşmeyi temsil ederken, siyasi manada ise kaçınılmaz olarak hanedanı yirminci yüzyıla taşıyan bir köprüdür. Öte yandan on dokuzuncu yüzyıl sonunda karşı karşıya kaldıkları

siyasi konum hem ulemanın hem de hanedanın Arabistan'daki var olma gücünü sonuna kadar sınamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suudi Arabistan, Vehhabilik, Cihat, Necid

To word, paper, and pen

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are some concerns of the study in hand which have been pointed out in the literature on Wahhābism. The House of Saʿūd, with their three-century-long ideological partners, the Wahhābī ulama, is now one of the most long-lived religio-political entity of the modern world history. The aim here is to examine the first two hundred years of the birth, development and change of the cooperation between the Saʿūdīs and Wahhabi ulama.

One of the main questions, therefore, is that how they managed to survive in the tumultuous political atmosphere of Arabia as the patrons of a reformist Islamic movement, which, vis-à-vis the Islamic orthodoxy, have incessantly been stigmatized as heretic. The longevity of the Wahhābism, in other words, is a question that needs explaining in its own terms and in its own historical contingency. There are, however, some other concerns of this dissertation: Whether Wahhābism can be considered as separate and independent of the House of Saʿūd, again in its own historical context? Put differently, and hypothetically, can there be such an extreme Islamic reformist, in fact a restitutionist movement independent of political protection and patronage? Right in this framework, can Wahhābism, with its partnership with a local political entity, a dynasty capable of war-making, be considered as a state-making process? If so, to what extent can it be evaluated as such? On the other hand, given the reformist and restitutionist character of the movement, can the political struggle between the Ottoman empire and Saʿūdī-Wahhābis be reduced to a mere sectarian conflict, or are there some other mechanics lying underneath the surface of the hostility? Again, in a similar fashion, to what extent Wahhābism, as a political organization, can be considered as rebellious in the larger structure of the Ottoman Arab provinces? If a rebellion, then how can the reaction and response of the central authority be analyzed

within a theoretical framework? Is it correct to speak of a fundamental change in Wahhābism, especially in terms of religious praxis? If so, is there any tangible evidence pointing to this change in their own sources? Based on this, what determinations can be made on Wahhābī historiography as a genre? Finally, what were the factors that put Wahhābism, as a local player, on a global scale in the game of imperialism of the nineteenth century world?

In conclusion, it can be said that the main discussion of the thesis will develop and progress within the framework of these questions. On the other hand, there is a modern literature on Wahhabism dating back two centuries, and the answers to the above-mentioned questions or the proposals for answers have partially found their way into this literature. Our aim is to collect these questions in a single study and to reconsider the religious and political ties of the movement in the Ottoman and Arabian context. In other words, our aim in this thesis is to discuss whether the Saʿūdī-Wahhabi organization is a unique phenomenon in the political pattern of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Arabia.

In addition to these, there is at least one complaint about the lack of Ottoman archive material in the literature.[1] Therefore, reference will be made to the documents extracted from the Ottoman archives at relevant points throughout the study. Also, it is hoped that the study, accompanied by other Turkish historical materials such as the chronicles of the relevant period, will contribute to the field, albeit partially. However, it should not be forgotten that the Ottoman literature on Wahhābism, as can naturally be expected, is highly subjective which lacks information on the inner structure of Wahhābism, and, as a result, reduces the whole movement into a mere marauding desert dweller. Therefore, Wahhābī sources make up for this deficiency to a large extent. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the present study differs greatly from the findings of the secondary literature on Wahhābism, apart from the theoretical framework of the above-mentioned frame. The aim is to point out only small gaps and fill them as much as possible, in the company of Turkish literature and Arabic

[1] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), 7.

chronicles. Finally, it is aimed to reach a recent narrative and explanation of the issue with both religious and political dimensions, in the light of the questions pointed out.

First, to examine the middle period of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism in its historical context, it is necessary to draw attention to the political fragmentation of the nineteenth century Arabia. Baron Nolde, a nineteenth century itinerant, puts it quite succinctly:

> With such great other undertakings, Egypt had grown weary of giving up more and more soldiers for the barren and ungrateful Najd, which was gradually evacuated, and the last Egyptian forces left Riyad in 1842. From then on, a long period of almost fifty years of war began again for inner Arabia. For a time, it seemed as if the old Wahhābī Empire would resurrect again. Faisal, a son of decapitated ʿAbd Allāh, came to Riyad and gradually regained lordship over most of Najd, though in some areas on nominally. From 1842, the year of the withdrawal of the last Egyptian troops, until the years 1870-72, the following main powers were constantly at war with each other in Najd: 1) The old Wahhābī house of the Ibn-Saʿūds in Riyad and al-Hasa, 2) the increasingly powerful Emirate of Hail, 3) the town of Unayza with tribal affiliation, 4) the town of Burayda, 5) the rather run-down town of Shaqra, 6) in the far south the state and town of Harīq-Hautah, 7) the Harb, 8) the Utaybah, 9) an finally, the Mutayr. After Hail, which belonged to the Ibn Rashidis, had already risen to great heights through two strong-willed and state-wise regents, Talal (r. 1848-68)[2] and Mitʿab (r. 1868-9), the current Emir Muḥammad (r. 1869-97), as the fifth of the house, seized control of the government in 1872. In a dispute with his own hand, he stabbed his nephew, the Emir Bender, and upon this was recognized as the new Emir of Hail by his cousin Hamud, the same who was ruler of Hail in my time, and who was in command of the castle.[3]

These are the words of Baron Nolde describing the chaotic political fragmentation following the withdrawal of the exhausted Egyptian troops from Arabia. He does not conceptualize the circumstances as a political scientist would in terms of power vacuum, but vacuum was what had been prevailing during the mid-years of the nineteenth century Arabia. If one were to pay attention to the words of Ibn Bishr (d. 1873), another chronicler of the nineteenth century Arabia, yet this time recording the past events in the name of the House of Saʿūd, the political circumstances had not been dramatically different from that of the eighteenth century. He narrates the chaotic

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[2] For their reigns see Madawi Al Rasheed, ibid., 55.

[3] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise nach Innerarabien, Kurdistan und Armenien, 1892* (Braunschweig: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1895), 66–67.

circumstances of Najd before the advent of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as, "The chiefs of the towns would not know anything but oppression and waging war against each other."[4] In this context, and according to the nineteenth century Wahhābī grand narrative, the Saʿūds, with their unitarian and puritan ideology, had been the saviors of Arabia from the greed of unlawful tribal chiefs and local warlords, and brought back the pure and undiluted faith of the presbyters of Islam, *al-Salaf al-Sālih*, whose *aqidah* had not been desecrated with the ferocious offence of idolatrous innovations of the following generations.

The Wahhābī grand narrative, whether historically true or not, considering the striking discrepancies which can be observed when its two most significant chronicles, by Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr, are studied, obliges the researcher to make comparison between the first two Saʿūdī states[5] to detect the changing nature of consecutive Saʿūdī states, hence the changing nature of their ideology when faced with contenders and predators. In other words, to understand and explain the altered chemistry of the second Saʿūdī state one must first compare it to the first one. This comparison, however, again dictates the researcher to elaborate the Wahhābī grand narrative in the greater context of Najd historiography. Only after that can one theorize on the different natures of the mentioned political entities and be able to explain the increasing interest in the reinterpretation of the history of Najd by the protectors of Wahhābism, the House of Saʿūd. The dynamic flow of time, starting from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth will also yield the struggle of Wahhābī elite to establish their own place in the larger Sunnī Islamic tradition by way of detecting the list of books (canonization) and grinding down the marginal stance of the early Wahhābī teachings by its founding father which exclusively interested in *sui generis* uncompromising *aqīdah* theology.

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[4] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān al-Majd fi tarikh Najd*, vol. 2 (Riyadh: Matbaat Dar al-Malik Abdalaziz, 1982), 33; Paul Dresch, "Arabia to the End of the First World War," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Francis Robinson, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 135.

[5] Today, it is an established tradition to refer to the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī political organization as "state" in studies on Wahhābism. Here I do the same for the sake of analysis, and the occasional cases of emirate or rule has the same meaning. On the other hand, neither the Ottoman archives nor the Wahhābī chronicles have such a definition. While it is impossible for the first to accept the existence of such a definition, the second does this only in the form of "ahd" (era or reign) through the names of Saʿūdī Imāms.

Accordingly, in the context of the eighteenth century, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, in this study, greets us as a motivated actor or "an engaged social actor in a specific context,"[6] and his "action linkages, that is, how a social actor engages in action to transform one condition or situation into another, simply put, makes things happen."[7] In other words, apart from the expansionist and hegemonic aspirations of the Saʿūds, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, as the founding father of Wahhābism, is seen as unique agent in the historical contingency of inner Arabia, a contingency "… which may not be repeated. The combination is idiosyncratic and unexpected from the flow prior conditions."[8] Even though the political development and mutation of the Saʿūdī states can be seen in a theoretical basis, in other words, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's rise is considered as eccentric and isolated in its own historical contingency, with specific combination of factors that came together in a particular time and place.[9] As Mahoney indicates, "Contingency refers to the inability of theory to predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome. A contingent event is therefore an occurrence that was not expected to take place."[10] Contingency, thus, though being unanticipated, the moment it materializes, has the power to impact upcoming affairs.[11]

To conclude, the study in hand is a theoretical and a comparative proposal on the rise and development of Wahhābism in its own terms and dynamics in the form of a narrative analysis, depending on the interpretation of historical material gathered through various archives and relevant secondary literature. During the endeavor of

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[6] W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods* (Boston; New York: Pearson Education, 2006), 475.

[7] Ibid., 475–76.

[8] Ibid., 477.

[9] Ibid.

[10] James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology" *Theory and Society 29*, no. 4 (2000): 513.

[11] Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 477.

theoretical explanation, however, Wahhābism, despite its roots in the deep time of Islamic culture, is considered as a particular issue both for its *aqidah* theology and for the pragmatism of its eponymous founder, let alone the effort of the following generations who tried hard to relocate it in Islamic orthodoxy. Therefore, because of its particularism, instead of universal generalizations, only relevant details play their roles as explanatory tools in the segments of a greater stained-glass.[12]

[12] Ibid., 474–75.

1.1. Conceptual Framework and Context

Literature on Wahhābism refers to three different Saʿūdī-Wahhābī rules and the study in hand analyzes the first two. The initial one is, inevitably, taken as the foundation both politically and ideologically, whose dominant *raison d'être* during its lifetime had been an uninterrupted jihadism, which is coated with a strict and unprecedented understanding of *tawhīd* (monotheism) which had been imposed on the indigenous peoples of Najd first. It also created its own historiography. Its military agents named themselves *al-muwahhidūn* (unitarians) and believed that they were the sole representative of the real and pure Islam. Its foundation and rise were celebrated by its believers and propagators, its catastrophic demise at the hands of the Egyptian forces in 1818, on the other hand, needed an explanation in terms of Wahhābī historiosophy. There came a classical one: God was punishing them because they had slackened the ropes of *tawhīd* in the face of idolaters. Despite all despair, what they did during the eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth centuries unavoidably triggered a sequence of events which carried their belief system to the twentieth century, and, though in its slightly changed temperament, directly influenced the foundation of modern day Saʿūdī Arabia in 1932. Our aim here, as the first step, is to examine the nascence of the movement to explain the ideological foundation of the second state and its changing nature during the nineteenth century, because the second one was the sole bridge to which the final owes its existence. In other words, the latter necessitates the former.

Then, as Baron Nolde did, we must first name the contenders to see the greater web of relations which had been weaved in Arabia: the Sharifs of Mecca, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite of Najd with its dependencies, the Banū Khālid of al-Hasa, the Rashidis of Jabal Shammar, the pashas of Baghdad, the sheikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait, the local tribes of inner Arabia such as al-Ajman, al-Anaza, al-Murrah, and al-Muntafik, and finally, to a lesser extent, Shaykhs of Yemen and Asīr. Yet the picture is much greater, and the rulers as well as the imperialist powers must be included in the list: the Ottoman Empire, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's Egypt, the British India, and the French, and finally the Qajar Persia of Nader Shah. By taking the House of Saʿūd to the center of the greater picture, and by weaving the interaction among these players

we will try to display the political and ideological panorama of the nineteenth century Arabia. While for some, like the Saʿūds and the Rashidis, and even for the Sharifs of Mecca, the struggle to dominate the region had not been unidirectional or linear, and from time to time it is true that it turned into a mere survival, for the other powers, such as the Ottomans, particularly during their long nineteenth century, the struggle had been built around establishing a direct and centralized control over the region which was under the military and commercial influence of Egypt and Britain through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The analysis, therefore, is an attempt to present the course of centralization efforts of the Ottoman Empire in one of its far domains, central and eastern Arabia, in an age of reform, turmoil, and more than anything, in an age of empires.

The definite description of the religious clique, in our case, *Āl al-Shaikh*, "the family of the Shaykh"[13], can be listed under five titles: First, *Āl al-Shaikh* is a Ḥanbalī originated religious clique for whom *tawhid* (unity and oneness of God, hence; *muwahhidūn*, the Unitarians) is the supreme theological tenet. In this respect, they embrace Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as the founding father and in whose wake interpret and define Islamic faith in a literal and an authoritative way of understanding and interpreting the Koranic scripture.[14] Any deviation from the definitive faith, therefore, is considered as *bidʿah*, or simply as *kufr*, results in the act of *takfīr*, if not exclusion. Second, for the sake of interpretation, definition and finally the extraction of a certain meaning –"in the name of which it would arrogate to itself the right to reject other meanings"[15]– from the Koranic scripture Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and his followers attribute an importance to *ijtihād* which, for the Wahhābīs, can only have three sources: the Qur'an, the *sunna* and the praxis of *ṣalaf ṣāliḥ* (the Pious

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[13] Esther Peskes, "Introduction: Wahhābism in the History of Islamic Doctrines - a Short Classification," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 9.

[14] Michael J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab* (London: Oneworld Academic, 2020), 51, 127.

[15] Roland Barthes, *Criticism and Truth* (London: Continuum, 2004), 28–29.; Esther Peskes, "The Wahhābiyya and Sufism in the Eighteenth Century," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 225.

Forefathers or Rightly Guided Companions). In other words, the Wahhābī faith is defined in a nostalgic longing for the praxis of the first three generations of Islam. Whose main target was to purify Islam from all forms of polytheism, idolatry, saint veneration, intercession, and innovations that had been introduced in ever since the beginning of Islam in the seventh century. Third, *jihād* is one of the vital concepts of the Wahhābī faith because only through *jihād* can a *muwaḥḥidūn* fight against *kufr* and *bidʿah*. Sword, or war making in other words, is an indispensable tool for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī expansion, this exclusively so for the first Saʿūdī state. Fourth, only in doing this, as far as the Wahhābī *ulama* is concerned, the religion of God can again be revived and restored in its pure form by the time it was believed to have been revealed to the Prophet in the early seventh century, and only by this way the ultimate *najāt* (salvation) can be reached in afterlife. Fifth, for the Wahhābī religious clique only under the political leadership of the Saʿūds is it possible for them to live and impose the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī faith to the local population of Arabia. In the light of these five titles, then, the given clerical elite, is a definitive meaning imposing, a puritanist, and a restitutionist clique who wholeheartedly believe in that they are reforming and reviving God's real religion so that the fabrications and the decadence of the later centuries will be wiped out once and for all.

All this structure, as far as we are concerned, is summarized by Diarmaid MacCulloch as "a monopoly on truth."[16] "Power," writes MacCulloch, "is often sustained by distortions of truth or reality, particularly when power takes the form of claiming a monopoly on truth."[17] In our case it is only and merely Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab who knows and understands the exclusive and true interpretation of Islam,[18] since it, the real meaning descended on his chest. Once the truth is obtained, defined and sustained by the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī oligarchy, almost all the aspects of the way of life is defined in an absolute closure by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī clique in such a harmony with

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[16] Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Silence: A Christian History* (London: Penguin, 2014), 6.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Muḥammad al-Atawneh, *Wahhābī Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 12.

the faith that, as it is propagated, only through this way *shirk* can be erased and *tawhīd* can reign ultimately, yet only in a regime of godliness.[19] In a sense, it would not be groundless here to stress that Wahhābism has almost a Manichaeisticly[20] dualistic structure in its faith; a cosmos in which *tawhīd* is always against *shirk*, and those who promote *shirk* are the evildoer *mushrik*s (polytheists) who has been the sole target of *jihād* in the cause of *Allah*. Consequently, and in the wake of the literature on Wahhābism, the proper name of the Wahhābī religious clique is the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*.

The Saʿūdī elite, on the other hand, constitutes the political, and the war making wing. In other words, it would not be wrong to name a clear division of labor between the two sides, politically and militarily, on the one hand, and, on the other, religious, and theologically. This, however, in its full-grown form, can only be observed towards the final decades of the first Saʿūdī state, probably following the retirement of Muhammed Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in 1773/4.[21] This means that, despite carrying the title of Imām, i.e., the leader, under no circumstances was the Saʿūdī elite responsible for the definition of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī faith. Instead, as far as the privity between the two clique is concerned, the sole *raison d'être* of the Saʿūdī elite was and still is to provide the religious clique with the political order and security in which the given faith, in the name of salvation, can be adhered to and imposed on the peoples of Arabia.

In this framework, the definite description of the Saʿūdī elite can be summarized in two main points in terms of what to do, and what not to: Firstly, then, *Āl Saʿūd* (the House of Saʿūd) is a Najdī dynasty who wholeheartedly embraced and patronized the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī dogma and is capable of rallying and mobilizing a decent amount of local men under their banner when necessary, raids (*ghazw*) for instance, and for whom

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[19] Michael Crawford, ibid., 97.

[20] Ibid., 61.

[21] Ibid., 101.

the imposition of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī dogma generates a supra-tribal[22] area of authority in the unstable political climate of central Arabia during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. Secondly, the political organization in the name of order and security was the only part of the Saʿūdī elite had been responsible for. They, in other words, were the sole executers of the political and military domain and had no place in the definition of the Wahhābī dogma, nor could they take part in the polemical world of theology. They were and are the sole patrons of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*. Hence, the proper name for the dynasty of Najd is the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite.

Throughout our study, the combination of the two proper names, the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* (or *Āl al-Shaykh*) and the Saʿūdī elite (or *Imām*), as the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity represents the inseparable nature of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī religio-political entity regardless of the first (1744-1818) and the second (1822-1891) states, nor does the nature of the co-operation between the two cliques differ during the lifetime of the modern Kingdom of Saʿūdī Arabia.[23]

The believers of Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism, on the other hand, have never named themselves as "Wahhābī" or "Wahhābiyya". This designation has a pejorative connotation for them. In fact, Ibn Saʿūd, to define Wahhābism as part of the greater Sunnī tradition banned the term, instead brought in Salafiyya[24]. They originally call themselves as *al-Muwaḥḥidūn* (The confessors of God's unity), *Ahl al-Tawḥīd* (The

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[22] Ira Lapidus, "Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History," in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 29–30.; "Before the rise of Wahhābism and its adoption by the Saʿūdīs in 1744, the power of the Saʿūdī rulers rested on their ability to collect the tax from the settled population in return for protection. Wahhābism provided the ideological mechanism by which Saʿūdī domination was extended from Deraiya as the Saʿūdīs imposed their religious and political leadership over most of the Arabian Peninsula." Madawi Al Rasheed, ibid., 89.

[23] Joseph Kostiner gives the same dichotomy for the political (*umarāʾ*, i.e., "lay rulers") and the spiritual (*ulama*, "those trained in the religious sciences") leaders. Joseph Kostiner, "Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia," in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 226–27.

[24] Michael Crawford, ibid., 2, 117, 121.

people of the unity) or *al-Muslimūn* (The Muslims).[25] However, the term "Wahhābiyya" made its first appearance in 1754, coined by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's brother, Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1794).[26] They had also been labelled by the Ottoman intelligentsia with this designation which clearly displays the pejorative attitude of the Ottomans to the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite. This attitude can be seen in almost all the related Ottoman archival material in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century Arabia, which is not surprising given the fact that the ideological nature of Wahhābism as a challenger and a counter-religion against the Ottomans. It is, nonetheless, important to share some of these material in which a variety of different designations on the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity can be found.

Here are some examples on the designations of Wahhābis which was used in the nineteenth century archival material of the Ottoman Empire: "Defile and impure body of heretics" (levs-i vücûd-ı havāric)[27], "the party of treacherous heretics" (tāife-i hāine-i havāric)[28], "party of heretics" (fırāk-ı dālle)[29], "diabolical organization" (teşkilât-ı

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[25] Peskes, "Introduction: Wahhābism in the History of Islamic Doctrines - a Short Classification," 4.

[26] Ibid.

[27] BOA, HAT., 343/19583. Here, the term *havāric* (plural form of *Hāricī*) is taken in its general meaning as it appears during the history of Islam, which simply means "heretics" or "deviants" both for Sunnīs and for Shi'a. But the literal translation of the term is "outsiders" and denotes an Islamic sect that emerged in the 1st/7th century who claims that any Muslim man can qualify for the caliphate. The Wahhābī polity was also named by Eyyûb Sabri Pasha in his *Tarih-i Vehhâbiyân* as "Qarāmita" the plural form of "Qarmatī" which designates a Shi'i sect in Islam who, just like the Wahhābīs, centered in Eastern Arabia and had harshly been condemned in the Islamic history for plundering the holy cities and Kaaba in the tenth century. Eyüb Sabri Paşa, *Tarih-i Vehhâbiyân* (İstanbul: Bedir Yayınevi, 1992), 2.. For another comparison between Wahhābis and Qarāmita, Silvestre de Sacy, "A Hypothesis of Contuniuty of the Qarmatians," in *The Wahhabis Seen through European Eyes (1772-1830): Deists and Puritans of Islam*, by Giovanni Bonacina (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 47–52.

[28] Ibid.

[29] BOA, MKT. MHM., 460/83.

şeytāniyye)[30], "the path of disorder" (mezheb-i fāsid)[31], "sick thoughts" (efkâr-ı sakīme)[32], "lack of endorsement for the four noble paths" (mezāhib-i celīle-i erbaaya adem-i tasdik)[33], "being in the cause of opinion with the announcement of creeds of disorder" (ilân-ı akāid-i fāside ile dava-yı ictihadda bulunmak)[34], "superstitious thoughts" (efkâr-ı bātıla)[35], "insects" (haşerāt)[36], "manifestation of insurgency and rebellion" (izhār-ı bagıy ve isyān)[37], "party of insurgence" (fırka-i bagıyye)[38], "the superstitious path/sect of Wahhābī" (Vehhābī mezheb-i bātılı)[39]. As for al-Dirʿiyya, the capital of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity, it was designated as "the center of accursedness" "makarr-ı nuhūset)[40] in one of the documents.

Karen Barkey, on the other hand, when analyzing the religious clashes of the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire uses push and pull metaphor: "In the seventeenth century, the central government found itself pulled by various forms of dissent… The

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] BOA, MKT. MHM., 460/83.

[33] Ibid.

[34] BOA, MKT. MHM., 460/83.

[35] Ibid.

[36] BOA, MKT. MHM., 477/36, BOA, HR. SYS., 93/18.

[37] BOA, MKT. MHM., 477/36.

[38] BOA, MKT. MHM., 477/36.

[39] BOA, DH. MKT., 1700/88.

[40] BOA, HAT., 343/19583.

popular heterodox forces pulled for more syncretism and less imperial domination, whereas the Kadızadeli religious reformists pushed for radical Puritanism so as to disengage Islam from its syncretic and impure applications…"[41] So, to this end, Barkey uses the term "Islamic Ultra-Orthodoxy" when sketching the outlines of the puritanical Kadızadeli movement, or *şeriat*-minded reformers who emerged and existed during the first half of the seventeenth century in a declining empire,[42] places them as opposed to the heterodoxy, "the movements of popular dissent" of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, i.e., Şeyh Bedreddîn (d. 1416), the Kızılbaş and finally the *Celâlî* revolts.[43]

Apart from the mainstream heterodoxy in the Ottoman Empire, Jane Hathaway draws attention to the fact that Birgevī Mehmed Efendi's (d. 1573) being a source of inspiration for the Kadızadeli puritanism[44] and, in parallel with her point, Bruce Masters characterizes Mehmed of Birge as "…prefigured the more extreme Islamist positions current in the twenty first century…"[45] Even though there had not been any organic connection between Wahhābism and Mehmed of Birge, nor between Wahhābism and Kadızadelis, it is true that Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), a contradictive scholar and jurisprudent of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth

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[41]Karen Barkey, *The Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 155.; for criticism see R. Aslıhan Aksoy Sheridan, "Celaliler / Eşkıylar: Gayesiz Asiler Miyiz Ki Hepimiz Biz?," *Kebikeç*, no. 33 (2012): 111–126.

[42] Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, "The Ḳāḍizadeli Movement: An Attempt of Şeriat-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire" (Ph.D., Princeton University, 1990), ii.

[43] Ibid., 154–182.

[44] Jane Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule 1516-1800* (London: Routledge, 2008), 217.

[45] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 120.

centuries, had been a fundamental figure of inspiration both for the ideology of Kadızadelis[46] and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.

Overall, the similar understandings of the above-cited puritanical movements in Islam can be determined under two characteristic features: First, a fervent belief in the Sunnī interpretation of Islam and the praxis of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*. Second, a belief in a long-standing corruption in Sunnī Islam which can only be disposed of through a strict commitment again to the way of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*; the way in which they understood and practiced the Islamic creed in the Koranic scripture and the tradition of the Prophet, i.e., the *sunna* and the *hadith*, without asking how or why. On this basis, it would not be inconvenient to observe that the reformist movements emerged in the framework of Sunnī Islam are discussed under the greater scheme of orthodoxy, which stresses the "right opinion" (hence, the term "orthodoxy") of the pious forefathers; the reflection of their tradition on the modern world can thus be evaluated in the form of a restitutive and a soteriological interpretation of the Islamic faith. In the final analysis, then, Wahhābism, despite the differences with the given Sunnī understandings of Islam, is analyzed as a *sui generis* religio-political ideology, a political religion[47], in the terminological framework of Islamic orthodoxy.

Speaking of Wahhābism as a political religion, on this exact point, Esther Peskes remarks "the bifocal structure of power Sunnīsm advocates"[48] which designates the combination of two tenets of politics in Sunnī Islam: *Al-Hukamā* (the rulers), and the *ulama*. Hence, Peskes places the ideological core of Wahhābism into "to give good council to the rulers",[49] without doubt by the Sunnī *ulama*, and evaluates it – right from its initiation– as a "politically active movement explicitly built on the idea of

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[46] Jane Hathaway, ibid., 217.

[47] Madawi Al Rasheed, ibid., 84-88.

[48] Peskes, "Introduction: Wahhābism in the History of Islamic Doctrines - a Short Classification," 2.

[49] Ibid.

scholarly guidance to the ruler"[50]. To this respect, regarding Esther Peskes, we believe that it would not be wrong, nor an over interpretation, to locate Wahhābism – and its founding father Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb – in the tradition of advice giving to the ruler, part of the famous mirror-for-princes literature. To the House of Saʿūd Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was what Plato was to King Dionysius in Sicily, what Aristotle was to Alexandre the Great, what Machiavelli was to the Medicis of Florence or Hobbes was to the royal family. However, what is aimed here is not to equate Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb to the significant figures of political philosophy, on the contrary, we want to emphasize his place as the ideological founder of the world's one of the oldest and still prevailing dynasties. In short, Wahhābism, as a religio-political ideology, becomes concrete and propagated only under the patronage of the House of Saʿūd.

Having examined the nomenclature on Wahhābism, we can now set our sights on the phases that the second Saʿūdī emirate had gone through during the nineteenth century.

The initial phase of the second Saʿūdī state is revival. Yet this is in a political sense which became concrete in the imamate of Turkī ibn ʿAbd Allāh, however, in a mild manner since the Egyptian forces had still been active in the region, and his imamate had taken place in between the two Egyptian military interventional periods in central Arabia, the first of which had been in between 1811-1818, and the second started in 1836 and went on until 1840. In other words, the revival was not a religious one, depending on the fact that the Wahhābī creed in the region was by no means dead, nor was it dormant, on the contrary, it was still alive and ready to be cultivated by its political instigator, i.e, the House of Saʿūd. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when the second Saʿūdī state had slowly been emerging from the ashes of the first one, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite had already been the sole patrons and the protectors of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* and the *daʿwa*, i.e. "the call" or proselytization, for almost a century and the Wahhābī proselytization in Najd had been an ongoing process at the hands of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *qadi*s for again almost a century. So, as it is often

[50] Ibid., 4.

recorded in the Ottoman archival material[51], finding men for their cause had not ever been a challenging issue for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī political elite. Therefore, apart from coercion[52], fear factor[53] and violence[54], conviction[55] (includes conversion to Wahhābism inevitably), and the opportunities of razzia[56] (*ghazw* or *ghazwa*) presented by the *daʿwa* to the Najdīs, it was highly possible that this a-century-old Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī proselytization was an effective motivation for the men whom the Saʿūdīs had been recruiting in their ranks. On this basis, it is certain that for the sedentary and nomadic[57] population of Najd the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī banner was an ideological cement,[58] and represented a way for subsistence, and, when combined with the sword of the Saʿūds, and conviction-coercion of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī faith, it seems

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[51] BOA, MKT. MHM., 477/36; BOA, HR. SYS., 93/18

[52] Madawi Al Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18–19; Selda Güner, *Osmanlı Arabistanı'nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbî Suûdîler (1744-1818)*, 69; Esther Peskes, "Introduction: Wahhābism in the History of Islamic Doctrines - a Short Classification," 3; Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, trans. Ethan S. Rundell (New Heaven; London: Yale University Press, 2014), 69; Michael Cook, "The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 9.

[53] This is particularly so for the Syrian nomads between the Ḥijāz and Saʿda, Ahmad S. Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 45.

[54] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 135.. He also says, "Believing as much in the authority of text as in the edge of the sword, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb…", ibid., 110.

[55] Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 19.

[56] Selda Güner, ibid., 11;Nabil Mouline, ibid., 47; Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, "The 'Imāma vs. the 'Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saʿūdī State," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 35.

[57] Madawi Al Rasheed, ibid., 21.

[58] For a similar observation, of combining settled and Bedouin systems Tim Mackintosh-Smith, *Arabs: A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires* (New Heaven; London: Yale University Press, 2019), xxii.

subjugation and mobilization of the Najdīs for armed conflict was granted by all means.[59] Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad further confirms the coercive nature of the Bedouin as an occupation, and as a means of transferring local products from sedentary communities to nomadic raiders of Arabia which in the long process of the history of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism, turned into an acute problem even for the third Saʿūdī rule.[60] One way or another, the political revival of the second Saʿūdī state, despite being in a rather different nature of Wahhābism compared to the first one in theological terms, was contingent on the validity and effectiveness of the legitimacy of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite. It, however, did prove legitimate in the early 1820s of central Arabia given fact that the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite was recognized as the *qāimmaqām* (district governors) of Najd by the Ottomans and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī authority in the region grew even much stronger after 1840, in the absence of the Egyptian forces. After all, the political revival of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite is the precondition for the mutation and accommodation of Wahhābism in the face of such predators as Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, the Sharifs of Mecca, or the Rashidis of Hail.

Thus, the literature on Saʿūdī-Wahhābism presents unanimity on the mutation which Wahhābism had experienced during the nineteenth century.[61] Accordingly, the next phase the second Saʿūdī state had gone through was the mutation and accommodation in political sense which distinguishes the first and the second Saʿūdī

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[59] Here, however, it is not possible to bring forward the *ʿasabiyya* or tribal solidarity (which is relatively a more convenient explanation in the Rashidī case, still not a *deux ex machina* either) in the case of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity as an argument for recruiting men, Albert Hourani, "Tribes and States in Islamic History," in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 307.. For Bruce Masters, on the contrary, "These Najdi tribesmen presented a potent combination of religious fervor and tribal solidarity." And the Wahhābī ideology was the epicenter of their religio-political movement, Bruce Masters, "Semi-Autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 205.

[60] al-Fahad, "The 'Imāma vs. the 'Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saʿūdī State," 35.

[61] Michael Cook, *Commanding Right Forbidding Wrong* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178–179; Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (London: Saqi Books, 1997), 188.

states dramatically. Based on Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī theology, however, things had been different for the Najdī *ulama* for whom the justification of the Saʿūdī political power was the primary target, and apart from this they simply cocooned themselves. Yet, what is meant by mutation on the political basis here is a distinct process of alteration from an uncompromising jihadist stance, which is a *fard al-kifāyah* (communal obligation), to a détente in Saʿūdī-Wahhābism against non-Wahhābī elements. In other words, at center of the theological mutation which Saʿūdī-Wahhābism experienced following the destruction of the first Saʿūdī state lies a salient change from jihadism[62] to a milder condition; namely, *al-ʿamr bi-l'maʿrūf wa'n-nahy ʿan al-munkar*, i.e., commanding right and forbidding wrong[63] which is again a *fard al-kifāyah*. On the other hand, this mutation did not occur by itself. In fact, it is highly unlikely that it was even desired by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*. It was, on the contrary, the price paid for the aggressive and uncompromising nature of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism during the first Saʿūdī state[64]. As a result, the essence of the mutation is central, since, as we argue, it will show the contrasting character and change between the two Saʿūdī-Wahhābī periods, and how the Saʿūdī elites and the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* acted in the face of crises and predators.

From the theological aspect, as stated by Nabil Mouline, for the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* the second Saʿūdī state had been a sanctuary within which they were able to seek greater knowledge and comprehension of the Islamic faith and from within that sanctuary they bridged connections with other Sunnī *ulama* corporations, first al-Azhar in Egypt between 1818 and 1826, then, Syria and Iraq, and finally, after 1876, with another similar movement in India, *Ahl al-Hadith*.[65] In other words, for the

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[62] Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 18.

[63] Michael Cook, ibid., 179; Nabil Mouline, ibid., 72–74.

[64] Alexei Vassiliev, ibid., 188.

[65] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 90–91.

Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* this was a period of seclusion, an isolation from the secular and profane in order to seek for solace in faith, to find a meaning for the loss of the first Saʿūdī state in 1818 and, the most important of all, to keep themselves clean and pure from the corruption and impurity of the outer world which was, for the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*, the Ottoman lands.[66] The Saʿūdī elite, on the other hand, having experienced the fierce intervention of the Egyptian forces at first hand in 1818 and then in 1836 once more, (and yet another in 1871, and in 1907) it was not hard for them, with the help of the Ḥanbalī -Wahhābī *ulama*, to find an excuse and justification in toning down their voice against the Ottoman Empire and avoided conflict for the sake of autonomy.[67] Hence, it is that détente of Wahhābism which created a relatively mild atmosphere in which the Sublime Porte and the elites of the second Saʿūdī state, though reluctantly and involuntarily, cohabitated, even cooperated for existence, despite the Wahhābī creed,[68] which ultimately obliges its believers to *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ*, in the political map of nineteenth-century Najd and central Arabia.

It is argued here that the third phase of the second Saʿūdī emirate had underwent was isolation, which represents the stormy relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Saʿūdī elite, i.e., Turkī ibn ʿAbd Allāh, Faisal ibn Turkī[69], and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal. Despite the mutual reluctance and desperation between The Porte and the Saʿūdī elite[70], all these names were appointed as *qāimmaqām* of Najd, since the Porte

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[66] Ibid., 76–81.; Alexei Vassiliev, ibid., 184.

[67] Ibid., 78; Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 84.

[68] Michael J. Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 98–99.

[69] He was officially assigned as the Ottoman *kaimmakam* of Najd in 1848 with a charter (berât). Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998), 69.

[70] For the Ottoman part, the main cause for the reluctance was obvious; the sequence of the bitter events that had been experienced during the first two decades of the nineteenth century had thought them the fragility of their authority in the Ḥijāz, and, in a greater extent, in Arabia. For the Saʿūdī elite, on the other hand, it was 'problematic from the perspective of Wahhābī doctrine,' particularly during the ʿAbd

had not yet been able to establish and impose its *de facto* authority upon the region.[71] Apart from the mutual reluctance and desperation between Istanbul and the Saʿūdī elite, there was another essential trend that had been soaring in the region since the rise of the first Saʿūdī state. It is, according to Alexei Vassiliev and Madawi al-Rasheed political centralization[72]. This trend was not merely an aspiration of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite. In fact, with the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict, in the greater scheme of modernization and centralization, establishing direct governmental apparatuses in all the Ottoman lands was a long-sought-after goal of the Sublime Porte. Najd in this context, despite being quite lately, was not an exception in the centralization agenda of the reforming Ottoman government. In other words, the trend towards centralization in the nineteenth century Najd was a common target for both contenders in the region, the Saʿūds, the Rashidīs, and the Ottomans in the imperial scale. As a result, the centralization policy, by its nature, had been at the expense of the local contenders, i.e., the Saʿūdī and the Rashidi dynasties and the Sharifate of Mecca, which was inevitably going to bring them face to face in 1891. However, what we also see towards the end of the nineteenth century was the integration of the imperialist and global powers into politics of the region by supporting one local family against the other which generated an illusion of political balance in the region; an illusion that in the short term proved beneficial for the Ottoman Empire, yet the long term results are well known in the history of the Middle East and out of the scope of this study. In the final analysis, however, the conflict between the contenders in Arabia in the name of establishing a centralized governmental apparatus is not an adequate explanation for the temporary decline of the second Saʿūdī state in the 1890s. It was, in fact, rather a subordinate factor to a more important one: The internal struggle in

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Allāh ibn Faisal's governorate in the context of asking for help of the "idolatrous" Ottomans against his brother Saʿūd, Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhābism," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 117.

[71] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 158.

[72] Alexei Vassiliev, ibid., 176.; Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 202.

the Saʿūdī dynasty. Following the death of Faisal ibn Turkī in 1865, his three sons, Saʿūd, Muḥammad, and ʿAbd al-Raḥman, did not recognize the succession of their eldest brother ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Faisal, and challenged him. Eventually, it was this civil war, inimical to their succession tradition, adelphic form of succession, which was going to test the strength and existence of the Najdī elite.

Finally, the last phase of the second Saʿūdī state is disintegration. As given above, the civil war[73] which provided Midhat Pasha, the famous Tanzimat statesman and governor of Baghdad between 26 April 1869 and 31 July 1872, with the justification for the military intervention first in al-Aḥsāʾ, then in the resolution of the Saʿūdī Civil War for the benefit of ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal against his rebellious brother Saʿūd.[74] That, however, was not the only pretext of the Ottoman military intervention. As the English naval activity and influence on the Persian Gulf had been rising[75], particularly after the establishment of the British protectorates in Muscat, Mukalla, Oman, Hadhramout, Bahrain[76], and as the contact between the Saʿūds and the British

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[73] *Tabsıra-i İbret* summarizes the feud between two brothers as follows: "Although ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal, the latest sheikh and chief in Najd who is from the sons of Saʿūd Wahhābī, is in passion for an independent government, [un]like his predecessors, does not have the intention of dissidence against the sublime state nor [is he intended to] harm around with a set of calling for sectarianism, and, while he has been in acquiescence of a moderate occupation, one of his brothers, Saʿūd, with the incentive and encouragement of some party, has fallen into the love of usurping the government of Najd from the hands of ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal, and has gathered around himself forces with his visit to India by the help and aid of the English. Thus, in the year of eighty-six, rebelled against his brother. During the combats that has been fought, with his prevail over his brother, first he seized the al-Aḥsāʾ province, thence, after he had placed and appointed forces and officers to the fortifications which was located in Hufuf and al-Mubarraz, and also to the Qatif castle and to the other places which is on the shore; because of his march towards his center of government in al-Riyāḍ, and his march even further inland, ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal, in his despair, asked for help and aid by sending mail and men to Midhat Pasha", Ali H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret* (İstanbul: Hilal Matbaası, 1909), 105.

[74] Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhābism," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 110, 117; Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 105. BOA, HR. SYS., 93/18; BOA, İ. DH., 646/44930.

[75] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 204.

[76] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 82–83. Ali Haydar Midhat also summarizes the political influence of the foreign elements in the Arabian Peninsula as follows: "The *qıtʿa* of Najd being in a state of crisis and disorder, and as it is understood that even this *qıtʿa*, just like Aden, Muscat, and Oman, is going to be lost with the interventions of the foreigners which can be observed from distance;

since 1865[77] had become salient, it did not prove hard for Midhat Pasha to find a justification to set al-Aḥsāʾ campaign in May 1871. The Porte was resolute to establish its direct authority over the Persian Gulf and the interior of Najd again.[78] This resolution, consequently, was going to become concrete in the region with the establishment of the *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* by Midhat Pasha in 1871 as the eleventh sanjak of the province of Baghdad; to this end, al-Hasa, Qatif, Qatar, and Najd were united under the given *mutasarrifiyyah* and Nafiz Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman forces, was appointed as its first *mutasarrıf*[79]. Despite its short existence in Arabia, *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* represents the first tangible attempt of the Porte to establish its direct governmental apparatus in eastern shores of Arabia since the seventeenth century. This was, indeed, Midhat Pasha's goal, "to put government departments back into action."[80]

However, the determinant factor in the dislodgement and disintegration of the Saʿūdī elite from the political scene of Najd, and thus from Arabia, up until 1902, was

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[so,] this situation has attracted Midhat Pasha's attention, the ensuing year, namely in the third year of Midhat Pasha's arrival…" Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 104.

[77] Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002), 38; according to *Gazetteer* the first contact between British and Saʿūdī-Wahhābī policy, during Ibn Saʿūd's (Saʿūd b. ʿAbdul Aziz, 1803-14) emirate, was made in 1809 during a British expedition against Raʾs al-Khaimah. Second contact was made in 1811 or in 1812 in which it is expressed that "… amicable relations should be established between the British and the Wahhābī governments and that the ports of either should be thrown open to the commerce of the other", J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, vol. 1 (Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1986), 1076–77.. For another instance of a contact during the emirate of Turki in 1831, ibid., 1096; for two other instances of encounter in 1798 and in 1817 see Michael Cook, "On the Origins of Wahhābism," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 20–21.

[78] Zekeriya Kurşun, ibid., 97; for a similar assessment on the absence of the Ottoman authority in Arabia Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 184–85.; also, Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 204.

[79] Ibid., 117–18.

[80] Najib E. Saliba, "The Achievements of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria, 1878-1880," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, no. 3 (1978): 309.

not the Ottoman military intervention, or its centralization policy, but it was the hegemonical rivalry between the Rashidis of Jabal Shammar in Hāʾil and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite in Riyāḍ. At the head of a tribal confederation, Jabal Shammar, the Rashidī influence in central Arabia had already been gaining in during the second half of the nineteenth century when the Saʿūdī dominance was losing ground.[81] In the name of centralization in Arabia, conclusively, the unease and tension between the two rival dynasties reached boiling point with the battle of Muleida, on the western outskirts of Buraydah, in the early 1891[82], and the coup de grace was delivered by the hands of the Rashidis. As a result, the final remnant of the Saʿūdī hegemony in Riyāḍ was wiped out, and the defeated family first escaped to the Al-Murrah tribe of the Empty Quarter and then took shelter in Kuwait until 1902.[83] Despite the undoubted Rashidī hegemony in central Arabia during the 1890s, the struggle for power between the two dynasties continued during the first quarter of the twentieth century, which eventually culminated in the foundation of the third Saʿūdī state, the modern Kingdom of Saʿūdī Arabia in 1932.

The struggle for power in Arabia had also witnessed the formation of international interests in the region. As stated above, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the British Empire had been wrapping around the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf with protectorates[84]. These were the main steppingstones for the British naval power, either militarily or commercially, to gain access to the Indian Ocean.[85] That being the case, safeguarding its interests (the imperial telegraph communications

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[81] Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 26.

[82] According to the Ottoman archive, however, al-Riyāḍ had already been taken by the Rashidīs in 1888, three years before 1891. BOA, Y. PRK. MYD., 10/5.

[83] Here Zekeriya Kurşun, maintains that the family survived on the allowance provided for them by the Ottoman government, Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 146.

[84] The two of the most important are Bahrain in 1861, and Egypt in 1882.

[85] Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 206.

with India and Australia[86] for instance) in its thoroughfare, i.e., the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, was of paramount importance for the British Empire, and it was certain that the British had been successful in securing their imperial interests in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, Alexei Vassiliev designated the Persian Gulf as, "a British lake," naming it, "the Pax-Britannica in the Gulf."[87] This success, however, needed consolidation from time to time when, for instance, such British protectorates as Muscat and Bahrain[88] had become the object of disagreement between the British Empire and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite. Besides, Wahhābī piracy in the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf[89], particularly during the 1810s and 1820s (a time span during which Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's forces had been operating against the Wahhābis in Arabia, and the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea was the bridgehead for the Egyptian forces) had been one of the main concerns for the British Empire, and Wahhābī piracy had severely been condemned by the British consul-general in Egypt.[90] On this basis, the relationship between the British Empire, and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite cannot be said to have been

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid., 185.

[89] Cook, "The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm," 15.

[90] Here, Henry Salt's observations regarding the Wahhābī piracy is interesting: "…It undoubtedly would be far better that His Highness [i.e., Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha] should have a preponderating influence there [i.e., the red Sea] than that such pirates as the Wahhābis should have possession of the sea." Also, according to Salt, because of their intolerance the Wahhābis were "enemies to the progress of civilization" and "the destruction of that sect which threatened at one time to have overspread not only in Arabia but some of the finest provinces of the Ottoman Empire and to have restored by its baneful influence the darkness of the first ages of Islamism." And "… of late the Wahhābis have become more daring in their incursions there than ever and that very lately they attacked and took one of his [i.e., Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha] smaller vessels. Under such circumstances, he urged the necessity of having naval force there to repel their insults, since otherwise it would be no longer safe for even his sons to pass to and from the Ḥijāz." Theophilus C. Prousis, *British Consular Reports from The Ottoman Levant in an Age of Upheaval, 1815-1830* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2008), 181–214.

in an amicable fashion and, at least, neutrality[91] in the internal politics of Arabia was the main approach of the British Empire up until the beginning of the Great War.[92]

Here, the theoretical approach to the second Saʿūdī state is based on three periods: Accordingly, the time span between 1811-1840 is analyzed in terms of a struggle for the establishment of an imperial domination in Arabia. Afterwards, follows the period between 1840-1871 during which the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite in Najd had enjoyed a relative autonomy in the absence of a central authority. The final stage, the twenty-year duration between 1871-1891, contrary to the former one, stages an attempt, even a venture in the name of establishing a central bureaucratic authority in the region by the hands of the Tanzimat bureaucratic elite. All in all, the struggle for imperial domination in Arabia, the relative autonomy enjoyed by the Najdī elite, and the military involvement of the Sublime Porte in 1871 are determinant in the political course of Najd and its environs during the nineteenth century, and thus, will form a kaleidoscope to elaborate the hegemonic relations that had been built in nineteenth-century Najd and its surroundings.

First, the multi-layered relations of obedience among the local and global contenders are analyzed in the context of imperialism. Namely, the Ottoman Empire and Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's Egypt, particularly through use of military force. To serve this purse, the political circumstances of the region, i.e., Syria, the Ḥijāz, and Najd, is discussed as developments in an era of imperialism. The military intervention of Egypt in the Ḥijāz, thence in Najd, and finally in Syria which went on up until 1840 had come to an end with the sanctions of the Convention of London in1840[93] and with

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[91] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 214.

[92] Alexei Vassiliev, ibid., 185–187.

[93] Also known as "Convention for the Pacification of the Levant". (Annex.) – Separate Act to the Convention of 15th July 1840: *Conditions imposed on Mehemet Ali. Withdrawal of Egyptian Troops from Arabia, Candia, &c.* "The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of 10 days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from the all the Holy Cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman

the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from the region, thus creating a power vacuum in the already indeterminate political atmosphere of Arabia; during which the authority was going to be delegated by the Sublime Porte to the local power brokers, i.e., the Saʿūdī elite of al-Riyāḍ in an unease fashion. The main characteristic of the given time span, however, is the indirect involvement of the central Ottoman government in the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī issue which displays the turbulent context in which the Ottoman government had found itself during the early nineteenth century, and as a result, was not yet capable of directly intervening in the politics of Arabia, at least until 1871. However, the central intervention in Arabia was formed and executed through the hands of another aspiring center, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's Egypt, (in the guise of) a proxy for the Ottoman government in Arabia, between 1811 and 1840. Eventually, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's "old and deep-seated interest in Syria"[94] and in the Arabian Peninsula hit the wall of the international interests of the European powers (Britain, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia, and Russia), i.e., "to protect the weak Ottoman Empire from total collapse"[95], with the Convention of London.

Second, the time span between 1840 and 1871 is analyzed as a period during which the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite had enjoyed a relatively autonomous political existence in Najd compared to the period between 1818 and 1840 and determined the local policies almost alone. In other words, in the absence of a central authority the

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Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pashalic of Acre, as above defined." Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, 3 vols., (London: Harrison, 1875), 2, 1013; "Temmuz 1840 Muahedenamesi" as appeared in Charles Seignobos, *Tarih-i Siyasi*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Akdam Matbaası, 1908) 2, 141; Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 291; for the full text of the Convention see R. Hughes Thomas, *Treaties, Agreements, and Engagements* (Bombay: Bombay Education Society's Press, 1851), 879-887.

[94] Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 48–49; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 58.

[95] M.M Badawi, "The Background," in *Modern Arabic Literature*, ed. M. M. Badawi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7.

Najdī elite was able to impose their own centralization agenda on Arabia.[96] For the Ottoman *raison d'état* up to 1871, however, the paramount expectation from Arabia, and thus from the Najdī elite, was the establishment of *emniyet ve asayiş*[97], particularly for the safety of pilgrimage[98], in the region.

Naturally, during the period, the obedience of the local population was – as it had formerly been – to the given elite, not to the Sublime Porte, not to the Turks definitely. That pattern of autonomy and policy making, had been valid only during the emirates of Ibn Turkī, and his son Faisāl. The emirate of Faisal's son ʿAbd Allāh, on the other hand, had witnessed the end of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī dominance in Arabia, only for temporarily. However, the reasons for the late coming of the *Tanzimat* reforms and its centralization policy in Arabia, only in 1871, are hidden in the context of the long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire and the sequence of events descended upon the Empire, particularly during the first half of the given century, is determinant in that delay; the Napoleonic invasion in Egypt between 1798 and 1802 followed by the gradually climbing autonomy that Egypt had gained in the hands of the Pasha during the first decades of 1800s, the Serbian uprising in 1804, the dethronement of Selim III in 1808, the Greek revolt between 1821-1830, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, the total abolition of the traditional janissary army in Istanbul in 1826, the

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[96] This vacuum of authority in Arabia following 1840s is summarized by Midhat Pasha as follows: "Upon the conditions of the Wahhābis which had lately occurred and in order to take control of Najd again, sixty years earlier, forces were dispatched from Egypt and despite the fact that al-Riyāḍ, al-Dirʿiyya, and Asha *qıtʿa*s attachment to the Sublime State had been renewed to some extent, after a short time span, with the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces, and also the state, with the intervention of several calamities, was not able to direct the necessary attention; [thus, the region] was left aside and since it were almost forgotten, the mentioned *qıtʿa* was left to the Wahhābī family again." Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 104–5.

[97] Midhat, 15. Security and public order was one of the main characteristic objectives of the *Tanzimat* Era. As Metin Ünver states, "However, fiscal concerns were not the sole motive behind the administrative arrangements which had been carried out in the provinces after the [proclamation of the] *Tanzimat* [Edict]. The establishment of central state administration by providing security and public order were another important target." Metin Ünver, "Vilayet Nizamnamelerinin Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatına Etkileri (1864-1876)," in *1864 Vilayet Nizamnamesi*, ed. Erkan Tural and Selim Çapar (Ankara: TODAİE, 2015), 98.

[98] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 58.

two wars against Egypt, the proclamation of the *Tanzimat* Edict in 1839 which marks the beginning of the reform age, uprisings in Nish in 1841 and in Vidin in 1850, the direct effect of the 1848 revolutions in France on Eflâk and on the various millets of the Ottoman Empire, which also created some serious concerns related to a possible Russian and Austrian threat in the *Avrupâ-yi Osmânî*,[99] the Crimean War between 1853-56; which culminated in the Congress of Paris in 1856, the proclamation of the *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) in 1856, and finally, a Cretan uprising in 1866-9. Apart from all these, the strenuous clash against the peripheral *aʿyan*s and the Russian military intervention in the Balkans were other initial vital factors for the Ottoman centralization in the region.[100] Consequently, the late coming of the direct Ottoman military intervention in the region, only in May 1871, i.e., to al-Aḥsāʾ first, and only after thence to Najd, ought to be evaluated in the given political context and, inevitably, the characterization of the way in which the Ottoman Empire involved in the political situation in Najd is read through the dichotomy between the pre and post Tanzimat Era.

The division between the core provinces, *timarlı*[101], "autonomous financial units charged with maintaining a balanced budget"[102] and the outer provinces, *sâlyâneli*[103], "where the state claims all the tax revenues, paying governors a yearly salary in cash,

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[99] Eduard P. Engelhardt, *Tanzîmât ve Türkiye: Devlet-i Osmânî'nin Târih-i Islahâtı*, trans. Ali Reşâd (İstanbul: Kanaat Kütübhânesi, 1328), 82–83.

[100] Halil İnalcık, "Recession of the Ottoman Empire and Rise of the Saudi State," *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, no. 3 (1988): 71.

[101] Ömer L. Barkan, "Timar," in *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler 1* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 805–6.

[102] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8.

[103] "SĀLIYĀNE," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 994; also, Ömer L. Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) Malî Yılına Âit Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 19, no. 1–4 (1957): 287–88.

while local authorities were responsible for the collection of taxes and the payment of all local salaries."[104] in the Ottoman provincial system takes to the stage, and, in accordance with Karen Barkey, it dictates the difference between direct rule and indirect rule.[105] Bruce Masters, in the context of the Arab provinces, presents the given division in the Ottoman provincial system as 'the inner zone,' and 'the outer circle'.[106] While the former provinces (Syria and Iraq) were under the direct control of the central Ottoman authority by the centrally assigned governors, thus; had a relative autonomy in the local administration, the latter were rarely administered by appointed governors[107] (except for the *Vali*, *qāḍī*, and *defterdar* were appointed), and "preserved some local autonomy"[108]. "In their stead," writes Bruce Masters, "local warlords ruled, although they also professed fealty to the sultan, and collected taxes in his name."[109] Thus, according to Masters' categorization, four different types of elites had ascended in the political realm of the Arab provinces: (1) Tribal/clan based groups (including the Wahhābīs), (2) Neo-Memluks, (3) Ottoman military forces and (4) the local *aʿyan*.[110] From this perspective, it is quite clear that Masters does analyze the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity as a local warlord elite with a distinct religious identity, not as a part

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[104] Ibid., 8.

[105] Karen Barkey, *The Empire of Difference,* 86; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 105.

[106] Masters, "Semi-Autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces," 186.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Halil Inalcık, ibid., 105.

[109] Bruce Masters, ibid., 186.

[110] Ibid., 186–87.

of *aʿyan* paradigm.[111] It is, however, true that his evaluation of *aʿyan* is relevant to the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century does not make any significant change in the religio-political condition of the House of Saʿūd; they had still been the warlords during the course of the nineteenth century. In other words, they did not mutate into "*Necid ayanı.*" Nor did they ever see – apart from themselves – a governor, nor a bureaucrat who had directly been appointed by the central government. To sum up, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite of Najd, particularly after the Convention of London in 1840, enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in the central and eastern shores of Arabia, appointed local rulers and *qāḍī*s, levied taxes almost like the first Saʿūdī emirate. The 1871 Ottoman military intervention in the region gains meaning in this context, and, for the part of the Porte, ought to be elaborated as a struggle for political existence in Arabia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Third, the twenty-year period between 1871 and 1891 is examined both as the climax of the Porte's struggle for the establishment of a centralized administration in Arabia, i.e., in Najd and in al-Aḥsāʾ, and – following Abdulhamid II's accession to the throne in 1876, and the commencement of withdrawal of the *Necid Fırka-i Askeriyesi* (the Military Division of Najd) from Najd in 24 November 1873[112] – as a time span during which Istanbul's dominant political pattern in the region had been divide and rule[113]. Right at this point a principal question in the Tanzimat historiography, which is "who governed between 1839 and 1876"[114] determines the line of governance between the *Sérail*, and *Bāb-ı Āli* (Sublime Porte). As far as the literature on the

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[111] In fact, Masters suggests a revision for the *aʿyan* paradigm. Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 85. İnalcık, "Recession of the Ottoman Empire and Rise of the Saudi State," 70–71.

[112] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 128.

[113] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 203.

[114] Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Tanzimāt," in *The Cambridge History of Modern Turkey*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11; Donald Quataert, ibid, 64–65; Şükrü Hanioğlu, ibid., 73.

Tanzimat Era is concerned, the answer to the question is *Bāb-ı Āli*, which, as for C. V. Findley, can also be identified as "a civil bureaucratic hegemony"[115] and for Donald Quataert "a bureaucratic ascendancy" and a continuation from a pre-modern to a modern form in the state.[116] Hence, in the final analysis, the elimination of intermediating groups, and establishing their direct authority had been the main target of the *Tanzimat* elite during the nineteenth century.[117] This means, in other words, a strict centralization (especially centralization of the fiscal power and administration), and a modernization policy (particularly to modernize legislation, military, education and communication) was adopted by the Sublime Porte in a top-down fashion.[118]

The Tanzimat era, however, is not monolithic. On the contrary, it has, as maintained by R. H. Davison, two distinct stages; the first being in between 1839 and 1856, and the second in between 1856 and 1876, and, while Reshid Pasha had been the leading statesman of the former, Âli and Fuad Pashas, and finally Midhat Pasha had been the dominant reforming figures of the latter.[119] In this context, it is this Midhat Pasha who had been a monumental figure in the application of 'the revised and generalized'[120] – thus, relatively more centralized – provincial administrative system of the central government. To this end, 1864 *Vilâyet Nizamnamesi*[121] (Provincial

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[115] Carter Vaughn Findley, ibid., 17.

[116] Donald Quataert, ibid., 64.

[117] Ibid., 65.

[118] R. H. Davison, "TANẒĪMĀT," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. P. J. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 201.

[119] Ibid., 201.

[120] Carter Vaughn Findley, ibid., 26–27.

[121] "By 1869, the Ottoman geography had been divided into 23 civilian administrative units. These also include Crete, which has a special nizamname, and the Ḥijāz provinces. As can be seen, Provincial Administration Law and the new administrative structure that it brought in was not immediate, on the

Administration Law) was prepared by the bureaucratic elite and was going to be particularly practiced first in the newly organized *Tuna Vilâyeti* (Danube province, which had been founded by conjoining Silistre, Vidin and Niş together as a new *vilâyet*) which was selected as a testing ground for the application of the new provincial law under the governorship of Midhat Pasha. In other words, the centralization schedule of the Tanzimat era had been tested in his governorate of *Tuna Vilâyeti* before he was assigned to Baghdad as its governor. In *Tabsıra-i İbret*, through his description of Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ we can have a glimpse of his future agenda for Arabia during his governorate of Baghdad:

> Namely, the *qıtʿa* (province) called as Najd covers the one fourth, and by another consideration one fifth of the Arabian Peninsula. During the time of Sultan Sulayman the Great, following his repulsion of the Portuguese who had been attacking and menacing in the Sea of Basra, those places, and the island of Bahrain were included in the lands of the Ottomans. And yet, even though the direction of Ahsa, which is the most prosperous and thriving part of Najd, had been kept under reasonable control for quite a long time by the assignment of a governor from *Der Saadet* (the Porte), a century earlier, with the prevail of Wahhābīs, the control and government of Najd had passed to the hands of the sons of Saʿūd, and even the island of Bahrain, with the protectorate of alien foreigners had turned into a separate government.[122]

As it is obvious that in Midhat Pasha's consideration Istanbul had hardly had authority in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ since the first days of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī ascendancy in the region, and only in this context does the 1871 military intervention make sense. In other words, Tanzimat elite, which had become concrete in the character of Midhat Pasha during 1860s and 1870s, knew that the functioning of the new administrative structure and thus the establishment of the central authority could only be obtained through the help of an armed force, i.e., a direct military intervention. Also, because the region had not seen any central government since 1840, and as far as Midhat Pasha was concerned in his memoire, had been in a state of disorder, it is not hard to fathom why the Ottoman *raison d'état* had found it necessary to dispatch a military expedition

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contrary, it had permeated in the country in time." Metin Ünver, "Vilayet Nizamnamelerinin Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatına Etkileri (1864-1876)," 110.

[122] Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 104.

in the region; the state was going to secure its existence and authority in the nineteenth century Arabia militarily. Consequently, what we see in the administration of the region, is an ascendancy of the military class. As for Metin Ünver, particularly after the *Nizāmnāme* of 1871, many administrative units such as Trebizond, Danube, ʿAsīr, Saida (Sidon), even Bosnia and Thessalonica had been governed by the military commanders at the level of *müşīr* (marshal) and *ferīk* (general); besides, in the same line with this, the marshalship of the sixth army, and the governorship of Baghdad had been joined together as a single administrative unit in 1872, and Rauf Pasha was appointed as its new governor.[123] Similarly, the administrators of the *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* were also appointed mostly from the military class. As these appointments are closely related with the fact that these provinces are in the borders, and with the effort of the central government to take these provinces under its direct control, or with its effort to sedentarize the local nomad population, it would not be wrong to say that in the core of this application lies *emniyet ve asâyiş* (securitivist) approach for the Ottoman central government.[124]

According to Karen Barkey, an empire is "a 'negotiated' enterprise where the basic configuration of relationships between imperial authorities and peripheries is constructed piece meal in a different fashion for each periphery, creating a patchwork pattern of relations with structural holes between peripheries."[125] In this context, so long as they patronize Wahhābism as a means to their political ends, as an ideological authority in other words, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite have always been able to negotiate on the political map of Arabia, either as opposed to the Ottomans (as the in case of the first Saʿūdī state), or together with the Ottomans (as in the case of second Saʿūdī state).

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[123] Metin Ünver, ibid., 110.

[124] Ibid., 111.

[125] Karen Barkey, *The Empire of Difference,* 1; Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 93.

1.2. Primary Sources

The Ottoman archives at the Prime Minister's Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, henceforth BOA) is the principal reference guide for this study. With the recently digitalized cataloging and classification system, the archival material presented to researcher is abundant so long as the correct keywords are supplied into the system. In this respect, many keywords – and some of their variations in the old Turkish manuscripts – have been included during the research for collecting the related documents. For instance, the first keywords which have been searched for are "*Vehhābī*" (Wahhābī), "*urbān*" (desert Bedouins), "*Suud*", "*İbn Suud*" (or the names of some other such import family figures from the Sauds as "*Süneyyan*, *Faysal*, *İbn Faysal* or *ʿAbd Allāh İbn Faysal*"), "*Suud familyası*" (the family or house of Saʿūd); also, '*İbn Reşīd*' and their besides, names of the significant settlements and ports ("İskele" in our case, like "*Yenbu İskelesi*" or "*Hufuf İskelesi*") located in Arabia, "Riyad" (or '*Riyaz*' as it mostly appears in this form in the manuscripts), "*Uyeyne*, *Diriyye*," "*Necid*" or "*Necid Kıtası*" (or "*Kıt'ası*"). In addition to these, the names of the Ottoman bureaucrats and centrally appointed governors who served in the region during the nineteenth century are also included in the search, such as "*Midhat Paşa*", or "*Rauf Paşa*". Names of the places where the Ottoman central administrative units were located are also helpful, like "*Bağdat Valiliği*," "*Necid Mutasarrıflığı*" or, for the governmental officials, "*Necid Mutasarrıfı*." These, however, are only some examples for a possible future researcher, and the number can easily be increased on the condition that one must know he or she is searching on a modern Turkish based search engine, thus, the names can have some different variations, and all of which must be covered to achieve and collect a satisfactory portfolio of documents. To emphasize here again, many of the names that have been included in the BOA database might not be written in their proper transcription form. To give an example, if one is searching for the documents which bears the signifier "Wahhābī" on them, then, shall not search for it in its proper transliteration into modern Turkish as "*Vehhābī*"; instead, simply "*Vahhabi*" or "*Vehhabi*" would be enough.

In this study Midhat Pasha's (1822-1884) memoir, *Tabsıra-i İbret* (Let My Life Be an Example) takes a central place both in the context of the arrival and application

of Tanzimat reforms in Baghdad, *Şam Vilâyeti*, Arabia, and for the firsthand narrative of the Ottoman military intervention in Arabia, for he was the architect of the 1871 al-Aḥsāʾ Campaign. The memoir, however, had been compiled and published by his son, Ali Haydar Midhat, on 1 July 1325 (14 July 1909), owing to the fact Midhat Pasha had been strangled[126] in Taif, Arabia, in 1884; for an alleged coup against Abdulhamid II. In fact, as far as Ali Haydar Midhat is concerned, this event was the main objective behind the publication of Midhat Pasha's memoir; he was to prove his father's innocence of the alleged crimes attributed to him.[127] To this end, Ali Haydar Midhat, in the dedication section of the memoir, emphasizes the patriotism of his father in various places, and his efforts in the modernization of the empire for forty-five years. In the opening words he clearly manifests the resentment he feels since he believes that the memory of his father and all his contribution in the four corners of the empire for reform had long been forgotten. So, his aim is to remind "his fellow countrymen"[128] of his father's deeds, not only as a mere diligent statesman, but also as a martyr to reform and modernization. As he puts it, Midhat Pasha's efforts and intentions was "to present to the Ottoman nation *bir hayāt-ı cedīd* (a new life); to develop and make prosperous the sacred motherland which turned into a ruin due to the lack of *emniyet* (security), *asāyiş* (public order), justice and government." But how was his memoir penned and compiled? As one reads through the foreword learns that it was written secretly, under the strict surveillance of the guards, and even the slightest 'noise' might have jeopardized the safety of the manuscript. So, they had to "station lookouts at the doors and windows in order to be able to hide it from the curios gazes of the guards." Thus, in his words, the memoir "was written under the impediments of many hardships." Moreover, as he denotes, his father's memoir is "a pleading against the verdict which had been given by the coward and vile judges of a tyrant ruler." But, in

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[126] We are provided with a clear narrative of his strangulation, even the names involved in the event are presented in the work. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 313–22.

[127] With his words: "This book is the first step to an attempt to 'officially' prove the innocence, acquittal and exculpation of the mentioned (Midhat Pasha)." Ali Haydar Midhat, ibid., 1.

[128] Ibid.

the end, according to Ali Haydar Midhat, "some parts" of his father's manuscripts, "through a secure means" had reached in the hands of his family that, by then, had been living in İzmir and being kept as "a sacred heirloom" in his hands. He also lets the reader know about how the book was safeguarded and reached in his hands as manuscripts. As a caution, Midhat Pasha had Hayrullah Efendi, who, with Fahri Bek Efendi, was one of the two witnesses of the events in Taif, written two other copies apart from the original *hatt-ı dest* (manuscript). However, the original manuscript, as Ali Haydar Midhat writes, "had been kept hidden in a secure place in the prison. But somehow, I do not know why, before the day he was executed, because it was taken out from the place where it had been, it was passed to the hands of the executers, and might possibly have been sent to Sultan Abdulhamid." One of the other two copies, on the other hand, "was sent by Hayrullah Efendi, in a date box, to Tuğlacızade Mustafa Efendi, the chamberlain, (with a note on the box) "to be delivered to" the sheikh of *Balat Tekkesi*, Kemal Efendi. But it could not be delivered to him." The other one, "was entrusted to Ali Vasfi Efendi, *Evrak Müdir Muavini* (the Assistant Director of Papers), by Fahri Bek Efendi in Taif, and he kept it safe as buried in soil, in a tin cup, until the declaration of the [second] constitution." He also tells us that he relied on the oral narratives of the two witnesses of the *events*[129] that had taken place in Taif: Hayrullah Efendi and Fahri Bek Efendi and added these oral statements to the appendix of the book. All things considered, the memoir provides the reader with considerable knowledge of how *Tanzimat* and its centralization policy was brought in the eastern Arabia through the hands of a *Tanzimat* statesman during the second half of the nineteenth century. However, here we did cross check the memoir with the related archival documents from the given period since it is obvious that the memoir had been compiled and published by an aggrieved and resentful son who had to rely on the oral testimony of his father's fellow friends.

Eyüp Sabri Pasha's (d. 1890) *Târih-i Vehhâbiyân*, published in 1879, also presents an historical account of the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state as well as the Egyptian

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[129] Ali Haydar Midhat uses the word "murder" instead of "the event." Midhat, 3.

intervention in the Ḥijāz and Arabia. He is also the writer of some other works; mainly on the history of Islam, the most famous of which is his three volume *Mir'atü'l-Harameyn* (Mirror of the Two Holy Cities), 1887-89. *Tārih-i Vehhābiyān*, on the other hand, being written through the eyes of a Turkish intellectual, a naval officer and a military instructor – first at *Rüşdiyye-i Bahriyye Mektebi Müdiri* (the Administrator of Naval High School), then at *Mekteb-i Fünûn-ı Bahriyye* (the School of Naval Sciences) – provides the reader with the ideological stance of an Ottoman intellectual. Apart from his administrative responsibilities[130], as a state officer who served in the Ḥijāz for a long time, he was also interested in the history of the region. In this respect, his work reflects the Ottoman *raison d'état* for the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī political formation. For Eyüp Sabri Pasha, however, this Najdī *madhhab* is merely the Wahhābis. They, in his prose, are the loose cannons of the Arabian deserts, and those who attached themselves to them are simply "the brainless mob" of the *urban*. In short, to be more precise, Eyüp Sabri Pasha does not leave the beaten track of the Ottoman intelligentsia of the nineteenth century and, to serve the purpose, labels the Najdī sect and its members as *mülhid*s; those who leave the right path of Islam and perverted into a diabolical route; those who leave Islam only to become profaners, and their presence for the religion of God is a blasphemy. He also makes an analogy between the Wahhābis of the eighteenth century and the Qarmatīs (p. *Qarāmita*) of the tenth century in respect to the sameness of their geographical origin, al-Aḥsāʾ, and the resemblance of the way in which they had blocked and plundered the road to pilgrimage. Rather than the many differences, like the Qarmatīs' being a Shīʿa sect and the myriad different conditions under which they had operated, for him merely these two factors, i.e., banditry, are enough to label them as *the same*. For him, in other words, the Wahhābis of Najd are the historical reflections of the almost-a-millennium-old Qarmatians. In this respect, his work, and his approach to Wahhābism can be evaluated as a stereotype in the nineteenth century Turkish literature, in the same line with Cevdet Pasha or with Lütfi Pasha.

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[130] As the warden of *Muhsebat-ı Bahriyye* (Accounts of the Navy) and as the second warden of the Commission of *Islahat-ı Bahriyye* (Naval Reforms).

There is, however, one crucial point of his work: As a nineteenth century Turkish intellectual, why did he choose to write on the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī emirate instead of writing on a contemporary one, i.e., the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state? This question shows us the arbitrariness of the historical periodization, and the contemporariness of Wahhābism as a religio-political entity. Put differently, "the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state" is a definition which is relevant only to the modern historiographical concern. There was no such nomenclature, nor a definition for the Ottoman *raison d'état* during the nineteenth century. It was, for Istanbul and *Bāb-ı Āli*, only a highly problematic, an insurgent, and a heretic-sectarian movement which had been marauding and creating an unstable political situation in Arabia since the beginning of the nineteenth century. So, even though Eyüp Sabri Pasha does not answer our question, his silence on the events that had taken place during the second half of the nineteenth century Arabia might be searched in this final point.

Since they represent a counterweight against the Ottoman archival material, and most of the time complementary to the Ottoman documents, Foreign Office (FO) materials are among the other relevant primary sources. Apart from the relatively minor events, the correspondence includes intelligence about the such important Ottoman bureaucrats in the region as Midhat Pasha, and two of his successors, Rauf and Redif Pashas, information on military campaigns that had been conducted in the region for some time, particularly the one that had been going on in al-Aḥsāʾ by the Ottoman Empire, some detailed account of the border disputes[131] between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, and some other accounts of piratical activity in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, Qatar and Kuwait. All in all, the document is an important reference source for the construction of the work in hand, and, thus, is employed as a counterbalance to verify or to negate the Ottoman archival material.

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[131] The issue of building a guard house by the Ottoman Empire in a town called Laooran, in the east of modern Darbandikan Lake, Iraq, and very close to the ruined village of Drolla, on the Persian border, is covered for some pages in the document.

Another central work, a selection of archival documents mostly from the records of the Foreign Office collection at the Public Record Office, *Records of the Hejaz*[132] (*Records* hereafter), was published by Anita L. P. Burdett in eight volumes in 1996. Covering the nineteenth century diplomatic correspondence of the British representation in the Ḥijāz, sent first to the representative in Egypt and thence to Istanbul, the selection is a significant source reference for the period, particularly for the fact that it includes the Sheriff of Ḥijāz's several challenges to the Wahhābis in al-Riyāḍ, which in the long run, i.e., during the first quarter of the twentieth century, was going to be entitled in the Foreign Office documents as "the blood feud between the Ḥijāz and al-Riyāḍ."[133] Apart from the challenge and antagonism between the two local political entities, *Records* subsume many other such issues that had been going on in the region as from the Napoleonic wars, trade and the navigability of the regional waters and rivers, Euphrates and Tigris, description of the local central cities and conflicts both at the local and imperial levels, to the Bedouins, local disturbances and the efforts to settle them, the issues on local administration. For the work in hand, however, the first, the second, the third, and the seventh volumes contain significant number of correspondences which are highly relevant to us.

Covering the years between 1745 and 1850, ʿUthmān ibn Bishr's (1795-1873) two volume *ʿUnwān al-Majd fi Taʾrikh Najd* (*History of Najd*) is a primary source for anyone who studies on the history of the Najd and on the second Saʿūdī state. Typical for any chronicle, Bishr starts his work with the biography of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and examines his life under short titles which are covered and sequenced under the years. In final section of the second volume, he also provides the reader with a section, named *al-Sawābiq* (the Precedent [Events*): Record of Events in Najd Before the Appearance of al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*," covering the years between 1446 and 1743. The boundary of the work in hand is limited to present all the titles in the book, but what is obvious from the given ones is that the book is a Wahhābī

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[132] Anita L. P. Burdett, *Records of the Hejaz 1798-1925*, 8 vols. (Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1996).

[133] Richard N. Schofield and Gerald Blake, eds., *Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957* (Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1988), 585.

grand narrative and serves to justify the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī cause historically. Some comprehensive evaluations and critics of *History of Najd* can be found in the literature on Wahhābism, depending on this fact, here, our aim is not to quote from the secondary literature. Instead, for the sake of a relatively objective approach to the source and for the sake of *intentio auctoris*, some short sections and anecdotes are directly going to be quoted from the source. So, after a classical introductory line to his chronicle, Ibn Bishr confesses the reason why he compiled his work:

> And I know that the people of Najd, their scholars say both of the past and of the modern, there was not amongst them who does care about the history of their days, nor their country, nor those who had built it, nor what had happened to them; nor about who had marched from it and marched towards it; except anecdotes written by some scholars; these, however, are not worthy of note, because; when they mention of the year they say, "in this year son of so and so was killed," but do not mention his name, nor do they mention of the reason why he was killed; and even when they mention of a battle or of an event they say, 'in this year happened the event of this and that.' Yet we know that, since the time of Adam to our day, there has always been war, but we want to know of the truth and the reason, and what odd, interesting and surprising things occurred; and all that in their history were non-existent.
>
> Verily then I wanted to collect a collection on the events of the House of Saʿūd, and on their days and news; yet, I did not find anything informing me on them credibly; and no scholar who does say the truth, even those who narrate in detail and particular; lie and falsehood at the end of this time prevailed on the people; so, we do not dare to write everything he transferred on the paper since we found him when he had heard a saying then he transferred it from one place to another with more of it and less of it. Fabricating lies prevailed on them; and they tried all possible ways in this. We ask God the Almighty to deliver us from error in speech and in deed.
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> And I traced the dates of their days and did not find anything that which heals even the slightest; and I did not find anything which permits a statement of the events and their places which might be a cure for the illness; apart from that verily I found ʿAlī b. Sallūm al-Wahbī who nicely indicates the sequence of the years, yet described the events that which does not help and did not make an investigation of the events and their places so that one can make benefit of it; his descriptions, however, reaches until the closing of the death of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad b. Saʿūd.[134]

[134] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān Al-Majd Fi Tarikh Najd*, 1:29–30.

As a chronicler, Bishr, apart from the one that of Ibn Sallūm's, does not provide his reader with any written reference from which he took his subject matter. This is, as seen above, is in fact what he complains and is the main reason and apology for compiling his work. In short, as maintained by al-ʿUthaymīn, his work is a compendium of oral narration.[135]

His prose, on the other hand, is rather dull and plain, far from *jeux de mots*,[136] "Oriental floweriness"[137] or rhetorical concerns which might easily be encountered in any classical Arabic text. In his prose traces of rhymed prose, can still be seen which makes it clear that even a nineteenth century chronicler had not been able to evade the classical imitation of the language. After all, the presence of *saj* does not spoil his clear narrative style. This is good tidings for anyone who studies on Arabic sources. Because otherwise – the classical *balagha* of Arabic – might have been rather discouraging and intimidating particularly for the newcomer. His style does not display any significant change in the course of the work.

> Then, after this, a woman was brought before the Shaykh. She confessed to have committed adultery in his presence. After it was proved in his presence that she was verily a chaste and virtuous woman; then he repeated the acknowledgment from her, and he asked about whether her being of sound minded or not. And then he said: 'Perhaps you had been raped?' Yet she acknowledged [the same thing] and confessed that which required stoning. Thus, he ordered this to be done and she was stoned. And his authority became greater after this and his power grew, and *tawhīd* (the unity of God) and *al-ʿamr bi'l-maʿrūf wa'n-nahy ʿan al-munkar* (the enjoining of virtue and the prohibition of vice) spreaded.

Here we see that Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb does not judge the women on his own accord, nor on his own decision; in fact, according to the narrative, her acknowledgement and confession 'required stoning' according to Islamic law. In other words, he had nothing but to have sentenced her to death by stoning; this is what

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[135] ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), xviii.

[136] H. A. R. Gibb, *Arabic Literature: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 8.

[137] Ibid., 9.

sharia, God's law necessitates. So, Ibn Bishr presents Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as a mere means for the realization of the *shariʿa* law; not less, not more. *History of Najd* is a primary source for the second Saʿūdī state[138], for it provides the researcher with a wide scope of Wahhābī perspective in addition and as opposed to that of the Ottomans.

C. Brockelmann provides us with a short summary on the life Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, together with a list of the works which had been written and compiled on his doctrine as well as the political struggles of the Saʿūd dynasty subsumed under "D. Ḥanbaliten und Wahhābiten."[139]

1.3. Secondary Sources

Secondary literature on Wahhābism is rich. The reason for this cannot be separated from the fact that Salafism, and Wahhābism in particular, had shaped the intellectual and political picture of the Middle East, and eventually that of the world in a remarkable way starting from the late nineteenth century, and especially after the discovery of the rich oil deposits in the eastern region of Saʿūdī Arabia, al-Aḥsāʾ, during the 1930s which made the House of Saʿūd and their ideology a worldwide player in the modern political field. In this respect, to be able to understand the political dominance of the Saʿūd dynasty, both in Arabia on a smaller, and in the Middle East on a broader scale, the modern historian of the twentieth century searched for the roots of their ideology and history. As a result of which, today, the history of Wahhābism and the House of Saʿūd has an abundant literature in the western academia. However, our aim here is not to include and introduce the whole secondary literature written on the Wahhābism. Instead, we want to contribute to the field by introducing some recent Turkish works on the issue.

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[138] ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb*, xvii.

[139] Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte Der Arabischen Litteratur*, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1938), 530–33.

Zekeriya Kurşun's two works, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti: Vehhabî Hareketi ve Suud Devleti'nin Ortaya Çıkışı* (The Ottoman Domination in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ: The Wahhābī Movement and the Emergence of the Saʿūdī State, henceforth The Ottoman Domination) and *Basra Körfezinde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar'da Osmanlılar 1871-1916*[140] (The Ottoman-British Conflict in the Gulf of Basra: The Ottomans in Qatar 1871-1916, henceforth The Ottoman-British Conflict) represent an exceptional archival contribution in the field of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Arabia and in the area of Wahhābism. While the latter is a complementary work, in the former Kurşun examines the development of Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity, starting from the emergence of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in Najd during the 1740s, and up until the break of the Great War. Following the classical pattern of periodization in the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī literature, however, he does not leave the beaten track in the structural formation of his work and presents the reader with three different Saʿūdī states consecutively spanning over a two hundred- and fifty-years' time.

In this regard, the first Saʿūdī state is, as far as Kurşun is concerned, in fact an inevitable result of the power vacuum in Arabia created by the political negligence of the Ottoman central authority. To quote his words, "The Ottoman state evaluated the *Vehhabî* movement which had dominated and directed the history of the region first as a religious entity, which in the end was bound to be eclipsed, and, to some extent, as fruitless and barren conflicts among the Shariffs of Mecca, the *Vehhabî*s, and the other local powers. Those sorts of conflicts which had their origins in the traditions had always been present in the region and had never caused considerable revolutions in any period of history. Both this *rehāvet* (slackness, lethargy) which was provided by historical experience, necessities and obligations of the distresses in which the Ottoman state had found itself did not let a timely intervention in the new formations which had been taking shape, and in the events that had been inflicting severe prestige

[140] Zekeriya Kurşun, *Basra Körfezinde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar'da Osmanlılar 1871-1916* (Ankara: TTK, 2004).

losses on the state in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ."[141] In the end, "the issue"[142] was solved by Mehmed ʿAlī Pasha's hand, who had been charged to suppress the insurgent ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿūd, yet, only to gain "a natural domain,"[143] namely; the Levant, the Ḥijāz, and inner parts of Arabia such as Najd on his own behalf.

So, it is in this context where he searches for the commencement of the second Saʿūdī state and holds Egypt responsible for the second ascendancy of the House of Saʿūd in the region. As he maintains, "Up until that time, through the Egyptian forces the Ottoman state had relatively been able to show its power in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ. The evacuation of the Egyptian forces from there with the mentioned 1840 protocol, however, caused to the emergence of a new power vacuum again. Because it was almost impossible for the Ottoman state which had had only a small amount of military force in the centers around Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ, in Jeddah and the Ḥijāz, to dominate in such vast geographies let alone the inner parts of Najd which were comprised of desert. Besides, the release of Faisal b. Turkī, who was an important leader of the House of Saʿūd that had been giving direction to the Wahhābī movement, or, at least, turning a blind eye to his escape from where he had been kept prisoner in Egypt since 1838 also helped the recuperation of the Wahhābis in Najd. With this, the state, because of the problems it had to deal with, did not have the opportunity to organize a military campaign. For this reason, a military demonstration was organized in Najd by way of sending the Sheriff of Mecca in the company of the limited number of soldiers against Faisal. With the impact of this operation a political settlement of the issue was brought in immediately. Accordingly, Faisal b. Turkī, on the condition of pursuing the application of the Ottoman tax laws in the region and paying an annual tax to the treasury of the Ḥijāz, was assigned as the *qāimmaqām* of al-Riyāḍ."[144] This

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[141] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 239–40.

[142] Ibid., 240.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid., 240–41.

assignment, for Kurşun, is the first manifestation of the Ottoman Empire's centralization policy in the region, particularly effected by the reforms of Mahmud II.[145]

On the other hand, it was not an effective implementation of the Ottoman direct control in the region, and indeed proved only as a palliative measure in the chaotic political map of the nineteenth century Arabia. So, the campaign of al-Aḥsāʾ was the military supplementary to this policy, so much so that, in his narrative, it was, "the manifestation of the state's authority," and, "the continuation of the policies whose aim was to build a centralized state."[146] As he maintains, "The Ottoman state, after Faisal ibn Turkī, invested the *qāimmaqām*ship of al-Riyāḍ to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal who had inherited the government and administration of the region according to the traditions. After a while, however, because of the internal strife which occurred in the House of Saʿūd, and with the danger into which ʿAbd Allāh's *qāimmaqām*ship fell, the Ottoman state found it necessary to directly intervene in the region. Thus, in 1871, the campaign of al-Aḥsāʾ had been organized whose justification was to reinstate ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal to his post as the *qāimmaqām* and demonstrating the power of the Porte on the coasts al-Aḥsāʾ, thence Najd. In fact, it was counted as the continuation of the policies whose aim was to build a centralized state."[147] This effort, as far as Kurşun is concerned, is crowned with the establishment of the *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* in Arabia, yet, by force of the circumstances, kept limited only on the coast of Najd, and, by 1874, in the inland concluded in returning to the conditions before 1841. In other words, this was the inefficacy and thus the failure of the Ottoman centralization policy in the region.

In this context, the downfall of the House of Saʿūd in 1891, and the collapse of the second Saʿūdī state at the hands of another local power, by the Rashidis, is

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[145] Ibid., 241.

[146] Ibid.

[147] Ibid.

explained as the result of an unease balance policy which had been practiced by Abdulhamid II during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. For Istanbul, in other words, Rashidis had been a counterbalance against the Saʿūdī hegemony. So, as Kurşun maintains, this policy caused a change in the power base of Arabia, a severe alteration from al-Riyāḍ, the Saʿūdī stronghold, to Hail, where the Rashidis of Jabal Shammar centered. The uneasiness of the mentioned balance policy is conspicuous in Kurşun's lines: "While turning a blind eye to Rashidis' growing stronger against the Saʿūdīs, Abdulhamid II, also, never wanted their power to reach at the level that of Saʿūdīs' once did. In other words, he saw Rashidis as an element of balance so long as they keep the Saʿūdīs under control. The best example of this can be seen in their capturing Najd and expulsing the Saʿūdīs from the region in 1891. The state did not develop any attitude towards this situation and just watched the events. However, the House of Saʿūd who had been deported from Najd was not ignored completely; they were both allowed to take residence in Kuwait, and a stipend was allotted to them from the state treasury."[148]

Thus, the closing years of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century is examined by Kurşun as a period during which a bipolar political concentration in Arabia had formed: Hail versus al-Riyāḍ. Having taken its side on the Rashidis the Ottoman central authority endeavored to keep the Saʿūdīs out of Najd, yet even the help of Hail did not prove effective against the family. To quote Kurşun, "This time, while the *qāimmaqām*ship of al-Riyāḍ was given to the house Saʿūd, the *amīr* of the House of Rashīd was also recognized as the *qāimmaqām* of Shammar and both of them were favored against each other, thus the balance had been conserved."[149] As a final point, Kurşun strongly emphasizes that, "Saʿūdīs' growing stronger in Najd

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[148] Ibid., 242.

[149] Ibid., 243.

as well as the important successes which they gained have always followed after by the calamities and problems into which the Ottoman state fell."[150]

To conclude, during Kurşun's analysis, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity is examined as a peripheral, and as an insurgent movement which is motivated by a religio-political ideology. His narrative tends to reduce the subject to a security problem in the far reaches of the empire, even though he acknowledges the theological chasm in terms of the religious creed between the Ottomans and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs. In his securitivist approach, in other words, the ideological aspect of Wahhābism shrinks into a power struggle between the central authority and the peripheral contender. To theorize, then, in Kurşun's terms, whenever the Ottoman center was strong and demonstrated its power with determination in the region, the peripheral locals tended towards cooperation with the central authority or, at least, tended not to revolt against the empire. Therefore, it is hard to say that he provides the reader with an overarching theory for the eighteenth and the nineteenth century Arabia. His work, after all, makes a major archival contribution to the field, even though his source criticism on the two different Wahhābī chroniclers, Ḥ. b. Ghannām and Ibn Bishr, is weak and deficient.

Another work in the Turkish literature on Wahhābism and the emergence of the first Saʿūdī emirate is Selda Güner's *Osmanlı Arabistanı'nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbî-Suûdîler (1744-1819).* In a broad sense, the fundamental reason behind the construction of the study, to quote directly from the author, is, "a concern to test some of the such widespread information pollution and legends as foreign political factors"[151] in the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī literature. As maintained by Güner, "…no information has been encountered on the presence or activity of the European states in the Arabian Peninsula in this period. In the absence of such information, it is thought that a foreign political factor had not been effective in the ascendance and gaining

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[150] Ibid.

[151] Güner is right with this concern since in the contemporary Turkish media it has been a trend to bring up the famous legend that Wahhābism was in fact a British conspiracy against the Ottoman Empire.

strength of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī uprising."[152] On the other hand, the center-periphery paradigm, as for the theoretical look, is the prominent approach in her study. "With regard to the Ottoman history, Wahhābism," as stated by Güner, "together with a theological interpretation laying behind, is an uprising which was carried out by the periphery against the center; it is an administrative and a political phenomenon."[153] In fact, the chasm of theological interpretation between the Ottoman Empire and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite is explained in the same center-periphery approach.[154] However, the roots and the reasons of their ascendance, particularly on the basis of faith, is not searched in the political or the economic situation of the eighteenth century Arabia, in Najd to be precise. This question is raised in various places in the course of the work.[155] In her words, Saʿūdī-Wahhābī uprising is only one of the uprisings which occurred in the Ottoman periphery of the eighteenth century. Explaining the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī uprising in the discourse of "corruption," "deterioration," or "decline," which are all related to the eighteenth century and/or in the process of decentralization would be an approach which is against the nature of the event. Najd is a peripheral area which is far from the classical Ottoman political and economic system. For instance, it did not experience the process of military changes, the monetization of the Eurasia-Atlantic economy and the financial system, the formation of the tax collection system (*iltizam*, "tax farming") in the seventeenth century, and the era of the manor system which again started in the seventeenth century. Besides, Najd did not have rich farmlands, nor was

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[152] Güner, *Osmanlı Arabistanı'nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbî Suûdîler (1744-1818)*, 9.

[153] Ibid., 1.

[154] "It is also possible to read Saʿūdī-Wahhābism only as Wahhābism, i.e., *madhab*, and in the religious argumentation of Wahhābism an assault on the Islamic legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan can be seen. According to this interpretation, while the ideology of the center is determined by the *Sunnī* (*Hanafī*) interpretation, on this side of the periphery located are the Wahhābis who rejects all of the other *madhaib*." Ibid., 2.

[155] Ibid., xiii, 17, 60, 61.

it able to take share from the Indian Ocean's trade or from the pilgrimage incomes."[156] Therefore, instead of a political and economic explanation, Güner maintains that it would be much easier to explain the situation from the point of the alliance between religion and sociology in the Ottoman Arabia.[157] In fact, it is right in this context she uses "the actual Arab sociology"[158] as a tool of explanation in the case of the emergence and formation of Wahhābism as a religio-political ideology at the hands of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. To sum up briefly, Güner analyzes the first Saʿūdī state in four chapters: "In Pursuit of the Golden Age," in which she examines the very first years of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and the emergence of Wahhābism as part of the greater *Salafiyyah*. In "The Alliance and Uprising," the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī phenomena is studied as a peripheral and uprising political entity until 1802-1803. The third chapter, "Banishment: The Army of Egypt in Arabia," tackles the Egyptian intervention in Arabia and Najd between 1811 and 1818, which brought the end of the first Saʿūdī state. The final chapter, "Uprising Against the *Devlet-i Aliyye*": Wahhābism from the Ottoman Perspective, deals with how the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity was perceived by the Ottoman central authority, as an empire, in terms of *raison d'état* and the reasons of their securitivist approach are sought.

Besides these, the formation of the schools of jurisprudence in the history of Islamic law provides us with a considerable amount of material on the debate of *raʾy* among the Muslim scholars. El Shemsy narrates a famous one from Sufyān b. ʿUyayna which gives clues on the approach of traditionalists towards the unprecedented method of *istidlāl* (deduction) in the ninth century Islamic culture: "Hishām b. ʿUrwa related from his father: "The affairs of the Israelites remained in order until the half-castes (*al-muwalladūn*) – the offspring of foreign captives – appeared in large numbers and began to voice speculative opinions (*raʾy*). They consequently went astray and led

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[156] Ibid., xiii.

[157] Ibid., xiii–xv.

[158] Ibid., 61.

others astray." Ibn ʿUyayna said: "We looked into this and found that the people's affairs were in order until this was changed by Abū Ḥanīfa in Kufa, al-Battī in Basra, and Rabīʿa in Medina. We looked into this [further] and found that they were [precisely] from the half-castes, the offspring of foreign captives."[159]

It is here where he draws attention to the parallel with Wahhābism and the Salafī tradition. As he maintains, Wahhābism represents an enclosure for it gained ascendance in the culture of a wild "sand civilization" (although Wahhābism has nothing to do with being a "sand civilization", which is an outdated analysis; if "sand" is an explanatory tool in the elaboration of Puritanism, then, how one can use the same tool to explain Protestantism, let alone other Puritan movements in Islamic culture such as *Kadizâdeliler* who emerged in the city life of seventeenth century Istanbul, as well as *al-Muwahhidūn* in Northern Africa and Spain, let alone the fact that Ahmad b. Ḥanbal put forward his traditionalist struggle in a city, Baghdad) and "a proto-Muslim" one; its essence is an absolute literalism in reading the Quranic text, and, in this current, "rationality" is characterized as secession and divergence from the principles of the religion[160] at the center of which lies the tenet of *tawhīd*. "*Tawhīd*," says İşcan, "according to Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb is ensured by not appealing to verdicts and commands anyone but Allah and the Prophet."[161] To translate and simplify his words, this means to ignore the twelve century of accumulation of *ijma* by the time of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. For them, *jihād* is the only way to spread *tawhīd* and purify Islam from the innovations of the late centuries and, their rigid struggle against *bidʿah* (innovation) becomes meaningful in this picture. "The struggle against innovations turned their understanding of *jihād* as though into a war which must be waged against the Muslims. This understanding incited Wahhābis to take rigid and draconian

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[159] Ahmed El Shemsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 31.

[160] Mehmet Z. İşcan, *Selefilik; İslami Köktenciliğin Tarihi Temelleri* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2014), 35.

[161] Ibid.

measures, overwhelming and suffocating the Muslims in the last century with the typical manifestations of the mentality of the *Hāridjī*s."[162]

The changing nature of Wahhābism and the second Saʿūdī state, of course, takes its due part in the general histories on the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire, and on the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī literature in particular.[163] The specific studies on the history of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity are mainly built on the first hand Arabic sources, namely; for the first Saʿūdī state Husayn ibn Ghannām's (d. 1810) *Taʾrikh Najd al-musammā: Rawḍat al-Afkār wa-ʿl-Afhām li-Murtād Ḥāl al-Imām wa-Taʿdād Ghazawāt Dhawī ʿl-Islām* (History of Najd), and for the second Saʿūdī state ʿUthmān ibn Bishr's (d. 1873) *ʿUnvān al-Majd fi Taʾrikh Najd*. For the biography of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb we have two works: *Lamʿ al-Shihāb fī Sīrat Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*; this work, which is edited by Aḥmad Abū Ḥākima and published in 1967, is, according to al-ʿUthaymīn[164], written by Ḥasan al-Rubkī; M. Crawford, on the other hand, indicates that it is an anonymous work.[165] Both refer to the same edition. Another local historian, Ibrāhīm Ibn Īsā (1853-1924) wrote two different works on the history of Najd: *ʿIqd al-Durar* [String of Pearls], takes the story from where Ibn Bishr stops and continues until 1885, the other one is *Taʾrīkh Baʿd al-Ḥawādith al-Wāqiʿa fī Najd* (History of some of the events which occurred in Najd), according to al-ʿUthaymīn, although he does not admit, Ibn Īsā has referred to Ibn Bishr's *sawābiq*, that which goes before the Saʿūds, from *ʿUnwān*.[166]

The secondary literature on the historiography of Najd before the rise of the Saʿūds and Wahhābism, however, provides the researcher with an indispensable

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[162] Ibid.

[163] In the words of Michael Cook, "… the contrast between the first and second Saʿūdī states", Michael Cook, "The Ḥanbelites of Najd," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 69.

[164] al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works*, xi.

[165] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 139.

[166] ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., xviii.

glimpse of the local history inner Arabia; *History Writing in Najd* by Mohammed Thenayan al-Thenayan[167], and *The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābis* by Uwaiḍah Metaireek Al-Juhany[168] are also relevant because they furnish anyone who wants to compare the perception of history when Najd had not yet been politicized by a local warlord family, thus play as a litmus-paper for the one who wants to test the candor of the Wahhābī chronicles mentioned in terms of identity building and idealizing the rise of their restitutionist roots. Again, in the same respect, two other works, *The Historians of Pre-Wahhābī Najd* by Michael Cook[169] and *Globalization, the State, and Narrative Plurality: Historiography in Saʿūdī Arabia* by Jorg Matthias Determann[170] are insightful for the historical schools and "a distinctive historiographical tradition" in the words of M. Cook, such as Ghannām's, which have been patronized by the Saʿūds for the propagation of their own political agenda in the greater Arabia. Finally, for the sake of historiography in its own language, Arabic, M. Cook mentions in his *Pre-Wahhābī Najd* of a certain work, *Mu'arrikhū Najd* (Historians of Najd) by Ḥ. al-Jāsir[171], however, at least for the writer of these lines, it was not available on the internet archives.

The memoranda of such European travelers and diplomats as C. Niebuhr (d. 1815), Johann Ludwig Burckhardt (d. 1817), Louis de Corancez (d. 1832), Carlo Guarmani (d. 1884), W. G. Palgrave (d. 1888), R. F. Burton (d. 1890), Baron Eduard Nolde (d. 1895), and later European travelers C. M. Doughty (d. 1926), D. G. Hogarth

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[167] Mohammed Th. al-Thenayan, "History Writing in Najd: 1591-1737" (Ph.D., University of Exeter, 1976).

[168] Uwaidah M. al-Juhany, "The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs" (Ph.D., University of Washington, 1983).

[169] Michael Cook, "The Historians of Pre-Wahhābī Najd," *Studia Islamica*, no. 76 (1992): 163–76.

[170] Jorg M. Determann, "Globalization, the State, and Narrative Plurality: Historiography in Saudi Arabia" (Ph.D., University of London, 2012).

[171] Hamad al-Jāsir, "Mu'arrikhū Najd," *Al-ʿArab*, no. 5 (1971): 788–92.

(d. 1927), and St J. Philby (d. 1960) are another source material for the researcher.[172] The fisrt European, however, known to have visited al-Dirʿiyya in 1799 is J. L. Reinaud.[173] In the absence of indigenous itinerants in the permeable cultural and geographical borders of the Islamic world, they provide us with irreplaceable knowledge and insight about the daily life of such-and-such tribe, or a hectic day of a port city, its connections to hinterland, weaponry, and its commerce by way of sea, and political polarization of such-and-such region among local and imperial actors.

Even though these contemporary sources represent some of the key works for the nineteenth century Arabia, there are still some blind spots which need to be filled in with the contribution of the Ottoman archival documents and the considerations of the nineteenth-century Ottoman intelligentsia on Wahhābism. Thus, building the subject-matter of an issue without consulting the archival material[174] is partly missing, though the writer of these lines is aware of that this study claims only to fill in some obscure parts of the greater picture. The Ottoman historians such as İzzî Süleymân Efendi (d. 1755), Câbî Ömer Efendi (d. 1814 [?]), Şânîzâde Mehmed Atâullah Efendi (d. 1826), Eyyûb Sabri Paşa (d. 1890), Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d. 1895) are in this respect relevant.

Finally, the operating logic of the following chapters is summarized below, so that the reader may evaluate and track the flow of analyses which presents the related primary and secondary literature in a general setting. However, if we need to draw a very general and rough framework here, the whole point is, to what extent the Wahhābī phenomenon can be handled within a purely Ottoman paradigm is being discussed. As can be seen, this point creates a rather ambivalent situation and a question: To what

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[172] The first three of these names for Esther Peskes are "…additional primary sources for research on Wahhābism's early stages." Peskes, "Introduction: Wahhābism in the History of Islamic Doctrines - a Short Classification," 13.

[173] G. Rentz, "AL-DIRʿIYYA," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis, CH. Pellat, and J. Schacht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 321.

[174] Madawi Al Rasheed emphasizes the substantial role of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 7.

extent was Arabia as a whole subject to Ottoman authority? This question will enable us to define the idiosyncratic place of inner Arabia within the Arab provinces.

The introduction reveals the thesis questions and the problematic of the study as well as examining the concepts that define Wahhābism according to the Ottoman image, thus provides the reader with an idea of the Wahhābī movement as it was considered in the Ottoman mind. Also, a general historical context is given together with the sources of the Wahhābī movement.

The initial cluster of the second chapter examines the movement in its historical context both in terms of periodization and theoretical approach starting from the larger imperial scale of the Ottoman empire from the analysis of H. İnalcık, and narrowing down first to the provincial level as analyzed by B. Masters' dichotomy of Early Modern and Modern, and finally, the focus narrows down onto the specific course of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis in the nineteenth century as it is examined by N. Mouline in the framework of a strictly closed society of believers. In other words, while the analyses of the former two were on the specifics of an empire in its historical periodization which determines its relationship with the provincial elites, the latter analyses the Wahhābī phenomena vis-à-vis the foreign powers which it saw as profane and alien. The second cluster of the chapter has a similar structure. The main objective is to examine the power and mutual interest relations of the Arab provinces with the center, starting from the power structure of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it is an analysis of power relations, again, starting from the general imperial level and narrowing down first to the Arab provinces, and finally focusing onto the specifics of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite in the central Arabia. Here, the same names, H. İnalcık, B. Masters, and N. Mouline are again preferred as the paradigmatic examples for our dissection. Depending on their analyses, it can be said that while the first two have seen a symbiotic relationship which benefits both the Ottomans and the provincial elites of the Arab provinces, the latter, particularly during the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth century, saw the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite as a contender and a challenger to the central imperial organization.

The third chapter is complementary to the previous chapter as it provides the reader with the central theological terms upon which the narrative and argumentation of the study is built. It is inevitable because of the religious character of the Wahhābism

which determines every aspect of their understanding of the world. To put differently, their motivation is determined by their beliefs. Thus, definition of the terms also crystalizes the political and ideological relationship between the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite and the other local agents. Besides, the answer to the question of whether the causes of the conflict between the Ottomans and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis can be reduced to the differences between religious and sectarian understanding is sought in this section. In addition, the parallelism between the Ottoman and Saʿūdī examples in terms of the state's turning the ulema class into their salaried employees was also noteworthy. Here, a brief narrative and clues about the political course of the first Saʿūdī state are also included. Finally, and by the necessity of nature and in the name of consistency and holism, the life of the founder of the movement and his understanding of the pure Islam are also included, since the position of Wahhābism in relation to the Shiite, Sūfī, and Sunnī worlds, respectively, from its beginning will be better understood.

The fourth chapter has again two main clusters. The first one examines foundation and the development of the Second Saʿūdī state in the context of Egypt's military intervention against the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state. Egypt's imperialist interests, as well as international concerns, particularly in the name of the British and the Ottoman empires, caused by the military intervention, and the issues of settling the problem are discussed. The main role of Egypt through the chapter is to put an end to the power vacuum, which was imposed largely by the inner Arabian geography and scattered nomadic population, until the early 1840s through the military dominance it established in the region. In other words, the Egyptian military intervention, which had been the most successful attempt compared to its predecessors in the attempt to eradicate the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity by advancing into the heartland of Arabia, largely disrupted the Wahhābī movement with the political hegemony it established in the region. However, as it will be seen, it was not enough to eliminate the movement root and branch as hoped by the Egyptians. Thus, the second cluster of the chapter represents the transition from an indirect intervention to a direct military intervention, this time in the name of the Sublime Porte and the Tanzimat elite. To this end, the second Saʿūdī state is examined in more detail and the political and sociological situation of the region before the Ottoman intervention is discussed. In addition, the regional role of the second Saʿūdī state and its reflection on world powers are

discussed under the main theme of piracy. This is directly related to our discussion in terms of determining the political position of the state in the regional diorama. It also gives an idea of the extent to which their religious understandings allow or disallow alliances with foreign powers. At this point, however, the Saʿūdī civil war plays a vital role since it paved the way for the Ottoman intervention. One of the main themes of the chapter is, therefore, based on and dedicated to the direct representation of the Ottoman power in the region through the Tanzimat reforms, its centralization and direct government policies.

The conclusion serves as a closing, in which answers to the questions on which the entire discussion is built are sought. On the other hand, although the answer proposals are by no means final, they are consistent with the current literature on the phenomenon of Wahhābism.

CHAPTER 2

PERIODISATION AND THEORISATION

Periodization in history is fiction. As emphasized by E. H. Carr, "The division of history into periods is not a fact, but a necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid in so far as it is illuminating, and dependant for its validity on interpretation."[175] In our context, to reach the relevant documents and archival evidence, if one were to scan the Ottoman archives with the key words "the second Saʿūdī state" he or she will not see any reference to any archival material whatsoever. As stated above, the Ottoman Empire did not see a political entity in Arabia during the nineteenth century which had been named by the Ottoman elite as the second Saʿūdī state; neither a first one in the eighteenth. For the Ottoman government it was merely *Saʿūd familyası* (the Family/House of Saʿūd), *Mesālih-i Hicaziyye*, or simply *Vehhâbî eşkiyâsı*. Using accurate terminology is indispensable for the archival research, but the name of the subject-matter can be tricky since, as emphasized above, periodization is mere fiction and so are the names it provides.

As stated, the importance of periodization in history cannot be denied so long as the researcher aspires to analyze changes in historical paradigms, and to teach and debate on it in an analytical and theoretical framework.[176] Continuity and change, in other words, are meaningful terms only when periodization comes into play in the name of theory.[177] The modern literature on Wahhābism has determined three

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[175] E. H. Carr, *What Is History?* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 60; Jeffrey Haydu, "Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving," *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 2 (1998): 340.

[176] Jacques Le Goff, *Must We Divide History into Periods*, trans. Malcolm DeBevoise (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 2–4.

[177] William A. Green, "World History," *History and Theory* 34, no. 2 (1995): 99.

consecutive periods, or even centuries for the political and ideological existence of the Saʿūdī political entities: The first in between 1744-1818, the second in between 1822-1891, and the final one, following an eleven-year interregnum and another prolonged one (a Civil War maybe, if one were to accept a hypothetical existence of an Arab nation) up until 1932, established in 1932. Should the narrative analysis be built on centuries, then they simply correspond to the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries in historical sequence. This periodization, albeit artificial, is not arbitrary; each of the closing dates represent a concrete political trauma in the long durée of the history of Saʿūds, enabling the researcher to determine their differences and change over time in the face of calamities and predators. Each period, put differently, needs its own theoretical definition[178] in its own historical flow. Causal processes, on the other hand, that explain the individual survival and continuation of a period are different and may not, like such ideologically main core terms as *tawhīd* or *al-amr bi al-maʿrūf*, operate in other.[179] While a *sui generis* contingent process, in other words, like that of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's in the greater context of Najd, can explain the nascence of the first Saʿūdī state to some extent, for the second one, another explanatory tools are needed, such as routinization or enclave society. As stated by J. Haydu, "[a]s social settings change, so do causal relationships. There is no good reason to assume that findings from one period support causal claims for another period."[180]

Saʿūdī-Wahhābism, with respect to its ideological and theological source material, feeds on another period, i.e., the medieval[181] accumulation of Islamic texts

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[178] Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 477.

[179] Ibid., 476.

[180] Haydu, "Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem Solving," 345.

[181] Islamic historiography does not have a middle age. Here we know the term Middle Ages, or medieval, is particular to European history in periodization, a term which indicates roughly the one-thousand-year time span between the fifth and the fifteenth centuries, i.e., the antiquity and modernity. However, for the sake of analysis it is found convenient to leave aside the debate on the particularity of the term Middle Ages to European history. In this sense, it is still not used as a global term, but as a

on *aqīdah* and jurisprudence. Therefore, during this study it will be considered as a medieval religio-political ideology. This is particularly so, since its ideological founders and sources, Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), Muwaffaquddīn Ibn Ḳudāmah (d. 1223), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 1350) lived and wrote their texts during the deep time of Islamic culture. Its political focus, in parallel, does not display any significant change from its theological justification mechanism and is still a medieval phenomenon by the political structure of its dynasty-based *herrschaft* pyramid organization, weaved as a hierarchical network of fidelity. It was, and still is a local patrimonial warlord who have been supported by a highly militarized faith-based ideology – not by a tribal federation which have had kinship ties with the Saʿūds – since the eighteenth century.[182] The pattern of political texture of Arabia was going to be weaved by the conflict of these sort of local hierarchical structures; by tribal strife, raids, warfare, and deals which was struck among these tribes in the absence of a local central authority as an arbiter.[183] It was in this absence of a central state authority that the pattern of relationships among the tribes of Arabia had been determined by a quasi-feudal and a quasi-*mannschaft* manner. It is highly possible that this is the reason why Alexei Vassiliev examined the political structure of Arabia in his *The History of Saʿūdī Arabia* with feudal terminology and, again, this must be the reason why such terms as "vassal, vassalage"[184], "the nobility, the feudal

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term which includes the Near East and its political and social organization since, although they are not the same, there are undeniable affinities between Europe and *Mashreq* such as the origins of their dominant belief systems and the justification of the worldly political power by religious or clerical authorities.

[182] ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb,* 51.

[183] This is particularly true for the second Saʿūdī state. "In the 1840s Egypt was virtually removed from the Arabian political stage. The Sublime Porte was still unable to intervene actively in Najdi affairs, nor did it wish to do so." Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 174.

[184] Ibid., 178, 185, 187, 188, 191, 203, 209.

nobility, the local nobility"[185], "the feudal"[186], "major-domo"[187] and "suzerain"[188] are almost omnipresent in his work, particularly for the second Saʿūdī rule.[189] Even al-ʿUthaymīn, in his work on the biography of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb used term "fief" as he introduces the fifteenth century al-Dirʿiyya. Ahmad S. Dallal, in addition to this, uses term "medieval Islam" as he examines the eighteenth-century reform movements, particularly in the framework of Sūfī circles.[190] Hence, we see that both the political and the theological focuses of Wahhābism inherit their legacy from the theological texts which was written in the medieval era. So, we argue that Saʿūdī-Wahhābism is an extension of the medieval religio-political structures into the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries of Arabia. This, in the light of the related literature, as we believe can be extended further to the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries without difficulty. Yet here we would like to point out that term medieval is employed in our study just for the sake of periodization and analysis, and in no way does it signify any pejorative connotation on the part of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism.

Now we will try to summarize some theoretical approaches to Wahhābism, which are seen here as paradigmatic both as periodization in the broader scheme of the Ottoman history and as a relatively narrower scheme of Arab provinces and finally Arabia which is the eventual focus for us. In the final analysis, these theoretical abstractions were thought to be useful in examining the developments and changes of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in terms of periodization.

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[185] Ibid., 179, 181, 188, 209.

[186] Ibid., 176, 204.

[187] Ibid., 197.

[188] Ibid., 195.

[189] Similar terminology can be seen in Nabil Mouline's lines, *The Clerics of Islam*, 80.

[190] Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," 54.

2.1. Halil İnalcık: Decentralization-Centralization and Modernization

Halil İnalcık's article might be confusing, particularly for the lay reader, when read parallel to the study in hand. In his "Recession of the Ottoman Empire and the Rise of the Saʿūdī state", henceforth *Recession*, he indeed mentions a first Saʿūdī state and a second one. However, while the first one corresponds to the first Saʿūdī emirate in our study, the second one he mentions does not coincide with the second Saʿūdī state in this work. What he refers to by "the second Saʿūdī state" is obviously the third one.[191] So, his argument, that "the second Saʿūdī state emerged as a reaction to the Caliphate-Centralization policies of the Ottoman government,"[192] in the opening paragraph of his article makes sense only after this clarification.

İnalcık presents four consecutive periods to analyze the rise of the Saʿūdī state in Arabia. (A) 1750-1812: The period of decentralization in the Ottoman Empire. Besides the rise of provincial *ayan* and *hanedan*s, "the growth of autonomy for the Arab provinces under local dynasties"[193] had been observed in this frame of change. The rise of the first Saʿūdī state coincides with this time span. (B) 1812-1878: During which Mahmud II's centralization policy and *Tanzimat* reforms (1839-1876) had been the principal elements besides the collapse of the first Saʿūdī state. Here İnalcık emphasizes the ever-gaining impact of the *al-Tawhid* movement not only in Arabia but also in the Islamic world, including India.[194] (C) 1878-1908: During which Abdulhamid II abandons the *Tanzimat* reforms and *shariʿa* becomes supreme in the empire and eventually gave way to an anti-British and 'pan-Islamic' policy. The idea of the supremacy of the Ottoman Caliphate and the Ottoman centralization policy in the Arab world, which became concrete in the Ḥijāz railroad, were two salient

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[191] İnalcık, "Recession of the Ottoman Empire and Rise of the Saudi State," 71.

[192] Ibid., 69.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Ibid.

developments of the period. *Al-Tawhid* movement had also been active and challenging against the Ottoman Empire.[195] Finally, (D) 1908-1918: This was the time of crises. The period witnessed the challenge between the Sharifate of Mecca and ʿAbd al-Aziz ibn Saʿūd for the establishment of hegemony in Arabia. With this, *al-Tawhid* movement had still been the key ideological motive in Arabia.

In *Recession*, İnalcık searches for the roots of the rise of the first Saʿūdī state in Arabia, "in the eclipse of the Ottoman central power in Egypt and in the Fertile Crescent." It is, in other words, an unintended and an unprecedented result of a sequence of events which had not been calculated by the central government, nor by the local Saʿūdī family. It is, i.e., the rise of the first Saʿūdī state, in İnalcık's terms, "a coincidence". This approach reminds us of Kurşun's work, who also explains the existence and continuation of the first and second Saʿūdī states by a power vacuum in the region. The belated Egyptian intervention in Arabia, between 1811 and 1840, is again explained in this scheme of fading central authority in Arabia. "In short," writes İnalcık, "Saʿūdī independence and expansion in the years 1765-1800 was aided by the decentralization and anarchical conditions in the empire as well as by the Russian wars of 1768-1774 and 1789-1792."[196]

As stated above, İnalcık does not include the second Saʿūdī state, in his article. Its absence, however, does not mean that it is in a complete oblivion in his analysis. In fact, it can be found as an indirect reference. "In this period (1812-1878)", says İnalcık, "the *al-Tawhid* movement spread and gained momentum in the Islamic world."[197] Although here the point of emphasis is on the religious focus of the movement, it, as a *modus ponens*, brings the second Saʿūdī state together with itself automatically, even if not named. In this framework, the second Saʿūdī state (1822-1891) inevitably corresponds to the time span between 1812 and 1878 in İnalcık's analysis. If we were

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[195] Ibid., 70.

[196] Ibid., 71.

[197] Ibid., 69.

to leave aside the ten-year difference between the two periodizations, the second Saʿūdī state, by and large, is evaluated in a centralizing and a modernizing Ottoman Empire.

2.2. Bruce Masters: Early Modern and Modern

In his *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918* Bruce Masters has a similar periodization in analyzing the Arab lands, or Arabic speaking lands, in the Ottoman Empire: Early Modern and Modern.[198] His definition of early modern helps locate the first and the second Saʿūdī state in the greater scheme of the world history, and in the relatively smaller scheme of the history of the Ottoman Empire:

> If we mean by the early modern period a time in which dynastic, land-based empires still dominated the political scene, then the first three centuries of Ottoman rule in the Arab lands easily fit the paradigm. Historians of Europe also see the "early modern period" as an era when the incipient capitalist world system was taking shape. In that process, I argued in an earlier work, the Ottoman Arab lands were increasingly drawn into the web of trade and economic interdependence that system created. Last, the relationship between the Arab provinces and the capital did not change radically in the first three centuries of the Ottoman rule. Although Ottoman political power emanating from the capital weakened in the region as local actors began to claim the right to serve the sultan in place of his own handpicked men, the provincial system established with the initial conquests endured. In that sense, there was neither a direct challenge to Ottoman rule in Arab lands outside Egypt nor a decline in Ottoman prestige.[199]

In the light of this analysis, the character of the periodical distinction between the first and the second Saʿūdī states, and the position of the Ottoman central authority vis-à-vis the two states, is clear. The first Saʿūdī state found its existence in an early modern empire, on a piece of peripheral land, which had been neglected by the central government almost a century by 1744.[200] Thus, must have felt itself potent to occupy

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[198] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 17.

[199] Ibid., 17.

[200] Ibid., 183.

the religious heartlands of the empire, the Ḥijāz, in the opening years of the nineteenth century because of this negligence, or power vacuum.

Even the theological roots of the uncompromising and rigid puritanism of the first Saʿūdī state can be traced in this solitude. In the absence of a central authority, in other words, they felt free to establish the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī order, knowing that they would not have been challenged by a central power in Najd[201], let alone the Ottoman Sultan far away in Constantinople; in this respect Wahhābis was not rebelling against the Ottomans,[202] they were challenging their authority in Arabia. Once again power vacuum is utilized as an explanatory tool. Finally, Muhammad ʿAlī Pasha's intervention in Arabia at the instigation of Mahmud II is also quite a typical way to intervene in a peripheral mutiny by an early modern empire, which by that time had not yet modernized and thus centralized enough to intervene in the issue itself directly.

Here, we also find Masters' "web of trade and economic interdependence" argument relevant, since it casts light upon the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs' pattern of war making which was always directed first at the Gulf region, al-Qaṣīm and al-Aḥsāʾ, only after then directed at the Ḥijāz.[203] This pattern of war making, or occupation from the Ottoman perspective, can be generalized for all three of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī states, and is indeed a clear manifestation of the fact that the Gulf region had already been integrated with the world trade routes in a considerable extent.[204]

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[201] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 47.

[202] al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works*, 113.

[203] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 17.

[204] "This pattern of political development," says H. İnalcık, "was quite logical considering the occupation of the Holy Cities by the Saʿūdīs involved the Ottoman Caliphate and the Islamic world while Ottoman political-economic interests in the Gulf area were not so vitally important. However, as from the last decade of the eighteenth century, a new imperial power, the British Empire, became more and more interested in the Gulf area and saw the emergence of a strong state on the coasts of the Gulf with anxiety." Halil İnalcık, "Recession of the Ottoman Empire and Rise of the Saudi State," 71–72; Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 70–71.

In this sense, since the early modern period includes the first three centuries of the Ottoman rule in Arabia, between 1516 and roughly the early years of the nineteenth century, then, one can easily deduce that most of the nineteenth century corresponds to the modern period, during which the rupture between the central Ottoman government and the Arab lands had gradually become conspicuous.[205] The second Saʿūdī state in our analysis also corresponds to the modern period. With the introduction of Tanzimat reforms in 1839, an ever-growing aspiration to centralization by way of modernization in the empire had gained vitality in the name of keeping the empire intact. So, Tanzimat elite's intervention in the second Saʿūdī state, despite being rather late, in 1871, is read in this framework of a modernizing and a centralizing imperial power and is a representation of an effort to intervene directly in the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī issue without consulting any other local power broker.

In the end, we see that both İnalcık's and Masters' approaches in periodizing the second Saʿūdī state agree in that they both place it in the modern period, during which the Ottoman central authority had been modernizing itself in the name of establishing a centralized governmental apparatus in its peripheral lands.

2.3. Nabil Mouline: Amixia for the Second Saʿūdī State

While the first two approaches in periodizing the second Saʿūdī state are purely for pinpointing its place in the larger scheme of the world history, and, in a lesser extent, in the Ottoman historiography, Nabil Mouline's usage of *amixia* in his *The Clerics of Islam* is for analyzing the attitude of the *ulama* of the second Saʿūdī state vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, and other non-Wahhābī foreign elements. This attitude, as we argue, is an indicator of the difference between the first and the second states in terms of theological understanding as well as its praxis on the Saʿūdī domains. In other words, it is a periodization concerning the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama's doctrinal attitude during the nineteenth century Najd. However, to be able to grasp the nature of the theological difference between the two emirates we first ought to examine the theological stance of the first one, of course, about Nabil Mouline.

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[205] Bruce Masters, ibid., 18, 222.

It is true that literature on Wahhābism draws attention to a mitigation, a détente, a relatively more compromising approach toward non-Wahhābī elements by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*, which was particularly the situation during the initial years of the nineteenth century. This mitigation, as maintained by Mouline, found its existence in a series of *fatawa* which were issued by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb following the conquest of, or occupation from the Ottoman perspective, Mecca in 1806.[206] However, before presenting the reader with the list, Mouline first lays the foundations for the mitigation in the rapid expansion of the emirate, particularly after 1795, when the emir of Mecca, Shaykh Ghalib, was defeated, and up until to 1806, the conquest of Mecca. This eleven-year time span, as for Mouline, was the period during which Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism had been transformed from a counterreligion into a religion[207] which was now proselytizing its *daʿwa* "at the level of *umma*".[208] This was also, with the conquest of Mecca, the very first attempt to routinize the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī tradition which was an effort to make it more palatable, convincing, and attractive for both the Muslim leaders throughout the Muslim world and for the non-Wahhābī Muslim sects.[209] Enumerated in sixteen concise articles, the essence of the chain of *fatawa* is an emphasis on the indispensability of the *tawhīd* understanding, the imitation of *al-salaf al-salih*, a strict prohibition on intercession (or saint-veneration), and speculative thinking, the conditions of being an absolute *mujtahid*, specification of the reference works for Qur'anic exegesis, possibility of miracles, the conditions and specification of exclusion, and *bidʿah* (innovations), unlawfulness of poetry and some genres of music, and finally, the acceptance of Sufi brotherhoods on the condition that they follow

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[206] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 72–75.

[207] Ibid., 72.

[208] Ibid., 75.

[209] Ibid., 74-75.

orthodoxy and orthopraxy.[210] Besides, as can be expected, no concessions were possible on the name of the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice.[211] For the ulama of the second Saʿūdī state, as maintained by Mouline, the reason for the final collapse of the first Saʿūdī state at the hands of the Egyptian forces in 1818 was hidden in this chain of *fatawa*. Therefore, they inevitably considered ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's *fatawa* as concessions which were overall a deviation from the early call of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *daʿwa*, i.e., Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's doctrine of purification by way of *tawhīd*.

As Mouline continues he maintains that in defense of the True Faith against the Ottomans and the Egyptian forces, the nineteenth-century Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama, then, leaned on a newly developed 'system of distinction' which was termed as *al-walāʾ wa al-barāʾ* (allegiance [to the Muslims] and rupture [with the infidels]) by ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (d. 1868), a grandson of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.[212]

Right in this same context, Sulayman ibn ʿAbd Allāh (d. 1818), during the war against the Egyptian forces, issued a set of *fatawa* enunciating the certain standpoints which should be adopted by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābis for the sake of preservation of the True Islam, which is Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī dogma undoubtedly.[213]

The gist of the first *fatwa* was a radical break with non-Wahhābī elements, that is "infidels and associationists." "The adherents of the True Religion," says Mouline, "thus had to radically break (*barāʾa*) with infidels and associationists. For them, the

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[210] Ibid., 72-74.

[211] Ibid., 72.

[212] Ibid., 76-77. Ahmad S. Dallal also stresses the fact that for Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb tawhīd is "an act of repudiation' which is possible only through al-barāʾa, keeping away from unbelievers and unbelief which 'functions as a rite of initiation into Wahhābism." Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," 38.

[213] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 77.

only appropriate attitude was one of uncompromising enmity (*muʿadat*)."[214] The second *fatwa* represents the scriptural evidence for an unconditional solidarity among the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābīs.[215] Finally, with the third *fatwa*, it was declared that travelling to infidel territories was forbidden.[216] "According to him," writes Mouline, "this ban was intended to guard against any corruption of the True Faith".[217] Here, Mouline concretizes Sulayman ibn ʿAbd Allāh's intention which led him to manifest his set of *fatawa*, according to whom neighboring Muslim countries were "a source of corruption, and thus eternal damnation [was inevitable]."[218]

During his argument, Mouline draws attention to the parallel usages of *al-walāʾ wa al-barāʾ*, a strict exclusivism to stay pure from what is profane, among such different Muslim sects as the Kharijite and Shiite groups, in Islamic history.[219] Yet, the main source of inspiration for this strict exclusivism, or misanthropy, as maintained by Mouline, is the Jewish principle of *amixia*[220]:

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[214] Ibid.

[215] Ibid.

[216] Ibid.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Ibid., 78.

[220] Since Nabil Mouline's evaluation and analysis of Wahhābism is methodologically Weberian, it is not hard to find parallels between his work and Weber's study on *Ancient Judaism*. "Sociologically speaking" says Weber, "the Jews were a pariah people, which means, as we know from India, that they were a guest people who were ritually separated, formally or de facto, from their social surroundings. 'All the essential traits of Jewry's attitude toward the environment' as Weber goes on, "can be deduced from this pariah existence – especially its voluntary ghetto, long anteceding compulsory internment, and the dualistic nature of its in-group and out-group morality." Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), 3.

> [The] preference for living in an exclusively Jewish milieu cut off from all communication with idolators, the burning desire to render such communication ever more difficult…[221]

Following this observation, Mouline maintains that the practice of *amixia* led way to an "enclave culture": "The establishment on the part of a community surrounded by enemies of a set of absolute norms, and intellectual barriers to prevent absorption by a generally hostile majority."[222] This enclave culture, now, was not only organized to protect the purity of the 'True Faith' but also 'to develop an enclave culture capable of saving the tradition' vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire which, with all its associationist tradition as far as Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb had witnessed in Medina in the form of *madhhab* exclusivism during public prayers, was 'a genuine antimodel' as 'an infidel state' to the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism.[223] In the end, this was also a period during which the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama wrote refutations against the other regional polemical critics whose aim was to impair Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism.[224]

In the final analysis, the nineteenth-century Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism can be said to have experienced a new highly conservative period following and surviving the traumatic collapse of 1818, and because of which its intellectual clique closed itself into a sanctuary, mostly Najd, only to save and protect the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī doctrine from what was considered as profane and idolatrous, the Ottoman Empire in the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī mindset and perception.

Before passing on to the next chapter there is still one subject, we would like to point out here which during the initial phase of this study had been rather appealing for the writer of these lines in terms of theoretical approach to Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism. It

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[221] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 78; for a similar analogy in the context of Christian amixia Malio Graziano, "The Next Middle Ages: Religion and Political Culture," in *The Routledge Handbook to Religion and Political Parties*, ed. Jeffry Haynes (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), 10.

[222] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 79.

[223] Ibid.

[224] Ibid., 81.

was Charles Tilly's *Trust and Rule*. Analyzing the different levels of integration or disintegration, and even evasion in some cases such as unscrupulous rulers' intervention, of trust networks to political regimes, Tilly's description of trust networks (which are kinship groups, clandestine religious sects, and trade diasporas) is:

> Trust networks, then, consist of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failure of others.[225]

During the further investigation, however, it eventually turned out that Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism of Najd had not turned into a clandestine religious sect for 'the preservation of their faith'[226] which 'consist of(s) of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failure of others.' In fact, they overtly continued to assign Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī qadis to the regions where they had politically prevailed, and, as mentioned above, against the non-Wahhābī arguments wrote polemical works, which was openly promulgated in the region, even in the Ottoman lands. This, however, does not mean that pro-Wahhābī propaganda in the Ottoman Empire was totally free of prosecution and censor. On the contrary, the archival material presents us with documents in which it is clearly stated that three books, *Fathu'l-Mannān*[227], *al-Dīn al-Hālis*, and *Kitābu't-Tawzīh ʿan Tawhīdu'l-Hallāḳ fī Jawāb Ahl al-ʿIrāḳ*, which were written and put into circulation for propagating Wahhābī *madhab* were banned. On the other hand, the relatively late dates of the documents, one is from 1904 and the other is from 1906, are other indicators of the very late intervention of the central Ottoman government,

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[225] Charles Tilly, *Trust and Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12.

[226] Ibid., 6.

[227] BOA, DH. MKT., 918/15.

and the Ottoman ulama in Wahhābism in the intellectual polemical field. Considering these documents, then, it would not be wrong to remark that during the nineteenth century under no circumstances did the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābism feel itself obliged to go underground, and to become a clandestine sect since there had not been any coercive political element in the region to force the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama for doing so. Even in the period during which Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb had not yet engaged himself to Saʿūds, namely, following his banishment from Basra, the period starting from the date he joined with his father in Huraymila, and kept silent under his influence up until his death in 1741, and the following three years he had had in Huraymila and al-ʿUyayna, he and his followers, despite persecutions and being declared as a *mülhid* and excommunicated by the local ulama, his movement did not turn into a secret society.[228] They challenged their accusers and critics (such as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Tandatāwī, Suleymān ibn Suhaym, Muḥammad ibn ʿAfāliq, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf (d. 1751-2), and ʿĪsā ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Muṭlaq (d. 1784)),[229] resisted them, and, when threatened with their life left the community to another safe haven, of which al-Dirʿiyya was the final for our reformer in 1744.

2.4. Authority in the Ottoman Arab Provinces

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire had been ruling in its Arabic speaking countries for almost three hundred years. Between this period, namely from the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 up until 1802, when the Napoleon's forces abandoned Egypt, Arabic speaking lands of the Ottoman Empire were in a relatively quiet status. It was during this three-hundred-year process, in Masters' analysis, that "ideologically, the Ottomans influenced the Arabic-speaking Sunnī elites to a degree unprecedented by their predecessors. The sultanate no longer was an institution that had to be endured in the absence of a more righteous regime

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[228] Michael J. Crawford, "The Daʿwa of Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb before the Al Saʿūd," *Journal of Arabian Studies*, no. 1:2 (2011): 156–59.

[229] Ibid., 150, 156.

(i.e., Mamluks)."[230] "It had become" says Masters, "a righteous regime."[231] The turbulent history of the empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth century confirms this even further. It was indeed during the eighteenth century that decentralization (the "age of the *aʿyan*"[232]) as a term in the peripheral history of the empire was introduced. The peripheral *aʿyān* families (the ʿAzms in Damascus, the Jalilis in Mosul, or Tepedelenli ʿAlī Pasha of Janina for example) negotiated and bargained with the nominal central authority of Istanbul, only in the Balkan regions did the Ottoman authority come to be questioned by Christian intellectuals .[233] Yet, as maintained by Bruce Masters, "there would be no Arab revolt against the sultan's rule in that troubled century for the empire."[234] Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was an exception in this diorama, however. This observation makes it necessary for us to draw an outline of the Ottoman domination and presence in its Arabic speaking lands. This is the aim of the chapter.

To serve this end three different, yet complementary to each other, approaches in the Ottoman historiography have been chosen. The first one focuses on a theoretical sketch of the establishment of the Ottoman rule during its historical existence: Halil İnalcık's Weberian based term Sultanism for the patrimonial praxis of the Ottoman authority. The other two are in a more restricted sense, to sketch the Ottoman political existence in its Arabic speaking lands: Bruce Masters' "collaboration" as a means of explanation of the interdependence between the local Arabs and the Ottoman elite, and Nabil Mouline's Weberian "ideological authority" as a tool for explaining the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī mindset right from its emergence up until today. These last two approaches,

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[230] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire: 1516-1918,* 71.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Ibid., 84.

[233] Ibid., 71.

[234] Ibid., 72. Here we should not forget the fact that Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity in Najd turned into an uprising in the Ottoman mind only when they attacked to the Ḥijāz region in the early years of the nineteenth century.

however, are used in a contradictory sense. In other words, while Masters' "collaboration" signifies the participation and cooperation between the Arabic speaking locals and the Ottoman elite, Mouline's "ideological authority" signifies the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī domination, and, in a sense, is the evidence of the ideological monopoly and hegemony which Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite established in the central Arabia, and, in a sense, denotes the lack of Ottoman ideological presence in the region vis-à-vis the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity. Thus, in the final analysis, it also signifies the nullification of all other authority types in the central Arabia since the second half of the eighteenth century.

2.5. "Sultanism"

The aim of this section is to summarize the spread of the Ottomans (*Āl ʿUthmān*) to Iraq and eastern Arabia in the Early Modern period and their dominance in the context of H. İnalcık's analysis of "Sultanism", which not only provides some clues on the Ottoman state organization as a patrimonial type of political dominance in the Weberian sense of the term, but also it makes it possible for us here to bridge a connection between the Āl Saʿūd, who have also been analyzed again in the same Weberian conceptual framework by N. Mouline as follows below. Here, attention is drawn to the inclusion of the ulama class in the state hierarchy under a patrimonial leader in both cases in the face of political and religious needs.

In his analysis of the Ottoman state structure and its governmental organization Halil İnalcık observes, despite some variations,[235] that it is a typical example of Weber's patrimonial domination.[236] In Weberian approach, as İnalcık draws attention to, tradition is the load-bearing column in validation and justification of patrimonial domination.[237] It is so much so that tradition is in fact the determinant and

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[235] Halil İnalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History* (İstanbul: Eren Press, 2006), 36.

[236] Ibid., 30.

[237] Ibid.

indispensable factor for power.[238] As he quotes from Weber, "ruler's powers are legitimate insofar as they are traditional"[239] to such an extent that, as he again follows the wake of Weberian lore, "the master is restrained from introducing innovations."[240] Sultan's discretionary power is restricted in this sense since innovations might hurt his economic interests.[241] Here sultanic law and the sultan's written orders come into play, yet, not as the mere discretion of the ruler in an arbitrary sense, but as a sultanic codification of what had already been there for quite some time.[242] These, in other words, are regulations on the traditional order introduced by the master.[243] Thus, his agents are obliged to follow sultanic law and his written orders in their undertakings and "if there is no clear reference to the matter in either of these," says İnalcık, "(they are ordered) to do 'what had long been practiced.'"[244] In this sense, the *ḳānūn* codes of Mehmed the Conqueror and Süleyman I had become the unalterable fundamental rules by the sixteenth century, pillars of the imperial justice, and "restrictive traditions" in Weberian terms.[245]

Apart from the tradition there is another pole which "checked the limitless arbitrary power of the sultan." It is, as asserted by İnalcık, the Islamic tradition and ulama as its sole representatives and practitioners as well as its determiners, in

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[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid., 30-31.

[240] Ibid., 30.

[241] Ibid., 31.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Ibid.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Ibid.

İnalcık's terms, "*the custodians*[246] of Islamic tradition."[247] Acknowledging the conflict among the ranks of the Ottoman ulama, which is inherent in the theological history and philosophy of Islam, İnalcık also admits that they had been "a traditional and legitimate center of resistance"[248] in the history of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, their rights as *ʿālim*-bureaucrats had already been guaranteed by Mehmed II law code (*Fatih Kānunnāmesi*), which made them an indispensable part of the Ottoman political formation.[249] This is, according to Abdurrahman Atçıl, exactly when they "Realize[d] Their Power"[250] and when their attitude started to change. Assuming the hierarchy among them as fixed and esteemed, they ensured that only and exclusively their own students were accepted into this hierarchy, which in time, with their ever growing power and influence, enabled them to set the boundaries of the Sultan's authority.[251] For Atçıl, this relative diminishment in the absolute power of the Ottoman sultan can be explained in the context of growing number of the influential poles in the empire; this was a realization of self-importance in the name of many different interest groups of the imperial structure.[252] One way or another, once they became this strong as a strictly hierarchical order, the "other groups," writes İnalcık, "often took sanctuary

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[246] The emphasis belongs to the writer of this study. A remarkable similitude between H. İnalcık and N. Mouline's "kleros".

[247] Ibid., 32.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Abdurrahman Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 83.

[250] Ibid., 83-84.

[251] Ibid., 84.

[252] Ibid., 90.

with the ulama to protect their traditionally established rights against the discretionary power of the Sultan."[253]

If tradition and its practice at the hands of the dynasty is the riverbed in which the state authority and unconditional sovereignty – patrimonial domination – is justified, it, as İnalcık quotes from Weber, "establishes itself through an administrative apparatus."[254] Law and administration are the indispensable mechanisms through which this domination expresses itself and functions.[255]

In İnalcık's analysis, this is also the indication of "the development from patriarchal to patrimonial domination."[256] So, the selection of the army and the bureaucrats are dependent on the demands of the patrimonial ruler. In fact, he is the sole determiner of court entourage and governmental elite and loyalty to ruler is the primary element.[257] Promotions were simply arbitrary at the hands of the absolute ruler.[258] Officials are thoroughly dependent on the ruler's discretion in their "economic compensation" and "with no provision for hereditary service,"[259] besides, they cannot form any sort of "a corporate group" or "legally autonomous monopolistic sodality"[260] since it might have been perceived by the ruler as a challenging threat to his sole

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[253] "They became critical of the arbitrary acts of the later sultans who behaved, in their judgement, contrary to the established Ottoman state tradition instituted by Mehmed the Conqueror and Süleyman I." Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire and Europe* (İstanbul: Kronik Books, 2017), 88.

[254] İnalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History*, 35.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Ibid.

[257] Ibid.

[258] Ibid., 36.

[259] Ibid.

[260] Ibid.

authority. This structure is the main trunk from which "the basic features of patrimonial bureaucracy" grow.[261] Finally, quoting from Weber, İnalcık maintains that "The household characteristics of the patrimonial state were maintained "in a grotesque degree… at the Turkish court" up to the nineteenth century."[262]

In his analysis of the Ottoman state and its governmental structure, on the other hand, İnalcık does not build all his argumentation blindly on Weber's description. In fact, he knows during the sixteenth century the Ottoman dynastic rule turned into an imperial structure and particularly with Suleiman the Lawgiver the Ottoman bureaucracy evolved into "a relatively 'rational' system of fixed rules and training."[263] As a consequence, it freed itself from the patrimonial system to a considerable extent. With this, as argued, group solidarity became an actual case since they were trained and gained their knowledge on field in guild-like bureaus for long years, even though they still did not have any hereditary right as well as title.[264] Thus the logic behind the Ottoman bureaucracy now manifests itself in the idea, and in the ideal of the Islamic "Religion and State" (*Din ü devle*), and of its interests, not solely based on the ruler's pleasure.[265] Within this framework, Mehmed the Conqueror's and Suleiman the Lawgiver's practice had been the formative example for the later Ottoman sultans, and those who acted contrary to the established order were seen as arbitrary innovators by

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[261] Ibid.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Ibid. A similar evaluation can be found in Jane Hathaway's "Decline" and decentralization argument with the notion of "crisis and adaptation" process in which she maintains "the Ottoman Empire adjusted its character from that of a military conquest state from that of a territorially more stable, bureaucratic state whose chief concern was no longer conquering new territories but extracting revenue from the territories it already controlled while shoring up its image as the bastion of Sunnī Islam." Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule 1516-1800*, 8.

[264] Ibid.

[265] Ibid.

the Ottoman bureaucracy. In other words, as İnalcık maintains, the Ottoman bureaucracy had then been the protectors of the established tradition.[266]

Here, in the context of merging political, mundane, and worldly power with a religious clerical elite in the *sui generis* example of the Ottoman Empire is an exceptional particularism in the Islamic culture, since Islam, maybe as a palimpsest of the Judaic anti-kingship attitude, and its ulama class is opposed to secular exercise of power, despite the grim reality of cannot keep its existence in the absence of it; "it opposes the political realm, but cannot withdraw from it."[267] For John A. Hall this merging of two anti-poles provides "a fuller explanation of the longevity of the empire" following its stagnation in 1600, also displays the Ottoman success where the Abbasids failed a millennia ago.[268] This Ottoman particularism in the Islamic culture may not have a direct effect on the antagonism between the Ottomans and the early Wahhābis since Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's writings do not refer to the Ottomans, and, in fact, he had barely an idea on what had been going on in the lands, even in the Arabic speaking lands of the empire. But, somehow, as far as we are concerned, points out to the need of institutionalization and building of a hierarchical structure to standardize religious bureaucracy, either for administration of law or to provide subjects with ethical and ritual requirements; this need was so inevitable in the name of longevity that even Saʿūdī Arabia itself, including its twentieth century version, was not able to evade the dilemma and institutionalized its religious cadre into a highly sophisticated hierarchy, the Council of Senior Scholars. An earlier kernel of this institutionalization under the greater umbrella of state can be seen in the struggle of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's trying to wipe out the bribery and other sorts of

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[266] Ibid.

[267] John A. Hall, *Powers and Liberties* (London: Pelican Books, 1986), 84; Robert W. Hefner, "Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society in an Age of Contest and Plurality," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Robert W. Hefner, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6–7.

[268] Hall, *Powers and Liberties*, 84. For a similar evaluation Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 74–81.

payment to local qadis by allocating them salaries which was directly paid from the state treasury.[269]

The core Arab lands were taken into this governmental structure during the first half of the sixteenth century, which again corresponds to the formative years of the Ottoman imperial system. This process, however, had two phases which became concrete by military acts of Selim I and Suleiman I. During the reign of the former Mamluk territories (Syria, Egypt, the western Arabian Peninsula including the Ḥijāz, and the coastal regions of Yemen)[270] were absorbed into the Ottoman Empire with two successive battles, the Battle of *Marj Dabik* on August 24, 1516, then the Battle of Raydaniyah in 1517. As a result, for the first time in the history of the Ottoman dynasty an Ottoman sultan gained the title of *Khadīm al Haramayn al-Sharifayn*, "Custodian of the two Holy Cities". It is assumed that, as indicated by Zekeriya Kurşun, depending on *Salnāme-i Vilâyet-i Basra 1308*, the Ottoman domination on the eastern shores of Arabia, namely *Ahsa Kıtʿası*, was established during the reign of Selim I.[271]

However, the real Ottoman domination in the region started with the arrival of Ottoman forces in Basra region during the reign of Suleiman I. In his famous campaign, *Sefer-i Irākeyn-i Sultan Süleyman* as named by Matrakçı Nasūh (d. 1564), against the Safavid presence in Iraq in 1534, (i.e. *Irak-ı Acem*, most parts of Iran, and *Irak-ı Arab*, roughly modern Iraq; hence, *Irākeyn*, literally "Two Iraqs") Suleiman I's main target was to dislodge the Safavid dynasty from Persia and even to destroy them.[272] Although the Sultan was not successful in his venture against the Safavids he was able to take Baghdad in 1534. Local Arab sheikhs of lower Iraq and Basra promptly recognized Ottoman authority; in fact, the establishment of the al-Aḥsāʾ

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[269] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 104.

[270] Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule 1516-1800*, 46.

[271] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 2.

[272] Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule 1516-1800*, 41.

beglerbegilik in al-Ḳatīf in 1552 was a concrete step in the Ottoman Empire's effort to increase its hand against Portugal in the Persian Gulf.[273] Based on Midhat Pasha's memoir, Z. Kurşun maintains that it was during this campaign envoys came from al-Ḳaṭīf[274], which is assumed as a natural part of al-Aḥsāʾ, and from Bahrain to present their submission to the Ottoman Padishah in Baghdad in 1534.[275] However, it seems that al-Aḥsāʾ was intended to be retained as an extreme front against Portugal.[276] One way or another, let alone the inner parts of Arabia, the Ottoman presence in al-Aḥsāʾ was only weak, and the eastern shores of Arabia was, in fact, "a tributary Arab state under autonomous rulers."[277] This was a part of the frontier regions of the Ottoman Empire in the east together with Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, and Shahrizor, which makes them always open and vulnerable to Safavids and Portuguese attacks.[278] As a result, this region was also subject to Ottoman punitive expeditions, first of all against the marsh Arabs, the Ottoman forces had never been able to penetrate into the inner parts of the *Sawāhil*.[279] This was going to be one the major issues, together with scorching

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[273] Halil İnalcık and David Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 335.

[274] For the Basra Kanunnamesi of 959 (1551-52) which mentions al-Ḳaṭīf see Ömer L. Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Çiftçi Sınıflarının Hukuki Statüsü," in *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler 1* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 734.

[275] Salih Özbaran, "XVI. Yüzyılda Basra Körfezi Sâhillerinde Osmanlılar: Basra Beylerbeyliğinin Kuruluşu," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 25 (1971): 54; G. Rentz, "AL-ḲAṬĪF," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. E. Van Donzel, B. Lewis, and CH. Pellat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 764.

[276] Frederick Anscombe, "The Ottoman Role in the Gulf," in *The Persian Gulf in History*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 262.

[277] P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political History* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), 56.

[278] Ibid., 57

[279] Ibid.

sun and humidity, for the nineteenth century Ottoman intervention in the region as we can see these inconveniences in the personal writings of Midhat Pasha. Similarly, Kurşun also admits that it is not exactly known how the Ottomans established their dominance in *Ahsa Kıtʿası*. One thing is sure, however, that Mehmed Pasha, *Beylerbeyi* of Basra, gave strict orders for the establishment of Ottoman domination in al-Aḥsāʾ in 1547. So, it had initially been under government control for some time, and then had been governed as a *salyâneli* province in the Ottoman provincial system under the name of *Lahsa Beylerbeyiliği*.[280] On the other hand, the Ottomans were not successful in their struggle against Portugal in the region during the sixteenth century and although al-Aḥsāʾ still appeared on the lists as an Ottoman province in the seventeenth century, the Ottomans were there only in name.[281] According to Ottoman archive material, it is understood that since 1558, its administrators were appointed from such cities of Iraq and Damascus provinces as Mosul, Aleppo, Hama.[282] Two Ottoman mosques were built in the region during the sixteenth century (one can still be seen), and, as a closing observation made by Z. Kurşun, this is a remarkable indicator of the lack of Ottoman presence and domination in the region considering that the Ottomans had (at least nominally) been in Arabia for four centuries by the beginning of the First World War in 1914. Indeed, the Ottomans' interest in the region diminished after the Dutch and English ousted Portugal from the Gulf, and the Ottomans themselves were finally expelled from region in 1670 by the Banū Khālid.[283] However, Rentz points out that the Ottoman governor was removed from here by Āl Ḥumayd already in 1603/4.[284] By and large, when Midhat Pasha's intervention began,

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[280] Indeed, Ahsa is not counted in the timar system, see Barkan, "Timar," 814.

[281] D. E. Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 136.

[282] BOA, DVNSMHM., 3/367, 5/997, 5/986.

[283] Anscombe, "The Ottoman Role in the Gulf," 262; also Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 14.

[284] Rentz, "AL-ḴAṬĪF," 765.

the Ottoman Empire had not been in Eastern Arabia for two centuries. Finally, north African coasts, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria were added to the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century as well as Yemen which was taken by admiral Suleiman Pasha in 1538 because of the naval struggle against the Portuguese presence in the Indian ocean, the Red Sea, and the eastern coasts of Africa.[285]

At this point, İnalcık might help us to complete our sketch of the Ottoman arrival and relative domination in the Arabic speaking lands. "It is true," says İnalcık, "that the Arab lands had to share the reverses and heavy financial burden of the Ottoman imperial presence. The concentration of power and wealth in the Ottoman capital overshadowed such old Arab metropolises as Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus which once enjoyed universal significance in power and wealth."[286] This situation, on the other hand, did not create a significant crisis in the Arab provinces against the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Arabic-speaking Sunnī elites had seen the Ottoman government as legitimate and the sole representatives, and even as the champions of Sunnī Islam. This was so to such an extent that up until the eighteenth century, with the exceptional case of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and the House of Saʿūd, they chose to collaborate with the Ottoman Empire.

2.6. "Colloboration"

One point, which is taken from Clifford Ando[287], introduced by Bruce Masters in *the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire* represents a fundamental question for this study in the context of the Ottoman Empire and its Arabic-speaking provinces: "What

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[285] Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule 1516-1800*, 43.

[286] İnalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History*, 45.

[287] Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 5.

induced quietude rather than rebellion?"[288] "It took," as maintained by Masters, "more than power to maintain an empire; it also required some level of collaboration on the part of its subjects."[289] This collaboration was indeed ensured by the fact that in the eyes of the local Sunnī elite the Ottoman Empire had now been the sole protector of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, patrons of the hajj, and representatives of the Sunnī Islam vis-à-vis "the others" of orthodox Islam, i.e. Shīʿa and other unorthodox mystic sects, on a global level by the first half of the sixteenth century.[290] As argued by Masters, "it had become a righteous regime."[291]

The first two centuries of the Ottoman presence in the Arab provinces was mostly marked by, in B. Masters' terms, the "professional Ottomans"[292] who were directly appointed from Istanbul by the court. Their term of office, however, was rather short and to be able to buy their next post they had to squeeze the maximum amount of income possible for themselves from local population. At one point or another, this atmosphere created by their rapacity had been the cause for their ill-fame on the pages of local chroniclers.[293] Yet, the era of these "short-term, rotating governors", as conceptualized by B. Masters, came to an end in most of the Arabic-speaking provinces of the empire by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Yet, only to leave their places to a new type of local administrators who are characterized in Masters' analysis on the eighteenth-century Arabic-speaking lands as self-made men.[294]

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[288] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 3.

[289] Ibid., 3-4.

[290] Ibid., 21.

[291] Ibid., 71.

[292] Ibid, 37.

[293] Ibid., 38.

[294] Ibid., 38-39.

These self-made men, in Masters analysis, were "localized actors," not locals, who had in one way or another become successful "in creating local bases of political/military power" by means of which were immune to sanctions of Istanbul to a considerable degree, in other words, had "varying degrees of autonomy" vis-à-vis the imperial center during the eighteenth century.[295] These local actors were based, of course in the context of Arabic-speaking provinces, in the North African Provinces (Sökeli Ali in Algiers, Alioğlu Hüseyin in Tunis, and Karamanlı Ahmed Tripoli), Egypt (the Qazdugliyyas, Bulut Kapan ʿAli, also known as ʿAli Bey al-Kabīr), Syrian (ʿAzms in Damascus) and Iraqi provinces (Jalīlis in Mosul and Hasan Pasha in Baghdad).[296] The Ottoman presence in these provinces encountered challenge during the rule of these localized actors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a period of decentralization in other words, particularly in the case of Egypt which hosted ʿAli Bey al-Kabīr's opposition to the direct Ottoman rule during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III.[297] However, "None of the rebels", says B. Master, "outside Cairo or Aleppo during Canpulatoğlu ʿAli's brief moment on the political stage, challenged the authority of Ottoman system. Rather they sought to ingratiate themselves into the Ottoman system."[298] "The Sunnī Muslim elite," as he goes on, "was willing to extend to the Ottoman sultans. Without that collaboration, the domination by the House of Osman over the political life of the region would have become tenuous at best. The empire in

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[295] Ibid., 39; for a detailed analysis of the *aʿyān* or magnates see Ali Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), 65–116.

[296] Ibid., 38-45

[297] Ibid., 44.

[298] Ibid., 47.

the Arab lands did not survive by the threat of force. Rather it endured as the Ottoman dynasty had co-opted with local elites as its willing collaborators…"[299]

However, it should not be forgotten that, as mentioned before, certainly as an exception to Masters' observation, ʿAli Bey al-Kabīr raised his flag of rebellion against the Ottoman administration in 1768, minted coins in his own name, and ruled Egypt as a separate state from the Ottoman Empire until 1772.[300] On the other hand, in this general framework, the total revolt or challenge against the Ottoman rule in the region before Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha and the Wahhābis was limited, as in the case of Djānbirdī al-Ghazālī, governor of Damascus, in the early third decade of the sixteenth century,[301] while the revolts of Murat Bey and Ibrahim Bey (the duumvirs) were effective, again, only in the example of Egypt and only for a short time in the eighteenth century.[302] None of these names, however, coveted Ottoman lands outside the province of Sham or Egypt, as in the case of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, whose justification was out of pure political interest, or the Wahhābis, whose justification was out of jihadism based on a self-professed religious dogma. In the final analysis, Masters's analysis of "collaboration" for this study is still paradigmatic, despite few additions above.

Nevertheless, there is a blind alley for us in Bruce Masters' work. While his concept of collaboration includes such provinces as Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Syrian and Iraqi provinces, namely Arabic-speaking provinces, it does not provide us with a conceptual frame for Arabia. This, however, is not a deficiency in his analysis. It is rather an indirect fact which clearly shows us that there had been a political

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[299] Ibid.

[300] G. Wiet, "ʿALI BEY," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 392.

[301] P. M. Holt, "DJĀNBIRDĪ AL-GHAZĀLĪ," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis, CH. Pellat, and J. Schacht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 1042.

[302] P. M. Holt, "IBRĀHĪM BEY," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden, London: E. J. Brill, Luzac&Co., 1986), 992.

vacuum, even an indifference on the part of the Ottoman Empire to the central Arabia up until the eighteenth century, during which no one found it preferable or profitable to collaborate with the central Arabian elites and vice versa. Indeed, there had been local tribes, and indeed these had been waging incessant wars (*maʿraka*) against each other. But this is as far as we can talk about Arabia up until the eighteenth century in which Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's *daʿwa* came to be known and became a considerable ideological and political threat first in al-ʿArīḍ, then to the Banū Khālid of al-Hasa, then to the Emirs of Mecca, then the Ottoman Empire during the closing years of the eighteenth century and the first decade of the nineteenth.

In brief, Masters' collaboration is not valid for the case of Arabia, and even if it is, it had been during the prevalence of the second Saʿūdī state. On the other hand, what is valid is Arabia's isolation, *terra nullius* of Najd in particular[303], and quietude in which an idiosyncratic religio-political movement was going to spring up and found for itself more than half a century to spread around only to be noticed in the beginning of the nineteenth century with their invasion and capture of the two holy cities, Mecca, and Medina.

2.7. "Ideological Authority"

The scale of our examination of the authority types in Arabia starts from the imperial and narrows down to the local in three consecutive phases. So, while the first two studies of this chapter analyze the Ottoman presence, and the nature of its relative domination in its Arabic-speaking provinces, Nabil Mouline's study, *The Clerics of Islam*, examines how Saʿūdī-Wahhābism became the dominant ideological mechanism in the central Arabia. His analysis, put differently, represents the narrowest, yet the most principal and intense authority type which, in the long run, has established itself as the uncontested hegemonic political entity of Arabia by the first half of the nineteenth century.

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[303] Michael Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 19.

Nabil Mouline's analysis, in this respect, is a well-established and detailed attempt to identify Saʿūdī-Wahhābism in the framework of an ideological authority type which is itself a Weberian scheme.[304] However, one should bear in mind the fact that the term ideological authority, despite being a Weberian typology of authority, was not developed by Weber himself. It is, as remarked by Mouline, a contribution to the Weberian literature by David E. Willer.[305]

As indicated in the early pages of his work, Nabil Mouline maintains that the Prophet of Islam is a representative of Weber's "charismatic authority" and "a mediator between God and humans."[306] Yet, with his death two fundamental questions arose, "… the problem of how to routinize his charisma. Who, in other words, was to inherit his prerogatives?" and "what is the nature of the ulama's authority?" To answer these, and to sketch a theoretical outline of the ulama as an elite, who has almost always been independent from and above political power, Mouline appeals to Weber's tripartite typology of authority.[307] We see in his work that *traditional authority* corresponds to *al-salaf al-sālih* from whom ulama inherited the Islamic tradition and 'claimed to be the exclusive guardians of' it.[308] Secondly, it is *charismatic authority* which has, according to Mouline, two ideal-typical dynamics: *al-Mahdi* (guided by Allah) as an eschatological savior figure and the *Mujahid* (the combatant of the faith), and *al-Mujaddid* (the reformer of the century) and *al-Mujtahid* (the independent jurist).[309] Thirdly, we see *legal-rational authority* which equips ulama with "belief in

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[304] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam,* 7.

[305] Ibid., 5.

[306] Ibid.

[307] Ibid. 4.

[308] Ibid., 5.

[309] Ibid., 5.

the validity of a legal status" and thus enabling them to "command the population's obedience."[310]

Mouline argues that the ulama's authority fits into these three ideal-typical types. However, as he further points out that they fail to demarcate and define the real characteristics of their authority. While four different types of social action and four different types of social order for legitimization are differentiated in Weber's analysis, he signifies only three types of authority.[311] This is where Mouline appeals to Willer who suggests the use of "'ideological' to refer to the ideal-type of authority that follows from action that is rational in value because it entails "belief in the absolute value of a rationalized structure of norms.'"[312] "This type of authority," says Mouline, "is based on the symbolic power of an enunciator – in general, a collective actor – to produce and transform beliefs inspired by *a first reference* (revelation, instruction, ideology, and so on)."[313] After this, thanks to Roberta Lynn Satow, Mouline points out that this ideological authority entails *an ethic of responsibility* for its possessors, not *an ethic of conviction*.[314] This means, as far as we are concerned, that the holders of the ideological authority, the ulama, do not need to concern themselves with convincing the laymen of the genuineness of their ideology. It, in other words, is an established truth for the society in which the ulama propagate, and thus it does not need apologetics. What the true concern for the ulama is the fact that the responsibility of keeping the ideology alive among the people and determining its meaning, hence they assume an ethic of responsibility.

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[310] Ibid.

[311] Ibid.

[312] Ibid.

[313] Ibid.

[314] Ibid.

In this respect, there is an equilibrium between determining a certain meaning for the sacred text and Mouline's naming the ulama as the clerics of Islam.[315] Despite generally accepted custom in Islamic tradition that there is no clergy in Islam, his justification for using the term *klerôs* is hidden in the word itself: κληρικός, "dominie, master or lord; and instructor."[316] Here one can easily argue that there is no clergy in Islam in the sense of Christianity, and in of church hierarchy. In Islam, there is no need of a clergyman to be initiated to faith, or to be cleansed from sins by way of confession, or to be baptized, to get married, and to be excommunicated (at least in theory). The ulama, however, in Mouline's analysis, are the clerics of Islam ("specialist guidance" in J. Schacht's or "the religious guardians of Islam" in J. L. Esposito's terms)[317] in the sense that a) they are/were organized into corporations, b) which is "an institutional order built upon feelings of collective belonging… who must share common beliefs", c) they thus are "responsible for managing meaning[318], conflicts of interpretation…", d) and in the end, with their "near monopoly on reading, writing, and the transmission of knowledge" they turned out to be a "collective actor" who have the responsibility of "dispensing salvation goods."[319] The ulama, in other words, are responsible for the economy of salvation.

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[315] Ibid., 3

[316] "The Wahhābī ulama," says Michael Crawford, "in general and Āl al-Shaykh were not only qāḍīs and muftīs but also the guardians of the religious and political system bequeathed to them." Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," 91.

[317] Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 74; John L. Esposito, *Islam, and Politics* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984), xi; for a similar evaluation Hall, *Powers and Liberties: The Cause and Consequences of the Rise of the West*, 84.

[318] Ibid., 2, 7. As mentioned above, to freeze its meaning at a certain historical context, i.e., the first three generations of the Islamic society.

[319] Ibid., 2; Joseph Schacht, ibid., 84; A similar monopoly on judicial literature can be seen during the early stages of Roman law, Russ Versteeg, *The Essentials of Greek and Roman Law* (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 98.

Esther Peskes also sketches a two decked framework of Saʿūdī- Wahhābism as a tool for explaining their ideological control over Najdī population.[320] The first layer of which is controlling all the aspects of the public domain, from rituals to daily life, and the second layer is monopolizing knowledge, from administering religious and legal instructions in mosques, madrasas; burning the books which in the eyes of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama are contrary to *tawhīd*.[321] "Wahhābism," as Peskes states, "abolished the plurality of public manifestations of the faith and imposed rigid uniformity."[322] The oneness of God, we might argue, ought to be reflected on the public sphere by the hand of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī teachings.

In the course of the history of Islam the overarching position of ulama made them the sole determiners of Islam as an ideology from which even the elites, the secular elites, the *khawāṣṣ* in Islamic terminology, have not been exempt.[323] With the help of their social position they thus gained control of "the high culture" and this also let them play a crucial role in "identity formation" by their literary and scientific production. This is the essence of the ulama, in Mouline's approach to them, according to which he passed his judgement on them as clerics; in the sense that "the genuine guardians[324] of what the ancient Greeks referred to as *klerôs* – the patrimony and heritage, spiritual and profane, of classical Islam."[325] Right in this framework, Aharon

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[320] Peskes, "The Wahhābiyya and Sufism in the Eighteenth Century," 224.

[321] Ibid.

[322] Ibid.

[323] Ibid., 3

[324] In the case Saʿūdī-Wahhābism, M. J. Crawford, parallel to Mouline's approach, describes Wahhābī ulama as "the guardians of the religious and political system." Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," 91.

[325] Ibid.

Layish describes the function of the Wahhābī ulama as "the authorized interpreters of the *shariʿa*" who "provides religious sanction for the acts of the monarch."[326] In other words, when the legitimacy of the *klerôs* became indisputable by the royal touch they make texts authoritative which inevitably turns into scripture for the believers and the community in which they live.

This is where two fundamental functions of ulama, as a collective body, comes into play in Mouline's study: Orthodoxy (right opinion) and orthopraxy (right practice or action).[327] By way of interpreting scriptural sources, the ulama "determine beliefs, the geography of heaven, and the image of God," and "define appropriate socioreligious behaviors and practices."[328] While the former, in this framework, corresponds to orthodoxy, the latter to orthopraxy. In Islamic vocabulary, however, orthodoxy is simply Sunnī tradition which is *Ahl as-sunna wa'l-jamāʿah* (the people of the sunna and the community) and orthopraxy is *ʿibādāt* (worship or ways of worshipping) and *muʿāmalāt* (dealings or personal conduct) in Islamic terminology. The combination of these two is a systematization and rationalization which catalyze the propagation of "the faith through prayer, predication, instruction, sermons, ritual procession, legal and theological consultation, writings…"[329] Moreover, Mouline also maintains that orthodoxy and orthopraxy paved the way for "centralization and cognitive codification" which, in the final analysis, also paved the way for "cultural imperialism" which is, in Mouline's terms, "a desire for domination in all domains of

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[326] Aharon Layish, "Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 189.

[327] Ibid.; in the case of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism, Esther Peskes also indicates that "Wahhābism monopolized knowledge: writings which deviated from the Wahhābī conceptions of *tawḥīd* were prohibited or destroyed, the institutionalized framework of the *madhāhib* was dismantled." Peskes, "The Wahhābiyya and Sufism in the Eighteenth Century," 224.

[328] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 2.

[329] Ibid.

knowledge."[330] In other words, with ulama's domination and monopoly on knowledge, *ʿilm*, Islamic faith, as far as Sunnīsm is concerned, now has a tradition; a list, a canon of what to be included (the tradition, sayings and deeds of the Prophet of Islam), and what not to be (heterodoxy; like Kharijism, Shiism, or the other philosophical inquiry based movements such as Qadariyya and Muʿtazila, or even Ashʿarism).

Orthodoxy and orthopraxy necessarily entail order (*niẓām* in the political terminology of Islam) in Mouline's analysis. He establishes the symbiotic relationship[331] between the right opinion which is orthodoxy; and right practice, which is orthopraxy, and, besides these two, the *ulama*'s need for a political power to "impose their vision of the world and disseminate it."[332] To put differently, the latter, which is where the House of Saʿūd comes into play, is *sine qua non* for the establishment and sustainment of the former elements, both of which simply stay in the strict boundaries of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama*. Order, in other words, is necessary to protect and to impose the faith and it does mean nothing by itself in the Islamic political theory. This is the reason why we have chosen to signify the subject matter of this study as Saʿūdī-Wahhābism or Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs, instead of Wahhābism or Wahhābī-Saʿūdīs; because the ideological wing of the phenomena, the *daʿwa* of the Wahhābī *ulama* could not have survived without the indispensable Saʿūdī sword and its coercive power. This differentiation between the two focal points of Saʿūdī-Wahhābism is defined by Mouline as 'a permanent division of labor."[333] At the one end of the stick is the Saʿūdī dynasty, or *ad-dawla* (the state), whose members were and have been responsible for "the political, military and financial," and on the other hand the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī

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[330] Ibid.

[331] Ibid., 3.

[332] Ibid.

[333] Ibid., 70.

ulama, or *Āl al-Shaykh*, had and has been responsible for "the juridico-religious space."[334]

Nabil Mouline's tripartite classification, the three O's, i.e., orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and order, for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity, however, is common in the history of Islamic political tradition and, in this sense, it has precursors in secondary literature.[335] Ann K. S. Lambton's *State and Government in Medieval Islam*[336] sets a good example of the Islamic political tradition and its development in terms of Mouline's three O's. In fact, emphasizing the indivisibility of state and church in Islamic political theory Lambton also confirms Mouline's analysis of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī polity as a joint operation between the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama and the House of Saʿūd, the political elite.[337] "The basis of the Islamic state" says Lambton, "was ideological, not political, territorial or ethnical and the primary purpose of government was to defend and protect the faith, not the state."[338] This statement crystalizes the function of the House of Saʿūd, whose existence provides protection for the faith. Lambton quotes the *Testament of Ardashīr*: "Religion and kingship are two brothers, and neither can dispense with the other. Religion is the foundation of the kingship, and kingship protects religion. For whatever lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears."[339] "This," as Lambton continues, "became

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[334] Ibid.

[335] Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 50.

[336] Ann K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[337] Ibid., 1- 45.

[338] Ibid., 13.

[339] Ibid., 45.

one of the stock maxims of Islamic political theory."[340] "The state is there to carry out the law," says Lambton.[341] In our case, the House of Saʿūd is there to carry out the Islamic faith, which is the Wahhābī doctrine.

In the final analysis, these concepts represent the holistic framework in our study. They narrow down from the general structure of the Ottoman Empire (the İnalcık paradigm) to the Arab provinces and the provincial elite (the Masters paradigm), and finally to the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī organization (the Mouline paradigm). In fact, it is the main goal of the study to show that the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis are isolated from the general structure within this general scheme. However, while this isolation roughly corresponds to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it is possible to talk about a half-hearted cooperation between the Ottoman centralization policy and the Saʿūdīs from the 1860s onwards. However, it should not be forgotten that the cooperation was demanded by the Saʿūdī Imām ʿAbd Allāh b. Faisal during the civil war of 1860s and 1870s, that is, by the political front; in other words, the Wahhābī ulama, that is, the religious wing, maintains isolation from the Ottomans and other non-Wahhābī elements. Therefore, besides the geographical isolation of Najd, it is still possible to talk about its religious isolation.

The Ottoman centralization policy, which will materialize in al-Aḥsāʾ in 1871, is in a rather ambivalent position. Although the name of the established central authority goes down in history as the *Necid Mutasarrıflığı*, the location of the place chosen as the capital indicates this ambiguous situation; al-Mubarraz, is in fact a part of the al-Aḥsāʾ province, and quite far from the actual Najd, whose capital, at least in the Saʿūdī sense of the word, is al-Riyāḍ.[342] In this respect, it would not be wrong to say that Ottoman centralization never actually reached Najd. Therefore, this situation prolongs the political life of the Saʿūdī dynasty and continues as an isolation factor.

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[340] Ibid.

[341] Ibid., 1.

[342] Rentz, "AL-ḴAṬĪF," 765.

In concluding the chapter, perhaps it would be useful to say a few words about our purpose here which is in no way to sketch a new theoretical framework or to force it to reader. Rather, the aim is to try to examine the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī phenomenon in a more general context that already exists and is widely accepted as part of the secondary literature. In short, the content of the blend is thought to further define the boundaries of the frame only in which could the isolation of the Hanbalī-Wahhābī idiosyncrasy be seen, elaborated, and analyzed. Accordingly, while the first two sections of the first cluster, i.e., 2.1 and 2.2, provides us with a periodical dissection (since the intervention of the outside world varies according to this periodization) into which the movement can be fitted as a local player, the last section of the same cluster, i.e., 2.3, gives an idea about the attitude of the Hanbalī-Wahhābī ulama who had taken different reactions (from incessant jihadism, for instance, to forced migration (*hijra*) and enclave society, which is *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ*) against the world and timespan in which they live as the true believers and the sole representatives of the genuine Islam as they understand it. The first part of the second cluster, i.e., 2.4 and 2.5, however, examines the power structure of the Ottomans; and tries to answer the question of whether the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite can be evaluated as part of the ayan paradigm or not; since the provincial elite of the Arab provinces have been considered as part of the paradigm, and, thus seen as part of the elite who collaborated with the Ottoman center to various extents as far as they saw it profitable and meet their interests in their due regions. Thus, Masters' "collaboration" provides us with a mutual interest network between the center and the provincial elite, as stated by Barkey, "an empire as a negotiated enterprise". The final section of the chapter, i.e., 2.7, interrogates the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite not as part of this "negotiated enterprise" but as a challenger to it, in short, which makes their ideological structure relevant in this analysis. However, perhaps the most important essence of the chapter is to point out a fundamental similarity between the Ottoman religious-administrative organization and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī religious-administrative organization in terms of gathering and integrating religious cadres

under the roof of the state, as "mülâzemet"[343] in the example of the Ottomans, and simply as ulama and judges (who served also as *mufti*s, *imam*s, preachers, and teacher)[344] as in the example of the Hanbalī-Wahhābī organization.[345] While the former employed the Hanafī tradition in doing this on an imperial scale, the latter used the conservative Hanbalī tradition as a leverage to the Wahhābī doctrines. Therefore, the main differences between the two will be discussed below.

[343] Abdurrahman Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 102–6.

[344] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 102–3.

[345] For the point that the gathering of religious cadres under the roof of the state within the framework of legal organization prolongs the life of the state, see Hall, *Powers and Liberties: The Cause and Consequences of the Rise of the West*, 107.


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Şiraz
Sircan
Bender Bujehr
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Kuveyt
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Re's el-Hayr
Bender Abbas
Re's Tennure
Cubeyl
Katif
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Abu Dabi
Tebük
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KAHTAN
SHAHRAN
YAM
ASİR
AMALISAH
AWAMIR
MENAHİL
REŞİD
& BEYT YEMENİ
AWAMIR
MENAHİL

CHAPTER 3

ḤANBALĪ-WAHHĀBISM AND ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY

In this chapter some important theological terms will be presented since they are vital for the conceptual framework, and they help us understand the religio-political differences between the two Saʿūdī states in the wider historical context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To this end, some of the most famous books of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, such as *Masāʾil al-Khams al-Wajiba Maʿrifatuhā* (The Five Maxims), *Kitāb al-Tawhīd* (The Book of Unity), *al-Qawāʿid al-Arbaʿ* (The Four Principles), *Kashf al-Shubuhāt* (Removal of the Doubts), have been used as sources to analyze the way in which he understood and employed those terms in his teaching. Apart from these, however, there are three anthologies of the works of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb: *Majmūʿat al-tawḥīd al-Najdiyya* (Cairo 1346), *Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wa'l-Masāʾil al-Najdiyya*, and *al-Durar al-Saniyyah fi'l-Awjiba al-Najdiyyah*; Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd University, on the other hand, prepared a thirteen-volume compendium on the works and writings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *Muʿallafāt al-Shaykh al-Imām Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdu'l-Wahhāb*. Apart from these, as indicated R. Hartmann, some of his manuscripts, which he himself copied from Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, can also be found in the Leiden library.[346] Along with these, however, some of the important works of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb can also be easily found in Turkish as in the form of translations and exegeses. Here is a list the works:

Cahiliye Toplumunun Özellikleri (Characteristics of the Time of Ignorance)

Üç Temel ve Delilleri (The Three Fundamental Principles and Their Evidence)

Dinde Üç Esas (The Three Fundamental Principals in Religion)

Şüpheli Şeyleri Açıklama (The Clarification of Specious Arguments)

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[346] Richard Hartmann, "Die Wahhābiten," *Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 78 (n.F.3), No. 3/4 (1924): 179.

Dinin Doğru Anlaşılmasından Dört Temel Kaide (The Four Principles)

Kitabu't-Tevhid (The Book of Monotheism)

Besides, we will also try to compare the core differences between the two law schools of Islam, Hanbalism and Hanafism, since, as far as we are concerned, they pose some structural contrasts in their understanding and application of faith and political authority. Here, however, the main question is not whether this madhhab distinction was the reason for conflict. Because there is no evidence of a prosecution carried out by the Ottomans against other Sunni sects in the Ottoman history. After eliminating this possibility of misunderstanding, it is useful to explain the point we want to turn to: As a Sunnī madhhab, are there any hereditary elements in Hanbalī teachings that would make it easier to regard other approaches, whether Sunnī or not, as infidels?

Finally, we will try to answer the question of whether Wahhābism was an aberration from the Sunnī tradition by the time it appeared in Najd. However, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's life is also presented in this chapter since, as far as we believe, this narrative will crystallize the way he interpreted Islamic doctrine.

3.1. Some Axial Terms

Baġy (Oppression): The simple meaning for *b-ġ-y* in Arabic is "wrongful" or "oppression", "leaving the right", "exceeding the limit", "to defy God", "crossing the boundaries of religion".[347] The Qurʾānic meaning does not show any remarkable difference of the term which can be found in 22:60, 42:39 and 2:173; in all these verses the term, by and large, means going over the limits or exceeding the boundaries of something that which shall not be breached or exceeded by the decree of God.

Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, on the other hand, uses 7:33 (the meaning of the word is "oppression without right") and 16:90 (it again means "oppression" here) to justify his argument against tyranny (here we see a yet another meaning of the word which is close to "oppression") which is the 91st article in his book: "(In their view),

[347] Ali Şafak, "BAĞY," in *TDVİA* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2013 1988), 451.

the most select of their good qualities was acting tyrannically. Concerning this, Allāh mentioned what He did."[348]

However, with this argument of his one cannot build a parallelism between his thoughts on tyranny and the Ottoman state; in fact, in none of his books one can find any direct reference to the Ottoman Empire nor to any other state. What he means by tyranny may well have been the negative and unfavorable attitude of the people whom he had met during his journeys, the results of some of which can be found in the chapter 4.3 of the study in hand. Yet, in the same chapter of the book, when he described "the Characteristics of the Time of Ignorance," we can find some familiar arguments as an example to what he might have possibly thought about and against the Ottomans and their religious practices. The subject matters of the quotations here are respectively on the issue of *shafaʿah* (intercession) and *taʿaṣṣub al-madhhab* (fanatical sectarianism) in Islam:

> When supplicating to Allah and worshipping Him, in practice, they would associate the righteous in that worship. Their goal was to have them intercede on their behalf with Allāh labouring under the assumption that this was something that Allāh and the righteous loved.[349]

"In their religion they are divided and split."[350] Three basic elements are listed for an armed uprising against the state to constitute a crime as *baġy*:[351] 1) The revolt against a legitimate head of state or state order. Oppositions that do not have this purpose do not constitute a crime of *baġy*. 2) Use of force in rebellion. Opposing the head of state without using force or avoiding allegiance is not considered a rebellion. Sunnī scholars, other than the Mālikīs, stipulated that for the crime of rebellion, it

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[348] Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbdu'l-Wahhāb, *The Foundations of Islām*, ed. Abū Rumaysah (Birmingham: Dār as-Sunnah Publishers, 2010), 69.

[349] Ibid., 33.

[350] Ibid., 35.

[351] Şafak, "BAĞY."

should be done using force. Mālikīs and Zāhirīs, on the other hand, accept as rebellion to oppose the legitimate head of state, without seeking the condition of using force. However, there is no hesitation when failure to comply with the illegitimate orders of the head of state does not constitute a crime of rebellion. 3) This is the point where the water boils: It is the intention of changing the head of state or not implementing his legitimate orders in the rebellion, and the rebels relying on a just cause (*ta'wīl*) in this regard. Here, the door cracked by way of interpretation will be sufficient for the Wahhābis in the Ottoman context. There are some differences of nuance among the madhabs. Accordingly, while for al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, the fleeing rebels are not followed, they can be chased only if it is sure that they will join their comrades, according to Abū Ḥanīfa. In this general framework of analysis, it is considered lawful to fight the rebels whose crimes are proven in *baġy* and to kill them while doing so. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that they are Muslims. In other words, their wounded who have been captured are not killed, their property is not distributed as booty and not destroyed, and their family members are not taken prisoner. In this respect, the Wahhābis did not consider their enemies as Muslims, especially in terms of their harsh and brutal practices during the first decade of the nineteenth century.[352]

Bidʿah (Innovation): This is something which is fabricated and does not have any foundation in the orthodox understanding of Islam, and in the example of the pious forefathers; hence, the second meaning of the term is an "opposite doctrine". In this semantic framework, M. H. Kamali defines its meaning in contrast to *Sunnah* which is a clear path, a beaten track; a normative practice or an established course of conduct; thus it can signify a good or a bad example, and may be defined by an individual, a sect or a community.[353] In the eyes of the pre-Islamic Arabs it was the known way of the practices of the forefathers and was also a source of pride and identity.[354] *Bidʿah*,

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[352] Dresch, "Arabia to the End of the First World War," 143.

[353] Mohammad H. Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 2003), 58.

[354] Ibid.

on the contrary, is the exact opposite of *Sunnah*; it is something that which lacks precedent and continuity with the practices of the past.[355] In other words, it signifies a rupture from the established tradition of an ideological golden age, i.e., the first three centuries of Islam. In the fiqh literature of Islam, on the other hand, there is a distinction between a good *bidʿah* and a bad one; in al-Shāfiʿī's analysis if there was no contradiction with Quran, the hadith, the ijmāʿ and the stance of the Companions then the innovation is a good one; otherwise a bad one.[356] Thus, in the literature of the Islamic law innovations are categorized under five titles: *farḍ* (obligatory, duty), *ḥarām* (forbidden), *mandūb* (recommended), *makrūh* (reprehensible, disapproved), *mubāḥ* (indifferent).[357] Right at this point, al-ʿUthaymīn observes the fact that, *bidʿah*, when used without a qualifying adjective, means an action or doctrine contrary to the *shariʿa*, or not to be found in its sources.[358] Therefore, an innovation, when it is a matter of doctrine and practice in religion, as emphasized by al- ʿUthaymīn, can only be categorized as *ḥarām* and *makrūh*.[359]

Therefore, the Ḥanbalites categorically reject innovations and the attitude of the Wahhābī doctrine towards innovations is the same with those of the Ḥanbalites. In fact, al-Wahhāb denounced and chastised all innovations. For him a *bidʿah* cannot be praiseworthy or good, since the Prophet said, "Every *bidʿah* leads people astray."[360] al-ʿUthaymīn categorizes *bidʿah* as follows: 1) Communal listening to the story of the

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[355] Ibid.; ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb*, 136.

[356] Ibid.

[357] Ibid.

[358] Ibid., 137.

[359] Ibid.

[360] Ibid.

Prophet's birth, together with music and in poetic form, 2) Asking for intercession from the founders of the orders, 3) Excessive praising for the founders of Sūfī orders, reciting the surah of *Fātiḥa* for them, 4) Calculating the number of prayers by counting beads, 5) In Ramaḍān, repeating all the daily prayers all over again following the final Friday prayer.[361] To these, however, can be added the building of domes over the tombs, grave decorations, wearing gold and silk by men, smoking tobacco, playing mankala and chess, since all of these are against the tradition of the Prophet.[362]

However, during the early days of the Ikhwan disturbance, which was going to turn into a rebellion in a short time, in December 1926 the brotherhood declared a list of *bidʿah* which provides us with a better understanding of the term in its own wider historical framework. Nabil Mouline lists these in eight articles as follows: 1) That the telegraph was seen as an evil innovation, 2) Even though it was forbidden by the law, King's sons, Saʿūd and Faisal, pay visits to such foreign countries as Egypt and England, 3) That the imposition of non-canonical and forbidden texts on the indigenous population Najd, 4) Despite considered as infidels the presence of the Iraqi and Transjordanian tribes in the Muslim territory to graze their herds, 5) That the prohibition of all trade with Kuwait, 6) That the Shiʿite presence in the eastern province who either be converted or exterminated, 7) That the implementation of positive laws in the Ḥijāz, 8) The allowance of Egyptian *mahmal* in the holy lands of Mecca.[363]

In addition to these, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb describes the hijra in the context of *bidʿah*: 'Hegira,' he says in his *Three Fundamental Principles* (*al-Usūl al-thalatha fi'd-dīn*), "is the migration of the ummah from the land of polytheism to the land of Islam, from the land of *bidʿah* to the land of *Sunnah*. This decree of hegira has

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[361] Ibid.

[362] Ibid.

[363] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 103.

been obligatory to the Muslims until the Judgement Day."[364] He supports his argument with Quran 4:97. Indeed, this was exactly what happened during the Egyptian invasion of Najd in 1838; when the Egyptian commander Hurşid Pasha appointed a dependent emir who was under his order, the leading Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī *ulama* left his lands, since they thought that it would be impious to stay there;[365] the duty of *hijra*, in other words, is a serious issue in the Wahhābī mindset as long as one wants to have salvation, and, to this end, wants to perform and fulfill his religious obligations in this world.

Al-ʿAmr bi'l-maʿrūf wa'l-nahy ʿan al-munkar (Commanding right and forbidding wrong): Also translated as "the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice" and "enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong." One of the best explanations for this tenet comes from Quran 3:110 which says, "You are the best community that has been raised for mankind; you enjoin right and you forbid evil."[366] The main implication of this verse, in Kamalı's analysis, is the fact that since the Companions are "the best community" in the Islamic ummah as signified by Quran, in the words of Kamalı, "their example commands authority and respect."[367] In other words, the tenet of commanding right and forbidding wrong creates a model of act for all Muslims through whom the orthodoxy and orthopraxy prevail in the Islamic society and daily life as in the way it had been lived during the days of the pious forefathers. As indicated by al-Uthaymīn, on the other hand, Ibn Taymiyyah grounded the Islamic faith on two pillars which are *amr* (commanding right) and *nahy* (forbidding wrong); for him this was indisputably incumbent upon all Muslims who were capable of imposing it to society.[368] In this context, the person who is responsible with the duty

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[364] Muhammed İbn Abdülvehhâb, *Dinde Üç Esas*, trans. Ahmet Çetin (İstanbul: Kitap Sünneti İhya Yayınları, 1998), 24.

[365] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 80.

[366] Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, 316.

[367] Ibid.

[368] al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 145.

of imposing *ḥisba* (office of the *muḥtasib*)[369], which is the responsibility to 'promote good and forbid evil,' is called *muḥtasib*; his main area of responsibility, however, is the market place who is also responsible for the observance of moral behavior in public life and monetary transactions. On the other hand, in the words of Emile Tyan, "Etymologically, the term *ḥisba* refers to performing an act for a disinterested purpose; more precisely, according to the expressions of others, for the sole purpose of pleasing God and obtaining a divine and celestial reward."[370] Finally, as remarked by al-ʿUthaymīn, these public officers are also called in the Wahhābī lands as *muṭawwiʿ* (p. *muṭawwiʿīn*, religious police)[371] and *nāʿib* whose main charge, besides the mentioned ones, is to force people to attend to public prayers.[372]

Nevertheless, commanding right and forbidding wrong gains its importance in terms of explaining the ideological difference between the first and the second Saʿūdī states. While the first one was categorically a *jihād* state, the second one had been a state of isolation depending on *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ*. In other words, the distinctive feature of the first period is the Wahhābization of the Saʿūdīs, that is, the shaping of the faith of the whole family (with their subjects) through the teachings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. In this context, it is also possible to define the first period of the Saʿūdī state as "Wahhābī- Saʿūdīs". As M. Cook draws attention to, this striking difference between the two political entities manifests itself particularly in the work of Ibn Bishr in whose account of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's life and career "anachronistic pervasiveness of forbidding wrong" is salient.[373] This is indeed a right detection given

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[369] Rudolph Peters, *Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 192.

[370] Émile Tyan, *Histoire De L'Organisation Judiciaire En Pays D'Islam* (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1960), 617.

[371] M. J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 93; al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 75, 147.

[372] al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 147.
[373] Cook, "The Ḥanbelites of Najd," 69.

the fact that Ibn Bishr was a chronicler of the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state, during the reign of which *ʿamr bi'l-maʿrūf* became an official state ideology at the hands of the Saʿūdī ruling elite, while it was mainly an almost uninterrupted *jihād* for the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite.[374] According to M. Cook, the reason for this radical change from jihadism to *ʿamr bi'l-maʿrūf* was due to the fact that the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state had little chance and power to extend its borders in the central Arabia; even though al-Aḥsāʾ was still in their reach, the Ḥijāz was now beyond their dominion since the Egyptians and the Ottomans were there; therefore, the holy war against the non-Wahhābī elements ceased to be the sole *raison d'être* for the Saʿūdī elite. If the second rule was going to protect its faith-based identity as pure Muslims, it had to be done in its isolation and in the name of and at the same time against its own subjects; "it had to turn," says M. Cook, "its righteousness inwards."[375] Here we see an inevitable resemblance between the analysis of N. Mouline and M. Cook; both of whom evaluates the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state as an enclave society which closed its borders to the alien faiths and now was trying to homogenize its own doctrine in its own indigenous land.

At this juncture, three of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's most widespread books also indicate important evidence on the absence of *al-ʿamr bi'l-maʿrūf wa'l-nahy ʿan al-munkar* neither as a topic nor as a particular title. In his *Three Fundamental Principles* the issue of *nahy ʿan al-munkar* passes only one time[376] and the tenet is not present in the other two of his books. Therefore, we suppose that this absence of the term in some of his most common books helps us to explain the anachronism which we encounter in the work of Ibn Bishr.

Fitna (Discord): The other meanings of this word are intrigue (in the sense of making secret plans to do something illicit or detrimental to someone), trick, and

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[374] Ibid.

[375] Ibid.

[376] Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *Dinde Üç Esas*, 36.

disunion; apart from these it can also mean a test; or may mean tainted or low-quality gold. The word, however, simply means political disorder, disunion or simply anarchy in the literature of the Islamic political philosophy. For Ann K. S. Lambton, *fitna* means sedition or civil war.[377] At his point, we encounter one of the most characteristic and common mottos of the Sunnī politics: "Oppression is better and preferable than disorder." In other words, political order is indispensable for the maintaining of the Islamic community, yet only in terms of orthodoxy and orthopraxy; without the sanctions of any political authority, religion is in danger of disorder which, in the eyes of the ulama, might be rather destructive for the faith. Everything considered, the absence of political order is detrimental to the Islamic faith and its propagation.

This doctrine is in fact one of the most systematized justifications for the existence of the state, its authority, and its *raison d'état* in the Sunnī Islamic world as well as the Shia part of it. "Belief in the origin of the community," says Ann K. S. Lambton, "and the lack of any separation between the "church" and state had important consequences so far as civil war and internal disturbances were concerned."[378] Thus, in his analysis, these disturbances are called as *fitna* and considered as rebellion against the divine law; consequently, following the great political conflict between Muawiyya and ʿAlī for the imamate, which was named as the first *fitna* in the history of Islam, all periods of political disturbances had been named as a period of *fitna*.[379] In fact, Abū Dharr (d. 652), Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (759), Abū Yūsuf (d. 798), al-Mawardī (d. 1058), and finally al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) have parallel thoughts about the justification of the authority of the ruler and of the state: 'Fear God and obey Him: and if a flat-nosed shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearken to him and obey him;' "He who obeys God obeys me and he who obeys the *imām* obeys me. He who rebels against me rebels against God and he

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[377] Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 330.

[378] Ibid., 15.

[379] Ibid., 16.

who rebels against the *imām* rebels against me;" "If the *imām* is just, then reward is due to him, and gratitude from you. If he is tyrannical, then the burden of sin is his, and it is yours to be patient." [380] In addition to these, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's mentor, held to the same Sunnī doctrine of state: "Religion without sultan (power), Holy War (jihad) and wealth, is as bad as sultan, wealth and conflict (harb) without religion."[381] Besides these, in the ninth century, a late Greek letter, *Letter to Alexander "On the Government of Cities*," which had Persian evocation was propagating the same doctrine: "Our knowledge of human nature shows that humans will not obey the law without coercion; therefore, the law needs someone to apply it; therefore, a kingdom needs both a legislator and a coercive ruler."[382] A Shiite formulation of the justification of political authority by al-Qaṣīm ibn Ibrahim (785-860) had also been influential on the Sunnī political theory and the idea of *raison d'être*: "The desire for sex and food is implanted in men and, if there were not someone to limit and curb it, people would fight against each other to satisfy their desire, and consequently the world be destroyed… People need a guide to teach them these restrictions, and this guide is the Imām. Also, the Imām punishes people if they disobey him, and rewards them if they obey him. In this manner people are kept safe."[383]

There is, on the other hand, a close relation between *fitna* and political disorder in terms of succession in the House of Saʿūd. The problem of succession between the equal heirs to the Saʿūdī throne manifested itself, by nature, in the form of civil war. The first instance of this was after the death of Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-Aziz in 1814. Thus, his son ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿūd was challenged by his brother for the throne and for the

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[380] Ibid., 57.

[381] Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 159.

[382] Ibid., 27.

[383] Ibid., 41.

family fortune. Even though the civil war came about during the Egyptian military intervention, ʿAbd Allāh became successful against his brother and protected his place as the sole leader of the house.[384] However, a second and a more well-known example of civil war was seen following the death of Faisal b. Turkī in 1865. His eldest son ʿAbd Allāh b. Faisal challenged fiercely by his brother Saʿūd, and the former, had no choice but to ask for help from the Ottomans which finally gave the Porte the pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ, which is the subject matter of the fifth chapter of this study. One way or another, as long as we want to explain the issue of civil war between the heirs of the family, we need to employ a conceptualization which is adelphic form of succession in Najd, a mode of horizontal succession among the male members of the family.[385] In the words of N. Mouline, "…all men belonging to the dominant lineage have equal power, and only providence or fortune is capable of deciding between them," however primogeniture is not out of option in this system.[386] In other words, political transitions from one imām to another are inevitably periods of acute crisis and conflict.[387] As a result, the House of Saʿūd, by the nature of its traditional political structure and organization, had always been open to the possibility of *fitna*, or civil war, during the transitional periods. The Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama, however, always supported the Saʿūdī family ideologically, because without their patronage the ulama would never survive the hostile territory of Arabia.

Ijtihād (Independent Reasoning, Personal Exertion): The most common meaning of the term in the Islamic law is "personal judgement", "individual verdict or decision". However, the root of the term is *j-h-d* which simply means "effort" or

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[384] Selda Güner, ibid., 194-96.

[385] N. Mouline, ibid., 49.

[386] Ibid.

[387] Ibid.

"zeal"; the well-known term of *jihād* shares the same root in this sense.[388] Ferrar gives the following designation: "Personal exertion, on the part of some authority who uses his own judgement in coming to a decision in a religious matter in place of accepting former precedent."[389] According to Kamalı, *ijtihād* means, "'exertion', and technically the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law, which is not self-evident, from its source."[390] Ann K. S. Lambton has a very similar description, "the exercise of individual reasoning or independent judgement."[391] Rudolph Peters' deepens the meaning of the term, "exerting one's effort in order to derive from the bases of the law (*adillah*) an opinion concerning a legal rule."[392] According to Emile Tyan, on the other hand, "… the condition of legal science means, not only the knowledge of the actual texts of the law as they are established in the primary sources, but also the capacity to deduce, by the orthodox method of reasoning, the appropriate solutions. This is called the capacity of *ijtihād*; the *qāḍī* must, in principle, be a *mujtahid*."[393] In this conceptual framework, the person who is qualified to reach independent reasoning is called *mujtahid* and the founders of the Islamic legal schools are considered as *mujtahid*s by Islamic tradition. However, apart from *ijtihād*, there are five principal sources in Islamic jurisprudence to make and ground laws: *Qurʾān*, *Sunnah* (the traditions of the Prophet), *ijmāʿ* (consensus), and *qiyās* (analogy, syllogism). Accordingly, Wael B. Hallaq notes that *ijtihād* is the climax of a jurist's effort to figure out and infer what

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[388] William M. Watt, *Islam: A Short History* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 90.

[389] M. L. Ferrar, "India," ed. H. A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), 206.

[390] Mohammad Hashim Kamalı, ibid., 523.

[391] Ann K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 331.

[392] Rudolph Peters, "Idjtihād and Taqlīd in 18th and 19th Century Islam," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 149.

[393] Emile Tyan, ibid., 168.

God's law is when it is not specifically indicated in Quran and the traditions of the Prophet.[394] Nevertheless, the discussion on whether the gate of *ijtihād* have been closed (*insidād bāb al-ijtihād*) since the early tenth century is in out of the scope of this study. Here, we are intended to show its relation to Wahhābism in its ideological context.

For Wahhābism the issue of *ijtihād* relevant to *taqlīd* which is "the unreasoning acceptance of a doctrine as laid down by a school or earlier authority."[395] Thus, *taqlīd* is the imitation of a specific *ʿālim*'s praxis and inferences which he deduced depending on his own personal judgement. In this sense, Wahhābism and the ulama attached to its doctrines have been distanced to blind dependence on the praxis of any *madhab*'s founder, since for them there can be no other and greater authority than *Qurʾān* and *Sunnah* as the quintessential sources for the Muslim community and the Islamic scholars.[396] However, according to al-ʿUthaymīn, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, from an earlier period, was accused of categorically rejecting the notion of *ijtihād* and giving weight on *taqlīd* instead by Sulaymān Ibn Suhaym, Muḥammad ibn ʿAfāliq (in his *Taḥakkum al-Muqallidīn bi-man Iddaʿā Tajdīd al-Dīn*), and al-Khālidī (in his *Ashadd al-Jihād fī Ibṭāl Daʿwā'l-Ijtihād*).[397] In contrast to these accusations, as stated by al-ʿUthaymīn, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb had never claimed to have been a *mujtahid* during his life time, nor was he categorically against *taqlīd*.[398] His son's writing is clear about the attitude of the Wahhābis on the issue:

> We are not qualified to exercise *ijtihād*, nor does any one of us claim to be. However, we will not hesitate to abandon the position of our Ḥanbalī school on

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[394] Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 1 (1984): 3.

[395] Ann K. S. Lambton, ibid., 336.

[396] al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 139.

[397] Ibid., 141.

[398] Ibid.

> any issue in favor of the opinion of one of the other three *Imām*s, if this latter is supported by a clear text from the Qurʾān or the tradition, which is not abrogated, limited, or opposed by another clear text. In many, but by no means all, cases, there is no objection to *ijtihād*. Many eminent scholars, who formally followed one or another of these schools, on certain issues held independent views that were contrary to the general opinion of the madhhab to which they belonged.[399]

The debate on the validity of *ijtihād* versus *taqlīd* has a long past in the turbulent history of Islamic culture. There is still no universally accepted consensus in the various Muslim communities of different Islamic countries. In generally accepted terms of the *ahl al-Sunna*, however, *taqlīd* is permissible and legitimate so long as it justifies itself in the erudite and illuminated person of a magnificent past era such, in our case, Ibn Hanbal or al-Shāfiʿī, or even al-Mālik. It is also quite a common conviction that *taqlīd*, in the absence of great *mujtahīd*s of the past, protected the religion in its uncorrupted, pure form, since its adherents had not had to speculate on the theoretical jurisprudential issues, and simply followed their own *imām*s' praxis and judicial corpus. It was, in other words, became compulsory following the closure of the door of *ijtihād* in the tenth century. This is exactly the point where things change color. Those who are in favor of *taqlīd* asserted that 'one must necessarily know' (*maʿlūm min al-dīn ḍarūratan*)[400], to such a level that for them this was an indispensable column for the *āmantu* (faith), therefore, those who were against were seen apostates by the traditional wing.[401] From the Quran they counted 16:43, 21:7, and 4:59 as proofs, besides two prophetic traditions which says: "My companions are like the stars: no matter whom of them you follow, you are on the right path" and "If one does not know what to do, the only remedy is to inquire."[402]

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[399] Ibid., 141-42.

[400] Rudolph Peters, ibid., 151-152.

[401] Ibid., 152.

[402] Ibid.

Ijtihād, on the other hand, represents a speculative reasoning proper, which was held by the Medinan traditionalists as an alien influence of Iraqis, first by Abū Ḥanīfa, then by his followers. In this respect, when brought side by side with a *hadith*, since human reason is liable to err, it is, by the traditionalist ulama, thought that *hadith* had always been the sturdiest stronghold for the believers. When this traditionalist approach considered in the light of Peters' "separation argument", who evaluates the issue in the context of polarization between traditionalists and fundamentalists. Accordingly, since Allah is transcendent and separate from his creation, the only possible way of knowing what Allah asks from believers were the prophets, who were the sole communication between Allah and his creatures, at least from the fundamentalist point of view.[403] Then, since all the believers are essentially equal in their creation by Allah, particularly in the eyes of the fundamentalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was one remedy for the problem knowledge: Anyone, whose genuine effort for religious learning based on piety can acquire the necessary qualities for *ijtihād*, consequently, again only in the eyes of the fundamentalists, anyone in that level of knowledge can be a *mujtahid*.[404] This understanding of the fundamentalists, however, did not come out of thin air. In fact they had their antecedents in the Islamic culture, first names of the given anti-*taqlīd* camp, counted by R. Peters, were Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064), Abū ʿUmar Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 1070), Sind b. ʿInān al-Azdī (d. 1146), ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 1262).[405] So the following names can be categorized, because of their antagonism against *taqlīd*, in their wake; Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (d. 1762), Hamd b. Ṇāṣir b. Muʿammar (d. 1810), Muḥammad b. ʿAli al-Shawkānī (d. 1832), and Muḥammad b. ʿAli al-Sanūsī (d. 1859).[406] Since the last names are the offshoots of a Medinan

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[403] Ibid., 149.

[404] Ibid.

[405] Ibid., 150.

[406] Ibid., 149.

scholarly network, and whose roots merge in the persons of Ibrāhīm b. Ḥasan al-Kūrānī al-Kurdī (d. 1690), Abu'l-Baqāʾ al-Hasan b. ʿAlī al-ʿUdjaymī, and the famous Muḥammad Ḥayya al-Sindī (d. 1750),[407] then, the ideological roots of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's puritan reformation movement should be looked for in this pro-*ijtihād* understanding, which opened the road for the modern Salafism, definitely not in *taqlīd*.[408] Indeed, his early critics, including the Ottoman archival material, saw him as a wannabe *mujtahīd*: "This man claims absolute *ijtihād*, and declares the entire *ummah* to be in error."[409]

Jihād (Struggling): Like *ijtihād*, the root of the word is *j-h-d*, and the meaning of which is given above. However, *jihād* means struggling for the cause of Allah and Islam, hence the meaning of the word is simply "holy war"[410] against the infidels and non-Muslims who live in the territory of *dār al-harb* ("house of war" or "house of conflict"[411]). In other words, while the greater *jihād* is waging war against ignorance and impiety which is fought in the form of pure thought, the lesser *jihād* is a war which is fought with sword against the rival religions and inner denominations. Within this framework, Kamali describes the word as "holy struggle"[412] which is supported by a hadith that says, "*jihād* shall remain valid till the day of resurrection."[413] In other

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[407] Ibid., 155.

[408] Ferrar, "India," 206.

[409] Michael Cook, "Written and Oral Aspects of an Early Wahhābī Epistle," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 78, no. 1 (2015): 163.

[410] Ann K. S. Lambton, ibid., 332.

[411] Antony Black, ibid., 374.

[412] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ibid., 524.

[413] Ibid., 207.

words, it is a perpetual struggle in the cause of Islam and Allah as a duty on every capable Muslim (*farḍ kifāya*), and those who perform this duty are called *mujāhid*, "one who leads the faithful in holy war or takes part in holy war."[414]

Jihād becomes one of the most crucial tenets of Wahhābism since, in their belief, they have been the only representative of genuine Islam and who are obliged to spread and propagate it not only in the world, but also in the Muslim world. Indeed, in Wahhābism *imām*'s responsibilities are not only preventing crimes against religion and society, protecting the Muslims, but it is also exerting an utmost effort to spread Islam through *jihād*.[415] In fact, *jihād* is an indispensable tool for the prevalence of Islam because the existence of the word of God is dependent on it.[416] Therefore, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb treats *jihād* in his *Mukhtaṣar al-Hady al-Nabawī* under four different categories: 1) In opposition to ourselves; it is to learn the ways of the Prophet with all its details, stay in its boundaries and propagate it no matter what the situation is we find ourselves in, 2) In opposition to Satan; to withstand against any suspicion about God and faith as well as to be strong and spirited against his enticements, 3) In opposition to unbelievers, pretenders and deceivers; this shall be followed and done by heart, tongue, money and life, 4) Tyrants and innovators shall be opposed physically whenever it is possible.[417] However, in his *Mukhtaṣar al-Insāf wa-'l-Sharḥ al-Kabīr* counts three obligatory conditions under which all Muslims are held responsible with *jihād*: 1) At war, 2) when the country is invaded by an enemy, 3) when the *imām* declares it.[418] Therefore, the idea of holy war in the historiography of Wahhābism is almost omnipresent. In fact, all wars, by their nature, were also call

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[414] Ann K. S. Lambton, ibid., 334.

[415] al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 145.

[416] Ibid., 146.

[417] Ibid., 101.

[418] Ibid., 105.

for *jihād* and participation was compulsory, particularly when it was a defensive *jihād*, as a collective duty for all Muslims who live under the command of the Saʿūds. However, as one of the many idiosyncratic peculiarities of Wahhābism, it was not the Imām, as is the known way of practice in Islam including Hanbalism, who declared offensive *jihād* during the first Saʿūdī state, but Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself who declared it; in fact, from its beginning up until its last days the first Saʿūdī state was a state of incessant *jihād*, because of the exclusivist *tawhīd* understanding of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, for whom *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ* sealed loyalty among the genuine Muslims, *takfīr* defined who the enemy was, military forces were mustered by *hijra* (emigration), and God's will was going to be realized on the face of the earth via *jihād*.[419] In fact *jihād* was immanent in *tawhīd per se*, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.[420]

Mulhid (Apostate): The root of the term is *l-ḥ-d* which simply means "go astray" and "abandoning faith"; hence the meaning of *mulhid* is a "denier" or a "faithless." In Şemseddin Sami's definition it means, "The one who does not believe in the divine nature and in the way of religion, an irreligious person." Furthermore, as indicated by A. Y. Ocak, the term is present in Quran 22:25 and has the same lexicographic meaning.[421] It was first used as early as ninth century by the Islamic jurists and theologians (*mutakallimūn*) as in the meaning of "faithlessness" and "godlessness" and has become part of the literature since then; the Ottoman ulamā used the term as in the same meaning together with *zindik*.[422] However, while the word only signified Manicheans at first, as parallel to the change of time and space, it also signified the

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[419] M. J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 70-71.

[420] Ibid., 69.

[421] Ahmet Y. Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler: XV.-VII. Yüzyıllar* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2016), 45.

[422] Ibid., 45.

Zoroastrians and the followers of Mazdakism.[423] By and large, *mulhid*, in any sense of the term, means all the faiths and movements which are and were against the Sunnī Islam; in other words, it is not only an indicator of being without the borders of Sunnīsm, also an indicator of being an atheist as well as a heretic.[424]

Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb is described and characterized as a *mulhid* in the Ottoman archive: "From the people of a town which is called as al-ʿUyayna from towns of Najd a *mulhid* called Muḥammad Bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, who has been enticing the people of those parts into perversion and heresy with his superstitious *ijtihād* which in opposition to the four exalted *madhāhib*…"[425] In another document, he was again identified as a *mulhid*: "… because the *mulhid* from the sheikhs of the Arabs who is called as ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Najdī had attacked to Mecca and Taif…"[426] The language of these materials, in our evaluation, shows the pejorative attitude of the Ottoman elites toward the movement, in whose judgment the Wahhābis were mere heretics and bandits and did not deserve anything but the sword and bullet, which is a clear sign of the securitivist approach of the Ottoman *raison d'état* to the issue; in other words, there had not been a struggle against the Wahhābis of Najd at the ideological level. *Mulhid* is relevant as it displays the Ottoman ideological attitude to the Wahhābis and their ideology.

Murtadd (Apostate): Simply means "to reject, deny, refuse"; hence derives from this root the term *irtidād* which means "rejecting or going out from Islam" and the one who does this is called a *murtadd*, an apostate. According to Ş. Sami a *murtadd* is, "A person who abandoned the religion of Islam and returned either back to his old religion or subjected to another one." According to Islamic law on apostasy, together with theft, banditry, unlawful sexual intercourse, slander, drinking alcohol, is considered in the

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[423] Ibid., 46.

[424] Ibid.

[425] BOA, C. DH., 135/6716.

[426] BOA, C. AS., 188/8118.

boundaries of "constituting violations of the claims of God (*ḥuqūq Allāh*), thus it necessitates *ḥadd* punishment".[427] However, in all Sunnī *madhāhib*, if the one who is accused of apostasy repents in a given time span, then he or she is not punished (insulting the Prophet, nevertheless, is not included in the right of repentance) and gains impunity.[428] The aforementioned crimes are also has fixed punishments.[429] On the other hand, while a Muslim's right to live is protected by the Islamic law, killing an apostate (as long as he or she does not have legal protection which is *ʿiṣma*) or an unbeliever who inhabits outside the territory of Islam (*harbī*) is permissible[430]; this is also supported with a *ḥadith* of the Prophet which says, "If someone changes his religion, then kill him."[431]

The term *murtadd* is highly relevant to any study on Wahhābism since it gives one of the crucial motifs to grasp the understanding of a Wahhābī towards non-Wahhābī elements both in their reach and out of it. In fact, in the twelfth chapter of his *Kashf al-Shubuhāt* (Removal of the Doubts) there is a separate subtitle which is dedicated to a *murtadd* whose blood, in accordance with the Islamic law, can be shed and belongings can be plundered.[432] Furthermore, an important example can be seen during the homogenization period of the second Saʿūdī state where *al-amr bi al-maʿrūf* became the crucial *raison d'état* and a tool for eradicating not-yet-converted-to-Wahhābism elements in reach. As maintained by N. Mouline, the performing of prayers were mandatory on every Muslim, and if one did not fulfil this duty he or she had to repent; yet if one still fails in fulfilling this mandatory ritual then his or her

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[427] Rudolph Peters, *Crime and Punishment in the Islamic Law*, 7.

[428] Ibid., 27.

[429] Ibid., 53.

[430] Ibid., 38.

[431] Ibid., 65.

[432] Muhammed İbn Abdülvehhâb, *Keşf-El-Şûbuhât*, n.d., 34.

execution was inevitable.[433] Another example can be found in his *Kashf*; "If a Muslim," says Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, "claims that Allah has children then he becomes a *murtadd*."[434] However, another important example is provided by a grandson of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Shaykh Suleiman, who was put to death during the Egyptian invasion, in whose epistle certain attitude towards any apostate is clearly displayed, the parallelism between an apostate and an idolater is striking:

> Q: What is meaning of God's words in the Qurʾān 'Thus you are like them' [Qur. 4:139] and of the *ḥadith* 'He who consorts with the idolater and lives with him is like him.'
>
> A: The meaning of the verse is plain. It is that the man who hears God's verses with disbelief and derision, then sits with the unbelievers who are deriding them, when he is not compelled to do so, and does not censure or keep aloof from them so that they talk about something else, is an unbeliever like them. Even if he does not do the same as them, he is still to be held responsible along with them for taking pleasure in unbelief and taking pleasure in unbelief is itself unbelief. Referring to this verse, the *ʿulamāʾ* have concluded that who takes pleasure in sin is like the one who commits it. Even if he claims that he disliked it in his heart, there is no excuse because it is the outward appearance that counts, and, as he displayed unbelief, he is an unbeliever. Thus, when the Ridda [Wars of Apostasy] broke out after the death of the Prophet and men claimed that they disliked it, the Companions did not excuse them, but treated all of them as apostates except those who censured apostasy with their tongues and hearts.
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> Similarly, there is a plain meaning to the *ḥadith*: 'He who consorts with the idolater and lives with him is like him.' It is that he who claims to be a Muslim and yet associates with idolaters and helps them and lives with them, so that the idolaters reckon him as one of them, is an unbeliever like them…[435]

Mushrik (Associationist): The root of the term is *sh-r-k* (*sharika*) which means "to share." *Mushrik*, however, does not simply mean, someone who shares something. In fact, the term is loaded with an extremely negative theological connotation which is someone who associates the oneness of God to other false gods. In other words, it means an "infidel" a "heathen" and an "unbeliever". In this semantic framework, the antonym of the term is "*muwaḥḥid*" (pl. *muwaḥḥdūn*), which means "People of unity"

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[433] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 83.

[434] Muhammed Bin Abdulvehhâb, ibid., 26.

[435] Elizabeth Sirriyeh, "Wahhābīs, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 111.

or “Unitarians”. However, the term is particularly employed in the Islamic historical and theological terminology to signify the pre-Islamic or *Jāhiliyya* Arabs who were pagans (*mushrikūn*) and had an indigenous pantheon of gods centered in Mecca. By nature, the term is prevalent in Qurʾān; if we were to name some of them 2:217, 4:50-52, 5:60, 6:71 can be counted alongside with many other verses which has direct reference to the term as in the sense of either “associationists” or “idolators” (thus, the term is also related to idolatry) and is, without doubt, a cardinal sin.

As might be expected, the term is highly widespread in the works of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. It is the antipode of *tawhīd* and goes hand in hand with *shirk* (associationism). Chapter four of his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* is dedicated to “the Fear of Shirk” in which he refers to Qurʾān 4:48, 116: “Allah will not forgive associating aught with him; but He will forgive the lesser sins to whomsoever He pleases.” Furthermore, in the same work he also remarks with an exact tone of firmness that, “Vows to other than Allah are *shirk*”, “To seek refuge other than Allah is *shirk*”. To seek help of other than Allah is *shirk*. However, in the second chapter of his *Kashf al-Shubuhāt* he indicates that ‘[even] the associationists acknowledge the oneness and unity of God.’ In his *al-Qawāʿid al-Arbaʿ* he claims that “The *shirk* of the polytheist of our time is worse than that of those before. At times of difficulty, the polytheists of old would be sincere to Allāh and at times of ease, they would associate partners with Him. The polytheists of our time, however, commit *shirk* all the time, in times of ease as well as times of hardship.”[436] He supports his claim with 29:65: “Now, if they embark on a boat, they call on Allah, making their devotion sincerely to Him. But when He has delivered them safely to land, behold, they give a share.”

There is, on the other hand, a thin red line between intercession and associationism in Wahhābism. According to its founder intercession is permissible when it is directly asked from God, otherwise, when it is asking for help from a dead

[436] Ibn ʿAbdu’l-Wahhāb, *The Foundations of Islām*, 104.

person, *istighāsa*, it is mere associationism and cannot be tolerated because, as he writes in his *Kashf*, "Allah does not show consent but *Tawhīd*."[437]

For the Wahhābīs, the Ottomans are undoubtedly *mushriks* and their lands are places where Islam cannot be practiced properly by a real Muslim, and as stated above, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to migrate from these lands of *shirk* to the lands of Islam. This, however, is only relevant in the context of the second Saʿūdī state (where *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ*, together with hijra played a vital role) since there is no direct reference to the Ottomans in the writings of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Indeed, during the heyday of the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state an Ottoman *surre* was not allowed in Mecca in 1808, while the holy city was under Wahhābī rule, as the Ottomans were seen as *mushrikūn*.[438]

Kufr (Blasphemy): The triconsonantal root of the word is *k-f-r* which means "to hide", "to cover" or "to conceal" something. However, it has a secondary meaning which is "denying God", "non-belief", "cursing the sacred", to put simply it is "sacrilegious" and the person who commits sacrilege is a *kâfir*, or "sacreligionist". But the simple term to correspond it in English is blasphemy. According to Ann K. S. Lambton, on the other hand, it is "unbelief".[439] Nonetheless, the usage of the term in the Islamic theological terminology has not displayed any semantic change during its development; it is denial of the truth which is Islam and its articles of faith. In line with the Islamic tradition, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb uses the word *kufr* to describe the identity of his doctrine vis-à-vis faithlessness, intercession, and idolatry. Here we should not forget the fact that the Ottoman lands, without doubt, were the lands of *kufr* for the followers of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb which means that one cannot

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[437] İbn Abdülvehhâb, *Keşf-El-Şûbuhât*, 20.

[438] BOA, HAT 113/4532.

[439] Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 333.

stay there so long as he wants to go on his life as a genuine Muslim.[440] Thus, migration or self-expatriation was incumbent upon him.

In the Ottoman archival material, however, there is no document accusing the Wahhābī elements of Arabia of *kufr*, or of being a *kâfir*. On the other hand, in the works of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb the word *kufr* is considerably widespread, although they do not denote the Ottomans particularly. In his *ʿUsūl al-Thalatha*, under the title of "The Things That Which Corrupt Islam" Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb enumerates blasphemy as the third article (the first two being associationism and intercession): "Not accepting the *mushrikūn* as *kâfir* or having doubts on their blasphemy or accepting their opinions as correct and true."[441] In the sixth article of the same subtitle he also says, "Mocking the decrees or anything from the religion of God, mocking the good deeds or punishments from God; these are all blasphemy."[442] In his *Kashf*, however, references to *kufr* and *kâfir* are more widespread than that of *ʿUsūl*. Here *kâfir*s are presented as also ignorant: He says, "Even the ignorant *kâfir*s know that…"[443] means that even the blasphemers understand and grasp the oneness of God. In the same work he indicates that, "*Kâfir*s are several and different from each other. For instance, some of them worship idols. They ask from them. Some of them hope from the saints (*awliyā*). On them God commands: "Those whom they invoke seek means of access to their Lord, [striving as to] which of them would be nearest, and they hope for His mercy and fear His Punishment."[444] In the twelfth chapter of the same work, he tries to shed light on the doubt of, "Those who perform some of the religious duties do not become a *kâfir* even though they do thing which are contrary to

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[440] Michael J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab* (London: Oneworld Academic, 2020), 114; Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 79.

[441] İbn Abdülvehhâb, *Dinde Üç Esas*, 49.

[442] Ibid., 50.

[443] Muhammed Bin Abdulvahhab, *Keşf-El-Şûbuhât*, 7.

[444] Ibid., 15; Qurʾān 17:57.

tawhīd." As an answer to this doubt he points out that religion shall be embraced completely; those who embrace some of it and leaves the rest are *kâfir*s.[445] For him aggrandizing people is also a kufr and ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib is not an exception in this tenet of his: "Do you think" he says, "that it is not harmless to aggrandize the other people while aggrandizing Alī necessitates *kufr*."[446] In his *Kitab al-Tawhīd*, forty fifth chapter is dedicated to "To Curse *al Dahr* is Blasphemy": "Since *al Dahr* is one the holy names of God, one cannot curse it, he says, otherwise it is blasphemy."[447]

In the end, we see that ʿAbd al-Wahhāb followed the same semantic path with the Islamic tradition in the way he employed *kufr* as a term to signify those who are not in the creedal borders of genuine Islam. Besides, in doing this he also creates and specifies the borders of his doctrine. In other words, to be able to identify the margin of his teaching he needed some other people who could be marginalized, and in this process, he did not go out of the classical theological argumentation; where there were real believers there had to be non-believers and those who corrupt the genuine belief. This understanding of *kufr* as a mechanism to create "the other" represents basis of *takfīr* which was going to be the most effective tool to make war against the non-Wahhābī elements in Arabia, exclusively, again, in the context of the first Saʿūdī state, where *jihād* remained constant.

Shafaaʿah (Intercession): The root of the term is *sh-f-ʿ* which is "to make something double", "to make mediation" or "intercession"; thus, *shafaʿa* means "mediation" and "to bridge connection with someone for the sake of some other people." In the Islamic popular tradition and mysticism, however, it is asking intercession of the saints (*awliyā*) for the benefit or forgiveness of someone either in this world or hereafter; in other words, together with intercession comes saint veneration in the Islamic tradition which is in fact independent of being a subject of

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[445] Ibid., 30.

[446] Ibid., 33.

[447] Muḥammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, *Kitāb Al Tawhīd*, trans. Isma'īl Rājī Fārūqī (Kuwait: Al Faisal Press, 1996), 124.

any *madhhab*. In this respect, there is an inevitable connection between *shafaʿa* and *shirk* in Wahhābī teaching.

In his *ʿUsūl* Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb supports his argument on intercession with a surah which reads, "And they worship other than Allah that which neither harms them nor benefits them, and they say, "These are our intercessors with Allah.'"[448] In his judgement in the same work, intercession has two sides: 1) Negative intercession which is not legitimate. 2) Positive intercession which is legitimate. If one asks of any other than Allah it is negative intercession since there is no one whose more powerful than Allah (he supports this claim with 2:254). Positive intercession, on the other hand, is the one through which one asks directly from Allah (this argument is supported by 2:255).[449] There is, however, still a third article in which ʿAbd al-Wahhāb says: "The Messenger of Allah was sent to the people who worshipped various gods. Some of them worshipped the sun and the moon, some of them worshipped righteous persons, some worshipped prophets, some worshipped angels, and some worshipped trees and stones. Yet, the Messenger of Allah regarded all of them as associationists and waged war against all of them without differentiation between them."[450] He supports this claim with 8:39, which reads as follows: "And fight them until there is no *fitnah* and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah…"[451] (Qur'an 8:39). In this framework, every act of saint veneration, which was rather widespread in the Arabic lands of the Ottoman empire, let alone Arabia, had to be an act of negative intercession in his judgement. His attitude towards negative intercession manifests itself clearly in his *Masāʾil al-Jāhiliyyah*: "When supplicating to Allāh and worshipping Him, in practice, they would associate the righteous in that worship. Their goal was to have them intercede on their behalf with Allāh labouring

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[448] Qurʾān 10:18.

[449] Muhammed b. Abdü'l-Vahhab et-Temîmî en-Necdî, ibid., 44-45.

[450] Ibid., 45.

[451] Husain b. Ghannām, *Rawḍat al-Afkār* (Riyadh: Dar al-Thulusiyyah li-n'Nasr wa't-tavzia, 2010), 339.

under the assumption that this was something that Allāh and the righteous loved."[452] He again supports this argument of his with 10:18 which is aforementioned. Finally, magic, astrology and divination are also acts directly counted as intercession by the Wahhābīs.

Takfīr (Excommunication): The meaning the term is "to declare someone a *kâfir*". Nevertheless, for the sake of analysis, here we correspond it excommunication; yet the term shall not be understood as in the sense of *extra ecclessiam nulla salus*, since there is no Church in Islam,[453] nor is there clergy, at least in theory, so no one can talk of excommunicating anyone, again, at least in theory. On the other hand, *takfīr* is a reality in the historical past of the Islamic world; it was in fact used as a political instrument to eradicate opponents in the political realm by using religion as a tool of marginalization since from the earliest times as in the example of the *Khārijites*,[454] whose most radical branch, *Azāriqa*, used *istiʿrāḍ* (the root of the term is *arḍ* which means "to reveal" or "to tell"; so the term means "to ask someone reveal his feelings and thoughts")[455] as a method for prosecution to identify those who were not from their belief; the end result for the one who was not from them was, inevitably, *takfīr* and hence death penalty.

As mentioned above, *takfīr* and *kufr* is widespread in Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's works. In his *Kashf*, for instance, he says that "according to these ignorant people; those who utter *kalima-i tawhīd* do not become a *kâfir* and he is not killed whatever he does. Therefore, these associationists are told; it is known that although the Jews utter *kalimat al-tawhīd* the Prophet fought against them and exterminated

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[452] Imām Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *The Foundations of Islam*, 33.

[453] Hefner, "Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society in an Age of Contest and Plurality," 3.

[454] J. O. Hunwick, "TAKFĪR," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 122.

[455] Mustafa Öz, "İSTİ'RÂZ," in *TDVİA* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2013 1988).

them."[456] In other words, uttering *kalimat al-tawhīd* may not be helpful if one is declared a *kâfir*. In the same work he emphasizes that denier of *tawhīd* becomes a *kâfir*.[457] Furthermore, in his *ʿUsūl* he says, "Almighty Allah informs in his lofty ayah that anyone who denies life after death becomes a kâfir." Supports his argument with 64:7 from Quran.[458]

Even though *takfīr* had been a mechanism to declare *jihād* on opponent tribes or towns in Arabia during the heyday of the first Saʿūdī state, during the days of the second Saʿūdī state it had been used as a corrective punishment for the procurement of the social order. This, however, does not mean that it lost its usage to justify war against the non-Wahhābī elements in Arabia. For example, participation in collective prayers was obligatory and the houses of those who did not take part in the prayers were to be burnt by the public *muwaṭṭaʿ*; resistance to commanding right and forbidding wrong was punished with exile to some other land; and making fun of the ulama or other religious representatives were straightaway punished with *takfīr* and were subject to death penalty.[459] There is also a secondary *takfīr*; according to which ones those who do not *takfīr* an infidel are also subject to *takfīr*, the only way of ensuring the sharp distinction of Muslim from the non-Muslim, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.[460]

However, the Wahhābī ulama during the second state had not been eager to use the *takfīr* card particularly when it was a matter of civil war and bloodshed following the death of Faisal b. Turkī in 1865. Shaikh ʿAbd al-Latif used his discretionary power and, against all insistence of the supporters of Saʿūd, he did not excommunicate ʿAbd

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[456] Muhammed Bin Abdulvahhab, *Keşf-El-Şûbuhât*, 38.

[457] Ibid., 32.

[458] Muhammed b. Abdü'l-Vahhab et-Temîmî en-Necdî, *Dinde Üç Esas*, 38.

[459] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 83.

[460] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 66.

Allāh and his supporters.[461] In end he had to recognize Saʿūd as *imām*; his justification in doing this was clear: "There can be no Islam save within the framework of the community and there can be no community save within the framework of the imāmate."[462] For him a single Islamic *ummah*, i.e., the Wahhābī believers, were the main bearing column of the faith, and had to be persevered whatever it takes.

In the final analysis, scholars of *Ahl al-Sunnah* have avoided making *takfīr* of a person who says he or she is a Muslim. Accordingly, the principle that Abū Ḥanīfa put forward that the people of the *qibla* cannot be excommunicated has been adopted by almost all Sunnī scholars. Among the Sunnī scholars, the group that most resorted to *takfīr* is the conservative *Salafiyya*. The basic conditions determined by scholars from different *madhāhib* regarding *takfīr* can be summarized as follows: 1) A fellow Muslim who believes and confesses kalima al-tawhīd cannot be excommunicated. 2) The people of the *qibla* cannot be excommunicated. 3) Controversial issues among scholars are not subject to *takfīr*. 4) people cannot be excommunicated by the indirect method, which is, if the thought that might be considered as subject to *takfīr* must be produced by its original producer, otherwise, those who adopt these views and thoughts cannot be expelled. 5) It is necessary to be content with determining the conditions of *takfīr* and avoid making *takfīr* of people. Because to expel a person, it is necessary to know the belief in his or her heart. 6) Anyone who unknowingly adopts some false beliefs cannot be expelled because ignorance is accepted as an excuse.[463]

Taqlīd (Imitation): The triconsonantal root of the term is *q-l-d* which means "to imitate," "to emulate," or "to adopt someone's opinions without weighing them." Hence *taqlīd* is "certain belief", and in the realm of Islamic theology it is, "to completely adopt the views of a *madhhab* and acting according to those." Thus, a *muqallid* (imitator) is the one who performs *taqlīd*. Ann K. S. Lambton describes it as,

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[461] Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," 95.

[462] Ibid., 96.

[463] Yusuf Ş. Yavuz, "TEKFİR," in *TDVİA* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2013 1988), 351–52.

"the unreasoning acceptance of a doctrine as laid down by a school or earlier authority."[464] In the words of H. Kamalı, on the other hand, it is, "imitation, following the views and opinions of others."[465] Rudolph Peters describes it as the complementary to *ijtihād*, "accepting an opinion concerning a legal rule without knowledge of its basis."[466] However, I. Lapidus establishes its meaning as opposed to *ijtihād* which is a vital observation in the way of grasping the core understanding of Wahhābism; according to I. Lapidus *taqlīd* is, "imitation, the principle of following the established doctrines of the Muslim schools of jurisprudence; the opposite of *ijtihād*."[467] Put differently, if *ijtihād* represents fluidity of thought in jurisprudence, *taqlīd* is the solidification in the name of protecting the *ijmāʿ* of the past generations.

Hence it is closely related to the discussion of whether the gate of *ijtihād* was closed or not; because if it was closed by the tenth century then it has all been *taqlīd* for the Muslim community since then. In this framework, as emphasized by Ann K. S. Lambton, *ijtihād* paved the way for *taqlīd*; although this gradual change created 'a narrowness and rigidity' it also provided a stable ground for law and, even in the absence of a powerful political authority, it had been able to survive thanks to its firm stance.[468] From now on, as asserted by J. Schacht, the doctrine was not going to be obtained by distilling Qurʾān, *sunna* and *ijmāʿ* (consensus), instead it was going to be received and embraced in the way it was taught by one of the acknowledged Islamic law schools which was also shielded by consensus.[469]

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[464] Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 336.

[465] Mohammad Hashim Kamalı, ibid., 526.

[466] Peters, "Idjtihād and Taqlīd in 18th and 19th Century Islam," 149.

[467] Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 882.

[468] Ann K. S. Lambton, ibid., 12.

[469] Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 71.

Here, however, one must bear in mind the fact that the determinant factor in terms of the official doctrine of the school was the works which were written by the old masters of the school.[470] At one point or another, the discussion on *taqlīd*, as indicated by R. Peters, boils down to a single question: Is it enough to have an authoritative text of the Qurʾān and the whole tradition of *Sunnah* or the verdict and judgement one *madhhab*?[471] If it is the latter, then it leads to *taʿṣṣub al-madhhab* (sectarian fanaticism) in the analysis of al-Shawkānī, al-Sanūsī and Ibn Ḥazm; all of them refuse the unconditional devotion and commitment to one *madhhab*, as though its founder was a prophet, impeccable and unerring.[472] In this conceptual framework, a number of the prominent ulama criticized *taqlīd* and called for a renewal and the revival of *ijtihad*, among these names were Shāh Walī Allāh, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Ṣanʿānī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī; the Wahhābī movement of Najd was not an exception in this call and they too joined in it together with their total rejection of *taqlīd* as their mentor, Ibn Taymiyyah did.[473]

As emphasized by E. S. Kaya and in the general framework of Sunnī tradition, however, the issues about which *ijtihād* can be made are also those in which it is permissible to imitate the view of a scholar. To put differently, the areas where *taqlīd* and *ijtihād* are considered valid overlap with each other. According to the *usūl* compilers, who accept that there can be jurists with *ijtihād* capacity on only some of the *fiqh* issues, it is possible for a person to be a *mujtahid* in some issues and a *muqallid*

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[470] Ibid., 71.

[471] Rudolph Peters, ibid., 153.

[472] Ibid.

[473] Mohammad Hashim Kamalı, ibid., 493.

in others.[474] In brief, it would not be wrong to point out that there is no root-and-branch rejection of *taqlīd* in the general frame of Sunnī tradition.[475]

Al-Walāʾ wa al-Barāʾ (Allegiance and Rupture): The triconsonantal root of the first is *w-l-y* which means "to be close to"; thus, the meaning of *al-walāʾ* is, "friendship, good intention, loyalty, fidelity." It has pre-Islamic origins and represents the ties between a patron and his client (Qurʾān 5:51 has a direct reference to the term).[476] *Al-barāʾ*, on the other hand, means, "to keep away from, to be purified, to be cleaned." (Qurʾān surah 9 is known by this name).[477] *Tabarru*, according to J. Wagemakers, is a derivation of the same root and means "severing ties between family member"' or "the expulsion of unruly tribesmen."[478] Also, means [the] "idea of exemption or of disengagement, in particular exemption from responsibility".[479] In addition to allegiance and rupture, however, the combination of the two can be translated as, "loyalty and disavowal" or as in its real sense in the Islamic world, and in the Wahhābī terms to be particular, it is, "loyalty to Islam, Muslims, and God and disavowal of everything else."[480] In the words of N. Mouline, on the other hand, it is,

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[474] Eyyüp S. Kaya, "TAKLİD," in *TDVİA* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2013 1988), 462.

[475] For an instance of antagonism toward Hanafism and *taqlīd* by the Ahl al-Hadis in the example of India see Yoginder Sikand, "Stoking the Flames: Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 96.

[476] Joas Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saʿūdī State: Quietist and Radical Wahhābī Contestations of Al-Walāʾ Wa-L-Barāʾ," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 1 (February 2012): 93.

[477] Ibid.

[478] Ibid.

[479] J. Calmard, "TABARRUʾ," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 20.

[480] Joas Wagemakers, ibid.

"allegiance [to the Muslims] and rupture [with the infidels]."[481] In Wahhābī literature, *walāʾ* is the unconditional loyalty and obedience to Allah, to His religion, Islam, and all the co-religionists to every aspect of life, *barāʾ*, on the other hand, is an absolute way of staying away from what is un-Islamic.[482]

The first manifestation of *al-walāʾ wa al- barāʾ* as doctrine of dissociation, which was developed by the ʿālim Suleiman ibn ʿAbd Allāh (d. 1818) in his *al-Dalaʾil fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl al-Ishrak* (Evidence Against Loyalty to The Polytheists)[483], can be seen during the final days of the first Saʿūdī state. In three consecutive *fatawa* Ibn ʿAbd Allāh specified the boundaries of a genuine Muslim (i.e., a Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī) who is distinct and separate from a non-Muslim: 1) All Muslims has to be hostile to an unbeliever; they also has to avoid contact with them; if one is a genuine Muslim, in other words, he has to completely break with (*barāʾ*) heathens and mushrikūn.[484] 2) Every Muslim has to be loyal to his co-religionist in accordance with the doctrine of *al-muwalat* (a derivation of *al- walāʾ*) which was obtained from the scripture with its evidence by Ibn ʿAbd Allāh.[485] 3) It was now forbidden to all Muslims (i.e. Ḥanbalī-Wahhābīs) to travel to infidel territories which is clearly the lands of the Ottoman Empire; the conservation of the True Faith could only be provided by this ban in the mind of Ibn ʿAbd Allāh.[486]

The second manifestation of the term, however, showed itself during the Saʿūdī Civil War and was first developed by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (d. 1868), the grandson of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, and then by his son ʿAbd al-Latif b.

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[481] Nabil Mouline, ibid., 77.

[482] Joas Wagemakers, ibid., 93.

[483] Ibid., 95.

[484] Nabil Mouline, ibid.

[485] Ibid.

[486] Ibid.

ʿAbd al-Rahman (d. 1876). The case, which triggered the second appearance of the term, was the civil war which broke out between the two sons of Faisal ibn Turkī (d. 1865), ʿAbd Allāh and Saʿūd. Even though ʿAbd Allāh had held the upper hand for almost six years, in 1871 his brother Saʿūd proved stronger than him and the former had to ask the Ottomans for help to break his brother's political supremacy. When the help came from the Ottoman side, the majority of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama sided with ʿAbd Allāh and justified his action as a political necessity.[487] A considerable minority of the ulama, however, stated that his act is *al-istiʿāna bi'l-kuffār* (asking help of infidels), who is the Ottomans in this case, in waging war against the other Muslims.[488] Hamd b. ʿAtiq, one of the dissident ulama, wrote in his *Sabil al-Najāt wa'l-Firāḳ min Muwalat al-Murataddin wa'l-Atrāk* (Fleeing and Separating from Loyalty to Apostates and the Turks) the Muslims must display enmity to non-Muslims, let alone being loyal to them and asking their help; in doing this, as maintained by J. Wagemakers, he was now "shifting the emphasis from inadmissible *walāʾ* to compulsory *barāʾ*."[489] Finally, ʿAbd al-Latif b. ʿAbd al-Rahman held the same attitude with Bin ʿAtiq, scolded ʿAbd Allāh for his asking help from the "infidel" Ottomans, besides writing to one of ʿAbd Allāh's supporters, Ibn ʿAjlan, that, "as for the question of asking them [the Ottomans] for help, that is controversial, but the correct [view] is … that it is absolutely forbidden."[490]

One way or another, we see that *al-walāʾ wa al-barāʾ* was employed by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama as an ideology to distinct themselves as the true Muslims from the non-Muslim elements in Arabia; thus, where the opportunity to conquer new regions was limited and where the main land was vulnerable to the attack of predators, it created the ideological infrastructure of an enclave society along with *al-ʿamr bi'l-*

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[487] Joas Wagemakers, ibid., 96.

[488] Ibid.

[489] Ibid.

[490] Ibid.

maʿrūf wa'l-nahy ʿan al-munkar. In other words, knowing who the enemy and the infidel was, and who was the co-religionist and the true Muslim had been vital in the minds of the elite of the second Saʿūdī state. As once pointed out elegantly "… rules are necessary to bind together strangers or semi-strangers."[491]

3.2. The Hanafite Versus the Hanbalite School

A hierarchy is, "a system or organization in which people or groups are ranked one above the other according to status or authority." Thus, a hierarch can be, a chief priest, archbishop, or other leader. The term is originally a Greek compound word, ιεραρχία from *hierarkhēs* which means "sacred ruler." In the words of N. Ferguson, it is, "rule of a high priest."[492] N. Ferguson's description of hierarchies proposes a reasonable explanation for the general structure of the early modern monarchical states: "… vertically structured organizations characterized by centralized and top-down command, control and communication. Historically, they begin with family-based clans and tribes, out of which (or against which) more complicated and stratified institutions evolved, and a formalized division and ranking of labour. Amongst varieties of hierarchy that proliferated in the pre-modern period were tightly regulated urban policies reliant on commerce and bigger, mostly monarchical, states based on agriculture; the centrally run cults known as churches; the armies and bureaucracies within states…"[493] In this context, the Ottoman and the Saʿūd dynasties were/are family-based (and patrimonial, as emphasized above in the analysis of H. İnalcık) political hierarchies, "out of which more complicated and stratified institutions evolved, and formalized division and ranking of labour." Without doubt, one of the most significant of this ramification of institutions was the organization of law which

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[491] Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 12.

[492] Niall Ferguson, *The Square, and the Tower* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), Plate I.

[493] Joas Wagemakers, ibid., 21.

was, in other words, *sharia* which was structured and built upon one of the four classical schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence.

The Ottomans opted for the Hanafi *madhhab*, which they inevitably inherited from the Anatolian Seljuks, who inherited it from their ancestors in Persia, and found and utilized as a ready-made postulate for the application of the *sharia* law on their lands, though it was not yet a uniform, positive and codified to be uniformly practiced in all corners of the empire. The situation for the House of Saʿūd, on the other hand, was not dramatically different from that of the Ottomans'. They inevitably found themselves as the patrons of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* when Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd made the famous alliance with Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in 1744. At this point, it will be meaningful to ask that whether this jurisprudential difference between the two houses had been the cause of an almost two hundred years of political and ideological conflict? We find this question central at this point since it will detain us from a naïve reading of the history of conflict between the two dynasties and the history of two judicial schools of Islamic tradition. In other words, this is a pitfall, a reduction of all the political conflict merely to *taʿaṣṣub al-madhhab* (sectarian fanaticism) in the critical reading of the historical material and evidence. Put differently, were the interpretational-hermeneutic differences in terms of jurisprudence the main factor for the political conflict between the Ottomans and the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs? As can be guessed from the coming of the lines it was not, and the aim of this chapter is to suggest some arguments to this end.

For the Ottomans, there was only one reason for conflict with the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis: the Saʿūdī challenge to Ottoman authority in Arabia, particularly in the Ḥijāz. However, instead of defining this challenge in a political language, the Ottomans followed a policy of confronting them by producing religious arguments, which formed the motivational ground of the rebel, and at the same time with military measures. That's why they labelled them *hâricî*, otherwise they were not *hâricî* in any way.

As mentioned above, the Ottomans inherited the Ḥanafī *madhhab* from the Seljuks, which had once permitted a significant freedom and flexibility for the

execution of monarchical authority in judicial area.[494] Parallel to this, H. İnalcık maintains that for the Ottomans Ḥanafī *madhhab* served the same ends with that of the Seljuks; the Ottoman dynasty employed it since it gave the utmost importance to *ijmāʿ* (consensus of opinion) among the four legal schools and, in the words of the doyen, "[was] the most tolerant and flexible."[495] Thus, this choice provided the Ottomans with a relative freedom in their administrative and managerial activities.[496] Right at this point, however, the vital role of the hierarchies comes into play as a rule: Hierarchical orders makes the exercise of power more effective.[497] The Ottomans, on that account, sought to build their own hierarchical law mechanism. "After all," says Guy Burak, "the Ottoman dynasty invested considerable efforts and resources to develop a learned hierarchy in order to justify its claim to be an Islamic dynasty."[498] The application of the Islamic law and its relation with the state, on the other hand, is like a coin; on one side, state has a rather limited role in the execution of the Islamic law, apart from creating law courts and appointing qadis to these; yet, it is qadis personal and discretional judgement that says the final word at the court (named as *Kadijustiz* by Max Weber); on the other side of the coin, however, is state which sees itself as the sole provider of law economics so much so that the legal scholars has almost no place in using their personal discretion; thus, what state sanctions and imposes is positive

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[494] A. C. S. Peacock, *The Great Seljuk Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 266.

[495] İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 181.

[496] Ibid.

[497] Niall Ferguson, ibid., 21.

[498] Guy Burak, *The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 17; Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 89.

law uniformly which must be applied by its qadis.[499] By building an educated hierarchical tower to dispense justice, the Ottomans were closer to the latter side of the coin. They did not abstain from intervening in verdicts of qadis for the sake of a unified law in the lands of the empire. In other words, the unification of *sharia* and its turning into a positive law through Ḥanafī *fiqh* (with its legal corpus) had been the quintessential goal for the Ottomans starting from the sixteenth century up until to the nineteenth.[500] In G. Burak's analysis, the emergence of this "state *madhhab*", by and large, had a-four-layered development at the hands of the Ottoman dynasty: First, the appearance and ascend of a monarchical scholarly hierarchy; second, assignment of qadis by the ruler; third, management of tenets and principles of the legal school by the state; fourth, the emergence of a dynastic law after the Mongol invasion of the eastern Islamic lands.[501] Eventually, as an inevitable result of these interlocking processes the Ottoman dynasty, through the help of its learned hierarchy in jurisprudence, obtained an almost monopolistic dominance on the law enforcement on the lands it ruled over.

The House of Saʿūd, on the other hand, naturally became the patrons of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* when they struck alliance with the ideological founder of Wahhābism in 1744. However, we cannot afford to overlook the fact that Hanbalism had already been an established school of jurisprudence in Arabia (even though it had been losing some considerable ground by the eighteenth century as a result of the Ottoman conquest who, as mentioned above, favored Ḥanafīsm)[502] since Ahmed b. Ḥanbal (d. 855), the eponymous founder of the school, and his students, beginning from the first century of the Abbasid rule in Baghdad, which was going to be the main

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[499] Rudolph Peters, "What Does It Mean to Be an Official Madhhab: Hanafism and the Ottoman Empire," in *Shariʿa, Justice and Legal Order*, ed. Bernard Weiss, vol. 51, Studies in Islamic Law and Society (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 590–91.

[500] Guy Burak, ibid., 13.

[501] Ibid., 10-11.

[502] H. Laoust, "ḤANĀBILA," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 162.

center of Ḥanbalism for the coming centuries, and from thence Damascus in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, Ahmad b. Ḥanbal's motivation, interest, and zeal as a pious name had been rather different from of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's. He was the foremost advocate and apologist of the traditional Islam,[503] and gained his fame as a resister to the Abbāsid *Miḥna* interrogations (which was upon the theological nature of the Qurʾānic script, whether it was the created word of God, or not. According to the adherents of the Muʿtazila sect, who were highly influenced by the philosophical texts of the ancient Greeks, and their patron, the Abbasid Caliph al-Maʿmūn, it was the created word of God, hence *maḥlūq*). He, in other words, did not cooperate with the political authority, on the contrary, he determinedly fought against it.

One of his later followers was going to have a vital effect on the perpetuation of Hanbalism. His name was Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad b. Taymiyyah, or simply Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). According to W. M. Watt, his career can best be understood only when it is read parallel to al-Ghazzālī's, which had been shaped by a desire to correct the corruption of the ulama.[504] Since Allah has an absolute dissimilarity to man, in Ibn Taymiyyah's understanding, any effort to fathom and grasp Allah's nature by way of philosophical speculation or theology was futile. This approach led him to think that a straightforward and uncomplicated acceptance of the Islamic faith. In fact, it was the best way to conduct life and have power in the political arena.[505] In the political conjuncture of the turbulent era of post-Mongolian Islamic world, his and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah's (d. 1350) prestige secured a well representation for Hanbalism in the new such centers of Islamic learning as Cairo and Damascus.[506] Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's teaching obtained its foundation in the teachings of this Ḥanbalī scholar: An antagonistic attitude towards *istighāsa*, philosophical speculation on the

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[503] H. A. R. Gibb, *Arabic Literature*, 72.

[504] William M. Montgomery, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (London: Aldine Transaction, 2009), 159.

[505] Ibid., 162.

[506] Ibid., 163.

nature and attributes of Allah, and esoteric interpretations of the Sufis. As a school of law, however, Ḥanbalī scholars had a relative freedom in their verdicts. Thus, we can say that the Saʿūds reside on the former side of the coin when compared to the Ottomans. They, in other words, did not interfere with the application of law on their lands apart from making sure of its application by the Wahhābī ulama.

Nevertheless, this *madhhab* difference between the two political entities is not adequate to explain the antagonism. Should one walk through this deceptive path then it would be a naïve way of interpreting the historical data we have in hand. Indeed, this is particularly so given the fact that *madhhab* difference had hardly been a valid pretext of political conflict for the Islamic dynasties, apart from Sunnīsm and Shiʿīsm, both of which had their own political rational, discourse and justification. Furthermore, even the dynasties who had been from the same *madhhab* were easily able to find political excuses to wage war against each other. The dynastic wars between the Seljuks and the Ghaznavids, the Ottomans and the Akkoyunlus pose concrete historical examples. Islamic dynasties had more than enough political pretexts and agendas when it comes to political rivalry, and *madhhab* difference was not an adequate cause by itself alone (again apart from Sunnī and Shiʿī antagonism). Depending on this observation and historical facts, we claim that the conflict between the Ottomans and the Saʿūds cannot be read as the mere result of *madhhab* fanaticism. For the Ottomans it was establishing a long-lost-sovereignty, since the seventeenth century to be precise, in one of its peripheral corners, namely Arabia, and its eastern shore, al-Aḥsāʾ, and for the Saʿūds it had been a process and a struggle for state making, and thus challenging the authority of a stranger and an "infidel" and invader military power.

3.3. Hanbalī-Wahhābism in the Context of Sunnī Tradition

It would be appropriate to say that as of the eighteenth century, when Wahhābism emerged, it occupied an ambiguous, but in the final analysis, a controversial place in the tradition of Islamic thought. The argument he first had had with his father, then the refutation written against him by his own brother Sulaymān Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (*al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Ilāhiyya fī'l-Radd ʿalā'l-Wahhābiyya*), who was a fierce opponent of

Wahhābism, and the relentless rejection of him by the traditional Sunnī ulama of the Ḥijāz[507], Basra and al-Aḥsāʾ[508] raise questions about Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's career and education. That his life was written in parallel with the life of the prophet, that the knowledge of *tawhīd* he had was placed on his chest, and that the association of the time he lived was even heavier than the time of the Islamic prophet, with the obvious implication which makes his mission even more arduous raises suspicions even more. In addition to these, his rejection of classical education on Islamic sciences and his saying that even an ordinary Muslim can also make *ijtihād* by reading the Qur'an makes him very interesting and at the same time exceptional in the Sunnī world. The fact that he declared the *jihād* instead of the secular leader is an even more interesting peculiarity, since in classical Islamic politics the *jihād* is declared by the political leader.[509] The discussions of his followers with the classical Sunnī ulama point to the continuity of the issue.[510] Due to this and similar attitudes, it has been pointed out in the secondary literature on Wahhābism that the movement, particularly by the time of its inception, was an "anomaly"[511] and an "abweicht"[512] within the framework of Sunnī Islam, and it has also been implied that it is an aberration[513]. Therefore, within this framework, Dallal and Crawford emphasize the "isolated" position of the movement

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[507] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 75.

[508] al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works*, 48.

[509] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 71.

[510] Heinrich L. Fleischer, "Briefwechsel zwischen den Anführern der Wahhabiten und dem Paśa von Damascus," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Peskes Esther, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 246–58.

[511] Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay*, 5.

[512] Hartmann, "Die Wahhābiten," 188.

[513] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 51.

in the Islamic world from its beginning.[514] On the other hand, the criticism of "circular logic", (simply put, all the *madhāhib* follow the *Salaf*, we follow the *Salaf*, therefore you are supposed to follow us which is following the *Salaf*) which they use while creating a ground for legitimacy, also points to a unique position in their view of the consensus and *madhhab* tradition.[515] Here, Determann defines the last step of this *sui generis* teaching's step by step positioning itself within the Sunnī tradition as the "rehabilitating the Wahhābis in the eyes of many Sunnī Muslims as followers of the pious ancestors."[516] All these determinations and signs lead us to examine the life and teachings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.

Its strict emphasis on a single, exoteric, and an authoritative definition on the meaning of the Qurʾān[517], however, is not the only aspect of the movement by which Wahhābism is deemed an exclusivist and puritan movement. The proselytizers of the *daʿwa* dictates that as one embraces al-Wahhāb's call, or simply becomes a "Muslim", it is also obligatory to accept *Āl Saʿūd* as the sole leader of the universal Muslim community, or the *umma*.[518] According to Crawford, it was this universalism and its message, even an almost Platonic understanding of the Pure, uncontaminated and a timeless Islam, which had been somewhat appealing to the cultural mosaic of central Arabia, despite the fact that the universal had to disguise and cover itself under the cloak of a warlord dynasty; political particularism, in spite of the disadvantages, was

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[514] Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," 34; Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 52.

[515] Cameron Zargar, "Origins of Wahhabism from Hanbali Fiqh," *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law* 16, no. 1 (2017): 112.

[516] Determann, "Globalization, the State, and Narrative Plurality: Historiography in Saudi Arabia," 57.

[517] Layish, "Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 188.

[518] Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," 33.

the carrier of religious universalism.[519] Differently put, Wahhābism entails submission to a particular dynasty with an absolute loyalty, and, in doing so, the Wahhābī ulama render *Āl Saʿūd* the fundamental condition of being a "Muslim", which is an unprecedented practice and has no place in the history of the Islamic orthodoxy. To theorize, then, it would not be wrong to assert that from the beginning, i.e., the *daʿwa* of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb since he came together with his father in Huraymila in the late 1730s, range of available options for him had already started to get narrow down, and by the time he had to leave al-ʿUyayna under the political pressure and threat of Banū Khālid of al-Aḥsāʾ, his path of choice had by then narrowed down to *Āl Saʿūd*, in fact they were the only choice left, and once he had pledged allegiance to the lord of al-Dirʿiyya, the path dependence of his career was locked both by marriage and by mutual vows. This was now, in the literal sense of the phrase, written on stone, as historical evidence demonstrates, and despite a turbulent relation and test of time, proved to be so even after three centuries.

The other side of the medallion, however, in the absence of a *fiqh* literature or a corpus of new *ijtihād*s by its eponymous founder, who exclusively wrote on *aqidah* matters, which he saw as vital for the era in which he found himself, the followers of the founder must have felt an urgent need to canonize their *fahrasa* (a list, a scholastic curriculum). Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's son, ʿAbd Allāh, to fill the gap his father left in *tafsīr* area he established the book a good Muslim shall read, which were, not strikingly, chosen from the Sunnī classics of exegesis literature: Tabarī's (d. 923) *Jamī al-Bayān*, Farrā al-Baghavī's (d. 1122) *Maʿālim al-Tanzīl*, al-Baydawī's (d. 1292) *Anwār al-Tanzīl*, al-Khazin's (d. 1341) *Lubāb al-Taʾvīl*, Ibn Kathīr's (d. 1373) *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, al-Haddād's (d. 1398) *Kashf al-Tanzīl*, al-Suyūtī's (d. 1505) *Tafsīr al-Jalālayn*.[520] For ḥadith they, again in the wake of Sunnīsm, opted for the six

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[519] M. J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 14-15.

[520] Nabil Mouline, *Clerics of Islam*, 73.

classical works on tradition, *al-Kutub al-Sittah*, which regarded as authoritative.[521] But there have been ups and downs on the road. It is quite rightly called the emergence of a "coherent doctrine" after Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb by his followers.[522] The process of canonization went further particularly during the formative years of the contemporary Saʿūdī state (1902-32). "Six books in a specific order," says Aharon Layish, "by well-known Ḥanbalī writers, were recognized as authoritative and binding sources. In a way this introduced an element of codification and unification of the material law into the nation's judicial system."[523] As shown by Aharon Layish, in this context, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd's venture into creating an Islamic code which depends also on the other *madhāhib* came to naught because of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī ulama's pressure.[524]

Besides all these, the early years of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, his family and travels in pursuit of *ʿilm* provide relevant clues on the formation of his thoughts. His thoughts, in fact, will be kneaded by his followers again and again to shape them as a suitable part which fits into the Sunnī traditionalism, only in a long time, however. To see the change, one must first investigate the past, the formation of Wahhābism in central Arabia. To begin with C. Brockelmann summarizes his life:

> Al-Imām M. b. ʿAbdalwahhāb b. Dāʾūd, the founder of Wahhābism, was born in 1115/1703 to al-Ḥawṭa, the chief town of B. Tamīm in Najd, n. s. in ʿUyayna in the region of ʿĀriḍ, through his studies in Mecca, Medina and Basra with the teachings of Ahmad b. Hanbal and his restorer Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, he became known, and after his return to his homeland he tried to persuade them eradicate innovations in religious practice. Only after the death of his father, who had been a *qāḍī* in Huraymila since 1139/1726 and died there in 1153/1740, he publicly appeared, particularly against tomb worship and saint veneration. Since he found no applause among his compatriots, he settled over to ʿUyayna, whose Emīr gave him an initial hearing, but then had to expel him in the orders of the Pashas al-Aḥsāʾ. He went to al-Dirʿiyya in 1157/1744, whose Emīr Muḥammad b. Saʿūd from Aneze tribe embraced his cause in the hope of gaining dominion over the whole Nejd. He survived the prince, who had become his son-in-law and spread

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[521] Ibid.

[522] Dresch, "Arabia to the End of the First World War," 144.

[523] Aharon Layish, ibid., 181.

[524] Ibid., 181; Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 87.

> his doctrine with armed forces in central Arabia. At the height of his success, he died in 1206/1791.[525]

The nineteenth century Wahhābī chronicler, Ibn Bishr narrates the situation in Najd before the advent of his master, in such a way that, an initiated eye to the history of the region from the beginning of Islam can easily see the parallel between his reconstruction of history and the *Jāhiliyyah* of Islam:

> The reason why these have happened in Najd only Allah knows. When the desert Arabs descent to towns to gather fruit men and women who pretend to be healers also come along with them. When one of the residents of the town gets sick or feel ill in one of his limbs, one of his family members go to these healers and ask for healing. Healers tell them to sacrifice a goat or a black sheep at such and such place. This is to prove their craft in the eyes of those brutes. Then they tell them "Do not mention the name of Allah. Give the sick one this much, you eat that much, and leave the rest." Allah, from time to time, either as a way of ordeal or to deceive heals their sick. It happens to be the time of healing occasionally, so that this prolongs their time. Thus, the vanity of the healers increases and yet there is no one among the people to stop them from doing so. *Al-ʿamr bi al-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar* has been interrupted. The chiefs of the towns know nothing but waging war against each other. Praise be to Allah, when the Shaykh reached the knowledge of tawhīd and those who have gone astray from its way, also the heretic innovations in which people have fallen, he denied all of those, and people approved what he had said. But neither did they forbid what the brutes do, nor did they destroy the innovations of the innovators.[526]

There is match between what Ibn Bishr narrates and Baron Nolde, particularly in the name of political fragmentation in central Arabia and the incessant warfare and plunder among the local power centers. But his narrative is relevant since it gives information about the cultural habits of the Badu, which were the object of despise because of their heretic lifestyle as described in the Wahhābī chronicle, and, more significantly, the absence of a guide who would otherwise save and lead the people away from wrong path. This guide, in the Wahhābī narrative was going to be the Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself. Finally, Ibn Bishr's particular emphasis on

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[525] Brockelmann, *Geschichte Der Arabischen Litteratur*, 2:530.

[526] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān Al-Majd Fi Tarikh Najd*, vol. 1 (Riyadh: Matbaat Dar al-Malik Abdalaziz, 1982), 34.

the establishment of "enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong" doctrine shows us a deliberate anachronism when compared to the earlier Wahhābī chronicler, Ibn Ghannām, in whose narrative and judgement the first Saʿūdī rule was more of a jihadist state rather than being a state which drove "enjoining the right" politics in its borders. The discrepancy between the two chroniclers tells us about the dramatic change in the ideological existence of the second Saʿūdī state when compared to the first one. The nineteenth century version of the first Saʿūdī state was not jihadist, it was, in the wake of the destruction of the foundation, a protectionist one, who was, rather than being in a struggle for enlarging its borders, trying to preserve its limited and humble existence in the Arabian Peninsula. To sum up the main articles of the above extract: 1) There is, probably in an ideological-religious way, a conflict between the sedentary and nomadic people of central Arabia, 2) A strict emphasis on the idolatry of nomads, 3) the ideological anachronism between the first and the second Saʿūdī rules, 4) the absence of an authority to establish the real meaning of religion, i.e., *tawhīd*.

Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was born in 1703 to a Najdī ulama family. His hometown was al-ʿUyayna. Najd, in those days, was a no man's land, surrounded, in fact, squeezed in between al-Aḥsāʾ in the east the Ḥijāz, and in the west, and again squeezed by two of the great deserts of Arabia, the Empty Quarter (*Rubʿ al-Khālī*) in the south, and the Great Nafud in the north. As history shows, Najd had always been open to attacks and hegemonical influence of Sharifs of the Ḥijāz, and the Banū Halid of al-Aḥsāʾ, making a state, or a state like organized structures in this *terra nullius*[527] had always been almost impossible, apart from Banū'l-Ukhayḍir.[528] But one shall not forget that big things have small beginnings. Both his grandfather, Sulaymān ibn ʿAli, and his father, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Sulaymān, were the *qāḍī*s of al-ʿUyayna.[529] They were, as had been the custom since at least the fifteenth century as it seems, the

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[527] M. J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 19.

[528] Cook, "The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm," 1.

[529] ʿAbd-Allah Salih Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 28-9; Ibn Bishr, *Unwān*, 1:33.

followers of Ḥanbalī jurisprudence. He was from a relatively well-off family since it was customary to allocate stipends to *qāḍī*s from *waqf*s and paying them fees for their judiciary services.[530] By and large, writings on the early years of his life present a trite of Islamic pedagogical tradition, like memorizing the Qurʾān and being overwhelmingly interested in studying and learning instead of playing outside like other children did.[531] "He," says Ibn Bishr in his chronicle:

> Studied *fiqh* with his father. And in his youth, may grace be upon him, he made many readings on books of *tafsīr*, *hadith*, and *kalām* of [various] *ʿulamāʾ* on the principal [matters] of Islam. And Allah set on his chest the knowledge of the *tawhīd* and its quest, and the knowledge of evils [if one] goes astray from [the true] path.[532]

This first phase of his religious education tells us that Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb formed his initial knowledge on Islam and Islamic faith in the family circles. Faith, which is basically *aqīdah*, will form the main scaffold his understanding. Ibn Bishr, as he goes further on, parallelizes his education with the general situation in Najd. "And *shirk*," he writes:

> During those days was spread in Najd and its surroundings, and the belief in trees, in stones, in graves and in edifices on them, and blessings and sacrifices to them had increased, and so did seeking refuge in genes and oblations to them. They would place foods in the corners of the houses to heal their patients and for the benefit of them, [yet they are] in alliance with other than Allah and other polytheisms be it greater or lesser.[533]

So, as can be guessed, the plot of the chronicle, in the wake of Ibn Ghannam before Ibn Bishr, is constructed to present young al-Wahhāb as the savior of the Najdī society from their unholy and deviant practices so that they might again find salvation as once their ancestors, *al-Salaf al-Sālih*, did. His life, in other words, is a reconstruction of the Prophet of Islam in a nineteenth century narrative, a role model

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[530] ʿAbd-Allah Salih Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 29.

[531] Ibid.; Ibn Ghannām, *Rawdat*, 208.

[532] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 33.

[533] Ibid., 33-34.

to be followed by Wahhābī population of central Arabia. At this point we see that al-Wahhāb makes his first pilgrimage to Mecca and from there to Medina where he met one of the first influential figures of his life, al-Shaykh al-ʿĀlim ʿAbd Allāh b. Ibrāhim b. Sayf.[534]

As maintained by Ibn Bishr in his chronicle, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, despite his familial legacy, did not find al-ʿUyayna anymore satisfactory for his own education and thus he apparently decides to further his pursuit of *ʿilm* in the Ḥijāz, namely Mecca and Medina:

> When he saw that the chiefs of tribes would not embrace the truth, and when he saw that his knowledge was not going to enrich [there]… he made pilgrimage from al-ʿUyayna to the *Baytullah al-Haram* (the Sacred House of Allah). And when he made his pilgrimage, he proceeded on foot to al-Madinah.[535]

During the early days of his career Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, though being in an obscure way as reflected by Ibn Bishr, he might already have started proselytizing among the local tribal chiefs, but, again on some unclear bases, his teachings, in Bishr narrative "the truth", did not find positive response in al-ʿUyayna. Nonetheless, it was in Medina where he met the second most influential figure of his life with the help of ʿAbd Allāh Ibrāhim b. Sayf. As Ibn Bishr narrates;

> And the Shaykh learned *ʿilm* from him. The Shaykh said: "I was with him one day and he said to me, 'I want to see you as a weapon which I prepared for al-Majmaʿa[536]". Whereupon I said, "Yes." Then he took me to a house which was full of books, and said, "This is what we prepared for them." Then he went on to Muḥammad Ḥayya al-Sindī al-Madanī [who was then] the Shaykh of ʿulamāʾ. Thus, he introduced me to Shaykh Muḥammad, and to his family, and I learnt from him.[537]

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[534] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 30-3; Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnvān*, 35.

[535] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 35

[536] A village in the district of Sudayr in Najd, ʿAbd Allāh b. Ibrāhim b. Sayf's family, Āl Sayf, were their chiefs according to Ibn Bishr, ibid., 35.

[537] Ibid.

We see here that Bishr again pictures another stage on which Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb is shown as consulting to his new mentor, Ḥayya al-Sindī, when it came to the matters of intercession and tomb veneration.

> It is said that the Shaykh Muḥammad one day stopped at the Prophet's (may piece be upon him) tomb and [saw] that people were interceding and asking [for help]. So, he showed them to Muḥammad Ḥayya and asked him, 'What are you saying for this?' He replied, "Indeed, those [worshippers] – destroyed is that in which they are [engaged], and worthless is whatever they were doing."[538] Then he stayed in al-Medina as far as Allah permitted and thence went to Najd.[539]

The main influence of Ḥayyā al-Sindī on the Shaykh, as maintained by John Voll, is the rigid refusal of *taqlīd* of the medieval Islamic sources, the encouragement on the part of *ijtihād*, and the rejection of popular religious practices such as saint and tomb veneration all of which is *shirk* according to al-Wahhāb[540] and to his successors; Shaykh ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan follows the same path as his grandfather's and answers a related question in the following fashion:

> … As to the question of whether traveling to visit the Prophet's grave is permissible, some ulamā have claimed that it is permissible to travel with the intension of visiting the graves of the Prophet or of the pious, such the author of the *Mughnī* [i.e., the Hanbalī scholar, Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma. Some other later Hanbalī and Shāfiʿī scholars found support in His [the Prophet's] words, who said: "Visit it" and "Visiting me after my death resembles visiting me when I'm alive." This is a baseless tradition for those who are familiar with hadith science… The right path is that adopted by preceding scholars, such as b. Battah, Abu al-Wafa b. Uqayl and others, all of whom agreed that such traveling is prohibited… This act can be legitimate only when a traveler intends to visit the Prophet's mosque [then the traveler may also visit His grave]…[541]

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[538] Quran 7:139.

[539] Ibid., 36.

[540] John Voll, "Muḥammad Ḥayya Al-Sindī and Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth-Century Medina," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 61.

[541] Muḥammad Al-Atawneh, *Wahhābī Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity*, 13.

These are what can be acquired from his acquaintance with Ḥayyā al-Sindī. Here, however, remains one critical point. Even though the multitude of 'the books in the house' is emphasized by Ibn Bishr the reader is not provided with a *fahrasa* (list of the books) on which Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb is said to have studied under Ḥayyā al-Sindī. This darkness on the list of the books is contrary to the *madrasa* tradition where the sources on which students construct their *ʿilm* are presented and are almost canonical. Furthermore, Voll, after investigating Ḥayya al-Sindī's educational background (whose five direct teachers were from India, Persia, Algiers, and Morocco[542]), emphasizes that Mecca and Medina did not have formal educational establishments in the eighteenth century. In other words, there were "schools" as closely-knit intellectual communities, but there is not enough evidence to prove that these were formally organized educational institutes like madrasas.[543] Here, however, one must admit the fact that the Ḥijāz, as a natural outcome of its position in Islam, had the opportunity of having and accommodating a wide range of scholars from all over the Islamic world, and this must have created an educational oasis not only in the Ḥijāz but also created an educational network among Egypt, Damascus, the Ḥijāz, and as given above, many other centers of the Islamic world for the students as well as for their scholars.[544]

Given the network among the scholars, their educational past, and linkage in Mecca and Medina, on the other hand, it is interesting to observe that none of the scholars of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, and even the teachers of his teachers, as Voll shows, including Muḥammad Ḥayya (who was a Ḥanafī), had Ḥanbalī origins, most of whom being Shāfiʿī with a firm Mālikī influence.[545] Voll's observation is in

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[542] John Voll, ibid., 63; al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 33.

[543] John Voll, Ibid., 63.

[544] Ibid.

[545] Ibid.

the same line with that of Michael Cook's who, by bringing examples from Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (d. 1131) and from the Hanbalite preacher Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1201), indicates that Ibn Ḥanbal, the eponymous founder of Ḥanbalī school of jurisprudence, did not have any central effect in the development of Wahhābī doctrines.[546] "Despite their common heritage," says Michael Cook, "the older Ḥanbalite authorities had doctrinal concerns very different from those of the Wahhābīs; and they were notorious for a religiosity which others regarded as steeped in superstition."[547] In other words, the context which created Ibn Hanbal in the ninth century of Baghdad was quite different than that of the eighteenth century of central Arabia in which Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was forged. Reducing the difference in between to a mere level of innovation and polytheism is a misreading of the historical context and contingencies. While Ibn Ḥanbal, based on the experience he understood as tradition, was resisting a dogma imposed by the state on the nature of the Qur'an, he was actually resisting the state authority in the name of an agnosticism on the nature of Qur'an, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was concerned to purify the religion from innovations and to impose his own limits on dogma from the hand of a state authority. While Ibn Ḥanbal prefers to say "I don't know" about the foundations on which the dogma is based, there is nothing concerning the nature of Islamic dogma that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb does not know because, as Ibn Bishr records, this knowledge was placed in his chest by Allah. If the Wahhābis have a claim that they belong to Sunnī Islam, it is primarily because their adherence to the Ḥanbalī madhhab in Islamic law; so, in the foundations of Islamic law they claim being Sunnī, while in the branches it turns out to be Ḥanbalī; it is in this ambivalent attitude that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb while emphasizing the universality of his message cunningly avoids the Hanbali affiliation, yet, when his opponents attacked his claim of being Sunnī, he immediately takes refuge in his Ḥanbalī past.[548]

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[546] Cook, "On the Origins of Wahhābism," 23.

[547] Ibid.

[548] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 52.

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's travels, on the other hand, give some further clues on the nature of his education and the formation of his ideas. He started his travels in his late teens which corresponds approximately to the early 1720s, and, following his second pilgrimage, he studied in Mecca and Medina, under the supervision of Shaykh Ibn Sayf and Ḥayya al-Sindī (d. 1751), who was from the Hanafī school of law.[549] The remnants of his stay in the holy land in his life, as summarized by al-ʿUthaymīn, was, firstly through Ibn Sayf, a firm belief that he had a duty which had been assigned to him by a certain *Ḥadīth*[550] he heard from his teacher, and, secondly, through Ḥayya al-Sindī, the reading of Ibn Taymiyya's works, which provided him with an antagonistic attitude against *bidʿah*, and some local practices which he deemed as intercession, thus idolatry.[551] Crawford, however, emphasizes the effect of al-Sindī's in under four titles: 1) Meticulous study on hadith, 2) Return to the sources of Islam, 3) Rejecting sectarian fanaticism, 4) Antagonism against popular religious practices.[552] He must have considered the events he saw in Mecca and Medina, such as praying separately for each sect, as sectarian fanaticism. These must have left some permanent effects on his understanding. Then he returns to Najd, to continue his proselytization, and to study on Ibn Taymiyya there.[553] Ibn Bishr goes on as follows:

> [After Madinah], he proceeded to al-Najd, and from al-Najd to al-Basra in desire of [proceeding] to Shām. And when he arrived in al-Basra he studied under the great scholars from the people al-Majmaʿa, a village from villages in al-Basra, [which had] a madrasa in it, I was told that his name was Muḥammad al-Majmūʿī, and thus he stayed for a while to study there. He denied things which were *shirkiyāt* (association) and *bidʿah* (innovation), and he declared [the things which

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[549] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 32-3. "When God whishes one of His slaves well, He makes use of him." The companions asked him how God makes use of His slave, and the Prophet answered: "He permits him to succeed in doing good work before his death.'"

[550] Ibid., 33. "When God wishes one of his slaves well, He makes use of him".

[551] Ibid., 34.

[552] M. J. Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, 23.

[553] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 34.

were] denial [of the oneness of Allah]. And his Shaykh was pleased with his word, and the *tawhīd* settled in him.[554]

Once again, we see in Ibn Bishr's narrative that al-Wahhāb continues his proselytization against the local practices which he deemed idolatry and association. al-ʿUthaymīn, on the other hand, in his narrative, saying that, "At Basra, a commercial town and a centre of trade, there must have been many aspects of daily life that were contrary to the purity of Islam, especially in the eyes of a conservative Ḥanbalī from central Arabia,"[555] tries to attribute some justification to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's discourse which he directed against the people of Basra during his stay there. Here, however, al-ʿUthaymīn does not mention anything about that there must also have been some attitudes of al-Wahhāb which might possibly have been perceived by the people of a lively and an ancient town as blatant, condescending, and pedantic. In fact, it is highly possible that this must have been the reason why his stay at Basra, whose inhabitants had already been Muslim for centuries and might not have wanted to learn their own belief system from a conservative Ḥanbalī from central Arabia, came to an unpleasant end. Eventually, he had to leave the town. Ibn Bishr narrates his banishment and what happens after that:

> …A man from Majmaʿa of al-Basra told me that the children of that world, about whom the Shaykh Mohammad read, are the best people of their country for their righteousness and knowledge of *tawhīd*… Then indeed the Shaykh came together with people in al-Basra, with their leaders and others, and they hurt him severely. Thus, they expelled him from the town in the afternoon… When he came out of al-Basra he walked on the path between the town and al-Zubayr, and he came to realize the thirst and was on the verge of exhaustion and destruction. He was walking on his feet, alone. An ass owner called as Abū Humaydān from people of al-Zubayr saved him. He saw his grandeur and dignity and because he was on the verge of exhaustion Abū Humaydān gave him water and carried him on his ass until their arrival at al-Zubayr.[556]

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[554] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1:36.

[555] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 35.

[556] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1:36–37.

Nevertheless, al-ʿUthaymīn supports his argument with an excerpt from Ibn Ghannām's *Rawḍa* indicating directly from the Shaykh's mouth that, "Certain men among the idolatrous people of al-Basra used to bring disputatious points (*shubuhāt*) and put them to me…" and, again according to *Rawḍa*, upon the answer of the Shaykh all those 'certain men' became silent.[557] Here, once again, we see that even a crumb of *shubha* (doubt, pl. *shubuhāt*) was quite enough either for Ghannām, or for al-Wahhāb, for judging people, who still name themselves as Muslim, as 'idolatrous.' This negative attitude of al-Wahhāb against doubt and argumentation can be evaluated as in the same line with the turbulent days of Islam in the first half of the ninth century, namely the intellectual and theological war between the Islamic orthodoxy and Muʿtazilism. "Rejecting everything that savoured of the hated heresy," says Gibb, "refusing even to admit discussion, they fell back on the Koran and the Tradition and met all questions with *Bilā kaif*, 'Don't ask 'How?'" Their champion, and the idol of the Baghdād mob, was Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, the foremost traditionist of his age."[558]

Al-ʿUthaymīn's attitude towards the local Shiʿīs turns out, once more, far from objectivity, and he states that, "The gap between the Sunnīs and the Shīʿīs was wide, and there was much in Shīʿism that was sharply rejected by the Sunnīs."[559] Yet his argument can be structured vice versa, as there was much in Sunnīsm that was sharply rejected by the Shīʿīs. Here one can witness the sectarian side of the historiography on Wahhābism. If one has doubts or "disputatious points" in his or her mind, and raises questions on them in an argumentative style, then it is not hard for them to be branded as idolatrous in the given literature.[560] If, on the other hand, one is on the Shiʿī side of

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[557] Al-ʿUthaymīn, Ibid., 35.

[558] H.A.R. Gibb, *Arabic Literature*, 68.

[559] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 35.

[560] Ibid., 46.

the Islamic faith, then only the Sunnī argument, which is the universal truth for the Islamic orthodoxy, can be mechanized against the heretic Shiʿī.

According to Ibn Bishr, following his arrival in al-Zubayr, al-Wahhāb wants to go further to al-Shām, but he loses his money, so "he gives up his desire to walk on there."[561] Then we see that he goes to al-Aḥsāʾ, and there he stays with al-Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAbd al-Latīf. From al-Aḥsāʾ he went further to Huraymila. As Ibn Bishr narrates, his father ʿAbd al-Wahhāb had moved in there since he had left al-ʿUyayna in 1726/27.[562] "After that," says Ibn Bishr,

> ʿAbd Allāh bin Muʿammar dies from the famous black death which fell upon al-ʿUyayna. So, after him his grandson Muḥammad bin Hamd al-Mullakab took his place in the town. A disagreement between him and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb took place, so he dismissed him from his magistracy. And he brought Ahmad bin ʿAbd Allāh bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAbd Allāh in his place. After that ʿAbd al-Wahhāb moved to Huraymila.[563]

It is clear in this passage that Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, once again, had to leave a town, this time al-ʿUyayna, because of a controversial argument possibly on matters of indoctrination of the new local chief. However, the exact content of the disagreement is not specified in the chronicle. In the end he left there for Huraymila. But his determination, according to Ibn Bishr, to indoctrinate and to call for his *daʿwa* does not change.

> …And when Shaykh Muḥammad arrived in the town of Huraymila he commenced calling it upon [his *daʿwa*]. He denied and renounced the innovation and polytheism that the ignorant [people] perform in their sayings and actions. The denial increased for this reason, because of the abundance of prohibitions. So much so that between him and his father a disputation (*kalām*) took place, and likewise disputations took place between him and the people of the town. Thereby he stayed there for two years until the death of his father, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in 1153. After that he declared the *daʿwa*, and denounced [what was evil], and

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[561] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1:37.

[562] Ibid.

[563] Ibid.

> enjoined good and forbade evil. Thus, people from people of the town followed him, and they sided with him, and he became famous for this.[564]

With his unbreakable determination, as we see, al-Wahhāb maintains his ground. But it is also clear from the passage that he comes up against some disturbances in the town as a result of the things he denounced and prohibited, most of which were superstitious beliefs such as the cult of saints, intercession, magical arts and innovation.[565] As far as we can infer from the passage that Wahhāb's prohibitions arrived at a considerable level for the locals, so that he had to dispute with his father[566], and after having had a series of assemblies with the inhabitants of the town, it seems that he reached a compromise with the people, and decided to stay there for two more years. Then we see that his call became famous, and he started to gather some followers around him. Bishr goes on as follows:

> The chiefs of the land of Huraymila were two tribes, but in their origin, they were one tribe. Each of their leaders had his own claim and one would not care for the other's. And in the town, there was not a chief to disturb them. Of the two tribes one had slaves, many of whom were base and adulterer. Thus, the Shaykh aspired to forbid them from their depravedness, and performed the enjoinment of good and forbiddance of evil. Consequently, the slaves, understanding [his intention], decided to kill the Shaykh and they were going to kill him secretly at night. When they were climbing on the wall, people recognized them and shouted at them, so they fled. The Shaykh, upon this, went to the land of ʿUyayna.[567]

This narrative, however, as remarked by al-ʿUthaymīn, cannot be found in Ghannām's chronicle, according to which the reason why al-Wahhāb moved to al-

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[564] Ibid.

[565] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 40.

[566] Bishr does not provide his readers with any reason about the content or contents of this disputation with his father. But, as stated by al-ʿUthaymīn, he was against the payment his father was then accepting for his judicial post in the town and for Wahhāb it was "bribery", not payment. In fact, it was also "bribery" in al-ʿUthaymīn's narrative. Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 40. According to Schacht, on the other hand, a *qāḍī* may earn his livelihood so long as his service is not tariffed, otherwise "it would be an invalid hire of service". Joseph Schact, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 188.

[567] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1:38.

ʿUyayna was in fact ʿUthmān ibn Muʿammar's, the chief of the town, acceptance of his teachings.[568] Bishr, on the other hand, informs us that ibn Muʿammar welcomed him warmly and he married him with al-Jauhara, the daughter of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muʿammar,[569] and the aunt[570] of ʿUthmān, the *Amīr* of al-ʿUyayna. This was the first construction of a political tie between al-Wahhāb and a local elite, between the ideology, or orthodoxy and orthopraxy in N. Mouline's words, and the sword, or "order" again in terms of Mouline, since we know that ibn Muʿammar, as Bishr tells us, heard the following words from his new ideologue: "Verily I hope that you rise for the victory of 'there is no God but Allah' then Allah will bestow thee and will render thee the owner of Najd and its Arabs."[571] With these lines it would not be wrong to say that al-Wahhāb, in the lines designed by Ibn Bishr, was aware of the potential consequences of his efforts from the beginning and estimated that the political end result of his teachings was going to create a power base at least on the scale of immediate region. Thus, either escaped or invited, he moved into his hometown, al-ʿUyayna. Ibn Bishr registers Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's following days under the patronage of ibn Muʿammar with the following lines:

> So ʿUthmān [ibn Muʿammar] helped al-Wahhāb. Thus, he declared the cause of Allah and *amr bi'l-maʿrūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar*. And men from the people of al-ʿUyayna subjected to him. There was a tree there which was venerated [by the people] and unto which [pieces of clothes] were tied. So, he sent men to there to cut it down, and they cut it down. Yet in the land there was a tree which was the greatest of all. The Shaykh went unto it himself and cut it down. Then his command spread, so much so that about seventy men gathered with him. Among them there was those who were from chiefs of al-Muʿammar.
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> Then the Shaykh wanted to destroy the dome of Zayd ibn al-Khattāb may Allah be pleased with him. Then [some people] came from the town of al-Jubaila and said to ʿUthmān, "Let us destroy that dome which was built on superstition and vanity and lead people astray from the true path." Upon this he said: "Take it down and destroy it." The Shaykh, upon this, said, "I am afraid the people of al-Jubaila [will try] to save it, and they will attack on us. So, we won't be able to

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[568] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 41.

[569] Ibn Bishr, ibid.

[570] Ibid.

[571] Ibid.

> bring it down unless you are with me." Thus, ʿUthmān went there with about six hundred men and the people of Jubaila wanted to prevent them from destroying the dome. But when they saw ʿUthmān and his determination to fight [against them] unless they leave the dome to be destroyed, they thus stopped, and withdrew from [the field] between them and the tomb. And the Shaykh destroyed it with his own hands when those who were with him hesitated to destroy the dome. Yet the ignorant people of the town waited there to see what was going to happen to the Shaykh as he destroyed the dome, and there happened the most beautiful consequence.[572]

These lines bear witness to the indispensable solidarity between the ideology and the political power; only with the military help of the chief of al-ʿUyayna, ʿUthmān ibn Muʿammar, did al-Wahhāb dare to execute his actions against the locally established traditions. This was the first rehearsal of the realization of his thoughts. First time in his life a local warlord supported him, with his six hundred and some men, and first time in his life al-Wahhāb was able to see the concrete result of his teachings. The ideology and the sword were combined for the first time in Najd. The Wahhābī movement was *de facto* declared.[573]

Following these two events, which was going to become the characteristic indications of the new movement, the stoning of a women after her repeated confession of adultery which took place, as noted by Ibn Bishr.[574] This event, as rightfully emphasized by al-ʿUthaymīn, represents the threshold at which the movement came round at last; strict and literal application of the religious law to daily life was asserted by al-Wahhāb and political challenge to the newly indoctrinated chief was going to manifest itself by another local player from al-Aḥsāʾ, Sulaymān b. Muḥammad, the leader of the Banū Khālid; yet another representative of the local established order, this time in direct intervention from the eastern coast of Arabia, al-Aḥsāʾ. The content of the sanctions of the Banū Khālid aimed at Ibn Muʿammar is recorded by Ibn Bishr with the following words:

> And when his authority came to be known and spread around, his news reached to Suleymān ibn Muḥammad, the chief of al-Aḥsāʾ and the Banū Khālid,

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[572] Ibid., 39.

[573] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 43.

[574] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 39.

> and he was told: 'Verily in the town of al-ʿUyayna there is an *ʿālim* like this and that, and it is told this and that. Upon this Suleymān sent a letter to ʿUthmān in which he threatened [and ordered] him either to kill the Shaykh or banish him from his town. And if he were not to act in accordance with this, he was going to cut his taxes which he collected from al-Aḥsāʾ, and it was a serious amount of tax which was said to have been twelve thousand *Aḥmars* including foods and clothes. When ʿUthmān got his letter, the matter became worse than the beginning. He was surprised at the command of the idol maker. He went to the Shaykh and told him about this. The Shaykh preached him that this is the religion of Allah and of His messenger and there is no choice for those who stand beside it but to be tested. Then the power, the victory, and the aid of the saints of the Most Beneficent will be yours, as stated in the Qurʾān. So ʿUthmān felt ashamed and walked away from him. Then those who decided against him frightened and threatened him in the name of lord of al-Aḥsāʾ. Upon this he went to the Shaykh for the second time and told him that, "Verily Suleymān commanded me to kill you and it is not in my power to bear his wrath and to disobey his command, because we do not have power to fight against him. We do not want to see you harmed in our town because of your knowledge and your closeness to us. Then he ordered a horseman beside him who was called as al-Furayd… and he told them, 'Ride with this man to where he desires." Upon this the Shaykh said, "I want al-Dirʿiyya." So, the Shaykh rode until he arrived at al-Dirʿiyya with the horsemen.[575]

This extract from Ibn Bishr presents us with a good explanation on why Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was sent away from al-ʿUyayna by its chief, ʿUthmān ibn Muʿammar, who had been eager to be his patron in the first place. He was simply executing the exact order of his militarily and economically superior Suleymān ibn Muḥammad. Al-ʿUyayna, in other words, was in no political situation to stand against al-Aḥsāʾ's threats and blackmails, as the former was deeply bound up with the latter economically as well as geopolitically. In fact, located on the western shores of the Persian Gulf al-Aḥsāʾ was the natural seaport of Najd, and directly opens out to the Arabian Sea through the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. The Banū Khālid chiefs had indeed been seen as the most powerful neighbor of Najd by its people for a long time to whom they had had to pay homage and gifts, and particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which Najd, when did not pay its due, had been raided by the Banū Khālid.[576] Where the game-changing political complications of the new

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[575] Ibid., 40.

[576] Ahmad M. Abu Hakima, *History of Eastern Arabia: 1750-1800* (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), 128.

movement was going to lead to was possibly foreseen by the establishment. Say it is either political or religious, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was a potential challenger to the established order and was not welcome. This may well be an overestimation of the observational powers of the establishment, but it can still be said in plain terms that Banū Khālid did not want to see any radical change in the regional (and conventional) political organization.[577] Theirs was a serious threat considering the notes of Carsten Niebuhr as conveyed by Sadlier:

> The whole district belongs to the Banū Khaled tribe, one of the most powerful among the Arabs, which extends so far into the desert that it often disturbs the caravans between Baghdad and Halel (Hail). The reigning Shaykh today is called Arar (ʿUrayʿir). The greater part of this country is inhabited by the Bedouins, and by various tribes who recognize the sovereignty of the Banū Khaled. There are still several towns there. Al-Aḥsāʾ is the residence of the reigning Shaykh.[578]

In fact, as emphasized above, the conflict between the Wahhābis and al-Khālidīs in Central and Eastern Arabia cannot be reduced to religious warfare, it was also political and economic.[579] The Banū Khālid intervention in Najd and Wahhābis came late because of the internal power struggle among the family members. Once this was overcome, they prepared a campaign against al-Dirʿiyya in 1758, and this alarmed the Wahhābis who started building a wall around the town and other towns.[580] The decisive battle took place in Ghuraymīl in 1789-90 and the Banū Khālid was defeated,

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[577] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 49-50.

[578] Capt. G. Forster Sadlier, *Diary of a Journey Across Arabia*, ed. P. Ryan (Bombay: Bombay Education Society, 1866), ii.

[579] Ahmad M. Abu Hakima, ibid., 130-131.

[580] Ibid., 130.

and in 1793[581] Saihat fell to Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.[582] The conflict, however, lasted until 1795 when al-Aḥsāʾ subjugated to Āl al-Saʿūd completely.

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's banishment, however, is examined by al-ʿUthaymīn in an apologetic style. In his analysis, using Ghannām's *Rawḍat* as his supporting document, al-ʿUthaymīn presents al-Wahhāb's banishment from al-ʿUyayna with a prelude which is, in effect, a guise by which he stages the issue as a religious rivalry between the local ulama and al-Wahhāb. Although there is a fragment of truth in the way he builds his narration, the essence of the case is somewhat different from the ends he is aspiring to reach in his examination. The main rigid reaction to the teachings of al-Wahhāb came from three local scholars of the region, as mentioned by al-ʿUthaymīn through Ibn Ghannam: ʿAbd Allāh ibn Īsā, ʿAbd Allāh al-Muwayyis and Sulaymān ibn Suhaym.[583] Although the first and the last names were initially in favor of the Wahhābī movement, they then, according to al-ʿUthaymīn, as he writes again through Ibn Ghannam, changed their attitude, so did the first one at the instigation of his son, towards al-Wahhāb.[584] At this point, Ibn Suhaym's letter to the ulama of al-Aḥsāʾ measures up its worth in the eyes of a contemporary researcher who studies on Wahhābism; "He considers as infidels," writes Ibn Suhaym, "those who do not agree with whatever he says and swear that it is the truth, while he regards as the true faithful those who believe him even if they are sinful."[585] This was going to be an observation which had foreseen the uncompromising political actions of the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state by about 1742, and even today's fundamentalists. Even his opening words are in

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[581] F. S. Vidal, "AL-ḤASĀ," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden, London: E. J. Brill, Luzac&Co., 1986), 238.

[582] Rentz, "AL-ḴAṬĪF," 675.

[583] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 44.

[584] Ibid., 45.

[585] Ibid., 46, 58-9, 62, 73.

harmony with the Ottoman archival material we shared here: Ibn Suhaym says, "In our region has arisen an ignorant, heretical, warped and misleading man, who has neither knowledge nor piety."[586] This letter, eventually, triggered some serious concerns among the ulama of al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Wahhāb was declared "an infidel, an innovator and a Kharijite" by the clerical elite of the establishment in al-Aḥsāʾ among whom, as stated by al-ʿUthaymīn, were ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Latīf and Muḥammad ibn ʿAfāliq.[587] In his narrative, on the other hand, al-ʿUthaymīn signifies that, despite all antagonisms against his teachings from the ulama, local support for his movement had risen and extended beyond Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ, to such places as far as Yemen.[588] At this point they, as expressed by al-ʿUthaymīn, appealed to political tools, saying that the true faith is in grave danger. Here what is implied by the author is that when the local ulama was not successful against the arguments of al-Wahhāb, when they lost against him, in other words, they resorted to political sanctions and enforcement which was going to be practiced by the chief of Banū Khālid, Sulaymān ibn Muḥammad. However, we all know the result of the involvement of Sulaymān ibn Muḥammad; al-Wahhāb had to leave al-ʿUyayna for al-Dirʿiyya where his fortune was going to change dramatically through a newly struck alliance with a local warlord, Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd.

Apart from the pilgrimage, these three trips that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb made in Arabia and the south of Iraq; The experiences of Basra, Huraymila, and al-ʿUyayna, respectively, must have proved to him that one thing was missing: Political authority. With the protection provided by the Saʿūd family in al-Dirʿiyya after 1744, this deficiency will be filled, and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb will convey his thoughts to Saʿūd, the leader of the Saʿūd family. The famous pact between Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd and

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[586] Ibid., 45.

[587] Ibid., 48.

[588] Ibid., 48-9.

Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was struck in al-Dirʿiyya in 1744[589], and according to Ibn Bishr in 1744.[590] Henceforth al-Wahhāb's idiosyncratic teachings found a patron and was going to be the crucial factor in the propagation of the first Saʿūdī state over the eighteenth century. Ibn Bishr narrates the well-known event as follows:

> By the time Shaykh arrived in al-Dirʿiyya he went to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Suwaylim and his uncle's son Hamad b. Suwaylim. When the Shaykh came to Ibn Suwaylim he got really scared because of Muḥammad b. Saʿūd. Upon that Shaykh, to calm him down told him 'Allah will find a way for both of us." Some people from the people of al-Dirʿiyya heard about the Shaykh and they paid him a visit secretly. The Shaykh told them about tawhīd. Then, they wanted to send for ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿūd, but they got scared of him. They went to his wife and brother Thunayyān. His wife was a smart, pious, and knowledgeable woman. They told both where the Shaykh is and what things he enjoins and what other things he forbids. Therefore, their hearts filled with the knowledge of tawhīd, and Allah put the love of the Shaykh into their hearts. When Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd came to his wife she told him where the Shaykh is and told him 'Allah directed this man to thee, and he is a treasure unto thee; value this thing with which Allah made thee distinct, and he confirmed her word, then his brothers, Thunayyān and Mishārī came into his presence and advised him to help him. Allah placed the love of the Shaykh and that which he has called upon in the hearth of Muḥammad. And he sent for him, yet they told him that, 'if thou went unto him with thy own feet and showed him thy respect then he would be free of people's torment, he finds safety, and thus people would learn that he is a prominent man next to thee.' So, Muḥammad b. Saʿūd went unto him and entered unto him in the house of Ibn Suwaylim. The Shaykh greeted him with pleasure and [Muḥammad b. Saʿūd] said: 'I am giving you the good tidings of the best of countries with its greatness and safety.' Upon this the Shaykh said: 'And I am giving you the good tidings of honor, power, and an obvious glory; I am heralding the word of oneness (*kalimat al-tawhīd*) unto which all the prophets had called; he who holds unto it, deeds with it and helps it then he will both have land and subjects on it. As you see all the parts of Najd has sunken till their throat to association, ignorance, separation, controversy and killing each other. Because of this I beseech thee become an imam in whom Muslims and thy posterity after thou rally around.' Then he started to explain him Islam, the law of Islam, what is permissible and what is unlawful, the call of *tawhīd* unto which the Prophet, peace be upon him, and his fellows had summoned, [how] to make contribution to *tawhīd* and the call for fighting for its cause. When Allah made this call clear in the heart of Muḥammad b. Saʿūd and put it there, he asked for his allegiance in this matter. So, the Shaykh pledged his allegiance. Blood for blood, death for death. Then Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd demanded that he shall not turn his face away should Allah bring forth such issues. There was, however, one condition. The Shaykh asked him to abandon the taxes he levied from the people of al-Dirʿiyya as the other chiefs of the towns of Najd had done. He should gain much more spoils than those taxes. It indeed

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[589] Ibid., 56.

[590] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 1:41.

> happened to come to that, and Allah gave them abundant property. The land became more crowded in 1157. Shaykh's comrades who pledged allegiance to him in al-ʿUyayna moved in to al-Dirʿiyya. Among them were the chiefs of al-Muʿāmara, they migrated despite ʿUthmān ibn Muʿammar. Thus raised [the number] of those who migrated to al-Dirʿiyya since they learnt that this place was stable and safe. Al-Dirʿiyya, without doubt, was a safe heaven.[591]

This story, recorded by Ibn Bishr in the late 1860s and early 1870s, is nothing but a rereading of the nineteenth century Saʿūdī-Wahhābī historical understanding of the eighteenth century within a certain agenda. The encounter of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd in Ibn Ghannām's chronicle, which must have been written somewhere between 1793 and 1810, is reported very briefly. The interesting point is that the condition that Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd, as mentioned in Ibn Bishr, should give up collecting taxes from the people of al-Dirʿiyya, is not included in Ibn Ghannām. In this case, the question to ask is: Why did Ibn Bishr, who is known to have used Ibn Ghannām's chronicle as his source, felt obliged to note a point that Ibn Ghannām had not mentioned this vital treaty of 1157 (1744). According to Crawford, the rapprochement between the two lasted longer than what Ibn Bishr reported, and only after a while became so decisive that it had repercussions. Ibn Bishr, who died in 1873, was writing the *ʿUnwān* during the most turbulent times of the second Saʿūd state, when the struggle for the throne between two of his four sons after Imām Faisal's death in 1865 reached its peak, and his aim was to emphasize the political unity under a single Saʿūdī Imām whose rule was guided by religion.[592] In short, while the historical narrative presented by Ibn Ghannām, the author of the source of the first Saʿūdī state, conveys a more slowly and irregularly developing relationship between the two names, the narrative presented by Ibn Bishr will express this in a "symbolic framework", in terms of the political conflicts of interest of the day.[593] If there is any truth to the story, which is exaggerated as the combination of sword and pen, it must have taken its

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[591] Ibid., 42-43; for a different but earlier narration of the story see Ibn Ghannām, *Rawdat*, 670.

[592] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 36–37.

[593] Ibid., 37.

known form only after 1773/4, that is, until his death in June 1792, when Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb withdrew from administrative matters.[594]

Tax issue points out to another matter. The amirs in Najd collect taxes that are not in accordance with the sharia from the people under their rule. Muḥammad b. Saʿūd, on the other hand, should not be like other greedy amirs and should not demand irreligious taxes from the people of al-Dirʿiyya. After all, Allah was going to grant him much more than that, but on one condition: To establish and apply religious justice properly.[595] Finally, while both sources reflect Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as a figure who re-established religion in Arabia, for Ibn Ghannām the basic elements of the first Saʿūdī state were the revival of religion through *tawhīd* and *ikhlās*; *takfīr* and *jihād* only make sense in this context, which was, contrary to the Sunnī and Hanbalī tradition, declared by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself, not by Saʿūdī imams.

After that, years will follow when Wahhābism spreads step by step in Najd, albeit under difficult conditions. As a matter of fact, although the Wahhābis were able to find shelter in al-Dirʿiyya, they would be subjected to persecution and *takfīr* in the rest of Arabia. For example, in 1749, the Sharif of Mecca imprisoned a pilgrimage convoy from Najd, some of whom died in prison.[596] On the other hand, this group, which was constantly ideologically kept alive by the religious instructions they received from Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, would form the backbone of the ideological and physical Wahhābī expansionism in Najd, with the attack launched by the Saʿūds against other cities.[597] Along with local-popular religious practices, the fact that he excommunicated popular religious figures such as Sufi al-Tāj in al-Harc in the letters he sent to local amirs and his refusal to distinguish between the saints and the Sufis

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[594] Ibid., 101.

[595] Ibid., 101-102.

[596] Ibid., 39.

[597] Ibid.

caused Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and his followers to be excommunicated by local emirs.[598] At this point, the Wahhābī jihad can be characterized as "defensive" according to Crawford.[599] However, with the political opportunity offered by al-Dirʿiyya to inviting the surrounding cities to "religion" and being ridiculed in return, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb declared offensive jihad, considering Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's religious understanding, this is inevitable; according to him, jihad is inherent in *tawhīd* and *tawhīd* needs a sword: "Fight them on until there is no more strife and all the religion is for Allah"[600] constitutes hard evidence for Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.[601]

We know, by and large, what had happened between 1744 and 1818. The first Saʿūdī state expanded and collapsed. However, "The first point is that" says M. Cook, "this expansion was almost everywhere slow and unsteady. We have seen this in detail in the case of Washm; and the same is true, with regional variations, for Miḥmal, Sudayr, al-Kharj, and al-Qaṣīm – not to mention the al-ʿArīḍ itself. In other words, the creation of a pan-Najdī state from a starting point within in Najd was very much an uphill struggle."[602] The political deeds of the first Saʿūdī state are out of the scope of this study, yet we see it beneficial to provide the reader with a short list as an evidence to Cook's observation: Thus, we know that Ḥuraymilā was captured in 1753[603]; in 1758 al-Dirʿiyya repulsed an attack from the Banū Khālid, under the command of ʿUrayʿir ibn Dujayn, of al-Aḥsāʾ[604]; after this successful defense the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs,

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[598] Ibid., 70.

[599] Ibid.

[600] Quran 8:39.

[601] Ibn Ghannām, ibid., 339.

[602] Cook, "The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm," 12.

[603] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 63.

[604] Ibid.

under the leadership of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd, even dared to make a counter-attack on al-Aḥsāʾ in 1762[605]; in 1765 Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd died to be followed by his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. It took almost twenty years to capture Washm for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī forces and it was finally taken in 1767[606]. In 1773/4 al-Riyāḍ was finally captured from its ruler Dihām ibn Dawwās after a twenty-eight-year struggle against him[607]; another defense was won against al-Aḥsāʾ in 1774[608]. Hail submitted in 1787, thus Wahhābis gained control over Jabal Shammar.[609] In 1788, thanks to Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, ʿAbd al-Azīz took an oath of allegiance from all his dependencies to his son and his successor Saʿūd.[610] The new Sharif of Mecca, Ghālib made an attack on al-Dirʿiyya in 1790, but was not triumphant and had to turn back,[611] again in 1795 to no avail.[612] The attacks of Büyük Süleymān Pasha of Baghdad were repelled two times in 1798.[613] Almost the same mechanic worked in the case of Washm and al-Riyāḍ as well as for al-Aḥsāʾ, which became a vassal province in 1793, and in 1795 it became totally a Saʿūdī dominion. Between 1796-98 they captured al-ʿAsīr. Najran

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[605] Ibid., 64.

[606] Michael Cook, ibid., 8.

[607] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 66.

[608] Ibid.

[609] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political History*, 152.

[610] Ibid.

[611] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 70.

[612] P.M. Holt, ibid.

[613] Michael Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 108; al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 71; P.M. Holt, ibid., 153.

fell to them in 1796. In 1799 they forced the governor of Baghdad to make a treaty.[614] But *coup de grace* came in 1802, when Mecca was captured for a short time under the leadership of Saʿūd ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Finally, in 1805, Medina was captured. Mecca was definitively captured in 1806. The rulers of al-Dirʿiyya now became the *de facto* rulers of the hajj and the Two Holy Cities.[615] Câbî Ömer Efendi notes the Ottoman pilgrimage convoy (*sürre*) was not allowed into Medina during the events of 1222 (1807) from the mouths of the Wahhābis: "This is the order of the Padishah of desert, now go back. If you were to go forward towards Mecca, then our Badu and warriors will plunder your goods. And if you go back, then you would be in safe."[616] Al-Zubarā, a port city of Qatar, was captured in 1809/10.[617] In addition, Najaf (Meshed Ali) in Iraq was raided in 1806, even the frontiers of Damascus were probed by Saʿūd in 1810 which alarmed and threatened Damascus seriously.[618] In the end, all these raised the Saʿūds to a level of universal concern in the broader world of Islam, and inevitably put them in a position challenging the Ottoman Empire and their prestige as the protectors of hajj by the opening years of the nineteenth century.

Following the capture of al-Riyāḍ, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb moved away from state affairs and left the control of the treasury to ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 1803), who was also trained by him.[619] Some of these successes were seen by the founder of the movement, some of were not since Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb died in al-Dirʿiyya in 1792 as an old man and buried in al-Turayf in an unknown grave. His life had seen hardships

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[614] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York: J. B. Lippin Company, 1939), 22.

[615] Al-ʿUthaymīn, ibid., 71.

[616] Câbî Ömer Efendi, *Câbî Târihi*, ed. Mehmet Ali Beyhan, vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 2003), 153.

[617] Michael Crawford, ibid., 110.

[618] P.M. Holt, ibid., 152.

[619] M. J. Crawford, ibid., 44

and banishments for the sake of propagating his teaching on *tawhīd* and even though he was embraced by the Āl Saʿūd his teaching had never seen a universal acceptance by the intellectual milieu of the eighteenth-century Islamic world. "Wahhābism," writes Ahmad S. Dallal, "both in its social manifestation and intellectual content was the exception rather than the norm of eighteenth century Islamic thought."[620] In a sense of adding on to his observation, Dallal goes on in an earlier paragraph and says, "…eighteenth century Wahhābism was an isolated phenomena which emerged out of Najd, the desert region of Arabia, and managed to overrun Mecca and Medina, the cultured cities of Ḥijāz, due to declining Ottoman control over this region."[621] Besides, there is no social concern in al-Wahhāb's ideology; "Immediate concern for the social is largely absent from the writings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb."[622] To support his argument and his case against Wahhābism, Dallal exemplifies four reformists, al-Ṣanʿānī (1688-1769), Shāh Walī Allāh (1703-62), ʿUsman dan Fodio (1754-1817), and al-Shawkānī (1759-1834), whose approach to reform in the Sunnī paradigm differs greatly from that of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's.[623]

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb wrote strictly on the limits of *tawhīd*, and classified people according to his delineation either as believer or infidel, there is no gray area between the two in his understanding.[624] None of his writings point out to any kind of social concern whatsoever, let alone tyranny or social injustice.[625] What he understands of

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[620] Ahmad S. Dallal, "The Origin and Early Development of Islamic Reform," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 36.

[621] Ibid., 34. Dallal names Wahhābism as "a political exception".

[622] Ibid., 37.

[623] Ibid., 39.

[624] Ibid., 37.

[625] Ibid.

religion and belief can be understood as a purely anti-intellectualism.[626] Faith in its purest form is in the heart, so an educational process in the field of classical Islamic sciences is irrelevant. He writes to his followers:

> You know that on the road to God on High there are inevitably enemies placed who deploy eloquence, knowledge, and proofs. From your knowledge of God's religion, you must forge a weapon with which to fight these devils… The *muwaḥḥid* will defeat a thousand of the opponents of the clerics of these polytheists.[627]

Much speculation can be made about Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's original motivation: Al-Juhany's conjecture of population increase in the eighteenth-century Najd,[628] which lacks historical data and evidence, or Crawford's conjecture of Nadir Shah's Shia ecumenism,[629] which, at least for me, sounds rather likely, yet still lacks sound and incontestable evidence. One way or another, it would not be wrong to point out that the essence is the concern of purification of religion, that he feels responsible for this and that his only point of reference is the practice of *al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ*, the Pious Forebears. Here, the gap, hence the tension between "the canonical ideal and real-world practice" is an innate motivator for reform in the name of a pure and unsullied Islam, which will reflect itself in modern Muslim political thought.[630]

Perhaps at this point N. Mouline's words becomes indispensable for our analysis here: "There was nothing 'abnormal' about the political and religious situation of Najd and its environs, during the first half of the eighteenth century. It was of a piece with

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[626] Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," *American Oriental Society* 113, no. 3 (1993): 350; Zargar, "Origins of Wahhabism from Hanbali Fiqh," 96.

[627] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 50.

[628] Crawford, 91; also al-Juhany, "The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs," 285–86.

[629] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 25–26.

[630] Hefner, "Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society in an Age of Contest and Plurality," 8.

longue durée of local history and seemed to suit a large portion of the elite, who were content with the traditional authority they enjoyed… I nevertheless believe that, like other reformers, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was convinced that he had a role in the economy of salvation of his time... Like Paul Veyne and Roland Mousnier, one must resign oneself to admitting, on the one hand, that 'not everything in history is explained by the state of society,' and on the other, that 'there are men for whom relations with God are an important matter, the most important matter of their lives.'"[631]

"No radical distinction will be drawn" writes Weber, "between a 'renewer of religion' who preaches an older revelation, actual or superstitious, and a 'founder of religion' who claims to bring completely new deliverances. The two types of merges into one another."[632] Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb did not consider himself openly as a *mujaddid*, nor did he claim to be a *mujtahīd*. Yet, it is obvious that he (and his followers) was on the side of *ijtihād* when it came to the debate between *ijtihād* and *taqlīd*.[633] The inner tone of his writings and letters he had sent around to propagate the "real" religion reminds one of the birth years of Islam. In fact, "the polytheism of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's time is worse than that of the time of the Prophet."[634]

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[631] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 50–51.

[632] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Talcott Parsons (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 46.

[633] Peters, "Idjtihād and Taqlīd in 18th and 19th Century Islam," 150; al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works*, 142; Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 56; Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 65.

[634] Cook, "Written and Oral Aspects of an Early Wahhābī Epistle," 167, 174.


Kuvarah
Nafud
Artaviyye
Şamlul
Şahme
Mulayyida
Kar'a
Bureyde
1891
Zilfi
Bukayriye
Uneyze
Harme
Hafr el-Atk
Misneb
Mecma'a
Ras
Nafud
Dahna
Nafud
Rumah
Duhne
Uşaykir
Sadik
el-Urumah Platosu
Şakra
Sarmida
Hureymile
Nifi
Uyeyne
Dir'iyye
al-Riyadh
Menfuha
Duvedmi
Muzahimiye
Hair
Bicadiye
Şa'ra
Cileh
Yemame
Harc
Ne'can
Kuveyiye
Arva
Dilam
NAJD
50 km
Ruveyda
Vadi Usayl

CHAPTER 4

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND SAʿŪDĪ STATE

This chapter represents a bridge between the history of the first and the second Saʿūdī state. The foreign intervention against the Saʿūdī expansionism, namely the Ottoman intervention, is decisive here, as pointed out by Al Rasheed. Since the context of the chapter is defined by a pre-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire, however, it is thus evaluated as a pre-modern state structure, a negotiator with its periphery and with its power brokers in its provinces, which, in other words, was not yet modernized and centralized. Therefore, when they came face to face with a political crisis in one of its most ideologically vital provinces, the Ḥijāz, the symbolic capital of Islam, during the opening years of the nineteenth century, Mahmud II, after the consecutive failures of the governors of Baghdad, Büyük Süleymān Pasha in 1798, and Damascus, ʿAbd Allāh Pasha al-ʿAzm[635] in 1807, who was ordered in 1803 against the Wahhābīs,[636] had to appeal to an up-start provincial governor, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt, for the settlement of the Wahhābī crisis in the Ḥijāz, and in Arabia on the larger scale.

Egypt's military intervention in Arabia, however, proved to be unexpectedly harmful in the end for the Ottomans. First, not only did they lose their nominal sovereignty in Egypt and in the province of Sham and the Ḥijāz, but it also paved the way for two catastrophic defeats in the history of the Ottoman dynasty: The battle of Konia in 1832, and the battle of Nizip in 1839. As a self-made man and the first name who made his autonomous rule in Egypt hereditary, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, established himself as the hegemonic power in the province of Sham, the Ḥijāz, the Red Sea, and in the western and eastern shores of Arabia, up until 1842. Arabia was

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[635] BOA, C. DH., 212/10560; HAT., 92/3766.

[636] BOA, C. DH., 78/3855; Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 36.

enveloped by Egypt during the 1830s, however, penetration into the interior has been difficult due to the adverse characteristics of the geography of the Arabian Peninsula. But the Egyptian military intervention to the central Arabia was going to be much more effective than the Ottoman intervention of 1871, despite its not-yet-modernized army.

Thus, 1840 represents the beginning of a new era in the political structure of Arabia, since the only local central power, Egypt, was removing its hand from the province of Sham, the Ḥijāz, and Arabia, as it was sanctioned by the Convention of London in 1840, which inevitably created a political vacuum in Arabia from which the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state was going to profit.

Inner Arabia, however, was a real *terra nullius* by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha obviously had been trying to envelope the peninsula by its port cities starting from the Red Sea, through Bāb al-Mandab and up until Muscat, Oman. For this reason, Pasha sent the navy there to end the piratical activities in the Red Sea and took the ports on both sides of the sea under his control.[637] On the same issue, yet this time in the Persian Gulf, a request for cooperation was also going to be requested from Ibrahim Pasha by the British Government, following his capture of al-Dirʿiyya.[638] On the other hand, the inner parts of the peninsula are relatively open to examination and give an idea about political conflicts in the light of historical data. Nolde counts the names: The North Shammar in Mesopotamia, in the south-west and south of Euphrates, the Anaza, dominating the whole region between Syria and Baghdad, the Muntafik in Iraq, and in Najd the South Shammar, from the original foundation of the Hail state, yet under the influence of so many alien figures and cannot anymore be named simply as Shammar people.[639] There are also the Badu in the interiors: The ʿUtaybah, Mutayr, who sometimes call themselves after their

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[637] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, 23.

[638] Sadlier, *Diary of a Journey Across Arabia*, 10.

[639] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 53–54.

cities, the Unayza, the Harīk or Hauta, and in the east of Mecca and Medina located the Harb who were terrifying people up until the borders of Hail.[640]

The Harb, according to Nolde, was a mighty, warlike, and savage tribe who can put 15.000-18.000 men on the battlefield, men armed with flint guns, and who were the main source of terror for the pilgrim caravans since they raid these almost every single year.[641] It was also recorded that they were 14.000, and for another account 2.000, and they were subjected to a military campaign by the Shammar in 1862.[642] The armed guard had not always been effective against "the bold and incessant undertakings of these Bedouins," since the immensely extended line of pilgrim caravans was hard for the Turkish soldiers to cover effectively, particularly in the case of night attacks.[643] Sometimes they kept the pilgrimage caravan where they were for months.[644]

Here Nolde's observations are exceptionally relevant in the name of the absence, or nominal existence, of the Ottoman central authority in al-Ḥijāz: "The Turks never, or only in the rarest of cases, let news of these uncomfortable conditions reach Europe. Among the Sultan's many titles, that of protector of the Mecca pilgrims indicates one of his most important and responsible duties, and under his banner and accompanied by his soldiers, the many tens of thousands make the annual pilgrimage to the great pilgrimage site. If, however, it is not possible to get there, or the health and lives of many thousands perish as a result, then in the eyes of the Muslim world the blame for

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[640] Ibid. 54.

[641] Ibid.

[642] J. Scheleifer, "ḤARB," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden, London: E. J. Brill, Luzac&Co., 1986), 180.

[643] Nolde, *Reise*, 54.

[644] Ibid., 55; BOA, İ. DH., 506/34428.

these conditions naturally falls on Turkey, or rather on the Sultan himself."[645] Put differently, the presence of Ottoman sultans in the region only in name or partially through unsuccessful military maneuvers damaged their prestige and charisma in the eyes of the entire Islamic world.

At that point, Nolde counts three different strategies for the Ottomans: 1) They must dispatch even larger numbers of troops to cover the caravan of pilgrims; this is, however, impossible because of the lack of water and food supplies. 2) They must seek out the Harbs in their hiding places and decisively break their strength. This is also apparently almost impossible in the face of a people who have neither cities nor any other permanent residences and who, therefore, flee as far and wide as they like before any too strong expedition into any desert can withdraw for any length of time. 3) They must settle peacefully with the Harbs. Of course, this can only be achieved through large payments and is therefore incompatible with the dignity and prestige of a state and a large military power.[646] This extract from Nolde, even by itself, is helpful to explain the indirect and inefficient intervention of the Ottoman central authority to the chaotic state of inner Arabia by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Let alone the Harbs or any other local raiding tribes, they had not even been able to intervene in the issue of half sedentary Wahhābis, either directly or by ordering their semi-autonomous peripheral pashas in the region. On the other hand, it is also known that the Ottomans paid local tribes for safe conduct under the name of *ṣurra*.[647] First, however, Büyük Süleymān Pasha of Baghdad, during the closing years of the eighteenth tried to intervene militarily in the Wahhābis, and he had been defeated for two times. After him, at the instigation of the Ottomans, the ʿAzm Pasha of Damascus may have felt

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[645] Nolde, ibid., 54.

[646] Ibid., 57; also, an interesting Ottoman document, though not dated, written by a certain "Harb Urbanı Şeyhu'l-Meşâyih(i) Saʿd b. Cezâ." Here, he warns the Ottoman authorities about the upbringing and punishment of tribes like Havâzim, Benî Amr, Sabah and Ehâmede, and then declares his loyalty to the Ottomans. He also points out the animosity and grudge between Bin Rasheed and Bin Saʿūd, so that Harb can be unleashed on them, as well as on the Badu of Najd since they do not like them. The letter must have been penned in 1880s or 90s. See BOA, İ. DH. 506/34428.

[647] S. Heidemann, "ṢURRA," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 894.

the courage the intervene in the Wahhābī raids, yet even he was afraid to get involved in. Only one name remained: Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt.

The demography of Arabia, on the other hand, is inaccessible for the historian since there was no census regarding the nineteenth century Arabia. As Nolde suggests, the country's population can be determined with reasonable accuracy by multiplying the number of fighters by five.[648] In his estimation, the total number of Bedouin warriors is 120.000, which yields to 600.000 in population in area twice the size of Germany.[649] By and large, the distribution of the number of warriors among the tribes is: The northern Shammar in Mesopotamia was about 15.000, all Anaza was 30.000, Ibn Rashid's forces in Najd was 30.000 excluding the Harb, Utayba and Mutayr, the Harb 15.000 and the Muntafik in Arabi Iraq 10.000. The other tribes were about 20.000.[650]

Although these are only estimates, they give an idea of the cost of a military intervention in the region. This observation was going to prove itself accurate with the military intervention of Midhat Pasha in 1871. In the end, the nineteenth century Arabia was a severely fragmented geography, particularly when the Bedouin tribes and their raid capacities are concerned. Their possible alliances with local warlords would easily tip the scale in the name of any contender against the Ottoman presence.

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[648] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 58.

[649] Ibid., 59.

[650] Ibid.

Arabian Peninsula
19th Century Caravan Trade
340 km
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
IRAQ
SYRIA
JORDAN
LEBANON
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
QATAR
EGYPT
SUDAN
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Oman
Arabian Sea
Red Sea
Gulf of Aden
Mediterranean
Nafud
Dahna
The Empty Quarter
Tehran
Baghdad
Amman
Damascus
Beirut
Jerusalem
Riyadh
Mecca
Medina
Muscat
Doha
Dubai
Sana'a
Aden
Khartum

4.1. Egypt, Arabia, and Istanbul (1811-1842)

> Marching along the coast of Hadramat, His Highness's soldiers will enter Oman, and eventually occupy Muscat and the country on the southwest side of the Persian Gulf, thus rendering himself master of the whole peninsula of Arabia, after which the conquest of Bagdad is easy – Mohammed Ali has heard of the power and grandeur of the ancient Caliphate, and he longs to found an empire which shall rival if not surpass it in splendor…[651]

These are the words of Colonel Patrick Campbell, then the Consul-General in Alexandria, addressed to Sir Alexander Johnston in London, in 1837. The report[652] was informing him of the condition of the Egyptian forces located in Arabia. As far as it is seen from the document, the Pasha was trying to encircle the Arabian Peninsula militarily, to be able to control the commerce in its ports, although his military power was not yet capable of penetrating in land more than a mile.[653]

Similarly, according to Nolde Egypt had been the uncontested master of the Arabian Peninsula, and of the affairs of inner Arabia between 1818 and 1842:

> … all inner Arabia up to the Persian Gulf was dependent on Egypt. All the most important points received Egyptian garrisons, and Arab princes and chiefs were appointed or deposed as Egyptian vassal princes or governors, depending on the circumstances. This situation, which offered some change only in rebellions and various disorders, lasted until 1842.[654]

In the secondary literature on the development and modernization of Egypt in the hands of its ambitious Pasha it is generally written that the involvement in the issue of Arabia and, inevitably in the issue of the Wahhābis, during the early years of the nineteenth century was in exchange for, or in the expectation of, the administration of

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[651] A. L. P. Burdett, "Reports on the State of the Hijaz in 1837, under Egyptian Occupation," in *Records of the Hijaz 1798-1925*, vol. 1 (Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1996), 520.

[652] Burdett, "Reports on the State of the Hijaz in 1837, under Egyptian Occupation."

[653] Ibid., 506.

[654] Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 64.

the province of Sham be given to Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha by the Sublime Porte.[655] The province of Sham, however, had never been the sole expectation of the Pasha, since he also had economic interests, in the form of its customs revenues, in the Arabian peninsula and in its surrounding seas.[656] He indeed, by 1837, was the master of the whole of the Red Sea (of course side by side the British naval force and her guns)[657], from Suez to Bāb al-Mandab, and as Colonel Patrick Campbell remarks in his report, "… The possession of these places gives the Pasha the command of the whole commerce of Yemen and the Ḥijāz, the two principal provinces on the western side of Arabia."[658] In addition, what we also understand from Campbell's report that the Pasha had an aspiration over Muscat and to al-Aḥsāʾ, and even as far as Baghdad (the conquest of which was going to be an obvious emulation to the Abbasid Caliphate if we were to believe in Campbell's report).[659] We also learn from the same document that Pasha had also established his monopoly over commercial transactions (and customs revenues) which realized at the port cities such as Yanbu, al-Mukhā, al-Hudaydah, al-Qunfidhah, and Jeddah. These transactions, as we learn from the document, had been much profitable for Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha and for the financing of his modernization movement in Egypt.[660] Within this scope, *Records of the Hejaz*

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[655] Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 41, 47-48; Selda Güner, *Vehhâbî Suûdîler (1744-1819)*, 175, 183, 188-189.

[656] Selda Güner, ibid., 195.

[657] Burdett, "Reports on the State of the Hijaz in 1837, under Egyptian Occupation," 508.

[658] Ibid., 506.

[659] Ibid.; Khaled Fahmy, ibid., 38.

[660] Ibid.

designates that Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha used the Wahhābī threat as a pretext to justify his occupation of Arabia and his long stay there, starting from 1811 to 1842.[661]

However, during the first six-year period of his governorship in Egypt, i.e., between 1805 and 1811, the Pasha did not want to intervene in the issue of the Wahhābis in the Ḥijāz and in Arabia. For this reluctance he had some valid justifications on his own part: Firstly, his political domination in Egypt was yet not ensured, the traditional power of the Mamluks, in other words, was still a source of concern for him. Secondly, the foreign elements in his army, such as Albanians in particular, were another concern for him since they were undisciplined and disobedient. These undesirable factors, however, was going to be eliminated by the Pasha later; the affairs of the Ḥijāz (*Mesālih-i Hicāziyye*), put differently, was going to create a political opportunity for the Pasha to rule out these unwanted circumstances and to consolidate his power in Egypt. Arabia, in other words, had posed an opportunity for him, in the name of his Arab empire.[662]

In the eyes of the Ottoman government, on the other hand, Egypt had a crucial geo-political place in the settlement of the *Mesālih-i Hicāziyye*: First, its proximity to the region made Egypt a natural and an inevitable player. Second, its historical context since the Mamluks was another factor which made Egypt vital for a military intervention in Arabia, since the Mamluks were the custodians of the Two Holy Cities of which Arabia was a natural hinterland. Indeed, since the Ottoman conquest in 1517 Jeddah and the Ḥijāz had been connected to Egypt with the new administrative order; thus, the considerable amount of the expenditures of the region was met by the treasury of Egypt as well as by the incomes of the customs revenues of the Jeddah port.[663]

Indeed, up until 1811 Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha was asked for several times to intervene militarily in the Wahhābī issue, who by that time had already pushed their

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[661] A. L. P. Burdett, "Egyptian Attempts to Extend Further into Arabia Lead to Final Withdrawal from the Hijaz, 1839-1840," in *Records of the Hijaz 1798-1925*, vol. 1 (Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1996), 571–72.

[662] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, 21.

[663] Selda Güner, ibid., 177.

way to the Red Sea and the Ḥijāz and blocked the pilgrimage road to the *Haramayn*.[664] The first time he was asked in 1805, which was kindly rejected by the Pasha due to the mentioned reasons. Similarly, the second one was again rejected in 1807 since his financial demands from the Porte was turned down.[665] Besides, according to the Pasha, first a fleet needed to be built in the Suez to be able to transport the necessary military forces, ammunitions, and provisions to Jeddah and Yanbu, from thence to the Ḥijāz and to inner parts of Arabia.[666]

For Egypt's involvement in the affairs of the Ḥijāz and Arabia the secondary literature presents reader with two main benefits and expectations on behalf of the Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha: First, in return for his military intervention the Pasha was expecting the governorate of the province of Sham would be entrusted to himself. As a matter of fact, Sham was a cornerstone of the Pasha's strategy in the Levant for at least two vital reasons: First, as mentioned above, he needed to build a fleet to cross the Red Sea, and eventually to be able to reach to the Persian Gulf, and yet Egypt did not have enough natural sources, i.e., woods for the new navy.[667] The province of Sham, on the other hand, was a natural source for timber. Second, in Khaled Fahmy's analysis, the reason why the Pasha had set his sights on the province of Sham was "the feeling of hostility and mistrust that he felt toward Sultan Mahmud II personally."[668] Marsot finds this distrust of the Pasha justified, based on the finding that Mahmud II

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[664] Câbî records that in the events of 1810, all three of the governors of Baghdad, Damascus and Egypt refrained from intervening against the Wahhābis for various excuses, see Câbî Ömer Efendi, *Câbî Târihi*, 1:714.

[665] Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 198.

[666] Güner, ibid., 176-79.

[667] Khaled Fahmy, ibid., 49.

[668] Ibid., 51; E. R. Toledano, "Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), 425.

actually forced him to go on an Arabian expedition to get rid of Pasha.[669] Either this or that, the province of Sham, in other words, was going to be the steppingstone for the Pasha should any hostility was seen from the side of the Ottomans. However, even at a late date such as 1813 the Pasha wanted to show himself reluctant in the matter of Sham and did not manifest his desire for this province; in one of his petitions to İstanbul he was writing that:

> … Even if the honorable Sham (*Şām-ı Şerif*), either by force or by persistence, had been entrusted to me by saying that, "it shall be under your administration," then I would have to resign and would ask that it be given to another vizier…[670]

To these, finally, yet another reason can be added which is in fact the Pasha wanted to have a prestigious place for himself in the world of Islam as the savior of the Two Holy Cities from the hands of Wahhābis who blocked the road to pilgrimage since 1806 and let only those who contented their conditions in al-Haramayn.

One way or the other, the Egyptian army was ready to conduct its operations in the Ḥijāz, from which it would advance into the inner Arabia. Besides this army, a fleet which was comprised of twenty-seven ships was also built in the Bulak shipyard.[671] His elder son, Tosun Ahmad Pasha was assigned as the commander of this new army. This event, however, paved the way for a milestone in the history of modernization of Egypt. At the citadel of Cairo, a ceremony for the honor of Tosun Pasha was held on 1 March 1811, and all the Mamluk lords were invited; on this famous occasion, almost all the Mamluks were shot and massacred. As well as this, the Arabian campaign was also another opportunity for the Pasha since it presented him with the chance of sending his disobedient Albanian troops to the Arabian campaign, thus getting himself rid of them, just like he did with the Mamluk lords.

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[669] Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 66.

[670] BOA, HAT., 343/19583.

[671] Selda Güner, ibid., 181.

Tosun Pasha's military campaign started in September 1811, and albeit all the difficulties in transportation and logistics[672], Medina was captured from the Wahhābī forces on 2 December 1812; then, one by one Jeddah, Mecca (22 January 1812) and finally Taif was taken.[673] In September 1813 Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha himself came to Jeddah to superintend his son's Arabian campaign. He, however, returned to Egypt after having involved in the affairs of the Sharif of Mecca, Ghālib, who had gradually become a mere representative of the Saʿūdī family,[674] and had him replaced with another one, Sharif Yahya b. Surūr, who was politically close to the Pasha.[675] In 1814, on the other hand, the leader of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs, Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz died, and his son, ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿūd took his place; thus the resistance of the Wahhābis was somewhat diminished.[676] However, Tosun Pasha's campaigns which had taken place during 1814 and 1815 did not see considerable successes against the Wahhābis apart from the capture of ʿAsīr.[677] At this point Nolde observes: "…the Egyptians did not achieve any resounding success, and that it looked as if the original plan of the Turks would be carried out. They had counted on getting the holy places back through Mohammad Ali's strength and willpower, as well as seeing the power of the Wahabis broken, believing at the same time that their vassal, who was becoming all too powerful, the terrible Lord of Egypt, would wear out his strength."[678] Eventually, as

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[672] Khaled Fahmy, ibid., 46.

[673] Selda Güner, ibid., 184-85.

[674] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 33.

[675] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri* (Ankara: TTK, 2013), 117–18; Selda Güner, ibid., 191-92.

[676] Ibid., 194.

[677] Ibid., 196.

[678] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 63-64.

the Ottomans expected and even hoped, Tosun Pasha, after some failures in Arabia because of the climate as well as the harsh geography, had to returned to Egypt and died in Rosetta from black death in 1816. His younger brother, Ibrahim Pasha, became the commander of the Arabian army (*Arabistan ordusu*) in his stead. However, contrary to the expectations of the Ottomans, he was going to change the course of events dramatically with his new troops.

Ibrahim Pasha had a relatively better equipped army under his command than that of his older brother's. Having reached in Medina in October 1816, he commenced his first attack on Jabal al-Shammar. Meanwhile Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-Azīz died in 1814 and his son ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿūd ascended the Wahhābī throne, and it fell to him to defend it against Ibrahim Pasha.[679] During his military campaigns in 1817 the locations such as al-Rass, al-Shaqra and Unayza were captured. Thus, he opened the road to the heart of Najd, al-Dirʿiyya.[680] Al-Dirʿiyya held out for well over six months, and at one point Ibrahim was in dire straits when nearly his entire powder supply was blown up in an explosion, an event Ibrahim confined to defense within his own facilities.[681] His final assault on al-Dirʿiyya took place on 6 April 1818 and it turned into a siege. With new reinforcements and powder supplies arriving, al-Dirʿiyya was finally forced to surrender under harsh conditions in September; all the treasures stolen from the Prophet's tomb had to be handed over, al-Dirʿiyya razed to the ground,[682] and the Wahhābī emir himself, together with his four sons as well as the son of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb who was the leader of the Wahhābī sect, was taken prisoner and sent to Cairo first, and thence to Constantinople as a prisoner, where the sultan was going to decide

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[679] Ibid., 65. Nolde gives this date as 1816.

[680] Selda Güner, ibid., 202-3.

[681] Nolde, ibid., 65.

[682] This was, however, a systematic process executed first in 1819, and second in 1821, this time it was a total destruction, see Rentz, "AL-DIRʿIYYA," 321.

his fate.[683] He was executed in Istanbul, despite Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's intercession,[684] by hanging by the order of Sultan Mahmud II at the *Eski Saray* on 17 December 1818.[685] Sadlier provides us with an account of the final days of the siege and the surrender of ʿAbd Allāh:

> At the moment of this last assault there remained with him only two thousand of the four thousand who originally resisted the attack of the Turks. Abdoolah was now obliged to retire to the only place which still remained to him, the citadel of his family on the side of Tarefa, in which he shut himself up with two hundred men, the remains of his force. In this place he stood a bombardment of three days, when he requested a parley.
>
> On visiting the Pacha he requested terms, a pardon for the troops who still had remained faithful to him, the same for his brothers and family at large, the preservation of the city, and the safety of his own person. The Pacha's deportment throughout this interview is represented as extremely haughty. To Abdoolah he presented his hand, who kissed it, as mark of submission, although as yet not entirely fallen. The terms offered by the Pacha were the pardon of the troops, and of his brothers, and their families; with respect to the city, no terms would be promised, and as to the personal safety of Abdoolah, Ibrahim Pacha would only pledge his word for his safety till the period of his arrival at Cairo.[686]

While Ibrahim Pasha wanted to continued his campaigns against the Wahhābis in al-Aḥsāʾ, al-Dirʿiyya was totally destroyed together with almost all of its edifices including the date trees.[687] However, since Davud Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, sent the old leaders of al-Aḥsāʾ from the tribe Banū Khālid, Majid and Muḥammad (who were refugees in Baghdad by then), to there, Ibrahim Pasha did not see it necessary to march against the eastern shore of Arabia anymore. However, in the words of Z. Kurşun, even though the details of his sojourn there is not known clearly, Ibrahim Pasha used al-Aḥsāʾ as his military base and organized several military

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[683] Nolde, ibid., 65.

[684] Ibid.

[685] Selda Güner, ibid., 208-213; Mehmed Atâullah Efendi Şânîzâde, *Târih-i Şânîzâde*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Bakırcıbaşı Mehmed Efendizâde Süleymân Efendi Matbaası, 1867), 15–17.

[686] Sadlier, *Diary of a Journey Across Arabia*, 121.

[687] BOA, C. AS., 421/17447; William Facey, *The Story of Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia* (London: Stacey International, 2000), 55; Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Aḥsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 54.

expeditions on the Wahhābis in the region during his stay.[688] Finally, having left al-Aḥsāʾ in the hands of the Banū Khālid, the representatives of the old political establishment, Ibrahim Pasha returned to Egypt in November 1819.[689]

During its golden age under the rule of ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿūd (1814-18) the borders of the Saʿūdīs were comprised of seven different regions of Arabia: al-ʿArīḍ, al-Aḥsāʾ, al-Qaṣīm, Jabal al-Shammar, al-Haramayn, the Ḥijāz, and Yemen.[690] Besides, they also had some considerable naval and piratical activities in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea, which made them mere looters and an unwelcome element in the eyes of the British Empire.[691]

Ibn Bishr narrates the story of the destruction under the title of "Ibrahim Pasha Destroys al-Dirʿiyya":

> When it was Shaʿbān messengers [came] and correspondences were presented from Muḥammad ʿAli to his son Ibrahim Pasha, and he was in al-Dirʿiyya. He ordered him to demolish al-Dirʿiyya and to level it down. Thus, he ordered its people to evacuate the town. Then he ordered his soldiers to destroy its houses and its palaces and cut off its palm trees and other trees. They did not show pity neither for the small nor for the great. And the soldiers started to destroy it quickly and they destroyed [while] some of its people were still inhabiting in it. And they ripped off the gardens, destroyed and burned the houses and palaces. They left it bereft as though no one left behind from those who once inhabited it. They dispersed its people to other places and countries. This town was once the strongest country. The power of its people, the multitude of its men and its wealth were beyond measure…[692]

We will, however, see that the House of Saʿūd was going to born again in a couple of years from its ashes, still as a religio-political power despite all odds. This, as far as we are concerned, raises a question about the nature of the ideological side of

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[688] Ibid., 54.

[689] Ibid., 55; Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:1095.

[690] William Facey, *Dir'iyyah and the First Saudi State* (London: Stacey International, 1997), 57.

[691] Facey, *The Story of Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia*, 54.

[692] ʿUthmān Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1:434; also, BOA, HAT 344/19650; following the destruction of al-Dirʿiyya, Saʿūd and his family "Süveyş tarikiyle Mısır'a duhulleri", see BOA, HAT. 346/19698.

Wahhābism: How did the second Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state find its quick birth and rise in the region in 1823 following its disastrous conclusion? But, before this, we shall see how it found its roots in the turbulent atmosphere of the nascent nineteenth century which is the object of the fifth chapter of the study in hand.

The years between 1819 and 1838 is the period of non-intervention in Arabia. The second Saʿūdī state, by and large, used this period as a political opportunity to establish itself, however, this time in al-Riyāḍ, a close location to the destroyed al-Dirʿiyya. The leader of the new Saʿūdī rule was Turkī Bin ʿAbd Allāh (r. 1824-1834) whose area of political extension was quite limited compared to that of his ancestors. Thus he, and his successor had to abstain from intervening in such regions as the Ḥijāz and al-Haramayn which were now under the domination of Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire despite being nominally.[693] It appears that he paid an annual tax to the treasury of Jeddah just like the other sheikhs of Najd[694]. On the other hand, he captured al-Aḥsāʾ again in 1830 when its chiefs swore allegiance to Turkī[695] and was in quest of re-establishing his rule on the coast of the Persian Gulf by 1833.[696] Turkī, however, was assassinated by a cousin of his in 1834, Mishārī Bin ʿAbd al-Rahman, and his son, Faisal Bin Turkī, took his place.

Faisal Bin Turkī's reign, on the other hand, disrupted by another Egyptian military intervention in 1838 when the forces of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, who landed on Yanbu in 1836, once again reached al-Riyāḍ under the command of Hurşid Pasha, who took Faisal prisoner and sent him to Cairo.[697] The reason for this final military intervention was simply due to the fact that Faisal Bin Turkī's avoidance of paying his

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[693] Cook, "The Ḥanbelites of Najd," 69.

[694] Zekeriya Kurşun, ibid., 57.

[695] Rentz, "AL-ḴAṬĪF," 675.

[696] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 38.

[697] Zekeriya Kurşun, ibid., 58.

annual tax to the treasury of Jeddah.[698] Eventually, Halid Bin Saʿūd, who was among those who had been taken to Egypt from al-Dirʿiyya and educated in Egypt, was assigned as the Amīr of Najd. However, after the withdrawal of Egypt from Arabia in 1842 by the sanctions of the Convention of London,[699] Halid Bin Saʿūd was toppled down by another member of the Saʿūdī family, ʿAbd Allāh Bin Thunayyān. His reign, however, was short lived, and came to an end when Faisal Bin Turkī escaped, more probably released from Egypt in 1843. According to a document found in the Ottoman archives his escape looks suspicious:

> … Shaykh Faisal Bek, in 1838, following a fierce conflict with the forces of Khurshid Pasha in the place called al-Dirʿiyya, which was the stronghold of the Wahhābis and located in the desert part of the Ḥijāz, had been arrested by the named Pasha and taken to Egypt, and there forced to live in a castle. He, however, on the fifth night of February 1843 escaped from the castle in a remarkable way. So much so that upon seeing several people he knew were of the same sect as he himself approaching the castle, silenced the guards, and he himself together with eight of his men, by the help of some horses hung down a cliff which was almost as high as one hundred meters… Then they rode their camels to the desert without stopping anywhere, and it was obvious that they reached in al-Arish in twenty hours. The Bedouins who were of the same sect as him had come to Egypt with forty camels, which they had brought with them form Najd, had been residing there for three years in front of everyone...[700]

4.2. The Convention of London

The road which led to the preparation of the "Convention for the Pacification of the Levant" in July 1840 is treated in the literature as a part of the "Eastern Question"[701], which simply is: How was the political instability of the Ottoman Empire

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[698] Ibid.

[699] Kenneth M. Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Francis Robinson, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 85–86.

[700] BOA, HR. SYS., 1524/17; for the appointment of Khālid Bek in his stead between 1838-1842 see BOA, HAT 1240/48255; İ. MSM. 62/1798; İ. MVL. 41/771; for another version of the story see R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1965), 142.

[701] J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East, and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 271; Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 289.

going to be balanced against any possible predator during the nineteenth and early twentieth century? Who, to put in different words, was going to take the lion's share from the major powers of Europe, if the political balance had been broken to the detriment of anyone in the big game? It was in this historical framework in which Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha found himself during the 1830s. Indeed, after his massive victories against the Ottoman Empire in Konia in 1832, and in 1839 in Nezib, the Pasha was the single most powerful land force in the Levant, Arabia, and Syria. Moreover, he became also a significant naval power when the entire Ottoman navy was handed to the Pasha in Alexandria by Ahmad Fevzi Pasha following the disaster at Nezib. He was once again "*l'homme du jour*" in the entire lands of the Ottoman Empire.[702] Now the Ottoman Empire was in a political blind alley and predicament as the result of its dynastic conflict with one of its governors. However, for Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary during the two Egyptian crises in 1832-33 and in 1839-41, the threat to the Ottoman existence in the political arena of the nineteenth century Levant was also a threat to the British interests in the area since the Ottoman Empire was now the intersection on which the mainland Britain and her empire in India connected at each other, particularly with the appearance of the steam engine technology.[703] For Britain the situation and the danger was clear: During the crises of Levant, the Ottoman Empire was backed by Russia, the Pasha, on the other hand, was supported by France; from the British perspective, these two powers, should be kept apart, otherwise Britain had to take its position along with the Ottoman dynasty. In addition, Britain was also in favor of a weak Ottoman Empire rather than seeing an energetic and ambitious viceroy sitting on the throne of Constantinople. [704] These were simply the reasons why Britain and Russia acted together in the resolution

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[702] Khaled Fahmy, ibid., 38.

[703] J.C. Hurewitz, ibid., 271.

[704] Ibid.

of the Eastern Question; thus, Tsar Nicolas I gave up the treaty of *Hünkar İskelesi* (1833) in exchange for the allowance of the Russian fleet in the Sea of Marmara in order to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for a possible threat from Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha. Palmerston, on the other hand, acknowledged Russia's condition that the major powers of Europe should act harmoniously in this dispute between the two Levantine powers.[705]

It was under these circumstances that Husrev Pasha, the Ottoman Grand vizier, was presented a Joint Note on 27 July 1839 by five European powers[706]: Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia were collectively asking the Porte "to suspend any final determination [of the Eastern Question] without their concurrence."[707] The Eastern Question, in other words, was going to be settled at an international level in which the Ottoman Empire was backed by the European powers against almost an imperial Egypt who, now with its modern army and fleet, had words to say in the politics of Levant and Eastern Mediterranean. In the end, the new situation and the Joint Note was informed to the Pasha on 7 August 1839. He was also informed by the British and French Consuls in Cairo that the Pasha should get himself ready for the arrival of an Anglo-Franco fleet at Alexandria unless he complied with the European powers.[708] The Pasha, however, refused to comply.

The Convention for the Pacification of the Levant was convened by Palmerston in London on 15 July 1840. Apart from the Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria were invited as signatories. France, however, although did not join the Convention at

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[705] Ibid.

[706] Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali: From the Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt* (Oxford: One World Publications, 2009), 94.

[707] Ibid.; *All the Pasha's Men*, 289.

[708] Ibid., 290.

first[709], finally signed it a month later.[710] The objective of this convention was clear: Should Muḥammad ʿAlī does not comply with the European sanctions: 1) Naval assistance to Turkey was going to be supplied by Great Britain and Austria. 2) Constantinople was going to be defended against Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha by Allied Powers, allied forces, however, was going to withdraw at the request of Sultan. 3) It was kept exceptional to enter to Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus for defense of Constantinople.[711]

The Convention organized its sanctions under eight independent titles in a separate act:

1) The Sultan promised to grant to Muḥammad ʿAlī, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the Paşalık of Egypt together with the Pashalic of Acre, including the administration of the southern part of Syria.
2) If these are not accepted by the Pasha, then the life administration of the Paşalık of Acre was not going to be entrusted to him. However, the Sultan consented to grant the administration of Egypt to the Pasha and to his descendants in the direct line. Furthermore, his forces were going to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of Egypt.
3) The annual tribute to be paid to Istanbul by Muḥammad ʿAlī was going to be in proportion with the regions he holds under his administration whether he accepts the first or the second choice.
4) Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha had to return the Turkish fleet with its crew and equipments.
5) All the treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire was going to be applicable to Egypt, and to the Paşalık of Acre.
6) The military and naval forces of Egypt was also considered as maintained for the service of the State.

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[709] Ibid., 291.

[710] Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, 245.

[711] Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. 2 (London: Harrison, 1875), 1008; J. C. Hurewitz, ibid., 272-75.

7) The Sultan is at the liberty to withdraw that offer if Muḥammad ʿAlī did not accept the convention in twenty days after he received it.
8) The Separate Act has the same force and validity in the Convention of this date (i.e., 15 July 1840).[712] In short, this was an ultimatum for Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha to withdraw his forces from Syria, Adana, Crete, and Arabia.[713] Who will fill the power vacuum that will arise after his forces are withdrawn?

Seeing that the Pasha was unwilling to accede to the sanctions, the British took the initiative and their fleet in the eastern Mediterranean bombarded Beirut in September 1840, also landed some troops there; to make matters worse, Lebanon and Syria now revolted against Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's rule.[714] Besides, hearing that the British and her European allies were about to blockade the eastern coast of Arabia, al-Aḥsāʾ, and probably the Mediterranean, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's forces evacuated Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ.[715] The Pasha, who cannot risk fighting in multiple fronts against the joint forces of Europe and the Ottoman Empire, yielded. His son, Ibrahim Pasha, withdrew his forces to Egypt, and the Ottoman fleet sailed to İstanbul.[716] The Porte, on the other hand, gave Muḥammad ʿAlī for which he had been fighting for almost forty years; the hereditary rule of Egypt. To that effect the firman of 1 June 1841 was presented to him on 7 June of the same year.[717]

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[712] Edward Hertslet, ibid., 1012-15.

[713] Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 291.

[714] Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali*, 96; Sidney N. Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (London: Routledge, 1960), 285.

[715] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:1104.

[716] Khaled Fahmy, ibid., 97.

[717] J. C. Hurewitz, ibid., 276-78.

The long-term effects of the Convention are out of our scope. Its importance, on the other hand, for the future of the Levant, and Arabia in particular, lies in the fact that it ended the existence of the sole central and military authority in Arabia, that of Egypt. But in the end, Egypt had also exhausted itself in incessant wars and invasions. Here Baron Nolde's observation gives an idea:

> Egypt's attention and efforts, meanwhile, have taken a different, larger direction. Ibrahim had previously decisively defeated the Turks at the Battle of Konia. He reigned supreme in Syria and Palestine, whence he undertook that second campaign against Constantinople, from the consequences of which the Turks were only to be saved by the combined efforts of the Great Powers. With such great other undertakings, Egypt had grown weary of giving up more and more soldiers for the barren and ungrateful Najd, which was gradually evacuated, and the last Egyptian troops 1842 left al-Riyāḍ.[718]

Hence, what we see is once more a power vacuum, which was quite appropriate to be filled by a locally organized political entity. This was, with the escape[719], or release[720], of Faisal Bin Turkī from Egypt in 1843, going to be the second Saʿūdī state, this time in al-Riyāḍ, yet still in their power base, Najd. All things considered, it would not be wrong to observe that the creation and making of the political structure, which was later going to be named as the second Saʿūdī state, was an indirect result of the European intervention in the Eastern Question. This intervention, by and large, gave Faisal Bin Turkī the opportunity to expand his political domain in Najd, yet in a very different way than that of his predecessors'. This, however, is the subject of the fifth chapter.

4.3. Power Vacuum: Arabia Until 1871

Perhaps it was Henry Kissinger who best described what happens when a power vacuum is formed in a political geography: "Suez turn out to be," he says in his

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[718] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, pp. 65-66.

[719] Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 175.

[720] Kurşun, *Necid ve Al-Aḥsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 59.

Diplomacy, “America’s initiation into the realities of global power, one of the lessons of which is that vacuums always get filled and that the principal issue is not whether, but by whom.”[721] Power, in short, abhors a vacuum. This was exactly what happened when Egypt, the sole centralized and modernized military authority, left the political arena of Arabia in 1841. In the words of A. Vassiliev, “With central Arabia again left to its own fate, the conditions emerged for a restoration of the Saʿūdī state within a limited geographic area.”[722] If the period between 1811 and 1842 has been a period of military intervention in Arabia, then the thirty-year-period between 1841 and 1871 is a period of almost non-intervention. Almost because of the political tranquility of Najd and Arabia, except for the fact that the ongoing myriad tribal struggles and conflicts, was once disturbed by the invasion of the Sharif of Mecca, Muḥammad b. Aun, in 1846-47.[723] This was a short period of intervention and was neither strong nor organized enough to be able to disturb the nominal political existence of the second Saʿūdī state.

However, Nolde's assessment of post-Egyptian Arabia is significant and adds up on Vassiliev’s:

> For a time, it seemed as if the old Wahhābī Empire would rise again. Feysul, a son of the beheaded ʿAbd Allāh, came to al-Riyāḍ and was gradually regained lordship over most of Najd, though in some areas only in name. From 1842, the year of the withdrawal of the last Egyptian troops, until the years 1870-1872, the following main powers were constantly at war with each other in Najd: 1) Ibn Saʿūds in al-Riyāḍ and al-Hasa. 2) The Emirate of Hail with its ever ascending might. 3) The city of Unayza with tribal affiliation. 4) The city of Burayda. 5) Shaqra, despite being rather weak. 6) Hariq and Hauta in the far south. 7) The Harb. 8) Utayba and Mutayr.[724]

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[721] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 548.

[722] Alexei Vassiliev, ibid., 174; Z. Kurşun has a similar analysis in terms of power vacuum, Z. Kurşun, ibid., 59.

[723] Ibid., 179.

[724] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 66.

On the other hand, the intervention of the Ottoman state to the second Saʿūdī state was quite late due to the reasons mentioned above. This or that, the declaration of the edict of Tanzimat on 3 November 1839 was the most determinant act on the side of the Ottomans. Thus, the zeal to spread the Tanzimat reforms to all corners and peripheries of the empire was in fact explains both the reason why the Porte intervened in the second Saʿūdī state as well as it explains the late coming and failure of this military intervention: The empire was too broad to applicate the Tanzimat reforms in all of its provinces as a policy of centralization, and, even worse, there was not enough men in the Ottoman bureaucracy to represent the central state in the provinces; in other words, the issue of *kaht-ı ricāl* (lack of men) was an acute sickness in the bureaucratic structure of the empire during the nineteenth century.[725] Thus, we see that the Porte was not eager to intervene in the issue of Arabia and Najd, and even if it was, it did not have the means to do so.

As emphasized above, post-Egyptian power vacuum gave the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite a chance to reestablish and spread their rule once again in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ, despite being in much more restricted borders than that of their ancestors'. This time, however, the distinctive ideological character of the state, as maintained by N. Mouline[726] and M. Cook[727], was not holy war against the infidel but was rather determined by a religious homogenization on the areas it prevailed. In other words, if the first Saʿūdī-Wahhābī state was an attempt to routinize the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī teaching of purification (or restitution) by the early years of the nineteenth century, particularly following the capture of Mecca in 1806,[728] then the second Saʿūdī-

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[725] İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi* (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008), 495; Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 341; Mustafa Oğuz, "Osmanlı Devlet'inde Devlet Adamı Kıtlığı (Kaht-ı Rical) Hakkında II. Abdülhamid'e Sunulan Bir Rapor," *Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları*, no. 24 (2008): 105.

[726] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*., 81-86.

[727] Cook, "The Ḥanbelites of Najd," 69.

[728] Nabil Mouline, ibid.., 72.

Wahhābī state, which was now closed and trapped in its narrower borders with a lot less chance to conquer new territories, was determined by a struggle to create a religious and doctrinal uniformity in Najd, which is exclusively Wahhābī.[729] This lack of uniformity, in the eyes of the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama, was the missing building block during the existence of the first Saʿūdī state and was the main reason why it collapsed, apart from the fact the Egyptian invasion. In other words, according to Wahhābī historiosophy, there had been religious dissidence and discordance which had to be eradicated this time. In this respect, the elimination of the traditional Ḥanbalī ulama was going to be of paramount importance for the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama.[730] This radical change in the ideology of the second Saʿūdī rule manifested itself as the control and monopolization of the public sphere by means of *al-amr bi al-maʿrūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar* (promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice). It was, put in different words, a strict imposition of the two O's (orthodoxy and orthopraxy) in the daily lives of the people.[731] However, homogenization, is not the single term in the literature to determine ideological structure of the second Saʿūdī state. This period was also named as "the officialisation of forbidding wrong" in the analysis of M. Cook.[732] All in all, it would not be wrong to state that the "homogenization" and "officialisation" of the religious doctrine (under the umbrella notion of *al-amr bi al-maʿrūf*) in Najd went hand in hand during the existence of the second Saʿūdī state.

As a final observation here, we think that A. Vassiliev's evaluation of the second Saʿūdī state displays another aspect of the power vacuum in Arabia. In his analysis there was a duality in the region during the early years of 1840s when Faisal b. Turkī came to power in his own house and land: This was the conflict between centralization and separatism. However, centralization on the part of the House of Saʿūd was more

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[729] Ibid., 82.

[730] Ibid., 82, 85.

[731] Ibid., 82.

[732] Michael Cook, ibid., 68.

salient and tended to be politically successful if there was no military intervention from outside; even though "separatism was [still] strong in Najd", i.e., the opposition to the centralization of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis was at a remarkable level, thus giving less chance to the Saʿūdī elite to enlarge their hegemony.[733]

4.4. The Ottomans: Post-Tanzimat Intervention

It seems that the Ottoman central administration found the power to intervene in Arabia only thirty-two years after the proclamation of the Tanzimat. The decisive factor now for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs, however, is no longer to expand through uninterrupted jihad, but rather to survive with and against the Ottomans, who sought to establish a modern and centralized direct administration in the region, and other local powers. Therefore, the direct military intervention of the Ottomans on the coasts of al-Aḥsāʾ in 1871 was in fact nothing more than an effort to turn the instability in the region to the advantage of the Ottomans. On the other hand, Britain, another imperial power in the region, was following this effort closely, since it might destabilize her interests in the Persian Gulf, and even her connection to India via the Arab Sea. Therefore, the game has now gained a dimension that attracts worldwide attention. Europe and the world have been changing rapidly. Transportation, communication, and military technology was to be the dominant determinants in this change, and the one who can keep up with them in the best way was to achieve a superior imperial position not only in the region but also in the whole world. So, where was the place of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis and their realm in the new world?

4.5. The Second Saʿūdī State in the World Context

Here, periodization once more greets us, but this time in the context of world-systems analysis. Wallerstein employs a quaternary classification to describe the development of the modern and capitalist world. First, the long sixteenth century between 1450-1640 stands for "the creation of the modern world-system and the

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[733] Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 176–77.

creation of some of its basic economic and political institutions."[734] Thus, in the center-periphery paradigm, he emphasized that while central industrialized powers specialized in trade and production, peripheral entities were to provide raw materials.[735] Second, runs from 1600-1750, during which the European world-economy had consolidated.[736] Third, covers the years between 1730 and 1840, which "is the story of the renewed economic and geographic expansion of the capitalist world economy.[737] Finally, the period which runs from 1789 to 1873/1914 and during which centrist liberalism declared its victory, which Wallerstein names as the "geoculture."[738] This process witnessed the birth of four successive colonial naval powers: Portugal, Spanish, Dutch and England, the birth of the last two is at the very beginning of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch were the first hegemonic power of the modern world-system.[739] Dutch influence in the Persian Gulf, on the other hand, was in decline by the eighteenth century and they had only the port of Khark.[740] Britain aspired to fill the void.

Of these four naval powers, Portugal is important because it had been the only naval power that the Ottomans had to contend with in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea during the sixteenth century. In the fifteenth century, in 1493, to be precise, the

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[734] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 4 (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 2011), xiii.

[735] David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers, *Geography and Revolution* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 354.

[736] Ibid.

[737] Ibid.

[738] Ibid.

[739] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914*, 4: xii.

[740] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:150.

world was divided into two colonial influence areas as east and west by a bull issued by the Pope; while Americas was given to Spain, Portugal got Asia.[741] Thus, Portugal would reach the Persian Gulf without wasting much time. In fact, one of the reasons why the Ottomans entered the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula was the direct Portuguese threat and activity there, especially in Trucial States, during the sixteenth century.[742] In addition, it should be added that there is an effort to establish dominance on the Silk Road and the Spice Road; and the desire to add the Fertile Crescent to its lands is among the important motivations.[743] On the greater scale, however, the Far East, according to Braudel, was made up of three colossal world markets: Islam, that is largely the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, India, east and west of Cape Comorin, and China, opening from the heart of Inner Asia to the Pacific.[744] In this geographical framework, it would not be wrong to point out the fact that, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, Arabian Peninsula, that is "the useful Arabia"[745], had already been enveloped by imperial naval forces, such as those of France and Holland following Portugal, and its port cities, whether in the Persian Gulf (like Jubail, Raʾs al-Tannūra, al-Ḳaṭīf, and al-ʿUqair), the Arabian Sea (such as Muscat, Salalah, al-Mukalla, and Aden), or the Red Sea (like al-Mukhā, al-Hudaydah, al-Qunfudhah, Jeddah, and Yanbu al-Bahr), "a second Mediterranean" to Braudel,[746] started to play

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[741] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 3.

[742] Salih Özbaran, *Umman'da Kapışan İmparatorluklar* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2013), 137; İnalcık and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 1:335–37.

[743] Özbaran, "XVI. Yüzyılda Basra Körfezi Sâhillerinde Osmanlılar: Basra Beylerbeyliğinin Kuruluşu," 53.

[744] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th -18th Century*, vol. 3 (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 484.

[745] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 47.

[746] Fernand Braudel, ibid., 478.

essential roles, particularly with the military intervention of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha to Arabia in the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, in the nineteenth century, Britain's game regarding the Persian Gulf would be shaped in a different framework than in previous centuries, in southern Iraq, Basra and Baghdad.[747] The key element here was "the changing interest from trade to politics, the recognition of the strategic problem of Indian defense, and the assertion by the British Government in India of a policy towards the Ottoman Empire which was in contrast to that of the Government in England."[748]

Wallerstein's definition of a capitalist system is relevant in the context of the Arabian Peninsula. "We are in a capitalist system only when the system gives priority to the *endless* accumulation of capital."[749] In the absence of an overall political structure on the global level or homogenous culture, the binding force among the developing capitalist entrepreneurs was the division of labour, through which the constant accumulation of wealth and capital was granted.[750] The system has its own reward-punishment mechanism: While "those who act with the appropriate motivations are rewarded and, if successful, enriched, those who act with other motivations are penalized."[751]

Whether or not the Ottoman Empire was integrated into this system, or to what extent it was integrated is subject of another discussion. But the Saʿūds, and their entrepreneurship as state making stands outside the definition of our system, at least

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[747] M. E. Yapp, "The Establishment of the East India Company Residency at Baghdād, 1798-1806," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 30, no. 2 (1967): 323.

[748] Ibid.

[749] Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2007), 24.

[750] Ibid.

[751] Ibid.

until the early decades of the twentieth century, with three exceptions: Gun running[752], slave trade[753], and piracy.[754] According to the Ottoman archive, *Bāb al-Mandeb* was the scene of regular arms smuggling during the nineteenth century between Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden. However, what keeps the Saʿūds out of the system is piracy, especially in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, which had been a source of nuisance both for Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt and the British Empire. For Britain its communication with India was an utmost importance, which made Iraq and the Persian Gulf vital for the British Empire. In fact, servants of the East India Company were also pointing to this point.[755] There were two possible routes serving to this end: 1) The Red Sea and Suez, and from there to Alexandria by overland. 2) The Persian Gulf, Basra, then through Euphrates up until the coast of Syria.[756] Since the Euphrates route was not satisfactory, they would prefer the Egyptian route, which, as far as I am concerned, explains to some reasonable extent, the British military intervention to Egypt (who had been supported by the French during the reign of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha) in 1882. In the end, however, with Mehmet ʿAlī Pasha's seizure of power, which, it should be noted, was supported by France, the Egyptian route became unreliable. Thus, postal communication between Britain and India was carried out via

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[752] Indeed, Babanzade writes in 1908 that there was a serious smuggling of weapons through Kuwait and that almost everyone, starting from Handiye, from the age of ten to the age of seventy, carried a gun. İsmail H. Babanzade, *Irak Mektupları*, ed. Murat Çulcu (İstanbul: Büke Yayıncılık, 2002), 135–36.

[753] BOA, DH. MKT., 1434/81: "Bir müddetten berû Cidde ve Hudeyde'de üserâ-yı zenciye ticâretinin kemâl-i keremi ile devâm etmekde olduğu halde buna hükûmet-i mahalliye me'mûrları tarafından müsâmaha edilmekde olduğu ve üserâ-yı mezkûreyi hâmilen Cidde limanına ve Hicaz vilâyetinin saz sevâhiline tevârüd iden…"

[754] The Ottoman archive presents documents beyond measure, the followings are about the Ḥijāz, Mukhā, Hudaydah, and Aden. BOA, Y. PRK., 1/25; DH. ŞFR., 142/85; Y. PRK. ASK., 140/55; HR. İD., 171/45; for a detailed map also with an attached report Y. PRK. UM., 44/83, see Appendix E

[755] P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922*, 252.

[756] Ibid.

Istanbul, Aleppo, Basra, and Bombay.[757]

The port of Suez, the Red Sea and Arabia with its ports were the steppingstone for the empire of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha to Indian trade in the Arab Sea.[758] It is told that the customs and commercial system established in these ports were almost flawless, particularly the ones in Jidda and Mukhā.[759] As Henry Salt, the Consul-General in Cairo from 1815 to 1827 in the name of the British Empire, observes "[The Pasha] has lately sent several vessels from Suez with a considerable quantity of European goods for India under the charge of two agents, who have likewise been entrusted with a million dollars to purchase different commodities."[760] Following the attack of Wahhābis to one his smaller vessels in the Red Sea "Muḥammad ʿAlī urged the necessity of having some kind of naval force there to repel their insults, since otherwise it be no longer safe for even his sons to pass to and from the Ḥijāz."[761] Upon that Salt agrees with the Pasha and writes to the Foreign Office that "it undoubtedly would be far better that His Highness should have a preponderating influence there than that such pirates as the Wahhābis should have possession of the sea."[762] It seems that most of the agreements made with various Arab countries in the Persian Gulf between 1820 and 1853 were related to the elimination of piracy activities altogether.[763]

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[757] M. E. Yapp, "The Establishment of the East India Company", 323.

[758] Prousis, *British Consular Reports from The Ottoman Levant in an Age of Upheaval, 1815-1830*, 185.

[759] See Appendix A.

[760] Theophilus C. Prousis, ibid.

[761] Ibid.

[762] Ibid., 185-86.

[763] R. Hughes Thomas, *Treaties, Agreements, and Engagements* (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1851), 21–35.

However, British complaints were not limited to the Red Sea. An Ottoman document[764] dated 1879 gives an idea about the Persian Gulf of the period:

> …Une fois de plus sa sérieuse attention sur l'existence de la piraterie dans le golfe Persique, et la négligence et l'incapacité des autorités Turque pour y mettre fin…

The document does not provide its reader with any open definition about the agents of the piratical activity. But the phrase "the negligence and the incapacity of the Turkish authorities" shows the nominal Turkish presence in the waters of the Persian Gulf, even after the adventurous military campaign to al-Aḥsāʾ, which was defined by Charles Herbert, the British Consulate General at Baghdad as "…[the] hopeless policy in Nejd."[765] Midhat Pasha also frequently points out the difficulties faced in positioning Turkish ships in the Persian Gulf, particularly in the matters of communication and postal service.[766] On the other hand, the above-mentioned complaint was submitted to the Ottoman authorities in translation. The Ottoman document does not mention any "negligence and incapacity" on the part of the Ottoman government. On the other hand, due to their awareness of the urgency of the issue, it is decided that "Merih ve Utarid nam korvet-i hümâyûnlar" (the royal corvettes named as Merih and Utarid) shall immediately be dispatched to the "Basra Körfezi" after necessary repairs without delay as a countermeasure to "deniz hırsızlığı" (sea robbery) and "korsanlık" (piracy).

At this point, we come across another interesting Ottoman document.[767] However, since the first page of the document is missing in the archive, we must fill in the blanks with some speculation. Accordingly, the British Empire decided to float

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[764] BOA, HR. H., 487/6.

[765] See Appendix D.

[766] BOA, HR. SYS., 93/18.

[767] BOA, Y. PRK. ASK., 78/33.

a ship on the Qārūn River (*Dujail*, the little Tigris) in Iran, which from Shatt al-Arab reaches up to Ahvaz from Khorramshahr, based on the privilege it had obtained nearly thirty years ago. This attempt was perceived as dangerous and harmful by the Ottoman central authority, and it was decided to terminate the concession. In this way, possible harm and danger would have been eliminated. To this end, it was decided that the port of Iskenderun be connected to Meskene[768] (modern Syria, on the right bank of Euphrates River) and through the Euphrates directly connected to the Shatt al-Arab, from thence to Persian Gulf. Therefore, it is reported that there is an urgent need for a "lokomotifli bir tramvay" (a tram with a locomotive). Thus, as reported in the document, "Hind ve İran ticaretine İskenderun tarafı tutturulmuş olsun" ([let] the Iskenderun side be attached to the trade of India and Iran). Babanzade also writes in 1908 that Midhat Pasha once opened this line between Euphrates and Meskene by force.[769]

On the other hand, the project did not materialize with the rejection of the Shah of Iran, who was afraid that Muhammareh (Khorramshahr) would be captured by the British due to the increasing importance of it now as a port.[770] The full text of the article is as follows:

> Between 1877 and 1879 persevering efforts were made by the British Government through Her Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran to secure the opening of the Qārūn River to steam navigation; but the attitude of the Shah on this point was one of obstinate resistance, dictated it would seem by a fear lest the growth of Muhammareh in value as a port should lead to its seizure by Britain, a consummation to which close relations between the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the British representative at Basrah, together with mischievous articles in the European press, appeared in His Persian Majesty's eyes to lend probability. The question of roads was at first allowed to slumber; but schemes for a railway to connect Arabistān with Central Persia were recommended to notice by the British

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[768] Zekeriya Kurşun, quoting from an archive document, BOA., Y. MTV. 48/82, mentions a similar project named as "İdâre-i Nehriyye", depending on the navigability of the Euphrates, pointing out that Baghdad can be connected to Meskene with a few river streamers, so that the order and security of the province would be ensured. Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti*, 145.

[769] Babanzade, *Irak Mektupları*, 101.

[770] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:274–75.

> diplomatic representative in Persia with the same total absence of results as that for the opening of the Qārūn.
>
> These unsuccessful negotiations, it may be observed, all took place before the exhibition by Britain of a benevolent of attitude towards Persia in connection with the proposed partition of Afghanistan. Subsequently when the question of Herat was discussed, the Shah would have been willing, in return for the advantages offered him, to concede the free navigation of the Qārūn and the construction of wagon roads from Būshehr to Tehrān and from Shūshtar to Isfahān.[771]

For the British Empire, however, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Persian Gulf was one of the most vital waterways which had to be kept open against any threat so long as they want to keep the biggest diamond, the Indian colonies in their hands.[772] Napoleonic wars during first decade of the nineteenth century had been the biggest threat in the eastern Mediterranean and then in Egypt, which, when combined with Muḥammad ʿAlī's expansionist politics which was backed by France, alarmed the British concerns in the Gulf.[773] In this context, it was their piracy activities that put the Wahhābis on the map in British eyes and aligned their interests with Egypt in 1819, at least as a hope. The first recorded attack in the Gulf to British came from the Qāsimī pirates, who captured the British vessel "Bassein" and attacked the British cruiser "Viper" in 1797,[774] two other ships were also plundered in 1803 by the Arab Shaykh of Nakhīlu.[775] As it turned out, piracy was encouraged and supported by the Wahhābīs. Ibn Bishr allocated a considerable space to a man like Rahmah ibn Jābir and mentioned him as follows:

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[771] Ibid.

[772] R. Bayly Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*, 37.

[773] Ibid.

[774] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:150.

[775] Ibid., 180; there is now, however, a controversy on to what extent they were pirates, Hideaki Suzuki, "The Making of the 'Joasmee' Pirates: A Relativist Reconsideration of the Qawāsimi Piracy in the Persian Gulf," in *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy*, ed. Ota Atsushi (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018), 69–70.

> This year died Rahmah Bin Jābir, the valiant fighter of the sea… Saʿūd – may the grace of Allah be upon him – used to employ him in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and al-Ḳaṭīf to fight at sea, and used to dispatch him men to fight alongside with him. There were many to follow him that, so he fought the people of Bahrain and the people of Muscat and others in a fierce war. When the fate of the House of Saʿūd ended with separation and banishment, he came to Dammam and established peace between the people of al-Ḳaṭīf and al-Bahrain for a period…[776]

Following the defeat of Napoleon, however, the attacks increased even more.[777] These attacks were "…piracy pure and simple and they accused the Wahhābī sect of instigating the attacks… After this phase, [i.e., in the wake of 1820] was over Britain established a watch over the Gulf and decreed a "maritime peace" by which none of the Arab states in the Gulf were allowed to fight each other at sea."[778] In other words, Britain was not going get involved in any intervention on land;[779] this was an issue to be dealt with the Egyptian forces following their destruction of al-Dirʿiyya in 1818. But when it was understood that there would be no help from Ibrahim Pasha, who was on his way back to the Ḥijāz, the British decided to solve the issue themselves. Raʾs al-Khaimah, in todays United Arab Emirates, also known as the Pirate Coast, was blockaded by the militarily superior British navy and the town was bombarded and stormed.[780] Ibn Bishr records the event under the title *The English Enters Raʾs al-Khaymah* in a very medieval tone, as usual, without any theoretical venture:

> In the early days of Safar, the Christians marched on the well-known people of Raʾs al-Khaimah in Oman. They came with great boats, mighty cannons, countless soldiers, and a mighty stratagem. They set out in the country and fought it by land and sea. So, its people fled from the town and left it to the British, who

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[776] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 2: 52-53.

[777] R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 38.

[778] Ibid.

[779] Ibid.

[780] Ibid., 48.

> entered the town and destroyed it. There were in this country a large number of people from all parts of Najd and the people of al-Aḥsāʾ and others.[781]

The document sent by an English major in 1878 draws attention to the piracy activity around Katif and states that the British ship intervened in the problem:

> Mirlivâ 'Rûrsî'den vârid olan telgrafnameye nazaran İngiltere beylik sefâininden "Vultur" (Vulture) nâm vapurun Katif civarında on beş kıt'a korsan gemisi tutmuş ve mutasarrıfın talebi üzerine bunları Katif hükûmetine teslim etmiştir… zabt eyledikleri sefîneler dahi kurtarılmıştır.[782]

In fact, Britain announced in a note dated October 1878 that it would directly intervene in the piracy activities, or "deniz hırsızlığı", on the coast of Katif in the Persian Gulf to ensure safety on the mentioned coasts.[783] Britain had already assumed this protective role from the 1840s to ensure that, against the Wahhābī threat, Bahrain remained attached to the British Empire.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, piracy in the Mediterranean was carried on by the Spanish, French, Dutch, Italian and British, at the expense of the Italian city-states such as Venice.[784] It continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Mediterranean (Barbary corsairs)[785] and Aegean Sea (Greek pirates)[786]. But during the nineteenth century, the policy of the British Empire, which was now increasing its influence in the Gulf region, was clear: Piracy was outlawed, and the Persian Gulf was no exception. To this end, and particularly against the Al-

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[781] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 1: 450-451.

[782] BOA, HR. TO., 254/26.

[783] BOA, HR. SYS., 82/33; Y. PRK. PT., 9/109.

[784] İnalcık and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 1:376.

[785] David Abulafia, *The Great Sea* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 529.

[786] Theophilus C. Prousis, *British Consular Reports from The Ottoman Levant in an Age of Upheaval, 1815-1830* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2008), 33–35; Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th -18th Century*, 3:481.

Qaṣīmī Shaykhs (whose bases were the port cities of Raʾs al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain, al-Hemra Island, al-Rams, Buhail, Ajman, Shinas, Khor Fakkan, and Khor Kalba)[787] who were considered by the British as mere pirates, *General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf* was signed on January 8, 1820.[788] The Iranian government had no particular interest in the Gulf and was not bothered by Britain's security in the Gulf. However, the Wahhābis and the Ottomans did not make any significant effort to establish dominance in the Gulf during the nineteenth century.[789] On the other hand, Britain kept the Wahhābis under surveillance against all possible dangers and interferences with the security of maritime trade, and especially tried to prevent the growth of naval power; the two punitive expeditions of 1809-10 and 1819-20 can be counted as the first examples of the British attitude against the Wahhābī naval presence in the name of maritime truce.[790] The Ottomans, however, only wanted to protect and hold on the coastal areas.[791] Indeed, since the sixteenth century, the emerging naval powers of England and the Netherlands were trying to enter the Eastern markets, which had long been monopolized by Portugal. First, the British, unable to penetrate the trade of Americas, which was held tight by the Spanish and her Armada, sought a passage from north to east, but they were eventually unsuccessful in the 1580s; thus, British commercial interests had to inevitably turn to the Indian Ocean

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[787] Mobarak al-Otabi, "The Qawasim and British Control of the Arabian Gulf" (Ph.D., University of Salfold, 1989), 28.

[788] William O. Beeman, "Gulf Society: An Anthropological View of the Kahlijis – Their Evolution and Way of Life," in *The Persian Gulf in History*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 151.

[789] Ibid., 15.

[790] Saul Kelly, "The Gamekeeper Versus the Merceneray Spirit: The Pax Britannica in the Gulf," in *Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf*, ed. Jeffrey R. Macris and Saul Kelly (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 54–55.

[791] Anscombe, "The Ottoman Role in the Gulf," 263.

and Indonesia.[792] The Persian Gulf was gaining importance for the British Empire from the seventeenth century as a steppingstone on its way to India. With the final defeat of Napoléon in Waterloo, 1815, Britain, who had no more rivals in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, could not tolerate piracy. However, this was only a secondary problem on the way to India and was going to be resolved by worldwide interventions rather than British alone. If, on the other hand, there was a game changer in the eastern Mediterranean, and from there in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, it was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 by the French, which, in the long run, prepared the road to the invasion of Egypt by the British in 1882. At the same time, with the ever present British naval activity since 1800s, it will directly cause the Ottoman's interest in the region to increase. This was now the Fifth Mediterranean in the making.[793]

4.5.1. The Second Saʿūdī State

The second Saʿūdī state is a legacy state built on the collective memory of the first one, which was rather fierce in its incessant jihad policy. This time, however, as emphasized above, the chaotic political fragmentation of Arabia, both in its nomadic tribes and sedentary culture, would not let the elite of the second dynasty to conquer, but only to protect and preserve what they had inherited from their ancestors. Thus, it is now a much more conservatist, in fact, a much more anti-alien political entity. *ʿAmr bi al-maʿrūf* and *al-walāʾ waʾl-barāʾ* would turn into a state policy, imposed by the rulers on the population. An analytical look at the history of Arabia was also to emerge for the first time with the special interest of the Saʿūdīs during this period. In other words, state-making inevitably brought with it the construction and re-reading of history. In this process, Ibn Bishr and Ibn ʿIsā would carry the flag handed over by Ibn Ghannām.

Doughty summarizes the passage from the first Saʿūdī state to the second:

> Three hundred were fallen of Saûd's men; his few tents and the stuff were in the power of Ateyba: and the shorn Waháby wolf returned as he might over the deserts, to er-Riâth. By the loss of the horses the Waháby rule, which had lasted

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[792] Livingstone and Withers, *Geography and Revolution*, 144.

[793] David Abulafia, ibid., 541.

> an hundred years, was weakened to death; never -such is the opinion in Nejd- to rise again! Founder of the Waháby reform was one Mohammed ibn Abd-el-Wáhâb, a studied religious elder, sojourning in the oasis eth-Ther'eyyeh, in East Nejd; and by blood a Temîmy or, as some report, of Annezy: he won over to his puritan doctrine the Emir of the town, a warlike man, Saûd ibn Abd-al-Azîz. The new Waháby power grew apace and prevailed in Nejd: in the first years of this age, they victoriously occupied the Hejâz! Then Mohammed Aly, the Albanian ruler of Egypt, came with a fleet and an army as 'the Sultan's deputy, to deliver the Harameyn." We have seen Ibrahîm Pasha, his son, marching through the midst of Arabia. After leaving Aneyza, he took and destroyed eth-Ther'eyyeh which was not afterward rebuilt: but the Wahábies founded their new clay metropolis at "the Rauthas" (er-Riâth). When they had rest from the Egyptian expedition, they ruled again in all Nejd and desert Arabia, as far as el-Yémen; and the Gulf coast towns yielded tribute: but the Waháby came no more into the Hejâz, occupied by the Turks, had been ceded by them to the Waháby (under tribute).[794]

However, as claimed in this thesis, if the second Saʿūdī state is a state formation in the literal sense of the word, then it may be necessary to briefly mention a treasury and an economic order that constitutes the income sources of this treasury. However, the important role played by the Wahhābī ideology, as a justificatory mechanism in the name of authentic Islam, should not be overlooked in the fact that the Saʿūdī family is seen as more legitimate in collecting *zakāt* than other local powers. In other words, if the Saʿūds have the power to take a share from the economy as a political force in Najd, it is primarily thanks to Wahhābism.[795] However, razzia (given the fact that raids and plunder was a dominant form of income source for rural Arabia)[796] was the main source of income of the first Saʿūdī state, apart from taxation of the Najdi sedentary population. Razzia revenues increased to a great extent, especially with the seizure of the holy lands at the beginning of the 1800s, and pilgrimage revenues were added to this. In addition, it is a striking fact that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was also personally interested in *Bayt al-Māl* (state treasury) and especially in the subsistence of the *ulama*

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[794] Charles M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, vol. 2 (London: The Medici Society, 1921), 425.

[795] Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 18.

[796] Andrew M. Watson, "Rural Life and Economy until 1800," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Robert Irwin, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 297.

class, as contrary to the classical attitude of the Islamic judges, were paid by the source quoted from the new treasury.

The isolated situation of Najd in Arabia, however, as a desolate part of the Arab provinces should not be overlooked. Therefore, the "useful Arabia" and *terra nullius* dichotomy appears once again, which is decisive for the economic structure and commercial connections in the region. A rough postulate should be possible for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As is clear from the nomenclature the useful Arabia is a lot more cultivable than Najd and is open to international sea trade by its port cities in the Red Sea (Yanbu al-Bahr, Jeddah, Hudaydah and Mocha), the Arab Sea (Aden, Mukalla, Salalah, Sur and Muscat), and the Persian Gulf (Raʾs al-Khaymah, al-Ḳaṭīf, al-ʿUḳayr, al-Jubail, Kuwait, and al-Faw). A few of these ports stand out with their almost global connections: Jeddah, "The Bride of the Red Sea"[797], had a privileged place as an indispensable port for pilgrims, who were warmly welcomed as "God's guests", and was actually the gateway to Mecca,[798] was connected to Calcutta, Bombay, Aden, Suez, Suakin, Hudaydah, and Singapore; Aden was an entrepôt with goods from East Africa, the Gulf, India and further east.[799] The Persian Gulf, similarly, was a part of the greater system of Indian Ocean trade, particularly through Basra.[800] In this respect, no wonder Muhammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt struggled to keep these shores with their ports and customs offices in his hand.

Similarly, the other Arab provinces too, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Levant, were parts of the greater trade networks of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean on the global scale.[801] Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, and

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[797] Ulrike Freitag, *A History of Jeddah* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 2.

[798] Freitag, 6.

[799] Freitag, 219–20.

[800] Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 53.

[801] Owen, 47.

Basra were connected to each other via land route of a lively caravan trade, which also included the Anatolian trade network via Adana and Urfa.[802] Alexandria, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Acre were the ports where sea trade with Europe was largely made in terms of imported products from Europe, and exportation of the local raw materials such as silk, cotton, and sugar; Baghdad and Basra, on the other hand, were the main gates for goods from east to Arabia, Kurdistan, Armenia, Anatolia and Syria.[803] By and large, as Bruce Masters points out, the merchants who traded in the Arab provinces under Ottoman rule profited, especially from local trade.[804] In this picture, then, where was Najd?

The aim here is not to examine in detail the commercial and economic history of the Arab provinces. This has been done many times.[805] The main purpose is to demonstrate that Najd is out of useful Arabia, and therefore its relative isolation from the outside world, from an economic point of view, shall be noticed. Perhaps this is the reason why R. Owen mentions Najd in his book only once.[806] However, it does not follow from this that Najd is completely isolated. Its main link is to southern Iraq and the al-Aḥsāʾ coast. Even an outlander like Midhat Pasha was quick to fathom the dependance of Najd to al-Aḥsāʾ in food sources and agriculture. Al-Aḥsāʾ was also as an opening to the Persian Gulf, either for taxation on trade or for piratical activities. Najd had a unique, yet a fragile and unsteady economic structure due to its arid climate

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[802] Owen, 48.

[803] Owen, 51.

[804] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 75.

[805] Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Charles Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Michael A. Cook, ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, New York: Routledge, 2014).

[806] Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914*, 276.

and anarchical tribal structure. This must have reflected in the treasury of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī states, although the contemporary sources are far from providing sufficient evidence both for the subject of land tenure (and its different applications) and for the system of taxation in the general framework of the Middle East.[807] Especially since the subject was reduced to the nomadic tribes of Najd, the sources say little about the tax system.[808]

Despite all this, however, it is possible to draw a general framework on economic situation, and commercial ties of Najd. First, the most determining element of the social structure and production activities is the dichotomy between settled and nomadic population.[809] For both, availability of water and climatic conditions are decisive. Draught, heavy rains,[810] locusts, gales, hailstorms or even frosts are the local factors which directly hits the vegetation, therefore people and fauna.[811] Nevertheless, contrary to expectations and aridity of the climate, agricultural activities that produce a considerable amount and variety of crops, vegetables, and fruits are still possible in Najd. The main ones, in the same order, are wheat, maize, barley, and millet; onions, beans, okra, leeks, eggplant, melon, watermelon, pumpkins, and gourds; lemon, apple, peach, pomegranate, vines, citron, dates.[812]

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[807] Owen, 33–35.

[808] Zekeriya Kurşun, "Basra Körfezi'nde Bir Arap Aşireti: Acman Urbanı (1820-1913)," *Belleten* 63 (1999): 124.

[809] Al-Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 16–17.

[810] A. Grohmann, "NADJD," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), 865.

[811] al-Thenayan, "History Writing in Najd: 1591-1737," 1–2.

[812] al-Thenayan, 3–4; for another detailed list of local agricultural products and economic activity by early 1900s see Özer Özocak, "Vehhâbî Coğrafyasını Anlamak: Hüseyin Hüsnü'nün Necid İzlenimleri," *Akademik Matbuat* 5, no. 2 (2021): 130–37; G. Rentz, "DJAZĪRAT AL-ʿARAB," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 540.

Al-Theneyan classifies the commercial activities and products in Najd into a triple classification: Local trade, the trade between nomadic and settled communities, caravan trade; agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured products.[813] While the marketplaces in towns are the main means of exchange for the local farmers by way of auction, the main products that change hands between the nomads and the sedentary population are livestock (and its by products such as milk, butter, leather etc.) and agricultural crops (such as barley, maize, coffee) and salt.[814] The caravan trade, on the other hand, connects Najd to Kuwait, Iraq (particularly to Baghdad and Basra), Egypt, Yemen, Aleppo, Damascus and the Ḥijāz, despite all risks of highway robbery; however, one the most important income item for Najd was its horses[815] and dromedary camels, especially horses were in demand even from India and Portugal from the sixteenth century on.[816] Finally, it is known that slave trade was carried out from Mecca and Muscat.[817]

The above summary is only to give an idea about Najd's social structure, economic activities, and ties to the outside world. What is relevant to us here is the fact that all these economic activities reflected to the treasury of al-Dirʿiyya and al-Riyāḍ as tax income in the name of Saʿūds, besides their incomes from razzias against any of the towns and cities which did not accept Wahhābī teachings and the Saʿūds as the sole rulers. In the final analysis, this framework drawn on the economic structure and treasury revenues is just to give a glimpse. For no source on Wahhābism, including secondary literature (except for one or two studies pointed out above in footnotes), provides detailed information on the taxation system of Najd and Arabia in general,

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[813] al-Thenayan, "History Writing in Najd: 1591-1737," 5.

[814] al-Thenayan, 5–7.

[815] Rentz, "AL-ḴAṬĪF," 764.

[816] al-Thenayan, 8–11; Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914*, 108.

[817] al-Juhany, "The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs," 175.

let alone a detailed narrative of income sources of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite apart from raids and a vague implication in taxation. Therefore, what can be said is that the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī movement, which we see as a state formation, has a treasury and this treasury gets some share from the economic structure of the region. In this context, for example, Midhat Pasha mentions that during their rule in al-Aḥsāʾ, the Wahhābī elites overtaxed the cultivated lands and date grooves in the region at three-tenths or even five-tenths instead of tithe.[818] The only vital factor in the name of Āl Saʿūd, as stated above, was their prerogative as the legitimate political elite who has the sole right to collect and levy taxes in Najd, which made it possible for them to exist as war-making warlords.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elite had been stuck in the central Arabia. Apart from a few exceptional and decisive examples, where there was no more jihad to fight. So, what mattered was to protect that was in hand. In this respect, and within the framework of dynastic history, Faisal b. Turkī's rule wa going to lay the foundations of today's Saʿūdī Arabia.

4.5.2. Turkī ibn ʿAbd Allāh

Saʿūds had and still have a large family which have made destroying them almost impossible. It is also obvious that their predators had not had any decent knowledge on the family tree with all its branches. Therefore, despite their hard-gained successes on the battlefield against them, they did not know who would take over. Ibrahim Pasha and his forces did destroy the main line coming from Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd except for the two names: Mishārī b. Saʿūd (d. 1821), who was the grandson of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Muḥammad, and Turkī b. ʿAbd Allāh (d. 1834), who was another grandson of Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd through his son ʿAbd Allāh. The whole reigning line of the Āl Saʿūd was going to come from this sideline, yet they were directly descended from the founder of the first Saʿūdī state.

However, before Turkī (he is Turkī not because somehow, he had had an unknown Turkish origin, but because of his fair skin color), a brother of the deceased

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[818] İ. DH., 646/44930.

ʿAbd Allāh, Mishārī b. Saʿūd, following the withdrawal of the main part of the Egyptian forces from Najd, assumed authority there. Lorimer provides us with two possibilities on how his rule came to an end: He was either overthrown by the Banū Khālid of al-Aḥsāʾ or captured by the Egyptians and killed by them.[819] On the other hand, an Ottoman document[820] dated 1821 mentions that a sheikh from Āl Saʿūd named "Muḥammad ibn Mishārī" was captured in al-Dirʿiyya and that handed over to Turkī and that Turkī killed him.

One way or another, it seems that, Turkī ibn ʿAbd Allāh, carried on fighting against the Turkish garrison located in al-Riyāḍ, and in time established his authority first in ʿIrqah as the chief of Wahhābī cause by 1823-24, as mentioned by Lorimer and Winder, then consolidated his power in Najd, the districts of which fell to him one by one.[821] First came al-Durma, after a strange wrestling case between Turkī and its governor, Nasir al-Saiyari, who died in wrestling by falling from the roof of a mosque.[822] Then his reconquest process gets faster and sturdier. By July 1824 al-ʿIrqah, al-Durma, al-Jalajil, al-Majmaʿah, al-Zilfi, al-Munaikh, al-Ghat, al-Unayza, al-Shaqra, Huraymila, al-Manfuhah, and Kharj was under his control; by the end of 1825 al-Riyāḍ, al-Dilam, Salamiyah, Yamamah had fallen to him.[823] According Winder, this was the first phase of his reconstruction of the legacy of his family. All the districts of the central Najd, al-ʿArīḍ, al-Kharj, al-Hautah, al-Mahmal, al-Sudair, al-Aflaj, and al-

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[819] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:1093.

[820] BOA, HAT., 865/38565.

[821] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1093; R. Bayly Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*, 61.

[822] Ibid.

[823] Ibid., 62-65; also, Ibn Bishr who said that all Najd was subject to him by 1825, *ʿUnwān*, 2:40.

Washm[824] now knows him as their Imām.[825] By 1827/8 Al-Qaṣīm [826], Buraydah, and finally Hail, the stronghold of the Rashidis, pledged their loyalty to Turkī.[827]

At this point, we see that an Ottoman document[828] dated 1826 mentions him as follows: Because of "zabıta muhmel kalındığından… nebh ve selb-i hüccâc…" (since policing of that area neglected… pilgrims were attacked and plundered) he was now authorized to "ol havâlinin tesviye-i umûr-ı asâyişine" (was responsible for the safety of that part.) Lorimer points out to this unusual conduct of the Imām Turkī and sees it as a "more liberal and enlightened" behavior than that of his ancestors.[829]

However, the greed for power in the family comes to light in 1831 in the person of his distant cousin, the grandchild of his grandfather's brother, Mishārī ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman, escaped from Egypt in 1825,[830] and rebelled against the Imām, and eventually, following his failure, pardoned by him.[831] In 1831 al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Ḳaṭīf paid tribute to Turkī, and Banū Khālid finally yielded to the obstinate Wahhābī cause at the Battle of Wabrah.[832] The same year Bahrain and Oman paid tribute; Trucial

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[824] According to Ibn Bishr Washm was taken in 1827. ʿ*Unwān*, 2: 58.

[825] R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 65.

[826] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 2:64.

[827] R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 68-69.

[828] BOA, HAT., 635/31331.

[829] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1:1094.

[830] "This year Mishārī b. ʿAbd al-Rahman bin Mishārī bin Saʿūd escaped from Egypt and came to Turkī b. ʿAbd Allāh who was in al-Riyāḍ. He greeted him with pleasure, gave him presents, and him the Amir of Manfuhā." Ibn Bishr, ʿ*Unwān*, 2: 41.

[831] Ibid.; R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 94.

[832] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1094.

Oman, the Shaykhs of Sharjah and ʿAjmān wanted to get along with Turkī on good and friendly terms.[833] At this point, we know that the sheikhs of Oman, who did not feel safe against Wahhābī expansionism, were in talks with Britain. "At this period the whole line of coast as far as Raʾs al-Hadd was dominated by the Wahhābī and rendered tribute."[834] On the other hand, we also know that the British decided not to take sides on any domestic issue due to the chaotic situation in Arabia during this period. It seems that Turkī also joined this trend. In 1831, through the Shaykh of Ajman, Rashīd ibn Humaid, Turkī asked for the renewal of the treaty which had been signed between the British, i.e., the Bombay Government, and Imām Saʿūd.[835] However, Bombay reported that there was no record of such an agreement in the Bombay archives.[836]

In any case, the British did not have a fixed policy regarding the Wahhābis at that time; the main aim was to remain as neutral as possible and avoid interference.[837] The directive of the Bombay Government was clear: "… desirable to abstain from all interference in any wars nor arising from piratical causes… While you continue most cautious in not giving guarantees or involving government, you are to take every opportunity of impressing the different Chief's with our desire of their remaining in peace."[838]

In 1834 Turkī was killed by the same cousin of his whom he pardoned 1831 for his rebellion, Mishārī ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman, probably plotting with the Shaykh of

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[833] Ibid., 1:1095.

[834] J. A. Saldana, *Precis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif Affairs* (Simla: Persian Gulf Gazetteer, 1906), 8.

[835] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1096; R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 82.

[836] Ibid., 1096.

[837] R. Bayly Winder, ibid., 81.

[838] Ibid.

Bahrain, who rebelled against Turkī in the same year.[839] Ibn Bishr narrates as follows:

> This year, on the last Friday of Dhu'l-Hijjah, the Imām, who had courage and sound opinion, who had no equal in skill and in politics, was killed and martyred.[840]

Another source repeats it: "In the year 1834 the Chief of Bahrain threw off allegiance to the Wahabi, and even ventured to blockade al-Ḳaṭīf and Ojair. In 1834 the career of Turki-bin-ʿAbd Allāh was cut short by his murder by a relative named Mishārī, who was in turn put to death by Faisal, the son of the Amir Turkī, and Faisal became the recognized Chief of the Wahabis."[841] In his time "the Wahabees, who have now recovered an extent of dominion nearly equal to that which they enjoyed in the times of their great prosperity."[842]

Ibn Bishr tells the story at length;[843] the summary is as follows: His son Faisal launched an unexpected attack on al-Riyāḍ and sieged the town. After a siege of about three weeks the gate of the town was opened from within in the end. Mishārī fled to the fortress. After the struggle that lasted until the morning, he was caught alone with injuries. Finally, Faisal b. Turkī, killed Mishārī for *lex talionis*.[844] In the eyes of Ibn Bishr this was plain and simple retribution, "Surely, Allah atones for who kills in

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[839] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1094.

[840] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 2: 97.

[841] Saldana, *Precis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif Affairs*, 8.

[842] R. Bayly Winder, *Saʿūdī Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*, 82.

[843] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 2: 99-104.

[844] Ibid., 2: 104.

retaliation."[845]

4.5.3. Faisal b. Turkī

After Mishārī was killed, Faisal was immediately recognized as the Imām of the Wahhābīs. The first four years of his rule as the leader of the Wahhābīs, under the shadow of Egypt, were in fact only a struggle for power. More than thirty years had passed since Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha started to fight for his suzerain, the Ottoman Empire, and he did not think that his initiative had paid off. Greek and Crete interventions, and above all the disaster in Navarino in 1827, had been costly for the Pasha. Moreover, despite having won two wars against the Ottoman Empire, it was worth noting that Syria was out of his hand in 1841 with an international sanction due to which his son Ibrahim Pasha had to leave Syria. On top of that, the expansion of Turkī in inner Arabia had been a blow to Egypt's presence there, which was only in name. It is in this context that Egypt's effort to re-establish its sovereignty in inner Arabia during the late 1830s becomes meaningful. At this point, an expedition to Asir would offer him an opportunity to test Faisal. As it is known, which we will see in Midhat Pasha's military intervention, camel means everything in Arabia, and, of course, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's forces was not an exception to this rule. Thus, Pasha demanded from Faisal the camels he needed for the supply and dispatch of his soldiers to Asir, and he also wanted Faisal to join the expedition.[846] However, Faisal states that he will not be able to participate in the expedition, using his illness as an excuse.[847] Mehmet ʿAlī Pasha's trump card against Faisal is clear: Khālid b. Saʿūd. Ibn Bishr speaks of him in a medieval tone of pious hatred:

> This year appeared the Egyptian forces with Ismāʿīl Agha and Khālid b.

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[845] Ibid. This judgement of his is in line with Quran, see 2:178-179-199, 5:44-45, 16:126.

[846] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1097; R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*, 107-108; According to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the number of camels demanded from him was fifteen thousand, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 1963), 139.

[847] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1097.

> Saʿūd. Verily Khālid had been transferred from al-Dirʿiyya together with the House of Saʿūd to Egypt when Ibrahim Pasha [took the town]. Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha thought that the people of Najd would obey Khālid and would come under his command when they saw him, and he thought that these pious soldiers would lead him to his goal and purpose. Whereas Allah rejects anything other than what He desires. And Allah's might overcome the plans of servants.[848]

Ibn Bishr recorded the events that followed from here in detail, and Winder similarly narrates them from the same source. He was cornered in al-Dilam, which was a walled town, by Hurşit Pasha and finally surrendered.[849] Thus began his Egyptian exile, which would last for five years. Here, Winder provides us with Hurşit Pasha's report to Cairo in its French translation:

> The number of infantry soldiers I had at my disposal not being sufficient, I employed the cavalry to repel the frequent sorties which took place from the village of Zumaiqah… While we were gaining this victory, the garrison of Dalam also made a sortie with the object of surprising a part of our intrenchments; but the assistance which I hastened to send frustrated this plan… A new attempt was made by those of Zumaiqah, supported by al-Hazzānī, who with a thousand infantry and a hundred cavalry had tried in vain to seize one of our provision convoys… To make myself master of Dalam and the person of Faysal a moment sooner, I ordered that two mines be made under the walls of the city, and while this work was being carried out, the artillery did not cease to beat… The latter, not feeling capable of sustaining the attack, preferred to surrender, and his example was followed by the other partisans of Faysal, who guarded the various points of the place. Faysal, no longer able to rely on anything but the inhabitants of the town and the zealots who were in his pay, sought his salvation in flight… Dalam was taken on Ramadan 23 after a forty-day siege.[850]

Feeling stuck in the international arena, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha's Arabia policy was now different from that of 1818-19, and his aim was to annex all inner Arabia, even including Iraq.[851] The eastward advance of the Egyptian army worried Britain. It was not a pleasant situation for Britain when a modern and disciplined army crossed

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[848] Ibid.

[849] Ibid., 171-172.

[850] Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*, 119–20.

[851] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1097.

all Arabia to the Persian Gulf and became a threat to Bahrain. As stated in a report written to Istanbul in April 1839 “the commander of the Egyptian”, meaning Hurşit Pasha, “nizâm ve magribî asâkiri kalîlü’l-aded ise de Necid tâifesinden on bin kadar ulûfeyle asker toplamakda ve Basra üzerine geleceği… Necid urbanından Âl Mutayr ve Âl Zafir gibi Irak münasebeti olan urbanın celb olunması… ve iktizasında Hürmüz Boğazında İngiliz sefinelerinin celb edileceği…”[852] This threat led to a betterment between Bahrain and the Wahhābīs. Because until then, the Shaykh of Bahrain was trying to get small pieces like Tarut Island from the weakened Wahhābīs, he also blocked al-Ḳaṭīf from the sea.[853] Ufaisān, the Wahhābī governor of al-Aḥsāʾ, took refuge in Bahrain after the murder of the sheikhs of Beni Khālid, who until then was supported by Egypt and used as a barrier against the Wahhābis in al-Aḥsāʾ. Apparently, Khālid b. Saʿūd’s authority was hardly questioned by the local population. Egypt was openly supporting him. It seems that Hurşit Pasha made his master the sovereign “over the whole of Najd.”[854]

In the meantime, an interesting change in expression about Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha is striking in the Ottoman archive documents. Mehmet ʿAlī Pasha, who was previously addressed as “Pasha *mûmâileyh*” (the mentioned Pasha) or "Muhammed ʿAlī Pasha", is now simply "the Egyptian". The cold, diplomatic archive documents reflecting the grim feelings in international relations presents a pleasant opportunity to smile that history offers to the historian.

Britain's Persian Gulf policy, on the other hand, was clear: To maintain the *status quo* and to deter Egypt from advancing. Local kingdoms such as Bahrain and Oman were also putting their hopes in Britain, on the other hand, they were negotiating with

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[852] BOA, HAT., 379/20525. “Although number of the Nizam and North African soldiers is small, he has been recruiting soldiers as many as ten thousand from the people of Najd and will march unto Najd… also summoning the tribes of al-Zafir and al-Mutair who also has connection to Iraq… and in the Strait of Hormuz the British ships will be confiscated if need be.”

[853] Ibid.

[854] Ibid.

Egyptian commander. For they had doubts that Britain could protect them, especially Bahrain. Britain, on the other hand, signing agreements with Shaykhs of Raʾs al-Khaymah, Beniyas, Debaye, and Umm al-Qaywayn in 1839.[855] These were largely agreements against piracy and the slave trade in the Gulf, but it is quite possible that Britain must have had Egypt in the back of its mind. These local chiefs also gave written assurances that they would support Britain against Egypt.[856]

Things were not going well for Egypt either. The uprisings in Syria should not have been forgotten by Egypt. Similar events began to unfold in Arabia. The Egyptian governor of Hasa were assassinated in Hufuf, the Ajman now attacking the supply lines of Egyptian forces in the eastern Arabia, and communication was getting insecure day by day[857], in addition, Ottoman archives mentions some epidemic among the forces of the Pasha in Medina.[858] According to Lorimer, Khurshid Pasha also fell out of favor with Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha[859]; the reinforcements that Khurshid Pasha expected by sea from Egypt did not come. Britain continued to press Egypt with gunboat diplomacy over the Gulf. It was only a matter of time before British warships blockaded the ports of al-Ḳaṭīf, Saihat and al-ʿUḳair in May 1840.[860] Under all these threats, Pasha, who knew that he could not stand alone against Britain and Europe without the help of France, which was understood that it would no longer come, started to evacuate his forces since it was not possible to hold the Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ coasts, when he finally yielded to the sanctions of the Convention of London in the autumn

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[855] R. Hughes Thomas, *Treaties, Agreements and Engagements*, 30-31.

[856] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1103.

[857] Ibid.

[858] BOA, HAT., 473/23133.

[859] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 132.

[860] Ibid.

of 1840. After that, Najd was to be controlled by Hurşit Pasha from Medina, and for this purpose, about eight hundred soldiers were left at the Pasha's command.[861] In the eyes of the Arabs and Wahhābīs, however, Khālid's political position and engagement were highly doubtful. There was great mistrust about what kind of connection he had with Egypt and Istanbul. It has been frequently recorded in the literature that he had been an Ottoman agent,[862] and Cevdet Pasha's *Tezâkir*, which presents a letter of his to the Porte, is presented as evidence in this regard.[863] In addition, an Ottoman archive document dated 1857 proves that "Cidde'de ikâmet etmekte olan Halid Bek'in (Khālid b. Saʿūd) vefâtı cihetiyle Cidde hazinesinden mahsus olup mahlul olan bin beş yüz kuruş maaşı ile ta'yinâtından Mekke-i Mükerreme ve Medîne-i Münevvere…"[864] he had been paid salary by the Ottoman government in Jidda. According to Winder, however, he spent the rest of his life in the Ḥijāz on a pension from Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha.[865] Palgrave describes his final years:

> Feysul appeared; and Khālid withdrew to Ḳaseem, thence crossing over to Egypt, till after many years on the banks of the Nile he sought a retreat at Mecca, where he had a tranquil nor unrespected life, till he enjoyed in 1861 the privilege, rare in his family, of dying a natural death on his bed. The son of Turkee meanwhile reinstated himself in his father's palace at Riaḍ without difficulty or opposition.[866]

It is reported that Khālid, during the last days of his short reign, had been

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[861] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1103.

[862] Ibid., 1:1104-5.

[863] Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, 1:139–49.

[864] BOA, İ. MVL., 380/16673. "Due to the death of Khālid Bek residing in Jidda, whose stipend, which had been allocated from the treasury of Jidda and now became idle which amounts to one thousand and five hundred piasters…"

[865] R. B. Winder, ibid., 140.

[866] W. G. Palgrave, *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862-1863)*, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1865), 61.

preparing for an expedition to Oman in October 1841, which was condemned and protested by Britain, and even a British representative was sent to Hufuf.[867] On the other hand, this purpose, if any, was never realized, because Khālid was going be overthrown when he least expects it, with the rebellion of another distant member of the family, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Thunayyān. Khālid's closeness to Istanbul, but above all to Egypt and the Egyptian soldiers in the region, alienated him from his own people.

He attacked al-Riyāḍ when he had the chance, but despite being unsuccessful, he captured al-Riyāḍ in December 1841, when the doors were opened for him from the inside.[868] Although he was immediately recognized as the Amir of Najd, his rule would be shorter than that of Khālid's. Most of this time was spent fighting Khālid, on the other hand, he tried to prevent Faisal's return. However, as the leader of the Wahhābīs, he owed much of his political existence to the struggle to expel Egyptian soldiers from Arabia.[869]

It is known, however, that the people of al-Aḥsāʾ became alienated from him due to excessive taxation and with his brutal leadership.[870] Things changed radically when Faisal b. Turkī fled Egypt in 1843.[871] Ibn Bishr tells the story of his escape and his descent from a cliff of seventy cubits.[872] When he arrived in Najd, the local amirs one by one offered their allegiance to him: Unayza,[873] Sudayr, Washm joined him,

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[867] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1105; R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 131.

[868] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1105.

[869] R. B. Winder, ibid., 142.

[870] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1107.

[871] BOA, C. DH., 40/1986; BOA, HR. SYS., 2933/50.

[872] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 2:207.

[873] Ibid., 211.

together with the Badu of al-Subayʿa, al-Suhul and al-Ajman.[874] Thunayyān was stuck in al-Riyāḍ and fortified the city against his cousin, but to no avail. Contrary to what Thunayyān expected, the town surrendered to Faisal without resistance.[875] Thunayyān wanted capitulation through envoys, but they could not agree.[876] However, at a time when he left the palace at night, men seized him, and took him to Faisal who took his weapon and immediately imprisoned him.[877] Ibn Bishr recorded that he died in prison in July 1843:

> Died ʿAbd Allāh ibn Thunayyān on Friday, in mid *Jumādā'l-Ākhira*. The Imām prepared him, and the Muslims prayed for him. The Imām appeared with his funeral and was buried in Riyad in an unknown grave. After that, Imām Faysal wrote to the people of the districts, urging them to do acts of obedience and to leave out objections. And he commanded them to adhere to tawhīd and to be upon its way.[878]

Thus began Faisal's second reign in 1843. Considering the previous thirty years, his second reign of a quarter of a century passed relatively calmly and Najd was partially united under his person. If we make a generalization contrary to the prejudices about the Wahhābīs, keeping the pilgrimage route open and ensuring the continuity of trade were the most important issues for Faisal. He also gave as much assurance as possible to England to prevent piracy on his part. On the other hand, his rule in al-Aḥsāʾ was built on fear, as the people's temperament was not very inclined to strict Wahhābī practices.[879] In 1851, he harshly warned the Bedouins in the south of al-Aḥsāʾ

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[874] R. B. Winder, ibid., 144-145.

[875] BOA, İ. MVL., 41/771. According to this document "Necid Emiri Hâlid Bek'in urbândan akça tahsili içün Ahsâ tarafına gidüb akrabasından Bin ʿAbd ʿAllah, Necid'in makar-ı hükûmeti olan Riyaz nâm mahali zabt ederek, ol tarafta bulunan urbân meşâyihleri Bin ʿAbdullah'a tabi'iyyet eyledikleri…"

[876] Ibn Bishr, ibid., 2:214.

[877] Ibid.

[878] Ibid., 2:214-215.

[879] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1107.

for cutting off the pilgrimage road,[880] and even subdued al-Murrah in the Jāfūrah desert (al-Dhafra), Ibn Bishr adds al-Manāṣīr to this and locates them in between Emirates, al-Buraimi and Qatar, which again equals to Jāfūrah desert.[881] His relationship with the people of the region, whether settled or nomadic, will continue until his death in fear and admiration. Even Ottoman sources admit that he was a saint in the eyes of the local people: "[he] is seen among the men of his tribe as a saint because of his patience in the face of all kinds of lackings and misery without showing any sort of hopelessness whatsoever."[882] His rule in Najd, which would last until 1865, can be reduced to a few simple patterns in terms of political objectives: 1) To get along as well as possible with the Ottoman authority and to ask for an official appointment (which was generally *Istabl-ı Âmire Müdirliği*[883] *ve Mîrü'l-Umerâlık*[884]*)* from the Ottoman Empire for himself and for his son, just in case.[885] 2) Get on as well as possible with Britain. 3) Not opposing the British in his efforts to annex Bahrain and Trucial Oman into Wahhābī lands.

According to the first article, it can be said that he consented to the Ottoman authority by and large. Lorimer quotes this policy of his as "in accordance with treaties between the Wahhābī Amīr and the Sultān ʿAbd al-Majīd, there matters which

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[880] Ibn Bishr, *ʿUnwān*, 2:226-227.

[881] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1110.; J. E. Peterson, "AL-MANASIR," in *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia* (Lanham, Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 91.

[882] BOA, HR. SYS., 1524/17, see Appendix B.

[883] BOA, İ. DH., 564/39324; A. DVNSMHM., 13/130-131, 12/53-54.

[884] BOA, MKT. MHM., 389/6, for ʿAbd Allah b. Faisal, during the civil war.

[885] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1110.

everyone is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds."[886] In fact, according to an archive document, he must have obeyed to the Ottoman state in 1847:

> Müstashib-u maiyyet-i zaferân-ı âlîleri olan asakîr-i nusret me'ser-i şâhâne ile bi-selât-Ullâh-i teâlâ Necid ülkesine bi'l-vusûl bir müddettenberû imâret-i memlekete tasaddî eden Faysal b. Türkî, kuvve-i kāhire-i saltanât-ı seniyyeye tâb-âver-i mukâvemet olamayacağını bi't-telâkkî bu cihetle müteşebbis ezyâl-i uzv u emân olarak dâire-i itaate girmiş…[887]

Lorimer also confirms this for 1855.[888] As mentioned above, from time to time, he aspired to the official duties of the Ottoman state, and the center approved them. It would not be wrong to say that this is a very pragmatist attitude towards the possible menaces that the chaos of nineteenth-century-Arabia may cause at any moment, and he will follow the same policy with Britain. In fact, this pragmatism is a struggle to protect his own political space and discretionary power within the comfort of the *status quo*. Aware of the Ottoman state's inadequacy of naval power in the Persian Gulf, Faisal tried not to anger the British interests in the region. This situation, i.e., lack of naval presence, will pose a great problem for Midhat Pasha in the future, and he will write that the Arabs tended towards Britain since the Ottoman ships could not display their banner in the Persian Gulf.[889] The vacuum was going to be filled by the British navy. But here, too, an acute problem was emerging for the Wahhābī state. Those who enter Arabia by force keep and sustain their presence on the coasts. Najd was a particular location for the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs, and they had coveted Bahrain just like Egypt before them. When they push their way to east, al-Hasa, they inevitably open to the Persian Gulf, rich in trade and products like date and pearl. This geographical eruption always alarmed three powers: the Porte, the Persians, and the government in Bombay. Of these, the British had the most active role in the Gulf with their navy, and

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[886] Ibid.; BOA, C. DH., 35/1735.

[887] BOA, C. DH., 31/1537.

[888] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1110.

[889] BOA, MKT. MHM., 496/10; HR. SYS., 93/18, see Appendix D.

Bahrain's territorial integrity was of paramount importance to Britain. Whenever Faisal attempts to invade Bahrain or the Emirates, on many pretexts, such as refusal to pay tribute or territorial disputes,[890] he will face the British fleet.[891] Although al-Aḥsāʾ was an exception, their presence there was also unwelcome because of their piracy activities. On the other hand, when Bahrain blockaded the Wahhābī ports in al-Hasa, the Shaykh of Bahrain was warned not to go forward by the British. This was simply the British policy of non-intervention on the coasts of Arabia.[892]

Just before his death he claimed all eastern Arabia from Kuwait to Raʾs al-Hadd all the down to the eastern most point of Oman.[893] It is known that he lost his eyesight in his old age. But he still saw that the country he held in his hands remained in one piece, though not as vast as his ancestors once had. He spent his last days paralyzed. He died in June 1865. According to Winder, his rule was the most important bridge connecting the first Saʿūdī state to modern Saʿūdī Arabia, so much so that Ibn Saʿūd, the famous founder of it as we know today was his grandchildren. Lorimer states that the cause of his death was cholera, and it seems that Palgrave points out to the history of that in al-Riyāḍ since 1854 and 1855.[894]

More than anything, he was a devout Wahhābī all his life and laid the foundations of some of the religious institutions known today:

> The elders of the town retired, held long consultation, and returning, proposed the following scheme, which received the kingly ratification. From among the most exemplary and zealous of the inhabitants twenty-two were to be selected, and entitled “Meddey’yeeah,” “men of zeal,” or “Zelators,” such being the

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[890] BOA, MKT. NZD., 286/87.

[891] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1112-1117.

[892] Ibid., 1:1116.

[893] Ibid., 1:1119.

[894] W. G. Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia,1862-63* (London: Macmillan, 1877), 243.

nearest word in literal translation, and this I shall henceforth employ, to spare Arab cacophony. Candidates of the requisite number were soon found and mustered. On these twenty-two Feysul conferred absolute power for the extirpation of whatever was contrary to Wahhābee doctrine and practice, and to good morals in general, from the capital firstly, and then from the entire empire. No Roman cencors in their most palmy days had a higher range of authority or were less fettered by all ordinary restrictions. Not only were these Zelators to denounce offenders, but they might also in their own unchallenged right inflict the penalty incurred, beat and fine at discretion, nor was the list of number of the blows.[895]

4.5.4. ʿAbd Allāh b. Faisal

ʿAbd Allāh was Faisal's eldest son and became the leader of the Wahhābis after his father's death. He was considered a veteran, as he oversaw some political and military issues in his father's time. However, he had inherited other problems with his father's power. The first of these caused a rift with England. The second was related to the Saʿūdī understanding of succession and directly paved the way for the collapse of the second Saʿūdī state. The same issue presented the necessary opportunity to the Ottoman military intervention in May-June 1871.

When Faisal b. Turkī died in 1865, he left behind four sons. Two of them, the eldest and his younger brother, ʿAbd Allāh and Muḥammad were from the Āl Saʿūd mothers, which made them sturdy Wahhābīs, and were from sedentary background. The other two, Saʿūd and ʿAbd al-Rahman, were from Bedouin descent from their mother side, the Ajman tribe[896], and the former had an al-Ajmanī wife.[897] The support

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[895] Ibid., 244-245.

[896] According to Kurşun, the Ajman tribe consists of thirteen sub-divisions: Āl Makhfūz, Āl Hubaysh, Āl Sulaimān, Āl Hitlan, Āl Maghbat, Āl Daghin, Āl Shamir, Āl Muflih, Āl Hādi, Āl Shawawla, Āl Masraʿah, Āl Yahyat, Al Zīz, see Kurşun, "Basra Körfezi'nde Bir Arap Aşireti: Acman Urbanı (1820-1913)," 126.

[897] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1121; R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 229-230.

of the two sides would be composed on this kinship ties. Saʿūd immediately revolted against his older brother ʿAbd Allāh but failed in this first attempt. On the other hand, according to Ottoman archival material, Istanbul seems to have approved the succession of ʿAbd Allāh, and he was first given *Ḳāimmakāmlık* (1868),[898] and then *Istabl-ı Âmire Müdirliği* (1868)[899] by the Porte. On the other hand, Istanbul was aware of the power struggle between him and his brother knowing that his power was in fact weak, and it was clearly stated that he needed military assistance, and, as stated in a letter sent to Baghdad, it was even considered that Najd be connected to Baghdad (1867).[900] This means that from the very beginning, the Porte was closely watching the struggle between the two brothers, and the direct administration of Najd was on the agenda of the Ottoman raison d'état. One thing was certain; that the area was under British influence and that the Arabs in the region tended towards the English.

However, the first problem that would give ʿAbd Allāh a headache was the Sur issue, a port town in Oman, which he inherited from his father's reign. The issue has been discussed at length.[901] The basis of the dispute was the exorbitant increase in the tribute that Faisal received from the Sultan of Muscat. However, the Sultan paid only the usual amount with the courage he received from the Government in India, who also encouraged the Sultan of Oman to take a more hawkish demeanor in terms of his defense against the Wahhābīs, also naval action was permitted. Thereupon, Wahhābī forces sieged the port city and caused considerable damage. What they did not consider, however, was that the presence of British citizens of Indian descent in the city, who had suffered considerable material damage, and one of them died. The Government in India responded rather harshly: Although there was no land operation,

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[898] BOA, MKT. MHM., 374/52.

[899] BOA, İ. DH., 564/39324; DVN. NMH., 17/7.

[900] BOA, MKT. MHM., 374/52.

[901] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1122-23; R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 230-37.

there would be a harsh retaliation by the navy. A Qaṣīmī tower in Zorah was shelled and destroyed, the island fort Abu Lif was bombarded, and a Wahhābī vessel was destroyed. In February 1865, Dammam was bombed from the sea. Britain was practicing gunboat diplomacy, this time in a concrete manner, without a ground operation, as it was her custom in the Gulf. Finally, in April 1866, ʿAbd Allah conveyed his request for peace to the British representative in Bandar Bushehr with one of his men. According to the final agreement "that British subjects would be protected in the Wahhābī dominions, and [ʿAbd Allāh] promised that, beyond collecting the tribute established by ancient custom, the Wahhābis would not in future interfere with Arab principalities in alliance with the British Government, in particular the Sultanate of Oman."[902] Although the British government in India considered the practice in Dammam unwarranted, they were satisfied with the agreement and compromise reached in 1866. However, as mentioned above, the balance of power in the region was very delicate and actors such as the Saʿūdīs, who had difficulties in regional politics from time to time, took every opportunity at their disposal. This time, apparently, without the knowledge of the British, they would also seek help from the Ottoman Pasha in Baghdad.

Accordingly, ʿAbd Allāh wanted the Pasha to inform the center against the British intervention, and if possible, he wanted to take the center to his side to deter the British. Apparently, the Wahhābī representative was initially welcomed, but then he had to leave Baghdad without been given any explanation. According to Lorimer, the probable reason for the interruption of the meeting was a raiding expedition that ʿAbd Allah personally participated in against nomadic tribes such as al-Zafir, and Anaza. The pursuit continued to the shores of the Euphrates, and came into a serious conflict also with Muntafik, then ʿAbd Allāh, who first rested in Kuwait, returned to al-Riyāḍ finally. The outcome was not clear to either side. News of the conflict reached the Turkish governor in Baghdad. Accordingly, the Turks were also damaged in the conflict that took place. The Governor of Baghdad ordered his officer in Basra to send

[902] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1124.

a letter to ʿAbd Allah, ordering the immediate cessation of the fighting and looting.[903] According to Winder, either this raid on the Turkish borders, or ʿAbd Allah's communication with the British in Bushehr might have been the reason why the talks between the two came to a premature end. What is important for us is the Turkish side's distrust towards the Wahhābīs, who, as Winder has stated, can strike at any moment and at anywhere.[904]

At this time, ʿAbd Allāh learned that his brother Saʿūd was moving from Sulaiyil in the south to al-Riyāḍ with the Bedouin forces he had gathered, plus the Najranīs. ʿAbd Allāh's forces met him in Muʿtalā. Saʿūd was defeated, and it is known that Saʿūd was injured at many points in this conflict.[905] After that, ʿAbd Allāh embarked on punitive campaigns in 1867 and 1868 against the Ajmanīs in Hufuf and Wadi al-Dawāsir, who had supported his brother Saʿūd.[906]

ʿAbd Allāh, who lost his power there after the surrender of the Buraimi garrison in Oman in 1869, intended to go on a naval expedition. However, he gave up on this aim by remembering his promise in 1866 not to attack the lands under the protection of England.[907] Simultaneously, unable to deal with Abu Dhabi, Oman, and his brother in rebellion, also, due to the shortage of water, which made impossible to cross the land route between al-Aḥsāʾ and Buraimi, he returned to al-Riyāḍ in desperation.[908] Here, Lorimer's observation of the concrete and brutal nature of politics in mid-nineteenth century central Arabia is elucidative: "The loss of Baraimi illustrated the

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[903] Ibid., 1:1125.

[904] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 238.

[905] Ibid.

[906] Ibid., 239.

[907] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1124.

[908] Ibid.

truth, exemplified on a larger scale by the Egyptian occupations of Najd in 1818-19, and 1838-40, and by the Turkish occupation of al-Qaṣīm in 1905-07, that political paramountcy depends even in Arabia on the passion of sufficient material force at the place to be dominated, and that the absence of such force it cannot long continue."[909] In other words, and maybe with a deep tautology, sheer power was the key to power in Arabia.

The brother Saʿūd must have understood this in a most bitter and ferocious way in Muʿtalā in 1866-7 (1283). After three years of disappearance, he suddenly appeared. Winder, from Pelly and Lorimer, starts the Saʿūd's revolt in 1869.[910] However, an Ottoman document from *Basra Kaimmakamlığı* dates the revolt to June 1868:

> Necid Kaimmakamı Abdullah'ın biraderi Suûd, Asîrlüden bir takım haşerât istihsâliyle sevâhil-i Necdiye'de vâkıa Lahsa ve Katif'i zabt eylediğinin rivâyete olındığını arz iderim, fermân efendimindir.[911]

Despite its intention at first, Bahrain promptly gave up on joining Saʿūd with the discouragement of Britain.[912] The majority of al-Aḥsāʾ Bedouins, al-ʿAjmān and al-Murrah, who had never fully adapted to the Wahhābī regime, join in Saʿūd's cause. The oases of al-Ḳaṭīf and al-Aḥsāʾ followed the suit. Winder, without citing a source, dates the final battle between the two brothers to Ramadan 1287 (December 21, 1870), the Battle of Jūda.[913] ʿAbd Allāh fled to al-Qaṣīm, to Hail, in hope of getting help from the Rashidi ruler, to no avail.[914] He, then, found support from the Qahtān tribe, and felt

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[909] Ibid., 1:1128.

[910] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 248.

[911] BOA, MKT. MHM., 413/1.

[912] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1128.

[913] R. B. Winder, ibid., 249.

[914] Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," 94.

himself courageous enough to return to al-Riyāḍ.[915] His brother Muḥammad was taken prisoner and imprisoned in al-Ḳaṭīf, in the same battle.[916] It is known that ʿAbd Allāh sought help from the Ottomans after this defeat.

Saʿūd left Hufuf in March/April 1871 and marched to al-Riyāḍ, with troops combined from al-ʿAjmān, the Dawāsir, al-Faraʿ, al-Ḥarīq, al-Aflaj and the Wādī Ḥanīfa.[917] ʿAbd Allah, with almost no resistance, fled with his Qahtānī forces to the Wādī Ḥanīfa. With the great effort of Shaikh ʿAbd al-Latīf to prevent bloodshed, Saʿūd finally entered al-Riyāḍ peacefully, and recognized as the Imām of the Wahhābis by the Shaykh.[918] He apparently continued to follow his brother until July 1871, defeating him again at Barra, about fifty kilometers north of al-Riyāḍ. However, ʿAbd Allāh managed to escape once again, and eventually joined to Ottoman forces in al-Aḥsāʾ.[919] The power struggle between the two brothers turned into a long and bloody struggle up until the death of Saʿūd in 1876. The Saʿūdī Civil War not only brought the Ottoman intervention into the Wahhābī lands, but also al-Riyāḍ witnessed the swing of power six times among the three brothers, ʿAbd Allāh, Saʿūd, and ʿAbd al-Rahman, during the following five years. Saʿūd, despite being declared an infidel by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Latīf for rebelling against his brother, captured al-Riyāḍ twice (in 1871, and in 1873, following the defeat of ʿAbd Allāh at al-Jizʿa)[920] and was promptly recognized as the legitimate Imām by the same Shaikh each time. Crawford provides us with the

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[915] Ibid.

[916] R. B. Winder, Ibid., 249.

[917] Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saʿūdī Qāḍī's Dilemma," 94.

[918] Ibid., 95.

[919] Ibid, 98; R. B. Winder, ibid., 250-51.

[920] Michael Crawford, ibid., 101.

Shaykh's text, in which the rebellious Saʿūd is excommunicated:

> …Saʿūd proceeded in three matters, each of them detestable: he broke allegiance himself, he separated himself from the community, and he summoned the people to break their allegiance to Islam. Accordingly, he and his supporters must be fought…[921]

Here, Crawford's analysis, the Shaykh's motive was not mere Machiavellianism in the name of his own good and personal interest. He was, as rightly pointed out by Crawford, using his judgmental discretion to save the community from the highly possible plunder and massacre of the Badu accompanying Saʿūd, who were on the verge of excommunicating the people of al-Riyāḍ, because of their association with ʿAbd Allāh.[922] For Shaykh ʿAbd al-Latīf the *ummah*, Islamic community, in our case the Wahhābī believers, was one of the quintessential columns of true belief. Here is the text in which the Shaikh recognized Saʿūd as the Imām of the Wahhābīs, also presents his justification:

> You know that the affairs of the Muslims cannot be right without an imām, nor can there be Islam in his absence. The purposes of religion can only be achieved, the pillars of Islam upheld, and the provisions of the Quran made clear within the context of the community and the imāmate. Dissension brings punishment and decline in both religion and the affairs of this world and *sharīʿa* is never the result. Anyone who is acquainted with the principles of the *Sharīʿa* knows that the people, in both their religion and their this-worldly affairs, require and need the community and the imamate.[923]

After this point, the Ottoman archives speak much more clearly because for the first time after two centuries of absence, a direct intervention in the region will take place in the name of the Sublime Porte. Therefore, now instead of Baghdad, Basra, Damascus or the Ḥijāz, documents that convey information directly from the region have been made available to the historian. On the other hand, the modernization and readability of the writing style of the documents are the clearest reflection of the

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[921] Ibid., 93.

[922] Ibid., 95.

[923] Ibid., 96.

Tanzimat mentality on the bureaucracy. In other words, we now have a collection of manuscript documents which are much more legible than their predecessors.

However, if the Tanzimat had only one ideal for its elite, it was direct modern provincial organization and ʿAbd Allah b. Faisal himself offered the opportunity sought for this ideal. According to a document written by Midhat Pasha in October 1871, all the people of the region, including al-Riyāḍ, were complaining about Saʿūd, and were looking for an opportunity to get rid of him.[924] In the eyes of Midhat Pasha, who followed the conflict between the two brothers from the very beginning, the economic revival and betterment of the region was only possible with the direct government. The Saʿūdī civil war would be the opportunity he had been waiting for. However, for the Ottoman state mind and the Tanzimat elite, the path of the direct government inevitably passes through security and public order. The same civil war, however, would put the Wahhābī religious ideal to a harsh political test. When Platonic religious ideal, with an implication of "a timeless quality"[925], tested on the sublunar corporeal world, may not present the perfect result for its believers.

Here, before moving on to the next chapter, we should talk about a deadlock and vicious circle inherent in the tradition of succession of the Saʿūd dynasty. It is the problem of succession which inevitably leads to "problems of internal governance", which arise from, in Mouline's analysis, the adelphic form of succession[926], which was particular to the second Saʿūdī state.[927] Mouline further argues that the roots of this problem stem from the patriarchal structure of Islamic states, and according to him, the range of action offered by the tradition to the sovereigns is quite narrow.[928] "In

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[924] BOA, İ. DH., 639/44488.

[925] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 14.

[926] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 49.

[927] Nabil Mouline, "Power and Generational Transition in Saudi Arabia," *Critique Internationale* 46, no. 1 (2010): 2–3.The first Saʿūdī state, according to Mouline, employed the lineal-agnatic mode.

[928] Ibid.

most cases of succession, the super-abundance of heirs led to numerous conflicts, which in their turn brought about wars of succession and foreign intervention."[929] According to this horizontal mode of succession model (it is horizontal because justifies the power struggle among myriad number of male descendants, hence the meaning of adelphic, brotherly), all adult males of the same line of descent of the ruling dynasty are equally entitled to power, and this model can only be interrupted and redesigned either by God's will or fate. Although primogeniture is not totally disregarded, in fact, the closest in lineage to the deceased leader is always preferred and has the highest chance in the game.[930] When all the male figures of the ruling family consider themselves equally and rightfully potent for the leadership – *primus inter pares* – in times of political transition, the result is inevitably the eleven-year Saʿūdī civil war of 1865-1876, chaos, and violence during the times of generational change.[931] As such, the opposing forces in the power struggle are constantly trying to push each other out of the game or to narrow down the opponent's political area as much as possible, and when another power joins the game from the outside it can find the opportunity to intervene that will determine the fate of the parties in the power struggle.[932]

The Ottomans overcame this problem with the practice of fratricide which was codified in the law code of Mehmed II, who rules that "[I]t is appropriate for those of my descendants who ascend the throne to execute their brothers for the sake of [preserving] the order of the world."[933] Although this is beneficial in terms of

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[929] Ibid.

[930] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 49.

[931] Ibid.

[932] Ibid.

[933] Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 51.

preventing the death of thousands of people due to worldly interests of competing male members of the ruling line, it is not permissible in terms of the sharia law. Interestingly, a similar practice, succession by assassination, became the rule for the Rashidi family, who were also Wahhābīs, during the nineteenth century.[934] In the eyes of a Wahhābī, on the other hand, this is pure blasphemy, a cardinal sin on the road of salvation. However, despite the sharia judgement, it did not withhold them to wage war against each other on the battlefield, which might also lead to killing of one brother by another, but in the end, this would be mere providence, and since only God have discretion on providence, it is lawful in the end.

This is exactly what happens when Faisal ibn Turkī died in 1865: All his sons, being *primus inter pares*, considered themselves equally worthy of throne, and thus the civil war started, which gave the pretext for the Ottoman intervention in the regional politics, this time in a direct military fashion, and, more than anything, in the name *emniyet ve asâyiş*. After that, the internal powers of Arabia would no longer dominate the political scene exclusively. On the contrary, it would be the side supported by foreign powers that would determine the outcome of the struggle. In other words, durability (or non-durability) of the local dynasties was directly tied to foreign aid and political support which will ultimately tip the scale in favor of one family.[935]

4.6. Porte on the East Arabian Coast

It is not possible to talk about a stereotypical Ottoman administration in the region for roughly three centuries, from the annexation of Arabic-speaking countries to the Ottoman lands at the beginning of the sixteenth century, until the proclamation of the Tanzimat in 1839. However, it is possible to say that there was no direct Ottoman

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[934] Madawi Al-Rasheed, "Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidis and Saudis in Central Arabia," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 2 (1991): 147.

[935] Ibid., 144-145.

administration in the region throughout the process.[936] The Ottomans had not touched the old order since the conquest of the region. In other words, they preserved the preconquest systems of land tenure and taxation, the purpose was clear: To provide a smooth transition to the Ottoman administration.[937]

On the other hand, as stated above, all Arabic-speaking countries under the Ottoman rule had their own *sui generis* administrative autonomy. North African territories, for example, had varying degrees of autonomy of *Dayis*, *Beys* and corsairs.[938] From its conquest, Egypt remained under the rule of local Mamluk families, the most powerful of these families would select a *Shaykh al-Balad* (*the Chief of the City*)[939], with almost all bureaucratic positions in their hands, despite the current Ottoman governor, as it is known, with the rule of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, Egypt was going to be ruled under a hereditary dynasty. According to Hanioğlu, Ottoman presence in Iraq, Syria, Acre, and Mount Lebanon is explained by "strong governors"[940] or "the self-made governors"[941] in Masters' analysis; Iraq, from Mosul to Basra, was dominated by the Mamluks of Baghdad up until 1831. Syria was under the absolute rule of the ʿAzms in Damascus. In Acre Zāhir al-ʿUmār al-Zaydānī, with the independent trade chain he established was able to support a standing army, was followed by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar. Mount Lebanon, however, was the most autonomous of these, had never seen direct Ottoman rule. The Ottoman central

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[936] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918*, 158.

[937] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 9.

[938] Ibid.

[939] M. Winter, "SHAYKH AL-BALAD," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 398.

[940] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 7.

[941] Bruce Masters, ibid., 37.

authority had to recognize Bashīr Shihāb II, who emerged victorious from the local power struggle, as the governor.[942]

But the vital point for us here is the fact that these areas had ties to Ottoman control, and none of them, except the Wahhābīs, rebelled against the Ottoman presence until the nineteenth century. As emphasized by Masters "Ideologically, the Ottomans influenced the Arabic-speaking Sunnī elites to a degree unprecedented by their predecessors. The sultanate no longer was an institution that had to be endured in the absence of a more righteous regime. It had become a righteous regime."[943] The answer for the question "[w]hat induced quietude rather than rebellion" may be looked for in the collaboration of these peripheral actors with the center.[944] Karen Barkey also offers an explanatory statement on the cooperation of the eighteenth century periphery with the center: "In the eighteenth century, these actors had acquired the capability for important and social growth and development, and it seemed to be in their interest to maintain the order that provided them with such privilege."[945]

On the other hand, Ottoman control in Arabia was not more powerful or centralized than in other Arabic-speaking countries. Indirect control could only be seen on the Red Sea coast, the Ḥijāz and partly on the east coast, and Ottoman claims to dominance in the Arabian Peninsula stemmed from agreements made with local Arab shaykhs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[946] Inner Arabia, on the other hand, has never witnessed a full Ottoman domination due to both the difficulty of geography and therefore the difficulty of transportation and the chaotic situation caused by nomadic tribes. In fact, this situation is expressed by two names, both with the concept

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[942] Hanioğlu, ibid., 14-16.

[943] Bruce Masters, ibid., 71.

[944] Ibid., 3.

[945] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 225.

[946] Şükrü Hanioğlu, ibid., 11.

of "terra nullius"[947], i.e, central/inner Arabia, and by the concept of "useful Arabia"[948], i.e., the coastal regions. This situation of isolation puts central Arabia in a position both negative and positive for state-making: It is negative because, in the light of historical data, the region has witnessed the emergence of very few state organizations; in other words, it is not a geography that allows for the formation of a state. But when it did allow, as in the case of the Saʿūdīs, it provided the state makers with a geography which is fortified by natural barriers. This, however, does not mean that the barriers are impregnable. They were impregnable as we had seen with the Egyptian invasions in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, when we add the Saʿūdī heirs, who are quite numerous, into the equation, it can be said that the state making through the dynasty continues even if it was interrupted. Their only defense, put differently, was safety in numbers.

The application of the Tanzimat was as different degrees and fashions in Arabic-speaking countries as the subordination of them to Ottoman control. However, as stressed above, the era of the Tanzimat meant direct central government for the local elites, and for the first time in a century and a half, it was aimed to embody the Ottoman sovereignty in the region.[949] As stated above, the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms varied from region to region. The only exception here is Egypt, which entered its own reform process with Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha. However, with the influence of international pressure, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha put the Tanzimat reforms (albeit partly with adaptations) into effect in Egypt, and his sons after him continued these practices, and even the 1856 Reform Edict was read to the public.[950] The Anglo-Ottoman commercial convention of 1838 also included Egypt and applied there from 1841

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[947] Michael Crawford, *Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab*, 19.

[948] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 47.

[949] Bruce Masters, ibid., 158.

[950] Süleyman Kızıltoprak, ed., *15 Numaralı Mühimme-i Mısır Defteri* (Ankara: TTK, 2015), 10–25.

on.[951] It is pointed out there is a correlation between the Anglo-Ottoman commercial convention's application in Egypt in the name of banning the Egyptian monopoly system as a "command economy" for the sake of British "free trade imperialism".[952]

With the withdrawal of Egypt, the old north-south divide in Syria was restored, Aleppo in the north, Damascus in the south.[953] However, with this came a significant change in the old provincial system: Advisory councils and a uniform military command. The Ottoman administration was now pushing the local autonomous governors out of the system, who were likely to challenge to its centralization policy. Egypt, it seems, had been more than enough for the Porte. From the 1840s, the old *meclis* system was re-established first in Syrian provinces and in Iraqi provinces. At this point, it is necessary to draw attention to an important new application, especially to look at the isolated geographical situation of inner Arabia from the point of view of the central administration: Two armies were created in 1840s, the Fifth and the Sixth armies of Syria and Iraq to protect pilgrim caravans against the Bedouin attacks, which made the region safer than ever before by 1880.[954] On the other hand, autonomy was given to local lords in the regions of Lebanon and Kurdistan, which were quite mountainous which had made it almost impossible for the central state autonomy to establish itself.[955]

However, since the recruitment system was implemented in the establishment of the Fifth and Sixth armies, this situation would also cause serious uprisings in the region from the 1850s on, like the one in Aleppo and in Kisrawan, and would also

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[951] Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919," 86.

[952] Ibid.

[953] Bruce Masters, ibid., 160-161.

[954] Ibid., 163.

[955] Ibid., 164.

cause the local people to become alienated from the Tanzimat practices.[956] On the other hand, since the declaration of the 1856 Reform Edict, the non-Muslim citizens were considered equal with Muslims, which would cause the Arab population to become more distant from Istanbul. One way or another, the Tanzimat reforms were implemented in different dimensions in the Arab provinces, especially the opening of local assemblies, just like the example of Beirut, took the lead in preparing the people for the republican movements that the twentieth century would bring. The aim here is not an in-depth examination of the issue, however.

What we are trying to show is that regions such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and even the Ḥijāz were relatively accessible to the Ottoman central administration. In other words, central Arabia will remain outside the reach of the central authority, just as it has been for centuries. Midhat Pasha's military operation against al-Aḥsāʾ, which was, particularly with its natural ports such as Raʾs al-Tannūra and al-Ḳaṭīf, also the gate to central Arabia, is nothing but an effort to break this distance and desolation and to re-establish the central authority there. The Tanzimat meant the modernization of the state with all its institutions and the re-establishment of infrastructure services within a modern framework. On the eastern Arabian coast, this meant above all *emniyet ve asâyiş*; it was so because the Bedouin tribes, with their Homeric type of warrior code and traditional plundering, whom even the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī elites shunned, had been the main enemies of agriculture and infrastructure services, which were the basic needs of settled life.

This was the first and weak footsteps of the sedentarisation policy that Ibn Saʿūd would put into practice in the future, and it would even be clearly stated in the reports written by Midhat Pasha about the region much before Ibn Saʿūd. In short, the military intervention of Midhat Pasha is an effort to embody the Tanzimat ideal in Arabia for the first time. However, the phrase "Arabia" here should not be misleading; it was the "useful Arabia" as stated above, and Midhat Pasha, knowing the harsh geographical condition of the region under the scorching sun of Arabia, humidity, which made malaria almost universal for every single Ottoman contingency, and unavailability of

[956] Ibid., 169, 173.

fresh water except at some hard-to-reach places, and the difficulty of transportation due to the very expensive supply of camels, was never going to try to reach al-Riyāḍ. He knew that would be an adventurous gamble played with the life of the forces under his command, let alone the cost of the operation which would be at the astronomical level. To put it another way, the Tanzimat remained an attempt to maintain security and order on the eastern Arabian coast and never penetrated Inner Arabia. What you will read below are the summary of the detailed reports of this firsthand witness that reached us, who was none other than Midhat Pasha.

Our aim here is not to retell the entire Tanzimat process, since the English literature on this subject is very rich and the subject has been studied many times, down to the smallest details. Here, we will examine the subject through two very important documents[957] written by Midhat Pasha and evaluate the Tanzimat reforms pointed out by these documents in their context. Rather than making theoretical comments on the subject, these documents will directly show us how the Tanzimāt was understood and implemented in the region by a first-class Ottoman reformist pasha. In addition, unlike the Wahhābī narrative, these documents are also important in terms of how the region was seen and interpreted by an Ottoman official. However, before that, to examine the situation from two sources, his son, Ali Haydar Midhat, quotes his father's notes on Najd as follows.

In *Tabsıra-i İbret* the reasons for the intervention in Najd and eastern Arabia is stated:

> … umûm-ı Necid Kıt'ası bir hâl-i buhrân ve iğtişâşda olub uzakdan görünen müdâhalât-ı ecnebiye ile bu kıt'anın dahi Aden ve Maskat ve Ummân tarafları gibi elden çıkacağı anlaşıldığından, bu ahvâl Midhat Paşa'nın Bağdâd'a vüsûlünün üçüncü senesi Necid'e asker sevki ve Ahsâ Kıt'ası'nın tahte zabt ve idâreye alınması gibi takib eden vâkıa bu mukaddemeden başlamışdır.[958]

The reason for the intervention is, first, the influence of foreigners; foreigners, to be specific, being the Great Britain and its navy. It is also acknowledged that since

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[957] BOA., HR. SYS., 93/18; İ. DH., 646/44930.

[958] Ali Haydar Midhat, *Tabsıra-i İbret*, 104.

the 1820s, as a clear result of this influence, Aden, Muscat, and Oman were completely lost to the Ottoman political influence. Therefore, the dispatch of troops to Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ is a direct response to British political influence. This will be clearly stated in the document. As it is understood, the expressions "depression and chaos" are a direct assessment of the situation in the region rather than a pretext for a military intervention. After that, the history of the region and its transition to Ottoman rule is described as follows:

Midhat Pasha points out to the Ottoman's struggle against Portuguese naval power in the Persian Gulf during the sixteenth century, and, following the expulsion of Portugal, in this context, he counts Bahrain as Ottoman territory and that the most fertile lands of the region are the al-Aḥsāʾ coasts. Although he states that the region was ruled by Ottoman governors for a while, he does not mention that the Ottomans were expelled from al-Aḥsāʾ by Banū Khālid in the seventeenth century. However, he speaks of Wahhābī political power to create a basis for military intervention, also states that Bahrain is under foreign influence, that is British, and now turned into an independent government, which is exactly what the British desired. He says that the political vacuum in the region was once filled by Egypt, but only on behalf of the Ottoman Empire; this, however, does not reflect reality. However, the reality for an Ottoman pasha is only his own political reading.[959]

According to Midhat Pasha, Ottoman domination was renewed by Egypt. However, with the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces, that is, with the authority vacuum in the region and the many problems that the Ottomans had to deal with, as mentioned above, the region was left unclaimed, so the Wahhābis were able to renew their power. In other words, when Najd falls into oblivion, the Wahhābis fill the void. He then describes the Wahhābis of his time and their aims. He states that the Saʿūdīs were after state making. However, he also admits that he is now following a more moderate policy instead of displaying an uncompromising attitude like his ancestors. At this point, Saʿūd's revolt is connected to the British, and it is stated that the British

[959] Ibid.

provoked Saʿūd against his brother ʿAbd Allāh. Therefore, the reason behind ʿAbd Allāh's request for help from Midhat Pasha was the fear that the Ottomans would lose these areas as well, due to his brother Saʿūd's capture of al-Aḥsāʾ and the naval supremacy established by the British on the coasts. Because, according to *Tabsıra-i İbret*, Saʿūd is clearly doing all this with the help of the British. In short, just as the struggle against Portugal caused the Ottomans to land in Basra and the eastern Arabian coast in the sixteenth century, the system of alliances and naval supremacy that Great Britain was establishing in the Persian Gulf during the first half of the nineteenth century similarly led the Ottomans to the Persian Gulf. Midhat Pasha will express this concern many times.[960]

The Saʿūdī civil war was going deeper than it seemed. As the military power in the hands of the Pasha was not enough for the time being, and there was no permission from the Porte yet. Here, Saʿūd's character, who was a cautious and a warlike man (unlike ʿAbd Allāh, he came from a Bedouin mother) contrary to his big brother, was also perceived as having an important role during events. It seems that it is not yet possible to estimate how much the British were involved, on the other hand. Therefore, Midhat Pasha decided to wait.[961]

He first mentions that British travelers roamed the region, and then points out that the Saʿūdī civil war is not a simple domestic power struggle as it seems. According to Midhat Pasha, the supporters of Saʿūd are now clearly the British. Right after this, Midhat Pasha briefly explains the British policy. Accordingly, they first attract the local administrators to their side, then stand there for a while, like an arbitrator watching from afar, without interfering with their affairs; if and only if the balance between local authorities is disturbed, then do they intervene to restore the old balance. As we mentioned above, Midhat Pasha summarizes the British policy of being involved in regional politics only through the seas and avoiding intervening in the interior regions from land. This is, in fact, what is called as the famous gunboat

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[960] Ibid., 105.

[961] Ibid., 105-106.

diplomacy of the British during the nineteenth century, the years of *Pax Britannica*,[962] following their global naval superiority in the eighteenth century, which can be started from the *annus mirabilis*, 1759, during the Seven Years' War. This indirect intervention turns into an open British protectorate over time, as emphasized by Midhat Pasha, and protectorate means, in his context, simply dominion. The Trucial coasts of the 1820s created by the British are now felt and became tangible for the Porte, after more than fifty years.[963] This indirect intervention turns into an open British protectorate over time, as emphasized by Midhat Pasha, and protectorate means, in his context, simply dominion. The Trucial coasts of the 1820s created by the British are now felt and became tangible for the Porte, after more than fifty years.

According to the Pasha, the coasts of Oman, Muscat, Mukalla and Ḥaḍramawt, that is, the southern Arabian coasts, completely came out of the Ottoman administration and came under the British protection, based on the same trucial system. So much so that this trucial order was also welcomed by the local administrators, bringing peace to the region. It seems that the tranquility provided by the British *raison d'état* in the name of balance of power was enjoyed by the local sheikhdoms.[964] To get back to the game again a military intervention in the region would be inevitable for the Porte. All that is required is that it sits on a legitimate basis and does not disturb the international balance. At this point, the Saʿūdī civil war is highly relevant for Midhat Pasha.[965]

"… merkūm Suûd Necid Kıt'ası'nı zabt edecek olur ise arkasından bir himâyet-i ecnebiye çıkacağına bir şübhe olmadığına…" Anxiety is now clearly expressed. Britain is penetrating Arabia, the first stage of this influence, the coasts, has been completed, if

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[962] Peter Burroughs, "Defense and Imperial Disunity," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Potter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 323.

[963] Ali Haydar Midhat, ibid., 106.

[964] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 74.

[965] Ali Haydar Midhat, ibid., 106-07.

Saʿūd also succeeds in his rebellion against his big brother, British domination will penetrate Arabia. Therefore, a corridor stretching from Basra to Muscat will be opened under the control of the British, and thus the road they want to open on the Euphrates River as far as India will become concrete. In the final analysis, the inconveniences, and problems that this would cause for the Ottoman state were clear for Midhat Pasha: The complete loss of Arabia.[966] After that, Midhat Pasha will explain the difficulties of entering Arabia.

If a military intervention is to be made, first, field knowledge is required. However, it is clearly stated in the text that the geographical knowledge of the Ottoman state about these places is quite limited after a domination of almost four centuries. While names like Palgrave, Philby or Baron Nolde could travel across Arabia despite the Wahhābis, it is exemplary that the Ottomans had such a shallow knowledge of the region. In short, the Pasha does not have a guide who knows the region, and this seems to be a problem that can only be overcome by introducing disguised spies into the region. Apart from this, while Britain started to search for water and even possibly had cartography activities in the region since the 1870s, such an effort is not yet reflected in the sources of the Ottoman Empire.[967] As will be seen in the future, these water and cartography activities will indirectly lead to the discovery of oil in the region in the

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[966] Ibid., 107.

[967] BOA., HR. SYS., 1909/31. "…İngilizler tarafından Necid sevahilinin tashîh haritası zımnında o sulara gönderilen beklik vapurunun i'zâmına muvafakat olınmış ise de bu def'a Necid mutasarrıflığından alınan tahriratda İngiliz me'mûrları Necid sahrasına direkler dikmek ve çöllerde dolaşmak istedikleri ve bu hal sûi-te'sirâtı dâ'î olacağı gibi Suûd el-Faysal'ın ahval-i hazırasına dair Bombay politika me'muruna ve bazı eşhasa yazmış oldığı muharriratı dahi ele geçerek burya gönderilmiş oldığından evrak-ı vâride posta ile takdim kılınmışdır. Câ-yı bahs ve isti'zân Suûd'un bunlara şu mekâtibâtı arasında İngilizlerin ol suretle çöllere direkler dikmek ve dolaşmak istemeleri Suûd'a bir nev'i tahdiş-i ezhân urbana sebebiyet vereceği mütalaası olub şu ameliyat ve bu sûret esası muhabere ve muvâfakata muvâfık olmadığı ve alınan emrin hükmü Necid sevâhilinde haritası alınmak dairesinde bulındığı cevaben mutasarrıflık-ı mezkûre bildirilmiş ise de…" According to this document dated 1873, Britain was mapping Najd. On the other hand, although such activities raise the suspicion that Britain was in engagement with Saʿūd, in fact, Britain has never acted jointly with Saʿūd, at least no such finding has been encountered in this study. Similarly, Lorimer summarizes the British policy during the 1870s as "to reassure the rulers of Arab principalities adjoining Hasa, to prevent them from embroiling themselves with the Turks, and to restrict as much as possible the scope of the Turkish operations." J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1133.

1930s. Although it is known that Inner Arabia is a difficult region due to its geography and climate, another problem is that the supply of camels, which is the only desert-crossing animal of this geography with some considerable amount of ammunition and food supply loaded on, is very expensive. Midhat Pasha will express this in the future. As it is seen, these spies will be able to enter Inner Arabia via al-Aḥsāʾ, not by land from Iraq, Syria, or the Ḥijāz, but by sea. Therefore, considering the troop deployment, Basra and Fav were as vital for the Ottomans as they were for the British.[968]

Accordingly, in the light of the information provided by the spies, the piers at a depth where large ships can dock and the roads leading inland from the coast should have been learned in a way that would enable the dispatch of soldiers. However, the Porte has a fundamental concern: The issue could turn into an international political crisis. However, after Midhat Pasha assured that things would not reach this level, the Porte allowed the dispatch of soldiers, and two steamboats were appointed so that the sea route could be used. The forces to be sent will be dispatched from the body of the 6th Army, which we have mentioned above, and an infantry regiment from the 5th Army will fill their place in Baghdad. What is interesting here is that the dispatched force is not sent by land (which will be much slower) but by sea; As it is understood, instead of giving the other party an opportunity to gather in this way, it is desired to make a surprise by sea.[969]

Since the transportation will be by sea, the most important factor is the deep piers. As it is understood, although al-Ḳaṭīf is not very suitable for docking of the large ships, Raʾs al-Tannūra, on the other hand, will be quite suitable. Therefore, the dispatch of soldiers will take place from there, and then they will march to Hufuf by land. It is important here that Midhat Pasha recognized al-Aḥsāʾ as quite fertile. Because the search for financial resources for construction and civil service expenditures will be built on the efficiency of agriculture and irrigation activities. One of the most important issues of the Tanzimāt elites was the realization of expenditures

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[968] Ali Haydar Midhat, ibid.

[969] Ibid., 107-08.

within a budget plan; fiscal discipline was vitally important.[970]

However, the danger of sending troops overland to the inner parts of Arabia is explained in the example of Süleyman Pasha.[971] Although the expression of sixty thousand camels and mules here seems exaggerated, it indicates the difficulty of transporting soldiers, supplies and ammunition. Midhat Pasha talks about the difficulty and high cost of supplying camels even after almost seventy years.

First, Basra was chosen as the exit point due to its proximity to the region, and soldiers were dispatched from there by way of sea. It is obvious that this will facilitate communication and supply. Thus, Midhat Pasha is spared from paying for the supply of camels and the enormous amount it will cause. Apart from this, it seems that there is not much information about the military equipment and canons used at the forts and soldiers in the region. However, Midhat Pasha thinks that these are old and obsolete weapons. Accordingly, five battalions of infantry, some artillery and cavalry were separated from the sixth army and a new military unit was formed and they were sent to the region by sea at the beginning of 1871. In addition, it is understood that Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh al-Sabah of Kuwait, which was annexed to Basra, also participated in the expedition by boats, large and small, from the sea and did not ask for any payment on his part. It would not be wrong to deduce from this that Kuwait was not yet alienated from the Ottoman administration. A similar situation will soon apply to Qatar and partially to Bahrain.[972]

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[970] Bekir Koç, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Midhat Paşa* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2021), 55.

[971] BOA., HAT., 94/3838. "… fakat mâhir topçu olmakla İngiltere top ve topçularından yâhud ordu-yı hümâyunda mevcûd top ve topçulardan bir takım tophâne ve iki kıt'a İngiltere sefîneleri korvetine mevzûan bindirilmekle irsâl ve Hasa ve Katif vilâyetleri üzerine hareket ve muhasaralarına ikdâmı zımnında kendüye hitâben bir kıt'a emr-i âlî isrâlleriyle ol tarafdan sultan-ı mezkûr hereket ve berren ü bahren Hasa ve Katif'e … cihât-ı selâseden hâricîye tazyik-i tâm olunarak cihet-i rabiasından dahi Vâlî-yi Bağdad utûfetlû Süleymân Paşa hazretleri bizzat kendüleri top ve … rükûb hemân doğru mesken-i hâricî olan Dir'iyye'ye mızrab-ı hıyâm ile muhasaraya ikdâm…." It is written in the document (October 1801) that the Wahhābis were attacked both from the sea and from the land. As it is understood, two British corvettes were also used in the dispatch of soldiers over the sea. Süleyman Pasha personally participated in the siege of al-Dirʿiyya.

[972] Ali Haydar Midhat, ibid., 109.

The Ottoman forces landed in Raʾs al-Tannūra on 26th of May 1871, which was suitable for the docking of large ships, and crossed over to al-Ḳaṭīf by land. Meanwhile, it should be noted that al-Aḥsāʾ is under the control of rebellious Saʿūd. So, any conflict is just a matter of time. As it is understood, the defense forces of Saʿūd, who saw the Ottoman forces, fled after a few artillery shells. From here, Ottoman troops marched to Hufuf and Mubarraz by land. Finally, the mentioned towns were also captured and taken under control by the Ottoman forces.[973]

In Midhat Pasha's eyes, there is only one solution to protect the region from the material and moral influence of foreigners: To form a basis of government was the utmost importance ("bir kaide-i hükûmet tesisi en ziyâde ehemm"). This was nothing but a reflection of one of the most important practices of the Tanzimāt elites in eastern Arabia: Application of the Vilayets Law of 1864 (*1864 Vilâyet Nizāmnāmesi*). Accordingly; "the vast area of the empire will be divided into a number of administrative units called vilayets, with the *wālī* in full charge of all political, financial, judicial, military and public affairs in the *vilayet*."[974] In this new provincial administration there would be a *liwā* under the administration of a *mutasarrıf*, who was appointed by the Porte and only accountable to the *wālī*; every *liwā* in turn was divided into a chain of *qaḍā*s, administered now by a *kaimmakam*; and every *qaḍā* would have its own *nāhiya*s, which were administered by a *müdīr*.[975] In short, the system envisages a fourfold administrative hierarchy. In the end, the goal of the new *Nizāmnāme* can be grouped under three main headings: a) To establish a functional and pluralistic local administration with increased powers. b) To establish a Western-style system in which non-Muslims can also take part in the judicial process by

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[973] Ibid., 110.

[974] Mahmoud Yazbak, "The Vilayets Law and Its Impact on Palestine," in *1864 Vilayet Nizamnamesi*, ed. Erkan Tural and Selim Çapar (Ankara: TODAİE, 2015), 152.

[975] Ibid.

separating the legal and administrative structures, thus, to put an end to the order in which each religious community enforces its own law. c) Organizing all people without discrimination of religion to achieve prosperity and peace and ensuring that non-Muslims remain under Ottoman rule of their own accord.[976]

Within this very new administrative organization that *Necid Mutasarrıflığı*, which will be established following the military campaign, will determine the fate of the region for about almost forty years, up until the First World War. However, it is noteworthy that this new order was ignored, especially when Abdulhamid II came to power in 1876,[977] so the region remained idle and continued its existence only as an unnamed place of exile for civil servants. Our purpose here is not, as stated above, to examine the development or interruption of the Tanzimāt process and the dominant political character of the Porte right before the despotic rule of Abdulhamid II. On the contrary, we want to examine how the Tanzimāt was implemented in the region by an activist Pasha, through his personal correspondence and petitions to the center. So, now we should go back to the document, both to see the Tanzimāt in its context, and to compare the firsthand document with the above quoted post-mortem memoire, which was published by a grieved son.

First, Midhat Pasha, as a dauntless Tanzimat practitioner, emphasizes that he should go to the region in person and points out that it is necessary to get information directly from the region, since not much was known up until then.[978] Pasha underlines that the soldiers deployed in the region should be subjected to shifts, since the climate of the region is unsuitable because of humidity and extreme temperatures. For this reason, he attaches importance to the use of castles at heights from time to time. Pasha determines the route followed by the sea route as follows: Basra, Kuwait, from thence al-Ḳaṭīf, and again by sea route al-Ujjayr, then to al-Aḥsāʾ. According to Pasha that

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[976] Bekir Koç, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Midhat Paşa*, 2.

[977] Ibid., 8.

[978] BOA., HR. SYS., 93/18. Also, Appendix 15.

the "bandit" consisting of the rebel Saʿūd, and his followers from the al-Ajman and al-Murrah was defeated heavily, and the people of the region, who hated them, were very pleased with this job. Pasha frequently states in these documents that the people of the region do not like the Wahhābīs, far from being a mere propaganda method, this should be an observation in accordance with factual reality. It is recorded by the Pasha that the soldiers drilled frequently in the empty fields between al-Hufuf and al-Mubarraz. After that, Pasha points out that after the issues on military and state organization were settled, he returned to Baghdad exactly sixty-two days following his arrival. This time, however, he went to al-Ḳaṭīf by land and returned from there by sea. Before delving deeper into the chaotic issues of the region, Pasha himself admits that the region abandoned to its fate for a long time (not confessing that it took two centuries, of course). Even after almost forty years, Babanzade still complains about the weakness of the state in erecting telegraph wires between Sevk ül Şiveh and Hammar.[979]

Pasha explains the course of the operation and the struggle between the two brothers. Midhat Pasha's expectation was that ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal would join the Ottoman forces, as he promised when he asked for help. However, this did not happen, and ʿAbd Allāh was stuck in al-Riyāḍ against his brother and the Bedouin tribes that supported him and did not provide the expected contact and correspondence with Pasha. On the other hand, Pasha does not want to alienate ʿAbd Allāh from the Ottoman administration in any way, at least for now, when the military operation has been going on. For this reason, ʿAbd Allāh's district governorship (*ḳāimmaḳāmlık*) was once again approved, especially since the reaction of the local population could not be predicted exactly. ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal came to al-Aḥsāʾ only after he was defeated by his brother and stood by the Ottoman forces. In this case, his district governorship was approved once again and even a monthly salary of one thousand two hundred riyals was allocated in his name. However, Pasha clearly states that he does not trust him and writes that he will want to be independent again when things recover. ʿAbd Allāh's taking refuge in the Ottoman forces angered Saʿūd even more against his brother. Although he was expelled from al-Riyāḍ by ʿAbd Allāh's supporters, he gathered men

[979] Babanzade, *Irak Mektupları*, 160.

from the Bedouins (al-Ajman and al-Murrah) and attacked al-Aḥsāʾ, but he suffered a heavy defeat and fled. At this point, it is noteworthy that, contrary to his previous claims, Midhat Pasha did not mention that Saʿūd was helped by the British. Finally, although ʿAbd Allāh was very happy with the victory and even congratulated the Ottoman forces one by one, he could not resist the insistence and anger of the Wahhābī scholars, who constantly sent him news from al-Riyāḍ, and returned to al-Riyāḍ, taking his brother Muḥammad al-Faisal with him, who was released by the Ottoman forces in al-Aḥsāʾ.

Here Midhat Pasha defines the Wahhābī ulama writing from al-Riyāḍ as "those who excommunicate other than what they themselves forbid" ("…Riyad'da bulunan ve kendilerinden başka nâsı tekfîr ile…"). On the other hand, we know that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Latīf, who is in al-Riyāḍ, openly scolds ʿAbd Allāh for his cooperation with the Ottomans, whom the Wahhābis consider an infidel state[980] (*al-ta'ifa al-kafira*, *al-dawla al-kufriyya*)[981], and wants him to immediately cut off his connection with the infidels and return to al-Riyāḍ. This is a perfect example of *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ* at the highest level of the Saʿūdī echelon, a real Muslim must practice allegiance and rupture, that is allegiance to Muslim and rupture from infidels, thus must migrate from the places they live, where a true Muslim cannot practice the Islamic rituals anymore.

At this point, Midhat Pasha writes that the local people are quite complaining (*aşuru müştekî*) about the Wahhābis and their rule, and therefore he notes that if the Saʿūdīs should return to these places, that is al-Aḥsāʾ, the people will migrate. This was reported to ʿAbd Allāh personally, who, in return, said that he did not aspire to the administration of al-Aḥsāʾ, Qatar and al-Ḳaṭīf and that he only wanted the administration of al-Riyāḍ and its surroundings inland. In this case, Midhat Pasha gave ʿAbd Allāh fifteen days and asked him to come to al-Aḥsāʾ and take over the *ḳāimmaḳāmlık*; however, he clearly states in the document he personally penned that ʿAbd Allāh would not come. However, this was a ploy to discredit ʿAbd Allāh from the public eye; since he did not show up, it is no longer possible for him to take up the

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[980] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 80-81.

[981] Ibid., 79.

ḳāimmaḳāmlık. However, it is known that ʿAbd Allāh cannot come due to the sanction of allegiance and rupture. Now it is clear what Midhat Pasha will do. ʿAbd Allāh was dismissed from the district governorship. Midhat Pasha wrote to the twenty-four towns and the shaykhs of the Badu that the administration of each locality tendered to the shaykhs of that locality ("her mahallin idâresi o mahalin şeyhine ihâle..."). However, Midhat Pasha also considers the possibility of the two brothers coming together again now that Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ are out of their hands. In addition, he expresses his concerns that the people of the region, apart from the Saʿūdīs, might loot due to hunger and famine. However, despite all this, Midhat Pasha wants to establish a central government in the region. In this context, in consultation with Nafiz Pasha, the commander of the military forces in al-Aḥsāʾ, it was decided to build towers, outposts and castles to be built there. As can be seen, the ideal of *emniyet ve asâyiş* is now embodied in the region in the person of a Tanzimat Pasha.

After that, although Midhat Pasha thought of walking to al-Riyāḍ at first, he gave up his plan due to the distance, the difficulty of supplying camels and the presence of only one water source on the road to al-Riyāḍ. Therefore, he proposes two alternative routes to reach al-Riyāḍ: Mecca-al-Riyāḍ route, according to the pilgrims going to and from which has many towns and places to stop and water sources enough for a whole battalion; or from Iraq to Jabal Shammar, and from thence to al-Riyāḍ, which is a lot better and safer (*ehven ve eslem*) that the route from al-Aḥsāʾ. Although Pasha did not explain why the Shammar route was safer, as it is known, Shammar was on the side of the Ottomans and the Badu of al-Muntafiq on the way was also supporting the Ottoman side. However, such an operation never took place. Ottoman domination of Najd, albeit indirectly, would be achieved through the Hail and Muḥammad b. Rashid of Shammar towards the end of the 1880s.

After that, Midhat Pasha deals with the issue of the attachment of Qatar to the Ottoman Empire within the framework of stopping the British influence in the region. As Babanzade pointed out in 1908, the British influence in the region was going to be

evident, particularly in Basra.[982] Pasha determined that Bahrain cooperated with the Indian government, and he even knew that the British had taken Muscat and Oman under their influence and protectorate. The fact that Britain played the role of arbiter between these local principalities did completely worry the Pasha. As stated above, Pasha thinks that these places are completely out of hand, but that at least al-Aḥsāʾ, Kuwait, Qatar and maybe even Bahrain can be taken under Ottoman influence. Therefore, his political efforts in the region will be in this direction. According to Pasha, although they are not saying anything about Qatar now, they will eventually lay claim to Qatar as it is geographically between Bahrain and Oman. On the other hand, Midhat Pasha notes that Saʿūd al-Faisal was encouraged by Bahrain and supplied weapons from there. It is known that Bahrain is used as a port for arms trade and smuggling in the Persian Gulf due to its island location. However, it is almost impossible to identify the issue of aid to Saʿūd al-Faisal from the Foreign Office archive. At this point, only Midhat Pasha's testimony and claim are available. But Midhat Pasha's role in the Qatar's and Kuwait's coming under the Ottoman protectorate is undeniable. It is known that he sent four Ottoman banners to Qatar; one to Shaykh Jasim bin Muḥammad bin Thānī, the heir apparent, one to Shaykh Muḥammad bin Thānī, the ruler of Qatar, who sent the banner to al-Wakra, one to the chief of al-Khor, Ali bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, and one to Khor al-Odaid.[983] Because Bahrain, under the auspices of Britain, sent a British ship, the gunboat Hugh Rose on 19 July 1871,[984] to collect taxes from Qatar, but the Shaykh, pointing to the Ottoman flag that Midhat Pasha had sent to Qatar Shaykh before, said, "We are under this flag, we do not recognize anyone else," and sent the ship back. The Shaykh also let the British officer on the ship know that the Ottoman Sultan was now expanding his *de facto*

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[982] Babanzade, *Irak Mektupları*, 162; for more detail on the British dominance in Basra see Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914*, 276.

[983] Habibur Rahman, *The Emergence of Qatar: The Turbulent Years 1627-1916* (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 94.

[984] Ibid., 95.

political and military power between Basra and Muscat.[985] Because, according to Midhat Pasha, Qatar is clearly a part of al-Aḥsāʾ (*Ahsa mülhekātından*), therefore counted as Ottoman territory. The Indian government, on the other hand, denies any such tax collection claim. Finally, Midhat Pasha sent a battalion of soldiers to Qatar, al-Bida, under the command of *Ḳāimmaḳām izzetlû Ömer Bey*, in December 1871, to protect them from looting and raids by Bedouins such as al-Ajman and al-Murrah. In January 1872 Qatar became a *qaḍā* of Necid Mutasarrıflığı, which was under the *vilâyet* of al-Aḥsāʾ. Shaykh Jasim was appointed as *Ḳāimmaḳām* without a salary and held exempt from paying all taxes apart from zakat, since there was cultivation due to its rocky and barren landscape. Finally, according Habibur Rahman, there was no significant change in the political composition of the country since the administration was left again to al-Thānī family.[986]

Midhat Pasha will now deal with the Kuwait issue. First, Midhat Pasha seems very pleased with the gratuitous help and naval power, only with small vessels though, provided by the Shaykh of Kuwait ʿAbd Allāh al-Sabah. Since he had come to greet Midhat Pasha to Fav, Pasha also wanted to visit Kuwait in return. The Pasha then summarizes Kuwait's geographical situation: Although it does not have agriculture and cultivated land, in the area between Kuwait and Arabia as barren by the proper meaning of the word, its climate is very pleasant, since it has high ground from sea level. On the one hand, it has a very large seaport which makes it rather easy for big vessel to dock, and, on the other, he states that the country is sheltered from this side, as the land is surrounded by tribes of Kuwait. The number of households in the country is estimated by the Pasha as five-six thousand.

While most of the town is Shafiite, a small part of it is Ḥanafī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī. There are, however, no Jews or Christians among them, and there are no Shiites and Wahhābīs. Pasha's statement is interesting here, and we may see a slip of the Ottoman *raison d'état*, perhaps at the risk of making an exaggerated interpretation: Midhat Pasha considers Wahhābism as a heterodox sect like Shia. However, this is

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[985] Ibid.

[986] Ibid., 96.

one of the common history readings of nineteenth-century Ottoman statesmen, so it is only natural that the Wahhābis are often referred to as *Hâricî*. Again, apart from the myriad differences in historical context and ideology, only superficial similarities count as the determining factors for the Ottoman intelligentsia.

Midhat Pasha also refers to Kuwait's trade reaching the Persian Gulf and beyond. There are many small boats in the country. They are used for pearl hunting and transportation to other ports such as Basra and Bandar Bushehr. The big boats, however, are engaged in trade as far as India, Baluchistan, Zanzibar, and Yemen. Finally, Kuwait is attached to *Basra Mutasarrıflığı*, and ʿAbd Allāh is the *Ḳāimmaḳām,* and since the country has no income or expenditure on behalf of the district governor, and the whole country lives like a family, there is no need for police and guards apart from the *Ḳāimmaḳām* himself.

Then Pasha moves on to describe the beaches of al-Ḳaṭīf. Midhat Pasha says that the forces have landed at Raʾs al-Tannūra, as it is deep enough for large ships to dock. He counts the forts of Dammam, Anak, Darin and Tarut (an island) within the limits of the town of al-Ḳaṭīf. However, he points out that small boats are used to reached from Raʾs al-Tannūra to al-Ḳaṭīf and this is quite a difficult task due to ebb and flow between the two points. It is noteworthy that he does not want to use the land route. Midhat Pasha speaks of al-Ḳaṭīf in a tone that is evidently uncomfortable because the climate is too hot. In addition, the pier is not at a suitable depth for the berthing of large ships. Therefore, Raʾs al-Tannūra will be the most suitable pier for all material sent from Iraq. The water problem will be met from the ʿAyn al-Raḥīm spring, which is very close, and water will be obtained from the sea by purchasing a water machine. It was also decided to build a coal and ammunition warehouse and guard rooms. Apart from this, since malaria is common due to the heat and humidity, it was deemed appropriate for the soldiers to have shifts from Basra for change of air and some of them are placed in the high places like Yadrānī, in wards made of date trees. Here, he has an important firsthand observation about al-Ḳaṭīf: Since its population is largely of Shia, they have been subjected to various kinds of persecution from the Wahhābīs; all the houses and shops were deliberately and regularly demolished, leaving no buildings left behind. However, with the arrival of the Ottoman forces, life was revived, and the townspeople were very happy about it.

On the other hand, according to the Pasha's statement, while the place known as *Sâhil-i Zahran* between Ujjayr and Dammam used to be a very well-watered and fertile area, which was full of date trees and agricultural fields, now with the Wahhābis everything in the name of civic life and agriculture was destroyed and it was used as camel grazing land. However, it has always been a problem for the Wahhābis to have Bedouin elements among themselves, which is overlooked here, and they have always been seen as an element of uncanny due to their fondness for looting and killing.[987] Similarly, the presence of Bedouins in Ujjayr also poses a problem for the Pasha. He is uncomfortable with the presence of Banū Hajar tribe here; they must either be resettled and sedentarized or expelled. Only then will the administrative organization of the region be shaped. A similar policy of sedentarization would be implemented by Ibn Saʿūd himself from the second decade of the twentieth century. Because civilization for both sides is, first, safety and security, and the Bedouins are an obstacle for civilization.

Midhat Pasha gives detailed information about the Ujjayr *iskelesi*. Since the pier is not deep enough, it is not suitable for large ships to berth, so large ships had to stop and wait in the Ujjayr Strait and the pier can only be reached by smaller boats. On the other hand, since there is a water source in a place called *Beriman* between al-Aḥsāʾ and Ujjayr, a castle should be built there, according to Pasha. Thus, security was ensured against the al-Ajman and al-Murre tribes, who were constantly looting in the al-Aḥsāʾ countryside. Here, he also mentions the establishment of a police station in a place called "Cefr karyesi". The important point for us is the aim of providing security between al-Hufuf-al-Mubarraz and Ujjayr. Because, as it is known, the center of the Najd *Mutasarrıflığı* will be al-Hufuf.

The presence of the Bedouin tribes in this region is interpreted as the failure of economic activities directly related to agriculture, and this is a very appropriate determination by the Pasha. He states that all the surrounding villages of al-Hufuf and al-Mubarraz, who were constantly attacked by the Bedouins, were surrounded by walls. On the other hand, these places are full of date palm fields, which are very well

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[987] Michael Crawford, "Civil War", 101; al-Fahad, "The 'Imāma vs. the 'Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saʿūdī State," 46.

watered by the local natural water springs, so much so that dates are the main food source for all life in the region.

However, Midhat Pasha also provides important information about *al-walāʾ wa'l-barāʾ* practice by the Wahhābis. Accordingly, he writes, "Hufuf ve Müberrez kasabaları, ehâlisinin içinde Vehhâbî mezhebinde olanlardan hizmet ve me'mûriyette bulunanlar Faysal familyasının oralardan kalkmasiyle bi't-tabi oralardan çekilüb…" What he is basically saying that the Wahhābī bureaucracy left there following the ouster of their Imām, since now the region is not truly Muslim, which makes incumbent upon them to leave, to rupture from the infidels. Therefore, the population of the region is now largely consisted of Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī and Mālikī elements, and there are also a small number of Shiites. The main livelihood of the region is rice farming as well as dates. Annual date yield should be at least four or five thousand *akça*. Therefore, according to the expectations of the Pasha, the people of the region should be quite wealthy. But reality is different: Three practices of the Wahhābis impoverished the region; a) Excessive taxation of the sedentarized elements: "Abdullah el-Faysal ile Suûd zemanlarında Vehhâbî mezhebinde olanlardan maadasının zıraat ve hâsılâtından öşür yerine hıms ve sülüs ve nısf derecesinde âidat alındığından başka…" b) Confiscation: "Her kimin yeddine bir güzel esb ve kısrak veyâhud her kimin hânesinde işe yarayacak bir kilim bulunur ise ellerinden alınmak…" c) Spoil and plunder by the Badu: "Bir taraftan bedevî aşâir ve kabâile yağma ve gâret etdirilmek misillü mezâlim ve taaddiyât ile hem memleket tahrîb ve hem de ehâli tenfir edilmiş…" Therefore, the lands that were used for agriculture are now empty and pushed out of the economic structure. According to Midhat Pasha, the local people were very pleased with the liberation of these places from the attacks of the Saʿūdī family (or *Suud familyası*) and Bedouin tribes.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, malaria was very common as the region was humid and scorching hot. That's why Midhat Pasha gives importance to the castles on high places; because these places provide change of air for the soldiers since they are cool and fresh air wise. Hizâm and al-Mubarraz castles can be given as examples to those high places.

Apart from this, it is noted that if the al-Dhafra is cleared of Bedouins (al-Ajman and al-Murra) and the al-Riyāḍ and Oman direction of Hufuf are opened to agriculture,

there will be demand, since these lands can be watered by a water spring called *Deliciye*, three hours from al-Hufuf. Therefore, a fortress is needed again for security. On the other hand, al-Hufuf and its surroundings can be irrigated with the *Ümmü Seb'a* (Umm Sab'ah) spring located to the north of al-Hufuf, which will provide significant agricultural returns. Therefore, it was also deemed appropriate by the Pasha to build a castle there. Finally, it was found appropriate to build a military hospital between Hizâm and *Deliciye*.

Midhat Pasha knows the vitality of transportation between al-Ḳaṭīf and al-Hufuf. Therefore, he decided to build towers in places with water sources (like Salama, Buqra, Abu'l-Hammâm, and Kenazan) to ensure their safety and to keep around twenty soldiers on guard.

Al-Ḳaṭīf and its subordinates Saihat, Tarut and Safva are filled with lands on which dates are cultivated and well-watered. These, however, became idle and desolate with the spoil of Badu and *Suûd familyası*. In addition, water resources are wasted and are not used for irrigation, as Midhat Pasha points out. In the meantime, while the people first heard that the Saʿūds, either Saʿūd of ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal, would return and thus were very afraid of this, but they were relieved to learn that the Ottoman soldiers were permanent there and started to trust the region, according to the Pasha's report. Dates are also the most important source of income in al-Ḳaṭīf. However, pearl hunting and fishing have also been an important source of income. Nevertheless, while the people fled from al-Ḳaṭīf because of the Saʿūdīs, they are now returning, thus the commercial life is reviving again.

After that, the Pasha makes perhaps the most crucial observation on the social, economic, and political condition of Arabia: It is not possible for Inner Arabia to exist without al-Aḥsāʾ. Although a small number of dates are grown in Inner Arabia, where water is scarce, the main source of nutrition is dates and rice supplied from al-Aḥsāʾ. Therefore, in the eyes of the people of Najd, al-Aḥsāʾ is a sort of granary: "Necid ehâlilerine dahi buraları anbar hükmünde olmasiyle…" Therefore, al-Aḥsāʾ should be protected and fortified with castles and towers and should be kept under constant surveillance. Because in this way, Najd will remain under Ottoman rule, even if it is not occupied directly. As can be seen "emniyet ve asâyiş" is not an end in itself, it is the key to sovereignty of Arabia, according to the Pasha. In the final analysis, whoever

holds al-Aḥsāʾ will automatically hold Najd as well. “Ahsa ve Katif ve Katar kıt’aları ve kal’aları ne tarafda ve kangı idarede bulunur ise Necid kıt’asının ve meskûn ve gayr-i meskûn ehâlisinin oraya tab’iyyet ve irtibâtı umur-ı tabîiyye ve zarûriyyeden bulunur.” This finding greatly reduces the cost of military intervention in the region since there would not remain need to make a campaign into the heartland of Arabia. However, in the long run, this determination will also enable the Wahhābis to survive in the isolation of central Arabia. Because the Ottomans never organized a military expedition to al-Riyāḍ and its surroundings.

Finally, since al-Aḥsāʾ has hitherto been devastated by intense exploitation, only one tenth of tax should be levied from now on, and only a fortieth tax from animal owners, who are simply Badu. Midhat Pasha surrenders Faisal's rights here, and, in fact, acknowledges his fair administration, but blames the fight for the throne between his two sons for the exploitation. If a just administration is established in this way, according to the Pasha, the revenues of the region will rise from seven thousand purses to over ten thousand purses.

In his next document, Midhat Pasha summarizes the new regulations to be implemented in the region under ten headings. Here it is seen appropriate to see the summary of these articles since they will provide the reader with a concrete knowledge about the Tanzimāt in its context.

First, the countries of al-Aḥsāʾ, al-Ḳaṭīf, Qatar and Najd will be united and thus the *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* will be established. Al-Hufuf will be the administrative center. There will be an accountant (*beytü’l-mâl müdîri*) and a deputy to the *Mutasarrıf*. An administrative council (*meclis-i idâre*) and a court of appeal (*temyiz-i hukuk*) will be established, and the necessary bureaucrats will thus be appointed. In addition, Qatar, al-Mubarraz and al-Ḳaṭīf are now turned into *qaḍā*s, with their own *ḳāimmakāms*, al-Hufuf being the center of administration again. On the other hand, the administration of Qatar will be left to its own shaykh. Apart from this, two correspondence officers who knows Arabic and Turkish will be assigned to the *qaḍā*s.

Similarly, *qaḍā*s will also have an administrative counsel, and a counsel of justice (*meclis-i deâvî*).[988]

Second, as in the past, a tithe[989] will be collected as tax from real estate, orchards and cultivated lands. A fortieth tax will be levied from the settled and nomadic people for their camels and animals.

Third, in al-Hufuf, al-Ḳaṭīf and al-Mubarraz, while there must have been a considerable amount of tax revenue due to fertile date cultivation, since these places are in ruins, the tax income is also very low. Therefore, a new method will be created: Cultivated lands, which will be owned by the state, will be taxed as a quarter in accordance with the method applied in Iraq. All the remaining products will return to the farmer, and three quarters will be collected in the name of the state from grains and other fruits. Apart from this, the date grove will be given to a farmer to be revived and cultivated, if the farmer revives and restores the land within seven years, then it will remain with the farmer, if not, then he will be ousted and someone else will take his place. If the land is completely empty and idle, then grain will be planted, half of the crop will belong to the farmer as revenue, and the other half to the state as tax in kind (*münâsafeten*). The same ratio will be applied for tree fruits. In short, as long as the farmer maintains and cultivates the land, he will keep it, otherwise it will be auctioned off. The farmer who cultivates the land will be given a bond in order not to be removed from there at any time.

Fourth, title deeds will be issued for all real estate and cultivated lands. For this, a land registry officer will be appointed from Baghdad.

Fifth, again, two types of title deeds will be given: a) For date groves and for cultivation lands. In this case, only the cost and registration tax will be charged. For lands to be sold by the state: By auction, at auction price, or for free but on the condition that it is cultivated. Apart from this, although it is desirable to give title deed, for those who do not want it there will be no coercion under any circumstances.

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[988] İ. DH., 646/44930.

[989] For the discussion that justice was not observed in the tithe by the Tanzimat elites, see Ömer L. Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi," in *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler 1* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 321–22.

Sixth, there are no mosque, masjid, and madrasa *waqf*s (pious foundations) in the region. However, it has been determined that although most of the existing date groves are idle and destroyed, they are connected to pious foundations, but this cannot be proven by any deed whatsoever. On the other hand, it is not appropriate for the state to collect their incomes as taxes, because the people claim that these places are pious foundations. Therefore, these incomes (*evkaf hâsılâtı*) will be paid as monthly salaries to the imams and muezzins, who are first to be registered to ledger accounts. The rest will be paid to madrasah and primary school teachers as a monthly salary, which will be decided and determined by the local administrative counsels. The expenses of school buildings will also be calculated and paid under the same item. Finally, an allowance will be made for the poor, and two schools, an industrial school (*mekteb-i sanayi*), and a correctional facility (*ıslahhâne*) will be built for them. Finally, charity houses will be established in towns for the poor. Because they also need training and discipline.

Seventh, a tithe will be collected from the land and seeds given to the villagers with the contract by the state, the amount remaining for trade will be registered in ledgers after the farmer's right is paid, and the appropriation of all zoning, development and construction works will be met from here. All these income and expense records kept in ledgers will be sent to the central province year by year.

Eighth, after deducting the expenses of camels and animals, which are state property, the remaining commercial income will be spent on places such as police stations and water wells, and other infrastructures, and detailed records will be kept in ledgers and sent to the central province.

Ninth, al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Ḳaṭīf's total income this year is about 30-35 loads. The yearly expenses of the officers and soldiers are as much as fifteen loads. Five loads of *gurûş* were allocated from the 1288 budget for the barracks in Hufuf and Katif, for construction of the coal and ammunition magazine in Raʾs al-Tannūra, the construction of maintenance expenses of the forts on al-Ujjayr and other roads, and government offices. Detailed records of all these will be kept and sent to the central province. The remainder of the revenues will also be sent to the central province.

Tenth, currently idle and empty lands are in fact very fertile. Therefore, these places need to be looked at and developed accordingly. It is also necessary to protect

these places against the attacks of the Bedouin tribes. However, according to Midhat Pasha, the Bedouin problem is not a problem that can be solved only by military and security measures. Therefore, the Bedouins in the region need to be sedentarized and resettled quickly. In addition, it is necessary to be moderate and fair towards the local people in order not to drive them away from the state.

As can be seen, Midhat Pasha is determined to implement all the infrastructure and superstructure requirements of the Tanzimāt in the region. Although safety and public order concerns rightfully come to the fore here, what is intended to be done is to build a modern state organization with all its institutions and bureaucracy, a concrete example of "a serious attempt to centralize and regularize taxation"[990] this time in the narrower context of al-Aḥsāʾ. First, the new agricultural policy foresees the registration of all agricultural activities and aims to bring the date groves back to trade by increasing irrigation opportunities, which, according to Pasha's personal observations, are quite a lot with the help of natural water springs. Apart from this, he not only oversees superstructure constructions such as roads, water wells, police stations, castles, piers, and government buildings, but also considers their budgets, officials and all income-expenditure balance with detailed records kept in the periphery and are sent to the central organization on yearly basis. Thus, it would not be wrong to point out that first time an official state memory is being created by keeping bureaucratical records in the region in such detail. In addition, by establishing administrative councils and the organization of justice, he strives to erase the Wahhābī ideological organization that maintains its existence in the region through Hanbali-Wahhābī qadis, who were appointed and sent from al-Riyāḍ and various other places which are held by the Wahhābī religious elite. Finally, Midhat Pasha determined for the first time in the history of the region that the Bedouin tribes be settled, which will be implemented on a much larger scale in future by Ibn Saʿūd himself.

Besides all these, Pasha determines the political fate of the western side of the Persian Gulf on a large scale. Especially in Kuwait and Qatar, the establishment of the Ottoman presence through local sheikhs ensured a relative balance between the

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[990] Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 75.

emirates in the region, which led to the emergence of the more powerful Emir type instead of the traditional shaykh figure.[991] This brought the diplomatic relations to a more formal and consistent level in the region with the role of the arbiter provided by the British, and especially ensured the commercial security at sea, which was the utmost goal of the British empire as well as the safety of sea routes to India. Here, as a final word on the fate of the region, Anscombe points out that "the coastal shaykhs could not have achieved before the First World War, had the Ottoman border remained near Basra. The political history of the Arabian coast in the twentieth century thus is the main Ottoman legacy to the Gulf today."[992] In short, the Ottoman presence in eastern Arabia between 1870 and 1913 had been a crucial period that cannot be reversed in terms of the political advances made in the region, except for Saʿūdī Arabia, which dramatically changed al-Aḥsāʾ since then.[993]

4.6.1. Withdrawal of the Ottoman Troops from al-Aḥsāʾ

The subject can be examined under two main headings: The political conflict between the Ottoman Pashas and governors and the idea of the burden of having a military unit in al-Aḥsāʾ became dominant in the center. Both titles will gradually undermine the Tanzimāt order established by Midhat Pasha in the region, and finally, in 1874, the military unit in the region was going to be withdrawn.

The first issue that affected the sequence of events was the dissension between Midhat Pasha and Mahmud Nedim Pasha. During his stay in Najd, Midhat Pasha was complained and journaled to the center by several officers in Baghdad, but when Pasha returned to Baghdad, he received the news and presented the necessary defense to the center, also stated that if these officers were not dismissed, then he would have to

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[991] Frederick Anscombe, "The Ottoman Role in the Gulf", 274.

[992] Ibid.

[993] Ibid.

resign from his post.[994] However, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was under the influence of Midhat Pasha's opponents, started to make pressures with the orders he sent to Baghdad, so Midhat Pasha finally resigned, and Rauf Paşa was appointed in his stead in May 1872, together with the marshalship of the Sixth Army.[995] This change will have a direct impact on the change in the political mentality and practices in the region and will hinder the implementation of the reforms, since now the first hand reformer has been alienated from the closest center to al-Aḥsāʾ and Najd.

Apart from this, during the office of Midhat Pasha, an offer was made – the idea was either of the Guardian of Medina or the Emir of Mecca – regarding the structural order of the province. Accordingly: Since the people of Jabal Shammar, Al-Qaṣīm, Unayza and Burayda are Sunnī and do not like Wahhābīs, and because the two roads from Medina to Najd are more convenient for travel (in terms of access to water and accommodation) than al-Aḥsāʾ, it is proposed to connect the administration of these places to Medina. In addition, according to the information provided by Halid Pasha, the Guardian of Medina, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, who now came to al-Riyāḍ, demanded taxes from the people. Thereupon, the tribes here declared that they would not pay him taxes unless he provided a guarantee from the government. According to the news of the Shaykh of Burayda to Medina, these tribes will be able to get rid of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal's hostile attitudes only if they are taken under the guarantee and protection of the government. On the other hand, Halid Pasha wrote that these places had already clearly shown their loyalty to the central government. After long discussions and delays, Istanbul finally decided on September 1, 1872, that the mentioned places should be separated from Necid Mutasarrıflığı and connected to Medina.[996] This new administrative restructuring caused Inner Arabia to separate from al-Aḥsāʾ administration, thus turning it into a smaller and a compact administrative area.

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[994] Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti*, 122.

[995] Ibid.

[996] Ibid., 123-124.

However, according to Kurşun's analysis, this was an administrative operation to narrow down the maneuverability of the Saʿūdī brothers.[997]

On the other hand, in fact, the biggest criticism and complaint against *Necid Mutasarrıflığı* was the claims that the military unit in the region caused a great expense, thus causing more of a fiscal damage than the income of the region. Rauf Pasha, who, pointing out to the civil war between the Saʿūdī brothers, argued that of the two Istanbul should support the one closest to the Porte, writes his opinions against the expenses of the military unit in Najd:[998]

> That ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal asked for help from the government against his brother who rebelled against his rule, and with the pretext that the English would help Saʿūd against his brother and thus be able to intervene in the region, the rule of Najd came to the Porte. Saʿūd's assault has been prevented by way of dispatching forces, and when the English intervention disappeared which was only a groundless fear in the first place, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, who came to the military forces, should have been honored, and given a battalion of gendarmerie, thus the forces which had been dispatched to al-Aḥsāʾ should have been withdrawn. Thus, there would be no need to constantly keep eight battalions of soldiers in the area at that much expense. But instead, both ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal have been discredited before the Padishah, and it has been declared that he was dismissed from *ḳāimmaḳāmlık*. Hence, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, who, feeling scared, have been wandering in the deserts, and eight battalions of soldiers have been lying idle in the coast of Najd. If it were to be told that these precautions have been taken to make income into the treasury, then, the title deed incomes of Najd amount merely to five to six thousand purses, the expenditure, on the other hand, amounts to several times more than that. If the cause of this maneuver is to provide development and civilization, then, after all those years and work that have been done not even ten percent of Iraq, where every sort of things in the name of safety and security is present, have so far been developed and built. While that much of reform is needed in Iraq, upon that now we have all been encumbered with the trouble of Najd. No benefit was gained from these attempts, and the losses that occurred among the soldiers due to exhaustion and the gravity of the region, although they do not fight, are astonishing to the minds.
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> Abd Allah should have been left as the *ḳāimmaḳām*, which was the right way of conduct, yet this was not done. Now that ʿAbd Allāh have not been taken in hand, it would seem impossible to withdraw the battalions. However, after coming here, during the shift of the battalions on the coast of Najd it was decided to decrease two battalions. The purpose of this was to gradually create a prelude to the withdrawal of all soldiers from here. Now, most of the soldiers in al-Ḳaṭīf,

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[997] Ibid., 124.

[998] Ibid., 126.

> where the weather is very dire, are sick.[999] Since there were three units of regular police (*zaptiye*) in Najd, regular soldiers shall be kept in Qatif, their administration shall be given to the police force. In addition, two battalions should be formed by adding five more police divisions, consisting of five hundred locals, to the existing three divisions. One of these battalions should be placed in the town of al-Ḳaṭīf, one division in the castles between al-Aḥsāʾ and Ujjayr, and three divisions in Hufuf and to some sub-districts. Thus, the other two battalions of regulars in al-Ḳaṭīf should be withdrawn to the center. Right after that ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal shall be invited warmly and following his appointment as the *ḳāimmaḳām* the rest of the battalions ought to be withdrawn. Thus, soldiers will have been spared from unbearable weather of al-Ḳaṭīf and Najd, and the treasure will have been spared from unnecessary expenditures.[1000]

As it can be seen, Rauf Pasha had a very negative view of the practices from his predecessor's time, and he does not hesitate to express these clearly. The plan he proposed was that of the Saʿūd brothers who were close to the Ottomans, which was ʿAbd Allāh b. Faisal, after being honored and given the administration of the region, is the withdrawal of Ottoman soldiers from the region. Especially the harsh conditions created by the climatic conditions on the Turkish soldiers are supported not only by the Ottoman archives, but also by the British archives. Malaria caused by humidity and extreme temperatures breaks the operational power of the military, and the expenses of transportation and army reach serious levels. Therefore, according to Rauf Pasha, it is not right to spend so much on Najd while an important province like Iraq is idle.

Kurşun conveys the two main concerns of the *Sadaret* here: First, if the troops withdraw, it may cause great harm to the security of the region and the view of the state in the eye of the local, so it is necessary to act cautiously. Second, if ʿAbd Allāh is re-appointed as *ḳāimmaḳām*, the problems that this will cause should be considered in advance.[1001] In short, Istanbul seems cautious for the time being. On the other hand, the Porte states that, after so much effort has been made to expel the Saʿūds from the

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[999] For similar comment from the side of Foreign Office see Appendix D.

[1000] Ibid., 127.

[1001] Ibid., 128.

region, the appointment of one of the two brothers as *ḳāimmaḳām* will not be well received by the local people who do not like the Wahhābīs, so it is necessary to find someone else. But if it is not possible to find such a person, then, and only then the appropriate one for the government can be appointed.[1002] Under these conditions, the permission of the soldiers to withdraw from the region was sent to the governor on November 24, 1873, the district governor was appointed to Shaykh Bazīʿ ibn Urayʿir, a member of the Banū Khālid family, was appointed as the Necid *Ḳāimmaḳāmı*, and the Ottoman forces withdrew from the region in February 1874.[1003] The reaction of the Saʿūdīs would be quite harsh.

The withdrawal of the troops from the region would cause the Saʿūd contenders to dare again, as Kurşun points out.[1004] ʿAbd al-Rahman, the youngest son of deceased Faisal and brother of Saʿūd, was released from Baghdad, where he was held hostage, and came directly to al-Aḥsāʾ, where he made a bloody massacre with thousands of men he gathered from the tribes of al-Ajman[1005], al-Murrah and Banū Hajar, and according to Kurşun the massacre lasted for forty days and at least one thousand locals and state officials, including soldiers.[1006] The rebellion, in the end, was suppressed by the Mutasarrıf of al-Muntafik, Nasir Pasha, routing ʿAbd al-Rahman, who fled to al-Riyāḍ, to his brother Saʿūd. Saʿūd, however, died in 1875, and first ʿAbd al-Rahman took his place, only to abdicate in the name of his big brother, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, who, thus, now have the rule of al-Riyāḍ and its surroundings once again up until 1889.

The security and public order concerns, *emniyet ve asâyiş*, which were frequently expressed by Midhat Pasha, became concrete with the resignation of the

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[1002] Ibid.

[1003] Ibid., 129.

[1004] Ibid.

[1005] Throughout the entire civil war, Saʿūd received support from the Ajman tribe, so much so that his brother ʿAbd Allāh thought that the Ahsa campaign was organized against the Ajman, see Kurşun, "Basra Körfezi'nde Bir Arap Aşireti: Acman Urbanı (1820-1913)," 136.

[1006] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti*, 129.

Pasha, and proved that the region could only be held by militarily, otherwise the state sovereignty could only exist in name. The newly appointed names are both people who did not fully understand the Tanzimat's ideals such as centralization and direct administration and are far from being action figures like Midhat Pasha. Thus, the ideal of direct government in the region, which was already fragile due to reasons such as geography, transportation, and climate, has been severely disrupted. Although the district governors of Najd will be appointed from the Porte from now on,[1007] the political balance of the region will still be determined by the conflicts between the local dynasties and tribes. It would not be wrong to say that Arabia is now a stage that opens to the power struggle of the three main power centers step by step: the Ḥijāz, Hail, and al-Riyāḍ. Foreign interventions and aids will determine who will prevail.

4.7. Foreign Intervention and a Changing Map

ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal's rule was quite shaky, as seen from the title above. Before 1876 his rule had been interrupted several times because of the incessant civil war between him and his half-brother Saʿūd. Even after the death of Saʿūd, he would not feel, since Saʿūd's sons, and his nephews, Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿūd, despite being not old enough, were present. Doughty describes Saʿūd and his sons in the same mirror of thoughts:

> It was not in Saûd's destiny that he should live out half his age. The fatal Waháby sat Ruler two years in er-Riâth, and deceased: it is believed that he died of an old malady. The people say of Saûd, "He was not a good man: all his heart was set upon spoiling and reaving." Abdallah, being thus restored to his dignity, spared the young sons of Saûd, and suffered them to dwell still at er-Riâth. I heard, a year later, that they had rebelled against him.[1008]

The Wahhābī throne did not come easily either. He had to fight against his other half-brother ʿAbd al-Rahman, the father of the legendary founder of the third state, King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz bin ʿAbd al-Rahman. It seems that to avoid yet another bloody

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[1007] Ibid., 130.

[1008] Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:426.

civil war, the younger one, ʿAbd al-Rahman abdicated, and in 1876, ʿAbd Allāh, entering the third time al-Riyāḍ, became the leader of the Wahhābīs. Since the death of Faisal ibn Turkī, only eleven years ago, this was the eighth change in the Wahhābī throne.[1009] Ibn ʿĪsā mentions a bloody skirmish which took place in 1876 between the forces of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal and ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Faisal, counting the polarization of the Badu tribes; apparently, while Muḥammad ibn Faisal, the brother of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal and his commander-in-chief, was supported by ʿUtaybah, ʿAbd al-Rahman was with "the people of al-Riyāḍ, al-Kharj, al-Ajman ve al-Dawāsir, also with al-Mutayr and Subayʿah, together with the sons of Saʿūd."[1010] Although ʿAbd Allāh's forces was defeated, in time, in really short amount of time, the two brothers came together against the joint threat of their nephews; who were finally sieged in al-Riyāḍ and had to flee, seeing the new loyalist front joined forces in the persons of three brothers, ʿAbd Allāh, Muḥammad, and ʿAbd al-Rahman, all are ibn Faisal.[1011] According to Lorimer, the British residents in Bushehr and Bahrain did not intervene in the Saʿūdī civil war, during the short reign of ʿAbd al-Rahman, even though he sent letters to them, letting them know that now he is the ruler of al-Riyāḍ.[1012] The British policy of non-intervention in the chaotic issues of Inner Arabia was still in effect, since it was too early to pick a side in the big game of Arabia.

However, joining his cause with his uncle ʿAbd al-Rahman, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd, another son of the deceased Saʿūd, stormed al-Aḥsāʾ in 1878, captured Dammam and sieged al-Ḳaṭīf, only to be defeated by the remaining Turkish force,[1013] and fled to Bahrain. A British royal ship named "Vulture", according to Lorimer,

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[1009] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 263.

[1010] Ibn ʿĪsā, *ʿIqd Al-Durar* (Riyadh: al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Saudiyya, 1999), 94.

[1011] R. B. Winder, ibid., 263.

[1012] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1134; R. B. Winder, ibid., 262.

[1013] BOA., DH. MKT., 1330/29.

helped lift the siege in al-Ḳaṭīf, relieved the Turkish force there.[1014] The British, under the sanction of the mentioned non-intervention policy, did not show the Saʿūd brothers favors.[1015]

The challenge to the Wahhābī throne showed itself two times again in the persons of, first Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd, the eldest son of the Saʿūd ibn Faisal, against his uncle in 1879, who in the end taken prisoner by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, who, however, did not keep him long under lock. Apparently, as it seems, to be able to curb at least some of the hostilities and jealousy among the nephews against himself, and, perhaps for the good of the Wahhābī rule in al-Riyāḍ, the power was split into two; while ʿAbd Allāh, with his two brothers ʿAbd al-Rahman and Muḥammad ruled in al-Riyāḍ, including al-ʿArīḍ, Sudayr and Washm, Saʿūd's son's, with the consent of their uncle, was going to rule in Kharj, Hautah, Harīq and Aflaj, together with the al-Ajman, al-Murrah and al-Dawāsir tribes.[1016] The second contender was one of the sons of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Thunayyān, ʿAbd Allāh, who had been in Constantinople, and was demanding the inheritance right over Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ from the Porte with the promise of loyalty. He made some important interviews with several British residents and the Ambassador at Constantinople, trying to convince him the goods which the Turks and British would have should he be appointed to the rule of Najd and Hasa. However, as Lorimer conveys, following his arrival in Constantinople in August 1880, he was lost to the pages of history and disappeared to the thin air.[1017]

On the other hand, Baron Nolde made the most correct interpretation of nineteenth-century Arabia: Political Fragmentation. This observation was now going to become concrete in the political struggle between two families of Arabia: the

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[1014] R. B. Winder, ibid., 263.

[1015] Ibid.

[1016] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1134-35.

[1017] Ibid., 1:1135; R. B. Winder, ibid., 266.

Rashidis of Hail, with their tribal ties to the Shammar Bedouins, roaming between Iraq, the banks of Euphrates, Syrian and the Hijazi borders, and the Saʿūdīs, who, by and large, trapped into al-ʿArīḍ and its surroundings, since the Turkish operation in al-Aḥsāʾ. Due to the nature of things, Najd was once again stuck in central Arabia; but this time the pressure was coming not only from the east but also from the north. Apparently, there is a rule at work in Arabia: If your opponent is weak, even if not your enemy, you can take his land. Ibn Rashīd, a cunning warrior and state maker as it seems, knew, and grasped the rule of Arabia. Lorimer tells us that it all started with an expedition of the Amir of Jabal Shammar in 1877 against the ʿUtaibah tribe, who were one of the vassal tribes of the Wahhābīs, and following this, the Amir of Hail started to subdue al-Qaṣīm and Sudayr districts, obviously again, another Wahhābī territories. Then came the towns of Burayda and Majmaʿa; Unayza, however, was resisting against the northern conqueror.[1018] R. B. Winder, on the other hand, provides the reader with some more detail into the historical narrative, and resembles the political factions and struggle in Al-Qaṣīm , between Burayda and Unayza to a cold war, in which the Hail supported Burayda, while the southern town was supported by the Saʿūds, in the hope of enlarging their territory to north.[1019] In an order sent to the Governor of Jeddah from *Sadâret* in 1851, he was cautioned that the Shaykhs of al-Qaṣīm and Burayda should be attracted to the Sublime Ottoman State.[1020] Otherwise, it must have been understood that they would not be able to resist the dominant powers of the region, a direct intervention, however, would take place as late as 1905.

The Wahhābī Imām, tried to retaliate in 1882 to take al-Qaṣīm and Sudayr district again from the Amir of Hail, his forces, however, were not successful and had to return to al-Riyāḍ. Then, ʿAbd Allāh b. Faisal intercepted some correspondence between Ibn Rashīd and his nephews, trying to persuade them either to join him, or at

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[1018] J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1136.

[1019] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 264-265.

[1020] BOA., MKT. MHM., 35/95.

least stay neutral in case of a possible skirmish between him and ʿAbd Allāh, upon which ʿAbd Allāh resigned from his post only to stay as the Imām, and appointed Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd as the commander-in-chief of the Wahhābī forces. The war between the two sides continued in this way until 1885, and at that time Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd knew to get a fracture from Burayda.[1021] R. B. Winder, on the other hand, points out to a negotiation between Ibn Rashīd and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal in October 1884, and finally amicable relations was established.[1022] The nephew of ʿAbd Allāh, however, this time intercepted some other correspondence of his uncle, apparently plotting against himself and waiting for his death on the battlefield at the hands of the Ibn Rashīd; such a way to rid of a notorious nephew to get away with the crime of murder. Upon learning this Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd immediately left the campaign against the north and returned to al-Riyāḍ.[1023] After that, the Arabian map would change color in favor of Ibn Rashīd until the end of the century.

Ibn Rashid's upper hand, to some extent, was due to a new military marvel, which probably provided by the Ottoman side, as well as the British. Ottoman archival material describes it simply "Martini iğneli tüfekleri".[1024] While the Ottoman forces operating in the region was equipped with this new weapon, Martini and Martini-Henry rifles, which was in production up until 1889, and used by various military forces around the world until the initial years of the nineteenth century. Since these had single-shot breech loading mechanism, loaded with a self-contained cartridge which is fired by a needle inside the chamber, hence the name of the gun, a well-trained regular infantry soldier could fire it up to twenty times in a minute, while an old muzzle loading flintlock rifle could be fired only once in sixty seconds. It was this new weapon which gave a tremendous amount of unrivalled fire power, despite being

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[1021] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1:1136.

[1022] R. B. Winder, ibid., 270.

[1023] J. G. Lorimer, ibid.

[1024] See Appendix C.

effective only in a ninety-meter range, it had a devastating firepower and muzzle velocity. As it turned out, the Saʿūds did not have much of this weapon, and this was probably the reason why they were often defeated when they encountered the Ottomans or the Rashidis.[1025]

Meanwhile, it is known that the sons of Saʿūd, Muḥammad and ʿAbd Allāh visited Bahrain in 1886. But the course of things changed dramatically in autumn of 1887: ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal was sieged by his nephews in al-Riyāḍ, and, following a short resistance, the town surrendered to Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd. ʿAbd Allāh was imprisoned by the new owners of the Wahhābī throne.[1026] He, however, promptly appealed to Ibn Rashīd that was in Hail, who responded in no time, and marched against al-Riyāḍ during the closing days of the same year.[1027]

> …And marched upon them the Amir Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Rashīd from Hail with his army and descended outside the town of al-Riyāḍ. And the leaders of the people of al-Riyāḍ came out to welcome him and they reconciled that the sons of Saʿūd would go out of al-ʿArīḍ to al-Kharj. Thus, the sons of Saʿūd went out from al-Riyāḍ to al-Kharj. Amir Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Rashīd took al-Riyāḍ, and appointed Sālim al-Subhān to it [as his] deputy. Then he returned to Hail and took ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal with him.[1028]

During this time, two main political elements can be said to have embarked on a concrete enlargement policy in Arabia if we put the Ḥijāz aside at least until the beginning of the First World War. It seems that both sides wanted to dominate the two

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[1025] Baron Nolde points out to Ibn Rashid's fondness to breech-loaders: "Apart from the camp of the allies, many thousands of horses and the like, over 12,000 guns also fell to Ibn Rashīd as booty on this occasion. To him, who in this respect values nothing but military breech-loaders of the best construction, these rifles naturally seemed too bad to keep, and he handed them over, along with some other booty, to his allies, the Harbs. So that this circumstance afterwards formed one of the latest complaints against him by the Turks since they asserted that the Amir had actually re-armed the Harbs for their attacks on the pilgrimages." See Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 75; James W. Fiscus, "Gun Running in Arabia: The Introduction of Modern Arms to the Peninsula, 1880-1914" (MA, Portland State University, 1987), 25.

[1026] Ibn ʿIsā, *ʿIqd al-Durar*, 112.

[1027] R. B. Winder, ibid., 270; J. G. Lorimer, ibid., 1:1137.

[1028] Ibn ʿIsā, ibid., 112.

cities of al-Qaṣīm, whose commercial income must have been attractive. However, it should not be forgotten that throughout this struggle, Ibn Rashīd always kept the Ottoman support alive by frequently repeating that he was fighting on behalf of the Istanbul government,[1029] in the name of Abdulhamid II, to be precise. Therefore, this situation was both welcomed by Istanbul, and, in the meantime, it was thought that it was necessary to be cautious against Ibn Rashīd, who was now constantly getting stronger. If we continue in the light of this observation, the analysis of events will be more consistent.

Thus, Ibn Rashīd entered al-Riyāḍ in 1888, and saved the imprisoned Imām, took him with himself to Hail, and appointed his own representative in his stead. When ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Faisal asked what his intention was regarding the town and the siege, his answer was to the same effect. He simply wanted to help ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, yet as his guest in Hail.[1030] At this point Ibn ʿĪsā does not beat around the bush and let us know that:

> During the first days of *Dhu'l-Hijja* of the same year (August 1887) the three sons of Ibn Saʿūd, that are Muḥammad, Saʿd, and ʿAbd Allāh were killed by Sālim al-Subhān. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd, however, rode from al-Kharj to Hail one day before that. Thus, Amir Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Rashīd ordered him to stay his side in Hail.[1031]

Ibn Rashīd never admitted that he had a share in this incident. He, in fact, denied any involvement. An archive material, on the other hand, has a very different opinion about Ibn Rashīd and his motivation:

> Suûd el-Faysal'ın oğulları geçen sene Riyad üzerine hücûm ve mahal-i mezkûru amcaları Abdullah el-Faysal'dan zabtla merkûmu yanlarında habseylemeleri üzerine … Cebelü Şammâr reisi Muhammed b. Reşid yigirmi binden mütecâviz cemaatle üzerilerine giderek orasını zabt ile evlad-ı Suûd'ı tard ve ihrâc ve tarafından Riyad'a bir vekil vaz'ı ve merkûm Abdullah'a istishâb ile mahaline avdet etmiş idi. Vekil-i merkûmdan Necid Mutasarrıflığına gelüb ber sûret-i taraf-ı çâkeriye gönderilen tahriratda Muhammed ve Abdullah ve Suud ve Abdü'l-Aziz namlarında olan dört nefer evlâd-ı Suûd'un üzerlerine yürüyerek

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[1029] BOA., DH. MKT., 1498/74: "… ve bu harekâtın Devlet-i Aliyye'ye sadakatinden ilerü geldiğinden…"

[1030] R. B. Winder, ibid., 271.

[1031] Ibn ʿĪsā, ibid., 112.

> merkûmları katlettiği ve sebeb-i katlleri ise a'mâl-i fesadden hâlî kalmamaları idüğü gösteriliyor ise de sebeb-i sahîhi tevsî-i dâire-i mülk ve idâre kaziyesi olûb binâen aleyh Necid Kıt'ası el-yevm İbn Reşîd'in nüfûz ve kuvveti dahilinde…[1032]

When Ibn Rashīd told what happened to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, he said they had it coming. Either this or that, it is known that by these murders Ibn Rashīd got his hold on the central Arabia a better grip. In fact, as Winder reports, let alone this event to keep Faisal away from Subhān, in January 1889 his brother ʿAbd al-Rahman was riding with him on the shores of Oman on behalf of Qāsim ibn Thānī, the Shaykh of Qatar.[1033] Lorimer also states that these murders were probably ʿAbd Allāh's idea.[1034]

ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal, now on the verge of death, probably due to dropsy, asked permission to return his hometown, al-Riyāḍ. Ibn Rashīd gave the permission, but this time only to be as his representative in the Wahhābī throne, or simply as the governor. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faisal thus went back home, to die in third day of his arrival, in November 1889.[1035] Ibn ʿĪsā briefly narrates his death under the year 1307 as follows:

In the year 1307 of Hegira died Turkī bin ʿAbd Allāh bin Faisal at Hail, may the Lord bless him. In the *Rabīʿ al-Awwal* of this year ʿAbd Allāh bin Faisal and his brother ʿAbd al-Rahman bin Faisal left Hail to al-Riyāḍ. By then ʿAbd Allāh was ill. And when they arrived in al-Riyāḍ his illness worsened, and he died two days later. This was on the eighth day of *Rabīʿ al-Thānī* of the same year (2 December 1889), may Allah's mercy upon him.[1036]

Philby makes a rather harsh but appropriate comment on his life and power:

[1032] BOA., DH. ŞFR., 137/15.

[1033] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, 273.

[1034] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*., 1:1138.

[1035] R. B. Winder, ibid., 273.

[1036] Ibn ʿIsā, ibid., 112-113.

> It was twenty-four years since he had succeeded his distinguished father as the lawful monarch of a realm extending from Jabal Shammar to the ‘Umman hinterland, and from the Persian Gulf to the Ḥijāz and Yemen Borders. His incompetence had dissipated this vast heritage; and he had not hesitated to call in foreign aid to prop up his tottering throne, with the result that strangers had annexed the districts they had come to save. Little remained to him but his home district of al-Arid, and quite nominal sovereignty over Washm and Sudair, when he was carried off to Haïl to eke out his last years in exile. He had spent no less than one third of his reign as a homeless fugitive, while others ruled in his stead at the centre of a disintegrating realm. By all accounts a man of charm and urbanity, he stands convicted by his record of an utter lack of wisdom. He must have been nearly seventy at the time of his death. It fell to his younger brother, ʿAbd al-Rahman, then nearly forty, to preside over the obsequies of his father’s empire.[1037]

What happened next would produce the greatest polarization in Arabian history since the time of the Prophet. The two merchant cities of al-Qaṣīm, Unayza and Burayda, whose place was shrinking in Hail's political sphere of influence, saw Ibn Rashīd as a threat to their independence. Inevitably, this put them directly on the same front as ʿAbd al-Rahman, to which ʿUtaybah and Mutayr tribes were going to be attached, who were also hostile to the Shammar confederation. Thus, the first front was formed against the threat of Hail. Lorimer, who describes it also as “universal hatred of Shammar tyranny”, and R. B. Winder names these two sides consecutively as “the confederation against Ibn Rashīd”[1038] and “anti-Rashidī confederation.”[1039] Al Rasheed also points out that the tribes actually came together to prevent Ibn Rashīd from descending to the south, which is, thus, a crystallization of the tribal alliances, in her analysis.[1040] Ibn Rashīd, on the other hand, had Zafir, Harb, and Muntafik on his side, apart from the Shammar contingents. Sources recorded that the war spanned two

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[1037] H. St. John Philby, *Saudi Arabia* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), 232; R. B. Winder, ibid., 273-274.

[1038] J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*., 1:1139.

[1039] R. B. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*., 276.

[1040] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis*, 153.

months, taking place between December and January 1891. It was fought on a plain called Mulaidah, thirty kilometers west of Burayda; right in between today's al-Qar'a, al-Shihiyah, and al-Bukayriyah. First to lose, Ibn Rashīd was able to turn the tide of the war in his favor with a very cool but also a murderous tactic, which cost lives of thousands of camels; the details of which is narrated by Winder, and not our concern here.[1041] Two princes on the side of al-Riyāḍ, Zamīl and his son of Unayza, perished, the rest fell into the Amir's captivity; Unayza and Burayda surrendered to Ibn Rashīd the same night, and soon the embassies also arrived, reporting to Ibn Rashīd the surrender of Raʾs, Shaqra and al-Riyāḍ and asking him to follow his orders or to send deputies there.[1042] His victory over the Al-Qaṣīm ī confederation was decisive, and it literally ended the nominal Saʿūdī rule in the central Arabia. ʿAbd al-Rahman, once again, in an opportunity to gain control of al-Riyāḍ and Kharj made a surprise attack, to no avail, which paved the way for Ibn Rashīd to raze al-Riyāḍ to the ground. From Baron Nolde:

> As a result of these events, the whole of inner Arabia lay at the feet of Ibn Rashīd. He chose Buraydah as his camp, and from there he arranged all the new circumstances as he pleased. However, one incident occurred. ʿAbd al-Rahman, one of the captives of Ibn Saʿūd, escaped safely from Ibn Rashid's camp to al-Riyāḍ, and was there proclaimed prince, on which occasion Ibn Rashid's officials were imprisoned. This trick, however, ended just as quickly and miserably as it had been thoughtlessly begun. In a few hasty marches, Ibn Rashīd from Buraydah reappeared before the gates of the unfortunate al-Riyāḍ, which now had to surrender to this enemy at mercy for the fourth time. ʿAbd al-Rahman escaped to the Turks at Hasa, but al-Riyāḍ had to pay heavily for his fickleness this time. The old castle of al-Riyāḍ was razed to ground, and all the city's inhabitants had to work hard to dismantle their own fortifications.[1043]

Ibn ʿĪsā summarizes what happened under the year 1309 as follows:

> In 1309 came ʿAbd al-Rahman bin Faisal, Ibrāhīm el-Muhannā al-Sālih Abā al-Khail (the governor of Buraydah) came together with a great army. They marched against the town of al-Dilam, and they captured it, forcing the servants of Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh bin Rashīd out of it. Then from there they marched against al-Riyāḍ, and

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[1041] R. B. Winder, ibid., 277.

[1042] Baron Eduard Nolde, *Reise*, 75.

[1043] Ibid., 76.

> its ruler at that time was Muḥammad al-Faisal, so they entered the town without resistance. And thence they marched to al-Mahmal, and its ruler was Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Rashīd, who, when reached their path, came out of Hail with his army. He walked upon them, and they were at Huraymila. He defeated them. Many men died from their side, Ibrāhīm el-Muhannā being one of them. Then he marched to al-Riyāḍ. He ordered its walls be demolished, with its new and old palace. So, they demolished them.[1044]

Hogarth provides us with perhaps the most concise narrative and analysis of the great event:

> The younger Emirate of Jabal Shammar also began to attract foreign notice. Palgrave, who passed through Hail observed the solidarity of the great Shammār tribe and surmised that its vitality might overbear one day the heterogeneous group of oasis populations and small tribes in South Najd, whose only cement was a discredited sectarianism. The event justified him. A dozen years later the Rashīd throne was attained, amid the usual horrors, by one Muḥammad, who wiped the blood of kinsmen off his hands to become a ruler of force and capacity, rarely shown by Arabs. Renewing the politic friendship of his line with the Ottoman Power in Irak, he threw down a gage to his rival of Riyādh, who had been weakened by the Turkish occupation of Hasa. The comparative wealth of the Kasim towns, Buraydah and Unayza, which command the trans-peninsular trade-route from Kuwait to Hejaz, became the prize in dispute. Hail lies nearer to them than Riyādh, and since the Shammar are neighbours more formidable than any nomads who owe allegiance to the House of Saʿūd, Muḥammad al-Rashīd found little difficulty in establishing a dominating influence over al-Qaṣīm during the 'eighties. Having secured from its adhesion sufficient resources to buy over the Eastern Harb and the Mutair tribes, he brought the Saʿūd Amir, in 1891, to a decisive battle, the greatest in central Arabian history since the triumph of Islam. Prevailing he entered al-Riyāḍ, from which ʿAbd al-Rahman, the last of Faisal's sons, had fled; and Hail became the single capital of central Arabia from Jauf el-Amr to the Great South Desert.[1045]

As stated above, Ibn Rashīd is now the ruler of northern and central Arabia. His rapid growth and strong establishment of Rashidī dominance, however, will make Istanbul uneasy as well, and there will be concerns that this situation will turn into a new Wahhābī event in the future. The Ottoman archives openly points out to this concern, although Ibn Rashīd expresses his loyalty to Istanbul at every opportunity, it is thought that he will seek independence whenever he gets the suitable moment. The language used in the correspondence (from *Medîne-i Münevvere Muhafizlığı* to

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[1044] Ibn ʿIsā, *Iqd al-Durar*, 114-115

[1045] D. G. Hogarth, *Arabia* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922), 116.

Sadâret) is remarkable considering Ibn Rashid's claim that he was fighting on behalf of the Ottoman Empire:

> Cebel-i Şammar emiri Muhammed İbn Reşid tevsî-i diyâr sevdasiyle, aşâyir-i urbandan cem-i gafîr ile Kasim memleketi ehâlisi üzerine bi-gayri-hakkın hücûm ve iktihâm ile katl ve yağmaya ve oraları kâmilen zabt ve istilâ itmesiyle Medine-i Münevvere havâlisinde meskûn kâffe-i urban mûmâileyhin havf ve şerrinden kendisine ittibâ ve itaat ve inde'l-lüzûm muavenet iderek zekât namiyle virgü virmekde oldıklarından ve mûmâileyh İbn Reşid Bağdad vilâyeti hudûduna kadar aşâyir ve kabâil-i mevcûdeyi tahte hükmüne alarak el-yevm kılliyetlü asâkir cem'ine muktedir oldığı cihetle mûmâileyhin mişvâr ve harekâtı pek vahim göründüğünden bahisle icra-yı iktizâsı istirhâmını…[1046]

Zekeriya Kurşun also points out that II Abdulhamid frequently had Ibn Rashid's political position in Arabia and his ideological influence on the people of the region questioned through the commissions he established and requested detailed reports from local administrators about Ibn Rashid's military might and capabilities.[1047] Therefore, it is clear for the Ottoman *raison d'état* that the problem in the region was not completely resolved. This perception will cause another military intervention in al-Qaṣīm between 1905-1907. It seems that only a concrete military presence in the region could represent the Ottoman administration. Otherwise, Ottoman domination was only nominal and destined to be indirectly represented through local warlords, as history has shown.

Less than a hundred years after the first disaster, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābī capital would be wiped off the map once again. But the Saʿūdī dynasty, with all their will to survive, lived in the persons of ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Faisal and his son ʿAbd al-Azīz ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman, who, with a certain kind of idiosyncratic Homeric heroism, challenged the Rashidī dominance in Central Arabia, after a decade of exile in Kuwait. On the other hand, it is not known that they demanded and received a salary from the Ottomans during this ten-year exile period.[1048] As of 1902, a new period of civil war

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[1046] BOA., Y. MTV., 49/98.

[1047] Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti*, 141-143.

[1048] BOA., DH. MKT., 1961/23.

began in Arabia that would last for thirty years. We all know the result: The modern Kingdom of Saʿūdī Arabia.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

In the history of religions, before defining the religious phenomenon, it is necessary to determine what it is in its pure form, that is, the closest to its original form, that is, to distinguish its simplest qualities. This is, however, impossible for the historian of religion, since there is no such purified form that can be reached through historical, or even archeological evidence. What we have is the evolution of thoughts in time which inevitably turned into complicated organized hierarchical structures, which were able to protect merely few of its past, say in archives or in libraries. Mircea Eliade was right in saying that it is impossible to find the purest distilled drop.[1049] On the other hand, this determination is valid only for the scientist who has a distance from the object that he or she is working on. Believing is one thing, trying to know is another.

For the *man* of belief, the situation is totally different. For him the past can be known, and, in fact, it is known in an absolute certainty. The sacred text, again, in its absolute, final, authoritative form, represents the perfect past, a temporal period during which the glory of piety, in all its sincerity and anti-intellectualism, was experienced, yet by only a handful of men, apostles or disciples as they are generally called, never to be turned back again. Faith is simply lived, experienced from the heart, and transmitted. Nevertheless, as time passes, one moves away from the pure truth of the past, faith gradually loses its sterility, which puts salvation in danger. Then, time turns into a trap, a pitfall; the more time passes, the greater the chance of falling into it. Therefore, knowledge of the past had to be preserved at all costs, and kept away, pure from innovations, fabrications, and speculations of any form whatsoever.

[1049] Mircea Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions* (Paris: Payot, 1949), 1.

This is, I believe, what the Islamic orthodoxy have done through test of time, particularly Ḥanbalism, the most conservative of the four traditional schools of Islamic law. Accordingly, the belief is described in its pure form of tautology: Faith is faith. True believer simply believes in it. The tenet is, therefore, *bilā kayf*. If, however, one was to speculate, then, it can only be based on tradition. Otherwise, speculation is mere innovation. *Credo quia absurdum*, not as a Tertullianist, but simply as an Aristotelian way of procuring credibility. Let's not go off the path.

Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb followed this rigid and conservative tradition, as it seems, by heart and in all his sincerity. It is hardly surprising that he is inevitably a Hanbalī scholar. I make this comment perhaps even at the risk of falling into a teleology, but I take the risk. While his teaching is traditionalist in one aspect, it differs from tradition in another: That is ignoring the consensus. An ambivalent situation. Ambivalent because it leads into excommunication from the traditional community, yet, still ambivalent, since it is prone to create its own genuine community. This ambivalence is exactly what must have happened to our protagonist. He must have felt himself ethically responsible[1050] for the purification of the faith, still at least as much responsible to put his hand under the stone. He tested his limits three times in Basra, Huraymila, and almost finally in al-ʿUyayna. Even his own father, according to the Wahhābī chronicles, held his son's reins until his death in 1740. Only then did Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb fell himself free from the gerontocracy of Islamic culture, and commenced his proselytization, the *daʿwa* to *tawhīd*, the true meaning of which, according to him, exclusively is known by himself, the knowledge of which was put on his chest by Allah. This was almost a gnostic sort of knowledge that he did not need to have a formal Islamic scholarly – a scholastic – education. He simply knew, and everybody else had to comply with what he told. This is all the reason why he was labelled by his enemies as *Khārijī*, once again, apart from many differences that historical contingency built, only basic and superficial similarities.

His movement, on the other hand, has had many names, but for us it is simply a reform movement, which is a reasonable designation, and a common definition in the

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[1050] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 28.

literature on him. The Arabic equivalent is, with some linguistic push, *tasfiyah*, with some linguistic push, to purify. There has been many purificatory movements recorded in the history of religions, to name only some, one thinks of the reform of King Hezekiah, the Almohad Caliphate of Ibn Tūmart, Protestantism of Luther and Calvin,[1051] Kadızadelis of the seventeenth century Ottoman Constantinople, the Dulcinites of the thirteenth and fourteenth century Italy; even Christianity and Islam can be counted as purificatory movements since the former was a moralist reaction to legalistic Judaism, while the latter was a monotheist reaction to the Trinity of Christianity, to the Nicene Creed to be precise. All of these, however, must be studied and explained within their own historical contexts, in their own conceptual frameworks. What I did here, similarly, is to isolate Wahhābism, both geographically and ideologically, in its own context of central Arabia, together with the Saʿūds, inevitably, and to trace its historical development and change through time, needs and in the face of predators. Now, it is time to answer the questions I pointed out at the beginning of the study.

As understood in the research conducted, the experience of the Wahhābī teachings to survive on its own had failed at least three times, Basra, Ḥuraymilā, and al-ʿUyayna. Therefore, although Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's main goal was not to integrate into a political authority, which is doubtful due to the example of al-ʿUyayna,[1052] he had to flee to al-Dirʿiyya due to the danger of death he faced in the latter. In this respect, the Saʿūds became a haven for the founder of the movement. After that, especially considering the kinship relations established by marriage, there was not much option left for Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and his descendants other than the Saʿūds. Because the search for another protector would have reduced the movement both to a mere opportunism, and the effort to find another patron would have been a very risky undertaking, considering the movement's harsh understanding of Islam and anti-

[1051] Abdullah F. Alrebh, "A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia: Power, Authority, and Religion in a Muslim Society," *Sociology in Islam* 5 (2017): 279.

[1052] For a different view see Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 92.

establishment attitude. The secular power, in other words, was a must.[1053] In any case, such an effort has not been encountered in the chronicles, and the Wahhābī ulama have stood by the Saʿūds even in the most difficult times, such as the civil war that broke out during the 1860s. Mouline explains this dependence on a political authority in the process of "homogenization" in Najd.[1054] Today the two, *Āl Saʿūd* and *Āl al-Shaykh*, are inseparable, still providing mutual justification for each other.[1055]

The final point reached by this relationship is, therefore, inevitably a state formation. As pointed out, Najd, before the advent of the Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs, had not seen any state formation,[1056] except that of Banū'l-Ukhayḍir.[1057] Wahhābism made state formation possible for the Saʿūds.[1058] This is true in the full sense of the word because the Saʿūds collected taxes, appointed governors and *qadi*s, owned a treasury, and distributed salaries to their officials, especially to the clergy and proselytizers,[1059] and last but not the least, it is a historical fact that they recruited soldiers from the local population, regardless of sedentary or nomadic, almost at any time. But, as emphasized, this was not a state making in the secular and republican sense of the word, on the contrary it was, as pointed out by Crawford, building the regime of

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[1053] al-ʿUthaymīn, *Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works*, 149.

[1054] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 86.

[1055] Nabil Mouline, "Les Oulémas Du Palais: Parcours des Membres du Comité des Grands Oulémas," in *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, ed. Esther Peskes, vol. 2 (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 225–26.

[1056] Cook, "The Historians of Pre-Wahhābī Najd," 174.

[1057] al-Juhany, "The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs," 79–80.

[1058] Rosie Bsheer, *Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020), 2.

[1059] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 103.

Godliness.[1060] In this respect, if there was an aspiration in the name of state formation, this was the goal of the *Āl Saʿūd*, but only in the service of religious establishment and ideal, at least in theory. Finally, we should mention two points: First, if Saʿūdī-Wahhābism, with its political aspirations such as conquest and jihadism, is a state formation, it is by no means a nation building depending on, say, an Arab "nationhood", as emphasized by Crawford; the intention was a universalism[1061] in the Platonic sense of the word. Second, the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis, whose references are all to the Sunnī tradition as they understand it, have never claimed caliphate, according to Crawford. This is interesting, and in Crawford's analysis there are two reasons for this: According to the Sunnī view, the application of *sharia* constitutes the basis of legitimacy for the caliphate; Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, on the other hand, did not want to draw the anger of the Ottomans in this early and relatively weak period of his reform movement.[1062] However, according to Câbî Ömer Efendi, Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 1814) had his name written in a poem as "Saʿūd, the Caliph of Allah"[1063], which casts doubt on Crawford's observation.

However, it is not wrong to say that the ideological foundations of the political struggle between the Ottomans and the Saʿūds lie in their understanding and interpretation of Islamic faith. Both sides, after all, resorted to religious discourse to marginalize the other. While the Ottomans was largely part of a Sūfī oriented Ḥanafī structure with esoteric connotations, the Wahhābis of Najd was a literalist and an anti-Sūfī, thus an anti-esoteric, law centered religious organization who claim to have the sole authentic knowledge of the Islamic faith and dogma and based themselves on the

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[1060] Ibid., 92.

[1061] Ibid.

[1062] Ibid., 113.

[1063] Câbî Ömer Efendi, *Câbî Târihi*, 1:664.

Ḥanbalī tradition in jurisdiction, which is the most conservative of the law schools.[1064] Therefore, in such a historical baggage, it is not at all difficult for both movements to marginalize each other as infidels or representatives of true religion. The historical reality at hand also shows this. However, given the state-making argument, this inevitably puts the Saʿūdī-Wahhābis in a position to challenge the Ottoman authority, not in Najd though, but in when they attacked and captured the Ḥijāz, and the two holy cities. However, one way or the other, neither side did not hesitate to use religious and sectarian arguments against the other. At least in this respect, the significant part of the conflict lies on the basis of faith and its interpretation with a historical baggage, particularly in the name of the Hanbalī conservatism.

But is this enough to reduce Saʿūdī-Wahhābis to mere rebels in the Ottoman context? A possible answer to this question lies in the dichotomy between "useful Arabia" and *terra nullius*. From the four classical geographical regions, three can be counted as part of the useful Arabia: The Ḥijāz (Tihāma), al-Aḥsāʾ, and in the the south, Ḥaḍramawt and Oman. What makes them useful is simply their ties to the seas as gateways and the outer world by way of a lucrative trade network, besides agriculture and local trade networks. The Ḥijāz to both Egypt and the Ottoman center, Oman and Ḥaḍramawt to the Indian Ocean, and al-Aḥsāʾ to the Persian Gulf, and thence, again, to the Indian Ocean world.[1065] *Terra nullius*, on the other hand, means the place which no one claims, that is Najd. In other words, no one claimed it but the Saʿūds. This situation, including al-Aḥsāʾ from the seventeenth century on, had been going on and the Ottoman political presence in the region was at best nominal. Indeed, although Kurşun and Akyıldız mention a "Pax-Ottomana" in the region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they do not include Najd when counting the areas under Ottoman rule.[1066] It was this power vacuum which facilitated the Saʿūdī-

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[1064] For this discussion see Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 42; Jane Hathaway, "Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19, no. 1 (2004): 41.

[1065] Dresch, "Arabia to the End of the First World War," 134.

[1066] Ali Akyıldız and Zekeriya Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 4.

Wahhābis to establish a state formation. The geographical isolation of Najd, in addition, also facilitated and provided the political longevity of the Saʿūdī state in a considerable extent, apart from the numbers of the family. Because the difficulty of military intervention in their capitals, al-Dirʿiyya and al-Riyāḍ, was also expressed by the Ottoman governors who carried out operations in the region. Therefore, the Ottoman central administration was able to establish authority in the region only when a military intervention was organized, which was possible in 1871, more than thirty years following declaration of the Tanzimat Edict. Prior to this, direct intervention did not take place, and the issue was referred to local powers. Apart from these, however, what made Saʿūdī-Wahhābis salient and a nuisance in the region is the fact that they raided ferociously far beyond their natural and geographical boundaries, Asir, Iraq, al-Aḥsāʾ, the province of Shām, and the Ḥijāz, besides scratching a millennia-old sectarian wounds in Karbala during the first decade of the nineteenth century. By and large, it is possible to categorize two types of intervention in the region in the context of the Ottoman empire, be it a state-making, challenge, or rebellion: Indirect, as in the paradigm of pre-Tanzimat, and direct, as in the paradigm of post-Tanzimat, in the person of Midhat Pasha.

Wahhābism did not remain the same either. It is true that the second state, compared to the first one, which was an indomitable jihadist in the name of state formation by way of *takfīr*,[1067] was more introverted, protective, and tried to make its discourse consistent, particularly consistent within the Sunnī tradition, yet in a circular logic[1068] which redefines the Sunnī tradition in the legacy of *Salaf* as it is understood by the Ḥanbalī-Wahhābī ulama.

At this junction, Saʿūdī-Wahhābīs' destiny intersects with history writing. Professional history of Najd as a genre, in the proper sense of the word, started with the Saʿūds[1069] during the closing years of the eighteenth century. In other words, Saʿūdī

[1067] Zargar, "Origins of Wahhabism from Hanbali Fiqh," 74.

[1068] Ibid., 112.

[1069] Cook, "The Historians of Pre-Wahhābī Najd," 175–76.

patronage created its own history writing which dramatically diverged from the pre-Wahhābī histories of Najd.[1070] Today, while agreeing to revise their religious texts for accusations by the United States of America of feeding extremism, the Saʿūds openly express that their history cannot be touched in any way is proof of how much importance they attach to their history.[1071] Therefore, it is true that the historical literature in front of us is essentially a Saʿūdī-Wahhābī propaganda: If a genre, however, it is rightly categorized by Determann as the "takfīrist" paradigm whose representatives are chronologically Ibn Ghannām, Hamad ibn Laʿbūn, Ibn Bishr, and Ibn ʿĪsā whom are also labelled as Ibn Ghannām school.[1072] In the need of creating a plausible other to provide basis for *takfīr*, thus making *jihād* possible against other local emirates, these sources re-build the life of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in parallel with the life of the Prophet of Islam, therefore they are concerned to show the previous period of Najd as *Jāhiliyyah*. According to Crawford[1073] and Mouline[1074], however, the situation in Najd had been what it had been for a couple of centuries, and there had not been any abnormality by the time of our founder's advent as a reformer. From the nineteenth century on, particularly with the inclusion of printing press into the game of mass propaganda, the Saʿūds propagated this genre and censored all other unauthorized histories of Najd and Arabia, such as Muqbil al-Dhukayr's and ʿAbd Allāh al-Bassām's which severely diverges from the interests of the Saʿūds.[1075] In addition, again with the help of the printing press, Wahhābism has been shown as part of Salafism since the 1920s, and thus it has been rehabilitated as a Salafist movement

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[1070] Ibid., 163; Determann, "Globalization, the State, and Narrative Plurality: Historiography in Saudi Arabia," 47.

[1071] Bsheer, *Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia*, xi–xii.

[1072] Jorg Matthias Determann, ibid., 49–58.

[1073] Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 62.

[1074] Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 50.

[1075] Ibid., 58-60.

in the eyes of the greater Sunnī world.[1076] Considering all these, it has been concluded that the Wahhābī sources should definitely be cross checked with other contemporary sources (even against each other as shown above in the case of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr), both non-Arab and non-Arabic, and related secondary literature.

Finally, there is a widespread opinion that Wahhābism is an inorganic movement, which was commenced by the help of the English, in the Islamic world in general and in Turkey in particular.[1077] However, we did not encounter such a finding in our study, nor does the literature on Wahhābism contain such information. Therefore, and to indicate exactly the opposite of what is claimed, the relations of the movement with the British naval power and the government in Bombay are discussed in the context of piracy activities to show that Wahhābism was an aspect that was not well received by the local and global powers until the end of the First World War.

Thus, I believe that the answers to the questions I have pointed out can be given in this way. The first state established its borders in Arabia with its expansionist and takfīrist policy. The second state, although not in such a large area, preserved its existence and provided the secure area that the ulama needed while maintaining the dynasty. Thus, the ulema had the opportunity to position the belief within the classical Sunnī sources and provided the religious and political legitimacy to the dynasty with the concern of the unity of the *ummah* even in times of crises. Therefore, the second state built the bridge that provided the transition to the twentieth century, above all in the name of the dynasty. This shows us that the movement can never turn into a state without a dynasty and a politically legitimate leader, and vice versa. Therefore, the double helix structure appears once again: The ulama and the Imam, *Āl al-Shaykh* and *Āl Saʿūd*. Finally, the third state, the first signs of which became concrete in the person of legendary Ibn Saʿūd in 1902 when he took al-Riyāḍ with a small platoon, would inherit some problems from its ancestors due to the nature of things: The Sharif of Mecca, who now surrounded Ibn Saʿūd from three fronts, the Ḥijāz, East Jordan and

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[1076] Ibid., 57.

[1077] Esther Peskes, "Die Wahhābīya als innerislamisches Feinbild. Zum Hintergrund anti-wahhabitischer Publikationen in der zeitgenössichen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams* 40, no. 3 (2000): 344–74.

Iraq,[1078] the Rashidis of Hail, also a strong front in north, the problem of the settlement of nomadic tribes, and an ulama class, now highly organized, who in no way eager to co-operate with foreign powers on the eve of the Second World War. However, perhaps the most important of these for Ibn Saʿūd, and the one that must have given him nightmares, will be a possible struggle for the throne and power after him, which is still a tangible danger even though it remains in his childhood memories. So, succession was also a problem that needed to be resolved ultimately.

[1078] Hartmann, "Die Wahhābiten," 207.

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A. MKT. NZD.	Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Nezaret ve Deva'ir Evrakı
C. AS.	Cevdet Askeriye
C. DH.	Cevdet Dahiliye
DH. MKT.	Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi
DH. ŞFR.	Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Evrakı
HAT.	Hatt-ı Hümayun
HR. İD.	Hariciye Nezareti İdare
HR. SYS.	Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi
İ. DH.	İrade Dahiliye
İ. MVL.	İrade Meclis-i Vala
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APPENDICES

A. FO 78/3185, Capt. J. Mackenzie to Sir A. Johnston, Bengal, 1 June 1837

From Captain James Mackenzie, 8th Bengal Light Cavalry to Sir Alexander Johnston, the chairman of the committee of correspondence of the Royal Asiatic Society

A Rough Sketch of the present State of Egypt and Arabia, The London, and Paris Observer, No 644, Paris, September 3, 1837.

11 Somerset St. Portman Square, (London)

June 1st, 1837

Sir Alexander Johnston

You requested me to give my opinion on the present state of Arabia and Egypt, founded on my journey through those countries during the course last year: I have now much pleasure in complying with your wish, as far as my humble abilities will permit.

I shall first speak of Arabia.

Mohammed Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, has conquered, and his troops are in actual possession of, the whole line of the Arabian coast, from Suez and Akaba, on the north, to Mocha, near the straits of Bab el Mandeb, at the southern extremity of the Red Sea. With exception of Mecca, and the fertile district of Taif, to the east of Judda, his dominion does not extend into the interior above a mile or two from the seashore, but His Highness' troops garrison the chief town and ports on the eastern edge of the Red Sea. The possession of these places gives the Pasha the command of the whole commerce of Yemen and the Hejaz, the two principal provinces on the western side of Arabia.

The internal trade he generally monopolizes, buying from the growers at his own price, and selling to the native dealers, or foreign merchants, at a considerable advance. On articles imported from India, he levies a duty of 10 percent, which he will take either in kind or money. Thus, the ship which carried as from Calcutta to Judda was freighted with rice: for every hundred bags landed by the owner at the customhouse, the governor took ten, leaving our Nakhoda ninety to dispose of to the dealers without

let or molestation. I never saw a more liberal or a better managed customhouse than the Pasha's at Judda; and it is the same at Mocha: there is no bribery necessary, and no annoying search after smuggled articles, or vexatious detention of the goods. I speak, however, with reference to transactions carried on under the British flag, and I have no doubt the civility and affection which Englishmen receive from the authorities in the Red Sea, are partly to be ascribed to the presence, in that sea, of two British ships of war (of the Indian Navy), whose guns inspire respect, and give the Turks and Arabs a favourable idea of our power. The chief articles of exportation (as I have mentioned in my journal) are coffee and senna; but the supply of the former is much diminished, owing to the injudicious monopoly of the berry by the Pasha. The growers on the coffee mountains will not raise, in any abundance, an article from which they cannot obtain a fair remunerating price; for the Pasha steps in between them and the foreign merchant and takes to himself the profit which ought justly to be the growers. The coffee and senna are not raised in Mohammed Ali's territory, but in the dominions of the Imām of Senna, a young and weak Prince, who possesses a fine country which, I fear, will one day fall into the hands of the grasping Pasha. His not yet having taken possession of the fertile province of Senna is to be ascribed to his repeated defeats by the Asseer tribe of Bedouins; a powerful body inhabiting the country, between Mecca and Senna, who nobly maintain the independence of their native land. In the campaign of 1835, the Egyptian army, under the command of the younger Ibrahim (the Pasha's nephew), was defeated by these sons of the desert, to the great annoyance and vexation of Mohammed Ali, who, having conquered the legions of the Sultan, and added Syria to his sovereignty, could ill brook the humiliation of and overthrow by a horde of undisciplined barbarians. Accordingly, in 1836, he made extensive preparations for another campaign against the Asseers, and formed *corps d'armee* at Gonfoda, Judda and Mecca, which advanced immediately after the ceremonies of the Haj, or pilgrimage, had been concluded. One of these corps I saw at Judda: It was composed of 3,000 infantry, a small body of cavalry, with six light field-pieces. The infantry are well clothed in the Nizam dress, a modification of the Turkish costume, introduced by the great Ibrahim after the war in the Morea. Their muskets are made at Cairo, after a French model, and are lighter and more handy than ours. Their cartridge-boxes, powder, and ball were all in excellent order. I frequently saw the troops maneuver in

a large plain in the south of Judda: They worked principally as light infantry, the better to cope with their irregular and undisciplined foes, the Asseers. The division (p. 513) was commanded by a Bey, who held the rank of major-general. The chief of the état-major is a Monsieur Mari, a Corsican, who was formerly sergeant-major in His Britannic Majesty's Corsican rangers, then commanded by Sir Hudson Lowe. Besides having the superintendence of the drill, he acts, when on service, as quarter-master-general, lays down the plan of the encampment, and directs the line of march. He made a tough sketch of the seat of war in the Asseer country, which he showed to me. It was rudely done, without instruments, but gave a good idea of the barren and inhospitable tract which had proved to fatal to the Pasha's army. He said hunger, thirst, and intolerable heat, had defeated the army. When suffering under the most severe privations to which human nature is liable, the Asseers came down from their almost inaccessible fastness, and drove the Egyptian troops before them. Monsieur Mari holds the honorary rank of lieut.-colonel, but being a Christian, is not permitted to exercise any authority over the men. Besides M. Mari, there are several European *Instructeurs*, mostly French and Italian. These gentlemen have no commissions, and little more authority than is possessed by a drill-sergeant in a British regiment. Several of them are well-informed gentlemanly men, with whom we passed many pleasant evenings. The physicians and surgeons in His Highness's army are likewise Europeans; they are chiefly French, but there are some Germans amongst them. A Monsieur Fischer, a German physician, bears a high character for talent and professional knowledge. At the house of the English agent at Judda, Malheem Youseef (Malloom Yussuff), and at the table of Capt. Hawkins, of the Clive sloop of war, we met most of His Highness's European *employés*, and were much pleased with their lively and agreeable manners. I believe there are no Englishmen in the Pasha's army; they are not sufficiently bending to please the Egyptian authorities and despise the paltry allowances which are received with gratitude by the more easily satisfied Italian and French adventurers. From my experience abroad, I should say that the English do not adopt themselves to the manners and customs of a foreign country, and indulge the humours and prejudices of the people, so readily and good-humoredly as the French and Italians. Hence the preference decidedly shown, in Egypt particularly, to natives of the above countries.

The Pasha's army in Arabia may amount at present (for it is now on the war establishment) to about 2,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, with proportion of sappers, artillery, etc. The headquarters of the army are at Mecca, where Koorshid Pasha (another nephew of Mohammed Ali), the governor-general and commander-in-chief of the Hedjaz, was residing when I was at Judda; but His Excellency pays frequent visits to Taif and Judda.

Ibrahim Pasha, the younger, is governor and commander of Yemen, with his headquarters at Hodeida. His *corps d'armée* amounts to about 5,000 or 6,000. Mocha is garrisoned by 1,200 men, and the ramparts of the town are defended by some old pieces of cannon. The town of Gonfoda, on the coast, was the headquarters of a division of about 3,000 to 4,000 infantry, and some cavalry, in consequence of the proximity to the Asseer Country. Loheia, Yambo, Medina, and other towns on the west coast of Arabia, have each a small garrison to protect them from the predatory attacks of the Bedouins. All the towns of Arabia, under the Pasha's control, have a civil governor independent of the military commandant. The one acts as a check upon the other, and thus abuse of power is prevented.

When Mohammed Ali have conquered the Asseers, or, which is more likely to happen, has quelled their turbulent spirit by bribes and promises, it is his intention to march a detachment from Mocha to Aden outside the Straits of Bab el Mandeb to take possession of that ancient sea-port, which possesses two excellent harbours, and commands the passage into the Red Sea. Aden is, at present, governed by a marauding sheikh who can make little or no resistance to the troops of the Pasha. It is part of the principality of Senna, but the Imām's authority is hardly recognized. Having become master of Aden, the Pasha will, undoubtedly, endeavor to extend his dominion over Hadramat, a province reaching to the southern shore of Arabia, and at present parcelled out among petty princes and sheikhs who are too weak to oppose his progress. Marching along the coast of Hadramat, His Highness's soldiers will enter Oman, and eventually occupy Muscat and the country on the south-west side of the Persian Gulf, thus rendering himself master of the whole peninsula of Arabia, after which the conquest of Bagdad is easy. Mohammed Ali has heard of the power and grandeur of the ancient Caliphate, and he longs to found an empire which shall rival, if not surpass it in splendor. The Imām of Muscat looks with considerable jealousy and apprehension

on His Highness's proceedings at Mocha, and contemplated march upon Aden (the high road to Muscat); and it is supposed that his recent present of a line-of battleship to the King of England, was with the view of conciliating the friendship of his powerful government in case of an invasion of his territory by Mohammad Ali's forces. I should imagine that the British government will never permit His Highness to extend his conquests so far as Muscat, as well on the score of justice to the Imām, as on the ground of policy with reference to its proximity to the coast of India. I doubt the propriety of our permitting the Pasha to take Aden. His government is, unquestionably, better than that of the lawless Shèks; but if, on the principal of humanity, it is better to establish a good and regular government, which shall secure order and protection to life and property, in the place of a tyrannical unjust government, where neither life nor property are secure, then it is a question, whether we, so intimately connected with that part of the world, in consequence of its being the best and nearest road to India, and so much superior in knowledge, power, and civilization, should not ourselves take and keep possession of Aden, whose noble harbours would be of the greatest benefit to us in the prosecution of our Indian steam navigation plans. Besides giving us a power and consequence and commercial advantages in Arabia, Abyssinia, and the northern coast of Africa, which we do not at present possess, it would be the means of extending our knowledge and religion over countries, and amongst people, now immersed in the profoundest ignorance. One thing is certain: Either Mohammed Ali, or some other powerful state, will take possession of Aden, and all the other principal seaports is that quarter; for it is utterly impossible that matters can long remain in their present barbarous state. It seems to be a law of nature, that the civilized nations shall conquer and possess those countries in a state of barbarism, and by such means, however, unjustifiable it may appear at first sight, extend the blessings of knowledge, industry, and commerce, among people hitherto sunk in the most glooming depths of superstitious ignorance. Mohammed Ali has done some good in Arabia; for, under his government, every man's life and property are secure from aggression, always excepting the aggression which His Highness may himself with impunity commit. I do not think his sway will last long, for the Turks are not popular in Arabia, and the arabs he has conquered sigh for their ancient freebooting independence. His son and successor, Ibrahim, being a man of vigorous mind, good talent, may continue to keep

together the scattered portions of his father's extensive dominions; but, unless his successor be an equally able man, the whole fabric will crumble to pieces, the government not being founded on the affections of the people.

B. BOA, HR. SYS., 1524/17

Shaykh Faisal: Being one of the chief sheikhs of the Wahhābī band, who is aged between thirty-six and forty, is short and of weak constitution; and is seen among the men of his tribe as a saint because of his patience in the face of all kinds of lackings and misery without showing any sort of hopelessness whatsoever. Yet, since he lacks all the qualifications and competences which are necessitated by his native land, he has been taken captive by the Egyptian forces for two times, and even once by his own men. The mentioned is not able to design and envision [things] in mind, thus not capable of executing them, nor commencing them, furthermore he is possessed with taking revenge, he even likes taking it; his helpers and those have been fooled into his way sometimes show trust him, and sometimes in leaving him they renounce supporting his cause. Since the supporters of the mentioned Shaykh are comprised of Wahhābī band who get along with and are in social intercourse with Ottoman subjects and some other Sunnī Arabs, and of thirty thousand people; and because of their fanaticism, they previously reached their hand of destruction to the eastern part of Arabia for a couple of times, and this time too it is observed that they marched into the inner parts of Asīr. Then again Shaykh Faisal Bek was transported to Egypt when he was taken under arrest by Hurshid Pasha following a violent conflict which had taken place in 1838 at al-Dirʿiyya which is in the desert land of Hejaz and is the sanctuary of the Wahhābīs. While he was imprisoned in a castle there, he managed to escape from the mentioned castle in a remarkable way in the fifth night of February in 1843. In other words, the mentioned Shaykh, having seen the approach of some men who are from the same sect with himself to the castle, silenced the men who had been his guardians, and with eight men including he himself, and with horses, they ran away together by going down through a rope from a cliff which was three hundred feet high. Then, on camels, and without stopping at any place, they galloped to the desert, finally arrived in Arish in twenty hours. The mentioned nomads came from Najd to Egypt, and they settled around the mentioned castle in front of everyone for three years without interruption, it is a strange condition that their aims and ends had not been found out. Although the mentioned, on the other hand, had been trying to play his Highness Sharif who had been residing in Mecca against the governor of Jeddah, and

vice versa, he, however, was not able to seduce either of them, thus, as it has later been heard that he decided to withdraw. According to the conveyance of the governor of Egypt, the mentioned Shaykh, after a short while, offered to join to His Highness who is to dismiss the Ottomans from al-Hejaz. If he were to rebel with this, then apart from dispatch and deployment of an army to Jeddah and one to Asīr, yet another one will also be sent unto him; and instead of the mercy which so far has been shown him, this time he will be held and executed; since all these have been made known to him by the mentioned governor, now Shaykh Faisal, with the help of some of the sheikhs of Najd and even with the help of the Imām of Muscat intended to usurp the honor of the al-ʿAmm dynasty, and with the ambition to drive out from the land and to discipline His Highness Osman Pasha, who is the protector of this family, from Jeddah; now it is obvious that he started to correspond with the mentioned Sheikh and Imam.

Now, as it has been learned from the news which arrived from Suez that the mentioned Osman Pasha will march on the mentioned [Shaykh Faisal], perhaps by now he has set off. While Shaykh Faisal has many times intruded against the sovereignty of the state and its legitimate government in the mentioned land of Hejaz, it is now a strange condition that he has appealed to the lofty state to procure high order as one its servant in those regions for the execution of governance; however, although an officer has been appointed to his responsibility, it is not of secret business that he will refrain or abstain from defending the side of the Lofty State and perhaps, as he once did, will find opportunity to raise the banner of rebellion against the Lofty State.

C. BOA, HR. SYS., 93/18

The report which was sent by the Governor of Baghdad on the general political situation of the Arabian Peninsula:

To the Correspondence Pen of the Chamber of Grand Vizierate

In a piece of my humble petition that which I previously presented on the issue of Najd, since the situation and circumstances and the current traditions of its residents and peoples were unbeknown to us, it would not be right to be able to present with any opinion on all kinds of its affairs; the necessity of my humble effort had been requested in person in order to be taken care of and to be able to answer that which were asked depending on knowledge and information.

Because in the correspondence, which was afterwards sent by Commander Nâfiz Pasha and was presented in verbatim, the necessity of my personal departure was further confirmed and urged, therefore; we departed from Baghdad amid Shāban, as presented and declared by way of telegraph.

As of six battalions of infantry, some artillerymen, imperial cavalry with infantry, and three squadrons of cavalry gendarme (zabtiye) are only for now sufficient in Najd military division (*Necid fırka-i askeriyesi*), its number has been risen to eight in accordance with the previous order; and in accordance with the necessity of change by way of taking back the previous battalions one or two at a time and sending the others in their stead, two battalions of regulars (*asākīr-i nizāmiye*) had also been taken together. These and the things such as provisions and munitions which were to be sent to the [Najd] military division were loaded on [the deck of] the steamer Babylon with the imperial corvettes of Lebanon and Alexandria and together we went to Kuwait and thence to Qatif and from thence to Ahsa by way the port of Ujjayr.

The order and arrangements and the comfort and relaxation of the imperial solders are all right thanks to the incessant effort and labor of abovementioned Nafiz Pasha and many of the emirs and gendarmes. The nomads of al-Ajman and al-Murrah and other bandits who together with Saʿūd al-Faisal had been resisting the imperial soldiers particularly in the recent days; and as of the division of battalion (*fırka-i müfreze*) which was marching on these had more than seven-eight thousand soldiers and were consisted of two battalions which were armed with needle rifles. On the

battlefield bandits left five-six hundred dead and most of the sword-leftovers (*bakıyyetü'l-suyûfe*) escaped as wounded; the other part had only two martyrs and seven-eight wounded which was still more encouraging for the imperial soldiers with people of all ages [in their ranks]; and even eight of the Wahhābis with riders? from the tribes of al-Ajman and al-Murrah joined in this with their satisfaction despite their exhaustion and troubled situation.

Since the climate of Ahsa *qıt'ası* is rather pleasant and mild during the summer and winter seasons there are no sick among the soldiers more than one percent. Yet because in the autumn and in a period of about two months' time malaria becomes common. Depending on the fact that malaria have now inflicted one-quarter and one-third of most of the battalions, and as it is arising from humid places, it has so far been experienced those high altitudes such as the fortresses of Haram and Sahur are safe in any case. The present forces have been transferred there and the sick have been sent to Iraq for change of air with a steamer. Meanwhile, the shift of the year eighty-one has also been executed and a thorough target practice at Samarra, which is located between Hufuf and Mubarraz, was made. After the work was done which was of necessity of the military and civil affairs during [our] stay in Ahsa which was about fifteen days, from thence [we] arrived in Qatif by land and there as well the necessary affairs were done; so, I arrived back at the gate of Baghdad on the sixty second day of my humble departure.

It is as important and necessary to present information on the local situation of Ahsa and Qatif *qıtʿaları* and the present condition of the imperial soldiers – because the aforementioned region has been desolate and unknown for some time – as mentioning also on the stages of its geographical conditions and on the places of its lands and affairs which under no circumstances does accept any application whatsoever is no less important and necessary in the meantime; and for this reason, as it requires and dictates necessary details and explanation and in order not be only by virtue of haste; – yet, be it necessitate, due effort will be provided – and to present interpellation for the required subsections (*fırkalar*) my humble observations on the event are penned in the form of another report and have been presented herewith.

As to the civil administration of the region, as it is known by his lofty understandings, the commencement of this settlement (*mesken*) was from the march

and prevail of Saʿūd upon his brother ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal, and its result was foreigner involvement into this operation. Last year, to this end, with ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal's askance for help from the part of the state (*taraf-ı devlet*), many of his proposal concerning the expulsion and aversion (*tard ve defʿi*) of Saʿūd and ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal's confirmation to the office (*teʾyīd-i meʾmūriyeti*) had been endured, and although it was agreed that on the arrival of the forces which had been sent from Baghdad in the coast of the Arab Peninsula ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal was going to come with his community and was going to proceed with the military division. Yet the imperial soldiers proceeded to Qatif only with the guidance of ʿAbd Allāh al-Sabbah, the *qāimmaqām* of Kuwait, and his community; from thence proceeded to Ahsa, and up until the Qala and Buqā was taken under control and merged there, ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal procrastinated and stayed in al-Riyāḍ, and sometimes because of the fear of his brother and sometimes because of the nomads who were antagonistic to him he stayed in a state of solitude (*hāl-i vahşet*).

Although letters were repeatedly sent to him both from my humble part and from the part of the mentioned commander, with a hesitant movement, he eventually dared to such proposals as to send force to fetch him and since it was found inappropriate to keep and employ such a savage man in office; so while his immediate discharge and removal from the office was in necessity, alas; since it was declared that the command and office of the forces had been confirmed and approved in the qāimmaqāmship of ʿAbd Allāh in the first place; now, his removal, particularly in the eyes of people and in the eyes of the tribes and nomads who pay strict attention to such issues, would essentially bring a bad effect. Thus, [the policy of] his allurement [by the central government] and reconciliation was maintained.

This mentioned [Faisal], with his defeat by [his brother] Saʿūd in the later combats and clashes, could not find any place to flee and escape and so he directly came to Ahsa and took asylum with the military division. Yet, although it is understood that once he sets himself free from his foe's claws he will once again fall in love of independence, in order not to break the previous word in order not to cause it to be broken by us; he has been accepted as the *qāimmaqām* and has been held in high esteem, and one thousand and two hundred riyals has been allocated to him as monthly stipend.

The coming of ʿAbd Allāh to the attendance of the military division in this way invited Saʿūd's anger and wrath still more and even though ʿAbd Allāh's supporters in Riyāḍ had expelled Saʿūd, with the absence of ʿAbd Allāh even his nomadic and settled (*bedevī ve hadarī*) supporters who were around the outskirts of Riyāḍ joined in Saʿūd's community, and [this] mentioned Saʿūd, thinking that these were an enough amount of force for himself, and also with more than seven-eight thousand insects (*haşerāt*) from the tribes of al-Ajman and al-Murrah who were already inclined and attached to him, arrived at a place which was close to Ahsa with the supposed intentions of storming it, taking ʿAbd Allāh as captive, fighting against the [imperial] soldiers, and plundering it. As it was written, two battalions equipped with needle-rifles from the military division were dispatched. More than six-hundreds of their carrions were left on the battlefield and thus they were defeated. Reports and telegraphs about these have previously been sent.

Being exceedingly satisfied and joyous for the defeat of Saʿūd and his being expelled in this way ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal congratulated the imperial soldiers one by one and appreciated their efforts and bravery. He also sent a letter of thanks to Baghdad. However, with his getting rid of the trouble of his enemy's assault and hostility, and on the other hand, with the intimidations and threats of the Wahhābī ulama in Riyāḍ – who try to exploit this many people by excommunicating anyone but themselves – who incessantly send letters to the aforementioned [ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal]; eventually, he had run away together with his people, and also had taken with himself Muḥammad al-Faisal who had been freed from Saʿūd's captivity by the imperial forces beforehand, and went to Riyāḍ, eight or ten days before my humble arrival there.

Thereupon in his letter which he sent to the mentioned commander (Nâfiz Pasha) from Riyāḍ; since the atrocities and incursions of the family of Faisal was fixed and obvious, it had been issued with a special proclamation (*ilanname-i mahsusa*) three months in advance that their qaimmaqamship had not been approved also by the state; and as to his previous appeal for help, following the arrival of the imperial forces and the expulsion of Saʿūd by them, and following the rectification and consolidation (*tashih ve teʾkid*) of his office of qaimmaqamship; and while the withdrawal of the military forces had been executed with his consideration and agreement (*mülâhaza ve*

mukavelesiyle), now speaking of its being announced and issued in that manner affected his honor, so that he had no choice but to withdraw to Riyāḍ. He also declared that he is the obedient servant of command and will of the exalted state. Our intention, on the other hand, is not the expulsion and removal of him or the House of Faisal from the qaimmaqamship completely. However, as the people of the qıtʿa of Ahsa and Qatif were very complainant of the atrocities done both by himself and by the officers whom had been appointed by him, and proved materially that which had been claimed that many of them [had mentioned] the extent of their oppression and assault, and that should they (the House of Faisal) were to return to Ahsa and Qatif then they are ready to flight and emigration; and they even recently attested and manifested [all these] face-to-face [this] mentioned ʿAbd Allāh in the presence of his excellency commander Pasha. Hence, he himself did not ask for the government of Ahsa, Qatar, and Qatif. [Instead] He was due to contented with the government of Riyāḍ and its vicinity. For this he was given a fifteen-days' time. So, it was written and sent to him with a latter that should he come to Ahsa in this time span then the qaimmaqamship of Riyāḍ, Qatif, and Qatar was going to be given to him as it had once been, and should he not come then his removal was going to be declared. Although it is known that he was not going to come this way was chosen in order not to give people any other chance to speak, and to make it known and obvious in the eyes of his people that he renounced his right.

Even though his answer was not received in the given time span, in his later-dated letter (*şukka*) which was written and sent by himself he stated that should his office of qaimmaqamship is rendered perpetual onto himself then he would serve and should not then since in excuse of illness his presence was not possible, he stated that in his stead someone else shall be appointed.

However, the employment of such a man who dreads service of the state and government and flees, and who does not come when sent for would not be possible for the formal office in state; and while he had been held in rather high esteem and been respected, he with his escape renounced from his right; and since his renouncement from his right is also obvious now in his letter in which he presented his excuse for not being in presence; his immediate removal is declared and until another qāimmaqām has been sent in his stead government of each locality is entrusted to its sheikhs; in this regard the imperial decrees – which have been sent to the sheikhs of twenty-four

sets of towns, such as Riyāḍ, Jabal al-Shammar, Unayza and Burayda, settlements and nomads – have been left to the mentioned commander *hazretleri* to be sent to.

As things stand my humble and deficient thoughts on the issue is also immediately presented since considerations on what will happen in the future, and what attitude will be adopted on our side, and what action will necessarily be taken by the military division are also of important affairs. Namely, the measures and operations which had been taken and executed in the previous dispatch of the military division has gone much farther beyond what had been asked by ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal which was on track of aid and help. In other words, ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal[’s intention was to] show this force to his brother Saʿūd as a couple of battalions, yet only as a shadow[1080]; and while the dispatched forces had taken their place with the intention of again returning back to where they had come from, the march of five-six battalions of forces on Qatif and Ahsa, and their capturing of the castles and taking them under control, and their merging out there were outside ʿAbd Allāh’s prediction and calculation he rose difficulties for this operation; and above all while Saʿūd’s march upon the [imperial] forces with his community, and his opposition and resistance was highly possible, these [two][1081] engaged in combat with each other. The military division, meanwhile, had acted with great speed and thus with the conclusion of the affair there had been no place for that consideration; however, since, on account of these premises and the complaints which had been made about them, it is known that the administration and government of Najd will get out of the hand of House of Faisal (*Āl-i Faisal*), there had remained the consideration of a possible merging of the two brothers and their march on Ahsa with their communities. However, the subsequent coming of ʿAbd Allāh to Ahsa in his defeat, and Saʿūd’s escape to Qatar in his horrible defeat had expelled this consideration. Even though ʿAbd Allāh retreated to Riyāḍ with such an indigence, and though mentioned Saʿūd had been defeated he is a warlike and valiant man; such that in clashes and combats both of his arms were injured with wounds and became disabled, and in the end he had ended up by himself alone he though did not stop and ventured around to recruit men; nomads (*urban takımı*) also

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[1080] Or simply, “only to threaten and intimidate his brother.”
[1081] ʿAbd Allāh al-Faisal and his brother Saʿūd.

conform to and obey his gallantry together with his nobility; and since most of the needs of people who live in the inner locations of Najd is provisioned by the crops and harvest of Ahsa and Qatif, and now some of them who had been starving for some time knew that – apparently in the name *ghazw*, yet with the intention of spoil and plunder – this sort of assault was in their benefit; and though merge of ʿAbd Allāh and Saʿūd is still probable; the possibility of their march against Ahsa and Qatif with recruiting some other communities [in their ranks] shall always be taken into utmost consideration; and above all utmost attention shall be paid particularly in time of harvest. In consultation with the mentioned Commander Pasha Hazretleri, and because of this consideration, the operation has been agreed on; the construction of such things as towers, patrol ports ('*karakol limanları*') and fortresses which must be built on some locations has also been described and organized as necessity dictates.

With the removal of the House of Faisal from the places inside Najd for good it, as had been desired, should completely be taken under control by way of merging with the required office; and with the removal of these evildoers who are called as the ulama of Wahhābī and who perhaps has been the distinct reason why this many people of such a vast land has so far been in despair and been idle, the people of those lands who believe in [this creed] shall be corrected about us; [the execution of] these, on the other hand, is absolutely contingent on dispatch of a military force (*kuvve-i askeriye*), and with aid and help of God the Almighty, and by the courtesy of his royal highness' lofty portion, all sorts of means are present. However, the shortest route to Riyāḍ is through Ahsa which takes seventy hours; and because there is no water [source] there apart from the only one in one of its locality which has a single well, as deep as thirty-forty strokes; and as it has been observed and witnessed this time in person, in places as sandy as this no other animal but camel is acceptable in terms of moving across; [on this basis] at least fifteen hundred camels are needed in order to be able to carry water, at least three-months-worth-of-provisions, and ammunition of a battalion which is composed of five hundred soldiers who will go [there]; and according to this calculation five-six thousand camels are needed for three-four battalions of soldiers. There a camel is bought and sold for three-four, and finally five riyals. This organization can easily be executed depending on the fact that the imperial soldiers has gained experience and skill in riding camel and to carry their burden they [have

gotten used to] use camel. But what is worthy of notice in this is that after forces has gone to Riyāḍ, in terms of providing transportation and communication, if the security is not deservedly and properly established here, then; on these circumstances dispatching soldier will not be secure and safe. Besides, depending on the notice and declarations of those who come and go through that road for pilgrimage and also on the statements of some knowledgeable and men of understanding (*erbab-ı vukūf*) on every locality of the route from Riyāḍ to the Holy Mecca there is fresh water in all of the towns and villages and everywhere; thus, if transportation could be provided through that route at least it would be well enough for the purpose or the route from Iraq through Jabal al-Shammar to Riyāḍ would be much better and safe compared to the route of Ahsa. Therefore, it is of requirement and necessity of well conduct (*icab-ı maslahat*) to decide on these [issues and] places since the alteration of that route is also acceptable when needed.

The place called Qatar is a *qıtʿa* protruding to the sea and located in the south course of Ahsa, between Oman and Bahrain. Despite its dense population its terrain is rocky and has no freshwater. It, therefore, does not have cultivation like Ahsa and Qatif. So, most of its population is scattered and engaged with pearl trade. For this engagement they have more than three thousand boats and ships. It was verified that this mentioned place was from [one of] the provinces of Ahsa (*Ahsa mülhakātından idüğü*) and because of this; also, the seizure of this place and taking it under control besides Qatif and Ahsa has been included in the commander's instructions. Since the sheikh and ruler of this mentioned place, Muḥammad ibn Thānī, due to his old age, had put his son, Qāsim ibn Thānī, into power; upon the demand made by these two four sets of flags has been sent to be hoisted to the required fortresses and to governmental positions (*mevākī-i resmiye*) by the commander. Thus, upon their being hoisted on their places, the English officers who were appointed by the government of India have started to protectorship for some time under the name of the independent government of Bahrain; and, by putting Muscat and Oman into this color they[1082] also

[1082] The British.

make these[1083] closer to this government[1084]. Although they are not saying anything for Qatar which is in between these [two], other than making an attempt also to there; because they have started to collect tax which is about nine thousand riyals from Qatar for a few years now for Shaykh Isa who were appointed to the island of Bahrain by them; this time as well when an English ship went [there] in askance of this amount from the sheikhs [they said], "we are under that banner," and pointing at the Ottoman banner [again they said], "as long as that banner is here we do not recognize any other." Upon this, as it was learned, the ship returned.

From the English consulate in Baghdad an explanation has officially been asked for that on what reason the English ship? went there and asked for tax while the *qıtʿa* of Qatar is a province of Ahsa which is also of the lands of the Ottoman Empire. In his letter, which he sent after consulting to the government of India, it was written that [the claims of] intervention of the English officials to Qatar and their asking for tax is not true, and hence he has no tie and relation whatsoever [in this affair.] As it was stated in my other petition (*arīza*), however, that both Saʿūd al-Faisal and the other bandits who have been acting against the government have always been encouraged by Bahrain, and besides this, their things such as provisions and ammunition have also been supplied and provided by Bahrain. Because [the distance] between Qatar and Bahrain is rather narrow things therefore which have been sent are carried from the island to the coasts of Qatar; the sheiks of al-Ajman and al-Murrah with Saʿūd al-Faisal and those who survived, after being defeated and scattered in the last battle they went to the direction of Qatar. There they provided provisions, ammunition and the other necessities which comes from Bahrain, and besides this; in order to be able to make pressure on the sheikhs of Qatar and its people because of their subjection and obedience to the lofty government they, with the [help of the] bugs they have recruited, cut [their access to] freshwater, and plundered their taxes (which they levied from sheep and goats, *ağnām*) and livestock.

Although the people of Qatar is powerful and sufficient enough not only to batter and discipline these but even Bahrain in general also, some of the people [of Qatar]

[1083] Muscat and Oman.
[1084] Bahrain.

has tended to these places because of their subsequent marriages and [newly established] kinships, and thus because of the well-conduct of affairs (*maslahāt*) has gained some hardships to some extent, [thus;] an immediate dispatch of forces has repeatedly been petitioned by mentioned Qāsim and his father Muḥammad. Yet another petition of theirs has also arrived upon my humble arrival to al-Aḥsāʾ. In it besides the protection of himself, of the people, and of the inhabitants was reiterated, and in case it was not possible, then, because a permission to emigrate on the occasion of hegira was also asked to be given to themselves. It has thusly been decided that a complete battalion from the imperial forces which is located in al-Aḥsāʾ be put on the board of the imperial corvette Assur steamer which is due to Alexandria, and that his excellency qāimmaqām Ömer Bek has been appointed as the commander of them with a special instruction, and as it is required by the special instruction with the expulse and repulse of bandits from there and thus with the restoration of the security of people that the battalion be back until about thirty-forty days' time.

Because this petition of mine is filled hereby to its capacity the details and observations about the economic and administrative necessities of the *qıtʿa* of Ahsa and Qatif have been presented and composed [in a] further [document]. In Shawwal of [12]88, in Qanoonawwal of [12]87 (14th of December 1871)

Midhat, Governor of Baghdad

D. FO 195/996, C. Herbert to Constantinople, Baghdad, 3 January 1872

"Relating to Nejd Expedition, 3rd of January 1872"

By the British Consulate General at Baghdad, Despatches sent to H. M. Embassy at Constantinople

British Consulate General

Baghdad 3 January 1872

Sir

Reverting to my dispatch No: 58 dated 1st Ultimo I have the honor to report the return of Midhat Pasha to Baghdad on the 28th of Idem. His excellency has brought up a considerable number of sick soldiers from al-Hasa an al-Kateef of these many were left at Bussorah, Koornah and Amarah and about 200 reached Baghdad.

The state of the garrisons at al-Hasa and Kateef is reported to be very bad, sickness prevails among the troops to a great extent and their numbers are said to be so much reduced that Nafiz Pasha is compelled to act purely on the defensive, and can

Hardly repulse the frequent raids of the arabs, who it seems continue to harass them even in the absence of the principal chiefs. ʿAbd Allāh is reported to be in Riyāḍ and Saood to continue in the neighbourhood Kutter while a correspondence is said to be going on between them though as yet it is not known that they have come to any terms.

Meanwhile Midhat Pasha shows no intention of withdrawing from aggressive, costly, and hopeless policy in Nejd - While at Bussorah on his way back to Baghdad he purchased from the Persian governor of Mahamrah a steam vessel to run between Bussorah and Kateef and on the 1st Instant a detachment of about 300 soldiers left this to supply the place of some of the sick men whom he brought up.

This country is thus being denuded of troops to a considerable extent and it is highly probable that these will be needed here in the [?].

The arabs are said to be disaffected, particularly the Shammar who are exiled by the mode of execution at Moosul of their late Shaykh ʿAbd-ool-Kareem - Rain is now falling abundantly thoroughly on the country and will fill the wells at desert and a rising is considered by no means improbable.

I have the honor to be

Sir

With the utmost respect

your Excellency’s

Most obedient humble servant

Charles Herbert

Consul General

E. BOA, DH. MKT., 2856/42



A Map of Najd Sanjak

F. BOA, Y. PRK. UM., 44/83



Y.PRK.UM.00044.00083.001

Details of arms smuggling by the British Government around Yemen

G. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Özatağ, Onur
Nationality: Turkish (TR)
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	AU Medieval History	2008
BS	AU Arabic Philology	2006
High School	Bornova Suphi Koyuncuoğlu High School, İzmir	1997

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2016- Present	Doğu Batı Yayınları	Freelance Translator
2014- Present	İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları	Freelance Translator
2009 September	Turkish-American Assoc.	English Teacher
2008 September	American Cult. Assoc.	English Teacher

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Arabic, French, German, Ottoman Turkish.

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H. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Eldeki çalışmanın Vehhabi tarihi üzerine literatürde işaret edilen birtakım kaygıları vardır. Üç asırlık ideolojik ortakları olan Vehhabi uleması ile Suud hanedanı, modern dünya tarihinin en uzun ömürlü dini-politik varlıklarından biridir. Dolayısıyla, ana sorulardan biri, İslami gelenek karşısında sürekli sapkın şeklinde damgalanan reformist bir hareketin hamisi olarak Arabistan'ın çalkantılı siyasi atmosferinde nasıl hayatta kalmayı başardıklarıdır. Başka deyişle Vehhabiliğin uzun ömürlülüğü, kendi terimleriyle ve kendi tarihsel bağlamı içinde açıklanması gereken bir sorudur. Ancak tezin başka kaygıları da var: Vehhabilik, yine kendi tarihsel bağlamında, Suud ailesinden ayrı ve bağımsız olarak kabul edilebilir mi? Böyle sert ve reformist bir hareket, siyasi koruma ve himayeden bağımsız var olabilir mi? Tam da bu çerçevede, yerel bir siyasi oluşum, savaşmaya muktedir bir hanedan ile ortaklığı olan Vehhabilik, bir devlet kurma süreci olarak değerlendirilebilir mi? Eğer öyleyse, bu ne ölçüde mümkündür? Öte yandan, hareketin reformist ve tasfiyeci karakteri dikkate alındığında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Suudi-Vehhabiler arasındaki siyasi mücadele salt bir mezhep çatışmasına indirgenebilir mi, yoksa düşmanlık yüzeyinin altında yatan başka mekanizmalar var mıdır? Yine benzer şekilde, siyasi bir örgütlenme olarak Vehhabilik, Osmanlı Arap vilayetlerinin daha geniş yapısında ne ölçüde isyancı olarak değerlendirilebilir? Bir isyan ise, merkezi otoritenin tepkisi teorik bir çerçevede nasıl incelenebilir? Özellikle dini uygulamalar açısından Vehhabiliğin on sekiz ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıllar boyunca değişim geçirdiği söylenebilir mi? Eğer öyleyse, kendi kaynaklarında bu değişikliğe işaret eden somut kanıt var mıdır? Buna dayanarak, bir tür olarak Vehhabi tarihçiliği hakkında ne gibi tespitler yapılabilir? Nihayet, on dokuzuncu yüzyıl dünyasının emperyalizm yarışında yerel bir oyuncu olarak Vahhabiliği küresel ölçekte konumlandıran etkenler nelerdir?

Sonuç olarak tezin ana tartışmasının bu sorular çerçevesinde geliştiği söylenebilir. Öte yandan Vehhabilik üzerine iki yüzyıla dayanan modern bir literatür vardır ve yukarıda bahsedilen soruların cevap önerileri kısmen bu literatüre girmiştir. Amacımız bu soruları tek bir çalışmada toplamak ve hareketin dini ve siyasi bağlarını Osmanlı ve Arap vilayetleri bağlamında incelemektir. Başka bir deyişle, bu tezdeki

amacımız, Suudi-Vahhabi örgütlenmesinin on sekizinci ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Arabistan'ının siyasi örüntüsünde benzersiz bir fenomen olup olmadığı tartışılmıştır.

Bu çerçevede ilkin konunun kavramsal sınırlarını tespit etmek şarttır. Dolayısıyla Vahhabilerin öncelikle kendilerini nasıl tanımladıkları önem kazanmakta, ardından da mücadeleye giriştikleri rakipleri tarafından nasıl vasıflandırıldıkları aktarılmaktadır. Anlaşıldığı üzere ve belki de konunun en can alıcı noktalarından biri budur, Vehhabiler hiçbir şekilde kendilerini Vehhabi olarak tanımlamamaktadırlar. Hatta, hareketi tarihsel bağlarından soyutlayarak İslam'ın on ikinci asrında, adeta kişisel çıkar ve keyfilikten doğmuş bir köksüz bir akım olarak yansıttığını düşünmeleri dolayısıyla bu onlar için hakaret olarak algılanan bir nitelendirmedir. Kendilerini tanımlamak için kullandıkları başlıca sıfatlarsa Muvahhidun, Ehl-i Tevhid, Ehlü's-sünne ve'l-cemaa ya da en sade haliyle Müslümandır. Buradan da anlaşılacağı üzere kendilerini tek ve gerçek İslam'ın yegâne temsilcileri olarak görmektedirler. Bu inanç kaçınılmaz olarak onları diğer mezhep ve inançlarla çetin bir çatışmaya sokmuştur. Tam da bu nedenle düşmanları tarafından, kendi inançlarının tam aksi yönünde tanımlanmaktadırlar: Harici, mülhid, kafir ya da en sade haliyle şaki. Bu iki tanımlama arasındaki gerilim on sekiz ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Arabistan'ı için de belirleyici olacaktır. Bu sıfatlandırmaların konuya ilişkin birinci ve ikincil kaynaklarda sıkça yer aldığı somut bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla, her iki tarafın da karşısındakini oyun dışına itmek amacıyla dini argümanlar kullandığı ve aslında kendisinin "gerçek İslam"ı temsil eden taraf iddiasında olduğu unutulmamalıdır.

Bu bakımdan temelde Arabistan'da ve genel olarak Osmanlı'ya Arap vilayetlerinde on sekiz ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıllarda büyük bir dini çatışma sahası açılmıştır. On sekizinci yüzyılda kutuplaşmanın tarafları şöyledir: Hicaz bölgesinde Mekke Şerifliği, Suriye ve Irak valilikleri, Ahsa'da mukim Beni Halid, Necid'de mukim Suudi-Vehhabiler ve Riyad'da mukim Dehham b. Devvas gibi daha küçük çaptaki yerel güçler ve son olarak İran Körfezi'nde konuşlanmış olan bir kısmı Kasim kökenli Utbi emirlikleri. Bu kutuplaşma on sekizinci yüzyıl Arabistan'ı için belirleyici olacaktır. Bu bağlam içinde temel bir patika ve Necid özelinde bir formülasyon aranacak olursa Suudi-Vehhabi siyasi ve dini örgütlenmesinin aslında Hicaz ve Ahsa arasında, bu iki güç tarafından sürekli askeri seferlere maruz kaldığı, haliyle coğrafi olarak sıkışmış olduğu iç Arabistan'ın yanı sıra bir de siyasi baskı altında olduğu

söylenebilir. Ayrıca Ahsa verimli topraklarıyla Necid için vazgeçilmez bir gıda tedarikçisidir ve küçük de olsa limanlarıyla Necid'in denize açılan kapısı konumundadır. Bu durum hem Ahsa'nın geleneksel yöneticileri olan Beni Halid'in Necid üzerindeki yaptırım gücünü açıklamakta hem de Suudi-Vehhabi askeri gücünün Necid'de güç kazanır kazanmaz neden kendini ilkin Ahsa'ya hücum etmek zorunluluğunda hissettiğini açıklamaktadır. Gerçekten de bu coğrafi fetih patikası üç Suudi-Vehhabi devleti için de geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Genel hatlarıyla on sekizinci yüzyılı tasvir eden bu patika, küçük değişikliklerle on dokuzuncu yüzyılda da varlığını sürdürmüştür. Başat güçler şöyle sıralanabilir: Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın kontrolündeki Mısır, Hicaz ve Mekke Şerifliği, Necid'de Suudi-Vehhabiler, 1830'lardan itibaren Necid'in kuzeyinde Hail'de mukim Beni Şammar temelli Beni Raşid. Ancak artık Osmanlı'nın bölgeye hâkim olarak doğrudan idare tesis etmek isteyecektir. Dolayısıyla artık bir Osmanlı varlığından söz etmek on dokuzuncu yüzyıl itibarıyla doğrudur. Denizler de ve her şeyden önce de İran Körfezinde Portekiz ve Hollanda gibi dünya güçlerinin zayıflamasıyla yerlerini Büyük Britanya alacaktır. Bu iki büyük gücün yerel hanedanlar üzerindeki etkisi ise bölge tarihinin yirminci yüzyıla bağlanmasında başat etkendir. Özellikle Britanya'nın Korsanlar Kıyısı olarak anılan İran ve Umman Körfezi sahillerini, yerel iktidarı elinde bulunduran hanedanlarla deniz güvenliği çerçevesinde 1820'lerden itibaren yaptığı antlaşmalarla "Ateşkes" sahillerine dönüştürmüş olması bölge için çığır açıcı niteliktedir. Öte yandan Britanya kara içlerine müdahale etmekten sakınmakta, böylece karalarda kendisine nispetle daha güçlü olan Osmanlı devletinin müdahalesini üzerine çekmekten sakınmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Britanya, ya da Bombay hükümeti arasında resmi düzeyde bir bağ kurulması ancak Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra mümkün olmuş, bundan önce ise Riyad'daki Suudi-Vehhabi seçkinleriyle hiçbir surette siyasi ilişki kurulmamıştır. Son olarak bu siyasi arenada Kuveyt, Katar, Bahreyn ve Umman gibi diğer yerel güçlerin varlığı ve bunların Osmanlı devleti ile Britanya arasındaki salınımları da bölgenin diplomasi tarihinin gidişatı bakımından göz ardı edilemeyecek denli önemlidir.

Ancak bu genel çerçeveye girmeden önce konu teorik incelemeye tabi tutulmuştur. Burada ilk nokta dönemlendirmedir. Bu, Suudi-Vehhabiliğin hem bölge hem de dünya tarihi içinde yerini tespit etmek üzere tahlile dahil edilmiştir. Burada E. H. Carr'ın, "Tarihin dönemlere ayrılması olgusal bir durum değil, ancak gerekli bir

hipotez ve düşünce aygıtıdır, aydınlatıcı olduğu sürece geçerlidir ve geçerliliği yoruma bağlıdır."[1085] Dolayısıyla, tam da bu noktada, Vehhabiliğin kendi kaynakları da dahil olmak üzere (İbn Le'bun istisnasıyla birlikte) tarihte bir birinci ya da ikinci bir Suudi-Vehhabi devleti olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Bunlar tahlili analitik bir çerçeve içinde tutabilmek için daha sonra ortaya atılmış kavramlardır. Ayrıca arşiv araştırmasında da başta Osmanlı arşivi olmak üzere bir sonuç vermemektedirler. Tüm bunlara rağmen, Carr'ın da işaret ettiği gibi ikincil literatürde artık oturmuş kavramlar oldukları için çalışmamızda da bu dönemlendirme önerileri kabul edilmiştir. Burada İslam tarihi içinde bir Orta Çağ'ın varlığı üzerine tartışmaya da kısaca değinilmiş, bunun yine ancak tahlili rahatlattığı ölçüde çalışmamızda kullanıldığına işaret edilmiştir.

Ardından sac ayağı üzerine oturan bir dönemlendirme tahlili sunulmuştur. Bunların ilki H. İnalcık'ın adem-i merkeziyet ve merkezileşme bağlamında modernleşme tartışmasıdır. İnalcık Arabistan'da Suudi-Vehhabi devletinin ortaya çıkışını tahlil edebilmek için dört temel dönemden bahsetmektedir: (A) 1750-1812: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda adem-i merkeziyet dönemi. Taşrada ayan ve hanedanların yükselişinin yanında, Arap vilayetlerinde, yerel hanedanların yönetimi altında artan bir özerklik söz konusudur. Birinci Suud devletinin ortaya çıkışı bu döneme karşılık gelmektedir. (B) 1812-1878: İkinci Mahmud'un merkezileşme siyaseti ve Tanzimat reformları başat unsurlardır. Burada İnalcık tevhit hareketi olarak adlandırdığı Vehhabiliğin sadece Arabistan'da değil, Hindistan da dahil olmak üzere tüm İslam dünyasında gitgide artan etkisini vurgulamaktadır. (C) 1878-1908: II. Abdülhamid'in Tanzimat uygulamalarını terk ederek imparatorlukta şeriatı üstün konuma getirmesi ve ardından takip eden İngiliz karşıtlığı ve İslam birliği siyaseti. Osmanlı halifeliğinin üstünlüğü fikri ve Arap vilayetlerinde Osmanlı merkezileşmesi, özellikle Hicaz demir yolu dönemin öne çıkan özellikleridir. Tevhit hareketi varlığını korumakta ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na meydan okumaktadır. (D) 1908-1918: Kriz zamanı. Mekke Şerifi ve Abdülaziz b. Suud'un Arabistan'da başat güç olmak adına meydan okuduğu dönem. Bununla birlikte tevhit hareketi Arabistan'da anahtar ideolojik motivasyonu temsil etmektedir. Kısacası İnalcık birinci Suud devletinin ortaya çıkışını nedenselliğini

[1085] E. H. Carr, *What Is History?* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 60.

Osmanlı merkezi idaresinin Mısır'da ve Verimli Hilal'de zayıflamış olmasına bağlamaktadır.

Bruce Masters da tahlilini benzer bir dönemlendirme içinde sunmakta, Erken Modern ve Modern önerisinde bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Erken Modern tanımı birinci ve ikinci Suud devletlerinin dünya ve Osmanlı tarihi içindeki konumlarını tespit etmekte faydalıdır. "Erken modern dönem ile hanedan ve toprak temelli imparatorlukların siyaset sahnesine hâlâ hâkim olduğu bir zamanı kastediyorsak, o zaman Arap topraklarındaki Osmanlı yönetiminin ilk üç yüzyılı bu paradigmaya kolaylıkla uymaktadır. Avrupa tarihçileri de 'Erken Modern'i, yeni başlayan kapitalist dünya sisteminin şekillendiği bir dönem olarak görmektedirler. Bu süreçte, Osmanlı Arap toprakları, sistemin yarattığı ticari ve ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılık ağına giderek daha fazla çekilmektedir. Son olarak, Arap eyaletleri ile başkent arasındaki ilişki, Osmanlı yönetiminin ilk üç yüzyılında köklü bir değişim görmemiştir. Yerel aktörler padişahın kendi seçtiği adamlar yerine hizmet etme hakkını talep etmeye başlayınca, başkentten kaynaklanan Osmanlı siyasi gücü bölgede zayıflasa da ilk fetihlerle kurulan taşra sistemi devam etmiştir. Bu anlamda, Mısır dışındaki Arap topraklarında ne Osmanlı yönetimine doğrudan bir meydan okuma ne de Osmanlı prestijinde bir düşüş vardı."[1086] Bu analizin ışığında, birinci ve ikinci Suudi devletleri arasındaki dönemsel ayrımın karakteri ve Osmanlı merkezi otoritesinin iki devlet karşısındaki konumu açıktır. İlk Suudi devleti varlığını Erken Modern bir imparatorlukta, merkezi hükümet tarafından 1745'e kadar neredeyse bir asır ihmal edilmiş olan bir periferide bir arazi parçası üzerinde buldu. Böylece, on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yıllarında imparatorluğun dini merkezlerini, Mekke ve Medine'yi bu ihmal, daha doğrusu iktidar boşluğu nedeniyle işgal etme gücü bulmuştur. Öte yandan, Tanzimat seçkinlerinin 1871'de oldukça geç olmasına rağmen ikinci Suud devletine müdahalesi, modernleştirici ve merkezileştirici bir emperyal güç çerçevesinde okunmakta ve başka kimseye danışılmadan doğrudan Suudi-Vahhabi meselesine müdahale etme çabasının bir temsilidir. Sonuç olarak İnalcık ve Masters'ın Erken Modern ve Modern dönemlendirmeleri, her şeyden önce Osmanlı devletinin adem-i

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[1086] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17.

merkeziyet ve merkezileşme politikalarını tutarlı bir bağlam içinde incelemeleri bakımından örtüşmektedirler.

İkinci Suud devletini dönemselleştirmedeki ilk iki yaklaşım, onun dünya tarihinin daha geniş şemasındaki ve daha az ölçüde Osmanlı tarihyazımındaki yerini saptamaya yönelik olsa da, Nabil Mouline'nin *The Clerics of Islam* adlı eserindeki *amixia* argümanı, ikinci Suud devleti ulemasının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve diğer Vehhabi olmayan yabancı unsurlar karşısındaki tutumunu analiz için önemlidir. Buna göre, Arabistan'da mevcut olan Mısır gibi bir gücün karşısında artık birinci devlet kadar cihatçı ve fetihçi bir siyaset izlemek imkanından yoksun kalan ikinci devlet, ulemanın işaret ettiği yolda dini muhafaza ve idame ettirmek adına içe kapalı bir toplum inşasına girişmiştir. Burada iki kavramı açıklamak gerekir: Hicret, yani Müslümanların dini vazifelerini yerine getiremedikleri yerlerden İslam topraklarına göç etmeleri. El-vela ve'l-bera, yani sadece Müslümanlarla ilişki içinde olmak ve Müslüman olmayanlardan uzak kalarak dini bozulmalara karşı muhafaza etmek. Bu kavramın yol açtığı sonuç ise emr-i bi'l-maruf ve nehy-i ani'l-münker, yani iyiyi emretmek ve kötülüğü yasaklamak. Tüm kavramsal çerçeve içinde, Nabil Mouline'e göre ikinci Suud devleti içe kapanmış ve adeta bir getto gibi, elindeki Müslüman nüfusu dış dünyanın dini ve inancı bozulmaya ya da yozlaşmaya uğrattığını düşündükleri unsurlara karşı korumaya almıştır.

Dönemlendirme ve içinde varlık bulan dış dünyaya karşı tutumdan sonra Osmanlı Arap vilayetlerinde Osmanlı otoritesinin işleyişi, yine aynı isimler eşliğinde incelenmiştir. İlkin Osmanlı'nın Arap dünyasını ele geçirişi kısaca ele alınmıştır. Burada bizim tahlilimiz için önemli olan unsur Memlük hâkimiyetinin 1517'de sona ermesinin ardından, Masters'ın yaptığı Osmanlı idaresinin bölgede "meşru bir rejim" olarak tanınmış olması tespitidir. Ancak burada Suudi-Vehhabi olgusunun adem-i merkeziyet içine yerleştirilen ve on sekizinci yüzyıla tarihlenen "ayan çağı" içinde ele alınamayacağı da işlenmiştir. Zira, Azmoğulları, Celililer, Bağdat Memlükleri gibi Arap vilayetleri ayanı İstanbul ile karşılıklı çıkar ilişkileri içinde Osmanlı otoritesini tanımış ve İbn Abdülvehhab'a ve kurduğu harekete kadar bölgede, Mısır dışında, Osmanlı otoritesine karşı topyekün bir isyan görülmemiştir. Masters'ın da işaret ettiği gibi Osmanlı on altıncı yüzyıldan itibaren bölgede büyük ölçüde meşru bir rejimdir. Dolayısıyla soru ve amaç bir kez daha kristalize olmaktadır: Bu çerçeve içinde

Vehhabi olgusu hangi saiklerle ve nasıl bir nedensellik zinciri içinde açıklanacaktır? Buraya ulaşmak, benzerliklere ve ayrışma noktalarına işaret etmek üzere ilkin büyük ölçekten başlanacaktır.

Bu bağlam içinde Osmanlı devlet ve idari yapılanması incelenirken İnalcık'ın "Sultanizm" çözümlemesi örneklem kabul edilmiştir. Patrimonyal tahakküm temel içeriktir. Buna göre sultanın otoritesi geleneksel kabul edilmiş sınırlar içinde kaldığı müddetçe geçerlidir, dolayısıyla yenilik makbul görülen bir şey olmadığı için hoş da karşılanmamaktadır. Başka deyişle, yenilikler iktisadi çıkarlarına zarar verebileceğinden padişahın takdir yetkisi bu anlamda sınırlandırılmıştır. Padişah kanunları ve padişahın yazılı emirleriyse, keyfi bir anlamda hükümdarın salt takdir yetkisi olarak değil, uzun süredir zaten mevcut olan kanunlar olarak devreye girer. Bu aslında klasik örfi-şer'i ayrımıdır. Kısacası, bunlar patrimonyal tahakküme sahip efendinin getirdiği geleneksel işleyişe ilişkin düzenlemelerdir. Böylece sultana bağlı olan uygulayıcılar, taahhütlerinde padişah kanunlarına ve onun yazılı emirlerine uymak, eğer eldeki meselenin çözümüne işaret eden açık bir hüküm yoksa mutat olanı uygulamak zorundadırlar. Öte yandan sultanın sınırsız keyfi gücünü frenleyecek ve denetleyecek diğer bir kutup daha vardır. Bunlar, İslami geleneğin muhafızları olan ulema sınıfıdır. İnalcık, İslam'ın ilahiyat tarihi ve felsefesinin doğasına içkin olan, Osmanlı ulemasının safları arasındaki çatışmayı da kabul ederek, onların Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarihinde geleneksel ve meşru bir direniş merkezi olduklarını da kabul etmektedir. Fatih Kanunnamesi de onlara bu hakkı zaten tanımıştır. Burada İnalcık'ın tahlilini aktarmanın başlıca nedeni Osmanlı devlet kadrolarında ulemanın maaşla devlet adalet yönetimine katılmış olmasının vurgulanmasıdır, zira bu İslam tarihinde Suudi-Vehhabi vakası dışında tek örnektir. Bilindiği gibi aslında ulema ve kadı vakıf ve baktıkları davaların gelirleriyle hayatlarını idame ettirmektedir ve tarih boyunca siyasi iktidara mesafeli olmuşlardır. Bu da bizi Osmanlı devlet örgütlenmesi ile Suudi-Vehhabi devlet örgütlenmesinde ulemanın devlete maaşla bağlanmasındaki benzerliği göstermektedir. Benzer şekilde, her iki örgütlenme de hanedana kayıtsız şartsız

bağlılık göstermektedir. Öte yandan benzer bir duruma Mısır ulemasında da rastlanmaktadır.[1087]

Bununla birlikte Masters "iş birliği" argümanı ile Arap vilayetlerinin bu devlet örgütlenmesine katılışını ve adem-i merkezi bir çizgi içinde olsa dahi onunla birlikte varlıklarını sürdürdüklerini ifade etmektedir. Diğer yandan, Arap vilayetlerinde Osmanlı varlığının ilk iki yüzyılında, doğrudan İstanbul tarafından atanan profesyonel Osmanlılar ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ancak bu düzen on sekizinci yüzyıl itibarıyla akamete uğramış, yerlerini Masters tarafından "kendi kendini inşa eden adamlar" olarak adlandırılan bir gruba bırakmışlardır. Masters'ın incelemesine göre bu kendi kendini inşa eden adamlar, İstanbul'un yaptırımlarından bağışık olan siyasi ve askeri gücün yerel temellerini yaratmakta şu ya da bu şekilde başarılı olmuş yereller değil, aksine "yerelleşmiş aktörler"di. Başka deyişle, on sekizinci yüzyıl boyunca imparatorluk merkezi karşısında önemli ölçüde özerklik sahibiydiler. Sultan III. Mustafa'nın doğrudan yönetimine karşı çıkan Ali Bey el-Kabir gibi isyankâr eden isimlerden örnek veren Masters yine isyancılardan hiçbirinin Osmanlı düzeninin otoritesine meydan okumadığının üzerini vurgulamaktadır. Aksine, onlar kendilerini Osmanlı sistemine entegre etmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu durumda Suudi-Vehhabiler yine çizilen tablonun dışında kalmakta, yani, iş birliği bir yana, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan dramatik bir kopuşu ve hatta onun otoritesine şiddetli bir meydan okuyuşu temsil ederler.

Bu noktada incelememizin ölçeği iyi daralarak Arabistan'da Suudi-Vehhabi siyasi-dini örgütlenmesinin otorite mekanizmalarına odaklanmaktadır. Mouline, neredeyse her zaman siyasi güçten bağımsız ve onun üzerinde olan bir seçkinler olarak ulemanın teorik bir taslağını çizmek için Weber'in üçlü otorite tipolojisine başvurur. Buna göre İslam peygamberinin Weberyen şema içindeki otoritesi karizmatik otoriteye karşılık gelmektedir. Böylelikle, ölümünün ardından bu otoriteyi kimin miras alacağı sorununa değinen Mouline ulemaya işaret etmektedir. Bu bakımdan mukaddes metne belirli bir anlam tayin etmesi ile Mouline'nin ulemayı İslam'ın din adamları olarak adlandırması arasında bir denge vardır. Söz konusu çalışmasında kolektif bir

[1087] Cuno, "Egypt to c. 1919," 83.

yapı olarak ulemanın iki temel işlevinden bahsedilmektedir: Doğru inanç ve doğru uygulama. Ulema, kutsal kaynakları yorumlayarak "inançları, cennetin coğrafyasını ve Tanrı imgesini belirler" ve "uygun sosyo-dini davranış ve uygulamaları tanımlar".[1088] Başka deyişle, ulemanın bilgi üzerindeki hakimiyeti ve tekeli ile İslami bilgi artık bir geleneğe sahiptir; nelerin dahil edilip edilmeyeceğine dair bir kanona, yani bir listeye. Liste içinde kalanlar gelenekçi ulemaca Sünnet-i seniyye olarak anılırken, dışarıda kalanlar sapkın sayılmıştır. Öte yandan doğdu inanç ve uygulama ikilisi kaçınılmaz olarak bunların dayatılmasını sağlayacak bir siyasi otoriteye de ihtiyaç duymaktadır ki bu kısaca nizam ya da düzendir. Dolayısıyla incelememizde devleti bu son kavram içinde bulmaktayız. Ancak bu tasnifin aslında Sünni İslam siyasetinde yaygın, hatta temel uygulama olduğunu da vurgulamak gerekir. Dinin idamesini sağlamak devletin görevidir, din ise devlete, yani hanedana meşruiyet sağlamaktadır.

Suudi-Vehhabi olgusunu eşyanın tabiatı gereği İslam dünyası içinde ele almak dinden, dini düşünceden ve bunun siyasete yansımasından bağımsız düşünülemez. Dolayısıyla incelememizin üçüncü bölümü tahlilin ayaklarını daha sağlam bir zemin üzerine inşa etmek için bir takım teolojik kavramları incelemektedir. Aslında, burada unutulmaması gereken nokta, mevzu bahis kavramların çeşitli siyasi amaçlara harç yapılmak üzere ajandası olan bir yorumlar bütününe tabi tutulmalarından dolayı ve teolojinin her şeyden çok inanca dayalı olması gerçeğini de göz önünde bulundurarak, tutarlı bir kavramsal zeminden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla her iki taraf da aynı kavramsal çerçeve içinde karşısındakini inanç sahasının dışına itmeyi amaçlamıştır. Aslında tam da bu noktada siyasi güç devreye girmektedir. Teolojik tartışma, yeni bir olası topluluğun davaya katılması için ikna edici olmadığında, devlet kurma ve varlığını sürdürmenin bir aracı olarak siyasi zorlama, yıldırma veya basitçe savaş, ikna etmenin nihai yöntemi haline gelmektedir. Bağlamda, *bağıy* (haddi aşarak zulmetme), *bid'at* (Selef-i Salihin'de temeli olmayan yenilik), *emr-i bi'l-ma'ruf ve nehy-i ani'l-münker* (iyi emretme ve kötüyü yasaklama), *fitne* (düzeni bozmak), *içtihâd* (bağımsız akıl yürütme), *cihat* (mukaddes savaş), *mülhid* (dinden dönen),

[1088] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 2.

mürtet (inkâr eden), *müşrik* (Allah'ın birliğini inkar eden), *küfür* (gerçeği örterek onu inkar eden), *şefaat* (Allah'tan başkasını Allah'a aracı tayin ederek yardım dileme), *tekfir* (küfre düşeni din dışı ilan etmek), *taklit* (nedenlerini sorgulamaksızın bir mezhep imamına bağlanıp onu taklit etmek), *el-vela ve'l-bera* (Müslümanlarla yakınlaşıp Müslüman olmayanlardan uzak durmak). Tüm bu kavramlar hem Suudi-Vehhabi siyasi-dini örgütlenmesinin iç dünyası ve dış dünyaya bakışları hakkında fikir sahibi olmayı sağlamakta hem de etraflarında halihazırda asırlardı şekillenmiş olan siyasi-dini yapıların onlara bakışı hakkında birinci elden fikir vermektedir. Son olarak Suudi-Vehhabi hakimiyeti altında yaşayan bir Müslümanın sosyal yaşamı en küçük noktasına kadar yukarıda işaret edilen kavramlar çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir.

Meselenin tarihsel bütünlüğü içinde incelenebilmesi için dini kavramların ne kadar önemi varsa İbn Abdülvehhab'ın yaşamı ve din anlayışı da aynı ölçüde önemlidir. Dolayısıyla, hareketin kurucusunun yaşamı kendi kaynaklarından çalışmaya aktarılmıştır. İbn Abdülvehhab'ın Hanbeli ulema kökenli bir aileden geliyor olmasına rağmen doğduğu köy el-Uyeyne'de babasından ders aldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak kaynaklarda aktarıldığı üzere bu tedrisatın içeriğinin ne olduğu ya da hangi kaynaklar üzerine çalıştığı hakkında herhangi bir bilgi veya fehrese mevcut değildir. Bundan sonra İbn Abdülvehhab'ın ilm peşinde seyahatlere çıktığı üzerine çeşitli spekülasyonlar vardır. Ancak bunların en makul olanı Hicaz ve Irak bölgelerine yaptığı seyahatlerdir. Hicaz'da aldığı eğitim de yine hiçbir kaynakta açık bir şekilde yazılı değildir. Tek bilinen, dini saflaştırarak özüne döndürmeye yönelik anlayışının burada şekillenmiş olması gerektiğidir. İlginç olan şu ki, Hicaz'da kaldığı dönem boyunca ders aldığı hocalarından hiçbiri Hanbeli değildir, hatta hocalarının hocaları dahi Hanbeli değildir. Zaten kaynaklar da hocalarından aldığı eğitimden ziyade tevhid ilminin İbn Abdülvehhab'ın göğsüne indirildiği iddiasını açıkça kayıt düşmektedirler. Dolayısıyla Hicaz'da temsil edilen Sünni gelenekle İbn Abdülvahhab ve ardından gelen Vehhabi uleması arasındaki tükenmek bilmez tartışmalar ve çatışmanın temeli İbn Abdülvehhab'ın din, Sünnet ve gelenekten ne aldığında aranmalıdır.

Kısacası bu Sünni geleneği yeniden tanımlamaktır. Bunlar şöyle özetlenebilir: Sadece Selef-i Salihin'i geçerli saymak, dışında kalan tüm birikimi bid'at kabul etmek, icma, tevil ve mezhep karşıtlığı, batıni referansı olan tüm dini birikimi sapkın görmek, dini ilimlerde aşırı derinleşmeyi (*ta'ammuk*) gereksiz görmek, din ve inancın

kaynağını sadece Kur'an ve hadis içine temellendirmek, Necid'in göçebe unsurlarını din dışı görmek, evliya tazimini, onlardan şefaat dilemeyi ya da kısaca istigaseyi küfür sayarak bunları yapanları tekfir etmek akla ilk gelen örneklerdir. Hatta ona göre kendi zamanının küfrü, İslam peygamberinin zamanının küfründen daha kötüdür. İbn Dolayısıyla Abdülvehhab'ın tasfiye hareketi daha başından Necid'de ciddi tepkiyle karşılanmış ve neredeyse yaşamına mal olan Basra, Hureymile ve el-Uyeyne tecrübelerinin ardından ancak Suud ailesinin himayesi altında yaşama fırsatı bulabilmiştir. 1744'te Suudlarla yapılan biatlaşma İbn Abdülvahhab'a düşüncelerini yayma ve yazma olanağı da tanımış, hem kendi soyundan gelecek olan ulemanın ilk neslini yetiştirmiş hem Suudların bu yeni dini anlayış içinde siyasi emellerini pekiştirme ve uygulama fırsatı sağlamıştır. Devletin işleyişi içinde doğrudan yer almıştır. Örneğin İbn Abdülvehhab'ın devlet hazinesini idare ettiği ve I. Abdülaziz'i bu konuda yetiştirdiği bilinmektedir. Öte yandan, İbn Abdülvehhab'ın ardında bıraktığı yazılarının sadece dini akide üzerinedir ve özü itibarıyla onu kendi anlayışı doğrultusunda yeniden tanımlamak amacındadırlar. Dolayısıyla, kurucusunun 1792'deki ölümünü takiben tüm bu yeni yaklaşımı miras alan Vehhabi ulema, on dokuzuncu ve yirminci yüzyıl boyunca Vehhabi zihniyeti Sünni ve Selefi birikim içinde eritmeye çalışmışlardır. Bunu yaparken özellikle Sünni fıkıh ve tefsir kaynaklarına başvurdukları açıktır.

Ancak tartışmanın yanlış mecralara sürüklenmemesi için burada Vehhabi anlayışın Sünni dünya dışında tasvir edilip konumlandırılmadığını da vurgulamaktayız. İbn Abdülvehhab'ın zaten topyekûn karşı olduğu Şia ya da diğer bir batıni/sufi gelenek içinde konumlanması eşyanın tabiatı gereği mümkün değildi. Dolayısıyla tezin böyle bir iddiası yoktur. İlkin, kendisi Necid ve Ahsa'daki ulema tarafından Sünni gelenek dışında, yeni yetme ve keyfi bir hareketin kurucusu olmakla itham edilmiştir. Bu o dönemin Sünni uleması için geçerli olabilir, ancak bizim böyle bir iddiamız da yoktur. Burada ifade edilmek istenen İbn Abdülvehhab'ın Sünni geleneği Selef-i Salih'le özdeşleştirirken, icma, taklit ve mezhep karşıtlığı üzerinden, son derece katı bir tevhit anlayışıyla yeniden tanımlayarak ve bunun, yani kendi anlayışı dışında kalanları tekfir etmiş olması, ardından gelen Vehhabi ulemasınınsa hareketi zamanla Sünni gelenek ve özellikle Selefi anlayış içine konumlandırmış olmalarıdır. Bu bağlamda Determann, yirminci yüzyılda Vehhabiliğin yayılması için

etkin bir araç olarak matbaanın rolünden bahsederken, "… pek çok Sünni Müslümanın gözünde Selef-i Salihin'in takipçileri olarak Vahhabilerin rehabilite edilmesi" şeklindeki tanımı açıklayıcıdır.[1089]

Şimdiye kadarki bölümler kavramsal çerçeve ve teori üzerineyken, sonraki bölümler Vehhabiliğin siyasi tarih boyutuna odaklanmaktadır. Mısır'ın 1811'de Arabistan'a girişi ve otuz yıl boyunca kurduğu hâkimiyet, bizim modern öncesi hâkimiyet tezimizi somutlaştırmaktadır. Henüz çevresine hızlı ve etkin bir şekilde askeri müdahale edebilecek kadar merkezileşmemiş bir Erken Modern imparatorlukta, merkezle iş birliği içinde olan yerel seçkin merkezi güç adına hareket eder. Dolayısıyla, on dokuzuncu yüzyılın hemen başında, önce Bağdat'tan Büyük Süleyman Paşa'nın, ardından Mısır'dan Muhammed Ali Paşa'nın Osmanlı Devleti adına iç Arabistan'a müdahalesi, kelimenin tam anlamıyla dolaylı askeri müdahalelerdir. Ancak birincisi başarılı olamasa da ikincisi 1811'den başlayarak Arabistan'da hakimiyetini yavaş yavaş geliştirmiş ve orada otuz yıl kalmayı başarmıştır. Birinci Suud devletinin başkenti Dir'iyye ile 1818'de Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın oğlu İbrahim Paşa tarafından yerle bir edilmesi, yedi yıl süren çetin bir savaşın nihai sonucu olarak dönemin en önemli olaylarındandır. Ancak 1836-38 arasında Mısır tarafından Necid'e bir müdahale daha gerçekleştirilmiştir. Öte yandan, Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın asıl amacının Arap Yarımadası çevresinde gerçekleşen kârlı ticaretten pay almak olduğu görülüyor. Başka bir deyişle, Mısır'ın iç Arabistan'a ve dolayısıyla Vehhabilere müdahalesi aslında bir bahanedir, çünkü önemli olan "Kullanışlı Arabistan"ın, yani yarımadanın kıyıları ve liman kentleridir. Ancak Mısır'ın, özellikle de giderek modernleşen Mısır'ın ticari sulardaki varlığı, uluslararası düzeyde bir endişenin de önünü açacaktır. Süveyş Kanalı'nın açılmasından önce dahi, İngiltere'nin baş düşmanı olan Fransa tarafından desteklenen bir Mısır (1833'te Hünkâr İskelesi'nin bir sonucu olarak Rusya tehdidiyle birleştiğinde), Hindistan'a çıkan deniz yolu düşünüldüğünde büyük bir rahatsızlık teşkil etmektedir. İngilizler için büyük önem taşıyan bu yollar, Arap Yarımadası'nın iki köşesindeki boğazlardan, Babülmendep ve Hürmüz Boğazı'ndan geçmektedir. Dolayısıyla Mısır'ın Arabistan'dan çıkarılmasındaki baş

[1089] Determann, "Globalization, the State, and Narrative Plurality: Historiography in Saudi Arabia," 57.

aktör Büyük Britanya olmuştur. 1840 Londra Konferansı Britanya'nın ticari ve güvenlik çıkarları bakımından bir zafer olarak görülebilir.

Dördüncü bölümün iki ana odak noktası vardır: Orta Arabistan'daki parçalanma ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bölgeye artan ilgisi. İkinci Suud devleti, bu genel çerçevede, yeniden doğuşunu birincisinin küllerinden bulur, ancak bu sefer sadece sınırlı bir güçle. Nitekim ulemanın yayılmacılıktan ziyade hareketi koruma ve özellikle hukuk ve hadislerde (Hindistan'da Ehl-i Hadis) kaynaklarını tespit etme çabası görülmektedir. 1806 yılında Mekke'nin ele geçirilmesiyle başlayan sürece on dokuzuncu yüzyılda öğretinin "rutinleşme"[1090] süreci ya da başka bir analizde özellikle emr-i bi'l-ma'ruf için "resmileşme"[1091] süreci olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Hem ideolojik hem de siyasi olarak eldeki dar sınırlarda, Suudi-Vehhabi seçkinleri bir kez daha Hicaz ve Ahsa arasında sıkışmakla kalmamış, Katar, Bahreyn, Kuveyt ve Umman şeyhleri gibi diğer yerel aktörler arasında da marjinal duruma düşmüşlerdir. İran Körfezi'ne de yansıyan bu kaotik siyasi durum Britanya'nın bu kıyı emirliklerini kendi siyasi etkisi altına almasına yol açacaktır. 1820'den itibaren Büyük Britanya, özellikle Bombay hükümeti aracılığıyla, bölgenin aktörleri arasında hakemlik rolü üstlendiği görülmektedir. Suudi-Vehhabi imamları ise dedelerinin mirasını bölgede yeniden diriltme çabasındadırlar. Özellikle Mısır birliklerinin Arabistan'dan tamamen çekildiği 1842 yılına kadar oldukça dar bir alanda hareket edebildikleri unutulmamalıdır. Faysal bin Türki'nin 1865'teki ölümü itibarıyla Suudi-Vehhabiler iç Arabistan'da ve Ahsa kıyılarında, eskisi kadar kuvvetli olmasalar da tutunmuşlardır.

Osmanlı müdahalesi ise geç gelecektir. Bunun nedeni imparatorluğun on dokuzuncu yüzyılda tecrübe ettiği çalkantılardır. Ancak Tanzimat seçkinlerinin ikinci kuşağı, Midhat Paşa gibi etkin bir isim bölgeye müdahale etme fırsatını bulabilmiştir. Paşa, müdahalenin başlıca gerekçesinin İran Körfezi'nde Britanya etkisi olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu nedenle, Faysal bin Türki'nin 1865'teki ölümünden itibaren taht kavgasında olan oğulları Suud ve Abdullah kardeşlerden birinin nihayet İngilizlerden yardım alacağından endişe duymaktadır. Bu endişe daha sonra halefi Rauf Paşa

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[1090] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 77.

[1091] Michael Cook, "The Ḥanbalites of Najd", 68.

tarafından sert bir şekilde eleştirilir ve bu bölgede devletin kaynaklarını israf etmekle suçlandı.

Öte yandan iç savaş Vehhabi uleması için de bir imtihanıdır. Kimin kâfir kimin gerçek Müslüman olduğuna ilk kez kendi düzenleri içinde, hem de en üst siyasi düzeyde karar vermeleri gerekecektir. İç savaş sırasında Riyad'da kalan Vehhabi uleması, iki kez çelişkiye düşerek kafir ilan ettiği Suud'u Vehhabi imamı tayin edecektir. Ancak bir Vehhabi alimi için ümmetin birliğini (tabii ki burada ümmetten kasıt Vehhabilerin kendileridir) sağlamak çelişkiye düşmekten ya da Crawford'un işaret ettiği üzere siyasi fırsatçılıktan daha önemlidir. Bu bize, en azından Vehhabi örneğinde, din ve siyasetin bölünmezliğini de göstermektedir. Ancak, Midhat Paşa'nın 1871'de askeri operasyonuyla, iki asır sonra Arabistan'ın doğu kıyısında Osmanlı siyasi varlığının yeniden ve bu kez doğrudan tesis edilmesi, bölgedeki güç dengeleri bakımından hayati önem arz etmektedir.

Ancak bölgede Suudi-Vehhabilerin, Mısır işgali sırasında Hail'e muhafız olarak yerleştirdikleri Raşidiler, Mısır'ın bölgeyi tahliye etmesinden sonra güç kazanmakta olan diğer başat bir hanedandır. Suudi-Vehhabilerle Raşidilerin siyasi emelleri ise Necid'in kuzeyindeki Kasim'de çatışmaya girecektir. Çatışmanın zirvesi ise 1891'de Müleyyide'deki savaşa varacaktır. Suudların Necid'den atılmasıyla sonuçlanan savaş iç ve kuzey Arabistan'da Raşidilerin başat güç olmalarını sağlamıştır. Temelde Cebelü Şammar aşiretlerinden oluşan göçebe bir konfederasyonun üyesi olan aile, dolaylı olarak da olsa bölgede Osmanlı devleti ile ortak faaliyet yürütecektir.

Yapılan araştırmadan anlaşıldığı üzere, İbn Abdülvehhab'ın İslam anlayışının tek başına hayatta kalma tecrübesi, Basra, Hureymile ve el-Uyeyne örneklerinde başarısız olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, İbn Abdülvehhab'ın asıl amacı siyasi bir otorite ile bütünleşmek olmamakla birlikte, ki bu el-Uyeyne örneğinden dolayı şüphelidir, nihayet Dir'iyye'ye sığınmak zorunda kalmıştır. Yani Suudlar, hareketin kurucusu için artık bir sığınaktırlar. Bundan sonra, özellikle evlilik yoluyla kurulan akrabalık ilişkileri de dikkate alındığında, İbn Abdülvehhab ve onun soyundan gelenler için Suudlar dışında pek bir seçenek kalmamıştır. Çünkü başka bir koruyucu arayışı hareketi hem salt bir oportünizme indirgeyecek hem de başka bir hami bulma çabası, hareketin sert İslam anlayışı yüzünden riskli bir girişim olacaktır. Diğer deyişle dünyevi iktidar bir zorunluluktur. Zaten böyle bir çabaya kaynaklarda da

rastlanmamıştır ve Vehhabi uleması, 1860'larda çıkan iç savaş gibi en zor zamanlarda dahi Suudların yanında yer almıştır. Mouline, Necid'de Vehhabilerin dayattığı dini anlayışın homojenleşmesi sürecinde siyasi otoriteye duyulan bağımlılığı (siyasi) düzen kavramı içinde izah etmektedir.[1092] Bugün iki kanat birbirinden ayrılması pek de mümkün görünmeyen bir bütündür ve halen birbirlerine meşruiyet zemini sağlamaktadırlar.

Dolayısıyla bu ilişkinin ulaştığı son nokta, kaçınılmaz olarak devlet inşasıdır. Belirtildiği gibi, Necid, Suudi-Vahhabilerin gelişinden önce, Benu Ukayzir dışında herhangi bir devlet oluşumu görmemiştir, çünkü Necid coğrafyası ve iklim koşulları nedeniyle buna pek imkân veren bir bölge değildir. Zaten Necidli olan Suudlar içinse devlet oluşumunu mümkün kılan Vehhabilik olmuştur. Bu, kelimenin tam anlamıyla doğrudur, çünkü Suudlar vergi toplamış, valiler ve kadıları tayin etmiş, hazineye tesis etmiş ve memurlarına, özellikle de din adamları ve kadılara buradan maaş vermişler, son olarak, yerleşik ya da göçebe olsun yerli nüfustan asker toplamışlardır. Ancak vurgulandığı gibi bu, kelimenin dünyevi veya cumhuriyetçi anlamında bir devlet inşası değil, tam tersine Crawford'un da işaret ettiği gibi, dini rejimin inşasıdır. Haliyle, eğer bir devlet kurma amacı varsa, bu ancak Suudlar için geçerlidir. Öte yandan devlet, en azından teoride, dini kurum ve idealin hizmetindedir. Son olarak iki noktaya değinmek gerekir: Birincisi, eğer fetih ve cihat gibi siyasi emelleriyle Suudi-Vahhabilik bir devlet oluşumuysa, hiçbir şekilde Arap "millet"ine dayalı bir ulus inşası değildir. O dönemde böyle bir kaygı yoktur. Crawford tarafından vurgulandığı gibi amaç, kelimenin tam manasıyla Platoncu bir evrenselcilikti.[1093] İkincisi, tüm referansları anladıkları şekliyle Sünni geleneğe olan Suudi-Vehhabiler hiçbir zaman hilafet iddiasında bulunmamışlardır. Bu ilginçtir ve Crawford'a göre iki nedeni vardır: Sünni görüşe göre hilafetin meşruiyetinin temelini oluşturan şey şeriatın uygulanmasıdır. Ancak bu kaçınılmaz olarak Osmanlı'nın halifeliğini tanımama ve ona karşı olmayı

[1092] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 86.

[1093] Michael Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 92.

gerektirmektedir. İbn Abdülvehhab ise reform hareketinin bu erken ve görece zayıf döneminde Osmanlıların öfkesini çekmek istememektedir.[1094]

Ancak Osmanlılar ile Suudlar arasındaki siyasi mücadelenin ideolojik temellerinin onların İslam inancını anlama ve yorumlamalarında yattığını söylemek yanlış olmaz. Sonuçta her iki taraf da diğerini marjinalleştirmek için dini söyleme başvurmaktadır. Bu tarihi bir gerçektir. Yukarıda da işaret edildiği gibi oldukça savunmacı olan Hanbeli mezhebi buna ayrıca izin vermektedir. Osmanlılar büyük ölçüde batıni çağrışımlarla tasavvufî yönelimli, Hanefi mezhebinin resmi temsilcisiyken, Vehhabiler literalist, tasavvuf karşıtı ve köklerini Hanbeli mezhebinde bulan, tasavvuf karşıtı bir dini örgütlenmedir. Bu nedenle, böyle bir tarihsel bagajda, her iki hareketin de karşısındakini kafir, kendisini ise hak dinin temsilcisi olarak algılaması zor değildir. Eldeki tarihsel gerçeklik de bunu göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, devlet kurma argümanı göz önüne alındığında, bu, kaçınılmaz olarak Suudi-Vehhabileri, Necid'de olmasa da Hicaz'a saldırarak Haremeyn'i ele geçirdiklerinde, Osmanlı otoritesine meydan okuyan bir konuma getirmektedir. Ancak öyle ya da böyle, her iki taraf da birbirine karşı dini ve mezhepsel argümanları kullanmaktan geri durmamıştır. Siyasi ve iktisadi çıkar çatışması bir yana, en azından bu açıdan, çatışmanın önemli bir kısmının inanç temelinde ve onun tarihsel bir bagajla yorumlanmasında yattığı söylenebilir. Sonuç itibarıyla, Suudların siyasi fetih ideolojisini meşru kılan Vehhabi anlayışının bizzat kendisidir.

Fakat bu, Osmanlı bağlamında Suudi-Vehhabileri basitçe isyankâr bir eşkıya güruhuna indirgemek için yeterli midir? Bu soruya olası cevap, "kullanışlı Arabistan" ve *terra nullius* arasındaki ayrımda yatmaktadır. Dört klasik coğrafi bölgeden üçü "kullanışı Arabistan"ın parçasıdır: Hicaz, Ahsa ve güney, yani Umman ve Hadramut. Bu bölgeleri kullanışlı kılan, tarım ve yerel ticaretin yanı sıra, kazançlı bir ticaret ağıyla denizlere ve dış dünyaya bağlarıdır. Hicaz, Mısır'a ve Osmanlı merkezine, Umman ve Hadramut Hint Okyanusu'na, Ahsa ise İran Körfezi aracılığıyla yine Hint Okyanusu'na açılmaktadır. *Terra nullius* ise kimsenin üzerinde hak iddia etmediği yer anlamına gelmektedir ki bu da Necid'dir. Başka bir deyişle, Suudlar ya da diğer yerel

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[1094] Ibid.

aileler dışında Necid üzerinde hak iddia eden yoktur, mevzu bahis iddialarsa aslında Necid'in tümü üzerinde değil, aksine küçük şehirler ve kasabalar üzerinedir. Bu durum, on yedinci yüzyıldan itibaren Ahsa da dahil olmak üzere devam etmekteydi ve bölgedeki Osmanlı siyasi varlığı en iyi ihtimalle ancak isimden ibaretti. Nitekim Kurşun ve Akyıldız on yedi ve on sekizinci yüzyıllarda bölgede bir Osmanlı Barışı'ndan söz etseler de Osmanlı idaresi altındaki bölgeleri sayarken Necid'i listelerine dahil etmemektedirler.[1095] Suudi-Vahhabilerin devlet inşasına izin veren işte bu iktidar boşluğuydu. Ayrıca Necid'in coğrafi izolasyonu, aile üyelerinin sayısı dışında Suud devletinin siyasi ömrünü önemli ölçüde uzatmıştır. Zira başkentleri el-Dir'iyye ve daha sonra Riyad'a askeri müdahalenin zorluğu bölgeye müdahale etmiş olan Osmanlı valileri tarafından da dile getirilmektedir. Dolayısıyla Osmanlı merkezi yönetimi, Tanzimat'ın ilanından otuz yılı aşkın bir süre sonra, ancak 1871'de mümkün olan bir askeri müdahale ile bölgede otorite kurabilmiştir. Bundan önce doğrudan müdahale yapılmamış ve konu yerel güçlere havale edilmiştir. Bunların dışında, Suudi-Vehhabilerin bölgede huzursuzluk kaynağı olarak görülmesinin nedeni, doğal ve coğrafi sınırlarının çok ötesine, Asir, Irak, Ahsa, Şam vilayeti ve Hicaz'a düzenledikleri yağma akınlarıdır. Ne de olsa bu toplanan vergilerin yanı sıra Suud devletlerinin en temel gelir kaynağıdır. On dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk on yılında Kerbelâ'da bin yıllık mezhepsel yaraları kaşıyarak Şiileri kendilerine karşı kışkırtmaları ise onlara imamları Abdülaziz'in 1803'te suikaste kurban gitmesine mal olmuştur. Bölgeye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bağlamında ister devlet kurma ister meydan okuma veya isyan olsun, iki tür müdahaleyi genel olarak kategorize etmek mümkündür: Tanzimat öncesi paradigmada olduğu gibi dolaylı ve Tanzimat sonrası paradigmada olduğu gibi, Midhat Paşa'nın şahsında doğrudan askeri müdahale.

Bu noktada Suudi-Vahhabilerin kaderi tarih yazımıyla kesişmektedir. Kelimenin tam anlamıyla bir tür olarak Necid'in profesyonel tarihi on sekizinci yüzyılın son yıllarında Suudların hamiliğinde başlamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, Suudi himayesi, Necid'in Vehhabi öncesi tarihlerinden çarpıcı biçimde ayrılan tarih yazımını

[1095] Ali Akyıldız and Zekeriya Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 4.

başlatmıştır. Bugün Suudi Arabistan, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin aşırılığı beslediği uyarıları karşısında dini metinlerini gözden geçirmeyi kabul ederken, tarihlerine hiçbir şekilde dokunmayacaklarını açıkça ifade etmektedirler ve bu, tarihlerine verdikleri önemin kanıtıdır.[1096] Dolayısıyla eldeki tarih literatürünün özünde bir Suudi-Vehhabi propagandası olduğu doğrudur: Bu Vehhabi kronikleri Determann tarafından haklı olarak "tekfirci" paradigma şeklinde sınıflandırılmaktadır; temsilcileri ise kronolojik olarak İbn Gannam, Hamad ibn Le'bun, İbn Bişr ve İbn İsa'dır ve "İbn Gannam ekolü" olarak adlandırılmaktadırlar.[1097] Tekfir için zemin oluşturmak üzere makul bir öteki yaratma ihtiyacı içinde diğer yerel emirliklere karşı cihadı mümkün kılan bu kaynaklar, İbn Abdülvehhab'ın hayatını peygamberin hayatına paralel olarak yeniden inşa etmektedirler. Dolayısıyla Necid'in İbn Abdülvehhab'dan önceki dönemi, İslam kaynaklarıyla aynı şekilde "Cahiliye" olarak anılmaktadır. Ancak Crawford[1098] ve Mouline'e[1099] göre, Necid'in inanç bakımından içinde bulunduğu durum birkaç yüzyıldır aynıdır ve İbn Abdülvehhab'ın reform hareketine kadar herhangi bir anormallik yoktur.

On dokuzuncu yüzyıldan itibaren, özellikle yüzyılın sonuna doğru matbaanın kitle propagandasına dahil olmasıyla, Suudlar bu türün propagandasını yapmışlar ve Suudların çıkarlarına ters düşen Necid ile Arabistan'ın diğer tüm tarihlerini, Mukbil ez-Zukayr ve Abdullah el-Bassam örneklerinde olduğu gibi sansürlemişlerdir. Vehhabilik, yine matbaanın da yardımıyla 1920'lerden itibaren Selefiliğin bir parçası olarak gösterilmiş ve böylece Sünni Müslümanlar nezdinde Selefi bir hareket olarak itibar kazanmasına çaba harcanmıştır. Bütün bunlar göz önüne alındığında, Vehhabi kroniklerinin hem Arap hem de gayri-Arap olmayan diğer çağdaş kaynaklarla çapraz kontrol edilmesi gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

[1096] Rosie Bsheer, *Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia*, xi–xii.

[1097] Jorg Matthias Determann, ibid., 49–58.

[1098] Michael Crawford, *Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhab*, 62.

[1099] Nabil Mouline, *The Clerics of Islam*, 50.

Son olarak, Vehhabiliğin genelde İslam dünyasında, özelde Türkiye'de İngilizlerin yardım ve desteğiyle doğan inorganik bir hareket olduğuna dair yaygın bir kanaat vardır.[1100] Ancak çalışmamızda böyle bir bulguya rastlanmamıştır. Vehhabilik üzerine literatür de böyle bir bilgi sunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle ve iddia edilenin tam aksine, hareketin İngiliz deniz gücü ve Bombay'daki hükümetle olan ilişkileri, Vehhabiliğin Britanya, en azından Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar, yerel ve küresel güçler tarafından pek de hoş karşılanmadığını göstermek üzere korsanlık faaliyetleri bağlamında ele alınmıştır.

Son tahlilde, girişte belirttiğim soruların cevaplarının bu şekilde verilebileceğine inanıyorum. İlk devlet, yayılmacı ve tekfirci politikasıyla sınırlarını genişletmiştir. İkinci devletse, benzer ölçekte bir sahada olmasa da varlığını korumuş ve hanedanın varlığını sürdürürken ulemanın ihtiyaç duyduğu güvenli alanı sağlamıştır. Böylece ulema, inancı klasik Sünni kaynaklar içinde konumlandırma fırsatı bulmuş ve kriz zamanlarında bile ümmetin birliği endişesiyle hanedana dini ve siyasi meşruiyet sağlamıştır. Dolayısıyla ikinci devlet, yirminci yüzyıla geçişi sağlayan köprüyü her şeyden önce hanedan adına inşa etmiştir. Bu da bize hareketin hanedan ve siyaseten meşru bir lider olmaksızın bir devlete evrilemeyeceğini göstermektedir. Bunun tersi ise Vehhabiliğin kendisi için geçerlidir; Suudlar Vehhabilik olmadan Arabistan'da bu denli başat ve devamlılığını idame ettiren bir rol üstlenemezdi. Dolayısıyla ikili sarmal yapı bir kez daha karşımıza çıkmaktadır: Ulema ve İmam, Âl el-Şeyh ve Âl-i Suud.

Son olarak, efsanevi İbn Suud'un 1902'de küçük bir birlikle Riyad'ı aldığında şahsında ilk işaretleri somutlaşan üçüncü devlet, eşyanın tabiatı gereği bazı sorunları da atalarından miras almaktadır: İbn Suud'u üç cepheden, Hicaz, Doğu Ürdün ve Irak'tan kuşatan Mekke Şerifliği, Hail'de mukim Raşidiler kuzeyde diğer bir güçlü bir cepheyi temsil etmektedirler, göçebe kabilelerin iskan sorunu ve artık oldukça örgütlü hale gelmiş bir ulema sınıfı ki İkinci Dünya Savaşı arifesinde yabancı güçlerle işbirliği yapmaya hiçbir şekilde hevesli oldukları söylenemez. Ancak İbn Suud için bunlardan

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[1100] Esther Peskes, "Die Wahhābīya als innerislamisches Feinbild. Zum Hintergrund anti-wahhabitischer Publikationen in der zeitgenössichen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams* 40, no. 3 (2000): 344–74.

belki de en önemli olanı ve belki de ona kâbuslar yaşatanı, çocukluk anılarında kalsa da hâlâ somut bir tehlike olan, muhtemel bir taht mücadelesidir.

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