THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST IN THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING IN KAZAKHSTAN

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ALİ DENİZ USTA

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Approval of the Graduate of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art.

_____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur **(METU, HIST.)** _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün **(METU, SOC.)** _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen **(METU, SOC.)** _____

I hereby declare that all information in this dissertation has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name : Ali Deniz Usta

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST IN THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING IN KAZAKHSTAN

Ali Deniz Usta

M.S., Eurasian Studies

Supervisor: Assis. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün

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In this thesis, the purpose is to analyze the path that the nation building process in Kazakhstan has been following in the post-Soviet period through examining the various policies implemented and the official rhetoric and discourses stated by the Kazakh policymakers. The ethno-symbolist approach of Anthony D. Smith and the views of Walker Connor and Willfried Spohn on nationalism and national identity have been utilized in the analysis of the research. The Soviet Nationalities Policy is examined to be able to better understand the post-Soviet nation-building, because the policies implemented under this comprehensive project, which had been outlined by the Bolsheviks, had deep political, cultural, demographic and linguistic impacts on the process in Kazakhstan. The ethnic situation has also been laid down in order to highlight under which ethnic circumstances the nation building process has been taking place. After analyzing the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the post-Soviet policies about language, education, employment, culture and national symbols, the statements of the President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the move of capital, this study claims that post-Soviet nation building process and nationalism in Kazakhstan have both ethnic and civic components whereby the nation building process in Kazakhstan is a more ethnic process than it is civic.

Keywords: Nation building, nationalism, Kazakh, Kazakhstan, nation, national identity, Soviet Nationalities Policy, ethno-symbolism, ethnic, civic.

ÖZ

KAZAKİSTAN'DAKİ MİLLET İNŞASI SÜRECİNDE
GEÇMİŞİN YENİDEN İNŞASI

Ali Deniz Usta

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Bu tezde amaç, Kazak siyasetçiler tarafından izlenen politikaların, resmi söylemlerin ve yapılan açıklamaların incelenerek, Sovyet sonrasındaki dönemde Kazakistan'daki millet inşası sürecinin izlediği yolun analiz edilmesidir. Bu çalışmanın analizinde, Anthony Smith'in etno-sembolist yaklaşımından ve Walker Connor ile Willfried Spohn'un milli kimlik ve milliyetçilikle ilgili görüşlerinden faydalanılmıştır. Bolşevikler tarafından şekillendirilen Sovyet Milletler Politikası kapsamında yapılan uygulamaların, günümüz Kazakistan'ına demografik, kültürel, politik ve dil bakımından yaptığı derin etkiler nedeniyle ve bugün Kazakistan'da uygulamaya çalışılan millet inşası sürecinin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi amacıyla, Milletler Politikası incelenmiştir. Millet inşası sürecinin hangi etnik durum içerisinde sürdüğünü aydınlatmak için, Kazakistan'daki etnik durum ortaya konulmuştur. Kazakistan anayasasının, Sovyet sonrası dil, eğitim, işe alma, kültür ve milli semboller ile ilgili politikaların ve devlet başkanı Nazarbayev'in açıklamaları ile başkentin taşınmasının incelendikten sonra bu çalışmada savunulan düşünce, Kazakistan'daki Sovyet sonrasında millet inşası sürecinin ve milliyetçiliğin, hem etnik hem de yurttaşlıkla ilgili unsurlar içermekle beraber, daha ziyade etnik unsurlar içerdiğidir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Millet inşası, Kazak, Kazakistan, millet, milli kimlik, Sovyet Miletler Politikası, etno-sembolizm, etnik, yurttaşlığa dayalı.

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For my father,

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always trusted in me,

and for my precious family.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introducing the Study

On the evening of December 25, 1991, the red Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin, marking the end of the Soviet Union. On the territories of the USSR, 15 nation-states emerged and this dissolution left these states with enormous transition tasks. As all of the post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan also had to build an independent state after 1991 upon the fall of the Soviet Union and had to deal with nation building and state building problems. For all post-Soviet states, the transition was a great challenge, but this was even a greater challenge for Kazakhstan. The problems of creating viable state institutions and regimes, national consciousness and transition to market economy were all common in all post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan. However, in Kazakhstan, which has heterogeneous, multi-ethnic population, the nation-state building process was even more difficult. The Kazakhs had never constituted the majority during the Soviet era and even after independence until 1998 (with 50.6 %)[1] in their own republic. Especially in the northern parts of the country, more than half of the population is composed of the non-Kazakhs and among these non-Kazakhs, it is the Russians that constitute the majority. Accordingly, Kazakhstan shows a large degree of linguistic Russification that the percentage of Kazakhs who speak Russian at home is the highest among the titular nationalities of the former non-Slavic Soviet Union republics (Rywkin, 1998).

Actually, for Kazakhstan, structural, political, demographic and economic factors still pose potential causes for future challenges to nation-building and state-building processes, whereby borders, which were artificially drawn by the Soviet state, and histories of the region are still contested. Besides these, there is no consensus among the majority of people on the issue of the national identity. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan, under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev (the president of the country), achieved a smooth transition into an independent statehood

[1] Data is online available at http://www.president.ka.

avoiding serious violence and establishing stability,. Nazarbayev adopted a nation-state building strategy that emphasizes the need for political stability, and deployed discourses and policies, which blur the differences and lessen tensions in the country (Olcott, 2000).

Considering these facts, it can be said that the direction of the Kazakh nation-state building process is yet not clear, but the factors which played role in the formation of the Kazakh self-perceptions can be identified. In order to build a viable nation and state, the Kazakh government has selected some elements of the past. Whilst few of these elements were related to the Soviet era experience, the majority of the others were from pre-Soviet period and a more distant, ancient past. Today, the Kazakhs are confronted not only with problems about post-Soviet triple-transition, at which state building, nation building and economic transition exist simultaneously, but also with problems about searching for an identity and merging the fractured parts of their history, as the Soviet experience made a profound impact on the Kazakh identity creating a gap between the contemporary/post-Soviet and old/pre-Soviet Kazakh identities. For the Kazakhs, re-establishing a sense of continuity both in their own and others' eyes is of great importance to be able show that they are not just the products of Russian and Soviet social and cultural policies. They try to show that they have historical roots and historical legitimacy and trace back their history well over two thousand years ago. Therefore, paraphrasing Yiftachel, today, the Kazakhs try to prove that the areas and sites in Kazakhstan reflect the traditions and the history of the Kazakhs, and use these places as symbols to provide evidence of a glorious past, to commemorate the important historical events and to reproduce the national identity and promote the position of Kazakh culture (2001: 370). In a nutshell, the Kazakhs try to prove that Kazakhstan territory belongs to them and the state, which is the primordial homeland of them. Actually, the nation building process should be carried out without excluding Kazakhstan's the non-Kazakh nationalities (i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Germans, Uzbeks, Koreans), because a peaceful ethnic heterogeneity and stability is possible only if the non-Kazakh ethnic groups feel themselves included in the new nation and/or national identity which is under construction.

As a matter of fact, the nation-building process in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, as in other post-Soviet borderlands, is not a straight one with clear paths and a clear

roadmap, as given the fact that the nation-building has been oscillating between inclusive and exclusive policies since independence. On the one hand, there are seemingly ethnic policies representing evidence to an ethnic nation-building, which contradicts with the official rhetoric stressing the inclusive and civic "Kazakhstani" identity, such as rewriting of history, introduction of new institutions, new emblems and symbols; elevation of the national language; Kazakh, to the status of the only state language; renaming of public places; use of language as a barrier to employment in state institutions; implementation of state programs with the aim of re-creating and preserving the Kazakh culture and cultural heritage, and move of capital. On the other hand, however, the Kazakh state has been pursuing seemingly civic policies coherent with the civic nation building and the rhetoric of building an inclusive "Kazakhstani" identity. For instance, in order to create an inclusive national identity, all ethnic groups are welcomed to live in Kazakhstan, which is secured by the constitution. According to the Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, everyone is equal before the law and court and no one can be subjected to any kind of discrimination, i.e. origin, social property status occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, and attitude towards religion, convictions, place of residence etc. Furthermore, the Kazakh administration has been putting pressure on radical nationalists (including the Kazakh ones), radical religious groups (like the Wahhabis or other radical groups) whereby not intervening in religious affairs as long as they remain within the limits of spiritual and cultural sphere and not poured into the political sphere.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that since the independence, there have been policies determined by trial-and-error method. For instance, the government sometimes implemented or intended to implement ethnic policies (i.e. suggestion that only the ethnic Kazakhs should be the president, denotation of the territory of Kazakhstan as the primordial homeland of Kazakhs in the 1993 Constitution, the status of Russian Language in 1993 Constitution), but when these policies met with severe criticism from different factions of the population and elites (especially from Russians), these were either replaced by more civic policies or entirely cancelled. Briefly, one can argue that the policies of Kazakhization which were promoted in the first years of the independence were slowed down later on by the state administration in order not to spoil relatively peaceful inter-ethnic balance in the country. In other

words, ethnic policies have lost their initial impetus and more civic policies were adopted over time. In accordance with this fact, these policies also need further examination before denoting them as ethnic or civic.

As the above mentioned shed light on the issue, nation-building has been a very challenging process with its ambiguities in Kazakhstan, because, in contrast to Western examples, where nation building and state building processes occurred in different times, in Kazakhstan, the nation-building and state-building processes are going hand in hand simultaneously. In fact, the nation building process in Western Europe occurred as a transition from feudal structures to central kingdoms and then to nation states. Yet, the experience of post-Soviet states was different from those Western examples and had different dynamics. For example, during the first years of the Soviet Union, the Soviet administration gave cultural rights to the ethnic groups and nationalities comprising the Union within the territories that were officially recognized by the Center. Political and autonomous administrative units based on national or ethnic identity were established with the aim of creating a homogenous Soviet culture (Tishkov, 1997: 30-33), but contrarily, this led to the institutionalization of the ethnicity under the Soviet rule. As a consequence, the Soviet rule, in a way, aided to the formation of a national identity among the Kazakhs, even if unintentionally, thus there has become a strong relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in Kazakhstan, and nationalism is understood within an ethno-national sense.

Therefore, Western literature and approaches about nation-building and nationalism are not equally relevant to understand non-Western experiences, even if they have often been powerful in explaining Western nation-state formation processes and useful in understanding the evolution of Western European states, as they often reflect western circumstances. Nevertheless, the assumptions of western literature have some bearing on the post-Soviet nation building processes, as the same terminology and categories are also used by policymakers in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, regarding there are differences in contents of the similar terminologies, the western terminology on nation building and nationalism provide us a starting point and a tool of analysis.

In the light of these facts, I will take use of especially the views of Anthony Smith in order to examine the nation building process in Kazakhstan. Besides Smith,

the views of Willfried Spohn, who argues that western modernity is only one of the other types of modernity and proposes that ethnicity and religion are also components of identity; and the views of Walker Connor, who argues that a nation is a group of people believing that they are ancestrally related whatever the reality is, will additionally be adopted in this thesis, as they are also relevant with the case of Kazakhstan.

Anthony D. Smith argues that nationalism requires restoration and rediscovery of the nation's cultural identity, meaning to return to the authentic roots of historic culture community of ancestral homeland. The nation's members are conscious of their cultural unity and national history and they cultivate their identity in vernacular customs, languages, arts and landscapes through national education and institutions (2001: 34). In accordance with Smith's views, to be able to better understand the nation building process in Kazakhstan, the elements selected from the past aiming at forming the new national identity should be focused on, as this will enable us to understand how the Kazakhs are perceiving their distant past, because the way they define the past can help to clarify the issues related with the current situation and determine the way they construct the present. It is not possible to evaluate post-Soviet issues in Kazakhstan without looking back to the past and also without understanding the way they interpret the past. Maybe the past does not provide exact answers about the direction of the nation-building process of Kazakhstan, but the perception of the past and the way it is utilized may give us clues in order to understand the present, giving explanations for the events that otherwise seem confusing. In the case of Kazakhstan, it is especially important to penetrate beneath the surface of current events, because post-Soviet rhetoric and discourses are not sufficient and accurate guides for understanding more fundamental developments in the state and society notwithstanding the path of Kazakh nation building. These are not only driven by present circumstances but also as a response to historical legacy. Therefore, it is important to analyze how they see the past in order to better determine the aspects of nation-state building process in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Furthermore, as Smith noted, national culture is not restricted to private sphere, so the nation's culture should be expressed publicly bringing about a political symbolism. The cultural nation must become a political nation, so that nation is

characterized by a political culture with its political roles, institutions and unique symbols, such as flags, anthems, festivals, ceremonies, celebrations (2001: 34).

In addition, nationalism is often referred to two forms: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism, so the distinction is based on a civic/ethnic dichotomy. Civic nationalism is also called territorial nationalism which emphasizes civic political institutions and laws as the foundation of membership of a nation. Every member in the nation is a citizen with equal rights and duties regardless of ethnic ties. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is based on a community composed of common descent instead of territory, vernacular culture instead of law and blood ties instead of citizenship (Motyl, 2001: 151). Unlike civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism puts boundary markers to differentiate those eligible for the inclusion in the nation from those who are not, leading political elites to exploit the ethnic differences and promote ancient tribal and ethnic components for political gain. On the one hand, the civic outlook is adopted by the modernist paradigm, which holds that ethnicity has no historic link to modern nation-state formation, thus implying that nation-states are modern structures. On the other hand, the ethnic outlook is generally adopted by primordialist or partly by constructionist approaches, which assert that ethnicity is important and it is a continuation of past ethnic revivals, hence disputing the modern origin of nations.

In this thesis, on the one hand, by denoting the nation building and/or a policy as 'ethnic', it is meant that the process or policy is favoring and considering only the ethnic Kazakhs and excluding non-Kazakh groups. On the other hand, by denoting the nation building and/or a policy as 'civic', it is meant that the process or policy is inclusive, not only considers the Kazakhs but also the non-Kazakh groups in the country. Furthermore, the term 'Kazakhization' is used interchangeably with the term 'ethnic' nation building, whereby I differentiate the Kazakh identity and the Kazakhstani identity, because the Kazakh identity is an ethnic identity only confined to the Kazakh population, whereas the Kazakhstani identity is used for all citizens living on the territory of Kazakhstan, including both the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs.

In the light of these, in this thesis; the purpose is to examine how the past is reconstructed in the nation building process of Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet period. While searching the issue, the policies implemented by policymakers in post-Soviet

period for the purpose of building a nation will be examined. Accordingly, this thesis argues that the concept of Kazakh nation is constructed upon features of pre-modern (pre-Soviet) times, whereby adopting the view that modern nation incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnic community and owes much to the general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the modern era (Smith, 1986: 18).

Moreover, in this thesis, the ethnic and civic dichotomy is rejected and the opinion that every type of nationalism has both civic and ethnic components and characteristics whilst the degree and weight of the civic and ethnic elements changes in different situations is adopted. Hence, the research question in this thesis is "To which type of nationalism is the case of Kazakhstan closer?" rather than "Which type of nationalism is there in Kazakhstan?" As a result, discussing the significance and the degree of both civic and ethnic elements in Kazakh nationalism through analyzing the civic and ethnic aspects of this nation building process, I argue that Kazakh nationalism and nation building has both ethnic and civic components whereby I claim that nation building process in Kazakhstan is a more ethnic process than it is a civic process. In other words, nation builders in Kazakhstan has been occupied more with consolidating the Kazakh identity, the ethnic one, spending less effort for consolidating the Kazakhistani identity, the civic one.

In the following chapter, theories of nationalism will be studied. However, nation, national identity and ethnicity are not separable from each other even if they represent the different sides of the issue, therefore nation and national identity concepts will also be discussed. In the third chapter, the Soviet Nationalities Policy and the policies implemented by the Soviet policymakers under the heading of this policy will be laid down in order to study its impact on the post-Soviet nation building process. Furthermore, this will enable us to better understand the underlying reasons of ethnic and civic policies implemented in post-independence period. In the fourth chapter, policies implemented by the Kazakh policymakers in order to build a viable nation and national identity will be covered. Before examining the policies, the ethnic structure in post-Soviet Kazakhstan will be put forward to be able to understand under which ethnic circumstances the nation building process has taken place. Then, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the language issue, educational, cultural and religious policies, employment policy, National symbols

and holidays, move of capital, and statements of the President Nazarbayev on nation building process will be examined cautiously before denoting them as civic, ethnic or both.

1.2 Methodology

In this thesis, I will utilize a documentary research method. Documentary research involves the use of texts and documents as sources such as articles, books, government publications, newspapers, reports on statistics and research, etc. I believe this method will enable me to understand the contemporary post-Soviet nation-building process in Kazakhstan, through reviewing the available secondary materials and related documents. While studying how past is reconstructed in the nation-building process of Kazakhstan, documentary research method can be very useful to uncover the elements of the past and to compare the past and present meanings of the elements used in this process. The most important documents used in this study are the Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan and the declarations and speeches of officials including the speeches of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, one of the weaknesses of the research is that only sources and documents (i.e. articles, newspapers) in English and Turkish languages have been used. Nevertheless, this weakness can be compensated to some extent by reading translated documents that I obtained through intensive web search. One especially important disadvantage of documentary research method, in the case of secondary sources, is that the reliability of some documents may be open to debate, since those who record the information may distort the data. Further, historical documents can be amenable to manipulation and selective influence, so some resources may have been produced for canalizing the thoughts of people into a direction by powerful political groups. Similarly, new technologies (e.g., the internet) offer possibilities for acquiring documents, but I have to exercise a critical reflexivity, since many of the documents on the internet are produced by powerful political and economic groups or powerful states or NGOs supported by these groups, who want to disseminate their own views in line with their interests. Thus, I have tried to critically evaluate all the material while using all these documents. Another weakness of the thesis is that I did not have the possibility to carry out

interviews with the officials in Kazakhstan and the Kazakh(stani) people which would enable me to understand their perception about the nation-building process.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: APPROACHES TO NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

Kazakhstan's national identity and nation-building process began after the independence in 1991, as in other post-Soviet states. In Kazakhstan, the policymakers try to build two identities; Kazakh identity (ethnic) and Kazakhstani identity (civic), therefore, in Kazakhstan civic and ethnic nation-building processes are concomitant and go hand in hand. On the one hand, the Kazakh administration tries to create a viable Kazakh nation, eliminating sub-national intra-ethnic adherences. On the other hand, they try to build a Kazakhstani nation trying to eliminate inter-ethnic divisions on the basis of citizenship and civic-territorial approach. Nevertheless, the process is not easy from the context of nation-building. To illustrate, the historical experiences of the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs, as well as their languages are different from each other. Moreover, self-awareness or the awareness of the other, especially among the Kazakhs and the Russians, is strong, thus making the situation more confusing.

To be able to better understand the nation-building process in Kazakhstan, it is essential to focus on the theories of nationalism. Understanding nationalism requires the study of related concepts, such as ethnic identity, nation, national identity and nation-building which are interrelated, so that none can be understood in isolation from the others. The relevance of the concepts and theories developed in the western literature will be discussed in the case of Kazakhstan. As I mentioned before, the post-Soviet nation building has different dynamics from its western examples, nevertheless, terminology of western literature can give clues about post-Soviet nation building processes, providing us with a tool of analysis.

Since nationalism and construction of a national identity are the basic elements of the nation-building process, in this chapter, I will begin with presenting the main debates and approaches to national identity. Then I will discuss the main approaches to nationalism and nation-building. Finally, I will evaluate the specific case of Kazakhstan.

2.1 National Identity

National identity is being conscious of and belonging to a nation, so it is a collective identity that brings people together under a common brand. Nationalism differs from national identity, because nationalism is an ideological movement on behalf of the nation, in other words, national identity is activated by nationalism. In other words, as Sir Ernest Barker noted, "…a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force" (cited in Connor, 1994: 4). With dynamic force, nationalism is implied, so even if people are not nationalist, they can still have a national identity. Actually, as mentioned by Smith, national identity and nation are complex constructs composed of interrelated components such as ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. They present solidarity among members of communities united by shared memories, myths, and traditions. But, this may or may not take the form of state (Smith, 1991: 15). Hence, the definition of national identity is closely related with how the nation is defined, which varies according to different scholars.

For Walker Connor, a nation is "a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related, and it is the largest grouping that shares such a belief" (1994: 212). The nation is based on felt kinship ties that its basis is a psychological tie that joins a people and differentiates it from everyone else, in the sub-conscious conviction of its members (Connor, 1994: 92). These ties do not have to be real biologically while the events do not have to be experienced exactly (because historical facts can be manipulated by the nation builders) in history. Thus, the important thing is not 'what is' but 'what is felt to be' and an important ingredient of national psychology is a sub-conscious belief in the groups' separate origin and evolution. The strong belief to or conviction of common ancestry is based on not facts and reason but on powerful and non-rational (not irrational) feeling of the members. Its appeal and stimuli can be studied, but it cannot be explained in a rational way. Doing this is to miss the depth and power of national conviction (Connor, 1994: 92-94).

In Connor's opinion, it is the nations that should be self-aware only while ethnic groups may be defined by outsiders, so members need not to be self-conscious of belonging to the ethnic group. According to him, ethnic groups can be viewed as 'pre-national' peoples, and potential nations, but a nation can only come into

existence when most of its members are aware of their national identity and nation. This means that an ethnic group may be defined by outsiders, whereby a nation must be self-defined and self-aware (1994: 98-103). However, Anthony Smith disagrees with Connor and argues that not only nations but both ethnic groups and nations should be self-conscious, so self definition is also important in ethnic groups (1991). Smith also makes the differentiation between ethnic category (other defined) and ethnic group (conscious self-defined).

Yet, while there is a general consensus about the subjectivity of the national identity, there are a number of different approaches about the meaning of it. Accordingly, the criteria for determining what constitute a nation changes from one community to another; the criterion may be the language, religion, territory or race, or a combination of any of these. The proponents of the civic dimension (i.e. Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, etc.) emphasize that nations are modern constructions, not historic. They emphasize nations' being recent and new in political character, cultural homogeneity, and territorial consolidation. For them, the only criterion for the membership of a nation is through citizenship. Similarly, nation-states provide the framework for modern industrial societies and the people in those nation states imagine a national identity through career structures, educational systems, and cultural instruments (newspapers, books etc.) (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). In the modernist view of nation, it is the nationalism that creates nation and as Hobsbawm argued, nations are invented traditions which are socially engineered (1990).

However, Anthony D. Smith argues that nations have both ethnic and civic-territorial components and defines the nation as "a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991: 14). As clearly seen from this definition, national identity has a complex nature including elements of other kinds of collective identities (religious, ethnic, or class etc.). So, a national identity is a multi-dimensional concept and can't be reduced to a single element (Smith, 1991: 14). With this, Smith emphasizes the importance of ethno-historical myths for providing political community a sense of collective identity and destiny.

Furthermore, as Smith put it out, the historical territory is the basic element of the national identity. The idea of ownership of a defined territory is very important for a national community in order to be able to make a connection to historical roots. Memories and events of the past that took place in this territory provide national pride, whereby historical territory idea is consolidated with the help of common myths and historical memory (1994: 32). This, in return, creates a common memory unifying people around the similar feelings.

Besides the territory, language and history are also other important elements of the national identity, as well as, of nationalism. For ethnicity, to turn into nationalism, conversion of cultural traditions of everyday life into more specific historical claims is required (Calhoun, 1993: 224). According to Gellner, this conversion is succeeded, to some extent, by the development of literate intellectuals and elites (1983). Immanuel Wallerstein approaches the issue from a different point and explains the reason why a person needs or wants a past and an identity as the past's being the central element in the socialization of individuals for the maintenance of group solidarity (1991: 78). Additionally, Calhoun stresses the importance of history in building a national identity, since it is shaped to create a national history for the aim of giving students and readers a sense of collective national identity (1993: 225). Whereby Benedict Anderson argues that history making and building a nation in the imagination of each member of it is made possible by "print capitalism" of newspapers and novels (1983), Calhoun emphasizes that besides literacy, the new communications technologies (print, broadcast etc.) can also play important role for creating a popular memory by linking dispersed populations (1993: 224).

On the other hand, Eric Hobsbawm (1990) argues that language is a medium of communication between members of society while it makes one group different from another. Language is an important component of nationalism, because; firstly, it is a key tool for claiming that nationhood is rooted in ethnicity; secondly, the shared language is a condition to claim a national community; thirdly, it is a tool for nation builders to match the state and the nation (Calhoun, 1993: 226). This explains the language policy and utilization of the past in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

Yet, as a matter of fact, how the national identity is identified and how the past is reconstructed are dependent on the nation-building process carried out by the state.

Hence, in that sense, national identity is a constructed concept. Accordingly, it is the state that controls and coordinates the process and it tries to shift population's loyalty from local, sub-national identities towards collective, national identity. While doing this, as Calhoun noted, in most cases, nationalists draw on pre-existing traditions and other cultural resources to build a national unity. But, since these traditions and cultural elements are adapted to new circumstances, minor changes may lead to major changes in the meanings of these traditions.[2] On the other hand, culture changes over long periods of time and some of the components of the culture can be given more importance while some others can be ignored depending on the situation and conditions. As Fredrik Barth noted "Some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied" (1969: 14). Therefore, the focal point here is not the presence of pre-modern cultural materials but the ways in which these are selected and used by the nation builders reflecting the present concerns. Moreover, even if the nation-building is controlled by the state elite, it is, in a sense, a process by which society is prevented from possible conflicts. Therefore, creation of national identity is an important part of national integration process.

One of the most important tools of the state to disseminate the new national identity is formal education. Education enables the state to offer the population a sense of belonging to the newly created nation. Therefore, the socialization of the people as citizens is achieved through compulsory, standardized, formal, public mass education systems, by which the state tries to create a homogeneous culture (Gellner, 1983). The common culture is an important component of the national identity (Smith, 1994: 32), so, the created nation concept provides a social bond among individuals by providing shared values, symbols and traditions. Accordingly, the members of the nation are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship through the use of symbols, such as flags, national anthems, uniforms, ceremonies, monuments and money (Smith, 1991: 16-17). Hence, these are the products of the public culture and these are backed by the establishment of national political institutions (Birch, 1989: 9). In line with this view, national identity is a very

[2] For example, the Soviet state's pressure on Islam led Islam to become a more concrete part of the identity of being a Kazakh to such degree that even formally atheist Kazakhs defined themselves as Muslims (Akiner, 1995).

important component supporting the state and its institutions. The selection of political personnel, the regulation of political conduct and the election of governments are grounded in criteria of national interest in order to reflect the national will and national identity of the inclusive population (Smith, 1991: 16).

In similar vein, Calhoun also emphasizes that in most cases, nationalists draw on pre-existing traditions and other cultural resources to build a national unity. But, he adds that since these traditions are adapted to new circumstances, minor changes may lead to major changes in meanings of them and traditions which do not serve for the contemporary purposes are either overlooked or reconstructed (1997: 50, 83). Therefore, the focal point here is not the presence of pre-modern cultural materials but the ways in which these are selected and used by the nation builders reflecting the present concerns. This point also has validity for Kazakhstan case that Kazakh national identity is being constructed based on pre-Soviet identities and cultural aspects (yurt, symbols on flag and state emblem, Islam as a part of national identity, Kazakh Language etc.).

Accordingly, among the cultural aspects of the national identity, religion, Islam in the case of Kazakhstan, has a special importance in building a viable national identity. For instance, as William Spohn put it, after the break down of Soviet Union, a world wide parallel revival of religion and nationalism has emerged. This parallel development is seen in different phenomena such as the growth of ethnic nationalism, revitalization of religion, the strengthening of religious fundamentalism and connection between religion and nationalism in various forms of religious nationalism (2003: 265). The spread of ethnic and religious nationalism is seen as a part of the conflicting nation-state formation process with a secular culture in the context of widespread multiethnic and religious cultures and low degrees of democratic pluralization. But similar to the modernization paradigm, the problem remains why the imposition of a state secular culture is accompanied by a rise rather than a decline of ethnic and religious nationalism (Spohn, 2003: 268).

Likewise, one can argue about an ethno-national identity instead of a national one, in Kazakhstan. In the Western model of nation-building, it is assumed that ethnic identities would fade with modernization while religion and ethnicity would become more powerful forces. However, the growth of ethnic politics and the rise of political movements around the religion and ethnicity in post-Soviet borderlands

disproved the assumptions of the Western model, which has validity for nation-building in Western Europe (Gitelman, 1992: 227). Therefore, the nationalities, including the Kazakhs, did not lose their identities even if some of cultural elements are either lost or changed form, because the Soviet system was ethnicity based as the Soviet state insisted that people retained an officially determined ethnic identity in the course of numerous state transactions[3] (Gitelman, 1992: 229). Moreover, national homelands in the form of Union Republics were instituted which were given the name and cultural imprint of the dominant ethnic groups, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan SSR. Titular nations also had the privileges in the fields of culture, education and language within their titular republic (Kolsto, 1999: 57-58). In other words, although the titular nations had no real autonomy, a perception of difference and separateness on the basis of nationality was inculcated in the people. Awareness of ethnic identity was reinforced due to Soviet policies' supporting national cultures, providing a written language and education in titular languages (Light, 2000: 49). Accordingly, the Soviet rule "genuinely promoted and encouraged national consciousness of diverse ethnic groups" (Mirsky, cited in Light, 2000: 49). As a result, ethnic-based Soviet nation-building was different from those in Western Europe. In fact this is pointed by Rogers Brubaker that according to him,

> It is hard to imagine a civic understanding coming to prevail given the pervasively institutionalized understanding of nationality as fundamentally ethno-cultural rather than political, as sharply distinct from citizenship, and as grounding claims to "ownership" of polities (Brubaker, 1996: 432).

As Spohn highlighted, it is presupposed that western modernity is only one among other types of modernity evolving in the various civilizations of the world. Thereby, according to the 'multiple modernity' concept, religious and imperial traditions remain constitutive elements of modern societies instead of dissolution of traditions by modernization or globalization (2003: 268). According to Einstedt, these religious and imperial traditions are reconstructed and shaped, despite evolving processes of secularization and imperial decline, multiple programmes of modernity

[3] For example, in the passports of the citizens of Soviet Union, the ethnicity of the individual was written in the 'fifth column'. To illustrate, even if an Uzbek person was living in the Kazakhstan SSR, on the fifth column of his passport, his ethnicity, Uzbek, was written apart from his Soviet Union citizenship. A modified version of this practice is still retained in Kazakhstan, as well as in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Bohr, 1998: 155).

and multiple processes of modernization (cited in Spohn, 2003: 268-269). In fact, considering the rise of ethnic and religious nationalism recently, multiple modernity concept has three dimensions.

Firstly, in parallel with the recent criticism of modernist approaches in nationalism research, it is assumed that not only political-civic, but also ethnic-primordial components remain constitutive dimensions of modern national identities and modern forms of nationalism (Smith, cited in Spohn, 2003: 269). Therefore, in contrast to modernist view, which supposes that ethnic bases of national identity and nationalism are replaced by political and civic dimensions with the formation of nation states, multiple-modernity assumes that ethnicity is still an important component of modern national identity and nationalism despite the fact that it is continually reconstituted and reconstructed (Spohn, 2003: 269). Therefore, the approach of the Spohn, which emphasizes the importance of ethnicity as a component of the identity, better explains the case of Kazakhstan. In addition, Brubaker argues that the ideal-typical distinction between two basic types of nationalism, a political-civic western type and ethnic-cultural eastern type, is problematic. Instead, national identities and nationalisms vary in their combinations of ethnic-primordial and political-civic components (cited in Spohn, 2003: 269), which is in parallel line with Anthony Smith, who argues that every nationalism has both ethnic and civic ingredients, as we will explore in the case of Kazakhstan too.

Secondly, 'multiple modernity' concept proposes that religion is a constitutive element of national identity and nationalism despite different kinds of secularization. As Martin and Lehmann pointed, whereby it is accepted that concomitant to modernization in western societies, secularization processes played important role in the decline of religious commitment, it has become apparent that religion has not lost its importance despite secularization processes; in contrast, they develop in different patterns and combined religious and secular components oscillating between secularization and desecularization (cited in Spohn, 2003: 269). According to the modernist assumption, nation-state building and modern nationalism dissolve religion and religious identities via secular national identity forms. However, according to Armstrong, Hutchinson and Hastings, nation building and collective identity formation transformed religions and religious identities making them a constitutive part of modern nations and national identity (cited in Spohn, 2003: 269).

Indeed, in Kazakhstan, Islam has been used as a building block of Kazakh identity, as long as it remains within the cultural sphere and not poured into the political domains. As a result, it is apparent that nationalism and national identity includes various forms of religious and secular components, which is also valid for the case of Kazakh identity and Islam as a part of this identity, which is supported by the state within certain limits.

Thirdly, according to 'multiple modernity' concept of Spohn, in the contemporary global era, there is an intensification of interactions between different civilizations with varying combinations of ethnic, civic, political, national, cultural and religious elements. This assumption is in contrast with the generalizing premise that there would be a growing global dissemination and reproduction of the Western model of the secular nation-state and nationalism as in the modernization versions of globalization theories. The assumption of 'multiple modernity' also contrasts with the generalizing premise that there would be a growing ethnic and religious counter-reaction as in the world-system versions of globalization theories (Spohn, 2003: 270). As Eisenstadt and Schluchter put forward, non-western varieties of modernity cannot be seen as simply an adaptation of non-western civilizations to western modernity. In contrast, non-western varieties of modernity are an incorporation of western impacts and influences in non-western civilizational dynamics, programmes of modernity and modernization processes (cited in Spohn, 2003: 270). As a result, internal dynamics and external forces of nation state and national identity formation within the various civilizations in the world should be considered if the contemporary worldwide rise of ethnic and religious nationalism is to be explained (Spohn, 2003: 270).

2.2 Nationalism

Nationalism is often used in many different ways. It is sometimes used to describe loyalty to the territory (the suitable word for this is patriotism in fact) while it is sometimes used to describe the belief that one's own culture and civilization is superior to others (the suitable word is racism). Sometimes it is used to define the feelings about national identity, which is not incorrect but loose (Birch, 1989: 4). Thereby, nationalism is a contested concept and it is defined differently by different scholars, so it has different meanings for different groups of academicians.

Nevertheless, we can use Anthony Smith's definition of nationalism which fits well to our purposes. According to Smith, "nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation" (2001: 9). After giving this definition, he adds that, this definition presupposes a "nation" concept and does not claim that nations exist before nationalisms. The words 'potential' and 'nation' cover many situations like nations without nationalisms which are not limited to political goals only. They also cover cultural and social spheres and national identity ideal whilst every type of nationalism pursues the aim of national identity in changing degrees for different cases (Smith, 2001: 10). In this section, the assumptions and principles of nationalism in literature will be discussed and main approaches to the concept will be identified for possible explanations for the nation building processes occurred in Western Europe, where it began first, to be able to find out useful implications for nation building process in Kazakhstan.

2.2.1 Types of Nationalism

Nationalism can manifest itself either as a part of popular (non-state) movement or as part of state ideology, and there are two perspectives to classify nationalism. In the first perspective, the classification is based on an ethnic/civic nationalism dichotomy. Civic nationalism is based on citizenship and it is usually a territorial conception that nations must possess well defined territories, so the people and territory must belong to each other. The legal political community and legal political equality of members as well as common civic culture and ideology are two components of the civic model (Smith, 1991: 9). Therefore, in the civic form of nationalism, the state derives political legitimacy from the active participation of its citizens and the claims of the members of a community are based on territory and political institutions. Additionally, ethnic nationalism is based on cultural and historical elements and emphasizes the native culture and community of birth that wherever a member of a community goes, s/he is considered as a part of the community due to organic ties (Smith, 1991: 11). So, in ethnic nationalism, the claims are based on historical and cultural identity of the community in consideration. According to Anthony Smith (1991), both ethnic and civic nationalisms have several elements for supporting their claims.

In civic nationalism, as Smith put it, the first element is that there is a demarcated territory, which is a recognized legal unit. In that type of nationalism, people and territory belong to each other. To create a loyalty, it must be made 'historic' land "where terrain and people exerted mutual and beneficial influence over generations" (1991: 9). The second element is the presence of laws and legal institutions with a political will, which requires at least some common regulating institutions in order to pose common political purposes to population. The third element is citizenship, meaning legal equality of citizens who have the same rights and duties. This also requires common code of laws, as well as agencies, like courts, for the enforcement of them. Actually, in civic nationalism, nations must have common culture (nations are viewed as cultural communities) and a civic, inclusive ideology, common understandings and aspiratory sentiments and ideas that bind the population together in their homeland/territory (Smith, 1991: 9-11). In a true civic nationalism, diversity is celebrated and it includes different cultures within national symbols of the state and its political institutions (Smith, 2001: 41-42).

According to Smith, on the other hand, ethnic forms of nationalism are based on genealogical and indigenous cultural dimensions in contrast to elements discussed above. The first dimension is the emphasis on the link of people to community by birth, so the genealogy and the myth of descent provide the link between the members of the nation, no matter how far they are from each other. To put it differently, this is an organic conception of the nation. Second dimension is the emphasis on indigenous history and traditions. Rediscovering the roots and ethnic past is important for political and territorial claims for the restoration of lands and populations to ethnic nation, the true owners of the land. Thirdly, it is important in ethnic based nationalisms to return to vernacular (everyday) culture that vernacular (everyday) language and customs are very important for recovering the ethnic past of the members of the community. And lastly, in ethnic nationalism, leaders justify their actions and gather people by claiming that what they do is for the 'will of the people' making the ethnic nationalism populist (1991: 11-12).

This ethnic/civic dichotomy of nationalism is rejected in this thesis. As Taras Kuzio also proposed, the traditional division of civic West versus ethnic East should be revised (2001: 135). Therefore, the second perspective on the type of nationalism argues that every type of nationalism has both civic and ethnic components in

varying degrees and in different forms (Smith, 1991:13). In Ronald G. Suny's words, "the nation is more often both civic and ethnic than either one exclusively" (2006: 281) In both, a unified national identity, a homeland and citizenship play important roles. Also both types emphasize the importance of common and distinctive mass culture. However, the difference between the two determines the way how to treat to minorities within the national state (Leoussi, 201: 87). As explained before, the perspective which proposes that every type of nationalism has both civic and ethnic features and characteristics is more congruent for the specific case of Kazakhstan, whereby the degree and weight of the two models change in different situations. Actually, these two kinds of nationalism represent the two extreme poles of a line about the issue and the reality lies in between; some cases are closer to ethnic and some others are closer to civic type of nationalism, whereby in both cases, some elements of the other type are also involved.

2.3 Main Perspectives on Nationalism

2.3.1 Modernity of Nation and Nationalism

Similar to their view on national identity that was explained before, according to the prominent representatives of the modernist paradigm, such as Gellner, (1983), Anderson (1983) and Hobsbawn (1990), nationalism is also a relatively recent, modern phenomenon and nationalisms are constructs and cultural artifacts. As Gellner explained it, "both the principle of making national and political units should be congruent and the nationalist movements trying to secure this state of affairs are relatively modern phenomenona" (Gellner, 1983:1) whereby "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist…" (Gellner, 1964: 168).

For the modernists, nationalism is the result of transition from traditional to modern society, so proponents of this perspective see the industrialization as the main reason of the development of nationalism. The modernists emphasize the change of collectivities from a traditional society to industrial society with the help of the standardization of education, the mass literacy and mass media, as well as economic and political centralization. For example, according to Karl Deutsch, modernization has created a vast mobilization of human race, but this did not lead to

the assimilation of populations automatically. Instead, he claims, nationalities that are based on cultural communities bounded by cultural barriers to communications emerged due to social upheaval. In his view, with the division of labor within modern society, a person's loyalty to a social class will increase and this will cause a decrease in the loyalty of the person to minority groups. Moreover, the increase of communication between the regions of the state, with a concomitant social upheaval, resulted in a sense of loyalty to a greater community (Deutsch, 1953: 21). To put it differently, Deutsch argues that the purpose of the nation building is to bring different parts of the population together within a congruent whole in order to create new loyalties and identities at the national state level eliminating the sub-national ones. However, this is not true for Kazakhstan, because while on the one hand, there is an effort, at least on the surface, to create a Kazakhstani identity, an inclusive identity conceived for all citizens in the country, on the other hand there are efforts to re-create a Kazakh identity for Kazakhs themselves, alienating the non-Kazakh parts of the population.

Similar to Deutsch, for Ernest Gellner, industrialization and modernization is important for the formation of nationalism. In other words, he argues that industrialization undermined the traditional social structures and the cultural elements (communication especially) became the most important ones. Furthermore, a person's identity started to be defined in terms of his culture instead of his position in the society. Culture and nationality are also closely related. Through educational system and official language the nation-state could construct the cultured people that the industrialization requires (Gellner, 1964: 134-155). Therefore, while Gellner's view is similar to Deutsch's, the difference is that Gellner emphasizes the role of state in imposing culture in its territories, while Deutsch does not. Indeed, as will be laid down in the following chapters, the Soviet Union imposed the Russian culture and language and strived to eliminate religious affiliations to penetrate communist ideology, while letting the populations express their culture as long as they remained apolitical and within the sphere of culture, so could not eradicate the traditional social structures in Kazakhstan and other republics, even if Kazakhstan is the most Russified republic in Central Asia. Moreover, where the state imposed sanctions on some of the cultural elements (on religion, rituals, sub-national affiliations etc.),

these elements were able to survive either changing form or going underground.[4] According to Laitin, contemporary conditions are not suitable for the establishment of Gellnerian type of nation-states, and the nature of Soviet institutional legacy makes the homogenization the main issue, leading to an exclusionary framework of nationalization in Kazakhstan. Due to the decrease in the Russian population and the weakening challenges from Russified Kazakhs, the result will be the rationalization of Kazakh Kazakhstan (Laitin, 1998: 360).

Benedict Anderson, another important representative scholar of modernism, defines the nation as an "imagined political community", which is also imagined as sovereign and limited. He states that "it is an imagined community in which the members will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community" (1983: 6). In fact, despite similarities, Anderson differs from Hobsbawn and Gellner, because he interpreted the "imagination" metaphor in terms of invention and fabrication. In Anderson's opinion, nation is a "half conscious, but explosive interaction between a production system and productive relations (capitalism), communications technologies and the type of fatality of human linguistic diversity" (1983: 146). From the viewpoint of Anderson, nationalism arises due to the invention of the printing press and capitalist system, as the printing press made it possible to produce the same text for a largely coherent readership in a limited number of close-to-vernacular languages and thereby standardizing the spoken languages to these languages, while capitalism in its constant search for unsaturated markets which made the print industry turn from Latin to these languages (1994: 90). Anderson argues that there are three types of nationalism historically: the 'Creole nationalisms' of the Americas, 'linguistic nationalisms' of Europe and 'official nationalisms' (1983: 109). Anderson points out that the imposition of official nationalism by the colonial state created cultural homogeneity while it spread the modern style education with the idea of nationalism. Besides, official nationalism gave the colonies a tangible identity through census, museum, and maps (1983: 184). Indeed, this is what Soviet Union did in the context of Nationalities Policy that will be discussed briefly in the next

[4] For example, due to repressions of the Soviet Union, the rituals of Islam went underground leading a parallel Islam, while tribal affiliations were not expressed publicly, because religion and sub-national identities were seen as contrary to Communist ideology.

chapter. However, long before the Soviet Nationalities Policy, there was awareness among the Kazakhs towards the Kazakh identity that in their history they were united under *Kasym Khan* and *Ablai Khan*. Even if the sub-national loyalties had important place in Kazakh life, this did not prevent a supra-national Kazakh identity in the minds of people. According to Walker Connor, even if the meaning of the term tribe is not agreed upon, traditionally it is used to describe an ethnically homogeneous sociopolitical unit forming only a part of a larger interrelated grouping. The concept of tribe as an ethnically subordinate unit is usually honored in Asia. Connor indicates that, calling these groups as tribes instead of nations underestimates the emotional magnetism these structures exert on individuals. Denoting this magnetism as tribalism instead of nationalism to describe the attachment to new states supports that the loyalty of the individuals will be transferred from part (which is nation but called as tribe) to the whole (actually state but called nation) (1994: 107-108).

Other important figures in modernist theory, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann and J. Breuilly, argue that the modern state is the best predictor of nations and nationalism, its relationship with society forms the melting pot for re-integrative nationalism (cited in Smith, 2001: 48). Eric Hobsbawm (1990) on the other hand, basically argues that the nation appeared only after the 18th century. Similar to Deutsch and Gellner, according to Hobsbawm, the nation is a product of the industrial revolution, and nations are artificial constructs or invention. In addition, nations are created in order to serve the interests of ruling elites by channeling the energy of the population due to invented traditions which are the results of social engineering. Therefore, Hobsbawm insists that nationalism comes before nations, as a result it is the nationalisms that created the nations (Hobsbawm, 1983: 7).

In short, according to modernists, upward mobilization of minorities depends on a successful assimilation, and only members of the population who know the language and cultural code of the dominant group can aspire for achievement (Kolsto, 1999: 49). Walker Connor on the other hand, opposes to this and claims that while the state institutions such as public schools, have role in assimilation, increase in communication among different groups in which the groups have distinct cultures (as the Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, especially the Russians in Kazakhstan), antagonism between these groups tend to increase (1994: 21). So, in contrast to modernists, Connor argues that increase in communication will lead to increased

conflicts and divisions and cultural awareness among the minorities increases by development in communication and transportation. In addition, Walker Connor (1994) also disagrees with the idea of nation building as assimilation into the larger society and the eradication of distinguishing ethnic characteristics. In contrast, Connor proposed that nation building had produced more nation destruction than nation building, and the engineering in nation-building is not as efficient as it had been claimed (1994). Indeed, as will be explored in the following chapter, the Soviet Nationalities Policy was unable to assimilate the Kazakh people despite the fact that the Kazakhs were the most Russified population in Central Asia. Even if the impacts of the Soviet policies, such as collectivization and sedentarization and the Virgin Lands campaign were deep, the elements of culture and identity survived. For Connor, the nation represents the ethnic groups; and objectivizing the nation, which means seeing common language, religion or any other shared cultural elements as components of nationhood, is not true. He argues that for the members of a nation, it is very difficult to prove a common origin, so a nation is a pure myth. And a subconscious belief in the origin of the nation is an important element of the national psychology (Connor, 1994: 93-94). For instance, even if the knowledge of Kazakh language was about 40% in 1989, the percentage of the Kazakhs that stated the Kazakh as their mother tongue was 98%, emphasizing the awareness of the Kazakh people.

Therefore, the explanatory power of the theories of those with modernist approach to nationalism and nation-building are low in the specific case of Kazakhstan. However, the perspectives that were adopted and advocated by Anthony D. Smith, Walker Connor and Willfried Spohn are more relevant for the specific case of Kazakhstan. Some of the arguments of Smith, Connor and Spohn have been presented where necessary until now, however, to be able to complete the whole picture, general ethno-symbolic perspective will be laid down in the following part, mainly based on the arguments of Anthony Smith, who is the most important representative of this perspective.

2.3.2 Pre-Modernity of Nations

Ethno-symbolism is the approach to ethnicity and nationalism that emphasizes the role of myths, symbols, traditions, values and memories in not only the formation

of nationalism but also in its persistence and change. Ethno-Symbolism is different from primordial and modernist paradigms, because it emphasizes the importance of subjective elements and the *longue duree* of our understanding of nations and ethnic groups. It is also different from other approaches in the weight it gives to popular cultures and activities and how these limit the strategies of elites (Smith, 2001).

In parallel with Anthony Smith, John Armstrong, argues that the boundary which is protected by cultural symbols, such as language, dress, law, religion etc. is very important for maintaining ethnic communities which are equal to pre-modern nations. Armstrong, in general, emphasizes the persistence of ethnic identities for a long time of span. According to him, ethnic identities undergo social and political transformations while the myths and symbols, which constitute that identity, also change, whereas symbolic boundaries remain durable. Therefore, ethnicity and nationality has a pre-modern nature, and long time intervals are needed to understand this issue while myths and symbols are the most important components of these identities and their persistence (1982).

In fact, it is Anthony Smith that is the most prominent scholar of the ethno-symbolist approach. In contrast to Ernest Gellner, who emphasizes that even if ethnicity played role in nationalism and nation-building, it cannot give sufficient explanation (1983), and Eric Hobsbawn, who proposes that the roots of nationalism lie in the political economy, not the culture (1990), Anthony Smith argues that modern nations and nationalisms have strong pre-modern and ethnic roots and try to rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories. Smith accepts that nations can't be viewed as primordial, but argues that nations are rooted in pre-modern history and in continuing ethnic consciousness. For him, nationalism, as an ideology, is a modern phenomenon, but argues that ethnic origins of nations are older than that. He emphasizes the importance of ethnic communities and their myths, common ancestry, symbols, memories and shows that these exist in both modern and pre-modern times, with continuity in history (Smith, 1986). As Smith put it, this is because:

> Myths, symbols, memories and values are carried in and by forms and genres of artifacts and activities which change only very slowly, so ethnie once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable under normal vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming moulds with which all

> kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact (Smith, 1986: 16).

Hence, this is how the idea of nation and the nations are established. In fact, nations are long-term processes, reenacted and reconstructed continually. Moreover, they require ethnic cores, heroes, homelands and golden ages if they will survive (Smith, 1986: 212-223). Smith also states that "modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments" (1986: 216). In other words, whilst some scholars see nation-building and nationalism as modern phenomena, Anthony Smith see them as a continuity of ethnicity and pre-modern features (Smith, 1991).

According to the ethno-symbolist thought, transformation of the ethnicity occurs slowly. While accepting that pre-modern ethnic boundaries were not fixed exactly, ethno-symbolism indicates that they maintained a level of integrity. In addition, it is possible to trace a 'genealogy of nations' in which both cultural and social cultural variables can be introduced to account for which ethnies become nations. The important moment is the transformation from being ethnies to becoming citizens. In fact, this is the cultural transformation of the character of membership, and this forms the basis for potential political mobilization (Smith, 1986: 166).

In general, as emphasized previously, there have emerged two symbolic conceptions of the modern nation. On the one hand, there is a 'civic-territorial' ideal of nation which stresses the importance of the long term residence in a clearly demarcated territory, on which there is unified law codes and legal institutions, common rights and duties for all citizens, and a public, civic culture for all citizens that embodies/includes myths, memories and symbols of the nation (Smith, 1991: 11). On the other hand, there is a more 'ethnic-genealogical' conception of nation which emphasizes the importance of assumed/presumed ancestry ties and kin relatedness for citizenship, the important role of popular mobilization, the centrality of vernacular language, customs and culture, and the linking power of native historical memories of the homeland (Smith, 1991: 12). In sum, nationalism involves a distinctive new form of group identity or membership. Rhetoric of belonging to

large scale communities depends on new forms of collective imagination; capacity of communication and social organizational conditions, and these elements supports a sense of identity with larger populations (Calhoun, 1993: 29-30).

In conclusion, in the light of the debates so far, in the theoretical context, nation-building and nationalism in Kazakhstan cannot be denoted as either civic or ethnic. Actually, these two concepts exist in varying proportions in different conditions. From an ethnic perspective, which proposes that nation is a natural and organic community, foundation of nationhood and national identity of Kazakhstan would be based only on pre-modern (in that case pre-Soviet) and historical identities. On the other hand, in the modernist view, the argument would be that Kazakh nation was constructed only during the Soviet period through the Soviet Nationalities Policy and the deliberate efforts of Soviet social engineers, because they prepared the conditions for the creation of not only Kazakh but also other Central Asian nations by delineating Central Asia in order to administer them. But, nation and national identity, as well as nationalism and nation-building in Kazakhstan case do not fit into either of these, and they are more complex than they lay the issue. Contemporary Kazakh identity and nationhood may have been constructed formally during the Soviet period, but Kazakh people identify themselves with both ethnic, primordial, pre-Soviet and civic, modern, constructed aspects of national identity, whereby nation building in Kazakhstan is also based on both civic territorial and ethnic nationalisms. So even if past limits the present to a certain degree, yet, the past leaves enough space for constant reinterpretation. The matter is not the presence of pre-modern cultural materials, but the ways in which these are selected, used and abused by nationalists, and this reflects the present concerns (Özkırımlı, 2005: 38). Therefore, even if Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolism lacks in some other cases and there are academic criticisms over its non-explanatory points for some cases, it is a suitable approach for the case of Kazakhstan, because while it accepts that there is a change in identities, it proposes that this change is not as fluid and modern as modernists assume. In contrast, identities are less fluid and they are reproduced on the basis of historical identities. In other words, while identities change over time, this change is based on past legacies and occurs slowly. So, the two notions are not mutually exclusive. In contrast, primordial and modern components of national

identity as well as civic and ethnic elements of nation-building and nationalism simultaneously exist and are interdependent in the case of Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY ON THE KAZAKH IDENTITY

The USSR, being a multinational state, had inherited the legacy of the Tsarist conquests of Eurasian territory, Central Asia being the last one. This land is primarily populated by Turkic peoples, such as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kirghiz. The culture of the region had been influenced by the arrival of a number of foreigners to the Central Asian scene. However, there are two major transformations in Kazakh history, both of which were under the Russian rule: during the Tsarist era and the Soviet era. During the Tsarist era, it was mostly the Kazakh aristocracy that was affected from Russification policies, whereby there were some administrative and economic changes. As a result, the effect of Tsarist regime in Kazakhstan was limited when compared with the Soviet regime, therefore it was during the Soviet era that nomadic way of life was deteriorated. The modifications made and the policies pursued and implemented during the Soviet era were all parts of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, which caused a dual result; on the one hand, it consolidated the sense of belonging to a nation and national identity, while on the other hand, it tried to create a supra-national Soviet culture. Thus, the Soviet era was a very important experience for the formation of the modern Kazakh identity and culture as well as the demographic situation in Kazakhstan. In fact, this demographic situation in the contemporary borders of Kazakhstan changed significantly because of Slavic immigrations under the Soviet rule and this demographic structure is one of the reasons for civic policies pursued by the Kazakh government today. Paraphrasing Rogers Brubaker's (1996) 'nationalising state' concept,[5] it will not be wrong to argue that, the nation building process in post-Soviet Kazakhstan also spins around an ethnic discourse which conceives the state as the homeland, thus the property of the Kazakhs (titular nation), which has been defined in *ethno-cultural terms* distinct from the state citizenry. Besides, this ethnic discourse conceives the state as an

[5] For more details, see: Rogers Brubaker, 1996, *Nationalism Reframed*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-106.

'incomplete nation-state', because despite indicating that the state is the homeland of the Kazakhs, the titular nation is viewed as being in a weak cultural, economic or demographic position within the country. This situation, on the other hand, is attributed to the legacy of the discrimination against Kazakhs by Russians during the Soviet period. In accordance with this weakness, today, it is claimed that it is necessary to promote the language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare and political dominance of the Kazakhs (titular nation). As a result, this discourse forms the basis for ethnic policies and practices towards minority groups. Therefore, before exploring the post-Soviet policies, it is important to understand the issue of the impact of the Soviet Nationalities policy on Kazakhstan and Kazakh identity, and the policies implemented under this policy, because in the post-Soviet period, the results of all these Soviet policies directly or indirectly affect the policy choices of Kazakh policy-makers and the nature of these nation-building policies, whether ethnic or civic.

This chapter begins with a short glance to the pre-Soviet history of Kazakhs in order to understand the traditional structure and culture of Kazakhs, because today, in their search for a viable Kazakh identity, policy-makers often make emphasis to this pre-Soviet history. The second part focuses on the main points of the Soviet Nationalities Policy. In the third part, I discuss how the borders of Kazakhstan were demarcated by the Soviet policymakers. In the fourth part, the policies on various issues (i.e. Soviet language policy, collectivization and sedentarization, culture concerning Islam, formal and non-formal education, industrialization and urbanization, and arts) will be explained. The fifth part concerns the rediscovery of national Kazakh culture and Kazakh identity especially after 1970s. In the last two parts, sub-national tribal/clanic identities during Soviet period and a general review of the historical factors forming basis to inter-ethnic structure in post-Sviet Kazakhstan will be discussed. As for the nation building in post-independence Kazakhstan, the process has its roots in the Soviet period. Today, the proportion of non-Kazakhs, especially Russians and other Russian speaking populations is still high in Kazakhstan and Kazakhs could not achieve to form the majority of the whole population until recently in the country. In addition, Kazakhstan is the most Russified country, both linguistically and culturally, in Central Asia. This demographic structure of the modern-day Kazakhstan, and linguistic and cultural

Russification of the Kazakhs are the results of the policies implemented under the Soviet Nationalities Policy of Soviet Union and these are creating important obstacles in the nation building process and affect the ethnic and civic policy choices of nation-builders today. Furthermore, today, the proponents of the ethnic policies favoring the Kazakhs for the creation of a more concrete Kazakh identity justify their arguments claiming that these ethnic policies are necessary for correcting the historical injustices of the Soviet Union against the Kazakhs, so that the level of ethnic consciousness of Kazakhs is elevated. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to determine the effects of the Soviet policies on the Kazakh culture and identity and their reflections on ethnic and civic policies in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

3.1 Pre-Soviet History of Kazakhs

It is generally accepted that the Kazakh Khanate was established during the 15th century. After complex evolutions, by the second half of the 16th century, the Kazakhs gained the control of the oases and rich pastures of Syr-Darya from the Uzbeks. This was, economically and strategically, very important, because it enabled the Kazakhs to access to the winter grazing grounds and the control of the trade of the cities which provided tax revenues, supply of commodities, and rain from cultivated lands of the sedentary population. In addition, this also gave the Kazakhs the control of the bases for defending against enemy attacks. These factors form the important reasons for the division of the Kazakhs into three separate hordes[6] (Akiner, 1995: 10), in other words three nomadic groups: Great Horde (*Ulu Zhuz*), Middle Horde (*Orta Zhuz*) and Small Horde (*Kishi Zhuz*). These hordes also consist a number of tribes, each of which were also united by the common interests of their nomadic economy and geographical reasons. For example, the division into the three hordes was suitable for the geography of the Kazakh steppes and each horde had summer and winter pasture rights in the three areas that the terrain allowed (Olcott, 1987: 11). In these open lands, the animals were pastured all year and this required regular movement, season by season, since overgrazing might destroy the balanced ecology and cause soil erosion (Akiner, 1995: 12-13). In fact, as Masanov stated, nomadism was a product of the given ecological environment, a way of adaptation of

[6] "Hordes (Zhuzes)" in fact means "hundreds". See: Eitzen, H., 1998, "Refiguring Ethnicity through Kazakh Genealogies," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.26, No. 3, p.432.

people to the ecological conditions. The natural geographical conditions, lack of water or irrigation facilities and the difficulty of agriculture made pastoral nomadism the only important way of survival. The nomadic life-style required the maintenance of a balance between the available water resources and the size of the population, hence, the low population density was a common attribute. (cited in Dave, 2003: 3).

Furthermore, every tribe within each horde (*zhuz)* had its own *tamga* (mark used for marking cattle and property), *uran* (war cry) and there was a common war cry "*Alash*", a unifying theme for all the Kazakh people (Otarbaeva, 1998: 423-24). This, also, reveals that a unified Kazakh identity, whether weak or strong, was existing in the pre-modern Kazakh history, which is in congruence with Anthony Smith's (1986) argument that the modern nations have pre-modern and ethnic roots. Smith accepts that nations cannot be viewed as primordial, but argues that nations are rooted in pre-modern history and in perduring ethnic consciousness (Smith, 1986). In support of this argument, according to Otarbaeva, the Kazakh Khanate had a broad, strong ethnic basis, in contrast to earlier states in Kazakhstan territory. Indeed, until the Russian conquest in 1850s, clanic/tribal structures were the main means of ruling over the people in Kazakhstan, as well as in other parts of Central Asia. Moreover, it was clanic/tribal structures that were resolving conflicts and disputes by peace, utilizing *adats*, and customary laws. As the Kazakhs faced with external threats, such as *Kalmyks*, *Cossack*, *Bashkirs* and *Jungars*, at the beginning of 18th century, *Abu'l Khayr*, Khan of the Small Horde, demanded the protection of Russia, and the help was accepted by Russia in return of their loyalty to the Russian rule (Olcott, 1987: 26-27). After the Small Horde, the Great Horde, in 1740 and the Middle Horde, in 1742, both accepted the protection of Russia. These acceptances of protection led to the loss of nominal independences of the three hordes in the 19th century (in 1822 Middle Horde, in 1824 Small Horde and in 1848 Great Horde) (Golden, 1992: 345). However, as Geiss pointed out, in the second half of the 19th century, the Tsarist Russia did not spend to much effort in order to change the traditional way of life in the colonized Central Asia. In fact, the primary reason for Tsarist Russia to penetrate into Central Asia was to protect its southern borders against Great Britain, and not expansion and colonization. Therefore, the Russian government's first concern was not to make administrative reforms in the area. As a

result, the Kazakhs, as well as other Central Asians, could continue their habitual lifestyle under the Tsarist rule (Geiss, 2003: 33-38).[7] Similarly, according to Kathleen Collins (2006: 79-80), Tsarist Russia's effect in Central Asia was indirect and local identities and the native institutions continued to function. The Kazakh people did not accept the new local institutions introduced by the Russians while local elites sometimes resisted with force, and often transformed those structures and integrated them into their own kin and clan-based institutions. The Tsarist Russia did not intervene much in Central Asian people's life as long as social stability continued. In fact, as I will lay down in the following parts, it was the Soviet state that attempted to eradicate the clan system. Yet, it cannot be denied that Russian expansion caused some degree of ethnic sentiment. For instance, in some land disputes, Kazakhs demanded their high-quality pastures, which were given to Cossacks, based on ethnicity (Schatz, 2001: 11). In the following parts, the policies implemented by the Soviet Union and their effects on the Kazakh identity and the Kazakh culture, as well as their reflections on civic and ethnic policies implemented in Kazakhstan today will be examined. However, before presenting polices of the Soviet state, firstly, the Soviet Nationalities Policy should be put forward.

3.2 Soviet Nationalities Policy

After the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks had to deal with the nationalities problem within the Union. However, there was a gap between ideology and practice. In theory, Lenin and the other Bolsheviks were guided by two convictions. First, the socialist state should be a unitary state. Second, proletarian internationalism, the basic principle underlying the organization of the socialist state and determining its composition, could allow no room for national differences and aspirations. Despite these convictions, in practice, the situation created by the 1917 Revolution forced the Bolsheviks to establish a federal state that recognized the existence of nations (d'Encausse, 1978: 39). In order to avoid a potential problem of emergence of national differences and aspirations, the Bolsheviks devised a theory which forecasted that as the socialist society would move steadily closer to true communism and as a result of the creation of a new Soviet culture, the nations would

[7] For more detail about tribal structure of Central Asians before/after the Tsarist conquest, see Geiss (2003).

gradually move closer together. So the ultimate aim, although different tactics had been used to pursue this goal, was to create a 'Soviet Man' and Soviet culture. Soviet Man would emerge as liberated from past, free and happy. There would be no major spiritual, intellectual difference between the Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Estonians and they would share the same culture, believe in the same Marxism-Leninism, (Benningsen and Broxup, 1983: 37).

In fact, as Terry Martin pointed out, "The original Soviet Nationalities Policy was a preventive or protective strategy to preclude the emergence of separatist nationalism by supporting what Stalin later called the "forms" of nationhood" (2002: 2). These four national forms in particular were: territories, elites, languages and "cultures" (2002: 2). Therefore, in a way, the Soviet administration accepted and to a degree propagated the national identity in the beginning, but with the purpose of preventing an uncontrolled nationalism among the non-Russian populations. As Martin put it, 'national territories' meant not only the contemporary independent union republics and autonomous republics and regions, but also thousands of national districts and village soviets. 'National elites' meant that the people to be employed in the governments, economic enterprises and educational institutions should be primarily from those national territories, though they would not be exclusively from among the members of the "titular" nationality. 'National languages' meant that the language of these republics in those territories should be the languages of titular nationalities. 'National culture' meant the national identity for the Bolsheviks since the Soviet policy systematically promoted the distinctive national identity and self-consciousness of its non-Russian populations through the aggressive promotion of symbolic markers of the national identity, namely, national folklore, museums, dress, food, costumes, opera, poets, classic literary works and progressive historical events (2002: 2). For the purposes of this thesis, territorial, linguistic and cultural aspects of the Soviet policy and their impacts on the Kazakh identity and culture will be discussed in this chapter.

According to the Soviet Nationalities Policy, it was important to establish at least semblance of independent nationhood among the titular nations of the Soviet Republics to be able to show that USSR was a voluntary union of free nations (Neuberger, 1995: 297). This resulted in a dual policy: identification with both the Soviet state and with the titular group which shaped the cultural, political and

economic life of all Soviet people. As Glenn indicated, it was in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, that the strongest impact was seen since the modernization campaign was the most intensive one. According to him, this was mainly due to the relative backwardness of the region in comparison to other western republics of the USSR and partly because of the dissimilar culture of the region from other parts of the Union in terms of religion, education, language, literature etc. Another reason of the heavy modernization campaign in Kazakhstan is that the most intensive Slavic migration was to the Kazakhstan, especially to its northern parts (1999: 96,100). As a part of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, the boundaries were drawn to differentiate the nations from each other. Hence, in time, Kazakh identity was reinforced and national identity concept articulated by the Soviet ideology was internalized, so the Kazakhs perceived themselves more different from their neighbors. As a result of this, the Kazakhs got an emotional validation, outweighing the traditional ties and historical realities. So the parameters of the modern Kazakh nationhood that were established and consolidated during the 20th century and still exist today were Soviet creation (Akiner, 1995: 34). The reinforcement of the Kazakh identity during the Soviet period indicates that even if the Soviet Nationalities Policy deteriorated some of the cultural aspects of the Kazakhs, it consolidated the sense of belonging to the Kazakh nation.

3.3 Demarcation of National Borders

Shortly after the Soviet Revolution, the Central Asian region was subject to a fundamental reorganization of its administrative boundaries involving the division of the region into five republics which has remained permanent since 1936. When the treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union was signed in 1922, none of the ethnic groups in Central Asia possessed republican status, Turkestan and Kazakhstan were part of the RSFSR, Khorezm and Bukhara were independent People's Soviet Republics although both khanates later joined the USSR, in 1923 and 1924 respectively. However, as early as 1919, a Turkestan commission had been set up to investigate the national delimitation of the area into administrative units based on the ethnographic and economic circumstances of the territory (Allwarth, 1990: 181). At first, the Kazakhs were given the status of autonomous republic (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic – ASSR) in 1920. Kazakh ASSR, in fact, had the name of Kirghiz

ASSR in 1920, but this changed when Kara-Kirghiz autonomous oblast was upgraded to Kirghiz ASSR in 1925. It was in 1936 that Kazakhstan gained the status of 'union republic' (i.e. Soviet Socialist Republic – SSR) (Fierman, 1991: 17).

These borders which were demarcated during the Soviet period now became the international borders of independent Kazakhstan, as well as of other contemporary Central Asian states, in the post- Soviet independence era. Beyond that, in contemporary Kazakhstan, these demarcated borders have been accepted as the homeland of Kazakh people, which is an ethnic denotation, as a part of the idea that historical continuity is one of the important components of renewed historical consciousness. In fact, according to the officially outlined 'Conception of the Establishment of a Historical Consciousness in the Republic of Kazakhstan,' the Kazakhs are autochthonous on the territory of present Kazakhstan (quoted in Bohr, 1998: 146). So, even if these demarcated borders were drawn artificially by the Soviet ethnographers and do not exactly match with the traditional/ancient Kazakh lands, they have become the homeland of the Kazakhs today, which is also indicated in the preamble of the Constitution in an ethnic manner.

Demarcation of boundaries was the first step of the Soviet Nationality Policy for differentiating nations from each other. Therefore, some other policies for the penetration of the Soviet ideology were implemented by the Bolsheviks. Meantime, it should be reminded that the tactics of the Soviet apparatus were changed time to time depending on the circumstances, so they did not remain the same during the whole Soviet period. Furthermore, it should be noted that for the Soviet administration, there were no systemic obstacles to the implementation the Soviet ideology, because it had the absolute power for controlling all the resources of mass communication and coercion. Hence, in mid-1920s, efforts for introduction of main economic program and social reform program started at the same time. These programs included language and education, reorganization of land ownership, industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, development of transportation and communication networks, health, family law etc. whereby they started to be implemented in all parts of the Soviet Union simultaneously (Akiner, 1995: 40). In Kazakhstan, like in other Central Asian states, this was even a greater task due to relative backwardness of the region. Thus, I will now focus on the main policies adopted by the Soviet policymakers.

3.4 Soviet Policies in Practice

3.4.1 National Language Creation Policy

As language is one of the most important elements for creating and developing a national identity, it is usually subjected to manipulations of the state administrations, so, in order to understand language politics in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, it is necessary to examine the Soviet language policy first. In fact, the idea of nation was first of all a political creation and it was a result of the territorial administrative realignments of 1924 and 1936. By the addition of cultural components (language, literature), by scientific formulations (history, ethnography and archeology) and finally by a sociological reality (social differentiation within new republic), the administrative product of this policy (frontiers, institutions, laws etc.) was subsequently enhanced. In the mean time, Soviet linguistics manufactured languages to meet the requirements of political directives (Glenn, 1999: 39). Since a nation is primarily defined by its language and its territory, another priority of the Soviet government after demarcation of boundaries was to develop national languages for those new nations (Dickens, 1988: 14) on the one hand, and to disseminate the Russian on the other. In fact, the Russian language had little impact on the vast majority of Central Asians before the inauguration of the Soviet regime, except for the few elites who were involved in the Tsarist administrative apparatus. However, the situation began to change after 1917. For the Soviet administration, fully functional national languages were important both for symbolic reasons and for practical reasons like mass communication and accordingly mass political indoctrination (Dickens 1989: 11). To put what Dickens said differently, language was important to decrease differences among the nations and increase the communication in the Union. Shirin Akiner indicates that the Kazakh language was also relatively more suitable and well equipped to meet these linguistic functions unlike most other Central Asian languages of early 1900s. It had little dialectical variation, so it could be considered to constitute a unified national language.[8] It did not have a very long history as a written medium, but the increase in literacy efforts during Tsarist era had enabled it to increase its functional base and to introduce a

[8] Kazakh language had few regional differences in comparison to other Central Asian languages.

modern political vocabulary (1995: 37). In short, as far as Kazakh language is considered, it was possible to increase the use of language in public life more rapidly. In 1923, a decree was passed in which official documents were required to be written in Kazakh in Kazakhstan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR), while similar measures were taken in Kazakh populated areas that were not in the boundaries of KASSR yet. Then, in 1924, both Kazakh and Russian were both given the status of state languages.

Hence, linguistic Russianization of the minorities was not immediately put into practice by the new Soviet regime in the beginnings of the Revolution, partly due to Lenin's internationalist outlook, partly in order not to worsen the political situation of the early 1920's which had already been fragile. As a result, in the early years of the Communist era, the minority languages were not eliminated, but promoted in the Soviet Union. In the new Soviet state, all of the peoples and languages were declared to be equal. Lenin was opposing to the "Great Russian chauvinism," criticizing those who wished to make Russian the official language of the Soviet Union (Dickens, 1988: 7). Soviet policy-makers had expected that development and support of non-Russian languages would have created stability in the multi-national Soviet Union, and they were expecting to gain the support of non-Russians. But, this policy led to the consolidation of the nationalities and the spread of nationalist ideologies (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001: 51). Nevertheless, after the death of Lenin and accession of Stalin to power, this situation changed. Stalin created a highly centralized system in which there was a need for a *de facto language* in the absence of a *de jure* official language, to bring all republics under the control of the Central and to be able to run the things in the country properly (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001: 51; Dickens, 1989: 12). In other words, there was a need for an instrumental language for 'inter-national' communication within the Soviet Union in the absence of a legally forced language. And of course, it was the Russian as the only logical choice.

However, for the Russian language to gain acceptance in Central Asia, some changes were required due to the linguistic situation in the region. To realize this, the literacy campaign was started and created the needed environment for these changes. The first step was to reform the alphabets, a process which took place in every part of the USSR at the same time. During the late 1920s and the early 1930s the Arabic

alphabet was replaced by a Latin script that was similar to the alphabet used in Turkey. The final step, taken in the late 1930's and the early 1940's, was the adoption of the Cyrillic script for all Central Asian languages (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001: 139). On the one hand, the argument that these steps cut off the Central Asians from their literary past and their connection with the rest of the Islamic world (Dickens, 1989: 12) is debatable because the degree of integration within the Islamic world is a disputed issue. Since this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, for now, it is sufficient to note that defending the existence of a uniform Islamic world is a very pretentious claim. On the other hand, it is undeniable that reforming the alphabets opened the way for subsequent attempts for Russianizing other languages (Dickens, 1989: 12). For example, during the next periods, vocabulary and phraseology of Kazakh were developed in accordance with the needs of society, while in politics, economics, science and technology areas this required assimilation of lots of Russian and international words, so national languages, as well as Kazakh language, were 'internationalized' (Glenn, 1999: 38). As a result, the language in printed and spoken form was established as a symbol of national identity. This enabled the use of a common Cyrillic script and a terminology while it created a linguistic supra-national Soviet relation and codified the language. In addition, in order to reflect the Kazakh pronunciation more effectively specific adaptations of the script were introduced. This, on the other hand, clearly demarcated the national boundaries, differentiating linguistically not only the Kazakhs from the Russians, but also the Kazakhs from their Central Asian Turkic neighbors (Dickens, 1988: 12). Therefore, this contributed to further consolidation of a distinct Kazakh identity.

3.4.2 Collectivization and Sedentarization Efforts of the Soviet State

While the Soviet administrators were promoting national languages and were tolerating some cultural features in the first years of the revolution, there was also an attack on the things that was perceived as the representative of the past, such as the nomadic culture. Firstly, most of the intellectual and political elite members, who joined forces with the new Soviet government after the formation KASSR, were later accused of nationalistic tendencies and as a result they were eliminated. The first arrests and executions started in 1928 (Olcott, 1995: 201). By the end of 1937, again

mass arrests began after the congress and a whole generation of Kazakh intellectuals, writers, journalists, and historians were found guilty and were executed for the crime of dedication to the Kazakh people. The third campaign was in 1949-50 (Olcott, 1995: 218-219). With these campaigns, the population was frightened and shocked, while Soviet state broke them and controlled the possibility of a popular opposition. In short, trying to control the population by fear, elimination of the possible alternative dissident sources and creating distrust and dissention among people[9], in return, accelerated the disintegrative processes (Akiner, 1995: 43-44).

Akiner argues that under the Soviet Rule, traditional structures were weakened and accordingly, these structures maintained their power only in private life. In public life, the loyalty of people was shifted to Soviet institutions in 2-3 decades, resulting in many Kazakhs' making career in party organizations in Moscow (1995: 43-44). However, it should be also considered here that, especially after the death of Stalin and ascent of Khrushchev, this situation loosened. For example, as it will be presented in the following pages, administrative officials, who are the ethnic Kazakhs, in the Kazakh SSR condoned and closed their eyes to the religious activities of the people, which were actually prohibited by the Center. Therefore, while people were seemingly loyal to the Soviet institutions and obey the rules, this was true only in the surface. I think this is especially true for the southern parts of Kazakhstan, since the southern part was less affected from Soviet policies in comparison to the northern parts. Therefore, it can be stated that what Akiner claims is more valid for the northern Kazakhstan.

Secondly, before the Soviet period, the Kazakh people, as well as other Central Asian peoples, had little experience of a written legal system that operated in an independent way from the local or central rulers, despite the cultural and religious customs or traditions. However, during the Soviet period, the judicial system was codified in the Soviet constitution only in the appearance, although it was the Communist Party leadership that actually determined how the constitution would be determined (Carley, 1998: 303). Naturally, this factor played role in the eradication or distortion of some customs and traditions of the Kazakhs and the Central Asian

[9] When records of the criminal proceedings became accessible, it became clear that even neigbours, close relatives and friends were denunciating each other to the officials. For more information see: Shirin Akiner, (1995) "*The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-state"*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

people. For example, before the Soviet era, clannish and other similar types of traditional structures were merged with Islamic and pre-Islamic principles and rules which were placing limits on the behavior of people. According to Carley, due to policies of the Soviet state, these social limits put by these traditional religious and cultural structures on the behaviors of the members of the society were destroyed to some extent, although authorities did not interfere much with the domestic life of the Central Asian societies during Tsarist era, a situation that continued during the Soviet era too (1998: 304). However, some other academicians, such as Rywkin, disagree with Carley and argue that cultural and linguistic Russification was the greatest in Kazakhstan (1982). I think the truth lies in between. To put it differently, the linguistic and cultural Russification occurred more in the northern parts of Kazakhstan, whereby domestic Kazakh culture and language survived more in the southern parts of the country.[10] Evidently, the Kazakhs, who are denoted as *mankurt,*[11] are usually living in the northern Kazakhstan, whilst those Kazakhs, who press for more ethnic policies today, and know Kazakh better, are generally from the southern regions of Kazakhstan.

Thirdly, pastoral nomadism was nearly totally eradicated by collectivization and sedentarization efforts of the Soviet state. This was the end result of the policy of the Soviet rule for eradicating the nomad community and to integrate into socialist economy. The first step of this process was orienting the Kazakhs into planned, socialized economy as producers and consumers. Bazaars continued to play an important role, leading to creating an increasing demand and dependency on processed and manufactured goods such as tea, sugar, shoes, and clothes in order to change the nomadic economic structure. In addition, as a consequence of the industrialization, work opportunities in industry (on railway line, oilfields etc.) increased. However, nomads and semi-nomads were unable to keep pace with all these developments (Akiner, 1995: 44).

As a result, these factors mentioned above also changed the traditional way of life and encouraged the Kazakhs to join in the newly established cooperatives. Nevertheless, the Soviet state started the second step of the campaign, namely total

[10] Also the presence of Uzbeks in southern regions were influential in this result.

[11] The term *mankurt* is used for the Russified Kazakhs, who have lost their roots and know little or no Kazakh language.

collectivization, in 1928. While this was part of a Union-wide socio-economic campaign, it had a more devastating effect in Kazakhstan than in any of the other republic because of the cultural and environmental characteristics of the region. According to Simon Ertz, collectivization was an instrument to establish absolute control over the countryside in order to ensure the steady flow of agricultural "surplus," needed for the larger project to industrialize the country (2005: 10). Collectivization began with a series of decrees which aimed to redistribute wealth; however, these efforts, economically, and in general, were not as successful as expected. In fact, as James Millar noted, the collectivization campaign was a failure that over the period of the first Five-Year Plan, no net resources could be extracted from the countryside (cited in Ertz, 2005: 11) because of the ignorance of the structure of the Kazakh society, culture and economy, as well as their poor adaptation to and not considering of local conditions exacerbating the scope of the results (Ertz, 2005: 11). Yet, the Soviet authorities continued to impose more punitive measures and the collectivization practically ended in all the regions in 1933 (Akiner, 1995: 44-45), whereby its effects continued thereafter.

During this period, the state orders constantly increased, and authorities played the deaf against the complaints and protests from the local communities. Non-fulfillment of the quotas was punished by fines, prison sentences, or death. The great pressure led nomads to take extreme measures such as sheering sheep in winter to be able to satisfy unrealistic state order (Akiner, 1995: 45). The cost of collectivization campaign in terms of human and animal losses was calamitous. Martha Brill Olcott, based on Naum Jasny's estimations, presents that during the collectivization campaign more than 1,5 million people died in 1930s and nearly 80 percent of herd were destroyed between 1928 and 1932 adding that actual losses were probably greater (1995: 184-185). On the other hand, Shirin Akiner, based on the data of Tatimov and Abylkhozhin, indicates that out of a Kazakh population of approximately 4.120.000 in 1930, 1.750.000 died from starvation, epidemics and executions. 200.000 fled into neighboring countries, 453.000 fled into neighboring republics and remained there. Even in 1959, the Kazakh population in Kazakhstan was still roughly a million less than the population in 1926 (2.8 million and 3.7 million respectively). The livestock losses were also disastrous: out of 6.5 million

cattle, in 1928, only 1 million left in 1932, sheep number fell from 18.5 million to 1.5 million, and horses from 3.5 million to 0.5 million in the same period (1995: 45-46).

Since Olcott (1995) stated that actual losses were probably greater, Akiner's numbers seem better reflecting the reality, but no matter what the exact numbers were, the thing which is certain is that collectivization caused calamitous effects and made impact not only in terms of human and animal losses, but also in terms of culture change and economic structure of the Kazakh people. On the one hand, Shirin Akiner supports this argument and claims that the tragedy of collectivization and sedentarization also extended to the annihilation of a whole culture. According to her, the knowledge, skills, experience that had been accumulated over centuries became worthless, and now seen as primitive, not as high accomplishment (1995: 46). On the other hand, Oliver Roy mentions that some local customs and habits continued to be observed (2000: 82), while Gleason (1997) points out that some of the legacies of nomadic past still continue today. Thus, this fact is also supporting the arguement that the penetration of the Soviet effect is more in northern parts of the Kazakhstan, which were more urbanized, than the southern parts of the country.

Another effect of the collectivization and sedentarization was that the family home became prefabricated hutches, replacing the 'yurt', the traditional home of the nomads, and this also signaled the end of the personal freedom and harmonious integration with the natural world that it had represented. The relatively few nomads who survived from this brutal campaign were left disoriented and disempowered (Akiner, 1995: 46).

In sum, whereby it cannot be denied that collectivization transformed the agricultural systems in Kazakhstan, via introducing the mechanization and other technological innovations and vastly enlarging the scale of operations, collectivization had disastrous consequences in Central Asia and it was the Kazakh nomads that were the most terribly affected group from this policy (Kort, 2004: 54). Furthermore, due to human losses, the demographic structure of Kazakhstan changed in such a way that until the end of 1990s, the Kazakhs could not form the majority in their country and this demographic structure is one of the main difficulties in the post-Soviet nation-building process affecting the ethnic and civic policies employed. This structure led the policymakers to grant dual citizenship in the beginning years of the independence to the Kazakhs living in near abroad, who had emigrated from

Kazakhstan because of these collectivization and sedentarization efforts of the Soviet state. These Kazakhs were especially settled in Russian dominated regions today. As Oka put it out, according to Kazakhs, who are the proponents of ethnic policies, the return of the ethnic Kazakhs from abroad is required for the reestablishment of historical justice and is certainly a correct policy (2002: 1). Actually, these are only few of the policies that were perceived by Russian speaking populations as discriminatory and exclusive, as we will examine in this thesis later on.

3.4.3 Culture

During the early years of the Soviet period, the Soviet state had no special effort to create a more uniform national culture and did not promote it, even if it had the means in order to do this, because the situation was already complicated both by the Soviet ideology and the efforts for Russifying the population. On the contrary, the development of the cultures of recognized nationalities was promoted. In other words, as Glenn pointed out, the policy of 'national in form, socialist in content' was fundamentally contradictory because while the creation of a Soviet community was being promoted, simultaneously national cultures were permitted (1999: 79). National cultures, in fact, were not repressed as long as they remained within the borders of folkloric culture, and not poured into the political sphere, whereby the creation of the greater socialist community was being promoted. The effects of Russification added another dimension not only in the proliferation of the usage of Russian language but also in the attitude which represented Russians as the leading ethnic group of the Soviet Union. The symbolic representation of national regalia, (the paraphernalia representing the SSRs) of each republic including the Communist party and the flag is a good example of how pervasive the two tendencies were (Glenn, 1999: 79). In addition, flags were designed such that hummer and sickle were the common components of all, while all communist parties of the republics were subordinates of the Communist Party.[12] That is why the Communist Party of Kazakhstan was established and subordinated to the Communist Party of Soviet Union and similarly, Kazakh flag was a modified version of the Soviet flag.

[12] In Soviet Union, there was no local communist party for Russia (RSFSR) unlike other republics, since Communist Party in Moscow was subordinating all other Communist Parties in other republics (i.e. Communist Party of Kazakh SSR and there was no Communist Party for Russia (RSFSR) separate from Communist Party) under itself.

On the one hand, for academicians, such as Shirin Akiner, Kazakh culture was subjected to an intensive process of cultural colonization that resulted in the wholesale Europeanization/ Russification of the Kazakh life under the rhetoric of modernization. Naturally, every sphere of life, from patterns of socialization to intellectual views, from table manners to sport, was affected. Of course this change of tradition by newly imported customs was realized gradually. Nevertheless, in time, the Soviet modernization penetrated the whole society and brought changes in the Kazakh people's perceptions of identity and culture (1995: 38). On the other hand, for some others, such as N. Masanov and N. Amrekulov, Soviet modernization project, could not completely penetrate the Kazakh society. According to them, "Kazakh traditional culture and customs were confined to the peripheral private sphere of the remote rural areas" (cited in Sarsembayev, 1999: 138-139). From this point of view, the Kazakhs were forced into a process of agrarian and industrial development by forceful collectivization under a centralized state, so modernization has not been an integral development but an external imposition that took roots within small urban elite. Nevertheless, the Soviet experience brought tangible changes to the Kazakh culture.

3.4.3.1 Policies towards Islam

One of the most important campaigns imposed upon traditional Kazakh society was the effort for eradication of Islam from Kazakh culture. In fact, this was again a Union-wide movement against religion, but authorities faced with very different problems from those they encountered in Christian communities of the western regions, because, unlike other religions, Islamic rules were prevalent in daily life of the society (Akiner, 1995: 46). For example, in Kazakhstan, as in other Central Asian states, many of the schools (*medressehs*), law courts were Muslim (formed based on the Islamic rules) in early 1920s and the script at that time was Arabic. Moreover, the rituals of everyday life were Muslim (such as circumcision, Islamic marriage and funeral rites), the intellectual and political leaders of the community as well as Party members were identifying themselves as Muslims, while Muslim religious leaders were (as acknowledged in Soviet sources of the time) active and influential at all levels of the society (Akiner, 1995: 46). Therefore, movement against Islam was an

attack both to particular beliefs and to a socio-cultural system which was the basis of the faith in the region.

Despite the fact that, in 1917 Lenin and Stalin had jointly issued and promised that Muslim's beliefs and customs, national and cultural institutions would be free and inviolable, three years later, an anti-religious campaign started. But since the Bolshevik power had not been strong enough in Kazakhstan yet, the campaign proceed with care and Islam was discredited gradually. Nevertheless, by mid-1920s, official attitudes towards Islam became more repressive and pressures began. As Benningsen notes, instead of Muslim schools and law courts, the Soviet institutions were established, whilst the abolition of the religious schools, namely *medressehs* and *mektebs*, as well as the termination of religious training of the *Ulema* (religious scholars) undermined the ideological authority of Islam. Meanwhile lots of mosques were closed and Islamic literatures were taken over by the legal authorities. Discriminatory legislation against clerics and preachers (of all faiths) was passed in 1928-29 and accordingly it became difficult for these people to find job. The law of religious associations that remained valid until 1990 severely limited the rights of believers, making activities such as religious education, proselytizing and fund-raising illegal. In the mean time, anti-religious publications increased and the banning of *waqfs* (endowments supporting pious foundations) in 1930 decreased the clergy's economic power (1989: 11).

This anti-religious campaign along with collectivization caused mass arrests and executions in order to eliminate Muslims, and other class enemies. However, later on, some concessions were given to main faiths including Islam due to the World War II. The Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was officially opened in 1943 and subsequently a few mosques were reopened and under the strict supervision of Spiritual Directorate, a few literature was printed (Fierman, 1991: 27).

Based on the policy of the Soviets towards Islam in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, it would be easy to conclude that there had been a strong eradication in the beliefs of Muslim populations of the region, although policies towards Islam were different in different periods. According to one point of view, most of the Kazakh population, in general, continued to identify themselves as Muslims even when their knowledge of Islam was limited. Whilst some religious

rituals, like funerals, were preserved with very little change, and continued, most of the other rituals changed much more than that (Akiner, 1995: 48). Yet, from another point of view, the situation was perceived differently. For instance, Glenn argues that despite the deliberately destructive nature of the Soviet policy towards Islam, the religion survived to a large extent. He points that during the Soviet period, it was generally true that even the people who claimed they were not Muslims, also practiced Muslim rites, such as observing Muslim festivals, practicing circumcision, having religious marriages and Muslim burials. Meanwhile, resistance to the anti-religious campaign that was assisted by clerical structure of the *Sunni* religion had been very effective against Soviet atheism. The imams, for instance, were selected by the local people, not appointed by clerical hierarchy, and although the mosque was very important for Muslims, all rites from prayers to funerals might be observed at home (1999: 90-91), so closure of mosques had no major impact on religion.

Poliakov, in a similar fashion, indicates that *mazars* (holy places, or simply graveyards) became especially important after the closing of mosques and repressions against Islam, since it was legal according to the Soviet laws to make religious rituals in a cemetery. Therefore, *mazars* took the function of mosques in a way (1992: 99-102). In addition, the Central Asian party members and officials also played important roles in ensuring that these activities continued unnoticed and unhindered by outside interference, so these elites acted as the gatekeepers of Islam (Glenn, 1999: 91).

On the other hand, although large scale adherence to Islam was persistent within the Soviet period, it did not remain totally unchanged, and there were three important trends; firstly, the influence of unofficial Islam, with the advantage of not being controlled by spiritual directorate and being free from Soviet influence, increased (Poliakov, 1995). Secondly, nationalization of Islam became apparent in many aspects such as the adoption of saints. For example, Ahmad Yasavi[13] (1106-1166) was embraced as a Kazakh national saint despite the fact that he had lived four centuries before the Kazakhs first appeared. Therefore, religion in Kazakhstan became a form of ethnic expression inextricably tied to the national consciousness of

[13] Hodja Ahmad Yasavi was a Turkic poet and Sufi mystic (Muslim mystic) who was born in Sayram and died in Yasi Turkestan (both cities are within modern-day Kazakhstan). He exerted powerful effect on the development of mystical orders throughout the Turkic-speaking world (online available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9004150/Ahmed-Yesevi).

each republic. So, saying 'I am a Muslim' is equated to saying 'I am a Kazakh'. Marat Akchurin, a journalist from Tashkent, confirms this fact stating that "Islam in Central Asia today is a fact of national identity and psychology together with a body of customs and traditions rather than a denomination" (1992: 32). Therefore, due to repressions of the Soviet state on Islam, it became a more concrete part of the Kazakh identity as a response to these repressions, and it became nationalized. This legacy still continues today so that the only ethnic side of the religion policy of the contemporary Kazakh government is the support of Islam as a constituent part of the Kazakh identity, as long as it remains within the cultural sphere. Walker Connor argues that if a person is not dealing with minor variations of the same culture, but with two distinct and self-differentiating cultures (such as Russian and Kazakh), the increased contacts increases the antagonisms (1994: 21). As a result of the policies of the Soviet state, Muslim identity became a powerful boundary marker of the Kazakh identity, which still prevails today.

As the statements of Akchurin show, Islam was also seen as a part of the Kazakh cultural heritage, an important linkage between Kazakhs' past, present and future. Meanwhile, superficial nature of Islam in nomadic way of life and the culture of the Kazakhs should be considered first, before relating the low level of knowledge of the Islam in Kazakhstan to the Soviet policies. In fact, throughout the Kazakh history, Islam was always superficial in Kazakh life due to the nomadic tradition. Olcott also supports this view stating that Islam's grip on the mainly nomadic societies remains looser (1995: 219). So, I think it will not be wrong to say that Islam in Kazakhstan, has been shaped by the rituals. Therefore, Islam in Kazakhstan, as in Central Asia can be called as 'folk' Islam: regional traditions and customs that had few commonalities with Islamic norms. Folk Islam had a resistant standing against anti-religious policies and the majority of Central Asians, regardless of their political ties, continued to practice the rituals such as circumcision, Islamic marriage and funeral rites. The official religious establishment was not trusted, and a system of religious communication emerged, which was called as 'parallel' or 'shadow' Islam (Steinberg, 2003: 221).

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that even if Islam and its rituals continued to be observed in a way, the Soviet rule led to secularization of elites, mainly including the Russified, pro-Soviet elite and intelligentsia and industrial workforce (Steinberg,

222). This view provides another support for the argument that when the effect of the Soviet rule on Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs is evaluated, the regional variation of this effect should be taken into consideration, because the degree of the effects of the Soviet period is not the same in the northern Kazakhstan and southern Kazakhstan.[14] Partially, this is related with the presence of the more conservative Uzbek population in the southern Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's being the southern neighbor of the country. Nevertheless, when policies of the Soviet state towards Islam are evaluated as a whole, it can be stated that secularization effect of the Soviet policies contributed to the Kazakh administration's policy on religion to be relatively non-discriminatory when compared with its other policies. In accordance with this, religions other than Islam are also tolerated in Kazakhstan and as we will explore in the following chapter in detail, Islam is being only promoted as a part of the Kazakh identity, not as a religion of faith.

3.4.3.2 Formal Education and Non-Formal Education

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the literacy rate was very low in Central Asia and the percentage of the literate ethnic Kazakhs was 1%, while it was on average 8.1% in Kazakhstan (Dickens, 1988: 20). These numbers were very low for the Soviet state to put its aims into practice that education and mass literacy campaign was one of the most important strategies of Soviet state for the transformation of Kazakh society. While the average level of literacy among the Kazakhs had come to 7% (In Kazakh SSR 25%) in 1926, it increased to 40% in early 1930, and 77% in 1939 (In KSSR 83.6%) (Akiner, 1995: 40-41); (Dickens, 1988: 20). In 1930-31, the Soviet state made free schooling compulsory for children over eight and for that purpose; it established boarding facilities, and universities. Accordingly, an important shift occurred in the Kazakh society that an orally transmitted culture turned into literacy bringing a fundamental change in the Kazakhs' perception of the world (Akiner, 1995: 41). A more important point is that literacy facilitated the process of political indoctrination, as it opened new channels for imposing and disseminating ideological propaganda to society. In conjunction

[14] This is partly due to Uzbekistan's being the southern neighbor of Kazakhstan and the presence of Uzbek population, who are more conservative in their beliefs in Islam, in the southern parts of the country.

with this fact, it will not be wrong to state that the first and the foremost purpose of the Soviet state was the indoctrination of people through increasing the literacy, since illiteracy had been seen as a serious blockage for the building of socialism. This is also apparent in the declaration of the Communist Party in 1918 stating that "General education (literacy), in school and out of school, must be closely linked to Communist propaganda. There is no form of science or culture which cannot be linked with the great ideas of Communism" (cited in McLeish 1972: 308).

Another important result of the literacy campaign was that education made it possible to impose a sense of national identity to the population. For instance, at school, legend was replaced by scholarly histories which were giving more confidence because of symbolic importance of the dates, statistics and references while maps traced precise boundaries and specific geographic features. So "Kazakhstan" took on a concrete shape in the minds of people, and the idea of "our" territory was distinguished from that of the others' territory. In a similar way, "our" history, and 'our' heritage as opposed to theirs was determined in exact detail, from earlier prehistory to modern times (Akiner, 1995: 41).

When it is considered that the same strategies and policies were pursued in other Soviet republics with the same instruments, it becomes clearer that national definition process in Kazakhstan was further strengthened. However, establishment of territorial boundaries created a number of disputed areas, since they were created without considering the ethnic composition of those territories, and, this situation in return, created national claims to the same heroes or cultural monuments by more than one of Central Asian peoples. Accordingly, the number of the potential sources of tension increased, since these conflicting claims were reinforced by the Soviet Union. Yet, for pragmatic reasons, such as keeping good relations with neighbors, these claims have not been put forward in the post-Soviet period. In sum, it is undeniable that the Soviet administration succeeded to increase literacy rate and this important increase in the literacy rate at the same time opened the way for linguistic Russification of the Kazakhs. In contemporary Kazakhstan, policymakers try to reverse the effects of this Russification and emphasize the Kazakh language, but language has become one of the most contentious issue between the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs forcing the government to adopt more civic policies in terms of language.

One of the two other cultural construction strategies was wide ranging program of popular, non-formal education through the museums and public libraries For instance, the Kazakh national museum was heavily emphasizing the ascent and descent of many groups that had inhabited in the territory of Kazakhstan SSR while they had small space for the history of the Kazakhs (Glenn, 1999: 88). So, the national museum of Kazakhstan had very few historical artifacts about Kazakh culture, whereby no distinction was drawn between the cultures of the Kazakhs (or Turkic people) and of the Russians, the colonizers of the area (Fuller, 1992: 54). Together with these museums and libraries, radio, TV, cinema, organization of discussion groups at which newspapers were read aloud, arrangement of regular talks on a variety of subjects (i.e. international affairs), which were certainly in line with the Communist outlook, were among the other instruments used for disseminating the Soviet ideology (Akiner, 1995: 42). Likewise, the Kazakh government has been implementing similar policies today, but in contrast to those Soviet ones, the contemporary nation building policies involve elements related with Kazakh identity, history and culture. Opening museums, printing books and series, promulgation of laws making the broadcasting in Kazakh language obligatory to a certain degree are only among some of these policies, which are certainly about the culture and history of the Kazakhs aiming to reverse the effects of all these Soviet policies mentioned above and revive the Kazakh culture.

3.4.3.3 Industrialization and Urbanization

At the beginning of the Revolution, the purpose of the Soviet policymakers was to develop industrialization by setting up industries next to the extraction of raw materials and production of primary products. However, in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, the economy was dependent only on the extraction of the raw materials and the production of agricultural goods and livestock. Thus, the outcome was a general lack of industrialization of the area (a situation which is still valid to a significant degree even today) in comparison to the western republics of the USSR (i.e. Ukraine, Baltics). As a consequence of this industrialization, more Slavic people, mainly Russians, came to Kazakhstan, and settled in the industrialized northern parts of the country (Glenn, 1999: 94). Therefore, when the Kazakhstan gained its independence, most of the positions in the industrial sector were occupied

by Russians and other Slav populations. In the post-independence period, this has been one of the targets of the Kazakh government and it has been trying to change this Russian domination in the industrial sector via implementing a Kazakh-favoring employment policy as it will be presented in the next chapter.

The industrialization of the Central Asian region varied from republic to republic, but Kazakhstan's per capita industrial output was the greatest in the region, whilst the per capita industrial output of the region was the lowest when compared to other republics of the Soviet Union, which was also apparent in the low percentage of the labor force of each republic in the industrial sector. In Central Asia, this rate was the highest in Kazakhstan with 22% in 1990. Even if the labor force in Kazak SSR was employed more in industry than in agriculture, different from the other Central Asian republics, these figures may be misleading given that the majority of industrial workers were mostly Slavic people (Glenn, 1999: 95). Actually, this was one of the factors that made the northern parts of the Kazakhstan dominated by Russians. This demographic structure, in return, has led the Kazakh government to implement ethnic policies, such as move of capital, repatriation of the ethnic Kazakhs from abroad, in order to dilute the Russian domination in the northern regions so that the north-south difference of the ethnic structure could be balanced, as being presented in more detail in the following chapter.

On the other hand, Glenn relates the high level of work force in agriculture to low urbanization in the region (1999). Use of urbanization was, in fact, the other strategy for cultural construction. Since, the Kazakhs had had a nomadic culture; it is natural that the impact of new constructions in concrete, steel and glass, and asphalt roads were felt far more in Kazakhstan than in settled regions of the Union. Another characteristic of the urbanization was naming the streets, cities, parks and official buildings after the key persons, who were important for the Soviet ideology. Besides, important events were named to the honor of those persons. For instance, Alma-Ata celebrated Marx, Lenin, Kirov, Communism, 50th anniversary of October Revolution, Gorky, Pushkin etc. (Akiner, 1995: 42). In fact, these celebrations were created to form alternatives against traditional celebrations like *Navruz* (the celebration of the coming of spring) and Muslim festivals like *Qurban Bayram*, with the purpose of disseminating the Soviet ideology. Nevertheless, these alternative celebrations and ceremonies remained limited to schools and work places where they

were organized by Soviet administrators or activists, as a result, these substitute celebrations were not endorsed by the people (Bacon, 1980: 181-182). Due to high industrialization, the urbanization rate in Kazakhstan was actually one of the two highest in Central Asia[15] while still low in comparison to the western republics of the Soviet Union. Most of the ethnic Kazakhs, however, were in rural parts of the country. Whereby Slavs were densely living in the northern parts of the country, the Kazakhs were forming the majority in the southern parts (rural) of the country and it is highly significant that Russians actually formed the largest nationality in industrialized regions of Kazakhstan as well as in urbanized areas causing north Kazakhstan to be more secular.

In sum, urbanization had two dimensions: the first one was by building the environment physically, and the second one was by naming the environment in order to Sovietize it. In fact, in physical terms, urbanization, similar to industrialization, mostly was achieved in the northern regions of Kazakhstan (Almaty was an exception in the south), having similar effects to that of industrialization discussed above. In conjunction with these policies, one of the ethnic policies of the contemporary Kazakh government to reinforce the Kazakh nation building process is to give Kazakh names to the streets, cities, universities, schools and various places in the present-day Kazakhstan, replacing the Soviet and Russian ones in order to de-Sovietize the environment, in a similar fashion with the policy of Soviet state, but in the reverse direction.[16]

According to some academicians (i.e. Akiner), the living standards in Kazakhstan increased as a result of the accelerated development policies of the Soviet period. However, this view is debatable, and should be approached cautiously, because most of the industrialized and urbanized areas of Kazakhstan were populated by Slavic people, so this view is not totally true for ethnic Kazakhs, especially for those living in the rural areas.[17] Nevertheless, it is doubtless that while this increase

[15] The other country was Turkmenistan, but this was not because of the industrialization level of the country. It was due to considering the areas that were counted in urbanized areas because of their closeness to urbanized areas. For more detail, see John Glenn, 1999, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, New York: St.Martin's Press, Ch. 4.

[16] For example, in Almaty, Kunaev Street's name was Karl Marx Street during Soviet era.

[17] In Kazakhstan, the titular nationality, Kazakhs, constituted only 17% of urban population, Russians over 50 %. In terms of urban/rural distribution of titular nationality (as opposed to the total population

was not at the same level with that of the western Soviet republics, such as Baltics and Ukraine, and even in all the regions of Kazakhstan, living standards were higher than the pre-Soviet Kazakhstan.

3.4.3.4 National Arts

The transformation in Kazakh culture was also visible in arts. As for all the other artistic works, the main principle for literature, was that it should be "national in form, proletarian in content". In Kazakhstan, as in other Central Asian states, the form of those was foreign since they were born in different cultures and brought for the Soviet ideological purposes to reshape the society. While the process was started during Tsarist era in a limited manner, these foreign European/Russian models started to be used as examples of imitated novels, short stories, poems and plays during the Soviet era beginning from 1920s. Likewise, during 1930s, this European/Russian style Kazakh orchestral music, opera and ballet were developed. In visual arts, again Kazakh painters began to produce portraits in the European/Russian style (Akiner, 1995: 38).

The subject of those works was in fact about the political priorities of the Soviet ideology like mechanization of agriculture, industrialization, construction of railways, fight for gender equality etc. In other words, anything that is in line with the political and cultural ambitions of the Soviet state could be the subject of these works. That's why similar operas, novels, ballets were produced in every language in all the republics of the USSR. The only national features of these works were the locations and few elements of local folklore and historical background avoiding from idealizing the past. These works, in fact, fulfilled important ideological purposes. Firstly, they made the idea of a shared Soviet culture more tangible. Secondly, in developing societies of Central Asia they filled the gap occurred with the waning of primitive traditional art. Thirdly, they reflected the diversity within unity, symbolically emphasizing the boundaries of national identity within a broader framework of the supra-national Soviet identity. Lastly, they provided the images and interpretations in order to shape the peoples' understanding of their history and

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of the republics) the greatest majority continued to be rural based. For more details see: Shjrin Akiner, (1998) "Social and Political Reorganization in Central Asia: Transition From Pre-Colonial To Post-Colonial Society," in Atabaki and O'Kane J. (eds.) Post Soviet Central Asia, Leiden Amsterdam, The International Institute for Asian Studies, pp. 1-34

culture, added details to the myths of the school text-books, imposed ideological messages. These creations were not only high style art for a selected part of public, but were also integrated into the life of the people by group goings to galleries, theatres, concert halls, and by studying of the new literature, at school and university. So, directly, they helped to disseminate the new, Soviet identities propagated by the Soviet policymakers (Akiner, 1995: 38-39**).**

Due to practical reasons, some aspects of the folk art were also preserved. For instance, traditional bards served for the purposes of the Soviet regime, and they acted as semi-official cultural ambassadors performing at state functions and festivals of republican art, sometimes traveling abroad to participate in similar events in other countries. Skilled crafts-men, like carpet-makers, wood-makers, wood-carvers, also went on to produce traditional style works, in order to present these as gifts to visitors and for international exhibitions (Akiner, 1995: 39), whereby people prefer to decorate their homes in traditional forms (Bacon, 1980: 165-166).

Besides, there were some other attempts to maintain and develop traditional skills, like vocal and instrumental music. But, as the training of these traditional skills was done in state institutes, they were influenced by the European/Russian norms and they lacked the traditional local ingredients relevant with the society. It was not surprising under these conditions that traditional art forms became only cultural tokenism, in other words, a matter of form. In time, Kazakh artists began to make important contributions in all main European/Russian artistic works, both as composers and as performers, which were shown as the mastery of the Kazakhs and as the Kazakhs made it their own. As a result, this pattern of acquisition and internalization contributed to a major cultural shift of the Kazakh society **(**Akiner, 1995: 39**).** Indeed, increased funding for cultural education and the arts in the 1930s triggered a new era in the Central Asian culture. For example, Akhmet Jubanov and Evgenii Brusilovskii composed a modern interpretation of folk music and formalized a Kazak national music that was not ethnographic anymore, and they respectively established the first Kazak state orchestra, based on local instruments and writing the first Kazak state operas[18] (Rouland, 2003: 2). In fact, when it is considered that the

[18] For instance, the first *Dekada* of Kazak Literature and Art in 1936, composing improvisational concerts, presentations of old folk songs, poetry readings as well as the two new Kazak national

musical tradition was at the core of Kazakh national identity and Kazakh literary tradition had been based on music, due to the lack of established printing culture until the end of the 19th century, the importance of the music can be better understood. Music was suitable for the aims of the Soviet state in articulating the modern nation in Kazakhstan, because all phases of life, such as marriage, birth, death, combat and exile, were celebrated by song. Therefore, music was an important tool offering a seemingly non-political sphere for cultural expression which was manipulated explicitly for political purposes of the Soviet administrators (Rouland, 2003: 1).

On the other hand, it is not totally true that internalization caused a major cultural shift. As discussed before, for some, i.e. Matuszewski, Soviet modernization project could not completely penetrate Kazakh society. For instance, in post-Stalinist less repressive period of the Soviet Union, Kazakh authors started to re-discover and re-assert their Turkic heritage in their works. Thus, the content of their works often reflected the influence of their long-standing literary tradition instead of conforming to the guidelines set down by the State (Matuszewski, 1982: 79).[19]

As a general fact, culture is not static, and changes over time, so it can be stated that in Kazakhstan while cultural rituals were kept, aspects related with the Soviet culture were also added to that the Kazakh culture, thus the Soviet era modified but not totally eradicated the Kazakh culture. In addition, the Kazakhs, especially in rural areas[20] retained the patterns and values of their own traditional culture. According to Bacon, people were selective in taking new elements modifying them in order to make them suitable with their own patterns. If not fit, they rejected. Similarly, as people remember the previous brutalities of the Soviet state, they were not resisting to innovations unacceptable to them. Instead, they followed their own cultural

operas were the good examples in order to show the "progress" and evolution of Kazak art since the Bolshevik Revolution (Rouland, 2003: 2).

[19] An example to this phenomenon is the analysis of the early Kievan epic *The Tale of the Host of Igor in 1975* by Olzhas Suleymenov, chairman of the Kazakhstan Writer's Union, in which he attempted to show that it was permeated by Turkic epic motifs and vocabulary, with whole passages paraphrased or translated directly from the Turkic (Matuszewski, 1982: 79). This monograph, as Matuszewski stated, was published in Alma-Ata in 1975, and was full of accusations of Russian chauvinism and of distortion of early Turkic history (1982: 79).

[20] In fact most of the ethnic Kazakhs were rural. Urban areas were mostly populated by Russians and other Slavic people since they were occupying most of the positions in industry.

inclinations quietly, despite legal enactments (1980: 208). Indeed, this became apparent especially after 1970s with the rediscovery of Kazakh culture even if it was deteriorated. It can also be proposed that whilst preventing the local cultures pouring into political area on the one hand, Soviet administration aimed to folklorize the Kazakh culture on the other hand, so that their political threats were to be eliminated. That is why the cultural components were untouched as long as they were not in political areas. However, Kazakh culture has been elevated to the political agenda today, as it is one of the important components of the nation building process. Therefore, in order to eliminate the Soviet modifications on the Kazakh culture and reassert the Kazakh culture as a building block of the Kazakh identity, cultural policy of the Kazakh government today concern mostly the Kazakh culture and identity as we will discover in the fourth chapter.

3.5 Rediscovery of Culture and National Identity in the Post-Stalin Era

There are some possible explanations for the rediscovery of the aspects of the culture and identity in Kazakhstan. Firstly, oppressions of the Stalin era were lessened by the post-Stalin leadership (Dickens, 1989: 20) and with the ascent of Khrushchev to the power, the Soviet state made efforts in order to rehabilitate for some injustices of the Stalinist era.[21] Moreover, more responsibilities were given (decentralization) to local officials so that efficiency in bureaucracy would increase (Smith, 1990: 8). Secondly, although Kazakhs, as the other Central Asians, had admittedly been deeply influenced by the modernization and secularization that Russo-Soviet culture had brought to them, main areas of cultural identity, such as religion, language and literature, served to remind the people of basic differences between the Kazakh and Russian culture (Dickens, 1989: 20). Therefore, when policies were loosened, the tendency of people was to emphasize the things that make them different from Russians.

At the same time, the retention of local traditions and culture has been also aided by the two tier structure that evolved during the Soviet period whereby the

[21] For example, some nationalities, such as Kalmuks, Karachai, Balkars, Ingush, that were forced to move for geo-strategic reasons during World War II were to some extent given their rights back. For more detail see: Graham Smith, 1990, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev," in G. Smith (ed.), The Soviet Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, London; New York: Longman Publications

local way of life remained relatively undisturbed as long as certain requirements were fulfilled (Olcott, 1992: xi). Hence, as long as the cultural components remained in the limits of culture and not enter into political areas, and the economic production targets are fulfilled, people were not disturbed and repressed. Olcott also points out that this two tier structure meant that much of the daily life of the Kazakhs, as other Central Asians, remained relatively untouched whilst the Soviet apparatus became infused with the clanic/tribal hierarchical structure of the Kazakhs (1992: xi).

In terms of language, the use of and emphasis to Russian language continued to increase during Khrushchev era and Brezhnev era. For example, the enhanced status of the Russian language was represented in the language reform laws of 1958-59 which gave parents the chance for deciding whether their children would attend schools giving education in their mother tongue or in Russian (Kreindler, 1995: 191). Furthermore, in late 1970s, the use of Russian further promoted by an increase in the numbers of hours it was taught as a second language. The effects of these policies implemented under Nationalities Policy obviously varied from republic to republic, but it was in Kazakhstan that linguistic Russification occurred most, because of the vast numbers of Slavs that had migrated there. Surveys in 1989 showed that 60% [22] of the population of Kazakhstan held Russian as their second language reflecting its ethnic composition. In similar vein, according to David Laitin, "…the Russian language has spread into every nook and cranny of urbanized and high-status Kazakh life" (1998: 135). On the one hand, this Russification is the main reason for a more ethnic policy on the language issue in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, because Kazakh administration is aware of the importance of determining language policies as language loss may cause identity to erode, whereby language has even greater symbolic importance in ethnically divided societies (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001: 64), like Kazakhstan. As Akiner pointed out, a high degree of Russification does not change the fact that there was still strong awareness of Kazakh identity, which was related more with self-perception (1995: 54). This fact is also apparent in statistics. For example, in the 1979 census, 97.5 % of the Kazakhs stated Kazakh as their mother tongue, while 52.3% (41.8 in 1970) responded that they knew fluent

[22] For more details see: Graham Smith (ed.), (1990) The Nationalities Question in Soviet Union, London; New York: Longman.

Russian as a second language (See Table 3.1 and 3.2 below). These responses show that the people saw the linguistic situation more as an ethnic loyalty and part of their identity rather than a matter of knowledge. On the other hand, the high degree of Russification also caused Kazakh administration to pursue more civic policies, such as the delay in the implementation of the law making Kazakh mandatory in state institutions, acceptance of Russian language as official language whereby the pace of ethnic policies has also slowed down, as we will discover in the next chapter.

Table 3. 1 Percentage of Central Asians declaring knowledge of Russian as a second language, 1970, 1979 and 1989

	1970	1979	1989	
Kazakhs	41,8	52,3	60,4	
Uzbeks	14,5	49,3	23,8	
Turkmen	15,4	25,4	27,8	
Tadzhiks	15,4	29,6	27,7	
Kirghiz	19,1	29,4	35,2	

Source: Smith, G. (ed.), (1990) The Soviet Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, New York: Longman Publications.

Table 3. 2 Percentage of the nationalities declaring their nationality language as their native tongue, 1979 and 1989

	1979	1989		
Kazakhs	97,1	97,5		
Uzbeks	98,3	98,5		
Turkmen	98,5	98,7		
Tadzhiks	97,7	97,8		
Kirghiz	97,8	97,9		

Source: Smith, G. (ed.), (1990) The Soviet Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, New York: Longman Publications.

In the meantime, there was a growing demand for Kazakh medium kindergartens and schools as well as dictionaries, teaching materials, books in parallel to this demand. Using Kazakh language as much as possible also began to be an honor even if only in the greetings and simple pleasantries (Akiner, 1995: 58). Similarly, the importance of Kazakh language schools among the urban Kazakhs also increased (Sarsembaev, 1999: 326). Finally, in September 1989, Kazakh language became the state language of the republic about the same time that other titular languages were being given the same status (Olcott, 1990: 69). As a result, awareness of Kazakh language started to increase more and Kazakh was started to be also used more in the public domain.

After the World War II, the victory brought Soviet Union a new global status and a chance to increase its political influence among the Third World countries, including Muslim ones in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The obvious prerequisite for success was to design a more receptive and positive image of the Soviet domestic treatment of Islam. In accordance with this new situation, the Soviet policy towards Islam in Kazakhstan, as well as in Central Asian states, became more tolerant. This took place in various forms such as sending official clergies to other countries, controlled toleration of Islamic educational training and rituals, allowing previously banned Islamic rituals to be practiced (Haghayeghi, 1995: 27). This relieve of pressure was in fact because of the attempt of the Soviet state to be seen more sympathetic to Muslim countries Thus, after Stalin's death, a new stage for the treatment of the religion began after the ascent of Khrushchev. At last, in 1990, a separate Muftiat in Alma-Ata was established within the Soviet Islamic hierarchy which was an official recognition of Islam as part of their general historical and cultural background. Most of the students and educated young professionals began to search for scholarly information about the religion and tried to do the practices of Islam (Akiner, 1995: 58). This search should be seen more as a part of the search for the identity of the Kazakhs than a search for faith, since being a Muslim is seen as the part of the identity in Kazakhstan which was emphasized before.

After 1970s, a new Kazakh intelligentsia appeared in Kazakhstan and the symbols which are the markers of Kazakh identity, started to be rediscovered (Sarsembaev, 1999: 326). Likewise, the hope of the Soviet leaders that the educated intelligentsia would lead the masses toward Russianization ended with failure. Actually, in contrast to the expectations of the Soviet leaders, the most highly educated Central Asian leaders that were hoped to serve for Soviet purposes became the figures promoting the cultural values of their own ethnic group (Bacon, 1980: 213). In Kazakhstan, it was under the leadership of Dinmukhamed Kunayev (The First Party Secretary of Kazakh SSR) that the Kazakh culture was promoted. Moreover, as I stated before, due to the relative loosening of repressions in the post-Stalinist period created a more suitable environment. As a result of all these factors, more concrete symbols of Kazakh cultural identity began to reappear during 1970s.

Among these symbols, maybe the '*yurt*' is the most important. The *yurt* is a portable structure consisting of a flexible wood frame covered by inner layer of

woven mats and an outer layer of felt coated with sheep fat for waterproofing. Designed to assemble or dismantle in a short time, the yurt was warm and comfortable in winter and cool in summer. Its floors and walls are decorated by hand made carpets (Gleason, 1997: 99). In the past, before the collectivization and sedentarization, yurt was the most important component of nomadic life since social activities mostly took place within yurts. After the collectivization and sedentarization, the *yurt*, as well as social activities, complex of beliefs and codes linked with *yurt*, had almost disappeared from steppes and it had become obsolete, but during 1950s, it reappeared again, not for the purpose of living in, but for the utilitarian purposes such as storage and guest accommodation (Akiner, 1995: 53-54). On the other hand, it has also been used in public domains as a setting for restaurants, clubs etc. Nevertheless, the most important role that the yurt played in this revival period was that it became a tool for emphasizing the ethnic identity.

A similar rediscovery in these years were in traditional designs and handcrafts. These were, in fact, reappeared for the purpose of producing souvenirs for tourists and export abroad. However, they soon became extremely popular within Kazakhstan itself in the wind of the ethnic rediscovery in those years. Even, several factories were established for the purpose of producing felt drugs, wooden toys, and ceramic dishes, woven griddles etc. Accordingly, during 1980s, this increased interest in ethnic roots, and the desire to rediscover the cultural world of the past led to the appearance of more and more publications on subjects such as the naming and the origin of Kazakh personal names, the art of hunting with birds of prey, design of traditional housings (Akiner, 1995: 54).

One of the areas of continuity that was preserved was dietary habits, which remained in traditional forms despite some changes. For example, while acceptance of bread as a steppe food by the Kazakhs was a great change, the bread was of the oasis type as it had been adopted by pastoral nomads in western Asia (Bacon, 1980: 203). However, the same is not true for dressing, because, male or female dress had become European type, whilst there were traditional headgears only in the more distant rural places. With some exceptions, traditional performing arts were represented by the music and dance groups dressed in mass-produced, token approximations of ‘native costume’ (Akiner, 1995: 52).

Burial practices besides practicing Muslim rites, such as observing Muslim festivals, practicing circumcision etc. are some other traditions that survived as a marker of ethnicity (Akiner, 1995: 52). In other words, religious beliefs and practices continued and most of the folk religion was protected and remained entrenched although there were some changes in the details of these practices and beliefs (Bacon, 1980: 205).

In the meantime, Kazakh identity was also reasserted in the reinterpretation of history, and professional historians started to re-evaluate Kazakh-Russian relations. During the Soviet era, the interpretation of the period of Russian conquests of Central Asia, as well as Kazakhstan, and resistance to these incursions had experienced several revisions. To illustrate, until 1930s, Russian conquests of the region had been seen as absolute evil and resistance to colonial power had been viewed as progressive. During 1930s and 1940s, the theory was modified and Russian expansion started to be viewed as lesser evil, because it had progressed the people from a primitive structure to a far more developed structure. By 1950s, the official view was that the Russian conquest was certainly good and those who fought against this were denounced (Glenn, 1999: 86).

However, during this re-evaluation period, it was acknowledged that archival materials had been suppressed during the Soviet era and perestroika historians suggested that a more critical approach should be taken. The turning point of the anti-colonial discourse in Kazakhstan, while less than the other Central Asian states, was the admission and beginning of the discussion of the sufferings endured by the Kazakhs during the Stalinist collectivization-sedentarization campaigns. Kazakh demographers also began to publish detailed estimates of the numbers of the people died during that time (Akiner, 1995: 59). Anti-colonial rhetoric is important in that it plays an important role in the nation-building process in Kazakhstan since it affects the perceptions and views of the Kazakhs against the Russian population in the country today.

The traditional extended and joint family type was also attacked by the Soviet regime through collectivizing the means of production and starting to pay wages to individuals instead of groups. This, in return, disrupted the traditional family economy in which the family head controlled the income and decided its allocation. Yet, despite this disruption, family solidarity could not be destroyed (Bacon, 1980:

168-169), and as a result, there was a continuity and not disappearance in social interactions, because the children were brought up in the home, where traditional values and patterns of behavior were given to them before they came under Soviet cultural influence in schools. The early training in the respect for the elderly and in the importance of kin relationships counteracted, to a large degree, the outside intervening for weakening family and kin ties (Bacon, 1980: 204). Akiner adds that within the family, relationships were regulated by convention and tradition with a balance between gender specific roles and authority. Marriages were exogamous (marrying with a person from out of one's own tribe) as in the past. Protection to the kin group (as will be presented in the following chapter) and obligations of loyalty to the group, continued to play an important role and the family became a defense mechanism for protecting the individual from the brutalities of the totalitarian state (1995: 53). Today, the reflections of these tribal relations are apparent especially in the employment of individuals for the administrative and public positions in Kazakhstan. As we will explore in the next chapter, there is a general discrimination against the non-Kazakhs in the employment policy in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Putting other reasons aside, one partial reason of this exclusion is because of the kinship and tribal loyalties of the Kazakhs that they distribute administrative and official positions to their relatives and the members of their family and tribes.

In the meantime, outside the nucleus family, there was an increase in the types of networks with mutual loyalty and obligation. While some of these were related with family, based on clan tribal structures of the past that will be handled separately in the next section, the other new networks were school friendships, people from same towns, neighbors, and Party contacts etc. Generally, these were for mutual interests and mutual benefits (Akiner (1995: 53).

3.6 Prevailing Traditional Sub-Ethnic Identities Despite Soviet Policies

The Soviet state followed policies to transform the Kazakh people socio-economically and culturally, and tried to undermine the traditional nomadic way of life with collectivization and sedentarization. Even if Kazakhstan, with these policies, was urbanized and industrialized to a certain degree, high literacy and education rates were achieved, as well as the transportation and communication

infrastructure were developed, however, sub-national/sub-ethnic identities[23] survived in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan,[24] especially in the southern Kazakhstan and after the independence, the sub-national lineage of political actors in Kazakhstan became a critical factor in the allocation of political resources (especially state and bureaucracy posts) and economic resources (especially access to revenues from extractive resources), thus, even if Soviet order put the Nationalities Policy into practice and tried to change the patterns of life, it was unable to eradicate the pre-Soviet patterns of life, as well as traditional relationships and identities. But, how could this be despite the coercive power of the Soviet Union and the policies it followed?

In the first years of the revolution, there was a slow economic change in Central Asia due to Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), which aimed to realize a socialist economy slowly (Massel, cited in Collins, 2006: 85). However, Stalin implemented collectivization and sedentarization between 1929 and 1933, to increase the speed of the modernization resulting in catastrophic losses for the Kazakhs and Kazakhs' nomadic way of life[25] (Zardykhan, 2004: 64). In fact, during the Soviet period, especially during the Stalin era, intensive anti-clan policies were implemented in the Central Asian republics. However, these efforts could not weaken the clan networks and the clans achieved to survive and even became stronger (Roy, 2000: 103, 109, 115). While it is true that the Soviet policies transformed the traditional life of the sub-groups and their networks partially, clans and tribes were able to adapt to the new conditions and the kolkhoz became the 'new tribe', because the division of tribes and clans into smaller parts through sedentarization by1930s, led the *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* to become the new forms of pre-Soviet tribal and clanic structures (Roy, 2000: 89). While the tribal ties were reinforced by marriages or cadre appointments when the Soviet state was not controlling them (Collins, 2006: 334), kolkhozes also led to the enhancement of fictive kinships in local areas creating a "localism" whereby clan elites, who were in

[23] The terms 'sub-ethnic' and 'sub-national' are used interchangeably.

[24] For the details of the issue, see: Kathleen Collins, Maria Brill Olcott, Edward Schatz, Pauline Jones Luong, Anette Bohr, Shirin Akiner.

[25] For more details see chapter 3.

good positions in the Party in 1920s and 1930s, were given the power within these new economic and political structures (Roy, 2000: 91-92).

Actually, the survival of clanic/tribal structures can be attributed to several reasons. First of all, in the 1940s, the 'clan problem' was usually ignored by Moscow due to the World War II. Secondly, with the death of Stalin in 1953, the extensive pressure was relieved. Thirdly, with the Brezhnev's 'stability of cadre' policy in 1960s-1970s, the clanic/tribal structures were further rehabilitated. Especially, the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) was advantageous for the clan networks to because of the *korenizatsiia* (nativization) policy and the Communist staff was stabilized in Central Asia.[26] This was the period when a political culture had time to reinforce, creating conditions for future independence (Roy 2000: 103). Actually, *korenizatsiia* (nativization) was the policy that aimed the recruitment and training of the members of titular native nationalities as well as their promotion to good positions in the state, economy and the Party. Nativization of local party cadres, which involved the Russification of the titular *nomenklatura*, the nationality policy led to dominance of the titular elites and local level (*oblast, kolkhoz, raion*) politics in Central Asia generally (Fierman, 1991: 22-23). Therefore, it is not wrong to state that the Soviet experience helped for the formation and consolidation of a Kazakh identity and besides their destructive effects, Soviet policies were not always negative.

Soviet policies modernized clans while driving them underground and linking them with corruption and the second economy, but could not eradicate them. On the contrary, Soviet policies opened the way for greater access to state and party resources for the some clans (Khegai, 2004: 10). To put it differently, sub-ethnic clanic/tribal identities continued in underground, as it was easy to conceal such affiliations, because kinship divisions do not have visible markers showing identity and differences out of the direct control of the state. As Schatz indicated, "clan identity became an asset when manifested in private but a liability when expressed in public" (2001: xxiii).

Actually, it was the command system of the Soviet state that created opportunities for the proliferation of access networks by constraining access to

[26] In Kazakhstan, during Brezhnev period, Dinmukhammed Kunaev held the post from 1959 to 1986 for 27 years.

political and economic goods (political power, consumer goods, industrial inputs), and it was the clan networks that were the most advantageous ones to access those goods. Furthermore, as the economic targets were set by the center, the demands of Moscow were high and the criteria for how to fulfill these demands were unclear, there was a lack of protection in cases of failures, whereby the penalties were high. As a result, tribal and clanic networks and affiliations were also used as an umbrella to be protected from the irregularities and penalties of Moscow. In such situations, networks were becoming very important, and in case of a failure, local administrators naturally wanted to work with people they knew and they trusted. Moreover, in case of not fulfilling the high expectations, local failures had to be concealed from the center, so only with a wide network and trusted staff this could be succeeded. This also links the different levels in the country, causing a patron-client structure. In this structure, locally based groups were centering around the local party leader. In fact, local party leaders were also appointed among the local people due to the *korenizatsiia* (nativization) that was implemented by Moscow to be able to prevent corruption and meet the targeted expectations.

Differently from Schatz, Olcott, Collins and Roy, according to some scholars, the resulting sub-national structures are based on regionalism, instead of tribal networks (see, for example, Luong 2002: 51-101). For example, Pauline Jones Luong claims that Soviet state created incentives for individuals to shift their social and political identities from pre-existing tribal and religious identities to "Soviet inspired" ones. She adds that the Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia did not lead to the re-emergence of political divisions based on ancient tribal affiliations and Islam. Instead, they displaced the former by promoting and politicizing regionalism and regional identities. So, according to Luong, the resulting structure of the Soviet state's policies were regionalism and regional competition (2002: 63-64). I disagree with Luong, and agree with the argument of Schatz that tribal structures survived and still prevail today. Because, as explained above, the division into the three hordes was suitable for the geography of the Kazakh steppes and the division was motivated by the geographical conditions, so each horde settled in different regions of the Kazakh steppes. Moreover, as Roy indicated, one clan or tribe formed one kolkhoz, therefore Soviet state indirectly and unintentionally helped the preservation of clans in *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* (2000: 87-89). This is also

reinforced by the fact that most of the Central Asians, including the Kazakhs as well, remained in the agricultural sector in their countries, and this resulted in a low level of migration from rural to urban places. This partly explains the prevalence of clanic and tribal identities and networks in the contemporary Central Asia. Kinship ties continued during the Soviet era and the dominance of the particular tribes and clans (in Kazakhstan, the dominant ones are those under Great Horde) in party and in the republican administrative institutions continued (Glenn, 1999: 137). Actually, it was not necessary for kinships to be real, so, regions are settled by either fictive or not, kin tribes.

In the meantime, as Olcott pointed out, the roles of clans should not be overestimated (2002: 184-185), because in some of the interviews made in Kazakhstan, it is revealed that there are Kazakhs who do not attach themselves to any tribal structure and do not even know anything about these structures. Similarly, Roy (2000: 114), states that in Kazakhstan, the sub-ethnic situation was different from the other Central Asian countries. In Kazakhstan, the tribal oppositions were less serious, because of the presence of Russians in large numbers and their direct political hold's being stronger in the country. This, in return, added another dimension to the allocation of power positions: allocation of power along the ethnic (Russian/non-Kazakh - Kazakh) lines. Today, this phenomenon is continuing especially on the basis of language policy as we will discover in the next chapter.

Thereby, as it was illegal to talk about a person's clan identity, clan networks went into the underground (the informal sphere) from the formal one. Whereby some of the pre-Soviet elites were eliminated, the Soviet state educated and promoted the new ones, but the Kazakhs kept their kin and clan identity, and reinforced it either by marriages or cadre appointments. In Kazakhstan, the modernization did not occur as its Soviet planners expected, and the Soviet policy led to the survival of the clans in a more informal and more corrupt form, instead of the demise of the clans (Collins, 2006: 334, 337). Whereas the Soviet policies further institutionalized these sub-ethnic identities, the relevance and importance of the survival of these tribal identities with the purposes of this thesis is that they form partial basis for the justification of ethnic policies implemented by the Kazakh government today. The Kazakh policymakers argue that these tribal stereotypes should be overcome and a viable Kazakh identity should be created. Moreover, these

prevailing sub-ethnic structures have partially given the Kazakhs the advantage of being more organized in comparison to the Russian speaking groups, because, as Annette Bohr indicated, "Slavic-based organizations in Central Asia have failed to formulate clear agendas" (1998: 140) to be able to press for more inclusive and civic policies. Hence, the Kazakhs have the advantage of pressing for more ethnic policies in Kazakhstan partially due to the clan networks and *zhuz* relations.

3.7 Historical Background of Ethnic Structure in Kazakhstan

As we saw before, by mid-1850s, all control of the Kazakh lands had passed to the Russian rule. As a result of this, in the latter periods of the 19th century, Russian immigrants started to settle on lands, restricting Kazakh nomadism, where the Kazakhs once used for pasture. In the contemporary history of Kazakhstan, there are three waves of migration of Russians (Ukrainians and other Slavs as well) into Kazakhstan: during Tsarist Russia's conquest of the Kazakh steppes and Turkestan between 1890s and 1910s; before and during collectivization campaigns of the Soviet Union between 1929-1933, and during the Virgin Land campaign of Khrushchev in 1950s. All these waves of migration caused resettling of lots of Russians and other non-Kazakh groups in especially the northern parts of the Kazakhstan (Davis and Sabol, 1998: 477).

The first wave began after the crop failure in European Russia and large number of families from Russia and Ukraine were brought to the Kazakh territory between 1891 and 1912 (Zenkovsky, 1960: 68-69) with the aim of exploiting agricultural resources of the region (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996: 211-212). This brought change to the Kazakh economic structure, passing the ownership of the large amounts of the grazing lands into the Russian hands, and the use of land became dependent on the permission of Russians (Winner, 1958: 18-19). However, these migrations were not always peaceful and easy; there were times the Kazakhs paid huge expenses and losses[27] or emigrated from Kazakhstan to China and Turkistan. After the collectivization, the Russian population increased from 1.3 million in 1926 to 2.5 million in 1939. In the same period, the number of Kazakhs decreased from 3.7 million to 2.4 million, because of high mortality and emigrations (Chinn and

[27] Losses were especially significant during collectivization and sedentarization efforts of the Soviet Union. For more details see chapter 3.

Kaiser, 1996: 188). During the Stalin era, a number of populations, before and during the World War II, were deported to Kazakhstan due to security concerns, such as Germans, Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, and Chechens etc. (Dave, 2003: 26-27). On the other hand, during Khrushchev era, the Virgin Lands policy was implemented with the aim of rationalizing the economy by agricultural development and increasing the grain production. During that period, millions of hectares of idle lands in Volga, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Urals were cultivated, whereby, *sovkhozes* replaced the *kolkhozes* (Olcott, 1987: 224-228). During the Brezhnev era, Soviet state reorganized the weak collective farms and reinforced the *sovkhoz* system. Yet, the grain harvest did not increase significantly due to bad organization, poor machinery use and soil erosion (Matley, 1994: 307). The only significant result was that after the Virgin Lands campaign, in 1959, Russians were numbering 4 million (42.7% of the total population) while the Kazakhs were only 2.8 million (30% of the total population) (Chinn&Kaiser, 1996: 188).

Table 3. 3 Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, 1959-1993 (Absolute Number and Percent of Total Population)

Nation	1959	1970	1979	1989	1993
Russians	3,974,229	5,521,917	5,991,205	6,227,549	6,168,740
%	42,7	42,4	40,8	37,8	36,5
Kazakhs	2,794,966	4,234,166	5,289,349	6,534,616	7,296,942
%	30	32,5	36	39,7	43,1

Source: Chinn and Kaiser, 1996, p. 189.

On the other hand, Slav and European populations, which migrated into Kazakhstan, also brought the industrial knowledge, thus, while most of the ethnic Kazakhs remained in the agricultural sector and remained as rural, Russian and European immigrants were mostly in the industrial sector and were urban. As a result, the Kazakhs were mostly in handicraft production and small enterprises, whereby Russians were in technical and industrial jobs. This led to a very important phenomenon; the reinforcement of the division of labor along the ethnic lines (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996: 214, 228). This pattern remained true for most of the time throughout the Soviet period, even if there were some efforts (i.e. *korenizatsiia*) for compensating this. In addition to this, Olcott (1990: 69) points out that immigration of Russians and other Europeans, and emigration of the Kazakhs became a historical

event used by Kazakh nationalists in making the Kazakh identity and nationalization of the Kazakhs, whereby this was channeled towards the Russians, who became the 'other'.

Yet, in 1960s, Kazakh population started to increase more than non-Kazakh populations (see Table 4.1). While the Kazakhs increased to 5.3 million from 2.8 million between 1959-1979 (from 30 % to 36%), Russians increased from 4 million to 6 million (42.7% to 40.8 %). This indigenization was mainly the result of higher birthrate among the Kazakhs and the decrease of the Russian immigration. Indeed, in 1970s Russians started to emigrate and this trend continued in 1980s. The main reasons of Russians for this emigration were better job opportunities in Russia, the increasing Kazakhization of the country and proportion of the Kazakhs in all sectors of economy, higher education and political presentation (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996: 188-189). Consequently, until the end of 1980s, the Kazakhs were at a minority position in their country, and they could not constitute the majority of the total population in Kazakhstan until 1997.

In conclusion, the Soviet period has resulted in the national delimitation of the area with the modernization of the region occurring within a national form. The industrialization[28] of the region has resulted in a large immigration of Slavic skilled workers. The presence of large numbers of Russians affected the Kazakh culture; after the first decades of the Soviet rule, as a result of the state policies and migration, the Russian language became the common language of the region. In Kazakhstan, the relatively low proficiency in the Kazakh language is paralleled by a high proficiency in Russian amongst the country's citizens, the highest in the Soviet Union after Belarussians, Ukrainians and Latvians, while most of the ethnic Kazakhs (nearly 98%) continued to see Kazakh language as their mother tongue. Hence, although Central Asians have been influenced deeply from the modernization and secularization that the Russo-Soviet culture had brought to them, it was deeper in Kazakhstan relative to other Central Asian states.[29] Nevertheless, main areas of cultural identity, such as language, religion, literature, etc. aided to remind the people

[28] In fact, the industrialization was limited due to Soviet government's usually establishing raw material based industries near the extraction sites and exploiting raw materials and, in order to make Kazakhstan dependent to the Moscow.

[29] This difference from the other Central Asian countries is illustrated by a popular Uzbek saying; 'If you want to become Russian, first become Kazakh' (Dave, 2004: 8).

of the basic differences between the two cultures. As presented up till here, this is evident from both the revival and survival of some elements of the Kazakh culture, and thus, when policies were loosened, the tendency had been to emphasize the elements that make them different from Russians. Moreover, members of the intelligentsia played a role in this revival, since, as Bacon emphasized, intelligentsia members trained under the Soviet regime had not lost their ethnic identity. Maybe they spoke Russian, wore European clothes, and in public, they behaved in conformity with the expectations of Soviet officials, but they remained as a part of their community (1980: 211).

Meanwhile, due to the lack of mobilization of the indigenous people, the traditional forms of the society continued with some modifications. This is most apparent in the fusion of the old tribal and clanic hierarchy with the Communist Party and government hierarchies. Beside these, the particular modernization implemented by the Soviet Union usually ignored the existing traditional institutions and implanted from above without paying attention to the social structure of the country, whereby the Soviet state also used the existing traditional institutions for pragmatic reasons in congruent with the Soviet ideologies. It was not an organic development; it did not penetrate all segments of the society, but an artificial imposition and in effect suppressed societal development. As modernization was implemented by Soviet colonial power, its penetration into the social structure of the society was disproportional that its impacts were not at the same level at all regions of Kazakhstan. So the degree of the effect of the Soviet Nationalities Policy on the Kazakhs was different in different parts (especially north-south division was obvious) of the country. Therefore, we cannot talk just about a simple effect but varying effects of the Soviet Nationalities Policy on the Kazakhs in different parts of Kazakhstan. It is possible to argue that the impact of the Soviet Nationalities Policy is much stronger in the north Kazakhstan and weaker in southern Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, the main role of the clans was traditionally to regulate the pastoral nomadic economy, after the Soviet rule, especially after the collectivization policy, whilst this role changed and concealed from the official surveillance. In rural parts of the country, the clans continued to have a social function to regulate the social life of the people, mainly because of the collective farms' being formed along the clan lines. Despite the efforts of Soviet Union to prevent and lessen the sub-

ethnic identities and denoting them as preventive for modernization, clans continued to play a role, especially in agricultural south of the Kazakhstan, in the territory of Great Horde. Even in northern and western Kazakhstan, especially where the clan identity was concealed[30] because of the dominance of Russians, extended family networks were the structures for protecting the people from state pressures and enabling them to access the scarce goods and services (Olcott, 2002: 184). In fact, the tribal structure was adapted to the Soviet system, because these were the structures enabling the survival of the people in an uncertain environment, and resisting to the Soviet state's repressions. Moreover, the sub-national, clanic/tribal networks provided the needed goods and services when the formal channels were unable to meet the demands of the people. So, the practical benefits of these sub-national identities and networks, accessing to the scarce resources, enabled these structures to continue, while these structures also had to transform and adapt to the changing environment.

On the other hand, Soviet policies led to the formation of a cohesive national unit within Kazakhstan, giving the Kazakhs a separate state structure within the Soviet Union. As Rogers Brubaker noted, the Soviet system institutionalized nationhood and nationality on the sub-state republic level by classifying them as social categories that are separated from Soviet citizenship, which was evident in the fifth columns of USSR internal passports that denoted an individual's ethnicity (Kazakh, Jew etc.) different from citizenship (cited in Bohr, 1998: 154). As indicated before, the results of various policies implemented under the Soviet Nationalities Policy, which were presented in this chapter, form the basis for various issues in the post-Soviet nation-building in Kazakhstan affecting the civic and ethnic policy choices of the nation-builders today, as we will explore in the following chapter.

[30] For example, according to Poliakov, "one of the best kept secrets of Central Asia was the pre-revolutionary social position and is still the most important determinant of social position today" (1992: xvi).

CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC STRUCTURE AND NATION BUILDING POLICIES IN THE POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan was deeply affected by the Soviet Nationalities Policy. Various elements of Kazakh culture was either destroyed or altered despite the fact that they survived from the Soviet policies within different forms. As a result, the burden of building a viable and inclusive nation has become rather heavy. In addition, the presence of the high proportion of non-Kazakh (especially Russians and Russified populations) populations, due to the Soviet Union's policy of settling of Russians, as well as Tsarist Russia, has made the nation building process in Kazakhstan further burdensome.

In this chapter, therefore, firstly, the ethnic situation, both from intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic perspectives, will be laid down in order to better understand under which conditions the nation-building policies are being implemented. Secondly, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be analyzed in order to give under which legal framework these nation building policies are being implemented. Finally, in the rest of the chapter, various nation-building policies; from language, education, and employment policies to cultural, national symbols selection, capital moving, and religious policies, as well as the statements of the president Nursultan Nazarbayev will be laid down, in order to determine whether the post-Soviet nation building process in Kazakhstan is more civic or ethnic.

4.1 The Inter-Ethnic and Intra-Ethnic Environment and Nation Building in Contemporary Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, the ethnic situation is dichotomous that both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic divisions exist. Whilst, intra-ethnic sub-national structures have been influencing the nation-building process and the policies in Kazakhstan, it is the

existence of large proportion of Russians and Russified non-Kazakh minorities[31] that makes the nation building process a more delicate and important issue. As a result, balancing the inter-ethnic harmony has become a more critical factor in the country, making it more difficult to implement the nation-building policies. Yet, in Kazakhstan, the main issue creating tension between the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs is the implementation of the policies that seems to favor the Kazakhs at the disadvantage of non-Kazakhs. One of the main justifications behind these policies is that since the Kazakhs are divided within themselves, it is vital to implement policies for the revival of a coherent Kazakh identity. Thus, it is necessary to lay down the contemporary ethnic structure and divisions in Kazakhstan, before exploring the nation-building policies pursued by the Kazakh administration. In this section, therefore, besides the inter-ethnic situation, the intra-ethnic situation and its effects will also be examined, since this justification needs further examination.

In the post-Soviet period, there has been a search for new national identity, the focus of which is on titular nation, the Kazakhs, in Kazakhstan. Yet, the inter-ethnic situation and the existence of large numbers of the non-Kazakhs (especially Russians and Russified non-Kazakh groups) should be taken into consideration for this new identity. It was especially the Russians that found themselves as second-class citizens in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, since they were once at special, privileged status during the Soviet period. Because of losing their privileged position and fearing for their future, large numbers of the non-Kazakhs, the Russians being the first, started to emigrate from Kazakhstan and the first destination was Russia. Immigration of the Diaspora Kazakhs from near countries (Mongolia, China, Turkey etc) into Kazakhstan and lower fertility rates among the non-Kazakhs contrary to higher birth rates among the Kazakhs also reinforced the demographic situation in Kazakhstan in favor of the titular nationality. However, there is still a high proportion of non-Kazakh minorities in the country, making the nation-building process more difficult and complex.

The pressures from the ethnic Kazakhs for more ethnic policies to revive Kazakh identity on the one hand, and the discontent of the non-Kazakhs with these

[31] According to Dave, "...vast majority of these non-titular, non-Russian people are linguistically assimilated into Russian culture and no significant cultural differences exist between them and 'passport' Russians" (Dave, 2003: 13).

ethnic policies and their demands for more inclusive and civic policies on the other forced Nazarbayev to follow a dual policy of state-building and nation-building project of harmonization (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 182). It should also be remembered that the southern regions[32] of the country were less affected from the Soviet policies in comparison to northern ones, and the Kazakhs from south are the ones that are insisting more for more ethnic policies in order to revive the Kazakh identity. This pressure also comes from the outlook of the majority of Kazakhs. The indigenous Kazakhs believe that Russians came and behave like conquerors, not as immigrants and in addition to repression of their language, culture, religion; their economy was exploited, or controlled by the center. For Kazakhs, Soviet nuclear testing severely damaged the Kazakhs lands also. So indigenous people believe they have a right to take measures to build up their national identity (language, culture etc.), economy and use land for the benefit of themselves as well as to identify the symbols and traditions of the state with their national identities (Carley, 1998: 311).

Ethnic policies, such as the appointment of the Kazakhs to key administrative positions, held by Russians before, the establishment of *Kazakh Tili* organization to revive and promote Kazakh language and culture, especially in Russified northern parts of the country and more imams' being sent to northern parts to change the religious imbalance between north and south (Bremmer, 1994: 621) and the repatriation of the ethnic Kazakhs from near abroad of Kazakhstan (China, Mongolia, Turkey etc) in the Russified north all seen as ethnic by the Russian and Russified populations in Kazakhstan. All these policies will be discussed in detail in the following parts, but for the time being, it should be noted that, these Kazakhization efforts have also been trying to be balanced by the 'harmonization' policy. These civic efforts involves giving equal status to all citizens in the Constitution, banning of associations promoting social, religious, tribal, national, racial or class discord, forcing organizations that want to be registered by the state to be neutral ethnically (Article 5, Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan), cancellation of the language law passed by the parliament that would make the knowledge of Kazakh language compulsory (Glenn, 1999: 115). Yet, the language policy as we will explore later on, has been the main issue between the Russians and

[32] Of course there were exceptions such as Almaty, where Russians and other non-Kazakh populations were dominant.

Kazakhs. The contemporary discontent of Russians, in fact, began in 1989, when the legislation that gave Kazakh the state language status, and Russian, the language of inter-nation communication, was passed. This was perceived by Russians as an indicator that Russian fell into the secondary status and they opposed to the legislation especially in north Kazakhstan (Glenn, 1999: 111-112).

Hence, due to policies perceived as ethnic in nature, especially in the early years of independence, (i.e. new language laws, citizenship law, employment) caused Russians to feel deprived and discriminated against. In fact, as Bohr noted, the situation is painful for Russians, because, during the Soviet period, Russians were at an advantageous position of the "leading nationality". However, those, remained out of Russia, found themselves as minorities, so they tend to see themselves as victims of discrimination. Other groups, who were Russified linguistically (Tatar, German, Jewish, Korean etc) have been accustomed to the fact of being minority, so do not see themselves as victims as Russians see themselves. Yet, there are some Russians who see the efforts of the Kazakhs as re-discovering their cultural heritage and approach the issue more calmly. However, the majority of them consider these efforts as the violation of their rights. Furthermore, they do not want to learn Kazakh language which they regard as an underdeveloped language, even if this is for keeping their jobs in the public sector. Russians are also disappointed with Kazakhs, because they think that the Kazakhs do not appreciate their developing and modernizing role in Kazakhstan. This view comes from Soviet propagating that Russians played important role in educating and modernizing, thus civilizing the Central Asians after the conquest of the region (1998: 144), because Russians were taught that non-Russian people voluntarily joined the Soviet Union, and the Kazakhs were essentially backward and barbaric in nature until Russians came. In other words, Russians believe that they civilized them and they do not accept that Moscow exploited the Kazakh economy, on the contrary, they believe that they brought industry, technology and literacy (Carley, 1998: 311). Besides the economic reasons, due to the policies that are perceived as ethnic and discriminative, non-Kazakhs, especially Russians continued to emigrate not only to Russia but also to the northern parts of Kazakhstan, where Russified population densely settled and mostly in majority.

Some of the Russians, who migrated to Russia, however, did not find an environment that they had thought. One reason of this was that there were no better socio-economic conditions in Russia, so there was no better life in Russia than the Russians had thought. Moreover, Russians from Kazakhstan and from other countries of Central Asia were seen as aliens by the indigenous Russians, which presents an evidence of cultural differences between the Russia Russians and the Kazakhstan Russians. For instance, Diener points out that the differences in food, work ethics (Kazakh Russians were told that they were working too much), the dialect and the form of speech caused them to feel different from those indigenous Russians. Furthermore, since non-Kazakh population lived for generations or long years in Kazakhstan, they had an emotional feeling of belonging to the area with which they had forged strong bonds, so they were unwilling to leave (2004). As Robert Lowe pointed out that "one Russian complained that he had been called Kyrgyz, dramatically demonstrating the identity crisis presently suffered by the Russians in the near abroad" (2003: 125). Hence, they realized that they are attached to Kazakh lands, even if they do not see it as their historical homeland. Nevertheless, Russians in Kazakhstan have varying degrees of rootedness in the country. For instance, Russians living in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan generally identify themselves more closely with Russians living in the Far Eastern regions in Siberia, not with the 'mainland' Russians. Moreover, there are strong regional and local attachments among Russians in East Kazakhstan, which is often more than their sense of belongingness to Kazakhstan or Russia. On the other hand, Russians in southern Kazakhstan are more acculturated into Kazakh culture and they tend to have more familiarity with the Kazakh language (Dave, 2003: 12).

On the other hand, despite the fact that the Kazakh government gave incentives for immigration of the Kazakhs from abroad to be able to change the ethnic balance within the country in favor of Kazakhs, they encouraged with the same difficulties. Initial enthusiasm for incoming of kin Kazakhs, the efforts for adapting them to Kazakhstan showed the effects of Soviet policies. As we explored in chapter 3, even if the Soviet policies could not eradicate the Kazakh culture and identity, nevertheless, it modified and changed it (Olcott, 2002: 176). Similarly, sixty thousand Kazakhs, who have returned from Mongolia, "expecting a Kazakh homeland instead found the Russified Kazakhs and settled *mankurts*" (Diener, 2004).

However, we should also take into consideration that they were settled in the northern parts, where the Russians are dominant and the Russification of the Kazakhs occurred far more than the southern regions of Kazakhstan, as already explained above.

The Russian and other non-Kazakh emigration to Russia, Germany, Korea, Ukraine etc., which is their historical homeland, slowed down after the mid-1990s, due to several reasons, such as the understanding that the life in the homeland is as hard as in Kazakhstan (case for Russians, and some of Ukrainians) (Diener, 2004), the homeland governments' trying to persuade the community to stay in Kazakhstan due to economic prospects of Kazakhstan and aiming to utilize from the diaspora nation (case for Germans and Koreans) (Dave, 2003: 14). On the other hand, the same pattern is true for some of the Kazakhs immigrated into Kazakhstan that ten thousand out of sixty thousand of those from Mongolia went back to Mongolia. (Diener, 2004).

These problems become more critical when the demographic fragility of the country is considered. Even if there had been large out-migrations (see Table 4.2) of non-Kazakh populations, especially of Russians; the non-Kazakh groups are still in majority in the northern regions. Meanwhile, as also presented by Dave, it should be kept in mind that about 20-30% of the population in North Kazakhstan, Akmola, Pavlodar, and Kokshetau oblasts are the non-Kazakhs and the non-Russians, such as Ukrainians, Belarusians, Koreans. However, most of these people are linguistically Russified whilst there is no significant cultural differences between them and Russians (Dave, 2003: 13). On the other hand, the ethnic Kazakhs are the majority in the southern regions of Kazakhstan.[33] Therefore, state policies that do not consider this fact can cause the problems to increase and this is evident from the protests. For instance, as Ustugov demonstrated, government's fiscal policy aiming to redistribute money from the industrialized north to the agricultural south by exempting some taxes from south was protested and met with anger by the northern populations. In fact, this policy was partly aiming to correct the disproportionate investments

[33] In fact, there are exceptions to this generalization that Almaty, which is in south-east was populated mostly by non-Kazakhs, especially Russians, whereby there are Kazakh dominated oblasts in northern parts. Moreover, the Uzbek population densely inhabit in southern part of the country. *Ceteris paribus*, what is argued here is to indicate a general tendency about the demographic structure in Kazakhstan.

between the regions; however, this was perceived as insensitive to the concerns of the northern communities (cited in Glenn, 1999: 112).

Table 4. 1 Ethnic composition in Kazakhstan, Census Data 1959-2004

Nationality	1959 (%)	1979 (%)	1989 (%)	1999 (%)	2004 (%)
Kazakh	30	36	40,1	53,4	54,03
Russian	42,7	40,8	37,4	29,9	30
Ukrainian	8,2	6,1	5,4	3,7	3,7
Belorussian	1,2	1,2	1,1	0,8	0,76
German	7,1	6,1	5,8	2,4	2,4
Tatar	2,1	2,1	2	1,7	1,7
Uzbek	1,5	1,8	2	2,5	2,51
Uighur	0,6	1	1,1	1,4	1,4
Korean	0,8	0,6	0,6	0,7	0,7
Combined* Turkic/Muslim	39,7	45,5	50,2	61	62
Combined* Slavic/European	60,3	54,5	49,8	39	38

*Figures are estimates and include other smaller ethnic groups.
Sources: Dave,B., Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan, Commission On Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Working Group on Minorities Ninth session, 05 May, 2003, p.5 and Eicher, S., 'Kazakhstan at a Glance, ch1, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english).

Besides the divisions among different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (i.e. Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, Uzbeks) as laid down in the previous section, there are also intra-ethnic divisions among the Kazakhs themselves which adds another dimension to the nation building process in Kazakhstan. As outlined before, the Kazakhs have been divided into three Hordes (*Zhuzes*) and these identities still continue today. Certainly, not every Kazakh knows his/her clan identity mainly because of the calamitous effects of the collectivization and sedentarization policies of the Soviet Union, as most people lost their families due to famine, arrests, killing etc. during that period. However, this tradition, even if it is unreal for some of the people, in general, takes an important place in daily life of the Kazakh people and the information of which horde an individual comes from is a valuable asset, because it provides various advantages, beyond its emotional value. Today, in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, political environment in Kazakhstan is still being affected by clan politics (see Table 4.2). Especially in the early years of independence, Nazarbayev

faced with old divisions between three hordes and smaller clan networks. (Olcott, 2002: 186-187).

Nevertheless, in political life of the Kazakhstan, there have always been coalitions among the clans and hordes. In addition, whereby the more important thing is a well established patron-client network, which may include the non-Kazakhs and the Kazakhs (without the knowledge of their genealogy), family and loyalty are cultural norms among the Kazakhs and play important role in daily life. Thereby, when a network is to be established, it should be consisted of trusted individuals and these are often selected from members of the family or clan. For instance, in 1995, Amalbek Tshanov replaced 40 bureaucrats with people from his clan when he became *akim* of Zhambyl *Oblast* (Olcott, 2002: 187). Thus, Nazarbayev encountered some difficulties. First, parliament became an arena in which clans competed for gaining access to state resources. Second, even if Nazarbayev manipulated the electoral and party legislation to decrease clan representation, this did not reach to its aim. Third, rivals wanted more share from the resources which were mostly given to Nazarbayev's clan (Collins, 2006: 301). In fact, it may be true that power sharing policy between the three hordes decreases the conflicts between Kazakhs, the non-Kazakhs increasingly feel themselves as second class citizens due to the Kazakhization policy. Hence, while Nazarbayev has achieved some balance for sub-ethnic/sub-national divisions on the one hand, it became difficult to give non-Kazakh population the sense of belonging to the Kazakhstan on the other hand, because of the replacement of the Russians and the other non-Kazakhs with the Kazakhs in governmental, industrial and educational positions (Glenn, 1999: 115), which will be explored in detail later on.

Table 4. 2 Clans of Rural-Born Kazakh Presidential Appointees

Horde	% of Population	% of Appointees (n=102)
"Lesser"	33.96%	18.14%
"Middle"	41.24%	46.57%
"Greater"	24.63%	35.29%

Chi-square = 0.00156

Source: Askhat Z. Asylbekov, Kto est' kto v Respublike Kazakhstan: 1996-7. Almaty: Respublika Kazakhstan, 1997, in Schatz, E., 2001: 26.

Olcott mentions that the increasing importance of the sub-ethnic structures is because of the efforts of the Kazakh government for reviving the Kazakh identity and as the government's seeing the clan identity as one of the basic components of the Kazakh statehood (2002: 184). Therefore, the Kazakh administration is putting forward the justification for more ethnic policies due to the pressure coming from the indigenous intelligentsias with the aim of integrating the Kazakhs within themselves that has been undermined to a certain degree by sub-ethnic loyalties and ties. As Bohr indicated, people often regard their clan and tribe as well as their horde as their principle attachment (1998: 141), in fact, whatever the social position of a clan member is, he/she is expected and required to work for the well-being of his/her clan. This is prevalent especially for the elite members of the clan, who, by providing opportunities or assistance to the members of their tribes, clans and networks, in return expect loyalty and respect from these members in order to maintain their status (Khegai, 2004: 9).

Because of the homogenization of the population of Kazakhstan due to the factors laid down before, intra-ethnic tensions are increasing. Clanism is creating a different type of ethnic problem, and this problem is becoming more serious because of the economic problems[34] and corruption (Olcott, 2002: 183). In other words, sub-ethnic loyalties are creating problems because the economic benefits have not been still distributed more equally, so clan networks and *Zhuz* loyalties are used as an asset to access the scarce resources making the issue problematic.

As Roy (2000: 114) mentioned, during the Soviet era, allocation of power was also along the ethnic (Russian/non-Kazakh-Kazakh) lines. Today this situation continues in favor of the Kazakhs, with the justification that sub-ethnic structures should be eliminated and a unifying the Kazakh identity should be built. However, as we saw, this policy is increasing the clan competition in the country, whereby those from Great Horde are the most advantageous ones in this rivalry. Similarly, Chaimum Lee (2002: 49) also argues that in addition to the division between the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakh, another important division in Kazakhstan is the division among the Kazakhs themselves, in contrast with the argument that ethnicity alone is the most important criteria for classification. For example, after the collapse

[34] There is a great economic recovery potential of Kazakhstan, thanks to rich natural resources, but what Olcott denotes here as problematic is the distribution of the economic resources.

of the Soviet Union, it became very important to define from which horde the government officials are and particularly, horde origin is an important key for selecting officials at the highest levels of the government (Lee, 2002: 48). Thus, even if Kazakh officials justify ethnic policies arguing that these policies are necessary to revive and create a viable Kazakh national identity, maybe the panacea is not Kazakhization, but a more civic nation-building strategy against a possible more severe clan rivalry in future.

In evaluation of the issue as a whole, it can be stated that in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the sub-ethnic identities still continue and the allocation of power positions is along the ethnic (Kazakh-non-Kazakh) line. The justification of the government for the ethnic policies having been implemented in the post-Soviet period is that this is necessary for the elimination of the sub-ethnic structures to be able to build a unified, coherent and stronger Kazakh identity. However, considering the Kazakhization of the Kazakh bureaucracy and economy, Kazakhization policy may create a reverse outcome in contrast to the expectations. A civic nation-building path may be also necessary for the Kazakhs themselves. For now there is an 'other' in the country, but as the ethnic structure becomes more homogenized, the rivalry may turn into an intra-ethnic characteristic, so, as long as clan rivalry and networks continue, there is a possibility that building a viable Kazakh identity and nation may stay on the paper, when the delicate and fragile balances established between them is cracked.

On the other hand, Kazakhstan's multi-ethnic structure, with which Kazakh officials pride with having more than a hundred different ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan, poses a more difficult challenge for building a new national identity in the country. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan's demography has been consolidated in favor of the Kazakh population,[35] since independence, multi-ethnicity will continue to determine the demographic characteristic in Kazakhstan. While there are attempts for integrating ethnic minorities into Kazakhstani identity by promoting the Assembly of Nationalities, which is said to represent all the minorities in Kazakhstan, this is far from a solution to problem, since the Assembly has no power,

[35] Kazakhs constituted 40.1 % and Russians constituted 37.4 % in 1989, and in 1999, Kazakhs' proportion increased to 53.4% while Russians' proportion decreased to 30.0% (Source: Kazakhstan's Statistical Agency, cited in Diener, 2004.

and established only for pretending that there are harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the country (Holm-Hansen, 1999: 213).

Therefore, inter-ethnic discord/discontent is evident in the exclusion of Russians from top administrative jobs, the refusal of giving equal status to Russian language with the Kazakh language, and the denial of giving dual citizenship. These, in return, increase the tension between the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs. While demographic change in favor of the Kazakhs is giving them confidence, the still heterogeneous structure of the Kazakhstani population and nation-building require a national identity that includes its substantial non-Kazakh populations, especially Russians. This is especially important, since emigration of the non-Kazakhs decreased substantially and Russians in Kazakhstan now see Kazakh territories as their homeland, even if this is not in ethnic historical terms.

The key point here is the distribution of the economic resources that if this could be achieved relatively on equal basis for all the people of Kazakhstan, these divisions cannot pose a serious threat for the unity and future of the country. Even if Kazakhstan becomes more homogeneous, there is a danger of sub-ethnic horde rivalries if the resources are not distributed relatively equally, which seems unequal now. Nevertheless, even if intra ethnic identities have some significance, it is the inter ethnic harmony that is crucial for the nation building. Even if the ethnic policies are justified claiming that there are intra-ethnic divisions posing threat to Kazakh identity, civic policies should be pursued in order not to alienate non-Kazakh population and to create a more viable and inclusive national identity. The so-called clan factor remains quite important right now in contemporary Kazakhstan, but it is hardly the single manner for integration and characterization of the sociopolitical processes and personnel advancement. More than anything, it is a psychological factor that influences a society's political life and, most significantly, influences the career path of various bureaucrats and their choice of a job and chances for advancement.

4.2 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan

A Constitution is an important blueprint indicating the framework a state operates. It outlines the rights and duties of its citizens and institutions, defines the fundamental political principles, establishing the structures, procedures, powers and

duties of the state organs. Therefore, a constitution of a state can give useful hindsight about the nature of a nation-building taking place in a country, since it reflects the nation-builders' view of non-titular populations, while not guaranteeing that the same approach will be prevalent practice and policies pursued by the state apparatus.

On August 1995, the new constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan was accepted with a referendum. In the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is stated that,

> We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic fate, creating a state on the indigenous Kazakh land, considering ourselves a peace-loving and civil society, dedicated to the ideals of freedom, equality and concord, wishing to take a worthy place in the world community, realizing our high responsibility before the present and future generations, proceeding from our sovereign right, accept this Constitution.

Looking at this preamble, one can say that the official discourse of Kazakhstan conceptualizes both ethnic and civic components, because post-Soviet Kazakh officials affirm the image of the state as 'primordial homeland of Kazakhs', which is an ethnic term, and as a civic state instituting the notion of a 'Kazakhstani (people of Kazakhstan) people.' In nationalism, the homeland is a territory that is believed by members of a community to be inhabited in history, the birthplace of the group's identity and ethnic attachment to the homeland generally leads to exclusive feelings about ownership of the territory, while homeland ethnicity forms the basis for ethnic nationalism (Yiftachel, 2001: 359). In fact, in 1993 constitution, the less emphatic 'ancient' instead of 'indigenous' had been used and in 1995 constitution, the passage of 'the Republic of Kazakhstan as a state system is self-determined by the Kazakh nation' was eliminated. Yet, according to Dave (2004), there is little effort for describing the attributes of a supra-ethnic 'Kazakhstani' identity without supporting this concept with legal-institutional safeguards, this Kazakhstani identity remains on paper. For example, there was no such category as 'Kazakhstani' in 1999 census, and instead, nationality still remains in all identity documents. In order to better determine the nature of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, now the related laws will be examined.

4.2.1 Kazakh Statehood

In the article 1 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Republic of Kazakhstan is a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are the individual, his life, rights and freedoms. The fundamental principles of the Republic are shıown as public concord and political stability; economic development for the benefit of all the nation; Kazakhstan patriotism and resolution of the most important issues of the affairs of state by democratic methods including voting at an all-nation referendum or in the Parliament. In this first article, Kazakh statehood is defined in civic terms. In fact, in 1993 Constitution, Kazakhstan was defined as "the state of self-constituted Kazakh nation." In this definition, Kazakh nation is defined in ethnic terms, specific to Kazakhs. Therefore, this definition, as Dzhunova noted, caused political disputes and angered some citizens belonging to non-Kazakh ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan (1998: 553), as it was perceived as a discriminatory statement. However, in 1995 Constitution, this seems to be corrected, that in 1995 constitution, "nation" is used for all citizens, not only for ethnic Kazakhs. Similarly, the name of the Republic, as indicated by the article 2, is the Republic of Kazakhstan, which means the land of Kazakhs.

In article 3, it is stated that,

> The people shall be the only source of state power… Nobody shall have the right to appropriate power in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Appropriation of power shall be persecuted by law. The right to act on behalf of the people and the state shall belong to the President as well as to Parliament of the Republic within the limits of the constitutional powers. The government and other state bodies shall act on behalf of the state only within the limits of their delegated authorities.

As apparent from these statements, this article depends the use of power on law to prevent the arbitrary acts of individuals, thus, the article can be denoted as inclusive and civic. Similarly, in the next article, the principle of the rule of law is further emphasized stating that "The Constitution shall have the highest juridical force and direct effect on the entire territory of the Republic."

On the other hand, in the constitution, while the political and ideological diversity is recognized, associations on ethnic and religious basis are strictly

forbidden. In relation with this, the first and the third paragraphs of the article 5 emphasize that,

> The Republic of Kazakhstan shall recognize ideological and political diversity. The merging of public and state institutions, and the formation of political party organizations in state bodies shall not be permitted… Formation and functioning of public associations pursuing the goals or actions directed toward a violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining the security of the state, inciting social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity, as well as formation of unauthorized paramilitary units shall be prohibited.

Moreover, the state does not make any discrimination against political organizations and denote them all equal as long as they do not interfere in the state. This is indicated in the second paragraph of the article 5 that public associations are equal before the law whereby illegal interference of the state in the affairs of public associations and of public associations in the affairs of the state, imposing the functions of state institutions on public associations, and financing of public associations by the state is not permitted. Furthermore, there are serious restrictions for foreign organizations in the paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same article that,

> Activities of political parties and trade unions of other states, religious parties as well as financing political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and citizens, foreign states and international organizations shall not be permitted in the Republic. Activities of foreign religious associations on the territory of the Republic as well as appointment of heads of religious associations in the Republic by foreign religious centers shall be carried out in coordination with the respective state institutions of the Republic.

When looked carefully, it is seen that these restrictions are for preventing the foreign interference in internal affairs of the country which is the basic right of a state, so these statements do not indicate any non-civic implication.

4.2.2 Private Ownership and Property

In the constitution, it is stated that the economy of Kazakhstan is based on different forms of property. As indicated in article 6, property can be held by the same token as both state and private ownership, within the limits indicated by law. According to President Nazarbayev, property can be held for personal plots of land and private gardens as well as for business and technological production, which

enables indigenous and foreign investors to build their enterprises (Dzhusunova, 1998: 552). So there is no discriminatory statement against Russians or any other non-Kazakh groups in the constitution about ownership of property and the ownership is protected by law.

4.2.3 Language Issue

Language issue is largely regarded as the primary component of the national identity and nation-state construction, hence it was the main delicate issue that created tension most among the non-Kazakhs (especially the Russians and the Russified non-Kazakhs), and the ethnic Kazakhs. Thus, after independence, the Kazakh government had to determine the status of both the Kazakh and the Russian language in the republic. Indeed, Nazarbayev in June 1994, stated that "new course in the field of interethnic relations" and pointed out that "false expectations in the state language policy should be eliminated by passage of a new language law" (cited in Karin and Chebotarev, 2002b: 6). As a consequence, in 1995 Constitution, Article 7 states that the state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the Kazakh language and in state institutions and local self-administrative bodies the Russian language is officially used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language. According to the law, the state will promote conditions for the study and development of the languages of the people of Kazakhstan. As can be understood clearly from these statements, the law contains both civic and ethnic aspects. It is ethnic because despite the presence of a significant proportion of the non-Kazakhs (over 40% of the population), the Russians and Russified Slavs and other minorities including Germans, Koreans, Uzbeks etc. Kazakh is accepted as the only state language, so these parts of the population are discontent with the language law, and they want the Russian to be also the state language, a bilingual structure. Nevertheless, the law can also be defined as civic, because 1995 constitution, at least, upgraded the status of the Russian from the "language of inter-ethnic communication" to the official language status and it is coequal language with the Kazakh as in the bodies of state government and local governments. Moreover, as it is apparent from the third paragraph of the article 7, the state is taking the responsibility of promoting conditions for the development of all languages of all people of the Kazakhstan. Similarly, according to article 19, everyone has the right for the exercise of their

mother tongue and culture, for the free choice of the language of communication (Constitution, 1995). Actually, as Gilliland and Telemtaev pointed, the language law does not regulate language use in personal relations and religious associations. Whilst the Language Law denotes Kazakh as the state language; and Russian as an official language, it does not restrict the use of other languages. In contrast, the Law brings sanctions for government officials that impede the use of other languages. So, while it is mandatory to use Kazakh, use of other languages is often contemplated (2000:1). In the light of those mentioned so far, it can be argued that except Kazakh being the sole state language, there is no discrimination against non-Kazakh languages, at least on the constitutional basis, the Kazakh language is not favored. Yet, in contrast with this statement, in the Concluding and Transitional Provisions section, article 93 of 1995 Constitution states that the government, local representative and executive bodies must create all necessary organizational, material and technical conditions for fluent and free-of-charge mastery of the state language by all citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with a special law with the purpose of the implementation of article 7 of the Constitution. This law implies that the primary concern will be the Kazakh language.

Likewise, in 1996, the lower house of the parliament passed a draft law which would make the knowledge of Kazakh mandatory for a list of state positions, while the law was requiring this provision to be implemented in 2006 for the non-Kazakhs and in 2001 for the Kazakhs. The senate refused the draft and the final version of the law that was adopted in July 1997, putting no deadline for the full switch to the Kazakh language in public administration. As Nazarbayev, stressed, "the Kazakhs should not demand that members of other ethnic groups speak Kazakh until they use it themselves." (Fierman, 2006: 103). According to this new Law on Language, the Kazakh language remained as the sole state language, while there is no provision making the state language a functional requirement for the majority of the population. Support for the state language is indicated in the Article 4 that "It is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to master the state language." In the new version of the language law accepted in 1997, while the Russian's status as a language of interethnic communication has been eliminated, it is stated that the Russian language is used on an equal basis with the state language in state organizations and organs of local self-government (Article 5). Therefore, while the

status of Russian has been changed, the policy has become more civic when compared to its former status.

4.2.4 Citizenship and Individual

In Kazakhstan, some ethnic policies are justified on behalf of the argument that the Kazakhs have become a minority in their own lands, so they should have special rights in their modern-day state. This justification was also used for dual citizenship debates. Accordingly, in the 1991 Constitution, the ethnic Kazakhs that were living abroad were granted the right to possess dual citizenship, which was spelled out in Law on National Independence of that constitution stating that "Kazakh state would create conditions for the return to its territory of persons who had left the territory during periods of the mass repressions and force collectivization… and their descendants as well as the Kazakhs in the former Soviet Republics." With this, the Kazakh officials hoped to boost migration into Kazakhstan by giving dual citizenship to the Kazakhs living abroad. Proponents argue that since the Kazakhs were forced to leave their homeland during the Soviet era (i.e. collectivization and sedentarization) rehabilitation was needed. In fact, the aim in these efforts was to dilute the dominance of the Russians in northern parts and as Zardykhan stated, the repatriated Kazakhs are seen more nationalistic than the Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan due to their dedication to the Kazakh language and traditions strongly. For instance, there is nearly no repatriated Kazakh family who was settled in Shymkent[36] (Zardykhan, 2004: 75). Indeed, opponents, argue that this measure is increasing the share of the ethnic Kazakhs in the country and squeeze out the non-Kazakhs, giving resettlement of the Kazakhs mostly in northern Kazakhstan, where the Russians are dominant (Bohr, 1998: 157). The 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan gives citizenship to every individual living on the territory of Kazakhstan on equal grounds and confirms only the citizenship of Kazakhstan as in the 1991 Constitution. In accordance with these principles, article 10 states that "Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be acquired and terminated as prescribed by law, shall be indivisible and equal regardless of the grounds of its acquisition. A citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan under no circumstances may be deprived of citizenship of the right to change his

[36] Shymkent is one of the most Kazakh-populated cities of Kazakhstan (Zardykhan, 2004: 75).

citizenship, and may not be exiled from the territory of Kazakhstan. Foreign citizenship of a citizen of the Republic shall not be recognized." However, different from the 1991 Constitution, the 1995 Constitution rejects dual citizenship and this right is omitted from the 1995 Constitution. Therefore, the citizenship is based on zero option for all citizens of Kazakhstan. In fact, Russians in Kazakhstan insisted on dual citizenship to which the Kazakhs strongly refused. According to the Russians, their cultural identity and well-being is threatened and they saw dual citizenship as a protection. On the other hand, the Kazakhs saw this demand as a sign of disloyalty toward Kazakhstan, and as a confirmation of suspicions that Moscow was using the Russians as fifth column for maintaining the Russian dominance (Carley, 1998: 313). One of the important reasons for why the Kazakh government refused to give dual citizenship to the Russians was the fear of secession and division of the country, which was reinforced with the proclamations of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who promoted the partition of Kazakhstan openly (Wolfel, 2002: 496). Giving the right of dual citizenship to the Kazakhs while denying the same right to Russians and other minorities was a discriminatory and ethnic practice. However, this practice has been corrected with the omission of the dual citizenship to all citizens without exception, making the constitution more civic. As a result, not giving dual citizenship to any group in the country cannot be denoted as an ethnic policy. As Patricia M. Carley indicated, no human rights standards consider dual citizenship as a "right". International human rights documents consider only the citizenship as a "right" (Carley, 1998: 313). Since the citizenship is not denied to any resident of Kazakhstan, and ethnic portion of the law and its practice are eliminated, the law on citizenship can be denoted as civic.

Similarly, article 14 states that "everyone shall be equal before the law and court. No one shall be subject to any discrimination for reasons of origin, social, property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstances." Again, as it is evident from these provisions, the constitution does not discriminate against any group of its citizens, and every citizen in Kazakhstan has the same rights and duties. The Constitution does not give special rights to any ethnic, religious or other types of groups at the disadvantage of other groups, so it can be denoted as civic in terms of citizenship and individual rights. For example, article 20 states that "the freedom of

speech… shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited… advocating war, social, racial, national, religious, class, clannish superiority as well as cult of cruelty and violence shall not be allowed." In addition, according to article 19 of the Constitution, "Everyone shall have the right to determine and indicate or not to indicate his national, party and religious affiliation and everyone shall have the right to use his native language and culture, to freely choose the language of communication, education, instruction and creative activities."

Among other things, there are similar civic statements in articles about education and employment. In article 24, it is stated that "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of labor and the free choice of occupation and profession" while article 33 emphasizes that "citizens of Republic shall have the right to elect and to be elected into public and local self administrations… citizens have equal rights to serve in a public office." On the other hand, article 30 states that "the citizens shall be guaranteed free secondary education in the state educational establishments…" Similarly, in the Constitutional Council section, in the second paragraph of the article 74, the rights and freedoms of the citizens and people were also protected denoting the laws and regulations which are infringing on the rights and freedoms as invalid. Therefore, in general terms, laws about citizenship and individual rights seem civic and universal as they are written on the constitution without implying any ethnic discrimination. However, we will check the validity of this statement in the following parts examining the implementations of nation-building policies in the country. For example, as Heat indicated, political advancement is far more accessible for the Kazakhs (2003: 184).

4.2.5 The Presidency

Presidentalism is the political regime chosen in Kazakhstan and it is mostly justified by that the delicate transition conditions[37] after independence and emergence of new institutions demand a strong presidential power. The presidency, as an institution was established in 1993 Constitution, but it gained new powers with the 1995 Constitution. According to the 1995 Constitution, there is a system of

[37] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transition in post-Soviet borderlands has been called "triple transition", since nation-building, state-building and economic recovery processes should be managed simultaneously in contrast to western nation-state building examples.

checks and balances. Articles between 40-48 give the president a new status as the head of the state, the highest official, symbol and guarantor of the unity of the people and power of the state. Thus, the president of the country plays a central role dominating the political system of the state. This unitary role of the president in constitution is civic and does not include any ethnic sentence. Only an indirect criticism can be attached to the laws about presidency due to the obligation of knowing Kazakh language in article 41. According to the second paragraph of the article, every citizen of the Kazakhstan is eligible for the office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan if he is by birth not younger than thirty five and older than sixty five and has a perfect command of the state language and has lived in Kazakhstan for not less than fifteen years. In fact, it is natural that the president of a country should have a good command of state language. But when the issue is viewed from the perspective of language law, an indirect ethnic denotation can be attached to the law. However, in the draft Constitution of the 1993, it had been recommended that only the ethnic Kazakhs may be president, which was immediately downplayed by Nazarbayev (Holm-Hansen, 1999, 193) and which was undoubtedly an ethnic recommendation. So when what was not done is considered, the laws about presidency can be said civic in general. In addition, even if it can be argued that it is very difficult in practice for a non-Kazakh to be the president of the country, granting all the citizens the right to be selected as president without any discriminatory criteria is an inclusive and civic policy.

Whereas the responsibilities of the president are appointing of some kind of the state personnel, and organizational, legislative and general political ones, in fact it is not the nature of laws which are criticized and which are perceived as discriminatory, but the underdevelopment of the other state institutions due to the strong presidency, because, while the president is the main force among the political institutions, in official Kazakhstani nation-building, the underdevelopment of institutions cannot be compensated (Holm-Hansen, 1999: 204). Therefore, while the constitution maintains the principle of separation of powers, it does not maintain the principle of equality between these branches of the state administration. The reflection of strong presidentialism is that the powerful institutions are filled by people directly or indirectly appointed by the president and this in return, restricts the chances of non-Kazakh groups to take part in the state apparatus and elected bodies (Holm-Hansen,

1999: 192), which is an ethnic practice. Therefore, strong presidentialism sets suitable environment for indirect discrimination.

4.2.6 The Parliament

In the 1995 Constitution, articles from 49 to 63 are related with the duties, responsibilities, basic functions and the structure of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Here, our concern is to determine whether there are discriminatory laws or not, so, what seems related with our purposes is the article 51 which states that "Elections of the deputies of the *Majilis* shall be carried out on the basis of the universal, equal and direct right under secret ballot..." This is a universal and civic statement but the figures in table 4.4 (see below) displays a disproportionate representation of the Kazakhs when their proportion in whole population is taken into consideration.

Table 4. 3 The Ethnic Composition of the Kazakhstani Parliaments (%)

Registered Nationality	Parliament 1990-93	Parliament 1993-95	*Parliament 1995-*
Kazakh	53	58	*65*
Russian	29	27	*30*
Ukrainian	7	6	*3*
Belarusian	1,5	-	-
German	4	2	*1*
Jewish	-	2	-
Others	5,5	5	2

Source: Holm-Hansen, 1998, p.203.

In a nutshell, it can be said that the elements of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan grant all rights that are universal and Kazakhstan's constitution, in general, do not mention of any ethnic entitlements with few exceptions, therefore it will not be wrong to denote it generally civic. However, the structure of ethnic entitlements available to the Kazakhs, is, according to Dave (2004: 14) executed informally. While some of these are represented above where

necessary, the validity of other rights and freedoms need further examination, so the implemented policies will be elaborated in the following parts.

4.3 Post-Soviet Language Policy in Kazakhstan

After gaining independence, the titular language problem has been one of the most contentious issues in Kazakhstan. Language has been seen as one of the most important building blocks of national identity, so when a language is challenged, the nation is perceived to be in state of danger; thus, language has gained significant importance in the process of de-Sovietization and de-Russification with the aim of creating national identity and consolidating nation-state. In fact, the criterion or characteristics that differentiate one cultural group from another may vary. But, language, especially in contemporary world became important.

The problems concerning the language issue in Kazakhstan had their roots in the Soviet and even Tsarist eras. As explained in detail before, the Kazakhs had become the most linguistically Russified nation due to demographic preponderance of Russian speakers in Kazakhstan (Dave, 2004). As a natural result of this, in 1989 census it turned out that 80% of the Kazakhstan's population was either native speaker of Russian or fluent in it. The words of Nazarbayev in 1989 actually illustrate the dominance of Russian in Kazakhstan that "All state businesses all political questions and all our activities take place exclusively in Russian. I was at a party conference: there were 298 delegates, all Kazakhs and one Russian person, the rayon military commissar and just the same everything transpired in Russian" (Nazarbayev, cited in Fierman, 1998: 5). In addition, increasing the national consciousness during the glasnost era affected the attitude towards language. In September 1989, Law on Languages was adopted in Kazakh SSR. In this law, Kazakh language was projected to be used in and penetrate into areas such as office communications, party works, trade and services. Until this law, Kazakh language had played either no or little role in these areas. Moreover, with this law, the prestige of Kazakh language was raised and it was introduced into administrative institutions while the knowledge of Kazakh was made a requirement for director positions (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002b: 1). According to Fierman, in practice, some Kazakhs can also be counted as native Russian speakers since they grew up in homes where Russian was the dominant language, they attended the Russian schools and they were

unable to write and speak Kazakh (1998: 5) and in total 64% of the Kazakhs were fluent in Russian, which is very high when compared to the rates in other Central Asian states which were between 23%-37% (Fierman 1998: 17). Hence, it can be inferred that the reason why Kazakhs denote Kazakh as their native language despite their non-proficiency in that language lies in the symbolic power of Kazakh language. In accordance with this, the insistence of denoting the Kazakh language as the sole state language is related with the fact that in Kazakhstan language is seen as an important component of ethnicity more than its usage in practice. Indeed, language is an important identity marker, and indispensable symbol of ethnicity and important tool for political aims.

4.3.1 Opposing Views of and Reactions to Language Policy

The actual language situation in Kazakhstan divided Kazakh society into two. As Holm-Hansen presented, for those who assert for protection and promotion of Kazakh language propose that de facto bilingualism and protection of Russian are believed to damage Kazakh, so their effort and usage should be limited. The proponents of "Kazakhization" complain that Kazakh language is not still widespread even among ethnic Kazakhs and it cannot develop another place, while opponents claim that the language policies are deliberately used to replace non-Kazakhs from their positions. Kazakh language is proliferating more in state administration (education, mass media, and state bodies) than in manufacturing sector. On the other hand, for opponents, if citizens are to be integrated through the loyalty to state institutions, these institutions should be "neutral" in ethno-cultural terms and the insistence on Kazakh language as the state language in governmental institutions prevents ethno-cultural integration. For them, Kazakh is not chosen by all of the Kazakhs themselves for communication and as a result, insisting on Kazakh language for communication will have a disintegrating effect and they propose that Kazakh and Russian should be given equal status (1999: 178-179, 182). In practice, however, government gave Russian the status of official language which will be for inter-ethnic communication and will be used on a par with Kazakh in state bodies of communication. In other words, opponents advocate that both should be given the status of state language - a bi-linguistic structure should be in the country. However, due to the unequal power of the two languages (Russian is a far more developed

language and has more words), this would lead to lasting dominance of the Russian language. Indeed, Russian language is used countrywide. According to Nurbulat Masanov, an ethnic Kazakh and a political scientist, Kazakh language is a past phenomenon. It is the Russian language that enables Kazakhstan's communications with the outside world. He claims that a Kazakh-speaking Kazakhstan will be isolated and inward-looking, and alienated from the achievements of world civilization (cited in Holm-Hansen, 1999: 183). The outlook of Masanov is a typical *mankurty* one in Kazakhstan and this view is not considering the language as an important building block of national identity. As Nauruzbayeva noted, Kazakh intellectuals like Masanov, criticize the language policies of the government and denote efforts about development of Kazakh language as non-effective and a move towards age of darkness and ignorance. Furthermore, the *mankurts* in Kazakhstan view Russian as the language of enlightenment, education and higher social status, so positive qualities were attributed to it, especially for upward mobility (Nauruzbayeva, 2003: 207-208). As we saw in the previous chapter, the impact of Russian language dates back to the 18th century. And gradually, Russian became a symbol of enlightenment and development. This image was reinforced through the educational system (Nauruzbayeva, 2003: 207). Therefore, the controversy on language positions in the constitution has not only been a matter between the Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs but also between the Kazakhs themselves. Urbanized Kazakhs, who have lived in the northern provinces, have low level of knowledge of Kazakh, hence they are also put into disadvantageous position due to the fact that the Kazakh language is becoming a necessary tool for administrative positions. Additionally, as language is as a tool for privileged positions, this is another reason why Kazakhs from southern parts who are members of Great Horde are brought to these positions. Holm-Hansen indicates that the pressure for acquiring a command of Kazakh, the state language, is more for Kazakhs than non-Kazakhs (1999: 181).

In fact, they are rural Kazakhs, who, in general, speak Kazakh and have little knowledge of Russian. On the other hand, all urban Kazakhs have a good command of Russian. Most of them are Russophone and have no or very little Kazakh knowledge which is the result of 70-year Russification/Sovietization policy. As a result, rural Kazakhs support Kazakh nationalists instead of Russophone Kazakhs. Meanwhile language issue is creating tension not only between Russians and

Kazakhs, but also between Russophone and traditional Kazakhs as well. Since the Russian-speaking Kazakhs know Kazakh very little, they meet the policy of Kazakhification with resentment (Sarsembaev, 1990; 328). Therefore, even if most of the scholars argue that the civic policies implemented by the Kazakh administration is mainly due to the presence of large portion of non-Kazakhs, I think another underlying reason for these civic policies is that there are Russified Kazakhs especially in the northern regions, so in order not to alienate those Kazakhs, more civic policies are pursued, and some initial ethnic policies have been relaxed. For example, this is one of the reasons why Kazakh government does not hurry to obligate Kazakh in the northern parts of Kazakhstan by 2006.

According to Berik Abdygaliev's article in *Saisat* (a social science journal in Kazakhstan), in 1996, it was the Russian language that created the basis for the unity of all Kazakhstani. It functions as a means of communication all over the republic and enables social interaction among all citizens in the country across social, demographic, territorial and professional group boundaries (cited in O'Callaghan, 2005, 210). In accordance with this, the language policies should be examined considering the actual linguistic situation. For instance, according to a survey carried out by Arena and Kalmykov in 1994, only 13% of all the respondents were able to speak, write and read in Kazakh fluently and only 71% of the Kazakhs were able to read, rite and speak the Kazakh language fluently, 51% of Russians had no knowledge of Kazakh while 25.5 % were able to understand spoken Kazakh (cited in Holm-Hansen, 1999: 180). Therefore, Russian is not the only language of all Slavic people, but also nearly all non-Turkic minorities, who will not return to their homelands (Koreans for example stay in Kazakhstan and try to revive their culture with the help of Korean government) (O'Callaghan, 2005, 210). However, in order to weaken the position of the Russian language and Russification of non-Kazakh and non-Russian minorities, official statements were issued stating that in addition to the Kazakh and Russian, other "original" languages of smaller ethnic groups must be supported in order to create multilingual individuals (Holm-Hansen, 1999: 179). Meanwhile, it should also be noted that continuing Russian influence cannot be explained only by the dominance of Russian language, and also the media should be taken into consideration, because, in Kazakhstan, in 2001, nearly 50% of the population reported watching the Russian ORT channel daily while this number is

over 40% for Kazakh channels and the popularity of the Russian ORT channel is over 75% in Kazakhstan, being well over the Kazakh ones.[38]

Accordingly, the Kazakh government adopted a number of legislative acts as well as implementing various policies in order to reintegrate Kazakh language into public life. Fifty percent usage of state language quota for mass media was set (Schatz, 2000: 494), the conduction of official documentation was enforced, and language tests for government positions were made compulsory. Additionally, international firms and other firms dealing with the state are required to make all documentation in Kazakh which will support the use of Kazakh in the workplace and as a language of bureaucracy, as well as the number of educational institutions instructing in Kazakh increased marking the shift towards the Kazakh language.[39] Yet, these measures were not sufficient for the revival of the Kazakh language. According to Nauruzbayeva, the enforcement of Kazakh language remains on paper and Russian is still dominating the public sphere (Nauruzbaeyva, 2003: 204-205). For instance, while many Kazakhs use basic pleasantries in Kazakh, especially in cities, they then switch to Russian. The increase in the use of Kazakh among many Kazakhs is mainly due to schools and military because Kazakh is mandated in those places, but the standard of Kazakh is poor, so people switch to use Russian after they go out of there (O'Callaghan, 2005, 211). Even if Nazarbayev claimed that language issue was not a problem anymore in 2000,[40] the efforts for encouraging Kazakhs to speak Kazakh with their children and indicating the learning of the state language as the duty of all citizens validates the continuing dominance of Russian (O'Callaghan, 2005, 211). Meantime, *Qazakh Tili* organization works for the replacement of Russian/International words with Turkic/Arabic analogues, language reform and certification of translation standards with the support of government based on governmental financing, political will (Sarsembaev, 1999: 334). Moreover, there is an increasing manifestation of Kazakh symbols such as the renaming of streets in main cities and towns (getting rid of ov/ev suffixes from Kazakh surnames, renaming Kazakh geographical places in Kazakh, correcting Kazakh spelling, translation of

[38] Online available at http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/Kazakhstan/hypermail/200110/0079.html.

[39] For more details see: O'Callaghan, 2005 and Nauruzbayeva, 2003.

[40] Online available at http://eurasia.org/ru/2000.

economic and daily life terms and advertisement into Kazakh, increasing use of Kazakh in the official press conferences and celebrating even if this does not give information to Russian speaking journalists (Dave, 1996; Dixon, 1994; Janabel, 1996).

Thus, when we look at the language situation in Kazakhstan within the context of above mentioned laws and governmental efforts, the use of Kazakh language does not seem to have reached to the desired level. Yet, despite the fact that, Nazarbayev has portrayed Kazakhstan within civic framework and stated that "a melting pot of peoples, languages and cultures and insists that Kazakhstan is a Eurasian state, home to Slavic and other ethnic groups" (cited in O'Callaghan, 2005: 208), the increasing share of Kazakhs in the population and in the administrative sphere seems to confirm the ethnic concept of Kazakhstan as the homeland of Kazakhs. Besides, the out-migrations of non-Kazakhs and increase in Kazakh people in the state organizations and state-controlled sectors have strengthened the Kazakhization trends (O'Callaghan, 2005: 208). Accordingly, although the Kazakhs are the majority in the country, their political effect is more than their demographic weight (O'Callaghan, 2005: 210).

Therefore, the uneasiness of non-Kazakhs, especially Russians, can be attributed to this fact. Also, it is generally those Kazakh elites who either have little or no knowledge of Kazakh, their mother language, that oppose to the language policy of the government. While it is true that the language policies and laws Kazakh government implemented are mostly in favor of the Kazakh language, it should not be ignored that there have been proposal of laws and policies that were rejected. For example, the presidency and the chair of both houses of parliament require the incumbents to be fluent in Kazakh, whereby the requirement of state officials' learning Kazakh, within 10 years has been dropped. In addition, the law requiring 50% of all media broadcasting to be in Kazakh has been enforced weakly, (O'Callaghan, 2005: 209). These implementations and rejections also reflect my argument that Kazakh nation-building has civic and ethnic components.

For now, the non-Kazakhs who do not know Kazakh can get by not knowing the Kazakh language, but their children, whether they go to Russian or Kazakh medium schools should know the Kazakh in ethnically dominated Kazakhstan in the future. In fact, some Russians refuse to learn Kazakh, because, as Bhavna Dave

pointed, “still in 1992-1993 it seemed quixotic for non-Kazakhs over half of the country’s population than to learn a language that had so little prestige” (1996: 5). Russians do not study the Kazakh language seriously whatever the job possibility is involved, and they view and denote the Kazakh as an underdeveloped and inadequate language (Laitin, 1998:21). Nevertheless, in general the Kazakh language education system created awareness of Kazakh identity, because these schools and institutions were developing and protecting and delivering Kazakh culture and as we will explore in the following sections, the number of Kazakh schools and colleges is increasing and as a result more children of Russified Kazakhs go to Kazakh schools, leading to a language shift for new generations.

4.3.2 Evaluation of the Language Policy

We can say that despite steady efforts of the government for increasing the use of Kazakh language, language planning in Kazakhstan has not succeeded yet. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, as stated before, Kazakh language has a symbolic function for Kazakhs, so even if they see it as part of their identity they do not feel obliged to use it. Secondly, there is a serious gap between rhetoric and long-term goals of language policy and practice. This is a slow process which would possibly take a great deal of time and many acts of government remain only on paper. For Kazakh language to be a real language that is used by all groups in Kazakhstan, Kazakh government should concentrate first on Russified Kazakhs, especially those living in northern Kazakhstan. Only after the majority of Kazakhs use it, Kazakh can play an important role in the country. Kazakh language is being increasingly used in stature in Kazakhstan cities and rural Kazakhs continue to come to cities. While there is a risk of being assimilated in Russified cities like Almaty, the government intervention in the language policy may prevent this. Moreover, the state insisted on Kazakh as the official language and the state apparatus is relocated with those who know Kazakh. However, the educational resources are rather insufficient, and as O’Callaghan stated;

> The link between nationalism and languages is so much to the fore in minority languages that most literature has a tendency to be based on the traditional way of life, national heroes etc… and this has caused a backlash

> among youth, who do not wish to be reminded of bygone days. There is much to be done… I am addressing the apolitical attitudes of youth (2005: 213).

While it is true that Soviet politics affected the Kazakh language and that Kazakhstan was the most Russified linguistically, some of the reasons of delayed transition to titular language was related to the development level of Kazakh language such as the lack of adequate terminology and insufficient publication of books in the Kazakh language. It is the most difficult in Kazakhstan to standardize the language because of the substantial Russian minority who constitutes nearly 29% of the population and the Russified Kazakh population who has a poor knowledge of Kazakh mostly and disparaging attitudes towards indigenous Kazakh culture and way of life.

In fact, the Kazakh administration tries to create conditions for Kazakh language to become a consolidating component that unties the multi-ethnic population of Kazakhstan, instead of separating it. For example, the Concept of Language Policy indicates that "It is necessary to raise the prestige of the state language to such a degree that its mastery becomes... a constituent element of Kazakhstan patriotism" (cited in Fierman, 1998: 14). While this condition cannot be realized in the near future, the definition of the republic's identity as reflected in the language issue has been contradictory and vague, therefore, there is no clear, definitive answer to whether Kazakhstan is a nation or civic state (Fierman, 1998: 14), because the language policy includes both ethnic and civic elements at the same time. However, it can be denoted more ethnic than it is civic, since most of the efforts of the state are focused mostly on the Kazakh language and the development of it, whereby the language is used as a tool for more Kazakhization in education and employment issues as we will explore in the following sections.

4.4 Educational Policies in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan

After the independence, Kazakhstan had to build a basis for a common identity for its citizens, and among other things, this was requiring implementation of policies related with conveying the culture of Kazakhs and other nationalities by education. Thus, education has been an important instrument in shaping the new generations of the country. The policies chosen and followed by the government give clues about

the type of nation-building in Kazakhstan, since it determines the long-term intentions of the state apparatus. Accordingly, instead of examining all the educational system of Kazakhstan, for our purposes, the main points of the system that are related with this thesis will be examined in this part.

In Kazakhstan, the education system consists of Kazakh-medium and Russian-medium schools, in addition to 3.3% minority language schools to which Uzbek, Uygur, Tajik, German, Tatar etc. schoolchildren attend. Parents have freedom to determine the language of their children's education. The curriculum subjects in these schools are identical and it is only the medium which is different. Second languages - Kazakh in Russian-medium schools and Russian in Kazakh-medium schools - are taught as compulsory school subjects from grade one. Nevertheless, when we look at the Table 4.5, it will clearer that total weekly hours of Kazakh are more than twice of the Russian. Moreover, school graduates have the choice of continuing their education in universities in Kazakhstan or of going to Russia to study there. These efforts of encouraging the Kazakh language are accompanied by 'kazakhization' policies. New school textbooks are written in line with the new ideology and teachers are required to use the Kazakhistani books (although of course many schools still use the Russian and old Soviet texts alongside the new ones) (Smagulova, 2005: 6-7).

Table 4. 4 Baseline Teaching Plan used in the Republic since 1994

##	Education Blocks	Grades					Total	
	Invariable (fixed) Part	5	6	7	8	9	Hours	Percent
I	Literature& Languages	10	9	9	8	7	43	
1	Mother tongue & literature	6	5	5	4	3	23	
2	Official language	2	2	2	2	2	10	
3	Other languages	2	2	2	2	2	10	

Source: The EFA 2000 Assessment: Country Reports, Kazakhstan, World Education, online available at http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/kazakhstan/rapport_2_1.html.

In fact, as it is a known fact, Russian has been continuing to be dominant in Kazakhstan and it seems to remain so in the public life for foreseeable future. According to a 1999 census, more people still know Russian well than any other language. To illustrate, 75 % of all population are fluent in Russian and the number of Kazakh language schools is rising, while the number of Russian schools is declining that the number of Kazakh schools was 2768 in 1991 (34.1% of all), which increased to 3357 in 1999, and the number of Russian schools decreased from 3641 to 2412 in the same period (Olcott, 2002: 178). On the other hand, difficulties in the education system of the country increased due to the language policy. Since there is a lack of Kazak textbooks, as well as, competent people to teach technical subjects in Kazakh as the curriculum requires. As a result, there is a need for translating and writing textbooks, manuals in Kazakh language and competent staff. It is not uncommon that the people who are fluent in Kazakh lack the technical vocabulary necessary to change their instruction language, because most Kazakhs received their higher education in Russian. Besides, in rural places, lack of staff is the main problem, due to the fact that rural areas are unattractive especially to younger teachers (UN Development Report, 2004*)*. Russian is also still the dominant higher education language. For example in 1999, 72% of the college students attended higher education in Russian while 27% in Kazakh and 1% in Uzbek, English and German (Olcott, 2002: 179). The reason of this is that even if the higher education in Kazakh language is available in a broad range of disciplines today, the quality of the higher education in Russian is higher than the Kazakh ones and the variety of the available subjects in Russian is broader than Kazakh. What is more, even Kazakh groups use Russian textbooks, especially in technical subjects that in 2003, only 15% of the textbooks were in Kazakh (Fierman, 2006: 112-113).

However, despite such difficulties, share of Kazakh Medium Classes in total class enrollment increased from 34.1% in 1991 to 52.1% in 2001 and 56.0% in 2004 in Kazakhstan. One of the reasons of the increase in Kazakh-Medium Schools is naturally the growing percentage of the Kazakhs in the population, in other words, demographic change is in favor of Kazakhs. As Table 4.6 illustrates, also the share of the ethnic Kazakh students in Kazakh-Medium Schools rather than Russian-Medium Classes has greatly increased in Kazakhstan, from about 66 percent to about 80 percent. Hence, the proportion of ethnic Kazakh children attending Russian classes

declined from about 34 percent in 1990 to about 20 percent in 1995 and remained so thereafter. It is clear that the majority of the Kazakhs attend to the Kazakh Medium schools in Kazakhstan (Fierman, 2006: 106).

Table 4. 5 Shares of Ethnic Kazakhs' Enrollment in Kazakh Medium Classes and Russian Medium Classes

Year	KMC	RMC
1990	66.1%	33.9%
1991	67.2%	32.8%
1992	71.7%	29.3%
1993	76.1%	23.9%
1994	78.0%	22.0%
1995	80.2%	19.8%
1998	80.8%	19.2%
1999	81.3%	18.7%
2003	ca. 80%	ca. 20%

Source: Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and ARK, in Fierman,2006, p. 107.

As it is clear from the Table 4.6, the proportion of Kazakh-Medium schools has increased. Putting demographic reasons aside, some of the reasons for the increase in learning Kazakh or enrolling in a Kazakh-Medium class are practical ones. Similar to knowing Russian's being an instrument for getting a good education and a good career in the Soviet Union, knowing Kazakh has the similar advantage in contemporary Kazakhstan. Directly or indirectly, certain jobs and positions, especially the ones in the government, are reserved for those who know Kazakh, since government offices are shifting towards using the state language, so knowledge of Kazakh has become a job requirement (Fierman, 2006: 112). Thus, the requirement of proficiency in Kazakh language has become an instrument for political exclusion of not only the Russians, but also some of those from Middle and Small Hordes putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Hence, people from Great Horde are those most advantageous ones from this policy (Olcott, 2002: 180), because, it is in the southern parts of the country that Kazakh is known most and these regions are all belong to Great Horde. While according to the Article 14 of the Constitution it is forbidden to discriminate on the basis of language that no one shall be subject to any discrimination for reason of language, the actual policies say the reverse. To illustrate, the Russians believe that there is a discrimination against them

which is evident from their downsizing from government positions and even from private enterprises, while there are no formal legislative restrictions on Russian language usage. For instance, more than half of Russian students said that ethnic origin would determine their career chances (Olcott, 2002: 182). Furthermore, a package containing legislative acts and implementation documents about education has been enacted, including a document of the State Conception of Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which seems supporting the ethnic nation-building process. For instance, Russian classics were excluded from instructional program of the Education Department of Kazakhstan. On the other hand, educational programs and projects that had pro-Kazakh orientation have been widely broadcasted and have received support (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002b: 10).

Table 4. 6 Proportion of KMC, Mixed, and RMC Schools

Year	Pure KMC Schools	Mixed Schools	Pure RMC Schools
1988	11.0%	15.0%	73.0%
1989	12.0%	20.0%	67.0%
1990	16.0%	24.0%	59.0%
1991	15.0%	27.0%	58.0%
1992	17.0%	31.0%	51.0%
1993	18.0%	34.0%	46.0%
1994	20.0%	36.0%	43.0%
1995	21.0%	36.0%	43.0%
1996	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1997	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1998	24.2%	33.0%	41.8%
1999	24.9%	34.2%	39.8%
2000	24.4%	34.4%	40.4%
2001	26.4%	34.7%	38.1%
2002	26.9%	35.1%	37.2%
2003	26.9%	35.8%	36.4%
2004	27.6%	35.4%	36.0%

Source: Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and ARK, in Fierman,2006, p. 108.

Therefore, the educational policies in Kazakhstan should be evaluated with language policies and employment policies, because as Roy indicated, at the level of education, local students are systematically favored due to the application of language laws (1999: 16). When the increasing number of Kazakh Medium schools

and a simultaneous decrease in Russian ones, is considered with the language policy, it can be stated that the educational policies of Kazakhstan are rather ethnic than civic.

4.5 Employment Policy of the State in Kazakhstan

In 1995 Constitution, whilst there is no direct law about employment, in Article 24 it is stated that everyone has the right to freedom of labor, and the free choice of occupation and profession. In fact, Nazarbayev had assured in 1996 that "adoption of a new program would eliminate the discrimination on the basis of language and full equality of both languages, Russian and Kazakh, would be provided in questions of employment, whereby there should be two criteria for any position: competence and loyalty to the homeland (cited in Karin and Chebotarev, 2002b: 3). Indeed, according to the Law on Employment accepted in 2001, the state guarantees both the maintenance of equal employment opportunities to all citizens and protection of the citizens from any discrimination.[41] However, based on the law indicating that no discrimination can be made for reasons of origin, social, property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstances, one can expect that everyone has the equal access to employment in Kazakhstan, but practices and the Law on Language say the reverse. For example, by 1994, Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians) were composing only the one-fifth of the highest administrative positions in Kazakhstan (Rywkin, 1998: 574). This proportion of Russians and other Slavs is very low when their relative percentage (over one-third of the whole population) is considered. As a result it is natural for Russians to feel discriminated against and deprived. In addition, some Russians, in the 1996 survey, indicated that there were pressures upon them for early retirement from their jobs, so that the ethnic Kazakhs could be appointed from Almaty, who had no or little connection to the oblast or the city concerned (Edmunds, 1998: 465).

Therefore, despite the fact that, in the constitution the laws about employment include no discriminatory statements, it cannot be denied that there is an indigenization of legislative and executive power, because majority of the

[41] The law is cited in http://www.cis-legal-reform.org/document.asp?is=3751 and translated from Russian in http://imtranslator.com.

presidential staff and ministers are composed of ethnic Kazakhs. Even if this underrepresentation of non-titular people at lower levels is justified by the Law on Language and knowledge of Kazakh rule, the practices about the employment are rather ethnic and discriminatory. For instance, in some parts of the northern Kazakhstan, although non-Kazakhs, especially Russians, are in majority, regional administrations are Kazakhified. Similarly, other important positions, in the justice system and law enforcement agencies as well as in other public positions such as the state-run media, hospitals and academic institutions, Kazakhs constitute the majority (Bohr, 1998, 194). "Covert" nationalization tools, such issuing official instructions in hiring, firing and promotion of personnel are often used for indigenization of the public sector. To illustrate, a directive was passed about advancement and hiring of employees depending on their knowledge of Kazakh language at a meeting at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan in 1992. According to a resolution, '…in the promotion of personnel and the giving of titles upon employees, the attitude of the employee in question towards the study of Kazakh language shall be taken into consideration' (Bohr, 1998, 154). Similarly, several teachers in a music school in Shymkent were fired because of failing to observe the law on state language (Bohr, 1998, 154). Especially after the law of language was promulgated in 1995, the number of Russians and Russian speaking people decreased in many ministries and institutions. For Russians, access to leadership positions, as indicated before, became very difficult. For example, in 1985, the share of Kazakhs in leadership positions was 50%, this figure became 75% in 1994, and 83% in 1997 (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002b: 2). Similarly, six of the top eight positions in Karaganda Oblast were held by Kazakhs in 1994, even if they constituted less than one fifth of the region's population (Bremmer and Welt, 1995: 141). These data are also congruous with those of Olcott that according to her, ethnic Kazakhs have been appointed to over 70% of positions and nearly 80% of Nazarbayev's presidential apparatus and 60% of legislators were from Kazakhs while all senior positions were filled by Kazakhs after the replacement of Tereschenko government (Olcott, 1995: 290). As Haghayeghi puts it, these imply that Nazarbayev pursues slow but deliberate Kazakhization campaign, and that's why many of the Russians in higher positions (in economic and political spheres) have been replaced by Kazakhs, whereby fluency in Kazakh

language has become the main instrument and requirement for holding government positions (1996: 190).

As a result, in practice, the employment policy of the Kazakh state is favoring Kazakhs more than other nationalities, mainly because language continues to be used as an instrument for Kazakhization as it is used in some other aspects of life in the country via enabling legislation, proclamations, and government programs. In turn, this leads to more ethnic policies without analyzing and evaluating the real requirements.

4.6 Cultural Policies of the State in Kazakhstan

In the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, there is no direct law about the protection of culture of all the populations by the state organs. It is only stated in article 37 that "Citizens of Republic of Kazakhstan must care for the protection of historical and cultural heritage, and preserve monuments of history and culture." But there is no indication of which culture and history must be protected. However, while there is no direct official indication in the constitution, there is a program with the name of "Cultural Heritage" State Program of Kazakhstan for 2004-2006[42], which is approved by the decree of the president Nazarbayev on January 13, 2003 with the number 1277 aiming to develop spiritual and educational spheres, to ensure the preservation and effective use of the cultural heritage of the Republic of Kazakhstan. While the government was responsible for elaborating the activities and plans, Ministry of Culture and other related ministries and *akims* were responsible for taking the necessary measures for the implementation of the program. An important aspect of this program is that the financing of it will be executed by the resources from the republican/state budget. Therefore this program can be considered as a blueprint and an official program for the cultural policies that the Kazakhstan government planned to implement. Accordingly, examining this program will be helpful in determining the nature of implementation of the cultural policies and the analysis of the program will give valuable insights about the nature of nation-building process of the state. For the purposes of this thesis, the main points of this program will be examined skipping the unrelated details.

[42] "Cultural Heritage" State Program for 2004-2006 is online available at www.chsp.kz.

As indicated in the program itself, the tasks of this program are:

- Re-creation of outstanding historical-cultural and architectural monuments of the country;

- Creation of a system for studying the cultural heritage, including the modern national culture, traditions, folklore and customs;

- Creation of a full-value fond of humanitarian education in the state language on the basis of best achievements of world scientific thought, culture and literature;

- Summing-up of the multi-century experience of national literature and written literature by the creation of unfolded artistic and scientific series;

- Re-creation and transfer on to modern audio-carriers of phono-recordings of important performers-musicians of oral professional tradition which are kept in the fonds, archives and depositaries of the country.

According to this state program, historical, archeological and architectural objects defined as needing urgent assistance and representing high importance for the national history of Kazakhstan are; the unique monuments of history and culture like mausoleums *Asan-Ata* and *Aikhoza* in the Kzyl-Orda regions, *Arystanbab* in the Southern Kazakhstan, the *Zhrakent* Mosque in Almaty region, the historical-architectural monuments in *Turbat* village of the Southern-Kazakhstan region, the historical-architectural and archeological monuments of the museum reserves "Azret *Sultan*, "*Zhidebai-Borli*" of the *Mangistau* reserve and "*Ordabasy*" reserve etc.

Actually, archeology is one of the important means used in nationalism. Nationalism requires the elaboration of a real or invented remote past; therefore, archeological findings may be manipulated for the nationalist purposes, since they are physical and visible for the members of a nation. As a result, as Kohl put it, archeological sites become national monuments and their artifacts are kept and displayed in national museums. Accordingly, they constitute an important part of national heritage and sites and artifacts are often included in the state regalia as symbols appearing in national flags, stamps, currency, national anthems. In addition, maps which are showing the ethnically identified sites and accepted as part of the national heritage, are compiled. All these efforts are used to promote how national identity is continuously constructed by the commemoration of the remote, archeologically ascertainable past (2001: 36).

On the other hand, it is emphasized that the publication of the important works of the world scientific thought (which were previously stopped), such as in philosophy, history, law areas, for the Kazakh-speaking audience became important to create unfolded historical, artistic, scientific series in the state language (Kazakh) in order to upbring the new generation in the spirit of Kazakhstani patriotism and delete white spots in the full study of the historical and cultural heritage and to sum up the multi century experience of Kazakh people. According to the program, the preservation and revival of cultural heritage, among other things, will be by the implementation of preparation and publication of best examples of national literature and written literature, the achievements of world scientific thought in the state language (Kazakh language). The terms such as Kazakh people, Kazakh language are all ethnic and exclusive. Even if there is an inclusive statement, "Kazakhstani patriotism," the primary concern is for the Kazakh culture, people and language here. Thus, the usage of such statements in the program underlies more ethnic type of nation-building pursued by cultural policies in Kazakhstan.

Under the heading of "Re-creation of Considerable Historical-Cultural, Archeological and Architectural Monuments of National History," the revival of monuments of national history was planned to be realized by organizing scientific-culturological researches and the implementation of measures of restoration, conservation and renovation of monuments which are significant for the national culture such as mausoleums of *Abat-Baitak*, *Aisha-Bibi*, objects of the necropolises *Karaman-Ata*, *Shopan Ata*, the palace complexes *Akyrtas* and *Baba-Ata*, as well as by the development of the historical and ethnic-cultural environment and implementation of archeological researches of ancient medieval sites, mounds and resettlements (e.g. *Koilyk*, *Isyk*, *Berel*, *Saraichik*). Under the same heading, the need for a center for restoration and formation of museum fonds that need regular restoration and its importance for the national history is also emphasized. When it is considered that all the mentioned mausoleums, sites and mounds are all related with the Kazakhs and Kazakh history and culture, it can be inferred that with the national history, what is meant in this program is the Kazakh history.

Among the archeological findings, the *Issyk Kurgan*, which was found in 1969 in southern Kazakhstan, has a special importance. The burial is thought to belong to an 18-year-old *Saka* (Scythian) prince interred with warrior's equipment, variously

dubbed “Golden Man.” From the nation-building perspective, its prominent status lies in its symbolic importance, because the "golden man" was adopted as one of the symbols of modern-day Kazakhstan. A likeness of the "golden man" is forming the topmost part of the Independence Monument on the central square of Almaty and its depiction may be found on the “Presidential Standard”[43] of Nursultan Nazarbayev.[44] Making “Golden Man”, which is obviously related with Kazakh cultural heritage, a general symbol for the country reflects another ethnic nation building practice in Kazakhstan, excluding especially Russians and other non-Turkic groups. On the other hand, since Sakas are accepted as coming from the Turkic origin, the usage of “Golden Man” as a symbol of the country is not exclusive for other Turkic groups of Kazakhstan.

Under the heading of “The Creation of a Whole System for the Study of Cultural Heritage of the Kazakh People,” it was planned to make scientific research expeditions to carry out work in archives and libraries of near or far foreign countries. The purpose of this was to study the heritage of important thinkers and scientists of the past and to detect and acquire manuscripts, rare editions, books and archival documents that have historical importance in the cultural heritage of Kazakh people. Moreover, scientific researches on historical, cultural, architectural and archeological monuments having a special significance for the national culture, including the zones of museum-preserves for the purpose of their preservation and museum building were also planned to be carried out. In order to preserve the unique samples of the documentary heritage, the need for keeping on studying the heritage of the important thinkers, scientists of the past was emphasized in the program. The examples being mentioned are all those related with the Kazakh culture; *Al-Farabi*, *Y.Balasagun*, *M.Kashgari*, *S.Bakyrgani*, *A. Yugneki*, *M.Dulati*, *K.Zhalairi*, *Z.Babur* and the others. Also the necessity for continuing detection, acquisition or manufacture of copies of manuscripts, rare editions and books is emphasized in the program. Among these, there are: “*Code Hummanicus*”, “*Kitabi Dedem Korkud*” (they are in the cities of Dresden and Vatican), “*Babyr-name*”, “*Mukhabbat-name*” (these are in London), “*Oguz-name*” (it is in Paris), “*Kutadgu bilig*” by *Yu.Balasagun*

[43] Presidential Standard is a kind of royal symbol used by the presidents (i.e. president of Ireland).

[44] The data on Issyk Kurgan is online available on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Issyk_kurg

(they are in Cairo city) and other manuscript monuments having historical significance in the cultural heritage of the Kazakh people. Moreover, a business plan was also elaborated for the administration and preservation of *Khodja Ahmad Yasavi's* mausoleum.

On the other hand, under the heading of "The Elaboration of Series of Editions of National and Scientific Thought, Culture and Literature," for introducing the Kazakh-speaking reader, fundamental literary-artistic and scientific editions were planned to be published. To illustrate some, these are; *Babalar Sozi* (The words of the ancestors) which unifies the Kazakh national folklore in the cycle of folkloristics, literature study and art study, sayings of *Korkyt Ata* and views of B*ai* and *Shakarim*, in the cycle of Philosophy, the written sources on the history of the Kazakhstan (including *Herodot, Ptolemy* and others) in the cycle of the historical science, book albums of the Kazakh national traditions and customs in the cycle of ethnography and anthropology etc.

Without any doubt, with national culture, what is meant is the Kazakh culture, because all the reminded names have been great persons in the histories of Turkic people including the Kazakhs, as well as in the Islamic world. For example, *Aisha Bibi* was an Uyghur noble woman and was the daughter of a Sufi poet, *Khakim-Ata*. *Farabi*, who lived between 14 December 950 and 12 January 951, is considered to have been a great scientist and philosopher in the history of Persia and the Islamic world, since he had made significant contributions to the fields of mathematics, philosophy, medicine and music[45]. On the other hand, the poet *Yusuf Has Hajib*, who was born in *Kashgar*, East Turkestan and had written the *Kutadgu Bilig*, was an early Turkic linguist of Turkic languages from the *Kara-Khanid Khanate*.[46] He was also a renowned scholar and lexicographer of Turkic dialects (Karpat, 2004: 150). Hence, while these are also important individuals for other Turkic-origin minorities in Kazakhstan, namely Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, Meskhetian Turks, these have no or less meaning for the Russians and other Russified non-Kazakh minorities. It was stated in the program also that the implementation of the program would affect the further integration and self-identification of the society, help in strengthening

[45] Data is online available at www.wikipedia.com.

[46] Kara Khanid Khanate is accepted as the first Turkic-Islamic state in history.

national and self consciousness and mutual understanding. So this program is claimed to influence the inter-ethnic relations and understanding positively and have civic purposes. Indeed, it is stated that "the interests of All-Kazakhstani self-identification and better understanding of modern Kazakh culture are not to be left out the historical-cultural heritage of other ethnic groups who gained in Kazakhstan a second Motherland." This sentence assures that self-identification and efforts for understanding of Kazakh culture would not exclude the cultural and historical heritage of non-Kazakh citizens. However, next, it is being indicated that:

> We are living in the conditions of dynamic changes. Edifying for us would be the experience of national self-assertion, including the experience of revival of mother tongue not only of our ancestors but of any other people who managed to implement the passionary energy in the surmounting of adverse historical circumstances for them. Naturally, of especial interest is the historical experience of exit from "alien existence" and "self-identification" on the part of the Kazakh and proto-Kazakh culture.

With these statements, whereby the Kazakh and other non-Kazakh languages are said to revive again, what is being emphasized is that the main interest will be to diminish the foreign effect on Kazakh identity and culture, and self identification of Kazakh and proto Kazakh culture, which is in contrast to the civic statement above. Meanwhile, the latter sentences indicate that while building the Kazakh nation, the utilized materials are of ancient and pre-modern Kazakh ones, validating the Smith's arguments on nation building and nationalism.

Ethnic rather than civic cultural policies are also apparent in the official website of Kazakhstan[47] (the web page of the President). The following data, which are about the cultural life of Kazakhstan, take part in the official website:[48]

- On July 1999, the first volume of the national encyclopedia of Kazakhstan, which was mostly composed of national ingredients about Kazakhs, was printed. In that encyclopedia, it is stated that Kazakh territories gave the world scholars such as *Al-Farabi* and *Ahmad Yasavi*, who enriched the cultural treasury of the humanity.

[47] The official website of the President Nazarbayev is www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=ru.

[48] The data presented in the website of the president are cited in Karin and Chebotarev, 2002: 11.

- On January 11, 2000, the national museum, which will include displays telling Kazakhs' ancient predecessors, military and contemporary history of Kazakhstan, as well as the ethno-social and political history of Kazakhs.

- On February 11, 2000, the bust of *Ablai Khan*, who was the important statesman and the unifier of Kazakhstan's lands and whose talents made the expansion of fundamental bases of Kazakh state possible, was unveiled. The bust is in the Kazakh State University of International Relations and World Languages.

- On November 18, 1999, 1300th anniversary of the storyteller D*ede Qorqyt* and his heroic epic *Kitaby Dedem Qorqyt* was celebrated in Almaty, whilst on June 13, the 100th anniversary of the Kazakh literary hero *Sabit Mukanov* was started to be celebrated in Northern Kazakhstan..

These policies are evidences of that the nature of the cultural policies implemented by the state is often ethnic rather than civic. Thereby, the emphasis is on Kazakh culture and not the culture of all the people of Kazakhstan. In Karin and Chebotarev's words, these may be interpreted as "the government's deliberate insertion of ethnic Kazakh ways of thinking into the republic's socio-cultural sphere" (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002a: 1).

In fact, these policies can also be interpreted as efforts to prove that the land of contemporary Kazakhstan is the homeland of the Kazakhs and that they have been the habitants of these lands for centuries. As emphasized by Yiftachel, homeland ethnicity forms the basis for ethnic nationalism when a homeland community have desire for state power, and the attachment to the territory forms a key component of construction of a national identity, marginalizing the minorities, whereby, in all ethnic nationalisms, generally the ethnic mobilization and identity formation is related with a specific territory, ethnic homeland and the area around this homeland that ethnic identity is reproduced. Hence, the aim of ethnic efforts is to prove that the land is the cradle of the nation (Yiftachel, 2001: 359-360). Therefore, it can be stated that the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the cultural policies and archeological efforts are utilized by the state apparatus to prove that the territory of today's Kazakhstan has been the land of the Kazakh nation for centuries, whereby all non-Kazakh populations are accepted as the permanent, not temporary, guests of this homeland, adding a civic ingredient to the concept of homeland.

4.7 National/State Symbols of Kazakhstan

In the nation building process, ethno-symbolic resources (e.g. customs, myths, heroes, state symbols) are utilized in order to create a common sense of unity and destiny. Anthony Smith (1991) gives special importance to the national symbols (i.e. re-enactment of resistance events such as 1986 riots in Kazakh case, as well as flags, anthems) since they play role in assuring the continuity of an abstract community of history and identity through articulating and making the ideology of nationalism tangible and making concepts of nation ceremonial (1991: 78). Hence, one of the essential steps in the process of national integration is the creation of symbols of the state which will give clues about the constitution of the national identity, such as the flag, national anthem etc. (Birch, 1989:9), which are concrete images of meaning and identity. Even if in the study of nations and nationalism, the study of national symbols is underdeveloped, the importance of symbolization in shaping social interaction at all levels has been widely accepted. By definition, 'National Symbols' are the symbols of any entity considering itself and manifesting itself to the world as a national community – namely sovereign states, but also nations and countries in a state of colonial or other dependence, (con)federal integration, or even an ethno-cultural community considered a 'nationality' despite the absence of political autonomy.[49] So, symbols are generally recognized as representations and projections of national values, and they are very important in the construction and re-construction of the communities that nations consist. According to David Marsland, national symbols play key roles especially in six areas of national being:

- In the recruitment of people and organizations into national movements,
- In the consolidation of the commitment of individuals and organizations to national movements,
- In legitimating nationalist political parties in post-dependency electoral competition,
- In disseminating the image of newly independent nations on the global political and economic stage,
- In sustaining the national identity of citizens of historical and new nations alike in the face of disruptive internal and external pressures,

[49] This is the definition of national symbol in dictionary. For more details see: www.wikipedia.com.

- In sustaining confidence and competitive advantage in international relations, ranging from trade, through diplomacy, to war. (2001:221)

We can separate the national symbols as official and non-official. While flag, national anthem, coat of arms, stamp of the land, national colors can be counted as official symbols, national myths, epics, dress, holidays, instrument(s), pastimes, folk hero(s), dances, music, culture hero monuments etc. can be counted as the non-official ones. In fact, the national symbols are usually designed to be inclusive and representative of all the peoples of the national community. Therefore, national or state symbols play very important roles in the nation-building process and that is why new symbols replaced the old Soviet-ones after the independence.

National symbols generally have a historical reference shared by all members of the nation. This shared memory of the symbol is a conventional one being subject to constant rehearsal and each time this bookmark is actualized (e.g. flag being saluted or national anthem played), it is a reminder of the collective history of the community that give a sense of collective identity to each person in the community (Geisler, 2005: xviii-xix). So, symbols are the images, conditions, objects and activities in which there are beliefs, values and attitudes that are utilized by people to realize objectives by controlling and influencing the behavior. Indeed, in the history, every society has made use of the symbols because they have great importance for social solidarity, transformation and renewals and are necessary for the establishment of social cohesion, the legitimization of institutions and the political authority as well as transmission and penetration of beliefs and conventions of behavior (Smith, 2001, 521-522). As McClintok put it, "Nationalism is shaped by visible, ritual organization of fetish objects – flags, uniforms, maps, anthems, national cuisines," (1996: 274), hence, the use of symbols for defining and justifying nationalism's social norms and values is important (Smith, 2001: 527).

On the other hand, it is natural that construction of national symbols is often disputed and creates disagreements among the nation-builders, so they are not fixed or static. In contrast, as Donnan and Wilson argued, national symbols should be flexible to keep their relevance over time and to attract diverse populations. So, the most effective symbols are those which have different meanings to different people (1999), thus, the symbols should be selected or created carefully to reflect the shared experiences of the members of the community. Symbols shape the population and

unite them while increasing their difference from other communities. Since they are sometimes viewed as a tool of communication and knowledge they transmit the history and ideology of a population to its members (Firth, 1973: 77). Although all symbols create some reaction, they should have strong representation power of the group to be able to become a key symbol for the unity. Symbols, such as flags, anthems, emblems, images of historical events tend to remain stable, increasing the consciousness of a nation's members and creating a sense of solidarity and identity. Some key symbols, such as flags and national anthems tell the story of a nation while they link the past with present and future. They are important tools to reconstruct and reinvent the memory of a nation (Geisler, 2005: 4-5). They are like glues that bind the nation together. As Confino stated, the important point about the national symbols is the representational power of the event, the framework under which the memory is represented, and how the representation has been interpreted and received by the members of the community (cited in Geisler, 2005: 5).

For a nation to survive, memories of its past should be a part of its current agenda so that every generation can feel a direct commitment to the experiences that form the nation. Moreover, by using myths, symbols and rituals, this commitment should be reinforced to create emotional attachment. So which symbols are selected and how these symbols are interpreted are important in determining the type of nation-building process of a state. In fact, as Smith (2001) put it, when new regimes come to the power, old symbols are generally eliminated and overthrown and new set of symbols (especially flag, national anthem, sacred texts, image of true patriots) are brought instead. New nations also create new capital cities and new names for the country as well as the alphabet (2001: 527).

Indeed, after the independence, as it occurred in the other post-Soviet states, efforts for creating a viable nation also started in Kazakhstan and as an important part of nation-building process, new national symbols had to be re-constructed in order to unite Kazakhstani population. For instance, the capital of Kazakhstan was moved from Almaty to Astana, the names of the streets were changed, and nowadays, the plan for passing to Latin alphabet is being made in the country. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, due to both Tsarist Russia's and Soviet Russia's policies, Kazakhstan has had a multi-ethnic structure legacy, thus, it was more a delicate issue for Kazakhstan to be able to unite its all citizens under a viable national

identity. After the independence, lots of new symbols were introduced by the Kazakh administration such as flag, national anthem and emblem, currency, central bank, monuments etc. In fact, in the Constitution of Kazakhstan, there is no ethnic statement about the state symbols, however, there are two related articles in the constitution. Article 9 states that "The Republic of Kazakhstan shall have its state symbols — the flag, emblem and anthem. Their description and order of official use shall be established by the constitutional law." And in article 34, paragraph 2, it is stated that everyone must respect the state symbols of the Republic. However, it is the symbols themselves that matter, and since the national symbols selected by the nation builders give clues about the nature of a nation-building process, whether it is more civic or ethnic orientation, we will explore the national symbols of Kazakhstan, the three most important ones; the flag, national emblem and the national anthem, the only mentioned symbols in the constitution (in article 9), in order to be able to determine whether they are civic or ethnic.

4.7.1 The Flag of Kazakhstan

Flags are officially designated representations of nations and transmit important information about the history, goals, future aspirations and affiliations of a nation. Therefore, national flags codify the subjective nature of a nation while objectifying the identity of a nation and concretizing the abstract nature of it (Motyl, 2001, 164). Since the flag continuously reminds the members of a nation of their cultural autonomy, it forms the basis of a unique conceptual community and it is important for the flag to be accepted by the members of the nation. Flag is also the most important symbol, since there is a quasi-religious aura surrounding flags, reflected in the words and ceremonies associated with their usage, which is also regulated by law. In fact, the flag is the ultimate symbol of the nation, so it exists in everywhere and every situation that the nation is represented such as public gatherings, schools, churches ceremonies, military activities (Smith, 2001: 528). As Smith pointed out, "…flags are particularly useful form of symbol because of their adaptability, the appeal of their colors and emblems, their relative inexpensiveness and the ease of manufacture, their hypnotic motion when flying and long distance visibility" (2001: 529). Hence, flags are representing the distinguishing features of a nation, such as its struggle for existence, its ethnic and religious composition, and natural resources.

Those meanings are conveyed to people by schools and by their relation with the specific experiences and situations that reinforce the meaning of the symbol (Smith, 2001: 529).

In Kazakhstan, as in other Central Asian states, a new flag was also adopted after independence. The color of the background of the new flag of Kazakhstan (see: Figure 4.1) is blue sky. In the middle of the flag, there is a sun with rays which is half-circled by the steppe eagle in the flight. On the hoist side (left side), there is a national ornamental motif. The blue represents a cloudless sky and unity, peace and prosperity. The gold sun represents wealth and serenity, whereby steppe-eagle symbolizes the vigilance and generosity (Otarbaeva, 1998: 431). When the symbols are interpreted from this perspective, the symbols seem inclusive and civic. However, the reality is not so simple and all these symbols have more meanings than those stated by Otarbaeva. For example, golden eagles are called *Berkut* in Kazakh (Kunanbay, 2001: 241) and the golden eagle, on a blue background, "symbolizes more than anything else the soaring, uplifting spirit of the Kazakh steppe" (Fergus, 2003: 51), because Kazakhs revere the golden eagle in part, due to the fact that they fly so high and close to the sun that the pilots reported seeing them flying as high as 20,000 feet (Kunanbay, 2001: 242). Moreover, the blue and gold, which are representing the sky and the sun, symbolizes the Sky God of the ancient cult, even if they have universal significance (Akiner, 1995: 61). As Akiner indicated, the sun and the eagle have also universal significance, but I think it is the perceptions that matter. I mean, if a person is a Russian in Kazakhstan and if s/he has some knowledge about the Kazakh culture, s/he has no attachment to the flag, since s/he knows what eagle means for Kazakhs. For example, if an American says that he loves the grey wolves, no one think anything wrong with this sentence but wolf lover. However, if one says the same words in Turkey, people will attach this person with some kind of political streams.[50] In a nutshell, it is apparent that the flag of Kazakhstan is generally designated in ethnic terms. There seems no symbol on the flag that non-Kazakh non-Turkic populations of Kazakhstan (especially Russians and Russified non-Russians) can feel any attachment to it. For Turkic populations of Kazakhstan, blue and Sky

[50] In Turkey, people called "*Ülkücü*" use the grey wolf as their symbol, due to the belief in *Ergenekon* myth, which symbolizes the re-birth of Turks.

God have a common meaning so non-Kazakh but Turkic populations such as Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Meskhetian Turks, can link themselves with the flag. Even if the flag of Kazakhstan is the least ethnic one among the Central Asian states (Bohr, 1998: 145), as most scholars (Dave, 2004, Akiner, 1995, Sarsembaev, 2002, Bohr, 1998 etc.) agree, the flag of Kazakhstan can be denoted as bearing Kazakh symbols which are drawn from Kazakh traditions.



Figure 4. 1 The Flag of the Republic of Kazakhstan

4.7.2 The National Anthem

As another official symbol, the national anthems can be said to represent the musical equivalent of a nation's flag or motto. These official songs reflect the character of nations and transmit their goals, desires, so anthems are another national symbol by which nations distinguish themselves from other ones and draw their identity boundaries. Generally, the national anthems are inclusive and they are adopted since they capture the citizens. Anthems are taught in schools, used in state occasions, public ceremonies and they have important functions such as reinforcing the national identity, creating bonds between citizens, motivating patriotic action and legitimizing the authority (Motyl, 2001: 359-360). Thus, national anthems are another symbols that serve to create a national consciousness and national identity connecting people together. It is also true for national anthems that they be should be inclusive and internalized to be accepted by the majority of the citizens.

The national anthem of Kazakhstan (see below) was adopted in 1992. The lyrics of the anthem were written over the old melody of the Soviet era anthem and the lyrics of this new anthem are written in Kazakh language (see below), the only

state language, so it emphasizes the importance of the Kazakh language with the aim of keeping it alive and develop it. As we discussed in the language part, when the issue is held from the language perspective, this can be said to be perceived by Russians with antagonism and difficult to sing since only about 15% of the Russians know Kazakh in varying degrees.

The lyrics of the national anthem of the Republic of Kazakhstan[51]are as follows:

Kazakh Lyrics

Altyn kün aslany,
Altyn dän dalasy,
Erlikting dastany,
Elime qarashy!
Ezhelden er degen,
Dangkymyz shyqty ghoy.
Namysyn bermegen,
Qazaghym myqty ghoy!

Mening elim, mening elim,
Güling bolyn egilemin,
Zhyryng bolyn tögilemin, elim!
Tughan zherim mening - Qazaqstanym!

Urlaqqa zhol ashqan,
Keng baytaq zherim bar.
Birligi zharasqan,
Täuelsiz elim bar.
Qarsy alghan yaqytty,
Mänggilik dosynday.
Bizding el baqytty,
Bizding el osynday!

English Translation

Golden sun in heaven,
Golden corn in steppe,
Legend of courage -
It is my land.
In hoary antiquity
Our glory was born,
Proud and strong
Is my Kazakh people

[51] Online available at http://david.national-anthems.net/kz'.htm

My country, my country,
As your flower I'll grow,
As your song I'll stream, country!
My native land - Kazakhstan!

I've a boundless expanse
And a way, opened in future.
I have an independent,
United people.
Like an ancient friend
Our happy land,
Our happy people
Is welcoming new time.

When the lyrics are considered, in general, it can be said that the anthem is emphasizing the Kazakh people, land (with words of "my native land") and symbols (golden sun and steppe are words related with Kazakh traditions). The only lyrics that can be denoted as inclusive and civic are; "I have an independent united people…" So, while the melody's being the same with the Soviet one and the words being inclusive make the anthem inclusive and civic, its being in Kazakh language and using ethnic terms in the first two parts make it ethnic. In general, the anthem can be denoted as ethnic and exclusive.

4.7.3 The State Emblem of Kazakhstan

The national state emblem is another symbol important in interpreting the type of nation-building process in a state. In the official emblem of Kazakhstan, there is sacred *Shanyrak,* which is the top (the cupola or the smoke-hole wheel) of the yurt, on a blue background from which *uyk*s (body brackets) like sun rays are being radiated in framing of wings of mythical horses. These gold winged horses are of the Kazakh myth. Lastly, with gold yellow color, there is an inscription of "Kazakhstan" written under the emblem (see Figure 4.2).

Shanyrak is functionally the main part that holds the yurt together, so it is the heart of the home and the wheel of the sun. The opening of the *shanyrak* enables to read the stars and tell the time. In addition, it takes one's attention to the sky and Sky God (Kunanbay, 2001: 91). In fact, *shanyrak* symbolizes the homeland of the Kazakhs (Otarbaeva, 1998: 431) which holds all the Kazakhs together as it holds the

yurt. Additionally, horses have been also one of the most important parts of the steppe life, so it reflects a component of Kazakh culture. In short, it can be said that the state emblem of Kazakhstan is exclusive and ethnic for Russians and other non-Kazakh/non-Turkic groups.



Figure 4. 2 The State Emblem of the Republic of Kazakhstan

In sum, the cultural references used in the official symbols of Kazakhstan are generally drawn from the Kazakh culture and traditions. Therefore, as Akiner (1995: 60) argued and which is supported by others (i.e. Dave, 2004, Bohr, 1998, Sarsembaev, 2002), state symbols of Kazakhstan can be denoted as more ethnic then they are civic. Therefore, it should be emphasized that the important thing is not to create state symbols, but to make them accepted by all the citizens living in the country so that state symbols can become the national ones. In Kazakhstan, in the short run it seems difficult that the state symbols could become national symbols, due to their ethnic nature in general.

4.8 National Holidays and Celebrations of Kazakhstan

There are different ways in which national is observed in everyday life. In fact, practicing rituals are very important for a nation, because they are the re-enactments of other actions rendering the abstract and concrete meaning (Connerton, 1990: 53)

and it is the ceremonies that the rituals are most apparent, as the commemorative ceremonies create and continue the resonance of myths, memories and symbols of the nation (Connerton, 1990: 70). They reinforce the belief that 'we are fulfilling history, and we will prevail '(Tilly 2004: 66), so they have an important role whereby they provide 'points of entry' for people at the collective national level showing the collective's orientation to them (Gamson, 1995: 89). Therefore, nationalism has its marks also in cultural practices such as common pastimes and holidays and examining the national holidays and celebrations in Kazakhstan will give us clues about the nature of the nation-building project in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan's national holidays are as follows:

- January 1 - 2 – New Year,
- March 8 – International Women Day,
- March 22 – *Nauruz Bayrami*,
- May 1 – Kazakhstan Nations Unity Holiday,
- May 9 – Victory Day,
- June 10 – Day of the capital,
- August 30 – Constitution Day,
- October 25 – Republic Day,
- December 16 - Independence Day.

As it is clear from above, New Year, International Women's Day, Kazakhstan Nations Unity Holiday, Victory Day, Day of the Capital, Constitution Day and Republic Day are all inclusive holidays that address all the citizens in Kazakhstan. Especially, Kazakhstan Nations Unity Holiday and Victory Day are unitary and are holidays for the citizens of Kazakhstan who had a common Soviet past and memory. For example, Victory Day is the day that is celebrated by all Soviet Republics in the memoir of the Soviet Union's emerging as one of the victorious states from the World War II and it is carried over to present day. However, the Independence Day may be perceived as ethnic/discriminative, and negatively by some of the minorities, especially Russians and other Slavs, since the Independence Day is celebrated on December 12, the day when the December 1986 riots began. In addition, some of the Russians still miss the Soviet period, and their privileged status had changed in not only in Kazakhstan but also in the other post-Soviet borderlands after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Kazakhstan..

In contrast to other ones, *Nauruz,* which is also called the New Year of Central Asians (Eitzen, 1999) and which signifies the renewal, is not an inclusive holiday for all citizens of Kazakhstan, since it is an ancient festival that is celebrated on the first day of the spring (March 22) by all Turkic people (Uzbeks, Turkmens, Arbaijanis, Kyrgyz etc.), not only by Kazakhs. While during the Soviet era *Nauruz* was banned as it was considered as religious, after gaining independence, it became important again and has been given the status of state holiday. Together with these national holidays, religious holidays are also celebrated, such as *Kurban Bayrami* and *Ramadan* among Muslims, Easter and Christmas among Christians.

When we look at the celebrations, we see the same picture. For instance, the historical pact made by the three *zhuz* leaders, *Kazybek bi, Tole bi*, and *Aylek bi* that the three *zhuz* leaders were united against *Dzunghar* Khanate 200 years ago in *Ordabasy* was celebrated (Holm-Hansen, 1999: 211-212). Moreover, in Kazakhstan, much attention is being given to the first Khanate, in the 15th century, the 540th anniversary of which was celebrated in 1995. Kazakhstan also put the *Al Farabi* on bank notes, the Muslim philosopher who was born in present south Kazakhstan (Roy, 1999: 167). So these are the celebrations that interest only the Kazakhs. On the other hand, in order to give the impression that celebrations concern not only Kazakhs but also the non-Kazakhs there are also other celebrations. For example, anniversary of the 1100 years of Slavic language was celebrated, but likewise, the 150th anniversary of the birth of Abai, who is the father of Kazakh literary language, and hero of Middle Zhuz, was also celebrated under national-cultural centers' coordination (Holm-Hansen, 1999: 212).

In fact, an important aspect of these special days is that each of them encompasses different parts of the history of Kazakhstan and Kazakh people. For instance, *Nauruz*, the celebration of the unification of the three *zhuz* leaders, celebration of the 540th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate and the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of the Abai are all related with the pre-Soviet period, whereby Victory Day, International Women Day, New Year, and Nations' Unity Day all remained from the Soviet period. On the other hand, Day of Capital, Constitution Day, Republic Day and Independence Day are started to be celebrated in the post-independence/post-Soviet period. Therefore, in sum, it will not be wrong

to state that both the national holidays and the celebrations in Kazakhstan have both civic and ethnic character.

4.9 Policies on Religion

As we explored before, one of the most important legacies from the Soviet period was the underground Islam. Islam could not have been eradicated under the Soviet rule, and it was prevailing despite the suppressions. As a result, Islam reappeared in the post-Soviet period that a return to the observance of a traditional and customary faith signing a recovery started to be observed. Meanwhile, since religion has always been seen as a potential source of inter-ethnic conflict (not only between the Kazakhs and Christian groups, but also between the conservative and non-conservative Muslims, for instance Kazakhs and Uzbeks) and opposition for Nazarbayev and Kazakh politicians, management of religion was an important task of the nation-building process in the country.

Regarding the institutional religious structure, in Kazakhstan, several government bodies deal with the religion. There is a Board on Relations with Religious Organizations under the Government of Kazakhstan, besides the Council on Religious Affairs (CRA). At the local level, *akimats* (local government bodies) check the activities of the religious organizations on behalf of the government. In Kazakhstan, only the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) registers the religious organizations. Most mosques are registered in the country, but this is a technical requirement and not a basis for the assessment of the doctrinal basis of organizations that apply for registration. Nevertheless, the state structures have the absolute power and have the power of intervening in religious affairs if they wish without the bureaucratic processes for registration. The Islamic groups are represented by Muslim Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan (DUMK). The DUMK usually conducts its internal affairs without the regular interference of the state bodies, and there seems to be no real tension between the DUMK and the state, while there is nearly no opposition to Muftiate (ICG, 2003: 32).

In Kazakhstan, there is no law or regulation that prohibits foreign missionary activity. The only requirement is registration and indication of the purpose of their stay (Article 5). According to the law on religion enacted in July 2005, local and foreign missionaries are required to register annually with the MOJ and give

information about the territory of missionary activity, religious affiliation and the length of the activity, as well as materials that would be used. The MOJ may not register those missionary organizations that are inconsistent with the law, including the laws prohibiting the incitement of inter-ethnic and inter-religious hatred (ICG, 2003). On the other hand, even if national government and national Muslim organization SAMK (Spiritual Association of Muslims of Kazakhstan) do not accept that there is an official connection between them, the government had tried to give semi-official status to SAMK by requiring it to determine which Muslim groups should be allowed to register and approve mosque constructions via some amendments in 2002. This move was cancelled by the Constitutional Council ruling that this was violating the similar principle separating the state and church so did not let the SAMK to approve the registration of any Muslim group (IRFR 2006). Therefore, the council prevented the constitutional right of freely disseminating the religious beliefs to be infringed.

Concerning the religious policy in practice, the general religion policy of Kazakh government towards religious groups and organizations is mainly based on the criteria of these organizations' being homegrown or not, instead of Islam and the others. While homegrown groups are usually seen as acceptable based on the assumption that their leaders understand Kazakhstan's delicate inter-ethnic situation as well as historical and cultural features, the foreign based religious groups such as Reverend Moon (Protestant Pentecostal) and Deva Maria were seen as alien and conflicting with more traditional faiths of Kazakhstan, namely Islam and Russian Orthodoxy (Olcott, 2002: 207). For example, as mentioned before, according to the Constitution of Kazakhstan, activities of foreign religious associations and the appointment of the heads of religious associations in the country by foreign religious centers should be made in coordination with related state institutions of the state. Therefore, the positions of Islam and Russian Orthodoxy is different from the others that they receive state support, have permanent contacts with state and local officials and bodies, and receive some other privileges. These two also try to prevent the emergence of other organizations they denote as undesirable (such as Protestant churches in Kazakhstan, worshipers of Khrishna etc.). Muslim leadership fears from the spread of Christianity among Kazakhs, while Russian Orthodox leaders worry the about growing influence of Protestant churches (Podoprigora, 1999). .

Yet, it cannot be denied that Islam has an important place in the nation building process in Kazakhstan. As it is an agreed upon fact, for the majority of Kazakhs today, Islam has a symbolic meaning rather than a spiritual one. For example, regular attendance to mosques is low, whilst the K*ur-an* (holy book of the Muslims) is not read by about two thirds of the respondents, and only with 18,2 % indicated that they read it in special cases such as the execution of ceremonies. It is also similar for the fulfillment of *namaz* while only 2% are involved in pilgrimages (*hadj*) and 15.7% in small pilgrimage (*umra*). On the other hand, significant proportion of the respondents indicated the payment of *zekat* (the tax in favor of requiring Moslems) and making *kurban* (Zhusupov, 2001:112). Islam is seen as a component of Kazakhness and is seen as an integral part of the Kazakh culture, hence Islam has become a part of search for a new Kazakh identity. On the one hand, whereby Kazakh government has been attempting to use the symbolic feature of Islam as part of state legitimization national identity, this had little impact on the state policy. In fact, the backbone of the state policy is based on interfering minimally as long as religion poses no serious threat to state security (ICG, 2003: 31-32), thereby, the violation of the integrity of the state through advocating religious superiority is forbidden by laws.

One can argue that Kazakh government's main policy about Islam is to maintain the Soviet-era distinction between religion as tradition and religion as faith. What the Kazakh government emphasize is the Islam as tradition (Muslim names, beliefs, practices which are also combined with pre-Islamic practices) as it is seen as part of Kazakh identity. As traditional Kazakh Islam still maintains many of the pre-Islam characteristics, it can be said that Islam could not penetrate into Kazakh life due to the nomadic lifestyle, which prevented elaborate systems of religious schools, shrines and quartal organizations (Olcott, 2002: 208-209). Moreover, Islam has been representing the cultural heritage for Kazakhs and according to the Kazakh officials, this side of Islam is to be celebrated. For example, Kazakhstan has invested to profile the mausoleum of Ahmet Yasavi in Turkistan city as a reverence to all Turkic people. On the other hand officials try to maintain the secular structure of the state (ICG Report, 2003: 3). Thus, while all new Central Asian states associated themselves with Islam, only Kazakhstan, as well as Turkmenistan, explicitly indicated that the state is secular (*dünyavi)* in their constitutions (Article 1, the Constitution of Kazakhstan), but the two also belong to the Organization of the

Islamic Conference, as the other Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan recognizes the presence of Islam and support Islam to some degree as part of identity while controlling the clergy and putting down radical movements (Roy, 1999: 158-159).

At first sight, the policy on religion may seem to be contradictory. But when it is considered that Islam is seen as a cultural component and one of the building blocs of Kazakh identity rather than solely a religion of faith of Kazakh and non-Kazakh Muslim people, the policy seems appropriate. According to Olcott (2002), the Kazakh leaders more fear from Islam than Russian Orthodoxy. Since 90% of those who stated themselves as believers stated Islam as their faith while 1150 out of 2299 religious institutions are associated with Kazakhstan's Muslim Eclectics Administration, Islam is the most visible religion in Kazakhstan (2002: 207-208).

Except the support for Islam as a cultural boundary marker, there seems no discriminatory policy within Kazakhstan against religious organizations other than Islam. For example, the government invited the national leaders of the two largest religious groups (namely Islam and Russian Orthodoxy) to join some state events while Jewish and Roman Catholic leaders have also been invited to some events as well. Even if more rarely, leaders of Baptists, Presbyterians, and other non-traditional religious groups have also joined in some events (IRFR 2006). In addition, Nazarbayev was given the award of the Order of Dmitri Donskoi by Patriarch Aleksei II (of all Russia) for his support of the restitution of Russian Orthodox institutions and practices in his country (Olcott, 2002: 208). Also, in June 2006, at a meeting of OSCE implementation in Almaty co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, religious leaders planned to build several large houses for worship including a new Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Astana, a new synagogue complex in Almaty and a new synagogue in Ust-Kamerogorsk. Moreover, the number of religious groups has increased from 3157 in 2004 to 3420 in 2006 (IRFR, 2006). These examples are also consistent with the constitution's related articles preventing any discrimination for reasons of attitude towards religion (Article 14), giving right to indicate or not to indicate religious affiliation freely (Article 19).

Although there were some claims of incidents of harassment as well as for example, by Jehovah's Witnesses Religious Center, they stated that there is generally a positive relation with the Central government, and there are no other religious groups that have reported similar denials for permission of public gatherings (IRFR

2006). Moreover, while it seems true that foreign religious organizations meet with more difficulties in comparison with the local ones, this cannot be interpreted as a discrimination when the general policy of the state on religion, which is based on the organizations' being Kazakhstan based or not, is considered. The important point here is whether there is discrimination against the religions other than Islam. There seems no such policy as ICG indicated in its 2003 report that Kazakh based organizations other than Islam are also recognized in the country. Furthermore, the Kazakh officials have also started to observe Muslim missionaries' activities closer and it is also difficult for foreign based Muslim missionaries to make activities in Kazakhstan. To illustrate, even if lots of mosques and religious schools have been built in Kazakhstan after the independence, any foreigner who is not officially registered and propagating Islam is subject to expulsion while in 2000, Kazakhstan started to recall students studying at Islamic academies and universities abroad (Olcott, 2002: 207). In addition, most *imam*s have only limited religious education, and took their education in Kazakhstan, so that they are usually loyal to local Islamic traditions and tend to reject foreign-trained students, who find it difficult to gain appointments in mosques, because the students, who studied in Islamic institutions abroad, are looked with suspicion (ICG, 2003: 33).

Thus, in the framework of politics, the basic principle of the Kazakh government can be denoted as civic in general, because it seems that there is a general tolerance towards all religions. As most scholars agree (i.e. Roy, 2000, Olcott, 2002, Akiner, 1995, Bohr, 1998, Dave, 2004), Kazakhstan has the most liberal policy on religious affairs in Central Asia. In fact, as Olcott indicated, Kazakhstan is the only state in Central Asia that can really be denoted as secular because it has not given a special legal role to religion, so there seems no danger of radical Islam for the foreseeable future (2002: 208). For example, the government does not permit religious instruction in public schools, and parents may only enroll children in supplemental religious education classes given by the religious organizations registered officially (IRFR 2006).

In a nutshell, it can be stated that the policy of Kazakhstan about religions is mostly consistent with civic provisions in the constitution. It is true that there are some exceptions such as the emphasis on Islam as a part of cultural heritage, Islam's being used as an identity marker. Similarly, some Islamic activities are reported in

the north of Kazakhstan partly to increase the visibility of Kazakh culture with the aim of balancing against non-Kazakh domination (Akiner: 1995: 65). However, these do not prevent us to denote the religious policies of Kazakh government as generally civic. For instance, A.Sarsenbaev, who is at the government of Kazakhstan, has stated that according to their and foreign experts' views the legislation on religion quite corresponds to the international standards and there is no need for new laws in on this subject (Zhusupov, 2001:111). Furthermore, even if government members' shaking hands with Catholics, hug Buddhists and embrace Judaists during official ceremonies dissatisfies some zealots of Islam, who assert that Islam represents the main component of the spiritual renaissance of Kazakhs, tolerance and unprejudiced approach to religious issues is the only reasonable policy for Kazakhstan. It was this policy that made Kazakhstan a suitable place to hold the Conference of World Religions (Yermukanov, 2003).

4.10 Move of Capital from Almaty to Astana

It is indicated in this thesis that old symbols are generally eliminated and overthrown when new regimes came to power, and new nations create new capital cities and accordingly, new names for the places in the country (Smith, 2005: 527). In relation with this view, in November 1997, the capital of Kazakhstan was moved from Almaty, that is in the south-east of the country, to Aqmola (meaning 'white grave'), that is in the northern steppe of the country. The name of Aqmola then changed into Astana (meaning 'capital city' in Kazakh), to prevent misunderstandings that a capital name meaning grave would create psychological speculations. While there are a number of reasons stated in international and unofficial platforms, there are four official reasons without any ethnic sentiment. The move was officially justified by those reasons:

- It was far from the industrial and geographical center because of its location,
- Almaty has exhausted its growth potential, there was no room to expand,
- There is pollution in Almaty,
- It was lying in an earthquake zone (Bohr, 1998: 156).

All these official arguments reflect legitimate concerns and aims. For example, Schatz stated that ". . . just as Kazakhstan was uniquely situated at the crossroads of

cultures, Astana enjoyed a singular location at the heart of Kazakhstan and could ensure stable and effective transportation, communication, and defense." (Schatz, 2004: 131), but these do not provide enough explanation for such a massive project when the huge economical costs are considered (Huttenbach, 1998: 583). Despite the official reasons, the move was mostly regarded as a policy for consolidating the Kazakhs' hold on the state through diluting the Russian dominated northern parts of the country by the migration of Kazakhs from the south. As Huttenbach noted, the move was very logical, because as the Kazakhsl steadily gain the absolute majority, both in the capital and the country, Russian domination will be diluted and weakened and forced to integrate more into the state structure. So, Nazarbayev has been following the Kazakhization policy very cautiously and diplomatically, whereby he maintained a public commitment to a multinational state (1998: 582-585). The move also gave an opportunity to create new loyal political elites and simultaneously keep a close eye on the oblasts near the Russian borders (Schatz, 2000: 79). When it is considered that the language law and the employment policy of filling most of the higher ranking positions in official posts with Kazakhs gave advantage to the Kazakhs, and the Kazakh population has been increasing more than the other groups, it seems logical to expect that the capital, where the government institutions exist, and the northern regions will be more Kazakh populated in future diluting the Russian domination.

In fact, the conflict between the Kazakhs and the Russians in northern regions arises from the incongruence of national and political boundaries. According to David Kaplan, the potential of conflict between groups in a borderland increases when the center of the government is further from the borderland region (cited in Wolfel, 2002: 497). The move of capital has also a symbolic meaning promoting the sovereignty within the Kazakhstan territory. As Wolfel put it, this move of capital to a non-Kazakh dominated northern Kazakhstan also implies and emphasize in a way that northern regions are a part of Kazakhstani state and nation while sending symbolic message of separation of colonial past of the Soviet Union (2002: 488)

Thereby, while the move has logical and civic motives, it cannot be denied that it has also ethnic purposes, as seen in most of the other policies we examined so far. For example, in the opening day of Astana on December 10 1997, Nazarbayev talked about the revival of Kazakhstan's "national consciousness" and "historical memory".

While he mentioned the Russian suppression of Kazakh culture, he finished his words by stating that 1998 would be the year of "national unity and national history". This can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the argument of the unity of the Kazakhstani people is used to appease Kazakhstan's multi-ethnic population and to maintain the inter-ethnic harmony. But the unity was expressed in an ethnocentric terminology – the Kazakh language, culture, history, memories, enemies etc. (Huttenbach, 1998: 585). In short, as Taras Kuzio noted, the main concern of the move of the capital from Almaty to Astana was to strengthen the Kazakh identity in northern part of Kazakhstan (2002: 258).

4.11 Statements of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Nation Building in Kazakhstan

As we saw up till now, the policies implemented by the Kazakh administration are generally ethnic rather than civic in nature. Ethnic policies are realized especially in most of the spheres that we have examined so far. Therefore, Kazakh administration is implementing and emphasizing the Kazakh values, either excluding or discriminating against the other populations in the country to some degree. However, in the early 1990s Nazarbayev was to adopt a conciliatory tone, with a civic content, due to large portion of non-Kazakh groups. He took attention to this fact stating that "Kazakhstan is not Uzbekistan and Almaty is certainly not Tashkent, or Baku (where titular control was established)" (cited in Dave, 2004: 3). Besides, at a large conference in Almaty in May 1993, Nazarbayev stated that the main task of the Kazakhistani state ideology would be "to combat every chauvinism, nationalism and separatism" through inculcation of Kazakhistani patriotism (cited in Kolsto, 1998: 59). Likewise, Nazarbayev cancelled the language law passed by the parliament that would make the knowledge of Kazakh language compulsory claiming that it was unconstitutional aiming to decrease the Russian fears (Glenn, 1999: 115). However, as Zardykhan noted, even if the policy of Kazakhization begun to be implemented before the independence, towards the ending years of the Soviet Union, initially, this was not stated officially in the rhetoric (2004: 72). Furthermore, in spite of the rhetoric of the Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan would continue "to be inhabited by the numerous representatives of nationalities sure of equal opportunities enjoyed by all the nations but deeming themselves to be citizens of Kazakhstan first

and the foremost"[52] (Nazarbayev, cited in Dillen, 194), demographic changes and employment policy say the reverse. Indeed, other speeches of Nazarbayev include ethnic sentiments providing important evidence for the argument of existence of ethnic nation-building in Kazakhstan. For instance, at a speech in the Grand Meeting of World Kurultai of Kazakhs in 1992[53], Nazarbayev exclaimed that:

> We are the children of the majestic mountains and the boundless steppes. Here, hundreds and hundreds of generations of Kazakhs were born, gained strength, and reached manhood. These boundless spaces are our cradle, our inheritance, our legacy. It is here that our glorious predecessors would hoist their banner of statehood, which was recognized by states near and far. Our native tongue acquired the status of a state language. The historical names of localities are returning; the good names of renowned sons of Kazakhstan have been restored, and their anniversaries are commemorated. In preserving this national distinctiveness, much has been done in the past several years. We have carefully restored everything that was lost: half-forgotten traditions, historic rights, culture, language, belief. My duty, as a person and as president is to be concerned constantly about the preservation and development of the Kazakh nation, its unique national characteristics. The fact that everyone clamors for the well-being of his nationality is entirely natural.
>
> [....] We must preserve the current interethnic peace and accord in the republic as we would the pupil in an eye. And the guarantor of interethnic accord must be, first and foremost, the Kazakh people, the legal successor of this country. Only if the Kazakh people can carry out and realize a policy of civic peace, interethnic accord, and positive mutual relations with the outside world can they become a true master: a citizen of a civilized state. 'He who has saved the Motherland will endure.' That's what our people said in ancient times. Glory to the Almighty! They saved the motherland; they defended this land. And there cannot be anything on earth more dear than one's native land (cited in Karin and Chebotarev, 2002a: 3-4).

Moreover, in his policy declaration entitled "Strategy for Kazakhstan's Political and Economic Development to 2005" in April 1992, Nazarbayev stated that "Kazakhstan was a state (that had been established) for the self-determination of the Kazakh nation" (cited in Masanov, 2002: 8). In fact, Nazarbayev had signaled that the ethnic policies would increase stating that "as Kazakhs became accustomed to their privileged status… and their awareness of Kazakh nationhood increased,

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[52] Nursultan Nazarbayev, 1997, "Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and ever growing Welfare of All Kazakhstanis," Message of the President of the Country to the People of Kazakhstan, online available at http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/145.

[53] Speech of Nazarbayev, at Grand Meeting of World Kurultai of Kazakhs, 1 October 1992, translated text of speech online available at http://www.president.kz/articles/Sover_Kaz/Sover_Kaz.asp?lng=en&art=1992.

conducting a pro-Kazakh policy became a *sine qua non* for political survival" (cited in Zardykhan, 2004: 72).

In these statements, Nazarbayev indicates his primary duty and concern as the preservation of the Kazakh nation, not Kazakhstani nation, and shows Kazakhs as the guarantor of the inter-ethnic peace in the country. In fact, Nazarbayev states in his work entitled 'A Strategy for Creating and Developing As Sovereign State' that even if the principle of equality of opportunities for all and equality before law is valid in Kazakhstan regardless of the ethnic affiliation, special provision can be made for the Kazakhs in particular situations. He also adds that this is normal since the same is done in many other countries (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002a: 4). Very similar to that, Nazarbayev stated that "It is important to safeguard and not to allow the washing away of the national features of the state. A nation cannot exist without a state, it vanishes. It is not our people's fault, but its trouble is that it has become a minority in the land of its ancestors", while adding "It is quite appropriate if in cases the interests of the indigenous nation, the Kazakhs, are given special emphasis in this state" (cited in Kulchik, 1996: 38).In addition to these, at the first session of Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan on March 24, 1995, Nazarbayev said in his speech that:

> For many centuries, the Kazakh people had to struggle for their independence and sovereignty. Owing to their better qualities; their ability to rally in moments of difficulty; and, not least, their striving to live in peace, accord, and in a neighborly way with other peoples, they have endured in the course of history and, after several decades, have succeeded in reestablishing their statehood. The Kazakh people, having endured the trials of time, possess a rich and complex history. Today they should offer assistance to all the peoples living in Kazakhstan, to understand better the roots of out unity and to eliminate historical offenses, for in looking at the past we need to see the future. It is no fault of the Kazakhs that the twentieth century became for them an age of tragic events that transformed them into a minority in their own homeland. And those who cast doubt on the right of this people to statehood either do not know or do not want to know the depth of this drama. I am certain that the Kazakh nation is worthy of statehood no less than any other nation. It suffered its history for this (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002a: 4-5).[54]

[54] The original text is in "Suverennomu Kazakhstanu — 10 let,"1995, in Russian.

Furthermore, in 1999, at a speech, Nazarbayev related the spiritual essence of Kazakhstan to the history and the spiritual essence of Kazakhs. He exactly said that:

> …It was precisely at this moment that we comprehended the simple but eternal truth that if we are united, we are invincible. It was at this moment that Ab[y]lai-khan, the people's unifier, upheld the nation against two persistent forces pressing upon the country from without. We approached a new century with a difficult legacy and yet with opportunities unavailable to any other generation in our national history. During this difficult and dramatic decade, we built what hundreds of generations had done without: an independent state. This is what serves as the main guarantor of the fact that today, the winds of history cannot wipe us from the face of the earth (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002a: 5).[55]

Yet, there are also different views on this issue. According to O'Callaghan, current circumstances indicate that an ethnic nation-building process is underway, but it may simply be a smokescreen for transference to civic nation-building, which may become more acceptable at a point in the future. President Nazarbayev has made it clear that Kazakh has a central role to play in the creation of Kazakhstani patriotism, but the Russian also has an important role to play (2005: 14). Similarly, an article in the Kazakhstani social science journal *Saiasat* in 1996 noting that it is the Russian language that creates the basis for the unity of all Kazakhstanis today, since it functions as a means of communication all over the republic and enables social interaction among all citizens in the country, across social, demographic, territorial and professional group boundaries (cited in O'Callaghan, 2005: 14). Nevertheless, President Nazarbayev has unambiguously promoted the idea that Kazakh culture ought to be an integrating factor for all the peoples of Kazakhstan indicating that;

> With respect to the integrating role of Kazakh culture, this is genuine pragmatism; it is not some kind of nationalist exercise… This is the culture of the majority of the country. This is a culture that possesses the entire array of institutional instruments. It is a culture that has been genetically formed in this particular territory and, to a great extent, has predetermined the character of historical development of Kazakhstan the state… Therefore, it is no paradox nor is there anything politically incorrect in the assertion of the integrating role

[55] The original text is online available at http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=ru, section "State," in Russian.

> of Kazakh culture. We need to say this directly and without any ambiguity (cited in Masanov, 2002: 10).

In addition to those above, in December 2000, Nazarbayev announced the results of the 1999 census as hail of Kazakhstan as a 'Turkophone state' (Dave, 2004: 4) and went further saying that "all of Kazakhstan is the historico-genetic territory of the Kazakh nation" (Masanov, 2002: 9). Therefore, in a way, he implies creating a national Kazakh state. As a result, whilst on the one hand, it cannot be denied that there are statements about inter-ethnic peace in the country, in those speeches cited above, it cannot also be denied that, the majority of the statements point that it is Nazarbayev himself who makes reservation for more ethnic policies. Furthermore, civic statements are used as necessary tools in order not to alienate non-Kazakh populations and not to spoil the delicate inter-ethnic balance in Kazakhstan. Therefore, it is clear that the Kazakh values, history, culture and concerns have precedence over other populations in the country, in contrast to equality of all citizens principle stated in the constitution. As, we also saw in the previous sections of this chapter, these ethnic policies have not only stayed in rhetoric, but also implemented and manifested in the cultural policies, language, national symbols of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, as (Kulchik, 1996: 38) put forward, it should also be kept in mind that, different versions of the texts of Nazarbayev's speeches are published in Russian and Kazakh languages. Since most Russians do not know Kazakh, and still follow the Russian media (such as ORT and NTV) and due to the control over the press, many statements of the president remained unknown to Russian-speaking population.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

After gaining its independence, as a result of the collapse of Soviet Union itself, Kazakhstan started its quest for a new national identity in 1991. It was natural that the starting point was not a *tabula rasa* onto which a new national identity could be written. Instead, historical, pre-Soviet identities that persisted in different forms during the Soviet era despite the suppressions of Moscow were the first ones that the Kazakh policy-makers used as resources for building the Kazakh nation. However, building a viable national identity that is inclusive for all the citizens living on the territory of Kazakhstan is not an easy task, because of the presence of the high proportion of non-Kazakh populations, especially Russians. The process of nation-building is critical, because of the clash of ethnic and civic elements. In this thesis, I have analyzed how the past is reconstructed in the nation-building process of Kazakhstan and the clash of ethnic and civic elements during that process.

In this context, from the theoretical perspective, the case of Kazakhstan could not be reduced to the dichotomy of nationalism theories that try to define the nation-building processes as either ethnic or civic, so this dichotomy is refused in this study based on the argument that Kazakh nation-building process contains both civic and ethnic policies. As this thesis showed, the nation-building and the national identity formation are complex processes and they can neither be purely ethnic or civic. In accordance with this fact, the approaches of Anthony Smith and of Walker Connor, as well as Willfried Spohn's arguments were adopted for the purpose of explaining the case of Kazakhstan, because the modern-day Kazakhstan case lays down the fact that even if Kazakh national identity was formalized and institutionalized during the Soviet period by the Nationalities Policy, actually the contemporary Kazakh identity is formed as a result of transformations it underwent in different historical periods. While taking use of these western approaches, it is regarded in this study that the western literature of nationalism and nation building may not be equally explanatory in non-western examples as in the case of Kazakhstan, because institutionalization of

the Kazakh identity led to an understanding of the nationalism within the ethno-national terms that the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism was reinforced. Moreover, the experiences of the Kazakhs under the Soviet rule had different circumstances from the western examples of nation buildings. Nevertheless, due to the absence of an alternative theoretical literature which is relevant with the non-western nation-building experiences and which would enable us to understand non-western societies, the western literature provided us a useful tool in the analysis of the issue from the theoretical perspective.

In accordance with the fact that contemporary nation-building in Kazakhstan is significantly affected by the policies implemented during the Soviet period under the Nationalities Policy, it was necessary to lay down these policies that were implemented by the Soviet state, in order to better understand the post-Soviet nation building in Kazakhstan. As it is explored in the third chapter of the thesis, these policies caused linguistic, cultural and demographic Russification of the territory of modern-day Kazakhstan, making the Kazakhs the only titular nation that could not form the majority in their titular republic even after their independence until 1997. For instance, due to the collectivization and sedentarization efforts which caused significant decrease in the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, and the Virgin Lands campaign, which caused significant increase in the number of Russians and other Slavic groups in the Republic, the demographic structure of Kazakhstan changed at the disadvantage of Kazakhs. All these are among the reasons which contributed to the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policies and attitudes of the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In other words, as the fourth chapter highlighted, it is this demographic structure that affects the policy choices of the policymakers in contemporary Kazakhstan (i.e. dual citizenship issue, north-south difference of ethnic structure). Furthermore, the linguistic and cultural Russification led to the re-assertion of Kazakh language and components of Kazakh culture via a number of policies implemented today. Therefore, the linguistic, cultural and demographic Russification of Kazakhstan under the Soviet rule led to both the reassertion of ethnic policies (i.e. ethnic symbols, employment policy favoring the Kazakhs, cultural policies usually related with Kazakh culture and traditions) and the implementation of civic policies (i.e. granting official status to Russian language, national holidays) in the post-Soviet

Kazakhstan. In return, this situation affects all the decisions and the policy choices in the nation-building process of Kazakhstan.

In similar vein, Kazakh policymakers have also been trying to shift the loyalties of the Kazakhs from sub-national/tribal identities towards a collective, Kazakh identity, while pre-existing traditions and cultural resources of the Kazakhs have been selected when implementing the policies for building a viable Kazakh identity (i.e. state symbols, cultural policies, and celebrations). Indeed, this is one of the excuses used by the nation-builders in Kazakhstan for the implementation of ethnic policies concerning the Kazakh values that the ethnic policies are necessary for the formation of unitary Kazakh identity as the sub-national/tribal identities, which could not have been eradicated by the Soviet policies, obstruct the nation-building process. In fact, the main reason of the Soviet state's failure in eradicating these identities was the Soviet policies' reinforcement of the relationship between the nationalism and ethnicity. In return, this led to the emergence of a nationalism understood within ethno-national terms and to the institutionalization of these identities.

Within post-Soviet circumstances along with such an ethnic structure, it has been advocated and explored in this thesis that Kazakh nation-building has both ethnic and civic components. It is ethnic because of the efforts and the policies of policy-makers with the aim of reviving and rectifying the Kazakh identity and culture. To illustrate, the preamble of the 1995 Constitution, territory of Kazakhstan is defined as the 'primordial homeland of Kazakhs'. Despite the Russian language is used more widespread than Kazakh, and the high proportion of the non-Kazakh, Russian-speaking population, only the Kazakh language has been given the status of the state language. Moreover, the proportion of the ethnic Kazakhs in the parliament is higher than their proportion in the population. In education, the number of Kazakh language schools has been rising, while the number of Russian schools has been decreasing since 1991, despite the difficulties of education in Kazakh language due to technical reasons, such as the lack of Kazakh textbooks, sufficient number of instructors competent to teach technical subjects in Kazakh language and lack of Kazakh vocabulary necessary to change the instruction language from Russian to Kazakh. An important reason of this increase in Kazakh schools is related with the employment policy of the state, because the requirement of knowledge of Kazakh language has become a tool for political exclusion of Russian speaking populations,

and Kazakh students are systematically favored over the non-Kazakh ones via language laws. In fact, the proportion of Kazakhs in administrative positions is higher than their proportion in the population. For instance, even in the northern oblasts, where is populated densely by Russians and Russian-speaking people, regional administrations have been filled by the ethnic Kazakhs while the same situation is prevalent in the public positions, such as state run media, hospitals, and academic positions.

In order to determine the type of nation-building in cultural policies of the state in Kazakhstan, the "Cultural Heritage" State Program of Kazakhstan for 2004-2006, which is a primary source reflecting the plans and aims of the state, was also analyzed. According to this program, the historical, archeological, and architectural objects indicated as having high importance for the national history of Kazakhstan are all related with Kazakh culture. This is important because, archeology plays a necessary role in nationalism such that it is usually manipulated for the nation-building purposes, and in Kazakhstan, as apparent in the state program, archeological works are used in order to prove that the territory of Kazakhstan has been the land of the Kazakhs in history. Giving importance to the works in philosophy, law, history for the Kazakh-speaking population in order to create historical, artistic, scientific series in Kazakh language, emphasis on studying about the heritage of important thinkers and scientists of the past, who are related with the cultural heritage of the Kazakh people, such as Al-Farabi, Kashagari, and Babur, planning to publish fundamental literary aims of the state, which are specific to Kazakh people and culture, all reflect that the cultural policies of the state are concerning Kazakh values, culture and traditions primarily, and thus they can be denoted as exclusive and ethnic policies. Besides, these policies aim to promote the conception of Kazakhstan territory as the ethnic homeland of Kazakh people.

Another issue examined in this thesis was the national/state symbols of Kazakhstan, as national symbols have special importance in assuring the continuity of history and identity by making the nationalism more tangible. In addition, state symbols reflect how the national values and identities are re-constructed, so they give clues about the nation-building processes. Even if some of the figures on these symbols (especially on the flag) and some of the features of them (the national anthem) are universal, they are perceived by non-Kazakh (and especially non-Turkic)

people as specific to Kazakh and Turkic[56] culture and traditions. Therefore, this research demonstrated that the elements of the state symbols are in general, related with the Kazakh culture, traditions, and myths, so they are perceived as non-inclusive and ethnic, especially by non-Kazakh non-Turkic (Russians and Russian speaking groups) populations.

Additionally, celebrations and national holidays were analyzed in this thesis as part of the nation building process in Kazakhstan. It is revealed that when the national holidays are considered, they are generally inclusive and civic, some of which remained from the Soviet period (i.e. Victory Day, International Women Day) and some of which are the creation of the post-Soviet era (i.e. Victory Day, Day of Capital, Constitution Day, Republic Day), while *Nauruz* is an exclusive holiday for the non-Turkic groups, which is specific to the Kazakhs and other Turkic groups that remained from pre-Soviet era. In contrast to the national holidays, celebrations are generally non-inclusive and related with the Kazakh people, even if there are few celebrations related with non-Kazakhs. Therefore, when the policy of Kazakhstan on national holidays and celebrations in nation building process are evaluated as a whole, they are both ethnic and civic.

Furthermore, according to the official discourse, the reasons of the move of capital from Almaty to Astana all seem to be logical ones without any ethnic implications. However, as this study indicated, the underlying reason was to dilute and weaken the Russian domination in the northern regions and to increase the domination of the Kazakhs in northern regions, through motivating the ethnic Kazakhs to move to Astana and surrounding regions. Accordingly, the policy can be said to have ethnic purposes.

Lastly, Nazarbayev's statements, which are related with the nation-building process, are examined. These statements are important, because as the president of the country with strong presidential powers, Nazarbayev is the chief decision maker in the elaboration of the nation-building process. His statements usually reflect ethnic expressions, In fact, as Nazarbayev openly admitted in some of his statements, which were mentioned in chapter four, that a pro-Kazakh policy is the basic requirement for the political survival of Kazakhstan, he sees it appropriate to give the Kazakhs

[56] For example, sky-blue in the flag has significance for all Turkic groups in Central Asia, not only for Kazakhs.

special importance. As this study shed light on, Nazarbayev seems to support more the ethnic nation-building in Kazakhstan. Even if he sometimes utilizes and implements inclusive policies as necessary tools not to break the ethnic balance and alienate the non-Kazakh parts of the population further, these are viewed as a disguise for covering the ethnic purposes of the state.

In the nation building process of Kazakhstan, there are also non-discriminatory and inclusive elements and policies, of the nation building process in Kazakhstan. Besides those already mentioned above, one of the primary civic elements of the nation building process is the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan, which draws the framework of the state, outlines the fundamental rights and duties of the citizens and institutions of the country, even if there are few exceptions such as the definition of the Kazakhstan territory as the primordial homeland of Kazakhs, and giving the state language status only to the Kazakh language. However, this does not prevent us to define the Constitution as inclusive in general, when the Constitution is evaluated as a whole. For example, the preamble also institutes the notion of 'Kazakhstani people'. As this thesis laid down, according to the Constitution; the use of power depends on law whereby the use of arbitrary power is forbidden and the Constitution is denoted as the highest juridical force in the state. Every citizen of the state is equal and have equal rights, including the educational ones and the right to employment, without subjected to any discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, sex, race etc. while every citizen has the same educational and employment rights and cannot be discriminated against based on any criteria. Elections on equal and universal basis, non-discriminatory requirements for the right to become the president of the country, elevation of the Russian language to the official status and denoting it as equal with the state language on governmental bodies and official institutions all reflect that the Constitution of Kazakhstan is based on universal principles with non-discriminatory and civic principles in general.

Concerning the policies on religion as part of the nation building process, it is one of the important issues that the Kazakh state follows non-discriminatory civic principles in that process. It is true that Islam has been supported by the policy-makers, but this is due to view of Islam as an important component of Kazakh identity. On the other hand, as this thesis put forward, the government is tolerant to all religions and is interfering minimally in the religious issues as long as they

remain in the cultural sphere and not violate the laws. As also indicated by the International Crisis Group's report in 2003, there is no discriminatory religion policy recently reported in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan has given no special role to religion, thereby, it has remained secular. Therefore, except that Islam has been promoted as an identity marker of the Kazakh identity and Kazakh culture, the religion policy of the government is consistent with the inclusive and non-discriminatory principles of the Constitution.

When the results of the nation-building policy are evaluated as a whole, it is apparent that the nation-building in Kazakhstan is both ethnic and civic, whereas it is more civic than ethnic in rhetoric and more ethnic than civic in practice. In other words, the nation-building process in Kazakhstan is more civic than ethnic in 'form', and it is more ethnic than civic in 'content'. However, when it is considered that the important thing that determines the nature of a nation building is the policies implemented, in other words, what is being done in practice; it would not be wrong to state that while the Kazakh nation building has both civic and ethnic elements, the actual process is more ethnic than civic. Additionally, it should be noted that due to the initial laws and policies, such as granting dual citizenship to the Kazakhs while denying it for the Russians, the definition of the territory of Kazakhstan as less emphatic 'ancient homeland' of the Kazakhs, and the proposal that the president of the country is to be elected from the ethnic Kazakhs only, the nation-building process was more ethnic in the first years of the independence than it is today. However, these laws and policies were either rejected immediately (proposal for Kazakh president), or eliminated (dual citizenship) and corrected (replacement of 'ancient' definition of the homeland with the less emphatic 'indigenous') in the following years of 1990s due to the discontent and pressures of the non-Kazakh groups (mainly Russians). Actually, this change of policy was essential for preserving harmonious ethnic relations in the country. Nevertheless, this will not change the general tendency of Kazakhization of the political, social cultural and economic structures of Kazakhstan, which is becoming more apparent with the policies of the government increasing the dominance of Kazakh portion of these policies especially at the expense of Russians and Russian speaking populations. As Karin and Chebotarev pointed out, this Kazakhization policy is denied and not recognized on the official level (2002a: 1), however, this thesis demonstrated, in various forms of policies,

ethnic based policies have been implemented in the country since independence, proving this tendency of the Kazakhization, while on the rhetoric and in some policy implementations, the government has been following civic principles, to a lesser degree.

Furthermore, in the case of Kazakhstan while all people (Kazakhstanis) belong to the territory of Kazakhstan, the land (Kazakhstan territory) belongs only to the Kazakhs in contrast to the civic nationalisms and nation buildings in which people and territory belong to each other. Thus, as in ethnic nationalism, there is an emphasis on indigenous homeland, Kazakh history and culture in nation-building in Kazakhstan, whereby rediscovering the roots and ethnic past have become important for the restoration of the Kazakh land and nation in this process.

In conclusion, as this study demonstrated, the Kazakh government is not promoting the civic, inclusive conception of 'Kazakhstani' identity in practice as much as it states in rhetoric, while it promotes the ethnic, 'Kazakh' identity more in its nation building efforts. To put it differently, if we consider ethnic and civic nation buildings as the ends of a scale, the findings in this thesis indicate that nation-building process is closer to the ethnic end of this scale. Actually, whereas the factors explained in this thesis (i.e. the presence of the high proportion of non-Kazakhs and Russified ethnic Kazakhs) force the nation-builders to adopt more civic policies (i.e. elevation of the Russian to the official status, cancellation of the language law making the knowledge of the Kazakh language mandatory, prevalence of the Russian in especially higher education) in the short-run, nation builders will push for more ethnic policies (i.e. further emphasis on the Kazakh language, culture and values) in the long-run. Therefore, even if the nation-building process in Kazakhstan has civic components in the short-run, the process seems to be more ethnic in the long-run.

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